

MR MARKER

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Folder Title: President Clinton's Trip to Russia and Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995 [1]				
Staff Office-Individual: Executive Secretary				
Original OA/ID Number: 2586				
Row: 35	Section: 2	Shelf: 10	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Anthony Lake to President William J. Clinton re: Moscow Summit (6 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
002. paper	One On One Meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (5 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
003. paper	One On One Meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin [duplicate of 002] (5 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
004. paper	Plenary on Economic and Commercial Issues (7 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
005. paper	Meeting with Russian Political Leaders (5 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
006. paper	START II (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
007. paper	Status of Economic Reforms (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
008. paper	Russia and NATO (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
009. paper	Chechnya (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
010. paper	Russian Iranian Nuclear Cooperation (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
011. paper	ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty: ABM/TMD [Theater Ballistic Missile] (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
012. paper	START Treaty and Space Launch Vehicles (SLVs) (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Executive Secretary
 OA/Box Number: 2586

FOLDER TITLE:

President Clinton's Trip to Russia and Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995 [1]

2016-0135-M

kh1782

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013. paper	CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] Treaty (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
014. paper	Nagorno-Karabakh (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
015. paper	Background on Regional Energy Issues (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
016. paper	COCOM (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
017. report	Biography (2 pages)	11/23/1994	P1/b(1)
018. report	Biography (2 pages)	05/02/1995	P1/b(1)
019. report	Biography (2 pages)	05/02/1995	P1/b(1)
020. report	Biography (2 pages)	05/02/1995	P1/b(1)
021. report	Biography (2 pages)	05/02/1995	P1/b(1)
022. report	Biography (2 pages)	04/26/1995	P1/b(1)
023. report	Biography (1 page)	03/01/1995	P1/b(1)
024. report	Biography (2 pages)	05/02/1995	P1/b(1)
025. report	Biography (2 pages)	05/01/1995	P1/b(1)

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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBH Date: 1/24/2020

2016-0135-M



**President Clinton's Trip
to
Russia and Ukraine
May 8-12, 1995**

Exec Sec Office

~~SECRET~~

President Clinton's Trip to Russia and Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995
Exec Sec Office

MOSCOW

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE 

SUBJECT: Your Trip to Moscow, May 9-11, 1995

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRH NARA, Date 1/24/2020
2016-0135-M

Your visit to Moscow comprises a day of ceremonial events on May 9, a day of substantive meetings May 10, and a half day of events May 11 to afford you contact with a broader range of Russians. Your public statements and press materials will be provided when complete. This briefing book contains:

SCHEDULE OF KEY EVENTS

SCOPE MEMORANDA

- Memorandum from Anthony Lake
- Memorandum from Secretary Christopher
- Memorandum from Secretary Rubin

WREATH-LAYING, TOMB OF UNKNOWN

Scenesetter

PARADE OF RUSSIAN WWII VETERANS

Scenesetter

OPENING OF WWII MONUMENT AND MUSEUM (POKLONNAYA HILL)

Scenesetter

MEETING WITH U.S. VETERANS

Scenesetter

KREMLIN RECEPTION, STATE DINNER AND VISIT TO TRETAKOV GALLERY

Scenesetter

Remarks

ONE-ON-ONE MEETING WITH YELTSIN

Background on Issues

Talking Points

FIRST PLENARY SESSION: SECURITY

Scenesetter

Background on Issues

Talking Points

SECOND PLENARY SESSION: ECONOMICS

Background on Issues

Talking Points

JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE

Remarks

SPEECH AT MOSCOW STATE UNIVERSITY

Scenesetter

Remarks

KREMLIN DINNER

Scenesetter

Remarks

MEETING WITH EMBASSY STAFF

Scenesetter

BREAKFAST WITH POLITICAL LEADERS

Background

Talking Points

Participants List

VISIT TO PRIVATIZATION SITE - COCA-COLA

Scenesetter

BACKGROUND PAPERS

START II

Status of Economic Reforms

Russia and NATO

Chechnya

Russian-Iranian Nuclear Cooperation

AMB Treaty: AMB/TMD

START Treaty and Space Launch Vehicles (SLVs)

CFE Treaty

Nagorno-Karabakh

IL-96

Background on Regional Energy Issues

COCOM

BIOGRAPHIC MATERIALS

**SCHEDULE
KEY EVENTS**

SCHEDULE OF KEY EVENTS IN MOSCOW

Tuesday, May 9

WREATH-PLACING, TOMB OF UNKNOWN
8:15 - 8:30 a.m.

PARADE OF VETERANS, RED SQUARE
9:00 - 10:30 a.m.

OPENING OF THE MONUMENT AND MUSEUM
POKLONNAYA GORA
1:00 - 2:30 p.m.

MEET AND GREET U.S. VETARANS
2:45 - 3:15 p.m.

HEADS OF STATE RECEPTION, THE KREMLIN
5:30 - 6:00 p.m.

STATE DINNER
6:00 - 8:15 p.m.

Wednesday, May 10

ONE-ON-ONE, THE KREMLIN
10:00 - 11:15 a.m.

FIRST PLENARY SESSION, THE KREMLIN
11:45 - 1:00 p.m.

SECOND PLENARY SESSION, THE KREMLIN
1:30 - 2:30 p.m.

JOINT PRESS CONFERENCE, THE KREMLIN
3:00 - 3:45 p.m.

SPEECH AT MOSCOW STATE UNIVERSITY
6:00 - 7:00 p.m.

OFFICIAL DINNER, THE KREMLIN
8:00 - 10:30 p.m.

Thursday, May 11

MEETING WITH EMBASSY STAFF (TBD)

BREAKFAST MEETING WITH POLITICAL LEADERS
9:00 - 10:30 a.m.

VISIT TO PRIVATIZATION SITE - COCA-COLA
10:30 - 11:30 a.m.

**SCOPE
MEMORANDA**

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE 

SUBJECT: Moscow Summit

DECLASSIFIED
FER E.O. 13526
2016-0135-M (1.01)
KBN 1/24/2020

The Setting

Your fourth summit with Boris Yeltsin comes at yet another critical juncture in the development of post-Cold War relations with Moscow and in Russia's own turbulent history. Three and a half years after the abrupt collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, the political situation in the Russian Federation remains deeply unsettled, owing to the combined effects of a prolonged economic downturn, severe social dislocation and the approach of the electoral season.

With the presidential election still more than a year away, the campaign to succeed Yeltsin is already in full swing. The president himself has yet to decide whether to seek reelection in 1996, due in part to his sharp slide in public opinion polls during the past year.

Relations between the United States and Russia have become an extremely sensitive political issue in Russia since your last meeting. Yeltsin's conservative critics accuse him and Foreign Minister Kozyrev of "selling out" to the U.S. and the West and of being insufficiently vigilant in defense of Russia's core geopolitical interests. These criticisms have struck a resonant chord with the political class in Moscow and have forced Yeltsin to tack to the right.

Yeltsin has refused to abandon the central features of his American policy and has repeatedly reaffirmed the importance to Russia of its "partnership" with the United States. He continues to champion the logic of political and economic integration and to reject the counsel of those who would have Russia turn its back on the West in favor of a go-it-alone strategy. That said, Russia will remain a fractious "partner" for the United States as it continues to search for the right balance in the conduct of its foreign policy between integration and isolation, engagement and withdrawal.

It is something of an irony that with doubts about the wisdom of Russia casting its lot with the West at their highest point since

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

1991, the country's *actual* economic performance has started to improve. Real wages for urban dwellers are up for the first time since the late 1980s and unemployment remains in the single digits. More than half of the country's productive assets are now in private hands and private-sector economic activity makes up 60% of the national total. Capital flight has slowed and the value of the ruble, while low, is more or less stable. Savings are up. A small, politically-moderate middle class is beginning to take shape, mostly in the cities. At the same time, corruption is endemic and criminal activity of all kinds continues to be a national preoccupation.

Three and a half years after the Soviet collapse, Russia's second great experiment with revolution in this century remains very much a work in progress. It is an open question whether the forces in Russia supporting democratic development and the transition to a market economy will triumph over more primitive, inward-looking elements, which would impose a more authoritarian political order, curtail civil liberties and re-nationalize the economy. **It is this very uncertainty that validates the logic of your policy and the rationale for your trip: persistent, patient engagement on behalf of reform and reformers to maximize the chance for a successful outcome.**

Timing

May 9

As you know, your visit to Moscow coincides with the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe. The day will be one of high emotion and solemn remembrance for the Russian people. Your coming to Moscow to commemorate their sacrifice is an important gesture to a proud, capable people who suffered deeply and whose lives are again filled with uncertainty.

Your presence on May 9 provides you with an unusual opportunity to connect with the Russian people and while honoring their great sacrifice during World War II, simultaneously to direct their gaze to the future. What they -- and Yeltsin -- will want to hear is that you, the elected leader of the most powerful country in the world, come to Moscow as a friend and supporter. In Russian eyes, your presence signifies the end of one era and, they hope, the beginning of another.

For most Russians, the disappearance of the Soviet Union means the resumption of their own history and a chance to rejoin the world after 75 years of self-imposed exile. Your being with them on this day of remembrance demonstrates you appreciate Russia's singular contribution to the defeat of Hitler and his armies but also, and just as importantly, that you welcome Russia's return

to the international community and to what the Russians themselves call "civilization."

May 10-11

If V-E Day is mostly about the pain of loss and the promise of renewal, May 10-11 in Moscow is about the substance of U.S.-Russian relations in 1995. The relationship has come under considerable strain since your last meeting with Yeltsin in September. Over the last eight months, the Russians have taken strong, public exception to our plans for NATO's expansion; they have deviated from Contact Group positions regarding Bosnia; they have resisted providing a date for the cut-off of conventional weapons shipments to Iran; and, worse yet, have announced their intention to provide Tehran with several light-water nuclear reactors and associated technology. They have adopted a harder line in their dealings with former Soviet republics and gotten themselves mired in a costly war along their southern periphery. They have signaled their inability -- or unwillingness -- to comply with the so-called "flank" limits contained in the CFE Treaty and have done very little to ease U.S. suspicions about their chemical and biological weapons programs. The START II treaty is stalled in the Duma and ratification is far from assured.

While the news is not all bad -- they continue to dismantle their nuclear weapons in accordance with START I with the assistance of Nunn-Lugar funding and to press ahead with an ambitious program of economic reform -- neither is it all that good.

Predictably, critics of Administration policy focus on these and other problem areas, arguing whatever the earlier promise in U.S.-Russian relations, the potential for further development is now exhausted; in their view the relationship is little more than the sum of these and other problems and as a result, in need of sharp correction.

The policy of intensive engagement, keyed as it is to the promotion of American interests, remains the best -- indeed the only -- viable course of action. This summit constitutes, therefore, an important opportunity for you to validate the essential correctness and continuing logic of your policy.

Core Goals

- Seek Yeltsin's renewed commitment to press ahead with Russia's transformation and its political and economic integration with the West;

- Reaffirm continuing U.S. support for economic reform, democratic political development, and the rule of law;
- Interact with a diverse group of Russian leaders to demonstrate U.S. interest in a Russia beyond -- and after -- Boris Yeltsin;
- Regarding specific issue areas:
 - Obtain Yeltsin's agreement to the NATO Partnership documents in return for launching the NATO-Russia dialogue (the "May-for-May" deal);
 - Obtain Yeltsin's agreement to a date certain for the cut-off of conventional weapons sales to Iran, facilitating Russia's entry into the post-COCOM regime;
 - Convince Yeltsin to reconsider the reactor sale to Iran and to abort the protocol agreements on uranium enrichment and the advanced training of personnel;
 - Press the Russians to extend the temporary cease-fire in Chechnya and to secure a political settlement to the conflict;
 - Urge the Russians to comply fully with all existing arms control agreements, including the CFE Treaty and BW/CW conventions, and to ratify START II;
 - Underscore the need to build confidence through rational economic and commercial policies.

Schedule and Substance

Following an early morning arrival in Moscow on *Tuesday, May 9*, you will proceed to the west wall of the Kremlin where you will place a commemorative wreath at the Tomb of the Unknowns. From there you will join other world leaders on Red Square to review the parade of World War II veterans. (The Russian leadership, including Yeltsin, will view the parade from atop Lenin's tomb.) In the early afternoon, you will visit the recently-completed World War II monument and museum at Poklonnaya Gora in Moscow. With Yeltsin hosting, you and other leaders will tour several of the rooms in the museum and the hall set aside to honor the 20 million war dead. At the conclusion of the tour, Yeltsin and/or Prime Minister Chernomyrdin will speak. You will offer brief remarks on the wartime sacrifices of the Russian people and on the Allied struggle to defeat Nazi Germany.

The evening is devoted to a Kremlin reception and state dinner for heads of state, hosted by Yeltsin. Following Yeltsin's toast, you will be invited to speak, as will Prime Minister Major, President Mitterrand and perhaps others. The evening's events are scheduled to conclude at 10:00 p.m.

Wednesday, May 10 begins with a 75-minute one-on-one session with Yeltsin in the Kremlin. **It is at this meeting that you will want to secure Yeltsin's approval of the "May-for-May" deal on the development of relations between NATO and Russia.** It will also be important in the one-on-one session to make clear the urgent need to end the fighting in Chechnya. You will press Yeltsin for a date certain on the cut-off of conventional weapons sales to Iran and impress upon him the intensity of U.S. opposition to the sale of Russian nuclear reactors to Iran; you will want to ascertain how accommodating Yeltsin can be on this sensitive issue. Time permitting, you will also want to urge Yeltsin to do everything possible to ensure Russian compliance with the CFE Treaty and all other arms control agreements.

Yeltsin will be eager to review the bidding on European security. He will also want to engage you in a discussion of economic issues. As such, he is likely to press you on expanding Russia's role at the G-7, on doing away with Jackson-Vanik and on improving Russian market access in the U.S. economy.

Two plenary sessions will follow your one-on-one with Yeltsin. The first will be devoted to security issues. **We suggest you press him to move ahead with START II ratification. You should ask him to go over the head of his experts and resolve START I implementation and BW and CW questions.** Yeltsin will want to discuss the ABM Treaty in light of Russian concern about our theater missile defenses. We have agreed on a statement of principles that makes clear we support the ABM Treaty but also must have the right to deploy effective theater missile defenses.

The second plenary will focus on economic issues and on trade and investment questions. **Here you will want to underscore the need for Russia to build investor confidence.** Macroeconomic stabilization is one aspect of this, but there are equally important areas for confidence building in taxation policy, the development of the private sector and capital markets and in trade and investment policy. The Russians are generally on the right track on most of these issues, but you will cite areas for prioritized, accelerated action and make clear our willingness to help. The Russian agenda for this meeting is market access. You will be able to cite good outcomes on a number of anti-dumping actions against Russia and the prospect for a negotiated solution

of the Russian gun import issue. Overall, Russia's new trade surplus with the United States is the most eloquent testimony to the openness of our markets.

You and Yeltsin will hold a joint press conference following the conclusion of the second plenary.

From the Kremlin you will go to Moscow State University where you will address Russian students -- and the Russian people via nationwide television -- stressing America's commitment to help during the painful period of transition. The day will conclude with an official Kremlin dinner at which Yeltsin will preside. We anticipate the usual exchange of toasts.

Two events are scheduled for the morning of *Thursday, May 11*. You will host a breakfast at Spaso House for 10-15 political leaders from the broad middle of the Russian political spectrum. This will show your policy of engagement enables the United States to cultivate ties with Russian politicians other than Yeltsin and those most closely associated with him. The breakfast will be followed by a visit to the US-West joint venture in Moscow, which is helping bring Russia on line and creating jobs and opportunities in both countries thanks to seed capital provided by Ex-Im Bank and OPIC.

MEMORANDUM
FROM SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER
TO BE PROVIDED



DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

May 2, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Robert E. Rubin *R. E. R.*
SUBJECT: Economic Themes for the Moscow and Kiev Summits

Your Summit meetings in Moscow and Kiev come with each country attempting major strides forward on economic reform. Each country has developed ambitious programs for stabilization and structural reform. Each country has earned IMF standby loans for the first time and will receive greater financial support from the West than ever before. Success in those programs will help each country move down the road toward economic prosperity. At the Summits, you have an opportunity to reinforce for Presidents Yeltsin and Kuchma that cooperation on economic reform is a positive feature of our countries' relationships. We are backing sound economic choices this year with major financing because we believe that it will promote the transformation of former Soviet states into sovereign, democratic societies.

THE MOSCOW SUMMIT

Russia has made remarkable progress in building a market economy. Who would have believed when the Soviet Union fell apart that four years later the private sector would be producing over 60 percent of GDP? The U.S.-Russian economic dialogue is also remarkable. While it is often overshadowed by our dialogue on foreign policy and security issues, I believe that dialogue is a healthy and important element in our relationship. At this juncture, our main point for President Yeltsin should be that one overriding need should guide Russia as it advances toward a market economy and sounder economic relations with the United States. That need is confidence.

Markets require confidence to function smoothly, to produce goods, and to mobilize flows of savings and investment -- both at home and from abroad. Russia can only build confidence with greater consistency in policy, regulation, laws, and the construction of market institutions.

Macroeconomic Stabilization

Stable macroeconomic policies and low inflation are needed for Russia to reap the benefits of free markets. To command support at the ballot box in upcoming elections, Russia's government must show it can soundly manage the ruble. Thus, 1995 is an especially critical year for reform. In our discussions with President Yeltsin, we should stress the need to build confidence in the government and in reform by fully implementing the economic program.

Russia's 1995 economic program has for the first time earned the IMF's support under a full standby loan of \$6.8 billion. That program has two key objectives. First, Russia aims to cut

monthly inflation to 1% in the second half of the year by reducing the budget deficit to 5 1/2% of GDP and slashing credit growth. The Duma has passed a budget consistent with these targets, and President Yeltsin has signed it into law. Second, Russia is implementing a major liberalization of its oil markets which will integrate Russia into world markets and reduce corruption.

The prospects for implementation of the program are better than in years past. The economic team -- especially Chernomyrdin and Chubais -- is strong and sees stability as an economic and political objective; the ruble's "Black Tuesday" collapse has sensitized policy-makers; and sectoral lobbies are weaker. But we should remain mindful that this is the fourth consecutive year in which Russia has launched stabilization efforts. In the last three years, spring was a time of hope, only to be dashed by despair in the fall -- with high inflation, ruble collapse, and massive capital flight. Moreover, Parliamentary elections will be held this year.

To help President Yeltsin build confidence, we can offer two things. First, we can reaffirm our commitment to back large multilateral support for reform. As long as Russia adheres to its 1995 program, it will receive \$500 million monthly from the IMF. The World Bank will soon approve a \$600 million fast-disbursing loan. Second, we can help Russia on official debt. The G-7 are now discussing a 1995 Russian debt rescheduling which we hope to complete by the end of May. At our urging, the G-7 are likely to commit to Russia that if it stays the course through early fall, work will commence on comprehensive rescheduling, aimed at providing a final resolution of Russia's debt difficulties.

Taxation

Russia needs a new tax code to promote investor confidence. The state must generate sufficient revenue to carry out basic functions. But entrepreneurs need confidence that the tax system is fair, predictable and will let them earn a profit.

Already, Russia's tax system is greatly improved over its Soviet predecessor. But the tax regime distorts incentives, lacks transparency, and is arbitrarily enforced. It is riddled with exemptions. Tax compliance is low -- state-owned firms often do not pay and revenue from the private sector is not being captured. The rich gas sector, due to its clout, is woefully under-taxed by international comparison. In response, Russia has raised tax rates on those who do pay to very high levels, only further encouraging evasion.

The excess wage tax, on which you are receiving separate briefings, is a prime example of these problems and its imposition has undermined the U.S.-Russian bilateral tax treaty. Of course, all of this adversely affects prospects for stability. Last year federal revenues accounted for only 11% of GDP, clearly an inadequate level for a country trying to restore stable national finances. This year, it is hoped revenues will rise to 14-1/2%, but collection may already be falling short.

There is much we can offer. First, last September, President Yeltsin accepted your offer to help mobilize a multilateral program of technical support to reform the tax regime. Reaction from Russia's Finance Ministry has been lukewarm. We stand ready to provide this support and we should reaffirm our commitment to do so. Second, I will renew our offer to send senior

Treasury tax officials to Moscow to work with the Finance Ministry on the bilateral tax treaty. Third, the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission's joint commercial tax dialogue is a further vehicle for discussing the excess wage tax.

Private Sector Development.

Without confidence in private market structures, no one will be eager to undertake investments. Farmers will not put their money at risk to increase yields unless they know they own the land. Businessmen will not sign contracts unless they know that these can be enforced in a court of law.

By freeing prices in 1992 and implementing a path-breaking privatization program, Russia has taken huge strides forward in putting in place the building blocks for free markets. Thousands of companies have been privatized, many are modernizing and rationalizing their operations, and the emerging private sector is becoming a strong constituency for law and order and for property rights. Bankruptcy procedures and a commercial code are being put in place. There has also been major progress on oil sector liberalization.

But Russia needs to invigorate private sector development, because the impetus for structural reform is slowing. The second stage of privatization has made little headway. Land ownership, now enshrined in the Constitution, has not been followed by progress on land privatization.

Here again, there is much we can offer. First, since early 1994, the World Bank has approved over \$2 billion in project loans, but virtually no money has been disbursed due to poor Russian implementation. The Bank's pipeline includes major loans to reform Russia's energy sector and create a private agricultural sector. We need to reaffirm that these monies remain available. Second, we should remind President Yeltsin we stand ready to offer large-scale technical support to back private sector development. Third, to promote enterprise reform, we have created numerous enterprise funds. This week, a \$50 million EBRD-United States fund is being approved. It will operate in Volgograd, Samara, and Saratov.

Capital Market Development.

Confidence is needed for Russian firms to acquire private capital for growth and for foreign investors to bring in new technology and know-how. Russia is a high-savings country, but the lack of confidence that investments will have a reliable return prevents funds from finding their way to Russian companies. Reliable returns are undermined not only by the prospect of inflation and financial instability, but also the inadequacy of capital markets and shareholders rights. Daunted by these obstacles, Russians hold \$50 billion abroad (by some estimates), plus billions of dollars in currency.

A successful capital market must intermediate flows of savings from households and foreigners to domestic companies. The Russian appetite for savings is high -- savings is 27% of GDP. And Russian companies are flush with projects that have potentially high rates of return.

Shareholders, including households, institutional investors, venture capitalists, and banks, are deterred by many capital market inadequacies. One is the absence of limited liability under the

law. A second is inadequate protection for shareholders. Russian firms usually hold their own registries and make them inaccessible by keeping them in the hinterlands. Last year, an aluminum producer deleted a major foreign shareholder from its registry, rather than let him sit on the firm's Board. A third is the weak legal foundation for corporate governance. An owner with a significant minority stake may be denied influence over the Board of Directors by management and inside owners. Outside owners, especially foreigners, have been excluded from Boards and have seen their shareholdings diluted through the issuance of discounted shares to friendly shareholders. Often, the insiders have been successful without violating any law.

These problems are highlighted in one statistic: the total market capitalization of Russia's top 30 traded companies is \$16 billion, less than that of a major U.S. firm.

We are already trying to help fix these problems. Our bilateral support financed the technical work for a \$10 million independent Russian registry company which has just been created by the EBRD, the IFC and several Russian banks. We are also providing extensive support to develop the Russian SEC.

Trade and Investment

You will be receiving separate briefing on trade issues for the Moscow visit, and I will leave this topic to others.

THE KIEV SUMMIT

In the first years of independence, Ukraine pursued gradualist policies aimed at stabilizing output and inflation. It achieved neither. Output fell as the command economy collapsed. Huge credits to coal and agriculture prompted waves of hyper-inflation. Then, price controls were imposed. Social stability was jeopardized and conflicts with Russia were reaching a flash point.

When President Kuchma assumed office in July 1994, he recognized that for Ukraine to remain independent, it had no choice but to pursue reforms. He has done so with vigor to revitalize the economy, develop mutually beneficial relations with Russia, and tap western support.

Last October, Ukraine embarked on a bold reform course, supported by a special IMF facility created at our urging to jumpstart reforms. Ukraine liberalized most prices, including those of food and industrial use of energy. The exchange rate system was freed; controls had cut exports and encouraged barter and capital flight. The 1994 budget deficit, which was headed toward 20 percent of GDP, was reduced to 8-1/2%.

Ukraine has just significantly strengthened its reform program with IMF support under a \$1.5 billion standby arrangement. The budget deficit is being cut again by more than half, down to 3.5% of GDP. Ukraine is eliminating the Government's involvement in most areas of the economy and it is liberalizing trade and most remaining prices. Privatization has begun with large support from AID -- 90% of small firms and 8,000 large firms are to be privatized this year. If the program is implemented, monthly inflation would fall to 1% monthly by year end.

Real results are already evident. After a major tug-of-war with Parliament, the budget was adopted. Monthly inflation, boosted at the turn of the year by liberalization, is now coming down sharply. It has fallen from a high of 72% in November to 21% in January and 10% in March. The exchange rate has been stable this year and foreign capital inflows are increasing.

Most importantly, since Kuchma assumed office economic reform has been key to the rekindling of hope now evident in Ukraine. The prospects for Ukraine as an independent, market-based democratic society have not been better at any time in the last few years.

In your meeting with President Kuchma, you may wish to emphasize the following three points.

First, President Kuchma and his economic team deserve praise for putting Ukraine onto the path of reform. Ukraine's progress in a short span of eight months has been remarkable. At the same time, we must urge him to stay the course.

Second, we remain committed to our pledge to support him. At the Naples Summit, you and the G-7 Heads of State pledged \$4 billion in support from international financial institutions over a two-year period following commencement of genuine reforms. Already, \$3.7 billion has been committed -- \$2.7 billion from international institutions and \$1 billion in special balance of payments support from western bilateral donors and Japan. As long as Ukraine continues with reforms, there is much more financing available from international institutions and export credit agencies will find it increasingly promising to lend to Ukraine.

Third, Ukraine needs to continue to improve its economic relationship in its own neighborhood.

As part of Ukraine's program, Russia and Turkmenistan, at our urging, rescheduled over \$3 billion in Ukrainian gas debts. It is crucial Ukraine make timely payments on current gas deliveries to carry out this deal and to strengthen market ties with these countries. Also, trade liberalization is the best means to allow Ukraine to integrate itself into the world economy. Ukraine must rededicate itself to this task.

**WREATH-LAYING,
TOMB OF UNKNOWN**

WREATH-LAYING

CONTEXT OF THE EVENT

You and your party will be met at the west gate of the Kremlin by the Deputy Commandant of the Moscow Military Garrison, General-Lt Smirnov, and other members of the Russian receiving party. They will escort you to Aleksander Garden where the ceremony will take place. As you approach the wreath two Honor Guard soldiers will pick it up and the band will begin playing Schumann's "Daydreams." As the Honor Guard proceeds toward the tomb, you should follow.

The official party will follow you. At the base of the steps to the tomb, the official party will stop while you and the soldiers continue up the steps toward the flame. The soldiers will place the wreath in front of the flame, step aside, and you may then step forward and "adjust" the presidential ribbons on the wreath. After a few seconds of silence, you should turn around to face the Honor Guard and band. The band will play the U.S. and Russian national anthems and then strike up a Russian military march. During the march, the Honor Guard will pass-in-review. The ceremony takes about 7 minutes. At the ceremony's completion and as you move to the waiting motorcade, General-Lt Smirnov may introduce 4-5 Honor Guard representatives to you.

BACKGROUND

Aleksandrovskiy Sad is the fenced-in memorial park by the Manezh outside the west wall of the Kremlin. The Tomb of the Unknown Soldier is at the north end of the park, across from the State Historical Museum. The tomb was built in 1966 and dedicated May 8, 1967 after the remains of an unknown soldier who fell in the Great Patriotic War (WWII) were transferred from another mass grave site. The tomb, with its over-sized helmet and guidon draped near the eternal flame within a large metal star, is on a large red granite square at the base of the Kremlin wall and northwest tower. On the wall to the south of the tomb are granite blocks for each of the cities awarded "Hero City of the Soviet Union" after the war.

Russians are acutely aware of the enormity of their losses in the Great Patriotic War -- on the order of 25 million deaths, of which about 10 million were soldiers and sailors. The tomb receives lots of emotional visits by citizens of all ages, often including brides and grooms still in wedding dress who lay bouquets near the flame.

**PARADE OF RUSSIAN
WWII VETERANS**

RED SQUARE PARADE

CONTEXT OF THE EVENT

Either President Yeltsin or Prime Minister Chernomyrdin will meet your motorcade and escort you to your seat near Lenin's tomb. Yeltsin will watch the parade from atop Lenin's tomb and may make a short speech. Yeltsin's remarks might be followed by a brief speech by General Kulikov, Russia's highest ranking WWII veteran still living. At the end of the parade, the President and the other Heads of State will return along the same path, through the Spasskiy Gates, to their waiting vehicles on Ivanovskiy Square. In addition to you and approximately sixty Heads of State attending VE-Day commemorations in Moscow, representatives of the Moscow diplomatic corps will watch the parade from the same platform.

BACKGROUND

Red Square is the historical center of the Russian state. It is a large public square, bordered by the Kremlin, St. Basil's Cathedral, the G.U.M. department store (a large marketplace in pre-revolutionary times) and the State Historical Museum (long closed for repairs). For centuries Russian leaders have used Red Square as a place for public demonstrations of various sorts, including executions, readings of key proclamations and the more familiar military hardware parades of Soviet times. In 1941, Russian troops were sent to the front from Red Square, linking the site to WWII in the minds of veterans. All of the Soviet Union's leaders (with the exception of Khrushchev) are buried along the Kremlin wall behind Lenin's tomb. The tomb itself remains open to the public but is no longer popular. However, Russians continue to come to Red Square as a place of pilgrimage.

WWII MONUMENT
& MUSEUM

POKLONNAYA HILL EVENT

CONTEXT OF THE EVENT

You will be met by President Yeltsin and escorted to his place in the special seating area in front of the new WWII memorial. At the commencement of the ceremony, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin will give a ten-minute speech, which will be followed by your remarks and those of British Prime Minister John Major, Chinese President Jiang Zemin, the head of one CIS state and Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov. After the remarks, a twenty-minute band concert will be given. Following the concert, you will move to the interior of the Central Museum, where Yeltsin will lead a tour of three of the museum's rooms.

BACKGROUND

Poklonnaya Gora is the site of the new WWII memorial (a tall obelisk surmounted by an angel sculpture) and the Central Museum of the Great Patriotic War. It is adjacent to Park Pobedy (Victory Park), an open-air exhibit of WWII-era and contemporary military equipment and weapons including aircraft, tanks and cannon. Nearby is the nearly-completed Cathedral of St. George the Victorious, one of the first churches to be built in Russia since the Bolshevik Revolution. The Russians are now completing the memorial and putting the final touches on the museum's interior. This has been a ten-year project. This year's festivities will include the dedication of the memorial and the Central Museum as well as marking the 50th anniversary of the end of WWII.

**MEETING WITH U.S.
VETERANS**

MEETING WITH
AMERICAN WORLD WAR TWO VETERANS IN MOSCOW

CONTEXT OF THE EVENT

About 40 U.S. veterans with connections to our wartime partnership with Russia will be in Moscow for the May 9 commemorations. They include the four American veterans traveling as part of your official delegation, a group headed by Secretary of the Army Togo West and about twenty veterans invited as guests of the Russian government. General West will host a reception in honor of these veterans at the Radisson Hotel which you will drop by at the conclusion of the museum and memorial dedication event at Poklonnaya Hill. You will address brief remarks to the veterans and then have a chance to mingle and speak with them individually.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- Recall our wartime partnership with Russia as a symbol of the future possibilities of our bilateral relationship.
- Thank the assembled veterans for their sacrifices on behalf of peace and stability.

POINTS TO MAKE

- Today is a day of solemn commemoration. We take this opportunity, a half century after the end of the war in Europe, to honor those who gave their lives so that we can stand here today.
- You played an important part in the wartime partnership with Russia that made our common victory possible.
- As President, I speak on behalf of all Americans when I say thank you -- to you here among us today and to your fallen comrades. We must never forget.
- Your sacrifices inspire us all to redouble our efforts to safeguard the peace and security you brought us. Building a strong relationship with Russia is vital to that peace and security. We will persevere because it is in America's -- at the world's -- interest that we do so.

**KREMLIN RECEPTION
STATE DINNER**

KREMLIN RECEPTION, STATE DINNER
AND POSSIBLE VISIT TO THE TRETYAKOV GALLERY

CONTEXT OF THE EVENT

Guests, including some sixty Heads of State/Government, will assemble initially in St. George's Hall where they will be greeted by the Yeltsins. At exactly 6:00 p.m., Yeltsin will ask everyone to observe a moment of silence, which will be observed throughout Russia, to honor those who fell in WWII. All guests will then proceed to the State Kremlin Building for the State Dinner.

You and Mrs. Clinton will sit at the central table along with President Yeltsin, and the Heads of State of Britain, China, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali and two Russian WWII veterans plus spouses. President Yeltsin will make five-minute remarks at the beginning of the dinner. You, President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Major are expected to respond with one-and-a-half minute toasts.

Following the State Dinner, you and Mrs. Clinton may be offered a tour of the Tretyakov gallery.

BACKGROUND

The Grand Kremlin Palace is the heart of the Kremlin and St. George's Hall is the traditional site for official greetings, departures, certain receptions and awards ceremonies. St. George's Hall bears the names of all Russian soldiers awarded the Order of St. George (the Czarist equivalent of our Congressional Medal of Honor), as well as the Cross and Star of the Order.

The modern State Kremlin Building, formerly known as the Palace of Congresses, is the site of cultural performances and some political gatherings. The seating capacity is large; 1,000 guests are expected for the May 9 dinner.

The Tretyakov Gallery has the world's best collection of Russian icons and a fine collection of other pre-revolutionary Russian art, particularly from the 19th century School of Wanderers. The museum recently re-opened to much critical acclaim after a ten-year renovation. The Tretyakov collection is based on that of the 19th century industrialist brothers Pavel and Sergey Tretyakov. Pavel was a patron of the Wanderers. The building was created in the likeness of an old Boyar castle by Viktor Vasnetsov in 1900-05.

Among the Tretyakov's highlights are landscapes by Shishkin, Surikov, Repin, Chagall and Kandinsky. Two of the most famous icons in the Tretyakov's collection are Andrey Rublyov's early 15th century "Holy Trinity" from the Trinity Monastery of Sergeyev Posad, widely regarded as the greatest Russian icon, and the Vladimir Icon, an image of the Virgin and infant Christ. The latter is credited with saving Moscow from the Tatars and other wonders and is believed crucial to the welfare of Russia as a whole. Most recently, the Vladimir Icon was the centerpiece of a service the Patriarch celebrated "to save Russia" during October 1993.

TOAST

TO BE PROVIDED

**MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT YELTSIN**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ONE-ON-ONE MEETING WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2016-0135-M (1.02)
KBM 1/27/2020

BACKGROUND

Your 90-minute private meeting with President Yeltsin will set the tone for the summit and represents an excellent chance to move forward a number of high-profile issues that have dogged the relationship for months. Moscow is entering a year-long political season (Duma elections this December followed by Presidential elections in June 1996), and Yeltsin's preoccupation with domestic politics will only grow. Your private conversation can help reestablish the personal connection between the two of you that has helped us over the rough spots of the preceding months. We need that connection to help us with the heaviest lifting in the relationship -- NATO and Iran-related issues -- that can in turn impart new momentum to the relationship to carry us through the tough year ahead.

Despite his sinking popularity and shrinking base of support, Yeltsin remains the single political figure in Russia with the clout to make the tough decisions necessary on many of our issues. While obsessed with the domestic political equation, he has an interest in maintaining strong links with you and in demonstrating to the Russian public that his policy of engagement with the United States is paying off. In your April 27 phone conversation and subsequent public statements, Yeltsin has sounded emphatic in his commitment to ensure a successful summit.

You can utilize this commitment to advance our agenda. **You should stress the importance of a positive summit to buoy the relationship in light of partisan attacks in Moscow and Washington.** To do this, we need to nail down the "May for May" arrangement that he blessed provisionally during your phone call. **This private discussion is also the place to conclude the final deal on a cut-off date for arms sales to Iran (enabling Russia's entry into the post-COCOM regime) and to press for a halt to the Iran nuclear reactor sale and a commitment to full compliance with CFE flank limits.** You should also discuss continued concerns over Chechnya and the political prospects for continued reform.

The Summit atmosphere will be unusual: the May 9 ceremonies will set a deeply emotional tone. If appropriate, you should remind Yeltsin why you came to Moscow (to honor the Russian people's sacrifice and our WWII partnership) and the sharp domestic criticism your decision provoked. Relating the summit agenda to "Victory Day" may help move Yeltsin in our direction on some of the tougher issues.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

CORE OBJECTIVES

- NATO: Firm up the "May for May" understanding; assure Yeltsin that NATO seeks a special and developed relationship with Russia in the interests of long-term European security.
- Iran/COCOM: Seal the deal with Yeltsin's agreement on the cut-off date for arms sales already in the pipeline.
- Iran/reactors: Reiterate our concerns; probe for Yeltsin's inclination to take action to halt or modify deal.
- CFE: Stress political downsides of violating treaty; assure Yeltsin of our commitment to help Russia solve flank problem in 1996; seek pledge to comply with sublimits in 1995.
- Chechnya: Press to make the temporary moratorium permanent and note your concern over the conflict's effect on Russia's international standing.

POINTS TO MAKE

- Meeting has true sense of history after yesterday's events. Taking first steps toward new Europe that preserves peace at low levels of armaments; European settlement that eluded us after 1945.
- Successful summit important for us both. Political criticism in Washington and Moscow has increased; must translate desire to move forward into concrete achievements.
- Plenary meetings will cover broad security and economic agenda. We need to settle several issues: NATO, as discussed on phone; Russia's entry into post-COCOM regime; CFE problem. Also want to discuss Iran reactor sale and Chechnya.

NATO expansion

- Know cooperation with NATO tough issue for you.
- NATO must evolve as factor for stability throughout Europe -- and political basis for U.S. engagement in Europe. Would Russia want Europe without U.S. influence?
- Understand Russian concerns about expanded NATO. But reluctance to engage Alliance will not slow NATO expansion.

Continued delay could isolate Russia, affect Western support for your integration.

- Hope we confirm agreement on understanding outlined in our phone call:
 - At late May meeting, NATO ministers would (1) reaffirm deliberate, gradual pace of expansion -- no acceleration; (2) reemphasize importance of Partnership for Peace; (3) commit to start discussions on new NATO-Russia relationship with Moscow.
 - As basis for NATO-Russia dialogue, Russia would agree to complete two NATO partnership agreements by date certain before late-May meeting.
 - NATO expansion will continue; process will not speed up and there will be no difficult surprises for you at the May NATO ministerial.
 - Should use remainder of year for serious discussion between Russia and NATO on long-term framework for Russia's relationship with Alliance. Relationship can be implemented in parallel with admitting new members and efforts to strengthen institutions like OSCE.

[IF YELTSIN PUSHES FOR ASSURANCES ON TIMING]

- Aware of sensitivities. NATO's study of "how and why" of expansion and partners briefings will continue through 1995. Follow-on work will consume first half of 1996. Unlikely to start look at "who and when" before then.
- Admission of new members will take time, even after political decision taken.

Iran/COCOM

- Understand may have agreement on Russian sales of conventional arms to Iran. Allows us to announce Russia as founding member of post-COCOM regime; underscores theme of integration.
- Can you agree to 2000 as cut-off year for arms sales in pipeline?

Iran reactor sale

- Want word about selling nuclear technology and reactors to Iran. You know our concerns.

- Huge mistake to go through with sale. Shared very sensitive intelligence with your experts; proves Iran has crash program to develop bomb.
- Other western states -- Germany, France -- backed away from similar deals; just too dangerous.
- Not only selling nuclear reactors to rogue state; understand also agreement to provide Iran with facilities to enrich uranium.
- Urge you to ensure Iran's nuclear ambitions not advanced. Can you reconsider sale?

CFE

- Hope you had time to study my letter.
- Agree CFE Treaty cornerstone of European security architecture we seek to build; must preserve it.
- Understand your security concerns in flank region. Want to help you deal with them. Will work with you on long-term resolution of flank problem when Treaty up for review in 1996.
- Already started developing Alliance approach. Ready to share ideas with your experts next month.
- You need to take steps also: can help **only** if Russia complies with flank limits when they take effect in November.
- Russian violation of treaty would be terrible. Ask you weigh costs of non-compliance in terms of Russia's international standing versus military rationale for extra armored cars.

[IF YELTSIN TIES CFE TO NATO EXPANSION]

- NATO still years away from actually taking in new members. Agree Treaty might need adjustments at future point; too soon to address these. Appropriate time after 1996 review conference.
- Noncompliance with CFE increases pressure on NATO to accelerate expansion.

Chechnya

- Concerned about Chechnya's effect on democratic development, international standing of Russia.
- Understand need to maintain territorial integrity, but military action excessive, out of line with international norms.
- Current moratorium step in right direction, will look cynical if large scale offensive resumes after foreign guests leave Moscow. Urge you to make permanent; give signal to world of commitment to political solution.
- OSCE can facilitate political dialogue and provide assistance, monitors.

Politics

- Much harder to deal with new Congress. Still broad support for engagement with Russia, but problem areas -- Iran reactors, Chechnya -- cause many to question engagement; some advocate cut off of assistance.
- Want to reconfirm commitment to policy supporting your reform and integration into world community.
- To promote policy, need solid reassurance of Russia's commitment to reform. Economic reforms going well. Important you resist pressures to reverse democratic reforms. Press freedom and civil liberties key; if weakened, will force us to look at relations from different perspective.
- Happy to see December and June 96 elections on track. Important these hold as constitution mandates.

PLENARY MEETINGS WITH YELTSIN

BACKGROUND

Inside the Grand Kremlin Palace are three formal meeting rooms connected to each other in a row: the Red Drawing Room, the Green Drawing Room and St. Catherine's Hall. At the other end of the Grand Kremlin Palace, connected by the White Corridor and Vladimir Hall, is the Hall of Facets.

The Green Room is currently used for President Yeltsin's tete-a-tete and small group meetings with foreign visitors. St. Catherine's Hall is devoted to the Order of St. Catherine, the only Russian order given to women. It was founded by Peter the Great in honor of Catherine I who bought Peter's freedom when he was held hostage briefly as a child. The Vladimir Hall is devoted to the Order of St. Vladimir which was awarded to soldiers and civilians whose actions benefited the country.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ONE-ON-ONE MEETING WITH
RUSSIAN PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0135-M (1.03)
KBH 1/24/2020

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PLENARY ON ECONOMIC and COMMERCIAL ISSUES

BACKGROUND

Russia has made remarkable progress in building free markets since independence. Under the leadership of Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin, Russia's economy has bottomed out and is now moving toward recovery on an increasingly privatized basis. The U.S. has been there to support Russia -- in the IMF, in the Paris Club, in opening up our markets and with technical assistance. Recognizing that Russia is moving into an election cycle, we want to help Yeltsin keep the reform engine moving forward.

The Summit coincides with a crucial time for economic reform in Russia. Policy choices Moscow makes during this election year will determine if prosperity or stagnation lies ahead. This one-hour meeting affords an opportunity to get across to Yeltsin the *one unifying need* that will speed progress to full market economy: **confidence**. Markets need confidence to function smoothly, make good economic decisions and mobilize the flows of investment and savings (both at home & from abroad) that fuel growth. **Your message to Yeltsin is that Russia can build confidence only through consistency in policy-making, laws and building of regulatory infrastructure and market institutions.**

You will focus on four areas that require strong leadership to build confidence: maintaining macro-stabilization in an election year; stabilizing tax policy; promoting private sector development; and deepening trade and investment -- bilaterally, regionally and globally. Without strong direction from the top in the next few months, macroeconomic stabilization could falter and essential legislative action could languish as electoral politics begin to heat up. Much of our agenda (Bilateral Investment Treaty, production sharing law) requires legislative action, but the successful passing of the Russian budget demonstrates that the government and the Duma can cooperate productively even on contentious economic issues.

Yeltsin will seek reassurance on U.S. support for Russia with the IMF during the difficult fall season. He is also likely to seek multi-year Paris Club rescheduling; a one-year rescheduling with a "goodwill clause" for the future will likely be approved later this month. On the trade side, Yeltsin may renew his push for "Economies in Transition" (EIT) legislation and raise EX-IM financing guarantees for Pratt & Whitney engines on the Ilyushin-96 aircraft. You can offer administrative action to give him some EIT advantages, although prospects for legislation are dim. And you can promise that EX-IM Bank's review of the Pratt & Whitney deal will proceed expeditiously, with full consideration of Russian concerns.

CORE OBJECTIVES

- Praise Yeltsin's leadership on reform.
- Emphasize need to build *confidence* to make markets function smoothly, mobilize domestic and foreign investment.
- Seek Yeltsin's leadership in advancing joint economic partnership through Duma approval of the Bilateral Investment Treaty and Production Sharing Legislation.
- Emphasize U.S. interest in joint efforts to expand trade and investment regionally, particularly in multi-billion dollar Caspian energy and pipeline development.
- Encourage follow-up of energy, trade and investment issues in the Gore-Chernomyrdin meeting in June.

POINTS TO MAKE

- Congratulate Russia on reforms. Strong leadership during difficult transition critical to economic transformation.
- Strong economic team -- PM Chernomyrdin, Minister Chubais -- earned Russia international respect.
- With IMF program in place, trade expanding, economy beginning to turn up, propose focus on mutual concern -- generating growth and creating jobs.
- Found keys to creating jobs are attracting domestic savings and global finance; directly related to "market confidence."
- Markets need confidence to function smoothly and attract investment to fuel growth and create jobs.
- Key to market confidence is consistency: in economic policies, commercial and tax laws, regulatory infrastructure and stable market institutions.

Building Market Confidence Domestically

- Strong leadership critical to maintain consistent macroeconomic policies in face of enormous election year pressures.
- Strongly support Russia in IMF, World Bank. Will continue work in Paris Club for generous debt rescheduling. Want to include clause stating if Russia implements program, G-7 begin work on comprehensive multi-year rescheduling.
- Tax policy second key to building investor confidence. Last year, agreed predictable tax system needed to help collect revenues for budget and reassure investors.
- Stable tax regime vitally important for survival of small businesses, in turn create most jobs, and for foreign investors who decide where to invest globally.
- Ready to make technical experts available to help tax reform effort. Urge you to reaffirm support. Secretary Rubin will follow up.
- Third key for confidence: market structures. Urge you to promote further privatization, advance land reform, improve legal code.
- Told World Bank approved more than \$2B in loans to develop energy, agricultural and financial sectors, but none disbursed due to implementation difficulties.
- Know you want to tap loans; ready to provide legal technical support to address implementation issues and release support.
- Finally, urge you to build confidence in market institutions so Russian firms acquire private capital for growth. Bob Rubin, worked on Wall Street for 27 years, will share thoughts on this subject.

Cooperating Bilaterally

- Want word about growing bilateral trade and investment relations.
- Economic partnership, embodied in Partnership on Economic Progress signed last September, is reaping benefits for both sides.

- Agreement on Timan Pechora and Sakhalin-1 during this summit.
- Hope June Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission announces results from commercial tax dialogue, progress on tariff and market access issues.
- Know you have concerns over U.S. market access just as we have concerns about Russian tariffs, especially aircraft and automotive sectors.
- Large body of U.S. trade law limits flexibility. Push for legislative change when can; climate not best.
- Can tell you through administrative judgments and like, will do what can to mitigate adverse effects.
- Need to focus on how to help American businesses build active partnerships with Russian business. Both sides want to benefit from abilities and creative energies of our world class firms.
- Ratification of Bilateral Investment Treaty and passing production sharing law -- two steps to help U.S. and Russian companies deepen commercial cooperation.
- Duma Speaker Rybkin gave cause for hope last week, but your leadership critical to push legislation through before summer recess. Fall is election time, may be too late then.

Cooperating Regionally

- Want to discuss enormous opportunities for U.S. and Russian firms in developing oil and gas in Caspian region.
- Interests directly engaged because American companies spent hundreds of millions, made commitments for multi-billion dollar contracts.
- For past two years development stalled. Two issues of concern.
- Understand Russia hopes to sign agreement with Caspian littoral states to establish zone of joint ownership in center of Caspian including Iran.
- Shared concerns over Iran's behavior. Do not welcome enhanced Iranian role in Caucasus and Central Asia.

- Very concerned condominium agreement could cause serious problems for Caspian energy development. It would:
 - allow any state veto over development and transport;
 - call into question existing and future deals, including Azerbaijan International Oil Consortium where U.S. and Russian companies have significant stakes;
 - require us to oppose loans by international financial institutions to projects in common area given Iranian involvement.
- Would not serve American interests or Russian interests. Greatly complicates efforts to stabilize and develop region.
- Established international precedents allow division of Caspian and take into account Russia's legitimate economic interests.
- Urge you not to enter condominium agreement on Caspian.
- Want to raise Caspian Pipeline Consortium; don't believe it can be financed as currently structured.
- Understand major international oil companies preparing new financing package for pipeline along same route.
- Recommend Gore-Chernomyrdin review financing proposals in June to expedite pipeline construction.
- Propose regional energy issues as major item for Gore-Chernomyrdin meeting. Can discuss in detail issues outlined in non-paper.

Building Confidence Globally (Time permitting)

- Committed to Russia's full and speedy integration into global trading system.
- Russia's accession to WTO proceeding well; look forward to first Working Party in Geneva in June.
- Russia's entry on sound commercial basis and full compliance with multilateral trade rules will boost world confidence in reforms, increase trade and investment.

IF RAISED

Economies in Transition

- Understand importance of recognizing Russia's status as Economy in Transition.
- Made progress in managing market access issues this year. In recent case, Russian magnesium producer fully cooperated with anti-dumping investigation, providing all requested information; found not dumping.
- Consulting with Congress and U.S. industry on appropriate strategy toward trade legislation for economies in transition. Frankly, serious opposition to dumping reform in new Congress.
- Consequently, exploring reforms can adopt administratively.
- Process of integrating economies is long term; must proceed step-by-step. Have greatest chance of success in atmosphere where Russia perceived as opening markets.

Jackson-Vanik

- As you know, certified Russia in full-compliance with provisions of Jackson-Vanik.
- Actual graduation requires Congress; Working to build consensus.
- Will be long process. Congress not ready to take action. Example of how Chechnya conflict has negative effect on Russia's image.

Ilyushin 96

- Welcome joint ventures in aviation sector; want continued cooperation. Important for economic development and high technology cooperation.
- This transaction has significant ramifications for aviation industries in both countries. Understand how important to you; taking your views fully into consideration.
- Under U.S. law, EX-IM Bank required to conduct thorough analysis of proposal, assess impact of deal on competitive position of U.S. manufacturers.

- Cannot prejudge outcome of EX-IM Bank's economic and technical analysis; will ensure completed by end of June.

Gun imports

- Can't remove Russia from ITAR list until resolved arms sales to Iran. Once that happens, prepared to discuss other possible arrangements.

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CONFERENCE**

PRESS CONFERENCE

TO BE PROVIDED

**SPEECH AT MOSCOW
STATE UNIVERSITY**

SPEECH AT MOSCOW STATE UNIVERSITY

CONTEXT OF THE EVENT

The venues under consideration for your speech are the central auditorium or "main hall" located on the second floor of the enormous main tower building, which dominates the campus, and an outdoor setting, perhaps on the steps and/or on an esplanade in front of the main tower. The hall seats 1,200 persons and would be filled to capacity should you speak there, according to university officials.

BACKGROUND

Moscow State University is the most prestigious, largest and oldest higher educational institution in Russia. It was founded in 1755 by the Russian scientist and man of letters, Mikhail Lomonosov. The university is the home and place of learning for some 33,000 students and about 9,000 professors, including over 100 members of the Russian Academy of Sciences and several Nobel Prize Laureates. It has been internationally rated as the second best university in Europe. The university enjoys a uniquely independent status among state universities in Russia and has an elective system of internal governance. The academic year lasts from September 1 to June 30. The campus is in a pleasant, elevated area of the city (Sparrow Hills, formerly Lenin Hills) about 15 minutes by car from the city center.

MOSCOW STATE UNIVERSITY

REMARKS

TO BE PROVIDED

MAY 10 KREMLIN DINNER

CONTEXT OF THE EVENT

You and President Yeltsin will meet in the Winter Garden, then enter the Hall's anteroom via a staircase. You will follow the other guests from the anteroom into the Hall of Facets. There will be toasts. No entertainment is planned following the dinner.

BACKGROUND

The Hall of Facets in the Grand Kremlin Palace is named for the decorative planes descending from the room's ceiling. It is one of the oldest rooms in the Kremlin. In January 1994, the Yeltsins hosted you and Mrs. Clinton at a State Dinner at this site. The room holds approximately one hundred forty guests for a sit-down dinner.

TOAST

TO BE PROVIDED

MEETING WITH
EMBASSY STAFF AND MARINE SECURITY GUARDS

CONTEXT OF THE EVENT

Before you depart Russia, you will address the U.S. Embassy staff and the Marine Security Guards stationed in Moscow. Your remarks will take place in the gymnasium where the Embassy staff and their families were forced to take shelter for two days and nights during the climax of the confrontation between President Yeltsin and the former Parliament in October 1993.

CORE OBJECTIVE

- Thank Ambassador Pickering and the Embassy staff for their hard work in preparing for your visit and reporting on the importance of U.S.-Russia relations and the vital role of the Embassy in promoting them.

POINTS TO MAKE

- Here to thank all of you and your exceptional Ambassador, Tom Pickering.
- Tireless, devoted work covering dramatic political events in Moscow and across Russia outstanding and true service to U.S.
- America has tremendous stake in stable, democratic Russia; among highest national interests. You directly help support it. You can take pride in super job.
- You have big job. This is exciting time. We're very proud of you and grateful for your service to our country at critical time.

BACKGROUND

The Chancery of the U.S. Embassy is located on Moscow's ring road, a major thoroughfare which encircles the heart of the city. The White House, in which Russia's parliament met until the October confrontation, lies a few hundred meters away.

Nearly five hundred Americans currently work at the Embassy, representing some twelve federal agencies. Counting family members, the total population of the Embassy community is

approximately six hundred. In addition, the Embassy has hired almost two hundred Russian Nationals for basic support services.

The U.S. Embassy moved to its present site, which is a little over a mile west of the Kremlin, after Stalin decided he did not want us too close. We have recently resumed occupancy of the old Embassy Office Building, converted from a Soviet apartment building in the early 1950s, following repair and renovation work after the most recent fire in 1991. The renovations attempted to maximize security, safety and efficiency despite the constraints of the building's basic structure.

Construction at the New Embassy complex behind the old Embassy building began in 1979. The housing and recreational facilities are essentially complete. There are 134 American-style housing units, a gymnasium, swimming pool, commissary and other facilities. The complex houses part of the Embassy staff; many employees live in apartments elsewhere in Moscow. Discovery of listening devices suspended work on the New Office Building. We have a basic agreement with the Russian government as well as funding from Congress to allow us to fulfill our office space needs; we are evaluating various options for completing and using the new building.

**BREAKFAST WITH
POLITICAL LEADERS**

MEETING WITH RUSSIAN POLITICAL LEADERS

BACKGROUND

Your meeting with leading Russian politicians offers an opportunity to underscore our interest in democratic reform in Russia, to hear frank Russian views and to establish contacts with the post-Yeltsin generation in Russian politics.

By law, Russia will hold parliamentary elections in December of this year and a presidential election in June 1996. Yeltsin has committed himself to hold firm to those dates, but some in his entourage are angling to postpone or cancel the presidential election if the December elections do not go well. The low popularity of all the likely candidates, coupled with the apathy of the Russian electorate, renders the election outcomes unpredictable for now.

Chechnya has exacerbated Yeltsin's isolation from his reformist allies, and his approval ratings have joined other politicians' in the single digits. Yet thus far, Yeltsin's unpopularity has not redounded to the benefit of any other political leader and no other politician has emerged as a natural successor (as Yeltsin himself shadowed Gorbachev in 1990-1991).

The group assembled for this meeting spans the political spectrum, including representatives or leaders from all major parties and groupings (except Zhirinovskiy's) and several key regional officials. (A full list of participants with brief biographic sketches is attached.) Most of your interlocutors will express their differences with U.S. policy directly and also when they talk to the press. Political discourse in Russia makes U.S. partisan mudslinging look comparatively genteel; the men you are meeting have not assembled for polite conversation in recent memory.

KEY OBJECTIVES

- Stress our respect for Russia as a great power, and our desire to promote Russia's integration into global political, economic and security structures.
- Affirm a view of integration and partnership that is compatible with political interests in the U.S. and Russia.
- Emphasize our support for principles, not particular leaders.

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- Note importance of Russian behavior being consistent with international norms (Chechnya, near abroad, Iranian issues).
- Stress our willingness to work with all responsible elements of the Russian political spectrum and acknowledge that Russia is more than just Moscow.

TALKING POINTS

- Pleased to be with you -- leading political figures in Russia today.
- Welcome comments about current situation in Russia with regard to politics, economics and foreign policy.
- Want to improve understanding of concerns, hopes and fears of citizens throughout Russian Federation.
 - Know, for example, Russian families feeling deeply wrenching effects of large-scale economic change -- not easy process. Have profound admiration for strength of Russian people.
- Support reform and reformers in Russia -- not particular leaders or parties.
- Working for full integration of Russian Federation into global political, economic and security structures.
- Perceive "integration" as process that adds to Russia's strength in interdependent world. Hope you do not see integration as threat to Russia's sovereignty or unique character.
- Value Russia as partner and great power that temporarily fallen on hard times; no desire to exploit Russian weakness.
- Relations with Russia will turn, in part, on Russian support for basic principles and norms of international organizations like United Nations and OSCE.
- Openly stated deeply concerned about Russian actions in Chechnya and corrosive effect they may have on development of Russian democracy and Russia's relations with West.
- Came to Moscow to commemorate enormous sacrifice of Russian people in Second World War. Yesterday, in remarks to Russian people, spoke of enormous respect Americans have for that sacrifice.

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- And just as in WWII, United States prepared to work with all people throughout your great country to move together into future.
- American heritage is based, perhaps above all, on diversity and freedom of speech. We respect and value diversity within Russian today, and listen to all its voices. Urge you to safeguard this ideal.
- Look forward to hearing ideas from all of you on question of how best work together to enter twenty-first century.

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Russian Participants in Roundtable with President Clinton
(notional as of 5/1/95)

- Grigoriy Yavlinskiy one of the most prominent moderate democrats, is in opposition to both President Yeltsin and the government. In polls, Yavlinskiy regularly ranks as one of the top two or three most popular leaders.
- Vladimir Shumeiko is the Chairman of the Federation Council, the upper house of the Russian Parliament. He is considered a "moderate" in the Russian context.
- Ivan Rybkin is the Chairman of the State Duma, the lower house of the Russian Parliament. He, too, is considered to be politically moderate.
- Gennadiy Zyuganov is the leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, which is considered one of the strongest and best organized parties in Russia today. Zyuganov is a skilled politician and has a long future ahead of him.
- Yegor Gaydar is the leader of Russia's Democratic Choice, whose fortunes have been waning of late. Gaydar is the personification of the "radical" Russian reformer.
- Sergey Glazyev is a key opposition leader (a "slow reform" economist) with nationalist tendencies. He is now working closely with Yuriy Skokov (a former Yeltsin insider) and General Lebed (commander of the Russian 14th army in Moldova) in the Congress of Russian Communities. Glazyev is not a rabid nationalist but does play the nationalists card.
- Boris Fedorov is a radical democrat in opposition to both President Yeltsin and the government, who has recently been burnishing his nationalist credentials.
- Boris Nemtsov is the governor of Nizhny Novgorod Oblast. He is one of the most forward-looking, reform-minded regional leaders in Russia. Yeltsin himself has said that Nemtsov is ready to be the next President of Russia.
- Yuriy Nozhikov the governor of Irkutsk Oblast, also sits on the advisory Presidential Council. Irkutsk has the reputation of being one of the more progressive regions.

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- Mikhail Lapshin is the head of the Agrarian Party of Russia, which now is a major force in the State Duma.
- Ruslan Aushev is the President of Ingushetia and a Federation Council member who has been active in trying to find a political solution to the Chechen conflict.

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**VISIT TO
PRIVATIZATION SITE**

DATE: _____

TIME: _____

PRIVATIZATION EVENT

TO BE PROVIDED

**BACKGROUND
PAPERS**

BACKGROUND PAPERS

1. START II
2. Status of Economic Reforms
3. Russia and NATO
4. Chechnya
5. Russian-Iranian Nuclear Cooperation
6. AMB Treaty: AMB/TMD
7. START Treaty and Space Launch Vehicles (SLVs)
8. CFE Treaty
9. Nagorno-Karabakh
10. IL-96
11. Background on Regional Energy Issues
12. COCOM

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START II

At the September 1994 Summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to seek early ratification of the START II Treaty, once the START I Treaty entered into force. The START I Treaty, which will reduce nuclear arsenals to 6,000 accountable warheads on each side, entered into force on December 5, 1994. The START II Treaty imposes two main limitations: stabilizing reductions to 3,000 -3,500 warheads and the complete elimination of MIRVed and "heavy" ICBMs that carry more than one warhead. The START II Treaty was signed on January 3, 1993 but could not enter into force until START I was in force. (U)

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence have completed hearings on the START II Treaty. The Senate Armed Services Committee has scheduled hearings for May 17. We expect a favorable vote on the Treaty later in May. (U)

The Russian Government has not yet submitted START II to the Duma for ratification, and few Duma leaders have taken a public position on ratification. Nevertheless, in Russian political circles critical of or opposed to the Yeltsin government, there is a perception that START II favors the United States; the mood in the Duma reportedly is running against ratifying the Treaty in its current form. The principal objections concern: (1) the survivability of Russian nuclear naval forces (since START II places a larger percentage of warheads on Russian SSBNs); (2) the cost of implementation resulting from the requirements to eliminate all MIRVed ICBMs (a main component of Russia's strategic force) and to destroy rather than convert a number of SS-18 missile silos; (3) the unfavorable mood in Russia toward the West created by plans for NATO expansion; and (4) Yeltsin's own political difficulties with the Duma in the wake of Chechnya. The Duma could propose amendments to the Treaty to redress some of these concerns or simply not take up the Treaty prior to the December elections; the U.S. wants the Treaty ratified without amendment. (S/NF)

Russia's top-ranking military officials, including Defense Minister Grachev, publicly support START II as a way to implement strategic reductions made necessary by declining defense spending. In the end, ratification in Russia may depend less on the treaty's technical merits than on the state of the broader U.S.-Russian relationship and internal political dynamics in Moscow. (S/NF)

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STATUS OF ECONOMIC REFORMS

The Russian economy has made clear progress in recent months. One sign of this progress is the nearly \$7 billion Standby agreement, which the IMF approved on April 11. To reach agreement with the IMF, the Russians had to commit to sweeping trade liberalization, tight monetary and fiscal targets and to monthly IMF progress reviews.

The Russian Government has kept inflation in check and it has declined since January, although it is still well above the lowest point in 1994. The IMF-approved tight budget is now in effect and the government maintains it will not increase expenditures without increasing revenues.

Russia's economy appears to have bottomed out and begun to recover. In March, Chernomyrdin told an international conference that "1995 was the turning point for the economy," and pointed to production increases in metals, chemicals and machine building as proof. (Some argue this is the result of an influx of easy money rather than genuine revival.) He also underscored the importance of creating a legal environment conducive to a market economy -- and said the GOR would make it and tax reform a priority this year.

Russia ran a relatively large trade surplus in 1994, and all indications are it will continue to do so in 1995 and beyond. The trade liberalization measures Yeltsin decreed as part of the IMF prior actions package will stimulate the export sector, although world prices of some commodities could fall as more enterprises turn to exports.

Not all of the news is good, however. Some economists predict unemployment will rise in 1995 and bankruptcies will increase. Both are signs of accelerating industrial restructuring, but they carry the danger of social instability. Chernomyrdin recognizes the seriousness of these concerns, and has said that stabilization and increased growth must be approached from a social perspective. Russian wages have declined, but real income has not fallen as much. Multiple job-holding and an active but underreported private sector probably explains the contradiction.

Second stage privatization has still not really begun. Time was lost during the brief tenure of a conservative privatization Minister. New Privatization Chief Belyayev impressed Washington interlocutors during a recent visit with his determination to forge ahead with cash privatization for some of Russia's most valuable enterprises.

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RUSSIA AND NATO

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This issue will be at the top of our Summit agenda. Our objective is to persuade the Russians by the Summit to agree to a date certain for signing the PFP and beyond documents and, if possible, to mark agreement on a Statement on European Security. This Statement would underscore our common commitment to building an inclusive security structure in which the NATO-Russia relationship would be a key element along with an expanding NATO and strengthened OSCE. It would not contain any major initiatives or departures. Our selling point is that signing of the documents is essential for starting a NATO-Russian dialogue in parallel with NATO enlargement.

This will not be an easy sell. The Russians continue to express very strong concerns about NATO expansion, and have still not accepted the two documents on NATO-Russian relations inside and outside the Partnership for Peace. The Russians seem to be trying to play upon what they see as differences within the Alliance on European security in general, and NATO enlargement and the NATO-Russia relationship in particular, to delay action on enlargement.

We have stressed that NATO expansion, while inevitable, is only one element in a broader strategy of recasting Europe's security structures to meet new post-Cold War realities. We have also tried to reassure the Russians that NATO enlargement is not a threat to them. We want to improve NATO's relations with Russia.

We have told the Russians directly that they cannot slow the changes underway in Europe, including NATO expansion, by refusing to engage. By doing this, Russia would only succeed in isolating itself. We also have stressed to the Allies that it is crucial to present a unified message on these topics to the Russians.

In making our Summit pitch, we will need to assuage the Russians concern that the May NATO Ministerials will somehow accelerate enlargement. We see the Ministerials as an opportunity for stock-taking. There will be no major news on enlargement, but we will want to say very positive things about progress in PFP.

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CHECHNYA

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The Chechen resistance is likely to frustrate Moscow's effort to end the fighting in Chechnya before the May Summit. Pockets of resistance remain scattered across the northern plain; the Russians do not yet fully control all the urban centers in central Chechnya; and they have not yet attempted to occupy the southern mountains. Large-scale positional military conflict is being replaced by hit-and-run, guerrilla-style warfare.

Casualty estimates are unreliable, but over 2,000 Russian soldiers may have been killed and perhaps as many as 20,000 civilians or more. There are no reliable estimates on Chechen fighters.

In April, Russian troops showed a lack of discipline and respect for the rights of civilians. In the town of Samashki -- home of Chechen "President" Dudayev's own clan -- several independent sources reported Russian troops engaging in such atrocities as lighting civilians on fire, throwing children under moving vehicles and executing the elderly. Russian human rights activists have accused the government of intensifying the war in order to end it before the Summit.

Moscow has set up a new Chechen government of Russian-backed native Chechens, who have taken up residence in Groznyy, suggesting Moscow is unlikely to undertake cease-fire or other negotiations with Chechen supporters of Dudayev. Prominent Chechens -- even those in the anti-Dudayev camp -- will be reluctant to support the Moscow-backed Chechens, who are regarded as mere puppets. Establishing and securing a Chechen government acceptable to a majority of the Chechen population will be a long a difficult process.

An OSCE long term "assistance group" arrived in Chechnya on April 25. The OSCE Permanent Council tasked the mission to address human rights concerns, facilitate delivery of humanitarian aid, promote peaceful resolution of the crisis and begin rebuilding Chechen police and legal institutions.

Chechnya has delivered a powerful blow to Yeltsin's political standing. He may yet recover, but his approval ratings have fallen into single digits. In recent surveys, more than 70 percent of Russians think Yeltsin should not run for re-election in June 1996, and more than 60 percent believe he should resign immediately. The mood may be shifting in Russia, however, from outrage toward the war to a more nationalistic support of "our boys down there." Whether this will translate into support for the President is an open question at this time.

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RUSSIAN-IRANIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION

The GOR is internally divided on nuclear cooperation with Iran, but those opposing it are weak. The GOR opposes a nuclear-armed Iran but needs the economic boost. Proponents of the deal use strong nationalistic arguments against our position, e.g., alleging a U.S. double standard in supporting reactors for the DPRK and a U.S. campaign to block Russian high-tech exports. MFA officials have warned that the GOR will not reverse the decision to sell power reactors to Iran (although FM Kozyrev indicated to the Secretary March 23 that alternative contracts to offset the cancellation of the Iran deal could play a role).

New information on possible future transfers of sensitive nuclear technology has sharply increased our concerns about the potential for Iran to apply Russian technology transfer to its weapons program. We recently learned that the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy signed in January 1995 a protocol to engage with Iran in areas of potentially direct weapons application, including to negotiate the sale of an uranium enrichment plant. There is also new evidence Russia may have agreed in 1992 to help Iran eventually build a spent-fuel reprocessing plant. Such facilities could give Iran the ability to produce fissile material for weapons.

We have told the MFA that such transfers would be a direct threat to U.S. security interests. They would have implications for many U.S. statutory provisions that could lead to results ranging from a ban on U.S.-Russian nuclear cooperation to a cut-off of aid to Russia. They also cast doubt on Chernomyrdin's assurances that Russia would proceed cautiously with Iran. MFA officials downplay the protocol as having no status in the GOR. They cite GOR agreement at the 1993 Summit to reverse a sale to Iran of heavy water-moderated research reactors -- well suited to plutonium production -- as proof of GOR caution on sensitive nuclear transfers.

Russian-Iranian negotiations, long delayed by financing issues, took a sudden turn when the two signed a \$1 billion contract for a 1,000 MW light water power reactor (LWR) in January 1995. GOR officials say this could be the first of four Russian LWRs which would be worth several billion dollars. LWRs per se are not a direct proliferation threat, but the resulting technology transfer (e.g., training of scientists) would significantly broaden Iran's nuclear infrastructure.

All nuclear suppliers except Russia and China refuse nuclear cooperation with Iran due to doubts about its nuclear aims.

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ABM TREATY: ABM/TMD

The issue of the demarcation between "theater" ballistic missile defense (TMD) and anti-ballistic missile defense (ABM) poses a threat to our strategic relationship with Russia and our arms control agenda. Although there has been some progress on this issue in the run-up to the summit, it still requires further work.

There is USG consensus that effective TMD must be developed to protect our forces abroad and our allies from attacks such as those experienced during the Gulf War. Several DoD programs are underway.

Since late 1993 we have been negotiating with the Russians (as well as Ukraine, Belarus and, more recently, Kazakhstan) to define the boundary, or demarcation, between strategic ballistic missile defenses, which are limited by the ABM Treaty, and defenses against shorter-range ("theater") ballistic missiles, which are not. An agreed demarcation is necessary to protect the ABM Treaty, which remains vitally important to our security interests. Negotiations have stalled, however, primarily because of complex, detailed Russian proposals reflective of their concern that our TMD could be so effective as to undermine the credibility of Russia's strategic deterrent.

A further complication is sharp criticism from some in the Congress of the whole idea of demarcation. They see it as constraining our TMD programs, contrary to national security interests, solely to protect an "obsolete" ABM Treaty. Their concerns, if left to simmer, could lead to a serious challenge to the ABM Treaty itself. It is important to resolve this issue with Moscow rapidly and on acceptable terms that will be defensible before a skeptical Senate.

Our gameplan since the beginning of the year has been to engage the Russian MOD and MFA leadership at as high a level as possible, and bring them around to a simplified approach. Lately, we have had some success. During Secretary of Defense Perry's April trip to Moscow, we proposed that the two sides agree on a set of principles to provide the framework for a negotiated resolution of the issue. The next week, during Deputy Secretary Talbott's visit to Moscow, U.S. and Russian officials prepared a draft joint statement on ABM-TMD principles "ad referendum" to Governments. This "ad referendum" text will be issued at the summit.

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START TREATY AND SPACE LAUNCH VEHICLES (SLVs)

The U.S. and Russia disagree on the START Treaty accountability of ICBMs and SLBMs used as SLVs. The U.S. maintains that SLVs using first stages of START-limited missiles remain accountable as ICBMs or SLBMs under the Treaty. Russia maintains that SLVs using stages or elements of Treaty-limited missiles are not subject to the Treaty provisions.

There are no provisions for removing missiles from accountability by converting them to SLVs. ICBMs and SLBMs used as SLVs remain accountable as ICBMs or SLBMs and the START Treaty provisions continue to apply, including: notifications of movement and launches, provision of flight telemetry, locational restrictions and some numerical limits on the missiles and launchers. In our view, these provisions are not onerous and Russia can have a viable SLV program within Treaty rules.

In 1992, Russia appeared to agree with the U.S. position on accountability but subsequently changed its position apparently due to strong lobbying by the Russian defense industry, which would prefer no Treaty constraints. Russia has proposed reaching a bilateral agreement with the U.S. regarding cooperation on distinguishing SLVs from START accountable missiles and a non-amendment Treaty change to permit removal of mobile ICBMs from accountability upon notification of their return to production facilities for conversion.

Secretary Christopher's March 23 letter to Foreign Minister Kozyrev said that, failing agreement by the summit on Treaty accountability of SLVs using first stages of Treaty-limited missiles, we will implement more intrusive inspection criteria. Secretary Christopher's letter also said we will not issue export licenses for satellites or satellite technology for launch on such SLVs until the accountability issue is resolved.

Resolution of the SLV accountability issue is central to the START Treaty and the U.S. continues to press this matter at high levels, including with Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin.

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CFE TREATY

We face a difficult problem with the Russians on compliance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) later this year. The Russians have told us they will not be in compliance with the Treaty's limits when they take effect in November. The Treaty was signed in November 1990 by the members of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact and entered into force in July 1992. The Treaty sets limits on key categories of conventional military equipment, as well as regional sublimits that restrict the amount of equipment deployed in specific areas.

The Russians have insisted for more than two years they need to be able to deploy more equipment in the Treaty's "flank" region than the Treaty permits (Ukraine has expressed concern about the flank limits for economic reasons but recently indicated it will comply with the limits). Russia maintains the additional equipment is necessary to deal with instability to its south. To that end, they have now indicated they plan to declare a "temporary exclusion zone" in the vicinity of Chechnya but respect the Treaty's limits. Our NATO Allies, especially Turkey, believe the Russian demand is not driven by genuine security concerns but rather by a desire to expand its influence, especially in the Caucasus region.

We and our NATO Allies have pressed the Russians to comply with the Treaty using its built-in flexibility, while signaling our willingness to seek a long-term solution to the flank problem at the already scheduled CFE Review Conference in May 1996. This message was underscored by Deputy Secretary Talbott during his meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov in early April. Talbott made clear the U.S. is ready to help solve the flank issue in 1996 if Russia complies with the Treaty in November. Mamedov was non-committal about Russian compliance but expressed interest in our thinking.

Our efforts to deal with the flank problem have been further complicated by statements by Defense Minister Grachev and other Russian officials that NATO enlargement would void the CFE Treaty. There are potential political ramifications of NATO enlargement for CFE (because of the Treaty's block-to-block structure) though legally there is no basis for the Russian argument. Allies are developing a strategy for dealing with this issue while studying it internally.

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NAGORNO-KARABAKH

The current conflict broke out in 1988 when the ethnic Armenian majority of Nagorno-Karabakh (NK), supported by the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), called for secession from the Azerbaijani SSR. In Spring 1992, the CSCE established the Minsk Group on Nagorno-Karabakh as a forum to negotiate a political settlement to the conflict. The Minsk Group's objectives are to consolidate a cease-fire, deploy monitors and a peacekeeping force and oversee the withdrawal of hostile forces and the return of refugees.

The Minsk Conference, to be convened after an initial agreement is signed, would then work on a permanent political solution. The Minsk Group efforts at first were unsuccessful because the conflicting parties believed a military solution was possible, while Russia began a second negotiating track, allowing the parties to "forum shop" between the two. In May 1994, the conflicting parties, exhausted from combat that had cost tens of thousands of lives, agreed to a cease-fire which has held, despite some violations.

We have made progress with the Russians on the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh since the last summit but still have work to do. Recently, the Russians insisted that a separate CIS representative attend all Minsk Group negotiations and warned they may question the Minsk Group's mandate.

The current problems with the Minsk Group follow promising advances made at the Budapest Summit in December 1994 when the OSCE agreed Russia would co-chair the Minsk Group with the Swedes, formally integrating the two negotiating tracks. Russia, in return, agreed to support OSCE efforts to field a multinational peacekeeping force (PKF). The co-chairmen worked well together initially as the High Level Planning Group (HLPG) was formed in Vienna to establish a PKF of around 3,600 troops. (Russia may contribute 1,200.) However, the Russians have recently returned to their earlier, less constructive position. The conflicting parties have also done little to break out of the current impasse. The Azerbaijanis have shown no sign of recognizing the N-K Armenians as a party to the conflict, while the N-K Armenians have not complied with their agreement to exchange POW's.

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IL-96

Yeltsin may raise with you the matter of a joint venture which Pratt & Whitney has had since 1990 with Russian aircraft manufacturer Ilyushin, to equip its IL-96 aircraft with U.S. engines. Another U.S. company, Rockwell, is supplying the avionics for these aircraft. P&W recently applied to EX-IM Bank for \$1 billion financing for 20 engine/avionics packages. Boeing and McDonnell Douglas are deeply concerned about Ilyushin as a potential competitor and draw an analogy with the creation of Airbus. They want EX-IM Bank to apply the same standard it has applied since 1972 to financing engines and parts for Airbus airframes, that is, refusing to provide financing or guarantees.

The U.S. Trade and Development Agency (TDA) has funded a study which concludes: 1) the primary market for these aircraft would be Russia and other NIS states; 2) development of the IL-96 poses no threat to Boeing because the product is not competitive in western markets; and 3) potential sales would be limited to NIS customers who could not afford western aircraft. FAA certification, which Ilyushin is seeking, could in the long term alter this conclusion. Ilyushin benefited from past Soviet subsidization, but its current plant and equipment are antiquated and the Russian government is in no position to subsidize it.

The IL-96 effort is a highly visible project often cited by U.S. and Russian officials. The project has been raised by the Russians at every Summit since Vancouver and has been discussed by Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and the Vice President as an example of future economic partnership. Also, U.S. and Russian cooperation thus far in the project has rebutted Russian suspicions that the U.S. wants to destroy Russia's industrial base and turn it into a raw material producer for the West.

The Russian government has intimated that if the IL-96 project is denied EX-IM BANK financing, this will adversely affect the ability of U.S. aircraft manufacturers to continue to obtain tariff waivers to lease or sell their planes in Russia and/or obtain the necessary regulatory certification for their aircraft to be used there. Russian officials have told USG counterparts Russia would sign the GATT Agreement on Civil Aircraft when it joins the WTO. This would ensure tariff-free access for U.S. aircraft and aircraft parts into Russia.

EX-IM BANK has asked other USG agencies for guidance on the wider political/economic aspects regarding Pratt's application and the NEC is chairing this effort. There are sharp interagency divisions on this issue and sensitive domestic political considerations (i.e., fierce opposition by Boeing and unions). We don't expect a decision until July at the earliest.

BACKGROUND ON REGIONAL ENERGY ISSUES

Russia has helped create obstacles to the development of Caspian petroleum resources by restricting access to export, hindering development of pipelines that bypass Russia and insisting some or all of the energy reserves in the Caspian Sea be developed jointly. We want to address these issues in the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission:

Legal Status of Caspian Sea

The legal status of the Caspian Sea has been undefined since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Recently, four of the five littoral states (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Russia) tentatively agreed to establish a 20 mile maritime zone for fishing, an adjacent exclusive zone for seabed mining and energy development (breadth to be determined) and a "common area" for the rest of the Caspian. Under this Russian proposal, exploitation of resources in the common area, including oil exploration/production and pipeline construction, could occur only with the concurrence of all the littoral states. The plan provides Russia with freedom of navigation, as well as control over offshore oilfields that would otherwise be owned by Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan if the Caspian were divided using median lines. If the plan goes through, there will be pressure on Azerbaijan, which supports median line boundary delimitation of the Caspian, to agree.

Caspian Pipeline Consortium

Russia strongly supports the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) project to construct a new pipeline from Western Kazakhstan to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. The USG supports the pipeline and port work but has concerns that the project does not meet international norms on proportionality of contribution to reward, transparency or commercial terms. The World Bank and the EBRD have not supported the project as structured and the principal shipper in Kazakhstan, Chevron, has declined to participate.

Pipeline Through Turkey to the Mediterranean

Turkey is promoting construction of a pipeline from Azerbaijan to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan to ship oil produced by the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC), which includes five U.S. oil companies and the Russian company Lukoil in a plan to develop three offshore oil fields in Azerbaijan. Russia has pushed for the consortium to export its oil through Russia rather than Turkey. In January, the USG endorsed construction of a pipeline through Turkey as one possible pipeline route for Caspian region oil.

~~SECRET~~

RUSSIAN ARMS SALES TO IRAN AND POST-COCOM REGIME

At the September summit, President Yeltsin agreed to end new arms sales to Iran and only service old contracts. You agreed to support Russia as a founding member of the post-COCOM regime as soon as the details of the Russian commitment were worked out. Over the past months, we have sought assurances from the Russians that the arms in the pipeline under existing contracts were "reasonably limited in time and content." We have sought in particular a comprehensive definition of what was covered by the Russian commitment on no new arms sales; we want it to apply to weapons, components, upgrades, spares, munitions, and arms-related technology.

The Russians informally provided a list of weapons they plan to deliver to Iran in fulfillment of the existing contracts, including over 1,000 tanks and 1,700 armored personnel carriers. The overall value approaches the \$4 billion figure used by Yeltsin. The list, however, includes no aircraft, air-launched precision guided munitions or other new or highly sophisticated weapons systems. The list also contains no production facilities. In sum, while the transfers will certainly benefit Iran, they should not upset the regional balance or compromise our ability to contend with an Iranian threat. We therefore have concluded that such transfers are reasonably limited in content. We are still seeking a final termination date for all transfers under existing contracts of the end of 1998.

The Russians have strongly resisted our efforts to ensure that the "no new sales" commitment include arms-related technology necessary to develop and produce advanced conventional weapons indigenously, as well as the technology to service and enhance the performance of existing weapons. The transfer of such technology would have a far greater destabilizing impact on the regional security balance than the transfer of the arms themselves.

In order to bring this issue to closure, the Vice President recently proposed to Prime Minister Chernomyrdin that the sides issue a public statement at the Moscow summit announcing U.S. support for Russia's participation in the COCOM successor regime and Russia's elaboration of its new contracts commitment. The details of our understanding, as well as an official Russian list of planned transfers to Iran, would be contained in a confidential *aide memoire*.

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**BIOGRAPHIC
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
017. report	Biography (2 pages)	11/23/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2586

FOLDER TITLE:

President Clinton's Trip to Russia and Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995 [1]

2016-0135-M
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RESTRICTION CODES**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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018. report	Biography (2 pages)	05/02/1995	P1/b(1)

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Executive Secretary
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022. report	Biography (2 pages)	04/26/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2586

FOLDER TITLE:

President Clinton's Trip to Russia and Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995 [1]

2016-0135-M
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023. report	Biography (1 page)	03/01/1995	P1/b(1)

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National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2586

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Folder Title:

President Clinton's Trip to Russia and Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995 [2]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Biography (2 pages)	05/02/1995	P1/b(1)
002. report	Biography (2 pages) <i>Partial release - KBH 9/8/2017</i>	05/02/1995	P1/b(1)
003. report	Biography (2 pages)	05/02/1995	P1/b(1)
004. report	Biography (2 pages)	05/02/1995	P1/b(1)
005. report	Biography (2 pages)	05/02/1995	P1/b(1)
006. report	Biography (2 pages)	04/26/1995	P1/b(1)
007. report	Biography (1 page)	07/29/1994	P1/b(1)
008. report	Biography (2 pages)	09/20/1994	P1/b(1)
009. report	Biography (1 page)	05/03/1995	P1/b(1) <i>KBH 9/8/2017</i>
010. memo	Anthony Lake to President William J. Clinton re: Your May 11-12 Visit to Kiev: Scope Memorandum (4 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) <i>KBH 4/30/2020</i>
011. paper	Meetings (One-On-One, Expanded Group) with President Leonid Kuchma (9 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) <i>KBH 4/30/2020</i>
012. paper	Ukraine: Overview of Bilateral Relationship (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) <i>KBH 4/30/2020</i>

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2586

FOLDER TITLE:

President Clinton's Trip to Russia and Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995 [2]

2016-0135-M

kh1783

RESTRICTION CODES

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013. paper	Ukraine: Political Overview (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBM 4/30/2020
014. paper	Ukraine: Economic Situation (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBM 4/30/2020
015. paper	Ukraine: U.S. Bilateral Assistance (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBM 4/30/2020
016. paper	Ukraine: Multilateral Economic Assistance (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBM 4/30/2020
017. paper	Ukraine: Trade and Investment (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBM 4/30/2020
018. paper	Ukraine: Energy and Chernobyl (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBM 4/30/2020
019. paper	Ukraine: Cooperation in Space (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBM 4/30/2020
020. paper	Ukraine: European Security Architecture (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBM 4/30/2020
021. paper	Ukraine: Relations with Russia (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBM 4/30/2020
022. paper	Ukraine: Crimea and Black Sea Fleet Issues (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBM 4/30/2020
023. paper	Ukraine: Nuclear and Security Issues (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBM 4/30/2020
024. report	Biography (2 pages)	05/02/1995	P1/b(1)
025. report	Biography (1 page)	11/16/1994	P1/b(1)

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Executive Secretary
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2016-0135-M

kh1783

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
026. report	Biography (1 page)	04/25/1995	P1/b(1)
027. report	Biography (1 page)	04/18/1995	P1/b(1)
028. report	Biography (1 page)	11/17/1994	P1/b(1)
029. report	Biography (2 pages)	04/12/1995	P1/b(1)
030. report	Biography (2 pages)	03/30/1995	P1/b(1)
031. report	Biography (2 pages)	05/02/1995	P1/b(1)
032. report	Biography (1 page) <i>Partial release - KBH 9/8/2017</i>	04/30/1995	P1/b(1)
033. report	Biography (1 page) <i>Partial release - KBH 9/8/2017</i>	10/17/1994	P1/b(1)
034. report	Biography (2 pages)	05/02/1995	P1/b(1)
035. report	Biography (1 page) <i>Partial release - KBH 9/8/2017</i>	11/02/1994	P1/b(1)
036. report	Biography (1 page)	04/06/1995	P1/b(1)
037. report	Biography (2 pages)	03/20/1995	P1/b(1)
038. report	Biography (2 pages)	02/23/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
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Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2586

FOLDER TITLE:

President Clinton's Trip to Russia and Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995 [2]

2016-0135-M
kh1783

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
039. report	Biography (2 pages)	03/17/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2586

FOLDER TITLE:

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2016-0135-M
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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002. report	Biography [partial] (2 pages)	05/02/1995	P1/b(1)
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1.4c, 3.5c

Sergey Mikhailovich SHAKHRAY
(Phonetic: shahKRY)

RUSSIA

*Deputy Premier (since April 1994);
Member, State Duma (since 1993)*

Addressed as: Mr. Minister

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

2016-0135-M (1.27)
2/27/2017 KBH



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Sergey Shakhray, a constitutional law scholar turned politician, provides President Boris Yel'tsin with an independent democratic point of view in a government increasingly dominated by former industrialists.

[Redacted]

1.4c, 1.4d

[Redacted]

1.4c, 1.4d

[Redacted] Shakhray was one of the principal architects of Yel'tsin's initiative in late April 1995 to create two centrist political blocs under Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin and Duma Speaker Ivan Rybkin. It was Shakhray who publicly broached the idea in a Russian press interview two weeks earlier.

3.5c

- Yel'tsin failed four times in 1990, when he was chairing the Russian Supreme Soviet, to persuade that body to elect Shakhray as his deputy. Each time, several democrats and centrists recoiled from giving Shakhray the support they had given Yel'tsin because they were put off by Shakhray's ambition, according to the Russian press.
- Shakhray's decision to run at the head of his then newly created party in the parliamentary election of December 1993 instead of joining other democrats cost him influence when Yel'tsin reorganized the cabinet the next month.

3.5c

In addition to his government position, Shakhray heads the democratic/centrist Party of Russian Unity and Accord, which holds 22 seats in the 450-seat State Duma. He

1.4c, 1.4d

[Redacted] has announced that his party will compete for parliamentary seats in December 1995 as part of the centrist bloc headed by Chernomyrdin. Shakhray has also stated that he will not run for the presidency in June 1996, waiting instead until the year 2000.

3.5c

[Redacted]

1.4c, 1.4d, 3.5c

[Redacted]

1.4c, 1.4d, 3.5c

[Redacted]

1.4c, 3.5c

1.4c, 3.5c

1.4c, 1.4d

- When some associates of Yel'tsin in the fall of 1994 floated the idea of postponing parliamentary and presidential elections, Shakhray came out strongly against the notion, insisting that the health of Russian democracy demanded that balloting proceed as scheduled. Russian journalists wondered in print why Shakhray would alienate regional elites, whom he had been courting and who would benefit if elections were postponed. 3.5c

Early Life

Shakhray was born on 30 April 1956 in Simferopol' in the Crimean region of Ukraine. His father was a military serviceman. The younger Shakhray graduated from secondary school at the head of his class. In 1978 he finished law school at Rostov State University with distinction and entered a graduate program at Moscow State University (known by its Russian initials MGU), earning a candidate's degree in 1982. During 1982-87 he was an assistant professor in MGU's law department. From 1987 until 1990 he headed the MGU law department's Laboratory on Informatics and Cybernetics. He joined the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1988 and resigned on 20 August 1991 3.5c

Into Politics

In 1989 Shakhray became a legal consultant to the USSR Supreme Soviet's Committee on Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order. A year later he won election to the Russian Congress of People's Deputies. His salience in helping organize the work of the Congress, according to a Russian biographic sketch, helped him win the chairmanship of the key Committee on Legislation of the Russian Supreme Soviet. The position brought him into close contact with then Supreme Soviet Chairman Yel'tsin. After Yel'tsin was elected President in June 1991, Shakhray ran unsuccessfully to succeed him as Supreme Soviet chairman. A month later Yel'tsin

named Shakhray State Counselor for Legal Questions. In December 1991 Shakhray was part of the working group that drafted the text of the agreement dissolving the USSR and creating the Commonwealth of Independent States, according to Shakhray's Russian biography. 3.5c

Government Positions

Shakhray was a deputy premier twice previously, first for internal security and legal matters (December 1991–March 1992), then for interregional relations (November 1992–January 1994). He held other government positions concurrently, mostly involving legal matters and regional affairs. In 1992 he joined the Security Council, Yel'tsin's most important advisory body. His ministerial positions included those of Chairman of the State Committee for Nationalities Policy (November 1992–December 1993) and Minister of Nationalities and Regional Policy (January–May 1994). In the spring of 1993 Shakhray helped write Yel'tsin's draft constitution, which dramatically increased the president's powers. Throughout this period, Shakhray also chaired various governmental temporary committees and commissions, including ones on personnel policy, religion, drug abuse, and the Kremlin's relations with specific Russian provinces 3.5c

1.4c, 1.4d

Shakhray has told Russian biographers that his chief pleasures are Russian baths and raising his children. He has been married twice. He has two sons and a daughter from his second marriage, born respectively in 1988, 1991, and early 1995. His wife has a philosophy degree.

1.4c, 1.4d, 3.5c

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2016-0135-M
kh1783

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006. report	Biography (2 pages)	04/26/1995	P1/b(1)

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Executive Secretary
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. report	Biography (1 page)	07/29/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2586

FOLDER TITLE:

President Clinton's Trip to Russia and Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995 [2]

2016-0135-M
kh1783

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. report	Biography (2 pages)	09/20/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2586

FOLDER TITLE:

President Clinton's Trip to Russia and Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995 [2]

2016-0135-M
kh1783

RESTRICTION CODES

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Yuliy Mikhaylovich VORONTSOV
(Phonetic: vohruntSAWF)

RUSSIA

*Ambassador to the United States
(since August 1994)*

Addressed as: Mr. Ambassador

Yuliy Vorontsov, a 42-year veteran of his country's foreign service, was named Ambassador to the United States by President Boris Yel'tsin on 23 July 1994. Vorontsov previously had been his country's Permanent Representative to the UN since 1990. His posting to Washington is his fifth diplomatic tour in the United States.

Vorontsov began his foreign service career in 1952. He served at the Soviet Mission in New York three times (1954-58, 1963-65, and 1990-94) and at the Embassy in Washington once (1966-77). His highest previous position in Washington was as Deputy Chief of Mission (1970-77) under Anatoliy Dobrynin. Vorontsov afterward served as Ambassador to India (1977-83) and to France (1983-86). He became first deputy foreign minister

in 1986, handling US and Middle Eastern matters. He headed the delegation to the nuclear and space talks in Geneva (1987-88). He then served as Ambassador to Afghanistan (1988-89).

In March 1993, while assigned to the UN, Vorontsov began serving concurrently on the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, a government-supported foreign and defense policy research center.

Vorontsov was born on 7 October 1929. He and his wife, Fayna Andreyevna, have an adult daughter, Ol'ga. He speaks English.

KIEV

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
May 4, 1995

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM/NARA, Date 1/24/2020
2016-0135-M

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE 

SUBJECT: Your Trip to Kiev May 11-12, 1995

Your visit to Kiev allows for substantive meetings with President Kuchma the afternoon of May 11 and a dinner hosted by Kuchma that evening. Prior to departure on May 12, you will speak at Shevchenko University and lay wreaths at Kiev's World War II monument and Babyn Yar. Your public statements and press materials will be provided later. This briefing book contains:

SCHEDULE OF KEY EVENTS

SCOPE MEMORANDA

- Memorandum from Anthony Lake
- Memorandum from Secretary Christopher
- Memorandum from Secretary Rubin

MEETING AT MARIYINSKY PALACE

Scenesetter

Briefing Paper for Meetings with Kuchma
Background, Core Objectives and Points to be
Made in One-on-one and Expanded Group Session

Arrival Statement

STATE DINNER

Scenesetter

Toast

RON AT STATE GUEST HOUSE

Scenesetter

WREATH-LAYING AT WORLD WAR II ETERNAL FLAME

Scenesetter

SPEECH AT SHEVCHENKO UNIVERSITY

Scenesetter

Remarks

WREATH-LAYING AT BABYN YAR

Scenesetter

Remarks

EMBASSY MEET AND GREET

Scenesetter

Remarks

BACKGROUND PAPERS

Overview of Bilateral Relationship
Political Overview
Economic Situation
U.S. Bilateral Assistance
Multilateral Economic Assistance
Trade and Investment
Energy and Chornobyl
Cooperation in Space
European Security Architecture
Relations with Russia
Crimea and Black Sea Fleet Issues
Nuclear and Security Issues

BIOGRAPHIC MATERIALS

**SCHEDULE OF
KEY EVENTS**

SCHEDULE OF KEY EVENTS IN KIEV

Thursday, May 11

ARRIVAL AT BORISPIL AIRPORT

1:00 - 1:20 p.m.

ARRIVAL CEREMONY AT MARIYINSKY PALACE

2:15 - 2:45 p.m.

SUBSTANTIVE MEETINGS AT MARIYINSKY PALACE

(ONE-ON-ONE FOLLOWED BY EXPANDED GROUP SESSION)

3:00 - 5:00 p.m.

DINNER HOSTED BY KUCHMA AT MARIYINSKY PALACE

7:30 - 10:00 p.m.

Friday, May 12

WREATH-LAYING AT WORLD WAR II ETERNAL FLAME

9:30 - 9:45 a.m.

SPEECH AT SHEVCHENKO UNIVERSITY

10:30 - 11:30 a.m.

WREATH-LAYING AT BABYN YAR

12:00 - 12:45 p.m.

EMBASSY MEET AND GREET

TBD

DEPARTURE FROM BORISPIL AIRPORT

2:15 p.m.

**SCOPE
MEMORANDA**

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE *AL*

SUBJECT: Your May 11-12 Visit to Kiev: Scope Memorandum

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2016-0135-M (1.35)

KBH 1/24/2020

SETTING

Your visit to Kiev comes as U.S.-Ukrainian relations continue a year-long upswing. Last year was a milestone for the relationship. The Ukrainians responded to your policy on denuclearization, and we put the nuclear weapons issue behind us. More broadly, your meetings with Presidents Kravchuk and Kuchma, our drive to increase bilateral and international aid -- particularly once Kuchma adopted major economic reforms -- and our effort to broaden bilateral relations have instilled confidence in Kiev that we attach importance to our relations with an independent Ukraine. You can reinforce this during your visit by making U.S. support for an independent, democratic, stable and prosperous Ukraine a key theme of your private and public comments. The message will be well-received.

Kuchma looks to your visit to bolster his position -- both domestically and with Russia. Since you last saw him in Budapest, he has expanded the economic reforms launched last October. After he forced through a stripped-down government budget in April, the IMF approved a stand-by program for Ukraine, which with G-7 bilateral contributions and debt rescheduling by Turkmenistan and Russia totals over five billion dollars. Kuchma knows the U.S. played a key role in this and is grateful.

Politically, Kuchma has continued to struggle with the parliament (the Rada) and its leader, Chairman Moroz. So far, Kuchma has won most of the big battles but not all. The Rada has resisted his proposed "law on power" that consolidates greater authority in the executive branch. Kuchma's staff says he may go around the Rada, perhaps by calling a referendum. Kuchma wants to align you on his side. Since he is the driving force for reform in Ukraine, that's where you want to be -- so long as he clearly recognizes that reform also entails strengthening democracy.

Kuchma and the Rada stand united on Crimea. After a year of Crimean parliament efforts to loosen links with Kiev, the Ukrainian government moved to annul Crimea's constitution (which was inconsistent with Ukraine's) and abolish the Crimean presidency. Kiev chose its timing well, taking advantage of disarray among Crimean politicians and public apathy and while Russia was preoccupied with Chechnya.

The Russians have behaved correctly on Crimea and have told us they do not want a crisis. Kuchma in general has worked to build good relations with Moscow, but the Black Sea Fleet, especially use of bases in Crimea, and conclusion of a treaty of friendship and cooperation remain problem areas. Kuchma sees the U.S. tie your visit underscores as improving his position vis-à-vis his larger neighbor.

Kuchma will be interested in your thoughts on European security. NATO expansion makes the Ukrainians uneasy, as they fear it could leave Ukraine as a buffer state or drive it into Russia's sphere of influence. That said, Kiev wants to develop a relationship with the Alliance through both Partnership for Peace and other mechanisms.

All this boils down to a desire by Ukraine, and on the part of Kuchma in particular, to strengthen the U.S. link and to host a successful summit. Although Kuchma may ask for things that we cannot provide, the agenda does not include issues with the drama of your Moscow stop. And Kuchma will be pleased with the basic messages of your visit: strong U.S. support for Ukraine, especially as it proceeds down the challenging path of reform, and a desire to move forward on the agenda that you and he endorsed at your November summit.

CORE GOALS OF YOUR VISIT

- Underscore long-term U.S. support for an independent, stable, democratic and prosperous Ukraine.
- Make clear the U.S. supports good relations between Ukraine and Russia.
- Encourage Kuchma and the Ukrainians to stay the reform course, knowing that they have a partner in the U.S.
- Encourage development of the trade and investment component of the bilateral relationship.

- Describe how you see ties between the U.S., NATO and Ukraine developing in a way that will enhance Ukraine's security and not leave it in a security vacuum.

ACHIEVING THESE GOALS

Schedule

On arrival at Borispil airport, you travel to the Mariyinskyy Palace for a formal arrival ceremony. You will make a short arrival statement at either the airport or the Palace. You have two hours of talks with Kuchma, which should suffice to cover the substantive agenda. The first hour will be a one-on-one, the second an expanded group session. Kuchma hosts a dinner in your honor that evening where you will exchange toasts.

Communicating your message of support and encouragement on reform to the Ukrainian public will be almost as important as your substantive exchanges; the venue is your May 12 speech at Shevchenko University. You also have two wreath-layings: Kiev's World War II monument and Babyn Yar. We have not scheduled a separate meeting with Moroz or other Rada leaders but are looking for a pull-aside at an appropriate moment.

Substance

We have agreed with the Ukrainians on the agenda. For the one-on-one: overview of the bilateral relationship, Russia and the situation in Ukraine. For the expanded session: reform (and international support), trade and investment and security questions (including Europe and NATO). The agenda is straightforward and contains no surprises, though you will likely have to fend off some Kuchma requests that go beyond what we can or are prepared to deliver.

Bilateral Overview. We suggest you begin the one-on-one with an expression of support for Ukraine and outline your vision for the relationship. **You might touch on economic reform and security cooperation**, issues that you can address in greater detail in the expanded session. Kuchma may request a U.S.-Ukrainian counterpart to the Gore-Chernomyrdin commission.

Russia. You might share some thoughts from your talks in Moscow. **You should encourage Kuchma in his policy of building good relations with both the West and Moscow.** This is also the place to put down a marker on Crimea: while it is an internal Ukrainian issue, Kuchma should not overplay his hand, as a crisis could put pressure on Moscow to engage. The Ukrainians rightly credit the trilateral process with breaking the Kiev-Moscow

logjam on nuclear weapons. Kuchma may suggest creation of a "permanent" trilateral mechanism. You should discourage that: Moscow would never agree, and our endorsement would diminish our credibility as a neutral interlocutor.

Situation in Ukraine. Time permitting, you might ask Kuchma's assessment of the prospects for reform and where executive-Rada relations are headed. **You might issue a subtle reminder our support for reform includes democratization.** We do not want Kuchma to misread your support as a blank check vis-à-vis the Rada.

Economic Reform/International Support. We suggest you open the expanded session by noting Ukraine's steps on economic reform and urging that they be accelerated. This is also the place to remind Kuchma and his team just how much the U.S. has done to date. Kuchma may resurface a Ukrainian proposal that he be invited to Halifax. There is no consensus in the G-7 for this.

Trade and Investment. You should urge Kuchma to create an inviting business climate. Our OPIC, West NIS Enterprise Fund and technical assistance programs increasingly aim at supporting private sector activity. We have proposed the Joint Commission on Trade and Investment meet in July. On an issue close to Kuchma's heart -- rockets (he headed Ukraine's largest missile production plant) -- you can note that the first talks on a commercial space launch agreement have been held, fulfilling one of your November pledges.

Chornobyl. You will want to pass lightly over this; we have not put it on the agenda. While Kuchma's decision to close the reactors by the year 2000 merits praise, he will press for greater Western assistance. This is a G-7 issue, and we look to others to provide the bulk of the aid.

Security Cooperation. With the nuclear issue behind us, we can now discuss Ukraine's "post-nuclear" era. Ukrainian anxieties run high. There are two ways to reassure them. **First, you can note how we are expanding bilateral security links. Second, you should reassure Kuchma about Ukraine's place in the evolving European security architecture. You should reiterate our commitment to manage NATO expansion in a way that enhances Ukraine's security and welcome Kiev's decision to develop a relationship with the Alliance.** Ukraine can utilize the Partnership for Peace channel more fully than it does now, and we hope to help with \$10 million in Warsaw Initiative money.



DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

May 2, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Robert E. Rubin *R. E. R.*
SUBJECT: Economic Themes for the Moscow and Kiev Summits

Your Summit meetings in Moscow and Kiev come with each country attempting major strides forward on economic reform. Each country has developed ambitious programs for stabilization and structural reform. Each country has earned IMF standby loans for the first time and will receive greater financial support from the West than ever before. Success in those programs will help each country move down the road toward economic prosperity. At the Summits, you have an opportunity to reinforce for Presidents Yeltsin and Kuchma that cooperation on economic reform is a positive feature of our countries' relationships. We are backing sound economic choices this year with major financing because we believe that it will promote the transformation of former Soviet states into sovereign, democratic societies.

THE MOSCOW SUMMIT

Russia has made remarkable progress in building a market economy. Who would have believed when the Soviet Union fell apart that four years later the private sector would be producing over 60 percent of GDP? The U.S.-Russian economic dialogue is also remarkable. While it is often overshadowed by our dialogue on foreign policy and security issues, I believe that dialogue is a healthy and important element in our relationship. At this juncture, our main point for President Yeltsin should be that one overriding need should guide Russia as it advances toward a market economy and sounder economic relations with the United States. That need is confidence.

Markets require confidence to function smoothly, to produce goods, and to mobilize flows of savings and investment -- both at home and from abroad. Russia can only build confidence with greater consistency in policy, regulation, laws, and the construction of market institutions.

Macroeconomic Stabilization

Stable macroeconomic policies and low inflation are needed for Russia to reap the benefits of free markets. To command support at the ballot box in upcoming elections, Russia's government must show it can soundly manage the ruble. Thus, 1995 is an especially critical year for reform. In our discussions with President Yeltsin, we should stress the need to build confidence in the government and in reform by fully implementing the economic program.

Russia's 1995 economic program has for the first time earned the IMF's support under a full standby loan of \$6.8 billion. That program has two key objectives. First, Russia aims to cut

monthly inflation to 1% in the second half of the year by reducing the budget deficit to 5 1/2% of GDP and slashing credit growth. The Duma has passed a budget consistent with these targets, and President Yeltsin has signed it into law. Second, Russia is implementing a major liberalization of its oil markets which will integrate Russia into world markets and reduce corruption.

The prospects for implementation of the program are better than in years past. The economic team -- especially Chernomyrdin and Chubais -- is strong and sees stability as an economic and political objective; the ruble's "Black Tuesday" collapse has sensitized policy-makers; and sectoral lobbies are weaker. But we should remain mindful that this is the fourth consecutive year in which Russia has launched stabilization efforts. In the last three years, spring was a time of hope, only to be dashed by despair in the fall -- with high inflation, ruble collapse, and massive capital flight. Moreover, Parliamentary elections will be held this year.

To help President Yeltsin build confidence, we can offer two things. First, we can reaffirm our commitment to back large multilateral support for reform. As long as Russia adheres to its 1995 program, it will receive \$500 million monthly from the IMF. The World Bank will soon approve a \$600 million fast-disbursing loan. Second, we can help Russia on official debt. The G-7 are now discussing a 1995 Russian debt rescheduling which we hope to complete by the end of May. At our urging, the G-7 are likely to commit to Russia that if it stays the course through early fall, work will commence on comprehensive rescheduling, aimed at providing a final resolution of Russia's debt difficulties.

Taxation

Russia needs a new tax code to promote investor confidence. The state must generate sufficient revenue to carry out basic functions. But entrepreneurs need confidence that the tax system is fair, predictable and will let them earn a profit.

Already, Russia's tax system is greatly improved over its Soviet predecessor. But the tax regime distorts incentives, lacks transparency, and is arbitrarily enforced. It is riddled with exemptions. Tax compliance is low -- state-owned firms often do not pay and revenue from the private sector is not being captured. The rich gas sector, due to its clout, is woefully under-taxed by international comparison. In response, Russia has raised tax rates on those who do pay to very high levels, only further encouraging evasion.

The excess wage tax, on which you are receiving separate briefings, is a prime example of these problems and its imposition has undermined the U.S.-Russian bilateral tax treaty. Of course, all of this adversely affects prospects for stability. Last year federal revenues accounted for only 11% of GDP, clearly an inadequate level for a country trying to restore stable national finances. This year, it is hoped revenues will rise to 14-1/2%, but collection may already be falling short.

There is much we can offer. First, last September, President Yeltsin accepted your offer to help mobilize a multilateral program of technical support to reform the tax regime. Reaction from Russia's Finance Ministry has been lukewarm. We stand ready to provide this support and we should reaffirm our commitment to do so. Second, I will renew our offer to send ~~senior~~

Treasury tax officials to Moscow to work with the Finance Ministry on the bilateral tax treaty. Third, the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission's joint commercial tax dialogue is a further vehicle for discussing the excess wage tax.

Private Sector Development.

Without confidence in private market structures, no one will be eager to undertake investments. Farmers will not put their money at risk to increase yields unless they know they own the land. Businessmen will not sign contracts unless they know that these can be enforced in a court of law.

By freeing prices in 1992 and implementing a path-breaking privatization program, Russia has taken huge strides forward in putting in place the building blocks for free markets. Thousands of companies have been privatized, many are modernizing and rationalizing their operations, and the emerging private sector is becoming a strong constituency for law and order and for property rights. Bankruptcy procedures and a commercial code are being put in place. There has also been major progress on oil sector liberalization.

But Russia needs to invigorate private sector development, because the impetus for structural reform is slowing. The second stage of privatization has made little headway. Land ownership, now enshrined in the Constitution, has not been followed by progress on land privatization.

Here again, there is much we can offer. First, since early 1994, the World Bank has approved over \$2 billion in project loans, but virtually no money has been disbursed due to poor Russian implementation. The Bank's pipeline includes major loans to reform Russia's energy sector and create a private agricultural sector. We need to reaffirm that these monies remain available. Second, we should remind President Yeltsin we stand ready to offer large-scale technical support to back private sector development. Third, to promote enterprise reform, we have created numerous enterprise funds. This week, a \$50 million EBRD-United States fund is being approved. It will operate in Volgograd, Samara, and Saratov.

Capital Market Development.

Confidence is needed for Russian firms to acquire private capital for growth and for foreign investors to bring in new technology and know-how. Russia is a high-savings country, but the lack of confidence that investments will have a reliable return prevents funds from finding their way to Russian companies. Reliable returns are undermined not only by the prospect of inflation and financial instability, but also the inadequacy of capital markets and shareholders rights. Daunted by these obstacles, Russians hold \$50 billion abroad (by some estimates), plus billions of dollars in currency.

A successful capital market must intermediate flows of savings from households and foreigners to domestic companies. The Russian appetite for savings is high -- savings is 27% of GDP. And Russian companies are flush with projects that have potentially high rates of return.

Shareholders, including households, institutional investors, venture capitalists, and banks, are deterred by many capital market inadequacies. One is the absence of limited liability under the

law. A second is inadequate protection for shareholders. Russian firms usually hold their own registries and make them inaccessible by keeping them in the hinterlands. Last year, an aluminum producer deleted a major foreign shareholder from its registry, rather than let him sit on the firm's Board. A third is the weak legal foundation for corporate governance. An owner with a significant minority stake may be denied influence over the Board of Directors by management and inside owners. Outside owners, especially foreigners, have been excluded from Boards and have seen their shareholdings diluted through the issuance of discounted shares to friendly shareholders. Often, the insiders have been successful without violating any law.

These problems are highlighted in one statistic: the total market capitalization of Russia's top 30 traded companies is \$16 billion, less than that of a major U.S. firm.

We are already trying to help fix these problems. Our bilateral support financed the technical work for a \$10 million independent Russian registry company which has just been created by the EBRD, the IFC and several Russian banks. We are also providing extensive support to develop the Russian SEC.

Trade and Investment

You will be receiving separate briefing on trade issues for the Moscow visit, and I will leave this topic to others.

THE KIEV SUMMIT

In the first years of independence, Ukraine pursued gradualist policies aimed at stabilizing output and inflation. It achieved neither. Output fell as the command economy collapsed. Huge credits to coal and agriculture prompted waves of hyper-inflation. Then, price controls were imposed. Social stability was jeopardized and conflicts with Russia were reaching a flash point.

When President Kuchma assumed office in July 1994, he recognized that for Ukraine to remain independent, it had no choice but to pursue reforms. He has done so with vigor to revitalize the economy, develop mutually beneficial relations with Russia, and tap western support.

Last October, Ukraine embarked on a bold reform course, supported by a special IMF facility created at our urging to jumpstart reforms. Ukraine liberalized most prices, including those of food and industrial use of energy. The exchange rate system was freed; controls had cut exports and encouraged barter and capital flight. The 1994 budget deficit, which was headed toward 20 percent of GDP, was reduced to 8-1/2%.

Ukraine has just significantly strengthened its reform program with IMF support under a \$1.5 billion standby arrangement. The budget deficit is being cut again by more than half, down to 3.5% of GDP. Ukraine is eliminating the Government's involvement in most areas of the economy and it is liberalizing trade and most remaining prices. Privatization has begun with large support from AID -- 90% of small firms and 8,000 large firms are to be privatized this year. If the program is implemented, monthly inflation would fall to 1% monthly by year end.

Real results are already evident. After a major tug-of-war with Parliament, the budget was adopted. Monthly inflation, boosted at the turn of the year by liberalization, is now coming down sharply. It has fallen from a high of 72% in November to 21% in January and 10% in March. The exchange rate has been stable this year and foreign capital inflows are increasing.

Most importantly, since Kuchma assumed office economic reform has been key to the rekindling of hope now evident in Ukraine. The prospects for Ukraine as an independent, market-based democratic society have not been better at any time in the last few years.

In your meeting with President Kuchma, you may wish to emphasize the following three points.

First, President Kuchma and his economic team deserve praise for putting Ukraine onto the path of reform. Ukraine's progress in a short span of eight months has been remarkable. At the same time, we must urge him to stay the course.

Second, we remain committed to our pledge to support him. At the Naples Summit, you and the G-7 Heads of State pledged \$4 billion in support from international financial institutions over a two-year period following commencement of genuine reforms. Already, \$3.7 billion has been committed -- \$2.7 billion from international institutions and \$1 billion in special balance of payments support from western bilateral donors and Japan. As long as Ukraine continues with reforms, there is much more financing available from international institutions and export credit agencies will find it increasingly promising to lend to Ukraine.

Third, Ukraine needs to continue to improve its economic relationship in its own neighborhood.

As part of Ukraine's program, Russia and Turkmenistan, at our urging, rescheduled over \$3 billion in Ukrainian gas debts. It is crucial Ukraine make timely payments on current gas deliveries to carry out this deal and to strengthen market ties with these countries. Also, trade liberalization is the best means to allow Ukraine to integrate itself into the world economy. Ukraine must rededicate itself to this task.

**MEETINGS AT
MARIYINSKY PALACE**

MARIYINSKY PALACE

CONTEXT OF THE EVENT

Mariyinsky Palace is the venue for all ceremonial and working events with President Kuchma. The arrival and departure ceremonies will take place in the outdoor gardens inside the front gates of the building. An honor guard and military band will welcome you. You will review the troops, prior to entering the Palace for the start of your substantive discussions with President Kuchma. The one-on-one, the plenary and the dinner will take place in a series of rooms on the second floor.

BACKGROUND

A prime example of Ukrainian and Russian baroque architecture, Mariyinsky Palace was commissioned by Empress Elizabeth in 1744 and designed by Bartolomeo Rastrelli. It was completed in 1755. The palace was designed for use by the royal family during their visits to Kiev, including stop-overs en route to Crimea.

The palace has a varied history. At the start of the 19th century, it was the residence of Kiev's military governors. During the war with Napoleon, the Russians used the palace as a hospital for French POWs. In the middle of the last century, the palace served as the headquarters of the Kiev Arts Society. Following a serious fire, the palace was restored in 1870. During the period of the Revolution and Civil War, the palace was used as the headquarters for Bolshevik military forces. In the 1920's, the palace was converted into an agricultural school and then an agricultural museum.

The palace sustained extensive damage during the Second World War and was rebuilt to original specifications from 1945-1949. Since that time, the palace has been used by the government for formal meetings, typically for visiting heads of state.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEETINGS (ONE-ON-ONE, EXPANDED GROUP)
WITH PRESIDENT LEONID KUCHMA

BACKGROUND

Your meetings with Kuchma and your overall program underscore the U.S. commitment to an independent, democratic, stable and prosperous Ukraine, increasingly integrated with Europe. After an initial period of doubt about U.S. interest in Ukraine (i.e., whether we cared except for the nuclear weapons), Kiev has growing confidence in our commitment. Your meetings offer the opportunity to reinforce that confidence by outlining your vision for continued, deepening bilateral ties. We suggest you open the one-on-one with our commitment to strong relations and reiterate our determination to stand by Ukraine through its difficult economic transition.

Ukrainian-Russian relations are on a more or less even keel but remain laden with problems: Crimea, Black Sea Fleet and energy dependency. Kuchma looks to the U.S. tie to improve his position vis-à-vis his powerful neighbor. You should stress that the U.S. supports good, durable relations between Ukraine and Russia.

Having annulled Crimea's constitution and fired its president, Kiev is concerned about possible Russian interference in Crimea. Senior Russian officials, however, have told us they have no wish to become involved. While Kuchma deserves recognition for the restraint Kiev displayed, he should not overplay his hand. You might note the importance of resolving differences with Crimea in a manner consistent with democratic norms.

Time permitting, you might solicit Kuchma's views on the future of reform and executive-Rada relations and put down a marker that we oppose any nuclear cooperation with Iran.

The expanded session gives you an opportunity to credit Kuchma for the notable progress he and his country have made on economic reform, which enabled IMF approval of a stand-by program. Kuchma will welcome your assurances of U.S. resolve to sustain Ukraine's transition to a market economy, which he can use to bolster public and Rada support in the face of economic difficulties.

We want to expand private trade and investment links. You should encourage the Ukrainians to create an attractive climate for U.S. business. You will be able to cite this summer's meeting of the Joint Commission on Trade and Investment and our just-launched negotiations on a commercial space launch agreement as steps in the right direction.

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On April 13 Kuchma made the welcome announced Ukraine intends to close Chernobyl by the year 2000. You will want to congratulate him on that but tread softly on this issue. He will press for outside financial assistance; this is being considered by the G-7, but our own ability to come up with new resources is very limited.

The security agenda has changed radically. With Ukraine's accession to the NPT and about 40 percent of the nuclear weapons in Ukraine in January 1994 transferred to Russia for dismantlement, there is no nuclear issue for the summit. Ukraine's main concern in its "post-nuclear" era is how, as NATO enlarges, Ukraine avoids becoming a buffer state or falling into Russia's sphere of influence. You can lay out an active bilateral security relationship that is building new ties between the U.S. and Ukraine, as well as underscore your commitment that, as NATO expands, it will proceed in a manner that enhances Ukraine's security. You should encourage Kuchma to take full advantage of the Partnership for Peace and advise him that Ukraine will have links with NATO that go beyond PFP.

CORE OBJECTIVES

(In the one-on-one)

- Underscore your vision of a deepening U.S.-Ukraine partnership and assure Kuchma of continued U.S. support as he leads Ukraine down the path of reform.
- Describe your talks in Moscow and express support for good Ukrainian-Russian relations. Note the importance of continued restraint with regard to Crimea.

(In the expanded meeting)

- Praise Kuchma's reform leadership and encourage him to continue unabated in the transformation to a market economy. Note U.S. support to date and assure him it will continue.
- Stress the importance of expanding the private trade and investment component of our bilateral relationship.
- Assure Kuchma of the importance the U.S. attaches to a secure, stable Ukraine in Europe. Note how we are expanding bilateral links and encourage Ukraine to strengthen its ties to European institutions, particularly through PFP.

POINTS TO BE MADE

(ONE-ON-ONE)

Bilateral Overview

- Delighted to see you; much accomplished since last met.
- 1994 milestone year for U.S.-Ukrainian relations.
 - Thanks to your leadership, nuclear issue behind us.
 - Defined basis for partnership with forward-looking focus on political, economic issues.
- Visit key opportunity to underscore U.S. support for independent, democratic, stable and prosperous Ukraine.
 - That kind of Ukraine very much in U.S. interest; committed to help make it happen.
 - Want Ukraine as political and economic partner of U.S. as well as factor for stability in Europe.
- Expect 1995 to be good year for our relations -- will fill out economic component of relationship and cooperate on security questions.
- Will discuss reform and security in greater detail in expanded group but want to offer brief comments.
- Impressed with success of personal efforts to generate momentum for reform, achieve IMF stand-by agreement.
- Realize required politically difficult decisions; they were right decisions. Generated right response: U.S., West committed to supporting reforms.
 - G-7 and international financial institutions already announced \$2.7B commitment on top \$1B in bilateral contributions.
 - Will work to sustain support as you continue down reform path.
- Want to enhance Ukraine's security in "post-nuclear" era by building bilateral security cooperation, taking full advantage of multilateral institutions.

- Be assured: as NATO enlarges, will manage process to not jeopardize Ukraine's security or put you in "gray zone."
Insecure Ukraine not in U.S. or European interest.

Russia

- Share interest in good relations with Russia.
- Made clear to Yeltsin our support for independent, sovereign and stable Ukraine.
- Despite some disagreements, Yeltsin and I committed to preventing redivision of Europe. Don't want Ukraine to be buffer state or to have to choose sides.
- Made progress with Yeltsin on number of fronts; should help keep our relations on track. (Provide read-out.)
- Admire cautious but deliberate strategy with Russia.
- Policy for building good relations with Russia and West exactly right. Support good Kiev-Moscow ties.
- Pleased with restraint on Crimea. Important solution is peaceful, consistent with democratic norms.
- Russians do not want Crimea to become issue; fear increase in tension will fuel domestic pressures to engage.
- Careful handling will ensure Moscow stays on sidelines -- where it should on internal Ukrainian affair.
- Interested in views on where Russia headed and future of Ukrainian-Russian relationship.

(If subject of permanent trilateral arrangement raised:)

- Can try to facilitate Kiev-Moscow relations but only effective if both sides welcome our involvement. Do not think institutionalizing trilateral mechanism productive. Let's take issues case-by-case and look pragmatically for opportunities.

(If U.S. mediation in Black Sea Fleet dispute is requested:)

- Russians would not welcome us. Prepared to think about other ways might be helpful.

Situation in Ukraine (time permitting)

- Interested in assessment of future prospects for economic reform?
- How will executive-Rada relations develop?
 - Important relationship managed to promote democratization, rule of law.

Iran

- Iran major topic of discussions in Moscow. Made clear oppose nuclear cooperation with Iran given Iranian nuclear ambitions.
- Ukraine has strong nuclear industry. Strongly hope you reject any approaches by Iran for cooperation.

POINTS TO BE MADE

(EXPANDED MEETING)

Economic Reform/International Support

- Commend you for putting Ukraine firmly on path of economic reform.
- Welcome IMF stand-by agreement; strengthens reform and reaffirms Ukraine's seriousness to international community, investors and financial markets.
 - Urge close cooperation with IMF and World Bank.
 - Specifically, progress on privatization, trade liberalization, land reform and energy pricing will open new opportunities to reinvigorate economy.
- Worked hard to ensure international community supports your bold reforms with equally bold support.
 - G-7, international financial institutions already announced \$2.7B in financial commitments on top of \$1B in bilateral contributions. Well down road to exceeding \$4B pledge at Naples.
 - U.S. led effort to produce support; will press EU, Japan to deliver pledges.
- In short, U.S. strong partner of Ukrainian reform.

(If Ukrainian participation at Halifax raised:)

- Canadians probably told you no G-7 consensus for Ukrainian participation at Halifax. Makes sense to think about way for Ukraine to address G-7 officials on reform and Chernobyl -- perhaps after Halifax.

Trade and Investment

- Private sector engine for reform, economic growth and job creation. Encouraged reforms intend to unleash private sector and market forces.
- Many U.S. companies interested in Ukraine. Assistance will support greater private sector activity -- includes OPIC, West NIS Enterprise Fund, technical assistance.

- Business climate very important; reducing inflation, lowering trade barriers, strengthening business laws, limiting government regulation and impartial judiciary key to economic growth.
- Understand importance of EXIM financing; glad EXIM reopened lending program for Ukraine. Also created Agricultural Trade Credit Insurance Facility to provide credits for agricultural inputs.
- Pleased Joint Commission on Trade and Investment meets this summer. Can discuss how to promote commercial interaction between our countries.
- Pleased negotiators started discussions on commercial space launch agreement -- exciting new chapter in bilateral cooperation.

(If market access or "economy in transition" raised:)

- Efforts last year to create "economy in transition" under trade laws lacked support in Congress. Remain committed to working on this. Looking at possible administrative changes.

(If removal of Jackson-Vanik restrictions raised:)

- Reviewing to determine if Ukraine in "full compliance."

(If access to Strategic Petroleum Reserve raised:)

- Under U.S. law, oil from SPR for U.S. domestic use; not export. No benefit to Ukraine compared with purchasing oil from non-Russian sources at market prices.

(If textile imports raised:)

- Agreed last year on quota for imports of women's wool coats from Ukraine -- world's highest. Concerned by delay in Kiev's approval of agreement.

Chornobyl/G-7 Action Plan

- Pleased by decision to close Chornobyl by year 2000. Realize not easy decision; understand concern about adequate power and alternative employment for labor force.
- Interested in helping establish nuclear safety center near Chornobyl to provide new jobs, help prevent accidents.

- Will discuss with G-7 other ways to promote international cooperation.

(If specific Chernobyl issues raised:)

- Will urge EBRD and World Bank to give priority to developing least-cost, alternative energy project in nuclear and conventional power sectors.
- EU doing study of "sarcophagus" over damaged reactor; when complete, will work with you and G-7 to identify additional international resources.
- Need to be frank: difficult to provide grant funding; will look to others for bulk of aid.

Security Cooperation

- 1994 put nuclear issue behind us. Appreciate far-sighted decision to accede to NPT; helped produce yesterday's successful vote to extend NPT indefinitely.
- As Secretary Perry told you in March, moved quickly to expand bilateral security relationship.
 - Stepped up pace of Nunn-Lugar assistance.
 - Dramatically expanded relations between military establishments -- more than 50 contacts for 1995.
 - Look forward to peacekeeping exercise later this month in Lviv. (FYI: Perry and Shali will attend.)
- Want Ukraine integrated into key multilateral institutions. Applaud your enthusiasm for European integration.
 - As we strengthen OSCE, see Ukraine as key player.
- Overriding goal in building new European security architecture: make all European states more secure and avoid creating new dividing lines or spheres of influence.
 - Not in U.S. interest for Ukraine to be isolated or uneasy about security situation; will ensure that does not happen.
- Appreciate you chose to engage NATO. Important for Ukraine to build links to Alliance, particularly through active participation in PFP and NACC.

- Potential of NACC and PFP far from exhausted. PFP can help link Ukraine to western neighbors as well as NATO.
- Assuming Congress fully funds Warsaw Initiative in FY 96, intend to make \$10M available for Ukraine -- most for any NIS. Also expect \$1M (FY 95) in next months to assist PFP participation.
- PFP not sum total of NATO-Ukraine relationship.
- See other ways to enhance relationship -- exchange of high-level visits or 16-plus-1 Council meetings. Envisage 16-plus-1 meetings on dismantlement; your contribution would be considerable.
- Will consult regularly as we define NATO future.
- NATO studying rationale for and process of expansion -- "how" and "why." "Who" and "when" discussed later.
- NATO hopes to brief to interested PFP countries in September -- briefings, not negotiations to admit new members. Hope Ukraine participates.
- Do not expect December meeting to identify states for membership; more likely to continue on steady, deliberate course.
- Do not now rule out any PFP member from membership.

**ARRIVAL STATEMENT
TO BE PROVIDED**

STATE DINNER

MARIYINSKY PALACE -- STATE DINNER

CONTEXT OF THE EVENT

Mariyinsky Palace is the venue for all of the ceremonial and working events with President Kuchma. We anticipate there will be around 80 total guests for the State dinner. After arrival at the Palace at 7:30 p.m., you and the First Lady, along with the Kuchmas, will greet the other dinner guests in a receiving line (there will be a press pool for this part of the evening). During the dinner, which will be held in the State Dining Room, you and Kuchma will exchange prepared toasts. Following the conclusion of the dinner, there will be traditional Ukrainian folk entertainment.

BACKGROUND

A prime example of Ukrainian and Russian baroque, Mariyinsky Palace was commissioned by Empress Elizabeth in 1744 and designed by Bartolomeo Rastrelli. It was completed in 1755. The palace was designed for use by the royal family during their visits to Kiev, including on stop-overs en route to Crimea.

The palace has had a varied history. At the start of the 19th century, it was the residence of Kiev's military governors. During the war with Napoleon, the Russians used the palace as a hospital for French POWs. In the middle of the last century, the palace served as the headquarters of the Kiev Arts Society. Following a serious fire, the palace was restored in 1870. During the period of the Revolution and Civil War, the palace was used as the headquarters for Bolshevik military forces. In the 1920's, the palace was converted into an agricultural school and then an agricultural museum.

The palace sustained extensive damage during WWII and was rebuilt to original specifications from 1945-1949. Since that time, the palace has been used by the government for formal meetings, typically for visiting heads of state. It is open on a limited basis for tours.

**STATE GUEST
HOUSE**

STATE GUEST HOUSE

CONTEXT OF EVENT

The State Guest House will host you and the First Lady during private-time while in Kiev including the overnight. The Ukrainian side has also proposed using the house for other non-public events such as meeting with Embassy staff.

BACKGROUND

What is now known as the State Guest House was originally constructed in 1873 as a one-story mansion for Major-General Ivensen, who served as deputy mayor of Kiev in the 1870s. In 1883, Markuf Zaks, a prominent Kiev merchant, purchased the building from Ivenson's widow. Zaks added a second floor and redesigned the facade in the Renaissance style. Until the 1917 revolution, Zaks used the building as both a residence and an office for his sugar business.

In 1918, the house was nationalized and used as office space for a number of government agencies. Starting in 1920, it housed offices of key leaders of the local Communist Party. During World War II the residence served as headquarters for the Hungarian Army, one of the occupying forces.

Since the war, the house has belonged to the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers. Following an extensive renovation at the beginning of the 1990s, the State Guest House has been used to accommodate visiting dignitaries. It is located a block away from Mariyinskyy Palace.

WREATH-LAYING AT
WWII ETHERNAL FLAME

ST. JOSEPH'S UNIVERSITY

MEMPHIS

MEMPHIS

MEMPHIS

WREATH-LAYING AT ETERNAL FLAME OF THE WORLD WAR II OBELISK

CONTEXT OF THE EVENT

Accompanied by President Kuchma, you will lay a wreath at the eternal flame marking the resting place of Ukraine's unknown soldier. The monument overlooks a picturesque part of the Dnipro River, which flows through Kiev, where the Soviet army sustained considerable losses in regaining control of the western bank. After the ceremony, you may have an opportunity to greet Ukrainian World War II veterans invited to this event. The event could require 30 minutes in all, 15 minutes each for the wreath-laying and for greeting veterans.

BACKGROUND

The eternal flame monument was erected following World War II in memory of Soviet servicemen who lost their lives fighting Nazi Germany. It is an emotional setting and traditionally many Kievans, particularly war veterans, visit it on or around Victory Day (VE Day, May 9). The park housing the obelisk and the eternal flame is Kiev's most solemn and tasteful war memorial. A tree-lined marble pathway extends about 250 yards from the park entrance to the flame, which is at the foot of the obelisk. Along the sides of the pathway are the graves of 34 soldiers who distinguished themselves for valor during the liberation of Kiev.

**SPEECH AT
SHEVCHENKO UNIVERSITY**

100

100

100

SHEVCHENKO UNIVERSITY

CONTEXT OF THE EVENT

Shevchenko University sits across the street from a park containing a 30-foot-high statue of Taras Shevchenko, Ukraine's most illustrious poet and patriot. You will speak outside of the University, looking toward the base of the statue, to an audience of students and other Ukrainians. The speech will require consecutive translation. The entire event would last approximately one hour.

BACKGROUND

Founded in 1834 as St. Vladimir University, the institution has grown from having two departments and 62 students to 16 departments and over 18,000 students. The University was built in 1837-43 in classical style. The building has an imposing block-long facade with eight Ionic columns on its portico.

During the 19th and early 20th centuries, the University was a center of Ukrainian nationalist and anti-Tsarist activity. According to some stories, the main campus acquired its distinctive color in 1901, when Tsar Nicholas II ordered it doused in bright red to punish rebellious students who refused to be drafted. The color was intended to shame the rebels and intimidate others.

In 1939, the University was renamed after Taras Shevchenko, on the occasion of the 125th anniversary of his birth. Shevchenko is revered as the father of the Ukrainian national revival movement, which began in the 1840s. He advanced the ideas of national independence, human equality and social justice. Born a serf himself, he struggled against serfdom and suppression of non-Russian nationalities. Shevchenko died in 1861 after years of enforced service in the army imposed as punishment for his membership in the Cyrill and Methodius Society, an incipient nationalist organization that met at the University.

Although Shevchenko University's administration has a well-earned reputation for conservatism, it is considered the top institution of higher learning in the country and is the alma mater of virtually all of Ukraine's political and economic elite.

REMARKS.

TO BE PROVIDED

WREATH-LAYING AT
BABYN YAR

WREATH-LAYING AT BABYN YAR

CONTEXT OF THE EVENT

There are two monuments to honor the Kiev civilians killed by the Nazis during World War II: the Soviet-built monument to all killed during the Nazi occupation, and the Menorah, specifically erected to commemorate the Jewish victims of the 1941 massacre.

The Soviet-built monument is situated in a large park, its base rising above the surrounding area that forms a natural stage for remarks. The area can accommodate several hundred people. Your motorcade may pass by it on the way to the Menorah, which is where you will lay a wreath and offer brief comments.

The Menorah site (three-five minutes by car from the Soviet-built monument) is on a small, level square, capable of accommodating about 150-200 people, adjacent to a Ukrainian enterprise. The ravine where the victims were executed is immediately behind the Menorah.

BACKGROUND

Babyn Yar (literally "Grandmother's Ravine," also called "Babiy Yar" from the Russian language transliteration) is a ravine where the Germans, during their 1941-1943 occupation of Ukraine, executed over 150,000 people, most of whom were Ukrainian Jews. Some Soviet POWs, partisans, Ukrainian nationalists and gypsies were also executed there. Kiev now has two Babyn Yar memorials. The first statue, built by the Soviets in 1976, is dedicated generically to citizens of Kiev who perished at Babyn Yar at the hands of the Nazis. In 1991, President Bush visited this site.

Many in the Jewish community object to the statue's depiction of soldiers and partisans defending the site when the massacre was conducted against defenseless victims. Also, the monument's inscription does not mention that the bulk of the victims were Jewish, and the monument itself was not erected on the exact site of the September 1941 massacre of the Kiev Jewish community.

In light of these concerns, Jewish organizations here erected a new Menorah monument -- a ten-foot-high menorah -- next to the ravine where the 1941 massacre occurred. The Menorah does not bear any inscription.

REMARKS
TO BE PROVIDED

**EMBASSY MEET
AND GREET**

EMBASSY MEET AND GREET AT BORISPIL AIRPORT

CONTEXT OF THE EVENT

You will greet Embassy Kiev staff, both Americans and foreign service nationals, as well as Kiev-based Peace Corps volunteers at Borispil Airport immediately prior to departure for the U.S. Ambassador Miller will introduce Secretary Christopher, who will in turn introduce the First Lady, who will introduce you. You will make brief remarks, thanking the Embassy for its support of the visit. You will then greet Embassy staffers along a rope line before departing for Air Force One.

BACKGROUND

Borispil Airport is the main airport of Kiev, with a military and a civilian side. The main terminal is of standard Soviet-era construction (i.e., uninspiring). The meet and greet will take place in a screened-off area of the departure lounge in the main terminal. The capacity of the area is about 400 people.

REMARKS
TO BE PROVIDED

UKRAINE BACKGROUND PAPERS

1. Overview of Bilateral Relationship
2. Political Overview
3. Economic Situation
4. U.S. Bilateral Assistance
5. Multilateral Economic Assistance
6. Trade and Investment
7. Energy and Chornobyl
8. Cooperation in Space
9. European Security Architecture
10. Relations with Russia
11. Crimea and Black Sea Fleet Issues
12. Nuclear and Security Issues

UKRAINE: OVERVIEW OF BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP

There has been tremendous progress in bilateral U.S.-Ukrainian relations over the last year, which are now as good as they have been since Ukraine regained independence following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The nuclear issue is behind us; Ukraine responded to our urgings to give up nuclear weapons and accede to the NPT (about 40% of the nuclear weapons in Ukraine in January 1994 have since been transferred to Russia for dismantlement). The U.S. push to broaden the overall relationship and our mobilization of international resources after President Kuchma's October decision to implement comprehensive economic reforms have helped instill confidence in Kiev that Washington attaches importance to Ukraine.

Security cooperation and economic reform remain high priorities. The focus of our security dialogue already has shifted from nuclear arms control issues to regional questions, including NATO expansion and Ukraine's security position. Ukraine's principal concern is that expansion not leave it as a buffer state between NATO and Russia or drive it into Russia's sphere of influence. We see bilateral security links and Kiev's development of a relationship with the Alliance as ways to avoid this. Kiev desires a strong U.S. link to enhance its position vis-à-vis its more powerful neighbor. This is especially true given that Crimea, Black Sea Fleet and energy dependency remain potential flashpoints.

Meanwhile, international institutions are engaging to sustain Ukraine's reform effort. Ukraine's 1995 reform program earned the IMF's support with a \$1.5B on stand-by program and a \$400M special loan, as well as significant bilateral balance-of-payments support from the U.S., EU and Japan. Continued U.S. and Western support is important to Kuchma, who fears if his program cannot deliver a stronger economy by the end of 1995, domestic political support for reform could quickly erode.

U.S. and international assistance will help Ukraine implement reform, but assistance, in itself, will not be sufficient to assure the long-term success of Ukraine's transformation. Our assistance is thus beginning to focus on supporting private trade and investment, and we are pursuing promising new areas of cooperation such as commercial space launch. Ukrainian exports to the United States are growing rapidly -- from \$109M in 1992 to nearly \$350M in 1994.

Our strategic goal remains to see Ukraine firmly on the path to a stable, market-oriented democracy, increasingly integrated into European and global economic and security institutions.

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UKRAINE: POLITICAL OVERVIEW

The on-going tug of war between the executive and legislature (the Rada) continue to complicate Ukrainian domestic politics. President Kuchma has been able to dominate the legislative agenda since his election last summer but won most of the big battles on issues important to him, ranging from economic reform to NPT accession to a budget meeting IMF criteria.

The new Rada, also elected last year, is finally beginning to shed its image as a legislature dominated by leftists. It is emerging as a legitimate contender for political power with an increasing centrist majority inclined to support economic reform. The Rada retains, however, an old guard leadership -- led by Rada Chairman and leftist leader Moroz, a key personal rival of Kuchma who opposes much of the Ukrainian president's reform program.

In an effort to solidify support for reform, Kuchma has pursued a strategy to weaken Moroz. In April, in a calculated move scripted in part by Kuchma himself, the Rada voted to dismiss his government over what it charged (disingenuously) was the failure to implement reform. Kuchma reportedly plans to appoint even more reformers to the government's top positions and revamp the Soviet-era Cabinet structure. He also hoped the Rada would approve a controversial "law on power" aimed at strengthening the executive. Leftists have led the charge against the bill and are well-positioned to block its approval. Kuchma is considering holding a referendum on the matter believing, as most surveys indicate, voters will support a strong presidency.

If Kuchma succeeds in solidifying a government/Rada reform team, he will have a tough assignment for it. In his April "State of the Nation" address, Kuchma maintained the economy will show improvement in the latter part of 1995 if his reform plan is implemented fully. Kuchma will look to the U.S. for help, concerned, absent some recovery, public support will erode.

Kuchma and the Rada see eye to eye on Crimea. Both the executive and legislature have worked closely to roll back Crimean separatism. Kiev is in control of the security situation on the peninsula, and the local population has shown little interest in the political struggle. But, the situation is unpredictable. Though the Russian government has largely stayed out of the dispute, President Yeltsin's April 15 remarks, indicating he would not proceed with major bilateral treaties with Kiev until the Crimean problem is resolved, is a reminder Russian restraint is essential to a peaceful resolution.

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UKRAINE: ECONOMIC SITUATION

In 1994, Ukraine's economic slide accelerated. National income shrank 26% compared with 1993, while industrial output was down 28% and agriculture fell 17% -- all record declines since independence in 1991. This slide was integral to shedding the communist legacy. But it has still been painful and only partially compensated by Ukraine's burgeoning "gray market," which by some estimates may now account for up to 40% of GDP.

President Kuchma took bold decisions last October to implement comprehensive economic reforms and reached agreement with the IMF on a systemic transformation facility. The Kuchma government has continued the reformist course in 1995, and thus the economic outlook is much brighter than it was in 1994. In January Kiev announced an ambitious mass privatization program: 90% of small firms and 8,000 large firms will be privatized this year. In February Ukraine implemented the second stage of price liberalization in housing and municipal services. In April Kiev won IMF support for \$1.9B in new financing, including a \$1.5B stand-by loan. In doing so, Ukraine agreed to reduce its budget deficit to 3.3% of GDP. Government involvement in most areas of the economy will be eliminated, trade liberalized and most remaining fixed prices freed.

Kuchma has achieved some real economic improvements, which are broadly in line with IMF projections. Monthly inflation -- which spiked at the turn of the year with price liberalization -- is now beginning to decline sharply, falling from a high of 72% per month in November to 10% in March. The exchange rate has been fairly stable, and foreign capital inflows are growing. Exports in some sectors have increased. According to Ukrainian government officials, industrial production improved in the first quarter of 1995 compared to the final quarter of last year.

Despite difficult living conditions, most Ukrainians approve of Kuchma's handling of the economy and now favor privatization. Given the magnitude of Ukraine's problems, however, more shocks and some backtracking are expected, and Kuchma is concerned about sustaining public support.

The Rada harbors strong opponents to key reform measures such as fiscal austerity, privatization and land reform. Some members continue to press for costly subsidy programs that run the risk of reigniting hyper-inflation. However, Kuchma may use a cabinet re-shuffle to strengthen the position of reformers.

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UKRAINE: U.S. BILATERAL ASSISTANCE

The U.S. attaches high priority to supporting Ukraine's transition to a democratic, market-based economy, and we have backed that support with significant resources. In FY94, the U.S. committed \$350M in FREEDOM Support Act (FSA) funds to Ukraine, matching the \$350M (FY 92-95) Nunn-Lugar assistance for eliminating nuclear weapons and infrastructure. In FY95, Ukraine will receive more than 20% of the total of \$850M in FSA funding for the NIS. After some bumps, implementation of this assistance is proceeding smoothly, particularly as Ukraine has adopted more comprehensive economic reforms.

Under President Kuchma's leadership, Ukraine has undertaken an ambitious program of comprehensive reform linked to an IMF systemic transformation facility (STF) and a follow-on stand-by arrangement. The U.S. played a major role in facilitating these IMF loans, offering special assistance to help close external financing gaps and successfully lobbying our G-7 allies to make similarly generous contributions. Last fall we pledged \$100M (mostly drawn from FY95 FSA funds) in connection with the STF. We pledged \$250M in March to support the stand-by agreement; as part of the pledge, we expect to leverage about \$24M in FY95 FSA funds through an innovative AID/Ex-Im Bank trade credit facility for up to \$160-175M worth of agricultural inputs.

Given Ukraine's new economic policies, we will be able to focus our technical assistance on key structural reforms and link it more closely to our broader efforts to stimulate trade, investment and private sector development. For FY95, \$102M of FSA technical assistance will go to support mass privatization, small business support, energy efficiency, nuclear reactor safety and environmental problems, development of democratic institutions and exchanges and training. To help with privatization, we have funded the printing of 250 million privatization vouchers and the creation of a national network of auction centers to cover 8,000 state enterprises.

Kiev has long expressed a strong interest in the resumption of normal Ex-Im Bank lending to Ukraine. Ukraine's dire economic straits and poor payments record delayed this, but the conclusion of the IMF stand-by agreement and Ukraine's implementation of IMF-mandated actions have led to a review of its credit rating. On May 2, Ex-Im Bank decided to go back on cover for Ukraine, starting with short- and medium-term loans.

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UKRAINE: MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

Ukraine recognizes President Clinton's personal efforts last July at the Naples G-7 Summit were key to the G-7 pledge of at least \$4B in assistance over two years following Ukraine's adoption of genuine economic reforms. In all of our subsequent contacts with the Ukrainian leadership, they have indicated U.S. support, combined with the G-7's show of support at Naples, was a major inducement for President Kuchma's launching of reforms in October.

Since October, the international financial institutions -- IMF, World Bank, European Bank of Reconstruction and Development -- have made concrete commitments of \$2.7B to meet Ukraine's financing needs (the IMF stand-by agreement concluded in April accounted for \$1.5B of this total). This comes on top of \$1B in Western bilateral support.

- o The United States provided \$100M to help Ukraine close its balance-of-payments gap in the fourth quarter of 1994. Subsequently, we pledged another \$250M in assistance that counted against Ukraine's balance-of-payments financing gap at the March 1995 donors meeting.
- o Japan pledged \$200M in trade credits during President Kuchma's March trip to Tokyo.
- o The European Union tentatively offered another \$400M conditioned on progress in closing the Chornobyl nuclear power plant. We oppose this linkage, but Kuchma's April 13 announcement that Chornobyl would be closed by the year 2000 appears to have led to the release of some EU funds.

Ukraine continues to run severe balance-of-payments deficits because of the high cost of fuel imports from Russia and Turkmenistan. Earlier this year both of these countries agreed to reschedule more than \$3B in Ukrainian arrearages for energy supplies. Until Ukraine finds other suppliers, it will remain heavily dependent on cooperation from Russia, in particular, and Turkmenistan in its efforts to meet the huge payments necessary to finance vital energy imports. Kuchma may ask us to assist Ukraine in finding alternative energy sources.

Given Ukraine's recent success with reform, there are good prospects for additional World Bank and EBRD financing later on in 1995, which could increase commitments to Ukraine beyond the G-7 pledge last year in Naples.

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PER E.O. 13526
2016-0135 M (1.412)
KBM 1/24/2020

UKRAINE: TRADE AND INVESTMENT

One of the key themes of the President's visit to Kiev will be the critical importance of trade and investment to sustaining Ukraine's economic reform effort and recovery. Ukraine offers immense potential -- a relatively developed (but antiquated) industrial base, a rich agricultural endowment, a skilled labor force and a large, untapped consumer market of 52 million people. However, only 200 U.S. companies, representing just \$200M in U.S. investment, operate in Ukraine. By comparison, Hungary, with one-fifth the population, has attracted many more U.S. companies and \$3.5B in U.S. investment.

President Kuchma has made a strong start toward opening Ukraine's economy to the outside world. Complying with its IMF stand-by agreement, Ukraine has eliminated virtually all export quotas and has pledged to reduce restrictions on imports. Controls on foreign exchange have been loosened and the exchange rate allowed to float. Ukraine has started the WTO accession process, which will bring its trade policy in conformity with international standards. Overall, Ukraine appears to have a relatively liberal trade regime, probably more liberal than Russia's today.

The U.S. chairs Ukraine's working party on WTO accession and is providing extensive technical assistance, including a full-time U.S. WTO advisor in Kiev. We have given Ukraine MFN status and have designated it a General System of Preferences beneficiary country. Recorded trade between Ukraine and the U.S. reached \$508M in 1994, mainly due to a surge in Ukrainian exports (imports of U.S. products were off by 40% last year; not surprising, given Ukraine's severe economic contraction). Nonetheless, despite nearly doubling exports and a positive trade balance with the U.S., Kiev believes we are unfairly limiting access to our markets and wants our trade laws revised to accommodate Ukraine as an "economy-in-transition." Ukraine also is pressing for higher textile quotas.

Unlike Russia or Kazakhstan, Ukraine has seen little foreign direct investment -- less than \$500M as of January 1, 1995. This low level is partly due to Ukraine's disastrous record on reform prior to October. The depressed local market and growing crime and corruption have also discouraged foreign investment. With Ukraine now serious about reform, the U.S. is making a sustained effort to promote greater American investment. OPIC is actively reviewing a number of defense conversion proposals, and the West NIS Enterprise Fund, with up to \$150M in funds, has opened an office in Kiev and is seeking investment opportunities. One obstacle: our Senate still has not ratified the Bilateral Investment Treaty.

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2016-0135-M (1.43)
KBM 1/24/2020

UKRAINE: ENERGY AND CHORNOBYL

President Kuchma announced to an EU/G-7 delegation on April 13 that Ukraine is prepared to close the Chornobyl nuclear power plant by the year 2000. Kuchma, however, linked his announcement to a plan to build a large, gas-fired electricity plant in the Chornobyl region. Although not an explicit condition for closing Chornobyl, Ukraine expects increased Western assistance for its energy problems and has publicly estimated the cost of closing Chornobyl at some \$4B.

The decision was not an easy one. Ukraine can barely meet its energy demands, and nuclear power now provides 40% of Ukraine's electricity (Chornobyl alone provides 5% of electricity). Ukraine cannot afford to import sufficient fuel and many fossil fuel electric plants are mothballed. Ukraine had fallen behind on its payments to Russia and Turkmenistan for natural gas and oil. Meanwhile, domestic coal production has fallen, largely because many mines are old, inefficient and lack needed investment.

At the 1994 Naples summit, the G-7 announced an action plan for Ukraine's energy sector that envisioned early closure of Chornobyl. The plan includes \$200M in grants, to which the U.S. committed \$38M over two years. The G-7's decision followed the EU Corfu declaration that the EU would make available \$120M in grants and another \$480M in loans for the same purpose. The World Bank and EBRD are helping to rehabilitate Ukraine's conventional energy sector. The IMF program requires industry to face market energy prices, which should dampen demand and help improve the energy situation.

The G-7 action plan will help develop least-cost energy sources to offset Chornobyl. We are considering Ukraine's proposal for a new, gas-fired plant within the EBRD and World Bank least-cost studies. Ukraine is looking for international help to rehabilitate the "sarcophagus" covering the damaged Chornobyl reactor. The EU has taken the lead and is preparing a study; we have not allocated any funds for this problem. Also, we are looking at ways to respond to Ukraine's concerns about the displacement of employees with the closing of Chornobyl.

The President's visit will be the occasion for announcing the details of our FY95 nuclear safety assistance program. These include assisting Ukraine in starting an international nuclear safety and environmental research center in the Chornobyl region and helping upgrade nuclear safety measures at Chornobyl.

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KBH 1/24/2020

UKRAINE: COOPERATION IN SPACE

The U.S. and Ukraine formalized their cooperative activities in space when Presidents Clinton and Kuchma signed a framework agreement at the November 1994 summit. NASA and the National Space Agency of Ukraine (NSAU) are the implementing agencies.

Cooperation under this agreement has covered a range of projects and activities. Chief among these has been the effort to identify a Ukrainian payload and Ukrainian payload specialist to fly on a future space shuttle mission. NASA has tentatively scheduled these activities for shuttle mission STS-87 in October 1997. The payload will consist of four experiments on the effects of microgravity and plant cellular physiology. NASA and NSAU are working to name the payload Ukrainian specialist.

NASA also has signed a contract with the Paton Welding Institute for the definition phase of the international space welding experiment. This is a joint project for flight demonstration of the Ukrainian universal hand tool, an electron beam welding device, which could be used for emergency repairs for the international space station. NASA representatives are also developing a report on how Ukraine can commercialize its aerospace industry.

Ukraine has pressed the U.S. to support its participation in the space station. Kiev's involvement as a separate international partner, however, is unlikely. Ukrainian space launch vehicles may be used by Russia for resupply missions, and Ukraine is providing other subsystem components to Russia for the project. We have encouraged the two countries to cooperate on this.

The U.S. and Ukraine broadened their space agenda with the first round of talks in April on a commercial space launch agreement. These negotiations flow from a commitment by the Presidents in November to facilitate Ukrainian access to world aerospace markets. They are the direct result of a U.S. policy process early this year that linked progress in the commercial space launch area to continuing fulfillment by Ukraine of its missile non-proliferation obligations. The talks are in an early stage, but we expect the agreement will provide Ukraine access to both geostationary/geosynchronous and low-earth orbit orbits.

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PER E.O. 13526
2016-0135-M (1.45)
KBH 1/24/2020

UKRAINE: EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

Ukraine continues to fear that Russia will pose a threat to Ukrainian sovereignty and independence. Kiev sees good relations with the West -- the U.S. in particular -- as a balance against Russia to minimize this threat. While we have built up certain confidence with the Ukrainians, Kiev continues to look for formal mechanisms -- e.g., a permanent trilateral (U.S.-Ukraine-Russia) process -- to strengthen its position.

Ukraine has adopted the stance that it does not seek to join NATO, given its law on neutrality. (Some senior Ukrainian officials have suggested an interest in eventual NATO membership and ask that Ukraine not be excluded from eventually joining the Alliance.) Ukraine also maintains other countries -- read Russia -- should not have a veto over new countries joining. Senior Ukrainian officials have indicated to the Poles and Czechs they would not object to those countries entering NATO.

Ukraine nevertheless finds the prospect of Alliance expansion unsettling: it fears it could find itself a buffer between NATO and Russia or driven into Russia's sphere of influence. The President's assurance we will manage the process of NATO expansion in a manner that does not undercut but that strengthens Ukrainian security is important to Kiev.

Ukrainian leaders seek to develop links to NATO. Some call for a "special" relationship with the Alliance, paralleling -- though not necessarily replicating -- the relationship that may develop between NATO and Russia. Details, however, have yet to be worked out. One of our aims must be to help Kiev better understand the kind of NATO-Russia relationship we hope will develop. We also need to explore how the NATO-Ukraine relationship could evolve.

Ukraine is important to the goals of NATO expansion. No formula for enhancing stability and security in eastern Europe will be credible unless it enhances Ukraine's security position. The Ukrainians are active participants in the NACC and PFP and want to develop a relationship with NATO beyond PFP. Ukraine was the first NIS country to sign up for PFP and has been one of the most active partners, participating in all PFP exercises to date. The President will announce in Kiev \$10M in Warsaw Initiative funding (FY96) to help support Ukraine's participation in PFP, assuming Congressional funding. Ukraine believes cultivating such cooperative activities will help build links to the West, which we wish to encourage.

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PER E.O. 13526
2016-0135-M (1.46)
KBN 1/24/2020

UKRAINE: RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

The U.S. supports stable, mutually beneficial relations between Ukraine and Russia as essential to regional stability. Good relations are important to achieve our goals with both countries, e.g., a crisis in their bilateral relations could disrupt the transfer of nuclear weapons to Russia for dismantlement.

While many Russians emotionally have a hard time accepting they now need a passport to travel to Ukraine, Moscow has largely behaved correctly. Despite occasional pot-holes, the overall trend in Ukrainian-Russian relations over the last 16 months has been positive. Among the milestones: the 1994 Trilateral Statement; the July election of President Kuchma (who advocates good relations with Russia); Ukraine's accession to the NPT; an agreed formula for debt restructuring; and the apparent resolution of most problems blocking the long-delayed Kuchma-Yeltsin summit in Kiev. Nevertheless, potentially contentious issues remain on the agenda, including basing of the Black Sea Fleet, energy dependency and Crimea.

The Ukrainians and Russians have long been preparing a bilateral treaty on friendship, cooperation and partnership, to be the centerpiece of a Yeltsin visit to Kiev. The signing, however, has repeatedly been postponed for more than eight months. Although lesser agreements are being implemented to facilitate normal bilateral interests, the symbolism and high profile of this treaty have given it the political importance of a peace accord and, at the same time, have made it a target of political extremists on both sides.

Thanks to U.S. efforts in January 1994, the Trilateral Statement remains the single most important confidence-building mechanism between Kiev and Moscow. Implementation is proceeding smoothly: Ukraine has transferred some 800 nuclear warheads to date; the remaining 1,100 warheads are due out by mid-1996. Russia is maintaining its commitment to compensate Ukraine by providing fuel assemblies for nuclear power plants.

Ukraine, dependent on Russia for more than 80% of its oil and most of its natural gas, has trouble keeping current on payments. Kiev reached agreement with Russia in March to reschedule \$3.9B of debt (mostly for energy resources) over the next ten years. Still, Ukraine must keep current on the rescheduling terms in order to ensure fuel deliveries from Russia. But the relationship is complex: Russian gas transits Ukraine to Central and Western Europe, and Kiev frequently makes up for cut-backs to Ukraine by tapping into this flow.

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KBH 1/24/2020

UKRAINE: CRIMEA AND BLACK SEA FLEET ISSUES

At the heart of the Crimean problem is Nikita Khrushchev's 1954 decision to transfer the peninsula from the territorial jurisdiction of Russia to Ukraine. In the Soviet era this had little practical effect. But, with the breakup of the USSR, the ethnic Russian majority in Crimea finds itself subject to Ukrainian vice Russian authority.

An active separatist movement has developed in Crimea, dominating local political debate. In its effort to rein in the movement, Ukraine has thus far been careful to follow a law-based strategy. In March 1995, given political divisions among the separatists (and Russian preoccupation with Chechnya), Kiev moved to suspend the separatist 1992 Crimean constitution, to annul a number of Crimean laws in conflict with the Ukrainian constitution and to abolish the Crimean presidency. President Kuchma has temporarily subordinated the Crimean government to the Ukrainian central government but reiterated Kiev's respect for Crimean autonomy within Ukraine. He has called on Crimea to adopt a new constitution, consistent with Ukraine's national constitution.

The Yeltsin government's response has been restrained. The Russians have told us they do not want a crisis in Crimea, which would increase domestic pressure on Moscow to become involved. Indeed, Russian nationalists in the Duma have made inflammatory statements. Yeltsin himself has acknowledged that Crimea is an internal Ukrainian affair. At the same time, he has said he would not proceed with major bilateral treaties with Ukraine until the problem is satisfactorily resolved -- a clear reminder of the influence Russia can exert. Despite this, Ukrainian and Russian negotiators continue to discuss bilateral problems.

The Black Sea Fleet is currently under joint Ukrainian-Russian command, and the two sides have apparently reached agreement on dividing the ships. The disposition of shore facilities, however, including the city of Sevastopol, remains unresolved and a matter of real contention. The Ukrainians are prepared to lease Russia basing facilities; the Russians seek close to full jurisdiction in a way that challenges Ukrainian sovereignty.

Kiev has consistently tried to interest us in mediating the dispute, much as we mediated the Trilateral Statement. We have offered both sides samples of our own basing agreements with third countries. At the same time, we have made clear that we will not become directly involved unless both Kiev and Moscow invite us and we feel we have a substantive contribution to make.

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PER E.O. 13526
2016-0135-M (1.48)
KRM 1/24/2020

UKRAINE: NUCLEAR AND SECURITY ISSUES

Our efforts to bring about the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine and its acceptance of non-nuclear weapon state status mark a key success for U.S. policy: Ukraine's agreement to the Trilateral Statement, ratification of START and accession to the NPT made 1994 a milestone year and put the Ukrainian nuclear weapons issue behind us. Our continuing dialogue with Kiev on nuclear and security issues increasingly reflects greater understanding.

Ukraine continues to implement smoothly its obligations under the January 1994 Trilateral Statement. We believe Ukraine has transferred to Russia some 800 nuclear warheads for dismantling (exact schedule agreed to by Kiev and Moscow is still secret). The remaining warheads, numbering about 1,100, are due to leave the country by mid-1996. Russia is maintaining its commitment to compensate Ukraine for the highly-enriched uranium in the warheads by providing fuel assemblies for nuclear power plants. Ukraine has informally voiced concern about the quality of the assemblies but has not challenged Moscow's compliance.

Ukraine's accession to the NPT on December 5, 1994 removed the last obstacle to entry into force of the START I Treaty. After some initial differences with Ukraine over the terms of U.S. on-site monitoring, we acceded to their request that we end our continuous monitoring at the Pavlohrad missile production facility on May 31, 1995 in favor of additional short-notice inspections.

Ukraine's willingness to give up nuclear weapons was generated in significant measure by U.S. commitments to provide Nunn-Lugar assistance. The U.S. has committed a total of \$350M under this program to assist Ukraine in the dismantlement of nuclear weapons and to provide related support (including construction of nearly 400 housing units for demobilized strategic rocket forces personnel). Discussions are underway with Ukraine to determine how to allocate \$73M in FY95 funding. During his March visit, Secretary Perry signed an agreement to provide an extra \$20 million for nuclear weapons elimination. The joint statement for release during the Kiev summit will announce the allocation of up to an additional \$10M for defense conversion and, possibly, allocations for the Science and Technology Center, the elimination of nuclear weapons infrastructure, export control and nuclear material control and accounting.

The U.S. maintains an active military-to-military contact program with Ukraine, with over 50 individual contacts in 1995. The first U.S.-Ukraine joint peacekeeping training exercise will be held in Lviv in late May.

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**BIOGRAPHIC
MATERIALS**

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
024. report	Biography (2 pages)	05/02/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2586

FOLDER TITLE:

President Clinton's Trip to Russia and Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995 [2]

2016-0135-M
kh1783

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
025. report	Biography (1 page)	11/16/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2586

FOLDER TITLE:

President Clinton's Trip to Russia and Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995 [2]

2016-0135-M
kh1783

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
026. report	Biography (1 page)	04/25/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2586

FOLDER TITLE:

President Clinton's Trip to Russia and Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995 [2]

2016-0135-M
kh1783

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
027. report	Biography (1 page)	04/18/1995	PI/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2586

FOLDER TITLE:

President Clinton's Trip to Russia and Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995 [2]

2016-0135-M
kh1783

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
028. report	Biography (1 page)	11/17/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2586

FOLDER TITLE:

President Clinton's Trip to Russia and Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995 [2]

2016-0135-M
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
029. report	Biography (2 pages)	04/12/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2586

FOLDER TITLE:

President Clinton's Trip to Russia and Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995 [2]

2016-0135-M
kh1783

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
030. report	Biography (2 pages)	03/30/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2586

FOLDER TITLE:

President Clinton's Trip to Russia and Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995 [2]

2016-0135-M
kh1783

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
031. report	Biography (2 pages)	05/02/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2586

FOLDER TITLE:

President Clinton's Trip to Russia and Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995 [2]

2016-0135-M
kh1783

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
032. report	Biography [partial] (1 page)	04/30/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2586

FOLDER TITLE:

President Clinton's Trip to Russia and Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995 [2]

2016-0135-M
kh1783

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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1.4c, 3.5c

Serhiy Hryhorovych OSYKA
(Phonetic: ohSEEkah)

UKRAINE

*Deputy Prime Minister (since January 1995);
Minister of External Economic Relations (since
August 1994)*

Addressed as: Mr. Minister

Serhiy Osyka's political connections and his professional experience probably led to his appointment as Minister of External Economic Relations and his subsequent promotion to Deputy Prime Minister with oversight of Ukraine's economic relations with the CIS. He enjoys the President Leonid Kuchma's support.

1.4c, 1.4d

Osyka's ties to the President go back to 1992, when he served as then Prime Minister Kuchma's adviser on trade issues. He has been Kiev's point man on trade relations with the West, specifically on Ukraine's potential role in GATT. He served a similar function under the previous administration.

3.5c

In late 1994, Osyka enjoyed a reputation as an economic reformer, who is committed to opening up Ukraine's economy.

1.4c, 1.4d

1.4c, 1.4d

The Deputy Prime Minister may

also fear intimidation from organized crime elements; in September 1994, attackers stabbed and seriously wounded a man whom they mistook for Osyka, according to Ukrainian and Western press accounts.

3.5c

Osyka, an ethnic Ukrainian, was born on 27 March 1955 in Kiev. He graduated from Kiev State University with a degree in international relations in 1977. He earned a law degree from that same institution in 1980 and later worked as an assistant professor there and at Ukraine's Institute of Foreign Relations. Osyka then served as a consultant to the Supreme Rada (parliament) during 1991-92. He was an adviser on foreign economic relations to the Prime Minister from 1992 until 1993. Osyka then worked as a deputy minister and first deputy minister in the Ministry of External Economic Relations until his appointment as Minister in 1994. He also served on a commission for Ukraine's cooperation with the European Union and as Ukraine's representative to GATT. In March 1994, he ran unsuccessfully for a seat in the Rada.

3.5c

Osyka and his wife, who is a Ukrainian language teacher, have a son. We do not know Osyka's English-language capability.

3.5c

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

2016-0135-M (1.57)
2/27/2017 KSH

1.4c, 3.5c

LP 95-104245
30 April 1995

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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033. report	Biography [partial] (1 page)	10/17/1994	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2586

FOLDER TITLE:

President Clinton's Trip to Russia and Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995 [2]

2016-0135-M

kh1783

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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1.4c, 3.5c

UKRAINE

Viktor Mykhaylovych PETROV
(Phonetic: pehTROFF)

*Minister of Machine-Building, the Military-Industrial Complex, and Conversion
(since July 1994)*

Addressed as: Mr. Minister

Viktor Petrov, who oversees Ukrainian conversion efforts, publicly opposes a major overhaul of his country's enormous military industrial complex. He told a Russian news service in July that Ukraine should not have left the international arms market, noting that other countries with smaller scientific and technical potential than Ukraine engage in large-scale weapons sales. In an interview on Kiev radio, Petrov recently remarked that Ukrainian defense enterprises need not be privatized. He argued that when such industries are privatized, they stop manufacturing unprofitable—but essential—products. 3.5c

1.4c, 1.4d

An ethnic Ukrainian, he was born in the late 1940s. He earned a degree in electrical engineering at the Kiev Polytechnic Institute and worked as director of the Lubny Computer Factory. We do not know Petrov's English-language capability. 3.5c

LDA M 94-16314
17 October 1994

1.4c, 3.5c

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

2016-0135-M (1.58)
2/27/2017 KBH

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
034. report	Biography (2 pages)	05/02/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2586

FOLDER TITLE:

President Clinton's Trip to Russia and Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995 [2]

2016-0135-M
kh1783

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
035. report	Biography [partial] (1 page)	11/02/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2586

FOLDER TITLE:

President Clinton's Trip to Russia and Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995 [2]

2016-0135-M

kh1783

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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1.4c, 3.5c

Volodymyr Ivanovych RADCHENKO
(Phonetic: radCHENkoh)

UKRAINE

Minister of Internal Affairs
(since July 1994)

Addressed as: General Radchenko

Lt. Gen. Volodymyr Radchenko, a career security service officer with extensive experience in fighting organized crime, enjoys the support of President Leonid Kuchma. In August, Kuchma told members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs' collegium that he has the utmost confidence in Radchenko and is counting on him to fundamentally reorganize the militia, rid it of corrupt officers, and generally improve its effectiveness. [redacted] 1.4c, 1.4d

[redacted] the General is also backed by Deputy Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk, who had been head of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and, thus, Radchenko's former boss. In his speech to the Supreme Rada (parliament) before his confirmation by that body, Radchenko stated that he played an active role in preparing Kuchma's recent decree on combating organized crime and that he also endorsed a controversial article in the decree that allows for "preventative detention" of a suspect for up to 30 days. A member of the Rada's commission for combating organized crime and corruption recently described Radchenko in the local press as "a man of exceptional decency, honesty, and devotion to his life's work." In press interviews, Radchenko describes himself as more focused on operations than on administration.

3.5c

1.4c, 1.4d



©

1.4c, 1.4d, 3.5c

Career and Personal Data

An ethnic Ukrainian, Radchenko was born on 23 October 1948 in Kiev. He has higher education as an engineer and lawyer. Radchenko has been involved in state security work since 1971: first in Kiev, then as deputy head of the Ukrainian KGB's branch in the Rivne Oblast, and then as head of the branch in the Ternopil' Oblast. From September 1993 until taking up his current appointment, he served as a deputy chairman of the SBU and chief of the SBU's anticorruption and organized crime department. Radchenko stated in the press that during his career he was decorated with the "badge of honor" for taking part in detaining a terrorist group. He noted in the same interview that he spent a short time in Spain "carrying out orders." Married, Radchenko has two children. We do not know his English-language capability. [redacted] 3.5c

LDA M 94-16624
2 November 1994

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PER E. O. 13526

2016-0135-M (1.60)
2/27/2017 KBH

1.4c, 3.5c

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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
036. report	Biography (1 page)	04/06/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2586

FOLDER TITLE:

President Clinton's Trip to Russia and Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995 [2]

2016-0135-M
kh1783

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
037. report	Biography (2 pages)	03/20/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2586

FOLDER TITLE:

President Clinton's Trip to Russia and Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995 [2]

2016-0135-M
kh1783

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
038. report	Biography (2 pages)	02/23/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2586

FOLDER TITLE:

President Clinton's Trip to Russia and Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995 [2]

2016-0135-M
kh1783

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
039. report	Biography (2 pages)	03/17/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2586

FOLDER TITLE:

President Clinton's Trip to Russia and Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995 [2]

2016-0135-M
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MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

POTUS Briefing Books-POTUS Trip to Russia/Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995

Staff Office-Individual:

Records Management

Original OA/ID Number:

811

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
43	1	7	2	v

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Anthony Lake to President William J. Clinton re: Your May Visit to Kiev: Scope Memorandum (4 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
002. memo	Warren Christopher to President William J. Clinton re: Your Trip to Moscow and Kiev, May 8-12, 1995 (5 pages)	04/30/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
003. paper	Meetings (One on One, Expanded Group) with President Leonid Kuchma (9 pages)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
004. paper	Ukraine: Overview of Bilateral Relationship (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
005. paper	Ukraine: Political Overview (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
006. paper	Ukraine: Economic Situation (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
007. paper	Ukraine: U.S. Bilateral Assistance (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
008. paper	Ukraine: Multilateral Economic Assistance (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
009. paper	Ukraine: Trade and Investment (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
010. paper	Ukraine: Energy and Chernobyl (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
011. paper	Ukraine: Cooperation in Space (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
012. paper	Ukraine: European Security Architecture (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 811

FOLDER TITLE:

POTUS Briefing Books-POTUS Trip to Russia/Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995

2016-0135-M

kh1781

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013. paper	Ukraine: Relations with Russia (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
014. paper	Ukraine: Crimea and Black Sea Fleet Issues (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
015. paper	Ukraine: Nuclear and Security Issues (1 page)	05/00/1995	P1/b(1) KBH 4/30/2020
016. report	Biography (2 pages)	05/02/1995	P1/b(1)
017. report	Biography (1 page)	11/16/1994	P1/b(1)
018. report	Biography (1 page)	04/25/1995	P1/b(1)
019. report	Biography (1 page)	04/18/1995	P1/b(1)
020. report	Biography (1 page)	11/17/1994	P1/b(1)
021. report	Biography (2 pages)	04/12/1995	P1/b(1)
022. report	Biography (2 pages)	03/30/1995	P1/b(1)
023. report	Biography (2 pages)	05/02/1995	P1/b(1)
024. report	Biography (1 page) <i>Partial release - KBH 9/8/2017</i>	04/30/1995	P1/b(1)
025. report	Biography (1 page) <i>Partial release - KBH 9/8/2017</i>	10/17/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 811

FOLDER TITLE:

POTUS Briefing Books-POTUS Trip to Russia/Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995

2016-0135-M

kh1781

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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026. report	Biography (2 pages)	05/02/1995	P1/b(1)
027. report	Biography (1 page) <i>Partial release - KBH 9/8/2017</i>	11/02/1994	P1/b(1)
028. report	Biography (1 page)	04/06/1995	P1/b(1)
029. report	Biography (2 pages)	03/20/1995	P1/b(1)
030. report	Biography (2 pages)	02/23/1995	P1/b(1)
031. report	Biography (2 pages)	03/17/1995	P1/b(1)

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~~SECRET~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN



**President Clinton's Trip
to
Russia and Ukraine
May 8-12, 1995**

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBH Date: 1/24/2020
2016-0135-M

The President

~~SECRET~~

President Clinton's Trip to Russia and Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995
The President

KIEV

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
May 4, 1995

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE *AL*

SUBJECT: Your Trip to Kiev May 11-12, 1995

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBM/NARA, Date 1/24/2020
2016-0135-M

Your visit to Kiev allows for substantive meetings with President Kuchma the afternoon of May 11 and a dinner hosted by Kuchma that evening. Prior to departure on May 12, you will speak at Shevchenko University and lay wreaths at Kiev's World War II monument and Babyn Yar. Your public statements and press materials will be provided later. This briefing book contains:

SCHEDULE OF KEY EVENTS

SCOPE MEMORANDA

- Memorandum from Anthony Lake
- Memorandum from Secretary Christopher
- Memorandum from Secretary Rubin

MEETING AT MARIYINSKY PALACE

Scenesetter

Briefing Paper for Meetings with Kuchma
Background, Core Objectives and Points to be
Made in One-on-one and Expanded Group Session

Arrival Statement

STATE DINNER

Scenesetter

Toast

RON AT STATE GUEST HOUSE

Scenesetter

WREATH-LAYING AT WORLD WAR II ETERNAL FLAME

Scenesetter

SPEECH AT SHEVCHENKO UNIVERSITY

Scenesetter

Remarks

WREATH-LAYING AT BABYN YAR

Scenesetter

Remarks

EMBASSY MEET AND GREET

Scenesetter

Remarks

BACKGROUND PAPERS

Overview of Bilateral Relationship
Political Overview
Economic Situation
U.S. Bilateral Assistance
Multilateral Economic Assistance
Trade and Investment
Energy and Chornobyl
Cooperation in Space
European Security Architecture
Relations with Russia
Crimea and Black Sea Fleet Issues
Nuclear and Security Issues

BIOGRAPHIC MATERIALS

**SCHEDULE OF
KEY EVENTS**

SCHEDULE OF KEY EVENTS IN KIEV

Thursday, May 11

ARRIVAL AT BORISPIL AIRPORT

1:00 - 1:20 p.m.

ARRIVAL CEREMONY AT MARIYINSKYY PALACE

2:15 - 2:45 p.m.

SUBSTANTIVE MEETINGS AT MARIYINSKYY PALACE

(ONE-ON-ONE FOLLOWED BY EXPANDED GROUP SESSION)

3:00 - 5:00 p.m.

DINNER HOSTED BY KUCHMA AT MARIYINSKYY PALACE

7:30 - 10:00 p.m.

Friday, May 12

WREATH-LAYING AT WORLD WAR II ETERNAL FLAME

9:30 - 9:45 a.m.

SPEECH AT SHEVCHENKO UNIVERSITY

10:30 - 11:30 a.m.

WREATH-LAYING AT BABYN YAR

12:00 - 12:45 p.m.

EMBASSY MEET AND GREET

TBD

DEPARTURE FROM BORISPIL AIRPORT

2:15 p.m.

**SCOPE
MEMORANDA**

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2016-0135-M (1.65)
KBH 1/24/2020

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE *AL*

SUBJECT: Your May 11-12 Visit to Kiev: Scope Memorandum

SETTING

Your visit to Kiev comes as U.S.-Ukrainian relations continue a year-long upswing. Last year was a milestone for the relationship. The Ukrainians responded to your policy on denuclearization, and we put the nuclear weapons issue behind us. More broadly, your meetings with Presidents Kravchuk and Kuchma, our drive to increase bilateral and international aid -- particularly once Kuchma adopted major economic reforms -- and our effort to broaden bilateral relations have instilled confidence in Kiev that we attach importance to our relations with an independent Ukraine. You can reinforce this during your visit by making U.S. support for an independent, democratic, stable and prosperous Ukraine a key theme of your private and public comments. The message will be well-received.

Kuchma looks to your visit to bolster his position -- both domestically and with Russia. Since you last saw him in Budapest, he has expanded the economic reforms launched last October. After he forced through a stripped-down government budget in April, the IMF approved a stand-by program for Ukraine, which with G-7 bilateral contributions and debt rescheduling by Turkmenistan and Russia totals over five billion dollars. Kuchma knows the U.S. played a key role in this and is grateful.

Politically, Kuchma has continued to struggle with the parliament (the Rada) and its leader, Chairman Moroz. So far, Kuchma has won most of the big battles but not all. The Rada has resisted his proposed "law on power" that consolidates greater authority in the executive branch. Kuchma's staff says he may go around the Rada, perhaps by calling a referendum. Kuchma wants to align you on his side. Since he is the driving force for reform in Ukraine, that's where you want to be -- so long as he clearly recognizes that reform also entails strengthening democracy.

Kuchma and the Rada stand united on Crimea. After a year of Crimean parliament efforts to loosen links with Kiev, the Ukrainian government moved to annul Crimea's constitution (which was inconsistent with Ukraine's) and abolish the Crimean presidency. Kiev chose its timing well, taking advantage of disarray among Crimean politicians and public apathy and while Russia was preoccupied with Chechnya.

The Russians have behaved correctly on Crimea and have told us they do not want a crisis. Kuchma in general has worked to build good relations with Moscow, but the Black Sea Fleet, especially use of bases in Crimea, and conclusion of a treaty of friendship and cooperation remain problem areas. Kuchma sees the U.S. tie your visit underscores as improving his position vis-à-vis his larger neighbor.

Kuchma will be interested in your thoughts on European security. NATO expansion makes the Ukrainians uneasy, as they fear it could leave Ukraine as a buffer state or drive it into Russia's sphere of influence. That said, Kiev wants to develop a relationship with the Alliance through both Partnership for Peace and other mechanisms.

All this boils down to a desire by Ukraine, and on the part of Kuchma in particular, to strengthen the U.S. link and to host a successful summit. Although Kuchma may ask for things that we cannot provide, the agenda does not include issues with the drama of your Moscow stop. And Kuchma will be pleased with the basic messages of your visit: strong U.S. support for Ukraine, especially as it proceeds down the challenging path of reform, and a desire to move forward on the agenda that you and he endorsed at your November summit.

CORE GOALS OF YOUR VISIT

- Underscore long-term U.S. support for an independent, stable, democratic and prosperous Ukraine.
- Make clear the U.S. supports good relations between Ukraine and Russia.
- Encourage Kuchma and the Ukrainians to stay the reform course, knowing that they have a partner in the U.S.
- Encourage development of the trade and investment component of the bilateral relationship.

- Describe how you see ties between the U.S., NATO and Ukraine developing in a way that will enhance Ukraine's security and not leave it in a security vacuum.

ACHIEVING THESE GOALS

Schedule

On arrival at Borispil airport, you travel to the Mariyinskyy Palace for a formal arrival ceremony. You will make a short arrival statement at either the airport or the Palace. You have two hours of talks with Kuchma, which should suffice to cover the substantive agenda. The first hour will be a one-on-one, the second an expanded group session. Kuchma hosts a dinner in your honor that evening where you will exchange toasts.

Communicating your message of support and encouragement on reform to the Ukrainian public will be almost as important as your substantive exchanges; the venue is your May 12 speech at Shevchenko University. You also have two wreath-layings: Kiev's World War II monument and Babyn Yar. We have not scheduled a separate meeting with Moroz or other Rada leaders but are looking for a pull-aside at an appropriate moment.

Substance

We have agreed with the Ukrainians on the agenda. For the one-on-one: overview of the bilateral relationship, Russia and the situation in Ukraine. For the expanded session: reform (and international support), trade and investment and security questions (including Europe and NATO). The agenda is straightforward and contains no surprises, though you will likely have to fend off some Kuchma requests that go beyond what we can or are prepared to deliver.

Bilateral Overview. We suggest you begin the one-on-one with an expression of support for Ukraine and outline your vision for the relationship. **You might touch on economic reform and security cooperation**, issues that you can address in greater detail in the expanded session. Kuchma may request a U.S.-Ukrainian counterpart to the Gore-Chernomyrdin commission.

Russia. You might share some thoughts from your talks in Moscow. **You should encourage Kuchma in his policy of building good relations with both the West and Moscow.** This is also the place to put down a marker on Crimea: while it is an internal Ukrainian issue, Kuchma should not overplay his hand, as a crisis could put pressure on Moscow to engage. The Ukrainians rightly credit the trilateral process with breaking the Kiev-Moscow

logjam on nuclear weapons. Kuchma may suggest creation of a "permanent" trilateral mechanism. You should discourage that: Moscow would never agree, and our endorsement would diminish our credibility as a neutral interlocutor.

Situation in Ukraine. Time permitting, you might ask Kuchma's assessment of the prospects for reform and where executive-Rada relations are headed. **You might issue a subtle reminder our support for reform includes democratization.** We do not want Kuchma to misread your support as a blank check vis-à-vis the Rada.

Economic Reform/International Support. We suggest you open the expanded session by noting Ukraine's steps on economic reform and urging that they be accelerated. This is also the place to remind Kuchma and his team just how much the U.S. has done to date. Kuchma may resurface a Ukrainian proposal that he be invited to Halifax. There is no consensus in the G-7 for this.

Trade and Investment. You should urge Kuchma to create an inviting business climate. Our OPIC, West NIS Enterprise Fund and technical assistance programs increasingly aim at supporting private sector activity. We have proposed the Joint Commission on Trade and Investment meet in July. On an issue close to Kuchma's heart -- rockets (he headed Ukraine's largest missile production plant) -- you can note that the first talks on a commercial space launch agreement have been held, fulfilling one of your November pledges.

Chornobyl. You will want to pass lightly over this; we have not put it on the agenda. While Kuchma's decision to close the reactors by the year 2000 merits praise, he will press for greater Western assistance. This is a G-7 issue, and we look to others to provide the bulk of the aid.

Security Cooperation. With the nuclear issue behind us, we can now discuss Ukraine's "post-nuclear" era. Ukrainian anxieties run high. There are two ways to reassure them. **First, you can note how we are expanding bilateral security links. Second, you should reassure Kuchma about Ukraine's place in the evolving European security architecture. You should reiterate our commitment to manage NATO expansion in a way that enhances Ukraine's security and welcome Kiev's decision to develop a relationship with the Alliance.** Ukraine can utilize the Partnership for Peace channel more fully than it does now, and we hope to help with \$10 million in Warsaw Initiative money.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2016-0135-M (1.66)
KBH 1/24/2020

SECRET/NODIS
DECL: 4/30/20

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WARREN CHRISTOPHER *WCC*

SUBJECT: Your Trip To Moscow and Kiev,
May 8-12, 1995

Your trip to Moscow and Kiev can advance our agenda with the two most important states to emerge from the rubble of the Soviet Union. In Moscow, your objective is to manage an increasingly complicated relationship -- level off the downward slope of recent months -- and to make progress on some issues. In Kiev, you want to build on the mounting improvements in our relationship, especially since President Kuchma's November visit to Washington, and to project a vision for the next stage of our cooperation.

RUSSIA

I. SETTING

You have two broad goals in Moscow. On the public side, you are there to pay our respects on May 9, to the people of Russia for their massive sacrifice in World War II. You will also use your public events May 10 and 11 -- particularly your meeting with political leaders and the speech at Moscow State University -- to underscore the unprecedented and growing breadth of our engagement across all Russia: we are reaching out to all reformers.

On the bilateral side, you should use your meetings with Yeltsin to record progress on a number of issues, starting with European security, and to narrow differences on others. Your theme is integration. Movement on European security and some arms control issues would demonstrate the advantages of our pragmatic engagement with Moscow. But you will also need to lay down some strong markers on the Iran nuclear reactor sale and Chechnya, and begin in earnest the process of educating Yeltsin on CFE.

SECRET/NODIS

The central political fact in Russia today is that authority is fragmented, and the political class, including Yeltsin, is focussing almost entirely on the domestic scene. Foreign policy issues are important principally as they factor into the jockeying for power. Additionally, among the Russian elite, including reformers, support for an assertive foreign policy is growing. This makes Russian ministries reluctant to be creative in addressing our issues.

The only person in Moscow with the clout to make the tough decisions necessary to move many of our issues is Yeltsin. While obsessed with the domestic political equation, he has an interest in maintaining strong links with you, and in demonstrating to the Russian public that his policy of engagement with the United States is paying off. Indeed, Yeltsin made clear in your April 27 phone call his intention to hold a successful summit.

You can utilize this interest to advance our agenda. You will be most persuasive with Yeltsin by stressing the importance of using the summit to buoy the relationship and your own commitment to do so. You should underscore that to do this we need to move forward on the Partnership for Peace and NATO-Russia documents. We hope as well to achieve clear progress on two or three major issues such as: Iran/COCOM, ABM/TMD, Iran nuclear, next steps on biological warfare, and the Timan-Pechora megadeal. But you should be prepared for strong resistance to some of our goals (e.g., the nuclear reactor deal). So part of your pitch should be the need to find a way to constructively manage differences.

II. OBJECTIVES

Reach an understanding on European security. Defining the NATO-Russian relationship and managing the Russian reaction to NATO enlargement will be a foreign policy priority for some time. You should reiterate that if Yeltsin submits the Partnership for Peace and NATO-Russia documents, the May North Atlantic Council meeting would mark the start of the NATO-Russian dialogue. You should underscore the importance for Russia's integration into Western political and security structures of avoiding sharp differences over NATO expansion and carefully managing how we discuss this issue.

Underscore the importance of Russian compliance with flank limits in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Persuade Yeltsin to accept our support for proposals to address Russian concerns at the 1996 CFE Review Conference in exchange for Russian compliance in November, when the treaty comes into effect. Note our willingness to discuss in the near future ideas for meeting Russian flank concerns at the 1996 Conference. Note our concern about Russian plans to create a new army formation in Chechnya, which would violate CFE provisions.

Seek Yeltsin's agreement to issue the statement of principles on ABM/TMD and to work for early ratification of START II by the Russian parliament.

Persuade Yeltsin to pursue a political settlement to the Chechnya conflict. Seek a statement noting Russia's commitment to adhere to international and OSCE principles for conflict resolution and to respect human rights.

Stress our full support for Yeltsin's commitment to holding on schedule parliamentary (December 1995) and presidential elections (June, 1996).

Nail down the package on ending Russian arms transfers to Iran before the year 2000 and admission to the post-COCOM regime.

Press Yeltsin to reconsider the nuclear reactor deal with Iran. Stress our concern about the most dangerous elements of the deal and push for further dialogue on the issue.

Press for implementation of BW and CW agreements. Persuade Yeltsin of the need to reach agreement on visits to Russian BW sites and for a supplemental declaration on CW.

Secure the Russian government's commitment to fulfill all requirements of the IMF Standby Agreement and to press ahead with privatization and tax and structural reforms.

Nail down agreement on the Timan-Pechora energy deal.

III. STRATEGY

Reaffirm A Steady Sense of Purpose: You should be able to score with Yeltsin if you make the point that we remain staunchly committed to Russia's reform and integration into Western institutions; but integration entails responsibilities on Russia's part. Behavior consistent with international norms (in Chechnya, in other NIS) and international security (NATO enlargement, the Iranian issues) is essential. You should want to make the specific point that continued fighting in Chechnya is unacceptable and is eroding support for Russia abroad. In terms of incentives, you can hold out the prospect of fuller participation in the G-7, some relief in opening U.S. markets for Russian goods and possible EX-IM loans for the Ilyushin-Pratt Whitney deal.

UKRAINE

I. SETTING

The news from Ukraine has been overwhelmingly positive since the summit in November. In December, Ukraine acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty; in March, it reached a Stand-By

Agreement with the IMF; and in April, Kuchma committed Ukraine to close the Chornobyl nuclear power plant by 1999. Still, despite (or perhaps because of) his bold leadership, Kuchma continues to wage political warfare with a Ukrainian Parliament less enthusiastic toward reform and reluctant to give Kuchma the broad executive authority to implement reform.

Kuchma will look to your visit as a sign of tangible U.S. support for Ukrainian independence and standing in the international community. He will use your visit to help bolster his people's confidence in comprehensive economic reform. He also will expect your visit to demonstrate that Ukraine has benefitted from the positive choices it has made since the January 1994 Trilateral Statement -- the landmark agreement which committed Ukraine to ship all of its nuclear warheads to Russia for dismantlement.

Kuchma's goals are consistent with our own. You should use the visit to define the future course of our bilateral relationship now that the difficult nuclear weapons issues are largely behind us. You should underscore U.S. resolve to sustain Ukraine's transition to a market economy. You will want to highlight our interest in a forward-looking bilateral agenda that addresses Ukraine's urgent economic needs and also emphasizes our longer term vision of a stable, prosperous, independent Ukraine well-integrated into European political, economic and security institutions.

II. OBJECTIVES

Underscore our vision of a deepening U.S.-Ukrainian partnership.

Welcome the restraint Ukraine is demonstrating with Crimea and urge Kuchma to keep working for a peaceful solution, consistent with democratic norms and the rule of law.

Support Kuchma's reform efforts and offer our continuing assistance. Congratulate him on progress since last November on the IMF stand-by program and on his public commitment to the EU/G-7 to close Chornobyl by the end of 1995. Highlight U.S. assistance and support for trade and investment.

Assure Kuchma that we will work to strengthen Ukraine's role within European political, economic, and security institutions, particularly in the context of NATO expansion.

III. STRATEGY

Supporting Ukraine's Independence and Security. Your mere presence in Ukraine after Moscow will provide a strong, public showing of U.S. support for Ukrainian independence and sovereignty. By separately honoring Ukrainian sacrifices in World War II you will be demonstrating U.S. recognition of the important role Ukraine has played and will continue to play in the region. At the same time your visit provides an opportunity to explore how to enhance Ukraine's security through deepening ties to the U.S., NATO and other European institutions. You will be able to share the results of your conversations with President Yeltsin and reiterate our readiness to facilitate, where we can, Ukraine's good relations with Russia.

Assisting reform: Economic reform in Ukraine has come at a political cost. Your praise of reform, and readiness to offer tangible assistance (and to ensure G-7 and IMF support), will make it easier for Kuchma to sell difficult policies at home. You should highlight trade and investment as the basis for our future economic partnership and a benefit of reform.



DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

May 2, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Robert E. Rubin *R. E. R.*
SUBJECT: Economic Themes for the Moscow and Kiev Summits

Your Summit meetings in Moscow and Kiev come with each country attempting major strides forward on economic reform. Each country has developed ambitious programs for stabilization and structural reform. Each country has earned IMF standby loans for the first time and will receive greater financial support from the West than ever before. Success in those programs will help each country move down the road toward economic prosperity. At the Summits, you have an opportunity to reinforce for Presidents Yeltsin and Kuchma that cooperation on economic reform is a positive feature of our countries' relationships. We are backing sound economic choices this year with major financing because we believe that it will promote the transformation of former Soviet states into sovereign, democratic societies.

THE MOSCOW SUMMIT

Russia has made remarkable progress in building a market economy. Who would have believed when the Soviet Union fell apart that four years later the private sector would be producing over 60 percent of GDP? The U.S.-Russian economic dialogue is also remarkable. While it is often overshadowed by our dialogue on foreign policy and security issues, I believe that dialogue is a healthy and important element in our relationship. At this juncture, our main point for President Yeltsin should be that one overriding need should guide Russia as it advances toward a market economy and sounder economic relations with the United States. That need is confidence.

Markets require confidence to function smoothly, to produce goods, and to mobilize flows of savings and investment -- both at home and from abroad. Russia can only build confidence with greater consistency in policy, regulation, laws, and the construction of market institutions.

Macroeconomic Stabilization

Stable macroeconomic policies and low inflation are needed for Russia to reap the benefits of free markets. To command support at the ballot box in upcoming elections, Russia's government must show it can soundly manage the ruble. Thus, 1995 is an especially critical year for reform. In our discussions with President Yeltsin, we should stress the need to build confidence in the government and in reform by fully implementing the economic program.

Russia's 1995 economic program has for the first time earned the IMF's support under a full standby loan of \$6.8 billion. That program has two key objectives. First, Russia aims to cut

monthly inflation to 1% in the second half of the year by reducing the budget deficit to 5 1/2% of GDP and slashing credit growth. The Duma has passed a budget consistent with these targets, and President Yeltsin has signed it into law. Second, Russia is implementing a major liberalization of its oil markets which will integrate Russia into world markets and reduce corruption.

The prospects for implementation of the program are better than in years past. The economic team -- especially Chernomyrdin and Chubais -- is strong and sees stability as an economic and political objective; the ruble's "Black Tuesday" collapse has sensitized policy-makers; and sectoral lobbies are weaker. But we should remain mindful that this is the fourth consecutive year in which Russia has launched stabilization efforts. In the last three years, spring was a time of hope, only to be dashed by despair in the fall -- with high inflation, ruble collapse, and massive capital flight. Moreover, Parliamentary elections will be held this year.

To help President Yeltsin build confidence, we can offer two things. First, we can reaffirm our commitment to back large multilateral support for reform. As long as Russia adheres to its 1995 program, it will receive \$500 million monthly from the IMF. The World Bank will soon approve a \$600 million fast-disbursing loan. Second, we can help Russia on official debt. The G-7 are now discussing a 1995 Russian debt rescheduling which we hope to complete by the end of May. At our urging, the G-7 are likely to commit to Russia that if it stays the course through early fall, work will commence on comprehensive rescheduling, aimed at providing a final resolution of Russia's debt difficulties.

Taxation

Russia needs a new tax code to promote investor confidence. The state must generate sufficient revenue to carry out basic functions. But entrepreneurs need confidence that the tax system is fair, predictable and will let them earn a profit.

Already, Russia's tax system is greatly improved over its Soviet predecessor. But the tax regime distorts incentives, lacks transparency, and is arbitrarily enforced. It is riddled with exemptions. Tax compliance is low -- state-owned firms often do not pay and revenue from the private sector is not being captured. The rich gas sector, due to its clout, is woefully under-taxed by international comparison. In response, Russia has raised tax rates on those who do pay to very high levels, only further encouraging evasion.

The excess wage tax, on which you are receiving separate briefings, is a prime example of these problems and its imposition has undermined the U.S.-Russian bilateral tax treaty. Of course, all of this adversely affects prospects for stability. Last year federal revenues accounted for only 11% of GDP, clearly an inadequate level for a country trying to restore stable national finances. This year, it is hoped revenues will rise to 14-1/2%, but collection may already be falling short.

There is much we can offer. First, last September, President Yeltsin accepted your offer to help mobilize a multilateral program of technical support to reform the tax regime. Reaction from Russia's Finance Ministry has been lukewarm. We stand ready to provide this support and we should reaffirm our commitment to do so. Second, I will renew our offer to send senior

Treasury tax officials to Moscow to work with the Finance Ministry on the bilateral tax treaty. Third, the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission's joint commercial tax dialogue is a further vehicle for discussing the excess wage tax.

Private Sector Development.

Without confidence in private market structures, no one will be eager to undertake investments. Farmers will not put their money at risk to increase yields unless they know they own the land. Businessmen will not sign contracts unless they know that these can be enforced in a court of law.

By freeing prices in 1992 and implementing a path-breaking privatization program, Russia has taken huge strides forward in putting in place the building blocks for free markets. Thousands of companies have been privatized, many are modernizing and rationalizing their operations, and the emerging private sector is becoming a strong constituency for law and order and for property rights. Bankruptcy procedures and a commercial code are being put in place. There has also been major progress on oil sector liberalization.

But Russia needs to invigorate private sector development, because the impetus for structural reform is slowing. The second stage of privatization has made little headway. Land ownership, now enshrined in the Constitution, has not been followed by progress on land privatization.

Here again, there is much we can offer. First, since early 1994, the World Bank has approved over \$2 billion in project loans, but virtually no money has been disbursed due to poor Russian implementation. The Bank's pipeline includes major loans to reform Russia's energy sector and create a private agricultural sector. We need to reaffirm that these monies remain available. Second, we should remind President Yeltsin we stand ready to offer large-scale technical support to back private sector development. Third, to promote enterprise reform, we have created numerous enterprise funds. This week, a \$50 million EBRD-United States fund is being approved. It will operate in Volgograd, Samara, and Saratov.

Capital Market Development.

Confidence is needed for Russian firms to acquire private capital for growth and for foreign investors to bring in new technology and know-how. Russia is a high-savings country, but the lack of confidence that investments will have a reliable return prevents funds from finding their way to Russian companies. Reliable returns are undermined not only by the prospect of inflation and financial instability, but also the inadequacy of capital markets and shareholders rights. Daunted by these obstacles, Russians hold \$50 billion abroad (by some estimates), plus billions of dollars in currency.

A successful capital market must intermediate flows of savings from households and foreigners to domestic companies. The Russian appetite for savings is high -- savings is 27% of GDP. And Russian companies are flush with projects that have potentially high rates of return.

Shareholders, including households, institutional investors, venture capitalists, and banks, are deterred by many capital market inadequacies. One is the absence of limited liability under the

law. A second is inadequate protection for shareholders. Russian firms usually hold their own registries and make them inaccessible by keeping them in the hinterlands. Last year, an aluminum producer deleted a major foreign shareholder from its registry, rather than let him sit on the firm's Board. A third is the weak legal foundation for corporate governance. An owner with a significant minority stake may be denied influence over the Board of Directors by management and inside owners. Outside owners, especially foreigners, have been excluded from Boards and have seen their shareholdings diluted through the issuance of discounted shares to friendly shareholders. Often, the insiders have been successful without violating any law.

These problems are highlighted in one statistic: the total market capitalization of Russia's top 30 traded companies is \$16 billion, less than that of a major U.S. firm.

We are already trying to help fix these problems. Our bilateral support financed the technical work for a \$10 million independent Russian registry company which has just been created by the EBRD, the IFC and several Russian banks. We are also providing extensive support to develop the Russian SEC.

Trade and Investment

You will be receiving separate briefing on trade issues for the Moscow visit, and I will leave this topic to others.

THE KIEV SUMMIT

In the first years of independence, Ukraine pursued gradualist policies aimed at stabilizing output and inflation. It achieved neither. Output fell as the command economy collapsed. Huge credits to coal and agriculture prompted waves of hyper-inflation. Then, price controls were imposed. Social stability was jeopardized and conflicts with Russia were reaching a flash point.

When President Kuchma assumed office in July 1994, he recognized that for Ukraine to remain independent, it had no choice but to pursue reforms. He has done so with vigor to revitalize the economy, develop mutually beneficial relations with Russia, and tap western support.

Last October, Ukraine embarked on a bold reform course, supported by a special IMF facility created at our urging to jumpstart reforms. Ukraine liberalized most prices, including those of food and industrial use of energy. The exchange rate system was freed; controls had cut exports and encouraged barter and capital flight. The 1994 budget deficit, which was headed toward 20 percent of GDP, was reduced to 8-1/2%.

Ukraine has just significantly strengthened its reform program with IMF support under a \$1.5 billion standby arrangement. The budget deficit is being cut again by more than half, down to 3.5% of GDP. Ukraine is eliminating the Government's involvement in most areas of the economy and it is liberalizing trade and most remaining prices. Privatization has begun with large support from AID -- 90% of small firms and 8,000 large firms are to be privatized this year. If the program is implemented, monthly inflation would fall to 1% monthly by year end:~

Real results are already evident. After a major tug-of-war with Parliament, the budget was adopted. Monthly inflation, boosted at the turn of the year by liberalization, is now coming down sharply. It has fallen from a high of 72% in November to 21% in January and 10% in March. The exchange rate has been stable this year and foreign capital inflows are increasing.

Most importantly, since Kuchma assumed office economic reform has been key to the rekindling of hope now evident in Ukraine. The prospects for Ukraine as an independent, market-based democratic society have not been better at any time in the last few years.

In your meeting with President Kuchma, you may wish to emphasize the following three points.

First, President Kuchma and his economic team deserve praise for putting Ukraine onto the path of reform. Ukraine's progress in a short span of eight months has been remarkable. At the same time, we must urge him to stay the course.

Second, we remain committed to our pledge to support him. At the Naples Summit, you and the G-7 Heads of State pledged \$4 billion in support from international financial institutions over a two-year period following commencement of genuine reforms. Already, \$3.7 billion has been committed -- \$2.7 billion from international institutions and \$1 billion in special balance of payments support from western bilateral donors and Japan. As long as Ukraine continues with reforms, there is much more financing available from international institutions and export credit agencies will find it increasingly promising to lend to Ukraine.

Third, Ukraine needs to continue to improve its economic relationship in its own neighborhood.

As part of Ukraine's program, Russia and Turkmenistan, at our urging, rescheduled over \$3 billion in Ukrainian gas debts. It is crucial Ukraine make timely payments on current gas deliveries to carry out this deal and to strengthen market ties with these countries. Also, trade liberalization is the best means to allow Ukraine to integrate itself into the world economy. Ukraine must rededicate itself to this task.

**MEETINGS AT
MARIYINSKY PALACE**

MARIYINSKY PALACE

CONTEXT OF THE EVENT

Mariyinsky Palace is the venue for all ceremonial and working events with President Kuchma. The arrival and departure ceremonies will take place in the outdoor gardens inside the front gates of the building. An honor guard and military band will welcome you. You will review the troops, prior to entering the Palace for the start of your substantive discussions with President Kuchma. The one-on-one, the plenary and the dinner will take place in a series of rooms on the second floor.

BACKGROUND

A prime example of Ukrainian and Russian baroque architecture, Mariyinsky Palace was commissioned by Empress Elizabeth in 1744 and designed by Bartolomeo Rastrelli. It was completed in 1755. The palace was designed for use by the royal family during their visits to Kiev, including stop-overs en route to Crimea.

The palace has a varied history. At the start of the 19th century, it was the residence of Kiev's military governors. During the war with Napoleon, the Russians used the palace as a hospital for French POWs. In the middle of the last century, the palace served as the headquarters of the Kiev Arts Society. Following a serious fire, the palace was restored in 1870. During the period of the Revolution and Civil War, the palace was used as the headquarters for Bolshevik military forces. In the 1920's, the palace was converted into an agricultural school and then an agricultural museum.

The palace sustained extensive damage during the Second World War and was rebuilt to original specifications from 1945-1949. Since that time, the palace has been used by the government for formal meetings, typically for visiting heads of state.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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KRM 1/24/2020

MEETINGS (ONE-ON-ONE, EXPANDED GROUP)
WITH PRESIDENT LEONID KUCHMA

BACKGROUND

Your meetings with Kuchma and your overall program underscore the U.S. commitment to an independent, democratic, stable and prosperous Ukraine, increasingly integrated with Europe. After an initial period of doubt about U.S. interest in Ukraine (i.e., whether we cared except for the nuclear weapons), Kiev has growing confidence in our commitment. Your meetings offer the opportunity to reinforce that confidence by outlining your vision for continued, deepening bilateral ties. We suggest you open the one-on-one with our commitment to strong relations and reiterate our determination to stand by Ukraine through its difficult economic transition.

Ukrainian-Russian relations are on a more or less even keel but remain laden with problems: Crimea, Black Sea Fleet and energy dependency. Kuchma looks to the U.S. tie to improve his position vis-à-vis his powerful neighbor. You should stress that the U.S. supports good, durable relations between Ukraine and Russia.

Having annulled Crimea's constitution and fired its president, Kiev is concerned about possible Russian interference in Crimea. Senior Russian officials, however, have told us they have no wish to become involved. While Kuchma deserves recognition for the restraint Kiev displayed, he should not overplay his hand. You might note the importance of resolving differences with Crimea in a manner consistent with democratic norms.

Time permitting, you might solicit Kuchma's views on the future of reform and executive-Rada relations and put down a marker that we oppose any nuclear cooperation with Iran.

The expanded session gives you an opportunity to credit Kuchma for the notable progress he and his country have made on economic reform, which enabled IMF approval of a stand-by program. Kuchma will welcome your assurances of U.S. resolve to sustain Ukraine's transition to a market economy, which he can use to bolster public and Rada support in the face of economic difficulties.

We want to expand private trade and investment links. You should encourage the Ukrainians to create an attractive climate for U.S. business. You will be able to cite this summer's meeting of the Joint Commission on Trade and Investment and our just-launched negotiations on a commercial space launch agreement as steps in the right direction.

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Declassify on: OADR

On April 13 Kuchma made the welcome announced Ukraine intends to close Chornobyl by the year 2000. You will want to congratulate him on that but tread softly on this issue. He will press for outside financial assistance; this is being considered by the G-7, but our own ability to come up with new resources is very limited.

The security agenda has changed radically. With Ukraine's accession to the NPT and about 40 percent of the nuclear weapons in Ukraine in January 1994 transferred to Russia for dismantlement, there is no nuclear issue for the summit. Ukraine's main concern in its "post-nuclear" era is how, as NATO enlarges, Ukraine avoids becoming a buffer state or falling into Russia's sphere of influence. You can lay out an active bilateral security relationship that is building new ties between the U.S. and Ukraine, as well as underscore your commitment that, as NATO expands, it will proceed in a manner that enhances Ukraine's security. You should encourage Kuchma to take full advantage of the Partnership for Peace and advise him that Ukraine will have links with NATO that go beyond PFP.

CORE OBJECTIVES

(In the one-on-one)

- Underscore your vision of a deepening U.S.-Ukraine partnership and assure Kuchma of continued U.S. support as he leads Ukraine down the path of reform.
- Describe your talks in Moscow and express support for good Ukrainian-Russian relations. Note the importance of continued restraint with regard to Crimea.

(In the expanded meeting)

- Praise Kuchma's reform leadership and encourage him to continue unabated in the transformation to a market economy. Note U.S. support to date and assure him it will continue.
- Stress the importance of expanding the private trade and investment component of our bilateral relationship.
- Assure Kuchma of the importance the U.S. attaches to a secure, stable Ukraine in Europe. Note how we are expanding bilateral links and encourage Ukraine to strengthen its ties to European institutions, particularly through PFP.

POINTS TO BE MADE

(ONE-ON-ONE)

Bilateral Overview

- Delighted to see you; much accomplished since last met.
- 1994 milestone year for U.S.-Ukrainian relations.
 - Thanks to your leadership, nuclear issue behind us.
 - Defined basis for partnership with forward-looking focus on political, economic issues.
- Visit key opportunity to underscore U.S. support for independent, democratic, stable and prosperous Ukraine.
 - That kind of Ukraine very much in U.S. interest; committed to help make it happen.
 - Want Ukraine as political and economic partner of U.S. as well as factor for stability in Europe.
- Expect 1995 to be good year for our relations -- will fill out economic component of relationship and cooperate on security questions.
- Will discuss reform and security in greater detail in expanded group but want to offer brief comments.
- Impressed with success of personal efforts to generate momentum for reform, achieve IMF stand-by agreement.
- Realize required politically difficult decisions; they were right decisions. Generated right response: U.S., West committed to supporting reforms.
 - G-7 and international financial institutions already announced \$2.7B commitment on top \$1B in bilateral contributions.
 - Will work to sustain support as you continue down reform path.
- Want to enhance Ukraine's security in "post-nuclear" era by building bilateral security cooperation, taking full advantage of multilateral institutions.

- Be assured: as NATO enlarges, will manage process to not jeopardize Ukraine's security or put you in "gray zone." Insecure Ukraine not in U.S. or European interest.

Russia

- Share interest in good relations with Russia.
- Made clear to Yeltsin our support for independent, sovereign and stable Ukraine.
- Despite some disagreements, Yeltsin and I committed to preventing redivision of Europe. Don't want Ukraine to be buffer state or to have to choose sides.
- Made progress with Yeltsin on number of fronts; should help keep our relations on track. (Provide read-out.)
- Admire cautious but deliberate strategy with Russia.
- Policy for building good relations with Russia and West exactly right. Support good Kiev-Moscow ties.
- Pleased with restraint on Crimea. Important solution is peaceful, consistent with democratic norms.
- Russians do not want Crimea to become issue; fear increase in tension will fuel domestic pressures to engage.
- Careful handling will ensure Moscow stays on sidelines -- where it should on internal Ukrainian affair.
- Interested in views on where Russia headed and future of Ukrainian-Russian relationship.

(If subject of permanent trilateral arrangement raised:)

- Can try to facilitate Kiev-Moscow relations but only effective if both sides welcome our involvement. Do not think institutionalizing trilateral mechanism productive. Let's take issues case-by-case and look pragmatically for opportunities.

(If U.S. mediation in Black Sea Fleet dispute is requested:)

- Russians would not welcome us. Prepared to think about other ways might be helpful.

Situation in Ukraine (time permitting)

- Interested in assessment of future prospects for economic reform?
- How will executive-Rada relations develop?
 - Important relationship managed to promote democratization, rule of law.

Iran

- Iran major topic of discussions in Moscow. Made clear oppose nuclear cooperation with Iran given Iranian nuclear ambitions.
- Ukraine has strong nuclear industry. Strongly hope you reject any approaches by Iran for cooperation.

POINTS TO BE MADE

(EXPANDED MEETING)

Economic Reform/International Support

- Commend you for putting Ukraine firmly on path of economic reform.
- Welcome IMF stand-by agreement; strengthens reform and reaffirms Ukraine's seriousness to international community, investors and financial markets.
 - Urge close cooperation with IMF and World Bank.
 - Specifically, progress on privatization, trade liberalization, land reform and energy pricing will open new opportunities to reinvigorate economy.
- Worked hard to ensure international community supports your bold reforms with equally bold support.
 - G-7, international financial institutions already announced \$2.7B in financial commitments on top of \$1B in bilateral contributions. Well down road to exceeding \$4B pledge at Naples.
 - U.S. led effort to produce support; will press EU, Japan to deliver pledges.
- In short, U.S. strong partner of Ukrainian reform.

(If Ukrainian participation at Halifax raised:)

- Canadians probably told you no G-7 consensus for Ukrainian participation at Halifax. Makes sense to think about way for Ukraine to address G-7 officials on reform and Chernobyl -- perhaps after Halifax.

Trade and Investment

- Private sector engine for reform, economic growth and job creation. Encouraged reforms intend to unleash private sector and market forces.
- Many U.S. companies interested in Ukraine. Assistance will support greater private sector activity -- includes OPIC, West NIS Enterprise Fund, technical assistance.

- Business climate very important; reducing inflation, lowering trade barriers, strengthening business laws, limiting government regulation and impartial judiciary key to economic growth.
- Understand importance of EXIM financing; glad EXIM reopened lending program for Ukraine. Also created Agricultural Trade Credit Insurance Facility to provide credits for agricultural inputs.
- Pleased Joint Commission on Trade and Investment meets this summer. Can discuss how to promote commercial interaction between our countries.
- Pleased negotiators started discussions on commercial space launch agreement -- exciting new chapter in bilateral cooperation.

(If market access or "economy in transition" raised:)

- Efforts last year to create "economy in transition" under trade laws lacked support in Congress. Remain committed to working on this. Looking at possible administrative changes.

(If removal of Jackson-Vanik restrictions raised:)

- Reviewing to determine if Ukraine in "full compliance."

(If access to Strategic Petroleum Reserve raised:)

- Under U.S. law, oil from SPR for U.S. domestic use; not export. No benefit to Ukraine compared with purchasing oil from non-Russian sources at market prices.

(If textile imports raised:)

- Agreed last year on quota for imports of women's wool coats from Ukraine -- world's highest. Concerned by delay in Kiev's approval of agreement.

Chornobyl/G-7 Action Plan

- Pleased by decision to close Chornobyl by year 2000. Realize not easy decision; understand concern about adequate power and alternative employment for labor force.
- Interested in helping establish nuclear safety center near Chornobyl to provide new jobs, help prevent accidents.

- Will discuss with G-7 other ways to promote international cooperation.

(If specific Chernobyl issues raised:)

- Will urge EBRD and World Bank to give priority to developing least-cost, alternative energy project in nuclear and conventional power sectors.
- EU doing study of "sarcophagus" over damaged reactor; when complete, will work with you and G-7 to identify additional international resources.
- Need to be frank: difficult to provide grant funding; will look to others for bulk of aid.

Security Cooperation

- 1994 put nuclear issue behind us. Appreciate far-sighted decision to accede to NPT; helped produce yesterday's successful vote to extend NPT indefinitely.
- As Secretary Perry told you in March, moved quickly to expand bilateral security relationship.
 - Stepped up pace of Nunn-Lugar assistance.
 - Dramatically expanded relations between military establishments -- more than 50 contacts for 1995.
 - Look forward to peacekeeping exercise later this month in Lviv. (FYI: Perry and Shali will attend.)
- Want Ukraine integrated into key multilateral institutions. Applaud your enthusiasm for European integration.
 - As we strengthen OSCE, see Ukraine as key player.
- Overriding goal in building new European security architecture: make all European states more secure and avoid creating new dividing lines or spheres of influence.
 - Not in U.S. interest for Ukraine to be isolated or uneasy about security situation; will ensure that does not happen.
- Appreciate you chose to engage NATO. Important for Ukraine to build links to Alliance, particularly through active participation in PFP and NACC.

- Potential of NACC and PFP far from exhausted. PFP can help link Ukraine to western neighbors as well as NATO.
- Assuming Congress fully funds Warsaw Initiative in FY 96, intend to make \$10M available for Ukraine -- most for any NIS. Also expect \$1M (FY 95) in next months to assist PFP participation.
- PFP not sum total of NATO-Ukraine relationship.
- See other ways to enhance relationship -- exchange of high-level visits or 16-plus-1 Council meetings. Envisage 16-plus-1 meetings on dismantlement; your contribution would be considerable.
- Will consult regularly as we define NATO future.
- NATO studying rationale for and process of expansion -- "how" and "why." "Who" and "when" discussed later.
- NATO hopes to brief to interested PFP countries in September -- briefings, not negotiations to admit new members. Hope Ukraine participates.
- Do not expect December meeting to identify states for membership; more likely to continue on steady, deliberate course.
- Do not now rule out any PFP member from membership.

**ARRIVAL STATEMENT
TO BE PROVIDED**

MARIYINSKY PALACE -- STATE DINNER

CONTEXT OF THE EVENT

Mariyinskyy Palace is the venue for all of the ceremonial and working events with President Kuchma. We anticipate there will be around 80 total guests for the State dinner. After arrival at the Palace at 7:30 p.m., you and the First Lady, along with the Kuchmas, will greet the other dinner guests in a receiving line (there will be a press pool for this part of the evening). During the dinner, which will be held in the State Dining Room, you and Kuchma will exchange prepared toasts. Following the conclusion of the dinner, there will be traditional Ukrainian folk entertainment.

BACKGROUND

A prime example of Ukrainian and Russian baroque, Mariyinskyy Palace was commissioned by Empress Elizabeth in 1744 and designed by Bartolomeo Rastrelli. It was completed in 1755. The palace was designed for use by the royal family during their visits to Kiev, including on stop-overs en route to Crimea.

The palace has had a varied history. At the start of the 19th century, it was the residence of Kiev's military governors. During the war with Napoleon, the Russians used the palace as a hospital for French POWs. In the middle of the last century, the palace served as the headquarters of the Kiev Arts Society. Following a serious fire, the palace was restored in 1870. During the period of the Revolution and Civil War, the palace was used as the headquarters for Bolshevik military forces. In the 1920's, the palace was converted into an agricultural school and then an agricultural museum.

The palace sustained extensive damage during WWII and was rebuilt to original specifications from 1945-1949. Since that time, the palace has been used by the government for formal meetings, typically for visiting heads of state. It is open on a limited basis for tours.

STATE GUEST HOUSE

CONTEXT OF EVENT

The State Guest House will host you and the First Lady during private-time while in Kiev including the overnight. The Ukrainian side has also proposed using the house for other non-public events such as meeting with Embassy staff.

BACKGROUND

What is now known as the State Guest House was originally constructed in 1873 as a one-story mansion for Major-General Ivensen, who served as deputy mayor of Kiev in the 1870s. In 1883, Markuf Zaks, a prominent Kiev merchant, purchased the building from Ivenson's widow. Zaks added a second floor and redesigned the facade in the Renaissance style. Until the 1917 revolution, Zaks used the building as both a residence and an office for his sugar business.

In 1918, the house was nationalized and used as office space for a number of government agencies. Starting in 1920, it housed offices of key leaders of the local Communist Party. During World War II the residence served as headquarters for the Hungarian Army, one of the occupying forces.

Since the war, the house has belonged to the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers. Following an extensive renovation at the beginning of the 1990s, the State Guest House has been used to accommodate visiting dignitaries. It is located a block away from Mariyinskyy Palace.

WREATH-LAYING AT
WWII ETHERNAL FLAME

STATE COLLEGE UNIVERSITY

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1964

WREATH-LAYING AT ETERNAL FLAME
OF THE WORLD WAR II OBELISK

CONTEXT OF THE EVENT

Accompanied by President Kuchma, you will lay a wreath at the eternal flame marking the resting place of Ukraine's unknown soldier. The monument overlooks a picturesque part of the Dnipro River, which flows through Kiev, where the Soviet army sustained considerable losses in regaining control of the western bank. After the ceremony, you may have an opportunity to greet Ukrainian World War II veterans invited to this event. The event could require 30 minutes in all, 15 minutes each for the wreath-laying and for greeting veterans.

BACKGROUND

The eternal flame monument was erected following World War II in memory of Soviet servicemen who lost their lives fighting Nazi Germany. It is an emotional setting and traditionally many Kievans, particularly war veterans, visit it on or around Victory Day (VE Day, May 9). The park housing the obelisk and the eternal flame is Kiev's most solemn and tasteful war memorial. A tree-lined marble pathway extends about 250 yards from the park entrance to the flame, which is at the foot of the obelisk. Along the sides of the pathway are the graves of 34 soldiers who distinguished themselves for valor during the liberation of Kiev.

**SPEECH AT
SHEVCHENKO UNIVERSITY**

SHEVCHENKO UNIVERSITY

CONTEXT OF THE EVENT

Shevchenko University sits across the street from a park containing a 30-foot-high statue of Taras Shevchenko, Ukraine's most illustrious poet and patriot. You will speak outside of the University, looking toward the base of the statue, to an audience of students and other Ukrainians. The speech will require consecutive translation. The entire event would last approximately one hour.

BACKGROUND

Founded in 1834 as St. Vladimir University, the institution has grown from having two departments and 62 students to 16 departments and over 18,000 students. The University was built in 1837-43 in classical style. The building has an imposing block-long facade with eight Ionic columns on its portico.

During the 19th and early 20th centuries, the University was a center of Ukrainian nationalist and anti-Tsarist activity. According to some stories, the main campus acquired its distinctive color in 1901, when Tsar Nicholas II ordered it doused in bright red to punish rebellious students who refused to be drafted. The color was intended to shame the rebels and intimidate others.

In 1939, the University was renamed after Taras Shevchenko, on the occasion of the 125th anniversary of his birth. Shevchenko is revered as the father of the Ukrainian national revival movement, which began in the 1840s. He advanced the ideas of national independence, human equality and social justice. Born a serf himself, he struggled against serfdom and suppression of non-Russian nationalities. Shevchenko died in 1861 after years of enforced service in the army imposed as punishment for his membership in the Cyrill and Methodius Society, an incipient nationalist organization that met at the University.

Although Shevchenko University's administration has a well-earned reputation for conservatism, it is considered the top institution of higher learning in the country and is the alma mater of virtually all of Ukraine's political and economic elite.

REMARKS
TO BE PROVIDED

WREATH-LAYING AT
BABYN YAR

WREATH-LAYING AT BABYN YAR

CONTEXT OF THE EVENT

There are two monuments to honor the Kiev civilians killed by the Nazis during World War II: the Soviet-built monument to all killed during the Nazi occupation, and the Menorah, specifically erected to commemorate the Jewish victims of the 1941 massacre.

The Soviet-built monument is situated in a large park, its base rising above the surrounding area that forms a natural stage for remarks. The area can accommodate several hundred people. Your motorcade may pass by it on the way to the Menorah, which is where you will lay a wreath and offer brief comments.

The Menorah site (three-five minutes by car from the Soviet-built monument) is on a small, level square, capable of accommodating about 150-200 people, adjacent to a Ukrainian enterprise. The ravine where the victims were executed is immediately behind the Menorah.

BACKGROUND

Babyn Yar (literally "Grandmother's Ravine," also called "Babi Yar" from the Russian language transliteration) is a ravine where the Germans, during their 1941-1943 occupation of Ukraine, executed over 150,000 people, most of whom were Ukrainian Jews. Some Soviet POWs, partisans, Ukrainian nationalists and gypsies were also executed there. Kiev now has two Babyn Yar memorials. The first statue, built by the Soviets in 1976, is dedicated generically to citizens of Kiev who perished at Babyn Yar at the hands of the Nazis. In 1991, President Bush visited this site.

Many in the Jewish community object to the statue's depiction of soldiers and partisans defending the site when the massacre was conducted against defenseless victims. Also, the monument's inscription does not mention that the bulk of the victims were Jewish, and the monument itself was not erected on the exact site of the September 1941 massacre of the Kiev Jewish community.

In light of these concerns, Jewish organizations here erected a new Menorah monument -- a ten-foot-high menorah -- next to the ravine where the 1941 massacre occurred. The Menorah does not bear any inscription.

REMARKS
TO BE PROVIDED

**EMBASSY MEET
AND GREET**

EMBASSY MEET AND GREET AT BORISPIL AIRPORT

CONTEXT OF THE EVENT

You will greet Embassy Kiev staff, both Americans and foreign service nationals, as well as Kiev-based Peace Corps volunteers at Borispil Airport immediately prior to departure for the U.S. Ambassador Miller will introduce Secretary Christopher, who will in turn introduce the First Lady, who will introduce you. You will make brief remarks, thanking the Embassy for its support of the visit. You will then greet Embassy staffers along a rope line before departing for Air Force One.

BACKGROUND

Borispil Airport is the main airport of Kiev, with a military and a civilian side. The main terminal is of standard Soviet-era construction (i.e., uninspiring). The meet and greet will take place in a screened-off area of the departure lounge in the main terminal. The capacity of the area is about 400 people.

REMARKS
TO BE PROVIDED

REPORT

AND

**BACKGROUND
PAPERS**

UKRAINE BACKGROUND PAPERS

1. Overview of Bilateral Relationship
2. Political Overview
3. Economic Situation
4. U.S. Bilateral Assistance
5. Multilateral Economic Assistance
6. Trade and Investment
7. Energy and Chornobyl
8. Cooperation in Space
9. European Security Architecture
10. Relations with Russia
11. Crimea and Black Sea Fleet Issues
12. Nuclear and Security Issues

UKRAINE: OVERVIEW OF BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP

There has been tremendous progress in bilateral U.S.-Ukrainian relations over the last year, which are now as good as they have been since Ukraine regained independence following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The nuclear issue is behind us; Ukraine responded to our urgings to give up nuclear weapons and accede to the NPT (about 40% of the nuclear weapons in Ukraine in January 1994 have since been transferred to Russia for dismantlement). The U.S. push to broaden the overall relationship and our mobilization of international resources after President Kuchma's October decision to implement comprehensive economic reforms have helped instill confidence in Kiev that Washington attaches importance to Ukraine.

Security cooperation and economic reform remain high priorities. The focus of our security dialogue already has shifted from nuclear arms control issues to regional questions, including NATO expansion and Ukraine's security position. Ukraine's principal concern is that expansion not leave it as a buffer state between NATO and Russia or drive it into Russia's sphere of influence. We see bilateral security links and Kiev's development of a relationship with the Alliance as ways to avoid this. Kiev desires a strong U.S. link to enhance its position vis-à-vis its more powerful neighbor. This is especially true given that Crimea, Black Sea Fleet and energy dependency remain potential flashpoints.

Meanwhile, international institutions are engaging to sustain Ukraine's reform effort. Ukraine's 1995 reform program earned the IMF's support with a \$1.5B on stand-by program and a \$400M special loan, as well as significant bilateral balance-of-payments support from the U.S., EU and Japan. Continued U.S. and Western support is important to Kuchma, who fears if his program cannot deliver a stronger economy by the end of 1995, domestic political support for reform could quickly erode.

U.S. and international assistance will help Ukraine implement reform, but assistance, in itself, will not be sufficient to assure the long-term success of Ukraine's transformation. Our assistance is thus beginning to focus on supporting private trade and investment, and we are pursuing promising new areas of cooperation such as commercial space launch. Ukrainian exports to the United States are growing rapidly -- from \$109M in 1992 to nearly \$350M in 1994.

Our strategic goal remains to see Ukraine firmly on the path to a stable, market-oriented democracy, increasingly integrated into European and global economic and security institutions.

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UKRAINE: POLITICAL OVERVIEW

The on-going tug of war between the executive and legislature (the Rada) continue to complicate Ukrainian domestic politics. President Kuchma has been able to dominate the legislative agenda since his election last summer but won most of the big battles on issues important to him, ranging from economic reform to NPT accession to a budget meeting IMF criteria.

The new Rada, also elected last year, is finally beginning to shed its image as a legislature dominated by leftists. It is emerging as a legitimate contender for political power with an increasing centrist majority inclined to support economic reform. The Rada retains, however, an old guard leadership -- led by Rada Chairman and leftist leader Moroz, a key personal rival of Kuchma who opposes much of the Ukrainian president's reform program.

In an effort to solidify support for reform, Kuchma has pursued a strategy to weaken Moroz. In April, in a calculated move scripted in part by Kuchma himself, the Rada voted to dismiss his government over what it charged (disingenuously) was the failure to implement reform. Kuchma reportedly plans to appoint even more reformers to the government's top positions and revamp the Soviet-era Cabinet structure. He also hoped the Rada would approve a controversial "law on power" aimed at strengthening the executive. Leftists have led the charge against the bill and are well-positioned to block its approval. Kuchma is considering holding a referendum on the matter believing, as most surveys indicate, voters will support a strong presidency.

If Kuchma succeeds in solidifying a government/Rada reform team, he will have a tough assignment for it. In his April "State of the Nation" address, Kuchma maintained the economy will show improvement in the latter part of 1995 if his reform plan is implemented fully. Kuchma will look to the U.S. for help, concerned, absent some recovery, public support will erode.

Kuchma and the Rada see eye to eye on Crimea. Both the executive and legislature have worked closely to roll back Crimean separatism. Kiev is in control of the security situation on the peninsula, and the local population has shown little interest in the political struggle. But, the situation is unpredictable. Though the Russian government has largely stayed out of the dispute, President Yeltsin's April 15 remarks, indicating he would not proceed with major bilateral treaties with Kiev until the Crimean problem is resolved, is a reminder Russian restraint is essential to a peaceful resolution.

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UKRAINE: ECONOMIC SITUATION

In 1994, Ukraine's economic slide accelerated. National income shrank 26% compared with 1993, while industrial output was down 28% and agriculture fell 17% -- all record declines since independence in 1991. This slide was integral to shedding the communist legacy. But it has still been painful and only partially compensated by Ukraine's burgeoning "gray market," which by some estimates may now account for up to 40% of GDP.

President Kuchma took bold decisions last October to implement comprehensive economic reforms and reached agreement with the IMF on a systemic transformation facility. The Kuchma government has continued the reformist course in 1995, and thus the economic outlook is much brighter than it was in 1994. In January Kiev announced an ambitious mass privatization program: 90% of small firms and 8,000 large firms will be privatized this year. In February Ukraine implemented the second stage of price liberalization in housing and municipal services. In April Kiev won IMF support for \$1.9B in new financing, including a \$1.5B stand-by loan. In doing so, Ukraine agreed to reduce its budget deficit to 3.3% of GDP. Government involvement in most areas of the economy will be eliminated, trade liberalized and most remaining fixed prices freed.

Kuchma has achieved some real economic improvements, which are broadly in line with IMF projections. Monthly inflation -- which spiked at the turn of the year with price liberalization -- is now beginning to decline sharply, falling from a high of 72% per month in November to 10% in March. The exchange rate has been fairly stable, and foreign capital inflows are growing. Exports in some sectors have increased. According to Ukrainian government officials, industrial production improved in the first quarter of 1995 compared to the final quarter of last year.

Despite difficult living conditions, most Ukrainians approve of Kuchma's handling of the economy and now favor privatization. Given the magnitude of Ukraine's problems, however, more shocks and some backtracking are expected, and Kuchma is concerned about sustaining public support.

The Rada harbors strong opponents to key reform measures such as fiscal austerity, privatization and land reform. Some members continue to press for costly subsidy programs that run the risk of reigniting hyper-inflation. However, Kuchma may use a cabinet re-shuffle to strengthen the position of reformers.

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UKRAINE: U.S. BILATERAL ASSISTANCE

The U.S. attaches high priority to supporting Ukraine's transition to a democratic, market-based economy, and we have backed that support with significant resources. In FY94, the U.S. committed \$350M in FREEDOM Support Act (FSA) funds to Ukraine, matching the \$350M (FY 92-95) Nunn-Lugar assistance for eliminating nuclear weapons and infrastructure. In FY95, Ukraine will receive more than 20% of the total of \$850M in FSA funding for the NIS. After some bumps, implementation of this assistance is proceeding smoothly, particularly as Ukraine has adopted more comprehensive economic reforms.

Under President Kuchma's leadership, Ukraine has undertaken an ambitious program of comprehensive reform linked to an IMF systemic transformation facility (STF) and a follow-on stand-by arrangement. The U.S. played a major role in facilitating these IMF loans, offering special assistance to help close external financing gaps and successfully lobbying our G-7 allies to make similarly generous contributions. Last fall we pledged \$100M (mostly drawn from FY95 FSA funds) in connection with the STF. We pledged \$250M in March to support the stand-by agreement; as part of the pledge, we expect to leverage about \$24M in FY95 FSA funds through an innovative AID/Ex-Im Bank trade credit facility for up to \$160-175M worth of agricultural inputs.

Given Ukraine's new economic policies, we will be able to focus our technical assistance on key structural reforms and link it more closely to our broader efforts to stimulate trade, investment and private sector development. For FY95, \$102M of FSA technical assistance will go to support mass privatization, small business support, energy efficiency, nuclear reactor safety and environmental problems, development of democratic institutions and exchanges and training. To help with privatization, we have funded the printing of 250 million privatization vouchers and the creation of a national network of auction centers to cover 8,000 state enterprises.

Kiev has long expressed a strong interest in the resumption of normal Ex-Im Bank lending to Ukraine. Ukraine's dire economic straits and poor payments record delayed this, but the conclusion of the IMF stand-by agreement and Ukraine's implementation of IMF-mandated actions have led to a review of its credit rating. On May 2, Ex-Im Bank decided to go back on cover for Ukraine, starting with short- and medium-term loans.

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UKRAINE: MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

Ukraine recognizes President Clinton's personal efforts last July at the Naples G-7 Summit were key to the G-7 pledge of at least \$4B in assistance over two years following Ukraine's adoption of genuine economic reforms. In all of our subsequent contacts with the Ukrainian leadership, they have indicated U.S. support, combined with the G-7's show of support at Naples, was a major inducement for President Kuchma's launching of reforms in October.

Since October, the international financial institutions -- IMF, World Bank, European Bank of Reconstruction and Development -- have made concrete commitments of \$2.7B to meet Ukraine's financing needs (the IMF stand-by agreement concluded in April accounted for \$1.5B of this total). This comes on top of \$1B in Western bilateral support.

- o The United States provided \$100M to help Ukraine close its balance-of-payments gap in the fourth quarter of 1994. Subsequently, we pledged another \$250M in assistance that counted against Ukraine's balance-of-payments financing gap at the March 1995 donors meeting.
- o Japan pledged \$200M in trade credits during President Kuchma's March trip to Tokyo.
- o The European Union tentatively offered another \$400M conditioned on progress in closing the Chornobyl nuclear power plant. We oppose this linkage, but Kuchma's April 13 announcement that Chornobyl would be closed by the year 2000 appears to have led to the release of some EU funds.

Ukraine continues to run severe balance-of-payments deficits because of the high cost of fuel imports from Russia and Turkmenistan. Earlier this year both of these countries agreed to reschedule more than \$3B in Ukrainian arrearages for energy supplies. Until Ukraine finds other suppliers, it will remain heavily dependent on cooperation from Russia, in particular, and Turkmenistan in its efforts to meet the huge payments necessary to finance vital energy imports. Kuchma may ask us to assist Ukraine in finding alternative energy sources.

Given Ukraine's recent success with reform, there are good prospects for additional World Bank and EBRD financing later on in 1995, which could increase commitments to Ukraine beyond the G-7 pledge last year in Naples.

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UKRAINE: TRADE AND INVESTMENT

One of the key themes of the President's visit to Kiev will be the critical importance of trade and investment to sustaining Ukraine's economic reform effort and recovery. Ukraine offers immense potential -- a relatively developed (but antiquated) industrial base, a rich agricultural endowment, a skilled labor force and a large, untapped consumer market of 52 million people. However, only 200 U.S. companies, representing just \$200M in U.S. investment, operate in Ukraine. By comparison, Hungary, with one-fifth the population, has attracted many more U.S. companies and \$3.5B in U.S. investment.

President Kuchma has made a strong start toward opening Ukraine's economy to the outside world. Complying with its IMF stand-by agreement, Ukraine has eliminated virtually all export quotas and has pledged to reduce restrictions on imports. Controls on foreign exchange have been loosened and the exchange rate allowed to float. Ukraine has started the WTO accession process, which will bring its trade policy in conformity with international standards. Overall, Ukraine appears to have a relatively liberal trade regime, probably more liberal than Russia's today.

The U.S. chairs Ukraine's working party on WTO accession and is providing extensive technical assistance, including a full-time U.S. WTO advisor in Kiev. We have given Ukraine MFN status and have designated it a General System of Preferences beneficiary country. Recorded trade between Ukraine and the U.S. reached \$508M in 1994, mainly due to a surge in Ukrainian exports (imports of U.S. products were off by 40% last year; not surprising, given Ukraine's severe economic contraction). Nonetheless, despite nearly doubling exports and a positive trade balance with the U.S., Kiev believes we are unfairly limiting access to our markets and wants our trade laws revised to accommodate Ukraine as an "economy-in-transition." Ukraine also is pressing for higher textile quotas.

Unlike Russia or Kazakhstan, Ukraine has seen little foreign direct investment -- less than \$500M as of January 1, 1995. This low level is partly due to Ukraine's disastrous record on reform prior to October. The depressed local market and growing crime and corruption have also discouraged foreign investment. With Ukraine now serious about reform, the U.S. is making a sustained effort to promote greater American investment. OPIC is actively reviewing a number of defense conversion proposals, and the West NIS Enterprise Fund, with up to \$150M in funds, has opened an office in Kiev and is seeking investment opportunities. One obstacle: our Senate still has not ratified the Bilateral Investment Treaty.

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UKRAINE: ENERGY AND CHORNOBYL

President Kuchma announced to an EU/G-7 delegation on April 13 that Ukraine is prepared to close the Chornobyl nuclear power plant by the year 2000. Kuchma, however, linked his announcement to a plan to build a large, gas-fired electricity plant in the Chornobyl region. Although not an explicit condition for closing Chornobyl, Ukraine expects increased Western assistance for its energy problems and has publicly estimated the cost of closing Chornobyl at some \$4B.

The decision was not an easy one. Ukraine can barely meet its energy demands, and nuclear power now provides 40% of Ukraine's electricity (Chornobyl alone provides 5% of electricity). Ukraine cannot afford to import sufficient fuel and many fossil fuel electric plants are mothballed. Ukraine had fallen behind on its payments to Russia and Turkmenistan for natural gas and oil. Meanwhile, domestic coal production has fallen, largely because many mines are old, inefficient and lack needed investment.

At the 1994 Naples summit, the G-7 announced an action plan for Ukraine's energy sector that envisioned early closure of Chornobyl. The plan includes \$200M in grants, to which the U.S. committed \$38M over two years. The G-7's decision followed the EU Corfu declaration that the EU would make available \$120M in grants and another \$480M in loans for the same purpose. The World Bank and EBRD are helping to rehabilitate Ukraine's conventional energy sector. The IMF program requires industry to face market energy prices, which should dampen demand and help improve the energy situation.

The G-7 action plan will help develop least-cost energy sources to offset Chornobyl. We are considering Ukraine's proposal for a new, gas-fired plant within the EBRD and World Bank least-cost studies. Ukraine is looking for international help to rehabilitate the "sarcophagus" covering the damaged Chornobyl reactor. The EU has taken the lead and is preparing a study; we have not allocated any funds for this problem. Also, we are looking at ways to respond to Ukraine's concerns about the displacement of employees with the closing of Chornobyl.

The President's visit will be the occasion for announcing the details of our FY95 nuclear safety assistance program. These include assisting Ukraine in starting an international nuclear safety and environmental research center in the Chornobyl region and helping upgrade nuclear safety measures at Chornobyl.

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UKRAINE: COOPERATION IN SPACE

The U.S. and Ukraine formalized their cooperative activities in space when Presidents Clinton and Kuchma signed a framework agreement at the November 1994 summit. NASA and the National Space Agency of Ukraine (NSAU) are the implementing agencies.

Cooperation under this agreement has covered a range of projects and activities. Chief among these has been the effort to identify a Ukrainian payload and Ukrainian payload specialist to fly on a future space shuttle mission. NASA has tentatively scheduled these activities for shuttle mission STS-87 in October 1997. The payload will consist of four experiments on the effects of microgravity and plant cellular physiology. NASA and NSAU are working to name the payload Ukrainian specialist.

NASA also has signed a contract with the Paton Welding Institute for the definition phase of the international space welding experiment. This is a joint project for flight demonstration of the Ukrainian universal hand tool, an electron beam welding device, which could be used for emergency repairs for the international space station. NASA representatives are also developing a report on how Ukraine can commercialize its aerospace industry.

Ukraine has pressed the U.S. to support its participation in the space station. Kiev's involvement as a separate international partner, however, is unlikely. Ukrainian space launch vehicles may be used by Russia for resupply missions, and Ukraine is providing other subsystem components to Russia for the project. We have encouraged the two countries to cooperate on this.

The U.S. and Ukraine broadened their space agenda with the first round of talks in April on a commercial space launch agreement. These negotiations flow from a commitment by the Presidents in November to facilitate Ukrainian access to world aerospace markets. They are the direct result of a U.S. policy process early this year that linked progress in the commercial space launch area to continuing fulfillment by Ukraine of its missile non-proliferation obligations. The talks are in an early stage, but we expect the agreement will provide Ukraine access to both geostationary/geosynchronous and low-earth orbit orbits.

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UKRAINE: EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

Ukraine continues to fear that Russia will pose a threat to Ukrainian sovereignty and independence. Kiev sees good relations with the West -- the U.S. in particular -- as a balance against Russia to minimize this threat. While we have built up certain confidence with the Ukrainians, Kiev continues to look for formal mechanisms -- e.g., a permanent trilateral (U.S.-Ukraine-Russia) process -- to strengthen its position.

Ukraine has adopted the stance that it does not seek to join NATO, given its law on neutrality. (Some senior Ukrainian officials have suggested an interest in eventual NATO membership and ask that Ukraine not be excluded from eventually joining the Alliance.) Ukraine also maintains other countries -- read Russia -- should not have a veto over new countries joining. Senior Ukrainian officials have indicated to the Poles and Czechs they would not object to those countries entering NATO.

Ukraine nevertheless finds the prospect of Alliance expansion unsettling: it fears it could find itself a buffer between NATO and Russia or driven into Russia's sphere of influence. The President's assurance we will manage the process of NATO expansion in a manner that does not undercut but that strengthens Ukrainian security is important to Kiev.

Ukrainian leaders seek to develop links to NATO. Some call for a "special" relationship with the Alliance, paralleling -- though not necessarily replicating -- the relationship that may develop between NATO and Russia. Details, however, have yet to be worked out. One of our aims must be to help Kiev better understand the kind of NATO-Russia relationship we hope will develop. We also need to explore how the NATO-Ukraine relationship could evolve.

Ukraine is important to the goals of NATO expansion. No formula for enhancing stability and security in eastern Europe will be credible unless it enhances Ukraine's security position. The Ukrainians are active participants in the NACC and PFP and want to develop a relationship with NATO beyond PFP. Ukraine was the first NIS country to sign up for PFP and has been one of the most active partners, participating in all PFP exercises to date. The President will announce in Kiev \$10M in Warsaw Initiative funding (FY96) to help support Ukraine's participation in PFP, assuming Congressional funding. Ukraine believes cultivating such cooperative activities will help build links to the West, which we wish to encourage.

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UKRAINE: RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

The U.S. supports stable, mutually beneficial relations between Ukraine and Russia as essential to regional stability. Good relations are important to achieve our goals with both countries, e.g., a crisis in their bilateral relations could disrupt the transfer of nuclear weapons to Russia for dismantlement.

While many Russians emotionally have a hard time accepting they now need a passport to travel to Ukraine, Moscow has largely behaved correctly. Despite occasional pot-holes, the overall trend in Ukrainian-Russian relations over the last 16 months has been positive. Among the milestones: the 1994 Trilateral Statement; the July election of President Kuchma (who advocates good relations with Russia); Ukraine's accession to the NPT; an agreed formula for debt restructuring; and the apparent resolution of most problems blocking the long-delayed Kuchma-Yeltsin summit in Kiev. Nevertheless, potentially contentious issues remain on the agenda, including basing of the Black Sea Fleet, energy dependency and Crimea.

The Ukrainians and Russians have long been preparing a bilateral treaty on friendship, cooperation and partnership, to be the centerpiece of a Yeltsin visit to Kiev. The signing, however, has repeatedly been postponed for more than eight months. Although lesser agreements are being implemented to facilitate normal bilateral interests, the symbolism and high profile of this treaty have given it the political importance of a peace accord and, at the same time, have made it a target of political extremists on both sides.

Thanks to U.S. efforts in January 1994, the Trilateral Statement remains the single most important confidence-building mechanism between Kiev and Moscow. Implementation is proceeding smoothly: Ukraine has transferred some 800 nuclear warheads to date; the remaining 1,100 warheads are due out by mid-1996. Russia is maintaining its commitment to compensate Ukraine by providing fuel assemblies for nuclear power plants.

Ukraine, dependent on Russia for more than 80% of its oil and most of its natural gas, has trouble keeping current on payments. Kiev reached agreement with Russia in March to reschedule \$3.9B of debt (mostly for energy resources) over the next ten years. Still, Ukraine must keep current on the rescheduling terms in order to ensure fuel deliveries from Russia. But the relationship is complex: Russian gas transits Ukraine to Central and Western Europe, and Kiev frequently makes up for cut-backs to Ukraine by tapping into this flow.

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UKRAINE: CRIMEA AND BLACK SEA FLEET ISSUES

At the heart of the Crimean problem is Nikita Khrushchev's 1954 decision to transfer the peninsula from the territorial jurisdiction of Russia to Ukraine. In the Soviet era this had little practical effect. But, with the breakup of the USSR, the ethnic Russian majority in Crimea finds itself subject to Ukrainian vice Russian authority.

An active separatist movement has developed in Crimea, dominating local political debate. In its effort to rein in the movement, Ukraine has thus far been careful to follow a law-based strategy. In March 1995, given political divisions among the separatists (and Russian preoccupation with Chechnya), Kiev moved to suspend the separatist 1992 Crimean constitution, to annul a number of Crimean laws in conflict with the Ukrainian constitution and to abolish the Crimean presidency. President Kuchma has temporarily subordinated the Crimean government to the Ukrainian central government but reiterated Kiev's respect for Crimean autonomy within Ukraine. He has called on Crimea to adopt a new constitution, consistent with Ukraine's national constitution.

The Yeltsin government's response has been restrained. The Russians have told us they do not want a crisis in Crimea, which would increase domestic pressure on Moscow to become involved. Indeed, Russian nationalists in the Duma have made inflammatory statements. Yeltsin himself has acknowledged that Crimea is an internal Ukrainian affair. At the same time, he has said he would not proceed with major bilateral treaties with Ukraine until the problem is satisfactorily resolved -- a clear reminder of the influence Russia can exert. Despite this, Ukrainian and Russian negotiators continue to discuss bilateral problems.

The Black Sea Fleet is currently under joint Ukrainian-Russian command, and the two sides have apparently reached agreement on dividing the ships. The disposition of shore facilities, however, including the city of Sevastopol, remains unresolved and a matter of real contention. The Ukrainians are prepared to lease Russia basing facilities; the Russians seek close to full jurisdiction in a way that challenges Ukrainian sovereignty.

Kiev has consistently tried to interest us in mediating the dispute, much as we mediated the Trilateral Statement. We have offered both sides samples of our own basing agreements with third countries. At the same time, we have made clear that we will not become directly involved unless both Kiev and Moscow invite us and we feel we have a substantive contribution to make.

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UKRAINE: NUCLEAR AND SECURITY ISSUES

Our efforts to bring about the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine and its acceptance of non-nuclear weapon state status mark a key success for U.S. policy: Ukraine's agreement to the Trilateral Statement, ratification of START and accession to the NPT made 1994 a milestone year and put the Ukrainian nuclear weapons issue behind us. Our continuing dialogue with Kiev on nuclear and security issues increasingly reflects greater understanding.

Ukraine continues to implement smoothly its obligations under the January 1994 Trilateral Statement. We believe Ukraine has transferred to Russia some 800 nuclear warheads for dismantling (exact schedule agreed to by Kiev and Moscow is still secret). The remaining warheads, numbering about 1,100, are due to leave the country by mid-1996. Russia is maintaining its commitment to compensate Ukraine for the highly-enriched uranium in the warheads by providing fuel assemblies for nuclear power plants. Ukraine has informally voiced concern about the quality of the assemblies but has not challenged Moscow's compliance.

Ukraine's accession to the NPT on December 5, 1994 removed the last obstacle to entry into force of the START I Treaty. After some initial differences with Ukraine over the terms of U.S. on-site monitoring, we acceded to their request that we end our continuous monitoring at the Pavlohrad missile production facility on May 31, 1995 in favor of additional short-notice inspections.

Ukraine's willingness to give up nuclear weapons was generated in significant measure by U.S. commitments to provide Nunn-Lugar assistance. The U.S. has committed a total of \$350M under this program to assist Ukraine in the dismantlement of nuclear weapons and to provide related support (including construction of nearly 400 housing units for demobilized strategic rocket forces personnel). Discussions are underway with Ukraine to determine how to allocate \$73M in FY95 funding. During his March visit, Secretary Perry signed an agreement to provide an extra \$20 million for nuclear weapons elimination. The joint statement for release during the Kiev summit will announce the allocation of up to an additional \$10M for defense conversion and, possibly, allocations for the Science and Technology Center, the elimination of nuclear weapons infrastructure, export control and nuclear material control and accounting.

The U.S. maintains an active military-to-military contact program with Ukraine, with over 50 individual contacts in 1995. The first U.S.-Ukraine joint peacekeeping training exercise will be held in Lviv in late May.

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**BIOGRAPHIC
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
016. report	Biography (2 pages)	05/02/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 811

FOLDER TITLE:

POTUS Briefing Books-POTUS Trip to Russia/Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995

2016-0135-M
kh1781

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]

b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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017. report	Biography (1 page)	11/16/1994	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 811

FOLDER TITLE:

POTUS Briefing Books-POTUS Trip to Russia/Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995

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018. report	Biography (1 page)	04/25/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
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POTUS Briefing Books-POTUS Trip to Russia/Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995

2016-0135-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
019. report	Biography (1 page)	04/18/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 811

FOLDER TITLE:

POTUS Briefing Books-POTUS Trip to Russia/Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995

2016-0135-M
kh1781

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
020. report	Biography (1 page)	11/17/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 811

FOLDER TITLE:

POTUS Briefing Books-POTUS Trip to Russia/Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995

2016-0135-M
kh1781

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
021. report	Biography (2 pages)	04/12/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 811

FOLDER TITLE:

POTUS Briefing Books-POTUS Trip to Russia/Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995

2016-0135-M
kh1781

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
022. report	Biography (2 pages)	03/30/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 811

FOLDER TITLE:

POTUS Briefing Books-POTUS Trip to Russia/Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995

2016-0135-M
kh1781

RESTRICTION CODES**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
023. report	Biography (2 pages)	05/02/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 811

FOLDER TITLE:

POTUS Briefing Books-POTUS Trip to Russia/Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995

2016-0135-M

kh1781

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
024. report	Biography [partial] (1 page)	04/30/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 811

FOLDER TITLE:

POTUS Briefing Books-POTUS Trip to Russia/Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995

2016-0135-M

kh1781

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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1.4c, 3.5c

Serhiy Hryhorovych OSYKA
(Phonetic: ohSEEkah)

UKRAINE

*Deputy Prime Minister (since January 1995);
Minister of External Economic Relations (since
August 1994)*

Addressed as: Mr. Minister

Serhiy Osyka's political connections and his professional experience probably led to his appointment as Minister of External Economic Relations and his subsequent promotion to Deputy Prime Minister with oversight of Ukraine's economic relations with the CIS. He enjoys the President Leonid Kuchma's support.

1.4c, 1.4d

Osyka's ties to the President go back to 1992, when he served as then Prime Minister Kuchma's adviser on trade issues. He has been Kiev's point man on trade relations with the West, specifically on Ukraine's potential role in GATT. He served a similar function under the previous administration.

3.5c

In late 1994, Osyka enjoyed a reputation

1.4c, 1.4d

as an economic reformer, who is committed to opening up Ukraine's economy.

1.4c, 1.4d

The Deputy Prime Minister may

also fear intimidation from organized crime elements; in September 1994, attackers stabbed and seriously wounded a man whom they mistook for Osyka, according to Ukrainian and Western press accounts.

3.5c

Osyka, an ethnic Ukrainian, was born on 27 March 1955 in Kiev. He graduated from Kiev State University with a degree in international relations in 1977. He earned a law degree from that same institution in 1980 and later worked as an assistant professor there and at Ukraine's Institute of Foreign Relations. Osyka then served as a consultant to the Supreme Rada (parliament) during 1991-92. He was an adviser on foreign economic relations to the Prime Minister from 1992 until 1993. Osyka then worked as a deputy minister and first deputy minister in the Ministry of External Economic Relations until his appointment as Minister in 1994. He also served on a commission for Ukraine's cooperation with the European Union and as Ukraine's representative to GATT. In March 1994, he ran unsuccessfully for a seat in the Rada.

3.5c

Osyka and his wife, who is a Ukrainian language teacher, have a son. We do not know Osyka's English-language capability.

3.5c

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

2016-0135-M (1.88)
2/27/2017 KBH

1.4c, 3.5c

LP 95-104245
30 April 1995

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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
025. report	Biography [partial] (1 page)	10/17/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 811

FOLDER TITLE:

POTUS Briefing Books-POTUS Trip to Russia/Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995

2016-0135-M

kh1781

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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1.4c, 3.5c

UKRAINE

Viktor Mykhaylovych PETROV
(Phonetic: *pehTROFF*)

Minister of Machine-Building, the Military-Industrial Complex, and Conversion
(since July 1994)

Addressed as: Mr. Minister

Viktor Petrov, who oversees Ukrainian conversion efforts, publicly opposes a major overhaul of his country's enormous military industrial complex. He told a Russian news service in July that Ukraine should not have left the international arms market, noting that other countries with smaller scientific and technical potential than Ukraine engage in large-scale weapons sales. In an interview on Kiev radio, Petrov recently remarked that Ukrainian defense enterprises need not be privatized. He argued that when such industries are privatized, they stop manufacturing unprofitable—but essential—products. 3.5c

1.4c, 1.4d

An ethnic Ukrainian, he was born in the late 1940s. He earned a degree in electrical engineering at the Kiev Polytechnic Institute and worked as director of the Lubny Computer Factory. We do not know Petrov's English-language capability. 3.5c

LDA M 94-16314
17 October 1994

1.4c, 3.5c

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

2016-0135-M (1.89)
2/27/2017 KBH

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
026. report	Biography (2 pages)	05/02/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 811

FOLDER TITLE:

POTUS Briefing Books-POTUS Trip to Russia/Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995

2016-0135-M
kh1781

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
027. report	Biography [partial] (1 page)	11/02/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 811

FOLDER TITLE:

POTUS Briefing Books-POTUS Trip to Russia/Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995

2016-0135-M

kh1781

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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1.4c, 3.5c

UKRAINE

Volodymyr Ivanovych RADCHENKO
(Phonetic: radCHENkoh)

Minister of Internal Affairs
(since July 1994)

Addressed as: General Radchenko



©

Lt. Gen. Volodymyr Radchenko, a career security service officer with extensive experience in fighting organized crime, enjoys the support of President Leonid Kuchma. In August, Kuchma told members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs' collegium that he has the utmost confidence in Radchenko and is counting on him to fundamentally reorganize the militia, rid it of corrupt officers, and generally improve its effectiveness. [redacted] 1.4c, 1.4d

[redacted] the General is also backed by Deputy Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk, who had been head of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and, thus, Radchenko's former boss. In his speech to the Supreme Rada (parliament) before his confirmation by that body, Radchenko stated that he played an active role in preparing Kuchma's recent decree on combating organized crime and that he also endorsed a controversial article in the decree that allows for "preventative detention" of a suspect for up to 30 days. A member of the Rada's commission for combating organized crime and corruption recently described Radchenko in the local press as "a man of exceptional decency, honesty, and devotion to his life's work." In press interviews, Radchenko describes himself as more focused on operations than on administration.

3.5c

1.4c, 1.4d

1.4c, 1.4d, 3.5c

Career and Personal Data

An ethnic Ukrainian, Radchenko was born on 23 October 1948 in Kiev. He has higher education as an engineer and lawyer. Radchenko has been involved in state security work since 1971: first in Kiev, then as deputy head of the Ukrainian KGB's branch in the Rivne Oblast, and then as head of the branch in the Ternopil' Oblast. From September 1993 until taking up his current appointment, he served as a deputy chairman of the SBU and chief of the SBU's anticorruption and organized crime department. Radchenko stated in the press that during his career he was decorated with the "badge of honor" for taking part in detaining a terrorist group. He noted in the same interview that he spent a short time in Spain "carrying out orders." Married, Radchenko has two children. We do not know his English-language capability [redacted] 3.5c

LDA M 94-16624
2 November 1994

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PER E. O. 13526

2016-0135-M (1.91)
2/27/2017 KBH

1.4c, 3.5c

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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
028. report	Biography (1 page)	04/06/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 811

FOLDER TITLE:

POTUS Briefing Books-POTUS Trip to Russia/Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995

2016-0135-M
kh1781

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
029. report	Biography (2 pages)	03/20/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 811

FOLDER TITLE:

POTUS Briefing Books-POTUS Trip to Russia/Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995

2016-0135-M
kh1781

RESTRICTION CODES

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- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
030. report	Biography (2 pages)	02/23/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 811

FOLDER TITLE:

POTUS Briefing Books-POTUS Trip to Russia/Ukraine, May 8-12, 1995

2016-0135-M
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RESTRICTION CODES**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
031. report	Biography (2 pages)	03/17/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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National Security Council
Records Management
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