State Paper: New Exclusion Zones and Strict Enforcement

-- The creation of new exclusion zones and their strict enforcement may result in some form of UNPROFOR's redeployment. It could involve movement within Bosnia, withdrawal from safe areas, or complete withdrawal from Bosnia which would limit UNPROFOR's ability to protect humanitarian relief convoys.

-- As British and French forces withdraw, the remaining forces are likely to be from Muslim countries which may appear to be staying to assist the Bosnian Government.

-- It is essential to attain UNPROFOR—including UN/SYG—approval of the use of NATO air power in enforcement of the zones.

-- In order to benefit fully from strict enforcement of the zones, any decision should give the Serbs time to change their minds and sign on to the Contact Group proposals and warn the Serbs that attacks against UN/aid personnel will elicit an appropriate military response.
NEW EXCLUSION ZONES AND STRICT ENFORCEMENT

The Contact Group agreed that if the Bosnian Serbs reject the proposed territorial settlement, NATO could impose Gorazde-type exclusion zones around the other safe areas -- Srebrenica, Zepa, Bihac and Tuzla. In addition, NATO could strictly enforce the exclusion zones (which would require that new instructions be given to UNPROFOR, to ensure that the UN "key" is turned when NATO decides to strike).

Declaring new zones would require a NAC decision demanding that the Bosnian Serbs withdraw all their military personnel and weapons from around the other safe areas and prohibiting heavy weapon and ground-force attacks. If the Bosnian Serbs fail to comply, their military forces in proximity to the safe areas, including support facilities, would be subject to NATO air strikes. The option of putting heavy weapons under UN control would require too many additional UNPROFOR troops and should not be repeated in these new exclusion zones, especially in light of UNPROFOR's vulnerability.

Timing: The NAC could declare new exclusion zones and NATO could implement strict enforcement at once or in phases. Assuming that -- as the British and French want -- new exclusion zones are created first, followed by strict enforcement, we should press to have the time period during which the new exclusion zones are created made as short as possible; Bihac and Tuzla are the most difficult cases, given the array of forces in these areas. The "strict enforcement" decision should be taken shortly thereafter to maintain credibility. Enforcement may be phased in as well, beginning with Gorazde and Sarajevo.

Risks to UNPROFOR: The creation of new zones, and especially their strict enforcement, will be perceived by the Serbs as a UN/NATO intervention on the side of the Bosnian Government. As risk to its forces increases, UNPROFOR will:

- redeploy from exposed positions (such as heavy weapons sites);
- withdraw from the safe areas; or
- withdraw completely from Bosnia.

NATO's Military Committee sees these steps as virtually undifferentiated, simply stages in a withdrawal process. UNPROFOR should be prepared to redeploy on short notice on the date that Contact Group Foreign Ministers give the Bosnian Serbs their final ultimatum on accepting the map. Isolated UNPROFOR units should be redeployed before that date. However, even if UNPROFOR redeployed units from exposed positions, it would remain a lightly armed peacekeeping force not equipped for combat. The British may insist that UNPROFOR be withdrawn from the safe areas. These withdrawals would limit UNPROFOR's ability to carry out its mandate in key areas, including protection of humanitarian relief convoys, monitoring the safe areas and monitoring of the heavy weapons collection sites around Sarajevo.
If we move on to strict enforcement after creating the new zones, the UK and France must take the lead to get UNPROFOR out of harms' way. In response to limited NATO bombing around Gorazde, the Bosnian Serbs closed all convoy routes and stopped all ground and air delivery of humanitarian aid, took some UNPROFOR personnel hostage, confiscated UNPROFOR equipment and fired on NATO aircraft. We must be prepared for a similar -- or harsher -- reaction should NATO again use air power. The British especially have made clear that UNPROFOR should be withdrawn completely if NATO plans to strictly enforce the zones.

One way to address this would be to establish a time period of up to several weeks between the end of the extension period and the beginning of strict enforcement, during which time those UNPROFOR forces that wished to depart could do so. The remaining UNPROFOR forces could use the time to further consolidate around Sarajevo, and possibly in the interior cores of the other safe areas (the Turks have indicated a willingness to do this). We should be aware that most of the remaining forces are likely to be from Muslim countries -- Turkey, Malaysia -- and would be seen as staying to assist the Bosnian Government. In addition, without the logistical network set up by the UK and France, they would have difficulty maintaining their forces in Bosnia. A British and French withdrawal will result in the de facto end of UNPROFOR.

Moving to Strict Enforcement: We need assurances before deciding on strict enforcement that the UN/SYG is on board, and that UNPROFOR will approve the use of NATO air power. UNPROFOR should agree in advance that NATO can carry out strikes for a fixed period of time against Bosnian Serb forces and their support facilities. Our decision on strict enforcement should be:

- transparent, and give the Serbs time to change their minds and sign on to the Contact Group proposals;
- preceded by a warning to the Serbs by the Contact Group that attacks against UN/aid personnel or hostage taking will elicit an appropriate military response;
- accompanied by UNPROFOR redeployment.

Other Bosnian Serb Reactions: Reacting either to new exclusion zones or strict enforcement, the Bosnian Serbs may step up military activity in areas not covered by the exclusion zones, such as Maglaj or Brcko. In order for NATO to respond directly, we would need a new Security Council resolution authorizing further NATO action (such as creating a new exclusion zone in the area of the offensive). The Serbs may also take hostages from among the many civilian UN and NGO humanitarian aid workers spread throughout Bosnia. If NATO plans to implement strict enforcement, and UNPROFOR is withdrawing, it would be prudent for these aid workers to withdraw as well (at least from areas where the Serbs can take them hostage).