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- b(8) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
I want to talk to you tonight about the purpose of American power in the world, as we chart a
course in a radically new international environment.

Charting such a course has never been easy. While the policy of containment looks obvious to us
in retrospect, we should remember that it took President Truman and Dean Acheson several years
to define their way and build a policy consensus behind it. And they had the advantage of an
ideologically and geographically distinct adversary with whom to contend.

Today, we -- all of us in this room who believe in American engagement -- have a still more
difficult challenge. We must seek to be as creative and constructive -- in the literal sense of that
word -- as the generation of the late 1940's. For we see a world of opportunity for such
construction. But we must do it in the domestic circumstances not of the 1940's but of the
1920's, when there was no single, foreign threat against which to rally public opinion and head off
the destructive isolationism that followed.

To most Americans, the post-Cold War era seems chaotic. The easy divisions of the Cold War
have given way to a confused complex of problems: "Traditional" threats of aggression by
regional bullies. Emerging transnational threats like environmental decay, over-population and
refugees. A global economic and information free-for-all that increases wealth and opportunity,
but also produces fear and uncertainty within all nations. And the carnage of terrible ethnic conflicts.

In short, for too many of our people and commentators, we seem to face an incomprehensible chaos that prevents us from setting a clearly defined goal for the exercise of American power and diplomacy.

I believe that view is profoundly and dangerously wrong.

For there is a simple truth about this new world. That truth is this: the same idea that was under attack by fascism and then by communism remains under attack today, but on many fronts at once.

In defeating fascism, and prevailing over communism, we were defending an idea that comes under many names -- democracy, liberty, civility, pluralism -- but has a constant face. It is the face of the tolerant society, in which leaders and governments exist not to use or abuse people, but to provide them with freedom and opportunity, to preserve individual human dignity. Societies in which the wonderful paradox of democracy is at work. The paradox is this: a society built around a central devotion to pluralism is a society best able to reconcile the divisions that would otherwise rip it apart.

Today, those societies -- from the fragile to the mature -- remain under assault. Far from reaching the end of history, we are at the start of a new stage in this old struggle. This is not a clash of civilizations. Rather, it is a contest that pits nations and individuals guided by openness, responsive government and moderation against those animated by isolation, repression and extremism. The enemies of the tolerant society are not some nameless, faceless force. They are extreme nationalists and tribalists, terrorists, organized criminals, coup plotters, rogue states and all those who would return newly freed societies to the intolerant ways of the past.
But for all its dangers this new world presents immense opportunities -- the chance to reshape and create new international security and economic structures that are not merely adapted to post-Cold War realities, but are specifically designed to consolidate the victory of the idea of democracy and open markets.

The issue for the next decade is whether our efforts at this construction can succeed in the face of the centrifugal forces at work within and among nations. This requires designing structures with the flexibility to withstand shifting threats to their stability, much like skyscrapers in Los Angeles or Mexico City are built with enough give to weather an earthquake. And it means that we must infuse these structures with the ideals and habits of democracy.

Democracy is at once the foundation and the purpose of the international structures we must build. It is the foundation because, as Zbig Brzezinski has put it, "If one builds...only with bricks and mortar we will find that something profound is missing, and the structure may not prove enduring, because societies as viable entities exist on the basis of conviction, of commitment, of certain shared values." It is also the purpose because the security structures that defend our safety and the economic institutions that expand trade and create jobs, give democracy the chance to flourish.

We are not starry eyed about the prospects for spreading democracy -- it will not soon take hold everywhere. But we know that the larger the pool of democracies, the better off we will be. Democracies create free markets that offer economic opportunity and they make for more reliable trading partners. They tend not to abuse the civil and political rights of their citizens. And democracies are far less likely to wage war on one another. Civilized behavior within borders encourages it beyond them. So it is in our interest to do all that we can to enlarge the community of free and open societies, especially in areas of greatest strategic interest, as in the former Soviet Union.
I. Building New Structures

I believe that over the past twenty months, building often on the work of our predecessors, we have made a good start at this process of construction. Working with our allies, President Clinton has moved to create new security arrangements, or revitalize old ones, and to devise pro-trade economic institutions, or modernize existing ones.

To meet the new reality in Europe, we are deeply engaged in transforming existing structures to fulfill President Clinton’s vision of an integrated continent. While NATO is and must remain the foundation of security and stability for the trans-Atlantic community, it must adapt to changing times so as to keep the peace -- and, if necessary, make the peace.

That’s why President Clinton has taken the lead in establishing the Combined Joint Task Forces for peacekeeping and crisis management, and the “Partnership for Peace,” to begin the process of expanding security in Europe eastward. And that is one reason why NATO’s action in Bosnia is so important: it is the first time NATO has undertaken actual military operations; the first time NATO has operated beyond the borders of its member states; the first time it has acted in behalf of the United Nations; the first time it has acted in close cooperation with the Russian Federation.

For the new European democracies, the Partnership for Peace is the lighthouse at the entrance to NATO’s harbor, offering real, practical military and defense cooperation with NATO. The Partnership also gives a boost to reformers and commits all Partners to open up and democratize their defense forces.

While keeping us prepared for the worst, the Partnership allows us to work toward the best possible outcome for Europe -- a community of democratic and stable nations.
In Asia, because there is no equivalent to NATO, we must develop a series of arrangements that will function, as President Clinton has put it, "like overlapping plates of armor, individually providing protection and together covering the whole body of our common security concerns."

These plates include the deployment of American forces to meet bilateral treaty arrangements and varied multilateral efforts -- from our attempt to defuse the North Korean nuclear threat to our participation in regional security dialogues, such as the unprecedented gathering in July of the ASEAN countries and others, including the United States, Russia, and Vietnam.

While the new global economy has delivered wonderful possibilities for growth and creativity, it also has limited governments' ability to control their nations' economic future. This has bred fear and insecurity within each of our societies -- especially among those left behind, and who blame their personal predicament on ominous, unidentified international forces.

There is a powerful lesson here for those of us concerned with sustaining our country's prosperity in the decades to come. That is the need to design structures with the every day, real interests of Americans in mind, that produce tangible benefits for them and turn their uncertainty into hope.

One striking example is NAFTA, whose passage President Clinton went to the mat to secure. Already, NAFTA has dramatically accelerated the exchange of goods and ideas between the United States, Mexico, and Canada. For all it promises to achieve in its own right, NAFTA is just the starting point for the integration of our hemisphere. Other trading compacts are following NAFTA. And we will pursue hemispheric integration at the Summit of the Americas, convened by the President in Miami next December.

In Asia, where our trade translates into almost 2.5 million American jobs, President Clinton took the lead and hosted the first ever gathering of the Organization for Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders. By setting pro-growth policies, toppling trade barriers, and cutting
regulatory red tape within the fast growing Asian-Pacific economies, we can take tangible steps to improve our peoples' lives. And a heavier flow of American goods, services and people in the region will help spread the ideals and the wealth of tolerant societies and build an integrated Asian-Pacific community.

Our difficult but successful completion of the GATT Uruguay Round, begun eight years ago, also will make a real difference in real lives. By lowering barriers to trade and bringing more nations into an open trading system, this accord promises to lift substantially American wages and living standards, and to do the same for other nations around the world. GATT's successor, the World Trade Organization, not only will ensure a more even international playing field, but also will provide a forum to resolve disputes openly.

The struggle to consolidate our victories in 1945 and in the Cold War involves not only construction, but also the patient application of diplomacy, and the measured exercise of power.

We use diplomacy to pursue peace. But peace is not just an end in itself. It also creates conditions necessary for the habits of democracy and community to thrive. Thus, when we support and foster peace in the Middle East or Northern Ireland or Southern Africa, we are promoting the tolerant society as well. It is no accident that the enemies of peace in such areas are also apostles of intolerance and extremism.

Effective diplomacy today -- as throughout human history -- depends not only on the skill of our diplomats, but also on the power that lies behind it.

The progress we have made in Bosnia, for example, came when power was tied to our diplomatic ends. The Sarajevo ultimatum largely succeeded because the threat of NATO air power was judged real. It provided the catalyst for the agreement on a federation between the Croats and Muslims in Bosnia, in itself a development of great strategic importance there. And I believe that
after the recent rejection of peace by the Bosnian Serbs, it was the threat of further action by
NATO, combined with the effect of our sanctions, that led Slobodan Milosevic to promise to
effectively close Serbia’s border with them.

Our approach to Haiti has also relied on diplomacy backed by power — the power of our
sanctions as well as the real threat of the use of force. The responsible course has been to pursue
every possible diplomatic way to reach our goal there. But make no mistake: when diplomatic
efforts are exhausted, the power behind them then becomes the only alternative.

Our goal is clear. For two Administrations, that goal has been the restoration of democratic
government in Haiti.

For almost twenty months we have vigorously pursued every diplomatic avenue available to
achieve a peaceful transfer of power from the coup leaders back to the democratically elected
government. We have tightened sanctions all we can without crushing the Haitian people. Our
efforts have failed to move the military leaders. Their brutality, if anything, gets worse. They
alone are responsible for Haiti’s terrible predicament.

In response, the international community has spoken clearly and authoritatively, through the
United Nations Security Council. Resolution 940 authorizes the use of all necessary means,
including force, to restore democracy to Haiti.

Thus far, seventeen countries with some 1,500 personnel have told us they will join the
international coalition in some form, and others are considering it. Additional nations will sign up
when the coalition is replaced by the UN mission.

I believe there is a great deal at stake here. First is the essential reliability of the United States and
the international community. Having exhausted all other remedies, we must make it clear that we
mean what we say. Our actions in Haiti will send a message far beyond our region — to all who seriously threaten our interests.

Second, there is a new wave of democracy sweeping over this hemisphere. But it is not irreversible. Haiti is a critical test of our commitment to defend democracy, especially where it is most fragile.

Third, the United States has a particular interest in curbing gross abuses of human rights when they occur so close to our shores. Murder, rape and intimidation are a systematic part of this regime’s reign of terror. The victims are women, children, orphans and even priests. These abuses will end only when the dictators are gone.

Finally, the consequences of this festering problem will not be confined to Haiti. We risk a further explosion of refugees, a mass exodus that could de-stabilize the region and prove difficult for us to contain.

So the military leaders must go. We still hope that they will do so voluntarily. But our message to them is clear: we will act if we must, and time is running out.

II. The Threats to Construction

As we build new structures and wield the tools of power and diplomacy, we must keep an eye to the long term threats to our efforts. In effect, we have to adopt the methods of the architect. Before starting a project, any good designer sits down with the client and asks a few basic questions: what’s the building for; what are your needs; how much time do you spend in each room? And in New England, we know also to ask this question: what direction do the high winds and storm fronts come from?
The threats to our international construction come from many quarters. Bosnia and Haiti, for example, are not simply transitory tragedies, immediate crises that can divert us from the "big picture." Rather they are part of something bigger and more menacing that threatens to undermine the foreign policy structures we are working so hard to build: the ethnic and other historic divisions within nations that tear them apart and in some regions threaten the definition of the nation itself.

It cannot and must not be the responsibility of the international community or this nation finally to resolve those deeply-rooted conflicts. We cannot force a reversal of centuries of animosity in a few years. To attempt to do so would condemn peacekeeping efforts to costly failure.

But where practical, we can save lives, as in Rwanda, and we can offer conflicted societies a breathing space in which to sort out their own affairs. Whether or not they do so must, in the end, be their own responsibility.

Where and when UN peacekeeping can and should engage cannot, in a world of such rapid changes, clearly be predicted on some briefer's multicolored map. But we can be very clear about the criteria to use in making those decisions. Following our very careful policy review, we are insisting, for example, that every peacekeeping operation have a clear mission, with adequate funding and a reasonable plan for completion.

These explosions within states -- in Eastern Europe, in Africa and elsewhere -- while rooted in historic hatreds, are also exacerbated by the so-called transnational problems whose dimensions have been more clearly exposed by the end of the Cold War.

Mass migration and refugees. The population explosion. An endangered environment. A nefarious nexus of crime, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Our institutions must be built to withstand, and ultimately to reverse, these threats.
The Cairo Conference on population growth and sustainable development rightly addresses perhaps the most important underlying transnational threat before us, and America is leading in the response.

But in our struggle against the forces of hatred, more attention must also be given, I believe, to the horrific prospect of the growing links among organized crime, drug trafficking, terrorism, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Several times in the last month, police seized nuclear materials smuggled into Germany from Russia. We should be thankful that superior police work and cooperation among various intelligence services -- including our own -- intercepted this deadly cargo. But we also should be concerned. Imagine, for example, what would have happened if the World Trade Center terrorists had detonated a non-conventional device.

This nexus demands a coordinated, international response. Mere vigilance will not suffice. The amount of plutonium needed to make a bomb is no bigger than a can of Coke. Intensified cooperation among various criminal justice systems is one of the most potent weapons in our arsenal. Over the past few years, we have greatly enhanced our intelligence sharing with allies and through Interpol, increased regular consultations, and engaged in joint anti-terrorist training. Most recently, in July, FBI director Louis Freeh visited several Eastern European countries and Russia, where he stressed the risks of nuclear proliferation through the efforts of organized crime and proposed new cooperative initiatives in response. Ultimately, this informal network of concerned nations will likely evolve into a new structure to counter what must rank as one of the greatest long term threats to our security.

And, as I said before, there is the immediate threat to our efforts at construction posed by the regional rogue states who seek to develop and traffic in the weapons of mass destruction, who support terrorism, who are no less dedicated to the destruction of the tolerant society than were the defeated leaders of fascism and communism.
That is why this President is determined to maintain and modernize the finest military in the world so we can deter aggression -- and counter it when the need arises. Why we have developed and are pursuing a strategy of “dual containment” of both Iraq and Iran. And why we will maintain our commitment to our South Korean allies, even as we negotiate a resolution of the nuclear issue with the North.

III. Our Challenge

The struggle before us, while in the tradition of the centuries-old fight between the ideas of freedom and authoritarianism, is also very new. Because we must fight on so many fronts at once, we will only make progress over time, in small victories, not only through the exercise of our power but also through patience, persistence and pragmatism.

We Americans are an impatient people. But patience, persistence and pragmatism are not evidence of indecision: they are the hallmarks of determination.

Choice, not chance, determines destiny. After World War I, we chose withdrawal, leaving a vacuum that was filled by the forces of hatred and tyranny. After World War II, we chose engagement, creating the institutions that guaranteed 50 years of freedom and prosperity.

Today, at this century’s third major turning point, the Clinton Administration has chosen. Rather than throw up our hands in despair at the complexities of the post-Cold War era, we have thrown ourselves with determination into the fight against those who would deny people their human rights, terrorists who threaten innocents, and pariah states who choose repression and extremism over openness and moderation. We have thrown ourselves, in short, into the long struggle for democracy and the order it brings.
In so doing, we take up the challenge previous generations met so well. Inspired by their example, aware of the responsibility they left, we are helping to create a world where tolerance, freedom and democracy prevail.
The Reach of Democracy

Tying Power To Diplomacy

By Anthony Lake

WASHINGTON

To many Americans, the cold war divisions have given way to a confusing tangle of problems that present us from setting clearly defined goals for our foreign policy. These problems include aggression by regional bullies, transnational dangers like overpopulation and refugees, a global economic and information-free-for-all that produces fear and uncertainty, and terrible ethnic conflicts.

Beneath the surface, however, there is an enduring truth about this new world. The same idea attacked by Fascism and Communism remains under attack today. Now, after the Cold War, the idea that comes under many names—democracy, peace, prosperity, civilization—under threat.

But there is a continuing fact that has been true—there is the face of the tolerant society, in which leaders and governments exist not to use or abuse people but to provide them with freedom and opportunity.

We are at the start of a new stage in this old struggle. This is not a clash of civilizations. Rather, it is a contest that pits nation and individuals guided by openness, responsive government and moderation against those animated by isolation, repression and extremism. The enemies of the tolerant society are not some nameless, faceless force. They are extremist nationalists and nationalists, terrorists, organized criminals, coup plotters, rogue states and all those who would return newly free societies to the intolerant ways of the past.

For all its dangers, this new world presents immense opportunities to reshape and create international structures that are adapted to post-cold-war realities and designed to consolidate the victory of democracy and open markets.

We are not starry-eyed about the prospects for spreading democracy, but we know that to do so serves our interests. Democracies create free markets that offer economic opportunity, and they make for reliable trading partners. They tend not to abuse their citizens' rights or engage in war on one another.

The Administration has made a good start at building security and economic institutions designed to create the conditions in which democracy can flourish. In Europe, we are deeply engaged in transforming NATO to fulfill President Clinton's vision of an integrated command by establishing Combined Joint Task Forces for peacekeeping and crisis management and the Partnership for Peace to begin expanding security in Europe eastward.

The new global economy requires that we design structures that produce tangible benefits for our citizens and turn their fears into hope. That is why the President went to the summit for the North American Free Trade Agreement, which has dramatically accelerated the exchange of goods and ideas between the United, States, Mexico and Canada. That is why he has taken the lead in setting a pro-trade agenda in the fast-growing Asian-Pacific economies. And that is why our successful completion of the GATT world trade talks was so important: it promises to make a real difference in real lives by creating jobs and raising wages.

The challenges we face also demand the patient application of diplomacy and the measured exercise of power. We use diplomacy to pursue peace. But peace is not just an end in itself. It also creates conditions necessary for democratic values to thrive. Thus, when we were forced to intervene in the Middle East, Northern Ireland and South Africa, we are promoting the tolerant society as well.

Economic development, too, is not only the skill of our diplomats but also on power. Nothing better demonstrates the effectiveness of diplomacy than the successful intervention in the Dominican Republic, where we have relied on diplomacy backed by force—sometimes to save lives, as in Rwanda and Somalia, and we can offer conflicting societies a breathing space in which to sort out their own affairs. Whether or not they do so must be their own responsibility.

These explosions in states are also exacerbated by transnational problems—refugees, population explosion, an endangered environment; a nefarious nexus of crime, terrorism and the weapons of mass destruction—whose dimensions have been clearly exposed by the end of the cold war and whose challenge we must meet.

We must also contend with regional rogue states like Iraq, Iran and Libya, which seek to traffic in the weapons of mass destruction, support terrorism and are dedicated to the destruction of the tolerant society.

For that reason, President Clinton will maintain and modernize the finest military in the world so that we can deter aggression—and counter it when the need arises. We have also developed a strategy of dual containment of Iraqi and Iran. And we will uphold our commitment to South Korea even as we negotiate a solution to the nuclear issue with the North.

Efforts must fight many fronts at once, we will make progress only over time, in small victories, in sustained struggle, in the constant struggle for democracy and the freedom and tolerance it brings.

Anthony Lake is President Clinton's national security adviser. This article is adapted from remarks at the Council for Foreign Relations on Sept. 12.
Cold War Games Again

By Robert H. Johnson

WASHINGTON-His intervention in Haiti, the Administration's post-cold-war strategy as defined by Anthony Lake, President Clinton's national security adviser.

To Mr. Lake, America is involved in an extension of the struggle for democracy and against authoritarianism that began with World War II and continued in the cold war. As in these conflicts, the struggle is Manichean: the forces of evil (rogue states, terrorists, tribalists) against the forces of good (democracies, tolerant societies).

From this perspective, Mr. Lake argued at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington this month that the world no longer appears clear, black and comprehensible-but that our enemies are easily identifiable. The threat is still authoritarianism; our goal is still promoting democracy.

Stated this way, America's goal remains, the one that the Truman Doctrine established at the beginning of the cold war: democratic intervention all over the globe in defense of freedom.

Mr. Lake argues that we must be selective in our interventions, and the Administration says the United States cannot be the world's policeman. But a policy based on principle risks over-widening commitments or double standards and growing cynicism. When our commitments are challenged, the willingness to carry them out becomes a test of presidential and national credibility.

Thus, Mr. Lake sees Haiti as a test of the U.S. commitment to the defense of democracy, and views the demonstration of U.S. resolve to reestablish democracy there as having broad international implications.

Case in point: Haiti's eligibility for $200 million of U.S. aid. Clinton administration officials hope that the Haitian government can use the aid to improve the lives of the people, promote respect for human rights and help create a stable political environment in which the formation of political parties can take place.

But many of Clinton's foreign policy advisers fear that a successful intervention in Haiti could be used as an example by other would-be dictators to argue that the United States is using its power to promote democratic change.

"If we see that a [government] is threatening the public in one way or another," Mr. Lake said, "we have the option to take action. But if we are seen as using our power to promote democracy or to promote regime change, then our ability to act is very limited, and we would be perceived by a lot of people as having become a foreign policy force in support of democracy.

Mr. Lake argues that if America fails to preserve democracy in Haiti, a flood of Haitian refugees could have destabilizing effects throughout the Caribbean. Now or why such a view might occur is not explained. Despite constant fears of dominoes through- out the cold war, there was never a case that clearly demonstrated the validity of the domino theory.

The definition of democracy, as in the past, has become too elastic: one free election in its 300-year history did not make Haiti a democracy, nor necessarily make President Jean-Bertrand Aristide a democrat. In Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda, the principle of support for democracy provided no useful guidance for policy.

The fundamental problem with basing foreign policy on the defense of democracy through intervention is that our Government lacks the means-and will lack the domestic political support-to carry out such a policy. When other countries lack the political and cultural roots of democracy, it is impossible for outsiders to create them, and the use of force in support of democracy will be unwarranted.

Somalia provided an easy post- cold-war lesson: in the difficulties of using our power to produce political change in a society we understand imperfectly and can, barely influence. The goal of nation-building, which came to symbolize American hybrids in Vietnam, was unexpectedly revived during the Clinton phase of U.S. involvement in Somalia. Fortunately, its impracticality was quickly recognized. But the problem of political change is even more daunting in Haiti.

The limits of our ability to act since the end of the cold war have also been demonstrated in Bosnia, where neither politicians in the former Yugoslavia nor America's allies have been able to make peace, and in the tension between the United States and the United Nations in the wake of the 1993 embassy bombings in Cairo, Libya and Damascus.

The lack of public support for intervention in Haiti is strong, and the strong reaction to the relatively limited U.S. involvement in Somalia suggests that Americans are now unlikely to pay a substantial price on behalf of vague causes like world order, democracy or national security.

The incoherence of the Administration's foreign policy arises partly from its tendency to take broad- brained base on principles, like the support of democracy, against authoritarianism, that frequently conflict with other interests and political reality. Backtracking, as in the case of the Clinton policy toward human rights in China, creates an appearance of uncertainty and in- competence.

Administration spokesmen have tended to nuke threats, implying that if this country does not take decisive action, American or global security will be put at risk. But when it has faced the implications of its state- ments, it has pulled back.

Thus, Secretary of Defense William S. Perry called the North Korea nuclear program a threat to the "entire world" and Mr. Clinton implied the possibility of a pre-emptive at- tack. But the Administration ulti- mately decided to negotiate.

While the U.S. must remain active in the world, it needs to undertake a much less ambitious foreign policy agenda. If it seeks to lead a move- ment for a world order based on democracy, it will exhaust itself in the effort. Its foreign policy will be come even more incoherent as domestic and international constraints limit its capacity to achieve its the- realitical goals. And its domestic poli- cies will be roiled by the clamor over its foreign policy failures, diverting its modest efforts from more essential tasks at home and abroad.

Robert H. Johnson is a fellow at the National Planning Association, a research organization specializing in economic and social issues, and author of "Improbable Dangers: U.S. Conceptions of Threat is the Cold War and After."
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Today, we -- all of us in this room who believe in American engagement -- have a still more difficult challenge. We must seek to be as creative and constructive -- in the literal sense of that word -- as the generation of the late 1940’s. For we see a world of opportunity for such construction. But we must do it in the domestic circumstances not of the 1940’s but of the 1920’s, when there was no single, foreign threat against which to rally public opinion and head off the destructive isolationism that followed.

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But for all its dangers this new world presents immense opportunities -- the chance to reshape and create new international security and economic structures that are not merely adapted to post-Cold War realities, but are specifically designed to consolidate the victory of the idea of democracy and open markets.

The issue for the next decade is whether our efforts at this construction can succeed in the face of the centrifugal forces at work within and among nations. This requires designing structures with the flexibility to withstand shifting threats to their stability, much like skyscrapers in Los Angeles or Mexico City are built with enough give to weather an earthquake. And it means that we must infuse these structures with the ideals and habits of democracy.

Democracy is at once the foundation and the purpose of the international structures we must build. It is the foundation because, as Zbig Brzezinski has put it, “If one builds...only with bricks and mortar we will find that something profound is missing, and the structure may not prove enduring, because societies as viable entities exist on the basis of conviction, of commitment, of certain shared values.” It is also the purpose because the security structures that defend our safety and the economic institutions that expand trade and create jobs, give democracy the chance to flourish.

We are not starry eyed about the prospects for spreading democracy -- it will not soon take hold everywhere. But we know that the larger the pool of democracies, the better off we will be. Democracies create free markets that offer economic opportunity and make for more reliable trading partners. They tend not to abuse the civil and political rights of their citizens. And democracies are far less likely to wage war on one another. Civilized behavior within borders
encourages it beyond them. So it is in our interest to do all that we can to enlarge the community of free and open societies, especially in areas of greatest strategic interest, as in the former Soviet Union.

I. Building New Structures

I believe that over the past twenty months, building often on the work of our predecessors, we have made a good start at this process of construction. Working with our allies, President Clinton has moved to create new security arrangements, or revitalize old ones, and to devise pro-trade economic institutions, or modernize existing ones.

To meet the new reality in Europe, we are deeply engaged in transforming existing structures to fulfill President Clinton's vision of an integrated continent. While NATO is and must remain the foundation of security and stability for the trans-Atlantic community, it must adapt to changing times so as to keep the peace -- and, if necessary, make the peace. That's why President Clinton has taken the lead in establishing the Combined Joint Task Forces for peacekeeping and crisis management, and the "Partnership for Peace," to begin the process of expanding security in Europe eastward. And that is one reason why NATO's action in Bosnia is so important: it is the first time NATO has undertaken actual military operations; the first time NATO has operated beyond the borders of its member states; the first time it has acted in behalf of the United Nations; the first time it has acted in close cooperation with the Russian Federation.

For the new European democracies, the Partnership for Peace is the lighthouse at the entrance to NATO's harbor, offering real, practical military and defense cooperation with NATO. The Partnership also gives a boost to reformers and commits all Partners to open up and democratize their defense forces. While keeping us prepared for the worst, the Partnership allows us to work toward the best possible outcome for Europe -- a community of democratic and stable nations.
In Asia, because there is no equivalent to NATO, we must develop a series of arrangements that will function, as President Clinton has put it, "like overlapping plates of armor, individually providing protection and together covering the whole body of our common security concerns.” These plates include the deployment of American forces to meet bilateral treaty arrangements and varied multilateral efforts -- from our attempt to defuse the North Korean nuclear threat to our participation in regional security dialogues, such as the unprecedented gathering in July of the ASEAN countries and others, including the United States, Russia, and Vietnam.

While the new global economy has delivered wonderful possibilities for growth and creativity, it also has limited governments’ ability to control their nations’ economic future. This has bred fear and insecurity within each of our societies -- especially among those left behind, and who blame their personal predicament on ominous, unidentified international forces.

There is a powerful lesson here for those of us concerned with sustaining our country’s prosperity in the decades to come. That is the need to design structures with the every day, real interests of Americans in mind, that produce tangible benefits for them and turn their uncertainty into hope.

One striking example is NAFTA, whose passage President Clinton went to the mat to secure. Already, NAFTA has dramatically accelerated the exchange of goods and ideas between the United States, Mexico and Canada. For all it promises to achieve in its own right, NAFTA is just the starting point for the integration of our hemisphere. Other trading compacts are following NAFTA. And we will pursue hemispheric integration at the Summit of the Americas, convened by the President in Miami next December.

In Asia, where our trade translates into almost 2.5 million American jobs, President Clinton took the lead and hosted the first ever gathering of the Organization for Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders. By setting pro-growth policies, toppling trade barriers, and cutting
regulatory red tape within the fast growing Asian-Pacific economies, we can take tangible steps to improve our peoples' lives. And a heavier flow of American goods, services and people in the region will help spread the ideals and the wealth of tolerant societies and build an integrated Asian-Pacific community.

Our difficult but successful completion of the GATT Uruguay Round, begun eight years ago, also will make a real difference in real lives. By lowering barriers to trade and bringing more nations into an open trading system, this accord promises to lift substantially American wages and living standards, and to do the same for other nations around the world. GATT's successor, the World Trade Organization, not only will ensure a more even international playing field, but also will provide a forum to resolve disputes openly and amicably.

The struggle to consolidate our victories in 1945 and in the Cold War involves not only construction, but also the patient application of diplomacy, and the measured exercise of power.

We use diplomacy to pursue peace. But peace is not just an end in itself. It also creates conditions necessary for the habits of democracy and community to thrive. Thus, when we support and foster peace in the Middle East or Northern Ireland or Southern Africa, we are promoting the tolerant society as well. It is no accident that the enemies of peace in such areas are also apostles of intolerance and extremism.

Effective diplomacy today -- as throughout human history -- depends not only on the skill of our diplomats, but also on the power that lies behind it.

The progress we have made in Bosnia, for example, came when power was tied to our diplomatic ends. The Sarajevo ultimatum largely succeeded because the threat of NATO air power was judged real. It provided the catalyst for the agreement on a federation between the Croatians and
Muslims in Bosnia, in itself a development of great strategic importance there. And I believe that after the recent rejection of peace by the Bosnian Serbs, it was the threat of further action by NATO, combined with the effect of our sanctions, that led Slobodan Milosevic to promise to effectively close Serbia's border with them.

Our approach to Haiti has also relied on diplomacy backed by power -- the power of our sanctions as well as the real threat of the use of force. The responsible course has been to pursue every possible diplomatic way to reach our goal there. But make no mistake: when diplomatic efforts are exhausted, the power behind them then becomes the only alternative.

Our goal is clear. For two Administrations, that goal has been the restoration of democratic government.

For almost twenty months we have vigorously pursued every diplomatic avenue available to achieve a peaceful transfer of power from the coup leaders back to the democratically elected government. We have tightened sanctions all we can without crushing the Haitian people. Our efforts have failed to move the military leaders. Their brutality, if anything, gets worse. They alone are responsible for Haiti's terrible predicament.

In response, the international community has spoken clearly and authoritatively, through the United Nations Security Council. Resolution 940 authorizes the use of all necessary means, including force, to restore democracy to Haiti.

Thus far, seventeen countries with some 1,500 personnel have told us they will join the international coalition in some form, and others are considering it. Additional nations will sign up when the coalition is replaced by the UN mission.
I believe there is a great deal at stake here. First is the essential reliability of the United States and the international community. Having exhausted all other remedies, we must make it clear that we mean what we say. Our actions in Haiti will send a message far beyond our region -- to all who seriously threaten our interests.

Second, there is a new wave of democracy sweeping over this hemisphere. But it is not irreversible. Haiti is a critical test of our commitment to defend democracy, especially where it is most fragile.

Third, the United States has a particular interest in curbing gross abuses of human rights when they occur so close to our shores. Murder, rape and intimidation are a systematic part of this regime's reign of terror. The victims are women, children, orphans and even priests. These abuses will end only when the dictators are gone.

Finally, the consequences of this festering problem will not be confined to Haiti. We risk a further explosion of refugees, a mass exodus that could de-stabilize the region and prove difficult for us to contain.

So the military leaders must go. We still hope that they will do so voluntarily. But our message to them is clear: we will act if we must, and time is running out.

II. The Threats to Construction

As we build new structures and wield the tools of power and diplomacy, we must keep an eye to the long term threats to our efforts. In effect, we have to adopt the methods of the architect. Before starting a project, any good designer sits down with the client and asks a few basic
questions: what's the building for; what are your needs; how much time do you spend in each room? And in New England, we know also to ask this question: what direction do the high winds and storm fronts come from?

The threats to our international construction come from many quarters. Bosnia and Haiti, for example, are not simply transitory tragedies, immediate crises that can divert us from the "big picture." Rather they are part of something bigger and more menacing that threatens to undermine the foreign policy structures we are working so hard to build: the ethnic and other historic divisions within nations that tear them apart and in some regions threaten the definition of the nation itself.

It cannot and must not be the responsibility of the international community or this nation finally to resolve those deeply-rooted conflicts. We cannot force a reversal of centuries of animosity in a few years. To attempt to do so would condemn peacekeeping efforts to costly failure.

But where practical, we can save lives, as in Rwanda, and we can offer conflicted societies a breathing space in which to sort out their own affairs. Whether or not they do so must, in the end, be their own responsibility.

Where and when UN peacekeeping can and should engage cannot, in a world of such rapid changes, clearly be predicted on some briefer's multicolored map. But we can be very clear about the criteria to use in making those decisions. Following our very careful policy review, we are insisting, for example, that every peacekeeping operation have a clear mission, with adequate funding and a reasonable plan for completion.
These explosions within states -- in Eastern Europe, in Africa and elsewhere -- while rooted in historic hatreds, are also exacerbated by the so-called transnational problems whose dimensions have been more clearly exposed by the end of the Cold War.

Mass migration and refugees. The population explosion. An endangered environment. A nefarious nexus of crime, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Our institutions must be built to withstand, and ultimately to reverse, these threats.

The Cairo Conference on population growth and sustainable development rightly addresses perhaps the most important underlying transnational threat before us, and America is leading in the response.

But in our struggle against the forces of hatred, more attention must also be given, I believe, to the horrific prospect of the growing links among organized crime, drug trafficking, terrorism, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Several times in the last month, police seized weapons-quality plutonium smuggled into Germany from Russia. We should be thankful that superior police work and cooperation among various intelligence services -- including our own -- intercepted this deadly cargo. But we also should be concerned. Imagine, for example, what would have happened if the World Trade Center terrorists had detonated a non-conventional device.

This nexus demands a coordinated, international response. Mere vigilance will not suffice. The amount of plutonium needed to make a bomb is no bigger than a can of Coke. Intensified cooperation among various criminal justice systems is one of the most potent weapons in our arsenal. Over the past few years, we have greatly enhanced our intelligence sharing with allies and through Interpol, increased regular consultations, and engaged in joint anti-terrorist training. Most recently, in July, FBI director Louis Freeh visited several Eastern European countries and
Russia, where he stressed the risks of nuclear proliferation through the efforts of organized crime and proposed new cooperative initiatives in response. Ultimately, this informal network of concerned nations will likely evolve into a new structure to counter what must rank as one of the greatest long term threats to our security.

And, as I said before, there is the immediate threat to our efforts at construction posed by the regional rogue states who seek to develop and traffic in the weapons of mass destruction, who support terrorism, who are no less dedicated to the destruction of the tolerant society than were the defeated leaders of fascism and communism.

That is why this President is determined to maintain and modernize the finest military in the world so we can deter aggression -- and counter it when the need arises. Why we have developed and are pursuing a strategy of "dual containment" of both Iraq and Iran. And why we will maintain our commitment to our South Korean allies, even as we negotiate a resolution of the nuclear issue with the North.

III. Our Challenge

The struggle before us, while in the tradition of the centuries-old fight between the ideas of freedom and authoritarianism, is also very new. Because we must fight on so many fronts at once, we will only make progress over time, in small victories, not only through the exercise of our power but also through patience, persistence and pragmatism.

We Americans are an impatient people. But patience, persistence and pragmatism are not evidence of indecision: they are the hallmarks of determination.
Choice, not chance, determines destiny. After World War I, we chose withdrawal, leaving a vacuum that was filled by the forces of hatred and tyranny. After World War II, we chose engagement, creating the institutions that guaranteed 50 years of freedom and prosperity.

Today, at this century's third major turning point, the Clinton Administration has chosen: Rather than throw up our hands in despair at the complexities of the post-Cold War era, we have thrown ourselves with determination into the fight against those who would deny people their human rights, terrorists who threaten innocents, and pariah states who choose repression and extremism over openness and moderation. We have thrown ourselves, in short, into the long struggle for democracy and the order it brings.

In so doing, we take up the challenge previous generations met so well. Inspired by their example, aware of the responsibility they left, we are helping to create a world where tolerance, freedom and democracy prevail.
Address by Anthony Lake
National Security Adviser
The Council on Foreign Relations
September 12, 1994
“The Purpose of American Power”

I’m delighted to be here. And Mort, thank you for that generous introduction. It’s always a pleasure to hear any words of praise from a prominent member of the Fourth Estate. Still vivid in my memory are the times that’s happened before — both of them.

I want to talk to you tonight about the purpose of American power in the world, as we chart a course in a radically new international environment.

Charting such a course has never been easy. While the policy of containment looks obvious to us in retrospect, we should remember that it took President Truman and Dean Acheson several years to define their way and build a policy consensus behind it. And they had the advantage of an ideologically and geographically distinct adversary with whom to contend.

Today, we — all of us in this room who believe in American engagement — have a still more difficult challenge. We must seek to be as creative and constructive — in the literal sense of that word — as the generation of the late 1940’s. For we see a world of opportunity for such construction. But we must do it in the domestic circumstances not of the 1940’s but of the 1920’s, when there was no single, foreign threat against which to rally public opinion.

To most Americans, the post-Cold War era seems chaotic. The easy divisions of the Cold War have given way to a confused complex of problems: “Traditional” threats of aggression by regional bullies. Emerging transnational threats like environmental decay, over-population and
refugees. A global economic and information free-for-all that increases wealth and opportunity, but also produces fear and uncertainty within all nations. And the carnage of terrible ethnic conflicts.

In short, for too many of our people and commentators, we seem to face an incomprehensible chaos that prevents us from setting a clearly defined goal for the exercise of American power and diplomacy.

I believe that view is profoundly and dangerously wrong.

For there is a simple truth about this new world. That truth is this: the same idea that was under attack by fascism and then by communism remains under attack today, but on many fronts at once. And the resulting struggle has been at the heart of American foreign policy throughout the past five and one-half decades.

In defeating fascism, and prevailing over communism, we were defending an idea that comes under many names -- democracy, liberty, civility, pluralism -- but has a constant face. It is the face of the tolerant society, in which leaders and governments exist not to use or abuse people, but to provide them with freedom and opportunity, to preserve individual human dignity. Societies in which the wonderful paradox of democracy is at work -- the paradox that a central devotion to pluralism best allows the unity of the free.

Today, those societies -- from the fragile to the mature -- remain under assault. Far from reaching the end of history, we are at the dawn of a new stage in this old struggle. This is not a clash of civilizations. Rather, it is a contest that pits nations and individuals guided by openness, responsive government and moderation against those animated by isolation, repression and extremism. The enemies of the tolerant society are not some nameless, faceless force. They are
extreme nationalists and tribalists, terrorists, organized criminals, coup plotters, rogue states and all those who would return newly freed societies to the intolerant ways of the past.

But for all its dangers this new world presents immense opportunities — the chance to adapt and create new international security and economic structures that are not merely sized to post-Cold War realities, but are specifically designed to consolidate the victory of the idea of democracy and open markets.

The issue for the next decade is whether our efforts at this construction can succeed in the face of the centrifugal forces at work within and among nations. This requires designing structures with the flexibility to withstand shifting threats to their stability, much like skyscrapers in Los Angeles or Mexico City are built with enough give to weather an earthquake. And it means that we must infuse these structures with the ideals and values of democracy.

Democracy is at once the foundation and the purpose of the international structures we must build. It is the foundation because, as Zbig Brzezinski has put it, “If one builds...only with bricks and mortar we will find that something profound is missing, and the structure may not prove enduring, because societies as viable entities exist on the basis of conviction, of commitment, of certain shared values.” It is also the purpose because the security structures that defend our safety and the economic institutions that expand trade and create jobs, give democracy the chance to flourish.

We are not starry eyed about the prospects for spreading democracy — it will not soon take hold everywhere. But we know that the larger the pool of democracies, the better off we will be. Democracies are less likely to wage war on one another. They create free markets that offer economic opportunity and make for more reliable trading partners. And they are far less likely to abuse the civil and political rights of their citizens. Civilized behavior within borders encourages
it beyond them. So it is in our interest to do all that we can to enlarge the community of free and open societies, especially in areas of greatest strategic interest, as in the former Soviet Union.

I. Building New Structures

I believe that over the past nineteen months, building on the work of our predecessors, we have made a good start at this process of construction. Working with our allies, President Clinton has moved to create new security arrangements, or revitalize old ones, and to devise pro-trade economic institutions, or modernize existing ones.

To meet the new reality in Europe, we are deeply engaged in transforming existing structures to fulfill President Clinton’s vision of an integrated continent. While NATO is and must remain the foundation of security and stability for the trans-Atlantic community, it must adapt to changing times so as to keep the peace — and, if necessary, make the peace. That’s why President Clinton has taken the lead in establishing the Combined Joint Task Forces for peacekeeping and crisis management, and the “Partnership for Peace,” to begin the process of expanding security in Europe eastward.

For the new European democracies, the Partnership for Peace is the lighthouse at the entrance to NATO’s harbor, offering real, practical military and defense cooperation with NATO. For Russia, the Partnership gives a boost to reformers and commits Moscow to open up and democratize its defense forces. While keeping us prepared for the worst, the Partnership allows us to work toward the best possible outcome for Europe — a community of democratic and stable nations.

In Asia, because there is no equivalent to NATO, we must develop a series of arrangements that will function, as President Clinton has put it, “like overlapping plates of armor, individually providing protection and together covering the whole body of our common security concerns.”
These plates include the deployment of American forces to meet bilateral treaty arrangements and varied multilateral efforts— from our attempt to defuse the North Korean nuclear threat to our participation in regional security dialogues, such as last year's unprecedented gathering of the ASEAN countries, including the United States, Russia, and Vietnam.

While the new global economy has delivered wonderful possibilities for growth and creativity, it also has limited governments' ability to control their nations' economic future. This has bred fear and insecurity within each of our societies— especially among those left behind, and who blame their personal predicament on ominous, unidentified international forces.

There is a powerful lesson here for those of us concerned with sustaining our country's prosperity in the decades to come. That is the need to design structures with the every day, real interests of Americans in mind, that produce tangible benefits for them and turn their uncertainty into hope.

One striking example is NAFTA, whose passage President Clinton went to the mat to secure. Already, NAFTA has dramatically accelerated the exchange of goods and ideas between the United States, Mexico and Canada. For all it promises to achieve in its own right, NAFTA is just the starting point for the integration of our hemisphere. Other regional compacts modeled after NAFTA will follow. And we will pursue hemispheric integration at the Summit of the Americas, convened by the President in Miami next December.

In Asia, where our trade translates into almost 2.5 million American jobs, President Clinton took the lead and hosted the first ever gathering of the Organization for Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders. By setting pro-growth policies, toppling trade barriers, and cutting regulatory red tape within the fast growing Asian-Pacific economies, we can take tangible steps to improve our peoples' lives. And a heavier flow of American goods, services and people in the
region will help spread the ideals and the wealth of tolerant societies and build an integrated Asian-Pacific community.

Our difficult but successful completion of the GATT Uruguay Round, begun eight years ago, also will make a real difference in real lives. By lowering barriers to trade and bringing more nations into an open trading system, this accord promises to lift substantially American wages and living standards, and to do the same for other nations around the world. GATT’s successor, the World Trade Organization, not only will ensure a more even international playing field, but also will provide a forum to resolve disputes openly and amicably.

The process of construction also involves the patient application of diplomacy, and the measured exercise of power.

We use diplomacy to pursue peace. But peace is not just an end in itself. It also creates conditions necessary for the habits of democracy and community to thrive. Thus, when we support and foster peace in the Middle East or Northern Ireland or Southern Africa, we are promoting the tolerant society as well. It is no accident that the enemies of peace in such areas are also apostles of intolerance and extremism.

Effective diplomacy today — as throughout human history — depends not only on the skill of our diplomats, but also on the power that lies behind it.

The progress we have made in Bosnia, for example, came when power — implicit or explicit — was tied to our diplomatic ends. The Sarajevo ultimatum largely succeeded because the threat of NATO air power was judged real. It [TK TK TK] provided the catalyst for the agreement on a federation between the Croats and Muslims in Bosnia, in itself a development of great strategic importance there. And I believe that after the recent rejection of peace by the Bosnian Serbs, it
was the threat of further action by NATO, combined with the effect of our sanctions, that led Slobodan Milosevic to promise effectively to close Serbia’s border with them.

Our approach to Haiti has also relied on diplomacy backed by power — the power of our sanctions as well as the real threat of the use of force. The responsible course has been to pursue every possible diplomatic way to reach our goal there. But make no mistake: when diplomacy fails, the power behind it then becomes the only alternative.

Our goal is clear. For two Administrations, that goal has been the restoration of democratic government.

For almost twenty months we have vigorously pursued every diplomatic avenue available to achieve a peaceful transfer of power from the coup leaders back to the democratically elected government. We have tightened sanctions all we can without crushing the Haitian people. Our efforts have failed to move the military leaders. Their brutality, if anything, gets worse. They alone are responsible for Haiti’s terrible predicament.

In response, the international community has spoken clearly and authoritatively, through the United Nations Security Council. Resolution 940 authorizes the use of all necessary means, including force, to restore democracy to Haiti.

Thus far, more than a dozen countries in addition to the United States have told us they will join the international coalition in some form, and others are considering it. Additional nations will sign up when the coalition is replaced by the UN mission.

I believe there is a great deal at stake here. First is the essential reliability of the United States and the international community. Having exhausted all other remedies, we must make it clear that we
mean what we say. Our actions in Haiti will send a message far beyond our region — to places like North Korea and Iraq and wherever else our interests are threatened.

Second, there is a new wave of democracy sweeping over this hemisphere. But it is not irreversible. Haiti is a critical test of our commitment to defend democracy, especially where it is most fragile.

Third, the United States has a particular interest in curbing gross abuses of human rights when they occur so close to our shores. Murder, rape and intimidation are a systematic part of this regime's reign of terror. The victims are women, children, orphans and even priests. These abuses will end only when the dictators are gone.

Finally, the consequences of this festering problem will not be confined to Haiti. We risk a further explosion of refugees, a mass exodus that could de-stabilize the region and prove difficult for us to contain.

So the military leaders must go. We still hope that they will do so voluntarily. The more resolute and united we are, the more likely it is that they will.

But it must be absolutely clear to them: we will act if we must, and time is running out.

II. The Threats to Construction

As we build new structures and wield the tools of power and diplomacy, we must keep an eye to the long term threats to our efforts. In effect, we have to adopt the habits of the architect. Before starting a project, any good designer sits down with the client and asks a few basic questions: what's the building for, what are your needs, how much time do you spend in each
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The threats to our international construction come from many quarters. Bosnia and Haiti, for example, are not simply transitory tragedies, immediate crises that can divert us from the “big picture.” Rather they are part of something bigger and more menacing that threatens to undermine the foreign policy structures we are working so hard to build: the ethnic and other historic divisions within nations that tear them apart and in some regions threaten the definition of the nation itself.

It cannot and must not be the responsibility of the international community or this nation finally to resolve those conflicts. We cannot force a reversal of centuries of animosity in a few years. To attempt to do so would condemn the United Nations [TK TK TK] to costly failure.

But where practical, we can save lives, as in Rwanda, and we can offer conflicted societies a breathing space in which to sort out their own affairs. Whether or not they do so must, in the end, be their own responsibility.

Where and when UN peacekeeping can and should engage cannot, in a world of such rapid changes, clearly be predicted on some brief’s multicolored map. But we can be very clear about the criteria to use in making those decisions. Following our very careful policy review, we are insisting, for example, that every peacekeeping operation have a clear mission, with adequate funding and a reasonable plan for completion.

In addition to these explosions within nations — in the former Soviet Union, in Africa and elsewhere — we also face the so-called transnational problems that the end of the Cold War has made all too real.
Mass migration and refugees. The population explosion. An endangered environment. A nefarious nexus of crime, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Our institutions must be built to withstand, and ultimately to reverse, these threats.

The Cairo Conference on population growth and sustainable development rightly addresses perhaps the single most important underlying transnational threat before us, and America is leading in the response:

But more attention must also be given, I believe, to the horrific potential of the growing nexus among organized crime, drug trafficking, terrorism, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Four times in the last month, police seized weapons-quality plutonium smuggled into Germany from Russia. We should be thankful that superior police work and cooperation among various intelligence services -- including our own -- intercepted this deadly cargo. But we also should be concerned. Imagine, for example, what would have happened if the World Trade Center terrorists had detonated a non-conventional device.

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III. Our Challenge

The struggle before us, while in the tradition of the centuries-old fight between the ideas of freedom and authoritarianism, is also very new. Because we must fight on so many fronts at once, we can only make progress over time, in small victories, not only through the exercise of our power but also through patience, persistence and pragmatic experimentation.

We Americans are an impatient people. But patience, persistence and pragmatism are not evidence of indecision: they are the hallmarks of determination.

Choice, not chance, determines destiny. After World War I, we chose withdrawal, leaving a vacuum that was filled by the forces of hatred and tyranny. After World War II, we chose engagement, creating the institutions that guaranteed 50 years of freedom and prosperity.

Today, at this century's third major turning point, the Clinton Administration has chosen. Rather than throw up our hands in despair at the complexities of the post-Cold War era, we have thrown
ourselves with determination into the fight against those who would deny people their human rights, terrorists who threaten innocents, and pariah states who choose repression and extremism over openness and moderation. We have thrown ourselves, in short, into the struggle for tolerance and democracy.

In so doing, we take up the challenge previous generations met so well. Inspired by their example, aware of the responsibility, we are moving forward to help create a world where tolerance, freedom and democracy prevail.
Immediate Action Request

Attached, please find a draft of remarks that Mr. Lake will deliver to the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington this Monday, September 12 at 6 p.m.

Please make known any comments to Tony Blinken (NSC/Speech Writing) at telephone 456-5689 or fax 456-6485 by 11 a.m. September 12.

Thank you.

To Tony B

My thoughts.

I think it's good. See comments.

Hank
Address by Anthony Lake
National Security Adviser

The Council on Foreign Relations
September 12, 1994

“The Purpose of American Power”

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Charting such a course has never been easy. While the policy of containment looks obvious to us in retrospect, we should remember that it took President Truman and Dean Acheson several years to define their way and build a policy consensus behind it. And they had the advantage of an ideologically and geographically distinct adversary with whom to contend.

Today, we — all of us in this room who believe in American engagement — have a still more difficult challenge. We must seek to be as creative and constructive — in the literal sense of that word — as the generation of the late 1940’s. For we see a world of opportunity for such construction. But we must do it in the domestic circumstances not of the 1940’s but of the 1920’s, when there was no single, foreign threat against which to rally public opinion.

To most Americans, the post-Cold War era seems chaotic. The easy divisions of the Cold War have given way to a confused complex of problems: “Traditional” threats of aggression by regional bullies. Emerging transnational threats like environmental decay, over-population and
refugees. A global economic and information free-for-all that increases wealth and opportunity, but also produces fear and uncertainty within all nations. And the carnage of terrible ethnic conflicts.

In short, for too many of our people and commentators, we seem to face an incomprehensible chaos that prevents us from setting a clearly defined goal for the exercise of American power and diplomacy.

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In defeating fascism, and prevailing over communism, we were defending an idea that comes under many names — democracy, liberty, civility, pluralism — but has a constant face. It is the face of the tolerant society, in which leaders and governments exist not to use or abuse people, but to provide them with freedom and opportunity, to preserve individual human dignity.

Societies in which the wonderful paradox of democracy is at work — the paradox that a central devotion to pluralism best allows the unity of the free.

Today, those societies — from the fragile to the mature — remain under assault. Far from reaching the end of history, we are at the start of a new stage in this old struggle. This is not a clash of civilizations. Rather, it is a contest that pits nations and individuals guided by openness, responsive government and moderation against those animated by isolation, repression and extremism. The enemies of the tolerant society are not some nameless, faceless force. They are
extreme nationalists and tribalists, terrorists, organized criminals, coup plotters, rogue states and all those who would return newly freed societies to the intolerant ways of the past.

But for all its dangers this new world presents immense opportunities — the chance to reshape and create new international security and economic structures that are not merely adapted to post-Cold War realities, but are specifically designed to consolidate the victory of the idea of democracy and open markets. Our challenge is to build this new architecture.

The issue for the next decade is whether our efforts at this construction can succeed in the face of the centrifugal forces at work within and among nations. This requires designing structures with the flexibility to withstand shifting threats to their stability, much like skyscrapers in Los Angeles or Mexico City are built with enough give to weather an earthquake. And it means that we must infuse these structures with the ideals and habits of democracy.

Democracy is at once the foundation and the purpose of the international structures we must build. It is the foundation because, as Zbig Brzezinski has put it, "If one builds... only with bricks and mortar we will find that something profound is missing, and the structure may not prove enduring, because societies as viable entities exist on the basis of conviction, of commitment, of certain shared values." It is also the purpose because the security structures that defend our safety and the economic institutions that expand trade and create jobs, give democracy the chance to flourish.

We are not starry eyed about the prospects for spreading democracy — it will not soon take hold everywhere. But we know that the larger the pool of democracies, the better off we will be. Democracies create free markets that offer economic opportunity and make for more reliable trading partners. They tend not to abuse the civil and political rights of their citizens. And democracies are far less likely to wage war on one another. Civilized behavior within borders
encourages it beyond them. So it is in our interest to do all that we can to enlarge the community of free and open societies, especially in areas of greatest strategic interest, as in the former Soviet Union.

I. Building New Structures

I believe that over the past nineteen months, building often on the work of our predecessors, we have made a good start at this process of construction. Working with our allies, President Clinton has moved to create new security arrangements, or revitalize old ones, and to devise pro-trade economic institutions, or modernize existing ones.

To meet the new reality in Europe, we are deeply engaged in transforming existing structures to fulfill President Clinton’s vision of an integrated continent. While NATO is and must remain the foundation of security and stability for the trans-Atlantic community, it must adapt to changing times so as to keep the peace — and, if necessary, make the peace. That’s why President Clinton has taken the lead in establishing the Combined Joint Task Forces for peacekeeping and crisis management, and the “Partnership for Peace,” to begin the process of expanding security in Europe eastward.

For the new European democracies, the Partnership for Peace is the lighthouse at the entrance to NATO’s harbor, offering real, practical military and defense cooperation with NATO. For Russia, the Partnership gives a boost to reformers and commits Moscow to open up and democratize its defense forces. While keeping us prepared for the worst, the Partnership allows us to work toward the best possible outcome for Europe — a community of democratic and stable nations.
between the Croatians and Muslims in Bosnia, in itself a development of great strategic importance there. And I believe that after the recent rejection of peace by the Bosnian Serbs, it was the threat of further action by NATO, combined with the effect of our sanctions, that led Slobodan Milosevic to promise to effectively close Serbia's border with them.

Our approach to Haiti has also relied on diplomacy backed by power -- the power of our sanctions as well as the real threat of the use of force. The responsible course has been to pursue every possible diplomatic way to reach our goal there. But make no mistake: when diplomacy fails, the power behind it then becomes the only alternative.

Our goal is clear. For two Administrations, that goal has been the restoration of democratic government.

For almost twenty months we have vigorously pursued every diplomatic avenue available to achieve a peaceful transfer of power from the coup leaders back to the democratically elected government. We have tightened sanctions all we can without crushing the Haitian people. Our efforts have failed to move the military leaders. Their brutality, if anything, gets worse. They alone are responsible for Haiti's terrible predicament.

In response, the international community has spoken clearly and authoritatively, through the United Nations Security Council. Resolution 940 authorizes the use of all necessary means, including force, to restore democracy to Haiti.

Thus far, more than a dozen countries have told us they will join the international coalition in some form, and others are considering it. Additional nations will sign up when the coalition is replaced by the UN mission.
I believe there is a great deal at stake here. First is the essential reliability of the United States and the international community. Having exhausted all other remedies, we must make it clear that we mean what we say. Our actions in Haiti will send a message far beyond our region — to places like North Korea and Iraq and wherever else our interests are threatened.

Second, there is a new wave of democracy sweeping over this hemisphere. But it is not irreversible. Haiti is a critical test of our commitment to defend democracy, especially where it is most fragile.

Third, the United States has a particular interest in curbing gross abuses of human rights when they occur so close to our shores. Murder, rape and intimidation are a systematic part of this regime’s reign of terror. The victims are women, children, orphans and even priests. These abuses will end only when the dictators are gone.

Finally, the consequences of this festering problem will not be confined to Haiti. We risk a further explosion of refugees, a mass exodus that could destabilize the region and prove difficult for us to contain.

So the military leaders must go. We still hope that they will do so voluntarily. The more resolute and united we are, the more likely it is that they will.

But it must be absolutely clear to them: we will act if we must, and time is running out.

II. The Threats to Construction

As we build new structures and wield the tools of power and diplomacy, we must keep an eye to the long term threats to our efforts. In effect, we have to adopt the habits of the architect. Before starting a project, any good designer sits down with the client and asks a few basic...
questions: what’s the building for; what are your needs; how much time do you spend in each room? And in New England, we know also to ask this question: what direction do the high winds and storm fronts come from?

The threats to our international construction come from many quarters. Bosnia and Haiti, for example, are not simply transitory tragedies, immediate crises that can divert us from the “big picture.” Rather they are part of something bigger and more menacing that threatens to undermine the foreign policy structures we are working so hard to build: the ethnic and other historic divisions within nations that tear them apart and in some regions threaten the definition of the nation itself.

It cannot and must not be the responsibility of the international community or this nation finally to resolve those conflicts. We cannot force a reversal of centuries of animosity in a few years. To attempt to do so would condemn peacekeeping efforts to costly failure.

But where practical, we can save lives, as in Rwanda, and we can offer conflicted societies a breathing space in which to sort out their own affairs. Whether or not they do so must, in the end, be their own responsibility.

Where and when UN peacekeeping can and should engage cannot, in a world of such rapid changes, clearly be predicted on some briefer’s multicolored map. But we can be very clear about the criteria to use in making those decisions. Following our very careful policy review, we are insisting, for example, that every peacekeeping operation have a clear mission, with adequate funding and a reasonable plan for completion.
These explosions within nations — in the former Soviet Union, in Africa and elsewhere — while rooted in historic hatreds, are also exacerbated by the so-called transnational problems whose dimensions have been more clearly exposed by the end of the Cold War.

Mass migration and refugees. The population explosion. An endangered environment. A nefarious nexus of crime, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Our institutions must be built to withstand, and ultimately to reverse, these threats.

The Cairo Conference on population growth and sustainable development rightly addresses perhaps the single most important underlying transnational threat before us, and America is leading in the response.

But more attention must also be given, I believe, to the horrific prospect of the growing links among organized crime, drug trafficking, terrorism, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Four times in the last month, police seized weapons-quality plutonium smuggled into Germany from Russia. We should be thankful that superior police work and cooperation among various intelligence services — including our own — intercepted this deadly cargo. But we also should be concerned. Imagine, for example, what would have happened if the World Trade Center terrorists had detonated a non-conventional device.

This nexus demands a coordinated, international response. Mere vigilance will not suffice. The amount of plutonium needed to make a bomb is no bigger than a can of Coke. Intensified cooperation among various criminal justice systems is one of the most potent weapons in our arsenal. Over the past few years, we have greatly enhanced our intelligence sharing with allies and through Interpol, increased regular consultations, and engaged in joint anti-terrorist training.

Most recently, in July, FBI director Louis Freeh visited several Eastern European countries and Russia, where he stressed the risks of nuclear proliferation through the efforts of organized crime.
and proposed new cooperative initiatives in response. Ultimately, this informal network of concerned nations will likely evolve into a new structure to counter what must rank as one of the greatest long term threats to our security.

And, as I said before, there is the immediate threat to our efforts at construction posed by the regional rogue states who seek to develop and traffic in the weapons of mass destruction, who support terrorism, who are no less dedicated to the destruction of the tolerant society than were the defeated leaders of fascism and communism.

That is why this President is determined to maintain and modernize the finest military in the world so we can deter aggression -- and counter it when the need arises. Why we have developed and are pursuing a strategy of "dual containment" of both Iraq and Iran. And why we will maintain our commitment to our South Korean allies, even as we negotiate a resolution of the nuclear issue with the North.

III. Our Challenge

The struggle before us, while in the tradition of the centuries-old fight between the ideas of freedom and authoritarianism, is also very new. Because we must fight on so many fronts at once, we can only make progress over time, in small victories, not only through the exercise of our power but also through patience, persistence and pragmatic experimentation.

We Americans are an impatient people. But patience, persistence and pragmatism are not evidence of indecision: they are the hallmarks of determination.

Choice, not chance, determines destiny. After World War I, we chose withdrawal, leaving a vacuum that was filled by the forces of hatred and tyranny. After World War II, we chose engagement, creating the institutions that guaranteed 50 years of freedom and prosperity.
Today, at this century's third major turning point, the Clinton Administration has chosen. Rather than throw up our hands in despair at the complexities of the post-Cold War era, we have thrown ourselves with determination into the fight against those who would deny people their human rights, terrorists who threaten innocents, and pariah states who choose repression and extremism over openness and moderation. We have thrown ourselves, in short, into the long struggle for democracy and the order it brings.

In so doing, we take up the challenge previous generations met so well. Inspired by their example, aware of the responsibility they left, we are helping to create a world where tolerance, freedom and democracy prevail.
001. speech
re: Address by Anthony Lake, National Security Advisor - The Council on Foreign Relations (Rob edits - new version - extensive comments) (16 pages)

09/12/1994
P5

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Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Lake meeting 9/8/94

CFR speech

more purpose, less accomplishment —

purpose of American power — increasingly post-Cold War era as world of chaos/conflict — that's wrong

while complex and new, a fundamental issue — conflict of Cold War replaced by a new struggle which requires American leadership/powers/

victory in Cold War was victory of idea —

idea of liberal democracy, tolerance, pluralism, civilized relations — challenged by fundamentalism.

now this is challenged by a panoply of threats — enul terrorism, not named forces of history aggressors/mullahs.

victory over communism has not been secured/consolidated — only US has power to do this

challenge not only to enlarge democracies/markets but consolidate victory against communism —

defeating them, where we can constructing the new architecture —

architecture forces aimed to destroy values — forces of intolerance — not clash of civilizations but
Ireland, Mideast, S Africa, as a victory for civilization —

opposed by forces opposed to civilization —

diplomacy doesn't always work — sometimes it fails,

Gaddafi, Haiti —

struggle continues — enemies still there, but

struggle not rhetorical —

at stake is victory not only ideas.

terrorism is less clear, more diffuse — requires
great flexibility —

victories are going to be relative,

give fractured societies breathing space, but not

of the single enemy

consolidate victory over Cold War —

through new structures — security/economic —

we've exhausted the diplomatic options —
intensive growth in human society. The idea of an acceptable standard of conduct along with the law are fundamental to the prevention of terrorism, and they are also crucial to the preservation of peace and stability. Peace is an idea that cannot be maintained without economic and political stability. The idea of an acceptable standard of conduct in the context of the Law of Conventions on the Law of the Sea is not an idea that can be maintained without economic and political stability. The idea of an acceptable standard of conduct in the context of the Law of Conventions on the Law of the Sea is not an idea that can be maintained without economic and political stability. The idea of an acceptable standard of conduct in the context of the Law of Conventions on the Law of the Sea is not an idea that can be maintained without economic and political stability.