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Poland Reawakens to Its History
As Communism's Mirror Shatters

By HENRY KAMM
The New York Times

WARSAW — Digging through Polish Communist Party archives for a study of farm collectivization, Dariusz Jarosz, a 35-year-old scholar, realized that he had struck historical gold: a cache of reports by secret-police informers on the mood of ordinary country folk.

"There was no social history allowed in the Communist years," Mr. Jarosz said. "It would have showed that people always rejected Communism." And that, to his delight, is precisely what the records revealed.

With such a trove, Mr. Jarosz temporarily put aside his study of collectivization in favor of a Distorting Mirror." That he and other scholars can even conceive of such a project — let alone undertake one — would have been unimaginable before Communism began to crumble five years ago.

Jarosz said — to land lightly on the eyes and ears of the spies' superiors. Thus was the fiction of a happy Communist society maintained.

The Lies
Enforced Alliance With Soviet Union

As the Poles and others formerly under Soviet domination begin to reclaim their heritage, they also find unexpected dividends. Mr. Jarosz's book, for instance, has led to collaboration with colleagues in other countries. He expects to attend a conference in Montreal this year. At the suggestion of a Japanese professor, he is preparing a paper for the session with an American historian.

Formerly, such foreign ventures were possible only for historians of the distant past. Prof. Karol Modzelewski of Warsaw University, a leading dissident since the 1969's, often imprisoned, said he had become a medievalist because bygone eras gave more scope for free inquiry. "No history was free, but in contemporary history there was direct party interference," he said. "Either pure and simple lies or pure and simple silence."

The fate of national history in countries incorporated into others in the Communist era was even harsher than in those that retained their sovereignty, however limited. In Poland or Hungary, history was falsified to justify Soviet dominance. In countries like Estonia or Moldova, it was swept aside and replaced by the Russian-centered history of the Soviet Union.

With less severity, their own history was denied also to smaller members of the Warsaw Pact. Historians in Slovenia, which never enjoyed independence, are working now to detach national history from that of its former rulers, the Hapsburg Empire as well as Yugoslavia.

"In our schools, the only textbooks were translations from the Russian," said Prof. Helmut Piirtlae, a historian at Tartu University, the only one in Estonia, which has fewer than two million inhabitants. "The republics were forbidden to write their own histories. The same texts were used in Tajikistan and Estonia. The translators had to repeat the Russian originals, including their errors. Russia's heroes were the heroes for our children. Other peoples' had no history."

For hundreds of years Poland was denied unity and swallowed up first by Prussia, Russia and Austria and later by Germany and the Soviet Union. So the right to a national history is a perennial subject of Polish anxiety. In the last half-century, Poland's history — as taught in schools and universities and spread by all the media of the Communist propaganda and entertainment machine — was founded on assertions that hardly a Pole believed.

Still, they proclaimed them in classrooms and lecture halls and spread them across the land from publishing houses, newspaper offices and film and television studios. Their audiences, when officially required to say so, professed to believe them.

The false history derived from a basic contention that Poles loved the Soviet Union. Communism. These lies were imposed throughout the Soviet camp, but nowhere did they clash more flagrantly with the truth than in this historically anti-Russian and devotedly Roman Catholic country, the largest and most important of Moscow's partners.

The enforced friendship imposed silence or lies about Soviet-inflicted wounds so big that they made contemporary history as told in the Communist decades a misshapen creature.

Melania Sobanska-Bondaruk, an Education Ministry official who is helping to shape a new curriculum, listed some of these sins against history:

Silence was imposed on the fact that the Soviet Union, under a secret annex to the Hitler-Stalin friendship agreement, joined Germany in invading and carving up Poland in 1939.

Nothing could be said about Moscow's annexation of large swaths of eastern and northern Poland and the expulsion of much of their populations.

A massacre in which Soviet troops slaughtered thousands of Polish officers and intellectuals in the Katyn forest in the presence of Belarus was said to have been perpetrated by the Nazi army. (In the period of Mikhail S. Gorbachev's glasnost, the Soviet Government yielded to Polish demands for truth and assumed responsibility.)

The Polish wartime exile government in London and its underground army were demonized and the Moscow-imposed regime represented as the free choice of the people.

The Polish uprising against the Nazis in 1944, with its great loss of lives, was depicted as an attempt by the London "bourgeois" government to seize power at the expense of the Communists. Nothing could be said about the fact that the Soviet Army acted by and let the Germans slaughter the insurgents and lay waste to the capital.

Reclaiming the Past
A special report.

distortions of the Soviet-era mirror.

They hungrily dig into archives of the party that from 1944 until 1989 interfered in Polish lives at all levels. They scan documents that tell so much and for that reason were never meant for the eyes of the public now belong to the Government and are open — not only in Warsaw, but also in towns and villages all over the country.

Explaining the "distorting mirror" of his book title, Mr. Jarosz said candid informers at the bottom level of the spied-on society had been "amateurs." They had full-time jobs as clerks or technicians on collective farms and under pressure or to gain advantage.

But by the time these initial documents were imposed, their own histories. The same texts were used in Tajikistan and Estonia. The translators had to repeat the Russian originals, including their errors. Russia's heroes were the heroes for our children. Other peoples' had no history.

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burbs’ Public Schools Seek Paying Pupils

By RAYMOND HERNANDEZ

 Unlike many other middle-income parents living in New York City, Cynthia Stinziano decided to send her child to public school. But the school she chose is not in her Bronx neighborhood or anywhere else in the city.

 Instead, Mrs. Stinziano pays about $4,300 a year so that her 9-year-old daughter, Nicole, can attend a public elementary school about 15 miles north, in the affluent Westchester town of Yonkers.

 “I just don’t think the schools in New York are as good as safe as those in Westchester,” said Mrs. Stinziano, who lives in the middle-class neighborhood of Pelham Gardens in the northeast Bronx.

 “It’s such a relief to know that’s safe in school and learning what she is supposed to,” Mrs. Stinziano said.

 Parents like Mrs. Stinziano are increasingly being sought out by suburban public school systems that have decided to take in children from outside their district in an effort to raise money.

 Such tuition programs have been in place in some suburban districts in the New York metropolitan region and across the country for years. But school administrators say the programs have become increasingly important as state and Federal aid to local schools declines and budgets get tighter.

 In Westchester County alone, at least nine public school districts have programs charging tuition to nonresident students, including prestigious ones like Bronxville, Edgemont and Mamaroneck. “The money has become vital,” said Ronald Valenti, the Superintendent of the Harrison Central School District, where 29 nonresident students are enrolled for a total of $200,000 in tuition this school year. “Every dollar counts when you’re trying to keep a lid on spending.”

 While the total numbers of students involved is not great — in the nine Westchester districts there are just a few hundred tuition-paying students — the practice has been spreading around the country, with suburban school districts capitalizing on empty desks in their classroom. In Haddonfield, N.J., a suburb of Philadelphia, the public school district is so aggressive about marketing its tuition program that it runs advertisements in local newspapers touting itself as a “quality alternative to private schools.”

 “It happens everywhere in the country where you have urban school districts surrounded by wealthier suburban school districts,” said Jay Butler, a spokesman for the National School Boards Association in Alexandria, Va. “In order for this to happen — that is, for a suburban school district to charge tuition to nonresident students — the district has to have underenrolled schools.”

 The practice of accepting nonresident students for a fee has been profitable because administrators do not hire extra staff members to accommodate the students. Instead, they take students only when there is room for them.

 “We’re actually selling empty seats,” said Barry Ersek, the Superintendent of Schools in Haddonfield, which has 107 tuition-paying students. “We’re not hiring new teachers or building new schools. So our overhead does not grow.”

 Parents, who often hear about the programs through word of mouth, have been willing to pay to send their children to suburban schools for a simple reason: they often feel their own neighborhood schools are inadequate. In many cases, middle-class urban dwellers have sought out suburban schools as though they were private academies.

 Indeed, public school administrators often set tuitions, which range from about $4,500 to more than $11,000 a year, to be competitive with the rates of private schools. Annual tuition at private schools ranges from $1,500 for some parochial schools to $30,000 for private boarding schools.

 The money collected from tuition payments, which are typically set below the per-pupil costs to be competitive with private schools, have become an increasingly valuable source of budgets, particularly for smaller districts.

 “It’s a very important source of revenue these days,” said John Chambers, the Superintendent of the Bronxville School District, which expects to collect about $300,000 in tuition payments for 6 students this year. By contrast, the school district expects to receive about $650,000 in state aid.

 But not everyone has embraced the tuition strategy. Some critics wonder whether the programs involved are fostering elitism and depriving poorer districts of the money they need to make ends meet.

 “It doesn’t help the poorer districts very much,” said Chris Phipps, a spokesman for the Education Commission for the States in Denver. “It probably makes the poor districts even poorer.”

 In addition, a number of communities have expressed misgivings about allowing outsiders in their neighborhood schools. Some people in the Westchester community of Scarsdale have argued against such a policy because, unlike their suburban counterparts, nonresident students do not bear the burden of local school taxes year after year.

 “I think there’s a feeling that it’s unfair, that those who only pay tuition don’t have the same commitment to the community,” said Richard D. Hinschman, the Superintendent of the Scarsdale district, which has not adopted such a program.

 Last year in the neighboring school district of Edgemont, a group of residents opposed a proposal to admit tuition-paying students on similar grounds. But the plan was eventually adopted after administrators argued that the money was needed to make ends meet.

 So far, nine students have enrolled in Edgemont, with tuition ranging between $7,000 and $8,400 a year, depending on their grade level. “It’s an alternative revenue source that isn’t going to take the place of other revenue sources,” acknowledged Nancy L. Tweddlen, the Edgemont Superintendent of Schools.

 “But it’s money that will help us offer classes from other sources like state aid.”

 There are districts that have had such programs and then limited or suspended them because they ran out of space within their schools. “It was a nice policy to have because it did generate income,” said Robert Pellicone, the Superintendent at the Eastchester School District, which suspended its program last fall after more than five years.

 To assure high standards, many school districts have adopted an admissions process — including exams, interviews and other references — to screen applicants. “This is not an open-door policy,” said Richard Maurer, the Superintendent of the Tuckahoe public schools.

 In fact, for years many suburban districts have used private detectives, security guards and other measures to weed out children from poorer areas who sneaked across town to public schools in their home communities. Consider the case of Barbara Palais, who lives in Yonkers with her family. She does not want to send her 6-year-old daughter, Erica, to the public schools in her blue-collar city.

 “The Yonkers school system is not what I want for my family,” Mrs. Palais explained.

 So she considered a number of private schools whose yearly tuition ranged from $8,000 to $10,000 per student. But Mrs. Palais decided against the private schools because she found the atmosphere too sheltered and the curriculum too intense.

 Eventually, Mrs. Palais settled on an elementary school in the Harrison School District. The tuition is cheaper than for private schools she looked at, she said, and the education is just as good. “It’s private school quality with a 50 percent discount,” said Mrs. Palais, a professor of taxation and accounting at Fordham University.

 At least nine Westchester districts have nonresident students.

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**COMPARE AND CONTRAST**

**Paying for a Public School Education**

In Westchester County, nine districts are raising money by charging tuition for nonresident students. Below is a selection of those public schools, compared to some private schools in the area.

**WESTCHESTER PUBLIC SCHOOLS**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Tuition Range</th>
<th>nearby Private School</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harrison</td>
<td>$4,500-$6,000</td>
<td>$8,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bronxville</td>
<td>$7,800</td>
<td>$10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edgemont</td>
<td>$7,000-$8,400</td>
<td>$9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mamaroneck</td>
<td>$8,300-$9,500</td>
<td>$10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dobbs Ferry</td>
<td>$7,112-$11,628</td>
<td>$12,000</td>
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**PRIVATE DAY SCHOOLS**

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<tr>
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<td>$5,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Hebrew High School, Mamaroneck</td>
<td>$6,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archbishop Stepinac High School, White Plains</td>
<td>$5,250</td>
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<tr>
<td>Melrose School, Brewster</td>
<td>$4,725</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dalton, New York City</td>
<td>$13,000</td>
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**BOARDING SCHOOLS**

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<th>School</th>
<th>Tuition</th>
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<tr>
<td>Harvey School, Katnich</td>
<td>$17,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phillips Academy, Andover, Mass.</td>
<td>$19,975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chateau Rosemary Hall, Wallington, Conn.</td>
<td>$13,775</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1990 Handbook of Private Schools

**OPEN HOUSE For Tuition Students**

**HADDONFIELD MEMORIAL HIGH SCHOOL**

**ADDRESS: 100 CHATHAM AVE., HADDONFIELD, N.J. 08033**

**OPEN HOUSE: TUESDAY, JANUARY 26, 1993 2:00 PM - 5:00 PM**

**HARDCOVER BOOKS**

**10% OFF**

**FREE OPEN HOUSE FOR TUITION STUDENTS**

**HADDONFIELD MEMORIAL HIGH SCHOOL**

**ADDRESS: 100 CHATHAM AVE., HADDONFIELD, N.J. 08033**

**OPEN HOUSE: TUESDAY, JANUARY 26, 1993 2:00 PM - 5:00 PM**

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**FREE OPEN HOUSE FOR TUITION STUDENTS**

**THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, JANUARY 26, 1995**
“How many years of falsification, we passed through!” said Mrs. Sobanska-Bondaruk, a former history teacher.

Accepted standards of scholarship have returned, now that historians no longer serve as propagandists churning out what Michal Kaczmarek, a Wroclaw University historian, called books to confirm official theses, building blocks for a so-called ideological front."

Prof. Andrzej Paczkowski, research director of the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences, emphasized the return to high academic standards. "There is not much published yet," he said. "It takes three or four years to do something serious."

Professor Paczkowski is working on a history of the Public Security Ministry, the command post of the sinister secret police in the seven years of Communist rule.

Prof. Krystyna Kersten of Warsaw University spoke enthusiastically of her students. "I'm very, very happy about the doctoral theses," she said. "They're really, really honest in methodology, use of sources and objectivity. One can say that the history of postwar Poland began just now, like a freshly plowed field."

Professor Modzelewski has just moved to the capital from a city in which lies and silence peaked in the Communist years. He transferred from the University of Wroclaw, in what until 1945 was Breslau, Germany's fourth-largest city.

A Fable

Denying One City Its German Past

While passing over the lost territories in the east in silence, the Communist authorities resorted in Wroclaw to silence about the six centuries until 1945 in which the city had been German in culture and politically part of the Hapsburg Empire, Prussia or Germany. They invented an endlessly reiterated legend that the city had always been Polish.

This historical concoction was spread also by Poland's other center of power, the Roman Catholic Church. Preaching in one of Wroclaw's churches in the 1960's, the late, vehemently anti-Communist Cardinal Wyszynski declared that "in this city even the stones speak Polish."

A firm line has been drawn under the Wroclaw fable, which reflected much uncertainty about the permanence of Poland's possession. In a city where not long ago the mere use of its German name was considered akin to seeking to undo Poland's boundaries, its people now take pleasure in recalling that it had a past, even if under another flag and name.

"At the beginning of the century, Wroclaw belonged to the German-Prussian Empire," a girl in a history class for 15-year-olds rose to say. "It was Polish war booty," a boy added realistically. "Poland paid for it with lands in the east." Another explained, "It was a decision made at Yalta."

"The discussion would not have been so open five years ago and impossible 10 years ago," said Izabela Kozej, school principal and history teacher.

At the Historical Museum, installed in the German Gothic town hall, Ewa Woloszy, deputy director, said: "We have turned 180 degrees. There is no more schizophrenia. We can research and present the true history of Wroclaw. It was schizophrenia because every one knew the truth in the past, too."

Maciej Lagiewski, the director, said people of the city were proud that Lower Silesia, of which Wroclaw is the capital, had produced 10 Nobel Prize winners, although all dated from the German past. "Seven of them were Jews," he added. "In the new consciousness of the young, they take pride in that."

Nonetheless, many Polish historians agree that the sensitive subject of Poland's relations with what was once the world's largest Jewish population has not yet received the attention it merits. Although for nearly three decades the Wroclaw authorities have heard requests to place a memorial plaque on a building that occupies the site of a large synagogue burned to the ground by the Germans in 1938, memory has not been served.

The Teachers

Most 'Shouldn't Be In This Profession'

"If we are historians of Poland, we shouldn't forget 1,000 years of mutual relations," said Dariusz Libienko, a Ph.D. candidate studying the area. "Semitic teaching and writings of many Roman Catholic clerics in the 1930's.

Prof. Jerry Holzer, a Warsaw University specialist on relations with Germans and Jews, says that in a revolution to a more nationalist view, Polish history is now seen as before World War II, as that of the Polish nation, not of all people living on Polish soil.

Prof. Daniel Grinberg, director of the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw, said, "There are no bad intentions, but there is not enough understanding of 'otherness.'" "Professor Holzer said much blame for the deficiencies in teaching stemmed from many teachers' state of knowledge. He said teachers received little. Their pay is so low, he said, that most work at second jobs rather than enrich their knowledge. The root of the problem lies deeper," says Grazyna Tomaszewska, head of Wroclaw's schools. "The greatest obstacle is teachers," she said. "For many years there was a negative selection in education. We have a small vanguard of teachers by vocation and a much bigger majority who shouldn't be in this profession at all."

Mrs. Tomaszewska said that even in the Communist days there had been history teachers who because of their devotion to their calling told the truth.

"The ethos of the profession drove out fear, or you are not a good teacher," she said. "Even today there are teachers who are propaganda microphones."

High interest in the history of the recent past led immediately after the fall of Communism to a flow of books that filled in the pages of history that had been left blank or devoted to propaganda. That appetite seems satisfied now, and Polish historians and other intellectuals say that the struggle to make a living or take advantage of new economic opportunities has crowded out most other interests.

Historians are regretful. "The right to history has finally been recognized — and it leaves the young more or less indifferent," said Prof. Bronislaw Geremek, another medievalist and prominent dissident.

But others said they had long wished for days of less historic moment.

"We've had too much history for too long," said Karol Szyndzielorz, editor in chief of Nova Europa, a new financial daily. "You might say now is the decline of history."
After Delivering His Hard-Hitter, Clinton Goes on Defense

By DOUGLAS JEHL
Special to The New York Times

KUTZTOWN, Pa., Jan. 25 — The day after he outlined his new vision of government, President Clinton found himself back on the defensive. His aides were soft-pedaling an important element of Mr. Clinton's speech to Congress on Tuesday and struggling to explain how it became an 81-minute marathon.

Even as the President's motorcade carried him past flying flags and welcoming signs along the Main Street of this Pennsylvania Dutch town, White House aides faced queries today ranging from whether the President would actually seek an increase in the minimum wage — which he advocated in the speech — to whether he would extend to his own legal defense fund the ban on lobbyists' gifts that he asked Congress to adopt voluntarily for itself.

By the end of the day, the White House had made clear that while Mr. Clinton favored raising the minimum wage by 75 cents, to $5 an hour, the certainty of Republican opposition meant that he would not send a specific proposal to Congress until he did more to test the waters there.

And after a sharp goose-and-gander challenge from Senator Bob Dole of Kansas, the trustees of Mr. Clinton's "legal expense trust" said they had "agreed to the request of the President and First Lady" that future contributions from registered lobbyists' gifts that he asked Congress to adopt voluntarily for itself.

The fund, which is to release its first six months of contributions next week, already refuses contributions from corporations, political action committees, labor unions, trade associations and partnerships and limits individual contributions to $1,000.

In traveling to Kutztown, midway between Reading and Allentown and home to a small state college, Mr. Clinton sought to emphasize the high priority that what he calls his "Middle Class Bill of Rights" would deserve.

"We are trying to change the focus of the national Government to the grassroots of America," he said in his address to about 6,000 students and other residents who filled the college's field house. He told the crowd that he believed education would be so important to Americans in the next century that it was wisest to restrict the broadest benefits of his proposed middle-class tax cut to those paying for post-high school education.

Two Military Chiefs Tell of Need for Money

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 25 — The nation's top military officials today said that the nation's combat readiness would drastically suffer if Congress failed to approve $2.6 billion in additional Pentagon spending by March 31.

Defense Secretary William J. Perry and Gen. John M. Shalikashvili, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the House National Security Appropriations Subcommittee that the Pentagon needed the additional money to pay for unplanned operations in Haiti, Bosnia, Cuba and the Persian Gulf.

The Pentagon's $264 billion annual budget covers training, equipment and troop salaries, but it does not pay for wars, peacekeeping or humanitarian missions.
Poland’s Economic Reforms

Introduction

When Poland’s Solidarity formed the first postcommunist government in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) five years ago this summer, the Polish people shared a vision of building a democratic country with a market economy. At that time, few Poles believed that vision would be quickly realized, because it would require overcoming the weighty inheritance of the communist economic system.

- Although central planning had been abandoned, Poland’s economy was overly industrialized and relied on extensive command trade links with the communist economies.
- With the collapse of the communism, financial pressures mounted in 1989 and by August hyperinflation broke out: prices rose 40 percent in August and 50 percent in September.
- In the summer and fall, a foreign exchange crisis developed and the zloty lost 75 percent of its value.
- Poland’s $43 billion debt to western creditors (about 260 percent of exports) ranked Poland’s among the worst debt crises in the world.

Very few people, in Poland or in the West, expected the new democratic government to be able to cope with these crises.

- Poles worried about having food and coal to get through the winter and requested humanitarian assistance from the West.
- A common refrain was that Poles had been conditioned by communism to prefer rationing by queue rather than price, and would not welcome markets or entrepreneurship.

Poland’s progress

Since 1989, Poland has surprised itself and the rest of the world.

- Growth will be 4 to 5 percent for the second year in a row.
- Inflation has averaged 2 percent per month so far this year.
- Unemployment rose to 16 percent. Since, growth resumed in 1993, however, private sector job creation has outpaced state sector job loss. For two months, unemployment has fallen.
- Now, about 60 percent of the economy is in private hands (up from about 20 percent when only agriculture was private).
- Exports to the West have virtually doubled since 1989, from $7 1/2 billion to about $14 billion.
Some years ago, a popular joke was that a Parisian on a train bound for Moscow and a Muscovite on a train bound for Paris each make a stop in Warsaw and each believes he has reached his destination. Now, Warsaw looks more like the West every day. It also offers Muscovites a preview of coming attractions in its transition.

Poland is returning to Europe, to Central Europe. After all, Warsaw is to the west of Helsinki, Prague is to the west of Vienna, and Budapest is to the west of Athens. We should reserve the term Eastern Europe for Minsk and Kiev.

Three lessons of Poland’s economic transformation

First, bold reform followed up with perseverance is the only sure route to prosperity.

As they said in Poland, you can’t cross a chasm in two leaps. Escaping the wreckage of the communist economic system required a bold and decisive leap. Poland’s reforms began with a near complete liberalization of prices (including a five-fold rise in energy prices), the removal of all international trade restrictions, the establishment of convertibility of the zloty, a balancing of the budget, and a tight credit policy that forced enterprises to fend for themselves.

Poland persevered through a valley of tears. The Poles have seen falling living standards (due to the collapse of the communist system), the collapse of the Soviet trading bloc, periodic reform setbacks, interrupted IMF agreements, and five prime ministers. Yet, Polish perseverance has led to the successful creation of a normal, growing market economy.

Many in the region have come to equate reform and economic decline. The case of Poland shows that is false. Poland, where the starting point was among the worst and reforms were arguably the most radical, the decline in output over the period 1989-92 was about 35 percent, among the smallest in the region (compared with 43 percent in Bulgaria, 51 percent in Romania, more in Ukraine), and since 1992 Poland has been growing.

Second, timely western support helps cement success.

When Poland launched its reforms, a $700 million IMF loan and a $1 billion currency stabilization fund were activated simultaneously. That support helped carry Poland through the early days of reform when skepticism ran high. By mid-1990, the inflation rate was under control and the exchange rate had been kept fixed.

Shortly after the reforms began, Poland’s official debt was rescheduled; later, 50 percent debt reduction was negotiated. Relief on debt provided crucial relief on the budget, just as the collapse of state enterprise profitability decimated the tax base.
In the course of 1990, the United States opened the first of its East European enterprise funds. That fund has helped show that private sector development was possible in Poland.

Over the past four years, the IMF has continued to support Poland's stabilization efforts, and the World Bank and EBRD have financed structural adjustment efforts.

Third, Poland's transformation path offers a roadmap of the milestones that economies in transition must pass.

Liberalization: Poland created markets by freeing-up prices, letting private individuals engage in all kinds of domestic and foreign economic activity, and getting the government out of the business of business.

Stabilization: Poland greatly reduced its huge budget deficit and cut credit growth to stop the runaway inflation and restore a stable basis for domestic commerce and international trade.

Privatization and structural reform: Poland moved quickly to allow private businesses to operate and to privatize small state enterprises. Now, over 90 percent of Poland's small businesses are in private hands, and the commerce and trade sectors are booming. The privatization of large enterprises is proceeding more slowly. The Mass Privatization Program, where workers, managers, and citizens will receive shares in 460 large state enterprises, is expected to take effect next year.

Institutional adaptation: Poland is modernizing its legal, fiscal, and financial institutions, jettisoning much of what was leftover from the old system and inappropriate for a market economy. Institutional adaptation includes the ongoing privatization and restructuring of the state commercial banks, the creation of a stock market, and the reform of the tax system. Other remaining steps include revamping of social insurance programs (such as unemployment compensation), improving bankruptcy procedures, strengthening the court system, and developing the financial infrastructure for housing, pensions, and financial services.

The challenges ahead

1. Poland's top priority is to preserve its stabilization. The confidence of domestic business and foreign investors, which underpin Poland's economic prospects, rests on the continued commitment to stability. There is little room for complacency.

2. The time has come for Poland to finish the job of privatizing large state enterprises. The Mass Privatization Program has been three years in the design phase. Political commitment wavers from time to time. Improved efficiency and the recapitalization of the industrial sector (in part through foreign direct investment) can
only be achieved once these enterprises are in private hands.

3. The privatization and restructuring of the state commercial banks must continue. After a scandal involving the pricing of the last bank privatization, enthusiasm for further privatization is waning. Banks provide the nervous system of a private economy. Poland needs healthy, private banks.

4. The Polish Government must pay greater attention to the reform of social programs and the creation of social infrastructure. Otherwise, it will be hard to sustain a social consensus for reform. The coalition government's main campaign platform was to alleviate the "hardships" of economic reform by placing an increased emphasis on the social safety net. That must be done in the context of budget realities and without compromising the newly established and hard won limits on government interventionism.
INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: An Overview on Poland

The Polish Outlook

On Foreign Affairs

A recent opinion poll reveals that 81% of Poland’s public consider full NATO membership important; about 40% deem NATO’s failure to admit Poland another Western betrayal and are fearful of an attack on Poland; 66% believe the Partnership for Peace enhances Poland’s security.

History has left the people of Poland with an abiding interest in foreign affairs. Poles look back with pride on their country’s role as a major regional power from the 14th to the 17th centuries, at a time when present-day Russia was merely Muscovy. They are aware of the fact that the Polish army took Moscow in 1610 and that a Polish king, Jan Sobieski, broke the Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683. They mourn the decline of Poland in the 18th century, which led to the division of Poland in 1795 among Russia, Prussia, and Austria.

During 123 years of foreign occupation, a sense of nationhood was kept alive. The country’s Catholic Church played a key role in that regard. On two occasions, in 1830 and in 1863, the Poles revolted against the Russian occupiers, but their revolts were put down after a great deal of bloodshed. A new Polish state was born in 1918, uniting Polish-populated lands of Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary. That state lasted until 1939, when, as the first victim of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, it was invaded by the Nazis and then divided between Germany and the Soviet Union.

Throughout World War II Polish units fought on the Allied side on all major fronts. At the same time, the Polish Home Army maintained a guerrilla effort in Nazi-occupied Poland, which culminated in the Warsaw Uprising of August 1, 1944. That uprising was put down brutally by the Nazis while the Soviet Army, which had reached Warsaw’s outskirts, stood by.

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff
At the end of World War II, a Soviet-dominated, Communist government was foisted upon Poland by the Russian occupying force. The fact that the West did not come to Poland's help at that time is to this day viewed as a betrayal, usually attributed to the alleged "sell-out" at Yalta. The Poles say their interest in NATO is motivated by fear of a Yalta II.

During the decades of Soviet dominance, Poles demonstrated their rejection of the Soviet-imposed regime more often than the people of any other satellite country in expressions of civic unrest, in 1956, 1970, and with the Solidarity Movement in 1980-81.

On Domestic Affairs

Democracy came to Poland in 1989 when, deprived of continued Soviet support, the Jaruzelski Government peacefully transferred a great deal of power to the Solidarity Movement, which, at that time, clearly had the support of the overwhelming majority of the Polish people. A new, democratic government was quickly established and embarked on bold economic reforms. However, it soon faced serious problems. In 1990 and 1991 GDP declined 18%, industrial production plunged 30%, hyperinflation devalued the zloty. For decades unemployment had been avoided by phantom jobs, redundancy, and inefficient production methods. After 1989 it increased from negligible numbers to the current rate of about 16%, ranging from single digits in some metropolitan areas to more than 25% in towns and the countryside.

Although the decline bottomed out in 1992 and the economy, driven by a vibrant private sector, grew by 4% in 1993 and is likely to exceed that figure in 1994, many Poles are dissatisfied with developments since 1989. Only 62% now regard the political system as better than its predecessor and more than half say the economy is now worse than it was under Communism.

There have been truly impressive economic gains in Poland in recent years, as a good many Poles have made full use of the opportunities offered by the development of the private sector. They have demonstrated creativity and ingenuity. However, a great many Poles resent the inequalities which the market economy has brought to the country and believe that they have been left behind.

The principal reason for the decline in the economies of the entire region, including Poland, has been the collapse of the Soviet-sponsored trading system. Other factors have been the built-in inefficiencies of Communist economic management, the obsolescence of Polish industry, the accumulation of long-term foreign debt in the Seventies, which was used for short-term purposes, and the difficulties which inhere in the shift from a command to a market economy. But most Poles who have been disadvantaged by recent developments attribute their misfortune solely to the last of these factors.

While it is appropriate to call attention to the significant progress which Poland has made in developing a healthy private economic sector, this must be done in a manner which underlines recognition of the fact that to date only a minority has
benefitted from the change. The growth of the private sector should be viewed as a reason for hope that others will in the future benefit as well.

Poland's economic decline has had major political consequences. The parliamentary elections of 1989 produced an overwhelming Solidarity victory at the polls. (The old-regime parties had, however, reserved a significant number of parliamentary seats for themselves.) In 1990 Walesa was elected President, obtaining 75% of the vote in a run-off against an obscure Polish emigre entrepreneur, who had suddenly appeared on the scene and who has since then again disappeared. In 1991, the time of the next election, the parties which came out of the Solidarity Movement lost much of their support. No grouping had a clear majority. Parties associated with the former regime got close to a quarter of the vote.

The instability of the parliamentary majority which came out of the 1991 election led to new elections, which were held in September 1993. A majority of the votes was cast for parties running in opposition to economic reform measures. Two parties with roots in the old regime got 36% of the vote and, under Poland's new electoral law, obtained 66% of the seats in Parliament. They are the Left Democratic Alliance (SLD), which is the reorganized Polish Workers' (Communist) Party and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), which used to be a Communist front.

Although the two parties had campaigned against the economic reforms, once in office they continued the reform course of the preceding governments. However, there appears to be tension between the two parties. The leadership of the ex-Communist party, relatively young, energetic, and intellectually inclined seems to have undergone a genuine conversion to democracy and market economics. It has filled the key economic positions in the present government and is the driving force behind the current reform policies. The PSL, while having gone along, so far, with the reform measures, appears reluctant and is reported to favor subsidies for farmers, even if this has adverse macroeconomic consequences. This one-time Communist front now appeals to social conservatism. It has received some Church support. Recent polling indicates that the PSL has gained popular support, whereas the SLD's support has declined since the 1993 election. The PSL leader, Prime Minister Pawlak has a 76% "trust" rating, SLD's Kwasniewski has a rating of 56%. President Walesa's approval rating is 25%.

The SLD leadership understands that only if Poland stays on the reform course is there a chance for improvement in economic conditions. That is also the view of the Union for Freedom, the party rooted in the Solidarity Movement, which holds 16% of the Parliamentary seats. In spite of the similarity of their present views, the historic antagonism between the ex-Communists and their one-time opponents is too profound for them to get together at this time.

IMF and Western pressure may very well cause the PSL to follow the SLD lead on reform. Prime Minister Pawlak must be reminded of the long-term interest of his country in staying the course.
But the West must also help the Polish Government focus on the problems of the Poles who so far have gotten the short end of the reform stick.

The U.S. Response

On Foreign Affairs

We have sought to allay Polish concerns through the Partnership for Peace. While some Poles viewed the Partnership initially with skepticism, there has been increasing recognition that the Partnership can start a process which would add to Poland's security. We have pointed out that under the Partnership each Partner will be in a position of developing increasingly close ties with NATO, so that ultimately the only ingredient of membership that would be lacking would be the guarantee of the country's border. That last step can be taken at a time deemed appropriate and can be accomplished, if necessary, with relative speed. The more time-consuming and complex task of developing a closer military relationship between NATO and Poland is being undertaken now, under the umbrella of the Partnership.

Poland was the first country to submit its "Presentation Document" to NATO. As a result, Poland is the first Partner with which NATO has made close contact and in which a military exercise is to take place (scheduled for September).

On Domestic Affairs

The United States has been in the lead in obtaining the massive reduction and rescheduling of Poland's burdensome foreign debt, has led in foreign investment in Poland, and has rendered technical assistance to both the Polish government and the private sector in their efforts to establish a market economy. This Administration has recently undertaken a comprehensive review of our assistance effort and is in the process of putting a more focused program in place and coordinating our efforts more effectively with those of the other donors and lenders (EU, UK, Germany, IBRD, and EBRD).

The total annual cost of our AID program for Poland is about $75,000,000. We are not in a position to provide assistance at Marshall Plan levels. Instead, we are focusing on the encouragement of private investment and the transplanting of know how to a society in which there is interest, ability, and intelligence, but the absence of experience with the market for over forty years. While continuing with the projects designed to assist the private sector, our new initiative will (a) result in the reprogramming of funds to allow us to work with the Poles on projects directed at the segments of the population that have been left behind (employment counseling, retraining, home construction, investment in infrastructure), (b) link our technical assistance to IBRD and EBRD loans, and (c) encourage other donors to coordinate their activities closely with ours.
Poland After Solidarity

Timothy Gardon Ash

The Roots of Solidarity: A Political Sociology of Poland's Working-Class Democratization
by Roman Laban
Princeton University Press, 247 pp., $24.95

Breaking the Barrier: The Rise of Solidarity in Poland
by Lawrence Goodwyn
Oxford University Press, 466 pp., $27.95

Rok 1989: Bronislaw Geremek Opowiada, Jacek Zakowski Pyta
(The Year 1989: Bronislaw Geremek Relates, Jacek Zakowski Asks)
Pjejada (Warsaw), 384 pp., 30,000 Zl ($5.50)

Droga Do Wolnosci: Opowiada, Bronislaw Geremek
(The Path to Freedom: Relates, Bronislaw Geremek)
Pyla (Warsaw), 304 pp., 26,000 Zl ($3.75)

Wdzie (The Chief)
by Jacek Kurski
Pomost (Warsaw), 128 pp., 17,000 Zl ($1.80)

1.

Between Sesame Street and Twin Peaks, Polish television shows President Lech Walesa making his first ceremonial appointment of an army general. The new general is a bishop. Around the corner from Pilsudski (formerly Victory) Square, a guardian peers longingly into the new Mercedes showroom. The Palace of Culture, the most famous symbol of Soviet domination, now contains a large shopping mall. In front of it, a huge billboard advertises POLARMER, a Polish-American travel agency. The coal is so crude as to be somehow appropriate: kitsch beats kitsch. Down Nowy Świat, a farmer snores in his vegetable truck, just a few yards from the freshly opened Christian Dior boutique. Just a few yards from the freshly opened Christian Dior boutique...opened Christian Dior boutique. (The official sign advertises Radio Z, one thing alone is certain: it will be post-Solidarity."

Without looking any further into the program, or nonprogram, of this ridiculous party, I will merely recall that its leader, Stan Tymiński, beat Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Poland's first noncommunist premier, veteran Solidarity advisor, honored intellectual, the "force of calm," as his election posters had it, into third place in the presidential elections. And the leaders of all the main contending parties with whom I spoke took very seriously indeed the threat, if not from Party X, then at least from what Jacek Kuron calls Phenomenon X. They all agree that a substantial part of the electorate is so disgruntled and disoriented that it can fall even for such rubbish.

Between Party X and Radio Z one almost feels like talking of Country Y. So much is new, unpredictable, bewildering, even to those who are supposed to be shaping this new Poland. The variables far outstrip the constants, the unknown the known."

Mrs. Danuta Walesa, pani prezyden- towa, attends the signature ceremony for a new Franco-Polish macaroni factory, called Danuta in her honor. It will be built, according to the publicity hand- out, in "a new, post-Solidarity style." And what, pray, is that? Of Poland's future architecture, as of the Danuta macaroni factory, one thing alone is certain: it will be post-Solidarity. On the road out of Warsaw a Soli- tary sign advertises Radio Solidar- nied. How long, how brave was Solidarity's struggle for access to the mass media? But now everyone listens to Radio Z. The Mazowsze region of the independent self-governing trade union Solidarity has a handsome head- quarters on one of Warsaw's main streets. But life is elsewhere. The nationwide union Solidarity has a new, young chairman, Marian Krezlawek, and a couple of million members. But most of Solidarity's great figures have moved on, to the presidential palace, to parliament, to different political parties, and there is little solidarity among them today.

From 1982 until 1989 the leading underground weekly, Tygodnik Ma- sowsze, carried on its masthead the following words: "Solidarity will not be divided or destroyed—Lech Wa- lesa." And indeed, General Jaruzelski did not succeed in dividing or destroy- ing Solidarity. Lech Walesa did what he, more than anyone, had kept to- gether through the whole decade of the 1980s, he, not alone of course, but more than any other single person, pulled apart at the beginning of the 1990s. More generally, liberation and democracy succeeded where dicta- torship and repression failed. Nie ma wolnosci bez solidarnosci, proclaimed the masthead of Poland's first genuinely independent opposition daily, Gazeta Wyborcza, echoing the strikers of 1980 who had set Solidarity back on the path to legality via the Round Table negotiations of early 1989: "There's no liberty without Soli- darity." When Lech Walesa subse- quently asked the editors of Gazeta Wyborcza to remove from their mast- head these words, "Solidarity" (printed, of course in the characteristic red jumbly lettering, and now a registered trademark of the union), someone suggested that they should leave a truncated motto: "There's no lib- erty...." But a more accurate revised version might have read: "There's no Solidarity in liberty." And that could apply now to Solidarity with a large S, and not only to Poland.

Of course there is a danger of retro- spective, sentimental idealization. Even with the intense, uniting pres- sure of a liberation, the process was filled with internal conflicts and divi- sions. Tensions between different groups, tendencies, and regions, be- tween peasant, workers, and intellec- tuals (and intellectuals themselves), were not few, between conservative Catholics, liberal Catholics, agnostics, and athe- ists, between left liberals, right liber- als, and antiblack, and just be-
tween individual personalities, were constantly surfacing. One might say that, under the combined efforts of Walesa—intentionally—and Jaruzelski—unintentionally—kept it together. Jacek Kuron once joked that Walesa was awarded another Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to reconcile Solidarity's warring factions.

It is, moreover, a dangerous oversimplification to suggest that the society from which Solidarity sprang and in which it operated, and European societies under communism more generally, were characterized by a solidarity (which really was) not found in the West. To be sure, there were forms of solidarity not found in the West. These ranged from the quotidian mutual dependence of consumers in a shortage economy to the less quotidian support of the directly oppressed and the exhilarating unity of the crowd at a papal rally. But there were also forms of unsolidarity, not least known in the contemporary West: collaboration, denunciation, bribery as the sine qua non for medical care.

When all this is said, the fact remains that there existed, in Poland in the 1980s, an extraordinary thing called Solidarity, and that for many individuals and women it offered an extraordinary experience of solidarity. This was, it seemed, something more than just the comradeship of men and women at war with an alien "power." Yet today, it seems, even less remains. In usually does war without comradeship when the war is over. A country slopes off to the array of books from state publishing houses (and the most interesting of these were sold out in a few days, or kept "under the counter") to the hurtownia, to Radio Z, or even Party X.

Solidarity is a thing of the past. But just because it is suddenly past, perhaps we may see it more clearly for what it was. In such a moment of radical, historical discontinuity, in the heat and dust of systemic transformation, the immediate future is uncommonly obscure. The recent past comes into uncommon sharp focus—both because we have information that we do not usually have so soon after the event, and simply because we know what we did not usually know: how the story ends.

3.

A short stroll through Warsaw's bookshops reveals a plethora of interesting publications about the recent past. These bookshops, incidentally, are the political poster child of the country's present turmoil. Where once you had to wait in line for a little plastic basket in order to view a stale publication somewhat of the recent past, today, it seems, even less remains. In usually does war without comradeship when the war is over. A country slopes off to the array of books from state publishing houses (and the most interesting of these were sold out in a few days, or kept "under the counter") to the hurtownia, to Radio Z, or even Party X.

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Although there are occasional furries about the alleged collaboration of this or that politician with the secret police, the contents of the secret police files are not at present the sort of political issue in Poland that they are in Czechoslovakia, let alone in East Germany. What is a major issue, however, is the way in which former communists have got rich by smartly turning themselves into capitalists. And these books are a prime example of just that. In one of Poland's most successful methods of privatization to date, the country's former (soi-disant) communists are not so much, to recall Harold Macmillan's famous joke at Mrs. Thatcher's privatization program, "selling off the family silver" as rather selling off the family secrets. (The word family may here also be understood in its Sicilian sense.) The publisher of most of the books, a firm called simply "BGW," is reputedly one of the most commercially successful book publishers in Poland today and surely a most fitting potential partner for Mr. Robert Maxwell. Meanwhile, from the columns of the weekly Nie "(No)," a skilful mixture of soft porn and political guttering, Jerzy Urban teases and jeers at the post-Solidarity politicians who have taken power from him. Politically and aesthetically this profitable self-privatization by former communists is deeply offensive to many people. It formed one major plank of the attack by the Center Agreement party—and by Lech Walesa—on the government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki.

Yet the responsible Center politicians now in government and the president's office have more to complain about than their predecessors how, in a country that aims to build both a market economy and the rule of law, you can legally punish a former communist for becoming a successful capitalist. At the other end of the post-Solidarity bookshelf we find the second volume of Lech Walesa's memoirs, ghost-written by one of his aides and covering

June 13, 1991

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the period from the end of 1984 (when his last volume broke off) to his election as president in December 1980; a vivid and perceptive short sketch of Walesa in action by his former press spokesman Jaroslaw Kurusiak; and a long and richly informative interview with Bronislaw Geremek, describing the negotiated end of martial law in Poland in 1989. Here too we find a moving first volume of autobiography by Jacek Kurusiak, the first attempt at a comprehensive treatment of the May events of 1980, and a book of conversations with one of the secret police officers who murdered Father Jerzy Popiełuszko in 1984. The persistent seeker may also unearth some of the remaining scattered, extensive survey material, in which Polish sociologists have attempted to chart the changing attitudes of that elusive collective społecznościw — "the society."

Striking — to me at least — is the relative paucity of books about Solidarity itself. Still it has been obscured not only by the difficulty of obtaining evidence on this subject in a communist police state, but also by the role of Polish intellectuals as what Laba nicely calls "cultural gatekeepers"; by Polish and Western scholars' disinclination to take the workers seriously as a subject of history; and by certain dominant "ways of seeing," indeed, according to Goodwyn, by "the persistence of hierarchy and elite privilege in modern life," no less.

Like almost all historiographical revisions, the new story oversimplifies at times even caricature the interpretation they wish to revise. Thus, while I think I moved a little in "Polish intellectual circles" and "have never heard anyone — least of all Jacek Kurusiak himself — say that Solidarity was the creation of KOR, and Walesa of Kurusiak. And in the introduction to what Goodwyn describes as "the most widely read study of Solidarnosc in the West," The Polish Revolution by T. Garton Ash, we can already read: "December 1970 is the single most important date in the prehistory of Solidarity... At least four vital lines of causality run from here to August 1980." But revisionism would not be revisionism without a limit on facts and, it is perfectly true that the role of KOR has been strongly emphasized in most of the literature (including The Polish Revolution). Goodwyn and Laba's shared desire to do justice to the workers' own, particular, self-conscious contribution to what was, after all, originally a workers' movement, commands our initial sympathy and respect.

At this point, however, we must start to distinguish between the two volumes. The New York Times has an odd arrangement of major or original treatments of Solidarity by German scholars, despite that country's outstanding tradition of Zeitgeschichte, is noteworthy and regrettable, although partly explicable by compound historical embarrassment.) To be sure, this historiography of Solidarity is not as extensive as that of, say, the cold war. Yet it is now proudly boast — in Professors Lawrence Goodwyn and Roman Laba — its first historiographical revisionism.

4.

Laba and Goodwyn deserve to be treated apart, yet also demand to be taken together. Each warmly acknowledges the cooperation, or, as Laba puts it, the "scholarly solidarity" of the other. Both claim to confront what Laba calls "the dominant trend of understanding of postwar Polish history and of Solidarity." And both characterize this "dominant trend" in very similar ways. Western scholars (including this reviewer) and Polish intellectuals are charged with advancing an "elite thesis" according to which it was Polish intellectuals — more specifically "Warsaw intellectuals" and most specifically the opposition group KOR — who made the decisive contribution to the collapse of Communist Poland. By the late 1970s the encoun-

An extraordinary tale of exploration, imperialistic arrogance, bloodshed, suffering, courage, and near disaster, this is the detailed account of an expedition to the interior of New Guinea in 1935 that encountered hitherto unsuspected populations numbering in the tens of thousands who had never before seen white men and who were still using Stone Age tools. Starving, racketed by dysentery, and beleaguered by hostile bands of warriors, the expedition finally found its way back to safety, leaving 50 dead Papuans behind. Using historical records, the memories of Papuans, and the interpretations of ethnographers, the book attempts to show why the Papuans and the explorers perceived events and responded to each other the way they did. 46 photographs and 14 maps. 344 pp. Paper, $12.95; cloth, $39.50

Stanford University Press STANFORD, CA 94305-2235

The New York Review
ing on a wide range of other Polish and Western sources. In the first part of the book he gives a detailed, narrative account of the Baltic strikes in 1970, and their aftermath in the 1970s period. This is vivid, often moving, and scrupulous in paring fact from myth. He makes short work, for example, of the legend that Jaruslawski was not responsible for the violent repression of the workers' protests. And it is fascinating to be reminded that the Polish soldiers moved to the coast to replace Polish workers were told they were going to fight Germans.

In the second part of The Roots of Solidarity, Laba singles out several aspects of the movement for thematic treatment. He looks at the debates over the organizational structure of Solidarity, gives a sharp analysis of the particular social, professional, and cultural mix on the Baltic coast, and offers a sensitive exploration of Solidarity's unique, evocative iconography—including the famous logo, designed by a twenty-nine-year-old Gdansk artist, and inspired by the crowd at the shipyard gates. Laba returns to his main argument in a chapter analyzing a collection of workplace strike demands made by their interfactory strike committee in the Lenin shipyard in August 1980, which led to the historic Gdansk agreement, came to be drafted.

His overall conclusion is judicious. Solidarity, he says, was a broad front for all Polish citizens; it was a strategic alliance of intellectuals, white-collar workers, blue-collar workers, and farmers that rested in large part without the intellectuals, but the Solidarity they joined was built on the particular set of demands made by their interfactory strike committee in the Lenin shipyard in August 1980, which led to the historic Gdansk agreement, came to be drafted. Here, in sum, is a well-made, original book, which, despite its occasional revisionist stridency, actually does impel us to revise, or at the very least to augment, our overall picture of Solidarity.

Lawrence Goodwyn is an historian of American social movements, author of The Roots of Solidarity, and has published previous works on the American workers' movement. The book he belabors previous writers on Solidarity for failing to take account of the "perspectives on social issues" developed in the past quarter-century by historians of social movements elsewhere. He castigates what he calls the "viewing from afar" or "theorizing from afar" by Polish as well as Western scholars. Students of Solidarnosc, he says, have "gotten lost" in an "arid descriptive," partly because the material was locked in police files, but also because they did not know where or how to look for it.

Faced with these extensive structures we look with interest to see what evidence Professor Goodwyn has used, and how he has used it.

Inspired by the birth of Solidarity in August 1980, we learn, Professor Goodwyn "applied for and in November 1981 received research funds to go to Poland." Unfortunately, martial law was then declared. "By the time I arrived in Europe in June 1982," he goes on, "most of the people who had brought Solidarnosc into being were in prison or in exile." But he did manage to interview some exited Solidarity activists in Paris. Subsequently, he appears to have reached Poland, although to judge by his acknowledgment to nine translators and, more important, his source notes, he does not appear to have mastered Polish. In fact, apart from his own interviews, one important Polish book on the Poznan events of June 1980, and, crudely, the Baltic materials as collected, translated, and interpreted by Roman Laba,

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Based on this formidable array of primary sources, many with profound insights as that "social knowledge is experimental," Professor Goodwyn devotes nearly four hundred turgid pages to demolishing the intellectual myth of "God," says one of his epigraphs (from Mies van der Rohe), "is in the details." So let us look at one detail. "We must know concretely what happened," he writes in a characteristic passage,

originally and subsequently, as the persons involved moved from a routinely compliant state of social conformity to presumably higher realms of insight and subtlety.

To this end, let us shift for a moment to the present tense and take station on the Baltic coast on August 23, 1980.

The point of choosing August 23 was that this was the first day a secret representative of the authorities came to negotiate with the strikers, and that the previous evening two Warsaw intellectuals, Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Bronislaw Geremek,2 had arrived with police files, but also because they did not know where or how to look for it.

Faced with these extensive structures we look with interest to see what evidence Professor Goodwyn has used, and how he has used it.

Inspired by the birth of Solidarity in August 1980, we learn, Professor Goodwyn "applied for and in November 1981 received research funds to go to Poland." Unfortunately, martial law was then declared. "By the time I arrived in Europe in June 1982," he goes on, "most of the people who had brought Solidarnosc into being were in prison or in exile." But he did manage to interview some exited Solidarity activists in Paris. Subsequently, he appears to have reached Poland, although to judge by his acknowledgment to nine translators and, more important, his source notes, he does not appear to have mastered Polish. In fact, apart from his own interviews, one important Polish book on the Poznań events of June 1980, and, crudely, the Baltic materials as collected, translated, and interpreted by Roman Laba, Goodwyn relies almost entirely on those previous Western and translated Polish authors whose work is most concerned to rebut—bining, as it were, the hand that feeds him.

Based on this formidable array of primary sources, many with profound insights as that "social knowledge is experimental," Professor Goodwyn devotes nearly four hundred turgid pages to demolishing the intellectual myth of "God," says one of his epigraphs (from Mies van der Rohe), "is in the details." So let us look at one detail. "We must know concretely what happened," he writes in a characteristic passage,

originally and subsequently, as the persons involved moved from a routinely compliant state of social conformity to presumably higher realms of insight and subtlety.

To this end, let us shift for a moment to the present tense and take station on the Baltic coast on August 23, 1980.

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2Since God is in the details it should be pointed out that Mazowiecki was not, as Goodwyn writes; at Warsaw University.

"I would, for example, wish to revise the experience in The Polish Revolution in which I describe KOR as working "very much as Lenin recommended (in Material to be Drawn)" the communist terrorist party should work, raising the political consciousness of the proletariat in key industrial centers. Instead, I go on to point out that the obious, crucial differences between KOR and the Bolsheviks, this plainly understates the autonomous contribution of the workers and overstates the direct role of KOR—also, in the case of the Baltic ports, in relation to intellectuals or semi-intellectual activists from other opposition groups.

June 13, 1991
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There is a concentration of Aids within the arts—from the viewpoint of biology, not surprising. Species variability is driven by the forces of the literary, visual and performing arts, while species uniformity is mass, nature impartial.

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activist, Lech Kaczynski, of two other opposition activists, the professor loftily observes: "This perhaps says more about criteria functioning in middle-class society in Gdansk that it does about the shop-floor capabilities of worker activists." There were many things in Gdansk in the 1970s, but one thing there was not: middle-class society.

Today Lech Walesa says that is just what he wants: middle-class society! "Great Britain has built her prosperity on a strong middle-class society in Gdansk that it is her to right: Bronislaw Geremek, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, and Lech Walesa.

while the huge state factories that made up the economy at a white-tie banquet in the city centre at a white-tie banquet in the city centre in the West, so it seemed to him, people were going forward to the twenty-first tech and the corporatist flysheet, there the fax and satellite disk. Now Poland is sprouting satellite dishes, and in the countryside one sees the beginnings of a dramatic confrontation between a nineteenth-century world of peasant piety, and a twenty-first-century world of television consumerism; between, as it were, the Bible and Twin Peaks." Roman Labu at one point makes suggestive reference to Barrington Moore's observation that (pace Marx) it is classes that become revolutionary. Poland's working class in the 1970s was, he suggests, a nineteenth-century proletariat in a twentieth-century state. One can put the consent too far, but clearly if the transition to a modern market economy is to succeed this anachronistic working class will also have to change out of recognition—while the huge state factories that were Solidarity's strongholds are consigned to industrial archaeology. But now will the intelligentsia step forward into a new, modern, western Poland without fundamental changes in habits, attitudes, and patterns of intellectual employment.

Thus it is not just Solidarity, the unitary social and political movement, that is a thing of the past. It is also the working class, with its unique "society" which Solidarity claimed to represent, a society divided yet understanding itself as one against the state. "And the working class is not a thing of the past."

In a very stimulating article in Poland's leading Catholic weekly, Tygodnik Powo-zodni (April 7, 1990), Father Józef Tischler, the theologian of the church, says: "There is much truth in the assertion that, after the confrontation of Christianity with communism, Christianity now faces the confrontation with liberalism." And taling of the spiritual power of the Church under communism he observes: "When the Church had no power, it turned out that it had power, one hopes now the opposite will not happen that having power, it will lose it."
here is with an old schoolmate who reminds him of his love of the order and clarity of Latin grammar. What we have here is the Latin grammar of Poland's transition from communism, albeit a grammar laced with anecdotcs.

At one point, asked why the authorities especially hostile to him in the seven lean years when Solidarity was banned, he replies modestly, "It's hard to say why." In fact, it's easy to say why. The authorities were especially hostile to him because he was the most skilful political tactician and strategist close to Walesa, and one who was able to analyse better than most what they were up to, as well as the international background and what Solidarity should do. Yet he was not just a politician. He tells several instances of his "moral discretion" at sitting down at the same table with General Jaruzelski, and, worst of all, with the appalling Mieczyslaw F. Rokowski. And in a passage which it is hard to imagine coming from any West European intellectual, he speaks of "playing my small part in the mission of the Polish intelligentsia, which has always served Poland above all, and not selfish ambition or advantage." A romantic self-image, no doubt, but hardly an ignoble one.

The story he has to tell is that of Solidarity's historic triumph, and the beginnings of the disintegration which followed so quickly on that triumph. While Geremek suggests that everything went as well as possible in 1989, then fell apart in 1990, his own narrative shows how the seeds of collapse were sown in the very moment of victory, with the formation of the Mazowiecki government following the election of June 4, 1989.

The story begins in late 1988, with "signals" from the authorities that they might be prepared to negotiate with Solidarity, signals decisively strengthened by two waves of strikes, with young workers chanting, "There's No Freedom Without Solidarity!" Geremek then gives a wonderful description of a whole bevy of intellectuals trying to prepare Lech Walesa for his television debate with the head of the official trade union, Alfred Miodowicz. The film director Andrzej Wajda lectures Walesa about camera technique. Economists, sociologists, lawyers, stuff him with facts and figures about the state of the nation. A nun plies him with herbal potions for his sore throat. Then off he goes, and trounces the Party hack with a line that is pure Lech: "The West goes by car, and we're on a bike." Here was Solidarity at its best, and that best was superbly sustained over the next half year, through the unprecedented Round Table talks, and the election campaign.

Geremek describes these negotiations in exhaustive detail. He shows how the basic precondition for these talks was the removal of the Gorbachev leadership of the barriers of Soviet refusal and their replacement by direct and indirect encouragement for reform. (At one point, a senior Party official jokingly asked Lech Walesa to prohibit Adam Michnik from reading Soviet newspapers.) In this manner, and faced with the country's deteriorating economic condition, the new political initiative came, as Geremek repeatedly stresses, firstly from the army and police, from General Jaruzelski and the interior minister, General Kisiezak (who had the best possible information on the level of popular discontent) for the very reason that the West was making the most vigorous effort to encourage Poland's reform.
Yet Solidarity's leaders were not at all sure they could win. It was the authorities who insisted on an early election because, they said, they had a pre-election organization, and control of virtually all the mass media. Since in retrospect the election result looks inevitable, it was probably wise of them to remit and just how difficult and uncertain this campaign was, and how tense and fraught were the further negotiations leading to the compromise first publicly suggested by the historic Michnik in the January formula, "Your President, Our Premier." For so one had been here before. The Soviet reaction was still unpredictable. "The Berlin Wall still stood. Husak was in Praque Castle. Even Hungary had not come to far. Poland was the icebreaker.

Then, after the nine years of struggle, after the negotiated breakthrough, after doing what Geremek's Party counterpart at the Round Table, Professor Janusz Reykowski, insisted had never been done before in the history of the world—that is, changing a political system completely without violence—after all this, the Solidarity camp began to fall apart. By the end of the year, the picture is one of frustrated, feuding factions, with the Solidarity group revolting against its own leadership, poor coordination between the two groups, and "its" government, dramatically worsened relations between Gdansk and Warsaw, and, as above all, between Lech Walesa and Tadeusz Mazowiecki. Between these two men there was, Geremek says, from the very formation of the Mazowieck government—a "more or less silent war."

To make a full and fair reconstruction of this silent war we should wait for Tadeusz Mazowiecki's memoirs, which are reportedly also on their way. But if we combine Geremek's account with those by Walesa and his former spokesman, Jaroslaw Kurski, we get the same basic picture. It is plainly not fair to compare Walesa's memoirs directly with Geremek's. Walesa is not an historian, his magic is not to be found in the printed page. His memoirs, ghost-written by Arkadiusz Rybczynski, a Catholic intellectual trained as an historian and with a long record in Solidarity, are actually a curious mixture of three different books. First, there is a rather stiff, portentous account of Walesa's various political initiatives and encounters, notably with foreign dignitaries and the foreign press. Secondly, there is an account of his family and his belief in the hearth, the Church, and the fatherland. The chapter on his wife, headed "Danka—Calm at the Foundations," begins, "The family is the main pillar of life, the source of balance, and woman—wife, mother—is the core of the family." Somehow one feels this language is not entirely Lech.

Thirdly, there is some genuine Lech, talking of Politics. He insists that he should be seen as a practicing politician, not, he says, "an empty symbol" but rather "a clever fox." A key word in his self-description—it recurs twice on the last page—is "skrupulatny," meaning "effective." This matches precisely the description of him by close associates, quoted by Kurski, as a supremely political animal, mistrustful of everybody, calculating always, a "political machine" as Krzysztof Wyszowskli (the same of 1980) puts it.

The second point to note is that, quite remarkably for a new president, this book is simply bristling with raw, naked hurt and resentment at his former Warsaw intellectual advisers who then stood against him. After just a few pages we read:

I wasn't an intelligent [that is, member of the intelligentsia], and one must realize that in Poland, inteligoczci [belonging in or being of the intelligentsia] is a value in itself. It matters less what a professor, doctor or famous actor who speaks in the name of the nation represents, what matters more is that he has a degree, good manners, "knowledge of what's what," and proper eloquence.

And so it goes on. Walesa recalls his own blistering attack on the "eggheads" at the second Solidarity congress in April 1990: "Must the President really speak fluent French in order to improve the lot of the working class?"

Last Professor Goodwyn too hastily concludes that this evidences a Baltic worker's special feeling for democracy, Walesa goes on:

In this situation—to put in order the most important things—the country should be governed for some time by a decisive, strong hand. For you cannot "democratically" catch a thief.

But the "gentlemen from the capital," "my antagonists [drinking coffee with cream]," did not see it this way:

After the interviews of Messrs. Michnik and Geremek—full of venom and unfounded political ambitions—it was somehow forgotten that I am a Nobel Peace Prize winner, and this great honor [to quote the president] is after all not given just for a pretty face. In the accounts of many [Western] journalists I once again became only an electrician—a limited robot [a contemptuous term for a worker] with ambitions to lead a 40 million strong nation in the heart of Europe.

How did such bitter recrimination come about after nine years of working so closely together, years that are still held fast—like the ghost of times past—in photos at the end of the memoirs showing Walesa laughing together with Geremek, Michnik, and Mazowieck? Was Solidarity only held together by the common enemy? From the accounts by Geremek and Kurski it is very clear that the trouble began as soon as Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Walesa's choice of premier, did not consult Walesa about the composition of his government in August and September 1989. Not the membership of the government, just the fact that Mazowiecki was determined to be his.
own man, seems to have offended Walesa.
From this point, relations between them worsened very quickly, despite efforts at mediation by Geremek and the Church. Kurski chronicles the deterioration, and notes the irony that the last, vain effort at reconciliation took place in Gdański on August 31, 1990—the tenth anniversary of the Gdański agreement and the birth of Solidarity. Solidarność August 31, 1980—August 31, 1990, KIP. Seventeen days later Walesa formally announced his candidacy for the office of president. Maźowiecki stood against him, and was trounced.

Geremek is inclined to blame Walesa’s political advisers in Gdański, and notably the twin brothers Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński, for much of this poisonous estrangement. Certainly this was no simple division between “workers” in Gdański and “intellectuals” in Warsaw. It was an argument between politicians in Gdański and politicians in Warsaw, with workers—or former workers—on both sides. But this Gdański group was only important because Walesa made it so. Walesa was, and is, nothing if not his own man, seems to have offended Walesa.

In April 1990, a group of Walesa’s veteran Solidarity advisors, including Geremek, Michnik, and Maźowiecki, told him that they envisaged an orderly political transition in which he would become president in the spring of 1991, together with a freely elected parliament and a new constitution. But given Walesa’s political advisers in Gdański and intellectuals in Warsaw, with workers—or former workers—on both sides. But this Gdański group was only important because Walesa made it so. Walesa was, and is, nothing if not his own man, seems to have offended Walesa.

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pened in 1989. To be sure, class and class consciousness played a part in the end as they had in the beginning of Solidarity. But the key to this particular passage of Polish history is to be found not in sociology or economics, but in old-fashioned politics, in the clash of personalities and the competition for power. Not Marx, nor Hegel, but Machiavelli and Thucydides must be at our side, when we write this last, sad chapter in the annals of Solidarity.

6.

Where does this leave Polish politics now? In a great muddle. Neither the exaggerated hopes nor the exaggerated fears of Walesa's presidency have yet been realized. He has not proved a great dictator. On a number of high (ex-) nomenklatura officials he has sacked from the Council of Ministers office (but, he soursly observed, had found good jobs in banks); (2) the new leadership had got debt reduction from the West (although he conceded that this was partly the work of Finance Minister Lech Balcerowicz, during the Mazowiecki government); (3) the new president had been more energetic (than Jaruzelski) in foreign policy.

It was late in the day, and Mr. Kaczyński was tired, but this list did not even overwhelm him. However, and here one has a nice illustration of the present muddle, Mr. Kaczyński was not necessarily concerned to make it so, since Walesa had chosen a premier from the so-called Gdánsk "Liberals" (meaning, essentially, neoliberal in economics), rather than the candidate of Kaczyński's Center Agreement party. As a good party politician, Kaczyński therefore performs the Geschnerish trick of being both in government and critical of it.

The government of "Liberal" Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, which contains two Center Agreement ministers, is perhaps slightly more effective than its predecessor in some areas of economic policy. However, because of the hiatus created by the presidential election and the change of government it has taken several months to get what should be the centerpiece of its economic program—privatization of the still dominant state sector—underway, and this will now be interrupted again by the parliamentary election campaign. In financial and monetary policy, there is an overwhelming continuity in the person and policies of Lech Balcerowicz, succeeded partly at the fierce insistence of the West, and particularly the United States: "Washington replacing Moscow," say some, darkly.

These policies are, however, threatened by, among other things, a large budget deficit, which partly results from the absence of the planned proceeds from privatization.

As Walesa himself ruefully observed in a recent interview, "It is difficult to transfer what is said at a rally to the process of governing." He has built up a large presidential office, with a wide circle of advisers from the intelligentsia. Jaroslaw Kaczyński told me that whereas for Jaruzelski the presidential secretaries of state had been substitute secretaries of the Central Committee, now they were needed "on account of the educational level of the president"—hardly a complex-soothing observation. In one of the most interesting areas of presidential responsibility, foreign policy, cooperation between the presidency and the government has thus far been excellent, partly because the foreign minister and the president's foreign policy adviser are old colleagues from Poznań University. Here, if nowhere else, impressive consistency has been achieved. The Polish presidential palace, the Belweder, is clearly a significant center of power, of which, to keep this in perspective, it probably still has less effective power than Václav Havel's presidential palace, the Prácheň. Both Havel and Walesa are currently still using the formal presidential powers defined with deliberate vagueness for their communist predecessors, together with informal powers derived from their leading role in the struggle against their communist predecessors.

Despite Bronislaw Geremek's best efforts, it has not proved possible for the politicians to agree on a new constitution defining a new separation of powers. The celebrations of the two hundredth anniversary of the constitution of May 3, 1791, the first democratic constitution in Europe, were therefore not all that they might have been. Debate continues between, say, the "French model" and the "German model" of the relations between president, prime minister, and parliament. This debate cannot, however, be resolved by the rigged parliament resulting from the Round Table agreement. At best, this parliament will pass on a draft constitution to its democratically elected successor. Meanwhile, the country winds up for an election this fall whose rules have actually been set, after long wrangling, by this rigged parliament.

Major contestants in the election will include: the Democratic Union, formally led by Tadeusz Mazowiecki, with Jacek Kuroń as campaign chairman, and thus far deriving its support mainly from the intelligentsia; the Center Agreement, led by Jarek Kaczyński; Zbigniew Bujak's social democratic grouping, appealing specifically to workers; Prime Minister Bielecki's Liberals, a more or less fissiparous peasant party, or coalition of parties; the ex-communists, who call themselves Social Democrats; and, of course, Stan Tymowski's Party X. But in a situation where the divisions between these parties are so unclear, in an economic situation which is still so difficult, in a society so self-conscious and widespread disorientation, it would be foolish to make any predictions about the campaign or its outcome.

I will, however, make just one guess. It does seem to me that the result which is most desirable is also the one which is least probable. This is a result comparable to that of the first, free

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Louis Aragon
Translated by Alyson Waters

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parliamentary elections in Spain after Franco, which produced a lower house of two large, strong parties, plus a number of smaller ones. The point about this result—applied to Poland—is not the ideological character of the two large parties. The point is simply that there should be large parties, capable of forming a serious parliamentary government and a strong parliamentary opposition, while at the same time having to cooperate in making fundamental change, whether in constitution-making or—a necessity which sharply distinguishes the Polish from the Spanish case—in transforming the economy.

That is what I fear Poland will not get. The more probable result seems to me (and I should be delighted to be proved wrong) a fragmented parliament of weak parties forming weak, fissiparous coalitions. This would be trouble enough in itself. Yet the fragmented parliament would be only one element in a larger fragmentation; with power divided, unclearly, un- easily, uncontrollably, between parliament, government, and presidency. And if that were all… but in this situation a great deal of effective power would not lie in any of these constitutional institutions, but rather on the street, in the farmyard, and in local or commercial (including ex-nomenklatura) cafés.

Even today, Polish politics run the risk of reinforcing certain cliché images of Poland, images of endless discord and noble anarchy. Although the external environment, to East and West, is currently more favorable than it has been for a very long time, it is arguable, for two hundred years—these things can change, and Poland is not an island.

The aim of this alarmist analysis would go on to predict, irrespective of possible external threats, the emergence of calls for a “strongman.” Enter Lech Walesa, with an axe. Cut to a photograph of Marshal Pilsudski. But, as Kurski rightly observes, post-communist (and post-Solidarity) Poland is not Poland after the First World War, and Walesa is not Pilsudski. (Apart from anything else, as Kurski wryly comments, Pilsudski was loyal to his colonels.) Here, too, one could obviously be proved wrong, but for another thing, the real bullying I still cannot see Lech Walesa using soldiers or police to put his political opponents into camps. Even if he wanted to, this is not a Poland, or indeed a Europe, which would easily let him. But beyond this I also think that, despite his autocratic style and alarming rhetoric, Lech Walesa actually has some of the needs of a normal, democrac Polanie.

What is this vision? Walesa is very careful not to be pinned down on anything, and certainly not on his own “politics” in the usual sense of that word (i.e., “left or right”). As Kurski reports, he has been heard to say “I am a man, and even against myself this does not mean he has no politics. At one of the “Magdalena” meetings he produced, according to the notes by Czerniak Kultuk, the following remark: “I propose my socialism. There are three bakers in town: one private, one cooperative, and one state-owned. The one which produces the cheapest rolls does best.” This is socialism with a Thatcherite face. And horrifying though this thought may be to many readers of this journal, I think his politics may be described—for all the obvious differences—as those of a Polish Thatcherist.

On his trip to Britain he made a special point of receiving Mrs. Thatcher, something protocol by no means necessarily demanded. In his memoirs he makes very few positive mentions of her visit to Gdansk in 1988, adding, “I have long been a fan of her vision of an entrepreneurial society, rewarding every initiative.” This is one of his own lifelong themes. Like Mrs. Thatcher, he sees the key to change in individual enterprise. Despite the occasional populist sop thrown to workers at the hustings, he is in favor of radical, rapid privatization:

I have already said a thousand times that I see two Poles. The first—that is the huge, post-Communist enterprises. The second—a private Poland. Now we are just beginning to build. We need to reconstruct two thirds of Poland, to catch up with the Europe that is running away from us.

His chosen prime minister, Bielecki, is a “liberal” in precisely the same sense that Mrs. Thatcher is. Like her, Walesa looks for short, sharp presentations, and work, work, work. Like her, he combines philistinism with a deep respect and liking for clever men of ideas. (Bronislaw Geremek was, so to speak, his Keith Joseph.) Cuming, like her, not from the old, established “upper” classes of his country (i.e., in Poland, the intellectuals), we have for a society in which the less well-off have an equal chance to climb the ladder to wealth and power, by their own initiative and hard work. He combines this, like Mrs. Thatcher, with a strong, simple, even simplistic attachment to the traditional values of family, Church, and country. “Vicario valentia la Polonia.” If Mrs. Thatcher had a vision of democratic capitalism, with the emphasis slightly more on capitalism than on democracy, then so does he.

Clearly, this comparison can be taken too far. Walesa is also capable of saying, as he did in a radio phone-in program shortly after he became president, “Let all share Poland—poverty equally.” There is, moreover, the obvious objection that he is perhaps the world’s most famous trade union leader, whereas Mrs. Thatcher is one of the world’s best-known union busters. Yet Solidarity was from the very outset much more than a trade union, and even as Solidarity chairman Walesa has made clear his commitment to a world of new trade unions based on bread-and-butter labor issues. As this article goes to press, Solidarity’s new chairman has announced a protest action (due to start this week) against the economic and social policies of the government. Unemployment reached 3.3 million (7.3 percent of the work force) at the end of March and this is before many of the necessary economic reforms have been privatized or shut down. It will be fascinating to see how Walesa now reacts to growing unemployment and labor unrest. But he does not say—and when reading reports, always bear in mind the first law of Lechology—my guess is that when it comes to real policy choices he will put the needs of business before the demands of labor.

The New York Review
"A Thatchertite Poland, then, as the final outcome of Solidarity? Carefully avoiding the word "irony," one should say that there were also worse possible outcomes for a country emerging from fifty, and, in a deeper sense, from two hundred, years of dependency and unfreedom. These include the outcome in which Poland goes from the abnorm­al extreme of Solidarity to an ab­normal extreme of un-Solidarity: a dis­sipation of political energies which would hinder the building of both cap­i­talism and democracy.

When asked what he thought were the consequences of the French Revolu­tion, Chairman Mao replied that it was a little too early to say. There is almost wisdom in that reply. Our judgment of 1945, then there is an important sense in which the end of "Yalta" also began in Poland. No country did more for the cause of liberty in Europe in the 1980s, and no country paid a higher price.

And how will Solidarity look in another ten years, in 2001? To imagine answers to this question, we must imagine Polish futures. If things go very badly indeed, if what misleadingly present themselves as the "realities" or "laws" of geopolitics once again intervene in Poland's internal affairs, then the answer will be simple. Solidarity will be seen just as the latest in the long line of legendary insur­rections. As Jacek Kuron noted, Poland found strength from a book about the January Rising of 1863-1864, so now people will draw inspiration and courage from the history of 1980. As in

the days of Solidarity's underground struggle young men read books about the wartime Home Army, and old men came forward with their forger's stamps from the days of the Nazi occupation; so now the experience of Solidarity will be passed on.

For Freedom's battle once begun, Bepozaàd by bleeding sire to son,

Though baffled is ever won.

Wildly improbable though this seems today, no one who knows even a little Polish history can believe it impossible.

At the other extreme there is the future in which, by 2001, Poland has become a normal country, in the sense that Spain, Portugal, and Greece are today normal countries. Still relatively poor, messy, divided, no doubt, but nonetheless having the essential sinews of democracy, the rule of law, and a market economy, reinforced by membership of an enlarged European Community and militarily protected by membership in NATO. This Poland may have no Walesas, but it will also have no need of Walesas. In this normal, perhaps even boring Poland, this is one of many moving details in Jacek Kuron, Wora i Wina, Do i od komunizmu (Faith and Guilt: To and from communism), published by Aneks (London) and Nowa (Warsaw), a book that surely deserves translation into English.

"This detail comes from Maciej Lo­pieki, Marcin Moskit, Mariusz Will, Konspira: Solidarity Underground (University of California Press, 1990), translated by Jane Cave.

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Mrs. Thatcher and Lech Walesa in Gdańsk, November 1988
there will be a new generation of politicians who want to be just that, politicians, neither more nor less.

In this Poland, with its strong middle class, the identities (and complexes) of those three great classes, intellectuals, workers, and peasants—each and all of them "abnormal" in late-19th-century Europe—will have been intermingled and transformed. In this Poland, history, and the historians, will be found in the university, the academy, and the schools, where to the younger pupils

Good Housekeeping

Murray Kempton

Violeta Chamorro, president of Nicaragua, was the Foreign Policy Association's guest at breakfast at the Waldorf recently; and her mise-en-scène stirred the tentative surmise—and indeed the wild hope—that nations ruined by professional politicians

might be finding their salvation in amateurs.

Very little is visible in Mrs. Chamorro's philosophy of government that could suggest pretensions more modest—least of all than the homemaker's. Her unassuming virtues cannot, of course, be called housewifely, because she is that grander presence, the chatelaine.

The Chamorros have an ancient and not always secure lodging among Nicaragua's ruling families. When her husband was killed fighting with the Salvadoran guerrillas, his widow inherited an ancestral house with a variety of mansions. One of her sons was a Sandinista loyalist and another a pillar of the civil resistance. A nephew was killed fighting with the Salvadoran guerrillas only a few weeks ago.

There is thus room under her protecting wing for a family torn by all the rancors and embitterments that have Solidarity will seem almost as remote as the January Rising.

Into this Poland there will then come a new generation of post-revisionist historians, fresh-faced young men from Oxford and Krakow, eager young women from Maryland and Lodz. They will swiftly dispose of all these Labas, Goodwyns, Garton Ashes; gut the archives; grill the survivors; put the Geremeks and Walesas in their place. And they will tell us how it really was.

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