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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. fax~~	~~To: Stanley [Roth]; From: Mary; Re: Spratly Islands and the South~~ China Sea (8 pages)	~~02/21/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VR 1/2/2020
~~002. report~~	~~South China Sea Disputes and US Policy Concerns (3 pages)~~	~~03/22/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VR 1/2/2020
~~003. report~~	~~Policy Considerations on the Spratly Islands Dispute (9 pages)~~	~~02/21/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VR 1/2/2020
004. cable	Re: PRC / Spratly Islands (2 pages)	05/26/1995	P1/b(1)
005. report	China: A Piece of the Rocks (1 page)	03/11/1995	P1/b(1)
006. report	Hardening Positions in the South China Sea (9 pages)	04/25/1995	P1/b(1)
007. cable	Re: Mischief Reef East (3 pages)	02/09/1995	P1/b(1)
008. report	China's South China Sea Strategy (18 pages)	03/22/1995	P1/b(1)
009. map	South China Sea (1 page)	03/00/1995	P1/b(1)
010. map	Spratly islands Oil Exploration [Oversize] (1 page)	03/00/1995	P1/b(1)
011. map	Garrisons and Outposts in the Spratlys [Oversize] (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Kristoff, Sandra)
OA/Box Number: 1041

FOLDER TITLE:
South China Sea, 1995

2012-0975-F
sb1264

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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Stanley:

The first four of the attached pages are what was done up last year for use at ASEAN/ARF meetings and with Philippine officials. It essentially reflects our current posture. The next several pages, a memo to then Under Secretary Arnie Kanter, was an interagency effort done in 1992 (in response to Beijing's provocative behavior at the time) exploring our obligations under the MDT.

You may recall after Ramos became President and as we were completing our withdrawal from Subic, he made an issue of the extent to which the MDT obligated us to come to Manila's aid in the Spratlys. For a while, he called for a reexamination and/or renegotiation of the treaty to ensure it would cover a Spratlys contingency. We made it clear to him that we had no interest in opening the MDT to review and that if he pushed the issue, the Philippines would wind up with no treaty at all.

I'm separately washfaxing to you the infamous Spratlys paper approved by Chas Freeman. (Keep in mind it was written last summer, and was intended to be the basis for interagency discussion--which never happened.)

Regarding the PBS documentary I mentioned, it was a 1-hour long special produced by Maryland Public Television sometime in the past year called "Who Owns the Oceans?" The first half is on the North Sea, the second half on the South China Sea/Spratlys. Great footage. I checked with OSD Public Affairs and they don't have it. If this isn't enough info for your Public Affairs shop, let me know and I'll dig some more. Hope to see you Thursday.

Mary

DECL:OADR

(1)

Spratly Islands and the South China Sea

U.S. Position

- The United States supports peaceful settlement of the conflicting territorial claims, strongly opposes the use of military force to resolve the dispute, and takes no position on the legal merits of the competing claims.

Regional Initiatives

- Between 1990 and 1993, Indonesia -- which has no claims on the Spratly Islands -- convened four unofficial conferences to create a climate for cooperation and conflict resolution among the claimants. A fifth conference is planned this year, but no date has been scheduled.

  -- China has participated in the conferences but has resisted the inclusion of countries from outside the region, as was originally envisioned by the Indonesians, and has opposed "internationalization" of the territorial dispute.

  -- China has called for joint exploration of South China Sea resources while shelving the territorial disputes, but has yet to make a detailed proposal.

  -- Beijing has continued to insist that territorial issues be resolved bilaterally.

- At the 1992 Manila Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC), ASEAN Foreign Ministers issued a Declaration on the South China Sea, calling for mutual restraint by all claimants without prejudicing individual claims of sovereignty.

  -- At the Manila PMC, the US expressed U.S. support for both the Indonesian and ASEAN efforts to seek a peaceful solution to the disputes in the South China Sea. The US also offered to be helpful in any way the claimants believed would be useful.

  -- Secretary Christopher repeated this offer at the 1993 Singapore ASEAN-PMC.

Chinese and Vietnamese Activities

- In May 1992, the Chinese Government and the U.S. Crestone Energy Corporation signed a contract authorizing Crestone to explore for oil in an area near the Spratlys claimed by both China and Vietnam.

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NL NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2017-0051-m (1,01)

(2)

-- The Vietnamese have strongly objected to the Crestone concession and Crestone's activities which they say violates their continental shelf claim.

-- Crestone claims that the Chinese promised to defend the project with naval forces. Asked about this statement, the PRC MFA spokesman commented, "the legitimate rights of foreigners doing business on Chinese territory will be protected by Chinese law."

o In February 1993 the Vietnamese government signed a memorandum with U.S. Oceanic Exploration Company to explore a region which largely overlaps the Chinese Crestone concession area.

o Crestone and Oceanic are small firms which have mainly focused thus far on analyzing existing seismic data collected by the Chinese.

-- This past April Crestone began collecting new seismic data through a subcontractor, a Chinese research institute. Crestone's new data collection activity "piggybacks" on the institute's ongoing research into the mineral resources of the Spratly Islands.

o In March 1994 a third small American firm, China Marine Oil Company, approached the PRC for a concession in the South China Sea.

o Crestone, Oceanic and China Marine have been advised of the USG position with regard to the Spratlys dispute.

o A trade journal reported recently that China has contracted a rig to begin drilling this fall in Vietnam's Blue Dragon block of the Spratlys which lies west of the contested Crestone concession.

-- This unconfirmed report is the first indication we have seen that China may contest a concession near where Vietnam's contractors have been operating without difficulty.

-- Mobil Oil Company, which is part of the consortium that has the contract from Vietnam for the Blue Dragon block, expects to begin drilling there within three months.

o During the past two years, China and Vietnam have held several rounds of inconclusive talks on territorial issues.

o In October 1993 China and Vietnam agreed in principle to resolve their territorial disputes peacefully.

(3)

Philippines and the MDT

o The GOP has repeatedly asked the United States to agree that the 1951 US-RP Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) compels us to respond militarily if there is an "armed attack" on its claim in the Spratly islands.

-- The MDT provides that we would "act to meet the common danger" in the case of an "armed attack" on the "metropolitan territory" of the Philippines, "the island territories" under Philippine jurisdiction, or the GOP's "armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft in the Pacific."

0 The Spratlys are clearly not part of the "metropolitan territory" of the Philippines, and we have informed the GOP of this view.

-- We also hold that the term "island territories under /GOP/ jurisdiction" excludes areas over which jurisdiction is in dispute, such as the Spratlys. An attack on Philippine "armed forces, aircraft, or public vessels anywhere in the Pacific" would, however, fall within the scope of our MDT obligations, and does not exclude the Spratlys.

o In any case, the treaty does not mandate specific actions; an actual response would depend on a policy decision. There are no scenarios that would automatically require US military action to meet our Treaty obligations.

Drafted:EAP:PYun
SERAGEN 1831; 04/26/94
Cleared:EAP:THubbard
EAP/RSP:DGBrown
P:WStanton
PM/DRSA:SGroh
S/P:Breer
DOD/RSA:MTighe
DOD/JCS/J5/APAC:CJTompkins
EAP/VLC:JGagnon
EAP/CM:JJNorris
EAP/PIMBS:WSButcher
INR/EAP/SEA;DAvery; MRegan
EB/ENG:FMaerkle
INR/GE:BThomas

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TALKING POINTS ON THE SPRATLYS

U.S. policy:

- The U.S. urges peaceful settlement of the issue by the countries involved in a manner that enhances regional peace and security.
- The U.S. strongly opposes the threat or use of military force to assert any nation's claim and would view any such use as a serious matter.
- The U.S. takes no position on the legal merits of competing claims and is willing to help in the peaceful resolution of the competing claims if requested by the parties.

In line with this policy:

- The U.S. strongly supports Indonesia's ongoing effort to develop a peaceful solution to this contentious issue. We urge all involved to work seriously within the framework provided by Indonesia.
- We believe the peaceful development of the resources of the region is the best way of benefiting all concerned.
- At the 1992 an 1993 Post-Ministerial Conferences, the US expressed this support, welcomed the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting's Declaration on the South China Sea, and offered to be helpful in any way the parties believe useful.
- We have informed US companies of the competing claims and have strongly recommended that US citizens and companies act with prudence in disputed areas; we have pointed out the risks of conducting on-site activities in these areas unless the contestants have first reached some agreement.

Spratlys/Philippines - MDT

- As I have said, the U.S. takes no position on the competing claims in the Spratlys and believes these differences should be resolved peacefully.
- We will uphold our commitments under the Mutual Defense Treaty.
- I see no need to speculate further on this.

Drafted:EAP:PYUN
SERAGEN 1828; 4/26/94

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By N NARA, Date 8/28/2014
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By VL NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2017-0051-M (1.03)

TO: P - Mr. Kanter

THROUGH: EAP - William Clark, Jr.

SUBJECT: The Spratlys Dispute and U.S. Defense Commitments to the Philippines

BACKGROUND

- Since formally staking a partial claim to the Spratlys in 1974 the Philippine Government (GOP) has repeatedly asked the United States to agree that the 1952 US-RP Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) covers the claimed islands.

- The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) recently announced plans to move a special forces unit to the island of Palawan, the Philippine territory nearest the Spratlys, to better position the Philippines to defend its claim.

- The GOP is conducting a review of US-RP relations, including a review of the MDT. In this context, some RP legislators have called for abrogation of the MDT if the US refuses to recognize its applicability to the Spratlys.

US OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE MDT:

- The MDT allows either party to call for "consultations" if it believes its security is threatened by "armed attack" in the Pacific.

- "Armed attack" is defined broadly as an armed attack 1) "the metropolitan territory of either of the parties" 2) "the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific Ocean"; or, 3) "its armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft in the Pacific."

  -- 1) The Spratlys are clearly not part of the "metropolitan territory" of the Philippines, and we have informed the GOP of this view. (See 1979 letter from Secretary Vance to Foreign Secretary Romulo (Tab 1) and 1985 diplomatic note (Tab 2).)

  -- 2) The meaning of the term "island territories under its jurisdiction" is open to interpretation, but the US can argue that it necessarily excludes areas over which jurisdiction is in dispute, such as the islands claimed by the Philippines in the Spratlys group, the so-called Kalayaan area.

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-- 3) An attack on Philippine armed forces, aircraft, or public vessels anywhere in the Pacific would fall within the scope of our MDT obligations. This extends the umbrella of the US MDT commitment to a vast region, and does not necessarily exclude the Spratly islands. (In April, then Foreign Secretary Manglapus said publicly that the MDT "provides that a Philippine ship is an extension of Philippine territory and ... the US is obligated to defend our ships").

- o Our obligation to "consult" can be triggered solely by the subjective opinion of the GOP that its security is threatened. However, if an incident meets one of the above-quoted definitions of "armed attack," our obligation goes beyond consultation; we are required to "act to meet the common dangers in accordance with ... constitutional processes."

- o The treaty does not mandate specific actions, however, and any actual response would depend on a policy decision.

- o If the policy decision were to take no concrete action, our MDT obligation could be satisfied by informing the GOP that no USG action would be forthcoming.

- o <u>There are no scenarios that would automatically require military action on the part of the US to meet our Treaty obligations.</u>

<u>PHILIPPINE SPRATLYS CLAIM</u>:

- o Although the partial Philippine claim to the Spratlys is generally considered one of the weakest of the several claims to the islands -- the U.S. has no view on the validity of the various claims -- our position that the Spratlys are not part of the "metropolitan territory" of the Philippines is based not on the weakness of the claim but simply on the fact that the claim is in dispute.

- o In addition to moving forces to Palawan, the Philippines recently announced an extensive plan to build military outposts on eight of the islands within its claim, which could greatly increase the possibility of an incident involving Philippine forces or vessels.

- o A petroleum concession recently granted by the Philippine Government to Occidental is not located with the Philippines Spratlys claim, or within what the U.S. recognizes as Philippine territorial waters, but is located in waters contested by China.

- o Concern over the potential Chinese challenge in the area of the Occidental concession no doubt prompts much of the current Philippine interest in determining our obligations under the MDT, but the same questions would arise if a Philippine ship or facility were to become involved in hostilities in the Spratlys proper, or indeed anywhere else in the Pacific.

FUTURE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE GOP:

- In the current climate of increased regional atte... ion to potential Spratlys disputes, we must avoid any USG statements on the MDT that the GOP could use to bolster its position vis-a-vis the other Spratlys claimants.

- Any announcement by the GOP that the US had acknowledged MDT obligations in the Spratlys could be misinterpreted by some claimants as a US commitment to come to Manila's aid in the event of hostilities.

- Not only would it appear that we were legitimizing the Philippine claim, but we would be drawn into public debate about our treaty obligations which could undermine efforts to resolve the Spratlys issue.

- We should reiterate privately that we do not consider the Spratlys part of the metropolitan territory of the Philppines for purposes of the MDT. (N.B.: We have not stated this publicly.)

- We must make it clear to Manila that nothing in the MDT would compel the US to respond militarily or otherwise come to the aid of the Philippines in a Spratlys conflict.

- Our message to the GOP should continue to be that the Philippines undertakes activities in the Spratlys at its own risk.

- Although we do not want to suggest that we would not live up to our treaty commitments, we also do not want to give Manila -- or any other claimant -- the false impression that we now, for the first time, acknowledge a potential role in the dispute.

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South China Sea Disputes and US Policy Concerns

China's recent occupation of Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands has again focused attention on and raised regional anxiety over the future of the South China Sea. Tensions generated by the incident have not escalated and a Spratlys crisis does not appear imminent. Yet there are important reasons for greater USG attention to the Spratlys and other South China Sea disputes and for a serious look at our long-term security interests and how these square with our longstanding policy of aloofness.

As tensions have ebbed and flowed over the years, the USG position on the Spratlys has been remarkably consistent--that we take no position on the merits of individual claims, that we urge all parties to find peaceful solutions to the disputes, and that we would view with concern any outbreak of hostilities. From time to time we have modified our public statements to account for developments like the Indonesian-sponsored workshops. We also have periodically reinforced our desire for a peaceful settlement privately to all claimants. But the substance of our position has not changed, and has left unanswered--within the US policy community as well as in East Asia--what our threshold would be for becoming involved, and what form our involvement would take.

In the bipolar Cold War context, this position made sense given other US national priorities in East Asia; relative restraint in claimant activity; the complex nature of the conflicting sovereignty claims, which defy easy resolution or an obvious USG role; and the unquestioned US commitment to regional stability, which undoubtedly served as an indirect deterrent to serious military adventurism. But the political-military environment has changed considerably in the past few years. We need to consider the following:

• The strategic backdrop has changed. The Cold War is over, we no longer have a permanent military presence in Southeast Asia, and we are widely suspected in Asia to be gradually disengaging from regional security. So, although we are sending the same message on the Spratlys and South China Sea that we always have, it is probably being received very differently.

• We could "afford" to maintain a distance from the Spratlys when our presence was strong and our commitment unquestioned. But there is growing potential for a serious gap to be perceived between our statements and our actions. Our continued efforts to persuade the Asians that we will remain engaged have not fully succeeded. In today's changed environment, US unwillingness to be involved in what many assess to be the region's most serious flashpoint after Korea undermines the credibility of our self-described role as the region's honest broker and ultimate security guarantor.

• China's potential power is compelling; its long-term ambitions are uncertain. The Asian states hope that China's role in the region will evolve positively and are working hard to encourage that trend. They are not, however, sanguine about the outcome and are uncertain about the US response in the event troubling trends emerge.

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• Officials from other claimant as well as non-claimant states in the region argue that the USG position on the Spratlys, which we characterize as neutral, actually favors China. Given that China has generally pursued the most aggressive strategy and is the best positioned to ultimately defend its claims with military force, this argument has validity–regardless of how one assesses Beijing's motivations. China is increasingly able to frame the debate on the South China Sea because of its relative strength. ASEAN states, claimants and non-claimants alike, remain extremely reluctant to take any diplomatic actions that China might view as threatening or even actions that might alienate Beijing politically. Similarly, US concern over the appearance of singling out China or otherwise provoking a more hostile, hardened approach on Beijing's part has influenced our own modest diplomatic activity.

• Strategically, the South China Sea is the gateway to the key SLOCs between the Pacific and Indian Oceans and contains key global shipping routes which are expected to see significant increases in traffic in the coming years. Freedom of navigation in this important area is vital to US national security and commercial interests, yet could be adversely affected by the eruption of military conflict.

At the crux of the policy problem is a question we did not have to think much about in the past, but which has taken on new and growing relevance: *Are we prepared to live with China's potential annexation of the Spratlys and Paracels, as bases from which it could seek to become the dominant power in the South China Sea?* A China that could conceivably exercise de facto control of the sea's territory and resources, if not the SLOCs themselves? Such a scenario is at least plausible if current trends continue and the US maintains its hands off approach, even if China's ambitions are not purely hegemonic. If we are prepared to live with such an outcome (as long as, for example, there is no resort to military force, SLOCs remain open, and freedom of navigation is guaranteed), what would this mean for our credibility and influence as an Asian power? If we are not prepared to accept such a situation, what steps can we take now to prevent it from evolving?

A more practical, near-term concern is that growing attention by the media and by Congress to China's activities in the South China Sea could undermine our engagement strategy with the Chinese, and specifically the Chinese defense establishment. Recent events in the Spratlys could be used by some already critical of the pace of our bilateral defense contacts as further justification to distance the US from the Chinese military. We need to consider how best to counter such efforts and how we can use the defense relationship proactively to moderate Chinese behavior in the South China Sea.

Since the Mischief Reef occupation, the USG has reaffirmed our longstanding "neutral" position and have raised our concerns quietly with Beijing. We have also consulted with Indonesia, which has played a positive role in sponsoring a series of informal workshops with claimant governments, about possible new Asian diplomatic initiatives such as a freeze on military activity and the establishment of a claimant contact group. But we need to do more. Our largely business as usual posture may have already begun to take a toll on our credibility in Southeast Asia and perhaps even in Beijing. The longer we

maintain a hands off posture, the harder it will be to prevent or reverse trends at odds with our security and other national interests.

A first step must be to more clearly define our interests, in the process obtaining interagency consensus that our national interests regarding the South China Sea extend beyond the absence of conflict, a peaceful resolution of disputed claims, and freedom of navigation to ensuring that China does not position itself as the de facto power in the region. We then need to find ways to adjust our policy now to prevent an unacceptable situations from emerging over the long term. Among such adjustments, we should:

• make the resolution of South China Sea disputes a discrete item on the US-China agenda, one that we pursue in political and defense channels as part of our ongoing bilateral dialogue, not simply when tensions flare;

• quietly pursue a high-level, low-visibility "eminent persons group" which would have the mission of persuading senior officials of claimant governments that it is in the common interest to devise joint exploitation and profit sharing formulas that would sidestep sovereignty questions;

• modify our public policy statements to incorporate the additional themes that a) we view the freedom and stability of the South China Sea region as important to US national security and b) we offer our support and expertise to a process geared to devising a joint development regime for disputed areas.

Policy Considerations on the Spratly Islands Dispute

Summary

Conventional wisdom on the Spratly Islands dispute is that prospects are poor for a resolution, particularly in the near- to mid-term, but even over the long-term. This prognosis is understandable when one considers the hurdles to a lasting solution -- the number of claimants and the mixed nature of the many overlapping claims, the perceived economic and security stakes, and the legal and diplomatic challenges involved in any sovereignty dispute. Moreover, despite new diplomatic initiatives in recent years, tensions persist and occasionally flare up. The current atmosphere is more uneasy than it has been in several years.

The longstanding US posture on the dispute has been one of aloofness. We have repeatedly noted the dispute as a potential flashpoint, have stressed the need for a peaceful resolution, and have endorsed diplomatic initiatives such as ASEAN's South China Sea Declaration and the Indonesian workshops. We have also indicated we would assist in working toward a resolution if asked. But we have carefully avoided an active role in urging, influencing, or brokering any particular actions by claimants toward a general settlement of the problem.

In the post-Cold war era, there are reasons to reconsider this posture. The Spratlys are a flashpoint for conflict that could involve major regional powers and important friends and threaten the regional stability that has existed for decades. Moreover, perceived lessening of US interest and engagement may be prompting adjustments in the security calculations of regional states that could affect behavior in the Spratlys. Clearly, it is in our interest that conflict be avoided in the Spratlys. The best way to achieve this objective is to find a mutually acceptable resolution. We therefore should consider first whether there are additional approaches to the problem that could produce positive results (or at least more significant progress than we have seen to date), and second, whether the US should take a more active role in seeking a solution. This paper suggests that the answer to both questions is yes.

The concept of joint resource exploitation/profit sharing is one that deserves more serious attention in the Spratlys context. Examples exist in Asia and elsewhere of joint exploitation regimes as solutions to territorial disputes. Spratlys claimants for the most part endorse the concept in principle, but have been reluctant or unprepared to engage in serious research or dialogue on such a scheme. The prospects for success are admittedly small, even if initial resistance of the claimant states were overcome. Legal, political and practical hurdles are formidable even when a dispute is bilateral in nature; the scale of difficulties involved in the multilateral Spratlys case may be unprecedented. Still, the uncertainty over the evolving security environment which has emerged in Asia in the post-Cold War period may provide a new opportunity for reconsidering proposals that have been quickly dismissed in the past.

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The US retains significant influence on regional security issues. We should consider whether there is a useful way for us to exert a positive influence on the Spratlys in this new era. There are obvious disincentives for the US to suddenly adopt a vocal and overt role, particularly given our traditional hands off approach. No one in the region wants to see us try to dictate a solution or to arrogantly insert ourselves into a complicated and sensitive problem just as Asian initiatives may be starting to have a modestly helpful impact. A clumsy US entry into the issue could be counterproductive, alienating our friends, driving claimants to harden their positions, and renewing regional doubts about our Asian policies in general.

What we should aim for, then, is to stimulate others in the region to take the lead in seeking a fresh approach. A respected group of senior regional statesmen of non-claimant countries, of the caliber of Lee Kuan Yew and Ali Alatas, for example, could offer a new and promising catalyst for focusing attention on a practical solution along the lines of a joint exploitation regime. Working quietly and informally behind the scenes, such an eminent persons group could, at a minimum, serve as a mechanism for consciousness raising. It could also elevate the Spratlys problem above the various national bureaucracies that may be more interested in protecting current positions than in finding a solution. Elevating the problem quietly to the senior most levels of the claimant governments could also cut through the protracted consensus building process that characterizes ASEAN-style policy making.

The Environment -- Diplomatic Initiatives...

The most noteworthy initiative on the Spratlys in recent years has been Indonesia's sponsorship of a series of workshops on "Managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea," funded in large part by the Canadian International Development Agency. Participants are government officials from the claimant states, in a non-official capacity, as well as private experts and academics. Additionally, observers and "resource persons" have participated from Canada, Laos, Singapore and Thailand. Japan and Australia have expressed interest in attending the workshops, and USG officials have made informal inquiries from time to time about the possibility of observing, but the consensus of the workshops thus far has been not to expand the list of participants. The last workshop (the fourth) produced agreement that any observers asked to attend future meetings will be brought in only for financial assistance or the transfer of technology, not as problem-solvers or mediators. There is also agreement among the participants that the key to continued progress toward long-term resolution of the Spratlys dispute is to avoid reaching too quickly for a resolution to the competing claims of sovereignty. Instead, the workshops have focused on non-controversial confidence-building measures.

Participants at the second workshop held in Bandung, Indonesia, issued a set a principles intended as recommendations for concerned governments. They are:

- Without prejudice to territorial and jurisdictional claims, to explore areas of cooperation in the South China Sea.

• Such areas of cooperation may include cooperation to promote safety of navigation and communications, to coordinate search and rescue, to combat piracy and armed robbery, to promote the rational utilization of living resources, to conduct marine scientific research, and to eliminate illicit traffic in drugs in the South China Sea.

• In areas where conflicting territorial claims exist, the relevant states may consider the possibility of undertaking cooperation for mutual benefit, including exchanges of information and joint development.

• Any territorial and jurisdictional dispute in the South China Sea should be resolved by peaceful means through dialogue and negotiation.

• Force should not be used to settle territorial and jurisdictional disputes.

• The parties involved in such disputes are urged to exercise self-restraint in order not to complicate the situation.

Indonesia's objective is to formalize the workshops so that concrete progress can be made in non-controversial areas of cooperation. There was no consensus on moving toward this objective at the third workshop in June 1992. At the fourth workshop in Surabaya in August 1993, Indonesia was increasingly frustrated by foot-dragging by China and Malaysia. Nonetheless, Jakarta will host at least one more informal session with the hope of raising the talks to a more formal level. This fifth session is scheduled for October 15 1994, with the objective of obtaining agreement on concrete projects.

Several working groups have been formed in the past two workshops. A working group on maritime scientific research was convened in Manila in May 1993 and reportedly met subsequently in Singapore and Indonesia. This group is now seeking support of governments in the participating countries for its proposal for joint research. Other working groups have been established on environmental resources, the resources assessment and development, legal issues, and safety in navigation.

ASEAN's movement into the security arena, and particularly its Declaration on the South China Sea announced at the July 1992 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, raised the profile and bolstered the efforts of the Indonesia workshops. The 1992 Declaration closely follows the Bandung Principles listed above. It calls on claimants to peacefully resolve competing claims; exercise restraint and create a positive climate for eventual resolution of all disputes; and to explore the possibility of cooperation on maritime safety and communication, anti-pollution efforts, search and rescue coordination, anti-piracy, and counter-narcotics.

The extent to which South China Sea disputes will be addressed in the new ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is not yet clear. Despite strong efforts by China and some Southeast Asian countries to keep the Spratlys off the agenda at the May 1994 ARF Senior Officials Meeting, the issue was discussed in a general and non-controversial

fashion. The issue was also broached generally in the ARF ministerial meeting in July. Some transparency and confidence building measures that may be promoted in the ARF could be meaningful for the Spratlys problem. However, it is unlikely that the ARF will play a central role in resolving the dispute in the foreseeable future.

...But Persistent (and Increasing?) Tensions

Oil companies under contract to China and Vietnam are increasing on-site exploration in contested areas, which has caused tensions to rise to perhaps the highest level since early 1992 when China passed a law claiming sovereignty over the Spratlys and awarded Crestone, a small US oil exploration company, an oil concession west of the Spratlys. China and Vietnam have been waging a war of words over which country has the right to drill in the Blue Dragon oil field and the nearby block China awarded to Crestone. China recently claimed sovereignty specifically over the Blue Dragon field for the first time, stating that the area is part of the Spratly Islands "adjacent waters" and not Vietnam's continental shelf. Vietnam awarded the surrounding block in December 1993 to an international consortium, including Mobil Oil, that wants to start drilling in spite of China's objections. Beijing warned Mobil's chairman of possible economic retribution if Mobil did not cancel its agreement with Vietnam. The PLA Navy reportedly wanted to confront Vietnam directly, but was not authorized to do so. Such developments have led the State Department to caution US firms involved that the areas concerned are disputed and that we do not recognize the legitimacy of any specific claims over others.

Attitudes of Claimant States

The greatest source of tension in the Spratlys is between Vietnam and China. They have agreed in principle to resolve their territorial disputes peacefully and continue to hold talks on territorial claims, but no progress has been made on the Spratlys. China has also agreed in principle to joint development of resources in the Spratlys, but has taken steps to reinforce its sovereignty claims undertake unilateral exploration. At the same time, Beijing has continued to insist that territorial issues be resolved bilaterally. China's Crestone concession was for an area contested only by Vietnam; more recent concession activity has also been confined largely to areas contested only by these two claimants. China has repeatedly stated that it has indisputable sovereignty over the Spratlys and adjacent waters and is opposed to any attempt to internationalize the territorial dispute, contending that only countries directly involved should discuss this issue.

Hanoi does not want to weaken its claim of sovereignty over the Spratlys, and is unwilling to give Beijing a share of the resources in areas that it considers part of its continental shelf rather than part of the Spratlys. Vietnam would consider Chinese proposals for joint development in the central Spratlys in return for China abandoning its claims in the areas lying closer to Vietnam's coast, but China is unlikely to abandon claims that appear to hold the best prospect for significant oil finds.

Malaysia, like China, does not want the dispute internationalized. The concept of joint development is problematic because Malaysian officials believe that merely agreeing to discuss joint development implies acceptance of the validity of the Chinese claims there. Malaysian officials have distinguished the Spratlys case from other regional cases of successful joint development efforts in that China's claim is far from its border and "extreme." A senior Malaysian MFA official recently reaffirmed to visiting Assistant Secretary Lord that while joint exploration is, in principle, a part of Malaysian policy, in fact it is too simple a formulation. China's claim extends nearly to the coast of East Malaysia. Malaysia has invested considerable money into developing resources in its EEZ, an area lying within China's claim, and has no intention of sharing this with any international consortium, according to the official.

Manila's higher profile recently on the Spratlys is probably due largely to the perceived loss of security following the US military withdrawal from Clark and Subic. President Ramos' trip to Vietnam last March included a widely publicized call for demilitarization of the Spratlys area, although Department of Foreign Affairs officials subsequently clarified that Ramos' proposal was actually for a joint study of the disputed area among all of the claimants, along with some other CBM's such as visits by garrison commanders. This study would be a step toward achieving his long-term aim, the formation of a multilateral commission comprising the claimants that would supervise activities in the area. Vietnamese officials reportedly agreed in principle to the joint study proposal. Meanwhile, the Philippines looks to the ARF as a mechanism to promote dialogue on Spratlys issues--probably as a means to compensate for its inadequate capability to physically defend its claims. Manila envisions pursuing various confidence building measures to create a cooperative atmosphere in which more difficult issues can then be addressed in a peaceful manner.

Tacit understandings have been reached among various Spratlys claimants on a bilateral basis and bilateral initiatives continue. Malaysia and the Philippines reportedly have a tacit understanding concerning the relatively small area contested by the two. Although the Philippines rejected a Malaysian idea of drawing a line in the ocean halfway between the two claims, both countries have agreed in principle to joint management of their fishery resources. Joint exploration was also reportedly discussed in recent bilateral meetings in Beijing and Manila, with no agreements reached. Assuming the PRC's claim to the whole area is resolved, Malaysia has proposed using parts of the Antarctic Treaty as a model to increase CBM's and to improve transparency among the claimants. With claimants other than China, Malaysia will continue to negotiate on a bilateral basis, but in a low key manner. According to one Chinese source, however, the Malaysians reacted positively to a proposal for joint development of the area of their overlapping claims during an April visit to Kuala Lumpur by the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister.

Joint Exploitation -- Asian Models for a Spratlys Resolution

One need not look outside the Asian theater for examples of successful resolution of disputed maritime/resource claims. Notable examples are:

• **Timor Gap Treaty:** Australia and Indonesia signed a treaty in 1989 to convert the Timor Gap--waters and seabed off East Timor that were not covered in the 1972 extension of the maritime boundary between Australia and Indonesia--into a joint zone of cooperation. Although Indonesia and Australia fixed their 1972 maritime boundary along the Timor Trough (which they viewed as the natural separation of their continental shelves), Indonesia, which incorporated East Timor in 1976, subsequently pressed the median-line boundary for the Timor Gap. The treaty takes into account both Australia's position that the boundary is the axis of the Timor Trough and Indonesia's median line position. According to the agreement, the 60,000 square kilometer zone comprises three regions which allow for the exploration and exploitation of petroleum resources. The center region is the largest of the three and is regulated by an Australian and Indonesian joint authority under the supervision of both nations' Ministerial Councils. Any tax revenues accrued from development are to be shared on a 50/50 basis. The northern area is regulated by Indonesia's laws and tax structure; the southern region is regulated by Australia. Australia obtains 10 per cent of Indonesia's tax revenues from the northern area, while Indonesia receives 10 percent of Australia's tax revenues from the southern area. Notification and consultation of any exploration and development in these two areas is required. Until the zone is replaced by a single boundary, this arrangement will allow both countries to benefit from the potential petroleum resources of the region. The agreement runs for 40 years with a 20-year extension period.

• **Japan-Korea Agreement on Continental Shelf Boundary and Joint Development Zone:** In 1974, Japan and Korea signed two maritime agreements, one establishing a continental shelf boundary in the northern part of the maritime region adjacent to the countries, and other creating a Joint Development Zone to the south of the shelf boundary. The latter agreement, which remains in force for a period of at least 50 years, defines nine subzones in each of which exploration and exploitation can be conducted by concessionaires of both countries. The total area encompassed by the agreement in over 24,000 square nautical miles. The agreement establishes a Joint Commission as the consultative mechanism for all implementation issues, and lays out a dispute arbitration process.

• **Malaysia-Thailand Joint Development Area:** The Malaysia-Thailand Joint Authority (MTJA) was established in 1979 to address overlapping sovereignty claims in the northeastern Malaysia/Southeastern Thailand area. The contested area was named the Joint Development Area (JDA). The 1979 MOU agreed to jointly explore and exploit the seabed and subsoil non-living resources in a defined JDA for a period of 50 years and to share the costs incurred and the benefits derived equally. During this time, the countries will continue to negotiate the boundary. The MTJA assumed all rights and responsibilities on behalf of both parties, but the implementation of the JDA plan was delayed because of legal complications arising from the claims of concession holders in the area. In 1990, Thailand and Malaysia signed a final agreement on the establishment of a joint authority to regulate exploitation of gas and oil reserves in the overlapping area. In April 1994, Prime Ministers Mahathir and Chuan signed production sharing

contracts between the Malaysia-Thailand Joint Authority, Petronas Carigali, Triton Oil, and the Thai National Oil Company to develop three blocks in the Gulf of Thailand covering roughly 7250 square kilometers.

Seeking a Spratlys Solution -- the Substance

Asian nations are clearly familiar with the concept of joint exploitation and have seen it work in practice. There is a wealth of legal writing on the concept, and many Asian analysts and observers have called for joint development of the Spratlys area as a way to sidestep conflicting sovereignty claims and reduce the prospects for hostilities to erupt. One longtime analyst, Mark Valencia of the East-West Center, has over the years developed the concept into the most concrete proposal for the Spratlys, one which incorporates many of the features of agreements described above. It offers a useful basis for discussion and study of an approach we might wish to quietly advocate.

Valencia has argued in a variety of fora since at least the mid-1980's that a cooperative regime makes sense for the Spratlys and is doable. He uses Antarctica as an example of another region where a seemingly intractable competition among ideological rivals was ameliorated by the institutionalization of a cooperative regime. He views the internationalizing of the Spratlys as the first step towards the realization of a larger ZOPFAN in Southeast Asia. He argues that the various bilateral commitments to resolve the issues by peaceful means are the foundation for such a leap forward. Under a cooperative regime, claims would be frozen and a "Spratlys Authority" established to eliminate conflict, facilitate exploration and development of resources, and facilitate the management of fisheries and maintenance of environmental quality. All the claimants would be members and nations like Indonesia, the US and Russia might be admitted as associate members to assist with exploration or mediate disagreements. As with Antarctic Treaty membership, such associate members would have to be financially able to assist and would have to accede to the agreement. Valencia has even gone to the extent of drafting a Spratlys Treaty that he has modeled on the Antarctic Treaty, while acknowledging the significant geographic and political differences between the two (see Tab 1 for a fuller description of Valencia's argument and his draft Spratlys treaty).

The joint exploitation approach for the Spratlys and Valencia's Spratly Treaty proposal specifically have received some scholarly attention but have not caught on among the claimants or other interested parties. In part, this lack of enthusiasm is undoubtedly due to the difficult problems surrounding the practical and legal dimensions of Valencia's proposal (as discussed in the article at Tab 2). Bilateral joint development agreements, still relatively rare on the world scene, are difficult to enough to accomplish even when, as is normally the case, the dispute is narrowly defined to a clearly designated area. The Spratlys problem is fundamentally more complex in that there is no single agreed upon area, but a "crazy patchwork quilt" of overlapping claims. As is pointed out, much of the overlapping claims area in the Spratlys involve three or more state parties. Those areas which are contested bilaterally involve mainly the two most antagonistic claimants--China and Vietnam.

It is for legal and other experts to assess the prospects for a joint exploitation scheme on its merits. Preliminary research raises doubts that such a scheme will become attractive in the near term, especially given the prevailing sentiments of key claimant states who persist in opposing the internationalizing of the dispute. Policy questions that need to be asked, however, include whether the current political environment warrants pursuit of a "bold stroke," as Valencia characterizes his proposal, what the response of claimant states would be, and what role the US should play. It may be, for example, that a joint exploitation arrangement only makes sense and is manageable if confined to the central part of the Spratlys contested by all the claimants except Brunei. This area, shown in Tab 3, is geographically defined and is confined enough for a practical application of the joint exploitation concept. Surrounding areas claimed by fewer countries could be addressed in a similar multilateral fashion, with the majority of contested area appropriate for bilateral arrangements.

The Process

In a classic low-key Asian style, the Asians are taking measured steps to address the Spratlys dispute. Confidence-building measures such as the Indonesian workshops have the potential to be moderately helpful, and endorsement of the Bandung Principles and ASEAN Declaration provide the beginnings of an official framework to complement the practical steps of the workshops. The ASEAN Regional Forum offers a potential new vehicle for claimant and interested states to discuss the issue and promote cooperation. Progress is being made bilaterally, such as with the Malaysian-Vietnamese agreement on their continental shelf dispute, and new initiatives are being proposed, such as Ramos' call for a study of demilitarizing the area, that are all similar to the measures Valencia has urged to establish an environment conducive to the formation of a Spratlys Authority.

This process is evolutionary. None of the claimants appear interested for now in a final, formal resolution, but rather in a cooperative process that reduces the likelihood of confrontation while keeping intact their respective claims of sovereignty. Moreover, they are conscious of the possibility that seeking to do too much too quickly could lead the process to unravel. The claimants and other concerned Asian nations repeatedly make the point that the cooperative process must evolve at a pace with which the claimants are comfortable.

Nonetheless, under the best circumstances, the current informal, multi-track, cautious process may lead nowhere. It could result in endless dialogue and working group meetings that do not address the fundamental issues, do not advance the objective of resolution, and do not influence the behavior of claimant states in reaffirming and protecting their claims. If provocative concession activity continues and the Spratlys remains perceived as the one regional flashpoint, even the introduction of modest confidence building measures may not be terribly significant. Given this potential, we should consider whether we can help energize the process to one which stands a better chance of producing results.

In the Asian context, the process can be at least as important as the substance of a solution. It would be inappropriate and possibly counterproductive for the US to step in at this point to play an active, overt role in pursuing a solution to the Spratlys. We should consider, however, encouraging action by other interested actors with a similar stake in a peaceful outcome of the Spratlys dispute. If the joint exploitation approach were refined and articulated quietly by the right individuals--for example, senior representatives of non-claimant states such as Lee Kuan Yew, it might be viewed as more feasible and politically palatable than at present. The US role might be limited to informing and encouraging such eminent persons to look more carefully at the joint exploitation concept, perhaps providing legal or other expertise as requested. These individuals could then determine to whom and how best to encourage attention to such a model in the claimant states. The opportunities for quiet diplomacy at senior government levels are countless given the proliferation of regional fora and frequent senior level visits. If interest evolved in the senior levels of claimant governments, these eminent persons could help broker direct discussions between claimant state officials.

We might also enlist the assistance of the Canadians in this effort. They have played a quietly constructive role in organizing the Indonesian workshops and thus are accepted as a player. They have been generally eager to pursue multilateral security initiatives in Asia. Working in concert with Ottawa would also reduce the prospects that the initiative, if it became public, would be negatively viewed as an example of unilateral US intervention in an Asian problem.

The political, diplomatic and legal hurdles to any type of solution indeed are daunting. At the same time, however, new opportunities have appeared in the post-Cold War period that should make us question the conventional wisdom on the Spratlys. We clearly have an interest in addressing this security problem which has the potential to create regional instability and foster arms buildups which run counter to our long term objectives for the region. In this regard, we should be prepared to question assumptions and consider new approaches, to include modifying the traditional US non-role. It is at least possible that claimant states have a real interest in at least considering a joint exploitation scheme; what may be needed now is a new push from a new direction. Although the prospects of a major breakthrough are limited, the approach outlined above carries little risk to US interests if managed well and done discreetly.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. fax~~	~~To: National Security Council Staff; From: Mariso Lino; Re: Taiwain /~~ Boeing (3 pages)	~~02/15/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VL 1/2/2020
~~002. fax~~	~~To: National Security Council Staff; From: Michael Guest; Re:~~ Following Up On Taiwans Planned Purchase of Boeing Aircraft (5 pages)	~~02/11/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VL 1/2/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Kristoff, Sandra)
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FOLDER TITLE:
Taiwan [1]

2012-0975-F
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Cleared last night

'95 FEB 15 P8:20

Washfax Receipt
Department of State

B

S/S #

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2017-0051-M (1.16)

C

Message No. 017660 Classification ~~Confidential~~ No. Pages 2

From: Marisa Lino (Office name) S/S (Office symbol) 647-5302 (Extension) 7224 (Room number)

Message Description Cable to AIT TAIPEI: TAIWAN'S COMMITMENT TO BUY BOEING

To (Agency):	Deliver To:	Extension	Room No.
NSCS	~~Nancy Soderberg~~	456-9461	WHSITRM
	Fred Dohse		
	Executive Secretariat		
	ROTH		
	SUETTINGER		

For: Clearance ☒ Information ☐ Per Request ☐ Comment ☐

Remarks: Please clear by: MUST GO. Meeting referred to in message needs to be requested tomorrow, post was told by secure phone. Issue is very urgent.

NSC: B. Suettinger

S/S Officer: Marisa Lino

CROSSHATCH

Return Time-Stamped Coversheet to S/S

DELIVERED TO LIU, EMPHASIZING THAT:

-- WE WILL NOT NEGOTIATE EXPLICIT LINKAGES BETWEEN COMMERICAL DEALS AND CABINET OR OTHER HIGH-LEVEL VISITS. WE ARE FULLY COMMITTED TO IMPLEMENTING THE TPR STEP ALLOWING CABINET-LEVEL VISITS TO TAIWAN, ON OCCASIONS APPROPRIATE TO OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS.

-- SECRETARY PENA AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS ARE PREPARED TO HOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON AFTER THE LETTER OF INTENT (LOI) IS SIGNED, TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THIS DECISION. WE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO SEND AN OFFICIAL TO TAIPEI TO WITNESS THE SIGNING OF THE LOI.

-- WE HOPE THE LETTER OF INTENT CAN BE SIGNED DURING NEXT WEEK'S VISIT (FEBRUARY 24) BY RON WOODARD, PRESIDENT OF THE BOEING COMMERCIAL AIRPLANE GROUP.

-- WE LOOK FORWARD TO QUICK AND FAVORABLE RESOLUTION OF THIS MATTER.

4. DOT ADVISES THAT SECRETARY PENA HAS OFFERED TO CALL MINISTER LIU, IF SUCH A CALL COULD ADVANCE OUR INTERESTS. DIRECTOR'S VIEWS ON THIS WOULD BE APPRECIATED.

5. FYI, SECRETARY PENA WILL BE IN CANADA FEBRUARY 24. HE MIGHT BE AVAILABLE TO MAKE A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT IN WASHINGTON LATE ON THE 24TH, OR, PREFERABLY, THE FOLLOWING DAY. SIGNED BELLOCCHI
YY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE (WE) 02.15. '95 20:18 NO. 1460120603 PAGE 3

ORIGINAL

OUTGOING TELEGRAM 2/15

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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EAP:PTOMSEN

NSC:
EAP/RSP/TC:HHLANGE
AIT/W:NBELLOCCHI

DOT:ALEVINE
P:BHALL

IMMEDIATE AIT TAIPEI FROM AIT WASHDC

ROUTINE BEIJING

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: EAIR, ETRD, PGOV, TW

SUBJECT: TAIWAN'S COMMITMENT TO BUY BOEING

REFS: A) TAIPEI 924 B) STATE 36468 (BOTH NOTAL)

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WASHINGTON AGENCIES APPRECIATE THE AIT DIRECTOR'S EFFECTIVE DELIVERY OF USG CONCERN AND DISAPPOINTMENT OVER THE WAY THIS MATTER HAS BEEN HANDLED BY THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES. WE REMAIN DISAPPOINTED, AND FIRMLY OPPOSED TO THE LINKAGE WITH ANOTHER CABINET-LEVEL VISIT WHICH TAIWAN IS PURSUING. AS THE DIRECTOR INFORMED TRANSPORTATION MINISTER LIU, THE ADMINISTRATION IS NOT/NOT WILLING TO INCLUDE IN AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE BOEING PURCHASE A PROMISE THAT A HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIAL WILL VISIT TAIPEI.

3. GIVEN LIU'S RESPONSE, WASHINGTON SUGGESTS THAT THE DIRECTOR MAKE A PARALLEL APPROACH TO A TAIWAN REPRESENTATIVE WITH MORE INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE, SUCH AS FM FRED CHIEN OR NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR DING MOU-SHIH. IN THIS MEETING, THE DIRECTOR COULD MAKE THE SAME POINTS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OK
SN
cleared
2/13/95

Washfax Receipt
Department of State

B

'95 FEB 11 P2:27
S/S #

Message No. 017482 Classification ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ No. Pages 4

From: Michael Guest (Office name) S/S (Office symbol) 647-8448 (Extension) 7224 (Room number)

Message Description Cable to AIT TAIPEI RE FOLLOWING UP WITH PRESIDENT LEE ON TAIWANS PLANNED PURCHASE OF BOEING AIRCRAFT

To (Agency):	Deliver To:	Extension	Room No.
NSCS	~~Nancy Soderberg~~	456-9461	WHSITRM
	~~Will Roh~~		
	Andy Sens		
	Executive Secretariat		
	ROTH		
	SUETTINGER		

For: Clearance ☒ Information ☐ Per Request ☐ Comment ☐

Remarks: Please clear by: NLT Sunday 2/12 5:00 pm — guidance needed for use in Taipei at OOB Monday —

NSC POC - Bob Suettinger

S/S Officer: Michael Guest

AJT

CROSSHATCH

Return Time-Stamped Coversheet to S/S

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2017-0051-m (1.17)

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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02/10/95 7-7711 SERATC 4647
EAP:PTOMSEN

EAP/RSP/TC:HLANGE
DOT:ABORMOLINI
P:EBRIMMER
S/S-O -

NSC:
AIT/W:RSANDER
S/S:

IMMEDIATE AIT TAIPEI FROM AIT WASHDC

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: EAIR, ETRD, PGOV, TW

SUBJECT: FOLLOWING UP WITH PRESIDENT LEE ON TAIWAN'S PLANNED PURCHASE OF BOEING AIRCRAFT

REFS: A) TAIPEI 778 B) TAIPEI 651

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. WASHINGTON AGENCIES INSTRUCT AIT DIRECTOR TO CALL ON PRESIDENT LEE AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY TO SEEK CONFIRMATION AND CLARIFICATION OF LEE'S FEBRUARY 3 MESSAGE ON TAIWAN'S PLANS TO PURCHASE TEN BOEING 777 AIRPLANES. DIRECTOR SHOULD INFORM LEE THAT SECRETARY PENA IS MOST APPRECIATIVE OF TAIWAN'S INTENTION TO BUY BOEING, BUT THAT WE HAVE RECEIVED CONFLICTING MESSAGES FROM OTHERS IN THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES. WE HOPE LEE WILL CONFIRM THE MESSAGE HE DELIVERED TO THE DIRECTOR ON FEBRUARY 3. PER THE TAIWAN POLICY REVIEW, THE USG WILL SEND CABINET LEVEL OFFICIALS TO TAIWAN AT APPROPRIATE TIMES, BUT THE TIMING AND NATURE OF THESE VISITS WILL BE DETERMINED BY WASHINGTON. THE PRESIDENT OF BOEING'S COMMERCIAL AIRPLANE GROUP WILL BE IN TAIWAN FEBRUARY 24, AND WE HOPE THAT HE WILL SIGN A LETTER OF INTENT AT THAT TIME, TO IMPLEMENT

PRESIDENT LEE'S MESSAGE. SECRETARY PENA AND BOEING WOULD BE PLEASED TO HOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON AT THAT TIME TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS AGREEMENT. END SUMMARY.

3. ON FEBRUARY 10, USG AND AIT REPRESENTATIVES MET AT THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION WITH BOEING OFFICIALS TO DISCUSS THE TAIWAN PROPOSAL TO PURCHASE 10 777 AIRCRAFT (REF B). USG PARTICIPANTS WERE ANN BORMOLINI, CHIEF OF STAFF TO SECRETARY PENA; DOT ACTING A/S PATRICK MURPHY; ARNOLD LEVINE, DIRECTOR OF THE DOT OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION AND TRADE; ROBERT SUETTINGER, NSC DIRECTOR FOR ASIAN AFFAIRS; EAP/RSP/TC ANDREW ROTHMAN; AND AIT/W BY RAYMOND SANDER. BOEING REPRESENTATIVES WERE LARRY DICKENSON, VP SALES (ASIA); CHRISTOPHER HANSEN, CORPORATE VP (DC OFFICE); JOSEPH OZIMEK, DIRECTOR OF PRODUCT MARKETING; AND JANE CICALA, DIRECTOR OF BOEING'S WASHINGTON OFFICE. AT BOEING'S REQUEST, DAVID LAUX, DIRECTOR OF THE USA-ROC ECONOMIC COUNCIL, ALSO ATTENDED THE MEETING.

4. FROM BOEING'S PERSPECTIVE, THEY HAD HEARD FROM SECRETARY PENA AND DAVID LAUX THAT TAIWAN WANTED TO PURCHASE NEW EQUIPMENT. SINCE THEY WERE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH CHINA AIRLINES FOR 737S, THE INTEREST IN 777S WAS NEW INFORMATION. CHINA AIRLINES HAS NOT YET EVIDENCED ANY KNOWLEDGE OF LEE'S DECISION IN DISCUSSIONS WITH BOEING. IN FACT, BOEING IS CONCERNED THAT CHINA AIRLINES IS MORE INCLINED TO BUY THE A-320 OVER THE 737. THIS WOULD BE A DOUBLE LOSS SINCE THE A-320 COCKPIT CONFIGURATION IS IDENTICAL TO THE AIRBUS COMPETITOR TO THE 777 AND A FAVORABLE DECISION ON THE A-320 WOULD DRIVE THE SELECTION OF THE LARGER AIRCRAFT TO THE AIRBUS. FROM BOEING'S PERSPECTIVE, CHINA AIRLINES IS NOT ABLE TO HANDLE BUYING BOTH THE 737 AND 777 AIRCRAFT AT THE SAME TIME. (BOEING WOULD, IN FACT, PREFER THAT THE AIRLINE REDIRECT ITS EFFORTS TOWARD THE LARGER PLANE, BUT AS NOTED ABOVE HAS SEEN NO INDICATIONS OF SUCH A REDIRECTION.)

5. AS AN HISTORICAL NOTE, A SIMILAR SCENARIO OCCURRED IN 1988 WHEN THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES WANTED A VERY PUBLIC CEREMONY FOR A LETTER OF INTENT (SIGNED BY THE TRANPORTATION MINISTER) TO BUY 10 AIRCRAFT. THIS WAS PLAYED OUT HERE IN WASHINGTON BY A TAIWAN BUYING MISSION, CONGRESSMAN FOLEY AND USTR YEUTTER, AND WITH THEN REPRESENTATIVE CHIEN FU AND HIS ECON DIVISION CHIEF BENJAMIN LU. THE PURCHASE WAS DIVIDED BETWEEN BOEING AND MCDONNELL-DOUGLAS AND TWO YEARS AFTER THE LOI WAS

ANNOUNCED BOEING FINALIZED A CONTRACT FOR SIX AIRCRAFT.

6. BOEING'S DICKENSON SAID THAT THEIR EXPERIENCE HAS BEEN THAT THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES USUALLY BUY AIRCRAFT AND THEN LEASE THEM TO CHINA AIRLINES, VIA THE TRANSPORTATION MINISTRY. HE ADDED THAT THE AIRPLANE PURCHASE DECISIONS WERE USUALLY "JAMMED DOWN CHINA AIRLINES' THROAT." BOEING SAID THAT WHILE IT NEEDED USG HELP WITH SALES TO CHINA AIRLINES, IT HAD A SMOOTH RELATIONSHIP WITH EVA AIRLINES.

7. BOEING ASKED THAT THE USG AND AIT FOLLOW UP WITH THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. DICKENSON WILL BE IN TAIWAN SHORTLY, AND RON WOODARD, PRESIDENT OF THE BOEING COMMERCIAL AIRPLANE GROUP, WILL JOIN HIM THERE FEBRUARY 24 FOR MEETINGS WITH CHINA AIRLINES. BOEING HOPES A LETTER OF INTENT COULD BE SIGNED AT THAT TIME.

8. AIT DIRECTOR IS REQUESTED TO SEEK AN APPOINTMENT WITH PRESIDENT LEE AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY, TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- AS PRESIDENT LEE REQUESTED, AIT DIRECTOR PASSED HIS FEBRUARY THIRD MESSAGE ON TO SECRETARY PENA. THE SECRETARY IS VERY PLEASED WITH LEE'S DECISION.

- THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE WAS VERY CLEAR: AS A RESULT OF SECRETARY PENA'S DECEMBER VISIT, THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES HAVE WORKED OUT ARRANGEMENTS FOR TAIWAN AIRLINES TO BUY TEN BOEING 777 AIRCRAFT. THIS DECISION WOULD BE ANNOUNCED BY THE AIRLINES, WHICH WOULD MEET WITH BOEING TO DISCUSS TERMS. THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES WOULD ASSIST WITH THE FINANCING. YOU HOPED THAT A SENIOR USG OFFICIAL COULD VISIT TAIWAN FOR THE SIGNING CEREMONY.

- SECRETARY PENA ASKED THAT THE DIRECTOR INFORM PRESIDENT LEE THAT HE IS PLEASED THAT THE CONSTRUCTIVE, POSITIVE DISCUSSIONS HE HAD IN TAIWAN HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THIS STRENGTHENING OF THE U.S.-TAIWAN COMMERCIAL RELATIONSHIP. HE ALSO THANKS PRESIDENT LEE FOR THE EXCEPTIONALLY WARM WELCOME HE RECIEVED IN TAIPEI.

- EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF SECRETARY PENA'S VISIT, WHICH WAS A MANIFESTATION OF THE POLICY REVIEW, AND OUR DESIRE FOR CLOSE COOPERATION IN THE FUTURE.

- THE SECRETARY AND OTHERS IN THE USG ARE CONCERNED, HOWEVER, ABOUT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE THEY HAVE RECEIVED FROM OTHER TAIWAN AUTHORITIES WHICH

DIFFER FROM THE MESSAGE YOU DELIVERED TO ME. THESE OTHER INTERPRETATIONS INCLUDE ADDITIONAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR THE AIRCRAFT PURCHASE.

- ONE MESSAGE HAD, IN FACT, LED SECRETARY PENA AND THE WHITE HOUSE TO PREPARE TO MAKE A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THIS PURCHASE ON FEBRUARY 3. FORTUNATELY, THIS MISTAKEN MESSAGE WAS CORRECTED PRIOR TO ANY PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT IN WASHINGTON.

- BECAUSE OF THESE VARYING MESSAGES, SECRETARY PENA HAS ASKED THAT I RECONFIRM WITH YOU THE INFORMATION YOU PROVIDED TO ME ON FEBRUARY 3.

- BOEING HAS WORKED CLOSELY WITH CHINA AIRLINES OVER MANY YEARS TO PROVIDE HIGH QUALITY AIRCRAFT FOR TAIWAN'S NEEDS, AND HAS BEEN DISCUSSING POSSIBLE SALES OF OTHER AIRCRAFT. IN THAT REGARD, TWO OF ITS SENIOR EXECUTIVES WILL ARRIVE IN TAIWAN FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH CHINA AIRLINES, INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT OF BOEING'S COMMERCIAL AIRPLANE GROUP, WHO ARRIVES IN TAIPEI FEBRUARY 24.

- BOEING, SECRETARY PENA AND I HOPE THAT A LETTER OF INTENT CAN BE SIGNED WITH BOEING AT THAT TIME. THIS WOULD PAVE THE WAY FOR THE DISCUSSION OF TERMS BETWEEN THE AIRLINES THAT YOU DESCRIBED IN OUR LAST DISCUSSION.

- AT THE TIME A LETTER OF INTENT IS SIGNED IN TAIWAN, SECRETARY PENA AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS ARE PREPARED TO HOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON, TO PROVIDE APPROPRIATE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THIS DECISION.

- WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR A U.S. OFFICIAL TO TRAVEL TO TAIWAN FOR THE PURPOSE OF WITNESSING THE SIGNING OF A LETTER OF INTENT.

- HOWEVER, I WANT TO REITERATE THAT HIGH-LEVEL OFFICIALS, INCLUDING AT THE CABINET LEVEL, WILL CONTINUE TO VISIT TAIWAN ON OCCASIONS AS APPROPRIATE TO OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS.

YY

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. cable~~	~~Re: Acknowledgment of Gifts (4 pages)~~	~~12/08/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ 1/2/2020
~~002. cable~~	~~Re: Transit of US for President Lee (3 pages)~~	~~02/23/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ 1/2/2020
~~003. cable~~	~~RE: Taiwan Invitee to Commemoration of the End of World War II (6 pages)~~	~~04/13/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ 1/2/2020
004. cable	Re: Transit of US by President Lee (3 pages)	03/21/1995	P1/b(1)
~~005. memcon~~	~~Yu-Ting yu of Honolulu TECO (7 pages)~~	~~03/17/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ 1/2/2020
~~006. email~~	~~To: Berger, Samuel; From: Roth, Stanley; Re: Suggested Taiwan~~ Talking Points (2 pages)	~~03/04/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ 1/2/2020
007. paper	Taiwan Demarche [partial] (2 pages)	10/23/1991	P1/b(1)
~~008a. memo~~	~~To: The President; From: John Podesta, Todd Stern; Re: Visa for~~ President Li of Taiwan (1 page)	~~04/20/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ 1/2/2020
008b. memo	To: The President; From: Anthony Lake; Re: Granting a Visa to President Li of Taiwan [partial] (3 pages)	04/14/1995	P1/b(1)
~~009. cable~~	~~Re: Proposed Transit by Vice Premier Hsu Li-The (2 pages)~~	~~04/25/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ 1/2/2020
~~010a. memo~~	~~Copy of 008a (1 page)~~	~~04/20/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ 1/2/2020
010b. memo	Copy of 008b [partial] (3 pages)	04/14/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Kristoff, Sandra)
OA/Box Number: 1041

FOLDER TITLE:
Taiwan [2]

2012-0975-F
sb1266

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010c. report	Visit to the United States by Taiwan President Li Teng-hui (4 pages)	04/07/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Kristoff, Sandra)
OA/Box Number: 1041

FOLDER TITLE:
Taiwan [2]

2012-0975-F
sb1266

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRT: COMM DOHSE HARMON SENS SIT
SIT: COQ HARMON NSC ROTH SUETTINGER SUM SUM2

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 081345Z DEC 95

FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

TO AIT TAIPEI
INFO ////
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ EYES ONLY
QQQQ
.
EYES ONLY FOR AIT DIRECTOR PASCOE FROM ROTH.
BEGIN TEXT:
.
SUBJECT: ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF GIFTS TO POTUS FROM LEE TENG-HUI AND KOO CHEN-FU
.
1. MARK MIDDLETON, A FORMER WHITE HOUSE OFFICIAL WHO MET WITH THE TAIWAN DELEGATION TO APEC AT OSAKA, ACCEPTED (WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION) GIFTS FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM APEC DELEGATION LEADER KOO CHEN-FU AND FROM PRESIDENT LEE. THE WHITE HOUSE WOULD LIKE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THEM IN AN APPROPRIATE, LOW-KEY WAY.
.

2. GIVEN THE UNOFFICIAL AND INDIRECT CHANNEL OF DELIVERY, WE BELIEVE AN ORAL, RATHER THAN WRITTEN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT WOULD BE SUITABLE. IF YOU AGREE, PLEASE USE THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS WITH THE HIGHEST LEVEL OFFICIAL YOU DEEM APPROPRIATE.
.
3. FOR PRESIDENT LEE:
.
PRESIDENT LEE S GIFT OF MARBLE CARVING STONES, CONVEYED THROUGH MR. MIDDLETON, HAS BEEN RECEIVED AT THE WHITE HOUSE.
.
THE PRESIDENT WOULD LIKE PRESIDENT LEE TO KNOW THAT HE GREATLY APPRECIATES HIS THOUGHTFULNESS AND GENEROSITY IN PROVIDING SUCH AN ELEGANT SYMBOL OF THE ENDURING GOODWILL THAT EXISTS BETWEEN TAIWAN AND THE UNITED STATES.
.
HE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO WISH PRESIDENT LEE A JOYFUL CHRISTMAS AND A HAPPY AND SUCCESSFUL NEW YEAR.
.
4. FOR DR. KOO CHEN-FU:
.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VR NARA, Date 8/24/2019
2017-0051-M

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DR. KOO S GIFT TO PRESIDENT CLINTON OF A WOODEN CARVING, CONVEYED THROUGH MR. MIDDLETON, HAS BEEN RECEIVED AT THE WHITE HOUSE.

.

THE PRESIDENT WISHES TO THANK DR. KOO SINCERELY FOR THINKING OF HIM AND PROVIDING SUCH A FINE KEEPSAKE OF THE OSAKA APEC MEETING, WHICH HE HAS HEARD FROM VICE PRESIDENT GORE WAS QUITE SUCCESSFUL.

.

THE PRESIDENT SENDS ALONG HIS WARMEST WISHES FOR A HAPPY NEW YEAR TO DR. KOO, AND WISHES HIM WELL IN THE CRUCIAL TASK OF IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PRC.

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END TEXT

DECL: OADR

BT
#7515

NNNN
<MSGID> M1989729

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

TO: AIT TAIPEI

FROM: WHITE HOUSE

EYES ONLY FOR AIT DIRECTOR PASCOE FROM ROTH

SUBJECT: ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF GIFTS TO POTUS FROM LEE TENG-HUI AND KOO CHEN-FU

1. MARK MIDDLETON, A FORMER WHITE HOUSE OFFICIAL WHO MET WITH THE TAIWAN DELEGATION TO APEC AT OSAKA, ACCEPTED (WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION) GIFTS FOR THE PRESIDENT FROM APEC DELEGATION LEADER KOO CHEN-FU AND FROM PRESIDENT LEE. THE WHITE HOUSE WOULD LIKE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THEM IN AN APPROPRIATE, LOW-KEY WAY.

2. GIVEN THE UNOFFICIAL AND INDIRECT CHANNEL OF DELIVERY, WE BELIEVE AN ORAL, RATHER THAN WRITTEN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT WOULD BE SUITABLE. IF YOU AGREE, PLEASE USE THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS WITH THE HIGHEST LEVEL OFFICIAL YOU DEEM APPROPRIATE.

3. FOR PRESIDENT LEE:

PRESIDENT LEE'S GIFT OF MARBLE CARVING STONES, CONVEYED THROUGH MR. MIDDLETON, HAS BEEN RECEIVED AT THE WHITE HOUSE.

THE PRESIDENT WOULD LIKE PRESIDENT LEE TO KNOW THAT HE GREATLY APPRECIATES HIS THOUGHTFULNESS AND GENEROSITY IN PROVIDING SUCH AN ELEGANT SYMBOL OF THE ENDURING GOODWILL THAT EXISTS BETWEEN TAIWAN AND THE UNITED STATES.

HE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO WISH PRESIDENT LEE A JOYFUL CHRISTMAS AND A HAPPY AND SUCCESSFUL NEW YEAR.

4. FOR DR. KOO CHEN-FU:

DR. KOO'S GIFT TO PRESIDENT CLINTON OF A WOODEN CARVING, CONVEYED THROUGH MR. MIDDLETON, HAS BEEN RECEIVED AT THE WHITE HOUSE.

THE PRESIDENT WISHES TO THANK DR. KOO SINCERELY FOR THINKING OF HIM AND PROVIDING SUCH A FINE KEEPSAKE OF

THE OSAKA APEC MEETING, WHICH HE HAS HEARD FROM VICE PRESIDENT GORE WAS QUITE SUCCESSFUL.

THE PRESIDENT SENDS ALONG HIS WARMEST WISHES FOR A HAPPY NEW YEAR TO DR. KOO, AND WISHES HIM WELL IN THE CRUCIAL TASK OF IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PRC.

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

2/23 INITIAL HERE 5.1

AUTH DRAFT

CLEAR 1 2

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ORIGINAL

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EAP:DHARTER

P:BHALL AIT/W:NBELLOCCHI

S, D, P, AND EAP ONLY - ONE COPY EACH

IMMEDIATE AIT TAIPEI

NODIS
EYES ONLY FOR DIRECTOR PASCOE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, TW

SUBJECT: TRANSIT OF U.S. FOR PRESIDENT LEE TENG-HUI

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AS YOU KNOW, VOICES CALLING FOR A VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES BY PRESIDENT LEE TENG-HUI ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY INSISTENT. THE MATTER CAME UP DURING HILL TESTIMONY BY THE SECRETARY ON FEBRUARY 15 AND BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY LORD ON FEBRUARY 9. THE SECRETARY, WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THIS IS A DIFFICULT QUESTION, EXPLAINED WHY THE ADMINISTRATION IS NOT PREPARED TO APPROVE A VISIT.

3. THE ADJUSTMENTS TO OUR TAIWAN POLICY WHICH WERE ANNOUNCED IN SEPTEMBER, 1994, PROVIDED THAT TAIWAN'S LEADERS WOULD BE ALLOWED TO TRANSIT THE UNITED STATES. WE BELIEVE THAT, IN VIEW OF CONTINUED PRESSURE ON THIS MATTER, IT IS TIME TO REAFFIRM FOR THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION ON VISITS.

4. AT THE SAME TIME, WE CAN CONFIRM OUR READINESS TO CONSIDER AN OVERNIGHT TRANSIT STOP IN HAWAII. THE STOP WOULD INCLUDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO PLAY GOLF, BUT WOULD NOT,

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2017-0051-M (1.18)

CONSISTENT WITH OUR TRANSIT POLICY, PROVIDE FOR ANY OTHER FORM OF PUBLIC ACTIVITY. WE WOULD HOPE THAT BY TAKING THIS INITIATIVE, WE WILL BE ABLE TO SECURE PRESIDENT LEE'S AGREEMENT NOT TO PURSUE A VISIT THROUGH THIS YEAR AND 1996.

5. YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO SEEK AN MEETING AT THE EARLIEST APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY WITH PRESIDENT LEE TO EXPLAIN THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION AND THIS INITIATIVE. TALKING POINTS ARE AS FOLLOWS.

BEGIN TALKING POINTS

-- THE TAIWAN POLICY REVIEW RESULTED IN A NUMBER OF STEPS WHICH ARE FURTHER IMPROVING U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS. AMONG THESE ARE CABINET-LEVEL VISITS TO TAIWAN {SECRETARY PENA'S VISIT WILL BE FOLLOWED BY OTHERS}, THE PROPOSED ECONOMIC DIALOGUE, AND ACTIVE SUPPORT FOR PARTICIPATION IN SOME INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. THIS WAS THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE UPGRADING OF OUR CONTACTS BY ANY ADMINISTRATION SINCE 1979.

-- OUR RELATIONSHIP IS BY ANY MEASURE AN EXCELLENT ONE, WITH HEALTHY TRADE, ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL TIES.

-- WE KNOW THAT YOU ARE INTERESTED IN A VISIT TO THE U.S. THIS IS A DELICATE ISSUE. THE ADMINISTRATION'S TAIWAN POLICY ADJUSTMENTS SPECIFICALLY RULED OUT VISITS TO THE U.S. BY TAIWAN'S TOP LEADERS.

-- THE ADMINISTRATION, HOWEVER, IS WILLING TO CONSIDER AN OVERNIGHT TRANSIT STOP IN HAWAII. A ROUND OF GOLF AS PART OF AN OVERNIGHT REST STOP WOULD BE POSSIBLE.

-- IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE ADMINISTRATION BE ABLE TO, IN GOOD FAITH, PORTRAY THE STOPOVER AS A TRANSIT STOP CONSISTENT WITH THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY, AS DECIDED IN THE TAIWAN POLICY REVIEW.

-- PUBLIC COMMENTS OR POLITICAL ACTIVITY WOULD NOT BE CONSISTENT WITH ADMINISTRATION POLICY.

-- SHOULD YOU WISH TO CARRY OUT THIS TRANSIT, THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD EXPECT THAT YOU AND OTHER MEMBERS OF TAIWAN'S LEADERSHIP WOULD NOT SEEK A VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES DURING 1995 OR 1996.

-- {IF NEEDED} THIS WOULD PRECLUDE A VISIT TO CORNELL.

WE RECOGNIZE THAT THIS MAY BE A DISAPPOINTMENT TO YOU, BUT WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT SUCH A VISIT WOULD BE IN OUR MUTUAL INTEREST.

-- {IF NEEDED} IT IS IMPORTANT TO THE UNITED STATES AND TO TAIWAN THAT WE NOT FURTHER PROVOKE CHINA BY TAKING STEPS WHICH GO BEYOND THE PARAMETERS OF THE TAIWAN POLICY ADJUSTMENTS. THIS APPLIES ESPECIALLY TO THE MOST SENSITIVE ISSUE -- A VISIT TO THE U.S. BY A MEMBER OF TAIWAN'S LEADERSHIP.

END TALKING POINTS

6. YOU MAY NOTE TO PRESIDENT LEE THAT YOU WILL BE PLEASED, IF HE WISHES TO ARRANGE A TRANSIT THROUGH HAWAII, TO BE IN FURTHER TOUCH WITH HIM OR HIS STAFF TO ASSIST IN WORKING OUT THE MODALITIES. YY

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

4/13 INITIAL HERE 5.1

AUTH ✱ DRAFT
CLEAR 1 2
3 4 5
6 7 8
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ORIGINAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EAP/RSP/TC:CFWURZEL:CFW
03/24/95 647-7711 SEFOGEN 3084
EAP:DHARTER, ACTING

EAP/RSP/TC:HHLANGE
AIT/W:NHBELLOCCHI
DOD/ISA:JBHALL
S/S-O:

EAP/RSP:PYUN; P:BHALL
NSC:
S/S:
DOD/ISSAC:CKICKLIGHTER

PRIORITY AIT TAIPEI

FROM AIT WASHDC

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, TW

SUBJECT: TAIWAN INVITEE TO COMMEMORATION OF THE END OF WORLD WAR II

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS IS A JOINT STATE-DEFENSE ACTION TELEGRAM. SEE PARAGRAPHS 6, 7 AND 8.

3. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATION COMMITTEE IS PLANNING CEREMONIES TO MARK THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC (EOWP) WHICH ARE SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE SEPTEMBER 1-3, 1995, IN HONOLULU, HAWAII. THE EVENTS ARE INTENDED TO COMMEMORATE THE SACRIFICES OF WORLD WAR II VETERANS, TO RECOGNIZE THE RECONCILIATION WHICH HAS OCCURRED SINCE THE WAR, AND TO HIGHLIGHT THE OBLIGATION THAT WE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION HAVE TO THESE VETERANS TO WORK TOGETHER FOR A MORE PROSPEROUS AND PEACEFUL FUTURE. ALL VETERANS OF THE WAR ARE WELCOME TO PARTICIPATE.

4. OFFICIAL FOREIGN PARTICIPANTS WILL GENERALLY BE DEFENSE MINISTERS OR THEIR DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVES.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
Department of State Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2017-0051-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INVITEES WILL RECEIVE AN INVITATION FROM SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PERRY. FOR POLICY REASONS, HOWEVER, SOME INVITATIONS WILL BE ISSUED TO INDIVIDUALS WITHOUT PUBLIC OFFICE TO ASK THEM TO REPRESENT A SPECIFIC PLACE OR GROUP OF VETERANS WHO FOUGHT IN THE PACIFIC WAR.

5. TAIWAN FALLS INTO THIS LATTER CATEGORY. IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT AN APPROPRIATE TAIWAN INVITEE WOULD BE RETIRED ADMIRAL SOONG CHANG-CHIH. AS A FORMER JOINT SERVICE CHIEF AND DEFENSE MINISTER, ADMIRAL SOONG'S BACKGROUND AND STANDING IN TAIWAN SOCIETY ALONG WITH HIS UNOFFICIAL STATUS APPEAR TO MAKE HIM THE INVITEE MOST COMPATIBLE WITH STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN THE U.S. UNOFFICIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH TAIWAN AND THE U.S. OFFICIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA.

ACTION REQUEST
---

6. AS A COURTESY, AIT IS INSTRUCTED TO GO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON SATURDAY, APRIL 15, AND ADVISE APPROPRIATE INDIVIDUALS, USING THE TALKING POINTS SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPH 7, THAT AIT ON BEHALF OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PERRY WILL DELIVER TO ADMIRAL SOONG AN INVITATION TO THE EOWP EVENTS. AIT SHOULD NOT INDICATE THAT IT IS INFORMING THE MOFA FOR THE PURPOSES OF CONSULTATION OR OF SEEKING AN ALTERNATIVE. NEVERTHELESS, AIT SHOULD WAIT UNTIL TUESDAY, APRIL 18, TAIPEI TIME TO DELIVER THE INVITATION TO ADMIRAL SOONG, AS SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPH 8. THIS WILL ALLOW TIME FOR THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES TO PROPOSE ON THEIR OWN AN ALTERNATIVE REPRESENTATIVE, IF THEY SO DESIRE. IF AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL BY TAIWAN APPEARS TO BE ACCEPTABLE, THAT PROPOSAL WILL BE CONSIDERED BY WASHINGTON AGENCIES; HOWEVER, ANY NEW NAME MUST BE RECEIVED HERE IN THE DEPARTMENT BY OPENING OF BUSINESS, MONDAY, APRIL 17, WASHINGTON TIME. BECAUSE CABLES INFORMING OTHER FOREIGN INVITEES WILL NOT BE SENT UNTIL MONDAY, APRIL 17, WASHINGTON TIME, AIT SHOULD NOT/NOT RESPOND TO ANY PUBLIC INQUIRIES ON THIS ISSUE UNTIL THE TWO DAY PERIOD HAS PASSED AND THE FORMAL INVITATION HAS BEEN EXTENDED TO ADMIRAL SOONG.

7. WHEN CALLING ON THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AIT DIRECTOR SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING POINTS. A COPY OF THE LETTER OF INVITATION, TO BE CONVEYED LATER TO ADMIRAL SOONG BY AIT, IS INCLUDED FOR AIT'S REFERENCE.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE (TH) 04.13. '95 19:33 NO. 1460120768 PAGE 3

-- ON SEPTEMBER 1-3 OF THIS YEAR, THE U.S. WILL BE HOLDING AN EVENT IN HONOLULU TO COMMEMORATE THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND THE END OF THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC.

-- THESE EVENTS ARE INTENDED TO COMMEMORATE THE SACRIFICES OF WORLD WAR II VETERANS, TO RECOGNIZE THE RECONCILIATION WHICH HAS OCCURRED SINCE THE WAR, AND TO HIGHLIGHT THE OBLIGATION THAT WE IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC HAVE TO THESE VETERANS TO WORK TOGETHER FOR A MORE PROSPEROUS AND PEACEFUL FUTURE.

-- AMERICANS RECOGNIZE THE SACRIFICES THAT THE CHINESE PEOPLE MADE DURING WORLD WAR II, AND THE CRITICAL CONTRIBUTION THAT CHINESE VETERANS MADE TO THE SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTION OF THE WAR.

-- TO UNDERLINE THE THEMES OF RECONCILIATION AND DETERMINATION TO WORK FOR A PEACEFUL FUTURE, WE WISH VETERANS FROM BOTH TAIWAN AND THE CHINESE MAINLAND TO PARTICIPATE.

-- THOUGH HIS EXACT SCHEDULE HAS NOT YET BEEN DETERMINED PRESIDENT CLINTON WILL TAKE PART IN THE CEREMONIES; HOWEVER, THE HONOLULU COMMEMORATION WILL NOT BE A SUMMIT-LEVEL OR A DIPLOMATIC EVENT.

-- INVITEES WILL BEAR THEIR DELEGATION'S COST OF TRAVEL TO AND FROM HAWAII, INCLUDING LOCAL ACCOMMODATIONS AND MOST LOCAL TRANSPORTATION.

-- MOST OTHER FOREIGN DELEGATIONS HAVE BEEN INVITED TO SEND THEIR MINISTER OF DEFENSE OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE -- EITHER FROM THE MINISTER'S OWN MINISTRY OR AN APPROPRIATE PRIVATE CITIZEN SUCH AS A DISTINGUISHED VETERAN OF WWII. PARTICIPATION BY CERTAIN INVITEES WILL BE ON AN UNOFFICIAL BASIS.

-- OUR PRESENT UNOFFICIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH TAIWAN DOES NOT PERMIT US TO EXTEND AN INVITATION TO YOUR DEFENSE MINISTER.

-- {IF ASKED: THE DEFENSE MINISTER OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN INVITED.}

-- {IF ASKED: THE FOLLOWING WILL ALSO BE INVITED ON AN UNOFFICIAL BASIS: VIETNAM, HONG KONG, COOK ISLANDS, AND THE FRENCH PACIFIC TERRITORIES.}

DEPARTMENT OF STATE (TH) 04.13. '95 19:33 NO. 1460120768 PAGE 4

-- {IF ASKED: DELEGATIONS WILL BE SMALL. MINISTERS OF DEFENSE OR THEIR REPRESENTATIVES WILL BE INVITED TO BRING TWO ADDITIONAL PERSONS; UNOFFICIAL INVITEES WILL NOT BE ACCOMPANIED.}

-- WE HAVE CHOSEN TO INVITE RETIRED ADMIRAL SOONG CHANG-CHIH BECAUSE OF HIS DISTINGUISHED CAREER, HIS STATURE AS A FORMER CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF AND MINISTER OF DEFENSE, THE RESPECT WHICH HE COMMANDS IN YOUR SOCIETY, AND HIS EXPERIENCE AS A VETERAN OF THE PACIFIC WAR.

-- ADMIRAL SOONG'S CURRENT STATUS AS A PRIVATE CITIZEN MAKES HIS ATTENDANCE AT THE EVENT COMPATIBLE WITH OUR CURRENT RELATIONSHIP.

-- THE INVITATION IS NOT TRANSFERABLE.

-- U.S. DEFENSE SECRETARY WILLIAM PERRY WILL BE SENDING TO ADMIRAL SOONG A LETTER OF INVITATION, AN ADVANCE COPY OF WHICH WE WILL DELIVER SHORTLY. WE UNDERSTAND THE ORIGINAL INVITATION WILL ARRIVE FOR AIT TO FORWARD IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

END TALKING POINTS.

LETTER
---

8. AFTER YOUR DELIVERY ON SATURDAY, APRIL 15, TAIPEI TIME, OF THE TALKING POINTS SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPH 7 TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND ASSUMING NO ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE IS PROPOSED BY THE MOFA, AIT IS INSTRUCTED TO DELIVER TO ADMIRAL SOONG THE FOLLOWING TEXT OF THE UNOFFICIAL INVITATION ON TUESDAY, APRIL 18, TAIPEI TIME. AIT WILL RECEIVE SECRETARY PERRY'S ORIGINAL INVITATION AT A LATER DATE, WHICH AIT IS REQUESTED TO DELIVER TO ADMIRAL SOONG AS APPROPRIATE. IF APPLICABLE, PLEASE LET ADMIRAL SOONG KNOW THAT HIS SPOUSE IS WELCOME TO ACCOMPANY HIM.

BEGIN TEXT

DEAR ADMIRAL SOONG:

I WOULD BE HONORED IF YOU COULD JOIN ME IN HONOLULU ON SEPTEMBER 1-3 TO COMMEMORATE THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE END OF THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC AND THE END OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE (TH) 04.13. '95 19:33 NO. 1460120768 PAGE 5

SECOND WORLD WAR.

THE COMMEMORATION WILL PROVIDE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR US TO HONOR JOINTLY THE SACRIFICES OF WORLD WAR II VETERANS. IT WILL ALSO BE AN OCCASION TO CELEBRATE THE PEACEFUL TRANSFORMATION THAT THE ASIA AND PACIFIC REGION HAS UNDERGONE SINCE THE END OF THE WAR, AND TO REAFFIRM OUR COMMON VISION OF PROSPERITY AND HARMONY AS WE MOVE TOWARD THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY. I BELIEVE WE CAN BEST PAY TRIBUTE TO OUR VETERANS, LIVING AND DEAD, BY RECOGNIZING THE PROGRESS MADE DURING THE PAST FIFTY YEARS AND BY COMMITTING OURSELVES TO CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER FOR A PEACEFUL AND PROSPEROUS FUTURE.

IN THE COMING MONTHS, WE WILL PASS TO YOU THE DETAILS OF THE COMMEMORATION PROGRAM. WE INTEND TO THANK AND RECOGNIZE OUR VETERANS DURING A SERIES OF MILITARY EVENTS AND MEMORIAL SERVICES. ALTHOUGH OTHER HEADS OF STATE WILL NOT BE ATTENDING, PRESIDENT CLINTON WILL TAKE PART IN THE COMMEMORATION. HIS TIME IN HAWAII WILL BE DEVOTED TO HONORING THE SACRIFICES OF OUR UNCOMMON PATRIOTS AND REDEDICATING OURSELVES TO PEACE IN THE ASIA AND PACIFIC REGION. THIS WILL NOT PERMIT HIM TO HAVE MEETINGS WITH FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES ATTENDING THE CEREMONIES.

WE ANTICIPATE A DIGNIFIED AND THOUGHTFUL COMMEMORATION, AND I HOPE YOU WILL JOIN ME IN THESE EVENTS INCLUDING, ON THE FINAL DAY, A COMMUNAL SERVICE THAT LOOKS TOWARD A SECURE AND PEACEFUL FUTURE.

SINCERELY,

WILLIAM J. PERRY

END TEXT OF LETTER.

9. FYI: FOREIGN PARTICIPATION. THERE FOLLOWS A LIST OF PLACES FROM WHICH PERSONS WILL BE INVITED. AIT MAY WISH TO DRAW UPON THIS AS DEEMED APPROPRIATE.

EAP

AUSTRALIA
BRUNEI
CAMBODIA
CHINA
COOK ISLANDS{U}
MARSHALL ISLANDS
MONGOLIA
NAURU
NEW ZEALAND
PALAU

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FIJI
F.S. OF MICRONESIA
FRENCH TERRITORIES{U}
INDONESIA
HONG KONG{U}
JAPAN
KIRIBATI
SOUTH KOREA
LAOS
MALAYSIA
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
PHILIPPINES
SINGAPORE
SOLOMONS
TAIWAN{U}
THAILAND
TONGA
TUVALU
VANUATU
VIETNAM{U}
WESTERN SAMOA

EUR

CANADA
FRANCE
NETHERLANDS
RUSSIA
UNITED KINGDOM

SA

BANGLADESH
INDIA
NEPAL
MALDIVES
PAKISTAN
SRI LANKA

ARA -- MEXICO

{U} INVITATIONS SENT THROUGH UNOFFICIAL CHANNELS, AS DEEMED APPROPRIATE, TO AN UNOFFICIAL RECIPIENT.

SIGNED BELLOCCHI. YY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE (TH) 04.13. '95 19:33 NO. 1460120768 PAGE 7

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. cable	Re: Transit of US by President Lee (3 pages)	03/21/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Kristoff, Sandra)
OA/Box Number: 1041

FOLDER TITLE:
Taiwan [2]

2012-0975-F
sb1266

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Sandy –
FYI. Mike called me in advance to let me know about the lunch. I asked him not to raise the East-West Center proposal. He did anyway, although he was careful not to suggest that he was offering it on our behalf.

Mike Oksenberg
Memorandum of Conversation
March 14, 1995
- 1:30pm
Pacific Club
Honolulu, Hawaii

I met for lunch Director-General Yu Ting-yu of Honolulu TECO

The luncheon conversation immediately got down to business. It seemed to me Yu was proceeding on instructions.

1. Yu expressed surprise at my resignation. He said that at my request, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) had been processing the renewal of the East-West Center's annual grant of $100,000.00. Renewal had been imminent. Upon learning of my resignation, the process had stopped. Was the Center in chaos? I stated that my resignation should have no effect upon Taipei's willingness to go forward. The Center continued to merit Taiwan's support. Yu stated that he would report my request for renewed funding to MFA.

2. Yu asked how my resignation would affect my long standing invitation to President Lee to visit the Center. I stated that it should have no effect. Indeed, I had explicitly mentioned to the Chairman of the East-West Center Board of Governors, Oz Stender, that I had extended an invitation to Lee, and Mr. Stender had requested that I remain

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING Per E.O. 13526
Sec. 3.2(C) Initials: VZ Date: 8/28/2019
2017-0051-M

engaged in that project. Thus, if Taiwan wished to continue involvement in any way, I would be available. Even after I left here in July, I would return for a visit, if that suited Taiwan's pleasure.

3. Yu then went over again the framework for the visit that I had proposed: that Lee would visit the Center as a private individual during a brief Honolulu stopover, possibly to attend a closed academic seminar on Chinese culture, to which he might deliver some remarks and at which he might receive a special Certificate of Merit acknowledging his contributions to the development of Chinese culture. He also perhaps would be able to have a short time to rest on the island, without contact with the media. I also repeated my offer to visit Taiwan to prepare for such a visit, if it would be useful.

4. Yu again asked whether this invitation had the approval of the Board of Governors. I assured him that it did, and that I would be glad to arrange a lunch with the Chairman, so he could assure himself of that before he reported back to Taipei. He said my assurance was sufficient.

5. Yu asked whether my idea was that the Hawaii stop would be en route to other parts of the United States or directly en route to a third country. I replied "To a third country."

6. Yu then asked whether I had discussed this proposal in Washington. I said -- very slowly and carefully -- that I spoke as an informed private citizen. There was no

agreement to or approval of this idea in Washington. This was my proposal. But it was my view there was a distinct possibility such a scenario would be approved. It was worth trying. He took notes on my formulation.

7. Yu then asked whether I thought a trip that included both Honolulu and Alaska would be approved, or one to Cornell through Hawaii and Alaska. I told him I did not think either was likely. He agreed, citing Winston Lord's strong statement that such a visit would not be in the American interest and would violate our China policy. I said that as a private citizen, in my opinion, depending on how it was handled, a visit could be managed in a way that would be compatible with our China policy. But a high profile visit to the mainland at this time or in the near future would not contribute to stability in the region.

8. I then went on to observe that Taiwan - mainland relations were improving. Jiang Zemin's New Year's speech, combining elements of flexibility and toughness, was worth exploring, and I detected a similar reaction in Taipei, a view he confirmed in detail. I thought a visit by Lee to the U.S. mainland would jeopardize the chances for further beneficial evolution of Taiwan - mainland relations. I judged that Taiwan at this point, given succession politics in Beijing, had to choose between gaining stature in Taiwan-American relations or giving increased substance to Taiwan - Chinese relations. Naturally, it was up to Taiwan to judge its interests, but from my vantage, I

thought it was more important to add substance to Taiwan - mainland relations rather than to add symbols to Taiwan - US relations.

Good line - wish I had thought of it

9. I added in Chinese, "As far as US relations are concerned, Taiwan lacks the form but has the reality. As far as the mainland is concerned, Taiwan lacks the form but still doesn't entirely have the reality. In my view reality is more important than form." I noted however, that perhaps Taipei had a different view, in light of its $4.5 million commitment to a Washington firm to seek approval for a Lee visit.

10. Yu responded unambiguously that he agreed with my assessment. This is what pragmatism entails, he said. To try to do more than a stopover, private visit in Hawaii en route to a third country would be overreaching. He then stated very vigorously that MFA knew nothing about the $4.5 million deal. He said, "Your friend Fred Chien has stated he was not consulted and did not know about this." Yu complained that MFA doesn't have this kind of money for entertainment. He claimed this project was launched by the Treasurer of the KMT, a Mr. Li. Yu then noted that even if Congress passed a resolution, it would have no effect. The administration's view, as he already noted, was very clear. I said that Taiwan should not count on the administration keeping Lee out of the U.S. mainland, if that indeed was Taiwan's preference. Particularly as the 1996 election approached, it might get a present it did not want. I recommended that to preclude mischief, Ding Moushi might be called into play to

Unfortunately, I suspect Yu is speaking for the Foreign Min. rather than for President Lee

discourage key friends on the hill from pressing too hard on a U.S. mainland visit by Lee.

11. Yu again agreed that a Hawaii stop over with a very low key, EWC visit, en route to a third country, would be ideal at this time. He again asked whether I thought this would be approved. I repeated my previous formula. I did not know, but it might be approved. It was worth trying. He asked whether, if Taipei wishes to pursue the matter, I should be the contact person. I replied that the response could either come through me or Stan Roth, whose name he asked me to write down. When I told him who Stan was, he said maybe TECO in Washington would be unable to meet with him. I said I was sure Lu had access to Roth. I asked that he not communicate the response through State.

12. Yu then asked about the timing of such visit. I said that was a matter for the two sides to work out. He smilingly said that President Clinton would be in Honolulu on September 2nd. I said nothing. He then said he doubted that would be a good time. I said I thought that was certainly the case.

13. He then asked whether the University of Hawaii would wish to bestow an honorary Ph.D. degree. I said I could not speak for the University, but I would inquire if he wished. He stipulated that I not do so, since that would probably entail consultation

IDENTIAL

with the Board of Regents, and an honorary degree might preclude a low profile, private visit.

10. We then summarized the conversation. I stressed the confidential nature of our discussion and that I was acting as a private citizen. I repeated my willingness to go to Taiwan to pursue these discussions or to play a role in the visit. But I could also easily bow out at this time. If Yu had a response, I would be glad to receive and convey it. I said I thought too much publicity had been given to the Cornell visit, reducing its likelihood. Let us work quietly on this possibility.

11. Yu then expressed regrets over my resignation. I told him the Center funding posed big headaches for the Center, and I'd prefer to think about American foreign policy in Asia. In addition, I confessed, the changes I made at the Center had stirred up controversy, for example, my insistence the Center address security issues posed by China's emergence as a great power. I didn't know how a research center could claim to be addressing the great issues of our time and ignore China's rise, but others didn't see it that way. He said the Board must have known beforehand and approved the changes I wanted to make or they wouldn't have hired me. I said he was right but subsequently I discovered the Board wanted changes without controversy. He laughed and said that was impossible. We then shared our respective views about Honolulu and our respective plans for the future. He's been here 1½ years and doesn't want his stay to extend much beyond two years.

16. Observations: I think this was a carefully planned conversation, though Yu's deputy who usually takes notes for him was not present. What I got here probably was a serious nibble, though he may have been massaging my ego. Taipei is probably encouraging different Americans to cultivate some options for Lee, encouraging each to lobby in Washington on Taipei's behest. The one I've proposed is one possibility. The Hawaii-Alaska combination is another.

17. I do think my option -- Hawaii alone -- is the least unattractive one to head off mounting congressional pressure for a mainland visit. Taiwan would have to indicate that it should be satisfied with such a visit and would turn off its lobbying effort on this issue through our 1996 Presidential elections. In my view, the mainland reaction could be managed if (1) Lee's visit came after a President Clinton two day trip to Beijing following the Osaka APEC meeting; (2) we convince Japan to allow Lee to refuel his plane without Lee deplaning in Hokkaido on his return to Taipei; and (3) Taipei would agree to enter into negotiations with the mainland on direct air links, with the President able to inform Beijing of this break through. In other words, use a Lee trip actively to promote our overall policy in the region, rather than defensively allow it to happen under political pressure.

Mike's real agenda

Roth, Stanley D.

From: Roth, Stanley D.
To: Berger, Samuel
Cc: /R, Record at A1; @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor
Subject: ~~[SECRET]~~ Reaction to Tarnoff's suggested Taiwan talking points
Date: Saturday, March 04, 1995 11:27AM

Sandy--

As you know from previous conversations, I feel these talking points are a formula for failure. Per your request, however, I am putting aside the question of a transit/golf versus a transit/event and focusing only on the talking points that deal with a transit/visit in general terms.

Specifically, I recommend that the points be beefed up with a serious exposition of the importance of cross straits dialogue and the potential of a visit/transit to derail the prospects for progress:

--I want to address with you a very sensitive issue: the relationship between your own initiative to achieve progress in the important cross straits dialogue with the mainland and another personal initiative of yours to travel to your alma mata, Cornell.

--It is our judgment that the two initiatives are incompatible, and that achievement of the latter would seriously damage the prospects for success on the former, which is, from the perspective of our mutual interests, far more important.

--As you know, the US applauds the seriousness with which your government has attempted to improve relations with the mainland through the process of cross straits dialogue.

--Significant progress was made last year, and the potential exists for even greater progress this year.

--Your appointment of Vincent Siew to head the cross straits dialogue from the Taiwan side demonstrates your own commitment to achieving progress.

--He has already come up with a creative initiative for an off-shore center which, if accepted by the PRC, will result in direct trade between Taiwan and the mainland. I don't need to emphasize to you just how significant a development that will be.

--Another promising development was Jiang Zemin's January 30 eight point Taiwan policy speech.

--Obviously, some of his points were as disappointing to you as to us. But on balance, the speech seemed to us to be positive, particularly the following points:

- o The statement that "Chinese will not use force against other Chinese"
- o The invitation for "leaders of the Taiwan authorities" to visit the mainland and the indication that Beijing was "ready to accept invitations from the Taiwan side to visit Taiwan"
- o The expression of interest in an investment protection regime

--I understand that you will be responding to Jiang's speech on April 8. The fact that your government is taking several months to respond suggests to me that you consider it to be a significant statement and are preparing a significant response.

--We seem to be at a moment when there is a real possibility of meaningful progress on cross straits dialogue, rather than a mere exchange of competing rhetorical proposals.

--It is difficult for my government to understand why you and your government would jeopardize the prospects for success at this important moment by continuing to push for a visit to Cornell University.

--Yet my government has been advised in Washington by your lobbyist that your government will seek the passage of legislation after the Congressional Easter recess that would seek to force the Administration to reverse its policy and permit you to visit Cornell.

--If this were to happen, we believe that the consequences would be serious both for Taiwan-PRC relations

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2017-0051-M (1.20)

and US-PRC relations.

--We would anticipate a major downturn in US-PRC relations as well as a halt to the cross straits dialogue.

--The most likely result of a visit to Cornell would be an increase in tension in the Strait, the very result which we have been working together successfully to avoid.

--I therefore urge you, on behalf of the President, to cease your efforts in the United States to obtain approval for a visit by Cornell.

--We know that this will be a major personal disappointment for you, but we believe that the vital national security interests of both of our countries will be better served.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. paper	Taiwan Demarche [partial] (2 pages)	10/23/1991	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Kristoff, Sandra)
OA/Box Number: 1041

FOLDER TITLE:
Taiwan [2]

2012-0975-F
sb1266

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
DECL: OADR

SUBJECT: Taiwan Demarche

Begin text of draft instruction

We face a difficult period in our relations with Taiwan. Pressures within Taiwan for national identity and international recognition are growing. Recent Taiwan election results confirm a strong desire for stability, combined with widespread sentiment for more international autonomy and "space" for Taiwan. President Lee Teng-hui must take such popular attitudes into consideration as Taiwan heads toward the 1995 legislative election and election of a president in 1996. In the People's Republic of China [PRC], we see little evidence that Beijing can be counted on to adjust its approach to Taiwan, and every evidence that its attitude toward Taiwan will continue to be uncompromising, particularly during China's approaching leadership succession period.

Beijing now appears to be watching our Taiwan steps closely, responding immediately and tangibly when we implement actions seen as incrementally advancing officiality in our relations with Taipei. This was manifested in their calling off of the visits by Secretary Pena and A/S MacNamara, as well as their negative response to U/S Tarnoff's invitation to Liu Huaqiu. Growing friction over Taiwan coupled with increasing problems over trade, proliferation and human rights in the context of Chinese succession problems could precipitate a downward spiral in Sino-American relations. This, in turn could raise tensions in the Taiwan straits and the region generally as China adopts a more belligerent course.

Washington agencies have become increasingly concerned about the substantial and growing efforts by Taiwan to reverse decisions reached in the Taiwan Policy Review (TPR) though congressional legislation, such as legislation to force Administration acceptance of a U.S. visit by Lee Ten Hui. An intensive push by Taiwan combined with the makeup of the new Congress could result in a series of congressional actions threatening to seriously damage the U.S.-Taiwan-PRC framework in place since 1979.

In some areas, e.g. Lee Teng Hui's visit to the
In order to forestall developments which might have the result of confrontation between the Congress and the administration, and in the long run could be harmful to relations between Taiwan and the U.S., chinese-taiwan relations, and an evolution from stability to tension or crisis in the taiwan strait, we plan to take action on three fronts:

~~SECRET~~

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Per E. O. 13526
VZ 08/28/2019
2015-0071-M (1.21)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6), (b)(1)

o Actively engage members of congress and their staffs on our China and taiwan policies.

o Engage the PRC on our mutual interests in stability in the area and on the nature of U.S. interests in Taiwan, urging china to strengthen its own interaction with taiwan.

bilateral dialogue with taiwan

You should brief taiwan on the administration's resolute actions to implement the steps called for in the TPR. Secretary pena's visit was a success. It was only the second such cabinet visit since 1979. under secretary spero is prepared to co-chair the first sub-cabinet economic meeting in the spring. The ait director has begun calls in the foreign ministry. Taiwan visitors, (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) are calling at economic and technical departments, EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) (b)(1), E.O. 12958 3.3(b)(6) we have permitted a name change in taiwan's office here. We have begun to research ways to assist Taiwan in international organizations. We should explain that the administration is not tied to a rigid interpretation of the TPR, but is ready to take other steps to enhance ties as long as they do not violate the TPR parameters.

You should indicate to taiwan that we fully appreciate that their lobbying activities are legal and consistent with the operation of our system of government. However, they should also realize the risk that their continued pressure on congress to legislate taiwan policy could actually set back their hopes for positive U.S. steps as well as create tension or serious friction in prc-taiwan relations and us-prc relations. This would serve neither Taiwan nor U.S. interests.

In the above context, you are authorized to invite the Taiwan leadership to establish a dialogue on the bilateral relationship. You will represent the U.S. side. Since it appears that the significant Taiwan initiatives in the U.S. are controlled directly by the president or from his office, we believe that at least your initial contact should be with the president himself, so that he may identify the appropriate interlocutor for an ongoing dialogue.

It should be clear that lee himself is identified with the process. We do not imagine that we will persuade Lee that it is in his interest to abandon Taiwan's efforts to influence Congress. However, we do believe that he could reconsider the

aggressiveness of that effort as counterproductive where it seeks to overturn fundamental aspects of the Administration's policy. Our hope is that he will be responsive to our proposal for a dialogue with the Administration. The dialogue will, at the least, be well received in Congress as further evidence tht the Administration is earnest in enhancing ties with Taipei. If successful, the dialogue could also assist in maintaining the initiative of foreign policy regarding Taiwan in the Administration, dampen the possibility of Executive-legislative branch tension, and moderate PRC reactions to our Taiwan policy.

You should stress to Taiwan that the Administration sees our relations with Taiwan as positive and dynamic -- we want to maintain an active, high-level dialogue with Taiwan and, within the limits of our overall China policy, continue to implement policy adjustments that serve the interests of both sides. This Administration will also continue to fully meet Taiwan's defense needs.

You should draw on the following talking points in your meeting with Lee:

o Recently, the Administration announced a series of adjustments in our taiwan policy and has since moved decisively to implement them. Together they constitute the most significant progress in our political-economic contacts made by any administration since 1979. They establish an overall framework within which we can work to further develop our relations. (describe TPR steps)

o We propose that our two sides engage in a dialogue to explore how we can enhance our relations, avoid misunderstandings and miscalculations, and provide for smoother development of our bilateral ties.

(Following four paragraphs can be dropped from cable instructions.)

o We understand, however, that politics in taiwan are likely to create continued pressure for further changes.

o We are concerned that transmittal of this pressure to our political system has the potential to create dangerous differences between our legislative and our executive branches which will be in neither taiwan's nor our interests.

o There is already one case from last year -- the Brown amendment on visits by Taiwan's leadership -- of legislation which, in the words of the president's signing statement, is in "potential tension" with his constitutional authorities. Any such tension, if it indeed develops, can have unanticipated and possibly unhelpful results for U.S.-Taiwan relations and for Taiwan itself.

x If taiwan continues to press for legislation by the new congress which seeks to overturn key aspects of our Taiwan policy, we are afraid that it could lead to an executive branch-Congress confrontation which would undermine taiwan-us ties and PRC-Taiwan relations, while raising tensions in the taiwan strait.

---

o In the dialogue, each side could present its respective objectives and aspirations for the relationship, to see how we might work together in our mutual interest.

o Neither of us will be able to satisfy all of the other side's requests, but certainly we will be able to identify areas for progress and follow up within a comprehensive framework.

o We would envisage that the dialogue will range through bilateral, regional and international issues.

(Use as needed)

o The TPR has made it possible in just a few months to expand our relations within a broader framework, in areas not possible since 1978. The TPR, we believe, will continue to provide a framework for significant adjustments in our ties over the longer term.

o For example, high level U.S. visits to Taiwan. We anticipate further U.S. cabinet level visits in the future. Implementation of the sub-cabinet dialogue will go forward. So will approval of Taiwan's GATT application when negotiations conclude and increased Taiwan participation in international organizations.

o As we proceed, I am sure you agree, we need to avoid actions which could destabilize the relationship between the U.S. and the PRC as well as your own relations with the PRC. This outcome would result in increased threats to Taiwan's security as well as to P.R.C.-Taiwan and P.R.C.-U.S. relations.

4-27
take copied

SECRET

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Sensoprep

April 20, 1995

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2018-0051-M (1.22)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN PODESTA
TODD STERN

SUBJECT: Visa for President Li of Taiwan

Attached is a memo from Tony Lake on whether to grant a visa allowing President Li of Taiwan to visit Cornell. Since 1979, U.S. policy has barred top Taiwanese officials from visiting the United States, even privately. President Li, however, has intensified his campaign for a visa -- including hiring a Washington lobbyist for some $4.5 million

The pressures here come from two sides. On the one hand, the Hill may be getting ready to act. Apart from Sense-of-Congress resolutions, which will pass easily, Rep. Toricelli and nine colleagues have drafted binding legislation requiring that visas be granted to senior Taiwan officials. On the other hand, the PRC would view the grant of a visa to Li as a serious erosion of our one-China policy and would likely retaliate.

Three options are presented. **(1) Continue current policy barring visits,** noting that every Administration since our 1979 normalization with the PRC has held to this policy despite strong sympathies with Taiwan. Pro: makes retaliation less likely, even if we lose in Congress. Con: ties up Congressional resources and we could still lose; **(2) grant visa but offer Chinese a high-level visit at same time** -- inviting President Jiang here or sending the Vice President to Beijing. Pro: Reduces the prospect of retaliation. Con: Offer could be criticized as pandering to China and Chinese could still reject it; **(3) grant visa and offer other actions short of high-level visit.** This option could be lose-lose: not enough to avoid retaliation, but enough to provoke criticism of pandering.

Tony recommends Option (1), noting it would be counter-productive to pick a fight with China on this issue at a time when we need their cooperation on such key matters as the North Korean nuclear issue. Secretary Christopher concurs. George is concerned that the Chinese seem to be pushing us around -- they sell nuclear technology to Iran and we can't even let President Li make a commencement address. Leon agrees with George.

Option 1___ Option 2___ Option 3___ Discuss ✓

always insisted to the bitter end he was wrong
4/3/02

SECRET

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008b. memo	To: The President; From: Anthony Lake; Re: Granting a Visa to President Li of Taiwan [partial] (3 pages)	04/14/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Kristoff, Sandra)
OA/Box Number: 1041

FOLDER TITLE:
Taiwan [2]

2012-0975-F
sb1266

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~ 2762

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION April 14, 1995 95 APR 14 P4:25

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Granting a Visa to President Li of Taiwan

Purpose

To decide whether or not to grant a visa to President Li and to consider taking steps to minimize the anticipated Chinese reaction if the decision is made to extend the visa.

Background

One of your decisions in last year's Taiwan Policy Review was to continue the policy of all Administrations since the normalization of relations with China in 1979 -- to bar the most senior officials in Taiwan from visiting the United States, even for private visits. The primary justification for this policy is that such high-level visits are incompatible with our unofficial relations with Taiwan. Indeed, China has insisted on this point, making it into a central issue in the relationship.

Another major factor is the recognition that the intense Congressional and media interest in such visits makes a truly private visit all but impossible. President Li's Cornell visit is a case in point: there would be huge media attention to his visit both here and throughout Asia, and it is likely that Members of Congress would travel to Ithaca, New York, to meet with him as well.

Despite the numerous other policy adjustments we made in the review, President Li has chosen to intensify his campaign to receive a visa (we denied his visa request, also for a Cornell event, in 1994). He has hired a lobbyist at considerable expense (reportedly $4.5 million over three years) to orchestrate Congressional and media support. (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c his motives are more political than personal; specifically, that the political boost he'll receive, if he's permitted to make the trip, will save him many more millions of dollars in campaign costs in his 1996 Presidential campaign than the cost of the lobbyist. This makes it very unlikely he will relent.

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/28/2019 (1.24)
2017-0051-M

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Thus far, Sense-of-Congress resolutions urging that President Li be granted a visa have been reported out of Committee in both the Senate and the House, with Floor action likely shortly after the Easter recess. Less clear is whether there will be a serious effort to pass binding legislation obligating you to grant a visa. Congressman Torricelli and nine colleagues have recently drafted a bill which amends the Taiwan Relations Act to require the extension of visas to senior Taiwan officials. It is unclear what the prospects are for passage of this legislation.

Finally, you should be aware that President Li has not yet responded to the formal request, which we made through AIT in Taiwan, asking him to defer a Cornell visit but offering a low-key transit through Hawaii.

In view of the fact that we can neither assume that President Li will accept our offer or that the Congress won't attempt to resolve this legislatively, I believe you need to consider several different policy options.

Option One: Stand Firm Despite Congressional Resistance

Unlike the Sense-of-Congress resolutions, which will pass easily, there is a chance that binding legislation can be defeated. In the context of a serious debate on binding legislation -- debate that did not occur on the Sense-of-Congress resolutions -- we would be able to emphasize the fact that since the normalization of relations with the PRC in 1979, every Administration has adhered to a one-China policy. In the context of this policy neither the Reagan nor the Bush Administrations, despite strong sympathies with Taiwan, permitted the President of Taiwan or other senior officials from visiting the United States, even for unofficial visits.

In addition, if the issue can be defined as Presidential prerogatives rather than as a seemingly innocuous visit to President Li's alma mater, the Administration might pick up some additional, bipartisan support.

Advantages

Minimizes damage to China relationship. If China perceived that the Administration had mounted a full court press to defeat binding legislation, it would be less likely to take retaliatory action, even if the legislation ultimately passed. While China has not tipped its hand about how it would respond, the consensus among most China specialists is that the PRC would consider a visit to be a serious erosion of our "one-China policy" requiring a strong response that would jeopardize the prospects of any further progress under your engagement strategy. (b)(1)

[redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d, EO 13526 3.5c [redacted] At a time when we may need China's help on the North Korean nuclear issue, it is counter-productive to engage in a fight with China on this issue.

Preserves credibility of Administration policy. Having just decided this issue last summer, in the context of the Taiwan Policy Review, the Administration will be vulnerable to charges of "flip-flopping" on a significant, if symbolic, policy issue.

Disadvantages

Ties up Congressional resources. The Administration has many issues to contest with the Congress, and this issue could tie up resources needed for more significant problems.

Administration might be defeated. Fighting and losing might be preferable to not fighting and losing, at least in terms of our relationship with China, but it's hardly an attractive option. The Administration will not reap any benefits from the fight with either the Congress or the media.

Option Two: Offer the Chinese a High-Level Visit when you approve Li Visit

The PRC has attached high priority to resuming the highest-level visits (you or the Vice President to China, President Jiang to Washington). Specifically, China is interested in a summit meeting that doesn't take place at the margin of an international event, such as APEC or the International Women's Conference (if the First Lady decides to attend). Therefore, if you permit President Li to come, you could either invite President Jiang to visit here or send the Vice President to Beijing. Recognizing that such a visit, in either direction, would have some political cost, permitting President Jiang to come to Washington after the United Nations General Assembly session in New York would pose fewer risks, including the possibility of a Chinese crackdown on dissidents in the context of a high-level visit to Beijing. A one-hour meeting in Washington (there is no reason why you would have to offer President Jiang any more than that) would also be less of a "plum" for China than a trip of several days duration by the Vice President.

Advantages

Reduces the prospect of damaging Chinese retaliation. By giving China something it wants badly, it has an incentive not to overreact. Moreover, this option preserves the basic element of our relationships with both the PRC and Taiwan, by providing for an official visit by the PRC and an unofficial visit by Taiwan.

Disadvantages

Risk that China will reject the offer. If China concludes that the United States is backing away from its one-China policy, it might decide to "sacrifice" a high-level visit and take some form of retaliation in order to teach the United States (and other countries) a lesson.

Decision will be criticized as pandering to China. The critics of China, in both the Congress and the media, will accuse the Administration of making a cynical deal that betrays its commitment to advancing the cause of human rights in China. Such criticism can be expected to generate headlines about kowtowing to China, not only at the time the decision is made public but also when President Jiang actually comes. It is unclear if the fact that an invitation had also been extended to President Li would help to diminish the criticism.

Option Three: Take Other Ameliorating Actions short of a High-Level Visit

China has a long list of policy objectives with us, including:

-- lifting of Tiananmen sanctions;

-- agreeing not to pursue a resolution at next year's UN Human Rights Commission;

-- implementing the 1985 agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy (requires Congressional waiver that China is not aiding Pakistani nuclear program); and

-- unconditional support for China's accession to the WTO.

None of these steps, individually, are likely to come close to offsetting the PRC's concerns about a visit by President Li. Perhaps as a package they would, but the cost in terms of your own policy objectives on a variety of issues would be high. Indeed, taking one or more of these steps, in the absence of progress by China on the substantive issues at stake, could become a lose-lose proposition: China fails to recognize the

gesture as adequate, while you are attacked by domestic critics for cynically attempting to cut a deal with China.

RECOMMENDATION

Both Secretary Christopher and I support Option 1, which continues a painful, but necessary policy, that has been supported by every Administration since 1979 and which preserves the prospects for additional progress in both U.S.-PRC and U.S.-Taiwan relations.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d, EO 13526 3.5c, (b)(1)

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

7/25 INITIAL HERE 6.0

APPR WJL DRAFT BL
CLEAR 1 WJL 2 WJL
3 BL 4 ____ 5 ____
6 ____ 7 ____ 8 ____

ORIGINAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EAP/RSP/TC:HLANGE:HHL
04/18/95 77711 SERATC 4856
EAP:WLORD

EAP:DHARTER
AIT/W:NBELLOCCHI
S/S:

P:BHALL
NSC:
S/S/O:

IMMEDIATE AIT TAIPEI

IMMEDIATE BEIJING, TOKYO IMMEDIATE, OTTAWA IMMEDIATE

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL:4/18/20

TAGS: PREL, TW, US

SUBJECT: PROPOSED TRANSIT BY VICE PREMIER HSU LI-TEH

REF: TAIPEI 02195

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE WOULD BE PLEASED TO PERMIT A TRANSIT OF HAWAII BY VICE PREMIER HSU LI-TEH EN ROUTE TO CANADA. SUCH A TRANSIT WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH ADMINISTRATION POLICY ON TRANSITS BY MEMBERS OF TAIWAN'S LEADERSHIP; THAT IS, A STOPOVER COULD BE ARRANGED EN ROUTE BETWEEN TAIWAN AND ANOTHER DESTINATION, THE STOPOVER SERVING THE PURPOSE OF SAFETY, COMFORT OR CONVENIENCE.

3. OUR UNDERSTANDING FROM THE CANADIAN EMBASSY HERE IS THAT THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT IS CONSIDERING WHETHER OR NOT TO APPROVE A "PRIVATE" VISIT BY HSU FOR THE PURPOSE OF RECEIVING AN HONORARY DEGREE FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF VICTORIA IN BRITISH COLUMBIA. SINCE THERE ARE DIRECT FLIGHTS BETWEEN TAIPEI AND VANCOUVER, WE PRESUME THAT A HAWAII STOPOVER WOULD, AS INDICATED BY MOFA, BE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITY FOR REST AND RELAXATION.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2017-0051-M (1.25)

4. THE STOPOVER OUTLINED BY MOFA, HOWEVER, CLEARLY EXCEEDS THE SCOPE OF A NORMAL TRANSIT, IN RESPECT OF BOTH LENGTH OF STAY AND PROPOSED ACTIVITIES. WE BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE REASONABLE TO LIMIT THE TRANSIT PERIOD TO ONE OR PERHAPS TWO NIGHTS, DEPENDING ON FLIGHT CONNECTIONS. PUBLIC ACTIVITY, SUCH AS A SPEECH TO A CONFERENCE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF CHINESE SCHOLARS, WOULD FALL OUTSIDE OUR DEFINITION OF A TRANSIT AND WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE.

5. YOU MAY DELIVER THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

-- THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PLEASED TO PERMIT A TRANSIT OF HAWAII BY VICE PREMIER HSU LI-TEH, SHOULD HE WISH TO STOP EN ROUTE TO OR FROM CANADA IN MAY.

-- THE TRANSIT, WHICH WE UNDERSTAND WOULD BE FOR THE PURPOSE OF REST AND RELAXATION BETWEEN FLIGHTS, COULD BE OVERNIGHT OR, DEPENDING ON FLIGHT SCHEDULES, OVER TWO NIGHTS.

-- WE ARE NOT ABLE TO AGREE TO A LONGER STAY, WHICH WOULD PLACE THE STOPOVER IN THE CATEGORY OF A VISIT. U.S. POLICY DOES NOT PERMIT VISITS TO THE UNITED STATES BY TAIWAN'S LEADERSHIP, INCLUDING THE VICE PREMIER.

-- TIME PERMITTING, THE VICE PREMIER MIGHT WISH TO ENGAGE IN RECREATION OR RELAXATION SUCH AS GOLF.

-- WE ARE NOT ABLE TO AGREE TO PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC ACTIVITIES BY VICE PREMIER HSU, SUCH AS THE PROPOSED SPEECH TO THE ASSOCIATION OF CHINESE SCHOLARS.

-- IF THESE GUIDELINES ARE AGREEABLE TO THE VICE PREMIER, WE WILL BE HAPPY TO WORK WITH THE MINISTRY TO MAKE A TRANSIT OF HAWAII AS RESTFUL AS POSSIBLE. SIGNED BELLOCCHI. YY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE (TU) 04.25. '95 18:33 NO. 1460120235 PAGE 3

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
4-27-95

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Sensoprep

April 20, 1995

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By N NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2017-0057-M (1.26)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN PODESTA
TODD STERN

SUBJECT: Visa for President Li of Taiwan

Attached is a memo from Tony Lake on whether to grant a visa allowing President Li of Taiwan to visit Cornell. Since 1979, U.S. policy has barred top Taiwanese officials from visiting the United States, even privately. President Li, however, has intensified his campaign for a visa -- including hiring a Washington lobbyist for some $4.5 million

The pressures here come from two sides. On the one hand, the Hill may be getting ready to act. Apart from Sense-of-Congress resolutions, which will pass easily, Rep. Toricelli and nine colleagues have drafted binding legislation requiring that visas be granted to senior Taiwan officials. On the other hand, the PRC would view the grant of a visa to Li as a serious erosion of our one-China policy and would likely retaliate.

Three options are presented. **(1) Continue current policy barring visits,** noting that every Administration since our 1979 normalization with the PRC has held to this policy despite strong sympathies with Taiwan. Pro: makes retaliation less likely, even if we lose in Congress. Con: ties up Congressional resources and we could still lose; **(2) grant visa but offer Chinese a high-level visit at same time** -- inviting President Jiang here or sending the Vice President to Beijing. Pro: Reduces the prospect of retaliation. Con: Offer could be criticized as pandering to China and Chinese could still reject it; **(3) grant visa and offer other actions short of high-level visit.** This option could be lose-lose: not enough to avoid retaliation, but enough to provoke criticism of pandering.

Tony recommends Option (1), noting it would be counter-productive to pick a fight with China on this issue at a time when we need their cooperation on such key matters as the North Korean nuclear issue. Secretary Christopher concurs. George is concerned that the Chinese seem to be pushing us around -- they sell nuclear technology to Iran and we can't even let President Li make a commencement address. Leon agrees with George.

Option 1___ Option 2___ Option 3___ Discuss ✓

always underestimate the Chinese leadership
4/19/95

SECRET

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010b. memo	Copy of 008b [partial] (3 pages)	04/14/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Kristoff, Sandra)
OA/Box Number: 1041

FOLDER TITLE:
Taiwan [2]

2012-0975-F
sb1266

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION April 14, 1995 95 APR 14 P4:25

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Granting a Visa to President Li of Taiwan

Purpose

To decide whether or not to grant a visa to President Li and to consider taking steps to minimize the anticipated Chinese reaction if the decision is made to extend the visa.

Background

One of your decisions in last year's Taiwan Policy Review was to continue the policy of all Administrations since the normalization of relations with China in 1979 -- to bar the most senior officials in Taiwan from visiting the United States, even for private visits. The primary justification for this policy is that such high-level visits are incompatible with our unofficial relations with Taiwan. Indeed, China has insisted on this point, making it into a central issue in the relationship.

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Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/28/2019 (1.28)
2017-0051-M

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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In addition, if the issue can be defined as Presidential prerogatives rather than as a seemingly innocuous visit to President Li's alma mater, the Administration might pick up some additional, bipartisan support.

Advantages

Minimizes damage to China relationship. If China perceived that the Administration had mounted a full court press to defeat binding legislation, it would be less likely to take retaliatory action, even if the legislation ultimately passed. While China has not tipped its hand about how it would respond, the consensus among most China specialists is that the PRC would consider a visit to be a serious erosion of our "one-China policy" requiring a strong response that would jeopardize the prospects of any further progress under your engagement strategy. (b)(1)

(b)(1) EO 13526 1.4c EO 13526 1.4d EO 13526 3.5c

At a time when we may need China's help on the North Korean nuclear issue, it is counter-productive to engage in a fight with China on this issue.

Preserves credibility of Administration policy. Having just decided this issue last summer, in the context of the Taiwan Policy Review, the Administration will be vulnerable to charges of "flip-flopping" on a significant, if symbolic, policy issue.

Disadvantages

Ties up Congressional resources. The Administration has many issues to contest with the Congress, and this issue could tie up resources needed for more significant problems.

Administration might be defeated. Fighting and losing might be preferable to not fighting and losing, at least in terms of our relationship with China, but it's hardly an attractive option. The Administration will not reap any benefits from the fight with either the Congress or the media.

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Advantages

Reduces the prospect of damaging Chinese retaliation. By giving China something it wants badly, it has an incentive not to overreact. Moreover, this option preserves the basic element of our relationships with both the PRC and Taiwan, by providing for an official visit by the PRC and an unofficial visit by Taiwan.

Disadvantages

Risk that China will reject the offer. If China concludes that the United States is backing away from its one-China policy, it might decide to "sacrifice" a high-level visit and take some form of retaliation in order to teach the United States (and other countries) a lesson.

Decision will be criticized as pandering to China. The critics of China, in both the Congress and the media, will accuse the Administration of making a cynical deal that betrays its commitment to advancing the cause of human rights in China. Such criticism can be expected to generate headlines about kowtowing to China, not only at the time the decision is made public but also when President Jiang actually comes. It is unclear if the fact that an invitation had also been extended to President Li would help to diminish the criticism.

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China has a long list of policy objectives with us, including:

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-- agreeing not to pursue a resolution at next year's UN Human Rights Commission;

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-- unconditional support for China's accession to the WTO.

None of these steps, individually, are likely to come close to offsetting the PRC's concerns about a visit by President Li. Perhaps as a package they would, but the cost in terms of your own policy objectives on a variety of issues would be high. Indeed, taking one or more of these steps, in the absence of progress by China on the substantive issues at stake, could become a lose-lose proposition: China fails to recognize the

gesture as adequate, while you are attacked by domestic critics for cynically attempting to cut a deal with China.

RECOMMENDATION

Both Secretary Christopher and I support Option 1, which continues a painful, but necessary policy, that has been supported by every Administration since 1979 and which preserves the prospects for additional progress in both U.S.-PRC and U.S.-Taiwan relations.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d, EO 13526 3.5c, (b)(1)

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010c. report	Visit to the United States by Taiwan President Li Teng-hui (4 pages)	04/07/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Kristoff, Sandra)
OA/Box Number: 1041

FOLDER TITLE:
Taiwan [2]

2012-0975-F
sb1266

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. cable~~	~~Re: Managing the Lee Visit: Press Conference (1 page)~~	~~06/01/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VL 1/2/2020
~~002. cable~~	~~Re: Managing the Lee Visit (3 pages)~~	~~05/30/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VL 1/2/2020
~~003. cable~~	~~Request for Transit by Premier Lien Chan (2 pages)~~	~~06/01/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VL 1/2/2020
~~004. cable~~	~~Copy of 003 (2 pages)~~	~~06/01/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VL 1/2/2020
005. list	List of Visitors from the National War College [partial] PII (1 page)	11/25/1995	b(6)
~~006. cable~~	~~Re: Guidance for General Committee Discussion on Taiwan (3 pages)~~	~~09/13/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VL 1/2/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Kristoff, Sandra)
OA/Box Number: 1041

FOLDER TITLE:
Taiwan [4]

2012-0975-F
sb1268

RESTRICTION CODES

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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IMMEDIATE AIT TAIPEI

EXDIS, FOR DIRECTOR PASCOE

E.O. 12356: DECL: 6/1/15

TAGS: PREL, TW

SUBJECT: MANAGING THE LEE VISIT: PRESS CONFERENCE

REF: TAIPEI 3230

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DEPARTMENT AND NSC APPRECIATE ASSURANCES FROM DING AND CHEN THAT LEE UNDERSTANDS OUR CONCERNS ABOUT MAINTAINING THE PRIVATE CHARACTER OF HIS VISIT, WILL SAY NOTHING TO EMBARRASS THE ADMINISTRATION, AND WILL BE CAREFUL IN RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS AT A PRESS CONFERENCE. MOVING THE TIMING OF THE CONFERENCE TO JUST AFTER HIS ADDRESS SHOULD HELP LEE TO MAINTAIN ITS ORIENTATION TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF HIS ADDRESS. YOU MAY INFORM DING AND CHEN THAT ON THIS BASIS, WE NO LONGER HAVE AN OBJECTION TO THE PRESS CONFERENCE. THIS ISSUE REMAINS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE IN WASHINGTON.

3. REQUEST THAT YOU REITERATE THAT WE WOULD APPRECIATE AN ADVANCE COPY OF LEE'S SPEECH.

4. WE ARE FAXING TO YOU THE DEPARTMENT'S GUIDANCE ON THE SCHEDULE AND ON OTHER ASPECTS OF THE VISIT. YY

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2017-0051-M (1.66)

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IMMEDIATE AIT TAIPEI

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: 5/30/15

TAGS: PREL, TW

SUBJECT: MANAGING THE LEE VISIT

REF: TAIPEI 3147

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE DO NOT OBJECT TO THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES RELEASING INFORMATION ON THE SCHEDULE FOR LEE TENG-HUI'S VISIT ON MAY 31. WE DO NOT ENVISION MAKING A SIMULTANEOUS ANNOUNCEMENT IN WASHINGTON, BUT THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESPERSON WILL BE PROVIDED WITH INFORMATION TO RESPOND TO INQUIRIES AT THE NOON BRIEFING ON MAY 31.

3. FOR PURPOSES OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT, WE STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES PROVIDE ONLY NECESSARY INFORMATION, I.E. MAJOR SCHEDULE EVENTS, AND AVOID PROVIDING DETAIL, SUCH AS SPECIFIC LOCATIONS AND PRECISE TIMES. THIS REQUEST IS MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRIVATE NATURE OF MR. LEE'S VISIT AND TO FACILITATE SECURITY.

4. WITH RESPECT TO THE SCHEDULE, YOU SHOULD CONVEY THE

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By n NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2017-0051-M (1.67)

FOLLOWING POINTS TO THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES. THE POINTS ARE ALSO BEING MADE TO TECRO HERE.

0 NEWS CONFERENCE. THE DEPARTMENT AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL URGE THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES TO RECONSIDER THEIR PROPOSAL TO HOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE AT CORNELL. WE PREVIOUSLY REACHED A NUMBER OF UNDERSTANDINGS WITH RESPECT TO THIS VISIT: 1) THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT IS TO ATTEND THE ALUMNI REUNION AND DELIVER A LECTURE, AND THERE SHOULD BE NO OTHER PUBLIC EVENTS; 2) THE VISIT IS PRIVATE, AND ALL ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH A PRIVATE VISIT; AND 3) CONTACT WITH THE PRESS SHOULD BE STRICTLY LIMITED TO CORNELL ALUMNI EVENTS. A PRESS CONFERENCE WOULD NOT, WE BELIEVE, BE AN ALUMNI EVENT, AND WOULD NOT BE CONSISTENT WITH THE PRIVATE NATURE OF THE VISIT. MOREOVER, THERE WOULD OF COURSE BE NO CONTROL IN SUCH A SETTING OVER THE QUESTIONS, AND THIS COULD BE AWKWARD FOR MR. LEE, IN VIEW OF THE AGREED PRIVATE, NON-OFFICIAL STATUS OF THE VISIT AND THE ATTENDANT DESIRABILITY OF AVOIDING COMMENT ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES OF INTEREST TO EITHER SIDE OR TO THE PRC. WE THEREFORE CONSIDER IT STRONGLY ADVISABLE FOR THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES TO INFORM CORNELL THAT A PRESS CONFERENCE IS NOT DESIRED. IF THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES DO NOT AGREE ON THIS POINT, WE REQUEST THAT THEY NOT INCLUDE THE PRESS CONFERENCE IN THE ANNOUNCEMENT UNTIL THE MATTER HAS BEEN RESOLVED.

0 OLIN LECTURE. WE WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING THE TOPIC FOR MR. LEE'S ADDRESS, AND WE WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE RECEIVING AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE AN ADVANCE COPY OF THE ADDRESS.

0 JUNE 10 RECEPTION. THE EVENING RECEPTION HOSTED BY LEE, ABOUT WHICH WE WERE INFORMED ON MAY 30, DOES NOT APPEAR ON THE SCHEDULE PROVIDED BY TECRO EARLIER. WE ASSUME THAT INVITED GUESTS ARE TO BE FROM THE UNIVERSITY COMMUNITY, BUT WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING IF THERE ARE TO BE ANY OTHERS INVITED.

0 MEETINGS. WE BELIEVE THAT THE NATURE OF CERTAIN MEETINGS IS COVERED BY THE GENERAL UNDERSTANDINGS THAT WE REACHED WITH TAIWAN. NEVERTHELESS, WE WOULD LIKE TO BE ASSURRED SPECIFICALLY THAT THE FOLLOWING EVENTS ARE CONSIDERED PRIVATE AND WILL NOT HAVE MEDIA PRESENT:

-- AIRPORT ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES IN THE U.S.

-- JUNE 7: MEET WITH OVERSEAS CHINESE REPRESENTATIVES

{WHICH WE UNDERSTAND WILL BE IN LEE'S HOTEL ROOM}.

-- JUNE 9: MEET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE USA-ROC ECONOMIC COUNCIL.

-- JUNE 10: RECEPTION HOSTED BY LEE.

5. WE NOTE THAT THERE IS ONE ELEMENT IN THE SCHEDULE RECEIVED FROM TECRO HERE WHICH IS NOT INCLUDED IN REFTEL SCHEDULE: JUNE 10, AFTERNOON, CAMPUS TOUR OR GOLF. YY

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

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IMMEDIATE AIT TAIPEI

EXDIS; FOR DIRECTOR PASCOE

E.O. 12356: DECL: 6/1/15

TAGS: PREL, TW

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR TRANSIT BY PREMIER LIEN CHAN

REFS: TAIPEI 3190 AND PREVIOUS

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. REF PROVIDED A REQUEST FROM THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES THAT THE DEPARTMENT APPROVE A TRANSIT OF NEW YORK BY PREMIER LIEN CHAN, JUNE 14 TO 17, WHILE HE IS EN ROUTE TO AMSTERDAM. WHILE IN NEW YORK, THE PREMIER WOULD RECEIVE AN HONORARY DEGREE FROM N.Y. POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY AT A PRIVATE LUNCHEON.

3. THE DEPARTMENT HAS DECIDED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE PREMIER TO STOP OVER IN NEW YORK SO SOON AFTER PRESIDENT LEE'S VISIT. OBSERVERS WOULD BE TEMPTED TO READ SOME SIGNIFICANCE INTO THE PRESENCE IN THE U.S., THE SAME MONTH, OF TAIWAN'S TWO HIGHEST-RANKING OFFICIALS. OUR DECISION WAS ALSO INFLUENCED BY THE PREMIER'S ABILITY TO TRAVEL TO EUROPE WITHOUT TRANSITING THE U.S. WE RECOGNIZE HIS DESIRE TO SEE HIS CHILDREN, BUT WANT TO PUT SOME SPACE BETWEEN A TRANSIT AND THE LEE VISIT.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2017-0051-M (1.68)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

4. PLEASE INFORM THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES THAT BECAUSE OF THE TIMING OF THIS PROPOSED TRANSIT, WASHINGTON IS UNABLE TO APPROVE THE REQUEST. OUR DECISION DOES NOT REFLECT A CHANGE IN OUR POLICY ON TRANSITS, BUT REFLECTS ONLY A PROBLEM WITH THE TIMING OF THIS STOPOVER. WE WILL BE PLEASED TO CONSIDER FUTURE TRANSIT REQUESTS FROM THE PREMIER. YY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE (FR) 06.02. '95 17:36 NO. 1460120385 PAGE 3

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

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IMMEDIATE AIT TAIPEI

EXDIS; FOR DIRECTOR PASCOE

E.O. 12356: DECL: 6/1/15

TAGS: PREL, TW

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR TRANSIT BY PREMIER LIEN CHAN

REFS: TAIPEI 3190 AND PREVIOUS

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. REF PROVIDED A REQUEST FROM THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES THAT THE DEPARTMENT APPROVE A TRANSIT OF NEW YORK BY PREMIER LIEN CHAN, JUNE 14 TO 17, WHILE HE IS EN ROUTE TO AMSTERDAM. WHILE IN NEW YORK, THE PREMIER WOULD RECEIVE AN HONORARY DEGREE FROM N.Y. POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY AT A PRIVATE LUNCHEON.

3. THE DEPARTMENT HAS DECIDED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE PREMIER TO STOP OVER IN NEW YORK SO SOON AFTER PRESIDENT LEE'S VISIT. OBSERVERS WOULD BE TEMPTED TO READ SOME SIGNIFICANCE INTO THE PRESENCE IN THE U.S., THE SAME MONTH, OF TAIWAN'S TWO HIGHEST-RANKING OFFICIALS. OUR DECISION WAS ALSO INFLUENCED BY THE PREMIER'S ABILITY TO TRAVEL TO EUROPE WITHOUT TRANSITING THE U.S. WE RECOGNIZE HIS DESIRE TO SEE HIS CHILDREN, BUT WANT TO PUT SOME SPACE BETWEEN A TRANSIT AND THE LEE VISIT.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By ___ NARA, Date 8/24/2019
2017-0051-M (1.69)

4. PLEASE INFORM THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES THAT BECAUSE OF THE TIMING OF THIS PROPOSED TRANSIT, WASHINGTON IS UNABLE TO APPROVE THE REQUEST. OUR DECISION DOES NOT REFLECT A CHANGE IN OUR POLICY ON TRANSITS, BUT REFLECTS ONLY A PROBLEM WITH THE TIMING OF THIS STOPOVER. WE WILL BE PLEASED TO CONSIDER FUTURE TRANSIT REQUESTS FROM THE PREMIER. YY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE (FR) 06.02. '95 17:36 NO. 14601203385 PAGE 3

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IMMEDIATE USUN NEW YORK

ROUTINE AIT TAIPEI, BEIJING

E.O. 12356: DECL: 9/20/2025

TAGS: PREL, TW, UN, CH

SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR GENERAL COMMITTEE DISCUSSION ON TAIWAN

REF: A) USUN 3068, B) 94 USUN 3977, C) 94 STATE 255245

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN REGARD TO THE PROPOSED UNGA AGENDA ITEM TO DISCUSS THE "EXCEPTIONAL SITUATION" OF TAIWAN, THE DEPARTMENT'S OBJECTIVE IS TO REPEAT THE EVENTS OF THE PREVIOUS TWO YEARS WHEN THE ITEM WAS WITHDRAWN FROM CONSIDERATION WITHOUT U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE GENERAL COMMITTEE DISCUSSION. CONSISTENT WITH OUR GENERAL POLICY, USUN SHOULD NOT ENCOURAGE A "NO ACTION" MOTION, BUT SHOULD BE PREPARED TO VOTE FOR "NO ACTION" OR AGAINST THE ITEM, IF A VOTE IS REQUIRED, IN LIGHT OF THE OTHER POLICY CONCERNS SURROUNDING THIS ISSUE. IF ASKED BY OTHER MEMBER STATES FOR THE U.S. POSITION PRIOR TO THE DISCUSSION OF THE ITEM IN THE GENERAL COMMITTEE, USUN SHOULD MAKE KNOWN OUR PREFERENCE THAT THE GENERAL COMMITTEE FOLLOW THE SAME PROCEDURE AS IN THE PREVIOUS TWO YEARS, WHICH AVOIDED A VOTE OF ANY KIND ON THE ITEM IN QUESTION. IF FORCED TO

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2017-0051-M (1.707)

VOTE, USUN SHOULD DEFEND OUR DECISION ON THE BASIS OF THE LONGSTANDING U.S. "ONE CHINA" POLICY. USUN SHOULD NOT, HOWEVER, SEEK TO SPEAK ON THE PROPOSED AGENDA ITEM IN THE GENERAL COMMITTEE DISCUSSION.

3. IF ASKED TO DEFEND A NEGATIVE VOTE TO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GENERAL COMMITTEE, USUN MAY DRAW UPON THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS:

O THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZES THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AS THE SOLE LEGAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA AND ACKNOWLEDGES THE CHINESE POSITION THAT THERE IS ONE CHINA AND TAIWAN IS PART OF CHINA.

O THE U.S. COMMENDS THE PEOPLE ON TAIWAN FOR THEIR ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ACHIEVEMENTS; FOR OUR PART, WE MAINTAIN A STRONG, UNOFFICIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PEOPLE ON TAIWAN.

O THE U.S., HOWEVER, DOES NOT SUPPORT MEMBERSHIP FOR TAIWAN IN THE UNITED NATIONS. TAIWAN DOES NOT QUALIFY FOR MEMBERSHIP UNDER ARTICLE 4 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER.

O INSCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED ITEM ON THE UNGA AGENDA WOULD ONLY BURDEN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WITH AN IRRECONCILABLE DEBATE. YY

Addition clearances:

IO/UNP:AKaragiannis
L/UNA:JCrook
L/EAP:JHergen
P:DRussel

all clear cw

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. cable~~	~~Re: Taiwan Request for Premier Lien U.S. Transit (2 pages)~~	~~05/05/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VR 1/2/2020
~~002a. note~~	~~Handwritten Comments to 002b (1 page)~~	~~00/00/0000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VR 1/2/2020
~~002b. memo~~	~~To: The President; From: John Podesta, Todd Stern; Re: Visa for~~ President Li of Taiwan (1 page)	~~04/20/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VR 1/2/2020
002c. memo	To: The President; From: Anthony Lake; Re: Granting a Visa to President Li of Taiwan [partial] (3 pages)	04/14/1995	P1/b(1)
002d. report	Visit to the United States by Taiwan President Li Teng-hui (4 pages)	04/07/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002e. memo~~	~~Copy of 002b [without annotations] (1 page)~~	~~04/20/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VR 1/2/2020
002f. memo	Copy of 002c [partial] (3 pages)	04/14/1995	P1/b(1)
002g. report	Copy of 002d (4 pages)	04/07/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002h. form~~	~~Memo cover sheet [with annotations] (1 page)~~	~~04/14/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VR 1/2/2020
002i. memo	Copy of 002c [partial] (3 pages)	04/14/1995	P1/b(1)
~~002j. memo~~	~~Copy of 002b [Draft] (1 page)~~	~~04/19/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VR 1/2/2020
002k. memo	Copy of 002c [Draft with annotations] [partial] (3 pages)	04/14/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Kristoff, Sandra)
OA/Box Number: 1041

FOLDER TITLE:
Taiwan [3]

2012-0975-F
sb1267

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002l. memo	To: Anthony Lake; From: Stanley Roth; Re: Visa for President Li of Taiwan [partial] (1 page)	04/14/1995	P1/b(1)
002m. memo	Copy of 002l [with annotations] [partial] (1 page)	04/10/1995	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	To: Mr. Tarnoff; From: Winston Lord; Re: Taiwan Visit Legislation [partial] (2 pages)	05/18/1995	P1/b(1)
~~003b. report~~	~~Meeting with Taiwan Representative (2 pages)~~	~~05/09/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RR 1/2/2020
004. email	To: Berger, Samuel; From: Roth, Stanley; Re: Taiwan - Lee Visit [partial] (1 page)	05/11/1995	P1/b(1)
~~005. report~~	~~Copy of 003b (2 pages)~~	~~05/09/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RR 1/2/2020
~~006. report~~	~~Copy of 003b [with annotations] (2 pages)~~	~~05/09/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RR 1/2/2020
~~007. cable~~	~~Re: Private Visit by President Lee (5 pages)~~	~~05/19/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RR 1/2/2020
~~008. cable~~	~~Copy of 007 (5 pages)~~	~~05/19/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RR 1/2/2020
~~009. cable~~	~~Re: Transit of U.S. by Vice Premier Hsu Li-The (2 pages)~~	~~05/24/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RR 1/2/2020
~~010. cable~~	~~Re: Request for Premier Lien Visit (2 pages)~~	~~05/24/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RR 1/2/2020
~~011. cable~~	~~Re: Managing the Lee Visit (3 pages)~~	~~05/24/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RR 1/2/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
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OA/Box Number: 1041

FOLDER TITLE:
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2012-0975-F
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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
012. cable	Re: Private Visit by President Lee [partial] (1 page)	05/20/1995	P1/b(1)
~~013a. memo~~	~~To: Mr. President; From: Todd Stern; Re: Memo from Tony Lake (1 page)~~	~~05/19/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ N 1/2/2020
013b. memo	To: The President; From: Anthony Lake; Re: Managing a Visit to Cornell University by President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan [partial] (1 page)	05/18/1995	P1/b(1)
013c. memo	To: Antrhony Lake; From: Robert Suettinger; Re: Possible Chinese Response to a Lee Teng-hui Visit to the United States [partial] (2 pages)	05/17/1995	P1/b(1)
013d. memo	To: The Secretary; From: Sandra O'Leary; Re: Managing Taiwan President Lee's Visit to Cornell [partial] (1 page)	02/25/1992	P1/b(1)
~~013e. memo~~	~~To: Anthony Lake; From: Robert Suettinger; Re: Managing a Visit to~~ Cornell University by President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan (1 page)	~~05/18/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ N 1/2/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
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PRIORITY AIT TAIPEI

FOR AIT TAIPEI FROM AIT WASH DC

E.O. 12356: DECL: 5/2/05

TAGS: PREL, TW

SUBJECT: TAIWAN REQUEST FOR PREMIER LIEN U.S. TRANSIT

REF: TAIPEI 02538

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE ARE PREPARED TO PERMIT A TRANSIT OF NEW YORK BY PREMIER LIEN CHAN EN ROUTE TO EUROPE. SUCH A TRANSIT WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH ADMINISTRATION POLICY ON TRANSITS BY MEMBERS OF TAIWAN'S LEADERSHIP.

3. THE STOPOVER PROPOSED BY VICE FOREIGN MINISTER CHEN, HOWEVER, HAS AS ITS PURPOSE PREMIER LIEN'S ACCEPTANCE OF AN HONORARY DEGREE. THIS WOULD CONSTITUTE A PUBLIC ACTIVITY, AND THIS WOULD NOT BE CONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSE OF A TRANSIT, WHICH IS SAFETY, COMFORT OR CONVENIENCE. WE CAN APPROVE A STOPOVER SUFFICIENT FOR REST AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE FLIGHT CONNECTIONS TO HIS ONWARD DESTINATION.

5. YOU MAY DELIVER THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2017-0051-M (1.32)

-- THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PLEASED TO PERMIT A TRANSIT OF NEW YORK BY PREMIER LIEN CHAN, SHOULD HE WISH TO STOP EN ROUTE TO EUROPE ON OR ABOUT JUNE 4.

-- WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE TRANSIT WOULD BE TO MAKE FLIGHT CONNECTIONS, AND FOR REST BETWEEN FLIGHTS.

-- WE ARE NOT ABLE TO AGREE THAT THE PREMIER, DURING THE STOPOVER, WOULD ACCEPT AN HONORARY DEGREE FROM NEW YORK POLYTECHNIC. THIS WOULD BE A PUBLIC ACTIVITY AND THUS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSE OF A TRANSIT.

-- IF THESE GUIDELINES ARE AGREEABLE TO THE PREMIER, WE WILL BE HAPPY TO WORK WITH THE MINISTRY TO MAKE A TRANSIT OF NEW YORK AS RESTFUL AS POSSIBLE. SIGNED BELLOCCHI. YY

4160

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

1] Dohe TO SB Date: Apr 10

Please note yellow sticky on memo. STATE is still verifying the Secretary supports this position. VR/Fred

2] SB TO TL Date:

I now think this fairly reflects options. Option one is lousy, except compared with alternatives, but Pres must

3] TO Date:

buy on. (One alternative is to beef up Hawaii transit alternative, e.g. w/ private speech there,

4] TO Date:

which Pascoe never deployed)

5] TO Date:

4-27
take copied

Sensagner

SECRET

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
4-27-95

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 20, 1995

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2017-0051-M (1.33)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN PODESTA
TODD STERN

SUBJECT: Visa for President Li of Taiwan

Attached is a memo from Tony Lake on whether to grant a visa allowing President Li of Taiwan to visit Cornell. Since 1979, U.S. policy has barred top Taiwanese officials from visiting the United States, even privately. President Li, however, has intensified his campaign for a visa -- including hiring a Washington lobbyist for some $4.5 million

The pressures here come from two sides. On the one hand, the Hill may be getting ready to act. Apart from Sense-of-Congress resolutions, which will pass easily, Rep. Toricelli and nine colleagues have drafted binding legislation requiring that visas be granted to senior Taiwan officials. On the other hand, the PRC would view the grant of a visa to Li as a serious erosion of our one-China policy and would likely retaliate.

Three options are presented. **(1) Continue current policy barring visits,** noting that every Administration since our 1979 normalization with the PRC has held to this policy despite strong sympathies with Taiwan. Pro: makes retaliation less likely, even if we lose in Congress. Con: ties up Congressional resources and we could still lose; **(2) grant visa but offer Chinese a high-level visit at same time** -- inviting President Jiang here or sending the Vice President to Beijing. Pro: Reduces the prospect of retaliation. Con: Offer could be criticized as pandering to China and Chinese could still reject it; **(3) grant visa and offer other actions short of high-level visit.** This option could be lose-lose: not enough to avoid retaliation, but enough to provoke criticism of pandering.

Tony recommends Option (1), noting it would be counter-productive to pick a fight with China on this issue at a time when we need their cooperation on such key matters as the North Korean nuclear issue. Secretary Christopher concurs. George is concerned that the Chinese seem to be pushing us around -- they sell nuclear technology to Iran and we can't even let President Li make a commencement address. Leon agrees with George.

Option 1___ Option 2___ Option 3___ Discuss ✓

always wanted to do the right thing
4-3-95

SECRET

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002c. memo	To: The President; From: Anthony Lake; Re: Granting a Visa to President Li of Taiwan [partial] (3 pages)	04/14/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Kristoff, Sandra)
OA/Box Number: 1041

FOLDER TITLE:
Taiwan [3]

2012-0975-F
sb1267

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION April 14, 1995 95APR 14 P4:25

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Granting a Visa to President Li of Taiwan

Purpose

To decide whether or not to grant a visa to President Li and to consider taking steps to minimize the anticipated Chinese reaction if the decision is made to extend the visa.

Background

One of your decisions in last year's Taiwan Policy Review was to continue the policy of all Administrations since the normalization of relations with China in 1979 -- to bar the most senior officials in Taiwan from visiting the United States, even for private visits. The primary justification for this policy is that such high-level visits are incompatible with our unofficial relations with Taiwan. Indeed, China has insisted on this point, making it into a central issue in the relationship.

Another major factor is the recognition that the intense Congressional and media interest in such visits makes a truly private visit all but impossible. President Li's Cornell visit is a case in point: there would be huge media attention to his visit both here and throughout Asia, and it is likely that Members of Congress would travel to Ithaca, New York, to meet with him as well.

Despite the numerous other policy adjustments we made in the review, President Li has chosen to intensify his campaign to receive a visa (we denied his visa request, also for a Cornell event, in 1994). He has hired a lobbyist at considerable expense (reportedly $4.5 million over three years) to orchestrate Congressional and media support. (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c his motives are more political than personal; specifically, that the political boost he'll receive, if he's permitted to make the trip, will save him many more millions of dollars in campaign costs in his 1996 Presidential campaign than the cost of the lobbyist. This makes it very unlikely he will relent.

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/28/2019
2017-0051-M (1.35)

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Thus far, Sense-of-Congress resolutions urging that President Li be granted a visa have been reported out of Committee in both the Senate and the House, with Floor action likely shortly after the Easter recess. Less clear is whether there will be a serious effort to pass binding legislation obligating you to grant a visa. Congressman Torricelli and nine colleagues have recently drafted a bill which amends the Taiwan Relations Act to require the extension of visas to senior Taiwan officials. It is unclear what the prospects are for passage of this legislation.

Finally, you should be aware that President Li has not yet responded to the formal request, which we made through AIT in Taiwan, asking him to defer a Cornell visit but offering a low-key transit through Hawaii.

In view of the fact that we can neither assume that President Li will accept our offer or that the Congress won't attempt to resolve this legislatively, I believe you need to consider several different policy options.

Option One: Stand Firm Despite Congressional Resistance

Unlike the Sense-of-Congress resolutions, which will pass easily, there is a chance that binding legislation can be defeated. In the context of a serious debate on binding legislation -- debate that did not occur on the Sense-of-Congress resolutions -- we would be able to emphasize the fact that since the normalization of relations with the PRC in 1979, every Administration has adhered to a one-China policy. In the context of this policy neither the Reagan nor the Bush Administrations, despite strong sympathies with Taiwan, permitted the President of Taiwan or other senior officials from visiting the United States, even for unofficial visits.

In addition, if the issue can be defined as Presidential prerogatives rather than as a seemingly innocuous visit to President Li's alma mater, the Administration might pick up some additional, bipartisan support.

Advantages

Minimizes damage to China relationship. If China perceived that the Administration had mounted a full court press to defeat binding legislation, it would be less likely to take retaliatory action, even if the legislation ultimately passed. While China has not tipped its hand about how it would respond, the consensus among most China specialists is that the PRC would consider a visit to be a serious erosion of our "one-China policy" requiring a strong response that would jeopardize the prospects of any further progress under your engagement strategy. (b)(1)

(b)(1) EO 13526 1.4c EO 13526 1.4d EO 13526 3.5c

At a time when we may need China's help on the North Korean nuclear issue, it is counter-productive to engage in a fight with China on this issue.

Preserves credibility of Administration policy. Having just decided this issue last summer, in the context of the Taiwan Policy Review, the Administration will be vulnerable to charges of "flip-flopping" on a significant, if symbolic, policy issue.

Disadvantages

Ties up Congressional resources. The Administration has many issues to contest with the Congress, and this issue could tie up resources needed for more significant problems.

Administration might be defeated. Fighting and losing might be preferable to not fighting and losing, at least in terms of our relationship with China, but it's hardly an attractive option. The Administration will not reap any benefits from the fight with either the Congress or the media.

Option Two: Offer the Chinese a High-Level Visit when you approve Li Visit

The PRC has attached high priority to resuming the highest-level visits (you or the Vice President to China, President Jiang to Washington). Specifically, China is interested in a summit meeting that doesn't take place at the margin of an international event, such as APEC or the International Women's Conference (if the First Lady decides to attend). Therefore, if you permit President Li to come, you could either invite President Jiang to visit here or send the Vice President to Beijing. Recognizing that such a visit, in either direction, would have some political cost, permitting President Jiang to come to Washington after the United Nations General Assembly session in New York would pose fewer risks, including the possibility of a Chinese crackdown on dissidents in the context of a high-level visit to Beijing. A one-hour meeting in Washington (there is no reason why you would have to offer President Jiang any more than that) would also be less of a "plum" for China than a trip of several days duration by the Vice President.

Advantages

Reduces the prospect of damaging Chinese retaliation. By giving China something it wants badly, it has an incentive not to overreact. Moreover, this option preserves the basic element of our relationships with both the PRC and Taiwan, by providing for an official visit by the PRC and an unofficial visit by Taiwan.

Disadvantages

Risk that China will reject the offer. If China concludes that the United States is backing away from its one-China policy, it might decide to "sacrifice" a high-level visit and take some form of retaliation in order to teach the United States (and other countries) a lesson.

Decision will be criticized as pandering to China. The critics of China, in both the Congress and the media, will accuse the Administration of making a cynical deal that betrays its commitment to advancing the cause of human rights in China. Such criticism can be expected to generate headlines about kowtowing to China, not only at the time the decision is made public but also when President Jiang actually comes. It is unclear if the fact that an invitation had also been extended to President Li would help to diminish the criticism.

Option Three: Take Other Ameliorating Actions short of a High-Level Visit

China has a long list of policy objectives with us, including:

-- lifting of Tiananmen sanctions;

-- agreeing not to pursue a resolution at next year's UN Human Rights Commission;

-- implementing the 1985 agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy (requires Congressional waiver that China is not aiding Pakistani nuclear program); and

-- unconditional support for China's accession to the WTO.

None of these steps, individually, are likely to come close to offsetting the PRC's concerns about a visit by President Li. Perhaps as a package they would, but the cost in terms of your own policy objectives on a variety of issues would be high. Indeed, taking one or more of these steps, in the absence of progress by China on the substantive issues at stake, could become a lose-lose proposition: China fails to recognize the

gesture as adequate, while you are attacked by domestic critics for cynically attempting to cut a deal with China.

RECOMMENDATION

Both Secretary Christopher and I support Option 1, which continues a painful, but necessary policy, that has been supported by every Administration since 1979 and which preserves the prospects for additional progress in both U.S.-PRC and U.S.-Taiwan relations.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d, EO 13526 3.5c

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002d. report	Visit to the United States by Taiwan President Li Teng-hui (4 pages)	04/07/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Kristoff, Sandra)
OA/Box Number: 1041

FOLDER TITLE:
Taiwan [3]

2012-0975-F
sb1267

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 20, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN PODESTA
TODD STERN

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Option 1___ Option 2___ Option 3___ Discuss___

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2017-0051-M (1.39)

SECRET

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002f. memo	Copy of 002c [partial] (3 pages)	04/14/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Kristoff, Sandra)
OA/Box Number: 1041

FOLDER TITLE:
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2012-0975-F
sb1267

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106200

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2762

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

April 14, 1995 95 APR 14 P4:25

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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SUBJECT: Granting a Visa to President Li of Taiwan

Purpose

To decide whether or not to grant a visa to President Li and to consider taking steps to minimize the anticipated Chinese reaction if the decision is made to extend the visa.

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Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/28/2019 (1.41)
2017-0051-M

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d, EO 13526 3.5c

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RECOMMENDATION

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Approve _____

Disapprove _____

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d, EO 13526 3.5c

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002g. report	Copy of 002d (4 pages)	04/07/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Kristoff, Sandra)
OA/Box Number: 1041

FOLDER TITLE:
Taiwan [3]

2012-0975-F
sb1267

RESTRICTION CODES

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SECRET

Document No. _____

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 4-18 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 4-19 NOON

95 APR 18 P 8:49

SUBJECT: Visit for President Li of Taiwan

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	✓		McGINTY		
PANETTA	✓		NASH		
McLARTY			QUINN	✓	
ICKES			RASCO		
BOWLES			SEGAL		
RIVLIN			SOSNIK		
EMANUEL			STEPHANOPOULOS	✓	
GEARAN			TYSON		
GIBBONS			WEBSTER		
GRIFFIN			WILLIAMS		
HALE					
HERMAN					
HIGGINS					
LAKE					
LINDSEY					
MIKVA					
McCURRY		✓			

REMARKS:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2017-0051-M (1.45)

RESPONSE: To: John P.
Fr: George S.
Aren't we being pushed around by China? They're selling nuclear technology to Iran and we can't address?
[illegible] give a commitment [illegible]

JOHN D. PODESTA
Assistant to the President
and Staff Secretary
Ext. 2702

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002i. memo	Copy of 002c [partial] (3 pages)	04/14/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Kristoff, Sandra)
OA/Box Number: 1041

FOLDER TITLE:
Taiwan [3]

2012-0975-F
sb1267

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

106200

~~SECRET~~

2762

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

April 14, 1995

95 APR 14 P4:25

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Granting a Visa to President Li of Taiwan

Purpose

To decide whether or not to grant a visa to President Li and to consider taking steps to minimize the anticipated Chinese reaction if the decision is made to extend the visa.

Background

One of your decisions in last year's Taiwan Policy Review was to continue the policy of all Administrations since the normalization of relations with China in 1979 -- to bar the most senior officials in Taiwan from visiting the United States, even for private visits. The primary justification for this policy is that such high-level visits are incompatible with our unofficial relations with Taiwan. Indeed, China has insisted on this point, making it into a central issue in the relationship.

Another major factor is the recognition that the intense Congressional and media interest in such visits makes a truly private visit all but impossible. President Li's Cornell visit is a case in point: there would be huge media attention to his visit both here and throughout Asia, and it is likely that Members of Congress would travel to Ithaca, New York, to meet with him as well.

Despite the numerous other policy adjustments we made in the review, President Li has chosen to intensify his campaign to receive a visa (we denied his visa request, also for a Cornell event, in 1994). He has hired a lobbyist at considerable expense (reportedly $4.5 million over three years) to orchestrate Congressional and media support. (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c his motives are more political than personal; specifically, that the political boost he'll receive, if he's permitted to make the trip, will save him many more millions of dollars in campaign costs in his 1996 Presidential campaign than the cost of the lobbyist. This makes it very unlikely he will relent.

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/28/2019 (1.47)
2017-0051-M

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Thus far, Sense-of-Congress resolutions urging that President Li be granted a visa have been reported out of Committee in both the Senate and the House, with Floor action likely shortly after the Easter recess. Less clear is whether there will be a serious effort to pass binding legislation obligating you to grant a visa. Congressman Torricelli and nine colleagues have recently drafted a bill which amends the Taiwan Relations Act to require the extension of visas to senior Taiwan officials. It is unclear what the prospects are for passage of this legislation.

Finally, you should be aware that President Li has not yet responded to the formal request, which we made through AIT in Taiwan, asking him to defer a Cornell visit but offering a low-key transit through Hawaii.

In view of the fact that we can neither assume that President Li will accept our offer or that the Congress won't attempt to resolve this legislatively, I believe you need to consider several different policy options.

Option One: Stand Firm Despite Congressional Resistance

Unlike the Sense-of-Congress resolutions, which will pass easily, there is a chance that binding legislation can be defeated. In the context of a serious debate on binding legislation -- debate that did not occur on the Sense-of-Congress resolutions -- we would be able to emphasize the fact that since the normalization of relations with the PRC in 1979, every Administration has adhered to a one-China policy. In the context of this policy neither the Reagan nor the Bush Administrations, despite strong sympathies with Taiwan, permitted the President of Taiwan or other senior officials from visiting the United States, even for unofficial visits.

In addition, if the issue can be defined as Presidential prerogatives rather than as a seemingly innocuous visit to President Li's alma mater, the Administration might pick up some additional, bipartisan support.

Advantages

Minimizes damage to China relationship. If China perceived that the Administration had mounted a full court press to defeat binding legislation, it would be less likely to take retaliatory action, even if the legislation ultimately passed. While China has not tipped its hand about how it would respond, the consensus among most China specialists is that the PRC would consider a visit to be a serious erosion of our "one-China policy" requiring a strong response that would jeopardize the prospects of any further progress under your engagement strategy. (b)(1)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d, EO 13526 3.5c

[redacted] At a time when we may need China's help on the North Korean nuclear issue, it is counter-productive to engage in a fight with China on this issue.

Preserves credibility of Administration policy. Having just decided this issue last summer, in the context of the Taiwan Policy Review, the Administration will be vulnerable to charges of "flip-flopping" on a significant, if symbolic, policy issue.

Disadvantages

Ties up Congressional resources. The Administration has many issues to contest with the Congress, and this issue could tie up resources needed for more significant problems.

Administration might be defeated. Fighting and losing might be preferable to not fighting and losing, at least in terms of our relationship with China, but it's hardly an attractive option. The Administration will not reap any benefits from the fight with either the Congress or the media.

Option Two: Offer the Chinese a High-Level Visit when you approve Li Visit

The PRC has attached high priority to resuming the highest-level visits (you or the Vice President to China, President Jiang to Washington). Specifically, China is interested in a summit meeting that doesn't take place at the margin of an international event, such as APEC or the International Women's Conference (if the First Lady decides to attend). Therefore, if you permit President Li to come, you could either invite President Jiang to visit here or send the Vice President to Beijing. Recognizing that such a visit, in either direction, would have some political cost, permitting President Jiang to come to Washington after the United Nations General Assembly session in New York would pose fewer risks, including the possibility of a Chinese crackdown on dissidents in the context of a high-level visit to Beijing. A one-hour meeting in Washington (there is no reason why you would have to offer President Jiang any more than that) would also be less of a "plum" for China than a trip of several days duration by the Vice President.

Advantages

Reduces the prospect of damaging Chinese retaliation. By giving China something it wants badly, it has an incentive not to overreact. Moreover, this option preserves the basic element of our relationships with both the PRC and Taiwan, by providing for an official visit by the PRC and an unofficial visit by Taiwan.

Disadvantages

Risk that China will reject the offer. If China concludes that the United States is backing away from its one-China policy, it might decide to "sacrifice" a high-level visit and take some form of retaliation in order to teach the United States (and other countries) a lesson.

Decision will be criticized as pandering to China. The critics of China, in both the Congress and the media, will accuse the Administration of making a cynical deal that betrays its commitment to advancing the cause of human rights in China. Such criticism can be expected to generate headlines about kowtowing to China, not only at the time the decision is made public but also when President Jiang actually comes. It is unclear if the fact that an invitation had also been extended to President Li would help to diminish the criticism.

Option Three: Take Other Ameliorating Actions short of a High-Level Visit

China has a long list of policy objectives with us, including:

- lifting of Tiananmen sanctions;

-- agreeing not to pursue a resolution at next year's UN Human Rights Commission;

-- implementing the 1985 agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy (requires Congressional waiver that China is not aiding Pakistani nuclear program); and

-- unconditional support for China's accession to the WTO.

None of these steps, individually, are likely to come close to offsetting the PRC's concerns about a visit by President Li. Perhaps as a package they would, but the cost in terms of your own policy objectives on a variety of issues would be high. Indeed, taking one or more of these steps, in the absence of progress by China on the substantive issues at stake, could become a lose-lose proposition: China fails to recognize the

gesture as adequate, while you are attacked by domestic critics for cynically attempting to cut a deal with China.

RECOMMENDATION

Both Secretary Christopher and I support Option 1, which continues a painful, but necessary policy, that has been supported by every Administration since 1979 and which preserves the prospects for additional progress in both U.S.-PRC and U.S.-Taiwan relations.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d, EO 13526 3.5c

DRAFT

April 19, 1995

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN PODESTA
TODD STERN

SUBJECT: Visa for President Li of Taiwan

Attached is a memo from Tony Lake on whether to grant a visa allowing President Li of Taiwan to visit Cornell. Since 1979, U.S. policy has barred top Taiwanese officials from visiting the United States, even privately. President Li, however, has intensified his campaign for a visa -- including hiring a Washington lobbyist for some $4.5 million

The pressures here come from two sides. On the one hand, the Hill may be getting ready to act. Apart from Sense-of-Congress resolutions, which will pass easily, Rep. Toricelli and nine colleagues have drafted binding legislation requiring that visas be granted to senior Taiwan officials. On the other hand, the PRC would view the grant of a visa to Li as a serious erosion of our one-China policy and would likely retaliate.

Three options are presented. (1) Stand firm, noting that every Administration since our 1979 normalization with the PRC has held to the same policy despite strong sympathies with Taiwan. Pro: makes retaliation less likely, even if we lose in Congress. Con: ties up Congressional resources and we could still lose; **(2) grant visa but offer Chinese a high-level visit at same time** -- inviting President Jiang here or sending the Vice President to Beijing. Pro: Reduces the prospect of retaliation. Con: Offer could be criticized as pandering to China and Chinese could still reject it; **(3) grant visa and offer other actions short of high-level visit.** This option could be lose-lose: not enough to avoid retaliation, but enough to provoke criticism of pandering.

Tony recommends Option (1), noting it would be counter-productive to pick a fight with China on this issue at a time when we need their cooperation on such key matters as the North Korean nuclear issue. Secretary Christopher concurs. George is concerned that the Chinese seem to be pushing us around -- they sell nuclear technology to Iran and we can't even let President Li make a commencement address.
[Leon agrees with ~~[illegible]~~ George.

Option (1)___ Option (2)___ Option (3)___ Discuss___

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By N NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2017-0057-M (1,48)

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002k. memo	Copy of 002c [Draft with annotations] [partial] (3 pages)	04/14/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Kristoff, Sandra)
OA/Box Number: 1041

FOLDER TITLE:
Taiwan [3]

2012-0975-F
sb1267

RESTRICTION CODES

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION April 14, 1995 95 APR 14 P4:25

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Granting a Visa to President Li of Taiwan

Purpose

To decide whether or not to grant a visa to President Li and to consider taking steps to minimize the anticipated Chinese reaction if the decision is made to extend the visa.

Background

One of your decisions in last year's Taiwan Policy Review was to continue the policy of all Administrations since the normalization of relations with China in 1979 -- to bar the most senior officials in Taiwan from visiting the United States, even for private visits. The primary justification for this policy is that such high-level visits are incompatible with our unofficial relations with Taiwan. Indeed, China has insisted on this point, making it into a central issue in the relationship.

Another major factor is the recognition that the intense Congressional and media interest in such visits makes a truly private visit all but impossible. President Li's Cornell visit is a case in point: there would be huge media attention to his visit both here and throughout Asia, and it is likely that Members of Congress would travel to Ithaca, New York, to meet with him as well.

Despite the numerous other policy adjustments we made in the review, President Li has chosen to intensify his campaign to receive a visa (we denied his visa request, also for a Cornell event, in 1994). He has hired a lobbyist at considerable expense (reportedly $4.5 million over three years) to orchestrate Congressional and media support. (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c his motives are more political than personal; specifically, that the political boost he'll receive, if he's permitted to make the trip, will save him many more millions of dollars in campaign costs in his 1996 Presidential campaign than the cost of the lobbyist. This makes it very unlikely he will relent.

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/28/2019
2017-0051-M (1.50)

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Thus far, Sense-of-Congress resolutions urging that President Li be granted a visa have been reported out of Committee in both the Senate and the House, with Floor action likely shortly after the Easter recess. Less clear is whether there will be a serious effort to pass binding legislation obligating you to grant a visa. Congressman Torricelli and nine colleagues have recently drafted a bill which amends the Taiwan Relations Act to require the extension of visas to senior Taiwan officials. It is unclear what the prospects are for passage of this legislation.

Finally, you should be aware that President Li has not yet responded to the formal request, which we made through AIT in Taiwan, asking him to defer a Cornell visit but offering a low-key transit through Hawaii.

In view of the fact that we can ~~neither~~ not assume that President Li will accept our offer or that the Congress won't attempt to resolve this legislatively, I believe you need to consider several different policy options.

Option One: Stand Firm Despite Congressional Resistance

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In addition, if the issue can be defined as Presidential prerogatives rather than as a seemingly innocuous visit to President Li's alma mater, the Administration might pick up some additional, bipartisan support.

Advantages

Minimizes damage to China relationship. If China perceived that the Administration had mounted a full court press to defeat binding legislation, it would be less likely to take retaliatory action, even if the legislation ultimately passed. While China has not tipped its hand about how it would respond, the consensus among most China specialists is that the PRC would consider a visit to be a serious erosion of our "one-China policy" requiring a strong response that would jeopardize the prospects of any further progress under your engagement strategy. (b)(1)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d, EO 13526 3.5c

At a time when we may need China's help on the North Korean nuclear issue, it is counter-productive to engage in a fight with China on this issue.

Preserves credibility of Administration policy. Having just decided this issue last summer, in the context of the Taiwan Policy Review, the Administration will be vulnerable to charges of "flip-flopping" on a significant, if symbolic, policy issue.

Disadvantages

Ties up Congressional resources. The Administration has many issues to contest with the Congress, and this issue could tie up resources needed for more significant problems.

Administration might be defeated. Fighting and losing might be preferable to not fighting and losing, at least in terms of our relationship with China, but it's hardly an attractive option. The Administration will not reap any benefits from the fight with either the Congress or the media.

Option Two: Approve Li Visit and Offer the Chinese a High-Level Visit ~~when you approve Li Visit~~

The PRC has attached high priority to resuming the highest-level visits (you or the Vice President to China, President Jiang to Washington). Specifically, China is interested in a summit meeting that doesn't take place at the margin of an international event, such as APEC or the International Women's Conference (if the First Lady decides to attend). Therefore, if you permit President Li to come, you could either invite President Jiang to visit here or send the Vice President to Beijing. Recognizing that such a visit, in either direction, would have some political cost, permitting President Jiang to come to Washington after the United Nations General Assembly session in New York would pose fewer risks, ~~including the possibility of~~ eliminating such possibilities as a Chinese crackdown on dissidents in the context of a high-level visit to Beijing. A one-hour meeting in Washington (there is no reason why you would have to offer President Jiang any more than that) would also be less of a "plum" for China than a trip of several days' duration by the Vice President.

Advantages

Reduces the prospect of damaging Chinese retaliation. By giving China something it wants badly, it provides China with ~~has~~ an incentive not to overreact. Moreover, this option preserves the basic element of our relationships with both the PRC and Taiwan, by providing for an official visit by the PRC and an unofficial visit by Taiwan.

Disadvantages

Risk that China will reject the offer. If China concludes that the United States is backing away from its one-China policy, it might decide to "sacrifice" a high-level visit and take some form of retaliation in order to teach the United States (and other countries) a lesson.

Decision will be criticized as pandering to China. The critics of China, in both the Congress and the media, will accuse the Administration of making a cynical deal that betrays its commitment to advancing the cause of human rights in China. Such criticism can be expected to generate headlines about kowtowing to China, not only at the time the decision is made public but also when President Jiang actually comes. It is unclear if the fact that an invitation had also been extended to President Li would help to diminish the criticism.

Option Three: Approve Li Visit and Take Other Ameliorating Actions short of a High-Level Visit

China has a long list of policy objectives with us, including:

-- lifting of Tiananmen sanctions;

-- agreeing not to pursue a resolution at next year's UN Human Rights Commission;

-- implementing the 1985 agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy (requires Congressional waiver that China is not aiding Pakistani nuclear program); and

-- unconditional support for China's accession to the WTO.

None of these steps, individually, is ~~are~~ likely to come close to offsetting the PRC's concerns about a visit by President Li. Perhaps as a package they would, but the cost in terms of your own policy objectives on a variety of issues would be high. Indeed, taking one or more of these steps, in the absence of progress by China on the substantive issues at stake, could become a lose-lose proposition: China fails to recognize the

gesture as adequate, while you are attacked by domestic critics for cynically attempting to cut a deal with China.

RECOMMENDATION

Both Secretary Christopher and I support Option 1, which continues a painful, but necessary policy, that has been supported by every Administration since 1979 and ~~which~~ that preserves the prospects for additional progress in both U.S.-PRC and U.S.-Taiwan relations.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d, EO 13526 3.5c

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002l. memo	To: Anthony Lake; From: Stanley Roth; Re: Visa for President Li of Taiwan [partial] (1 page)	04/14/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Kristoff, Sandra)
OA/Box Number: 1041

FOLDER TITLE:
Taiwan [3]

2012-0975-F
sb1267

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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~~SECRET~~

2762 Redo

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D C 20506

April 14, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: STANLEY ROTH SOR

SUBJECT: Visa for President Li of Taiwan

Attached at Tab I is a Memorandum for the President concerning a VISA for President Li Teng-hui of Taiwan.

Concurrence by: Bill Danvers WD

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum for the President at Tab I.

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d, EO 13526 3.5c

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/28/2019
2017-0051-M (sb1267_0021)

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002m. memo	Copy of 0021 [with annotations] [partial] (1 page)	04/10/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Kristoff, Sandra)
OA/Box Number: 1041

FOLDER TITLE:
Taiwan [3]

2012-0975-F
sb1267

RESTRICTION CODES

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~~SECRET~~

2762 redo

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D C 20506

April 10, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: STANLEY ROTH SR

SUBJECT: Visa for President Li of Taiwan

to Stan — please reverse FRIDAY. Thanks. (Good memo)

Attached at Tab I is a Memorandum for the President concerning a VISA for President Li Teng-hui of Taiwan.

Concurrence by: Bill Danvers WCD

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum for the President at Tab I.

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d, EO 13526 3.5c

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/28/2019
2017-0051-M (sb1267_002m)

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	To: Mr. Tarnoff; From: Winston Lord; Re: Taiwan Visit Legislation [partial] (2 pages)	05/18/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Kristoff, Sandra)
OA/Box Number: 1041

FOLDER TITLE:
Taiwan [3]

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United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

MAY - 8 1995

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM
S/S

~~SECRET/NODIS~~
DECL:OADR

TO: P - Mr. Tarnoff

FROM: EAP - Winston Lord

SUBJECT: Meeting on Taiwan Visit Legislation; Tuesday, May 9, 3:00 p.m.

I. BACKGROUND

The concurrent resolution on a Lee Teng-hui visit (tab 1) passed the House last week 396-0. The Senate is likely to pass it this week by a similarly overwhelming vote. The resolution is designed to prompt Administration action on a visit, but we now understand that binding legislation is upon us. We understand that Torricelli's amendment to the Taiwan Relations Act (tab 2) is to be introduced on Monday, May 8, as an amendment to the State Authorization bill. It will almost certainly be marked up by the HIRC. The bill will go to the floor of the House sometime near the end of the month. The amendment would remove the Secretary's discretion with respect to entry into the U.S. of individuals from the "democratically elected leadership chosen by the people of Taiwan or their elected representatives." Similar legislation can be expected in the Senate.

AIT Director Lynn Pascoe met with Taiwan's National Security Council Chairman Ding Mou-shih on May 8. Ding told Lynn that efforts to secure a U.S. visit for Lee were not controlled by Taipei, and that his government is not driving the effort. He said that Taipei is opposed to amendment of the TRA, but he showed no inclination to ask their congressional supporters to back off. Lynn will meet later this week with Foreign Minister Fred Chien.

Stanley Roth and I are meeting late on May 9 with Taiwan Representative Benjamin Lu. (At tab 3 are draft talking points that we are still working on with the NSC; we will want your comments.) We will attempt to convince Taiwan to interrupt this scenario by making a genuine effort to have its supporters stand down. In spite of recent signals from high level officials in Taiwan that they

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were shifting their priorities from symbolic events such as a Lee visit to matters of substance such as WTO accession, we have seen no sign of such a shift. Neither has Taiwan responded to Lynn Pascoe's discussion of six weeks ago with President Lee on this subject. We will try to impress on the Taiwan authorities the very difficult position in which they are putting the Administration, and the likelihood that a confrontation with the Congress on this issue will have a cost in terms of carrying through on implementation of the Taiwan policy adjustments.

Taiwan will weigh carefully whether or not it wishes to end its visit campaign. It has invested a great deal in the effort already, and Taiwan will not lightly invite questions about its credibility. Even if Taiwan agrees that its interest is to end this campaign, it will be difficult for them to deliver. There is now an incredible momentum behind the campaign, which consists of orchestrated letter writing, a "Stand Up Taiwan Committee" at Cornell, the Cassidy lobbying contract, and the effort on the Hill. Cornell is not the only specific visit proposal: The resolution calls for a transit of Alaska to attend the USA-ROC Economic Council meeting, and Senator Murkowski is pursuing this without much apparent encouragement from Taipei. On the Hill, in fact, the whole notion of a Lee visit has taken on a life of its own, with no dissenters from the view that a visit is appropriate. In these circumstances, it would take a public statement by President Lee to arrest the Hill effort.

From the PRC perspective, this is a critical issue. The Chinese have attached as high importance to blocking the visit as have the Taiwans to pulling it off. Though China's options for retaliation are limited, it is virtually certain that it will exercise some of those available, even if they may also be harmful to China itself. If a Lee visit should take place, it is likely that the Chinese will revive the linkage to our nonproliferation dialogue, and this will impede significantly our high-priority agenda involving China/Iran transactions, South Asian security, NPT extension, a tougher and more transparent Chinese export control regime, and negotiation of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. China might also extract a price from us in the Security Council and with respect to the Korean Peninsula situation. The Chinese will likely hold off indefinitely on a human rights dialogue and counter-narcotics cooperation.

II. OPTIONS

If our demarche to Benjamin Lu does not yield immediate and visible results, we have certain basic options, which can be varied and combined to suit circumstances. It is clear that **an intelligent choice among these options requires a clear understanding of White House judgments about the foreign policy and the domestic political issues involved.**

A. Demand that Taiwan solve the problem.

1. Escalate our demarche.

Lu would be called in to hear a tougher message (b)(1) EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) with more specifics on consequences if Taiwan does not turn this around. One consideration needs to be borne in mind: The terms of our threatened retaliation will almost certainly become publicly known, and thus possible subjects of contention between the Administration and Taiwan's Hill supporters.

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

o International organizations. We have undertaken to support Taiwan's voice in international organizations, and we could freeze the effort to identify targets. This would be of some importance to Taiwan.

o Sub-cabinet economic dialogue. Postponement of the dialogue would have limited impact.

o Access to USG officials. Cutting back on access would be a clear signal of our displeasure, but of uncertain importance to Taiwan.

o Arms sales. Restrictions on sales of new arms systems offers less leverage than previously, since there are now other constraints on Taiwan's purchases -- limited defense budgets and a strained absorptive capacity for systems already in the pipeline. Submarines are the only new major system they are seeking, and we have consistently refused to sell subs for years. Attempts to slow down delivery of systems already approved would spark wide and vociferous criticism on the Hill.

In sum, We have some credible threats, but deploying them may increase Hill pressure to move binding legislation.

2. Improve the offer to Taiwan.

A year from now, there will be a popularly-elected president of Taiwan, and pressure for his (presumably Lee's) visit will have become virtually irresistible. Taiwan will no

longer have to manufacture sentiment for a visit. Perhaps we could now suggest to Taiwan that we recognize that the visit issue might be reexamined sometime after our respective presidential elections in 1996. The Secretary, you will recall, in March made even a transit contingent on Taiwan not seeking a visit through 1996.

A risk is that such a suggestion, no matter how carefully couched, would likely be portrayed by Taiwan as a tacit agreement to a future visit. We could deny for Beijing's benefit that any deal was cut, but our denials would ring hollow, and we would have to endure doubt and suspicion by Beijing. Taiwan would have to make it publicly plain that it was not seeking a visit through next year, so as to avoid placing yet another visit debate squarely in the middle of our presidential campaign. Given recent votes in the Congress, Taiwan may not see this as much of an offer.

B. Concentrate on the legislation.

1. Strongly oppose binding legislation.

We have employed arguments against the visit and the visit resolution, but these arguments simply are not accepted on the Hill. The resolution, while a significant political statement, is of course non-binding. The threatened amendment to the TRA, on the other hand, is not only objectionable from the standpoint of Taiwan policy, but in terms of constitutional principle. If we concentrate on fighting the amendment, cooler heads on the Hill might prevail, though this is only a hope; we have no information that this is will be the case.

2. Live with the legislation.

We could oppose the binding legislation up until passage, but accept that it has overwhelming congressional support and, if the Authorization Bill is otherwise acceptable, the amendment becomes law. The legislation does not require that visits take place; only that Taiwan leaders may not be excluded. Taiwan leaders may not seek to visit if the Administration makes clear that they are not welcome.

This approach is not attractive. The principle of allowing the Congress to determine such a policy is not one that we would yield lightly. And it essentially leaves to Taiwan the decision on whether or not its leaders should visit.

3. Veto the legislation.

This would not be an easy decision for the White House on the basis of Taiwan policy alone, given the nearly universal Hill support for a Lee visit. But the constitutional principle is a serious one, and after serious consideration, may be deemed to warrant a veto. An advantage to a veto, apart from the constitutional point, is that it sends a clear signal to Beijing that we are consistent and to Taipei that this really is important to us. We are very likely to have other objections to other features of the Authorization Bill as well.

A veto may be a short-lived remedy. Given sentiments on the Hill on this specific issue, either a veto would be overcome, in which case the Administration looks weak, or the legislation would keep coming back in other forms until it was attached to something veto-proof.

C. Change policy: Allow a visit now.

Congressional sentiment is by now abundantly clear. Even the PRC should recognize that the Administration has a great deal to lose by continuing the battle. By accepting the inevitable and bowing to congressional pressure, we appear reasonable and pragmatic to the Hill and Taiwan, if not to Beijing. The parameters of a visit, and the implications for our relationship with the PRC, would have to be examined carefully before deciding to modify policy.

Following are some possibilities for a visit:

o "Private visit" to Cornell: This is what Taiwan wants and what Congress expects, and would therefore be easiest to manage from this aspect. It would however involve a public event (a prestigious lecture to an audience of 2,000 alumni, which would undoubtedly receive media coverage). We could insist on nothing further, but this would probably be enough to prompt a response by Beijing.

o A stopover in Alaska: Lee's invitation is to address the annual meeting in September of the USA-ROC Economic Council, which would be a public event. This is not an attractive option. This is an initiative by Republican Senator Murkowski, and approval would weaken the rationale for turning down other invitations by congressional members. It also does not buy us much to approve this while denying Cornell, which is what the Taiwans and the Hill really want.

o An enhanced transit: We have proposed a plain, unadorned transit of Hawaii; it is conceivable, but not likely, that Lee will deem this acceptable after our further representations. We might sweeten a transit through Hawaii or some other point with non-public event such as an invitation-only meeting with the Chinese community. It would probably not be feasible to shut out media coverage of the stopover entirely, however, so a reaction by Beijing is virtually assured. Lynn Pascoe was authorized to deploy a modest "sweetener" for Hawaii, should this seem likely to convince Lee, but Lee's interest was clearly focused elsewhere, and Pascoe did not raise it. An enhanced transit, no matter where it takes place, will be more sensitive to the PRC than a pure, no-events transit.

Attachments

Tab 1 - House Concurrent Resolution, U.S. Visit of President Lee Teng-hui

Tab 2 - Torricelli Amendment to the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT

Meeting with Taiwan Representative Benjamin Lu

May 9, 1995

- Since we last met, the situation we discussed, concerning Congressional attempts to change Administration policy with respect to visits to the U.S. by President Lee, has become more pressing.

- Congress has continued to move forward with resolutions calling on our President to welcome a visit by President Lee, and we are told that the Congress will soon consider introducing binding legislation. This would create serious tension between the two branches of Government.

- You should not miscalculate about the proposed Torricelli amendment to the Taiwan Relations Act -- it is attached to a bill which will never become law in its present form.

- We are frankly disappointed and very concerned that there has been no response to the message we conveyed to you, and directly to President Lee, six weeks ago. You must realize what a difficult position this can put the Administration and the President in.

- The failure of your authorities to respond to Director Pascoe's high-level representation in a timely fashion has alrady had an adverse imkpact on our bilateral relationship, and will continue to do so.

- We find this difficult to understand, in view of the message that recent visitors to Taiwan have received, that your authorities are more interested in progress in substantive areas than in symbolic events such as a visit to Cornell. We see no evidence of a change in priorities.

- In fact, Taiwan's official spokespersons, including for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have welcomed the most recent developments in the Congress.

- As we pointed out in March, tension between the Congress and the Administration on this issue is likely to be harmful to our relationship and to U.S. interests. It would be very difficult to make progress on subjects of interest to Taiwan in such a climate.

- We hope that you see it in your interest to proceed cooperatively with us on this so that we can implement further policy adjustments.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 8/29/2019
2017-0057-M (1.52)

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- Taiwan authorities should not misinterpret recent press coverage of high-level meetings with PRC officials which alludes to the difficulty of this issue; there is no change in Administration policy on visits by Taiwan's leaders.

- I wish to underline that this is an Administration policy which has been affirmed at the highest levels, by which I mean the President.

- If a damaging confrontation is to be avoided, Taiwan must take some positive action to make it known that President Lee is not seeking a visit at this time. We urge your authorities to take such action now.

- The campaign has a momentum, and passively withdrawing support from it will be insufficient to discourage those who are challenging Administration policy. At this stage, only an authoritative public statement by your authorities that President Lee is not seeking a visit at this time will be sufficient to put a stop to this effort.

- We suggested in March that President Lee might wish to transit the Hawaii en route to another destination. A transit need not be of Hawaii if that does not work out for a particular destination. Another stopover point may be acceptable. (If asked: Anchorage is not ruled out, but a transit could not incorporate a public activity such as attendance at the September meeting of the USA-ROC Economic Council.)

- We must emphasize that time is of the essence in this matter, and we would appreciate a response from Taipei in the very near future.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. email	To: Berger, Samuel; From: Roth, Stanley; Re: Taiwan - Lee Visit [partial] (1 page)	05/11/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Kristoff, Sandra)
OA/Box Number: 1041

FOLDER TITLE:
Taiwan [3]

2012-0975-F
sb1267

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

5/11 Stanley -
Memo should be very short (and can TAB earlier memo. Update. Basic dilemma. Options. Concise pros and cons.

Cicio, Kristen K.

From: Roth, Stanley O.
To: Berger, Samuel
Cc: /R, Record at A1; Suettinger, Robert L.; @UP - APNSA Special Assistants
Subject: ~~[SECRET]~~ Taiwan--Lee Visit
Date: Thursday, May 11, 1995 11:34AM
Priority: High

Sandy--

Some thoughts before we complete our discussion and begin working on the actual memo:

I. Very Short-Term

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

I'm dubious that they'll bite, although there is a slight chance that they'll interpret the State Department hard line as a "warning" to accept the offer. I certainly wouldn't wait 6 weeks for an answer like we did the last time, (b)(1), E.O. 12958 3.3(b)(6) (b)(1) In other words, I think there's a reason not to announce a decision this weekend.

2. If Taiwan Rejects the Offer
In the likely event that Taiwan rejects or ignores our offer, I completely agree with you that we should get a Presidential decision about how to proceed.

Although I am sceptical that the President will agree, I believe it is important that we put the "hang tough" option in the package that goes forward. Every time the President has waivered in the past, he seems to have been persuaded by the argument that no other major country (Japan, the Europeans) permits high-level visits either. Indeed, it's important if we decide to change policy that we notify the Japanese in advance; they complained bitterly (and correctly) that we left them in the dark when we announced the results of the review last summer. Given my very real concern that the Chinese will retaliate in some significant fashion, I think we need to make sure that the President, unlike the Congress, understands that this action has consequences. I worry in particular about North Korea, if the negotiations don't get back on track. I'd hate to be the one asking the Chinese for help with the North after we've accepted a Lee visit.

agree

(Do we get any mileage from the President by comparing the Congressional action on Taiwan to the Congressional action thus far on moving the US Embassy to Jerusalem? I assume that we are fighting the Jerusalem issue tooth and nail, despite the unanimous vote. Why is the Jerusalem fight politically sustainable and the Taiwan fight politically unsustainable?) Can't a case be made that the Administration has to do the right thing in both cases?

You can explain to a reasonable American and he/she will agree. Not true for Taiwan.

If the decision is made to hang tough, then we need to make the next decision about whether we try to strengthen our hand by taking tangible steps to demonstrate to Taiwan our displeasure: postponing the economic dialogue, indicating no further Cabinet visits, suspending our effort to help them get into international organizations, not lifting Pelly sanctions, (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) (b)(1) Some of these are significant steps; State strongly opposes some, if not all, of them. Taiwan will immediately complain to the Hill, if past precedent is any guide. But there's no need to join the issue if the President opposes this course of action.

If the decision is to change course, I think it is both a question of when and how.

When: A case can be made that we can further reduce the prospect of serious Chinese retaliation by issuing a veto threat to the first bill to which binding legislation is attached. Since that will be the foreign operations/foreign aid authorization bill, a bill which has not passed in many years, I think we lose little by threatening a veto. Of course, the proponents will ultimately find a vehicle that will be painful for us to veto, at which point we could back-off and tell the Chinese that we had done all we could. With some luck, this process could get us past the Cornell event in June. The down side is equally apparent: we will continue to take "hits" from both the media and Congress, rather than taking our lumps up front and cutting our losses.
Ultimately, we'll still have to deal with the charge that this is another flip-flop.

Kept talking tough and talking down has ⊖ consequences

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How: We provided 2 options in the last memo: offer an offsetting summit to Jiang Zemin in the fall, or try to ameliorate the Chinese reaction short of a summit (by lifting Tiananmen sanctions, easing our position on WTO, agreeing not to pursue a resolution in next year's UN Human Rights Commission). Of these two, I much prefer the offsetting summit. I fear the other option will turn out to be the worst of all worlds: won't ameliorate the Chinese reaction, and will incur significant criticism at home for "pandering".

why isn't offering Taiwan a reasonable alternative (rather than a grudging one) a third option?

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First Draft-Not Used

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Meeting with Taiwan Representative Benjamin Lu

May 9, 1995

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- We are frankly disappointed and very concerned that there has been no response to the message we conveyed to you, and directly to President Lee, six weeks ago. You must realize what a difficult position this can put the Administration and the President in.

- The failure of your authorities to respond to Director Pascoe's high-level representation in a timely fashion is puzzling. We find it difficult to understand, in view of the message that recent visitors to Taiwan have received, that your authorities are more interested in progress in substantive areas than in symbolic events such as a visit to Cornell. Yet we see no evidence of a change in priorities.

- In fact, Taiwan's official spokespersons, including for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have welcomed the most recent developments in the Congress.

- This is a dangerous game. As we pointed out in March, tension between the Congress and the Administration on this issue is likely to be harmful to our relationship and to U.S. interests. It would be very difficult to make progress on subjects of interest to Taiwan in such a climate.

- We hope that you see it in your interest to proceed cooperatively with us on this so that we can implement further policy adjustments.

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By VL NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2017-0051-M (1,54)

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- Taiwan authorities should not misinterpret recent press coverage of high-level meetings with PRC officials which alludes to the difficulty of this issue; there is no change in Administration policy on visits by Taiwan's leaders.

- I wish to underline that this is an Administration policy which has been affirmed at the highest levels, by which I mean the President.

- If a damaging confrontation is to be avoided, Taiwan must take some positive action to make it known that President Lee is not seeking a visit at this time. We urge your authorities to take such action now.

- The campaign has a momentum, and passively withdrawing support from it will be insufficient to discourage those who are challenging Administration policy. At this stage, only an authoritative public statement by your authorities that President Lee is not seeking a visit at this time will be sufficient to put a stop to this effort.

- A transit is possible, such as the one that we have just approved for Premier Lien. We suggested in March that President Lee might wish to transit the Hawaii en route to another destination. A transit need not be of Hawaii if that does not work out for a particular onward destination. Another stopover point may be acceptable. (If asked: Anchorage is not ruled out, but a transit could not incorporate a public activity such as attendance at the September meeting of the USA-ROC Economic Council.)

- (If a stopover in Hawaii is of interest to President Lee, it might also be possible to arrange, in addition to rest and relaxation, a meeting with a local group such as a foreign affairs committee. Such an event could not however be publicized.)

- But visits are not possible, and further efforts to promote them will harm our relationship. We must emphasize that time is of the essence in this matter, and we would appreciate a response from Taipei in the very near future.

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~~SECRET~~

Revised Draft
Used at meeting
Not pre-cleared by NSC

Meeting with Taiwan Representative Benjamin Lu

May 9, 1995

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- In fact, Taiwan's official spokespersons, including for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have welcomed the most recent developments in the Congress.

- This is a dangerous game. As we pointed out in March, tension between the Congress and the Administration on this issue is likely to be harmful to our relationship and to U.S. interests. It would be very difficult to make progress on subjects of interest to Taiwan in such a climate.

- There are two ways in which we can proceed on this issue.

- The first way is to continue the path of confrontation, with all the attendant risks that I have outlined.

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By VL NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2017-0051-M (1.55)

- The second way is to work together to resolve this issue. Let me suggest how this could be done.

- I want to reiterate that the offer of a transit by President Lee is still on the table.

- We suggested in March that President Lee might wish to transit Hawaii en route to another destination.

- A transit need not occur in Hawaii, if that does not work out for a particular destination. We could work with you to find another acceptable stopover point, but it must be a genuine transit, without any public activities. We can talk about specific activities in connection with a transit

- (If asked: Anchorage is not ruled out, but such a transit could not incorporate a public activity such as attendacne at the September meeting of the USA-ROC Economic Council.)

- If you chose to accept this offer, we would expect that you would take some positive action to make it known that President Lee was no longer seeking a visit, whether it be to Cornell, Anchorage or someplace else.

- Passively withdrawing your support from the Congressional campaign for a visit will be insufficient to discourage those supporting it and to head off problems in our relations which could arise. Only an authoritative indication from your authorities that President Lee is not seeking a visit at this time will be sufficient to end the congressional activity.

- In conclusion, I must emphasize the importance which we attach to a timely response from Taipei; we would appreciate this response in the very near future.

'95 MAY 19 P8:14

Washfax Receipt
Department of State

B

S/S #

Taiwan Prepared by Suettinger approved

Message No. 022002 Classification ~~SECRET~~ No. Pages 4

From: Deborah E. Graze (Office name) | S/S (Office symbol) | 647-5302 (Extension) | 7224 (Room number)

Message Description Cable to AIT TAIPEI: Private Visit by President Lee

To (Agency):	Deliver To:	Extension	Room No.
NSCS	~~Nancy Soderberg~~	456-9461	WHSITRM
	~~Fred Dohse~~		
	Executive Secretariat		
	ROTH		
	SUETTINGER		

For: Clearance ☒ Information ☐ Per Request ☐ Comment ☐

Remarks: Please clear by: 5/19 ☆ MUST GO BEFORE 2300 BECAUSE OF TIME DIFFERENCE TO TAIWAN and limited availability of Taiwan officials.

NSCS POC is RSuettinger, who is expecting this.

S/S Officer: Deborah E. Graze

CROSSHATCH

Return Time-Stamped Coversheet to S/S

AJT
UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VR Date: 8/26/2014
2017-0051-M

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

INITIAL HERE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

APPR DRAFT
CLEAR 1 2
3 4 5
6 7 8

~~SECRET~~

EAP/RSP/TC:HOWARD LANGE:EAE
05/19/95 7711 SERTCDR 271
EAP: K WIEDEMANN:

AIT/W - N BELLOCCHI S/S/S -
S/S-O -

NIACT/IMMEDIATE AIT TAIPEI

NODIS
FROM AIT WASHDC, FOR DEPDIR LA FLEUR FROM DAS WIEDEMANN

E.O. 12356: DECL:20015

TAGS: PREL, TW

SUBJECT: PRIVATE VISIT BY PRESIDENT LEE

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AIT WASHINGTON ARRANGED A MEETING ON MAY 19 FOR EAP DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY KENT WIEDEMANN AND NSC ASIA DIRECTOR ROBERT SUETTINGER, WITH TECRO DIRECTOR BENJAMIN LU. THE TALKING POINTS IN PARAGRAPH 4 BELOW WERE DELIVERED TO LU. AS YOU WILL SEE FROM THE POINTS, THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES ARE REQUESTED TO RESPOND BY THE MORNING OF MAY 20, WASHINGTON TIME, TO INDICATE THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF THE PRINCIPLES WHICH HAVE BEEN OUTLINED FOR A PRIVATE VISIT TO CORNELL. LU WAS INFORMED THAT THERE WILL BE NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE DECISION UNTIL WE HEAR FROM TAIWAN, AND WE THEREFORE REQUEST THAT THIS MATTER BE HANDLED WITH THE UTMOST CONFIDENTIALITY. LU INDICATED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE NEED FOR CONFIDENTIALITY AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO DIFFICULTY IN PROVIDING A RESPONSE BY THE TIME REQUESTED.

3. YOU SHOULD CONTACT THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO INFORM HIM OF THE DECISION AND OF THE NEED FOR RESPONDING

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By NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2017-0051-M (1.56)

IMMEDIATELY. YOU MAY ALSO WISH TO NOTIFY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. YOU MAY, AT YOUR DISCRETION, PROVIDE A COPY OF THE TALKING POINTS, SHOULD THEY NOT HAVE BEEN RECEIVED FROM TECRO.

4. FOLLOWING ARE THE TALKING POINTS.

BEGIN TALKING POINTS

- I WANT TO INFORM YOU THAT THE ADMINISTRATION NO LONGER OBJECTS TO PRESIDENT LEE MAKING A PRIVATE VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES IN JUNE, FOR THE EXPRESS PURPOSE OF ATTENDING THE CORNELL UNIVERSITY ALUMNI REUNION.

- AS WE HAVE MADE CLEAR IN THE PAST, THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION HAS THE GREATEST RESPECT FOR PRESIDENT LEE AND WHAT HE HAS ACCOMPLISHED FOR TAIWAN. IF HE DECIDES TO ATTEND THE CORNELL REUNION, HE WILL BE TREATED WITH APPROPRIATE COURTESY, IN THE CONTEXT OF AN UNOFFICIAL, PRIVATE VISIT.

- BEFORE WE DISCUSS THE VISIT, I'D LIKE TO EXPLAIN WHY WE CHANGED OUR POSITION, AND REITERATE THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF OUR IMPORTANT RELATIONSHIP WITH TAIWAN.

- FOR SOME TIME, THE ADMINISTRATION HAS STATED THAT A PRIVATE VISIT BY TAIWAN'S TOP LEADERS WOULD NOT BE CONSISTENT WITH THE UNOFFICIAL NATURE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP, AS SET OUT IN THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT. THIS POSITION HAS BEEN HELD BY ADMINISTRATIONS OF BOTH PARTIES SINCE 1979.

- I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT THIS DECISION DOES NOT, IN ANY WAY, REFLECT A CHANGE IN THE FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF U.S. RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN. WE WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN UNOFFICIAL ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN.

- I'D NOW LIKE TO ADDRESS THE MODALITIES OF PRESIDENT LEE'S PRIVATE VISIT TO CORNELL. I AM SURE YOU WILL AGREE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THIS VISIT TO BE MANAGED IN A WAY THAT IS MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL.

- I PROPOSE THAT WE WORK TOGETHER CLOSELY TO AVOID ANY PROBLEMS WHICH COULD CAUSE DIFFICULTY FOR EITHER SIDE. AFTER PRESIDENT LEE'S VISIT, WE STILL HAVE MANY IMPORTANT ISSUES ON WHICH PROGRESS IS OF MUTUAL INTEREST.

- WE HAVE GIVEN CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO STEPS THAT CAN BE TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT THE VISIT SERVES YOUR INTERESTS AS

WELL AS OURS.

- THIS IS A PRIVATE VISIT, AND IT WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR THIS TO BE MADE CLEAR IN ALL PUBLIC COMMENTS. ALL TRAVEL AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH A PRIVATE VISIT.

- IT SHOULD EMPHASIZED THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT IS TO ATTEND THE ALUMNI REUNION AND DELIVER A LECTURE. THERE SHOULD BE NO OTHER PUBLIC EVENTS.

- - I'M SURE THAT IN PRESIDENT LEE'S PUBLIC COMMENTS HE WILL BE CAREFUL NOT TO EMBARRASS THE UNITED STATES OR THE PRESIDENT, OR COMPROMISE OUR FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES.

- CONTACT WITH THE PRESS SHOULD BE STRICTLY LIMITED TO THE CORNELL ALUMNI EVENTS.

- IF PRESIDENT LEE WISHES TO HOLD MEETINGS WITH POLITICAL OR PRIVATE FIGURES THEY SHOULD BE HELD DISCREETLY, WITH A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF MEDIA COVERAGE.

- WE WILL OF COURSE CONTINUE TO ENTERTAIN REQUESTS FOR TRANSITS.

- WE WOULD EXPECT THAT REQUESTS FOR SIMILAR VISITS BY OTHER TAIWAN LEADERS WILL BE RARE.

- WE WOULD HOPE PRESIDENT LEE WILL INFORM APPROPRIATE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS THAT HE DOES NOT INTEND TO RETURN TO THE U.S. IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

- WE WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING YOUR PLANS FOR CARRYING OUT THIS VISIT.

- I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO AGREE ON THESE UNDERSTANDINGS WHICH ARE DESIGNED TO FACILITATE PRESIDENT LEE'S VISIT, TO ENSURE THAT IT GOES SMOOTHLY AND CONTRIBUTES TO A POSITIVE ATMOSPHERE FOR THE FUTURE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP.

- AIT WILL WORK CLOSELY WITH YOU TO ENSURE THAT ALL APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENTS ARE MADE. IF YOU, OR YOUR AUTHORITIES IN TAIPEI, HAVE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PRINCIPLES WE HAVE OUTLINED FOR THE VISIT, PLEASE LET US KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE HOPE TO HEAR FROM YOU BY TOMORROW MORNING, WASHINGTON TIME.

- IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THIS MATTER REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL THE WHITE HOUSE MAKES AN ANNOUNCEMENT.

END TALKING POINTS.

5. DIRECTOR LU ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION WITH RESPECT TO MEDIA COVERAGE. HE WAS INFORMED THAT WE EXPECT NO PRESS CONFERENCES, AND THAT OTHER MEDIA COVERAGE BE LIMITED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE TO THE EVENT AT CORNELL ITSELF. WITH RESPECT TO THE POINT ABOUT PRESIDENT LEE'S PLANS FOR FUTURE VISITS, LU SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT PLAN ANY OTHER TRIPS TO THE U.S. THIS YEAR, BUT THAT HE MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN A VISIT IN 1996. SIGNED BELLOCCHI. YY

Taiwan

Approved by Suettinger

Prepared by Suettinger

'95 MAY 19 P8:14

Washfax Receipt
Department of State

B

S/S #

Message No. 022002 Classification ~~SECRET~~ No. Pages 4

From: Deborah E. Graze (Office name) S/S (Office symbol) 647-5302 (Extension) 7224 (Room number)

Message Description Cable to AIT TAIPEI: Private Visit by President Lee

To (Agency):	Deliver To:	Extension	Room No.
NSCS	~~Nancy Soderberg~~	456-9461	WHSITRM
	~~Fred Dohse~~		
	Executive Secretariat		
	ROTH		
	SUETTINGER		

For: Clearance ☒ Information ☐ Per Request ☐ Comment ☐

Remarks: Please clear by: 5/19 ☆ MUST GO BEFORE 2300 BECAUSE OF TIME DIFFERENCE TO TAIWAN and limited availability of Taiwan officials.

NSCS POC is RSuettinger, who is expecting this.

S/S Officer: Deborah E. Graze

CROSSHATCH

Return Time-Stamped Coversheet to S/S

AIT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: M Date: 6/21/2019

2017-0051-M

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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~~SECRET~~

EAP/RSP/TC:HOWARD LANGE:EAE
05/19/95 7711 SERTCDR 271
EAP: K WIEDEMANN:

AIT/W - N BELLOCCHI S/S/S -
S/S-O -

NIACT/IMMEDIATE AIT TAIPEI

NODIS
FROM AIT WASHDC, FOR DEPDIR LA FLEUR FROM DAS WIEDEMANN

E.O. 12356: DECL:20015

TAGS: PREL, TW

SUBJECT: PRIVATE VISIT BY PRESIDENT LEE

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AIT WASHINGTON ARRANGED A MEETING ON MAY 19 FOR EAP DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY KENT WIEDEMANN AND NSC ASIA DIRECTOR ROBERT SUETTINGER, WITH TECRO DIRECTOR BENJAMIN LU. THE TALKING POINTS IN PARAGRAPH 4 BELOW WERE DELIVERED TO LU. AS YOU WILL SEE FROM THE POINTS, THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES ARE REQUESTED TO RESPOND BY THE MORNING OF MAY 20, WASHINGTON TIME, TO INDICATE THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF THE PRINCIPLES WHICH HAVE BEEN OUTLINED FOR A PRIVATE VISIT TO CORNELL. LU WAS INFORMED THAT THERE WILL BE NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE DECISION UNTIL WE HEAR FROM TAIWAN, AND WE THEREFORE REQUEST THAT THIS MATTER BE HANDLED WITH THE UTMOST CONFIDENTIALITY. LU INDICATED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE NEED FOR CONFIDENTIALITY AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO DIFFICULTY IN PROVIDING A RESPONSE BY THE TIME REQUESTED.

3. YOU SHOULD CONTACT THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO INFORM HIM OF THE DECISION AND OF THE NEED FOR RESPONDING

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
~~SECRET~~ White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NARA, Date 8/28/2015
2017-0051-M (1.57)

IMMEDIATELY. YOU MAY ALSO WISH TO NOTIFY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. YOU MAY, AT YOUR DISCRETION, PROVIDE A COPY OF THE TALKING POINTS, SHOULD THEY NOT HAVE BEEN RECEIVED FROM TECRO.

4. FOLLOWING ARE THE TALKING POINTS.

BEGIN TALKING POINTS

- I WANT TO INFORM YOU THAT THE ADMINISTRATION NO LONGER OBJECTS TO PRESIDENT LEE MAKING A PRIVATE VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES IN JUNE, FOR THE EXPRESS PURPOSE OF ATTENDING THE CORNELL UNIVERSITY ALUMNI REUNION.

- AS WE HAVE MADE CLEAR IN THE PAST, THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION HAS THE GREATEST RESPECT FOR PRESIDENT LEE AND WHAT HE HAS ACCOMPLISHED FOR TAIWAN. IF HE DECIDES TO ATTEND THE CORNELL REUNION, HE WILL BE TREATED WITH APPROPRIATE COURTESY, IN THE CONTEXT OF AN UNOFFICIAL, PRIVATE VISIT.

- BEFORE WE DISCUSS THE VISIT, I'D LIKE TO EXPLAIN WHY WE CHANGED OUR POSITION, AND REITERATE THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF OUR IMPORTANT RELATIONSHIP WITH TAIWAN.

- FOR SOME TIME, THE ADMINISTRATION HAS STATED THAT A PRIVATE VISIT BY TAIWAN'S TOP LEADERS WOULD NOT BE CONSISTENT WITH THE UNOFFICIAL NATURE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP, AS SET OUT IN THE TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT. THIS POSITION HAS BEEN HELD BY ADMINISTRATIONS OF BOTH PARTIES SINCE 1979.

- I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT THIS DECISION DOES NOT, IN ANY WAY, REFLECT A CHANGE IN THE FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF U.S. RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN. WE WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN UNOFFICIAL ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN.

- I'D NOW LIKE TO ADDRESS THE MODALITIES OF PRESIDENT LEE'S PRIVATE VISIT TO CORNELL. I AM SURE YOU WILL AGREE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THIS VISIT TO BE MANAGED IN A WAY THAT IS MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL.

- I PROPOSE THAT WE WORK TOGETHER CLOSELY TO AVOID ANY PROBLEMS WHICH COULD CAUSE DIFFICULTY FOR EITHER SIDE. AFTER PRESIDENT LEE'S VISIT, WE STILL HAVE MANY IMPORTANT ISSUES ON WHICH PROGRESS IS OF MUTUAL INTEREST.

- WE HAVE GIVEN CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO STEPS THAT CAN BE TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT THE VISIT SERVES YOUR INTERESTS AS

WELL AS OURS.

- THIS IS A PRIVATE VISIT, AND IT WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR THIS TO BE MADE CLEAR IN ALL PUBLIC COMMENTS. ALL TRAVEL AND OTHER ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH A PRIVATE VISIT.

- IT SHOULD EMPHASIZED THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT IS TO ATTEND THE ALUMNI REUNION AND DELIVER A LECTURE. THERE SHOULD BE NO OTHER PUBLIC EVENTS.

- - I'M SURE THAT IN PRESIDENT LEE'S PUBLIC COMMENTS HE WILL BE CAREFUL NOT TO EMBARRASS THE UNITED STATES OR THE PRESIDENT, OR COMPROMISE OUR FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES.

- CONTACT WITH THE PRESS SHOULD BE STRICTLY LIMITED TO THE CORNELL ALUMNI EVENTS.

- IF PRESIDENT LEE WISHES TO HOLD MEETINGS WITH POLITICAL OR PRIVATE FIGURES THEY SHOULD BE HELD DISCREETLY, WITH A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF MEDIA COVERAGE.

- WE WILL OF COURSE CONTINUE TO ENTERTAIN REQUESTS FOR TRANSITS.

- WE WOULD EXPECT THAT REQUESTS FOR SIMILAR VISITS BY OTHER TAIWAN LEADERS WILL BE RARE.

- WE WOULD HOPE PRESIDENT LEE WILL INFORM APPROPRIATE MEMBERS OF CONGRESS THAT HE DOES NOT INTEND TO RETURN TO THE U.S. IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

- WE WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING YOUR PLANS FOR CARRYING OUT THIS VISIT.

- I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO AGREE ON THESE UNDERSTANDINGS WHICH ARE DESIGNED TO FACILITATE PRESIDENT LEE'S VISIT, TO ENSURE THAT IT GOES SMOOTHLY AND CONTRIBUTES TO A POSITIVE ATMOSPHERE FOR THE FUTURE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP.

- AIT WILL WORK CLOSELY WITH YOU TO ENSURE THAT ALL APPROPRIATE ARRANGEMENTS ARE MADE. IF YOU, OR YOUR AUTHORITIES IN TAIPEI, HAVE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PRINCIPLES WE HAVE OUTLINED FOR THE VISIT, PLEASE LET US KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. WE HOPE TO HEAR FROM YOU BY TOMORROW MORNING, WASHINGTON TIME.

- IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THIS MATTER REMAIN CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL THE WHITE HOUSE MAKES AN ANNOUNCEMENT.

END TALKING POINTS.

5. DIRECTOR LU ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION WITH RESPECT TO MEDIA COVERAGE. HE WAS INFORMED THAT WE EXPECT NO PRESS CONFERENCES, AND THAT OTHER MEDIA COVERAGE BE LIMITED AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE TO THE EVENT AT CORNELL ITSELF. WITH RESPECT TO THE POINT ABOUT PRESIDENT LEE'S PLANS FOR FUTURE VISITS, LU SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT PLAN ANY OTHER TRIPS TO THE U.S. THIS YEAR, BUT THAT HE MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN A VISIT IN 1996. SIGNED BELLOCCHI. YY

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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EAP/RSP/TC:HLANGE:HHL
05/23/95 77711 SERATC 4982
EAP:KWIEDEMANN

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S/S-O: NSC:

IMMEDIATE AIT TAIPEI

IMMEDIATE SINGAPORE

EXDIS, SINGAPORE FOR AMBASSADOR LORD

E.O. 12356: DECL:5/23/15

TAGS: PREL, TW, US

SUBJECT: TRANSIT OF U.S. BY VICE PREMIER HSU LI-TEH

REF: TAIPEI 3017 AND PREVIOUS

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DEPARTMENT UNDERSTANDS THAT VICE PREMIER HSU IS NOW REQUESTING A TWO-DAY STOPOVER IN LOS ANGELES, BEGINNING MAY 27, EN ROUTE TO CANADA. AS WE NOTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE INITIAL REQUEST FOR A TRANSIT {OF HAWAII}, WE ARE PREPARED TO APPROVE A TRANSIT OF NORMAL DURATION.

3. YOU MAY INFORM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND HSU'S OFFICE AS FOLLOWS:

-- THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PLEASED TO PERMIT A TRANSIT OF LOS ANGELES BY VICE PREMIER HSU LI-TEH, SHOULD HE WISH TO STOP EN ROUTE FROM TAIPEI TO CANADA IN MAY.

-- AS THE TRANSIT IS FOR THE PURPOSE OF A BRIEF REST AND CHANGE OF FLIGHTS, THE DURATION OF STAY APPROVED IN LOS ANGELES IS ONE NIGHT.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2019-0051-M (1,58)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-- A STAY LONGER THAN ONE NIGHT WOULD PLACE THE STOPOVER IN THE CATEGORY OF A VISIT, WHICH WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO APPROVE AT THIS TIME.

-- WE UNDERSTAND THAT DURING HIS TRANSIT, THE VICE PREMIER WILL HAVE NO PUBLIC MEETINGS OR MEETINGS WITH LOCAL GROUPS.

-- IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT AT THIS TIME, WHEN WE ARE PREPARING FOR PRESIDENT LEE'S PRIVATE VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES, THAT VICE PREMIER HSU AVOID ANY PUBLICITY DURING HIS TRANSIT.

-- AIT WILL BE PLEASED TO WORK WITH THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES TO FACILITATE THIS TRANSIT. YY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE (WE) 05/24/95 20:49 NO. 1460120941 PAGE 3

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S/S-O: NSC:

NODIS NOT FOR ADS

IMMEDIATE AIT TAIPEI

IMMEDIATE SINGAPORE

NODIS
FOR A/DIR LAFLEUR; SINGAPORE FOR AMB. LORD

E.O. 12356: DECL:5/24/2005

TAGS: PREL, TW

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR PREMIER LIEN VISIT

REF: A) TAIPEI 2538, B) STATE 113064, C) TAIPEI 3017

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT. NODIS.

2. THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES ARE NOW PROPOSING A VISIT RATHER THAN A TRANSIT OF NEW YORK FOR PREMIER LIEN CHAN. AS WE HAVE RECENTLY EXPLAINED IN CONNECTION WITH THE DECISION TO PERMIT LEE TENG-HUI TO MAKE A PRIVATE VISIT TO CORNELL, VISITS BY MEMBERS OF TAIWAN'S LEADERSHIP ARE A HIGHLY SENSITIVE MATTER, AND WE DO NOT EXPECT THAT TAIWAN WILL BE REQUESTING SUCH VISITS FREQUENTLY. A VISIT BY THE PREMIER WITHIN A FEW DAYS OF LEE TENG-HUI'S VISIT TO CORNELL HARDLY COMPORTS WITH THE CONCEPT OF INFREQUENT, AND PRESENTS UNACCEPTABLE RISKS TO THE FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS OF THE U.S. WE HAVE TO EXPECT THAT THE EVENT PROPOSED IN NEW YORK WOULD RECEIVE PUBLICITY. LIEN'S VISIT IS THEREFORE NOT APPROVED.

3. YOU SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO THE APPROPRIATE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES.

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NARA, Date 8/27/2019
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-- YOU HAD INITIALLY REQUESTED A TRANSIT OF NEW YORK FOR PREMIER LIEN CHAN ON HIS WAY TO EUROPE.

-- PRIOR TO OUR RECENT DECISION TO PERMIT A VISIT BY PRESIDENT LEE, WE WERE PLEASED TO PERMIT THAT TRANSIT, AS WE INFORMED YOU EARLIER THIS MONTH.

-- THE PREMIER IS NOW REQUESTING APPROVAL TO TRAVEL TO NEW YORK JUNE 14-17 WITH NO ONWARD DESTINATION TO A THIRD COUNTRY. THAT WOULD OF COURSE BE A VISIT RATHER THAN A TRANSIT.

-- WITHIN THE PAST FEW DAYS, WE HAVE DISCUSSED WITH YOU THE ADMINISTRATION'S DECISION TO PERMIT OCCASIONAL PRIVATE VISITS BY MEMBERS OF TAIWAN'S LEADERSHIP. WE EXPLAINED AT THE TIME THAT WE EXPECT THAT REQUESTS FOR SUCH VISITS WILL BE RARE.

-- IN VIEW OF THE FORTHCOMING VISIT BY PRESIDENT LEE, ANY VISIT BY THE PREMIER TO THE U.S. WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE IN TERMS OF THE OVERALL FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS OF THE U.S.

-- WE THEREFORE HOPE THAT YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THAT WE ARE UNABLE TO APPROVE THE REQUEST FOR A VISIT BY PREMIER LIEN. YY

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NODIS NOT FOR ADS

IMMEDIATE AIT TAIPEI

IMMEDIATE SINGAPORE

NODIS
FOR A/DIR LAFLEUR; SINGAPORE FOR AMBASSADOR LORD

E.O. 12356: DECL: 05/24/2015

TAGS: PREL, OTRA, TW

SUBJECT: MANAGING THE LEE VISIT

REF: TAIPEI 3016

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT. NODIS.

2. AIT ACTING DIRECTOR IS REQUESTED TO, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, CALL ON AN APPROPRIATE TAIWAN AUTHORITY TO DELIVER THE POINTS SET OUT BELOW. DEPARTMENT AND AIT/W WILL ATTEMPT TO DELIVER THE SAME POINTS TO TECRO REPRESENTATIVE LU LATE ON MAY 24.

- PRESIDENT CLINTON AGREED TO PRESIDENT LEE MAKING A PRIVATE VISIT TO THE U.S. NEXT MONTH FOR THE EXPRESS PURPOSE OF PARTICIPATING IN ALUMNI FUNCTIONS AT CORNELL UNIVERSITY. A FEW DAYS AGO, YOUR REPRESENTATIVE IN WASHINGTON INFORMED US THAT THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES UNDERSTAND THAT THIS IS TO BE A PRIVATE VISIT, AND ALL ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE CONSISTENT WITH THIS PRINCIPLE.

- REPRESENTATIVE LU ALSO INFORMED US OF YOUR WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE CLOSELY WITH THE U.S. IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 1/2 NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2017-0051-m (1.60)

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DIFFICULTIES IN CONNECTION WITH THE VISIT.

- WE WOULD LIKE TO REQUEST YOUR RECONSIDERATION OF THE TRAVEL PLANS YOU PROPOSED. WE BELIEVE THAT WITH CERTAIN ADJUSTMENTS, IT WOULD BE MORE IN KEEPING WITH OUR OVERALL AGREEMENT ON THE UNOFFICIAL CHARACTER AND PRIVATE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT.

- WE AGREE THAT AN OVERNIGHT STOP IN LOS ANGELES IS/IS APPROPRIATE AND THAT IT IS APPROPRIATE FOR THE PRESIDENT TO MEET, IN HIS HOTEL SUITE, WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE LOCAL CHINESE COMMUNITY. IN KEEPING WITH THE PRIVATE NATURE OF THE VISIT, THERE SHOULD BE NO MEDIA COVERAGE OF THOSE MEETINGS.

- WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT A STOP IN NEW YORK CITY IS NECESSARY EN ROUTE TO CORNELL. WE WILL WORK WITH YOU TO FACILITATE TRAVEL FROM LOS ANGELES TO ITHACA IN ONE DAY.

- IN ITHACA, WE BELIEVE THAT TWO NIGHTS SHOULD BE ADEQUATE TO CARRY OUT THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THIS PRIVATE VISIT, WHICH IS TO DELIVER THE OLIN LECTURE. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE FOR THE PARTY TO ARRIVE IN ITHACA ON JUNE 8. THE LECTURE IS SCHEDULED FOR JUNE 9, AND THE PARTY COULD DEPART THE FOLLOWING DAY.

- DURING THE REFUELING STOP IN ANCHORAGE, THERE SHOULD BE NO PUBLIC ACTIVITIES OR PRESS CONFERENCES. ANY MEETINGS WITH POLITICAL FIGURES SHOULD BE HELD WITH A MINIMUM OF PUBLICITY.

- WE ASK THAT THE SIZE OF THE TRAVELING PARTY BE KEPT TO A MINIMUM, AND WE WOULD APPRECIATE INFORMATION ON THE FUNCTIONS OF THOSE YOU ARE PROPOSING.

- WE ASK THAT DETAILS OF THE PARTY'S ITINERARY NOT BE MADE PUBLIC UNTIL THEY HAVE BEEN FINALIZED BY BOTH SIDES.

- I HAVE BEEN ASKED TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE ADMINISTRATION IS LOOKING FORWARD TO WORKING WITH TAIWAN TO ENSURE THAT THIS PRIVATE, UNOFFICIAL VISIT IS UNDERTAKEN IN A MANNER WHICH IS MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL.

- THE U.S. SIDE WILL ENDEAVOR TO PROVIDE PRESIDENT LEE WITH A SAFE, COMFORTABLE AND ENJOYABLE PRIVATE VISIT TO HIS ALMA MATER.

- AS WE EXPLAINED A FEW DAYS AGO, THE U.S. EXPECTS THAT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
(WE) 05.24. '95 20:49 NO. 1460120941 PAGE 6

ALL ARRANGEMENTS AND PUBLIC COMMENTS MADE BY YOUR SIDE WILL BE CONSISTENT WITH THE PRIVATE, UNOFFICIAL NATURE OF THE VISIT, AND WILL NOT CONFLICT WITH WELL-KNOWN POLICY TOWARDS TAIWAN AND TOWARDS THE PRC.

- IN THIS REGARD, I'D LIKE TO NOTE THAT WE HAVE SEEN PRESS REPORTS FROM TAIWAN STATING THAT PRESIDENT LEE'S VISIT WILL BE OTHER THAN PRIVATE. IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IF YOUR SPOKESMAN WERE TO CLARIFY THAT THIS VISIT IS IN FACT PRIVATE.

YY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE (WE) 05.24. '95 20:49 NO. 1460120941 PAGE 7

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
012. cable	Re: Private Visit by President Lee [partial] (1 page)	05/20/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Kristoff, Sandra)
OA/Box Number: 1041

FOLDER TITLE:
Taiwan [3]

2012-0975-F
sb1267

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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EAP:KWIEDEMANN

AIT/W:NBELLOCCHI S/S:
S/S-O: NSC:

IMMEDIATE AIT TAIPEI

NODIS
FROM AIT WASHDC, FOR ACT/DIR. LA FLEUR FROM DAS WIEDEMANN

E.O. 12356: DNG:5/20/15

TAGS: PREL, TW

SUBJECT: PRIVATE VISIT BY PRESIDENT LEE

REF: A) STATE 123659, B) TAIPEI 2986

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. TECRO DIRECTOR LU REPORTED THAT THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES AGREE TO THE UNDERSTANDINGS WE PROPOSED CONCERNING PRES. LEE'S VISIT TO CORNELL. ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE CONSISTENT WITH A PRIVATE VISIT, TAIWAN WILL WORK CLOSELY WITH THE U.S. SIDE, AND PUBLICITY WILL BE LIMITED TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE. A SPECIFIC TRAVEL PLAN WILL BE WORKED OUT IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. TAIWAN WILL INFORM INTERESTED MEMBERS OF CONGRESS THAT LEE HAS NO INTENTION TO MAKE ANOTHER VISIT IN THE NEAR FUTURE. LU WAS ADVISED THAT THE SPECIFICS OF GENERAL U.S. POLICY ON VISITS WILL BE DETERMINED, BUT THAT IN OUR MUTUAL INTEREST, SUCH VISITS SHOULD NOT BE FREQUENT. LU WAS ALSO INFORMED THAT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION HOPES THERE WILL BE NO REPETITION OF THE TACTICS USED BY TAIWAN LEADING UP TO THIS DECISION. END SUMMARY.

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/28/2019
2017-0051-M (1.61)

~~SECRET~~

3. TECRO DIRECTOR BENJAMIN LU CONVEYED ON MAY 20 TO EAP DAS KENT WIEDEMANN AND NSC ASIA DIRECTOR ROBERT SUETTINGER THE RESPONSE OF HIS AUTHORITIES TO OUR PROPOSAL OF THE PREVIOUS DAY (REF A) CONCERNING A PRIVATE VISIT TO CORNELL BY PRESIDENT LEE TENG-HUI. ACCOMPANYING LU WAS ANDREW HSIA, DIRECTOR OF TECRO'S SECRETARIAT DIVISION. ALSO ON THE U.S. SIDE WAS AIT/W DIRECTOR NAT BELLOCCHI AND TAIWAN COORDINATION ADVISOR HOWARD LANGE. THE MEETING TOOK PLACE AT THE AIT/W OFFICES IN ROSSLYN.

4. DIRECTOR LU REPORTED AT THE OUTSET THAT HIS AUTHORITIES ARE "VERY GRATEFUL" FOR THE FAVORABLE DECISION OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WITH RESPECT TO PRESIDENT LEE'S VISIT TO HIS ALMA MATER. HE WENT ON TO CONVEY THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- TAIWAN UNDERSTANDS THAT THIS IS TO BE A PRIVATE VISIT, AND ALL ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE CONSISTENT WITH THIS PRINCIPLE.

- NO SPECIFIC TRAVEL PLAN HAS BEEN FORMULATED, AND THERE WILL BE A HIGH-LEVEL MEETING EARLY NEXT WEEK IN TAIPEI TO FORMULATE SUCH A PLAN, WHICH WILL BE DISCUSSED WITH THE U.S. AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

- THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES AGREE TO COOPERATE CLOSELY WITH THE U.S. IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY DIFFICULTIES IN CONNECTION WITH THE VISIT. THEY WILL ALSO COOPERATE IN THE FUTURE ON OTHER ISSUES OF MUTUAL CONCERN.

- CONCERNING ANY MEETINGS WITH POLITICAL FIGURES WHICH MIGHT TAKE PLACE DURING THE VISIT, THEY WOULD BE CONDUCTED "EXACTLY AS SUGGESTED" BY THE U.S. SIDE; THERE WOULD BE NO PUBLICITY.

- TAIWAN WILL INFORM INTERESTED SENATORS AND CONGRESSMEN THAT PRES. LEE HAS NO INTENTION TO VISIT THE U.S. AGAIN IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

- ANY CONTACT WITH THE PRESS WILL BE LIMITED TO THAT WHICH IS NECESSARY IN CONNECTION WITH THE CORNELL ALUMNI ACTIVITY. (LU ASKED FOR UNDERSTANDING, HOWEVER, THAT THIS IS SOMETIMES DIFFICULT TO CONTROL, SUCH AS, FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN THE PRESIDENT IS MOVING FROM ONE PLACE TO ANOTHER.)

- TAIWAN WILL WORK CLOSELY AND COORDINATE WITH THE U.S. SIDE IN ORDER THAT THE VISIT TRANSPIRES IN A SATISFACTORY WAY.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE (TU) 05.23. '95 17:54 NO. 1460120441 PAGE 3

- IT IS AGREED THAT THE MATTER WILL BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL UNTIL AN ANNOUNCEMENT IS MADE BY THE U.S.

5. LU NOTED THAT OUR POINTS EXPRESSED THE EXPECTATION THAT SIMILAR VISITS BY OTHER TAIWAN LEADERS WILL BE RARE, AND HE ASKED FOR FURTHER EXPLANATION. MR. SUETTINGER SAID THAT THIS DECISION, WHICH WAS MADE BY THE PRESIDENT, RELATED PRINCIPALLY TO THE CORNELL EVENT, AND THAT FURTHER MEETINGS WILL BE REQUIRED WITHIN THE USG TO ESTABLISH THE GENERAL POLICY. WHAT THE U.S. WISHES TO AVOID, HOWEVER, IS A "PROCESSION OF VISITS" BY TAIWAN'S LEADERS WHICH WOULD FURTHER CONVINCE THE PRC THAT THE U.S. IS ESTABLISHING AN OFFICIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH TAIWAN -- A CONCLUSION WHICH THEY WILL ALREADY BE INCLINED TO DRAW FROM THE CORNELL VISIT. WE HOPE THAT WE DO NOT SEE FREQUENT REQUESTS FOR PRIVATE VISITS, AND THERE ARE THOSE WHO THINK THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO OTHER VISITS BEFORE THE END OF 1996.

6. LU ALSO NOTED A REFERENCE IN THE PRESENTATION OF THE PREVIOUS DAY TO THE REASONS FOR THE U.S. DECISION, AND ASKED IF THERE COULD BE FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THIS ASPECT. MR. SUETTINGER SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION WAS RELATED TO A GENERAL PRINCIPLE THAT THERE SHOULD BE FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND TRAVEL, THAT OTHER CONTROVERSIAL VISITORS HAVE COME TO THE U.S. AND THERE SHOULD NOT BE AN EXCEPTION FOR PRES. LEE, AND THAT OF COURSE CONGRESSIONAL OPINION HAD TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

7. DAS WIEDEMANN OBSERVED THAT THIS DECISION WAS INDEED A REFLECTION OF U.S. PUBLIC OPINION, BUT HE HOPED THAT IN THE FUTURE, THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES WOULD WORK CLOSER WITH THE ADMINISTRATION ON SUCH MATTERS. BOTH SIDES SHOULD MANAGE THESE VERY SENSITIVE EVENTS IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE BENEFITS TO BOTH SIDES AND MINIMIZE POSSIBLE DAMAGE. TAIWAN MUST KNOW THAT THERE WILL BE A VERY STRONG REACTION FROM THE PRC, AND THAT WE CAN EXPECT AN IMPACT ON BOTH THE U.S. AND ON TAIWAN. BOTH SIDES HAVE MANY MUTUAL INTERESTS TO PURSUE, AND WE DO NOT THINK, SAID WIEDEMANN, THAT IT IS CONSTRUCTIVE FOR TAIWAN TO USE PUBLIC FORA AND THE CONGRESS AS SUBSTITUTES FOR CLOSE, OPEN CONSULTATIONS WITH THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. MR. SUETTINGER ADDED THAT MANY IN THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION ARE VERY UNHAPPY WITH THE TACTICS THAT TAIWAN USED IN THIS MATTER, AND WE WOULD HOPE FOR NO REPETITION. LU REMARKED THAT INDEED, ONE OF HIS OBJECTIVES DURING HIS SHORT TENURE HERE HAS BEEN TO WORK MORE CLOSELY WITH THE ADMINISTRATION.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE (TU) 05.23. '95 17:54 NO. 4601204 41 PAGE 4

B. COMMENT. (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

(b)(1) SIGNED

BELLOCCHI. YY

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
(TU) 05.23. '95 17 54 NO. 1460120441 PAGE 5

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 5/19

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 19, 1995



MR. PRESIDENT:

Attached is a memo from Tony Lake on whether to grant a visa to Taiwan's President Lee to visit Cornell and, if so, how to manage the visit to minimize the adverse consequences with China.

There are two options at this point. **First, revise our policy to allow private visits by Taiwan's senior leaders**, making our best efforts (a) to restrict the Lee visit (e.g., no diplomatic courtesies, invitation to Ithaca only with stop in New York -- no stop in Washington, commitment by President Lee not to visit Alaska in September, etc.), and (b) to emphasize to the Chinese the domestic and congressional context of the decision and assure them that it does not portend recognition of Taiwan's sovereignty or a change in U.S. policy toward China. As Tony notes, there is no guarantee that these efforts to downplay the Lee visit and reassure the Chinese will work. **The other option is to maintain our current approach (denying visa) and wait for Congress to force the issue through binding legislation.**

Tony and Secretaries Christopher and Perry favor the first option.

Revise policy ✓ Maintain policy___ Discuss___

Todd Stern

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2017-0051-M (1.62)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013b. memo	To: The President; From: Anthony Lake; Re: Managing a Visit to Cornell University by President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan [partial] (1 page)	05/18/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Kristoff, Sandra)
OA/Box Number: 1041

FOLDER TITLE:
Taiwan [3]

2012-0975-F
sb1267

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 5/19

3832

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

May 18, 1995 95 MAY 18 P11 : 10

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Managing a Visit to Cornell University by President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan

Purpose

To decide whether to grant a visa to President Lee and, if so, how to do it in a manner that minimizes negative repercussions.

Background

We have talked at length about the pros and cons of granting a visa to President Lee Teng-hui to visit Cornell. This is a serious policy dilemma: balancing concern over a potentially severe PRC reaction to a Lee visit against the overwhelming Congressional and media support for such a visit.

You are aware of the arguments for changing our policy on this issue. Attached at Tab A is an assessment of China's likely response if we proceed. You should review it before making a final decision.

If you nonetheless decide to proceed, this memo focuses on how to manage the issue to maximize our flexibility and minimize the damage to relations with China. To do this, we have to move quickly and carefully.

Managing the Issue: Establishing the Public Theme

We should try to maintain the initiative, rather than be seen as reacting passively to Congress or external pressure. The rationale should be that we have decided to revise further the Taiwan Policy Review of last September to permit, rather than deny, private visits to the United States by Taiwan's senior leaders. We would explain that:

- Lee Teng-hui's visa is for an unofficial, private visit solely for the purpose of allowing Cornell University to honor one of its most distinguished graduates with a chair in his name.
- We Americans treasure the freedom of speech and travel and find it difficult to deny these rights to others. We have

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Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/28/2019
2017-0051-M (1.63)

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

permitted non-official travel by other controversial world leaders.

- Actions taken by the Congress in support of a Lee visit -- while non-binding -- clearly indicate overwhelming support for the visit in the U.S.
- This action does not imply or portend any fundamental change in our policy toward China or Taiwan. It is not an issue of sovereignty but one of courtesy. The U.S. continues to recognize only one China -- the People's Republic of China -- and we will continue to adhere to the three communiqués that underpin our relations with that country.
- We expect the Taiwan authorities to treat this as a private, unofficial visit, and we urge others to do so as well.

Working to Keep the Visit Low-Key -- Talking with Taipei

This is an enormously important issue for both Taiwan and China, and the press coverage in Taiwan will be extremely heavy. There are already many rumors and inaccurate press accounts. We need a few days to make preparations to insure both Taipei and Beijing understand what is afoot. If the story leaks, we will have more problems. Thus, for the next few days, we need to hold the press line where it is.

We need to work quickly to get a message directly to President Lee on our concerns about how he handles this visit. Notwithstanding the risk of leaks from the Taiwan representative office here, this office should be the means to communicate the message. They are anxious to be told before the story becomes public, which may incline them toward strict confidentiality.

Taiwan's principal representative, Benjamin Lu, should be called to a meeting (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) We should indicate you are disposed to grant Lee a visa to make a private visit to Cornell, assuming he would respect the following requests:

- That he acknowledge the visit is private, not official.
- That it be handled with as small a retinue as possible and in a low-key fashion.
- That he understand the U.S. Government will not extend diplomatic courtesies, nor provide Secret Service or Diplomatic Security escorts. We will, of course, afford the party the protection of local police.
- That it is not in Taiwan's or U.S. interest to worsen the damage to U.S.-China relations by making controversial remarks about China or U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan.
- That the invitation is to Ithaca only, with transit via New York City and an intermediate stop. We would expect Lee to

honor your request not to accept invitations to Washington. Moreover, we would appreciate that he use discretion in dealings with others in the United States who may wish to drive a wedge between the U.S. and China or the U.S. and Taiwan.

- That we expect President Lee to decline the invitation to visit Alaska in September and that other members of Taiwan's senior leadership will not make similar requests.
- That the announcement will be made in Washington after we hear from Taipei about plans and a response to our requests. Strict confidentiality until that time is essential.

Damage Control with Beijing

At the same time, the Chinese Ambassador should be called in to inform him of the impending decision. We should not deliver the message via an emissary to Beijing, although the Ambassador should be informed via the most secure means available.

The Chinese should be briefed as follows:

- The domestic context of the decision should be discussed frankly, beginning with an explanation of the importance in the United States of freedom of travel and freedom of speech.
- The U.S. university system is a source of great pride to all Americans, and we have made it available to students from around the world. Cornell University is justifiably proud of its alumnus, Lee Teng-hui, and wishes to honor him with an endowed faculty chair in his name. Almost all Americans believe this is a courtesy that should not be denied.
- This sentiment -- with active Taiwan urging -- motivated the Congress to pass resolutions calling on the Administration to grant Lee a visa.
- The most recent votes were overwhelmingly against the Administration's position and binding legislation has been prepared. It will pass, and there is no doubt a Presidential veto would be overridden.
- Further escalating the battle with Congress would only heighten the public attention to the issue. The outcome would be the same, with greater damage.
- We will do what we can to limit the trappings of officiality of the visit, but press coverage is likely to be heavy.
- We will make clear publicly that this decision -- from the U.S. perspective -- involves the provision of a necessary courtesy to an individual widely respected here, not a fundamental change of policy.

- We do not consider it -- nor will we treat it -- as an official visit, a recognition of Taiwan's sovereignty, a change of U.S. policy toward China or portent thereof.
- The United States fully intends to maintain a solid, positive relationship with China. This is of strategic importance to us, and we will continue our adherence to the communiqués that underlie the relationship.
- Easing of Congressional pressure will enable the Administration to renew MFN with less difficulty this year.
- More importantly, we urge China not to react to this issue in ways that do serious damage to the relationship. We have established a healthy series of dialogues on a number of difficult issues and believe it is in the interest of both countries that the relationship continue to be one between equals, talking openly with each other.
- The U.S. agrees with China's often-stated position that a summit meeting between the leaders of our two countries would be desirable. A temperate response to this issue will enable us to extend an invitation to President Jiang Zemin to visit Washington in October.
- If China's reaction is too severe, a summit meeting would be more difficult to arrange.

There is no guarantee that either approach will work, however. Taiwan has manipulated this issue precisely for the publicity it would garner for Lee in his own presidential bid next year. He will not be predisposed to go to Cornell in a low-key fashion. China's leaders very likely will insist on a harsh response. Jiang may well refuse an invitation to visit -- even officially -- if a Lee visit has taken place earlier. That's a "face" issue as well as a political one. And even if he accepts, the Chinese may bargain hard for more concessions in response to our request for moderation.

At Tab B is a State Department paper that covers much the same ground as this memo, with minor variations.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the approach outlined above to manage the issue. Chris and Bill concur.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

That you maintain our current approach, waiting until Congress forces the issue with binding legislation.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab A Assessment of China's possible reaction
Tab B State Department Memo on managing the process.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013c. memo	To: Antrhony Lake; From: Robert Suettinger; Re: Possible Chinese Response to a Lee Teng-hui Visit to the United States [partial] (2 pages)	05/17/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Kristoff, Sandra)
OA/Box Number: 1041

FOLDER TITLE:
Taiwan [3]

2012-0975-F
sb1267

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON D C 20506

3832

May 17, 1995

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ROBERT L. SUETTINGER

SUBJECT: Possible Chinese Responses to a Lee Teng-hui Visit to the United States

There is very little reporting to date on Chinese planning for retaliatory steps to be taken if the United States disregards China's demands and permits Lee Teng-hui to make a "private" visit to Cornell University. The leadership probably has not made a final decision, nor even considered a list of options. As has always been the case with U.S. initiatives toward Taiwan, China has a relatively limited choice of retaliatory measures, given the growing dependence of its economy on the U.S. market. Various leaders have talked vaguely about "setbacks" in the relationship and the need to "teach the U.S. a lesson," but there is little specific information.

The Taiwan issue has been the most difficult to manage in the bilateral relationship since Nixon visited China in 1972. It is not like other issues, subject to rational calculus of balanced interests. It is emotional, linked to nationalism, sovereignty and resentment over historical slights. Deng Xiaoping -- while never pro-U.S. -- viewed the issue as malleable and subordinated it to maintaining the overall relationship.

But three factors will make China's reaction this time more difficult to predict: 1) Deng Xiaoping is gone but not yet dead; 2) China's successor leaders appear to be developing a distorted but malign perception of U.S. policy toward China; and 3) Lee Teng-hui has exposed the failure of China's Taiwan policy by taking it inexorably toward de facto independence.

The succession makes it necessary for any Chinese leader to look tough in the face of a foreign challenge. With Premier Li Peng evidently overseeing China's foreign policy, there will be even less inclination to give the U.S. the benefit of the doubt. Chinese leaders increasingly appear to believe that the U.S. goal is to contain and divide China and will see the Lee visit as furthering that goal.

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/28/2019
2017-0051-M (1.64)

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Declassify on: OADR

China's reactions will probably be calibrated on how public the "insult" of a Lee visit appears and on whether compensating offers have been made to China. Moreover, the damage to the relationship must be looked at in both the short and the long term.

China's immediate reactions will probably include the following:

- Extremely harsh criticism of the Congress and the Administration in all its media.

- Reduced high-level visits across the board, including military-to-military exchanges. Commerce Secretary Brown's proposed July visit may be canceled. China's Defense Minister may call off his June visit to Washington.

- Suspension of bilateral dialogue on nuclear-related issues, such as peaceful nuclear cooperation and nuclear sales to Iran and Pakistan. China has linked cooperation on these issues to U.S. F-16 sales to Taiwan in the past and will probably cancel discussions scheduled for early June.

- Suspension of further discussions on China's adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime.

- Some visible punitive actions against U.S. corporations with heavy China exposure and viable competitors.

- Increased resistance to U.S. policies toward human rights, legal reform, etc.

- More visible military training activity in areas adjacent to the Taiwan Strait.

China probably will not decrease significantly its cooperation in reducing the North Korean nuclear threat. That problem engages fundamental Chinese interests, both strategic and economic. It would be even less likely than now, however, to cooperate in enforcing a trade embargo or other punitive economic sanctions.

A hostile reaction by China will have an impact on two medium-term problems: MTCR-related sanctions and the WTO problem.

- The nonproliferation community has met and decided that China transferred to Iran in 1992 and 1994 technology and training that could be seen as intended for a Category I missile system (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d, EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) We are preparing a demarche to ask for an explanation, with the

understanding that this is sanctionable activity. It is doubtful the Chinese will respond positively. This is particularly so if, in rage over the Lee decision, they cancel strategic discussions slated for June -- a distinct possibility. That, of course, would only serve to further the process of imposing sanctions. Unless the President issues a waiver (on national security grounds), the sanctions are required by law. In the wake of the Lee visit, the imposition of economic sanctions would be viewed as an indication the U.S. had no interest in good relations with China.

- Taiwan has made no secret of its desire to join the WTO. In fact, it reportedly is making special efforts to have its accession negotiations completed by mid-summer. The China accession, by contrast is lagging, with the opposition led principally, but not solely, by the United States. Taiwan clearly wants to join separately and before China, an idea for which there is considerable support in Congress. China has been strongly opposed to Taiwan joining first. This problem will grow more acute in the wake of a Lee visit, as Taipei will push harder. (b)(1)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

Over the longer term, the damage may turn out to be even greater. China is at a turning point in its world-view, burdened with a lack of vision and a lack of trust in and knowledge of the United States. It will view a Lee visit -- correctly or not -- as a fundamental change in U.S. policy toward China. It will consider that the U.S. has embarked upon a course of dividing and containing China, thwarting its economic growth, resisting its territorial claims and stifling its plans for national reunification. Current views of the U.S. as China's "principal enemy" may harden. China may see its only alternative as to strike out on its own. It may also decide that, notwithstanding growing economic ties to Taiwan, tougher measures to remind Taiwan of its military vulnerability are necessary. To those ends, China may:

- Adopt an increasingly confrontational approach toward the U.S., both in bilateral relations and international affairs;

- Step up its military modernization, including development and deployment of forces capable of threatening Taiwan (e.g., M-9 and M-11 mobile missiles, which has already begun);

- Reduce its vulnerability to U.S. economic pressure by developing markets in Asia and Europe;

- Seek to undermine U.S. policy in Asia, such as by breaking consensus within APEC.

These by no means exhaust the possibilities of China's reaction. And again, it must be reiterated that the U.S. may be able to take some compensating measures. But my view is that, because of the succession issue and the persistent problems that already bedevil the bilateral relationship, China's reaction to a Lee Teng-hui visit will be harsh and lasting.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013d. memo	To: The Secretary; From: Sandra O'Leary; Re: Managing Taiwan President Lee's Visit to Cornell [partial] (1 page)	02/25/1992	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Kristoff, Sandra)
OA/Box Number: 1041

FOLDER TITLE:
Taiwan [3]

2012-0975-F
sb1267

RESTRICTION CODES

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Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/18/2019
2017-0051-M (1.65)

TO: The Secretary

THRU: P - Mr. Tarnoff

FROM: EAP - Sandra O'Leary, Acting

SUBJECT: Managing Taiwan President Lee's Visit to Cornell

SUMMARY

USG agreement to permit a visit to Cornell by Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui will require careful management of the conditions which we would require for the visit, on which we should obtain agreement from Taiwan. Immediately thereafter, we should notify the PRC; inform key members on the Hill, Cornell, and other interested countries; and issue a public statement.

PARAMETERS FOR A VISIT

The main event at Cornell will be an address to 2,000 or so alumni, and it will presumably receive media coverage. This should meet all of Lee's objectives for the visit, and he should thus cooperate with us to limit to some extent the damage in Beijing. Much as we might resent Taiwan's actions in going directly to the Hill on this issue, we do not recommend retaliating against Taiwan in other areas. (b)(1)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

- The visit is to be characterized as private. We expect Taiwan's cooperation in making travel, lodging, public remarks and press statements, and other arrangements which are consistent with this.

- The purpose of the visit is to attend the alumni reunion and deliver a lecture. There are to be no other public events. We would expect that Lee would include nothing in the lecture which would embarrass the U.S. or the President, or compromise U.S. foreign policy objectives.

- Avoidance of press conferences or meetings with the media, outside of that strictly related to the Cornell event.

- If Lee wishes to have other meetings, e.g. with congressmen, they should be in his hotel suite, and he would discourage media coverage of any such meetings.

- We would not expect another request for visit approval through the end of 1996, after our national elections.

- We would expect President Lee to inform Sen. Murkowski that he is not interested (which we understand to be the case) in making a visit to Anchorage in September.

NOTIFYING THE PRC

We must communicate this decision to the PRC at a high level, ideally through a joint State/NSC presentation by U/S Tarnoff and Mr. Berger (or Mr. Lake) to the Chinese ambassador. The Chinese have followed closely the succession of resolutions and other legislative measures on the Hill, and will probably not be wholly surprised. At the same time, you have stated in testimony before Hill committees that a "visit" by Lee (as opposed to a "transit") is inconsistent with U.S. policy established in 1979 and followed by each successive administration. The Chinese have warmly welcomed these clear statements, but warned of unspecified consequences should the U.S. proceed to permit a visit. We take these warnings seriously. Against that background, we suggest a presentation to the Chinese along the following lines.

- The President has decided that Lee Teng-hui may be granted a visa, so that he may attend ceremonies in early June at Cornell, where he earned a doctorate degree. We have asked you in today to hear an explanation of our policy.

- On April 17 Secretary Christopher explained to Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Qian in New York City that the Administration had stated clearly its opposition to a visit by Lee Teng-hui; that he had personally elaborated in formal testimony the reasons why he and the Administration considered such a visit to be contradictory to our policy and our interests; but that he had not managed to convert a single member of Congress to that view.

- Both Houses of the Congress have voted overwhelmingly in recent days to express their sense that Lee Teng-hui should be permitted to attend the commencement ceremonies at Cornell. Only one member in both houses voted in opposition to these resolutions. We heard -- and were obliged to believe -- that binding legislation would be sought to mandate a visit by Lee Teng-hui. Given the expression of sentiment we had seen, it was clear that such a measure would be veto-proof.

- This is not an outcome we sought or welcomed. But under the circumstances the President considered that the best course of action was to preempt binding legislation. This would have created an unwelcome precedent, and one highly damaging to the U.S.-China relationship that we wish to preserve and develop.

- Lee's visit will be expressly private. No member of the executive branch will meet with him. He will simply attend ceremonies, and conduct no activities which could be construed by objective observers to be official.

- We understand that Lee's visit will be very unwelcome to you, and that it will be seen by some as a shift in the policy and practice followed since establishment of U.S.-China diplomatic relations in 1979. But we would underscore to you that we do not consider that granting a visa for this visit represents any change in the fundamentals of our policy toward China and toward the people of Taiwan.

- Our relationship with Taiwan remains unofficial. That relationship will be conducted in accordance with the three U.S.-China joint communiques.

- Our attitude, objectives, and national interest with respect to China remain unaltered. We continue to aspire to develop an enduring, friendly relationship with a China that is strong, stable, prosperous and open. We believe that there is great potential in such a relationship.

- We suggest that there be an early meeting between Under Secretary Tarnoff and China's newly-appointed Vice Foreign Minister Amb. Li Zhaoxing to review what might be done to achieve the progress in U.S.-China relations that both sides seek in their own interests.

We may want to consider at an early stage whether or not an invitation to Chinese President Jiang Zemin for an October visit to Washington would help to buffer Chinese reaction. But we should not offer this outright in our initial presentation; it would signal desperation to the Chinese, and would probably be rejected out of hand as a deliberate attempt to promote a "one-China, one-Taiwan" policy at direct odds with our longstanding commitments.

Furthermore, this is a particularly delicate moment in the Chinese political succession, with Jiang and his putative rivals maneuvering behind the scenes to build coalitions and burnish their image. For any Chinese leader, accepting an invitation to come to Washington under these circumstances is a

probable loser. At minimum, his opponents will be inclined to charge that he is "kowtowing to the Americans, and selling out Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan." Finally, no Chinese leader will relish the public relations aspects of the two visits: Lee Teng-hui arriving to rapturous sentiments from the Congress and press, Jiang Zemin arriving to be castigated for Chinese inaction on human rights, for continuing dubious arms and technology relationships with Iran, Pakistan and others, and for failure to address adequately our economic and commercial agenda.

Regardless of how we package the decision, we should expect Beijing to make known swiftly its displeasure. China has a long menu of possible actions and gestures for response. In the aftermath of the decision, we would expect responses could include some of the following:

- A protracted delay in granting agrement to our Ambassador-designate, possibly coupled with recall for "consultations" of Ambassador Li Daoyu.
- Cancellation of the mid-June visit to the U.S. by Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian -- an important event in the developing military-military relationship which has been an integral part of the President's China engagement strategy.
- Back out of the agreed discussions on areas of importance to us: nuclear cooperation experts talks, MTCR experts discussions, and export control experts talks. As these were identified as the key positive outcomes of your April 17 meeting in New York with Foreign Minister Qian, the Chinese might opt to retaliate here.
- Decline to offer the same type of cooperation -- tacit and a bit more -- we have enjoyed on North Korean issues.
- Refuse to pursue counter-narcotics cooperation through receiving of Office of National Drug Control Policy Director Dr. Lee Brown (another item agreed on April 17 in New York).
- Spurn our invitation to resume a human rights dialogue.
- Search for opportunities to award high-profile commercial contracts to American competitors.
- Reject our proposal of another USN port call in China -- a program of significance to our ability to sustain our port calls in Hong Kong following the 1997 reversion.
- Use its influence to block any efforts to support Taiwan's participation in international organizations.

- Draw tighter linkages between Taiwan arms sales and issues of importance to us over which China has influence.

INFORMING THE HILL AND CORNELL

Nearly simultaneous with the PRC notification, we would inform key members in the Senate and House of the decision. We would make the following points.

- This represents no fundamental change in U.S. policy; relations with Taiwan remain unofficial.

- The visit is in response to the sentiment on the Hill specifically for a Cornell visit, and the Administration has concluded that such visits can be consistent with the TRA and the spirit of our communiques with China.

- Anchorage is a different matter -- it would not fit the definition of a "private" visit. We understand that in any case, President Lee is not interested in the visit.

- We would expect that the members of Congress, having met their objectives, will conclude that binding legislation should no longer be pursued.

We would inform other interested embassies here along lines similar to the above, giving particular attention to the Japanese. It is particularly important to apprise the Japanese of any shift in our Taiwan policy, a point made clear to A/S Lord on May 18 by Vice Foreign Minister Fukuda.

The President of Cornell would be notified.

PUBLIC POSTURE

This decision will become a component in the complicated machinery of our unofficial relations with Taiwan, and public statements will be carefully analyzed. We believe that you should make such a statement, which would have the following elements.

- Nothing in this decision has changed our relations with Taiwan, which continue to be unofficial.

- That relationship will continue to be governed by the Taiwan Relations Act and the three joint communiques with the People's Republic of China.

- The United States recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. The United States also acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one china and Taiwan is a part of China.

- This framework for our China policy has been reaffirmed by successive U.S. administrations since 1979.

- President Lee's visit to Cornell is not official in any sense; he is participating in the school's reunion as a distinguished alumnus, and he is welcome in that private capacity.

- We have said that Pres. Lee's visit to Cornell, though private, would be difficult to reconcile with an unofficial relationship. Consistent with the view of Congress, the Administration has concluded that such a private visit accords with the spirit of the TRA and is consistent with U.S. China policy, as reflected in the TRA and in the executive agreements with the PRC.

- Since our China policy remains unchanged, we would hope that the PRC will see this decision for what it is, one which should not affect the relationship between the U.S. and China, where both countries have important economic, political and security interests at stake.

Managing Cornell Visit
SERATC 4960, 5/17/95

Drafted: EAP/TC:HLange
Cleared: EAP:KWiedemann
S/P:ARomberg
H:KMcCormick
P:BHall

~~SECRET~~

3832 REDO

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 18, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ROBERT L. SUETTINGER RL

SUBJECT: Managing a Visit to Cornell University by President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan

Attached at Tab I is a Memorandum for the President on the issue of granting a visa to Lee Teng-hui. Per your instructions, it revises and replaces package 3656 on the same subject.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Memorandum for the President at Tab I

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum for the President
Tab A Assessment of possible Chinese reaction
Tab B State Department memo on managing the process

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2017-0051-M

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	To: Samuel Berger; From: Robert Suettinger; Re: Taiwan Policy After the Lee Visit [partial] (6 pages)	06/16/1995	P1/b(1) VL 1/2/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Kristoff, Sandra)
OA/Box Number: 1041

FOLDER TITLE:
Taiwan [5]

2012-0975-F
sb1269

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C 20506

June 16, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: STANLEY O. ROTH SOR

FROM: ROBERT L. SUETTINGER RLS

SUBJECT: Taiwan Policy After the Lee Visit

Now that the Lee Teng-hui visit has been completed, and before all its effects are felt, we believe an inter-agency meeting should be held to establish or re-establish the principles that will guide the relationship between the U.S. and Taiwan. In the absence of such a meeting, we run the real risk of making *ad hoc* decisions on a number of upcoming issues without taking larger policy considerations into account. Given the sensitivity of some of the issues, I suggest you reconvene the informal "mini-Deputies" group that worked so successfully last year in managing the China MFN decision. This avoids the necessity of circulating a paper that is virtually guaranteed to leak.

There are several issues that should be raised for the group to consider.

1. The overall U.S. government reaction to Taiwan's effort to force the issue of the Lee visit, as well as the conduct of that visit. Having explicitly warned Taipei that there would be consequences if the Administration and U.S. interests were ignored, should we now convey a sense of dissatisfaction? If so, how?

2. The question of further visits by Taiwan's leaders. Do we need to further refine our guidelines on transits and private visits? Taiwan has already begun to push on this issue, and we should clarify how we intend to respond.

3. Economic issues. The Sub-Cabinet Dialogue will be held in two weeks. Its agenda is anodyne, by agreement between State and Treasury. Should it remain that way? Should we try to "cash in" on the Lee visit goodwill by increasing our advocacy for U.S. business deals in Taiwan?

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/28/2019
2017-0051-M (1.71)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

5. International Organizations. In last year's policy review, we committed to promoting Taiwan's enhanced participation in selected international organizations. An initial State-led interagency effort to develop a list was grossly inadequate, and has been tasked by Lord and Roth to try again. Should we now "go slow" on this already slow process as a means of expressing our dissatisfaction with Taiwan or to prevent further damage to U.S.-China relations? Or in light of Congressional interest, should we press the bureaucracy harder to come up with a useful list and process?

6. The UN. Separately from the above issue, Taiwan is pushing harder on its bid to join the United Nations. While recognizing the time is not ripe, it will focus on gaining U.S. support for a motion to have a UN "study panel" look into the issue. China will view this as a key indicator of U.S. policy in the region. Although we have said clearly that the Administration does not support Taiwan's UN bid, Congressional support for the idea is strong.

Reacting to the Visit

Taiwan's approach to gaining a visa for Lee to visit Cornell was successful, (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

One way of making our case more credible, however we decide it, is to engage the President in communicating our policy to Lee Teng-hui. (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

Controlling the Visitor Flow

We will need to decide whether the Lee visit constitutes a revision of the guidelines set out in the Taiwan policy review last year (no leadership visits, bona fide transits permitted), or was a one-time exception -- for Lee only -- that does not change our basic approach. If it is the former, then a process is required to set out the parameters for private visits, as opposed to transits.

In the meeting with TECRO at which we discussed this issue, we indicated that, while we had not gone through the bureaucratic process of changing the guidelines on private visits, we would consider requests on a case-by-case basis. (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

Economic Issues

A review of bilateral economic issues would be useful in preparation for the Sub-Cabinet dialogue. The dialogue itself has been reduced to a relatively anodyne exchange of views on regional economic questions. Treasury had more ambitious plans for the discussions, but has reluctantly backed off.

In the wake of the Lee visit, some have raised the issue of capitalizing on it economically. We have already seen in the willingness of Taiwan to increase the size of its Boeing purchase that there is an increased willingness to be responsive to US commercial interests in the wake of the visit. Although we minimized publicity, DOT Secretary Peña did meet with Taiwan's Transportation Minister and witnessed the signing of the letters of intent to buy several 777s. The larger issue is the Dragon Gate nuclear power plant. Although that deal collapsed a few weeks ago, it is likely to be resuscitated, and U.S. vendors will still be in position to win the contracts. Some have suggested that we should somehow link the Lee visit to a favorable outcome to the re-letting of Dragon Gate contracts.

WTO Accession

The more important issue, however, is Taiwan's accession to the GATT/WTO. (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

International Organizations (Other than the UN)

In the Taiwan Policy Review, we recommended a change in our policy to that of supporting Taiwan's admission to those international organizations that accepted non-states as members and of trying to ensure that Taiwan's voice was heard in other international fora. Given the size of Taiwan's foreign currency reserves, Taiwan could play a particularly useful role in international financial institutions and aid organizations.

China has made clear it will resist expansion of Taiwan's participation in international events. In the wake of the Lee visit, this resolve has probably strengthened, and China will vigorously criticize any significant U.S. efforts to expand Taiwan's "diplomatic space." Moreover, it will read whatever we do in this area as indicative of our attitude not only toward Taiwan, but toward China.

China's resistance to the expansion of Taiwan's international activity has also been clearly conveyed to those organizations. In preliminary inquiries, U.S. government agencies have been reluctant to provide active support or even recommendations for ways to support Taiwan's access to international organizations, because they believe such efforts will fail.

(b)(1) we recognize that Taiwan can bring pressure to bear on the Administration through Congress on these issues, (b)(1)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

The UN Question

Taiwan has made no secret of its desire to enter the United Nations, and we have indicated that we do not support the idea. We have not, however, elaborated our reasons for opposing it. China, of course, is adamantly opposed and will use its considerable clout in the UN to block any step that will move Taiwan's bid forward. Taipei recognizes that the issue is very provocative to Beijing, and is moving cautiously. Last year, Taiwan tried and failed to garner support for a UNGA resolution to form a "China-Taiwan study panel" to review the issue.

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) Support for Taiwan's entry into the UN is already growing in Congress. A Sense of Congress resolution supporting Taiwan's entry into the UN is part of the House version of the State authorization bill. Taiwan will clearly work to broaden this to larger USG support if it can. We should consider how to respond.

RECOMMENDATION

That you call a mini-Deputies Committee meeting in the week of June 19 to discuss these issues.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	To: Mr. Tarnoff; From: Winston Lord; Re: Taiwan Visit Legislation [partial] (2 pages)	05/08/1995	P1/b(1)
~~001b. list~~	~~Talking Points for meeting with Taiwan Representative (2 pages)~~	~~05/09/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ ✓ 1/2/2020
~~002. cable~~	~~Re: Managing the Lee Visit (3 pages)~~	~~06/01/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ ✓ 1/2/2020
003. cable	Re: Lee Visit and US-PRC Relations [partial] (1 page)	06/02/1995	P1/b(1)
004. cable	Re: PRC-Taiwan-US / Foreign Relations (2 pages)	05/31/1995	P1/b(1)
005. memo	To: Samuel Berger; From: Robert Suettinger; Re: Managing a Li Teng-hui Visit [partial] (4 pages)	05/16/1995	P1/b(1)
006. memo	To: The President; From: Anthony Lake; Re: Managing a Visit to Cornell University by President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan [partial] (2 pages)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)
007. memo	To: Anthony Lake; From: Robert L. Suettinger; Re: Possible Chinese Responses [partial] (2 pages)	05/17/1995	P1/b(1)
~~008. memcon~~	~~Political Counselor, Chinese Mission to the United Nations (2 pages)~~	~~05/23/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ ✓ 1/2/2020
009. cable	Re: PRC-Taiwan-United States / Foreign Relations (3 pages)	05/30/1995	P1/b(1)
010. cable	Re: PRC-Taiwan-U.S. / Relations (5 pages)	05/26/1995	P1/b(1)
~~011. cable~~	~~Re: Managing the Lee Visit (4 pages)~~	~~05/30/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ ✓ 1/2/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:
Lee [Lee Teng-hui] Visit

2012-0975-F
sb1270

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~012. cable~~	~~Re: Managing the PRC Reaction to the Lee Teng-hui Visit (4 pages)~~	~~05/23/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ N 1/2/2020
~~013. cable~~	~~Re: Vice Premier / Foreign Minister (6 pages)~~	~~05/23/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ N 1/2/2020
~~014. cable~~	~~Re: Private Visit by President Lee (3 pages)~~	~~05/22/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ N 1/2/2020

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
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Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
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FOLDER TITLE:

Lee [Lee Teng-hui] Visit

2012-0975-F
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001a. memo	To: Mr. Tarnoff; From: Winston Lord; Re: Taiwan Visit Legislation [partial] (2 pages)	05/08/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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National Security Council
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OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:
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United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

MAY - 8 1995

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM
S/S

~~SECRET/NODIS~~
DECL:OADR

TO: P - Mr. Tarnoff

FROM: EAP - Winston Lord

SUBJECT: Meeting on Taiwan Visit Legislation; Tuesday, May 9, 3:00 p.m.

I. BACKGROUND

The concurrent resolution on a Lee Teng-hui visit (tab 1) passed the House last week 396-0. The Senate is likely to pass it this week by a similarly overwhelming vote. The resolution is designed to prompt Administration action on a visit, but we now understand that binding legislation is upon us. We understand that Torricelli's amendment to the Taiwan Relations Act (tab 2) is to be introduced on Monday, May 8, as an amendment to the State Authorization bill. It will almost certainly be marked up by the HIRC. The bill will go to the floor of the House sometime near the end of the month. The amendment would remove the Secretary's discretion with respect to entry into the U.S. of individuals from the "democratically elected leadership chosen by the people of Taiwan or their elected representatives." Similar legislation can be expected in the Senate.

AIT Director Lynn Pascoe met with Taiwan's National Security Council Chairman Ding Mou-shih on May 8. Ding told Lynn that efforts to secure a U.S. visit for Lee were not controlled by Taipei, and that his government is not driving the effort. He said that Taipei is opposed to amendment of the TRA, but he showed no inclination to ask their congressional supporters to back off. Lynn will meet later this week with Foreign Minister Fred Chien.

Stanley Roth and I are meeting late on May 9 with Taiwan Representative Benjamin Lu. (At tab 3 are draft talking points that we are still working on with the NSC; we will want your comments.) We will attempt to convince Taiwan to interrupt this scenario by making a genuine effort to have its supporters stand down. In spite of recent signals from high level officials in Taiwan that they

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/28/2019
2017-0051-M (1.73)

were shifting their priorities from symbolic events such as a Lee visit to matters of substance such as WTO accession, we have seen no sign of such a shift. Neither has Taiwan responded to Lynn Pascoe's discussion of six weeks ago with President Lee on this subject. We will try to impress on the Taiwan authorities the very difficult position in which they are putting the Administration, and the likelihood that a confrontation with the Congress on this issue will have a cost in terms of carrying through on implementation of the Taiwan policy adjustments.

Taiwan will weigh carefully whether or not it wishes to end its visit campaign. It has invested a great deal in the effort already, and Taiwan will not lightly invite questions about its credibility. Even if Taiwan agrees that its interest is to end this campaign, it will be difficult for them to deliver. There is now an incredible momentum behind the campaign, which consists of orchestrated letter writing, a "Stand Up Taiwan Committee" at Cornell, the Cassidy lobbying contract, and the effort on the Hill. Cornell is not the only specific visit proposal: The resolution calls for a transit of Alaska to attend the USA-ROC Economic Council meeting, and Senator Murkowski is pursuing this without much apparent encouragement from Taipei. On the Hill, in fact, the whole notion of a Lee visit has taken on a life of its own, with no dissenters from the view that a visit is appropriate. In these circumstances, it would take a public statement by President Lee to arrest the Hill effort.

From the PRC perspective, this is a critical issue. The Chinese have attached as high importance to blocking the visit as have the Taiwans to pulling it off. Though China's options for retaliation are limited, it is virtually certain that it will exercise some of those available, even if they may also be harmful to China itself. If a Lee visit should take place, it is likely that the Chinese will revive the linkage to our nonproliferation dialogue, and this will impede significantly our high-priority agenda involving China/Iran transactions, South Asian security, NPT extension, a tougher and more transparent Chinese export control regime, and negotiation of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. China might also extract a price from us in the Security Council and with respect to the Korean Peninsula situation. The Chinese will likely hold off indefinitely on a human rights dialogue and counter-narcotics cooperation.

II. OPTIONS

If our demarche to Benjamin Lu does not yield immediate and visible results, we have certain basic options, which can be varied and combined to suit circumstances. It is clear that an intelligent choice among these options requires a clear understanding of White House judgments about the foreign policy and the domestic political issues involved.

A. Demand that Taiwan solve the problem.

1. Escalate our demarche.

Lu would be called in to hear a tougher message (b)(1) (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) with more specifics on consequences if Taiwan does not turn this around. One consideration needs to be borne in mind: The terms of our threatened retaliation will almost certainly become publicly known, and thus possible subjects of contention between the Administration and Taiwan's Hill supporters.

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

o Sub-cabinet economic dialogue. Postponement of the dialogue would have limited impact.

o Access to USG officials. Cutting back on access would be a clear signal of our displeasure, but of uncertain importance to Taiwan.

o Arms sales. Restrictions on sales of new arms systems offers less leverage than previously, since there are now other constraints on Taiwan's purchases -- limited defense budgets and a strained absorptive capacity for systems already in the pipeline. Submarines are the only new major system they are seeking, and we have consistently refused to sell subs for years. Attempts to slow down delivery of systems already approved would spark wide and vociferous criticism on the Hill.

In sum, We have some credible threats, but deploying them may increase Hill pressure to move binding legislation.

2. Improve the offer to Taiwan.

A year from now, there will be a popularly-elected president of Taiwan, and pressure for his (presumably Lee's) visit will have become virtually irresistible. Taiwan will no

longer have to manufacture sentiment for a visit. Perhaps we could now suggest to Taiwan that we recognize that the visit issue might be reexamined sometime after our respective presidential elections in 1996. The Secretary, you will recall, in March made even a transit contingent on Taiwan not seeking a visit through 1996.

A risk is that such a suggestion, no matter how carefully couched, would likely be portrayed by Taiwan as a tacit agreement to a future visit. We could deny for Beijing's benefit that any deal was cut, but our denials would ring hollow, and we would have to endure doubt and suspicion by Beijing. Taiwan would have to make it publicly plain that it was not seeking a visit through next year, so as to avoid placing yet another visit debate squarely in the middle of our presidential campaign. Given recent votes in the Congress, Taiwan may not see this as much of an offer.

B. Concentrate on the legislation.

1. Strongly oppose binding legislation.

We have employed arguments against the visit and the visit resolution, but these arguments simply are not accepted on the Hill. The resolution, while a significant political statement, is of course non-binding. The threatened amendment to the TRA, on the other hand, is not only objectionable from the standpoint of Taiwan policy, but in terms of constitutional principle. If we concentrate on fighting the amendment, cooler heads on the Hill might prevail, though this is only a hope; we have no information that this is will be the case.

2. Live with the legislation.

We could oppose the binding legislation up until passage, but accept that it has overwhelming congressional support and, if the Authorization Bill is otherwise acceptable, the amendment becomes law. The legislation does not require that visits take place; only that Taiwan leaders may not be excluded. Taiwan leaders may not seek to visit if the Administration makes clear that they are not welcome.

This approach is not attractive. The principle of allowing the Congress to determine such a policy is not one that we would yield lightly. And it essentially leaves to Taiwan the decision on whether or not its leaders should visit.

3. Veto the legislation.

This would not be an easy decision for the White House on the basis of Taiwan policy alone, given the nearly universal Hill support for a Lee visit. But the constitutional principle is a serious one, and after serious consideration, may be deemed to warrant a veto. An advantage to a veto, apart from the constitutional point, is that it sends a clear signal to Beijing that we are consistent and to Taipei that this really is important to us. We are very likely to have other objections to other features of the Authorization Bill as well.

A veto may be a short-lived remedy. Given sentiments on the Hill on this specific issue, either a veto would be overcome, in which case the Administration looks weak, or the legislation would keep coming back in other forms until it was attached to something veto-proof.

C. Change policy: Allow a visit now.

Congressional sentiment is by now abundantly clear. Even the PRC should recognize that the Administration has a great deal to lose by continuing the battle. By accepting the inevitable and bowing to congressional pressure, we appear reasonable and pragmatic to the Hill and Taiwan, if not to Beijing. The parameters of a visit, and the implications for our relationship with the PRC, would have to be examined carefully before deciding to modify policy.

Following are some possibilities for a visit:

o "Private visit" to Cornell: This is what Taiwan wants and what Congress expects, and would therefore be easiest to manage from this aspect. It would however involve a public event (a prestigious lecture to an audience of 2,000 alumni, which would undoubtedly receive media coverage). We could insist on nothing further, but this would probably be enough to prompt a response by Beijing.

o A stopover in Alaska: Lee's invitation is to address the annual meeting in September of the USA-ROC Economic Council, which would be a public event. This is not an attractive option. This is an initiative by Republican Senator Murkowski, and approval would weaken the rationale for turning down other invitations by congressional members. It also does not buy us much to approve this while denying Cornell, which is what the Taiwans and the Hill really want.

o An enhanced transit: We have proposed a plain, unadorned transit of Hawaii; it is conceivable, but not likely, that Lee will deem this acceptable after our further representations. We might sweeten a transit through Hawaii or some other point with non-public event such as an invitation-only meeting with the Chinese community. It would probably not be feasible to shut out media coverage of the stopover entirely, however, so a reaction by Beijing is virtually assured. Lynn Pascoe was authorized to deploy a modest "sweetener" for Hawaii, should this seem likely to convince Lee, but Lee's interest was clearly focused elsewhere, and Pascoe did not raise it. An enhanced transit, no matter where it takes place, will be more sensitive to the PRC than a pure, no-events transit.

Attachments

Tab 1 - House Concurrent Resolution, U.S. Visit of President Lee Teng-hui

Tab 2 - Torricelli Amendment to the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT

Meeting with Taiwan Representative Benjamin Lu

May 9, 1995

- Since we last met, the situation we discussed, concerning Congressional attempts to change Administration policy with respect to visits to the U.S. by President Lee, has become more pressing.

- Congress has continued to move forward with resolutions calling on our President to welcome a visit by President Lee, and we are told that the Congress will soon consider introducing binding legislation. This would create serious tension between the two branches of Government.

- You should not miscalculate about the proposed Torricelli amendment to the Taiwan Relations Act -- it is attached to a bill which will never become law in its present form.

- We are frankly disappointed and very concerned that there has been no response to the message we conveyed to you, and directly to President Lee, six weeks ago. You must realize what a difficult position this can put the Administration and the President in.

- The failure of your authorities to respond to Director Pascoe's high-level representation in a timely fashion has alrady had an adverse imkpact on our bilateral relationship, and will continue to do so.

- We find this difficult to understand, in view of the message that recent visitors to Taiwan have received, that your authorities are more interested in progress in substantive areas than in symbolic events such as a visit to Cornell. We see no evidence of a change in priorities.

- In fact, Taiwan's official spokespersons, including for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have welcomed the most recent developments in the Congress.

- As we pointed out in March, tension between the Congress and the Administration on this issue is likely to be harmful to our relationship and to U.S. interests. It would be very difficult to make progress on subjects of interest to Taiwan in such a climate.

- We hope that you see it in your interest to proceed cooperatively with us on this so that we can implement further policy adjustments.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NARA, Date 8/28/2014
2007-0051-M (1.74)

DRAFT

~~SECRET~~

- Taiwan authorities should not misinterpret recent press coverage of high-level meetings with PRC officials which alludes to the difficulty of this issue; there is no change in Administration policy on visits by Taiwan's leaders.

- I wish to underline that this is an Administration policy which has been affirmed at the highest levels, by which I mean the President.

- If a damaging confrontation is to be avoided, Taiwan must take some positive action to make it known that President Lee is not seeking a visit at this time. We urge your authorities to take such action now.

- The campaign has a momentum, and passively withdrawing support from it will be insufficient to discourage those who are challenging Administration policy. At this stage, only an authoritative public statement by your authorities that President Lee is not seeking a visit at this time will be sufficient to put a stop to this effort.

- We suggested in March that President Lee might wish to transit the Hawaii en route to another destination. A transit need not be of Hawaii if that does not work out for a particular destination. Another stopover point may be acceptable. (If asked: Anchorage is not ruled out, but a transit could not incorporate a public activity such as attendance at the September meeting of the USA-ROC Economic Council.)

- We must emphasize that time is of the essence in this matter, and we would appreciate a response from Taipei in the very near future.

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: SIT, NSC, ROTH, SUETTINGER, SUM, SUM2

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG:010903Z JUN 95

FM: AIT TAIPEI

TO:
AIT WASHDC IMMEDIATE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TAIPEI 003230

EXDIS

FOR EAP DAS WIEDEMANN/EAP/RSP/TC DIRECTOR LANGE

E.O. 12356: DECL: 2015
TAGS: PREL, TW
SUBJECT: MANAGING THE LEE VISIT

REFS: A) STATE 123659, B) TAIPEI 2986; C) TAIPEI 3016; D) STATE 127768; E) TAIPEI 3092 F)LANGE-LAFLEUR 5/26/95 TELCON; G) TAIPEI 3147; H) STATE 131552; I) LANGE/PASCOE 6/1/95 TELCON

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN ACCORDANCE WITH TELCON REF I, AIT DIRECTOR TELEPHONED NSC DIRECTOR DING MOU-SHIH AND MOFA VICE MINISTER STEVE CHEN DURING THE MORNING OF JUNE 1 TO EMPHASIZE WASHINGTON'S CONCERNS OVER THE PRESIDENT LEE'S PLANNED PRESS CONFERENCE IN CORNELL. IN BOTH CONVERSATIONS, THE DIRECTOR UNDERLINED THE PRIVATE NATURE OF THE TRIP, THE INEVITABLE POLITICAL CAST OF A PRESS CONFERENCE, AND THE DIFFICULTY INVOLVED IN CONTROLLING THE QUESTIONS THAT WOULD BE RAISED. HE URGED THAT THE PRESS CONFERENCE BE SCRAPPED AND A FORMAL MEETING WITH THE PRESS BE HELD OFF UNTIL LEE RETURNS TO TAIWAN SIMILAR TO WAY HE DID IT LAST YEAR AFTER HIS SOUTHEAST ASIAN TRIP.

3. DING RESPONDED WITH REPEATED REASSURANCES THAT TAIWAN WANTS TO WORK CLOSELY WITH US ON THE TRIP TO CORNELL AND UNDERSTANDS OUR CONCERNS THAT THE TRIP BE A PRIVATE ONE. HE ASSURED THE DIRECTOR THAT PRESIDENT LEE WOULD NOT EMBARRASS THE U.S. GOVERNMENT DURING HIS VISIT NOR SEEK TO COMPLICATE OUR LIVES. HE ADDED THAT THEIR INTENTION ALL ALONG HAD BEEN FOR THE SESSION WITH

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2017-0051-M (1.75)

THE PRESS TO BE TIED TO THE OLIN LECTURE WHICH, OF COURSE, WAS THE PURPOSE OF THE TRIP. HE SAID WE SHOULD TALK TO VICE MINISTER CHEN WHO WAS MANAGING THE DETAILS OF THE TRIP.

4. THE DIRECTOR THEN CALLED CHEN TO REPEAT OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE PRESS CONFERENCE AND ASK THAT IT BE SCRATCHED FROM THE PROGRAM. CHEN ALSO WENT TO GREAT LENGTHS TO SAY THE TAIWAN SIDE WANTED TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE ADMINISTRATION TO MAKE THE TRIP A SMOOTH ONE. HE FELT THAT THEY HAD GONE OUT OF THEIR WAY TO BE COOPERATIVE AND WANTED TO CONTINUE TO DO SO. CHEN EXPLAINED THAT THE IDEA FOR THE PRESS CONFERENCE HAD ORIGINALLY COME FROM CORNELL AND WAS DESIGNED TO ENSURE THAT THE DIGNITY OF THE LECTURE AND ENSUING Q & A'S WERE NOT DISRUPTED BY JOURNALISTS' QUESTIONS. THE UNIVERSITY HAD SUGGESTED LEE MEET WITH THE PRESS BEFORE THE SPEECH TO LAY OUT ITS THEMES AND HIS VIEWS. THIS STRUCK THE TAIWAN SIDE AS WRONG (THEY DO NOT PREVIEW SPEECHES AMERICAN STYLE), AND THEY SUGGESTED INSTEAD THAT THE PRESS CONFERENCE FOLLOW THE SPEECH. HIGHER LEVELS IN THE PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE HAD THEN CONCLUDED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO GIVE PRESIDENT LEE SOME TIME TO REST AND RESCHEDULED THE PRESS CONFERENCE FOR THE NEXT DAY.

5. CHEN CONTINUED THAT THEY HAD NOW RECONSIDERED THE TIMING BASED ON OUR CONCERNS. THE TAIWAN SIDE HAS DECIDED TO DO THE PRESS CONFERENCE RIGHT AFTER THE SPEECH AND Q & A'S TO EMPHASIZE ITS CLOSE RELATIONSHIP TO THE SPEECH ITSELF. CHEN NOTED THAT THE PRESIDENT UNDERSTOOD OUR CONCERNS AND WOULD BE VERY CAREFUL IN ANSWERING REPORTERS' QUESTIONS. HE SAID WE NEED NOT WORRY ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE PRESS CONFERENCE WHICH WOULD BE RELATIVELY SHORT. HE ADDED, IN RESPONSE TO FURTHER PRODDING, THAT THE PRESS CONFERENCE WOULD NOT APPEAR ON THE SCHEDULE TO BE HANDED OUT TO THE PRESS THURSDAY AFTERNOON IN TAIPEI. (THE DRAFT SCHEDULE TO BE GIVEN THE MEDIA TODAY BY MOFA -- FAXED TO US AFTER THIS CONVERSATION -- MAKES NO REFERENCE TO A PRESS CONFERENCE. WE HAVE FAXED A COPY TO EAP/RSP/TC.) FINALLY, CHEN SAID THEY ALSO WOULD BE CAREFUL ON THE SPEECH ITSELF. THE TITLE OF THE SPEECH WILL BE "THE TAIWAN EXPERIENCE AND THE U.S." LEE PLANS TO DWELL ON HIS EDUCATION IN THE U.S., THE IMPORTANCE OF PAST U.S. AID TO TAIWAN'S SUCCESS, AND OUR LONG-TIME FRIENDSHIP.

6. COMMENT: TAIWAN'S LEADERSHIP HAS CLEARLY FACTORED OUR CONCERNS INTO THE PLANNING OF LEE'S CORNELL TRIP AND HAS BEEN AT PAINS TO REASSURE US THAT HE WOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO MAKE OUR PROBLEMS MORE SEVERE IN HIS PREPARED OR SPONTANEOUS REMARKS. THEY HAVE ALSO PUT THE PRESS CONFERENCE BACK IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SPEECH

TO KEEP IT WITHIN THE PARAMETERS OF OUR EARLIER CONVERSATIONS, BUT THEY ARE NOT INCLINED TO BACK OFF FROM IT ALTOGETHER. WE RECOMMEND THE USG ACCEPT THIS APPROACH. WE DO NOT NEED A REPEAT OF THE HONOLULU EXPERIENCE WITH COMPLAINTS THIS TIME THAT WE MUZZLED LEE IN CORNELL AFTER THE PRESIDENT HAD AGREED TO LET HIM MAKE THE TRIP.
PASCOE
BT
#3230

NNNN
<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
<^SSN>3230
<^TOR>950601054314 M1695204

FROM:
SITREPRT

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. cable	Re: Lee Visit and US-PRC Relations [partial] (1 page)	06/02/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:
Lee [Lee Teng-hui] Visit

2012-0975-F
sb1270

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BASS, BERGER, DOHSE, FUERTH, HARMON, LAKE, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG, HARMON, LAKEA, ROTH, SUETTINGER, SUM, SUM2, WHSR_SPECIAL

PREC: IMMEDIATE ~~CLASS: SECRET~~ DTG:021113Z JUN 95

FM: AMEMBASSY BEIJING

TO:SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5728

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~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 021484

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, CH, TW, US
SUBJECT: LEE VISIT AND US-PRC RELATIONS

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PRC SENSITIVITIES WILL BE HIGH OVER THE NEXT COUPLE OF WEEKS AS CHINA'S LEADERS WATCH THE VISIT TO CORNELL BY TAIWAN PRESIDENT LEE TENG-HUI UNFOLD. THEY WILL BE LOOKING FOR EVIDENCE, BOTH IN LEE'S DEPORTMENT AND IN US HANDLING OF THE ARRANGEMENTS, THAT WILL HELP THEM ASSESS THE DEGREE OF DAMAGE TO THEIR OWN POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR MANAGING THE TAIWAN ISSUE, INCLUDING IN DOMESTIC POLITICS HERE. THEY WILL INTERPRET TAIWAN VICE PREMIER HSU LI-TEH'S UNANNOUNCED VISIT TO CANADA AS CONFIRMING THEIR UNSETTLING ASSUMPTION THAQ THE CHALLENGE POSED BY THE LEE VISIT LIES LESS IN THE VISIT ITSELF, AS AN ISOLATED EVENT, THAN IN WHAT IT PORTENDS FOR THEIR ABILITY TO HOLD THE LINE AGAINST A PROGRESSIVE EROSION OF THEIR DEFENSES AGAINST TAIWAN'S EFFORTS TO GAIN ADDITIONAL INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SPACE. CHINA'S REACTION TO DATE UNDERLINES THE GRAVITY WITH WHICH THEY VIEW THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES.

3. BECAUSE OF THESE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES, CHINA VIEWS THE LEE VISIT AS THE MOST SERIOUS BLOW TO THEIR TAIWAN STRATEGY, AND TO US-PRC RELATIONS, SINCE THE US F-16 SALE TO TAIWAN IN 1992. IT MAY, THEREFORE, BE INSTRUCTIVE TO COMPARE THE TWO EVENTS, AS THE CHINESE WILL CERTAINLY DO, IN SEARCH OF CLUES TO CHINA'S FUTURE BEHAVIOR.

4. ON THE SURFACE, THE US SALE OF 150 F-16 A/B'S TO TAIWAN IN SEPTEMBER 1992 WAS INTRINSICALLY A MORE DAMAGING EVENT, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE UNITED STATES FAILED IN ITS EFFORTS TO HAVE THE F-16 SALE REPLACE RATHER THAN SUPPLEMENT THE FRENCH SALE TO TAIWAN OF MIRAGE FIGHTERS.

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/28/2019
2017-0051-M (1.76)

CONSISTENT WITH THIS, THE INITIAL CHINESE REACTION WAS SEVERE. IT PROBABLY INCLUDED THE DECISION TO SHIP ITEMS

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

5. SEVERAL FACTORS, HOWEVER, SERVED TO MITIGATE THE CHINESE REACTION.

-- FIRST, THE PRC CONCLUDED THAT THE F-16 SALE TO TAIWAN DID NOT REPRESENT A CONSIDERED POLICY SHIFT ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES BUT WA{A PRODUCT OF THE DESPERATE EFFORTS BY THE REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL INCUMBELT TO SALVAGE HIS REELECTION. THIS MODERATED THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE SALE.

-- SECOND, PRESIDENT BUSH SENT DENG XIAOPING A PRIVATE MESSAGE ASSURING HIM, IN THE WAKE OF THE SALE, THAT THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGE IN THE FUNDAMENTALS OF US CHINA POLICY.

-- THIRD, THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION SENT A SENIOR OFFICIAL, WITH THE STATUS OF A PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY, TO BEIJING BOTH TO EXPLAIN THE SALE AND TO OFFER SEVERAL MAJOR COMPENSATING ACTIONS, INCLUDING RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF THE PRC'S FROZEN MILITARY ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES AND A VISIT BY THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE TO REVIVE THE JOINT COMMISSION ON COMMERCE AND TRADE.

-- FOURTH, THE PRC CONCLUDED THAT THE REPUBLICAN INCUMBENT WAS LIKELY TO LOSE THE ELECTION AND SHIFTED THEIR ATTENTION FROM TRYING TO PUNISH THE OUTGOING ADMINISTRATION TO TRYING TO POSITION ITSELF FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION.

-- LASTLY, DESPITE THE ADVERSE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROSPECTIVE BUILDUP OF MODERN MILITARY AIRCRAFT ACROSS THE STRAIT, THE DELIVERIES WOULD NOT OCCUR FOR SEVERAL YEARS, AND THE PRC HAD THE ABILITY TO OFFSET THIS WITH A MILITARY BUILDUP AND MILITARY DEPLOYMENTS OF ITS OWN.

6. FROM THE PRC STANDPOINT, QHE LEE VISIT HAS MORE DISTURBING POTENTIAL DOWNSTREAM IMPLICATIONS THAN THE F-16 SALE. IN BEIJING'S EYES, TAIWAN HAS DEMONSTRATED ITS ABILITY TO USE A SYMPATHETIC AND UNRULY CONGRESS TO FORCE THE HAND OF THE ADMINISTRATION ON AN ISSUE OF IMPORTANCE TO BEIJING. BEIJING HAS NO WAY OF KNOWING WHEN THIS PROCESS WILL STOP. MOREOVER, IT IS CONFIDENT THAT FOR TAIWAN THIS ONLY REPRESENTS THE OPENING WEDGE OF A AMBITIOUS OPEN-ENDED STRATEGY TARGETED AT THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY JAPAN. BEIJING'S WORST FEAR IS THAT WITH THE TRICKLE STARTED BY US AGREEMENT TO THE LEE VISIT, THE DIKE WILL START TO

CRUMBLE, THUS FORCING THE PRC TO CONFRONT AT AN AWKWARD TIME AN UNDESIRABLE SET OF OPTIONS, ALL INVOLVING MAJOR COSTS AND RISKS. THE MOOD IN CHINESE POLICY CIRCLES IS ALSO MARKED BY SERIOUS AND GROWING UNCERTAINTY ABUT US POLICY INTENTIONS ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF CHINA-RELATED ISSUES.

7. THESE FACTORS REINFORCE THE REASONS FOR HANDLING THE LEE VISIT WITH CARE, AS WE APPEAR TO BE DOING. BEIJING HAS TOO MUCH STAKE IN THE US RELATIONSHIP LIGHTLY TO TAKE ACTIONS THAT WOULD DISPROPORTIONATELY DAMAGE ITS OWN INTERESTS OR UNLEASH A PROCESS IT COULD NOT BE CONFIDENT OF CONTROLLING. ITS REACTIONS TO DATE HAVE MET THIS TEST. NEVERTHELESS, THERE IS A GROWING DANGER THAT A US POLICY THAT HAS BROUGHT BENEFITS TO ALL THE PARTIES IS BEING DRIVEN TOWARD BECOMING A ZERO SUM GAME IN WHICH TAIWAN'S SHORT-TERM GAINS ARE IMPOSING SEVERE COSTS ON US INTERESTS. FOR THAT REASON ALONE THERE IS AN IMPELLING NEED FOR TOP LEVEL ATTENTION TO MANAGING THE RELATIONSHIP, AND CONSIDERING WHERE WE ARE HEADING. ROY

FROM:
SITREPRT

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. cable	Re: PRC-Taiwan-US / Foreign Relations (2 pages)	05/31/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:
Lee [Lee Teng-hui] Visit

2012-0975-F
sb1270

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. memo	To: Samuel Berger; From: Robert Suettinger; Re: Managing a Li Teng-hui Visit [partial] (4 pages)	05/16/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:
Lee [Lee Teng-hui] Visit

2012-0975-F
sb1270

RESTRICTION CODES

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

Bob -
This needs to be more of an action plan. What do we do, when, how.

May 16, 1995

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: ROBERT L. SUETTINGER

SUBJECT: Managing a Li Teng-hui Visit

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/28/2019
2017-0051-M (1.78)

If we decide to acquiesce in a Li visit to Cornell, it is important to handle it in ways that will help minimize the negative repercussions. Below are some suggestions on general themes, short term actions, and longer term measures.

General Themes

[articulate reasons • U.S. tradition of free speech,

There are two basic approaches we could take to this issue:

Bob - It's a combination • does not constitute change in 'one China' policy. No recognition. Will not consider visit official. But denial is unsustainable in view of a) Congressional expectations and b) our own values as a nation - free speech, etc

1) That it's the right thing to do to allow private visits by senior Taiwan leaders. However, it does not constitute a change in our "one China" policy. This action conveys no recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state, as we consider this not to be a major change in policy or a denigration of China's claim to sovereignty. This is not a sovereignty issue, but one of courtesy.

- This approach would basically overturn the Taiwan Policy Review and will increase the severity of China's reaction.

2) We were forced to grant this visa for a private visit because of overwhelming Congressional support. The Administration advised against it repeatedly as being not in our long-term interest. We will not consider the visit as official. Therefore it implies no change in the policy laid out in the Taiwan Policy Review. (Obviously, we can make that adjustment later.)

- This approach will offend some in Congress, and may spur Taiwan to take other steps to bypass the Administration, but it reflects the reality and will help in explaining the issue to China.

Working with Taiwan

Bob - do we want to go to Taiwan first or PRC? Sequence. We don't have much time. This will begin to leak.

There are two objectives here: 1) To get Li to accept some conditions for his private visit; and 2) To convey the message to Taipei that we strongly object to the methods utilized and that

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

Why emphasize 2? Says we've been had.

our willingness to allow Li to visit Cornell does not constitute a change in our overall policy.

We should get the message directly to President Li as soon as possible.

- AIT Director Lyn Pascoe could most easily deliver the message, (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) And he represents the State Department, which is seen as an outlier on this issue.

- (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) Perhaps more plausible would be someone from the President's entourage who is not associated with the NSC and is not too well-known. Although the Taiwan press is already all over this story, we should by all means avoid publicity.

make a specific recommendation who? when? how?

We should indicate that the President is disposed to grant Li a visa to make a private visit to Cornell, and would appreciate Li's respecting the following requests:

Essential:

- The visit is private, not official, and should be handled accordingly, with as small a retinue as possible and in a low-key fashion.
- The U.S. Government will not extend diplomatic courtesies to the Li party, will not provide Secret Service or Diplomatic Security escorts, but will afford the party the protection of local police.
- The invitation is to Ithaca only, and should not include visits to any other location, especially not Washington. A rest stop in Honolulu is appropriate, providing the conditions of the Taiwan Policy Review are met. It is not to be a transit stop as earlier offered as an alternative to Cornell.
- We fully expect that this visit is a one-time deal: That President Li will decline the invitation to visit Alaska in September, and that other members of Taiwan's senior leadership will not make similar requests (some are already pending).

Desirable, but optional:

- ~~We would appreciate Li's providing an advance draft~~ of his ~~proposed remarks on the~~ occasion ~~of the endowment~~ of the ~~honorary chair in his name. (Fallback position~~: We would

NO

appreciate it if Li would stress in his remarks that he considers this is a personal visit, and that he avoid gratuitous remarks about China or U.S. relations with China.

- We would prefer the Li limit his contacts with U.S. Congressmen, recognizing that many will wish to see him, but that the greater his exposure, the greater the prospect for damage to U.S. relations with China.

more generic – can't tell him not to see Congressmen.

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

Working with China

At about the same time we should inform China in advance of the President's decision by either of the following methods: 1) A private meeting between Tony and Ambassador Li Daoyu in Tony's office; or 2) Possibly a Sandy Berger drop-by the Ambassador's residence. We should not deliver the message via emissary in Beijing, although the Ambassador should be i(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(5), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

more precise

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(5), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

The Chinese should be briefed as follows:

- The domestic context of the decision should be discussed frankly, including points on American values and traditions, the nature of relations between Congress and the President.
- Without doubt, Congress would have passed binding legislation soon. Given the vote tallies, it would be veto-proof.
- We will do what we can to limit the trappings of officiality of the visit, but press coverage is likely to be heavy.
- The decision -- from our perspective -- involves the provision of a necessary courtesy to a leader widely respected here. We do not interpret it as an official visit, a recognition of Taiwan's sovereignty, a change of U.S. policy toward China or portent thereof, or a refusal to hear China's complaint.

spell out a bit

- Explain why protracted fight w/ Congress (which we would lose) would only make matters worse – elevate issue

- The United States fully intends to maintain a solid, friendly relationship with China. This is of strategic importance to us, and we will continue our adherence to the communiques that underlie the relationship.
- We understand that China's reaction will be an angry one, but believe it is in the best interests of both countries to keep the reaction from damaging essential components of the relationship.
- Easing of Congressional pressure will enable the Administration to renew MFN with less difficulty this year.
- (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)
- More importantly, the United States would like to extend an invitation to President Jiang Zemin to pay an official visit to Washington in October, around the time of the UN anniversary.
- Obviously, we would like to wait an interval before making that public -- perhaps to late June or early July -- in order to allow the rhetorical reaction to cool, and to avoid making it seem as if President Jiang is getting "second prize."
- If China's reaction is too severe, a summit meeting would be more difficult to arrange.

why concede that

not blanket invite. a moderate Chinese reaction will enable us to extend invite...

• public statement & posture. What is rationale for change? • how do we deal w/ Congress?

Over the Longer Term

We must expect and allow for a fair amount of public Chinese venting of anger on this issue, and to take steps to damage the relationship in some way. Some additional steps, not mentioned in the earlier memo, might include cancellation of the Defense Minister's visit and holding up agrément to the Sasser ambassadorship.

More troubling, however, are the issues of MTCR-related sanctions and the WTO problem.

- The nonproliferation community has met and decided that China transferred to Iran in 1992 and 1994 technology and training that could be seen as intended for a Category I missile system (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d, EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) We are preparing a demarche to ask for an explanation, with the understanding that this is sanctionable activity. It is doubtful the Chinese will respond positively. This is particularly so if, in rage over the Li decision, they cancel strategic discussions slated for June -- distinctly possible. That, of course, would only serve to further the process of imposing sanctions. Unless the President issues a waiver (on national security grounds), the sanctions are required by law.

In the wake of the Li visit, the imposition of economic sanctions would be viewed as an indication the U.S. had no interest in good relations with China.

- Taiwan has made no secret of its desire to join the WTO. In fact, it reportedly is making special efforts to have its accession negotiations completed by mid-summer. EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) Taiwan clearly wants to join separately and before China, an idea for which there is considerable support in Congress. China has been strongly opposed to Taiwan joining first. This problem will grow more acute in the wake of a Li visit, as Taipei will push harder. (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. memo	To: The President; From: Anthony Lake; Re: Managing a Visit to Cornell University by President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan [partial] (2 pages)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:
Lee [Lee Teng-hui] Visit

2012-0975-F
sb1270

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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25X6

~~SECRET~~

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¶ You are aware of the arguments for changing our policy on this issue. Attached at TAB A is an assessment of China's likely response if we proceed. You should review it before making a final decision.

¶ If you nonetheless decide to proceed, this memo

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Managing a Visit to Cornell University by President ~~Li Teng-hui~~ Lee of Taiwan

Purpose

To decide ~~how~~ (whether) to grant a visa to President Li (and, if so, how to do so) in a manner that minimizes the negative repercussions.

25x6, declass 12-31-2045

Background

We have talked at length about the pros and cons of granting a visa to President Lee Teng-hui to visit Cornell. This is a serious policy dilemma: balancing concern over a potentially ~~nasty~~ serious PRC reaction to a Lee visit against the overwhelming Congressional and media support for such a visit. ~~There is little need to review what happens if we stick with our current approach of denying a visa.~~

~~This memo is based on the assumption that you may conclude there is no viable alternative to issuing a visa.~~ ~~It~~ focuses, ~~then~~ on ~~the prospects for managing~~ how to manage the issue to maximize our flexibility and minimize the damage to relations with China. To do this, we have to move quickly and carefully.

PRC reaction to this decision ~~is going to~~ will be very negative and will probably put us in a period of confrontation. Taiwan has always been the most troublesome issue in the bilateral relationship. Currently, it is an extremely important issue for the Chinese leadership -- perhaps a defining one. During a time of political uncertainty in China, with Deng Xiaoping near death, Chinese leaders may feel obligated to respond with maximum toughness against a U.S. they see as growing increasingly hostile. At Tab A is an assessment of China's likely response options to a Li visit. (It is worth reading.). And although we are recommending an approach designed to minimize their reaction, it may not work.

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Kathleen Allegrone, Senior Reviewer

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President, Chief of Staff

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Managing the Issue: Establishing the Public Theme

We should try to maintain ~~a sense of~~ the initiative, rather than be seen as reacting passively to Congress or external pressure. ~~For that reason, the State Department, rather than the White House, should be the lead agency on the issue~~. The ~~line~~ should be that we have decided to revise further the Taiwan Policy Review of last September to permit, rather than deny ~~all~~ private visits to the United States by Taiwan's senior leaders. We would explain that: (rationale)

- Lee Teng-hui's visa is for an unofficial, private visit solely for the purpose of allowing Cornell University to honor one of its most distinguished graduates with a chair in his name.
- We Americans treasure the freedom of speech and travel and find it difficult to deny these rights to others. We have permitted non-official travel by other controversial world leaders.
- Actions taken by the U.S. Congress in support of a Lee visit -- while non-binding -- clearly indicate~~d that our previous guidelines on this issue were no longer politically sustainable~~ overwhelming support for the Lee visit in U.S.
- This action does not imply or portend any fundamental change in our policy toward China or Taiwan. It is not an issue of sovereignty, but one of courtesy. The U.S. continues to recognize only one China -- the People's Republic of China -- and we will continue to adhere to the three communiqués that underpin our relations with that country.
- We expect the Taiwan authorities to treat this as a private, unofficial visit, and we urge others to do so as well.

Working to Keep the Visit Low-Key -- Talking with Taipei

This is an enormously important issue for both Taiwan and China, and the press coverage in Taiwan will be extremely heavy. There are already many rumors and inaccurate press accounts. We need a few days to make preparations to insure both Taipei and Beijing understand what is afoot. If the story leaks, we will have more problems. Thus, for the next few days, we need to hold the press line where it is.

We need to work quickly to get a message directly to President Lee on our concerns about how he handles this visit.

25X6

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

25X6

Damage Control with Beijing

At the same time [redacted] Peter Tarnoff should call in the Chinese ambassador to inform him of the impending decision. We should not deliver the message via an emissary to Beijing, although the Ambassador should be informed via the most secure means available.

The Chinese should be briefed as follows:

- The domestic context of the decision should be discussed frankly, beginning with an explanation of the importance in the United States of freedom of travel and freedom of speech.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

The U.S. university system is a source of great pride to all Americans and we have made it available to students from around the world. Cornell University is justifiably proud of its alumnus, Lee Teng-hui, and wishes to honor him with an endowed faculty chair in his name. Almost all Americans believe this is a courtesy that should not be denied.

- This sentiment -- with active Taiwan urging -- motivated the Congress to pass resolutions calling on the Administration to grant Lee a visa. The Administration has opposed this strongly, and the fight with Congress has been protracted.
- The most recent votes were overwhelmingly against the Administration's position, and binding legislation has been prepared. It will pass, and there is no doubt a Presidential veto would be overridden.
- Further escalating the battle with Congress would only heighten the public attention to the issue. The outcome would be the same, with greater damage.
- We will do what we can to limit the trappings of officiality of the visit, but press coverage is likely to be heavy.
- We will make clear publicly that this decision -- from the U.S. perspective -- involves the provision of a necessary courtesy to an individual ~~a leader~~ widely respected here, not a fundamental change of policy. We do not ~~interpret it~~ consider it or will we treat it, as an official visit, a recognition of Taiwan's sovereignty, a change of U.S. policy toward China or portent thereof. ~~or a refusal to hear China's complaint.~~
- The United States fully intends to maintain a solid, friendly relationship with China. This is of strategic importance to us, and we will continue our adherence to the communiques that underlie the relationship.
- Easing of Congressional pressure will enable the Administration to renew MFN with less difficulty this year.
- More importantly, we urge China not to react to this issue in ways that do serious damage to the relationship. We have established a healthy series of dialogues on a number of difficult issues, and believe it is in the interest of both countries that the relationship continue to be one between equals, talking openly with each other.
- The U.S. agrees with China's often-stated position that a summit meeting between the leaders of our two countries would be desirable. A temperate response to this issue will enable us to extend an invitation to President Jiang Zemin to visit Washington in October.
- If China's reaction is too severe, a summit meeting would be more difficult to arrange.

There is no guarantee that either approach will work, however. Taiwan has manipulated this issue precisely for the publicity it

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

would garner for Lee in his own presidential bid next year. He will not be predisposed to go to Cornell in a low-key fashion. China's leaders very likely will insist on a ~~very~~ harsh ~~rhetorical~~ response. Jiang may well refuse an invitation to visit -- even officially -- if a Lee visit has taken place earlier. That's a "face" issue as well as a political one. And even if he accepts, the Chinese may bargain hard for more concessions in response to our request for moderation.

RECOMMENDATION

That you maintain our current approach, waiting until Congress forces the issue with binding legislation.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

That you approve the approach outlined above to manage the issue.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Assessment of China's possible reaction

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~SECRET~~

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Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/28/2019
2017-0051-M (1.79)

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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We need to work quickly to get a message directly to President Lee on our concerns about how he handles this visit. (b)(1)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

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RECOMMENDATION

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Approve _____

Disapprove _____

That you approve the approach outlined above to manage the issue.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Assessment of China's possible reaction

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. memo	To: Anthony Lake; From: Robert L. Suettinger; Re: Possible Chinese Responses [partial] (2 pages)	05/17/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:
Lee [Lee Teng-hui] Visit

2012-0975-F
sb1270

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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~~SECRET~~ 3656 REDO

May 17, 1995

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ROBERT L. SUETTINGER

SUBJECT: Possible Chinese Responses to a Li Teng-hui Visit to the United States

There is very little reporting to date on Chinese planning for retaliatory steps to be taken if the United States disregards China's demands and permits Li Teng-hui to make a "private" visit to Cornell University. The leadership probably has not made a final decision, nor even considered a list of options. As has always been the case with U.S. initiatives toward Taiwan, China has a relatively limited choice of retaliatory measures, given the growing dependence of its economy on the U.S. market. Various leaders have talked vaguely about "setbacks" in the relationship and the need to "teach the U.S. a lesson," but there is little specific information.

The Taiwan issue has been the most difficult to manage in the bilateral relationship since Nixon visited China in 1972. It is not like other issues, subject to rational calculus of balanced interests. It is emotional, linked to nationalism, sovereignty and resentment over historical slights. Deng Xiaoping -- while never pro-U.S. -- viewed the issue as malleable, and subordinated it to maintaining the overall relationship.

But three factors will make China's reaction this time more difficult to predict: 1) Deng Xiaoping is gone, but not yet dead; 2) China's successor leaders appear to be developing a distorted, but malign perception of U.S. policy toward China; and 3) Li Teng-hui has exposed the failure of China's Taiwan policy by taking it inexorably toward de facto independence.

The succession makes it necessary for any Chinese leader to look tough in the face of a foreign challenge. With Premier Li Peng evidently overseeing China's foreign policy, there will be even less inclination to give the U.S. the benefit of the doubt. Chinese leaders increasingly appear to believe that the U.S. goal is to contain and divide China, and will see the Li visit as furthering that goal.

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/28/2019
2017-0051-M (1.80)

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

China's reactions will probably be calibrated on how public the "insult" of a Li visit appears, and on whether compensating offers have been made to China. Moreover, the damage to the relationship must be looked at in both the short and the long term.

China's immediate reactions will probably include the following:

- Extremely harsh criticism of the Congress and the Administration in all its media.

- Reduced high-level visits across the board, including military-to-military exchanges. Commerce Secretary Brown's proposed July visit may be canceled. China's Defense Minister may call off his June visit to Washington.

- Suspension of bilateral dialogue on nuclear-related issues, such as peaceful nuclear cooperation and nuclear sales to Iran and Pakistan. China has linked cooperation on these issues to U.S. F-16 sales to Taiwan in the past, and will probably cancel discussions scheduled for early June.

- Suspension of further discussions on China's adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime.

- Some visible punitive actions against U.S. corporations with heavy China exposure and viable competitors.

- Increased resistance to U.S. policies toward human rights, legal reform, etc.

- More visible military training activity in areas adjacent to the Taiwan Strait.

China probably will not decrease significantly its cooperation in reducing the North Korean nuclear threat. That problem engages fundamental Chinese interests, both strategic and economic. It would be even less likely than now, however, to cooperate in enforcing a trade embargo or other punitive economic sanctions.

A hostile reaction by China will have an impact on two medium-term problems: MTCR-related sanctions and the WTO problem.

- The nonproliferation community has met and decided that China transferred to Iran in 1992 and 1994 technology and training that could be seen as intended for a Category I missile system (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d, EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) We are preparing a demarche to ask for an explanation, with the

understanding that this is sanctionable activity. It is doubtful the Chinese will respond positively. This is particularly so if, in rage over the Lee decision, they cancel strategic discussions slated for June -- distinctly possible. That, of course, would only serve to further the process of imposing sanctions. Unless the President issues a waiver (on national security grounds), the sanctions are required by law. In the wake of the Lee visit, the imposition of economic sanctions would be viewed as an indication the U.S. had no interest in good relations with China.

- Taiwan has made no secret of its desire to join the WTO. In fact, it reportedly is making special efforts to have its accession negotiations completed by mid-summer. (b)(1) (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) Taiwan clearly wants to join separately and before China, an idea for which there is considerable support in Congress. China has been strongly opposed to Taiwan joining first. This problem will grow more acute in the wake of a Li visit, as Taipei will push harder. (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

Over the longer term, the damage may turn out to be even greater. China is at a turning point in its world-view, burdened with a lack of vision and a lack of trust in and knowledge of the United States. It will view a Li visit -- correctly or not -- as a fundamental change in U.S. policy toward China. It will consider that the U.S. has embarked upon a course of dividing and containing China, thwarting its economic growth, resisting its territorial claims, stifling its plans for national reunification. Current views of the U.S. as China's "principal enemy" may harden. China may see its only alternative as to strike out on its own. It may also decide that, notwithstanding growing economic ties to Taiwan, tougher measures to remind Taiwan of its military vulnerability are necessary. To those ends, China may:

- Adopt an increasingly confrontational approach toward the U.S., both in bilateral relations and international affairs;

- Step up its military modernization, including development and deployment of forces capable of threatening Taiwan (e.g. M-9 and M-11 mobile missiles, which has already begun);

- Reduce its vulnerability to U.S. economic pressure by developing markets in Asia and Europe;

- Seek to undermine U.S. policy in Asia, such as by breaking consensus within APEC.

These by no means exhaust the possibilities of China's reaction. And again, it must be reiterated that the U.S. may be able to take some compensating measures. But my view is that, because of the succession issue and the persistent problems that already bedevil the bilateral relationship, China's reaction to a Li Teng-hui visit will be harsh and lasting.

Memcon
Bonnie Glaser
Guo Changlin
Political Counselor
Chinese Mission to the United Nations
May 23, 1995

[Guo was head of the America Division of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations until he was assigned to the UN mission. He is an adviser to China's ambassador on U.S. foreign policy and domestic politics. This memcon is based on a phone conversation.]

The decision to give Lee Teng-hui a visa is bitter fruit that China can't swallow. This is worse than the decision to sell F-16s to Taiwan. The U.S. is already seen as unfriendly to China and there is growing suspicion of U.S. intentions toward China and this will intensify.

There will definitely be a reaction from China, although I can't say exactly what it will be. Some visits will be canceled. The visit by the Chinese defense minister will probably be canceled. The Chinese may say that it is postponed, but in effect it will be canceled for a long time.

China's reaction will be seen by steps taken in the short run as well as by steps taken over a longer period of time. Chinese reaction will be both bilateral and international.

The Chinese reaction published in the *People's Daily* is a very important statement. It is not just a Foreign Ministry statement. It represents a consensus. The issue has likely been discussed at all levels and among the research institutes.

Q. Many people say that after the F-16 decision was made China decided to sell the M-11s to Pakistan and some people have speculated that China will retaliate by stepping up its nuclear cooperation with Iran and further developing relations with Iran in ways that are damaging to U.S. interests.

There is no sign that China will move closer to Iran or sell more missiles to Pakistan. I cannot rule out that China will do something that is not in its own interests, however. China may sacrifice some interests to save its sovereignty. China must do something. There is no end to U.S. pressure. Only 8 months have passed since the readjustment of U.S. Taiwan policy in which the U.S. stated it would only permit Lee Teng-hui to visit the U.S. in transit to another country.

The decision will trigger serious debate in Beijing as did the decision to sell F-16s to Taiwan. The "containment school" [those who argue that the U.S. seeking to militarily contain China] is growing in influence. I can say that this view will not be the dominant view, but will also not be the minority view. It will be somewhere in between. The mainstream view may prevail. This view holds that the U.S. does not want a strong China and seeks to keep China divided, but also takes note of the political realities in the United States.

Q. Do you think that China will appreciate the U.S. contention that if Clinton did not allow Lee to visit, Congress would have passed binding legislation calling for such a visit and perhaps even gone further and would have had the votes to override a veto?

There is an understanding of the domestic political element of the issue in China, but the Chinese think that Clinton is the president and since he is pursuing an engagement strategy with China and if he understands the importance of China, then he should have made a different decision. So they will not accept this explanation.

Q. Were you surprised by the decision to give Lee Teng-hui a visa?

I expected that a visa would be granted eventually, especially after my discussions with people in Washington last March. What I was surprised about was that Clinton suddenly moved to do this. It was an abrupt decision. And instead of giving Lee an extended transit visit, the U.S. decided to allow him to visit for several days. So this was a bit surprising to me.

I think that the decision must be viewed in the larger context of U.S. foreign policy and debates over foreign policy. This includes the relationship between the State Department and the White House as well as between the Congress and the Executive branch. It also has to do with the fact that there is general unhappiness with Chinese behavior. Another factor is Taiwan's successful lobbying efforts.

There is a very strange phenomenon in U.S. politics now. The senior policymakers in the Clinton administration do not have a strategic perspective. There are many others who have a strategic perspective, but they are not speaking out. So Congress takes a view that is at one extreme, but there is no different voice. I think this is abnormal.

The U.S. is pursuing an ambiguous policy on the issue of "one China." The Clinton administration refuses to talk about the meaning of the three communiqués. There is now almost no hope for any exchange of visits by Clinton and Jiang Zemin. At the moment, I don't think that the U.S. will back Taiwan's entry into the UN. But it is supporting Taiwan's efforts to extend its international living space and this will continue.

China is to some extent waiting to see how the Lee visit is arranged, what the schedule is like and how it is reported in the media before it reacts fully. We will also watch Congress on the progress made on resolutions on Tibet and other issues related to Taiwan. So China will retaliate now, but also later. Even if the U.S. takes steps to balance this decision, China will still retaliate, but if the U.S. does something, this could affect the degree of retaliation. If the U.S. is going to do something, it should do it soon. The sooner the better.

I don't think that there is any chance that the U.S. will reverse this decision. China has to insist that the U.S. reverse it as a matter of principle, but I don't expect any change.

I think that the U.S. should immediately talk to the Chinese side about its intentions, the realities, how it plans to put comprehensive engagement in place and what the long-term strategic context of Sino-U.S. relations is. This would help. I am worried that U.S.-Chinese relations could be pushed into a confrontation. This could damage both sides' interests. Such an eventuality cannot be ruled.

I was perplexed by the report that Secretary Perry supported this decision since the U.S. military is in favor of expanding relations. The report I read said that four cabinet members, including Perry, met in the middle of last week and a consensus was reached. What is Perry's view on China?

People in China are very much worried about the deployment of TMD in Japan. The "containment school" is convinced that this is part of U.S. containment against China. China is only a middle sized nuclear power and this system will weaken China's nuclear deterrent.

Did you notice China's statement on Lee Teng-hui's response to Jiang Zemin's six points that was published yesterday? It is notable that China is dealing with the issue of Chinese-Taiwan relations separately and will not allow the U.S. decision to permit Lee to visit to adversely affect ties with Taipei.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. cable	Re: PRC-Taiwan-United States / Foreign Relations (3 pages)	05/30/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:
Lee [Lee Teng-hui] Visit

2012-0975-F
sb1270

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010. cable	Re: PRC-Taiwan-U.S. / Relations (5 pages)	05/26/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:
Lee [Lee Teng-hui] Visit

2012-0975-F
sb1270

RESTRICTION CODES

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P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BRANSCUM, NSC,. ROTH, SUETTINGER

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG:300857Z MAY 95

FM: AIT TAIPEI

TO:
AIT WASHDC IMMEDIATE

////

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TAIPEI 003147

EXDIS

FOR EAP DAS WIEDEMANN/EAP/RSP/TC DIRECTOR LANGE FROM
A/DIR LAFLEUR

E.O. 12356: DECL: 2015
TAGS: PREL, TW
SUBJECT: MANAGING THE LEE VISIT

REFS: A) STATE 123659, B) TAIPEI 2986; C) TAIPEI 3016;
D) STATE 127768; E) TAIPEI 3092 F)LANGE-LAFLEUR
5/26/95 TELCON

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. MOFA VICE MINISTER CHEN CALLED IN A/DIR MAY 29 TO PRESENT US WITH THE FOLLOWING PROPOSED SCHEDULE AND DELEGATION LIST FOR PRESIDENT LEE'S VISIT. (WE ARE FAXING TO EAP/RSP/TC THE DELEGATION LIST WHICH CONTAINS NAMES IN CHINESE CHARACTERS AS WELL AS ENGLISH.) ASSUMING WE AGREE ON THE SCHEDULE, MOFA AWAITS OUR PROPOSAL ON A MUTUALLY AGREEABLE TIME WHEN THE SCHEDULE COULD BE JOINTLY ANNOUNCED. GIVEN THAT THE DETAILS WILL NOT REMAIN UNDER WRAPS LONG IN THE MEDIA ENVIRONMENT HERE, IT WOULD BE WISE TO PROCEED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE (I.E. TUESDAY YOUR TIME, WEDNESDAY HERE).

3. THE DELEGATION LIST LOOKS PRETTY MUCH LIKE THE EARLIER DRAFTS, ALTHOUGH PLEASE NOTE THAT MRS. WU (WIFE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL OFFISE SECRETARY-GENERAL) WAS INADVERTENTLY LEFT OFF THE LIST FAXED SATURDAY AND THAT AN NSC SECRETARY HAS BEEN ADDED TO THE LIST. THE TOTAL IS NOW AN EVEN 50.

4. CHEN SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PARTY WOULD MOTOR FROM SYRACUSE TO ITHACA AND BACK.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NARA, Date 8/28/2009
2007-0051-M (1.83)

5. BEGIN TEXT OF TENTATIVE ITINERARY FOR THE VISIT OF PRESIDENT LEE TENG-HUI TO THE UNITED STATES:

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 7, 1995

1220 DEPARTURE FROM TAIPEI

0900 ARRIVAL IN LOS ANGELES
. PROCEED TO UNIVERSAL CITY HILTON HOTEL

1035 MEET WITH OVERSEAS CHINESE REPRESENTATIVES
. FROM THE LOS ANGELES AREA

RON UNIVERSAL CITY HILTON HOTEL

THURSDAY, JUNE 8, 1995

0850 DEPARTURE FROM LOS ANGELES

1640 ARRIVAL IN SYRACUSE
. LEAVE FOR CORNELL UNIVERSITY BY CAR
. ARRIVE AT CORNELL UNIVERSITY

EVENING RECEPTION AND DINNER
. HOST: MALDEN C. NESHEIM, PROVOST
. CORNELL UNIVERSITY

RON HOLIDAY INN OR CORNELL'S STATLER HOTEL

FRIDAY, JUNE 9, 1995

MORNING PRIVATE BREAKFAST

1030 MEET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF INNER
. CIRCLE, USA-ROC ECONOMIC COUNCIL

1200 SMALL LUNCHEON
. HOST: NORMAN R. SCOTT, VICE PRESIDENT FOR
. RESEARCH AND ADVANCED STUDIES

1500 SPEECH AT OLIN LECTURE

1630 NEWS CONFERENCE
. HOST: HENRIK N. DULLEA, VICE PRESIDENT FOR
. UNIVERSITY RELATIONS

1700 RECEPTION

1830 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT FRANK H.T. RHODES

1900 RECEPTION AND DINNER
. HOSTS: PRESIDENT AND MRS. FRANK H.T. RHODES

RON HOLIDAY INN OR CORNELL'S STATLER HOTEL

SATURDAY, JUNE 10, 1995

0745 BREAKFAST GATHERING
. HOST: DAVID L. CALL, RONALD P. LYNCH DEAN OF

. THE COLLEGE OF AGRICULTURE AND LIFE
. SCIENCES
. AT THIS EVENT, PRESIDENT WILL BE PRESENTED
. WITH THE COLLEGE'S DISTINGUISHED ALUMNI
. AWARD

1300 LUNCHEON
. HOST: DON M. RANDEL, HAROLD TANNER DEAN OF
THE COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

EVENING RECEPTION HOSTED BY HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT
. LEE

2100 LEAVE CORNELL UNIVERSITY FOR SYRACUSE

2300 DEPARTURE FROM SYRACUSE

SUNDAY, JUNE 11, 1995

0140 ARRIVAL IN ANCHORAGE, ALASKA

1450 DEPARTURE FROM ANCHORAGE

MONDAY, JUNE 12, 1995

1630 ARRIVAL IN TAIPEI

END TEXT.
LAFLEUR
BT
#3147

NNNN
<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
<^SSN>3147

<^TOR>950530053834 M1691041

FROM:
SITREPRT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BASS, BERGER, DOHSE, FUERTH, HARMON, LAKE, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG, HARMON, LAKEA, NSC, SUETTINGER, SUM, SUM2

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~SECRET~~ DTG:230826Z MAY 95

FM: AMEMBASSY BEIJING

TO:
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4161

////

~~S E C R E T~~ BEIJING 018936

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, TW, CH, US
SUBJECT: MANAGING THE PRC REACTION TO THE LEE TENG-HUI
- VISIT

REF: A. BEIJING 18620, B. BEIJING 18087

1. ~~SECRE~~T - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN DELIVERING HIS STRONG PROTEST OVER THE LEE VISIT (REPORTED SEPTEL), VICE PREMIER/FOREIGN MINISTER QIAN QICHEN HAS RATCHETED UPWARD BOTH THE PRC'S LEVEL OF CONCERN AND THE GRAVITY OF THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES. HE HAS NEVERTHELESS PROVIDED THE HINT OF AN OPENING BY CALLING ON THE UNITED STATES TO ADOPT "REMEDIAL MEASURES" TO MINIMIZE THE DAMAGE TO THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP FROM THE LEE VISIT. I READ THIS AS A VEILED EXPRESSION OF INTEREST IN TONY LAKE'S REFERENCE TO OUR WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS A POSSIBLE VISIT BY PRESIDENT JIANG ZEMIN FOR A SUMMIT MEETING.

3. WE SHOULD SEIZE THIS OPENING AND TRY TO ENLARGE IT. WE CAN DO SO WITHOUT COMMITTING OURSELVES PREMATURELY ON A JIANG VISIT. NEVERTHELESS, WE NEED TO MOVE QUICKLY SINCE DELAY COULD HARDEN ATTITUDES ON BOTH SIDES AND MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN THE CONSISTENCY AND INTEGRITY OF OUR POLICY. IF HANDLED PROPERLY, WE CAN BOTH LIMIT THE DAMAGE TO OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND CREATE OPPORTUNITIES FOR MOVING AHEAD IN CONSTRUCTIVE WAYS.

4. IN MY OWN RESPONSE TO QIAN, I PICKED UP ON HIS REFERENCE TO "REMEDIAL MEASURES" AND URGED THAT WE MOVE PROMPTLY TO TURN THE CURRENT PROBLEM INTO AN OPPORTUNITY.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2017-0051-M (184)

I SPECIFICALLY URGED THAT THE PRC TAKE UP OUR OFFER TO
HAVE U/S TARNOFF MEET AT AN EARLY DATE WITH VICE MINISTER
SECRET 2

LI ZHAOXING. QIAN DID NOT REJECT THIS PROPOSAL BUT DID
NOT GO BEYOND CONTENDING THAT FACTS WOULD SHOW IN WHAT
DIRECTION OUR POLICY WAS HEADING.

5. IN ADDRESSING THE "COMPLEXITIES" INTRODUCED BY THE LEE
VISIT, THE DANGER IS THAT ACTIONS ON ONE OR BOTH SIDES
WILL CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE LESS CONDUCIVE TO MANAGING THE
PROBLEM SUCCESSFULLY. THUS FAR THE PRC RESPONSE HAS BEEN
STRUCTURED TO CONVEY A HIGH LEVEL OF CONCERN (IN MY NEARLY
FOUR YEARS HERE, THIS IS THE FIRST TIME VP/FM QIAN HAS
PERSONALLY SUMMONED ME TO DELIVER A PROTEST), REINFORCED
BY THE THREAT OF STRONGER ACTIONS. THEY ARE NOT, HOWEVER,
BURNING BRIDGES. THE SUBSTANCE OF QIAN'S FORMAL STATEMENT
WAS SIMILAR TO VICE FOREIGN MINISTER LI ZHAOXING'S PROTEST
TO ME ON MAY 20 AND DID NOT GO BEYOND IT TO CITE SPECIFIC
RETALIATORY ACTIONS THAT THE PRC HAD OR INTENDED TO TAKE
(IN OUR FORTY MINUTE MEETING, QIAN DID NOT REFER TO THE
PRC DECISION TO CUT SHORT THE VISIT BY PLA AIR FORCE
COMMANDER LT. GEN. YU ZHENWU OR TO CANCEL THE VISIT BY
STATE COUNSELLOR LI GUIXIAN).

6. MOREOVER, THE CHINESE ARE NOT ALTERING THEIR PEACEFUL
REUNIFICATION LINE TOWARD TAIWAN. THE BEIJING RADIO
CHINESE LANGUAGE MORNING NEWS SUMMARY ON MAY 23 CARRIED
BACK TO BACK AN ACCOUNT OF THE PRC PUBLIC STATEMENT
PROTESTING THE U.S. DECISION ON THE LEE VISIT AND A MAY 22
STATEMENT BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TAIWAN AFFAIRS OFFICE
CALLING FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SPIRIT OF PRESIDENT
JIANG ZEMIN'S JANUARY 30 EIGHT-POINT REMARKS ON TAIWAN AND
FOR COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS.

7. THUS FAR, THE CHINESE HAVE TAKEN ONLY LIMITED ACTIONS
TO UNDERLINE THEIR POINT THAT THERE WOULD BE DAMAGE TO THE
BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. HOWEVER, WE FACE THE PROSPECT OF
FURTHER CHINESE ACTIONS, ESPECIALLY IF THE ATMOSPHERE
WORSENS. THE LEE VISIT ITSELF, EVEN IF CAREFULLY MANAGED
WITHIN THE SENSIBLE GUIDELINES WE HAVE SET"DOWN, WILL
TOUCH ON SENSITIVE NERVE ENDS HERE AND PROVIDE GRIST FOR
THE MILLS OF THOSE MOST CRITICAL OF U.S. POLICY WITHIN THE
LEADERSHIP. THE VISIT BY PRC DEFENSE MINISTER CHI HAOTIAN
IS SCHEDULED FOR A PARTICULARLY AWKWARD TIME IMMEDIATELY
AFTER THE LEE VISIT. IT COULD YET PROVE A CASUALTY OF
THIS DEVELOPMENT, AS COULD THE BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON
PROLIFERATION AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERAT
ION ISSUES THAT
HAVE BEEN RESCHEDULED FOR MID JUNE, AND THE ARMS CONTROL
TALKS IN JULY. TO THE EXTENT THAT WE CAN HEAD OFF FURTHER
SECRET 3

DAMAGE BY MOVING QUICKLY, OUR OWN INTERESTS WILL BE

SERVED.

8. SEVERAL ACTIONS COME TO MIND. FIRST, IN HIS REMARKS TO ME, QIAN SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO THE SECRETARY'S COMMENTS TO HIM ON THE LEE VISIT DURING THEIR APRIL 17 MEETING IN NEW YORK. (QIAN WAS SELECTIVE IN WHAT HE CHOSE TO RECALL OF THAT CONVERSATION, SO I REMINDED HIM OF THE SECRETARY'S CAREFULLY FORMULATED COMMENTS ON THE MOOD IN CONGRESS REGARDING THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION ON THE LEE VISIT ISSUE.) GIVEN THE OBVIOUS VALUE THAT QIAN ATTACHES TO HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SECRETARY, A

PERSONAL LETTER TO QIAN FROM THE SECRETARY REAFFIRMING THAT THE FUNDAMENTALS OF OUR POLICY HAVE NOT CHANGED WOULD BE TIMELY AND HELPFUL.

9. SECOND, I HAVE AND WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS HARD FOR PRC AGREEMENT TO SCHEDULE TALKS BETWEEN U/S TARNOFF AND VFM LI ZHAOXING. HOWEVER, THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO CALM PRC NERVES AND TO LIMIT THE IMPACT OF THE LEE VISIT WOULD BE TO SCHEDULE AN EARLY JUNE VISIT HERE BY TONY LAKE. THE DECISION ON THE LEE VISIT WAS A PRESIDENTIAL ONE, AND THIS WAS REFLECTED IN THE NSC'S ROLE IN EXPLAINING THE DECISION TO AMBASSADOR LI DAOYU. AN EARLY VISIT HERE BY TONY LAKE TO CONVEY THE SAME ASSURANCES TO SENIOR CHINESE LEADERS, FOLLOWED BY TALKS BETWEEN PETER TARNOFF AND VFM LI ZHAOXING WOULD PROVIDE A TIMELY OPPORTUNITY TO OFFSET THE IMPACT OF THE LEE VISIT.

10. SUCH A LAKE VISIT COULD BE BRIEF AND WOULD BE ENTIRELY CONSISTENT WITH THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CENTRAL POLICY ISSUE -- I.E. OUR ONE CHINA POLICY AND OUR UNOFFICIAL FRAMEWORK FOR DEALING WITH TAIWAN -- THAT THE CHINESE ARE WORRIED ABOUT. ASIDE FROM THE SUBSTANTIVE VALUE OF THE TALKS, THE VISIT WOULD REPRESENT THE RIGHT SORT OF DIGNIFIED GESTURE TO COMPENSATE FOR THE LOSS OF FACE THE PRC INEVITABLY WILL SUFFER BECAUSE OF THE LEE VISIT. IF WE CAN SCHEDULE SUCH A VISIT, WE SHOULD INFORM THE CHINESE PROMPTLY. THE VISIT ITSELF WOULD BE BEST RIGHT AFTER THE JUNE 4 ANNIVERSARY AND IN THE WAKE OF THE PRESIDENT'S MFN DECISION.

11. THIRD, WE SHOULD MOVE PROMPTLY TO CONFIRM THAT PRC DEFENSE MINISTER CHI HAOTIAN WILL SEE THE PRESIDENT. EVEN UNDER THE BEST OF CIRCUMSTANCES, IT WOULD BE GLARINGLY OUT OF STEP WITH THE TREATMENT TOP PRC LEADERS ACCORD OUR OWN CABINET-LEVEL VISITORS HERE FOR DEFENSE MINISTER CHI NOT

TO SEE THE PRESIDENT. UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS, A FAILURE BY CHI TO SEE THE PRESIDENT COULD IN ITSELF LEAD TO CANCELLATION OF HIS VISIT, WHICH WOULD DEEPEN AN ALREADY POTENTIALLY SERIOUS CRISIS. IN SHORT, IN DEALING WITH A COUNTRY OF CHINA'S SIZE AND IMPORTANCE, WE SHOULD BE

GUIDED BY COMMON SENSE AND LARGER INTERESTS.

12. I THINK WE HAVE THE MEANS TO CONTAIN THE IMPACT ON SINO-US RELATIONS OF THE LEE VISIT AND TO SET THE STAGE FOR CONTINUED COOPERATION WITH THE PRC ON ISSUES IMPORTANT TO OUR NATIONAL INTEREST. I URGE THAT WE MOVE SPEEDILY TO SEIZE THIS OPPORTUNITY. ROY
BT
#8936

NNNN
<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
<^SSN>8936
<^TOR>950523044045 M1680899

FROM:
SITREPRT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BASS, BERGER, DOHSE, FUERTH, HARMON, LAKE, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG, HARMON, LAKEA, NSC, ROTH, SUETTINGER, SUM, SUM2

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~SECRET~~ DTG:230837Z MAY 95

FM: AMEMBASSY BEIJING

TO:
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4164

RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI IMMEDIATE 7628

~~SECRET~~ BEIJING 018944

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, CH, TW
SUBJECT: VICE PREMIER/FOREIGN MINISTER CALLS IN AMBASSADOR TO PROTEST LEE TENG-HUI VISIT

REF: A) BEIJING 18620, B) BEIJING 18087

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY ON MAY 23 VICE PREMIER/FOREIGN MINISTER QIAN QICHEN CALLED THE AMBASSADOR TO ZHONGNANHAI TO PROTEST THE U.S. DECISION TO PERMIT LEE TENG-HUI TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES. AFTER REPEATING MANY OF THE POINTS MADE BY VICE FOREIGN MINISTER LI ZHAOXING ON MAY 20, QIAN ARGUED FURTHER THAT THE UNITED STATES HAD GONE BACK ON THE COMMITMENT, MADE DURING HIS APRIL 17 MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY, ONLY TO CONSIDER AN EXTENDED TRANSIT FOR LEE. NOTING THAT THE U.S. DECISION HAD BEEN MADE AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF MANY PROBLEMS IN OUR RELATIONSHIP, QIAN CALLED ON THE U.S. TO TAKE REMEDIAL MEASURES TO MINIMIZE THE "SERIOUS" DAMAGE TO OUR RELATIONSHIP.

3. THE AMBASSADOR RESPONDED THAT THE BASIC PRINCIPLES AT THE CORE OF OUR POLICY REMAINED UNCHANGED. HOWEVER, STRONG CONGRESSIONAL SENTIMENT HAD LED THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO CHANGE OUR APPROACH TO HANDLING THE LEE VISIT WITHOUT ALTERING OUR OBJECTIVE, WHICH WAS TO KEEP INTACT OUR UNOFFICIAL FRAMEWORK FOR DEALING WITH TAIWAN. WE RECOGNIZED THAT THESE CHANGES HAD INTRODUCED NEW COMPLEXITIES IN OUR RELATIONSHIP AND, AS A RESULT, WE SHOULD ACT PROMPTLY TO TURN THE PROBLEM INTO AN OPPORTUNITY. THE AMBASSADOR THEREFORE URGED CHINA TO ACCEPT IMMEDIATELY NSC ADVISER LAKE'S OFFER OF

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NR NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2017-0051-M (1.85)

CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN U/S TARNOFF AND VICE FOREIGN MINISTER LI ZHAOXING, WHICH COULD EXPLORE WAYS TO MOVE OUR RELATIONSHIP FORWARD AND NOT ALLOW THE LEE VISIT TO BECOME AN OBSTRUCTION TO IMPROVED RELATIONS. END SUMMARY.

4. AT 9:00 A.M. ON MAY 23 VICE PREMIER/FOREIGN MINISTER QIAN QICHEN CALLED THE AMBASSADOR TO A MEETING AT ZHONGNANHAI. DURING THIS MEETING, QIAN, ON BEHALF OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT, LODGED A STRONG PROTEST OVER THE U.S. DECISION TO PERMIT LEE TENG-HUI TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES. READING FROM A PREPARED TEXT (PARA 17), QIAN SAID THAT THE U.S. ACTION HAD VIOLATED THE THREE U.S.-CHINA JOINT COMMUNIQUES, INFRINGED UPON CHINA'S SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERESTS, AND UNDERMINED CHINA'S PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION. HE URGED THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SERIOUSLY TO CONSIDER THE CONSEQUENCES OF ALLOWING LEE TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES.

5. AT THE CONCLUSION OF HIS FORMAL PRESENTATION, QIAN SAID HE WISHED TO MAKE TWO POINTS. IN HIS TALKS WITH SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER IN NEW YORK ON APRIL 17, THE SECRETARY HAD STATED IN CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS TERMS THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT ALLOW EE TENG-HUI TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES. THE SECRETARY HAD STATED THAT A LEE VISIT WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE U.S. POLICY OF DEVELOPING ONLY UNOFFICIAL RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER HAD ALSO SAID THAT THE ONLY THING THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT MIGHT CONSIDER HAS THE QUESTION OF AN EXTENDED TRANSIT STOP FOR LEE. THE UNITED STATES HAD GONE BACK ON ITS WORD AND NOW ARGUED THAT A LEE VISIT HAS CONSISTENT WITH ITS POLICY OF NOT DEVELOPING OFFICIAL RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN

6. SECOND, QIAN SAID THAT CHINA ATTACHED IMPORTANCE TO U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS. IN RECENT YEARS, THROUGH THE EFFORTS OF BOTH SIDES, U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS HAD MADE SOME PROGRESS. BUT IT COULD NOT BE DENIED THAT THERE HAVE BEEN MANY TROUBLES IN U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS AND THESE TROUBLES WERE TOO MANY. AGAINST THIS BACKDROP, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAD NOW TAKEN THIS SERIOUS ACTION. THEREFORE, QIAN URGED THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO CONSIDER THE CONSEQUENCES OF ITS DECISION. IT WAS NOT CHINA'S DESIRE, BUT IT WOULD BE FORCED TO REACT STRONGLY TO THE U.S. DECISION. QIAN THEN URGED THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO REDRESS ITS ERROR AND, AT A MINIMUM, TO ADOPT REMEDIAL MEASURES TO MINIMIZE THE DAMAGE TO U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS

7. THE AMBASSADOR STATED THAT HE HAD LISTENED VERY CAREFULLY TO THE STATEMENT OF CHINA'S POSITION AND WOULD CONVEY IT TO HIS GOVERNMENT IMMEDIATELY. HE THEN OFFERED SOME PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS. OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS HAD HAD A NUMBER OF RECENT CONTACTS ON THIS QUESTION IN BEIJING AND WASHINGTON, INCLUDING DURING QIAN'S MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY ON APRIL 17. AS QIAN KNEW, THE AMBASSADOR WAS PRESENT AT THAT MEETING. QIAN'S CHARACTERIZATION OF THAT

MEETING WAS ACCURATE. HOWEVER, THE AMBASSADOR RECALLED THAT THE SECRETARY HAD ALSO REFERRED TO THE STRONG PRESSURE HE WAS UNDER FROM CONGRESS, WHICH WAS UNABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT POSITION.

8. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO ITS RELATIONS WITH THE CHINA, THE AMBASSADOR CONTINUED. WE CONTINUED TO RECOGNIZE THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AS THE SOLE LEGAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA. WE ALSO RECOGNIZED THE SENSITIVITY OF THE TAIWAN ISSUE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF

THE U.S.-CHINA RELATIONSHIP. HOWEVER, IF CHINA CONSIDERED BOTH HOW THE ISSUE HAD DEVELOPED, AND HOW IT HAD BEEN HANDLED BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, IT WAS CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT AT EACH STEP OUR OBJECTIVE HAD BEEN TO PRESERVE THE CORE PRINCIPLES OF OUR RELATIONSHIP AND TO HANDLE THIS ISSUE IN A MANNER THAT WAS CONSISTENT WITH OUR COMMITMENTS.

9. WE HAD INDEED HAD TO ALTER THE WAY WE DEALT WITH THIS PROBLEM, THE AMBASSADOR SAID. THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WAS FULLY AWARE OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES BEHIND WHY WE HAD TO DO THAT. HOWEVER, OUR OBJECTIVE HAD NOT CHANGED. IN HIS MEETING WITH PRC AMBASSADOR LI DAOYU ON MAY 20 IN WASHINGTON, NSC ADVISER LAKE HAD REITERATED THAT THE LEE VISIT WOULD BE STRICTLY PRIVATE. WE DID NOT CONSIDER THIS DECISION TO ENTAIL RECOGNITION OF TAIWAN'S SOVEREIGNTY. NOR WOULD WE TREAT LEE'S VISIT AS OFFICIAL IN NATURE. WE HAD NO INTENTION OF CHANGING OUR POLICY -- NOR DID OUR ACTION PORTEND ANY CHANGE.

10. AS NSC LAKE HAD SAID, WE RECOGNIZED THAT THIS DECISION HAD INTRODUCED SOME COMPLEXITIES IN THE MANAGEMENT OF THIS QUESTION. TO DEAL SUCCESSFULLY WITH THESE NEW COMPLEXITIES, WE SHOULD BE CLEAR ON SEVERAL POINTS. FIRST, THE U.S. INTENT ON THIS QUESTION WAS UNAMBIGUOUS. IN RECENT CONVERSATIONS SENIOR, RESPONSIBLE, U.S. OFFICIALS HAD EMPHASIZED THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE TO ABIDE BY THE THREE JOINT COMMUNIQUES.

11. SECOND, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CONTINUED TO RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF SINO-U.S. RELATIONS AND WISHED TO BUILD ON POSITIVE TRENDS. WE WERE NOT TRYING TO AVOID THE PROBLEM AREAS THAT VP/FM QIAN HAD REFERRED TO; RATHER WE WERE PREPARED TO ADDRESS THEM AND FIND THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY OF DEALING WITH THEM. THAT IS WHY WE HAD PROPOSED A MEETING AT AN EARLY DATE BETWEEN U/S TARNOFF AND VFM LI ZHAOXING TO DISCUSS WAYS TO TRY AND IMPROVE THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. WE HAD INDICATED THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO CONSIDER STEPS OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS COULD TAKE THAT WOULD HAVE A MAJOR IMPACT ON OUR RELATIONSHIP.

12. THIRD, TO MANAGE THESE COMPLEXITIES THERE HAD TO BE WILLINGNESS TO LIMIT DAMAGE AND NOT ALLOW LEE'S VISIT TO BE INTERPRETED IN WAYS THAT WERE INCONSISTENT WITH WHAT WE

WERE TRYING TO DO. WE INTENDED TO ENSURE THAT THE LEE VISIT WOULD BE PRIVATE, UNOFFICIAL IN NATURE, AND DID NOT CHANGE THE CORE OF OUR ONE CHINA POLICY, WHICH RECOGNIZED THE PRC AS THE SOLE LEGAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA AND WAS BASED ON OUR COMMITMENTS IN THE THREE JOINT COMMUNIQUES.

13. THE AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT THROUGH DIALOGUE OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS COULD FIND WAYS NOT ONLY TO LIMIT ANY ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES BUT ALSO TO MOVE THE RELATIONSHIP IN THE DIRECTION THAT WE WANTED IT TO GO. HE THEREFORE URGED CHINA TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITY QUICKLY TO ENGAGE IN CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN U/S TARNOFF AND VFM LI TO SEE IF WE COULD FIND CONCRETE STEPS TO MOVE THE RELATIONSHIP FORWARD.

14. VP/FM QIAN THANKED THE AMBASSADOR FOR HIS OBSERVATIONS. HE STATED HIS BELIEF THAT THE UNITED STATES AD TAKEN THIS ACTION ONLY AFTER CONSIDERING MANY ASPECTS OF THIS SITUATION. HOWEVER, OBJECTIVELY SPEAKING, THIS MOVE HAD CAUSED SEVERE DAMAGE TO U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS. THE AMBASSADOR HAD REFERRED TO THE INTENT OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND REITERATED THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WOULD CONTINUE TO HOLD TO A ONE CHINA POLICY. QIAN SAID THAT HE HOPED THIS WAS THE CASE, BUT FACTS WERE REQUIRED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THIS WAS SO. THEREFORE THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT WOULD NEED TO LOOK AND SEE. QIAN REPEATED THAT HE HOPED THAT THE AMBASSADOR WOULD CONVEY CHINA'S VIEWS TO SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER AND ESPECIALLY TO PRESIDENT CLINTON.

15. THE AMBASSADOR REPEATED THAT HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY CONVEY CHINA'S VIEWS TO WASHINGTON. HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD NOT WAIT PASSIVELY BUT WOULD TAKE ACTIVE STEPS TO CREATE THE "FACTS" THAT WOULD SHOW WHERE WE WANTED THE RELATIONSHIP TO GO.

16. IN CONCLUSION, THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN THROUGH MANY CRISES IN U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS, SOME INVOLVING ISSUES MORE FUNDAMENTAL THAN THE QUESTION OF A PRIVATE VISIT TO A U.S. UNIVERSITY. HE HAD FOUND THAT WHEN WE HAD PROBLEMS IT FORCED BOTH SIDES TO FOCUS ON THE FUNDAMENTALS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP. THIS COULD CREATE OPPORTUNITIES. THE AMBASSADOR URGED THAT WE LOOK CAREFULLY AT THIS SITUATION AS AN OPPORTUNITY, AND NOT LET IT BECOME AN OBSTRUCTION TO OUR RELATIONSHIP. VP/FM QIAN SAID IF THE U.S. HOPED TO GIVE THAT KIND OF IMPRESSION, IT MUST FIRST TAKE REMEDIAL MEASURES.

17. TEXT OF QIAN'S FORMAL STATEMENT:

ON 22 MAY, IN DISREGARD OF THE SOLEMN REPRESENTATIONS AND RESOLUTE OPPOSITION OF THE CHINESE SIDE, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ANNOUNCED ITS DECISION TO ALLOW LEE TENG-HUI INTO THE U.S. TO ATTEND THE GRADUATION CEREMONY OF CORNELL UNIVERSITY. THIS GRAVE MOVE TAKEN BY THE U.S. SIDE HAS

VIOLATED THE THREE SINO-U.S. JOINT COMMUNIQUES, INFRINGED UPON CHINA'S SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERESTS AND UNDERMINED CHINA'S GREAT CAUSE OF PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION. ON BEHALF OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT, I HEREBY LODGE A STRONG PROTEST WITH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT.

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THERE IS ONLY ONE CHINA IN THE WORLD AND TAIWAN IS AN INALIENABLE PART OF CHINESE TERRITORY. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IS THE SOLE LEGAL GOVERNMENT REPRESENTING THE WHOLE OF CHINA. |HIS IS A FACT RECOGNIZED BY BOTH THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF THE MOTHERLAND IS THE COMMON ASPIRATION OF ALL THE CHINESE PEOPLE, INCLUDING OUR COMPATRIOTS IN TAIWAN. IT IS ALSO THE IRREVERSIBLE TREND OF HISTORY. WE STAND FIRMLY OPPOSED TO DEVELOPING OFFICIAL RELATIONS OR MAINTAINING EXCHANGES AND CONTACTS OF AN OFFICIAL NATURE WITH TAIWAN BY ANY COUNTRY THAT HAS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CHINA; WE WILL NEVER ACCEPT ANY ATTEMPT TO CREATE "TWO CHINAS" OR "ONE CHINA, ONE TAIWAN." ON THIS ISSUE OF PRINCIPLE, THE POSITION OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT REMAINS EXPLICIT AND FIRM.

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THE QUESTION OF TAIWAN WAS THE KEY ISSUE STANDING IN THE WAY OF THE NORMALIZATION OF SINO-U.S. RELATIONS. IT WAS ONLY AFTER THE U.S. GOVERNMENT MADE EXPLICIT COMMITMENTS ON THE TAIWAN QUESTION THAT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WERE ESTABLISHED. OVER THE PAST 16 YEARS SINCE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, CONSECUTIVE U.S. ADMINISTRATIONS HAVE STATED THAT THEY WOULD PURSUE A "ONE CHINA" POLICY AND HANDLE THE TAIWAN QUESTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE THREE SINO-U.S. JOINT COMMUNIQUES. BUT THE TAIWAN QUESTION HAS REMAINED A MAIN OBSTACLE BLOCKING THE DEVELOPMENT OF SINO-U.S. RELATIONS. WHENEVER THE U.S. SIDE VIOLATES THE PRINCIPLES CONCERNING TAIWAN IN THE THREE JOINT COMMUNIQUES, SINO-U.S. RELATIONS RUN INTO DIFFICULTIES, STAGNATE, OR EVEN RETROGRESS. RECENTLY, IN DISREGARD OF THE REPEATED REPRESENTATIONS OF THE CHINESE SIDE, THE U.S. SIDE MOVED FURTHER AND FURTHER IN UPGRADING U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS. IT HAS NOW EVEN GONE SO FAR AS TO ALLOW LEE TENG-HUI TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES. GIVEN LEE TENG-HUI'S POSITION, HIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES IN WHATEVER NAME AND IN WHATEVER FORM WILL BE A SERIOUS POLITICAL QUESTION AND EVIDENCE OF U.S. CONNIVANCE AND SUPPORT FOR THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES IN CREATING "TWO CHINAS" OR "ONE CHINA, ONE TAIWAN." THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS GONE BACK ON ITS COMMITMENT OF NOT ALLOWING LEE TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES, WHICH IT SOLEMNLY REITERATED ONLY A FEW DAYS EARLIER, AND HAS TAKEN ACTIONS WHICH UNDERMINE THE BASIS OF SINO-U.S. RELATIONS. THIS WILL PRODUCE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES.

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THE TAIWAN QUESTION BEARS ON THE SOVEREIGNTY,

TERRITORIAL INTEGRIY AND THE GREAT CAUSE OF PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF CHINA. THEREFORE, THE 1.2 BILLION CHINESE PEOPLE FEEL STRONGLY ABOUT THIS ISSUE. THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE WILL NEVER ACCEPT ACTIONS BY ANY COUNTRY THAT ARE DETRIMENTAL TO THE FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS OF THE CHINESE NATION. I AGAIN SOLEMNLY URGE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT SERIOUSLY TO CONSIDER THE CONSEQUENCES OF ALLOWING LEE'S VISIT AND TO ADOPT REMEDIAL MEASURES TO IMMEDIATELY REDRESS ITS ERROR IN THE OVERALL INTERESTS OF SINO-U.S. RELATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HAS ALWAYS CHERISHED SINO-U.S. RELATIONS. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION WILL FORCE US TO RESPOND STRONGLY. SHOULD THIS HAPPEN, THE U.S. SIDE SHALL BEAR ALL THE CONSEQUENCES ARISING THEREFROM. END TEXT.

18. THE AMBASSADOR WAS ACCOMPANIED BY THE DCM, THE ACTING POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR, AND INTERPRETER BROWN. PRESENT ON THE CHINESE SIDE WERE ASSISTANT MINISTER YANG JIECHI, DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL LIU XIAOMING, DEPUTY DIVISION CHIEF XIE FENG, AND AN ADDITIONAL STAFFER. ROY
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<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
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FROM:
SITREPRT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

DIST: BASS, BERGER, DOHSE, FUERTH, HARMON, LAKE, SENS, SIT, SODERBERG, HARMON, LAKEA, ROTH, SUETTINGER, SUM, SUM2, WHSR_SPECIAL

PREC: IMMEDIATE **CLASS: ~~SECRET~~** **DTG:**221233Z MAY 95

FM: AIT TAIPEI

TO:
AIT WASHDC IMMEDIATE

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 003016

NODIS

FOR EAP DAS WIEDEMANN/EAP/RSP/TC DIRECTOR LANGE FROM A/DIR LAFLEUR

E.O. 12356: DECL: 2015
TAGS: PREL, TW
SUBJECT: PRIVATE VISIT BY PRESIDENT LEE

REFS: A) STATE 123659, B) TAIPEI 2986

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. MOFA VICE MINISTER STEVE CHEN CALLED IN A/DIR MAY 22 AND PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING NOTIONAL SCHEDULE FOR PRESIDENT LEE'S PROSPECTIVE PRIVATE VISIT. CHEN STRESSED THAT THIS WAS ALL VERY MUCH IN THE PLANNING STAGES AND MANY DETAILS REMAINED TO BE WORKED OUT.

3. CHEN SAID MOFA CURRENTLY ENVISAGES A FIVE-DAY TRIP ON THE FOLLOWING SCHEDULE:

JUNE 6: DEPART TAIPEI FOR LOS ANGELES/OVERNIGHT IN LOS ANGELES

JUNE 7: DEPART LOS ANGELES FOR NEW YORK/OVERNIGHT IN NEW YORK

JUNE 8: DEPART NEW YORK FOR ITHACA/OVERNIGHT IN ITHACA

JUNE 9: DELIVER OLIN LECTURE IN ITHACA/OVERNIGHT IN ITHACA

JUNE 10: ATTEND CORNELL ALUMNI HOMECOMING FUNCTIONS/ OVERNIGHT IN ITHACA

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2017-0051-M (1.86)

JUNE 11: DEPART ITHACA FOR NEW YORK AND THEN IMMEDIATELY ON TO TAIPEI (VIA REFUELING STOP IN ANCHORAGE).

JUNE 12: ARRIVE IN TAIPEI

4. CHEN SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT AND HIS ENTOURAGE WOULD BE TRAVELING ON A CHARTERED BOEING 747. THEY HAD NOT YET DETERMINED WHETHER THE PRESIDENT WOULD CHANGE TO A SMALLER PLANE AT NEW YORK TO FLY DIRECTLY TO ITHACA, OR FLY THE 747 TO SYRACUSE AND TRAVEL TO ITHACA BY MOTORCADE. THE PARTY WOULD INCLUDE THE FIRST LADY, PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE SECRETARY GENERAL WU POH-HSIUNG, GOVERNMENT INFORMATION OFFICE SECRETARY-GENERAL JASON HU (AS INTERPRETER) AND OTHER, LOWER RANKING STAFFERS. NO CABINET MINISTER WOULD BE ACCOMPANYING LEE, CHEN SAID, IN KEEPING WITH THE UNOFFICIAL NATURE OF THE VISIT. HE ESTIMATED THAT, WITH SECURITY PERSONNEL, THE PRESIDENT'S DOCTOR, THE FIRST LADY'S AIDES, ETC., THERE MIGHT BE 35 PERSONS IN THE ENTOURAGE; HE CONTRASTED THIS WITH THE 40-50 PERSONS WHO ACCOMPANIED PRESIDENT LEE ON HIS RECENT MIDDLE EAST TRIP.

5. IN LOS ANGELES, CHEN SAID, LEE PLANNED TO VISIT WITH HIS SISTER-IN-LAW. HE PLANNED NO PUBLIC ACTIVITIES IN LOS ANGELES BUT WOULD RECEIVE IN HIS HOTEL ROOM REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CHINESE/TAIWANESE COMMUNITY.

6. IN NEW YORK, LEE HOPED TO PAY A PRIVATE VISIT TO MADAME CHIANG KAI-SHEK. QUERIED ON THIS POINT BY A/DIR, CHEN SAID HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE ENCOUNTER WITH MADAME CHIANG COULD BE SECRET AND THAT THERE WOULD BE NO PRESS COVERAGE. LEE WOULD ALSO PROPOSE TO MEET WITH LOCAL OVERSEAS CHINESE IN xIS HOTEL, BUT WOULD CONDUCT NO PUBLIC EVENTS.

7. IN ITHACA, THE PRESIDENT WOULD PARTICIPATE IN VARIOUS ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATED WITH CORNELL'S ANNUAL ALUMNI "HOMECOMING."

8. WITH RESPECT TO THE REFUELING STOP IN ANCHORAGE, CHEN SAID THAT LEE WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH SENATOR MURKOWSKI.

9. A/DIR REMARKED THAT THIS WAS A LONGER VISIT THAN ONE MIGHT HAVE ANTICIPATED. CHEN RESPONDED THAT THE OLIN LECTURE WAS ONE OF THE MOST PRESIGIOUS EVENTS AT CORNELL, WHILE THE CORNELL ALUMNI HOMECOMING WAS A VERY IMPORTANT AFFAIR FOR ALUMNI (CHEN UNDERSTOOD THERE WERE 3,000 ATTENDEES AT LAST YEAR'S HOMECOMING). SOME OF THE PRESIDENT'S FORMER PROFESSORS WERE STILL TEACHING, AND CHEN EXPECTED PRESIDENT LEE WOULD WANT TO SPEND TIME WITH THEM. THESE WERE THE CENTERPIECE OF THE

VISIT. AS FOR THE STOPS ON THE WAY, HE HOPED THAT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO ACCOMMODATE A SCHEDULE THAT WOULD ENSURE THE TRIP WAS A COMFORTABLE ONE FOR PRESIDENT LEE. HE STRESSED THAT TAIWAN WANTED TO WORK WITH US AND WOULD STICK TO ITS COMMITMENT TO ESCHEW ALL PUBLIC ACTIVITIES BY THE PRESIDENT EXCEPT AT CORNELL, ALTHOUGH HE REITERATED THAT TAIWAN WOULD OBVIOUSLY HAVE NO CONTROL OVER THE MEDIA AT U.S. AIRPORTS.

10. CHEN CONCLUDED THAT MOFA WOULD ALSO BE TRANSMITTING AN OUTLINE SCHEDULE TO TECRO FOR
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 TAIPEI 003016

NODIS

FOR EAP DAS WIEDEMANN/EAP/RSP/TC DIRECTOR LANGE FROM A/DIR LAFLEUR

E.O. 12356: DECL: 2015
TAGS: PREL, TW
SUBJECT: PRIVATE VISIT BY PRESIDENT LEE

PRESENTATION IN WASHINGTON MAY 22.

LAFLEUR
BT
#3016

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<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SSN>3016
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<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
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FROM:
SITREPRT

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	To: Lynn Davis / Ted McNamara; From: Bob Einhorn; Re: Nonproliferation (5 pages)	11/20/1995	P1/b(1)
002. report	Military Digest Supplement (4 pages)	11/17/1995	P1/b(1)
003a. paper	Re: China - Pakistan (4 pages)	10/10/1995	P1/b(1)
003b. paper	Flow Chart (1 page)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)
004a. paper	China - Iran [partial] (5 pages)	09/26/1995	P1/b(1) VR 1/2/2020
004b. paper	Transfer, China to Iran [partial] (12 pages)	09/26/1995	P1/b(1) VR 1/2/2020
004c. paper	Missile Annex Review Committee (2 pages)	09/29/1995	P1/b(1)
005. report	China / Taiwan (3 pages)	07/03/1995	P1/b(1)
~~006. paper~~	~~Burma (3 pages)~~	~~07/17/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VR 1/2/2020
007. cable	Incomplete Cable, no subject [partial] (1 page)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1) VR 1/2/2020
008. memo	To: Anthony Lake; From: Robert Suettinger; Re: Possible Chinese Responses to a Lee Teng-hui Visit [partial] (2 pages)	05/17/1995	P1/b(1) VR 1/2/2020
~~008a. note~~	~~Cover sheet with notes (1 page)~~	~~07/14/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VR 1/2/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:
Missiles

2012-0975-F
sb1271

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008b. cable	View of Sino-U.S. Relations (7 pages)	07/13/1995	P1/b(1)
008c. cable	PRC Foreign Affairs (6 pages)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1)
008d. cable	1989 Tianamen Square Incident (3 pages)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1)
009. cable	Re: Pakistan/India/China (3 pages)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1)
010. memo	To: The President; From: Anthony Lake; Re: Chinese Missile Proliferation [partial] (1 page)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1) RR 1/2/2020
011. memo	Copy of 010 [partial] (1 page)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1) RR 1/2/2020
012. memo	To: The Record; Re: New York Times Press Report, 22 June 1995 (4 pages)	06/23/1995	P1/b(1)
013. report	China's Proliferation Behavior (10 pages)	07/24/1995	P1/b(1)
014. memo	To: Anthony Lake, Samuel Berger; From: Robert Suettinger; Re: Next Steps [partial] (4 pages)	10/11/1994	P1/b(1) RR 1/2/2020
015a. chart	Timeline Sino-Iranian, Figure 1[Oversize] (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)
015b. chart	Timeline Sino-Iranian, Figure 2 [Oversize] (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)
016. cable	Re: Pakistan - PRC (3 pages)	10/25/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:
Missiles

2012-0975-F
sb1271

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
017. cable	Pakistan-PRC-United States / Missiles (2 pages)	10/11/1994	P1/b(1)
018. cable	China-Pakistan-United States / Missiles (3 pages)	10/12/1994	P1/b(1)
~~019. cable~~	~~Arms Control and Nonproliferation (5 pages)~~	~~04/20/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VR 1/2/2020
020. cable	Meeting on Nonproliferation and Security Issues [partial] (1 page)	04/12/1995	P1/b(1) VR 1/2/2020
~~021. cable~~	~~Experts Talks (12 pages)~~	~~04/15/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VR 1/2/2020

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FOLDER TITLE:
Missiles

2012-0975-F
sb1271

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	To: Lynn Davis / Ted McNamara; From: Bob Einhorn; Re: Nonproliferation (5 pages)	11/20/1995	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. report	Military Digest Supplement (4 pages)	11/17/1995	P1/b(1)

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Missiles

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. paper	Re: China - Pakistan (4 pages)	10/10/1995	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. paper	Flow Chart (1 page)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)

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Missiles

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004a. paper	China - Iran [partial] (5 pages)	09/26/1995	P1/b(1)

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ISSUE PAPER

CHINA-IRAN: CW-RELATED TRANSFERS

DISCUSSION

The Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (the Act) requires the President to impose sanctions on any "foreign person" (including private or parastatal companies) if he determines that they have "knowingly and materially" contributed, after the effective date of the law, to efforts by certain countries, including Iran, to use, develop, produce, stockpile, or otherwise acquire chemical weapons (CW). The President's authority under this Act has been delegated to the Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs.

In November 1994, the U.S. Government (USG) considered two cases involving transfers of CW-related material from China to Iran. At the time, the evidence relating to the Chinese entities was sufficient to support either a determination of sanctionability or a determination that no sanctionable activity had occurred. The evidence was not so strong as to require the USG to make a determination of sanctionability. In light of this, the IWG recommended finding that the evidence was insufficient to support a determination that the Chinese entities involved had knowingly made a material contribution to the Iranian CW program, and recommended conducting consultations with the Chinese to obtain more information.

Since November, the USG has delivered several demarches to the Chinese Foreign Ministry to raise our concerns about the overall trend in China-Iran CW-related transfers. In a December, 1994 demarche, we requested Chinese assistance in investigating the individuals and companies involved in the two cases, and asked that the Chinese take all possible steps to terminate the assistance to CW programs if the results of their investigations supported our information. We advised the Chinese that the USG may be forced to proceed with sanctions determinations if no new information or assistance was forthcoming. To date, despite follow-up inquiries in March and June, 1995, the Chinese have responded only that they are looking into the matter.

Since November 1994, we have collected new information about the ongoing activities of the Chinese entities. This information is pertinent to the entities' knowledge about the

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end-use of their assistance, and it illustrates that the entities are continuing their involvement with CW-related end-users in Iran.

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

Options

The USG must independently consider whether each entity knowingly was involved in a material contribution to Iran's CW program. Since the three shipments at issue have already been determined by the USG to be "material" in Case 1, and Agencies agreed it was material in Case 2, the interagency should focus on each entity's knowledge that it was contributing to a CW program. For each entity, the following options are available:

1. **No Sanctionable Activity**

Under this option, the interagency would recommend a determination, in view of all evidence available, that the entity did not knowingly contribute to Iran's CW program. It also could recommend that an individual person should not be sanctioned because he was acting in his capacity as an employee of a company (and thus the company would be sanctioned), or that a company should not be sanctioned because an associated individual person committed the sanctionable activity in his personal capacity (and thus the person would be sanctioned). Under the Act, sanctions imposed against a foreign person also are to be imposed against an "affiliate" of that person if the affiliate knowingly assisted the sanctionable activities and is controlled in fact by the foreign person. If these circumstances apply, sanctions would be imposed against both an individual person and an affiliated company.

2. **Impose sanctions**

Under this option, the interagency would recommend that the evidence in its entirety is sufficient to support a determination that the entity knowingly and materially contributed to Iran's CW program.

3. **Invoke consultation period**

Under this option, the interagency would recommend, as in Option 2, that the evidence in its entirety is sufficient to support a determination that the entity knowingly and materially contributed to Iran's CW program. However, in addition, the interagency would recommend that we invoke a 90-day consultation period, which would delay the imposition of sanctions. During this consultation period, we would need to encourage the Chinese to take "specific and effective actions, including appropriate penalties to terminate the involvement" of the entity in the sanctionable activity. In keeping with the manner in which the interagency has consistently implemented this statutory provision, we specifically would encourage the Chinese to:

a. terminate the sanctioned entity's assistance to foreign CBW programs;

b. complete or have underway administrative or judicial proceedings against any illegal actions committed under Chinese law; and

c. investigate and closely monitor the entity to ensure such activities do not recur.

If, at the end of the 90-day period, we determine and certify to the Congress that the China "is in the process" of taking

these actions we could invoke a second and final 90-day period. At the end of the 90 or 180 days, we would either certify that these actions had been taken (and thus not impose sanctions), or impose sanctions.

While the law "urges" the USG to initiate such consultations, we should not enter into consultations if we lack a reasonable expectation that the above-mentioned conditions would or could be met. In light of the responses we have received to our repeated demarches on this subject, Chinese receptivity to consultations and these conditions is an open question. It is also important to note that if the Chinese are unable or unwilling to meet the non-imposition criteria, this option only delays the imposition of sanctions -- and the consequences of such sanctions -- for a period of 90-180 days.

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SEACBMLS 342
7/7/95 x74009

Cleared: PM/CBM:VVan Diepen
L/PM:AWeiner
INR/SPA:RTaggart
T:JBarker (info)
EAP/CM:PRoe
NEA/RA:LWard
OSD:MFitzgibbin
JCS/J5:LSwift
DOC:SGoldman
ACDA:DOliveria
EO 13526 3.5c
NSC:EHarris (info)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004b. paper	Transfer, China to Iran [partial] (12 pages)	09/26/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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2012-0975-F
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EO 13526 3.5c

67

Transfer of MTCR-Controlled Items from China to Iran

Questions to Address

- Were Chinese and/or Iranian entities knowingly involved in the transfer of MTCR-controlled technology, equipment, and training for the production of MTCR-class missile EO 13526 1.4c
  EO 13526 1.4c
- Did this activity contribute to the acquisition, design, development, or production of Category I missiles in Iran?
- If so, what sanctions should be imposed on the Chinese and/or Iranian entities involved? In particular, did the transfer involve Category I items so as to require Category I sanctions?
- Did the transactions make a "substantial contribution" to Category I missiles in Iran?
- Should any required sanctions against the Chinese and/or Iranian entities be waived? If so, should any waiver be permanent, temporary, or partial?
- If a sanctions determination is made, how should we inform China and/or Iran of this decision?

EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.3(b)(6), (b)(1)

EO 13526 3.5c

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(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

-- A 1994 amendment to the missile sanctions law provides that "it should be a reasonable presumption that (an MTCR Annex item) is designed for use in a missile listed in the MTCR Annex" if the final destination of the item is a terrorist-list country, such as Iran. While we are not legally obligated to apply such a presumption, this does reflect Congressional views as to how the law ought to be applied.

On May 5, 1995, the Interagency Working Group (IWG) on Nonproliferation and Export Controls reviewed this case and decided to seek additional information from China about what MTCR-controlled guidance-related items are being provided to Iran and the specific end-use for which China is transferring them to Iran. However, as part of China's retaliation for the private, unofficial visit by Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui, China refused to accept the demarche from our embassy in Beijing. We therefore delivered it to Chinese officials in Washington, on June 9, and later confirmed that the demarche had been passed to MFA officials in Beijing. We asked China to respond to our concerns about China-Iran missile cooperation within 30 days. It has yet to do so, although a Chinese MFA spokesman responding to press reports about China-Iran missile cooperation publicly denied that China has engaged in transfers to Iran that are inconsistent with China's MTCR commitments.

-- We may take China's failure to provide us with any information about these activities into account in assessing the "end-use" and "knowledge" issues.

Missile Nonproliferation Commitments

Iran. Iran is not an MTCR adherent.

China. From March 1992 until August 1993, China committed itself to observing the original 1987 MTCR Guidelines and Annex. From August 1993 until October 1994, China was "reconsidering" this commitment, in response to U.S.-imposed

missile sanctions. Subsequently, in a U.S.-China Joint Statement signed October 4, 1994, China committed not to export any MTCR-class ground-to-ground missiles (this goes beyond MTCR requirements) and also reaffirmed its commitment to the original 1987 MTCR Guidelines and Annex. (These commitments became effective upon the November 1, 1994, waiver of U.S. missile sanctions imposed on Chinese entities.) The activities of concern described in the attached Statement of Fact predate the October 4, 1994, Joint Statement. (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

(b)(1), E.O. 12958 1.4(c) (All other items noted above as being covered by the MTCR Annex are covered under both the original and current Annex.)

Note: None of the above-described Chinese MTCR commitments made China an "MTCR adherent" for the purposes of U.S. law.

The Sanctions Law

U.S. law requires the imposition of sanctions on "foreign persons" (including private or parastatal companies) if it is determined that they have, after November 5, 1990, knowingly exported, transferred, or otherwise engaged in the trade of MTCR Annex items that contribute to the acquisition, design, development, or production in a non-MTCR country of MTCR Category I missiles. Sanctionable activity includes facilitating, conspiring to engage in, or attempting to engage in such activity. It also includes being an end-user in such cases.

The law requires different degrees of sanctions if the activity involves Category I vs. Category II MTCR Annex items, and imposes additional sanctions if the transaction is judged to make a "substantial contribution" to Category I missile programs in a non-MTCR country. In addition, in the case of China, sanctions would have a broader scope because of the Helms Amendment. (b)(1), E.O. 12958 1.4(c)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

Category I sanctions:

-- denial of all new individual licenses (not limited to MTCR Annex items) for exports to the sanctioned entities for at least two years; and

-- denial of all USG contracts with the sanctioned entities for at least two years.

Category II sanctions:

-- denial of new export licenses for MTCR Annex items to the sanctioned entities for two years; and

-- denial of USG contracts relating to MTCR Annex items with the sanctioned entities for two years.

If it is further determined that the transfer "substantially contributed" to the design, development, or production of Category I missiles in a non-MTCR country, an additional sanction requires:

-- a ban on all imports into the United States of products produced by these entities for at least two years.

Previously, in the two determinations involving a Category II transaction, we did not determine that they met the "substantial contribution" threshold; previous determinations involving Category I transactions found for "substantial contribution" when complete Category I missiles and/or production facilities for Category I items were being transferred.

In the case of China, the so-called Helms Amendment to the sanctions law would extend the target of the sanctions beyond the specific entities that engaged in the sanctionable activity and would be applied to all activities of the Chinese government "relating to" the development or production of MTCR-class missiles or MTCR items, or "affecting" the development or production of electronics, space systems or equipment, and military aircraft. (The Helms Amendment does not apply to Commerce-controlled exports.)

Sanctionable Activity?

Under the sanctions law, sanctions must be imposed, unless otherwise waived, if the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs determines that any of the above-described activities involved the knowing transfer (or conspiracy or attempt to transfer) of MTCR Annex items that contribute to the acquisition, design, development, or production of Category I missiles in Iran -- a non-MTCR state. In past sanctions cases, the United States has used a high standard of evidence in determining whether sanctionable missile proliferation activity has occurred. In most previous cases, sanctionable activity also has been confirmed either by a public declaration by one of the countries involved or by unambiguous intelligence, such as imagery, explicit special intelligence, or high-grade, first-hand HUMINT.

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

Which Sanctions?

If a determination is made that sanctionable activity occurred, the question of what types of transfers occurred -- Category I, Category II, and/or "substantial contribution" -- also should be addressed. As noted above, the transactions described in the Statement of Fact involve Category II MTCR Annex items, (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

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(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

If the Interagency believes that sanctionable activity has occurred, the Interagency also should consider whether the transfer made a "substantial contribution" to missile nonproliferation, which would require an additional sanction. In previous sanctions determinations involving a Category II transaction, we did not determine that they met the "substantial contribution" threshold; previous determinations involving Category I transactions found for "substantial contribution" when complete Category I missiles and/or production facilities for Category I items were being transferred.

Effect of Sanctions

The effect of sanctions on either China or Iran is not a factor that may be considered under the law in determining whether the standard to impose sanctions has been met. However, to the extent that the sanctions affect national security interests, the effect of sanctions may be taken into account in a waiver justification.

Iran. The effect of imposing sanctions on Iran would be negligible.

China. The mere suggestion of imposing missile sanctions on China is likely to have a strong negative impact on our already troubled bilateral relationship, whether or not we offer China waiver conditions for any sanctions that might be imposed in this case. While it is possible that the sanctions/waiver process may give us some leverage with China on missile proliferation matters, sanctions also may make the Chinese more rigid and less responsive to U.S. pressure to address missile proliferation problems. In addition, imposing sanctions would cause China to "lose face" and reintroduce a highly contentious issue to our bilateral relationship, which is at its lowest point since the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident. Imposing sanctions at this time also would jeopardize any attempt to renew the recently-cancelled MTCR talks with China and undermine our efforts to secure a political commitment from China to abide by the current MTCR Guidelines and ban exports of equipment and technology for use in MTCR-class missiles. Indeed, based on past sanctions experience, we could expect China to react to sanctions by deciding to "rethink" or suspend its October 4, 1994 MTCR commitments.

The economic cost of Category II sanctions would be negligible for China, given USG licensing practices, but would affect U.S. industry. For example, although Category II sanctions would prohibit the export to a broad range of Chinese entities several hundred million dollars worth of satellites containing MTCR Annex items that require a State Department license, Commerce-controlled satellites would be unaffected. However, China might make good on a previous threat to retaliate against the United States by denying and/or cancelling lucrative contracts to U.S. industry, including in areas outside the space and defense sectors.

Unlike Category II sanctions, we would expect Category I export sanctions and/or "substantial contribution" import sanctions to have a significant economic impact on China and the United States. The export sanction could affect an estimated several hundred million dollars in bilateral trade, and a ban on imports could affect several billion dollars in bilateral trade, over two years. In addition, there likely

would be a long-term loss in revenue for U.S. exporters that are unable to recoup the ground lost to foreign competitors during the sanctions period. U.S. industry also would have to find alternate -- and probably higher priced -- suppliers for products they otherwise would import from China. This in turn could result in higher costs for consumers and/or a loss in revenue for industry.

We also would note that the Department of Commerce believes sanctions would have a severe impact on the launch services market and could effect as much as $1500 million in launch-related U.S. licenses. Commerce also projects that sanctions would have negative consquences for Motorola's $3.5 billion "Iridium" satellite communications system.

Whether to Waive

Sanctions may be waived if the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs determines that a waiver is "essential to the national security" of the United States. The waiver determination must be prenotified to the Congress, twenty working days before taking effect, and also must include "a report fully articulating the rationale and circumstances which led" to the execution of the waiver.

Types of Waivers

Waivers can be temporary or permanent, partial or full, and can be applied as soon as any waiver conditions we may set are met. In cases where the necessary actions already have been taken to satisfy our waiver requirements, sanctions can be imposed and waived simultaneously, provided the underlying "essential to the national security" standard is satisfied. Otherwise, sanctions can be waived as soon after their imposition as our waiver conditions are met and Congress has been notified in accordance with the law. Sanctions also may be waived for a limited and specified length of time, to allow an opportunity to reach an agreement satisfying our permanent waiver conditions. Such a waiver would be justifiable if we had a reasonable expectation that our permanent waiver terms would be achieved during this timeframe. Any such temporary waiver (which could be made publicly or confidentially) also would have to be justified on the basis of being "essential" to U.S. national security.

In addition to applying a blanket waiver of sanctions, we also have the option of partially waiving sanctions, as long as the partial waiver can be justified as "essential to the national security" of the United States. This type of waiver can be used to waive an entire "type" of sanction, e.g., a determination may be made to waive the denial of licenses to, the denial of USG contracts with, and/or the denial of imports

from the sanctioned entities. Similarly, the Helms Amendment portion of the sanctions could be waived. The same Congressional notification/justification required for a full, temporary, or permanent waiver would be required for a partial waiver.

The notification of the intention to waive sanctions may be classified or unclassified. If we choose to notify Congress on a classified basis, a Federal Register notice still is required. However, that notice would entail a general statement noting that "a determination" had been made pursuant to the law and that publication of the determination would be harmful to the national security of the United States.

Waiver Conditions

In assessing whether to waive sanctions we historically have looked at two elements: a general MTCR-related commitment and a specific commitment related to the sanctionable activity.

IRAN

There would be no basis for (and no point in seeking) a waiver of sanctions against the Iranian entity; we imposed similar sanctions on Iran in 1992 with no perceptible reaction.

CHINA

Give our efforts to encourage China to adopt more responsible missile nonproliferation behavior, we could use the sanctions/waiver process to obtain from China significant missile nonproliferation commitments that would enable us to further our nonproliferation goals in a manner consistent with U.S. sanctions law.

MTCR Commitment

Since the transactions described in the Statement of Fact predated China's MTCR commitments under the October 4, 1994 Joint Statement, we could consider relying on the October 4 Joint Statement and not require any further MTCR-related commitment. Because the activity in question occurred after China's 1992 commitment to the MTCR, China's apparent practice under that commitment could make it difficult to justify to the Hill a waiver based solely on China's 1994 reaffirmation of that commitment. Alternatively, we could require China to agree to expand its commitment to the current MTCR Guidelines and Annex, perhaps through an expanded version of the October 1994 Joint Statement.

Specific Activity Commitment

China has not been forthcoming about any specific steps it may have taken to investigate or curb the flow of missile-related equipment and technology to Iran. (b)(1)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c In response to our initial demarches regarding Iran's continuing efforts to acquire MTCR Annex items from Chinese sources, China said that it would investigate the information and also reminded us that it takes its international commitments seriously. However, we do not know whether China actually initiated any investigations, and China also did not respond to our June 9 demarche seeking clarification of these issues.

In view of China's apparent lack of interest in investigating (or at least discussing with us) China-Iran missile cooperation, and given our concern -- for security and nonproliferation reasons -- to prevent the transfer of MTCR Annex items to missile programs in Iran, we could try to obtain a commitment that Chinese entities will not export any MTCR Annex items to Iran for use in MTCR-class ground-to-ground missiles. The Chinese suggestion during our mid-April talks that China does not export equipment and technology for use in such missiles (anywhere) might offer a starting point for discussions. Alternately, we could take the global ban on exports of MTCR-class ground-to-ground missiles China agreed to in October 1994 as sufficient to cover the "specific activity commitment." Since China's 1994 export ban commitment covered ground-to-ground missiles, rather than missile components, it could be difficult to defend bringing the specific activity at issue here within the scope of the 1994 export ban commitment.

Diplomatic Strategy

There is no need to consider diplomatic approaches to Iran.

For China, if a decision is reached recommending that sanctionable activity has occurred, the Interagency should task State to develop a diplomatic strategy to implement any such decision.

-- It should be noted that during MTAG deliberations on this case, the IC indicated that, due to sources and methods concerns, it might be difficult to obtain detailed cleared language related to the activities described in the Statement of Fact for release to the government of China, even if a sanctions determination is made.

NOTE: ACDA, COMMERCE, DEFENSE, JCS, AND NPC HAVE AGREED TO USE THIS PAPER AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION,

Attachments:

Tab 1 -- Statement of Fact
Tab 2 -- MARC Paper

EO 13526 3.5c

drafted: PM/CBM:PRoe
SEBCBMPR 399 04/10/95 x7-4931

cleared: PM:REinhorn
PM/CBM:VVanDiepen
EAP/CM::MMeserve
NEA/NGA:CHenzel
INR/SPA:DTurmelle
L/PM:AWeiner
T:AWinner

revised: PM/CBM:PRoe 07/10/95

cleared: PM/CBM:VVanDiepen
EAP/CM::PRoe
NEA/RA:LWard
INR/SPA:AVincent
L/PM:AWeiner
T:JBarker

NSC:EHarris
ACDA/NP:BSchoen
JCS/J-5:DBarret*
OASD/ISP/CP/N&I:DCooper*
DOC/BXA:Raymond Jones
EO 13526 3.3(b)(6), EO 13526 3.5c

*HAVE AGREED TO USE THIS PAPER AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004c. paper	Missile Annex Review Committee (2 pages)	09/29/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:
Missiles

2012-0975-F
sb1271

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. report	China / Taiwan (3 pages)	07/03/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:
Missiles

2012-0975-F
sb1271

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(DECL:7/14/2025)

July 17, 1995

BURMA OPTIONS PAPER:

WHERE DO WE GO IN THE WAKE OF AUNG SAN SUU KYI'S RELEASE?

Following the release of Aung San Suu Kyi July 10, we need to examine the next steps the United States should take to encourage the SLORC to make further progress on human rights and democratization. A key question is whether we should respond to ASSK's release with some modest positive steps now, or whether we should tie such steps to further action by the SLORC. EAP and Embassy Rangoon believe the unconditional release of ASSK itself merits some modest positive steps, as her unconditional release is the single most important first step the SLORC could have taken to address our concerns in the areas of democracy and human rights. In fact, the two paths for U.S.-Burma relations that DAS Hubbard sketched out to SLORC officials implied that her release would bring some sort of U.S. response.

There are a number of steps the United States would like to see the SLORC take in the near term and the longer term. Perhaps our key near-term priority is to see the SLORC enter into a genuine political dialogue with ASSK and the NLD about the political future of the country. This is the priority ASSK has set in her statements, and the steps we take should be keyed to promoting this goal. Other near-term steps by the SLORC include releasing more political prisoners, allowing ICRC to visit prisoners and inspect prisons in Burma, taking actions to reduce the flow of narcotics out of Burma, and ending the use of forced porterage by the military. Our longer-term goals include the restoration of a democratically-elected government in Burma and national reconciliation that includes ethnic minorities; overall improvement in the human rights situation, including the release of all political prisoners; and wide-ranging cooperation with the Government of Burma on counternarcotics.

This discussion paper for our July 18 Interagency Working Group meeting outlines a list of positive "carrots" we could use in response to ASSK's release and "sticks" we could use to try to induce further SLORC action.

Once we settle on our next steps, we will want to demarche our allies on what we plan to do. We also need to focus on the message Secretary Christopher will convey to his colleagues at the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference August 2-3.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2017-0051-M (1.98)

I. Positive Steps The U.S. Could Take

o Reengage our attempts at a high-level dialogue with the SLORC, for example:

-- Visit by A/S Lord or other ranking official to Rangoon to meet with ASSK and the SLORC:
  -- enables us to speak directly to the SLORC to press the case for a dialogue with ASSK;
  -- arguably more effective than sharply criticizing them publicly;
  -- keeps others from getting all the credit for positive steps;
  -- tests if the SLORC is genuinely willing to engage in dialogue (rather than subjecting visitors to gruesome "video treatment").

-- Meet in New York or Washington with high-level SLORC official to UNGA (a SLORC official is expected for the 50th anniversary of the UNGA).

-- Invite the Burmese Ambassador in to the Department for a meeting with A/S Lord.

o Name an ambassador to Rangoon:
  -- is important symbolically;
  -- allows us better access to SLORC and better opportunities to influence SLORC decision-making;
  -- ambassador can be withdrawn as sign of displeasure if conditions worsen;
  -- idea promoted by some Members of Congress;
  -- downside is that an ambassador might not be confirmable.

o Increased counternarcotics cooperation:
  -- implement National Heroin Strategy if President signs off on it;
  -- explore increasing funding through UNDCP;
  -- ASSK told Staffdel that exchange of information and training were useful "carrots" to encourage progress;
  -- downside is negative reaction by some in Congress.

o Increase in International Visitor Program with Rangoon:
  -- benefits include that it promotes our objectives by providing Burmese more exposure to the U.S.;
  -- downside is this step is not highly visible.

o Increase in other USIS programs:
  -- increase in VOA programs, putting correspondent inside Burma.

o Provide humanitarian assistance through NGOs (AID).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

II. Sticks The U.S. Could Use to Prod the SLORC

- o Hold the line on IFI financing:
  - -- talk to Japan, others to shore up opposition to IFI financing.

- o Continued pressure in international fora, e.g., via UNGA, ILO, UNHRC resolutions.

- o Explore forming a Contact Group with ASEAN to press our concerns on Burma:
  - -- idea has been pushed before without success.

- o Make public statements urging the SLORC to take further steps:
  - -- need to calibrate this with whether we decide to undertake direct discussions with the SLORC;
  - -- ASSK has suggested that the SLORC announce a date for the start of talks with her within two weeks.

- o Restrictions on travel of Burmese diplomats in the U.S. reciprocal to Burmese restrictions on U.S. diplomats.

- o Actions to prohibit the importation of certain Burmese imports to the U.S. because of forced labor.

- o Reduce U.S. representation in Rangoon to permanent charge and downgrade Burmese representation in Washington.

- o McConnell proposal for economic and trade sanctions:
  - -- ASSK expressed opposition to McConnell's two-week deadline for the SLORC to abandon power as "absolutely not realistic" and "pie in the sky"

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. cable	Incomplete Cable, no subject [partial] (1 page)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:
Missiles

2012-0975-F
sb1271

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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2017-0051-M (1.99)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. memo	To: Anthony Lake; From: Robert Suettinger; Re: Possible Chinese Responses to a Lee Teng-hui Visit [partial] (2 pages)	05/17/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
OA/Box Number: 1044

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Missiles

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May 17, 1995

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ROBERT L. SUETTINGER

SUBJECT: Possible Chinese Responses to a Lee Teng-hui Visit to the United States

There is very little reporting to date on Chinese planning for retaliatory steps to be taken if the United States disregards China's demands and permits Lee Teng-hui to make a "private" visit to Cornell University. The leadership probably has not made a final decision, nor even considered a list of options. As has always been the case with U.S. initiatives toward Taiwan, China has a relatively limited choice of retaliatory measures, given the growing dependence of its economy on the U.S. market. Various leaders have talked vaguely about "setbacks" in the relationship and the need to "teach the U.S. a lesson," but there is little specific information.

The Taiwan issue has been the most difficult to manage in the bilateral relationship since Nixon visited China in 1972. It is not like other issues, subject to rational calculus of balanced interests. It is emotional, linked to nationalism, sovereignty and resentment over historical slights. Deng Xiaoping -- while never pro-U.S. -- viewed the issue as malleable, and subordinated it to maintaining the overall relationship.

But three factors will make China's reaction this time more difficult to predict: 1) Deng Xiaoping is gone, but not yet dead; 2) China's successor leaders appear to be developing a distorted, but malign perception of U.S. policy toward China; and 3) Lee Teng-hui has exposed the failure of China's Taiwan policy by taking it inexorably toward de facto independence.

The succession makes it necessary for any Chinese leader to look tough in the face of a foreign challenge. With Premier Li Peng evidently overseeing China's foreign policy, there will be even less inclination to give the U.S. the benefit of the doubt. Chinese leaders increasingly appear to believe that the U.S. goal is to contain and divide China, and will see the Lee visit as furthering that goal.

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/28/2019
2017-0051-M (2.00)

China's reactions will probably be calibrated on how public the "insult" of a Lee visit appears, and on whether compensating offers have been made to China. Moreover, the damage to the relationship must be looked at in both the short and the long term.

China's immediate reactions will probably include the following:

- Extremely harsh criticism of the Congress and the Administration in all its media.

- Reduced high-level visits across the board, including military-to-military exchanges. Commerce Secretary Brown's proposed July visit may be canceled. China's Defense Minister may call off his June visit to Washington.

- Suspension of bilateral dialogue on nuclear-related issues, such as peaceful nuclear cooperation and nuclear sales to Iran and Pakistan. China has linked cooperation on these issues to U.S. F-16 sales to Taiwan in the past, and will probably cancel discussions scheduled for early June.

- Suspension of further discussions on China's adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime.

- Some visible punitive actions against U.S. corporations with heavy China exposure and viable competitors.

- Increased resistance to U.S. policies toward human rights, legal reform, etc.

- More visible military training activity in areas adjacent to the Taiwan Strait.

China probably will not decrease significantly its cooperation in reducing the North Korean nuclear threat. That problem engages fundamental Chinese interests, both strategic and economic. It would be even less likely than now, however, to cooperate in enforcing a trade embargo or other punitive economic sanctions.

A hostile reaction by China will have an impact on two medium-term problems: MTCR-related sanctions and the WTO problem.

- The nonproliferation community has met and decided that China transferred to Iran in 1992 and 1994 technology and training that could be seen as intended for a Category I missile system (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d, EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) We are preparing a demarche to ask for an explanation, with the

understanding that this is sanctionable activity. It is doubtful the Chinese will respond positively. This is particularly so if, in rage over the Lee decision, they cancel strategic discussions slated for June -- distinctly possible. That, of course, would only serve to further the process of imposing sanctions. Unless the President issues a waiver (on national security grounds), the sanctions are required by law. In the wake of the Lee visit, the imposition of economic sanctions would be viewed as an indication the U.S. had no interest in good relations with China.

- Taiwan has made no secret of its desire to join the WTO. In fact, it reportedly is making special efforts to have its accession negotiations completed by mid-summer. (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) Taiwan clearly wants to join separately and before China, an idea for which there is considerable support in Congress. China has been strongly opposed to Taiwan joining first. This problem will grow more acute in the wake of a Lee visit, as Taipei will push harder. (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

Over the longer term, the damage may turn out to be even greater. China is at a turning point in its world-view, burdened with a lack of vision and a lack of trust in and knowledge of the United States. It will view a Lee visit -- correctly or not -- as a fundamental change in U.S. policy toward China. It will consider that the U.S. has embarked upon a course of dividing and containing China, thwarting its economic growth, resisting its territorial claims, stifling its plans for national reunification. Current views of the U.S. as China's "principal enemy" may harden. China may see its only alternative as to strike out on its own. It may also decide that, notwithstanding growing economic ties to Taiwan, tougher measures to remind Taiwan of its military vulnerability are necessary. To those ends, China may:

- Adopt an increasingly confrontational approach toward the U.S., both in bilateral relations and international affairs;

- Step up its military modernization, including development and deployment of forces capable of threatening Taiwan (e.g. M-9 and M-11 mobile missiles, which has already begun);

- Reduce its vulnerability to U.S. economic pressure by developing markets in Asia and Europe;

- Seek to undermine U.S. policy in Asia, such as by breaking consensus within APEC.

These by no means exhaust the possibilities of China's reaction. And again, it must be reiterated that the U.S. may be able to take some compensating measures. But my view is that, because of the succession issue and the persistent problems that already bedevil the bilateral relationship, China's reaction to a Lee Teng-hui visit will be harsh and lasting.

~~SECRET~~

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008b. cable	View of Sino-U.S. Relations (7 pages)	07/13/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:
Missiles

2012-0975-F
sb1271

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008c. cable	PRC Foreign Affairs (6 pages)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:
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sb1271

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008d. cable	1989 Tianamen Square Incident (3 pages)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. cable	Re: Pakistan/India/China (3 pages)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010. memo	To: The President; From: Anthony Lake; Re: Chinese Missile Proliferation [partial] (1 page)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/28/2019
2017-0051-M (2.05)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Chinese Missile Proliferation

As you know, in August 1993, the U.S. imposed missile sanctions against certain entities in China and Pakistan for their involvement in the November 1992 transfer of M-11 missile-related items from China to Pakistan. The sanctions against the Chinese entities were waived in October 1994 after China agreed to observe the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Guidelines and not to export ground-to-ground MTCR-class missiles. (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

If we determine that China transferred M-11 missiles to Pakistan, we will be required, under the missile sanctions law, to deny all new licenses for exports to, imports from, and U.S. government contracts with the sanctioned entities for at least two years. The waiver previously granted China for transferring missile technology to Pakistan would not apply to these new sanctions. The Helms amendment to the missile sanctions law would, with some

exceptions, further extend the sanctions beyond the specific entities that engaged in the sanctionable activity to include all activities of the Chinese government "affecting" the development or production of electronics, space systems or equipment and military aircraft. Such sanctions would clearly have a severe impact on U.S.-Chinese political and economic relations. As a consequence, the policy community has insisted that any sanctions determination be based upon a high standard of proof.

Although a sanctions determination has not been made for the M-11 missile, a separate sanctions review is underway for the transfer of MTCR-controlled equipment from China to Iran. This review is expected to be completed within the next few weeks. However, because this case involves the transfer of MTCR-controlled equipment rather than missiles, only licenses and contracts involving MTCR-controlled items would be denied to the sanctioned entities. According to State, the economic impact of these sanctions would be negligible. These sanctions can be waived upon a determination that doing so is "essential" to the national security.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011. memo	Copy of 010 [partial] (1 page)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:
Missiles

2012-0975-F
sb1271

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/28/2019
2017-0051-M (2.07)

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
012. memo	To: The Record; Re: New York Times Press Report, 22 June 1995 (4 pages)	06/23/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:
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2012-0975-F
sb1271

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013. report	China's Proliferation Behavior (10 pages)	07/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
014. memo	To: Anthony Lake, Samuel Berger; From: Robert Suettinger; Re: Next Steps [partial] (4 pages)	10/11/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:
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~~TOP SECRET~~ LOG NUMBER

October 11, 1994

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
SANDY BERGER

THROUGH: STANLEY O. ROTH
DANIEL PONEMAN
MARTIN INDYK

FROM: ROBERT L. SUETTINGER
ELLEN LAIPSON

SUBJECT: Next Steps on the M-11 Issue -- The Political Dimension

In the wake of the agreement between China and the United States on lifting Category II sanctions against China, I believe we need to revisit our policy to determine what, if anything, Secretary Perry can do to advance the process during his trip to Beijing.

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

(b)(1)

The issue has become, in effect, a "sword of Damocles" that could cost the U.S. as much as $7 billion if we actually impose the full Category I set of sanctions. I have been convinced for some time by the weight of the various bits of ~~evidence~~ that the Chinese have shipped missiles ~~to~~ Pakistan, probably M-11s. It's only a question of ~~time~~ before we find them. The Chinese and Pakistanis ~~seem~~ to think they can tough it out. But they don't have many other options.

they know this

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Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/28/2019
2017-0051-M (2.13)

~~TOP SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

The question for us is, now that the Chinese have agreed not to sell/ship any Category I missiles and parts?, what do we want to do about those they have already shipped? What do we want Pakistan to do?

I see three options:

1) Continue talking quietly with the Chinese and Pakistanis about the offer currently on the table -- namely full disclosure and commitment to no further missile transfers in exchange for complete adherence to MTCR and its annexes on China's part, and agreement not to deploy on Pakistan's part.

PRO:

? • Doesn't force any difficult issues in a pre-election period.

• Leaves more time for the multilateral diplomacy approach we have adopted to work. Secretary Perry may be able to persuade China's Liu Huaqing that the "grandfathering" offer is real and that it is in China's interest to take it.

CON:

• Leave us hostage [EO 13526 1.4c] or to a decision on India's part to force Pakistan's hand by announcing deployment of Prithvi, thereby triggering a Bhutto announcement that they have a countervailing force.

• Neither Pakistan nor China appear interested in taking up our offer.

• There's no ~~comparable "carrot"~~ real incentive for Pakistan, which wants the Pressler Amendment sanctions eliminated.

2) "Grandfather" the M-11s without getting any transparency from the Chinese.

PRO:

• Will clearly please Beijing and probably will facilitate China's full adherence to MTCR guidelines hereinafter.

• Leaves unanswered what has already been shipped, enabling us to continue to hold off Indian announcement of Prithvi deployment, and to continue trying to broker a new South Asian ~~nonproliferation~~ restraint agreement.

CON:

- Will be sharply criticized in Congress, both by those opposed to China and by those committed to non-proliferation goals, who will see it as weakening our commitment. It may be challenged on legal grounds.

- Will be seen as a precedent on other proliferation questions; in effect, rewarding bad behavior.

- ~~Probably~~ will ~~be seen by the~~ deeper Chinese ~~as "caving in,"~~ conviction that we are putting economic issues ahead of proliferation issues.

- Will make it difficult to prove future shipments in violation of MTCR, since the Chinese could say the shipments were shipped before "grandfathering."

3) Find that the evidence supports a conclusion that China has shipped M-11s to Pakistan, but waive sanctions on national security grounds. Waiver can be defended on basis of China's willingness to join MTCR and not ship further missiles to Pakistan or anywhere else.

PRO:

→ you're selling this option — no?

- Will probably facilitate China's rejoining the MTCR.

- Prevents damage to overall relations with China that would result from heavy economic sanctions called for by the Helms Amendment.

- Averts the complex and bureaucratically controversial process of deciding how and when to impose sanctions against Chinese industries and products.

- (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

- Leaves open option to impose sanctions (lift waiver) if China or Pakistan continue in unacceptable behavior. May actually increase leverage.

- A proactive rather than passive approach to the problem. Does not set precedent for other cases.

CON:

- National security grounds for waiver will be difficult to justify and the move will be heavily criticized by Congress and press.

- (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

- Does appear to be "caving in" to the Chinese by finding them guilty but not punishing them.

- Will be strongly criticized by India.

- Creates further pressure on the President to find a longer-term solution to the South Asia problem.

Concurrences by: Elisa Harris, Bill Clements

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
015a. chart	Timeline Sino-Iranian, Figure 1[Oversize] (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
015b. chart	Timeline Sino-Iranian, Figure 2 [Oversize] (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
016. cable	Re: Pakistan - PRC (3 pages)	10/25/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:
Missiles

2012-0975-F
sb1271

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
017. cable	Pakistan-PRC-United States / Missiles (2 pages)	10/11/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:
Missiles

2012-0975-F
sb1271

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
018. cable	China-Pakistan-United States / Missiles (3 pages)	10/12/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:
Missiles

2012-0975-F
sb1271

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FOR CD DEL, GENEVA, FOR NPT DEL

E.O. 12356: DECL OADR
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, MNUC, MARR, NPT, CH, US, MTCRE
SUBJECT: APRIL 13 HOLUM-LIU MEETING ON ARMS CONTROL AND NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE CABLE. OADR BECAUSE OF EXCHANGES WITH A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT.

2. THIS IS A REPORTING CABLE.

3. SUMMARY: IN A POSITIVE DISCUSSION, ACDA DIRECTOR JOHN HOLUM MET WITH CHINESE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER LIU HUAQIU ON APRIL 13, 1995, AND DISCUSSED A WIDE-RANGE OF ARMS CONTROL AND NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES. LIU STRESSED THROUGHOUT THE MEETING THAT CHINA WELCOMED REGULAR AND DETAILED EXCHANGES ON ARMS CONTROL. SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION OCCURRED ON NPT EXTENSION, CTBT, CWC, AND FISSILE MATERIAL PRODUCTION CUTOFF (FMCT). IN RESPONSE TO HOLUM'S URGING CHINA TO PUBLICLY BACK INDEFINITE EXTENSION OF THE NONPROLIFERATION TREATY AT THE UPCOMING CONFERENCE IN NEW YORK LIU STATED THAT WE WOULD BE VERY HAPPY WITH A SPEECH THAT VICE PREMIER/FOREIGN MINISTER QIAN QICHEN WAS PLANNING TO MAKE AT THE UN ON APRIL 18, THE DAY AFTER HIS WORKING LUNCH WITH SECRETARY OF STATE CHRISTOPHER. HOLUM PROPOSED THE WEEK OF JUNE 12 FOR THE NEXT ROUND OF ACDA-LED BILATERAL ARMS CONTROL CONSULTATIONS WITH CHINA. LIU WELCOMED THE

RENEWING THE DIALOGUE, AND SAID HE WOULD REPLY CONCERNING TIMING THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. AS PART OF THESE BROAD DISCUSSIONS ON ARMS CONTROL, HOLUM ASKED LIU IF HE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2017-0051-M (2.19)

WOULD CONSIDER ESTABLISHING A WORKPLAN ON STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL TO COORDINATE AND REGULARIZE OUR TALKS IN THIS AREA. ACDA DIRECTOR HOLUM ADDED THAT A STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL WORKSHOP WOULD BE A GOOD WAY TO BEGIN DISCUSSION OF THIS TOPIC. HOLUM SAID ACDA ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR STRATEGIC AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS MICHAEL NACHT WOULD BE THE POINT-OF-CONTACT ON STRATEGIC ISSUES AND PASSED A NONPAPER TO LIU ON THE WORKPLAN AND WORKSHOP IDEAS. END SUMMARY.

4. CHINESE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER LIU HUAQIU MET WITH ACDA DIRECTOR JOHN HOLUM ON AFRIL 13. VFM LIU WAS ACCOMPANIED BY CHINESE AMBASSADOR TO THE US LI DAOYU, FOREIGN MINISTRY COUNSELOR LIU JIEYI OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AFFAIRS, SECOND SECRETARY ZHENG ZEGUANG OF THE CHINESE EMBASSY, FOREIGN MINISTRY DEPUTY DIRECTOR XIE FENG OF THE DIVISION OF US AFFAIRS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NORTH AMERICAN AND OCEANIAN AFFAIRS, AND FOREIGN MINISTRY DEPUTY DIRECTOR ZOU YIJUN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSLATION AND INTERPRETATION. ON THE US SIDE, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR LAWRENCE SCHEINMAN OF THE NONPROLIFERATION AND REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL BUREAU (NP), ASSISTANT DIRECTOR MICHAEL NACHT OF STRATEGIC AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS BUREAU (SEA), DONALD GROSS OF THE DIRECTOR'S OFFICE. TODD ROSENBLUM OF SEA, AND CHINA/MONGOLIA AFFAIRS OFFICE DIRECTOR DONALD KEYSER OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS (EAP) BUREAU, MICHAEL MESERVE OF THE CHINA/MONGOLIA DESK OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S EAP BUREAU, VIVIAN CHANG OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S FOREIGN LANGUAGE SERVICES DEPARTMENT, AND KENNETH WEISS OF NP, WHO ACTED AS NOTETAKER, WERE PRESENT.

5. ARMS CONTROL BILATERALS

HOLUM GAVE HIS CONDOLENCES TO LIU UPON THE DEATH OF CHEN YUN ONE OF CHINA'S SENIOR LEADERS. HOLUM THEN SAID THAT HE WAS DELIGHTED THAT VFM LIU COULD MAKE THIS BRIEF VISIT, AND WANTED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO FOLLOW UP ON LIU'S INVITATION TO CONTINUE BILATERAL ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS IN BEIJING IN THE LATE SPRING OF THIS YEAR. HE PROPOSED SCHEDULING THESE BILATERALS FOR THE WEEK OF JUNE 12, AND SUGGESTED HIS AGENDA TOPICS WOULD BE SIMILAR TO THOSE OF HIS OCTOBER 1994 TALKS IN BEIJING SUCH AS GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ARMS CONTROL STRATEGIC DOCTRINE, CTBT, FMCT, CWC, MTCR, AG, ETC. LIU WELCOMED THE DIRECTOR TO CHINA, BUT WOULD REFER THE MATTER OF TIMING TO THE

RELEVANT DEPARTMENTS, AND REPLY THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

6. FMCT AND CTBT

HOLUM NOTED THAT MUCH HAS HAPPENED SINCE PRESIDENT NIXON'S HISTORIC VISIT TO CHINA OVER 20 YEARS AGO. ALTHOUGH THE COLD WAR HAS ENDED, THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS

DESTRUCTION AND BALLISTIC MISSILES HAS EMERGED AS A PRIMARY THREAT TO GLOBAL SECURITY. HE SAID THAT ALTHOUGH WE MAY HAVE DIFFERENCES IN VIEWS, IT IS VERY IMPORTANT FOR CHINA TO PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE AND POSITIVE ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND THAT THE US AND CHINA SHOULD COOPERATE ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. HOLUM HIGHLIGHTED PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA INCLUDING THE FMCT AND CTBT. HOLUM WELCOMED THE SUCCESS OF THE CD IN AGREEING TO A NEGOTIATING MANDATE FOR THE CUTOFF OF THE PRODUCTION OF FISSILE MATERIALS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND REMARKED THAT A CUTOFF TREATY COULD HELP CAP THE STOCKS OF INDIA, PAKISTAN, AND ISRAEL. HOLUM STATED THAT WE ARE ALSO ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT) NEGOTIATIONS AND ARE MAKING PROGRESS IN REDUCING THE "BRACKETS" IN THE DRAFT TEXT. IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, THE US POSITION HAS BEEN FLEXIBLE. FOR EXAMPLE' HE SAID THAT THE US IS NO LONGER INSISTING ON A RIGHT OF WITHDRAWAL AFTER TEN YEARS WITHOUT CITING SUPREME NATIONAL INTEREST BECAUSE THIS PROPOSAL HAD CAUSED DIFFICULTIES FOR OTHER COUNTRIES. THE UNITED KINGDOM HAS ALSO COMPROMISED BY WITHDRAWING ITS PROPOSAL ON EXCEPTIONAL TESTS. HOLUM SAID THAT WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN COMFLETING THE NEGOTIATIONS IF CHINA WITHDREW ITS PROPOSAL TO PERMIT SO-CALLED PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS' AND OTHER NON-NEGOTIABLE POSITIONS.

7. LIU RESPONDED BY NOTING CHINA'S INTEREST IN REGULAR AND DETAILED EXCHANGES ON ARMS CONTROL WITH THE UNITED STATES. HE STATED THAT RELEVANT CONSULTATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES CAN FACILITATE OUR OVERALL RELATIONS AND IMPROVE REGIONAL STABILITY AND WORLD PEACE. IN THAT VEIN, HE WELCOMED HOLUM TO CHINA FOR AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND HOPED THAT HE CAN STAY LONGER THAN LAST TIME. (IN ADDITION TO URGING HOLUM TO SEE THE THREE GORGES, HE GAVE A DESCRIPTION OF HIS TOUR OF XIAN'S ARCHAEOLOGICAL EXCAVATIONS WITH FORMER PRESIDENT BUSH LAST YEAR.) HE THEN SAID THAT WE HAVE SHARED INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES IN THE BROAD AREA OF ARMS CONTROL,ALTHOUGH IT IS NATURAL THAT WE HAVE SOME DIFFERENCES. FOR INSTANCE. BOTH OF OUR COUNTRIES HAVE TAKEN A POSITIVE APPROACH TO THE CTBT, AND CHINA BELIEVED THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE COMPLETED

TEXT AT FIRST, BUT THESE BRACKETS WILL BE REDUCED. IN 1993, HE SAID THAT HE LED THE CHINESE DELEGATION TO THE UNHRC IN VIENNA, AND IN THOSE NEGOTIATIONS THERE WERE MORE WORDS IN BRACKETS THAN OUTSIDE THE BRACKETS. DISCUSSION OF THE VERY FIRST SENTENCE TOOK ALL DAY AND NIGHT, BUT EVENTUALLY THE BRACKETS IN THE TEXT WERE REDUCED. HOWEVER, LIU SAID THE CTBT NEGOTIATIONS ARE DIFFERENT BECAUSE ALL SIDES HAVE A POSITIVE ATTITUDE. IF THE PARTIES STICK TO THEIR PRINCIPLES, BUT ARE STILL FLEXIBLE. THERE WILL BE AN AGREEMENT. CHINA WILL STICK TO ITS PRINCIPLES, BUT WILL BE FLEXIBLE. CHINA WILL NEGOTIATE IN A POSITIVE MANNER, LIU CONCLUDED. IN THE CWC, LIU SAID

CHINA WAS ONE OF THE FIRST TO SIGN, AND CHINA WOULD LIKE TO SEE IT RATIFIED AT AN EARLY DATE. IN REGARD TO THE FISSILE MATERIAL CUT-OFF TREATY, LIU REFERENCED THE OCTOBER 1994 US-CHINA JOINT STATEMENT ENDORSING THE EARLY CONCLUSION OF A CUTOFF TREATY. IN THE AREA OF ARMS CONTROL IN GENERAL, LIU SAID CHINA IS PREPARED TO STRENGHTEN COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES, AND HE WELCOMED MORE DETAILED EXCHANGES WITH HOLUM IN BEIJING IN THE SUMMER.

8. CWC

HOLUM REPLIED THAT SINCE LIU HAD BROUGHT UP THE CWC, HE HAD A TECHNICAL QUESTION REGARDING WHETHER THE CHINESE WOULD HAVE A CANDIDATE FOR DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE CWC PREPCOM SECRETARIAT. LIU REPLIED THAT MR. LI, WHO HAD BEEN A DEPUTY IN THE SECRETARIAT, HAS BEEN APPOINTED AMBASSADOR IN VIENNA. OTHER COUNTRIES ARE INTERESTED IN FILLING THAT POST. LIU ASKED, WHOM DO YOU SUPPORT? HOLUM SAID HE SUPPORTED CHINA.

9. NPT EXTENSION

HOLUM THEN SAID THAT IN REGARD TO THE NPT EXTENSION VICE PRESIDENT GORE WILL LEAD THE US DELEGATION, AND SECRETARY OF STATE CHRISTOPHER WILL ALSO GO TO THE NPT CONFERENCE. HOLUM SAID THAT INDEFINITE AND UNCONDITIONAL EXTENSION OF THE NPT WAS A MAJOR US FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVE. HE STATED THAT WE BELIEVE THERE IS A MAJORITY FOR INDEFINITE EXTENSION OF THE TREATY, BUT WE HAVE BEEN EMPHASIZING FOR SOME TIME THAT WE STILL HAVE TO GO THROUGH THE PROCESS, AND THE ONLY VOTE THAT COUNTS IS THE ONE AT THE END. IT IS OF VALUE TO HAVE AS LARGE A VOTE AS POSSIBLE IN FAVOR OF INDEFINITE EXTENSION. HE NOTED THAT CHINA, LIKE THE US, HAS UNDOUBTEDLY FOCUSED ON THE LEGAL SITUATION. THIS IS THE ONLY OPPORTUNITY FOR INDEFINITE EXTENSION WITHOUT RENEGOTIATING THE TREATY HE SAID. HOLUM SAID THAT

RELATIVELY NEW MEMBER OF THE NPT, A PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, AND A NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATE, AND THE US WAS LOOKING FORWARD TO CHINA'S EARLY AND PUBLIC SUPPORT OF INDEFINITE EXTENSION OF THE NPT. HOLUM ASKED IF CHINC WOULD MAKE AN ANNOUNCEMENT ON ITS PREFERRED OUTCOME IN THE EARLY STAGES OF THE CONFERENCE.

10. LIU RESPONDED THAT CHINA ACCEDED TO THE NPT IN 1992, AND SUPPORTED ITS THREE MAJOR OBJECTIVES. ALTHOUGH IT HAS DEFICIENCIES, CHINA SUPPORTS THE TREATY, AND HAS FULFILLED ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE TREATY AFTER ACCESSION, SAID LIU. FINALLY, LIU STATED THATCHINA ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE CONFERENCE. VICE PREMIER/FOREIGN MINISTER QIAN QICHEN IS NOW IN EUROPE, AND WOULD ATTEND THE CONFERENCE. LIU SAID THAT HIS ENTIRE DELEGATION WOULD GO TO NEW YORK, AND THAT CHINA SUPPORTS THE SMOOTH

EXTENSION OF THE NPT. SUPPORT FOR SMOOTH EXTENSION DOES NOT EXCLUDE INDEFINITE EXTENSION, AND CHINA WOULD BE FLEXIBLE, LIU SAID. HE SAID THAT VP/FM QIAN WILL DELIVER A SPEECH ON APRIL 18 THAT WE THINK WILL MAKE YOU "VERY HAPPY." PRIOR TO QIAN'S SPEECH, LIU STATED THERE WOULD BE A MEETING BETWEEN OUR TWO MINISTERS, AND HOPEFULLY IT WILL ENHANCE THE LEVEL OF COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. CHINA AND THE US HAVE DIFFERENT NATIONAL CONDITIONS, BUT OUR COMMON INTERESTS ARE GREATER THAN OUR DIFFERENCES, AND WE SHOULD TRY TO ENHANCE OUR COMMON INTERESTS AND UNDERSTANDING OF EACH OTHER, SAID LIU. CHINA AND THE US SHOULD BECOME PARTNERS IN COOPERATION, INCLUDING ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, HE CONCLUDED.

11. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL DIALOGUE

IN RESPONSE TO LIU'S INTEREST IN GREATER SINO-AMERICAN DIALOGUE IN ARMS CONTROL, HOLUM SAID THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA NEEDED TO OPEN A DIALOGUE ON STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL THAT WOULD COMPLEMENT, BUT BE DISTINCT FROM, OTHER ASPECTS OF OUR SECURITY DIALOGUE. HOLUM ASKED LIU IF CHINA WOULD CONSIDER HOLDING REGULAR AND ROUTINE DISCUSSIONS ON STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ISSUES. HOLUM SUGGESTED THAT THE US AND CHINA ESTABLISH A WORKPLAN TO GUIDE THIS PROCESS AND THAT WE BEGIN THE DIALOGUE BY CONDUCTING A US-CHINA STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL WORKSHOP. AFTER STATING THAT ACDA ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR STRATEGIC AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS MICHAEL NACHT WOULD BE THE POINT-OF-CONTACT ON THE WORKPLAN AND WORKSHOP, HE PROVIDED VFM LIU WITH A NON-PAPER DETAILING THE PRINCIPLES OF THE PROPOSAL. LIU REPLIED THAT HE WOULD STUDY THE PROPOSAL SERIOUSLY, AND PRESENT IT TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND RELEVANT DIVISIONS IN THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. HE CONCLUDED BY

RESTATING THAT CHINA WELCOMED REGULAR EXCHANGES ON ARMS CONTROL WITH THE US AND THAT HE WELCOMED HOLUM TO BEIJING FOR A DETAILED EXCHANGE OF VIEWS THIS SUMMER. CHRISTOPHER
BT
#7424

NNNN
<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
<^SSN>7424
<^TOR>950420161350 M1628931

FROM:
SITREPRT

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
020. cable	Meeting on Nonproliferation and Security Issues [partial] (1 page)	04/12/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:
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2012-0975-F
sb1271

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~~SECRET~~ STATE 099632

E.O. 12356: DECL: 4/22/10
SUBJECT: APRIL 12 DAVIS-LIU MEETING ON NONPROLIFERATION AND SECURITY ISSUES

REF: STATE 77863 (NODIS/NOTAL)

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY
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2. U/S DAVIS AND CHINESE VICE FOREIGN MINISTER (VFM) LIU HUAQIU MET FOR TWO HOURS APRIL 12 TO DISCUSS NUCLEAR AND MISSILE NONFROLIFERATION ISSUES, AND EXPORT CONTROL COOPERATION.

--LIU CLAIMED THAT IMPEDIMENTS TO NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. WERE THE FAULT OF THE U.S. CONGRESS' NOT OF CHINESE ACTIVITIES WITH IRAN AND PAKISTAN THAT WERE LIMITED AND UNDER SAFEGUARDS. U.S. INTELLIGENCE TO THE CONTRARY WAS INACCURATE.

--LIU SUGGESTED THAT THE U.S. OVERCOME ITS IMPEDIMENTS AND GET ON THE NUCLEAR COOPERATION BANDWAGON--OR BE LEFT BEHIND BY ITS ECONOMIC COMPETITORS.

--IN BOTH THE NUCLEAR AND MISSILE AREAS, CHINA REFUSED TO ISSUE NEW JOINT STATEMENTS OR MAKE COMMITMENTS ABOUT EXPORTS TO SPECIFIC REGIONS OR COUNTRIES. LIU AVOIDED AGREEING TO NEW ROUNDS OF EXPERTS TALKS IN BOTH AREAS, PUSHING NUCLEAR TALKS TO THE FOREIGN MINISTERS AND MISSILE TALKS TO AN UNSPECIFIED "APPROPRIATE TIME."

--LIU USED BOTH FORMULATIONS IN RESPONDING TO U.S. REQUESTS TO HOLD EXPERTS TALKS ON EXPORT CONTROLS.

--THE CHINESE SUGGESTED THEY WERE PREPARED NOT TO EXPORT EQUIPMENT OR TECHNOLOGY FOR DIRECT USE IN MTCR-CLASS GROUND-TO-GROUND MISSILES.

--THE CHINESE NOTED THEIR SUPPORT OF "SMOOTH" EXTENSION OF THE NPT AND WILLINGNESS TO WORK WITH THE U.S. WITH A "CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE."

--LIU TWICE SUGGESTED DISCUSSIONS ON NUCLEAR NO-FIRST-USE WHICH U/S DAVIS SIDESTEPPED WITH THE ALL-TOO-CHINESE REPLY OF "AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME." END SUMMARY.

OPENING STATEMENTS

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/28/2019
2017-0051-M (2.20)

3. U/S DAVIS WELCOMED VFM LIU, WHO NOTED THAT THE SIDES HAD MAINTAINED GOOD NONPROLIFERATION COOPERATION SINCE THE SIGNING OF THE OCTOBER 1994 JOINT STATEMENTS AND THAT HE WAS READY TO DISCUSS QUESTIONS OF COMMON CONCERN. HE ASKED DAVIS TO SPEAK FIRST, AFTER WHICH LIU WOULD RESPOND.

4. U/S DAVIS AGREED THAT PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE LAST OCTOBER, NOTED THE NEED TO BUILD ON THAT PROGRESS -- AS WELL AS RECENT PROGRESS ON KOREA AND OTHER NUCLEAR ISSUES -- AND REMINDED LIU OF THE SIDES' RESPONSIBILITIES TO PROMOTE INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. THIS WAS A KEY REASON WHY THE U.S. WAS FOCUSED ON THE SITUATION IN SOUTH ASIA AND ON IRAN'S ACQUISITION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD) -- SHE NOTED THAT IF IRAN WERE TO ACQUIRE WMD, CHINA'S SECUIRTY WOULD BE THREATENED. SHE HOPED CHINA WOULD WORK ON THESE COMMON PROBLEMS AND PURSUE THEM THROUGH REGULAR MEETINGS ON THE ENTIRE SECURITY AGENDA.

5. VFM LIU AGREED THAT THE SIDES HAD SHARED OBJECTIVES, INCLUDING PREVENTING WMD PROLIFERATION. THE EXISTING FIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES WERE "MORE THAN ENOUGH"; CHINA WAS PERHAPS MORE CONCERNED ABOUT A NUCLEAR KOREA THAN THE U.S., GIVEN KOREA'S PROXIMITY AND THE POSSIBILITY THE ISSUE POSED OF A NUCLEAR SOUTH KOREA AND JAPAN. CHINA SUPPORTS NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREE ZONES IN SOUTH ASIA, LATIN AMERICA, AND THE SOUTH PACIFIC; TOOK PART IN THE ARMS CONTROL IN THE MIDDLE EAST (ACRS) TALKS; AND DID NOT WISH TO SEE WMD FROLIFERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. CHINA NEEDS A STABLE GLOBAL AND REGIONAL SITUATION FOR ITS LONG-TERM ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT; IT WILL DO THINGS SUPPORTIVE OF THIS OBJECTIVE AND REFRAIN FROM DOING DISRUPTIVE THINGS. CHINA AND THE U.S. CAN COOPERATE IN THIS AREA, AND WHILE THEIR METHODS OF PURSUING THESE OBJECTIVES MAY BE DIFFERENT THE WAY AHEAD WILL BE EASY AS LONG AS THEE GOALS REMAIN THE SAME. LIU CONCLUDED BY HOPING THE U.S. WOULD PAY ATTENTION TO CHINESE CONCERNS ABOUT TAIWAN.

US/CHINA NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT -- EXPERTS TALKS

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6. DR. DAVIS THEN MOVED TO THE DISCUSSION OF SPECIFIC TOPICS. SHE OPENED THE NUCLEAR DISCUSSION BY RECALLING DOE SECRETARY O'LEARY'S VISIT TO BEIJING AND O'LEARY'S PROPOSAL TO CONVENE EXPERTS TALKS ON IMFLEMENTING THE U.S./CHINA AGREEMENT FOR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION AND REMOVING IMPEDIMENTS TO COOPERATION. THE EXPERTS TALKS HAD TAKEN PLACE OVER THE PAST TWO DAYS AND PM DAS EINHORN WHO CHAIRED THE U.S. SIDE, WOULD PRESENT A BRIEF REPORT ON THE TALKS.

7. EINHORN THEN SUMMARIZED THE DISCUSSION IN THE EXPERTS TALKS, MAKING THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. CHINA HAD MAJOR PLANS TO EXPAND ITS PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAM AND U.S. COMPANIES WERE READY AND ABLE TO

PLAY A LARGE PART IN ENHANCING CHINA'S NUCLEAR SAFETY INFRASTRUCTURE, PROVIDING THE WORLD'S SAFEST AND MOST RELIABLE NUCLEAR REACTORS, WORKING ON ADVANCED NUCLEAR ENERGY SYSTEMS, AND CREATING JOINT VENTURES FOR EXPORTS.

B. THE EXPERTS REVIEWED THE U.S. LEGAL FRAMEWORK, WITH THE U.S. SIDE EXPLAINING THE SEVEN LEGAL REQUIREMENTS UNDER TWO U.S. LAWS THAT NEEDED TO BE SATISFIED BEFORE THE U.S. COULD LEGALLY PROCEED WITH FULL-SCALE NUCLEAR COOPERATION. WHILE THE LAWS SEEMED COMPLICATED, THEY

OVERLAPPED SUBSTANTIALLY AND SEVERAL OF THE REQUIREMENTS WERE ALREADY MET. THE CENTRAL REMAINING REQUIREMENT WAS IN THE AREA OF NON-PROLIFERATION. THE U.S. PRESIDENT NEEDED TO CERTIFY TO CONGRESS THAT CHINA IS NOT ASSISTING OTHER COUNTRIES TO OBTAIN NUCLEAR WEAPONS, OR MATERIAL OR COMPONENTS FOR SUCH WEAPONS. THE CHINESE SIDE UNDERTOOK TO REFLECT AND STUDY THE U.S. PRESENTATIONS BUT QUESTIONED HOW U.S. DOMESTIC LAW COULD IMPEDE COOPERATION UNDER THE U.S./CHINA AGREEMENT.

D. THE EXPERTS THEN TURNED TO THE IMPEDIMENTS TO COOPERATION. IN THE U.S. VIEW, THE IMPEDIMENTS WERE CHINESE ACTIVITIES WITH THIRD COUNTRIES THAT MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY CERTIFICATIONS. TO DEMONSTRATE THE VALIDITY OF U.S. CONCERNS, THE U.S. SIDE RELEASED INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES ON CHINESE NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES WITH THIRD PARTIES, FOCUSING ON PAKISTAN AND IRAN. WE RAISED THESE ACTIVITIES PARTIALLY BECAUSE THE U.S. SIDE DID NOT KNOW TO WHAT EXTENT CHINESE AUTHORITIES WERE KNOWLEDGEABLE OF THESE ACTIVITIES.

Pakistan presenting evidence of their perfidy.

E. REGARDING PAKISTAN, EVEN AFTER CHINESE ACCESSION TO THE NPT IN 1992, THE U.S. RECEIVED INFORMATION ON ASSISTANCE TO UNSAFEGUARDED NUCLEAR FACILITIES, AS WELL AS SUPPORT FOR ACTUAL WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT. REGARDING IRAN, THE U.S. STRESSED THAT IRAN WAS SEEKING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND THE U.S. SIDE PROVIDED INFORMATION ON CHINESE ACTIVITY THAT COULD MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO IRAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM. THE U.S. DID NOT SUGGEST THAT THIS COOPERATION WAS INCONSISTENT WITH CHINESE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE NPT, NOR THAT CHINA WOULD KNOWINGLY CONTRIBUTE TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE U.S. BELIEVED RATHER THAT ANY NUCLEAR COOPERATION CONTRIBUTED TO IRAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY. THE CHINESE SIDE SUGGESTED THAT THE U.S. CONCERNS WERE UNFOUNDED AND REITERATED THAT CHINESE COOPERATION WITH PAKISTAN AND IRAN WAS STRICTLY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES AND IN STRICT CONFORMITY WITH CHINA'S PRINCIPLES GUIDING NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH THIRD COUNTRIES.

Iran
We'd rather you didn't.

F. THE EXPERTS TURNED TO HOW IMPEDIMENTS TO COOPERATION MIGHT BE OVERCOME. THE US. SIDE PROPOSED A "PRACTICAL APPROACH" AND OUTLINED INITIAL THOUGHTS INCLUDING: (1) A JOINT US/CHINA STATEMENT CONTAINING UNDERTAKINGS CONSISTENT WITH BOTH COUNTRIES' POLICIES ON

NON-PROLIFERATION (2) A PRIVATE WRITTEN UNDERSTANDING CONTAINING ELEMENTS OF COOPERATION WHICH WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH THOSE UNDERSTANDINGS. EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

(b)(1) (3) CHINA JOINING THE CONSENSUS OF RESPONSIBLE SUPPLIERS WHO HAVE DECIDED THAT ANY NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH IRAN CONTRIBUTES TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITIES; (4) CHINA DEMONSTRATING SUPPORT FOR SOUND EXPORT POLICY BY JOINING THE ZANGGER COMMITTEE AND ADHERING TO THE GUIDELINES OF THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP; AND (5) THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PRIVATE CONSULTATION MECHANISM TO DEAL WITH ANY QUESTIONS THAT MIGHT ARISE WHICH COULD AFFECT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT.

G. ONCE AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON A PRACTICAL APPROACH, TIME WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR U.S. GOVERNMENTAL PROCESSES TO TAKE PLACE AND THE PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATIONS TO BE MADE. THIS INTERVAL COULD BE USED TO ASSURE THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF THE ARRANGEMENT AND TO ASSURE THAT THIS COMMON UNDERSTANDING WAS BEING IMPLEMENTED EFFECTIVELY.

H. THE U.S. SIDE HAD URGED THE CHINESE SIDE TO COMMENT ON THESE SUGGESTIONS AND TO PUT FORWARD ITS OWN IDEAS ON HOW TO SOLVE PROBLEMS AND TO OVERCOME IMPEDIMENTS TO COOPERATION. THE CHINESE SIDE FELT THAT IMPEDIMENTS TO COOPERATION WERE "LARGELY ON THE U.S. SIDE," BUT UNDERTOOK TO STUDY THE PROPOSALS CAREFULLY. CHINA NOTED THAT THE CHINESE SIDE TALKED ABOUT "COOPERATION" BUT THE U.S. SIDE TALKED ABOUT "PROLIFERATION." THE U.S. SIDE STRESSED THAT TALKING ABOUT PROLIFERATION WAS THE KEY TO UNLOCK THE DOOR TO NUCLEAR COOPERATION.

I. FINALLY, EINHORN NOTED THAT THE TALKS WERE USEFUL AND HELPED EACH SIDE TO UNDERSTAND RESPECTIVE POSITIONS BETTER. THE TWO SIDES SHARED THE GOAL OF EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1985 US/CHINA AGREEMENT, AND THEY SHARED THE GOAL OF NON-PROLIFERATION.

8. DR. DAVIS STATED THAT THE U.S. WAS VERY ENCOURAGED BY THE EXPERTS MEETING. WE SHARED THE DESIRE FOR EARLIEST POSSIBLE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1985 AGREEMENT AND SAW BENEFITS FOR BOTH CHINA AND THE U.S. FROM EXPANDED COOPERATION. THE U.S. WAS SUGGESTING PRACTICAL WAYS TO MAKE THAT HAPPEN AND WELCOMED THE CHINESE ASSESSMENT.

LIU ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE
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9. VFM LIU THANKED EINHORN FOR THE CONCISE SUMMARY OF THE TALKS AND NOTED THAT HE WOULD REPORT WHAT THE EXPERTS DISCUSSED TO THE VICE PREMIER AND FOREIGN MINISTER. ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE REPORT, LIU PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING "INITIAL THOUGHTS":

A. FIRST, IMPEDIMENTS TO COOPERATION DO NOT COME FROM THE CHINESE SIDE. THE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED IN 1985 BY LI PENG AND DOE SECRETARY HERRINGTON AND RATIFIED BY THE U.S. CONGRESS IN DECEMBER 1985. TO BE CANDID, SAID LIU, THE IMPEDIMENTS COME FROM THE U.S. CONGRESS.

B. SECOND, IN NUCLEAR COOPERATIN, THE UNITED STATES HAS STRENGTHS AND ADVANTAGES. CHINA HAS NEEDS AND A HUGE MARKET. IF OBSTACLES CAN BE OVERCOME, THE PROSPECT FOR COOPERATION IS QUITE BROAD. DEVELOPMENT OF ENERGY SOURCES IS A VITAL PART OF CHINA'S FIVE-YEAR PLAN AND ITS 15-YEAR LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM. MAJOR COMPANIES IN OTHER COUNTRIES ALREADY HAVE SOUGHT SUCH COOPERATION WITH CHINA. HE HOPED THAT IMPEDIMENTS TO U.S. COOPERATION COULD BE OVERCOME.

C. THIRD, CHINA HAS STRICT REGULATIONS ON EXPORT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL. SUCH EXPORTS, INCLUDING COOPERATION WITH PAKISTAN AND IRAN, WERE GOVERNED BY THREE PRINCIPLES -- GUARANTEE OF PEACEFUL PURPOSES ACCEPTANCE OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS, AND NON-TRANSFER TO THIRD COUNTRIES WITHOUT CHINESE APPROVAL. PAKISTAN HAS A RIGHT TO UTILIZE NUCLEAR ENERGY TO PROMOTE GROWTH. CHINA HAS LITTLE NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH PAKISTAN AND IRAN, AND WHAT COOPERATION CHINA DOES HAVE IS UNDER SAFEGUARDS -- SO THERE IS NO QUESTION OF PROLIFERATION. IN THE CONSULTATIONS, CHINA HAD PROVIDED DETAILED INFORMATION ABOUT COOPERATION WITH PAKISTAN AND IRAN, SO THE U.S. SHOULD NO LONGER HAVE MISGIVINGS. THE "INFORMATION YOU HAVE ACQUIRED IS INACCURATE," SAID LIU. THE U.S. SIDE HAD SAID THAT CHINA HAD PROVIDED PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT TO "PAKISTAN'S CONFIDENTIAL REACTOR AT KHUSHAB." THE CHINESE SIDE HAD LOOKED INTO IT. THIS WAS NOT TRUE; THEY HAD NEVER HEARD OF KHUSHAB, LET ALONE SUPPORTED IT. THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN A RESPONSIBLE ATTITUDE.

10. ON THE SUGGESTIONS FOR OVERCOMING IMPEDIMENTS, LIU APPRECIATED THAT THE U.S. WAS TRYING TO OVERCOME IMPEDIMENTS AND RESPONDED TO THE U.S.'S INITIAL SUGGESTIONS WITH THE FOLLOWING:

A. ON THE IDEA OF ISSUING A NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION JOINT STATEMENT, WHILE MUTUAL COOPERATION IS IN BOTH OUR INTERESTS SUCH A JOINT STATEMENT WOULD CREATE OBSTACLES RATHER THAN PAVE THE WAY TO COOPERATION. THE U.S. SHOULD TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO PROMOTE COOPERATION RATHER THAN THE CONTRARY. CHINA NEEDS ENERGY BUT CANNOT WAIT FOR THE U.S. TO CHANGE ITS POLICY. NOR CAN CHINA FORGO COOPERATION WITH OTHER COUNTRIES.

B. SECOND, NOT TO PROVIDE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR MANUFACTURE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS ALREADY CHINA'S CLEAR-CUT POLICY AND ITS NPT OBLIGATION, WHICH HAS BEEN FULFILLED, SO THERE IS NO NEED FOR A STATEMENT.

C. THIRD, ALTHOUGH CHINA HOPES THAT NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES WOULD ACCEPT FULL-SCOPE SAFEGUARDS VOLUNTARILY, THAT DECISION IS UP TO THEM. AS AN EXPORTING COUNTRY CHINA ASSURES THAT ITS EXPORTS WILL NOT LEAD TO NUCLEAR PROLIFERATIGN. AGAIN NO NEED FOR A JOINT STATEMENT.

D. FOURTH, COUNTRIES SHOULD TREAT EACH OTHER AS EQUALS. WE DO NOT AGREE, SAID LIU, WITH PUBLIC OR PRIVATE UNDERSTANDINGS DIRECTED AT A THIRD STATE. CHINA ABIDES BY INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON NON-PROLIFERATION AND DOES NOT ADOPT COUNTRY-SPECIFIC POLICIES. ALTHOUGH CHINA HAS NOT JOINED ZANGGER OR THE "LONDON CLUB, CHINA HAS GOVERNED ITS EXPORTS IN LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES.

11. IN SHORT, SAID LIU, CHINA THINKS IT IS UNNECESSARY TO ISSUE A JOINT STATEMENT OR DEVELOP A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON NON-PROLIFERATION. THE U.S. SHOULD OVERCOME THE CONGRESSIONAL IMPEDIMENTS TO GET COOPERATION UNDER WAY. IF THE UNITED STATES STILL HAS DIFFICULTIES IN THIS AREA, THE CHINESE SIDE IS WILLING TO WAIT. CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. IN THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY IS POSITIVE; THE U.S. SIDE NEEDS TO MAKE THE SAME EFFORTS.

IRAN AND FUTURE EXPERTS TALKS
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12. DR. DAVIS RESPONDED BY NOTING THAT THE EXPERTS DISCUSSIONS SHOWED THAT WE ARE TRYING TO FIND PRACTICAL WAYS TO MAKE COOPERATION POSSIBLE. THE PATH WE SUGGESTED WOULD BUILD ON CHINA'S OWN COMMITMENTS TO THE NPT AND ITS THREE PRINCIPLES GOVERNING NUCLEAR COOPERATION. WE WERE MERELY CALLING ON CHINA TO REAFFIRM THOSE POLICIES, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO ITS COOPERATION WITH PAKISTAN. THE CASE WITH IRAN IS DIFFERENT -- AND DANGEROUS. THERE THE U.S. DOES WISH THAT CHINA ULD GO BEYOND BOTH SIDES' NPT COMMITMENTS. THE INTELLIGENCE THE U.S. PROVIDED IS AN EFFORT TO GAIN CHINA'S UNDERSTANDING OF IRAN'S INTENTION TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE U.S. BELIEVES THAT ANY COOPERATION WITH IRAN, EVEN IF LEGAL, COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THEIR NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY AND CREATE DANGERS FOR OUR TWO COUNTRIES. DR. DAVIS EMPHASIZED THAT WE WERE NOT ASKING CHINA TO DO MORE THAN WE AND ALL RESPONSIBLE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS ARE DOING.

13. FINALLY, DR. DAVIS SUGGESTED THAT THE TWO SIDES RECOMMEND TO MINISTERS THAT WE HAVE BEGUN AN IMPORTANT WORK AND THAT WE PLAN AN EARLY SECOND MEETING OF THE EXPERTS TO CONTINUE THEIR WORK. IF THE INITIAL THOUGHTS DISCUSSED IN THE FIRST ROUND WERE NOT A SOLUTION, THE EXPERTS SHOULD COME BACK WITH OTHER SUGGESTIONS.

14. LIU SAID THAT HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE CONCERN ABOUT IRAN. THE CHINESE CONCERN WAS NOT LESS THAN THE U.S. CHINA HAD MUSLIMS IN NORTHWEST CHINA AND WAS VIGILANT

REGARDING THE POTENTIAL OF PROBLEMS CREATED BY FUNDAMENTALISM. BUT WHILE CHINA WAS SERIOUS ABOUT PREVENTING PROLIFERATION, WE SHOULD NOT LINK NON-PROLIFERATION TO NUCLEAR COOPERATION. SOMETIMES U.S. INTELLIGENCE IS INACCURATE. CHINA DOES NOT STAND FOR OR ENCOURAGE OR ASSIST PROLIFERATION. CHINA HAS FULFILLED ITS NPT OBLIGATIONS, AND ITS EXPORTS ARE GOVERNED BY ITS THREE PRINCIPLES. THE U.S. SHOULD NOT LINK NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH WHAT IT "IMAGINES" ABOUT CHINESE ACTIVITIES. REGARDING THE CONTINUATION OF THE EXPERTS TALKS LIU STATED THAT HE WOULD REPORT TO HIS MINISTER AND CONSIDERATION WOULD BE GIVEN TO THE SUGGESTION.

15. DR. DAVIS CONCLUDED THE DISCUSSION OF THE EXPERTS TALKS BY URGING THE CHINESE SIDE TO STUDY THE PAPERS ON PAKISTAN AND IRAN PROVIDED BY THE U.S. THESE ISSUES HAD ONLY BEEN RAISED BECAUSE OF OUR CONCERNS. WE WOULD AFPRECIATE CHINA LOOKING INTO THESE ACTIVITIES. ANY COMMENTS BY CHINA COULD BE FACTORED INTO THE ONGOING DISCUSSIONS. NON-PROLIFERATION WAS THE KEY TO OPENING THE DOOR TO NUCLEAR COOPERATION. LIU REPLIED THAT CHINA DID NOT NEED THE KEY TO THE DOOR BECAUSE THE DOOR ON THE CHINESE SIDE WAS ALWAYS OPEN. DAVIS LOOKED FORWARD TO THE SIDES. EXPERTS COMING THROUGH THAT DOOR TO CONTINUE THEIR DISCUSSIONS AND FIND A WAY FOR FURTHER COOPERATION.

MISSILE NONPROLIFERATION/MTCR

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16. U/S DAVOS THEN TURNED TO THE ISSUE OF MISSILE NONPROLIFERATION. SHE REITERATED THE U.S. PROPOSAL (REFTEL) FOR A FOLLOW-ON TO THE OCTOBER 1994 JOINT STATEMENT THAT WOULD COMMIT BOTH SIDES TO OBSERVE THE CURRENT GUIDELINES AND ANNEX OF THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR), AND TO BAN EXPORTS OF ITEMS THAT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO MISSILE PROGRAMS IN SOUTH ASIA. SHE NOTED THAT THIS PROPOSAL WAS BUSED ON EQUALITY AND MUTUAL RESPECT WITH CHINA AND THAT THE UNDERTAKINGS WERE FULLY RECIPROCAL. IT WOULD MAKE ONLY MINOR ADJUSTMENTS TO CHINA'S OBLIGATIONS. WHILE WE WOULD PREFER A PUBLIC STATEMENT WE ARE OPEN TO OTHER APPROACHES.

17. VFM LIU RESPONDED THAT CHINA WAS VERY PRUDENT AND RESPONSIBLE, NOT PROLIFERATING WMD OR THEIR DELIVERY VEHICLES AND THAT THE FORM OF CHINA'S MTCR COMMITMENT WOULD NOT CHANGE THIS FACT. THE NEW U.S. PROPOSAL RAISED A SERIES OF COMPLICATED QUESTIONS, SUCH AS UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTANTLY-REVISED MTCR. WHILE IT MAY BE DISCUSSED "AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME," THE QUESTION OF CHINA COMMITTING TO THE CURRENT MTCR DOES NOT CURRENTLY EXIST. CHINA STILL NEEDS CONSIDERABLE TIME TO STUDY THE MTCR, BUT IT HAD UNDERTAKEN TO NOT EXPORT GROUND-TO-GROUND MISSILES FEATURING THE PRIMARY PARAMETERS OF THE MTCR -- NOR IS CHINA PREPARED TO EXPORT EQUIPMENT OR TECHNOLOGY DIRECTLY TO BE USED IN SUCH MISSILES. AS FOR MTCR ITEMS NOT

one small step forward?

INTENDED FOR USE IN SUCH MISSILES, CHINA WOULD MAKE ITS OWN DECISIONS UNDER ITS OWN POLICIES.

18. AS FOR ADDITIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON EXPORTS TO SOUTH ASIA, LIU OBJECTED TO SUCH "DOUBLE STANDARDS." HE SAID THERE SHOULD BE OBJECTIVE (I.E., UNIVERSAL) EXPORT CONTROL CRITERIA. SUMMING UP, LIU SAID THERE WAS NO NEED AT PRESENT TO ISSUE A NEW JOINT STATEMENT, PUBLIC OR PRIVATE.

NO-FIRST-USE
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19. HOWEVER, LIU NOTED, CHINA WOULD BE WILLING TO ISSUE A STATEMENT ON NO-FIRST-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. PRESIDENT JIANG HAD DISCUSSED THIS WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON, AND CHI A HAD PUT FORTH A PROPOSED TEXT. THIS WAS IN ALL COUNTRIES' INTEREST AND LIU HOPED THE U.S. WOULD RESPOND AND ISSUE A STATEMENT ON NO-FIRST-USE "AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME., (DR. DAVIS LATER NOTED THAT THE SIDES HAD BEEN DISCUSSING THIS ISSUE IN CONNECTION WITH VARIOUS SECURITY ASSURANCES THEY HAD MADE. THE U.S. WAS NOT PREPARED TO MAKE SUCH A STATEMENT AT THIS POINT, BUT WAS PREPARED TO CONTINUE TO REVIEW ITS POLICY.)

REBOUND: BACK TO MISSILES -- EQUIPMENT/TECHNOLOGY EXPORTS
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20. U/S DAVIS ASKED LIU IF CHINA WAS PREPARED NOT TO TRANSFER EQUIPMENT OR TECHNOLOGY INTENDED FOR USE IN GROUND-TO-GROUND MTCR-CLASS MISSILES. LIU BEGAN TO RESPOND, BUT WAS CUT OFF BY HIS EXPERTS (ESPECIALLY THE MFA'S LIU JIEYI). AFTER CONSULTATIONS, LIU RESPONDED TO DAVIS THAT CHINA IS "PREPARED" NOT TO EXPORT EQUIPMENT OR TECHNOLOGY THAT CAN BE DIRECTLY USED IN SUCH MISSILES. DAVIS ASKED IF THIS WAS A COMMITMENT IN ADDITION TO THE OCTOBER 1994 JOINT STATEMENT. LIU REPLIED THAT THIS IS IN FACT WHAT CHINA HAS DONE; IT WOULD NOT EXPORT THE MISSILES OR EQUIPMENT OR TECHNOLOGY THAT CAN BE USED DIRECTLY IN THEM.

21. DAVIS THEN NOTED THAT CHINA COULD AGREE THAT BOTH SIDEWOULD FOLLOW THIS POLICY IN THE CASE OF SOUTH ASIA. LIU NOTED THAT CHINA'S JOINT STATEMENT COMMITMENT ON NOT EXPORTING MISSILES NATURALLY APPLIED ALSO TO SOUTH ASIA. DAVIS ASKED IF THIS ALSO INCLUDED THE TECHNOLOGY AND EQUIPMENT NECESSARY TO PRODUCE SUCH MISSILES. AFTER ANOTHER INTERJECTION BY CHINESE EXPERTS AND MORE DISCUSSIONS AMONG THE CHINESE SIDE, LIU REPLIED THAT IN OCTOBER CHINA HAD SAID IT WOULD NOT EXPORT THE MISSILES OR THEIR COMPONENTS.

22. U/S DAVIS SAID THAT THE TWO MINISTERS COULD CONFIRM THIS AT LEAST PRIVATELY, WHICH WOULD BE A GOOD STEP. EXPERTS COULD FORMULATE THE LANGUAGE, LEAVING FOR LATER

WHETHER IT WOULD BE A PUBLIC OR PRIVATE STEP. LIU REITERATED THERE WAS NO NECESSITY FOR A NEW JOINT STATEMENT, EITHER PUBLIC OR PRIVATE. DAVIS SAID THE MINISTERS SHOULD DECIDE WHETHER ANYTHING NEW WAS NEEDED; LIU SAID EXPERTS MAY DISCUSS THIS FIRST IN ORDER TO CLARIFY THE ISSUE.

23. DAVIS HOPED THE EXPERTS WOULD COME BACK WITH ANOTHER SMALL STEP THAT SERVED BOTH SIDES' GOALS, AND THAT COULD SET THE STAGE FOR CHINA BECOMING AN MTCR MEMBER. LIU AGAIN NOTED THE MTCR'S COMPLEXITY; DAVIS RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. AND ITS MTCR PARTNERS WERE PREPARED TO HELP CLARIFY THE REGIME. DAVIS THEN ASKED WHEN THE SIDES WOULD HOLD THE IN-DEPTH DISCUSSIONS OF THE MTCR CALLED FOR IN THE OCTOBER 1994 JOINT STATEMENT. LIU REPLIED THIS MAY HAPPEN "AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME," AND THAT HE WOULD TELL THE U.S. "AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME" WHEN IT WAS AN APPROPRIATE TIME FOR MTCR DISCUSSIONS.

EXPORT CONTROLS
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24. U/S DAVIS THEN CHANGED SUBJECTS, NOTING HER HOPE THAT THE SIDES COULD BEGIN EXPORT CONTROL DISCUSSIONS -- PERHAPS AS SOON AS THE END OF MAY. SHE PROVIDED LIU WITH ANOTHER COPY OF THE U.S. PROPOSAL FOR SUCH DISCUSSIONS AND ITS THOUGHTS ON EXPORT CONTROLS. LIU UNDERTOOK TO REPORT TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON THIS, AND TO SEE WHEN "AN APPROPRIATE TIME" FOR SUCH DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE. HE NOTED THAT HIS EXPERTS' SCHEDULE WAS VERY BUSY THIS YEAR AND HE WOULD HAVE TO SEE WHEN SUCH TALKS MIGHT BE SCHEDULED.

NPT REVIEW AND EXTENSION CONFERENCE
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25. DR. DAVIS OPENED THE DISCUSSION OF THE UPCOMING NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY REVIEW AND EXTENSION CONFERENCE NOTING THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO SHARE OUR ASSESSMENT OF HOW PREPARATIONS FOR THE CONFERENCE WERE SHAPING UP. IN RESPONSE TO LIU'S IMMEDIATE QUESTION ON THE NUMBER OF COUNTRIES SUPPORTING INDEFINITE EXTENSION OF THE NPT (97 ASKED LIU), DAVIS QUOTED SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER'S STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT A MAJORITY OF MEMBER STATES NOW FAVOR INDEFINITE EXTENSION. THE U.S. HOPE IS TO INCREASE THAT MAJORITY GREATLY SO THAT THERE IS OVERWHELMING SUPPORT FOR INDEFINITE SUSPENSION.

26. LIU ASKED ABOUT THE ATTITUDE OF PRESIDENT MUBARAK OF EGYPT. DAVIS NOTED THAT MUBARAK WAS JUST HERE A FEW DAYS AGO; HE HAD MADE CLEAR THAT EGYPT WAS A STRONG SUPPORTER OF THE NPT, AND THAT EGYPT SHARED THE U.S. VIEW THAT THE NPT SHOULD BE BOTH STRONG AND UNIVERSAL. MUBARAK AGREED BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY NOT TO UNDERCUT "THAT GOAL."

27. LIU STATED THAT CHINA SUPPORTED THE NPT'S MAJOR OBJECTIVES OF PREVENTING PROLIFERATION, AND PROMOTING DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. CHINA SUPPORTED THE "SMOOTH" EXTENSION OF THE TREATY AND WAS

READY TO WORK WITH THE U.S. AND OTHERS TO THAT END. CHINA COULD SUPPORT INDEFINITE EXTENSION IF THAT WAS AGREED UPON BY ALL COUNTRIES CONCERNED. CHINA ALSO BELIEVED THAT INDEFINITE EXTENSION SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN TO MEAN THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES GET TO KEEP THEIR NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOREVER, AND THAT UNCONDITIONAL EXTENSION SHOULD NOT MEAN THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES HAVE THE RIGHT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES. HE NOTED THAT THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD ATTEND THE REVIEW AND EXTENSION CONFERENCE, AND THAT CHINA WOULD "ADOPT A CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE" AND WOULD COOPERATE WITH OTHERS THERE, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES.

28. DR. DAVIS RESPONDED THAT IN NO WAY DOES OUR COMMITMENT TO INDEFINITE AND UNCONDITIONAL EXTENSION UNDERCUT OUR COMMITMENT TO THE ARTICLE VI GOAL OF DISARMAMENT. INDEED, A PERMANENT NFT SUPPORTS DISARMAMENT; ANYTHING LESS THAN INDEFINITE EXTENSION UNDERCUTS IT. IN CONCLUDING DISCUSSION OF THIS TOPIC, LIU STATED THAT COUNTRIES (NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES) SHOULD GIVE EVEN STRONGER SECURITY ASSURANCES PROVIDING FOR "NO FIRST USE" OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NO THREAT TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES. AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION TO THIS END WOULD BE A "SOLUTION OF THESE ISSUES. DR. DAVIS CONCLUDED HER DISCUSSION OF THIS TOPIC BY DRAWING ON ONE OF LIU'S EARLIER LIGHT-HEARTED RESPONSES TO THE EFFECT THAT -- ON THE SUBJECT OF A CONVENTION, "WE WILL BE BACK TO YOU AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME."

29. U/S DAVIS CONCLUDED THE MEETING BY REITERATING HER HOPE THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD RECOMMEND TO THEIR MINISTERS THE HOLDING OF REGULAR MEETINGS ON NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL SUBJECTS AS A REGULAR PART OF THE BILATERAL DIALOGUE. LIU SAID THAT WOULD BE DETERMINED BY THE MINISTERS, NOTING THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO MAINTAIN CONSULTATIONS ON VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP

PARTICIPANTS
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30. PRESENT AT THE MEETING ON THE CHINESE SIDE WERE: VICE FOREIGN MINISTER LIU HUAQIU (CONCURRENTLY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS STATE COUNCIL); AMB. LI DAOYU, CHINESE AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES; MA ZHENGANG DIRECTOR, MFA NORTH AMERICAN DEPARTMENT; LIU XIAOMING, COUNSELOR, MFA NORTH AMERICAN DEPARTMENT YANG JIECHI, DCM, PRC EMBASSY; XIE FENG, USA DEPUTY DIVISION CHIEF, MFA NORTH AMERICAN DEPARTMENT; LIU JIEYI, MFA INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATIONS DEPARTMENT, COUNSELLOR AND DISARMAMENT DIVISION CHIEF; LU SHUMIN POLITICAL COUNSELLOR, PRC EMBASSY; SHAO WENGUANG. COUNSELLOR AND SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO AMBASSADOR LI DAOYU; WU ZURONG, COUNSELLOR, PRC EMBASSY; ZHENG ZEGUANG, SECOND SECRETARY PRC EMBASSY; AND ZOU YIJUN, INTERPRETER, MFA.

31. ON THE AMERICAN SIDE WERE: UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR DANIEL PONEMAN, COMMERCE A/S SUE ECKERT, ACDA ASSISTANT DIRECTOR LAWRENCE SCHIENMAN PM NONPROLIFERATION DAS ROBERT EINHORN DOE'S KENNETH LUONGO, OSD/ISP PRINCIPAL DIRECTOR GEORGE LOOK, CHINA DESK DIRECTOR DON KEYSER, PM/CBM DIRECTOR VANN VAN DIEPEN, PM/NE DIRECTOR RICHARD STRATFORD, T SPECIAL ASSISTANT JOHN BARKER, EAP/CM OFFICER MICHAEL MESERVE, AND INTERPRETER VIVIAN CHANG. CHRISTOPHER

FM: SECSTATE WASHDC

TO:

~~SECRET~~ STATE 099130

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: 04/15/15
SUBJECT: EXPERTS TALKS ON PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. EXPERTS FROM CHINA AND THE U.S. MET APRIL 10-11 TO DISCUSS PROPSPECTS FOR US-CHINA NUCLEAR COOPERATION, IMPEDIMENTS TO IMPLEMENTING THE 1985 AGREEMENT ON PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION, AND HOW TO OVERCOME THEM. THE US SIDE LAID OUT IN DETAIL THE SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY SURROUNDING THE AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION, AND THE ACTIVITIES OF CHINA WITH PAKISTAN AND IRAN THAT HAVE SERVED TO IMPEDE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT. THE CHINESE DID NOT REJECT OUT OF HAND US ARGUMENTS, BUT GAVE NO GROUND ON THE NATURE OF THEIR ACTIVITIES AND DID NOT AGREE TO THE ELEMENTS OF A SOLUTION AS PROPOSED BY THE US. NONETHELESS, THE TONE OF THE MEETING WAS POSITIVE WITH BOTH SIDES EXPRESSING AN INTEREST IN FURTHER DISCUSSION,

3. THE CHINESE DELEGATION FOR THE TALKS CONSISTED OF THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS: JIN XIAOMING, DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, STATE SCIENCE ANT TECHNOLOGY COMMISSION (SSTC); LI DONGHUI, ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR GENERALS DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, CHINA NATIONAL NUCLEAR CORPORATION; GENG ZHANXIU, DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY, SSTC; HU FENGXIAN, FIRST SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF NORTH AMERICAN AND OCEANIAN AFFAIRS, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS; AND FAN LIJUN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, SSTC. ATTENDING FROM THE CHINESE EMBASSY WERE: WANG WENGUANG, MINISTER-COUNSELOR FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY; SHAO WENGUANG, COUNSELOR AND ASSISTANT TO THE AMBASSADOR; WU ZURONG, COUNSELOR OF EMBASSY; AND LIU HUA, SECOND SECRETARY, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.

4. ON THE US SIDE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROBERT EINHORN, BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS, SERVED AS CHAIRMAN AND ROBERT NORDHAUS, DOE GENERAL COUNSEL, SERVED AS VICE CHAIR. OTHER DELEGATION MEMBERS WERE AS FOLLOWS: KENNETH LUONGO, KRISTIN SUOKKO, AND RAYMOND HUNTER, DOE; RANDOLPH WILLIAMS, DOC; CAPT. WAYNE PIERINGER, JCS; MICHAEL FITZGIBBON, DOD; RONALD HAUBER AND JAMES SHEA, NRC; AND SCOTT DAVIS, ACDA. PARTICIPATING OFFICERS FROM STATE WERE: RICHARD STRATFORD, PM; AND MICHAEL MESERVE AND

ROBIN BORDIE, CHINA DESK.

5. THE TWO SIDES AGREED TO CONDUCT DISCUSSION ON THE BASIS OF A FIVE ITEM AGENDA. THOSE FIVE ITEMS WERE: A) INTRODUCTORY REMARKS; B) OPPORTUNITIES FOR COOPERATION; C) THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK; D) IMPEDIMENTS TO IMPLEMENTATION; AND E) MEANS OF OVERCOMING IMPEDIMENTS

AGENDA ITEM ONE - INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
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6. DAS EINHORN OPENED THE MEETING BY STATING THAT THE US POLICY OF COMPREHENSIVE ENGAGEMENT WITH CHINA WAS TO PROMOTE A STABLE, OPEN, AND PROSPEROUS CHINA WITH WHOM WE COULD PROMOTE OUR MUTUAL INTERESTS THROUGH COOPERATION. THE PURPOSE OF THE TALKS, WHICH WE SAW AS SERVING COMPREHENSIVE ENGAGEMEN, WAS TO DISCUSS FRANKLY AND OPENLY HOW TO PROMOTE AND EXPAND NUCLEAR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. NOTING THE IMPETUS GRANTED THE TALKS BE SECRETARY O'LEARY'S VISIT, EINHORN STATED THAT OVERCOMING DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES WILL NOT BE EASY BECAUSE THE SENSITIVE SUBJECTS OF CHINA'S NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH PAKISTAN AND IRAN NEED TO BE ADDRESSED. HE NOTED THAT THE US WISHED TO DISCUSS THESE QUESTIONS IN A NON-ACCUSATORY MANNER WITHOUT CAUSING EMBARRASSMENT TO CHINA. THE US GOAL WAS NOT TO DWELL ON THE PAST, BUT TO FOCUS ON WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE TO ALLOW FOR COOPERATION IN THE FUTURE.

7. IN RESPONSE, CHINESE DELEGATION HEAD JIN NOTED THAT TEN YEARS HAD PASSED WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS ON NUCLEAR COOPERATION, AND THAT CHINA REGARDED THE TALKS AS A POSITIVE STEP. JIN ADDED THAT WITH CANDID AND OPEN DISCUSSIONS, PROBLEMS IMPEDING EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT COULD BE SOLVED.

AGENDA ITEM TWO - OPPORTUNITIES FOR COOPERATION

8. DOE GENERAL COUNSEL NORDHAUS OUTLINED FOR THE CHINESE THE US DESIRE TO EXPAND NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH CHINA IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH US LAW. HE NOTED CHINA'S INCREASING NEED FOR NEW POWER GENERATING CAPACITY, AND THE APPEAL OF U.S. NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY IN SATISFYING THAT NEED. HE ADDED THAT US COMPANIES ARE VERY INTERESTED IN PURSUING PARTICIPATION IN THE EMERGING CHINESE NUCLEAR POWER GENERATING MARKET AND THAT THE USG WAS SUPPORTIVE OF THIS INTEREST. NORDHAUS DETAILED THE GREAT ADVANTAGES FOR CHINA IS PURSUING NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH THE US, EMPHASIZING THAT US NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY WAS THE MOST ADVANCED SUCH TECHNOLOGY AVAILABLE. HE ADDED THAT US EXPERIENCE WITH NUCLEAR SAFETY AND OUR EXPERTISE WITH NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL WOULD BE OF GREAT VALUE TO CHINA. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE TALKS WOULD IDENTIFY MEANS OF EXPANDING COOPERATION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF US LAW.

9. CHINESE CHAIRMAN JIN AGREED THAT CHINA NEEDED TO EXPAND ITS NUCLEAR GENERATING CAPACITY, CITING PLANS TO EXPAND NUCLEAR GENERATING POWER CAPACITY TO 20,000 MGW BY 2010 AND 45-50,000 MGW BY 2020. TO MEET THESE GOALS, JIN SAID THE BEST OPTION WAS TO IMPORT POWER STATIONS FROM THE WEST. JIN NOTED THAT SHOULD BARRIERS TO PURCHASE SUCH PLANTS BE LIFTED BY THE US, CHINA STILL WOULD REQUIRE PREFERENTIAL FINANCING AND CONDITIONS TO COMPARE TO BIDS FROM OTHER PROVIDERS.

AGENDA ITEM THREE - LEGAL FRAMEWORK

10. EINHORN STRESSED TO THE CHINESE THAT THE COOPERATION AGREEMENT WAS SUPPLEMENTED BY SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION WHICH GAVE CLEAR AND STRICT GUIDELINES FOR THE US TO FULFILL BEFORE THE AGREEMENT COULD BE IMPLEMENTED. HE ADDED THAT THE U.S. WAS POWERLESS TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT WITHOUT SATISFYING THE REQUIREMENTS OF OUR LEGISLATION. PM'S STRATFORD THEN OUTLINED FOR THE CHINESE THE APPLICABLE LEGAL RESTRAINTS.

11. HE RECOUNTED THE HISTORY OF THE AGREEMENT'S NEGOTIATION, STRESSING THAT A MAJOR STEP IN ALLOWING THE ADMINISTRATION TO FORWARD THE AGREEMENT TO CONGRESS WAS THE STATEMENT BY THEN-PREMIER ZHOU ZIYANG THAT CHINA DID NOT ENGAGE IN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION ITSELF AND THAT IT DID NOT HELP OTHER COUNTRIES TO DO SO. CONGRESS IN TURN APPROVED THE AGREEMENT IN 1985 BUT STIPULATED THAT NO EXPORTS OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL OR TECHNOLOGY COULD OCCUR UNTIL CERTAIN CONDITIONS WERE MET. THE CONDITIONS LAID DOWN AT THAT TIME WERE:

-- A CERTIFICATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT RECIPROCAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION AND VISITS ARE ESTABLISHED, AND THAT ARRANGEMENTS ARE DESIGNED TO BE EFFECTIVE IN ENSURING THAT ITEMS TRANSFERRED UNDER THE AGREEMENT ARE USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. STRATFORD NOTED THAT THE US AND CHINA COMPLETED SUCH ARRANGEMENTS IN 1987 AND THAT THEY REMAIN IN EFFECT. HOWEVER, GIVEN THE LENGTH OF TIME THAT HAD PASSED, BOTH SIDES MAY WISH TO EXAMINE THE DOCUMENT AGAIN.

-- A CERTIFICATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT, BASED ON INFORMATION PROVIDED BY CHINA AND FROM OTHER SOURCES, CHINA IS NOT IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 129 2 OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT WHICH PROHIBITS NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH ANY COUNTRY THAT HAS ASSISTED A NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPONS STATE TO DEVELOP OR ACQUIRE SUCH WEAPONS;

-- A CERTIFICATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION PROVISION OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE AGREEMENT, THE ABILITY OF THE USG TO APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE A REQUEST MADE PURSUANT TO THAT SECTION IN NOT PREJUDICED

THIS PROVISION WOULD APPLY TO US CONSENT RIGHTS OVER THE REPROCESSING OR ENRICHMENT OF US ORIGIN MATERIALQ; AND

-- A REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT DETAILING THE HISTORY AND CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NONPROLIFERATION PRACTICES AND POLICES OF CHINA.

12. STRATFORD CONTINUED THAT FURTHER CONDITIONS ON IMPLEMENTING THE AGREEMENT WERE PASSED IN 1990 IN RESPONSE TO CONDITIONS PREVAILING AT THE TIME OF TIANANMEN SQUARE. THESE NEW PROVISIONS EXTENDED THE BAN ON TRANSFERS TO CHINA TO DUAL-USE ITEMS AND TO TRANSFERS OF U.S. TECHNOLOGY AND ESTABLISHED THREE NEW CONDITIONS FOR

IMPLEMENTATION:

-- A CERTIFICATION BY THE PRESIDENT THAT CHINA HAS PROVIDED ASSURANCES THAT IT IS NOT ASSISTING AND WILL NOT ASSIST DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY ANY NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE IN ACQUIRING NUCLEAR WEAPONS;

-- A CERTIFICATION AND REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT APPLYING TO ALL FORMS OF NUCLEAR COOPERATION; AND

-- A REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE PROGRESS OF POLITICAL REFORM IN CHINA, OR A REPORT THAT IT IS N THE US NATIONAL INTEREST TO TERMINATE THE RESTRICTIONS ON NUCLEAR-RELATED TRADE. IN ADDITION, THE PRESIDENT WOULD HAVE TO DETERMINE THAT CESSATION OF ANY SUCH TRADE WOULD BE PREJUDICIAL TO ACHIEVEMENT OF US NONPROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES.

STRATFORD CONCLUDED THAT WHILE THE CONDITION CALLING FOR AN AGREEMENT ON THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WAS MET, AND THAT NEITHER COUNTRY WAS PREJUDICED AS TO CONSENT RIGHTS, THE OTHER CONDITIONS REMAINED OUTSTANDING.

13. DAS EINHORN COMMENTED THAT THE CRUX OF THE MATTER WAS THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE PRESIDENT CERTIFY TO CONGRESS THAT CHINA IS NOT ASSISTING ANY NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATE TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR MATERIALS FOR THOSE WEAPONS. HE ADDED THAT THIS CERTIFICATION COULD ONLY BE MADE IF THE PRESIDENT COULD REPORT ON SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF POLITICAL REFORM IN CHINA, OR IF HE WAIVED THAT PROVISION IN THE US NATIONAL INTEREST, HE COMMENTED THAT MEETING THE VARIOUS REQUIREMENTS OF PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION WAS LEGALLY A STRAIGHTFORWARD PROPOSITION, BUT THAT, FOR THE US, MOVING FORWARD WITH NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH CHINA WAS MORE COMPLEX POLITICALLY. SIMILARLY, HE UNDERSTOOD THAT IT WAS NOT AN EASY PROPOSITION FOR CHINA TO PROVIDE ASSURANCES AND ADJUST BEHAVIOR WITH RESPECT TO ITS ACTIVITIES WITH THIRD COUNTRIES.

14. CHINESE DEL HEAD JIN RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT THE

INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE US WAS NOT NEW TO CHINA. REFERRING TO THE CONDITIONS PLACED ON THE PRESIDENT BY THE CONGRESS, JIN SAID THAT CHINA REGARDS THIS AS AN INTERNAL US AFFAIR AND REJECTS THE ARGUMENT THAT THESE CONDITIONS SHOULD RESTRICT COOPERATION. IN ADDITION, CHINA BELIEVES IT IS INAPPROPRIATE FOR THE US TO USE ITS DOMESTIC LAWS TO AFFECT US-CHINA TRADE OR CHINA'S TRADE WITH THIRD COUNTRIES.

15. JIN CONTINUED THAT CHINA REPEATEDLY HAS MADE CLEAR ITS NON-PROLIFERATION POLICIES, CITING THE ZHAO ZIYANG STATEMENT AND THE FACT THAT CHINA IS BOUND BY THE PROVISION OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. HE ADDED THAT CHINA CONDUCTS ITS NUCLEAR EXPORTS IN ACCORD WITH THE FOLLOWING THREE PRINCIPLES:

-- ALL EXPORTS MUST BE FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES;

-- THE EXPORTS MUST BE SAFEGUARDED BY THE IAEA; AND

-- THE EXPORTS CANNOT BE RETRANSFERRED TO A THIRD PARTY WITHOUT CHINA'S CONSENT.

JIN ADDED THAT CHINA APPROVES NUCLEAR EXPORTS ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS, AND THAT RECIPIENT COUNTRIES MUST ACCEPT THESE PRINCIPLES AND PROVIDE ASSURANCES THAT THEY WILL RESPECT THEM. HE FURTHER STATED THAT CHINA STRICTLY CONTROLS URANIUM ENRICHMENT AND HEAVY WATER PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY, AND AFFIRMED THAT NO EXPORTS OF THIS TECHNOLOGY HAD BEEN MADE AND THAT NONE WAS PLANNED. IN SUM, JIN STATED THAT CHINA'S POLICIES FORM NO IMPEDIMENT TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT.

16. IN RESPONSE, DAS EINHORN NOTED THAT THE LAWS OF CONGRESS ARE BINDING ON THE ADMINISTRATION, AND THAT THESE LAWS CONSTRAIN OUR ABILITY TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT. HE TOOK NOTE OF THE POSITIVE EVOLUTION IN CHINA'S APPROACH TO NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION, BUT ADDED THAT QUESTIONS REMAIN IN THE US REGARDING CHINA'S NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES WITH PAKISTAN AND IRAN. EINHORN STRESSED THE US BELIEF THAT OUR INFORMATION ON THESE ACTIVITIES WAS RELIABLE OR ELSE THERE WOULD BE LITTLE POINT IN RAISING THE ISSUES, AND HE REPEATED THAT THE US SEEKS TO ADDRESS THESE QUESTIONS IN A CONSTRUCTIVE, NON-ACCUSATORY MANNER-

17. JIN IN TURN REPEATED HIS ASSERTIONS THAT CHINA DOES NOT ADVOCATE OR ENCOURAGE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, AND THAT CONGRESSIONAL CONDITIONS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT ARE AN INTERNAL US CONCERN. HE CONTINUED THAT THIS DID NOT MEAN THE TWO SIDES COULD NOT DISCUSS THE PROBLEMS BEFORE THEM. THE CHINESE SIDE, AFTER REVIEWING THE ISSUES OUTLINED BY THE US FELT THAT THE PRESIDENT EASILY SHOULD BE ABLE TO CERTIFY TO CONGRESS THAT THERE IS NO PROBLEM WITH EXPANDED NUCLEAR COOPERATION

WITH CHINA. JIN STRESSED THAT CHINA NEEDS A PEACEFUL INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT TO ACHIEVE ITS TWO MOST

IMPORTANT OBJECTIVES, PEACE AND MODERNIZATION, AND THAT CHINA COOPERATES WITH OTHER COUNTRIES TO FURTHER THOSE GOALS. JIN ALSO STRESSED THE COMMERCIAL POTENTIAL FOR THE UNITED STATES IN NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH CHINA, CHINA WELCOMES USPARTICIPATION IN THE CHINESE MARKET, BUT IS WILLING TO WAIT FOR THE US TO OVERCOME ITS DIFFICULTIES WITH CONGRESS. CHINA'S MODERNIZATION, HOWEVER, WOULD NOT WAIT; JIN SAW THE CURRENT SITUATION AS LEADING TO A LOSS BY AMERICAN COMPANIES OF THEIR CHANCES IN THE CHINESE MARKET.

18. THE US SIDE ACKNOWLEDGED THE GREAT COMMERCIAL POTENTIAL IN THE CHINESE MARKET AND STATED THAT THE EXPERIENCE AND ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY OF US FIRMS GIVES THEM A COMPETITIVE EDGE. DAS EINHORN SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER THAT COOPERATION IS NOT STRICTLY A COMMERCIAL QUESTION. COOPERATION CAN STRENGTHEN THE WHOLE FABRIC OF THE US-CHINA BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, WHICH IN TURN WILL STRENGTHEN STABILITY IN EAST ASIA AND THE WORLD AT LARGE. BECAUSE OF THIS, THE US IS JUST AS INTERESTED AS CHINA IN FINDING PRACTICAL MEANS TO OVERCOME THE OBSTACLES TO SUCH COOPERATION.

AGENDA ITEM FOUR - OBSTACLES TO PROGRESS

19. EINHORN BEGAN BY SAYING THAT THE US APPROACHED THIS DIFFICULT AGENDA ITEM IN A SENSITIVE AND COOPERATIVE SPIRIT. IT WAS NOT THE US'S INTENTION TO EMBARRASS CHINA BUT TO FIND PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS BOTH SIDES FACE. IN ORDER TO DO SO, BOTH SIDES MUST START WITH A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF THE PROBLEMS. HE CONTINUED BY SAYING THAT THE MAIN REASON FOR THE TEN YEAR DELAY IN IMPLEMENTING THE AGREEMENT, WAS A CONCERN OVER ACTIVITIES THAT CHINA WAS ENGAGING IN WITH COUNTRIES OF PROLIFERATION CONCERN, NAMELY IRAN AND PAKISTAN. NOTING THAT THIS INFORMATION WOULD NOT BE A SURPRISE TO THE CHINESE DELEGATION, EINHORN SAID THAT THE US REMAINED DISAPPOINTED THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN ABLE SO FAR TO ENGAGE CHINA IN AN HONEST AND FRANK DISCUSSION ON THIS ISSUE BUT HOPED THE TWO SIDES COULD START A NEW, MORE PROMISING CHAPTER IN THIS DIALOGUE.

20. EINHORN SAID THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN EASY FOR THE US TO MAKE AVAILABLE WHAT COULD ONLY BE CALLED INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION, BUT THAT THE US SIDE WANTED TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IT WAS NOT MAKING WILD ACCUSATIONS, BUT RATHER ACTING ON INFORMATION IT CONSIDERED RELIABLE. HE ADDED THAT A NUMBER OF THE ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED MAY WELL NOT HAVE COME

TO THE ATTENTION OF THE RESPONSIBLE AUTHORITIES IN BEIJING. IF THESE ACTIVITIES ARE BEING CARRIED OUT

WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM BEIJING, THE CHINESE SIDE WOULD NEED TO TAKE CORRECTIVE MEASURES. EINHORN SAID THAT HE KNEW FROM PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT OF SITUATIONS WHERE WE HAD PROVIDED INFORMATION TO BEIJING ABOUT ACTIVITIES OF WHICH IT HAD NOT BEEN AWARE. CHINESE AUTHORITIES HAD INVESTIGATED THESE SITUATIONS, HAD TOLD US OUR INFORMATION WAS ACCURATE, AND HAD TAKEN APPROPRIATE ACTION. IN OTHER CASES, BEIJING HAD INFORMED US THAT OUR INFORMATION WAS INCORRECT. HOWEVER, THE ONLY WAY TO SOLVE SUCH PROBLEMS IS THROUGH DIALOGUE.

21. EINHORN THEN PROCEED TO OUTLINE IN DETAIL US CONCERNS ABOUT CHINESE NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH PAKISTAN AND IRAN. QNOTE: THE TEXT OF THE PAPERS HANDED OVER TO THE CHINESE DELEGATION WILL BE TRANSMITTED SEPARATELYQ. THE PRESENTATION ON PAKISTAN FOLLOWED THE OUTLINE OF CHINESE ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED IN THE PAPER PROVIDED THE CHINESE DELEGATION; THE IRAN PRESENTATION WAS CAST IN A BROADER POLICY CONTEXT, WITH REGARD TO THE IRANIAN SITUATION, EINHORN NOTED THAT THE US HAS DISCUSSED ITS CONCERNS ABOUT IRAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM WITH ALL POTENTIAL SUPPLIERS. THE US IS NOT RAISING THE ISSUE WITH CHINA BECAUSE IT BELIEVES THAT CHINA HAS VIOLATED ITS POLICIES OR OBLIGATIONS IN EXPORTING NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TO IRAN, BUT RATHER BECAUSE IT IS CONVINCED THAT IRAN IS SEEKING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH IRAN OF ANY KIND CONTRIBUTES TO IRAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTENTIONS. EINHORN REPEATED THAT IT WAS NOT THE US INTENTION TO SINGLE OUT CHINA, AND THAT THE US IS NOT ACCUSING CHINA OF ACTIVITIES INCONSISTENT WITH THE NPT. THE IRAN CASE IS ONE WHERE EVEN LEGAL COOPERATION COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF WEAPONS BY A NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATE WHICH IS NOT SINCERE AS TO ITS PROLIFERATION UNDERTAKINGS. HE NOTED THAT ALL NATIONAL SUPPLIERS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF CHINA AND RUSSIA, AGREE WITH THE US POSITION.

22. MR, JIN RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT THE CHINESE DELEGATION WAS NOT AWARE OF THE INTERACTIONS DESCRIBED BY MR. EINHORN, AND THAT HE BELIEVED HE HAD GIVEN A VERY CLEAR AND FULL PICTURE OF CHINA'S COOPERATION WITH PAKISTAN AND IRAN. HE ADDED THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE US ALLEGATIONS WERE GROUNDLESS AND WERE BASED ON RUMORS RATHER THAN FACT. AS EINHORN HAD SAID, THE US HAD SOMETIMES PROVIDED INFORMATION TO CHINA WHICH WAS INACCURATE.

23. TO BE CLEAR, HOWEVER, MR. JIN SAID THAT HE WOULD GIVE AN OVERVIEW OF CHINA'S COOPERATION WITH IRAN AND PAKISTAN. IN PAKISTAN, CHINA WAS COOPERATING ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF A 300 MEGAWATT REACTOR, URANIUM GEOLOGY, NUCLEAR PHYSICS RESEARCH AND PERSONNEL TRAINING. CHINA HAS DONE THIS IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH ITS OWN EXPORT PRINCIPLES AND BOTH PAKISTAN AND CHINA HAVE AGREED THAT

THE NUCLEAR REACTOR IS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES AND WILL SUBMIT TO IAEA SAFEGUARDS.

24. JIN CONTINUED THAT CHINA HAS SIGNED A COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY WITH IRAN. COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES INVOLVES BASIC RESEARCH, FOOD IRRADIATION, AND PROCESSING. COMMERCIAL AND TECHNICAL NEGOTIATIONS ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF A 300 MEGAWATT REACTOR ARE UNDERWAY. BOTH CHINA AND IRAN ARE MEMBERS OF THE NPT AND OPERATE UNDER IAEA SAFEGUARDS. IRAN HAS ALSO PROMISED THAT IT WILL ACCEPT CHINA'S PRINCIPLES ON NUCLEAR EXPORTS, JIN AVERRED THAT CHINA HAS NO PROBLEMS WITH ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH EITHER PAKISTAN OR IRAN. THIS COOPERATION IS UNDER IAEA SAFEGUARDS WHICH CHINA VIEWS AS FULL AND SUFFICIENT. JIN ADDED THAT INSOFAR AS THE NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES OF EITHER COUNTRY WAS CONCERNED, THESE ARE THE ACTIVITIES OF SOVEREIGN NATIONS ABOUT WHICH CHINA HAS NO INFORMATION.

25. EINHORN RESPONDED THAT THE MATERIAL HE HAD REVIEWED WAS DIFFICULT AND SENSITIVE MATERIAL AND THAT IT WOULD TAKE SOME TIME FOR THE CHINESE DELEGATION TO FULLY CONSIDER AND DISCUSS IT. HE SAID THAT THE US DID NOT QUESTION THAT CHINA'S COOPERATION WITH IRAN WAS CARRIED OUT ON THE BASIS OF CHINA'S THREE PRINCIPLES, BUT THAT NPT MEMBERSHIP ALONE IS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE ASSURANCES OF AN NPT MEMBER STATE'S ULTIMATE INTENTIONS. THE EXAMPLES OF IRAQ AND NORTH KOREA ARE ILLUSTRATIVE. BOTH ARE NPT PARTIES BUT BOTH HAVE BEEN FOUND TO HAVE VIOLATED THEIR OBLIGATIONS BY THE IAEA, WE KNOW NOW THAT FOR YEARS IRAQ WORKED WITH WELL-MEANING SUPPLIERS TO ADVANCE A CLANDESTINE NUCLEAR PROGRAM, A PROGRAM ONLY DISCOVERED AFTER THE GULF WAR. THE US NOW HAS EVIDENCE THAT IRAN IS TRYING TO FOLLOW IN IRAQ'S FOOTSTEPS WITH ITS OWN CLANDESTINE PROGRAM, IN VIEW OF THE EXPERIENCE WITH IRAQ AND NORTH KOREA, NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS NEED TO BE ON GUARD WITH GOVERNMENTS WHOSE INTENTIONS ARE OPEN TO QUESTION. SPECIAL RESTRAINT BY RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENTS IS THE ONLY PRUDENT COURSE.

26. EINHORN ALSO COMMENTED THAT CHINA NEEDED TO LOOK AT ITS NUCLEAR COOPERATION RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN WITH A CRITICAL EYE. HE NOTED THE FACT THAT PAKISTAN'S KAHUTA URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY WAS UNSAFEGUARDED, A FACT WHICH IN ITSELF SHOULD PROVIDE A SIGN THAT IT IS DESIGNED TO PRODUCE WEAPONS-GRADE MATERIAL. THE ADDITIONAL FACT THAT PAKISTAN'S UNACKNOWLEDGED HEAVY WATER REACTOR AT KHUSHAB ALSO IS UNSAFEGUARDED SHOULD SET OFF ALARM BELLS FOR CHINA EINHORN OFFERED THE OPINION THAT COOPERATION WITH AN UNSAFEGUARDED REACTOR LIKE KHUSHAB COULD BE CONSTRUED AS TANTAMOUNT TO COOPERATION WITH A WEAPONS PROGRAM. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT US INTELLIGENCE WAS NOT INFALLIBLE, BUT AFFIRMED THAT THE US DOES NOT RAISE ISSUES SUCH AS THESE LIGHTLY. EINHORN ASKED THAT, IF THE CHINESE

SIDE BELIEVED THE US INFORMATION TO BE INACCURATE, CHINA SHOULD TELL THE US SIDE WHY AND HOW IN DETAIL SO THAT THE US COULD BE COMFORTABLE IN ACCEPTING CHINESE ASSURANCES.

27. JIN RESPONDED BY REITERATING THAT CHINA'S COOPERATION WITH THIRD COUNTRIES ON NUCLEAR ISSUES WAS CONSISTENT WITH ITS OWN EXPORT PRINCIPLES. JIN ADDED THAT NUCLEAR EXPERTS IN CHINA WERE PUZZLED THAT THE US-CHINA AGREEMENT HAS NOT BEEN IMPLEMENTED WHILE THE US HAS FREELY COOPERATED WITH OTHER COUNTRIES. EINHORN RESPONDED THAT SUCH COOPERATION COULD PROCEED BECAUSE THERE WERE NO LEGAL INHIBITIONS TO DOING SO. IN ADDITION, HE EMPHASIZED THAT CONGRESS WAS CONSIDERING LEGISLATION TO PREVENT AN AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE US AND RUSSIA DUE TO CONCERNS OVER ITS REACTOR SALES TO IRAN. THIS DEMONSTRATED THAT US CONCERNS ARE NOT DIRECTED AGAINST CHINA, BUT ARE BASED ON WELL-FOUNDED SUSPICIONS ABOUT IRAN. EINHORN ARGUED THAT BOTH PARTIES NEEDED TO HAVE A HEALTHY SKEPTICISM ABOUT NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH CERTAIN COUNTRIES. IN SHORT, CHINA'S THREE PRINCIPLES WERE INSUFFICIENT IN DEALING WITH COUNTRIES LIKE IRAN; THE BOTTOM LINE IS NOT THAT CHINA IS UNPRINCIPLED, BUT THAT IT NEEDS MORE PRINCIPLES.

AGENDA ITEM FIVE - OVERCOMING IMPEDIMENTS

28. DAS EINHORN TURNED TO THE MEANS TO OVERCOME IMPEDIMENTS TO NUCLEAR COOPERATION, OUTLINING FOR THE CHINESE THE ELEMENTS OF A POSSIBLE SOLUTION, HE STRESSED THAT A SOLUTION WOULD HAVE TO MEET THE POLITICAL NEEDS OF EITHER SIDE AND WOULD HAVE TO BE POLITICALLY SUSTAINABLE IN EACH PARTY'S DOMESTIC CONTEXT. IN SOME CASES, PARTICULARLY WITH IRAN, ARRANGEMENTS WOULD HAVE TO GO BEYOND STRICT LEGAL REQUIREMENTS. MOREOVER, THE APPOACH WOULD HAVE TO AVOID FUTURE MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND

PROBLEMS. THAT NEED POINTED TO A SOLUTION WHICH WAS REDUCED TO WRITING AND WHICH WAS AS SPECIFIC AS POSSIBLE. TO BE CREDIBLE, THE APPROACH MUST INVOLVE NOT ONLY A WRITTEN COMMITMENT, BUT ALSO THE DEMONSTRATION OVER A FINITE PERIOD OF TIME THAT THE COMMITMENT IS WELL UNDERSTOOD AND IS BEING EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTED. EINHORN SUGGESTED THAT ONE ELEMENT OF A SOLUTION MEETING THESE REQUIREMENTS WOULD BE A JOINT CHINESE-US STATEMENT IN WHICH BOTH PARTIES WOULD STATE THAT:

-- THEY WOULD PROVIDE NO ASSISTANCE TO UNSAFEGUARDED NUCLEAR FACILITIES IN NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPONS STATES; AND

-- THEY WOULD REAFFIRM THEIR NPT OBLIGATION NOT TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO ANY NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPONS STATE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OR MANUFACTURE OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES.

29. EINHORN CONTINUED THAT SUCH A PUBLIC JOINT STATEMENT WOULD CONTAIN GENERAL ASSURANCES. BEYOND THAT, CLEAR AND

SPECIFIC FORMULATIONS ARE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE CONFIDENCE THAT CERTAIN ACTIVITIES DO NOT OCCUR. TO THIS END, THE US SIDE PROPOSED AN ADDITIONAL PRIVATE, WRITTEN UNDERSTANDING ON THE TYPES OF SPECIFIC ACTIVITIES THAT WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH THE GENERAL ASSURANCES. THE ELEMENTS OF A PRIVATE UNDERSTANDING WOULD BE DRAFTED WITH OBJECTIVES OF:

-- AVOIDING PERSONNEL CONTACTS OR SUPPLY TO PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM (?? GARBLED);

-- ENSURING NO CHINESE PARTICIPATION IN THE COMPLETION OF PAKISTAN'S KHUSHAB RESEARCH REACTOR UNLESS THE FACILITY IS PLACED UNDER IAEA SAFEGUARDS;

-- AVOIDING PERSONNEL CONTACTS BETWEEN PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS DESIGN AND PRODUCTION ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR PRC COUNTERPARTS AS WELL AS SUPPLY TO THESE ORGANIZATIONS, AND

-- AVOIDING TRANSFER OF ENRICHMENT, REPROCESSING, OR HEAVY WATER PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY.

THE PRECISE LANGUAGE OF THIS UNDERSTANDING WOULD BE SOMETHING FOR THE TWO SIDES TO WORK OUT; WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS THAT SUBSTANCE BE GIVEN TO THE COMMITMENT AND THAT MISUNDERSTANDINGS BE AVOIDED.

30. EINHORN ALSO SUGGESTED THAT CHINA JOIN THE NPT EXPORTERS (ZANGGER) COMMITTEE AND ADHERE TO THE GUIDELINES OF THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP. A FURTHER SUGGESTED ELEMENT WOULD BE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CONFIDENTIAL MEANS OF RESOLVING DIFFICULTIES, SPECIFICALLY A BILATERAL CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM.

31. WITH REGARD TO IRAN, EINHORN SUGGESTED THAT, IN VIEW OF THE US CONVICTION THAT NO NUCLEAR SUPPLIER SHOULD ENGAGE IN NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH THAT COUNTRY, CHINA SHOULD JOIN THE EMERGING INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS AND AGREE NOT TO ENGAGE ANY NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH IRAN.

32. IF CHINA COULD AGREE TO TAKE NONPROLIFERATION STEPS ALONG THESE LINES, THIS WOULD ALLOW US TO PROCEED WITH THE PROCESS OF PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION. IN THAT EVENT, THE US SIDE OFFERED THAT IT WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT, AS PART OF THAT PROCESS, THAT HE ISSUE THE NECESSARY CERTIFICATIONS. THE PERIOD OF TIME BETWEEN THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT AND THE FINAL PROCESSING OF A CERTIFICATION WOULD SERVE TO ALLOW BOTH PARTIES TO BECOME COMFORTABLE THAT THE AGREEMENT IS BEING IMPLEMENTED.

33. RESPONDING TO THE US PRESENTATION, JIN SAID THAT THE AGREEMENT HAD NOT BEEN IMPLEMENTED BECAUSE OF PROBLEMS ON THE US SIDE. THE CHINESE SIDE WELCOMED THE US PROPOSAL

ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD HAVE TO STUDY IT FURTHER BEFORE THEY COULD MAKE A SPECIFIC RESPONSE. JIN ADDED THAT HIS GENERAL IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE US DESIRE WAS FOR CHINA TO CHANGE ITS SIGNED AGREEMENTS WITH THIRD COUNTRIES. IT WAS UNLIKELY, HE CONTINUED, THAT CHINA WOULD BE ABLE TO DO THIS.

34. LI DONGHUI THEN ASKED IF THE PROPOSED CHINA-US JOINT STATEMENT, CHINA'S ACCESSION TO THE ZANGGER COMMITTEE AND THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP WERE PARALLEL OR SEPARATE REQUIREMENTS. EINHORN RESPONDED THAT THE US SAW THEM ALL AS ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS WHICH WOULD HELP PROVIDE REASSURANCE. LI FURTHER ASKED IF THE JOINT STATEMENT WAS A MUST FOR THE US; EINHORN REPLIED THAT SUCH A STATEMENT WAS A CENTRAL FEATURE OF A SOLUTION. HU FENGXIAN WISHED TO KNOW WHAT SUGGESTIONS THE US HAD FOR EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT. DOE'S NORDHAUS ADDED THAT THE CHINESE SIDE KNEW FROM PRIOR DISCUSSIONS WITH US COMPANIES THE SORT OF US EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY THAT WOULD BE AVAILABLE UPON IMPLEMENTATION.

35. JIN COMMENTED THAT THE CHINESE SIDE HAD COME TO THE TALKS TO DISCUSS COOPERATION BUT THE US SIDE WAS INTERESTED ONLY IN NONPROLIFERATION. CONSEQUENTLY, IT APPEARED THAT THE GAP BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES WAS ENLARGING. THE CHINESE SIDE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE US HAD TO ABIDE BY ITS OWN POLICIES BUT CHINA HAD TO MEET ITS OWN AS WELL. JIN NOTED THAT THE TWO SIDES APPEARED TO HOLD DIFFERENT UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT CONSTITUTED THE PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION, SAFEGUARDS, AND NONPROLIFERATION. NONETHELESS, JIN CONCLUDED THAT HE BELIEVED THE US'S INITIAL THOUGHTS WERE POSITIVE AND HE HOPED THAT PRESENT DIFFICULTIES COULD BE OVERCOME.

36. EINHORN RESPONDED THAT THE US SAW NONPROLIFERATION AS THE NECESSARY KEY TO UNLOCK THE DOOR ON COOPERATION. EINHORN NOTED US RESPECT FOR CHINA'S LAWS AND POLICIES; WHAT THE US ASKS IS ESSENTIALLY THAT CHINA AFFIRM ITS OWN POLICIES AND ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEM. HE ADDED THE GENERAL REQUIREMENTS OF A SOLUTION -- A MUTUAL REAFFIRMATION OF NPT OBLIGATIONS AND A STATEMENT OF NON-SUPPORT TO WEAPONS PROGRAMS IN NON-WEAPONS STATES -- ARE THINGS THAT ANY NPT PARTY WOULD WANT TO DO ANYWAY. HE ADDED THAT THE PRIVATE UNDERTAKINGS MENTIONED ARE SPECIFIC STEPS TO PREVENT MISUNDERSTANDINGS IN THE PROCESS OF IMPLEMENTING THE COOPERATION AGREEMENT. ALL ELEMENTS PROPOSED BY THE US WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH CHINA'S EXISTING PRINCIPLES. WITH REGARD TO IRAN, EINHORN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE US SIDE ASKED FOR A GREATER COMMITMENT THAN REQUIRED BY CHINA'S NPT OBLIGATIONS. STILL, THIS REQUEST WAS NOTHING MORE THAN WHAT THE US HAD ASKED OF ITSELF AND OTHER SUPPLIER COUNTRIES.

37. JIN RESPONDED THAT CHINA NEEDED TO STUDY THE US

PROPOSAL CAREFULLY. HE NOTED THAT IT WOULD TAKE TIME TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS BUT THAT CHINA IS PREPARED TO WAIT. HOWEVER, ITS DEVELOPMENT GOALS COULD NOT BE HELD BACK, THIS IMPLIED THAT CHINA WOULD HAVE TO STRENGTHEN ITS COOPERATION WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT WAS FULLY AWARE OF THE SUPERIORITY OF US TECHNOLOGY.

38. EINHORN IN TURN ASKED THE CHINESE SIDE TO STUDY THE US PROPOSAL AND TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY WHAT WAS IN CHINA'S SELF-INTEREST, TO OPEN UP THE DOOR TO US COMPANIES OR TO KEEP THE DOOR LOCKED BY PURSUING ITS CURRENT ACTIVITIES WITH IRAN AND PAKISTAN. HE ADDED THAT THE CHINESE DELEGATION HAD MADE CLEAR THAT CHINA'S EXPORTS TO IRAN WERE NOT INTENDED FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT BUT THAT IT SHOULD FULLY CONSIDER HOW CHINA'S ASSISTANCE COULD BE MISUSED. HE OFFERED THE OPINION THAT COOPERATION WITH IRAN WAS FAR LESS BENEFICIAL TO CHINA THAN WOULD BE

COOPERATION WITH THE US DOE'S NORDHAUS ADDED THAT THESE DISCUSSIONS ARE IMPORTANT TO THE US IN ORDER TO REINFORCE OUR NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES AND TO EXPAND COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITY, WHILE THEY ARE IMPORTANT TO CHINA TO FACILITATE ACCESS TO THE SAFEST AND BEST NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY.

39. WU ZURONG ASKED WHAT SPECIFIC PLANS THE US HAD FOR COOPERATION AFTER A PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATION. NORDHAUS RESPONDED THAT THE PROJECTS WOULD DEPEND ON WHAT CHINA WAS MOST INTERESTED IN. HE SAID THAT THE O'LEARY DELEGATION HAD IDENTIFIED ADVANCED LIGHT WATER REACTOR TECHNOLOGY, SAFETY SYSTEMS, TRAINING AND EMERGENCY OPERATIONS AS AREAS OF MAJOR INTEREST. HE ADDED HE WOULD COMPILE A LIST OF POTENTIAL PROJECTS WHICH COULD BE DISCUSSED AT A SUBSEQUENT MEETING.

40. EINHORN CONCLUDED THE DISCUSSIONS BY STATING HE WOULD PROVIDE A POSITIVE REPORT ON THE MEETING TO U/S DAVIS AND VFM LIU THE NEXT DAY, NOTING THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE A CLEARER UNDERSTANDING OF THE OTHER'S POSITION, AND THAT THE TWO SIDES SHARE AN INTEREST IN EARLY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT AND SUPPORT FOR THE PRINCIPLE OF NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION. HE ADDED THAT HIS RECOMMENDATION WOULD BE THAT THE TALKS BE CONTINUED. JIN RESPONDED THAT THE MEETING WAS SIGNIFICANT SINCE IT WAS THE FIRST ON THE ISSUE SINCE 1987. HE NOTED THAT CHINA PREFERRED TO EMPHASIZE COOPERATION WHILE THE US PREFERRED TO EMPHASIZE IMPEDIMENTS. HE ADDED THAT THE CHINESE DOOR TO COOPERATION IS OPEN WHILE THAT OF THE US IS CLOSED. HE CLOSED BY SAYING THAT THE ISSUE WAS TOO COMPLICATED TO RESOLVE IN ONE MEETING AND THAT HE EXPECTED FOLLOW-ON MEETINGS TO INCLUDE MORE ON POSSIBLE AVENUES OF COOPERATION.

CHRISTOPHER

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	China: History Evaluation [partial] (6 pages)	00/00/1995	P1/b(1) VR 1/2/2020
002. report	1972 Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (7 pages)	00/00/1994	P1/b(1)
~~003a. memo~~	~~To: Andrew D. Sens; From: Barbara Starr; Re: M-11 Missiles in~~ Pakistan (1 page)	~~07/14/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VR 1/2/2020
~~003b. memo~~	~~Re: M-11s in Pakistan (2 pages)~~	~~07/14/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VR 1/2/2020
004. form	Fax Cover Sheet; From: Colonel Karl Eikenberry; To: Distribution; Re: SECDEF Letters to House Leaders on MFN [partial] (1 page)	07/24/1995	P3/b(3)
~~005. draft~~	~~Annotated Outline for Paper on U.S.-China Agenda (13 pages)~~	~~06/21/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VR 1/2/2020
006. memo	To: Stan Roth; Re: Jiang Zemin (2 pages)	07/17/1995	P1/b(1)
007. report	PRC/US: Taiwan Imbroglios, Then and Now [partial] (4 pages)	07/06/1995	P1/b(1) VR 1/2/2020
~~008. fax~~	~~To: Bob Suettinger; From: A. Rothman; Re: Draft Paper on Taiwan~~ Policy (8 pages)	~~07/07/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VR 1/2/2020
009. memo	To: George Tenet; Re: U.S.-China Relations (2 pages)	07/07/1995	P1/b(1)
010. fax	To: The Honorable William J. Clinton; From: Lee Teng-hui (2 pages)	06/10/1995	P1/b(1)
011. memo	Re: Beijing's Perspective (10 pages)	06/15/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:
U.S. - PRC [People's Republic of China] Downturn

2012-0975-F
sb1274

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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~~012. paper~~	~~Thoughts on the China Box (6 pages)~~	~~00/00/0000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ NL 1/2/2020
013. memo	To: Mr. Tarnoff; From: Winston Lord; Re: China Startegy Meeting (16 pages)	07/07/1995	P1/b(1)

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1995

CHINA

HISTORY OF COMPLIANCE EVALUATION

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

DISCUSSION OF OBLIGATIONS

China deposited its instrument of Accession, and thereby became a Party to the BWC, on November 15, 1984. (U)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/28/2019
2017-0051-M (2.34)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

COMPLIANCE ANALYSIS

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

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5435

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20451

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

July 14, 1995

URGENT
STAFFING

MEMORANDUM TO ANDREW D. SENS
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Chinese M-11 Missiles in Pakistan ~~(S)~~

I would appreciate your forwarding the attached Memorandum, dated July 14, 1995, to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, from Director Holum regarding Chinese M-11 missiles in Pakistan. Given the urgency of this matter, it is preferable that Tony Lake see this by Monday. The Director looks forward to hearing his views on this matter. ~~(S)~~

Barbara Starr
Barbara Starr
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2017-0051-M (2.37)

~~SECRET~~
DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Washington, D.C. 20451

JUL 14 1997

THE DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Coping with M-11s in Pakistan ~~(S)~~

The Intelligence Community has assessed that China has transferred M-11s to Pakistan, not merely components. This conclusion has been shared with key Hill staffers, and the Washington Post recently ran a front-page story citing this consensus and the sanctionability of this transfer under U.S. law. ~~(S)~~

Invoking sanctions on China would exacerbate the Sino-U.S. relations, and the political and economic consequences would be far-reaching. With respect to Pakistan, invoking sanctions could well destroy the Congressional support for providing nonmilitary relief from Pressler and for the President's initiative to resolve issues related to the F-16s and other military equipment caught in the pipeline. Furthermore, a publicized sanctions decision will undermine our efforts to secure Indian restraint on Prithvi production and deployment. These implications are widely understood, and the Administration urgently needs to develop a strategy to address them. I, therefore, urge you to initiate a senior-level review to develop such a strategy. ~~(S)~~

I believe that the Administration cannot maintain that the evidence of Pakistani possession of M-11s is insufficient to compel the conclusion that a Category I violation has occurred. This position has always been tenuous, and now is even more so. The Intelligence Community reached its consensus because the evidence has become even more compelling. Thus, clinging to the view that the evidence is inadequate leaves the Administration vulnerable to charges that it is ignoring the law and coddling China. In 1993, when the initial M-11 sanctions determination was made, ACDA recommended to Under Secretary Davis that she find that there was sufficient evidence of a Category I transfer. At that time, however, the decision was limited to a Category II determination. Given the accumulation of additional evidence since then and the IC's formal assessment of M-11 transfers, I am more firmly convinced that a Category I sanction determination is required. ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~
DECL: OADR

Even if some agencies are not yet convinced by the evidence of the presence of M-11 missiles in Pakistan, we should not ignore the undisputed existence of a contract for the provision of M-11 missiles and related production capability. Since U.S. law requires imposition of sanctions on a "foreign person" which, inter alia, "conspires to or attempts to engage in" such activities, this contractual relationship establishes a necessary and sufficient condition for a sanctions determination based on conspiracy, independent of any export activity. In short, sanctions are warranted on the basis of both conspiracy and export activities. ~~(S)~~

What is required is an outcome that satisfies these complex legal, policy, and political conditions and advances overall U.S. interests. This means that while being prepared to find that a Category I violation has occurred, we establish a basis for the President to waive sanctions based on a determination "that such a waiver is essential to the national security interest of the U.S." We need to establish the conditions that must be met by China and Pakistan to justify a waiver. As in past cases, a temporary waiver could be provided to allow us to undertake immediate, confidential, high-level negotiations in these two countries to achieve the conditions for a permanent waiver. We will need to decide also how to handle India, and how to balance and maximize our leverage with all of them. ~~(S)~~

We believe that these issues would best be discussed in an interagency setting, and we would be glad to prepare a paper for this purpose. I urge you to initiate this process. (U)

John Holum

John Holum

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004. form	Fax Cover Sheet; From: Colonel Karl Eikenberry; To: Distribution; Re: SECDEF Letters to House Leaders on MFN [partial] (1 page)	07/24/1995	P3/b(3)

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~~SECRET~~
DECL: OADR

DRAFT

URGENT

A/S Lord

U.S.-CHINA AGENDA: BUILDING ON PRESIDENT'S MAY 26 MFN DECISION

Annotated Outline for Concise Strategy Paper

I. BACKGROUND/INTRODUCTION

o **Major themes, interests, objectives in U.S.-China relations**

-- The Administration recognized from the outset that the U.S. national interest is best served by friendly relations with a China which is strong, stable, prosperous and open. Our specific strategies to pursue various objectives must be tested against that core national interest.

-- The comprehensive engagement strategy approved by President Clinton in September 1993 remains valid as our basic roadmap to pursue geopolitical (global and regional), economic/commercial, human rights, non-proliferation and transnational interests.

-- The President's May 26 decision on China MFN is consistent with concepts in that approved strategy. It made plain, however, that the tactic of linking human rights progress to annual renewal of MFN -- as embodied in the President's May 28, 1993 Executive Order -- had outlived its usefulness. But essential goals in all areas, including human rights, are unchanged.

-- The President on May 26 announced his intention to pursue vigorously our human rights objectives in China through other strategies and mechanisms. He specified illustrative examples of the approach we would take. We need now to give substance to that commitment as a matter of some urgency.

-- At the same time we need to assure that we have in place effective strategies to pursue our other major interests with China. We also need to assure that each element, or component, serves and does not detract from our ability to pursue the larger national interest.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VC NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2017-0051-M (2.35)

-- The situation on the Korean Peninsula today underscores the importance of keeping channels open for regular, constructive dialogue with China's top decision-makers. China views North Korea in the perspective of its own abiding national security interests; these are congruent in some respects with our own, but differ in other respects. Our ability to encourage the most positive Chinese stance as this situation unfolds will be proportionate to the overall strength of our relations and candor of our dialogue.

o **Chinese reaction to President's May 26 decision**

-- The Chinese official reaction welcomed the President's decision; took perfunctory exception to the continuation of some Tiananmen-era sanctions and the imposition of a new ban on arms and ammunition; and expressed hope that U.S.-China relations might now develop in a more positive direction without the uncertainties built into the annual review of MFN.

-- The Chinese private reaction was mixed. Official guidance took a triumphalist tone, hailing Beijing's "victory" over "anti-China" elements in the U.S. Some guidance suggested that the Administration, on the defensive in China policy, can now be pressed successfully for new concessions in key areas.

-- In some quarters of the Foreign Ministry, quasi-official think tanks, and the senior military hierarchy, however, there was a more jaundiced and skeptical reaction. This view mirrored suspicion that the rhetoric and actions surrounding the President's May 26 decision in fact betrayed an unabated U.S. intent to destabilize and topple the current Chinese regime through unremitting pressure on human rights and other sensitive issues. Since June 1989, Chinese conservatives have tended to see a U.S. policy which cynically calls for a strong and stable China but which in reality works to promote "peaceful evolution" calculated to sap the regime's morale, legitimacy and domestic strength.

-- This viewpoint in China -- apparently held by a number of senior leaders, and by a not insignificant body of opinion in the Foreign Ministry -- has resulted in particularly close attention following May 26 to our actions and deeds with respect to human rights and Taiwan. The Chinese have demonstrated extreme sensitivity where we have seemed willing to upgrade our contacts, perhaps involving financial support, with individuals and groups in China standing in direct or tacit opposition to the current regime.

-- Keying also to the much-ballyhooed Taiwan Policy Review, and noting the strong Congressional and editorial appeals for the U.S. to "upgrade" symbolically and otherwise its ties with Taipei, the Chinese have probed to see whether we intend a significant policy departure in the Taiwan Strait.

-- Hence, even following the President's May 26 decision, there is in Beijing confusion about our intentions, unwillingness to be drawn too tightly into our embrace, and a disposition to withhold support and insights from us (e.g., on the Korean Peninsula) until it has clarified to its satisfaction our essential policy thrust.

o **The Chinese domestic picture**

-- For Beijing, analysis of our intentions and ability to meet us halfway are further impeded by the looming, perhaps ongoing, political succession to Deng Xiaoping. The same factors which militated against adoption of liberalizing policies on human rights (or, put crudely, concessions to our interest in seeing an improved human rights performance) also argue against too conspicuous gestures to our concerns.

-- It has become conventional wisdom, but no less true for it, that Chinese national pride -- always a close kin to nationalism, and to incipient xenophobia -- obliges contestants for post-Deng authority to resist outside pressure as a first order of business. U.S. sanctions play into this symbolically, emotionally and therefore practically. A leadership distrustful of our motives, and disenchanted by our perceived propensity to conduct foreign policy by sanctions, will remain disinclined to consider conciliatory actions in areas we consider important.

-- Chinese leadership preoccupation with "unity and stability" factors is neither a slogan nor a pretext. The much-admired Chinese economic performance has obscured the reality that a brittle leadership cognizant of its own limitations also faces a daunting array of domestic challenges: hyperinflation in the cities, a stagnant rural economy, a vast army of floating population (100 million strong), pervasive corruption, cynicism and confusion arising from the growing social and regional inequities that have attended the economic reform process, a demoralized communist party and administrative apparatus, moribund state sector enterprises coupled with absence of a social safety net (or the financial resources to underwrite one), ethnic tensions in Muslim Xinjiang and Tibet, and provincial-central tensions. When all this is coupled with manifestations of peasant economic distress, urban worker disquiet, intellectuals' disenchantment, and public pronouncements or actions by political dissidents, the Chinese leadership tendency is to hunker down and avoid any action likely to inflame the situation.

II. U.S.-CHINA POLICY AGENDA

o **General observations**

-- We need a broad-gauged approach consistent with the President's comprehensive engagement strategy, with the content and spirit of his May 26 decision on MFN, and with the totality of our current interests.

-- We need as a first priority to send a clear and reassuring signal with respect to our intentions vis-a-vis China.

-- Sending this type of signal can best be accomplished by sustained, high-level dialogue producing concrete results in the interests of both nations. As both the Chinese and we are wont to say: "actions speak louder than words."

-- Secretary Christopher's bilateral working lunch with Chinese Vice Premier/Foreign Minister Qian in Bangkok on July 25 will provide one opportunity to send this kind of message -- and to foreshadow how we mean to conduct bilateral relations in the months ahead.

-- That relatively brief encounter should be supplemented by a broad review of bilateral issues with Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu at the earliest time mutually convenient. It should be buttressed by visits in both directions by senior policy officials responsible for human rights, non-proliferation, economic/commercial issues, regional concerns, and other key areas (e.g., "common agenda" issues embracing global and transnational concerns).

-- Before we launch this process, we need to consider carefully level and sequencing of visits. If, for example, we are prepared to hold out the prospect of (a) an early visit to the U.S. by Foreign Minister Qian, (b) a visit to China by Vice President Gore, and/or (c) a visit to China by the President, perhaps in connection with the expected APEC leaders meeting in Jakarta this November, we will wish to establish among ourselves how we would anticipate such visits as fitting into the framework of our broad national interests.

-- If we are able to articulate early and well our substantive intentions, and to describe precisely to the Chinese how we propose to achieve our mutual objectives through high-level exchanges, we will send the most reassuring possible signal.

-- It is worth noting here that our prospects of enhancing our human rights dialogue, and seeing concrete results from it, will be improved to the extent that we can present this to the Chinese as an important part of a totality (not as the sine qua non for progress in other dimensions of the relationship).

o **Human rights agenda**

-- [Procedural Note: John Shattuck and his colleagues are reworking a paper on this subject for presentation to the Secretary as an action memorandum. When the Secretary has approved, we will be able to identify for the NSC a State position on how to proceed.]

-- [Procedural Note: Various groups are working within State to explore implementation of the specific concepts and mechanisms mentioned by the President in his May 26 MFN announcement. A team led by DRL, and including USAID, NSC, EAP and others, is canvassing major U.S. NGO's for programs and possibilities relating to our desire to foster a civil society in China. This team and other teams are consulting with USIA and VOA on programming initiatives which might be taken. Inauguration of Radio Free Asia is in question owing to inaction by the House Appropriations Committee on its funding authorization. When conclusions are firm -- and there is much controversy over some elements of these programs -- and approved by the Secretary, we will be able to share the State Department view with the NSC.]

-- [Procedural Note: The NSC/NEC task force on voluntary business principles has been launched. EAP is represented by Kathleen Harrington and by this office; E and EB are very interested, as are G and DRL. Some significant differences have emerged in the process of informal consultations thus far, and the attitude of the U.S. private sector reflected in preliminary soundings taken ranges across a spectrum from dutifully interested to very wary to utterly hostile. While all agree on the need to kick-start the process of identifying a set of agreed principles, the consensus is that this will be complex and contentious. It is by no means certain to me that such principles will have emerged, and been blessed, by July 4.]

-- Dialogue: It is extremely important that we reengage quickly with the Chinese on the broad human rights dialogue that had been skillfully conducted by John Shattuck with his Chinese counterpart Assistant Minister Qin Huasun. We need to send a firm signal of our undiminished interest to: the Chinese government; Chinese moderates and liberals who otherwise may have been dispirited by the May 26 decision -- or at least the lack of a quick, clear follow-through approach; human rights NGO's in the United States; and members of Congress, the media, and the American public.

-- It is important that we dispel any Chinese suspicions about our ultimate intentions early in our renewed dialogue. I would personally advocate a forthright explanation of why John Shattuck met with Wei Jingsheng (coupled with a strong reiteration of our interest in the well-being of this courageous individual); a discussion of what we meant by our references after May 26 to a "new human rights strategy" (which some Chinese interpreted as having a messianic flavor with specific political objectives); and a laying out of the positive support we intend to give (e.g., in fostering a civil society through invitations to lawyers, jurists, legislators and so on).

-- We should continue to focus on precisely the areas featured in the Shattuck/Qin dialogue over the past year. We need to probe for Chinese willingness to be more conciliatory absent the MFN-related "pressure" which they said was resented and counterproductive. We should lay special stress, as before, on the status of such dissidents as Wei Jingsheng and the health/possibility of medical parole for those ailing in prisons or labor camps. We should continue to encourage fruitful talks between the Chinese and the ICRC resulting in a first visit to a Chinese prisoner.

-- A similarly high priority needs to be Tibet. We should make plain our disappointment, and indeed bafflement, at the Chinese failure to respond favorably to the overtures made publicly by the Dalai Lama as recently as late April in New York. We should press vigorously for an early resumption of talks between the Chinese Government and the Dalai Lama, on an agreed agenda at a date certain.

-- Our tone in all this will need to be along the lines of: These matters were identified as major concerns for Americans in the President's Executive Order in May 1993. The President has stated his belief that we can express our concerns in other ways, but he has emphasized that the substance of our concerns is unchanged and our hopes for a better human rights situation

in China undiminished. These are, after all, concerns which reflect values and principles held in common by all mankind. Precisely because Americans hold these values dear, and historically have harbored feelings of respect and affection for the Chinese people and culture, we have spoken with you as friends about aspects of the human rights situation in China. So long as these concerns remain unaddressed, and the situation of human rights does not improve steadily and conspicuously, there will be controversy in the United States over the shape and substance of bilateral relations. As we have said often, an enduring constructive relationship with China must rest upon a firm domestic consensus, and we cannot begin to forge that consensus until we have dealt successfully with the human rights questions which divide us.

Visits: We had received from Beijing intimations that Vice Foreign Minister Liu would be receptive to resuming the human rights dialogue in Washington -- thereby avoiding the supercharged political atmosphere in Beijing. With Liu unable to come to Washington, and with no obvious time for such a visit prior to August, we should consider an early invitation to Assistant Minister Qin Huasun to visit here for talks with John Shattuck. Alternatively, depending on the consensus which emerges from internal discussions at State, we might consider proceeding with a "common agenda" initiative -- led by Tim Wirth but embracing a human rights component to be handled, as before, by John Shattuck. Secretary Christopher will wish, in any case, to address human rights in the course of his planned July 25 Bangkok bilateral with Qian Qichen.

o **Non-Proliferation Agenda**

-- [Procedural Note: T, PM and EAP/CM have been working on several non-proliferation papers for Dr. Davis. Until these papers have been presented, and approved by her and/or the Secretary, we will probably not be in a position to present a firm State consensus to the NSC. What is at issue in the main is whether, when and how to try to break the impasse over MTCR commitments/M-11-related shipments to Pakistan/missile sanctions. We do not know when Dr. Davis will be able to review these issues.]

-- Our non-proliferation dialogue with the Chinese has been stalled by the Chinese insistence (reiterated here in January by VFM Liu, and again in Beijing in March during the Secretary's trip) that we lift missile sanctions imposed last September as the prerequisite for reaffirming the commitment to the MTCR and advancing our dialogue in that area.

-- Additionally, we had agreed in Seattle last November, and immediately thereafter through follow-up by Embassy Beijing, that we would pursue a dual-track approach (1) to resolving our non-proliferation concerns, and (2) to hearing China's Taiwan-related concerns. The Chinese have contended that Liu's trip last January, and the March follow-up discussions in China, satisfied their part of the dual-track agreement (even though no breakthroughs occurred). They therefore insist that Under Secretary Tarnoff should visit China to discuss broad bilateral issues including Taiwan concerns. VFM Liu reminded us of that U.S. commitment, and Chinese expectation, in declining to pay another visit to Washington in late June.

-- A further consideration involves our aborted strategic dialogue with the Chinese senior military hierarchy. All agree that Gen. Liu Huaqing, executive vice chairman of the Military Commission, is probably the key decision-maker (or at least the voice which must be quieted) on missile non-proliferation issues. So long as we are seen to stall on our long-standing invitation to Gen. Xu Huizi (first extended during Chas Freeman's visit last fall), the senior Chinese military is inclined to resist discussions of other subjects and to harbor suspicions about our motives.

-- It may be, however, that Admiral Larson's upcoming visit, though keyed to the Korean Peninsula, will offer an opportunity to advance our dialogue in this area. We will have another opportunity in August assuming that Gen. Xu Huizi agrees to the further delay that we are now proposing in his arrival here.

-- Assistant Secretary Raphel is tentatively planning a late August visit to China for discussions, inter alia, of our ballistic missile initiative for South Asia.

o **A Common Agenda**

-- [Procedural Note: G, OES and DRL are working, in cooperation with E, EB and EAP, on the concept of a "common agenda" for discussion with the Chinese of broad law enforcement issues, environmental concerns, prospective energy cooperation, and human rights initiatives. We believe that this proposal has merit -- not least as an umbrella which could potentially help us to take the sting out of a human rights dialogue while accentuating the theme of cooperation and advancing a host of interests. We doubt that any concept will be ready for approval by the Secretary, let alone for presentation to the NSC, within two weeks.]

-- A visit to China by Tim Wirth and potentially by the Vice President would flow logically from a decision to pursue formulation and presentation of a "common agenda" approach.

o **Economic/Commercial Agenda**

-- General Observations and Upcoming Visits. Successful convening of the three U.S.-China joint commissions (JEC during Secretary Bentsen's January 1994 visit to China; JCCT hosted by Secretary Brown in Washington last April; and JCM -- Joint S&T Commission -- hosted by Presidential Science Advisor Gibbons also in April) set the stage for reciprocal convening of these annual events and laid out the key areas we mean to pursue in our bilateral dialogue.

-- Under Secretary Spero is considering a July/August visit to China to review the entirety of our economic/commercial agenda, focusing in particular upon China's GATT admission, IPR enforcement, market access, services, and ways to reduce the U.S. $23 billion trade surplus enjoyed by China.

-- Commerce Secretary Brown plans an August 13-20 visit to China; this will probably be a joint Executive Branch/private sector delegation focused on creating business opportunities and following up on the April 1994 JCCT discussions.

-- Energy Secretary O'Leary plans a China visit in August/September. While concrete goals have not been finalized, we anticipate that her mission will have both a commercial and an environmental cooperation component.

-- Key Issues: We need to develop an integrated economic/commercial strategy which inter alia factors in:

-- GATT Admission/World Trade Organization Inauguration. We need to examine our current approach to assure that it is in conformity with the overall interests of U.S.-China relations, the tactics and intentions of Japan and our major European partners, and our commercial requirements.

-- Intellectual Property Rights. We will need to work intensively with China, following the expected identification of China as a priority foreign country, to have Beijing put in place the requisite enforcement measures to avert further U.S. action following the 6-month investigation period.

-- Market Access.

-- A New Export Control Regime ("Son of COCOM").

-- Satellite Launch Services.

-- Energy/Environmental Cooperation Advantageous to U.S. business.

-- A Services Ageement.

-- Exchange Rates.

o **Tiananmen-Era Sanctions**

-- As we review ways to promote our economic/ commercial agenda with China, we will need to weigh the possibility of lifting, sequentially or in a package, the measures left in place by the President in his May 26 decision. For now, it is agreed that the sanctions involving TDA, OPIC, and USAEP must remain in place in light of the President's announcement.

-- Commercially, the proscription of these programs for China harms U.S. business more than the Chinese. Symbolically, however, the sanctions are important in a negative sense to the Chinese and in a positive sense to the human rights NGO's and the members of Congress especially concerned about China's human rights situation.

-- Our goal should be to consider ways that the lifting of these sanctions might be useful in leveraging out some of what we seek from the Chinese -- most likely in commercial areas, but possibly in other areas as well. We should also bear in mind that lifting of these remaining economic/commercial sanctions (those on USML items and dual-use items for military and police end-users might be more problematic), as well as our continuing symbolic abstentions on World Bank loans, could help to set the stage (or improve the cosmetics) for a high-level visit to China. Secretary Brown's August trip is one possibility; others include a hypothetical visit to China by either the Vice President or the President later in the year.

o **Strategic Dialogue/Military-to-Military Dialogue**

-- [Procedural Note: DOD has been asked by NSC to prepare within the next two weeks a paper addressing the rationale for enhancing our strategic dialogue and military-to-military dialogue with the senior Chinese military. We believe that we are on similar wave lengths with DOD and JCS, and we have consistently supported the DOD/JCS logic and specific proposals for high-level visits such as that by CINCPAC Admiral Larson to China and by PLA Deputy Chief of Staff Xu Huizi to the U.S. This logic is examined at length in the comprehensive engagement strategy paper approved by the President, and in greater length in NSC-11 which preceded it. Our logic has not changed, but has taken on new relevance and urgency by the Korean Peninsula situation and the looming political succession in China. We will await an opportunity to comment upon the DOD paper, and confine our observations now to a very few.]

-- The senior Chinese military represents a key element, perhaps the crucial element, in Chinese national security policy decisions. It carries particular weight in such issues as: non-proliferation, Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, Hong Kong reversion, U.N. peacekeeping operations, territorial claims in waters surrounding China, and, broadly, Asian and Pacific regional security.

-- The Chinese military will be a force in the political succession. Many believe that the military will emerge the dominant force; most assume that the military will play a kingmaker role at minimum.

-- From both perspectives, we need to understand better Chinese military/strategic thinking; policy options; and threat analyses.

-- Similarly, the Chinese military represents a notably conservative force in Chinese society and political life -- one reflecting and promoting nationalistic traditions and values. We need to assure that the Chinese military hierarchy does not through isolation and misinterpretion of our rhetoric and policies come to consider the U.S. a potential threat to Chinese security.

-- Resumption of high-level dialogue, and limited non-military cooperative arrangements, can help to achieve all of those goals.

-- While the Korean Peninsula contretemps continues, it is especially important that we be able to send a signal to Pyongyang that the Chinese and U.S. military leaderships are improving their dialogue and consulting on issues of mutual concern.

-- It is accordingly worth following through on the agenda already laid out by DOD: CINCPAC Larson visit to China in early July; Gen. Xu Huizi visit to the U.S. in mid-August; meeting in Washington during late summer of the executive committee of the joint defense conversion commission; and visits to China in the fall by DIA Director LTG Clapper and by SECDEF Perry.

drafted: EAP/CM: DWKeyser: dwk [SECMDR 1642 6/21/94]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. memo	To: Stan Roth; Re: Jiang Zemin (2 pages)	07/17/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:
U.S. - PRC [People's Republic of China] Downturn

2012-0975-F
sb1274

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. report	PRC/US: Taiwan Imbroglios, Then and Now [partial] (4 pages)	07/06/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:
U.S. - PRC [People's Republic of China] Downturn

2012-0975-F
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United States Department of State
Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Viewpoint

INR analysts' working paper

PRC/US: Taiwan Imbroglios, Then and Now

As in 1992 when the US announced the sale of F-16s to Taiwan, the 1995 visit to Cornell by Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui has thrown the US-China relationship into disarray. (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

* * *

Chinese leaders find themselves with few good options for dealing with what they view as US complicity in Taiwan's drive for upgraded international status. (b)(1)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) latitude for moderation appears to be eroding due to lack of trust in US and Taiwan leaders, worry over Taiwan's momentum towards international respectability, and a desire to direct the anger of educated Chinese toward the US rather than the PRC regime. These factors loom larger than in 1992, when Beijing ultimately caved when the US proved determined to meet Taiwan's security needs.

Greatly complicating the decision process in 1995, moreover, is the absence of Deng Xiaoping's decisive voice counseling patience and moderation to his would-be successors as they compete for bureaucratic assets and the approval of elite opinionmakers. A comparison of current political dynamics with those of three years ago highlights the important internal changes that make it harder for China's leaders to head off confrontation.

Produced by the Office of Analysis for East Asia and Pacific (INR/EAP)

July 6, 1995

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/28/2019
2017-0051-M (2.42)

1992: Deng in Command

Intra-bureaucratic processes were similar in 1992 and 1995, with PRC officials responsible for US affairs meeting in interagency groups to coordinate retaliatory options. The lists then and now ranged from public protest, media propaganda, and suspension of cooperation in nonproliferation fora to a second stage (not activated in 1992) which includes recalling the PRC ambassador, shifting from abstention to veto in UNSC voting behavior on issues important to the US, and suspension of large trade or investment contracts. Staged responses enable Beijing to look tough while controlling the pace of developments by issuing demands, awaiting a response, and then ratcheting up its actions if their demands have not been met. In 1992, the second stage reportedly was put off pending the outcome of the US presidential election.

A major reason for China's conciliatory stance in 1992 was Deng Xiaoping's characteristic intervention and short-circuiting of the regular bureaucratic decision process. Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, as de facto chair of the foreign affairs leading group (FALG), reportedly passed its findings directly to Deng rather than handing responsibility first to Premier Li Peng for presentation to the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC). Effectively bypassing the PBSC, Deng then made the decision with input from Qian and more senior select advisors, including General Secretary Jiang Zemin and elders Yang Shangkun (then in charge of military and reunification issues) and Wan Li (then NPC Chairman). All four counseled moderation in responding to the US move.

1995: Bureaucratic Maneuvering

In 1995, the actors and policy dynamics have been quite different. Deng is physically incapable of involvement and Qian has been discredited for his failure to prevent or predict Lee's visit. A more bureaucratic and arduous consensus-building process has emerged, as each member of the collective leadership has only a narrow power base and limited personal legitimacy. The individual influence of the leaders is largely restricted to sectors where each has been assigned functional duties. Even within these sectors, several other top leaders may be involved directly or through allies, further diluting individual authority. Now that top leaders can no longer rely on the backing of key elders to retain power, they are loathe to offend key bureaucratic constituencies for the sake of pushing controversial policy alternatives. "Easy" hard-line solutions are emerging, as short-term political gains take precedence over strategic policy considerations; the latter appear to be the luxury of strong leaders.

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

The Politburo Standing Committee as a whole, rather than Deng's office, now serves as the forum for decision on options presented by Li, with Jiang Zemin acting as convenor and referree among equals rather than final arbiter like Deng--at least in the area of US-China relations. As head of the Taiwan Leading Group, Jiang thus far seems to have preserved his moderate program announced in January by agreeing to delay the July unofficial talks. He most recently defended his Eight Point Proposal as the basis on which China will pursue its "one China" policy on June 30. Military leader Liu Huaqing, whose hard line advice to upgrade China's military posture and plans against Taiwan was ignored by Deng in 1992, probably has gained ground given his responsibility for military affairs, to include both US-China military relations and response to Taiwan's military exercise on the eve of the Lee visit. Those PBSC members charged with economic matters have limited influence, as reflected by the public statement that sovereignty over Taiwan outweighs China's economic interests; others have no input given their unrelated functional duties.

Both Jiang Zemin and Qiao Shi had been seeking to expand their influence in US-China relations (as well as other foreign relations, including with Russia) by exercising the option of summitry as State President and Chairman of the National People's Congress, respectively. But their chances of gaining policy leverage through such means have receded considerably with the adoption of a "non-engagement" stance toward the US and the recall of the ambassador, options Deng had precluded in 1992. (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

FALG's role as "gatekeeper" for top leaders' foreign agendas -- both trips and meetings -- to level the playing field.

Policy Implications

The politics of handling the Lee visit seem to have further polarized and personalized politics at the top as leaders seek to blame competitors for failure. But at the same time, there is a conservative shift along the whole policy spectrum, as the leadership tries to redress an elite perception that they have been shamefully weak in the face of public humiliation at the hands of the US and Taiwan.

The judgment that the US has shifted to a containment policy against China has been used to justify further tightening of domestic controls, especially against dissidents but also on religious and ethnic minorities. One unconfirmed press report says Li Peng has seized leadership of a counterespionage campaign to cut ties between dissidents and foreign supporters, perhaps strengthening his influence in the security sector at the expense of Jiang and Qiao Shi, who reportedly have been more open to engagement on human rights and releases of dissidents.

In dealing with the US, Beijing has talked of the need to upgrade its lobbying among influential American interest groups, but the main emphasis is placed on selective pressure in bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. Evidence continues to suggest that Chinese leaders lack room for maneuver and that further relaxation of their stance is unlikely soon. (b)(1)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

For further information contact INR analyst (INR/EAP:CHAMRIN Phone: 647-2265).

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B

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IESSAGE NO. 024000 CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~ No. Pages 7 ATTACHED

ROM: A. Rothman (Officer name) | EAP/TC (Office symbol) | 647-7711 (Extension) | 4312 (Room number)

IESSAGE DESCRIPTION Draft paper on Taiwan policy

O: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	Bob Suettinger/Asian Affairs	456-9251	

OR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

EMARKS: Bob: Food for thought. This draft is out with Winston, Kent and Bill, but in our meeting this afternoon, Winston made clear he favors a more more restrictive approach (Option III). Hope this helps with your paper.

Andy

S/S Officer:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/24/2019
2017-005)-m (2.43)

DRAFT

Taiwan Policy and Re-Engaging the PRC

Introduction

- Our Taiwan policy is coming under great pressure, from Taiwan, Congress and China. In the wake of the Lee visit, we should reexamine the objectives of our Taiwan policy, and establish guidelines for specific elements, such as high-level visits and support for Taiwan in international organizations.

- This is important for U.S.-Taiwan relations, and is also a critical element in our relations with the PRC. Until we more clearly define the direction our Taiwan policy (What is our posture toward its campaign for independent political status?), it will be difficult to establish confidence in the Beijing relationship.

- Redefining our Taiwan policy will not be easy, as Taiwan and Congress are pulling us in directions that are contrary to Beijing's policy to isolate Taiwan, and which strain the unofficial framework of our Taiwan relations.

U.S.-Taiwan Policy Under Pressure

- Taiwan was the most contentious issue in our 1970s normalization talks with Beijing, but we crafted a policy that successfully enabled us to pursue our interests on both sides of the Taiwan Strait for 16 years.

- Our "one-China" policy, based on a framework established by the three joint communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act, achieved our primary goal -- peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait area. This framework also enabled U.S.-PRC relations to move forward, and created a secure environment for Taiwan's political and economic success. U.S. relations with Taiwan -- our seventh largest trading partner -- have expanded and grown stronger under this policy.

- Taiwan is no longer satisfied with the second-class international status which a one-China policy requires, and is working actively to change our policy. Several factors are behind this shift:

  Economic Development: Taiwan is now a powerful economic force, with the world's second largest foreign exchange reserves. It seeks international political stature commensurate with its economic influence.

  Assertiveness and self-confidence: Increased contacts have convinced even native Mainlanders on Taiwan that China has too much at stake in growing economic ties with Taiwan to risk confrontation over Taiwan's seeking to stretch its international legs.

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Demographics: Ethnic Taiwanese, who have little sense of connection to the Mainland, have come to power.

Democratization: The remarkable transformation from an authoritarian one-party system to a democracy has forced leaders to respect the electorate's desire for international prestige and recognition for Taiwan.

o What does Taiwan want?

- Continued de facto independence and international affirmation of its "sovereignty."

- Stability in the Taiwan Strait (which forecloses open declaration of independence).

- Equal status with the PRC (e.g., in APEC).

- A strong political position vis-a-vis the PRC, the better to resist PRC efforts to force a resolution of the Taiwan question on its terms.

o Taiwan and the PRC both know clearly what Taiwan's game is: to challenge PRC sovereignty over Taiwan and the prestige of China's leadership.

o Taiwan has skillfully transferred to us a disproportionate share of the costs for its actions. Most of Beijing's anger over the Lee visit has been directed at us: Amb. Li was recalled; Sen. Sasser's agrement is on hold; the proposed Tarnoff/Li meeting has been deflected; the Secretary's letter to Foreign Minister Qian has not been answered; the dialogue on human rights has been halted, we have yet to receive access to Harry Wu, and dissident Chen Ziming's parole was revoked; even routine contact on non-proliferation issues has been restricted in Beijing.

o Taiwan will not hesitate to continue using the U.S. to achieve its goals, and will continue to play the Congress and media against the Administration. President Lee ignored our request prior to the Cornell visit that he work with us on a transit, and instead lobbied for a visit through the Congress. We expect this behavior to continue.

o Increasingly, U.S. public opinion does not support the apparent anomaly of a restrictive policy toward a Taiwan which is stable, prosperous, democratic, tolerant of dissent, and clearly in control of its territory.

China's Perception and Reaction

o U.S. relations with Taiwan -- particularly visits, support for participation in international organizations and arms sales -- will continue to be one of the most difficult

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aspects of our relationship with Beijing. The PRC examines carefully all of our actions, looking for "evidence" to support its suspicions that the USG seeks to keep China divided and weak.

- When the post-Deng leaders attempt to consolidate power, they may attempt to strengthen their position by taking an even harder line on Taiwan issues.

- The PRC viewed the 1992 sale of F-16s and the modest outcome of last year's Taiwan policy review as evidence of our desire to strengthen Taiwan's independent position and to weaken China. (F-16s will be delivered in 1996-97.)

- The decision to permit Lee to visit was received with alarm in Beijing, because of the political symbolism of the visit, but primarily because China fears this represents a broad change in U.S. policy, to a "one-China, one-Taiwan" policy.

- As Beijing is aware, the visit was a key element in Taiwan's campaign for greater political status, and the PRC fears the U.S. has decided to support that campaign.

- As noted earlier, China has largely retaliated against us, in an effort to warn that it will not accept U.S. support of Taiwan's campaign. These are warning shots; Beijing has not yet taken any actions which hurt its own interests (as it perceives them), and has yet to take steps which would seriously damage our bilateral relationship.

- China is waiting for authoritative evidence of our Taiwan policy, particularly with respect to visits by Taiwan's leaders.

<u>Future Directions with Taiwan</u>

- In its direct dealings with China, Taiwan will continue to move carefully and cautiously. Taipei will continue to pledge faithfulness to the long-term goal of reunification and avoid open assertions of independence. At the same time, Taiwan will aggressively press us to support its effort to develop independent political standing.

  - Taiwan's efforts are likely to focus on obtaining additional leadership visits to the U.S., and U.S. support for its participation in the UN, IMF and other major international organizations. Taipei may also press for the sale of submarines.

  - Our policy on visits may be tested in the coming months by invitations for Taiwan leaders to attend the USA-ROC Economic Council Meeting in Anchorage, in September; possible Congressional invitations to visit Washington; and invitations to the Atlanta Olympic games. Our position on UN participation will be tested during the September UNGA session.

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- We can expect Congress and the media to support Taiwan's desire for regular high-level visits and participation in international organizations. Whatever policy we adopt, we must be prepared to defend it in the context of strong public sympathy and support for Taiwan's objectives.

Future Directions with the PRC

- Our relations with China are at a very low point, and appear to be moving downward. As a "condition" for improving relations, China has asked that we spell out the details of our Taiwan policy, particularly concerning visits. Beijing is looking for policy statements and actions that demonstrate the U.S. is not supporting Taiwan's drive for a separate identity.

  - We are not likely to redefine our Taiwan policy in a way that satisfies Beijing, nor are we likely to be able to explain our policy in the degree of detail China seeks.

- Reducing tension over Taiwan will not guarantee better relations with China, but it is a prerequisite for making progress with Beijing on other issues of importance to us.

- If we cannot reduce friction over Taiwan, it may not be possible to engage China on weapons proliferation, human rights and other issues. We would run a significant risk of a continued deterioration of relations with the PRC, our sixth largest trading partner.

What is Our National Interest?

- Our Taiwan policy should be guided by U.S. national interests in both Taiwan and the PRC, not by what either party wants from us, or by popular perception of what is "right" (i.e., support for Taiwan's agenda because it is a democracy like us). Our primary interest is maintenance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait area. Conflict across the Strait would have unpredictable consequences into which we could be drawn.

- With Taiwan, we also have an interest in supporting U.S. firms in our seventh largest export market. We want to encourage continued liberalization of Taiwan's economic and political systems, and we want to continue enabling Taiwan to defend itself. A stable U.S.-PRC relationship supports our interests in Taiwan.

- With China, our interest is to help integrate further the PRC into the international community, and to encourage it to accept the obligations that come with its economic and political status, including respecting international standards for free trade, non-proliferation, regional security and human rights.

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- With both Taiwan and China, we want to encourage peaceful and realistic approaches to resolving their differences, without ourselves becoming enmeshed in the complicated cross-Strait relationship.

Options for Redefining our Taiwan Policy

- Both Taiwan and China are waiting to learn if our decision to admit Lee Teng-hui reflects a fundamental change or will have a broader impact on our Taiwan policy. Does the Lee visit indicate a new U.S. policy to support Taiwan's campaign for separate political status ("one-Taiwan"), or does it simply represent a decision to permit occasional, truly private visits by the leadership?

- The following represent three basic options for redefining our Taiwan policy:

Option I: Tacitly Support Taiwan's Campaign for Independent Political Status

- Key elements: adopt a broad definition of "private visits," to include participation in any events without Executive Branch sponsorship or participation; with respect to timing, state only that we do not wish to see a "procession of visits;" and actively support Taiwan's participation (not membership) in key international organizations.

- We would not announce a policy of supporting Taiwan's campaign, but our actions would be read as accomplishing this. We would explain to Beijing that "private visits" are consistent with our "one-China" policy and unofficial relations with Taiwan. Quiet support for Taiwan's campaign for de facto independence is the best way to undermine a strong effort by some on the island to obtain de jure independence, which would likely lead to military confrontation with China.

- Pros: Most popular and durable option in terms of U.S. domestic politics; has a certain logic in terms of the official/unofficial split; would be received warmly in Taipei.

- Cons: Implementation of this policy will be seen by China as evidence of a breach of our "one-China" policy, leading to a long-term rupture in U.S.-PRC political and commercial relations; Beijing will aggressively oppose, and probably succeed in blocking Taiwan participation in major international organizations; could also lead Beijing to retaliate against Taiwan, endangering stability in the Strait.

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Option II: Maintain the Current Policy, and Deal with New Cases on an Ad Hoc Basis

- Key elements: avoid more clearly defining our policies on visits and international organizations; as we are forced to deal with requests for specific visits or support for participation in a specific organization, we would make a case-by-case decision based on prevailing domestic and foreign policy considerations.

- We would continue to state (to Taipei and Beijing) that the U.S. still maintains a "one-China" policy; that private visits do not change the unofficial nature of U.S. relations with Taiwan; and that future requests for private visits will be considered on their merits. With respect to international organizations, we would continue to state that when it is in our interest to do so, we will support opportunities for Taiwan to have its voice heard.

- Pros: Avoids locking us into a policy that would be difficult to defend on the Hill, or that would be clearly read by Beijing as a breach in our "one-China" policy; provides flexibility to deal with changing circumstances, such as Taiwan's first presidential elections (March, 1996) or China's actions on human rights.

- Cons: Leaves us unable to clearly define our visits policy to Taiwan, Beijing (which has asked for details), Congress or groups interested in extending invitations; Beijing may not re-engage with us while it waits to see our ad hoc decisions; at each decision point, we will receive strong pressure from all sides.

Option III: Restrict our Support for Taiwan's Campaign

- Key elements: leadership visits will be rare, and will be limited to events strictly related to the visitor's personal life and not directly connected to his public status. Examples of private visits are: to attend functions at an alma mater, to visit family, to receive medical treatment or for vacation, but with no public events, such as dinners with Chinese-American groups. With respect to international organizations, at this time we will limit our active support to Taiwan's top priority -- WTO accession. If Taiwan can build a consensus for its participation in other organizations, we would join that consensus if it is in our interest to do so.

- We would inform Taipei of the specific restrictions on private visits, and state our expectation that it will not make requests outside of these guidelines. We would be less specific with Beijing, simply stating that, on rare occasions, we will approve further visits, which will be strictly private in nature.

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- o <u>Pros</u>: Best option for reducing friction with the PRC over Taiwan, and therefore for re-engaging with Beijing; most consistent with our one-China policy; Taiwan has stated that WTO accession is a top priority.

- o <u>Cons</u>: Very difficult to defend on the Hill and in the media, because of the appearance that we are not doing the "right" thing for Taiwan; Taipei will aggressively push for more, with Congressional support; if we adopt this policy, but are then forced to succumb to pressure to accept a wider scope of visits, we will appear weak to both Beijing and Taipei.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. memo	To: George Tenet; Re: U.S.-China Relations (2 pages)	07/07/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:
U.S. - PRC [People's Republic of China] Downturn

2012-0975-F
sb1274

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010. fax	To: The Honorable William J. Clinton; From: Lee Teng-hui (2 pages)	06/10/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:
U.S. - PRC [People's Republic of China] Downturn

2012-0975-F
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011. memo	Re: Beijing's Perspective (10 pages)	06/15/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:
U.S. - PRC [People's Republic of China] Downturn

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Thoughts on Getting Out of the China Box

1. US-China relations have reached **a critical juncture**, one probably not equaled during the Deng era. The only comparable time might be the first 1-2 years of the Reagan Administration, when Taiwan was again at the heart of the question, and negotiation of a joint communiqué became necessary. For numerous reasons, this does not seem to be the time to consider another communiqué--for either party. Beijing could not dictate the agenda or limit it to Taiwan . For China to open the Pandora's Box of (re-)defining the relationship in writing would inevitably release all sorts of issues other than the one they would wish--Taiwan--including at least human rights and proliferation, and possibly such other issues as trade, Hong Kong, and Tibet. Similarly, pressures on Beijing's leadership might be irresistible to expand the agenda to include WTO or other issues in ways that would become hopelessly tangled, probably leading to further slippage in the relationship rather than shoring it up. On the US side, no administration--certainly not this one--could afford to negotiate another communiqué that "sells Taiwan short." Taiwan's economic and political progress--and its growing clout on the Hill--make such a course untenable.

2. Taiwan's increasing economic importance, march toward democracy, and support on Capitol Hill suggest that **a reevaluation of our relationship with Taiwan is (and, probably for some time, has been) in order**. This inevitably is going to upset Beijing greatly, especially at a time when the leadership is undergoing a succession transition in which various leaders are going to feel compelled to posture on nationalist grounds. Nevertheless, to continue to pursue US-China relations as if the world had not changed risks allowing those relations to become ever further out of kilter with a rapidly evolving world in ways that can only exacerbate tensions and accelerate a slide toward China replacing the USSR as our chief rival, if not putative enemy.

3. Though the **substance** of our reevaluation will give Beijing heartburn, we can try to minimize the damage by being as **open and honest with China** as possible about our reasoning, actions, and plans. What seems to have upset the Chinese the most is the feeling that they were misled and can no longer trust the Administration or its word. In large measure, the damage is already done: Beijing is convinced we have already changed our policy. **We might as well gain the advantages of actually doing so** if we are going to pay the costs of being perceived as having done so.

4. A reevaluation of our relationship with Taiwan, of course, must be closely connected with a **reevaluation of our relationship with China.** We still have not defined for ourselves--or for the Chinese--how we view their place in the world or our relationship with them after the fall of the USSR. By default, they have begun to slip from the category of a "friendly non-allied nation" to a "potential threat," with the jury increasingly deliberating whether they are a current clear and present danger. We should see them as a crucial partner in addressing the problems of the 21st century; we can only work as partners on the basis of mutual trust and respect.

5. To get our thinking well grounded, we need to review **what are our long-term, key interests vis a vis China**. We have three major ones:

-- **Preventing the eruption of social chaos, economic collapse, or territorial fragmentation of China.** Aside from the humanitarian reasons for such a policy, disintegration of China would almost inevitably lead to widespread regional problems potentially ranging from unchecked emigration to competition by neighbors for slices of the China "melon" to lashing out by an impotent/ultranationalist regime.

-- **Encouraging China to play a constructive role in regional and global arenas.** This can only be accomplished with mutual respect, a modicum of trust, and recognition and acceptance of the fact that we will not always agree. That China wishes to cooperate with Iran, for example, doesn't necessarily make China a rogue elephant or a bad dog. We were largely successful in conducting our business with the PRC on this basis between 1979-93, and even to an extent from 1972-79.

-- **Fostering progress toward a more open and free Chinese society** on the premise that this is not only the "right" thing to do, but that more democratic nations make better neighbors. We need greater patience and a recognition that our pressure must be carefully calibrated to avoid its becoming counter-productive. Of course, over the long-term, a more open and free China should also be a more stable and prosperous China.

6. So what do we do?

A. **First - recognize that our "One China" policy, as conceived since 1979, is obsolete.**

1. We need to recognize -- and take steps to implement our recognition -- that Taiwan imposes increasingly large footprints in the world.

2. We need not--indeed, cannot--adopt a "Two China" or "One China, One Taiwan" policy. **We ought not to get caught up in such terminology, allow the PRC to dictate the terms of discourse or policy evaluation, or permit ourselves to be drawn into the middle of the Straits struggle**. We need do no more than reaffirm our commitment to the Shanghai Communiqué which recognized that both sides of the Strait agree there is only one China and that we recognize Beijing as the capital of China.

3. Until Beijing-Taipei differences over who represents China are (peacefully) settled by the two sides, **we should not support any change in Taiwan's diplomatic status**, including membership in the UN. We should not receive

Taiwan officials on an official basis nor send high-ranking political officials to Taiwan.

4. **We should not be reticent, however, about conducting "normal" economic relations with Taiwan or involving appropriate-level officials from Taiwan in international cultural, trade, scientific, or economic activities**. Similarly, we should not obstruct "private" visits by Taiwan leaders, recognizing that we have virtually no control over what they say or do once here or how they interpret "private." The Dalai Lama might serve as a model for "routine" non-official visits to the US (without, of course, any visit to the Oval Office.) Such an approach would not fully satisfy anyone, but would relieve some of the Congressional pressure while "capping" the nature of our relations with Taiwan, a clear goal of the PRC.

5. Tactically, of course, it would probably be better **to implement such a change in policy slowly**. And **Taiwan should not get a free ride** from such a change in policy. We should make it clear that each step toward greater "space" comes with a price: progress toward a peaceful solution to the Beijing-Taipei dispute. This should not mean the US mediating--or even getting caught in the middle, never mind micro-managing the specifics--of their politics, just assuring that we get just compensation for our concessions in the coin we require: fostering our national interest of assuring peace in the region.

6. **The crucial factor must be candor with both Taipei and the PRC**. Under no circumstances will Beijing accept this or agree to it. They may even lash out occasionally in ways that complicate our lives--but they are already set on a course to do that anyway. Over time, they will learn to live with it, especially if we define clearly what we are doing, why, and what its limitations are, and if Beijing sees some countervailing benefits to its own interests.

B **Second, we should quietly drop the term "comprehensive engagement" and simply deal with China on a normal basis. We should focus our engagement on those issues of highest priority and highest potential payoff in terms of US national interests.**

1. Beijing has come to view **"comprehensive engagement" as a cynical cover for "peaceful evolution" and support for the Westernization and fragmentation of China**. They view us as making an endless series of demands that infringe on their sovereignty or national dignity, tactically shifting from applying pressure on trade to proliferation to human rights (when, indeed, we are not pushing on all three simultaneously). Our tactics have been viewed as all threat/pressure and no reward/benefit. Rather than "comprehensive engagement," which they view as across-the-board pressure, we should seek a "selective engagement" on issues where real progress can be made.

2. **Tiananmen is now six years past**; most Chinese have forgotten, forgiven, or decided to sublimate it. Tiananmen sanctions are a relic of the past and should quietly be lifted. Top-level contacts should be resumed, but without fanfare. We should **treat China as just another important country** with which we have normal relations and real issues to discuss. If they chose not to respond in kind out of pique over Taiwan, the onus is on them. They don't like to be in that position and will squirm to shift blame to us, but will eventually see it in their interest to reciprocate.

3. Just as we should not give Taiwan a free ride, we should not in any way indicate to Beijing that we "owe" them anything, are apologetic, or are making amends. We are simply defining our relationship with them as a normal one, conducted on its merits as with any other nation. **China should not be treated as a special case**. Similarly, we are defining our relationship with Taiwan consistent with our national interest, not Beijing's view of the world.

C.. We need to apply ***patience*** **to our expectations of human rights progress**. The long-term trends and systemic pressures are favorable, and require only **passive support from the USG**. Progress must be driven by such non-governmental factors as economic modernization, development of a middle-class, and intra-system pressures for greater predictability, justice, and regularity, as well as the glare of the international spotlight so well wielded by NGOs.

1. We too seldom recognize that **we are used by human rights activists** (here and in China), and that our public pressure emboldens many of those in China to take self-destructive actions to pressure the regime in the expectation of foreign support. **The net result of our pressure over the last two years has been the largest-scale crackdown on dissidents since 1989-90**. The saddest aspect of this--aside from the inestimable human cost of, for example, eight more years in prison for Chen Ziming--is that **we have begun to alienate many of those forces in society who should be and used to be our natural allies.** Yearly struggles over the UNHRC, squabbling over "engagement" on human rights, and presentation of lists and demands contribute to a growing and widespread sense among Chinese elites that the US disrespects and bullies China.

2. We can best pursue our agenda of improving the human rights *climate* (rather than obsessing with individual cases) by **strongly supporting responsible economic modernization and development of the rule of law through robust bilateral programs, while for the most part leaving direct human rights criticism and pressure to private sector agencies and individuals**. (Parenthetically, John Kamm has had greater success in acquiring information--and perhaps even influencing Chinese actions on specific cases--than the USG, in large part because he can't be seen as "pressuring" or "threatening" China.)

3. This, of course, requires **leadership,** not knuckling under to perceived pressure from Congress or special interests. We cannot expect to see -- or show -- results in the short-term and can expect bitter criticism. But the longer-term results will be well worth the short-term discomfort.

D. **Third, we need to recognize and applaud Chinese progress when it occurs.**

1. **One of the brightest spots in this respect is proliferation**. Since the mid-1980s, China has become increasingly responsible in its proliferation behavior. It has signed the NPT, CWC, agreed to abide by MTCR, agreed to negotiate CTBT, etc. Yet the PRC has gotten virtually no credit from the US for these improvements. Instead, we focus on perceived (or sometimes real) transgressions.

2. While we cannot and should not overlook Chinese misbehavior**, we must pick our shots carefully** to avoid an endless round of sanctions, confrontations, and threats. Sales of M-11 missiles to Pakistan are one thing: they are pretty clearly a violation of China's self-accepted international commitments. Sales of nuclear power plants to Iran or Pakistan are another: the Chinese are following all the international rules. That's not good enough for us, and we can quietly press Beijing about our concerns. But public posturing and threats of sanctions aren't going to help.

3. Similarly, it wouldn't hurt to recognize when Beijing takes steps to de-escalate problems as they seem to be trying to do with the Philippines on the Spratly issue. At the same time, we can reiterate our concern and attitude of watchfulness.

7. **Summary** - The above-outlined policy adjustment involves **defining our interests and articulating clearly--to ourselves, Congress, and Beijing and Taipei--how we intend to pursue them, in our own language, and without apology to either "China."** We should avoid becoming prisoner to Chinese jargon about how many "Chinas" there are or being played as a "card" by either Beijing or Taipei. This is a tough course because it is sure to please no one and draw fire from all sides. We may not be able to bring the PRC around: Beijing is pretty close to writing this Administration off and waiting for the 1996 elections. (Of course, practically speaking, it can't do that. To do so would provoke a continued -- even accelerated -- slide in relations.) Taipei thinks it has the Administration on the run and can pry concessions from us with the lever of Congress.

By dropping sanctions and resuming top-level dialogue (including a public invitation later this summer to Jiang Zemin to visit the US next spring), we place the ball in Beijing's court.* As relations emerge from the cold, we should focus our energy and

---

* Jiang almost certainly cannot afford to accept an invitation connected to the Fall UN celebrations because it would follow too closely after Lee Teng-hui's visit. Such a visit might become possible next spring.

attention on those issues of highest US national security interest in ways most likely to achieve real long-term positive results. Such "selective engagement" should take place in the context of a "normalization" of relations with China, i.e., treating China as just another important country with which we conduct normal business. At the same time, we should make clear to Beijing and Taipei that the old, Cold War approach to Taiwan is obsolete. We must deal with Taipei on the merits of an increasingly important, if still unofficial, relationship that requires certain kinds of contacts and freedom of travel.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013. memo	To: Mr. Tarnoff; From: Winston Lord; Re: China Startegy Meeting (16 pages)	07/07/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Asian Affairs (Suettinger, Robert)
OA/Box Number: 1044

FOLDER TITLE:
U.S. - PRC [People's Republic of China] Downturn

2012-0975-F
sb1274

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. agenda~~	~~Drop by Meeting with Lee Kuan Yew (2 pages)~~	~~02/29/2000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ vr 1/2/2020
~~001b. talking~~ points	~~Points to be made for meeting with Lee Kuan Yew (1 page)~~	~~02/29/2000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ vr 1/2/2020
~~002. memo~~	~~To: Samuel Berger; Re: Pyongyang Visit (3 pages)~~	~~06/01/1999~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ vr 1/2/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Office of Press and Communications (Crowley, Philip J. (PJ))
OA/Box Number: 4153

FOLDER TITLE:
China / Taiwan [2]

2012-0975-F
sb1275

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1398 NSC Press

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 29, 2000

DROP-BY MEETING WITH
LEE KUAN YEW
DATE: March 1, 2000
LOCATION: Samuel Berger's Office
TIME: 11:15 a.m.

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

I. PURPOSE

- Reaffirm our strong commitment to Asia and to constructive relations with China.
- Emphasize value of our close security ties and shared commitment to trade liberalization.

II. BACKGROUND

Although he stepped down as Prime Minister ten years ago, Lee remains Singapore's preeminent political figure and senior statesman. His views and opinions are influential in Singapore and across the region. He regards our military presence in Asia as uniquely benign and stabilizing. Lee was the driving force behind the construction of a new deep-water berth at Changi Naval Base for the use of U.S. aircraft carriers. While he has expressed impatience about U.S. efforts to promote human rights, he regards our overall foreign policy as serving the interests of the region well.

Lee is mildly critical of our Indonesia policy, suggesting we are too concerned with the "process of democracy" and not sufficiently attentive to threats to Indonesia's stability and unity. Although he is supportive of Wahid, he believes Wahid should have concentrated on economic reform before taking on Wahid and the military. Lee continues to play a role in keeping channels of communication open between China and Taiwan, and keeps a close watch on developments in Indonesia. His perspectives on China policy should be of particular interest. You should enlist his continued support for our efforts to launch a new WTO Round.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 2/29/10

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/28/2015
2017-0051-M (2.50)

III. PARTICIPANTS

U.S.
The President
Samuel Berger
John Podesta
Ambassador Steven Green
Kenneth Lieberthal

Singapore
Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew
Ambassador Chan Heng Chee
Leo Yip Seng Cheong, Private Secretary
Benjamin Jeyaraj William, Deputy Chief of Mission

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House Photographer
Closed Press

V. SEQUENCE

My meeting with Lee Kuan Yew will begin at 11:00 a.m. You will join that meeting in progress, accompanied by John Podesta.

Attachment
Tab A Points to be Made

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH LEE KUAN YEW

BILATERAL TIES

- Value our excellent ties and close cooperation on security and economic issues.
- Important that we get new trade Round launched this year. Further trade liberalization will benefit all WTO member countries. All parties need to show flexibility to get this done. We are prepared to do so, and hope you are.

CHINA

- Overall impression is that China wants to stabilize relationship, but is not going to take major initiatives before the end of my term.
- Recognize sensitivity of Taiwan issue, especially in context of March 18 Presidential election.
- China's White Paper unhelpful, but advances some flexibility that may facilitate negotiations.

INDONESIA

- Strongly support Wahid's reform efforts and directions; recognize importance of stable, democratic Indonesia.
- Will contribute to economic recovery with increased bilateral aid through IMF and World Bank programs.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/28/2014
2017-0051-M (251)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 1, 1999

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: KENNETH LIEBERTHAL

SUBJECT: Read Out on Pyongyang Visit

I want to flesh out a bit the results of our trip to North Korea last week. In brief, we received mixed signals from the DPRK about the proposal Perry put on the table.

The North's substantive response was totally negative:

- They refused to discuss at all their nuclear weapons program because, they said, no such program exists. They cited Kumchangni as an example of the U.S. using demands for inspections of "suspect" sites to intrude on North Korea's sovereignty. [Note that the briefing we received from the site inspection team made clear that there is "no possibility" that this site was developed with the idea of putting a reprocessing facility there.]

- They indicated they are willing to discuss missile exports (no change from their previous position) but that they have a sovereign right to develop long range missiles and will in fact test another one whenever their military decides to do so.

- They received only very reluctantly our messages from KDJ and Obuchi, and they made absolutely clear that they will not deal with the ROK and Japan issues through the U.S.

Other body language, though, was quite positive. Specifically:

- We received extraordinarily good treatment there in terms of accommodations, banquet details, acceptance of all our requests for places to visit, and motorcade arrangements.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Classified by: K. Lieberthal
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: June 1, 2009

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NL NARA, Date 8/28/2014
2.17-0051-m (2.52)

- All talks were held in a calm and courteous fashion. Evans Revere (our State Department Korea specialist) expected a tirade in our second session (when they were to deliver their formal reaction to Perry's presentation at the first session). Instead, we received a calm, thoughtful, strategic-level analysis. Our interlocutors repeatedly termed our visit to be of "epochal" importance, praised our "sincerity," and expressed their "appreciation" for the Perry review.

- Our interlocutors used Korean terms of very high respect when referring to President Clinton and to Perry.

- We received extensive - and neutral - coverage in North Korean media. No name calling at all, and the media made clear that we met with top people from both the government and the military (thereby associating those institutions with our visit).

- The communiqué issued after we left (which had not been cleared with us) was factual and neutral in tone. It termed our discussions "in depth" and "serious."

If, therefore, one take the North Korean negotiating posture to be a combination of what they say and what they do, the overall message was very mixed. Our Korean specialists on the trip feel that it is likely that we will get some sort of probe from the North during the coming few weeks, and that we will then begin to ascertain the real response to our proposals.

Finally, the North made clear that they want to continue all activities with us that were already under way (Four Party talks, missile talks, etc.).

My own view is that the North expected more than they got in the Perry proposal and thus had to back away from their high expectations. They are now deciding how to play it. In addition, they made absolutely no effort to disguise the sharp disagreements between their Foreign Ministry and their military (the latter referred to the former contemptuously as "the neckties"). Indeed, the tensions between the two were highlighted to such an extent that it may have been in part a "good cop, bad cop" routine.

The bottom line, I believe is that:

- North Korea very likely will test another long range missile, probably before the end of the summer.

- Pyongyang might accept part of our proposal but will not accept all of it. Rather, they will start to negotiate to see how much they can get and how little they can give up. If they stall until after their next missile test, they may then agree to a lot of goodies in exchange for a moratorium.

- Our meetings with the Japanese and ROK in Seoul went very well, and we remain closely coordinated on this effort. Clearly, though, North Korea regards this as a negative. They have worked for years to split the three of us up and play one against another, and they see our current coordination as threatening. We can count on their doing everything they can to disrupt a coordinated approach among the US, ROK, and Japan.

- We need to decide what type of "report" Perry will make and to whom. We very likely will not have any real confidence concerning the DPRK's reaction to Perry's game plan until at least two or three weeks from now. Does it make sense for him to make his recommendations before then? Also, should his recommendations be made to the President Clinton or to the President? Should they take the form of a report or only of oral recommendations?

- We also need to decide what role, if any, Perry and Ash Carter should play after they submit their recommendations. Any future role would turn them into active negotiators. Note, in this regard, that Wendy Sherman told the North Koreans that she would take over this issue once Perry had made his recommendations and that Ash Carter would continue to play a very active role.

Concurrences by: [Enter names of concurring NSC staff, initialed off]

Attachment
Tab [A] [Enter brief description of attachment]

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	Re: Chinese Interest in GPS (3 pages)	01/11/1995	P1/b(1)
002. cable	Re: Highlight Cable (3 pages)	01/24/1995	P1/b(1)
003. cable	Re: No Subject found [Vietnam Missiles] (3 pages)	03/03/1995	P1/b(1)
004. cable	Re: Taiwan Reacts to Chinese (3 pages)	03/13/1995	P1/b(1)
005. cable	Re: Highlight Cable (3 pages)	03/24/1995	P1/b(1)
006. cable	Re: No Subject Found [Executive Summary] (3 pages)	03/26/1995	P1/b(1)
007. cable	Re: Special Report (2 pages)	03/27/1995	P1/b(1)
008. cable	Re: China Missiles (2 pages)	05/09/1995	P1/b(1)
009. cable	Re: No Subject Found [Executive Summary] (3 pages)	05/15/1995	P1/b(1)
010. cable	Re: Highlight Cable (2 pages)	05/24/1995	P1/b(1)
011. cable	Re: Highlight Cable (2 pages)	05/24/1995	P1/b(1)
012. cable	Re: No Subject Found [Executive Summary] (3 pages)	05/25/1995	P1/b(1)
013. cable	Re: Supplement to Weekly Wire (2 pages)	06/23/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1995-Dec 1996 ([China or Taiwan Missile Test])
OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:
[01/11/1995 - 07/26/1995]

2012-0975-F
sb1276

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
014. cable	Re: Foreign Missile Launch Event Highlights (4 pages)	06/26/1995	P1/b(1)
015. cable	Re: Foreign Missile Launch Event Highlights (3 pages)	07/03/1995	P1/b(1)
016. cable	Re: Foreign Missile Digest (9 pages)	07/06/1995	P1/b(1)
017. cable	Re: Status Message (3 pages)	07/12/1995	P1/b(1)
018. cable	Re: PRC-Military Aviation (3 pages)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1)
019. cable	Re: Taiwan's Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology (3 pages)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1)
020. cable	Re: Scientific and Technical Weekly Wire, Part 1 (4 pages)	07/19/1995	P1/b(1)
021. cable	Re: Comments on Upcoming Missile Test (3 pages)	07/20/1995	P1/b(1)
~~022. cable~~	~~Re: Attention-Grabbing Missile Exercise (2 pages)~~	~~07/21/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VR 1/2/2020
023. cable	Re: China: Missile Launches [partial] [10 USC 424] [50 USC 3605] (3 pages)	07/23/1995	P1/b(1), P3/b(3) VR 1/2/2020
024. cable	Re: China: Missile Launches (2 pages)	07/24/1995	P1/b(1)
025. cable	Re: Pakistan-PRC (2 pages)	07/26/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1995-Dec 1996 ([China or Taiwan Missile Test])
OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:
[01/11/1995 - 07/26/1995]

2012-0975-F
sb1276

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
026. cable	Re: Special Report (2 pages)	07/26/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1995-Dec 1996 ([China or Taiwan Missile Test])
OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:
[01/11/1995 - 07/26/1995]

2012-0975-F
sb1276

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Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHBJA2510 2021059-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 211059Z JUL 95
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY BEIJIKG
OSRI: RUEHBJ
DTG: 211059Z JUL 95
ORIG: AMEMBASSY BEIJIKG
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3228
INFO: RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 7155
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 8130
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 4327
RUESLE/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 6023
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 9906
ZEN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU
SUBJ: ATTENTION GRABBING MISSILE EXERCISE

TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ BEIJING 032510

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MCAP, CH, US, TW
SUBJECT: ATTENTION GRABBING MISSILE EXERCISE

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT. ACTION REQUEST AT PARA 6.

2. ON JULY 21 EMBASSY REQUESTED MEETINGS ON CHINA'S JULY 21-28 MISSILE EXERCISE NEAR TAIWAN WITH THE MFA DISARMAMENT DIVISION AND THE MND FOREIGN AFFAIRS BUREAU (FAB). OUR MFA CONTACT TOLD US HE WOULD CHECK ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A MEETING AND NOTED WE MIGHT BE REFERRED TO ANOTHER OFFICE. HE ADDED THAT THE XINHUA PRESS STATEMENT AND THE JULY 20 REMARKS OF THE MFA PRESS SPOKESMAN (SEPTEL) WERE AS MUCH AS HE COULD SAY ON THE SUBJECT, WITH WHICH HE WAS NOT PERSONALLY INVOLVED. THE MND FAB DECLINED TO MEET WITH US ON JULY 21, SAYING THAT THERE WAS NO INFORMATION BEYOND WHAT HAD APPEARED IN THE PRESS.

3. A VARIETY OF CHINESE NON-GOVERNMENT INTERLOCUTORS HAVE TOLD US THEY BELIEVE BEIJING IS CONDUCTING THE EXERCISE BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN UNABLE TO CATCH TAIWAN'S ATTENTION WITH STRONG RHETORIC AND OTHER MEASURES, SUCH AS POSTPONEMENT OF CROSS-STRAIT TALKS, IN REACTION TO THE VISIT OF LEE TENG-HUI TO THE UNITED STATES AND TAIWAN'S PERCEIVED DRIFT TOWARD INDEPENDENCE. NO CONTACTS, INCLUDING PRESS, APPEAR AWARE THAT AN ACTUAL MISSILE TEST HAS ALREADY OCCURRED.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
VL NARA, Date 8/26/2019
2017-0087-M (2,22)

4. PRC NEWSPAPERS ON JULY 19 CARRIED THE OFFICIAL XINHUA ANNOUNCEMENT REGARDING THE EXERCISE. HOWEVER, THE OPEN PRESS HAS NOT REPORTED ON THE JULY 20 REMARKS OF THE PRESS SPOKESMAN REGARDING THE EXERCISE, NOR HAS IT REPORTED TAIWAN OR OTHER REACTION. HOWEVER, THE INTERNALLY CIRCULATED "REFERENCE NEWS" HAS GIVEN PROMINENT COVERAGE TO FOREIGN REACTION TO THE EXERCISE AND, ON JULY 21, CARRIED ONE SUBSTANTIAL ARTICLE SOURCED TO SEVERAL TAIWAN NEWSPAPERS TITLED "TAIWAN OFFICIALS REACT QUICKLY TO OUR MISSILE EXERCISE." IT CARRIED ADDITIONALLY A REPORT DESCRIBING THE 4.23 PERCENT DROP IN THE TAIPEI STOCK MARKET ON JULY 19 FOLLOWING THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE EXERCISE.

5. COMMENT: AT A JULY 20 SOCIAL EVENT TWO PROMINENT RESEARCHERS FROM CHINESE THINK TANKS WERE DISTINCTLY PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY FOR AN IMPROVEMENT IN U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS AS A RESULT OF THE UPCOMING MEETING BETWEEN SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER AND VICE PREMIER/FOREIGN MINISTER QIAN QICHEN IN BRUNEI. ONE OF THE RESEARCHERS ASCRIBED THE PROBLEM TO THE PRESENT EMOTIONALLY CHARGED POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE ON BOTH SIDES. WE SUSPECT THAT THE DECISION TO HOLD A DELIBERATELY PROVOCATIVE MISSILE EXERCISE SHORTLY BEFORE THE BRUNEI MEETING WAS PROBABLY A SUBJECT OF INTENSE DEBATE IN BEIJING AND REFLECTS THE CONINUED STRONG VOICE OF THE MILITARY IN PROVIDING A NATIONALISTIC EDGE TO CHINA'S REACTION. APART FROM SERVING AS AN UNSUBTLE WARNING TO TAIWAN, THE TIMING OF THE EXERCISE SUGGESTS THAT AT THIS POINT BEIJING MAY BE MORE INTENT ON SENDING US MESSAGES AND ESTABLISHING A TOUGH POSITION FOR INTERNAL CRITICS AS WELL AS EXTERNAL CONSUMPTION. WE EXPECT THE PRC TO KEEP THIS GAME FACE ON AT LEAST THROUGH THE BRUNEI MEETINGS AT THE END OF THE MONTH. END COMMENT.

6. ACTION REQUEST: EMBASSY REQUESTS THAT DEPARTMENT PROVIDE TALKING POINTS ON THE MISSILE EXERCISE TO PRESENT TO CHINESE MFA AND MND OFFICIALS. WE PLAN TO FOLLOW UP ON OUR REQUESTS FOR MEETINGS EARLY NEXT WEEK. HALLFORD
BT
#2510

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 2510

TOR: 950721070325 M1774828

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PRT: SIT
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
023. cable	Re: China: Missile Launches [partial] [10 USC 424] [50 USC 3605] (3 pages)	07/23/1995	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
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OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:
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b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Cable

PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: ~~SECRET~~
LINE1: PATMZYUW (b)(3) 1258 2050428-MORN-- (b)(3)
LINE2: ZNY MMORN
LINE3: ZKZK PP SOA DE
LINE4: P 232213Z JUL 95
OSRI: (b)(3)
DTG: 232213Z JUL 95
ORIG: (b)(3)
TO: (b)(3)
INFO: ////
SUBJ: CHINA: MISSILE LAUNCHES. (U)
TEXT:

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/28/2019
2017-0051-M (2.89)

~~S E C R E T~~
SECTION 1 OF 2
QQQQ

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, (b)(3)

)))
(U) THIS MESSAGE IS PART OF THE PRODUCTION EFFORT OF THE UNIFIED COMMANDS, THE MILITARY SERVICES, NSA, AND DIA. THE CONTENTS REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF THE ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION AND MAY NOT REFLECT A COORDINATED DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE POSITION.
)))

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d, EO 13526 3.5c, (b)(3)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d, EO 13526 3.5c, (b)(3)

NNNN
~~S E C R E T~~ EO 13526 1.4c
SECTION 2 OF 2
QQQQ

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d, EO 13526 3.5c, (b)(3)

DECL: OADR
#1259

NNNN
SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
SSN: 1258
<^SSN>1259
TOR: 950724005810 M1777218

<^TOR>950724005809 M1777217

DIST:

SIT: NSC

❑

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	Re: Highlight Cable (4 pages)	07/27/1995	P1/b(1)
002. cable	Re: Warning to Taiwan from PRC Leaders [partial] (3 pages)	07/27/1995	P1/b(1) VL 1/2/2020
003. cable	Re: Missile Launch, Taiwan and Sino-U.S. Relations (4 pages)	07/28/1995	P1/b(1)
004. cable	Re: Special Report (4 pages)	07/28/1995	P1/b(1)
005. cable	Re: Chinese Communist Party (6 pages)	08/11/1995	P1/b(1)
006. cable	Re: S and T Perspectives [partial] (1 page)	08/23/1995	P3/b(3)
007. cable	Re: PRC / Military Aviation (2 pages)	08/26/1995	P1/b(1)
008. cable	Re: No Subject Found [Executive Summary] (3 pages)	08/27/1995	P1/b(1)
009. cable	Re: Highlight Cable (4 pages)	09/01/1995	P1/b(1)
010. cable	Re: Highlight Cable (3 pages)	09/09/1995	P1/b(1)
011. cable	Re: PRC Flight Test (2 pages)	09/11/1995	P1/b(1)
012. cable	Re: Highlight Cable (3 pages)	09/17/1995	P1/b(1)
013. cable	Re: No Subject Found [Executive Summary] (2 pages)	09/17/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1995-Dec 1996 ([China or Taiwan Missile Test])
OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:
[07/27/1995 - 12/26/1995]

2012-0975-F
sb1277

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
014. cable	Re: Highlight Cable (3 pages)	09/20/1995	P1/b(1)
015. cable	Re: Highlight Cable (3 pages)	09/22/1995	P1/b(1)
016. cable	Re: Successful Test [partial] [10 USC 424; 50 USC 3605] (3 pages)	09/26/1995	P1/b(1), P3/b(3) VR 1/2/2020
017. cable	Re: Highlight Cable (4 pages)	08/28/1995	P1/b(1)
018. cable	Re: PRC / Combat Readiness (3 pages)	09/28/1995	P1/b(1)
019. cable	Re: PRC / Combat Readiness (2 pages)	09/29/1995	P1/b(1)
020. cable	Re: No Subject Found [Executive Summary] (3 pages)	10/04/1995	P1/b(1)
021. cable	Re: China: Fighter Base (2 pages)	10/31/1995	P1/b(1)
022. cable	Re: Highlight Cable (3 pages)	10/31/1995	P1/b(1)
023. cable	Re: Highlight Cable (3 pages)	11/07/1995	P1/b(1)
024. cable	Re: No Subject Found [Executive Summary] (3 pages)	12/08/1995	P1/b(1)
025. cable	Re: No Subject Found [Executive Summary] (3 pages)	12/20/1995	P1/b(1)
026. cable	Re: Iran [partial] [10 USC 424; 50 USC 3605] (4 pages)	12/26/1995	P1/b(1), P3/b(3) VR 1/2/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1995-Dec 1996 ([China or Taiwan Missile Test])
OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:
[07/27/1995 - 12/26/1995]

2012-0975-F
sb1277

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. cable	Re: Warning to Taiwan from PRC Leaders [partial] (3 pages)	07/27/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1995-Dec 1996 ([China or Taiwan Missile Test])
OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:
[07/27/1995 - 12/26/1995]

2012-0975-F
sb1277

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Cable

PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: P 271211Z JUL 95 ZDK
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
OSRI: RUEHBJ
DTG: 271211Z JUL 95
ORIG: AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4153
INFO: RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 4421
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 7257
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 8170
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5662
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 0002
RUESLE/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 6113
ZEN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/28/2019
2017-0051-M (3.01)

SUBJ: WARNING TO TAIWAN FROM PRC LEADERS; MESSAGE FOR WASHINGTON (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 033978

DEPT FOR EAP/CM AND IO/OIC

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, KWMN, MARR, CH, US, TW
SUBJECT: WARNING TO TAIWAN FROM PRC LEADERS; MESSAGE FOR WASHINGTON (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

REP: BEIJING 33102

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) DISCUSSED SINO-U.S. RELATIONS AND THE THE TAIWAN ISSUE WITH EMBOFFS ON JULY 27. (b)(1) STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TAIWAN ISSUE TO LEADERS IN BEIJING, AND SAID THE MISSILE TESTS NEAR TAIWAN AS WELL AS THE JULY 24-27 SERIES OF FOUR "PEOPLE'S DAILY" COMMENTARIES CRITICIZING LEE TENG-HUI SHOULD BE INTERPRETED AS A VERY STRONG WARNING TO LEE AND TAIWAN NOT TO GO TOO FAR ON TAIWAN INDEPENDENCE. (b)(1) ALSO STRESSED THAT A VISIT BY HILARY CLINTON DURING THE UN WOMEN'S CONFERENCE WOULD HELP U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS. THE CHINESE PEOPLE, PARTICULARLY THE YOUTH, HAD A POSITIVE IMAGE OF MRS. CLINTON, WHO WOULD BE WARMLY WELCOMED BY CHINA. END SUMMARY.

3. (b)(1) REMARKED THAT THE JULY 27 "PEOPLE'S DAILY"

CARRIED THE LAST OF A SERIES OF FOUR COMMENTARIES CRITICIZING LEE TENG-HUI AND HIS SPEECH AT CORNELL UNIVERSITY AND AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE END OF MISSILE TESTS NEAR TAIWAN. [redacted] STRESSED THAT THESE CONSTITUTED A VERY STRONG WARNING FROM THE PRC GOVERNMENT TO THE TAIWAN GOVERNMENT AND LEE TENG-HUI. CHINESE LEADERS BELIEVED LEE HAS ADVOCATING INDEPENDENCE FOR TAIWAN AND HAS A SEPARATIST LEADER.

4. [redacted] SAID HE BELIEVED THE PRC GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT DEAL WITH LEE. [redacted] NOTED THAT THERE WOULD BE A PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN TAIWAN NEXT YEAR. CITING HAU PEI-TSUN AND LIN YANG-KANG AS EXAMPLES, [redacted] SAID BEIJING HOPED TO DEAL WITH TAIWAN LEADERS WHO SUPPORTED REUNIFICATION. TAIWAN HAS A VERY SENSITIVE ISSUE TO THE PRC GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE, HE ADDED. THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND LAWMAKERS NEEDED TO REALIZE THIS. NO PRC LEADER COULD MAKE CONCESSIONS ON THIS VERY CRUCIAL ISSUE FOR CHINA, AN ISSUE WHICH INVOLVED SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. BEIJING HAS WARNING TAIWAN AND LEE NOT TO GO TOO FAR ON TAIWAN INDEPENDENCE. [redacted] SAID HE EXPECTED PRC RHETORIC ON TAIWAN-BELATED ISSUES TO CONTINUE THROUGH THE TAIWAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION NEXT YEAR.

All closures on this page
(b)(1), E.O. 13526
3.3(b)(6)

5. WITH THE MISSILE TEST, [redacted] CONTINUED, THE PRC GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY HAD DEMONSTRATED IT HAD THE CAPABILITY TO TAKE TAIWAN BACK. THE FOURTH AND FINAL PEOPLE'S DAILY COMMENTARY (JULY 27) MADE THIS POINT CLEAR (SEE BELOW PARA 8). THE MISSILE TEST HAS BOTH A PRACTICAL EXERCISE AND A POLITICAL MESSAGE. [redacted] STRESSED THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF THE MILITARY ON THE TAIWAN AND SOUTH CHINA SEA ISSUES. HE ALSO INDICATED THAT PRESIDENT JIANG HAS UNDER PRESSURE ON THE TAIWAN ISSUE.

6. DURING LUNCH, [redacted] SAID HE HAD ARRANGED OUR MEETING TO PASS A MESSAGE THAT CHINA WOULD VERY MUCH WELCOME A VISIT BY FIRST LADY HILARY CLINTON. [redacted] SAID THIS HAS HIS PERSONAL VIEW BUT WAS SEARED BY OTHER ACADEMICS, AND THAT HE HAD EARLIER EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR A VISIT BY MRS. CLINTON IN A REPORT TO THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT. [redacted] REMARKED THAT HILARY CLINTON HAD A VERY POSITIVE IMAGE IN CHINA, EXPECIALLY AMONG THE YOUNG PEOPLE. HE NOTED THAT AS HEAD OF THE U.S. DELEGATION TO THE UN WORLD CONFERENCE ON WOMEN, SHE WOULD OF COURSE BE THE GUEST OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

7. [redacted] NOTED THAT FORMER PRESIDENT BUSH WOULD BE VISITING CHINA IN SEPTEMBER. HOWEVER, [redacted] SAID, A VISIT BY HILARY CLINTON WOULD BE OF GREATER SIGNIFICANCE FOR BILATERAL RELATIONS THAN THE VISIT BY FORMER PRESIDENT BUSH, BECAUSE A VISIT BY MRS. CLINTON WOULD BE MORE THAN AN OPPORTUNITY TO PASS MESSAGES. [redacted] ALSO REMARKED THAT HE HOPED PRESIDENT CLINTON AND PRESIDENT JIANG ZEMIN COULD MEET IN NEW YORK, ON THE MARGIN OF THE UN 50TH ANNIVERSARY CEREMONY, AND AGAIN AT THE APEC MEETING IN OSAKA. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE ATMOSPHERE WAS RIGHT FOR A PRESIDENTIAL MEETING IN WASHINGTON.

8. COMMENT: THE JULY 27 PEOPLE'S DAILY ANNOUNCED THE END OF MISSILE TESTS NEAR TAIWAN AND THE REOPENING OF NORMAL TRAFFIC IN THE AREA AS OF 1800, JULY 26. THE PEOPLE'S DAILY ARTICLE INCLUDES A MAP SHOWING THE MISSILE IMPACT AREA IN RELATION TO TAIWAN AND THE COAST OF
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BEIJING 033978

DEPT FOR EAP/CM AND IO/OIC

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, KWMN, MARR, CH, US, TW
SUBJECT: WARNING TO TAIWAN FROM PRC LEADERS; MESSAGE FOR WASHINGTON (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

FUJIAN. AN ARTICLE IN THE PLA DAILY ADDS THAT THE PLA SUCCESSFULLY LAUNCHED SIX MISSILES FROM JULY 21-26 WITH ALL LANDING IN THE TARGET AREA. THE ARTICLE GOES ON TO SAY THAT THE SUCCESSFUL MISSILE TEST DEMONSTRATES THE PLA HAS THE RESOLVE AND CAPABILITY TO PROTECT NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, UNIFICATION OF THE MOTHERLAND, AND THE SACRED MISSION OF PROTECTING THE MOTHERLAND AS ENTRUSTED BY THE PARTY AND PEOPLE. THE FOURTH PEOPLE'S DAILY COMMENTARY CRITICIZING LEE CONTAINS THE DIRECT WARNING: "WE WILL DEFINITELY NOT SIT AROUND DOING NOTHING ABOUT ANY ACT OF SEPARATION WHICH OBSTRUCTS OR DAMAGES THE GREAT CAUSE OF CHINA'S REUNIFICATION."

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

BT
#3978

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

SSN: 3978
<^SSN>3978

TOR: 950727194601 M1784345

<^TOR>950727194618 M1784346

DIST:

PRT: SIT
SIT: NSC ROTH SCHWARTZ SUETTINGER SUM SUM2

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
016. cable	Re: Successful Test [partial] [10 USC 424; 50 USC 3605] (3 pages)	09/26/1995	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1995-Dec 1996 ([China or Taiwan Missile Test])
OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:
[07/27/1995 - 12/26/1995]

2012-0975-F
sb1277

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Cable

PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: ~~TOP SECRET~~
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LINE2: ZNY MMIDO
LINE3: ZKZK PP SOA DE
LINE4: P 262147Z SEP 95
OSRI: (b)(3)
DTG:
ORIG: (b)(3)
TO:
INFO: ////
SUBJ: CHINA: SUCCESSFUL TEST OF 1.4(c) BALLISTIC MISSILE. {U}
TEXT:

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/28/2019
2017-0051-M (3.24)

~~T O P S E C R E T~~ ~~ZARF UMBRA NOFORN~~
HANDLE VIA ~~TALENT KEYHOLE COMINT~~ CHANNELS JOINTLY
SECTION 1 OF 2
QQQQ

(b)(1), E.O. 12958 1.4(c), EO 13526 3.5c, (b)(3)

}}}
{U} THIS MESSAGE IS PART OF THE JOINT PRODUCTION EFFORT OF THE UNIFIED COMMANDS, THE MILITARY SERVICES, NSA, AND DIA. THE CONTENTS REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF THE ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION AND MAY NOT REFLECT A COORDINATED DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE POSITION.
}}}
SERIAL: (b)(3)
SUBJ: CHINA: SUCCESSFUL TEST OF 1.4(c) BALLISTIC MISSILE. {U}
DOI: 26 SEP 95 {AS OF 1125 EST}
TEXT: 1. (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d, EO 13526 3.5c, (b)(3)

}}}
4. EO 13526 1.4c

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d, EO 13526 1.4g, EO 13526 3.5c, (b)(3)

#2129

NNNN
~~T O P S E C R E T~~ ~~ZARF UMBRA NOFORN~~
HANDLE VIA ~~TALENT KEYHOLE COMINT~~ CHANNELS JOINTLY
SECTION 2 OF 2
QQQQ

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c, (b)(3)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d, EO 13526 3.5c, (b)(3)

DECL: OADR
#2130

NNNN

SECT:

SSN: (b)(3)

TOR:

DIST:

SIT: NSC
□

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
026. cable	Re: Iran [partial] [10 USC 424; 50 USC 3605] (4 pages)	12/26/1995	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1995-Dec 1996 ([China or Taiwan Missile Test])
OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:
[07/27/1995 - 12/26/1995]

2012-0975-F
sb1277

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Cable

PREC: ROUTINE
CLASS: ~~TOP SECRET~~
LINE1: RATMZYUW (b)(3) 1197 3610523-MNSH-- (b)(3)
LINE2: ZNY MMNSH
LINE3: ZKZK RR (b)(3) DE
LINE4: R 262159Z DEC 95
OSRI: (b)(3)
DTG: 262159Z DEC 95
ORIG:
TO: (b)(3)

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/28/2019
2017-0051-M (3.46)

INFO: ////
SUBJ: IRAN: MISSILE TEST. {U}
TEXT:
~~T O P S E C R E T~~ EO 13526 1.4c
SECTION 1 OF 3
QQQQ

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c, (b)(3)

}}}
{U} THIS MESSAGE IS PART OF THE JOINT PRODUCTION EFFORT OF THE UNIFIED COMMANDS, THE MILITARY SERVICES, NSA, AND DIA. THE CONTENTS REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF THE ORIGINATING ORGANIZATION AND MAY NOT REFLECT A COORDINATED DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE POSITION.
}}}
SERIAL: (b)(3)
SUBJ: IRAN: MISSILE TEST. {U}
DOI: 26 DEC 95 {AS OF 1628 EST}
TEXT: 1. (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d, EO 13526 1.4g, EO 13526 3.5c, (b)(3)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d, EO 13526 1.4g, EO 13526 3.5c, (b)(3)

NNNN
~~T O P S E C R E T~~ 1.4(c)
SECTION 2 OF 3
QQQQ

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d, EO 13526 1.4g, EO 13526 3.5c, (b)(3)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d, EO 13526 1.4g, EO 13526 3.5c, (b)(3)

NNNN
~~T O P S E C R E T~~ 1.4(c)
SECTION 3 OF 3
QQQQ

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d, EO 13526 1.4g, EO 13526 3.5c, (b)(3)

#1199

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03
<^SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03

SSN:

TOR:

(b)(3)

DIST:

SIT: NSC

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	Re: Taiwan Reaction (3 pages)	03/05/1996	P1/b(1)
002. cable	Re: Support Cable for East Asia Brief [partial] (5 pages)	03/06/1996	P1/b(1) n 1/2/2020
~~003. cable~~	~~Re: Effect of Announced PRC Exercises (3 pages)~~	~~03/06/1996~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ n 1/2/2020
~~004. cable~~	~~Re: PRC - Taiwan Tensions (2 pages)~~	~~03/06/1996~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ n 1/2/2020
~~005. cable~~	~~Re: Canadian FM [Foreign Minister] (2 pages)~~	~~03/12/1996~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ n 1/2/2020
006. cable	Re: No Subject Found [PRC] (2 pages)	04/15/1996	P1/b(1)
007. cable	Re: Taiwan / Missile Activity (2 pages)	06/13/1996	P1/b(1)
008. cable	Re: Highlight Cable (5 pages)	06/23/1996	P1/b(1)
009. cable	Re: Highlight Cable (3 pages)	07/06/1996	P1/b(1)
010. cable	Re: No Subject Found [China] (4 pages)	07/06/1996	P1/b(1)
011. cable	Re: Taiwan / Missile Activity (2 pages)	07/10/1996	P1/b(1)
012. cable	Re: Taiwan / Missile Activity (2 pages)	07/12/1996	P1/b(1)
013. cable	Re: Highlight Cable (3 pages)	07/15/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1995-Dec 1996 ([China or Taiwan Missile Test])
OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:
[03/05/1996 - 12/02/1996]

2012-0975-F
sb1278

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
014. cable	Re: No Subject Found [China] (5 pages)	07/15/1996	P1/b(1)
015. cable	Re: Update (5 pages)	07/25/1996	P1/b(1)
016. cable	Re: Highlight Cable (3 pages)	08/25/1996	P1/b(1)
017. cable	Re: China conducts launch (2 pages)	09/19/1996	P1/b(1)
018. cable	Re: Highlight cable (3 pages)	09/30/1996	P1/b(1)
019. cable	Re: No Subject Found [China / Iraq] (3 pages)	09/30/1996	P1/b(1)
020. cable	Re: Update (4 pages)	10/17/1996	P1/b(1)
021. cable	Re: Highlight Cable (3 pages)	10/17/1996	P1/b(1)
~~022. cable~~	~~Re: A/S Lord's Talks (10 pages)~~	~~10/19/1996~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ R 1/2/2020
~~023. cable~~	~~Re: U/S Tarnoff (4 pages)~~	~~10/24/1996~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ R 1/2/2020
024. cable	Re: Syria (5 pages)	11/14/1996	P1/b(1)
025. cable	Re: Taiwan / Missile Activity (2 pages)	11/21/1996	P1/b(1)
026. cable	Re: Taiwan (2 pages)	12/06/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1995-Dec 1996 ([China or Taiwan Missile Test])
OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:
[03/05/1996 - 12/02/1996]

2012-0975-F
sb1278

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
027. cable	Re: Taiwan / Missile Activity (2 pages)	12/19/1996	P1/b(1)
028. cable	Re: China: Testing (3 pages)	12/02/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1995-Dec 1996 ([China or Taiwan Missile Test])
OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:
[03/05/1996 - 12/02/1996]

2012-0975-F
sb1278

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. cable	Re: Support Cable for East Asia Brief [partial] (5 pages)	03/06/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1995-Dec 1996 ([China or Taiwan Missile Test])
OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:
[03/05/1996 - 12/02/1996]

2012-0975-F
sb1278

RESTRICTION CODES

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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Cable

PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: ~~SECRET~~
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LINE2:
LINE3: (b)(1), EO 13526 3.5c
LINE4:
OSRI:
DTG: 060713Z MAR 96
ORIG:
TO:

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.5c

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/28/2019
2017-0051-M (3.49)

INFO: ////
SUBJ: H/W SUPPORT CABLE FOR EAST ASIA BRIEF OCPAS EAB 96/054 FOR 06 MARCH 1996

TEXT:
~~S E C R E T~~ EO 13526 3.5c
SECTION 1 OF 2

EO 13526 3.5c

EO 13526 3.5c

SUBJECT: H/W SUPPORT CABLE FOR EAST ASIA BRIEF OCPAS EAB 96/054 FOR 06 MARCH 1996

REF: NONE.

CONTENTS

1. CHINA: PENDING MISSILE LAUNCHES 3.5c

2. CHINA: NUCLEAR TEST (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

3. EUROPE-ASIA: AIMING TO BUILD ON SUMMIT 3.5c

1. CHINA: PENDING MISSILE LAUNCHES 3.5c

// THE ANNOUNCEMENT YESTERDAY OF CLOSURE ZONES FOR SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHES IS PROBABLY THE ONLY WARNING THAT WILL BE RECEIVED OF THE INITIAL CHINESE LAUNCHES.//

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

//GIVEN THE PROXIMITY OF THE CLOSURE AREAS TO TAIWAN, IF A MISSILE IS FIRED OVER THE NORTHERN TIP OF THE ISLAND, PORTIONS OF THE BOOSTER COULD COME DOWN ON THE ISLAND.// (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

//AN ACCIDENTAL MISSILE IMPACT ON TAIWAN IS POSSIBLE BUT UNLIKELY.//

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

-- THE CURRENT CLOSURE AREAS ARE NEARLY 30-KM WIDE. 3.5c

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

BOX

TAIWAN REACTIONS TO CHINESE MISSILE TEST PLANS 3.5c

TAIWAN AUTHORITIES YESTERDAY STERNLY CONDEMNED CHINA'S NEW MISSILE TEST PLANS AND ARE REQUESTING SIMILAR US CONDEMNATION, ACCORDING TO

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c PRESS REPORTS. PREMIER LIEN CHAN CALLED THE PLANS "PROVOCATIVE," THE FOREIGN MINISTRY ASKED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO RESPOND WITH "CLEAR-CUT ACTION," AND THE DEFENSE MINISTRY SAID TAIWAN WOULD EXERCISE RESTRAINT TO AVOID GIVING CHINA ANY PRETEXT FOR BELLIGERENT ACTION.

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

CHINA'S MISSILE TESTS ARE PARTLY DESIGNED TO WEAKEN LI'S MANDATE IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION LATER THIS MONTH BUT MAY HAVE THE OPPOSITE EFFECT. THE LEGISLATIVE YUAN PRESIDENT HAS SAID PUBLICLY THAT TAIWAN'S POPULACE IS ACCUSTOMED TO CHINA'S MILITARY INTIMIDATION AND HAS SUGGESTED THAT THE TESTS MAY GENERATE MORE SUPPORT FOR LI.

-- FOLLOWING CHINA'S MILITARY EXERCISES LAST SUMMER, LI'S POPULARITY ROSE TO ITS HIGHEST LEVEL. MOREOVER, 1.4(c) RECENT CHINESE EXERCISES HAVE AROUSED PUBLIC RESENTMENT AND STRENGTHENED VOTER

SUPPORT FOR HIM.

-- PROMINENT MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITION, PROINDEPENDENCE DEMOCRATIC PROGRESSIVE PARTY SAY SUBSTANTIAL NUMBERS OF THE PARTY'S SUPPORTERS ARE LIKELY TO VOTE FOR LI TO SHOW TAIWANESE ETHNIC SOLIDARITY AND BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE LI IS THE ONLY CANDIDATE STRONG ENOUGH TO STAND UP TO BEIJING, 1.4(c)

-- ONLY 10 PERCENT OF VOTERS RESPONDING TO A RECENT PUBLIC OPINION POLL CONDUCTED BY A TAIWAN NEWS AGENCY INDICATED THAT CHINA'S MILITARY EXERCISES WOULD AFFECT THEIR CHOICE OF PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES. 3.5c

EAST ASIA

2. CHINA: NUCLEAR TEST (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

FINAL SECTION OF 2

EO 13526 3.5c

SUBJECT: H/W SUPPORT CABLE FOR EAST ASIA BRIEF OCPAS EAB 96/054 FOR 06 MARCH 1996

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

EUROPE

3. EUROPE-ASIA: AIMING TO BUILD ON SUMMIT 3.5c

AT THE MEETING IN BANGKOK THAT ENDED ON SATURDAY, BOTH SIDES AGREED TO A SERIES OF STEPS INTENDED TO STRENGTHEN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONS, (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

-- GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE-SECTOR REPRESENTATIVES WITHIN SIX MONTHS WILL CRAFT A PLAN TO PROMOTE INVESTMENT BETWEEN THE TWO REGIONS. SENIOR OFFICIALS WILL MEET IN JULY TO DISCUSS WAYS TO ENHANCE ECONOMIC COOPERATION, PARTICULARLY IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION.

-- FOREIGN AND ECONOMIC MINISTERS WILL MEET NEXT YEAR TO DISCUSS ISSUES OF MUTUAL CONCERN AND TO PREPARE FOR THE 1998 SUMMIT. 3.5c

SEVERAL PARTICIPATING LEADERS AND THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS HAVE TOUTED

THE OUTCOME AS A NEW ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE REGIONS //--ONE THAT IMPLICITLY WOULD REDUCE US INFLUENCE--BUT NEITHER REGION SEEMS TO HAVE A VISION OF HOW RELATIONS SHOULD EVOLVE. TIES ARE THEREFORE LIKELY TO EXPAND SLOWLY OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS.//

-- // COUNTRY-TO-COUNTRY ECONOMIC CONTACTS WILL INCREASE, BUT NEITHER

SIDE APPEARS READY TO NEGOTIATE A FREE TRADE OR OTHER MAJOR ECONOMIC PACT.// ASIAN LEADERS REBUFFED EUROPEAN CALLS TO EASE RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT. 3.5c

EO 13526 3.5c

SECT:

SSN:

TOR:

DIST:

SIT: NSC

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHINA1004 0661021-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 061021Z MAR 96
LINE4: FM!AIT TAIPEI
OSRI: RUEHIN
DTG: 061021Z MAR 96
ORIG: ////
TO: RUEBBEA/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4590
RUEANHA/FAA HQS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO: RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU IMMEDIATE 6405
RUESLE/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI IMMEDIATE 4553
RUHBBMA/AMCONSUL NAHA IMMEDIATE 0167
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG IMMEDIATE 7550
RUCPDC/USDOC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHKR/AMEMBASSY KOROR IMMEDIATE 0003
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE IMMEDIATE 5479
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 7506
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 6028
RUEHMT/AMCONSUL MONTREAL IMMEDIATE 0079
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0741
RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IeMEDIATE
RURAIIA/CIA W!SHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 3873
SUBJ: EFFECT OF ANNOUNCED PRC MILITARY EXERCISES OFF
TAIWAN COAST ON AIR CARRIERS AND OCEAN SHIPPERS

COUNTERPARTS FOR THE PURPOSE OF COORDINATING EVENTS LIKE
TEXT:

//////////////// INCOMPLETE MESSAGE ////////////////////////

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 TAIPEI 001004

STATE PASS AIT/W

STATE ALSO FOR EAP/RSP/TC, EB/TRA/AVP AND EB/TRA/MA

MONTREAL FOR FAA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/06/05
TAGS: EAIR, EWWT, PREL, ASEC, MOPS, PARM, TW, CH
SUBJECT: EFFECT OF ANNOUNCED PRC MILITARY EXERCISES OFF
TAIWAN COAST ON AIR CARRIERS AND OCEAN SHIPPERS

COUNTERPARTS FOR THE PURPOSE OF COORDINATING EVENTS LIKE
THIS. THEY ALSO STATED THAT THEY HAD NO INFORMATION
REGARDING THE MISSILE LAUNCH SITE LOCATIONS, THE MISSILE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By YL NARA, Date 8/28/2015
2017-0651-M (3.50)

TYPES, THE MAXIMUM ALTITUDE OR THE TRAJECTORY OF THE MISSILES. ADDITIONALLY, THEY SAID THAT THEY WOULD BE UNABLE TO DETECT THE MISSILE LAUNCHINGS, NOR WOULD THEY BE ABLE TO SEE THE MISSILES ON RADAR AFTER THEY WERE LAUNCHED.

SHIPPING
---

15. ~~(C)~~ KEELUNG HARBOR

HSU WEN-LIANG, KEELUNG HARBOR'S ROUTE MANAGER, TOLD AIT THAT THE VAST MAJORITY OF SHIPPING TO AND FROM KEELUNG HARBOR WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY THE TESTING. MOST SHIPPING (FROM THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, AND KOREA) ENTERS KEELUNG FROM THE NORTHWEST; THE TEST AREA ANNOUNCED BY THE PRC IS DUE EAST OF THE PORT. THE ONLY SHIPS WHICH WILL BE AFFECTED, SAID HSU, ARE SOME OF THOSE TO AND FROM AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND. HE DOES NOT BELIEVE EVEN THESE SHIPS WILL FACE GREAT DIFFICULTIES FROM THE TESTING, HOWEVER, AS THE TEST AREA IS SMALL AND EASILY AVOIDED.

16. ~~(C)~~ KAOHSIUNG HARBOR

KAOHSIUNG HARBOR ADMINISTRATION DIRECTOR OLIVER YU OFFICIALLY HAD NO COMMENT FOR AIT/K ON THE IMPACT OF THE MEASURES. INFORMALLY, HE NOTED THAT THERE WOULD BE SMALL EFFECT, THE EFFECT WOULD BE OF LIMITED DURATION, AND IT WOULD NOT BE HARD FOR SHIPS TO AVOID THE TEST AREA.

17. ~~(C)~~ APL

JEFFREY THEOBALD, GENERAL MANAGER OF APL IN TAIWAN, TOLD US THAT APL HAS 17 SHIPS CALLING AT THE PORT OF KAOHSIUNG EVERY WEEK. THEIR SHIPS RUNNING BETWEEN KAOHSIUNG AND HONG KONG WILL HAVE TO BE RE-ROUTED TO STAY CLEAR OF THE AREA OF IMPACT OF THE MISSILES. OTHER THAN RE-ROUTING, APL PLANS AT THIS TIME TO MAINTAIN ITS SCHEDULES WITHOUT MODIFICATION.

18. ~~(C)~~ SEA-LAND

TONY YANG, GENERAL MANAGER OF SEA-LAND IN TAIWAN, TOLD US THAT HE HAS CONSULTED WITH HIS COMPANY'S VESSEL OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT DEPAMENT AND GIVEN THEM THE COORDINATES OF THE PROJECTED AREAS OF IMPACT OF THE PRC MISSILES. HE SAID THAT FOUR SEA-LAND VESSELS OPERATE WEEKLY BETWEEN KAOHSIUNG AND HONG KONG. HE INDICATED THAT HE DOES NOT EXPECT ANY DISRUPTIONS TO SEA-LAND OPERATIONS, BUT VESSEL OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT WILL DECIDE ON MEASURES TO BE TAKEN TO KEEP SEA-LAND VESSELS OUT OF THE PROJECTED TARGET AREA.

19. ~~(C)~~ EVERGREEN SHIPPING

STEVE CHAO, THE PUBLIC RELATIONS DIRECTOR, SAYS THAT EVERGREEN EXPECTS THAT SIX OR SEVEN OF ITS VESSELS WILL ARRIVE IN TAIPEI OR KAOHSIUNG DURING THE WEEK OF TESTING. ALL WILL BE AFFECTED BY THE TESTS TO SOME DEGREE, AND WILL HAVE TO CHANGE COURSE A BIT. HE ESTIMATED THAT THEIR ARRIVAL TIMES WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED, HOWEVER, AS THE

DIVERSION AREA IS SMALL; SHIPS CAN MAKE UP FOR THE LOST TIME FAIRLY EASILY BY INCREASING THEIR SPEED. EVERGREEN TOLD US THAT THEY WERE UNAWARE OF ANY CHANGES IN RATES OR COVERAGE AS A RESULT OF THE PRC MISSILE TEST. THEIR OPERATIONS DIRECTOR TOLD US THAT HE WAS CERTAIN THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE; OTHERWISE, HE WOULD HAVE HEARD ABOUT IT.

20. ~~(C)~~ TAIWAN FISHERMAN

BT
#1004

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 03 OF 04

SSN: 1004

TOR: 960306081908 M2115746

DIST:

SIT: NODIST NSC
□

Cable

PREC: PRIORITY
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: PAACZYUW RUEHLOA2857 0661819-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: P 061819Z MAR 96
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
OSRI: RUEHLO
DTG: 061819Z MAR 96
ORIG: AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0032
INFO: RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 4606
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 0442
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 5324
RUESLE/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 0247
SUBJ: PRC - TAIWAN TENSIONS: UK VIEW

TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ LONDON 002857

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/6/96
TAGS: PREL CH TW UK
SUBJECT: PRC - TAIWAN TENSIONS: UK VIEW

REF: STATE 29556

1. CLASSIFIED BY MICHAEL J. HABIB, POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR. REASON: 1.5(B).

2. (U) IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ABOUT A CHINESE MISSILE EXERCISE IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT AT THE MARCH 6 DAILY PRESS BRIEFING, THE FCO SPOKESMAN SAID:

QUOTE
WE WERE WATCHING THE SITUATION BETWEEN CHINA AND TAIWAN VERY CLOSELY. WE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS AN IMMINENT THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF TAIWAN. HOWEVER, WE WERE CONCERNED THAT MISSILE TEST ZONES WERE SO CLOSE TO TAIWAN AND THAT PROPOSED CHINESE ACTION HAD FURTHER HEIGHTENED TENSION IN THE REGION. THERE WAS ALSO THE POSSIBILITY OF A MISCALCULATION LEADING TO CONFRONTATION. WE WERE RAISING THE SITUATION WITH EU PARTNERS AND WERE CONSIDERING WITH THEM WHAT ACTION THE EU MIGHT TAKE.
END QUOTE

2. ~~(C)~~ FCO CHINA DEPT HEAD DAVID COATES TOLD US THERE ARE VIRTUALLY NO DIFFERENCES IN THE US AND UK ANALYSES OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT. HE THANKED US FOR REFTEL POINTS PROVIDED EARLIER AND SAID MB. LORD'S TESTIMONY HAD BEEN USEFUL IN PREPARING PM MAJOR'S BRIEF FOR HIS MEETING WITH PREMIER LI PENG ON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By N NARA, Date 8/28/2015
2017-0051-M (3.51)

THE MARGINS OF THE BANGKOK ASEM SUMMIT. COATES ASKED HOW, SPECIFICALLY, THE US IS RESPONDING TO REQUESTS BY TAIWAN AUTHORITIES FOR SECURITY ASSURANCES AND SAID HMG WOULD WELCOME FURTHER DETAILED EXCHANGES WITH US ON HOW BEST TO MAINTAIN STABILITY IN THE REGION.

3. ~~(C)~~ FCO ASSISTANT UNDER SECRETARY GRAHAM FRY TOLD US MARCH 6 THAT ALTHOUGH THE LEADERS' BILATERAL MEETING FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON HONG KONG ISSUES (SEPTEL), MAJOR DID URGE LI TO TAKE ACTIONS TO REDUCE TENSIONS IN THE REGION. FRY SAID LI, USING THE FAMILIAR RESPONSE, REITERATED THAT BEIJING REMAINS COMMITTED TO PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION WITH TAIWAN BASED ON A POLICY OF ONE PEOPLE, TWO GOVERNMENTS. LI SAID HE HOPED THAT THE EXAMPLE OF HONG KONG WOULD BE A GOOD ONE FOR TAIPEI. LI WENT ON TO ARGUE THAT IT IS LEE TENG-HUI AND THE TAIWAN AUTHORITIES, WHO SEEK TO SPLIT CHINA, WHO MUST CHANGE THEIR WORDS AND DEEDS IN ORDER TO REDUCE CROSS-STRAIT TENSIONS.

DEAL
BT
#2857

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 2857

TOR: 960306132222 M2116444

DIST:

SIT: KRISTOFF NSC SUETTINGER WISE
□

Cable

PREC: ROUTINE
CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
LINE1: RAAUZYUW RUEHOTA1247 0722209-UUUU--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNR UUUUU ZZH
LINE3: R 122209Z MAR 96
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
OSRI: RUEHOT
DTG: 122209Z MAR 96
ORIG: AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6827
INFO: RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 0068
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1348
SUBJ: CANADIAN FM EXPRESSES CONCERN TO
PRC AMBASSADOR

TEXT:

UNCLAS OTTAWA 001247

SENSITIVE

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL, CH, CA
SUBJECT: CANADIAN FM EXPRESSES CONCERN TO
PRC AMBASSADOR

1. DECONTROL UPON RECEIPT - SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PROTECT ACCORDINGLY.

2. (U) FOREIGN MINISTER AXWORTHY CALLED IN CHINESE AMBASSADOR ZHANG YIJUN MARCH 11 TO REGISTER CANADA'S "GRAVE CONCERN" OVER CHINA'S RECENT MISSILE TEST FIRINGS NEAR TAIWAN. AXWORTHY SAID IN PARLIAMENT LATER ON THE SAME DAY THAT HE HAD IMPRESSED UPON ZHANG THE NEED TO AVOID ANY ACTION THAT MIGHT ESCALATE TENSIONS, AND THAT HE HAD OFFERED CANADA'S GOOD OFFICES TO HELP RESOLVE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BEIJING AND TAIPEI.

3. (U) A CONTACT IN THE DFA'S CHINA DIVISION TOLD US THAT AXWORTHY HAD NOT MADE A FORMAL OFFER OF MEDIATION; RATHER, HE HAD EXPRESSED OTTAWA'S WILLINGNESS TO ASSIST IN THE EVENT THAT A CONSENSUS IS REACHED AMONG THE PARTIES CONCERNED THAT CANADA COULD BE HELPFUL.

4. (U) ACCORDING TO OUR CONTACT, AXWORTHY TOLD ZHANG THAT CANADA VIEWS U.S. NAVAL DEPLOYMENTS IN THE TAIWAN AREA AS "A CAUTIOUS AND PRUDENT MOVE," AND THAT IT IS "NOT UNUSUAL FOR THE U.S. TO DEPLOY VESSELS TO STAND BY IN AREAS WHERE ITS INTERESTS ARE INVOLVED."

BLANCHARD
BT
#1247

NNNN
SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01
SSN: 1247
TOR: 960312170847 M2126424
DIST:
SIT: NSC
□

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHKOA9741 2930313-CCCC--RHEHAAA.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 190313Z OCT 96
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
OSRI: RUEHKO
DTG: 190313Z OCT 96
ORIG: AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8599
INFO: RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUESLE/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 0737
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON 0564
RUALSFJ/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 2723
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA/J51//
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 4049
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 2807
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 2415
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6672
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 3057
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 5949
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 2300
SUBJ: A/S LORD'S OCTOBER 17-18 TALKS IN TOKYO: KOREA,

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2017-0051-M (3.82)

TEXT:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 06 TOKYO 009741

CINCPAC ALSO FOR FPA TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/06
TAGS: OVIP, PREL, PHUM, MNUC, ETRD, CH, KS, KN, BM, JA
SUBJECT: A/S LORD'S OCTOBER 17-18 TALKS IN TOKYO: KOREA,
CHINA AND BURMA

REF: TOKYO 9737

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY RUST DEMING, DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION, AMERICAN EMBASSY TOKYO. REASON 1.5 (B) AND (D).

SUMMARY
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2. ~~(C)~~ THIS MESSAGE COVERS THE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN EAP A/S LORD AND JAPANESE MOFA OFFICIALS ON KOREA, CHINA AND BURMA DURING HIS OCTOBER 17-18 VISIT TO TOKYO. LORD OUTLINED THE THREE PURPOSES FOR HIS VISIT TO SEOUL, EXPRESSED SYMPATHY FOR THE STRONG ANTI-DPRK FEELINGS IN SEOUL AND DESCRIBED THE NEED FOR AN "EXIT STRATEGY" TO MOVE BEYOND THE IMPASSE CREATED BY THE DPRK SUBMARINE INTRUSION. LORD SHARED HIS

SUGGESTION TO THE ROK THAT PERHAPS DPRK WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN A BRIEFING ON THE FOUR PARTY TALKS COULD SUFFICE AS A GESTURE TO THE SOUTH, BUT NOTED THAT THIS WAS NOT YET ACCEPTABLE TO THE ROK. THE JAPANESE OFFICIALS, EXPRESSING CONCERN ABOUT PYONGYANG'S LIKELY REACTION IF THERE IS NO SIGN OF PROGRESS ON KEDO, AGREED THAT WE MUST GUARD AGAINST THE "UNRAVELING" OF KEDO. THE OFFICIALS, HOWEVER, HAD NO SUGGESTIONS OF WHAT IT WOULD TAKE TO IMPROVE THE ATMOSPHERE ON THE PENINSULA.

3. ~~(C)~~ ON CHINA, LORD NOTED THAT HE HAD RECEIVED A LITANY OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST JAPAN WHILE IN BEIJING, BUT THAT HE HAD "PUSHED BACK" HARD, PARTICULARLY ON THE ISSUE OF U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY TIES. DURING A DISCUSSION OF IMPROVED U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS AND LIKELY UPCOMING HIGH LEVEL VISITS, JAPANESE OFFICIALS POINTED OUT THAT THERE IS SOME SENTIMENT HERE THAT IMPROVED U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS COULD WORK TO THE DISADVANTAGE OF JAPAN. LORD TERMED THIS SENTIMENT AS IRRATIONAL, GIVEN THE DEPTH OF U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS, BUT PROMISED TO CONSULT CLOSELY AS OUR RELATIONS WITH CHINA DEVELOP. THE SENKAKUS ISSUE IN U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS (SEE ALSO REFTEL), AND CHINA AND THE WTO WERE ALSO TOPICS OF CONVERSATION. AN EXCHANGE ON BURMA SHOWED THAT TOKYO IS TROUBLED BY TRENDS IN RANGOON. END SUMMARY.

4. ~~(C)~~ DURING AN OCTOBER 17-18 VISIT TO TOKYO, EAP A/S LORD HAD A SERIES OF FRUITFUL EXCHANGES ON REGIONAL, BILATERAL (REFTEL) AND ECONOMIC MATTERS (SEPTEL). IN MEETINGS WITH MOFA VICE FOREIGN MINISTER HAYASHI, FOREIGN POLICY BUREAU DIRECTOR GENERAL KAWASHIMA AND NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS BUREAU DIRECTOR GENERAL ORITA, A/S LORD PROVIDED EXTENSIVE BRIEFINGS ON HIS JUST-CONCLUDED TRIPS TO SOUTH KOREA AND CHINA. IN AN OCTOBER 17 WORKING DINNER WITH ASIAN BUREAU DIRECTOR GENERAL RYOZO KATO, DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL KENZO OSHIMA, NORTHEAST ASIA DIVISION DIRECTOR KORO BESSHO AND CHINA DIVISION DEPUTY DIRECTOR KOICHI ITO, LORD EXCHANGED VIEWS ON KOREA, CHINA AND BURMA. DCM DEMING, POLMINCOUNS SILVER, EAP SPECIAL ASSISTANT ARVIZU, AND POLOFFS HEFFERN AND REYNOLDS (NOTETAKERS) WERE PRESENT AT THESE EXCHANGES.

KOREA BRIEFING
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5. ~~(C)~~ IN EACH BRIEFING, LORD OUTLINED THE THREE PURPOSES OF HIS VISIT TO KOREA: TO DEMONSTRATE U.S. SOLIDARITY WITH SEOUL; TO SEND A STRONG MESSAGE TO NORTH KOREA; AND, TO RECONFIRM WITH THE ROK, DESPITE CURRENT TENSIONS, OUR GOALS ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE, I.E. TO MAINTAIN THE NUCLEAR FREEZE, TO KEEP KEDO ALIVE AND TO PROMOTE FOUR PARTY TALKS.

6. ~~(C)~~ LORD SAID THE ROK HAS GOOD REASON TO BE UNSETTLED BY RECENT EVENTS AND RHETORIC AND HE IS SYMPATHETIC WITH CURRENT SENSITIVITIES IN SEOUL. THE SUBMARINE INTRUSION, SOUTH KOREAN CASUALTIES DURING THE SEARCH FOR THE COMMANDOS, THE MURDER OF THE ROK DIPLOMAT IN VLADIVOSTOK, AND DPRK THREATENING RHETORIC AMOUNT TO SERIOUS CHALLENGES FOR THE ROK. THE U.S. UNDERSTANDS THE NEED FOR A "COOLING OFF"

PERIOD IN DEALING WITH PYONGYANG. FOR EXAMPLE, WE UNDERSTAND WHY, FOR BOTH SECURITY AND POLITICAL REASONS, THE ROK REFUSES TO SEND KEDO-RELATED TECHNICIANS TO THE NORTH. IN
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 06 TOKYO 009741

CINCPAC ALSO FOR FPA TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/06
TAGS: OVIP, PREL, PHUM, MNUC, ETRD, CH, KS, KN, BM, JA
SUBJECT: A/S LORD'S OCTOBER 17-18 TALKS IN TOKYO: KOREA, CHINA AND BURMA

ADDITION, SEOUL IS RELUCTANT IN THE CURRENT CLIMATE TO SIGN RECENTLY CONCLUDED KEDO PROTOCOLS.

7. ~~(C)~~ THE PROBLEM, SAID LORD, IS NOW TO DEVISE AN "EXIT STRATEGY" TO MOVE BEYOND THE CURRENT IMPASSE. THE ROK IS DEMANDING AN OUTRIGHT APOLOGY FROM THE DPRK WHICH, IN LORD'S VIEW, IS UNLIKELY. HE EXPLORED WITH ROK OFFICIALS ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES WHEREBY GESTURES BY THE NORTH, SHORT OF AN APOLOGY, WOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO ALLOW CONTACTS WITH THE NORTH TO PROCEED. FOR EXAMPLE, LORD ASKED, COULD SEOUL ACCEPT DPRK WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN A BRIEFING ON THE FOUR PARTY TALKS AS A SUFFICIENT GESTURE TO ALLOW US TO MOVE AHEAD? LORD SAID THERE IS CURRENTLY NO CONSENSUS IN THE ROK ON THIS POINT, BUT SOME IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY SEEM TO BE CONSIDERING ACCEPTING LESS THAN AN OUTRIGHT APOLOGY FROM PYONGYANG. LORD ADDED THAT IT IS ESSENTIAL TO AVOID CREATING THE PERCEPTION THAT KEDO IS UNRAVELING AND THAT, PERHAPS, SOME TYPE OF EXPERTS MEETING COULD BE PUT TOGETHER TO MAINTAIN SOME DEGREE OF CONTACT.

KAWASHIMA AND HAYASHI REACTIONS
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8. ~~(C)~~ DIRECTOR GENERAL KAWASHIMA COMMENTED THAT SOUTH KOREA HAS A PROPENSITY TO "PRESS US INTO A CORNER" DURING PERIODS OF TENSION WITH THE DPRK, WHEN, IN FACT, IT IS SEOUL THAT WOULD LOSE THE MOST IN A KOREAN CONFLICT. KAWASHIMA ALSO ASKED LORD HOW LONG WORK ON KEDO CAN BE HELD IN ABEYANCE BEFORE PYONGYANG RESORTS TO "NUCLEAR BRINKMANSHIP" AND, FOR EXAMPLE, THREATENS TO RESUME REPROCESSING. VICE FOREIGN MINISTER HAYASHI ECHOED THIS FEAR, ASKING WHAT PYONGYANG WILL DO IF THERE IS A "PROLONGED PERIOD" OF INACTIVITY ON KEDO. LORD CONCURRED THAT DPRK BRINKMANSHIP ON KEDO WAS A SERIOUS DANGER, WHICH WAS WHY, DURING HIS VISIT TO SEOUL, HE HAD STRESSED THE NEED NOT TO LET KEDO UNRAVEL.

KOREA - THE ASIAN BUREAU VIEW
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9. ~~(C)~~ AT A DINNER WITH ASIAN BUREAU OFFICIALS HOSTED BY THE DCM, THERE WAS ALSO EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION ON KOREA, INCLUDING THE SUBMARINE INCIDENT AND THE DILEMMA THAT THE RESULTING ROK HARD-LINE HAS CAUSED REGARDING KEDO. ACCORDING TO NORTHEAST ASIA (I.E., KOREA) DIVISION DIRECTOR BESSHO, SOUTH KOREA'S

AMBASSADOR TO KEDO SHOWED LITTLE FLEXIBILITY ON THE DPRK IN HIS OCTOBER 16 TALKS IN BRUSSELS WITH JAPANESE AMBASSADOR TO KEDO SEKI. WHEN LORD ASKED WHAT WE CAN DO TO KEEP KEDO FROM UNRAVELING, DIRECTOR GENERAL KATO RECOMMENDED THAT: KEDO SHOULD KEEP TALKS GOING WITH THE EU; THE THREE PARTNERS SHOULD CONTINUE THEIR TALKS ON THE NEXT PROTOCOL; AND KEDO SHOULD CONTINUE FUEL OIL DELIVERIES TO THE NORTH. LORD INTERJECTED THAT ROK FONMIN GONG HAD INDICATED AGREEMENT TO CONTINUE OIL DELIVERIES. AS LONG AS DELIVERIES CONTINUED, GONG HAD OPINED, THE DPRK WOULD NOT PULL OUT OF THE AGREED FRAMEWORK.

10. ~~(S)~~ KATO NOTED THAT THE GOJ HAS KEPT THE ROK INFORMED ON ITS BILATERAL TALKS WITH THE NORTH. PRESIDENT KIM RECENTLY TOLD JAPANESE REPORTERS IN SEOUL THAT HE WAS SATISFIED WITH THE WAY PM HASHIMOTO WAS OBSERVING COMMITMENTS MADE AT THEIR APRIL CHEJU SUMMIT. HE NOTED IN PARTICULAR THAT JAPAN WAS NOW CONFINING ITS CONTACT WITH THE DPRK TO GOVERNMENT CHANNELS. ASKED BY DCM DEMING WHETHER ANY POLITICIANS HAD SHOWN INTEREST IN PURSUING POLITICAL CONTACTS WITH NORTH KOREA AFTER JAPAN'S OCTOBER 20 ELECTION, KATO SAID LDP POLICY AFFAIRS RESEARCH COUNCIL HEAD YAMASAKI HAD PUBLICLY INDICATED INTEREST. DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL OSHIMA POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT NORTH KOREA HAD NOT PROVEN TO BE A POSITIVE AVENUE FOR POLITICIANS TO PURSUE IN THE PAST AND MOST HAD BEEN BURNED BY THE EXPERIENCE.

THE NORTH KOREAN MISSILE TEST
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11. ~~(S)~~ RESPONDING TO A QUESTION FROM KATO, LORD STATED THAT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS OF A POSSIBLE DPRK MISSILE TEST IN THE ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 06 TOKYO 009741

CINCPAC ALSO FOR FPA TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/06
TAGS: OVIP, PREL, PHUM, MNUC, ETRD, CH, KS, KN, BM, JA
SUBJECT: A/S LORD'S OCTOBER 17-18 TALKS IN TOKYO: KOREA, CHINA AND BURMA

NEAR FUTURE HAD LEAKED TO THE PRESS DUE TO A "LACK OF DISCIPLINE" THE USG, BUT ALSO DUE TO LACK OF COORDINATION WITHIN THE GOJ. KATO REPLIED THAT, SHOULD THE MISSILE TEST ACTUALLY TAKE PLACE, THE GOJ WOULD ISSUE A STRONGLY WORDED STATEMENT. BEFORE THE TEST, HOWEVER, THERE WAS LITTLE JAPAN COULD DO, ALTHOUGH IT WAS TRYING TO ASK THE CHINESE TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE ON NORTH KOREA. LORD URGED THE JAPANESE TO BROADEN THEIR APPROACH TO THE DPRK THROUGH CHINA BEYOND THE SPECIFIC MISSILE TEST TO INCLUDE AN APPEAL FOR GENERAL RESTRAINT, AN END TO THREATS AGAINST THE SOUTH, AND SOME SORT OF GESTURE OVER THE SUBMARINE INTRUSION INCIDENT. KATO WAS RECEPTIVE TO LORD'S SUGGESTION. OUR JAPANESE INTERLOCUTORS ALL AGREED THAT THE DIET AND JAPANESE PUBLIC WERE CERTAIN TO REACT STRONGLY, SHOULD THE NORTH CARRY OUT A MISSILE TEST.

CHINA BRIEFING
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12. (C) ALL OF LORD'S MOFA INTERLOCUTORS ALSO FOLLOWED WITH INTEREST HIS BRIEFING ON HIS TRIP TO CHINA, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF CURRENT STRAINS IN PRC-JAPAN RELATIONS. KAWASHIMA NOTED WITH REGRET THAT JAPAN'S ATTEMPTS TO STRENGTHEN TIES WITH CHINA EARLIER THIS SUMMER, AFTER CHINA ENDED ITS NUCLEAR TESTING, WERE DERAILED BY THE PRIME MINISTER'S YASUNKUNI SHRINE VISIT AND SENKAKU ISLANDS DISPUTE. LORD REPLIED THAT, WHILE THE CHINESE REAFFIRMED TO HIM THEIR INTEREST IN GOOD RELATIONS WITH JAPAN, HE RECEIVED A HEAVY DOSE OF ANTI-JAPANESE RHETORIC VIRTUALLY IN EVERY BEIJING MEETING. CHINESE OFFICIALS REITERATED THE NOW-FAMILIAR LITANY OF COMPLAINTS, INCLUDING THE SENKAKUS DISPUTE; "HISTORICAL" ISSUES, I.E., PM HASHIMOTO'S YASUKUNI VISIT; ENHANCED U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONS; INCREASED GOJ DEFENSE SPENDING; AND THE RISE OF JAPANESE RIGHTIST-BASED "MILITARISM."

13. (C) LORD TOLD THE JAPANESE OFFICIALS HOW HE PUSHED BACK WHEN CONFRONTED WITH THIS LITANY, ESPECIALLY ON THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY ISSUE, WITH THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY TIES HAVE BEEN A MAJOR FACTOR FOR REGIONAL STABILITY AND PROSPERITY, WHICH IS ALSO IN CHINA'S INTEREST;

-- THE 1960 SECURITY TREATY CONTAINS A REGIONAL ELEMENT, SO THERE IS NOTHING NEW ABOUT THIS ASPECT IN THE APRIL 1996 SECURITY DECLARATION OR THE ONGOING JOINT DEFENSE GUIDELINES REVIEW;

-- THE SECURITY DECLARATION, WHICH MAKES EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO THE LIMITS IMPOSED BY THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION, ENVISIONS ONLY JAPANESE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR U.S. FORCES IN A REGIONAL CONTINGENCY, NOT AN OVERSEAS COMBAT ROLE;

-- THE APRIL 1996 JOINT SECURITY DECLARATION WAS LARGELY CONCLUDED IN TIME FOR THE ABORTED NOVEMBER 1995 SUMMIT MEETING. THE DECLARATION, THEREFORE, WAS NOT A REACTION TO THE TAIWAN STRAITS CRISIS AND IS NOT DIRECTED AT ANY ONE COUNTRY; AND

-- WITHOUT THE SECURITY ALLIANCE WITH THE U.S., THERE WOULD BE A POWER VACUUM THAT WOULD BE DESTABILIZING.

14. (C) LORD ALSO BRIEFED THE JAPANESE OFFICIALS ON THE CURRENT STATE OF U.S.-CHINESE RELATIONS AND THE UPCOMING SERIES OF HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS IN THE WORKS. WHILE OBVIOUSLY NO SPECIFIC PLANS CAN BE MADE UNTIL AFTER THE ELECTION, LORD NOTED THAT VICE PRESIDENT GORE MIGHT VISIT CHINA IN EARLY 1997 AND THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF AN EXCHANGE OF LEADERS' VISITS IN 1997 AND 1998. LORD BALANCED THIS RELATIVELY HEADS-UP ON POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S.-CHINA TIES WITH A STATEMENT OF OUR GENUINE CONCERN ABOUT THE RECENT ROUND-UP OF CHINESE DISSIDENTS. THE HUMAN RIGHTS "WILD CARD," SAID LORD, COULD UPSET POSITIVE MOMENTUM IN RELATIONS AND TARNISH UPCOMING VISITS. KAWASHIMA NOTED THAT JAPAN, OF COURSE, HOPES THAT HUMAN RIGHTS WILL EXPAND IN CHINA. HE ASKED RHETORICALLY, HOWEVER, WHETHER ANTI-JAPANESE SENTIMENT MIGHT NOT FLOURISH

MORE WIDELY IN A MORE DEMOCRATIC CHINA. LORD SAID WE HAD A
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 06 TOKYO 009741

CINCPAC ALSO FOR FPA TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/06
TAGS: OVIP, PREL, PHUM, MNUC, ETRD, CH, KS, KN, BM, JA
SUBJECT: A/S LORD'S OCTOBER 17-18 TALKS IN TOKYO: KOREA,
CHINA AND BURMA

STRONG FAITH THAT HUMAN RIGHTS PRODUCED MORE OPEN SOCIETIES AND SUCH SOCIETIES WERE MORE LIKELY TO CO-EXIST PEACEFULLY WITH THEIR NEIGHBORS.

PAY ATTENTION TO JAPAN AS YOU IMPROVE CHINA TIES
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15. ~~(C)~~ JAPANESE OFFICIALS ALL WELCOMED U.S. ENGAGEMENT WITH CHINA, AND SAID THEY WERE PLEASED THAT U.S. EFFORTS TO IMPROVE TIES WITH BEIJING ARE BEGINNING TO "BEAR FRUIT," BUT THEY ALSO COMMENTED THAT THERE IS SOME UNEASE IN CERTAIN QUARTERS IN JAPAN WITH IMPROVING U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS. DIRECTOR GENERAL ORITA GAVE LORD AN ARTICLE IN BUSINESS WEEK WRITTEN BY THE SANKEI REPORTER IN WASHINGTON WHICH QUOTES AN UNNAMED "HIGH LEVEL USG SOURCE STATING THAT, "CHINA IS A MORE NATURAL PARTNER FOR THE U.S. THAN JAPAN IS." LORD ASSURED ORITA AND THE OTHER MOFA OFFICIALS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WAS SENSITIVE TO THIS UNEASE BUT OFFERED HIS PERSONAL VIEW THAT SUCH SENTIMENTS ARE "IRRATIONAL." HE NOTED THAT OUR DIALOGUE WITH CHINA CANNOT COMPARE WITH THE DEPTH OF OUR TIES TO JAPAN AND THAT IMPROVED U.S.-CHINA TIES WILL HAVE NO NEGATIVE IMPACT ON OUR RELATIONS WITH JAPAN. ORITA AGREED THAT THE FEAR OF SOME JAPANESE OVER CLOSE U.S.-CHINA TIES WAS IRRATIONAL, BUT WANTED TO MAKE CERTAIN LORD WAS AWARE OF IT. LORD ASSURED OF HIS INTERLOCUTORS THAT WE WOULD WORK TO ENSURE THAT THE AMOUNT OF ATTENTION THAT JAPAN GETS IN THE NEXT YEAR OR TWO WILL NOT BE COMPARED UNFAVORABLY TO THAT GIVEN TO CHINA. LORD SAID WE WOULD NEED TO BE CAREFUL IN OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN THIS AREA AND WOULD FULLY CONSULT WITH JAPAN AS OUR RELATIONS WITH CHINA EVOLVE. WE HOPE THE GOJ WILL DO THE SAME.

CHINA, THE SENKAKUS AND THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY TREATY
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16. ~~(C)~~ AT THE DINNER ON OCTOBER 17, KATO OUTLINED FOR LORD THE SEPTEMBER 25 NEW YORK MEETING BETWEEN FM IKEDA AND PRC VICE PREMIER AND FONMIN QIAN. QIAN HAD RAISED HISTORICAL ISSUES, E.G., HASHIMOTO'S JULY VISIT TO YASUKUNI SHRINE; THE U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIP; AND THE SENKAKU/DIAOYUTAI DISPUTE. THE COMMON THREAD RUNNING THROUGH THE THREE ISSUES, KATO COMMENTED, WAS A GROWING CHINESE SUSPICION THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT, UNDER PM HASHIMOTO, WAS CHANGING THE BASIC POLICY TOWARD CHINA WHICH IT HAD HELD SINCE NORMALIZING RELATIONS IN 1972. CHINA WAS "FRUSTRATED" BY THE STRONG STAND JAPAN TOOK AT THE TIME OF THE TAIWAN STRAIT INCIDENT IN THE SPRING, AND BY ITS REACTION TO CHINA'S NUCLEAR TESTS.

17. ~~(C)~~ LORD NOTED THAT STATE COUNCIL FOREIGN AFFAIRS OFFICE DIRECTOR LIU HUAQIU HAD SAID THAT SOME PEOPLE HAVE SPECULATED THE SECURITY TREATY APPLIED TO THE DISPUTED (SENKAKU) ISLANDS. OSHIMA RESPONDED THAT THE GOJ NEEDED TO HAVE A COHERENT STATEMENT ON THE ISSUE OF THE APPLICATION OF THE SECURITY TREATY TO THE SENKAKUS TO USE IN THE UPCOMING DIET SESSION. DCM DEMING NOTED THAT WE HAD ALREADY SEEN GOJ'S PROPOSED PRESS GUIDANCE ON THE ISSUE AND WERE SATISFIED WITH IT. AFTER THE DIET CONVENED IN NOVEMBER, KATO SAID, HE EXPECTED SOME DIET MEMBERS TO ASK "TENACIOUS QUESTIONS." LORD ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE SECURITY TREATY APPLIED, BUT THAT PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF THE MATTER WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL. IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TO CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER ON OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS. (NOTE: REFTEL CONTAINS AN EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION OF THE SENKAKUS ISSUE WITH NORTH AMERICAN BUREAU DIRECTOR ORITA).

18. ~~(C)~~ IN THE WAKE OF THE SENKAKUS INCIDENT, KATO CONTINUED, CHINA HAD JUST THE PREVIOUS DAY (OCTOBER 16) CANCELED WITHOUT EXPLANATION A VISIT TO JAPAN BY 50 CHINESE MAYORS WHO WERE TO HAVE TAKEN PART IN AN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM IN KOBE. POLMINCOUNS SILVER NOTED THAT, IN A POSSIBLY RELATED EVENT, AFTER THE PRC FOR THE FIRST TIME IN MANY YEARS HAD TRIED TO BAR A SANKEI EDITORIAL BOARD MEMBER FROM A CHINA VISIT WITH EDITORIALISTS FROM OTHER MAJOR JAPANESE NEWSPAPERS, THE JAPANESE EDITORIALIST GROUP HAD CALLED OFF ITS CHINA VISIT. THE CHINESE HAD COMPLAINED THAT THE SANKEI WAS BIASED AGAINST CHINA.

CINCPAC ALSO FOR FPA TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/06
TAGS: OVIP, PREL, PHUM, MNUC, ETRD, CH, KS, KN, BM, JA
SUBJECT: A/S LORD'S OCTOBER 17-18 TALKS IN TOKYO: KOREA, CHINA AND BURMA

19. ~~(C)~~ THE USG HAD INDICATIONS, SILVER NOTED, THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HAD ISSUED A DIRECTIVE TO SCHOOLS AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES NOT TO ALLOW ANTI-JAPANESE DEMONSTRATIONS. OSHIMA CONCURRED THAT THE PRC WAS UNDER STRONG DOMESTIC PRESSURE TO TAKE A MORE FORCEFUL POSITION TOWARD JAPAN. THE CHINESE HAD SHOWN RESTRAINT AFTER THE MOST RECENT SENKAKUS INCIDENT AND HAD KEPT DOWN ANTI-JAPANESE DEMONSTRATIONS. LORD INTERJECTED THAT THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT IS STIFLING SUCH DEMONSTRATIONS BOTH BECAUSE THEY WANT TO MAINTAIN GOOD BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH JAPAN, BUT ALSO BECAUSE THEY DO NOT WANT TO RISK THE POSSIBILITY THAT AN ANTI-JAPANESE DEMONSTRATION WOULD SHIFT TO SOME OTHER ANTI-GOVERNMENT AGENDA, AS HAD HAPPENED IN THE MID-1980S WHEN HE WAS AMBASSADOR. VFM TANG JIAXUAN WOULD BE VISITING JAPAN SHORTLY, ITO NOTED, AS PART OF A REGULAR ANNUAL EXCHANGE. HOWEVER, THE TIMING OF THE VISIT HAD BEEN ADJUSTED DUE TO THE ISLAND DISPUTE.

CHINA AND THE WTO

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20. KATO COMMENTED THAT CHINESE VICE PREMIER LI LANQING HAD CANCELED HIS PLANS TO ATTEND A GOJ-SPONSORED SEMINAR ON CHINA AND THE WTO TO BE HELD THIS MONTH. AGAIN, NO REASON HAD BEEN GIVEN. LORD OBSERVED THAT CHINA'S ENTHUSIASM FOR JOINING THE WTO SEEMED TO HAVE WANED SOMEWHAT. PERHAPS, HE SURMISED, THE CHINESE RECOGNIZED THAT THE OPENING OF THEIR ECONOMY, REQUIRED FOR MEMBERSHIP, WOULD PUT ADDITIONAL COMPETITIVE PRESSURE ON THE VASTLY INEFFICIENT AND BLOATED STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES, AND THAT THE RESULTING INCREASED UNEMPLOYMENT, WITH NO EFFECTIVE SAFETY NET, COULD CONTRIBUTE TO SOCIAL INSTABILITY.

BURMA
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21. ~~(C)~~ KATO REPORTED THAT SEVERAL MONTHS AGO THE JAPANESE HAD SUGGESTED TO AUNG SAN SUU KYI SOME FORM OF GESTURE TO THE SLORC. ONE SUGGESTION WAS FOR HER TO PAY A CALL ON AN OLDER RELATIVE, WHO IS A SLORC OFFICIAL, IN THE MANNER OF "CONVENTIONAL BURMESE PROTOCOL." SHE REJECTED THE PROPOSAL OUTRIGHT. THE SECOND SUGGESTION WAS FOR THE NLD TO FORMULATE A COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC POLICY AS A NON-CONFRONTATIONAL TOPIC OF DIALOGUE WITH THE SLORC. SHE AGREED TO THINK ABOUT THIS PROPOSAL, BUT, AS FAR AS THE JAPANESE ARE AWARE, THE NLD HAS NOT ACTED ON IT. KATO SPECULATED THAT THE NLD LACKED THE EXPERTISE TO ENGAGE IN AN ECONOMIC DIALOGUE WITH THE SLORC. FM IKEDA, KATO CONTINUED, HAS MET "TWO OR THREE TIMES" THIS YEAR WITH BURMESE FM OHN GYAW. IN THEIR TALKS, IKEDA HAS POINTED OUT THAT, WITH THE NLD ELECTORAL VICTORY IN 1989, THE SLORC LACKS LEGITIMACY. TO REMEDY THAT, HE PROPOSED, THE SLORC SHOULD GATHER OPINIONS FROM AS MANY SECTORS OF BURMESE SOCIETY AS POSSIBLE IN THE PROCESS OF DRAFTING THE NEW CONSTITUTION, AND THEN PUT THE PRODUCT BEFORE THE PUBLIC THROUGH A REFERENDUM. IN RESPONSE, KATO SAID, OHN GYAW SIMPLY SAID "THANK YOU." JAPAN, KATO PROFFERED, HAS NOT GIVEN RANGOON ANY NEW YEN LOANS OR GRANTS RECENTLY. THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION MAKES IT DIFFICULT FOR JAPAN TO "EXTEND A HELPING HAND." JAPAN'S AMBASSADOR IN RANGOON DEMARCHED THE SLORC WITHIN THE PAST FEW WEEKS, URGING IT TO "BE MORE GENEROUS TO THE OPPOSITION."

22. ~~(C)~~ KATO AND LORD AGREED THE WORSENING HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN BURMA WAS AT LEAST PARTIALLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO GROWING SELF-CONFIDENCE NURTURED BY PERCEIVED IMMINENT ADMISSION TO ASEAN. MALAYSIA PM MAHATHIR, KATO OBSERVED, HAD GONE BEYOND HIS AUTHORITY, SINCE HE IS NOT YET ASEAN CHAIR, BY INDICATING CERTAIN BURMESE ADMISSION. THE SLORC HAVE BEEN EMBOLDENED BY "THIS GOOD SIGN." THE THAIS, HE NOTED, HAVE BEEN MOST RETICENT ON THE MATTER OF BURMESE ADMISSION, WITH INDONESIA IN BETWEEN THAILAND AND MALAYSIA. SINGAPORE HAS BEEN SILENT. LORD SAID BURMA'S ACCEPTANCE INTO THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM THIS PAST SUMMER, TOGETHER WITH THE LONG-STANDING ASEAN, AND TO SOME EXTENT JAPANESE, POLICY OF ENGAGEMENT TOWARD BURMA HAD ALSO ENCOURAGED THE SLORC REGIME. HE SUGGESTED THE NEED FOR A PAUSE IN THE PACE OF THE ADMISSION PROCESS AND SUGGESTED

CINCPAC ALSO FOR FPA TEARE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/06
TAGS: OVIP, PREL, PHUM, MNUC, ETRD, CH, KS, KN, BM, JA
SUBJECT: A/S LORD'S OCTOBER 17-18 TALKS IN TOKYO: KOREA,
CHINA AND BURMA

THAT EVEN MALAYSIA AND OTHER ASEAN COUNTRIES WERE NOW SEEKING A FACE-SAVING WAY TO SLOW THINGS DOWN. THE USG, LORD STATED, WHILE BEING CAREFUL NOT TO TELL THE ASEANS WHAT TO DO, HAS ASKED THEM RHETORICALLY WHETHER THEY WANT TO BE EMBARRASSED BY HAVING A COUNTRY LIKE BURMA AS A MEMBER.

23. ~~(C)~~ THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION, LORD CONTINUED, HAS BEEN WORKING TO FEND OFF CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION CALLING FOR MANDATORY ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST BURMA WHILE ACCEPTING A PROHIBITION ON AID AND ARMS SALES. THE COMPROMISE COHEN LEGISLATION, HE REPORTED, WOULD INVOKE A BAN ON U.S. INVESTMENTS IN THE EVENT AUNG SAN SUU KYI IS ARRESTED OR OF "LARGE SCALE REPRESSION." IN IMPLEMENTING THE RECENTLY-ENACTED LAW, THE ADMINISTRATION MUST BE CAREFUL TO BALANCE ITS CREDIBILITY WITH CONGRESS AGAINST THE PROSPECT OF LOSING THE LITTLE LEVERAGE IT HAS WITH THE SLORC.

24. ~~(C)~~ OSHIMA OBSERVED THAT THE SLORC REGIME FACES SEVERAL MAJOR PROBLEMS, INCLUDING HOW TO HANDLE ITS ETHNIC MINORITIES, PARTICULARLY THE KAREN. NOW THE REGIME NEEDS TO GO BEYOND CONTROL AND FIND WAYS TO GRANT GREATER AUTONOMY TO THE MINORITIES. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WAS ANOTHER PROBLEM AREA. MOST FOREIGN INVESTMENT HAS BEEN IN TOURISM AND IN OIL AND GAS EXTRACTION. THE GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO ENCOURAGE MORE INVESTMENT IN MANUFACTURING, HE REMARKED. CURRENTLY, JAPAN INVESTMENT RANKS AT SIXTH OR SEVENTH, WITH ONLY FOUR PERCENT OF THE TOTAL INVESTMENT, POPULAR PERCEPTION TO THE CONTRARY. SOME JAPANESE, HE ADDED, HAVE PROPOSED (OPIUM) CROP SUBSTITUTION, INCLUDING PRODUCTION OF BUCKWHEAT FOR "SOBA NOODLES" AS PART OF A MORE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH. NONETHELESS, AT THIS POINT IN TIME, HE ADMITTED, BURMA DOES NOT MEET THE MINIMAL CRITERIA FOR A REGIME WITH WHICH ONE CAN DEAL.

25. ~~(C)~~ YET ISOLATING BURMA, OSHIMA ARGUED, WOULD PUSH IT FURTHER TOWARD CHINA. HE HAD JUST RETURNED FROM BANGLADESH, HE SAID, WHICH NOW DEPENDS ON CHINA FOR 80-90 PERCENT OF ITS ARMS. GROWING BURMESE RELIANCE ON CHINA WORRIED THE ASEAN COUNTRIES AND WAS A MAJOR FACTOR IN THEIR DESIRE TO BRING BURMA INTO THEIR FOLD. BUT ADMISSION, LORD SUGGESTED, COULD ALSO BE HELD UP FOR USE AS LEVERAGE TO ENCOURAGE BURMA TO OPEN.

26. (U) THIS CABLE WAS NOT REVIEWED BY A/S LORD. MONDALE

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 06
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<^TOR>961018232827 M2453202
<^TOR>961018232842 M2453203

DIST:
SIT: KRISTOFF PRITCHARD SUETTINGER
SIT: NSC

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~SECRET~~
LINE1: OAASZYUW RUEHCAA2682 2982208-SSSS--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY SSSSS ZZH
LINE3: O 242204Z OCT 96 ZFF4
LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC
OSRI: RUEHC
DTG: 242204Z OCT 96
ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
TO: AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO: ////
SUBJ: U/S TARNOFF MEETING WITH CHINESE AMBASSADOR TO DISCUSS SECRETARY'S CHINA TRIP

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2017-0051-M (3.83)

TEXT:

~~S E C R E T~~ STATE 222682

NODIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/16
TAGS: PREL, OVIP, CM
SUBJECT: U/S TARNOFF MEETING WITH CHINESE AMBASSADOR TO DISCUSS SECRETARY'S CHINA TRIP

1. CLASSIFIED BY EAP/CM DIRECTOR HOWARD LANGE. REASON 1.5 (D). EXEMPTION 1.6X6.

2. SUMMARY. IN AN OCTOBER 21 MEETING WITH CHINESE AMBASSADOR LI, UNDER SECRETARY TARNOFF SET THE STAGE FOR THE SECRETARY'S UPCOMING CHINA TRIP, EMPHASIZING THE USG'S DESIRE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF CURRENT MEETINGS TO EXPAND COOPERATION AND NARROW DIFFERENCES. HE UNDERLINED THE NEED FOR A GOOD ATMOSPHERE FOR THE TRIP, AND OUR CONCERN ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS. HE ALSO DISCUSSED THE SITUATION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, INCLUDING NORTH KOREAN PLANS FOR A MISSILE TEST, AND ASKED CHINA TO JOIN IN EXPRESSING CONCERN TO PYONGYANG. LI AGREED ON THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONTINUED PROGRESS IN U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS AND THE NEED FOR A GOOD ATMOSPHERE DURING THE SECRETARY'S UPCOMING VISIT. HE ALSO STRESSED CHINA'S CONCERN ABOUT U.S. ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN AND WARNED THAT CURRENT TEXTILE NEGOTIATIONS COULD DAMAGE THE OVERALL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. END SUMMARY.

3. UNDER SECRETARY TARNOFF CALLED IN CHINESE AMBASSADOR LI DAOYU OCTOBER 21 TO SET THE STAGE FOR THE SECRETARY'S NOVEMBER TRIP TO CHINA AND TO DISCUSS DIRECTOR OF POLICY AND PLANNING JAMES STEINBERG'S OCTOBER 28-29 VISIT TO BEIJING. TARNOFF LED OFF THE MEETING BY RELAYING THE SECRETARY'S SATISFACTION AT THE SUCCESSFUL VISIT TO BEIJING OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY LORD. TARNOFF SAID WE

SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE CURRENT SERIES OF MEETINGS, INCLUDING THE VISIT TO CHINA OF ASSISTANT U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE SANDS, MINISTER SONG JIAN'S MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON THIS WEEK ON TECHNOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, AND EXPERTS' TALKS ON NUCLEAR ENERGY, TO EXPAND OUR COOPERATION AND NARROW OUR DIFFERENCES.

4. U/S TARNOFF EXPRESSED THE SECRETARY'S PERSONAL APPRECIATION THAT STEINBERG WAS ABLE TO SEE VICE PREMIER QIAN, MINISTER LIU HUAQIU AND VICE MINISTER LI ZHAOXING DURING HIS LAST TRIP TO CHINA, AND HIS HOPE THAT SIMILAR MEETINGS CAN BE ARRANGED FOR THIS VISIT. IN PARTICULAR, STEINBERG WILL WANT TO DISCUSS PREPARATIONS FOR THE SECRETARY'S TRIP, WAYS TO ENHANCE THE CONSTRUCTIVE NATURE OF THE TALKS, AND AREAS WHERE WE MIGHT MAKE PROGRESS OR REACH AGREEMENT BEFORE THE VISIT. TARNOFF ADDED THAT THE SECRETARY HAD ASKED HIM TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE THE SECRETARY ATTACHES TO HIS UPCOMING TRIP.

5. TURNING TO NONPROLIFERATION, U/S TARNOFF SAID WE WERE PLEASED BY CHINA'S AGREEMENT TO CONDUCT EXPERT-LEVEL NONPROLIFERATION TALKS FROM OCTOBER 31 TO NOVEMBER 1. THESE MEETINGS WILL HELP PREPARE THE GROUND ON THE ISSUES OF STRENGTHENING EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEMS, CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION, MISSILE PROLIFERATION, AND ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS SALES TO IRAN. TARNOFF INFORMED LI THAT IN ORDER TO FACILITATE UNDER SECRETARY DAVIS'S TALKS IN BEIJING, WE WILL PROVIDE CHINA WITH NON-PAPERS VIA OUR EMBASSY IN BEIJING IN ADVANCE OF THE EXPERTS' TALKS.

6. U/S TARNOFF NOTED THAT HUMAN RIGHTS REMAINS AN OBVIOUS AREA OF DIFFICULTY IN OUR RELATIONSHIP, AND THAT SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ARE TROUBLING. REPORTS OF A POSSIBLE TRIAL OF WANG DAN AND THE SENTENCING OF LIU XIAOBO ARE DISAPPOINTING AND NOT CONDUCIVE TO CREATING A FAVORABLE ATMOSPHERE FOR THE SECRETARY'S VISIT. THIS IS ESPECIALLY SO IN VIEW OF OUR HOPE THAT PRISONERS MIGHT BE RELEASED ON MEDICAL PAROLE, AS NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER LAKE REQUESTED DURING HIS JULY VISIT.

7. TARNOFF REMINDED LI THAT THE SECRETARY'S PREVIOUS VISIT TO CHINA OCCURRED AT A TIME OF PARTICULAR TENSION IN SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS, PARTICULARLY OVER HUMAN RIGHTS. HE NOTED AGAIN THAT LI HHUAQIU HAD TOLD A/S LORD THE ATMOSPHERE FOR THE SECRETARY'S TRIP WOULD BE GOOD. TARNOFF CONTINUED THAT HE HOPED THAT DURING STEINBERG'S TRIP THE CHINESE MIGHT RSPOND TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS PROPOSALS BOB SUETTINGER OF THE NSC MADE TO LIU XIAOMING LAST MONTH. FINALLY, TARNOFF SAID HE HOPED THAT THERE WILL BE NO FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS WHICH MIGHT INTERFERE WITH THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE SECRETARY'S TRIP. WE ALSO HOPE THAT A QUIET DIALOGUE, ADDRESSING THE CONCERNS OF BOTH SIDES, MAY ACHIEVE POSITIVE RESULTS BY THE TIME OF THE SECRETARY'S VISIT.

8. AS HIS LAST ITEM, U/S TARNOFF EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR CHINA'S COOPERATION ON THE UNSC PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON THE NORTH KOREAN SUBMARINE INCIDENT. THERE ARE

INDICATIONS THAT NORTH KOREA MAY BE PLANNING A MISSILE TEST SOON. THIS IS A TIME WHEN ALL SIDES NEED TO SEND CONSISTENT SIGNALS TO NORTH KOREA. THE U.S. WORKED HARD TO OBTAIN REAFFIRMATIONS OF SUPPORT FOR THE AGREED FRAMEWORK AND FOUR PARTY PROPOSAL FROM SEOUL. NORTH KOREA'S ARREST OF AN INNOCENT AMERICAN ON ESPIONAGE CHARGES AND ITS APPARENT MISSILE TEST PREPARATIONS ARE OTHER COMPLICATING FACTORS.

9. IN RESPONSE, AMBASSADOR LI SAID THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP IS LOOKING FORWARD TO THE SECRETARY'S VISIT. HE AGREED THAT RECENTLY THERE HAS BEEN SOME IMPROVEMENT IN THE ATMOSPHERE OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND THAT THERE ARE OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER IMPROVEMENT. LI SAID HIS GOVERNMENT ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE SECRETARY'S VISIT, AND HOPES IT WILL CREATE CONDITIONS FOR A PRODUCTIVE SUMMIT IN MANILA.

10. LI CONTINUED THAT CHINA WOULD WELCOME THE SECRETARY VISITING FROM NOVEMBER 17. UNFORTUNATELY, THE LEADERS' SCHEDULES WERE FULL FOR NOVEMBER 18-19. SAYING THAT HE WAS SPEAKING ON INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS POINT, LI SUGGESTED THAT THE SECRETARY VISIT SHANGHAI NOVEMBER 18-19, AND BEIJING NOVEMBER 19-21, WITH MEETINGS ON NOVEMBER 20-21. CHINA WOULD ALSO BE PLEASED TO WELCOME POLICY AND PLANNING DIRECTOR STEINBERG ON OCTOBER 27.

11. LI NOTED THAT MINISTER LIU HUAQIU HAD POINTED OUT TO ASSISTANT SECRETARY LORD THAT TAIWAN IS THE MOST IMPORTANT BILATERAL ISSUE. CHINA HOPES THE U.S. WILL ADHERE TO THE

THREE COMMUNIQUES, NOT CONDUCT OFFICIAL EXCHANGES WITH TAIWAN, AND NOT SELL ARMS TO TAIPEI. ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN HAVE IMPAIRED BILATERAL COOPERATION, LI SAID, AND HE HOPED THE U.S. WILL STOP SUCH SALES.

12. ON NONPROLIFERATION, LI STRESSED THAT CHINA HAS OBSERVED AND WILL CONTINUE TO OBSERVE THE OCTOBER 1994 AND MAY 1996 STATEMENTS. CHINA HAD AGREED TO THE AGENDA FOR EXPERTS0 TALKS, BUT WANTS ITS ISSUES INCLUDED AS WELL.

13. TURNING TO HUMAN RIGHTS, LI CITED "CHINA'S CONSISTENT, PRINCIPLED" STAND: CHINA'S JUDICIARY IS INDEPENDENT, AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES SHOULD NOT INTERFERE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

14. IN CONCLUSION, LI SAID HE WISHED TO EXPRESS HIS PERSONAL STRONG CONCERN ABOUT U.S.-CHINA TEXTILE NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID THE U.S. ACTION OF "SLASHING" CHINA'S TEXTILE QUOTA "LACKS FOUNDATION AND REASON." THE CHINESE SIDE MAY REACT VERY STRONGLY, IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR TRADE RELATIONSHIP, IF THE AGREEMENT CANNOT BE RENEWED OR IF NEGOTIATIONS BREAK DOWN. LI EXPLAINED THAT HIS REASON FOR RAISING THE ISSUE WAS CONCERN THAT U.S. POLICYMAKERS WERE NOT AWARE OF THE POTENTIAL DANGER POSED BY TEXTILE TALKS TO OTHER FACETS OF THE RELATIONSHIP.

15. AMBASSADOR LI WAS ACCOMPANIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR

LU SHUMIN AND FIRST SECRETARY ZHENG ZEGUANG. DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BADER, P SPECIAL ASSISTANT WOO, AND EAP/CM DESK OFFICER WAYMAN (NOTETAKER) ALSO ATTENDED. CHRISTOPHER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 2682

TOR: 961024183307 M2461759

DIST:

SIT: KRISTOFF PRITCHARD SUETTINGER
SIT: NODIS

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	To: Poneman, Daniel, Samore, Gary; From: Suettinger, Robert; Re: China Package [partial] (7 pages)	03/05/1996	P1/b(1) N 1/2/2020
~~002. email~~	~~To: Distribution; From: Suettinger, Robert; Re: Responsing to China's~~ actions - State (1 page)	~~03/05/1996~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ N 1/2/2020
~~003. email~~	~~To: Distribution; From: Kristoff, Sandra; Re: Press Points for Miasile~~ Tests (2 pages)	~~03/06/1996~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ N 1/2/2020

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([China or Taiwan Missile Test])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[08/10/1995 - 03/06/1996]

2012-0975-F
sb1279

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	To: Poneman, Daniel, Samore, Gary; From: Suettinger, Robert; Re: China Package [partial] (7 pages)	03/05/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([China or Taiwan Missile Test])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:
[08/10/1995 - 03/06/1996]

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MSMail

DATE-TIME	05 March 96 09:15
FROM	Suettinger, Robert L.
CLASSIFICATION	~~SECRET~~
SUBJECT	China Package #1392 ~~[SECRET]~~
TO	Poneman, Daniel B. Samore, Gary S.
CARBON_COPY	NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY	
	For Tony's meeting with Liu [[1392TL.DOC : 2361 in 1392TL.DOC]][[1392TABA.DOC : 2362 in 1392TABA.DOC]][[1392TABB.DOC : 2363 in 1392TABB.DOC]][[1392TABC.DOC : 2364 in 1392TABC.DOC]]
ATTACHMENT FILE DATE	5 March 96 8:22
ATTACHMENT FILE NAME	1392TL.DOC ~~SECRET~~ 1392 ~~SECRET~~ Reason: 1.5 (b) (d) Declassify On: 1.6 X6 ~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/28/2019
2017-0051-M (3.92)

March 4, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: SANDRA J. KRISTOFF

FROM: ROBERT L. SUETTINGER

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Liu Huaqiu

Your meeting with your Chinese counterpart, State Council Foreign

Affairs Office Director Liu Huaqiu, has a complex set of objectives, as outlined in the Memorandum for the President of February 17, 1996:

ù To establish a high-level, informal channel of communications to manage relations in what will be a difficult year.

ù To seek a "pragmatic balance" of U.S. and Chinese core interests so that both sides understand how issues will be played out in the coming year and can take steps to avoid a sharp downward spiral in relations.

ù To make clear to Beijing our expectations regarding the Taiwan Strait: Urging both sides to stand down and return to productive cross-Straits talks, reminding China that provocative military actions will have grave consequences, and restraining Taiwan from pushing an expansive international political agenda.

ù To seek a problem-solving approach to non-proliferation issues,

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

Preparations

Preparations for the meeting are still in train, but the fundamentals have been set. Liu Huaqiu will arrive in New York on March 6, and has cleared his calendar for discussions on March 7-8. He then has a weekend conference with embassy and consular personnel, and will be available for more meetings on March 11. He will bring with him two solid MFA professionals: Assistant Minister Yang Jiechi -- a rapid riser who formerly served as DCM in Washington; and Liu Xiaoming, Counselor and Acting Director of the North American and Oceanian Affairs Bureau -- a smooth but tough negotiator who is knowledgeable of U.S. politics. Another Assistant Minister, Cha Peixin, also is accompanying him. Each has excellent English language skills, and although Liu may want to feel "safe" with an interpreter, we could dispense with providing one on our side.

While the press has picked up rumors about a high-level dialogue, the story has not yet received much coverage. State has prepared

low-key Q & A's as guidance for press inquiries. We recommend a quiet public affairs strategy to keep expectations about "breakthroughs" realistic. We should, however, brief privately some members of Congress, and perhaps place Presidential calls to Gingrich and Dole.

Preliminary atmospherics seem good, but will be affected by China's

recent announcement of further missile tests in the Taiwan Straits. The President's letter to Jiang Zemin has been delivered, and appears to have had a salutary effect. Jiang's response was friendly in tone, but non-committal. Liu reportedly is looking forward to the meeting as an opportunity to communicate clearly and honestly. He is pleased you are taking the lead on China policy, and has made it clear he has comparable access to President Jiang and Premier Li Peng.

The Chinese fully realize this is a very important meeting, and that the goals are improved communication, problem management, and progress where possible on problem-solving. That said, we should keep expectations low. In current circumstances, Beijing has little maneuver room, and Liu has less license to change policies. He likely will take conventional approaches on a number of issues. A brief overview of China's perspective on global and bilateral relations is at Tab A.

A Scenario for the Sessions

We believe Liu will appreciate the courtesy of having a brief meeting on Thursday to agree on the agenda, followed by a get-acquainted dinner hosted by Secretary Christopher. Recommended NSC participants: Lake, Berger, Kristoff, Suettinger.

On Friday, we recommend the morning session be devoted to broad-gauged reviews of U.S. and Chinese foreign policy goals and practices. A thematic set of issues on which to base your discussion is at Tab B. Lunch should be informal and on-site.

A one-on-one meeting for about an hour following lunch will set the stage for crafting the "pragmatic balance" in mid-afternoon. (See Tab C). A few issues that you might consider for your off-line discussion:

ù Military posturing in the Straits and potential U.S. responses. Missile tests are a challenge.

ù You should mention the Chas Freeman gambit and the "missiles over L.A." story. Liu will probably raise it if you don't -- (Jiang and others reportedly were alarmed at the "irresponsible" nature of the story and have tried to find and punish the source.)

ù Political pressures on the President in an election year with respect to China; need to show progress in problem areas to avoid China policy becoming a campaign issue. (You might also inquire about political atmospherics in Beijing).

ù Public opinion on China and how it affects the President's positions on human rights (NGOs) and trade (U.S. business). The

prospects for MFN.

ù The importance of implementing agreements -- China's reputation and credibility at stake; good efforts and goodwill squandered when economic entities -- some with official names or backing -- violate China's own laws and guidelines on nonproliferation, IPR. Sanctions a a last resort, but U.S. will not hesitate to impose them if China fails to abide by its commitments.

ù Our concerns about a breakdown in North Korea. Whether or not China could support a "two plus two" approach after South Korean elections.

ù The possibility of a Jiang state visit after November and a summit in Beijing in 1998.

ù Solicit recommendations on how China would propose to re-structure human rights dialogue next year.

ù The rationale for seeking a pragmatic balance and the key elements on each side of the ledger.

With a short break for group caucusing, the final session should put together the pragmatic balance. Talking Points are at Tab C. State and NSC non-proliferation specialists could meet on details of the 825 case over the weekend, reporting back to you and Liu on Monday. A wrap-up at about 5:00 should agree on press points, which we are preparing.

Ambassador Li is hosting a dinner for participants on Friday evening. A meeting with Secretary Christopher and perhaps a short meeting with the President the following week would enable Liu to report convincingly to Jiang that the U.S. pragmatic balance proposal represents a unified U.S. Government position approved at the highest political level.

Concurrence by: Dan Poneman, Eric Schwartz
(in concept)

RECOMMENDATION

That you use materials in this package to prepare for private meetings with Chinese Vice Minister Liu Huaqiu.

Attachments
Tab A Overview of Chinese "strategic thinking"
Tab B Thematic issues for Friday morning discussion

Tab C Talking Points for Friday afternoon session
Tab D Biographic Information
Tab E Scope Paper from Secretary Christopher

ATTACHMENT FILE DATE 5 March 96 8:26

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TAB A
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China's Basic World View and Sino-U.S. Relations

Liu will be responding to whatever points you raise from the perspective of China's current outlook on world events -- a mix of ideology, pragmatism, nationalism and machiavellian calculation long-practiced in China. Liu's patron, Li Peng, outlined this view in a speech to ambassadors last August.

The post-Cold War Correlation of Forces

China sees the world in a multipolar configuration involving five forces:

ù The U.S. -- the only true superpower, but on the wane;
ù Russia -- politically and economically weak but still militarily significant;
ù The EU -- growing in economic strength and increasingly independent of the U.S.;
ù Japan -- desirous of great power status but weakened by political infighting;
ù China -- beset by hostility from the U.S. and EU, but holding great promise as the last champion of socialism.

The U.S. as Rival

China views the U.S. as its principal rival and opponent, both in a strategic sense and an ideological one. Beijing is obsessed by the notion that the U.S. is trying by a variety of methods -- including internal subversion -- to change China's socialist system and to prevent its growth and success by various means that fall under the rubric of "containment." In the former effort, the U.S. has assistance from the EU and Japan, but not firm support.

China intends to use its economic strength to improve relations with the EU, Japan and Russia to deflect U.S. pressure and divide forces that might otherwise be arrayed against it. China also will use its influence as (self-proclaimed) champion of the Third World to bolster its position internationally.

China's "two track" approach

China's view of the bilateral relationship involves a degree of dynamic tension. It recognizes, for example, that China must not allow relations with the U.S. to rupture, as the U.S. remains essential to China's economic development, both as an investor and major market for Chinese goods. But it also is obliged to confront the U.S. at every turn, to bring about a fundamental change in U.S. attitudes and policies toward China. It views the U.S. "comprehensive engagement" as a multi-dimensional pressure mechanism by which the U.S. uses different issues and problems to keep China off-balance.

China's response, articulated and approved at a high-level leadership conference last summer, is to "struggle against" the U.S. but not break relations, and to work cooperatively with the U.S., particularly in trade and economic issues, but not at the expense of national dignity and sovereignty.

Domestic Politics

Obviously, domestic politics plays a major role in Beijing's definition of its foreign policy priorities. While we have no overwhelming evidence that relations with the U.S. are a major source of controversy, there are differences, and they do impact on the struggle for succession to Deng Xiaoping.

To the degree there is a pattern to reporting, Premier Li Peng (to whom Liu Huaqiu is tied) consistently takes a more confrontational stand against the U.S., while Jiang Zemin appears inclined toward a somewhat softer line. Li is angling for military support, both ideologically and in practical political terms.

The military has consistently supported a harder line on Taiwan for nationalistic reasons and because tension in the Straits justifies higher budgetary allocations for defense. Others whom we have occasionally identified as reformers also have criticized Jiang for being insufficiently tough on Taiwan, an indication of "politics as usual" in Beijing, where perceptions are more important than substantive issues.

China's "Strategic" Perspective on the Bilateral Relationship

China has consistently complained about the absence of a "strategic" perspective on U.S.-China relations during the Clinton Administration. For the most part, that has been short-hand for the unwillingness of the U.S. to put aside difficult bilateral issues and problems for the sake of the longer-term "strategic" relationship. Beyond that, what China is looking for is more symbolism than substance. The important component of the "strategic" relationship developed under the Nixon Administration, from China's perspective, was being treated with respect as an important actor (not in being expected to behave like one). In that sense, the importance of engaging in a strategic dialogue lies in the act of soliciting China's opinion, rather than in the quality of that opinion.

What passes for Chinese "strategic thinking" these days is in fact rather shopworn. Ideologically constricted and inwardly directed, Chinese strategic thinking contains little originality and less candor, given that the political situation within China neither requires nor welcomes creative analysis. Since the U.S. is viewed as a strategic adversary, the idea of cooperation is always fettered by distrust, and the clear preference is for take rather than give.

China studiously avoids any kind of binding commitment, wary of the "unequal treaties" it has signed in a distant but still relevant past. It prefers hoary maxims of the Kissinger era to fresh, untested ideas. China occasionally, for example, reminds Americans of the need for continuing vigilance toward the Soviet Union, or of the value of cooperating against Japan.

The utility of a strategic exchange of views lies in the stimulation of higher-quality thinking, the avoidance of misunderstanding of U.S. intent, and the manipulation of Chinese perceptions about the bilateral relationship and China's place in the world. Given the centrality of the U.S. to China's foreign policy, we are the only country that is able stimulate China's strategic thinking in a positive direction.

Standard Positions on Issues

Liu will spend a good deal of time defending established policy

positions, briefly summarized below.

Taiwan

ù Far and away the most sensitive issue in the bilateral relationship, on which there is complete leadership unanimity.

ù The current problem is Taiwan's fault, compounded by U.S. error

(at best) or evil design.

ù Li Teng-hui is seeking full independence, and his recent statements to the contrary are not credible. His efforts to gain more international support (UN, IFI membership) are proof of his plans.

ù Evil elements in the U.S. may be seeking to use Taiwan's independence as a means of containing China (Taiwan as the "unsinkable aircraft carrier") or subverting China through support of democratization.

ù China must maintain military pressure on Taiwan to prevent trends toward independence from going further.

ù The U.S. visa for Lee's Cornell visit -- disregarding China's protest -- was an insult to China, an indication Washington does not take Beijing seriously.

ù In the current situation, the most important problems are another Lee visit or major arms sales to Taiwan. Either will precipitate another major downturn in relations.

Non-proliferation

ù China's policy is clear and unambiguous -- it does not provide weapons of mass destruction to any country, does not sell nuclear materials or technology to unsafeguarded nuclear programs, and has strict export controls on chemical weapons-related materials.

ù China has undertaken solemn public commitments and is living up to them. Information to the contrary is either bad intelligence or simply a way for the U.S. to pressure China in order to slander China or monopolize international weapons markets.

ù For its part, the U.S. has sold weapons of mass destruction (the F-16) to Taiwan. The bilateral dialogue on non-proliferation must address this issue, as well as China's supposed proliferant activity.

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

Human Rights

ù U.S. support for human rights in China is hypocritical, an effort to impose American values on China, part of a plot to destroy

China's socialist system by undermining its values and supporting criminals, such as Wei Jingsheng, who oppose the Communist Party.

ù The State Department human rights report (due out just before Liu arrives) constitutes interference in China's domestic affairs, and slanders China.

ù The repeated effort to pass a human rights resolution at the UNHRC is simply an effort to vilify China and is doomed to failure.

ù The bilateral human rights dialogue was made meaningless by U.S. efforts to pressure China in international fora.

ù President Clinton pledged the U.S. would not take a confrontational approach, but has not kept his promise.

ù China has made great progress in developing human rights, but does not accept Western definitions of what they are; China supports "Asian values" of social harmony, discipline, and obedience to authority.

Intellectual Property Rights

ù China signed the agreement last February in good faith, and has made great efforts to enforce it.

ù The U.S. is not fulfilling its part of the bargain in such areas as providing technology and training for customs service modernization.

ù U.S. demands on implementing the agreement are extreme and impossible for China to satisfy. The U.S. refuses to give China credit for the progress it has made, but keeps asking for more.

ù China has no tradition of intellectual property rights, and it will take time to educate people about it.

ù Many of the factories cited by USTR are in fact foreign joint ventures.

ù The U.S. should not threaten sanctions. If it carries them through, China will retaliate against U.S. industries.

WTO Accession

ù China has worked for 9 years to gain admission to GATT, now WTO.

ù The U.S. has consistently blocked China's entry as a means of containing China's economic growth.

ù Furthermore, U.S. does not intend to apply WTO principles to China, due to Jackson-Vanik restrictions on granting of MFN.

ù U.S. roadmap contains too many demands that China cannot meet in its current state of economic development.

ù China is a developing country, with a low per-capita income. Needs time to adjust its economic structure and business practices to world standards.

ù China can be successful without WTO.

ù Accession of Taiwan to WTO before would be a grave mistake.

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TAB B

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The Message: U.S. Foreign Policy Background

We believe it would be useful for you to provide a general overview of U.S. international policy goals, as the Chinese often fail to realize that Washington has broader interests and responsibilities that go beyond the bilateral context. What follows are themes you might consider raising in an initial session.

Post Cold War Challenges

ù Fundamental shifts in policy frameworks as result of collapse of Soviet Union.

ù Challenge to craft broader, more positive foundation; no longer containment against threat, rather cooperation for stability, security, prosperity. Has been slow in coming -- not easy to articulate.

ù Dangers include sporadic classic aggressions, territorial disputes, civil conflicts, proliferation of nuclear technologies,

religious intolerance and ethnic disputes, protectionist economics, political repression, transnational problems of drugs, environment degradation, refugees, etc.

ù U.S. also sees opportunities to preserve and extend peace through international cooperation: Shared interests in preventing conflict; developing coalitions to combat aggression when it happens; improving international agreements on nonproliferation, security, peacekeeping, trade.

ù Engagement and Enlargement -- President believes there cannot be a gap between American ideals and American policy. U.S. values freedom of choice and beliefs, rights of individual to express political and religious views without government interference.

_ History shows that democracies tend not to go to war against each other, to resolve problems peaceably, more readily develop mutually beneficial trade relations.

_ Countries that protect the civil/human rights of citizens make better neighbors. They do not practice terrorism or produce refugees.

_ Community of democracies is growing, and U.S. will actively support this trend. Foundation of U.S. policy on human rights, not an effort to subvert China.

Conveying Our Strategic View of U.S.-China Relations

ù U.S. believes China is central to global and regional affairs. We accept China's statements that its objectives are security, stability and prosperity based on continued economic reform, institutional development and participation in regional and international institutions.

ù U.S. values a stable, strong, prosperous China that is a responsible and active player in international and regional affairs.

Global Issues

ù The U.S. welcomes China's increasing involvement in support of international efforts to halt spread of weapons of mass destruction. Important player in making NPT, CWC, CTBT, FMCT work.

_ Two possible roles for China to play: participant in enhancing controls and easing dangers of a world of readily available WMDs; or proliferant. We desire the former and

appreciate China's assurances of good intentions and adoption of adequate controls.

_ Recognize not easy to bring under control industries recently freed from central command control. But necessary to do so -- for the sake of China's international reputation and self-interest.

ù China as member of UNSC can play key role in advancing international peacekeeping goals.

_ Increasingly interdependent world can no longer really afford small, medium-sized conflicts -- costs becoming high for all. U.S. cannot unilaterally control. UN has the major role to play -- in keeping with its ideals. But we also are concerned about its capabilities.

_ Would like to hear China's view of peacekeeping in UN context.

ù As one of world's largest economies, China inevitably will be a key player in international economic institutions. WTO membership is an important step.

_ President believes in free trade -- source of U.S. economic success in many areas. Aggressively pushed for trade agreements to strengthen international rules-based system, open markets, develop interdependence and unfettered access. Controversial in U.S. -- e.g. Buchanan campaign rhetoric.

_ With Asia in general, China in particular, fundamental issue of fairness involved. U.S. markets open to products from China, Japan, Korea. But markets in Asia closed, for variety of reasons, in variety of ways.

_ U.S. has been the engine of growth for much of Asia, absorbing billions in Asian exports. Competition has been good for American industry, shaping it up, sharpening its skills, improving products.

_ On WTO, U.S. wants China in, but on commercially viable terms. What does that mean? Terms that enable U.S. businesses to compete in China in ways commensurate with how foreign businesses compete in U.S.

_ No political interest in subsidizing China's economy. But willing to negotiate fair terms. Chinese economy huge, possibly world's third largest in gross terms. Can be destabilizing if China acts contrary to international trade norms.

_ Recognize that in per capita terms, still a developing economy with many backward areas. Willing to work hard to come to agreement. China has to do its share. Tough decisions.

_ End goal is a China that participates fully in international economic community, international community that trusts China to abide by rules, and by its commitments. Not there yet.

_ China should not think the U.S. fears China's economic development and is therefore trying to stop or delay it. Myth, with no basis in reality. Look at U.S. investment in China, business interest, sales of high-technology goods. Consistently stronger Chinese economy means more U.S. exports and jobs.

The Regional Perspective

ù History, geography, demographics, economics makes U.S. an Asia Pacific power. Policy toward China needs to be understood in context of overall Asia policy. There are no fundamental or historical clashes of national interest between us.

_ Five bilateral alliances are historically-based foundation of security -- still relevant today, even though circumstances have changed.

_ Forward deployment of troops and U.S.-Japan relations are basis for preservation of stability. Aside from the concern about North Korea, not directed at any other country -- including China. Security concerns of Asian nations vary: Some fear Russia, some Japan, some North Korea, some China.

_ U.S. troops a form of insurance; all recognize we have no territorial ambitions, not a threat to any country. 100,000 troops -- same as in Europe -- a commitment of engagement, an important presence.

_ Appreciate China's willingness to engage in regional security cooperation through ASEAN Regional Forum, Northeast Asia Security Dialogue, etc. Understand China's concerns about broadening into dispute resolution. Prepared to move at a pace Asian nations find comfortable.

ù Building cooperative economic architectures based on international norms is foundation of prosperity. U.S. economy

turning increasingly toward Asia. Economic organizations such as APEC have proven useful in bringing disparate Asian economies together toward common goals. Again, not a threat, not an effort to bring any countries under U.S. heel. Equalization of opportunity.

ù U.S. will continue its leadership role -- in our interest, and numerous Asian countries have agreed it is in theirs as well. Principal vehicle will be APEC for economic matters and ASEAN Ministerial for political consultations, ARF on security matters.

Strategic Dialogue

Believe there are areas where U.S., Chinese interests converge with respect to international, regional issues. Also areas of difference, which we need to discuss frankly and manage skillfully. Areas of shared interest:

ù Asia Pacific stability: no arms race, no military actions. Foundation of prosperity, increasing regional cooperation.

ù Korean Peninsula: control of nuclear program an important

achievement, appreciate cooperation from China.

_ Longer term problems now at stake -- prevention of conventional conflict; promoting North-South dialogue; handling the North in a period when economic and social stability appear to be deteriorating.

_ Considering effort to support peace agreement between North and South -- necessary to reduce prospects for military conflict, help North Korean economy weather difficult period -- achieve "soft landing."

_ China's interests, cooperation important in this effort. Support for revived "two plus two?"

ù Japan: political and economic role as "normal" international player. China has different perspective (along with Korea).

_ President's trip will reaffirm defense commitments through a security declaration -- involves recovery of balance in bilateral relations, both with respect to contentious trade issues that have strained relations and the Okinawa rape issue that roiled public opinion about bilateral relationship.

_ Looking carefully, China will see nothing new.

ù Southeast Asia: peaceful resolution of territorial disputes; freedom of navigation -- appreciate China's moderate approach to resolving conflicting claims in Spratlys.

ù We have mutual interest in a Cambodia independent of both Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge influence.

ù South Asia: Tension reduction, confidence-building. Constrain missile deployment and dampen possibility of nuclear confrontation.

ù Russia: transition to economic health; prevention of return to Far East expansion; manage ethnic tensions. Interested in Chinese view of Russian relations.

ù Middle East: Maintain unblocked access to petroleum resources; expand peace between Israel and its neighbors; prevent terrorist states/groups from provoking new tensions.

_ Avoid the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction or capacity to develop them indigenously.

_ Iran, Iraq are special problems, with which all nations should be concerned.

ù Transnational: need to protect environment while sustaining economic growth; control of drugs; addressing people migration issues; preventing terrorist actions.

ù Congruence of interests suggests appropriateness of U.S.-China relationship grounded in clear, realistic, pragmatic recognition of common core interests; acknowledgment of areas of difference.

Managing in 1996

ù U.S.-China relations have not been reevaluated thoroughly by both sides in this post Cold War situation. Changed circumstances invite new evaluation, adjustments to reflect changed calculus.

ù Must manage this critically important relationship in ways that are sensitive to core interests of each side; seek to advance those interests in ways that strengthen the relationship and promote common interests. Risks and dangers to each of disregarding each other's core interests, leading to destructive downward spiral.

ù Already too many examples of misunderstanding, missed communications.

_ China of U.S.: WTO accession, "containment" theory.

_ U.S. of China: Sensitivity of Lee visa; Jiang Zemin "state visit" to U.S.

Some basic reassurances. Although you cannot expect to undo years of Marxist-Leninist training added to cultural xenophobia and political insecurity, it cannot hurt to reiterate some basic premises of U.S. policy toward China that often get misconstrued.

ù U.S. does not fear or wish to contain China.

ù China's military development is not a threat to U.S.; need to recognize some in Asia are fearful; therefore, U.S. has encouraged dialogue in regional security fora and transparency of defense spending and planning.

_ U.S. does not believe China is militarily expansionist--should that change would rely on our alliances in the region, which are up to task of maintaining regional security.

ù We do not seek to undermine Chinese government: hope reform process continues as we believe rule of law, political pluralization, democratization will benefit China.

ù We are not seeking to promote Taiwan independence or prevent reunification. Future is for PRC and Taiwan to work out. Our concern is that the process remain peaceable, that both sides recognize the need for stability, cooperation.

ù Hong Kong: Do not contest elements of 1997 reversion; Hong Kong plays unique economic role benefiting China and others. But genuine autonomy, as promised in the Joint Declaration, essential to Hong Kong's success -- includes rule of law and civil liberties.

Identifying Core Interests. We are concerned that the calendar will bring a string of old and new problems, putting additional strain on relations only recently restored to a semblance of normalcy. If current dynamics of bilateral relations play out, we risk confrontation and adoption of adversarial relationship; want to manage our frictions and craft building blocks of cooperation.

ù Each side has core interests on which we can be expected to focus. They may be in conflict. To help avoid downward spiral, maintain foundations of relations, we need to clarify these interests, hear each other out.

U.S. core interests for this year:

ù Maintaining a productive relationship with China;
ù Preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits;
ù Keeping faith with our nonproliferation commitments and U.S. legislation;
ù Promoting human rights;

ù Seeing implementation of trade agreements, especially on intellectual property rights.

Want to hear China's concerns. (Assume they will be Taiwan, first and foremost; then human rights and UNHRC, with underlying themes of threat to China's internal stability, maintenance of social systems.)

Note that some of China's actions appear to run contrary to some fundamental U.S. interests. For example:

_ China's military exercises and implicit threats to take military action against Taiwan would cause instability in the Taiwan Straits.

_ Some Chinese actions on the human rights front raise concerns about commitment to universal, internationally recognized human rights.

_ Chinese actions regarding Pakistan and Iran raise questions about its commitment to international nonproliferation norms.

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TAB C
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Pragmatic Balance

Prepared to address these issues sequentially, making clear to China what we are prepared to do to manage the issues in 1996, and what we would like China to consider doing. Not an effort to dictate China's policy, but to keep open clear channels of communication, avoiding "surprises," enabling careful management of

controversial issues.

Taiwan

ù One China policy based on three communiqu,s has worked well and continues to be fundamental U.S. policy. Relations between PRC, Taiwan and U.S. improved significantly within this construct.

ù It is not in the U.S. interest for this policy to change. The Lee Teng-hui visit was not a unilateral shift in policy.

ù Each must refrain from unilateral actions that undermine the ability to sustain policy.

ù Reunification and Taiwan's future are issues for China and Taiwan to decide. U.S. concern is that it be decided through peaceful negotiations, not through unilateral declaration or military action.

_ For our part, we have not supported and will not support Taiwan independence. Don't believe that is Lee Teng-hui's intent.

_ Concerned that Taiwan is pushing too aggressively for change in its relations with both China and U.S., and for international recognition.

_ Provocative PRC exercises and actions in Taiwan Strait also have added to tensions and are unacceptable. Unprovoked military action against Taiwan is unthinkable and would have very grave consequences throughout the region.

ù Regular and routine interactions between economic officials of Taiwan and U.S. fall under definition of "unofficial" relations. China cannot expect them to be curtailed.

ù Likewise, transit visits do not constitute any change in U.S. policy or infringement of China's sovereignty. We will monitor them carefully. Thus far, Taiwan has stayed well within guidelines for no political activity.

The U.S. is prepared to take the following steps to ease tensions in the Taiwan Strait and re-invigorate the cross-Straits dialogue process:

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

ù We will continue to stress the overarching importance of restoring the cross-Straits dialogue without preconditions or posturing.

ù We do not expect and have no plans to accept high-level visits to the U.S. in 1996, except in case of medical emergency. That includes the Olympics.

ù No Cabinet-level U.S. officials will travel to Taiwan in 1996. (Sub-cabinet level contacts will continue).

ù We will not support Taiwan membership in the UN.

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

ù No major new arms sales to Taiwan will be approved in 1996. We will continue with those already planned.

ù We will convey these points to Taiwan and urge that it take additional steps to restore the cross-Straits dialogue.

In return, we expect China to:

ù Avoid provocative military actions and exercises in Taiwan Strait, in particular to refrain from missile launches; limit exercises to past patterns (e.g. pre-1995).

ù Avoid incendiary rhetoric about Lee's intentions; recognize his position has moderated.

ù Make sincere efforts to re-establish a cross-Straits dialogue without preconditions as soon as possible after the March elections.

ù Curtail criticism of U.S. transit visa policy. Don't over-react to everything that happens.

ù Accept U.S.-Taiwan economic interactions as being fully consistent with "unofficial cultural and economic relations" stipulated in 1979 communiqu,.

Non-proliferation -- The 825 Case

Having earlier outlined the background for U.S. policy on

non-proliferation, you should focus on presenting our proposal for resolving the 825 issue. Specifically, we would agree to waive 825 sanctions and bring the U.S.-China nuclear cooperation agreement into force if China agrees to a joint public declaration of nonproliferation principles and an exchange of private notes limiting its nuclear assistance to Pakistan and Iran. (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) Although we don't expect Liu to negotiate a solution during his trip, we are looking for agreement to seek a prompt solution on the basis of our proposal and a schedule for follow-on meetings within a few weeks to negotiate the language of the documents.

China has some misperceptions about U.S. nonproliferation policy that may need to be put to rest. For example, China complains: The U.S. is trying to control the international arms market; the U.S. sells technology and materials to Israel that violate international agreements; China was not involved in drawing up MTCR, not obligated to abide by annexes; nonproliferation statutes are a U.S. problem, as China not required to obey U.S. laws; U.S. is getting "bad intelligence," etc. Beijing also has drawn a specific link between Chinese missile sales and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. These, for the most part, are specious arguments, and you should avoid being drawn into them.

Points for Liu:

ù We view nonproliferation as a strong common interest, as demonstrated by our cooperation to halt North Korea's nuclear weapons program and to extend the NPT indefinitely.

ù We want to continue to work with you on a broad range of nonproliferation issues, including prevention of a nuclear and missile race in South Asia and conclusion of a CTBT in 1996.

ù Overall trend of U.S.-China cooperation and China's policy very positive, and we welcome it.

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

ù In addition, as you know, concerns about China's nuclear assistance to Pakistan may require U.S. to stop any Ex-Im Bank loans to China.

ù I think we can turn this problem into a win/win opportunity for both of us. We have devised a proposal that would not only resolve the immediate ring magnet issue, but would also bring major, long-term benefits to both the U.S. and China.

ù Specifically, if we can agree on ground rules for both sides' nuclear cooperation with other countries, this will serve as the basis both to waive any Ex-Im Bank sanctions and to bring the 1985 U.S.-China nuclear cooperation agreement into force.

ù Our proposal is divided into two parts -- a public joint statement and a confidential exchange of notes.

ù The public statement reaffirms both sides' NPT obligations and the basic principles governing nuclear cooperation with third parties. Much of the substance comes from China's declared

policy. By making the statement joint, we are committing both sides to the same principles on an equal basis.

ù The confidential exchange of notes deals specifically with Pakistan and Iran -- the two problem areas.

ù On Pakistan, we are asking China to prevent any future assistance to Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear program (b)(1)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

ù The confidential exchange of notes also commits China and the U.S. not to engage in nuclear cooperation with Iran, even under IAEA safeguards.

ù We know that your cooperation with Iran is consistent with China's NPT obligations, but there is a high risk that Iran will misuse your assistance to seek a nuclear weapons capability, which we know China does not desire.

ù In making this request on Iran, we are not singling out China. We've asked all nuclear suppliers not to engage in nuclear cooperation with Iran. Almost all of them, including the entire G-7, have agreed.

ù The confidential note would commit the U.S. to waive any Ex-Im sanctions that may arise (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) and to take the necessary steps to bring the U.S.-China Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation into force.

ù The Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation would open the way for extensive participation by U.S. companies in China's nuclear power program, which would benefit from access to the safest, most advanced nuclear technology in the world.

ù I have draft versions of the two documents. Our experts can get together during your visit to review and discuss the documents.

ù We believe it is essential to find a prompt solution. As you know, Secretary Christopher has deferred any determination on 825 and put Ex-Im loans to China on hold for 30 days to give us time to work on resolving this issue.

ù At a minimum, we would like to agree in principle during your visit to seek a solution based on our proposal. We can schedule a follow-up experts meeting in the next week or so to come to a full agreement on the documents.

(As needed)

ù Secretary Perry could discuss nonproliferation issues further with Defense Minister Chi (pronounced "CHUR", rhymes with "fur") in April. Secretary Christopher might also discuss the issue when he meets with Vice Premier Qian later this spring.

Human Rights

ù As indicated in introductory remarks this morning, U.S. human rights policy firmly grounded in American ideals. These are part of what motivates us as a nation, significant part of the reason we are successful, influential in the world.

ù President Clinton -- leader of the Democratic Party -- believes U.S. foreign policy must not be seen as inconsistent with those ideals. Different in some ways from Nixon, Bush.

ù U.S. not trying to force our ideas on others. Every country must develop in its own path, at a pace that preserves societal coherence.

ù But history has proven that free-market democracies succeed and prosper; military dictatorships, one-party autocracies, totalitarian regimes do not.

ù Trend in the world is toward increasing democracy -- we have supported this trend and will continue to do so.

_ Democracies develop means for solving problems. They are messy, noisy, unpredictable, sometimes irresolute, sometimes appear confused. But they work.

_ They make better neighbors, tend not to make war on each other, solve problems equably -- because that is what people want and demand from their government.

ù Firmly believe that these ideals have resonance with non-Western philosophy. Confucius is recorded to have said: "Heaven sees as the people see, and heaven hears as the people hear."

ù We have noted some positive developments in China's approach toward legal reform. In particular, we understand the National People's Congress is considering a law on criminal procedures that continues the welcome process of further developing China's legal structure and the rule-of-law.

ù Many in the United States stand in admiration of what China has been able to accomplish in a short period of time: the rapid improvement of living standards, economic flourishing -- in both agriculture and industry, strengthening of basic freedoms and recognition of the rights of citizens.

ù We do not wish to gainsay that progress.

ù At the same time, there are things that happen in China that are troubling, and in some cases deeply troubling. Many of these things are known to the outside world only because China has made so much progress in opening itself to the outside world.

ù But we cannot be true to ourselves and remain silent.

ù Our Congress and the American media will not allow it. Non-governmental organizations that put American ideals into practice will not allow it.

ù Perhaps some of the policies we have pursued in this area have needed modification. We try to learn from our mistakes and

correct them.

ù The President, for example, reversed course in 1994 and de-linked human rights conditions from renewal of China's

Most-Favored-Nation trade status. Politically, this was a costly step for the President, and he has been repeatedly criticized by members of his own political party.

ù In doing so, he hoped that China would reciprocate by taking steps to address some of our human rights concerns in a quiet but visible fashion. China did not respond. More than that, it cut off the bilateral human rights dialogue.

ù When he met with President Jiang in October, the President offered to find ways to avoid confrontation over a resolution on human rights in the UN Human Rights Commission, an internationally-respected organization whose agreed mandate is monitoring human rights around the world. We subsequently asked for preliminary consultations to see if we could find ways to avert a confrontation. China did not respond.

ù We remain at an impasse with China, with the UNHRC meeting due to begin in a matter of weeks.

We want China to understand in advance how we plan to proceed at the UNHRC and subsequently, so as to avoid surprises and minimize collateral damage to the relationship as a result of the UNHRC debate.

ù The Congressionally-required Human Rights Report by the State Department is coming [came] out this week. As usual, it had a lengthy section on China.

ù It will no doubt create controversy in China. Timing of its release was dictated by the earlier Federal worker furlough. We did not time it to coincide with the National People's Congress meeting in Beijing.

ù The judgment in the report that little overall progress was made in many prominent areas of human rights is balanced somewhat by recognition of improvements in legal reform.

ù But the overall perspective -- which is shared by several other countries -- is that China's human rights record did not significantly improve in 1995, and in some ways, it regressed.

ù In those circumstances, and absent any Chinese willingness to address our concerns in ways to avoid confrontation, we have no choice but to proceed to co-sponsor a resolution at the UNHRC.

ù We have already begun consultations with EU members on the resolution. It is our intent to have it substantively as similar in tone and content as possible to last year's resolution.

ù Our entire approach, in fact, will be commensurate with the approach we took last year. We will lobby for support at about the same level. [Eric Schwartz thinks we should not go into this level of detail -- e.g. "commensurate" -- with the Chinese, even though we have agreed to it internally.]

ù In our lobbying, we will avoid making gratuitous attacks on China.

ù Once the vote is concluded -- however it comes out -- the effort will cease. We will not crow if we win nor complain if we do not. It is our view that the UNHRC is an appropriate forum for discussion of these kinds of issues.

ù In the lead-up to the MFN decision, we will not consider any

re-linkage of human rights issues to other economic or political considerations.

ù Neither will the Administration support MFN legislation that makes such a linkage.

ù In future, and particularly after November, we will develop proposals in consultation with China for conducting a more effective human rights dialogue.

In return, we expect China to:

ù Show similar forbearance in its conduct of activities at Geneva, bearing in mind that a key U.S. goal is to get through this period without a major downturn in bilateral relations.

ù Respond to the vote with dignity and calm.

ù Consider and discuss with the U.S. and other countries sponsoring the resolution what can be done to avoid a similar situation in the future.

ù Take the initiative to consider how China can improve its reputation in the world with respect to human rights, e.g. re-stating China's adherence to the spirit of the Universal Declaration.

ù Develop proposals for making the bilateral human rights dialogue more meaningful and productive from China's perspective.

ù Avoid linking the Geneva resolution to any other issue in U.S.-PRC relations.

Trade Issues

ù China's emergence as economic power is welcome. Goal is non-disruptive integration with international economic systems. Matching of China's policies to international norms.

ù Recognize China is in difficult transition. Cognizant of Russia example.

ù As with Russia, our objective is to ensure China's economic emergence does not damage global economy.

ù Confident China understands risks associated with failure to build strong and open trade links with other global economic powers.

ù U.S. trade policy is central component of foreign policy and linked closely to domestic political factors.

ù Domestic political factors mean the foundation of trade policy is reciprocal responsibility. We will welcome foreign firms and products to U.S., but insist our products and services be able to enter foreign markets on equal terms.

ù When President made MFN decision two years ago, he recognized that trade and intensified economic engagement with China promotes long-term U.S. interests.

ù Intend to renew MFN this year on same terms as last year. But expect debate will be controversial. 1996 is a political year and we expect Congress to attempt imposition of full or partial sanctions.

ù Last year exercised waiver authority to grant MFN and neither the House nor Senate brought a resolution of disapproval to a vote. Accomplished this through working with Hill leadership to focus Congressional vote on a measure which, though distasteful to China, never was enacted, as it never reached the Senate floor.

ù Less likely we will be able to do that this year. Year-long troubled bilateral relations and increased Congressional concern over Taiwan are the cause. Growing trade deficit also seen as a problem.

ù Our assessment: to win battle with Hill, we need to be able to

demonstrate engagement on trade issues is working.

ù Key to this is intellectual property rights agreement. Cannot renew MFN without implementation of this pivotal trade agreement.

ù Also progress toward WTO accession will be seen as evidence of China's sincerity, willingness to play by the rules of the multilateral trading system.

IPR

ù Appreciate steps China has taken to implement 1994 agreement. Know the problem is enormous and difficult to resolve.

ù Tough but intelligent decisions needed to implement past promises in this discrete area.

_ Not only because of obligations under IPR agreement, but also because IPR protection is in China's own interest -- foreign investment flows to economies where IPR protections

are strongest.

ù Want to shift focus from allegations regarding extent of Chinese adherence to agreement; focus instead on what we need for China to do over near term in light of MFN debate.

In an effort to manage this issue without resort to sanctions, we would like to see certain minimum steps to demonstrate China's intent to curb piracy:

ù Provide a blueprint for enforcement actions (national and provincial level) against factories producing pirated CD's and entertainment industry products. Close some now, some later.

_ Administrative guidance notices to step up enforcement.

_ Assignment of additional of police units dedicated to IPR enforcement.

_ Prominent prosecution of IPR violators.

_ Advise governments and investors in Hong Kong and Taiwan in particular that no further joint ventures in CD or laser-disk production will be approved, nor will new equipment to be provided to existing ventures unless it is fully certified to be in compliance with all Chinese laws on intellectual property protection.

ù Step up Customs seizures of pirated products at the border.

ù Begin consultations with USTR and U.S. business to devise schedule for destruction of pirated stock, extension of proper licensing agreements, formation of joint ventures, etc.

ù Provide schedule for reduction and elimination of quotas (within a specified time) on audiovisual products.

ù Develop with U.S. Customs schedule for training of officers.

ù Above to be concluded by late April. Will send USTR team to Beijing soon to begin work.

ù If can't show sufficient progress to enable President to say progress has been made, expect retaliation in form of [x% cut back in textile quota].

WTO

ù Rationale in giving roadmap was to define universe of expectations and minimum levels of what constitutes commercially reasonable accession to WTO.

ù Believe we've shown flexibility. Understand Beijing still reviewing.

ù Propose that we accept likelihood this issue will not advance significantly further this year.

ù Attention to details of roadmap and hard decisions would be required of both of us to move forward. Political will to do this may not exist for either of us.

ù We will continue to meet and consult at your request, but suggest we acknowledge need to put this issue on hold in our bilateral agenda.

ù We will restrain rhetoric about China's lack of serious intent to adhere to international rules; China will.continue participation in Geneva Working Group process.

Next Steps

ù Prepared to examine balanced package solution to immediate bilateral agenda items.

ù U.S. will issue restatement of one China policy.

ù Will convey to Taiwan limits of U.S. support for its agenda.

ù Prepared to continue interlocutor meetings: invite to Washington in fall, return to Beijing in spring; initiate strategic dialogue.

ù Meeting between Presidents at APEC Manila summit.

ù State visit to Washington in 1997 with return Presidential visit to Beijing in 1998.

MSMail

DATE-TIME 05 March 96 10:49

FROM Suettinger, Robert L.

CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT Responding to China's actions -- State ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~

TO
Baker, Jane E.
Baldwin, Kenneth
Bass, Peter E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Dohse, Fred J.
Hall, Wilma G.
Harmon, Joyce A.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kessinger, Jodi
Millison, Cathy L.
Sens, Andrew D.
Veit, Katherine M.
Wiley, Mary C.

CARBON_COPY Kristoff, Sandra J.

TEXT_BODY

Jeff Bader informs me that Peter Tarnoff is planning on calling in the Chinese ambassador this afternoon with respect to China's announcement of a virtual blockade of Keelung and Kaohsiung with missile tests. (Peter, I sent you cable traffic on this from Taipei). Assume State will also have Amb. Sasser make representations in Beijing.

The essence of Tarnoff's message: U.S. deeply disturbed by China's intended missile tests, consider it a crude form of intimidation that has additional effect of endangering civilian population, disruption of normal international air and sea traffic. Urge China to reconsider tests in designated areas. (Referring indirectly to post-election period) -- continued use of such tactics inevitably will have profound effect on U.S.-PRC relations in long term.

State preparing press points, which I will forward as soon as I receive them.

Bob

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By YL NARA, Date 8/28/2019
2017-0051-M (3.43)

MSMail

DATE-TIME	06 March 96 12:01
FROM	Kristoff, Sandra J.
CLASSIFICATION	~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SUBJECT	Press Points for Missile Tests ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~
TO	Baker, Jane E. Baldwin, Kenneth Bass, Peter E. Cicio, Kristen K. Dohse, Fred J. Hall, Wilma G. Harmon, Joyce A. Joshi, M. Kay Kessinger, Jodi Millison, Cathy L. Sens, Andrew D. Veit, Katherine M. Wiley, Mary C.
CARBON_COPY	NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NA NARA, Date 8/28/2014
2017-0051-M

TEXT_BODY

Sandy --

Per conversation with Tony this morning, attached are slightly harder press points for use with respect to missile tests that may begin as early as tomorrow afternoon. I have cleared them with State.

[[MISSLPTS.DOC : 3106 in MISSLPTS.DOC]]

ATTACHMENT FILE DATE	6 March 96 11:54
ATTACHMENT FILE NAME	MISSLPTS.DOC

TAIWAN STRAIT POINTS

Q: How does U.S. view the PRC announcement of missile tests?

--The PRC has announced a military exercise that will include the firing of surface-to-surface missiles near Taiwan. One area for the missile firings is approximately 20 statute miles from the northeast coast of Taiwan. According to Beijing, the missile exercise will occur from March 8 to March 15.

--The closure area is disruptive of international civilian air and sea traffic and the U.S. is deeply disturbed by this PRC provocative action.

--We believe the PRC missile exercises are reckless and have moved to a scale which increases tensions in the Taiwan Strait.

Q: What has the Administration done in response to the PRC announcement?

--We have put the PRC on notice, at the highest levels, that consequences will follow should the missile firing exercises endanger populated areas or harm international commerce.

Q: What consequences does the Administration contemplate?

--It would be inappropriate to engage in speculation about particular U.S. actions in response to particular incidents.

--Any specific U.S. action would depend on the circumstances at the time.

Q: What would the U.S. do if Taiwan were attacked.

--It is the policy of the United States to consider a direct attack on Taiwan as a threat to the interests of the United States that would carry with it grave consequences. It would be inappropriate to discuss U.S. contingency planning in greater detail.

--We would, of course, consult with Congress about U.S. responses as required under the Taiwan Relations Act.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. email~~	~~To: Kreczko, Alan; From: Suettinger, Robert; Re: Re: Taiwan (3~~ pages)	~~03/06/1996~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ R 1/2/2020

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([China or Taiwan Missile Test])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[03/06/1996 - 03/07/1996]

2012-0975-F
sb1280

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

MSMail

DATE-TIME	06 March 96 12:27
FROM	Suettinger, Robert L.
CLASSIFICATION	~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SUBJECT	RE: Taiwan ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~
TO	Kreczko, Alan J.
CARBON_COPY	NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY	

Agree. Even Taiwan and FAA have fallen back on whether it constitutes interference. Proposed press guidance below talks about exigencies that might develop if the missiles go astray. Look OK to you?

[[MISSLPTS.DOC : 3153 in MISSLPTS.DOC]]

From: Kreczko, Alan J.
To: Bass, Peter E.; @UP - APNSA Special Assistants
CC: /R, Record at A1; Baldwin, Kenneth; @ASIA - Asian Affairs
Subject: Taiwan ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~
Date: Wednesday, March 06, 1996 12:22 PM

Please pass to TL:

Spoke with State/L again re China missile exercise and international law. They are now NOT prepared to say it is a violation of international law.

Problem in getting a definitive view here is that test is one of "undue" or "unreasonable" interference with high seas freedoms. That is heavily fact dependent. State/L now understands that press reports that Taiwan is going to close its airport are wrong. Rather, aircraft are going to be re-routed. Re-routing now appears to be only a matter of a few extra minutes airtime; FAA is apparently not worked up about it. Moreover, commrecial shippers apparently do not consider impact on sealanes traffic to be that substantial.

Given those facts, and those assessments re impact on shipping and aircraft in high seas areas, L would not conclude that exercise imposes unreasonable burden on high seas freedoms of others. Moreover, given our own exercises on high seas, there are reasons not to take too aggressive a read of this.

State/L will continue to try to get a grip on facts, and to coordinate with DOD/JCS. I'll let you know if this results in a changed legal view.

ATTACHMENT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/27/2019
2017-0051-M

FILE DATE 6 March 96 11:54

ATTACHMENT FILE NAME MISSLPTS.DOC

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--We believe the PRC missile exercises are reckless and have moved to a scale which increases tensions in the Taiwan Strait.

Q: What has the Administration done in response to the PRC announcement?

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Q: What consequences does the Administration contemplate?

--It would be inappropriate to engage in speculation about particular U.S. actions in response to particular incidents.

--Any specific U.S. action would depend on the circumstances at the time.

Q: What would the U.S. do if Taiwan were attacked.

--It is the policy of the United States to consider a direct attack on Taiwan as a threat to the interests of the United States that would carry with it grave consequences. It would be inappropriate to discuss U.S. contingency planning in greater detail.

--We would, of course, consult with Congress about U.S. responses as required under the Taiwan Relations Act.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	To: Distribution; From: Suettinger, Robert; Re: China missile launches - proposed guidance (3 pages)	03/07/1996	P1/b(1)
~~002. email~~	~~To: Distribution; From: Veit, Katherine; Re: FW: Memo to President~~ (3 pages)	~~03/09/1996~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VR 1/2/2020
003. email	To: Distribution; From: Veit, Katherine; Re: [Package for Berger final version] (18 pages)	03/10/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([China or Taiwan Missile Test])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:
[03/07/1996 - 03/11/1996]

2012-0975-F
sb1281

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

MSMail

DATE-TIME 09 March 96 16:53

FROM Veit, Katherine M.

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT FW: Memo to President ~~[SECRET]~~

TO
Baker, Jane E.
Baldwin, Kenneth
Bass, Peter E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Dohse, Fred J.
Friedrich, M. K.
Hall, Wilma G.
Harmon, Joyce A.
Joshi, M. Kay
Kessinger, Jodi
Millison, Cathy L.
Sens, Andrew D.
Veit, Katherine M.
Wiley, Mary C.

CARBON_COPY Suettinger, Robert L.

TEXT_BODY

Jane - this is the memo I gave you to put in system and fax to Joyce Harmon.

Bob - thought you might want to see finished product!

smile.....

_____
From: Suettinger, Robert L.
To: Veit, Katherine M.
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Memo to President ~~[SECRET]~~
Date: Saturday, March 09, 1996 02:06 PM

[[LIUMEET.DOC : 4134 in LIUMEET.DOC]]

Kathy --

Thanks for your help. Note it does not have log # or cover memo to Tony.

ATTACHMENT FILE DATE 9 March 96 16:50

ATTACHMENT LIUMEET.DOC

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/28/2014
2017-0051-M (3.95)

FILE NAME

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~ cc: Vice President
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d) Chief of Staff
Declassify On: 1.6 x6

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Meetings with Liu Huaqiu, Director of the Foreign Affairs Office of China's State Council

My meetings with Liu, approximately my counterpart, went about as expected. I believe they served a useful purpose in enhancing China's understanding of the U.S. position on a number of crucial issues facing us. Although we did not reach a final accord on the "pragmatic balance" I laid out, he did not reject it out-of-hand, and I expect to hear further from Liu prior to his departure on March 12.

The meetings, of course, were immediately affected by China's launch of three M-9 missiles into the closure areas near Taiwan that they had declared last week. Liu seemed surprised that they had been fired. In response, we scaled back plans for an introductory dinner, making it a working event instead and laying down clear markers that China's current activities are reckless and that an attack on Taiwan would have "grave consequences." Bill Perry very effectively refuted Liu's claim that the missile tests were "ordinary" exercises that should not worry us, and Chris warned Liu that U.S. public and Congressional reaction to China's actions was increasingly negative.

Atmospherics at the all-day meeting on Friday at Pamela Harriman's Middleburg estate were serious but not confronta-tional, with both sides listening and speaking carefully. A lengthy, global "strategic overview" and discussion of the overall relationship in the morning went well. I then raised the Taiwan question just before lunch. In the afternoon, we continued on Taiwan, then covered the ring magnets/ nonprolif-eration question, finishing up with slightly abbreviated presentations on trade issues and human rights. Our exchange on Taiwan was the most intense. Liu hurled invective against Lee Teng-Hui, but he took on board both our warnings and our reassurances. Liu's initial response to our draft agreements on non-proliferation was quite negative, but by the end of the Chinese ambassador's dinner in the evening, which I did not attend, their position was shifting somewhat toward the positive. The Chinese appear genuinely to want to resolve this issue. Expert talks are the next step. His response on economic issues was surprisingly passive; on human rights, predictable.

Liu has more meetings on Monday and Tuesday with various officials, including several Members of Congress, and he will get an earful on Taiwan.

One further question remains to be resolved: whether or not you meet with Liu. In your letter to Jiang, you indicated that you hoped to see Liu. Post-missiles and with the Middle East trip in the offing, we need to take stock on Monday on whether we recommend you should see him for a few minutes. Right now, I lean against.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	To: Distribution; From: Suettinger, Robert; Re: FW: Call from Senator Rockefeller [partial] (1 page)	03/14/1996	P1/b(1) 1/2/2020
002. email	To: Baldwin, Kenneth; From: Suettinger, Robert; Re: Re: Call from Senator Rockefeller [partial] (1 page)	03/15/1996	P1/b(1) 1/2/2020
003. email	To: Distribution; From: Baldwin, Kenneth; Re: FW: Call from Senator Rockefeller [partial] (1 page)	03/15/1996	P1/b(1) 1/2/2020
004. email	To: Distribution; From: Kristoff, Sandra; Re: [Secretary of Defense Perry] (2 pages)	03/18/1996	P1/b(1)
005. email	To: Bass, Peter; From: Kristoff, Sandra; Re: Re: TPL [Talbott-Perry-Lake] topics (3 pages)	03/20/1996	P1/b(1)
006. Email	To: Distribution; From: Suettinger, Robert; Re: [Memcon] (31 pages)	03/21/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([China or Taiwan Missile Test])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:
[03/12/1996 - 03/21/1996]

2012-0975-F
sb1282

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	To: Distribution; From: Suettinger, Robert; Re: FW: Call from Senator Rockefeller [partial] (1 page)	03/14/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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NSC Emails
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OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:
[03/12/1996 - 03/21/1996]

2012-0975-F
sb1282

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MSMail

DATE-TIME	14 March 96 11:07
FROM	Suettinger, Robert L.
CLASSIFICATION	~~SECRET~~
SUBJECT	FW: Call from Senator Rockefeller ~~[SECRET]~~
TO	Baker, Jane E. Baldwin, Kenneth Friedrich, M. K. Hilliard, Brenda I. Joshi, M. Kay Kessinger, Jodi Millison, Cathy L.
CARBON_COPY	NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY	

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/28/2019
2017-0051-M (3.97)

Sorry, Nancy, left you off the distribution on the first run.

From: Suettinger, Robert L.
To: Lake, W. Anthony; Berger, Samuel; @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor
CC: /R, Record at A1; Kristoff, Sandra J.; Danvers, William C.
Subject: Call from Senator Rockefeller ~~[SECRET]~~
Date: Thursday, March 14, 1996 11:04 AM

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spun up about a lot of things. He did express his appreciation to the USG for taking a "tough" position on the missile tests and for deploying the Indy and Nimitz. But then he went into full complaint mode, focusing on his lack of access to the White House and his limited contacts with State. Lu said he was concerned that, in a "crisis situation," he did not know how he could convey Taipei's position to the President. He asked Rockefeller to meet with the President and encourage him to speak directly to the Taiwan Strait problem, using words like "reckless" and "provocative."

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. email	To: Baldwin, Kenneth; From: Suettinger, Robert; Re: Re: Call from Senator Rockefeller [partial] (1 page)	03/15/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([China or Taiwan Missile Test])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:
[03/12/1996 - 03/21/1996]

2012-0975-F
sb1282

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

MSMail

DATE-TIME	15 March 96 07:10
FROM	Suettinger, Robert L.
CLASSIFICATION	~~SECRET~~
SUBJECT	RE: Call from Senator Rockefeller ~~[SECRET]~~
TO	Baldwin, Kenneth
CARBON_COPY	NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY	

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/28/2019
2017-0051-M (3.98)

Taiwan's mission here: Taiwan Economic and Commercial Representative Office

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From: Baldwin, Kenneth
To: Suettinger, Robert L.
CC: /R, Record at A1; @CROSS - Cross Hatches
Subject: RE: Call from Senator Rockefeller ~~[SECRET]~~
Date: Thursday, March 14, 1996 08:06 PM

A RESPONSE FROM NES
Bob:
Whats TECRO?

From: Suettinger, Robert L.
To: Soderberg, Nancy E.
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: FW: Call from Senator Rockefeller ~~[SECRET]~~
Date: Thursday, March 14, 1996 11:07 AM

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MSMail

DATE-TIME	15 March 96 11:21
FROM	Baldwin, Kenneth
CLASSIFICATION	~~SECRET~~
SUBJECT	FW: Call from Senator Rockefeller ~~[SECRET]~~
TO	Baker, Jane E. Baldwin, Kenneth Friedrich, M. K. Hilliard, Brenda I. Joshi, M. Kay Kessinger, Jodi Millison, Cathy L.
CARBON_COPY	NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY	

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/28/2019
2017-0051-M (3.99)

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