

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	David Sherman to Michael Hurley et al; re: Kosovo (1 page)	06/22/1999	P1/b(1)
002. cable	re: Yugoslavia (2 pages)	06/02/1999	P1/b(1)
003. cable	re: Yugoslavia (3 pages)	06/02/1999	P1/b(1)
004. cable	re: Balkan Crisis/Kosovo (3 pages)	05/20/1999	P1/b(1)
005. cable	re: Yugoslavia (5 pages)	05/14/1999	P1/b(1)
006a. fax cover sheet	Tom Warrick to Mary Quinn et al; re: Proposed Interagency Talking Points for ICTY Prosecutor Louise Arbour [50 USC 403 (g), Section 6] (partial) (1 page)	04/28/1999	P3/b(3)
006b. talking points	re: Talking Points for Interagency Use with Louise Arbour (1 page)	04/28/1999	P1/b(1)
007. email	David Wippman to Press - Public Affairs et al; re: Kosovo (1 page)	04/19/1999	P1/b(1) <i>✓ 3/3/2020</i>
008. cable	Secretary of State, Washington, D.C. to American Embassy, The Hague; re: Message for Arbour on USG Support for ICTY (2 pages)	04/16/1999	P1/b(1)
009a. fax cover sheet	DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force to Sandy Berger et al; re: Kosovo (1 page)	04/01/1999	P1/b(1)
009b. paper	re: Kosovo Atrocities Update (3 pages)	04/01/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Michael Hurley (Bosnia)
 OA/Box Number: 1710

FOLDER TITLE:

Atrocities

2006-0647-F
jp2119

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010a. fax cover sheet	DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force to Sandy Berger et al; re: Kosovo (1 page)	03/31/1999	P1/b(1)
010b. paper	re: Kosovo Atrocities Update (3 pages)	03/31/1999	P1/b(1)
011. email	Gregory Schulte to Michael Hurley; re: Notice to Milosevic on Atrocities (1 page)	03/30/1999	P1/b(1) <i>VR 3/3/2010</i>

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FOLDER TITLE:

Atrocities

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Hurley, C. Michael

From: Wippman, David
Sent: Monday, April 19, 1999 10:59 AM
To: @PRESS - Public Affairs; @KOSOVO; @INTEL - Intelligence Programs
Subject: Kosovo Imagery of Mass Graves ~~SECRET~~

SWCI called to say that a statement by a NATO press spokesman over the weekend that NATO has imagery showing 43 mass grave sites in Kosovo is incorrect. The statement was apparently based on information from multiple sources some of which have not been corroborated (e.g., refugee accounts). State is working on guidance on this point.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 11/5/2019
2013-0656-m (1.07)

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Hurley, C. Michael

From: Schulte, Gregory L.
Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 1999 4:33 PM
To: Hurley, C. Michael
Subject: FW: Notice to Milosevic on atrocities ~~{CONFIDENTIAL}~~

pls put Scheffer trip in next update

-----Original Message-----

From: Wippman, David
Sent: Tuesday, March 30, 1999 11:49 AM
To: Schulte, Gregory L.
Cc: @KOSOVO; @MULTILAT - Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs; @LEGAL - Legal Advisor
Subject: Notice to Milosevic on atrocities ~~{CONFIDENTIAL}~~

We raised with David Scheffer (State/MCI) today the question whether it might be useful to put Milosevic formally on notice of some of the international criminal acts being committed by his forces, to help build a record for a possible future ICTY prosecution (i.e., to help eliminate any possible argument he did not know what his forces were doing in the field). Scheffer liked the idea, but wanted to think further about how such a message might be delivered (i.e., whether publicly or privately) and what exactly the content should be.

Scheffer is heading to Macedonia tonight, and possibly thereafter to Albania. Scheffer hopes to get a better sense of what atrocities are being committed, and to encourage a "coalition of the willing" (allies, OSCE, etc.) to support collection of information on war crimes and crimes against humanity (e.g., through refugee interviews), for our info and for eventual provision to the ICTY.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date _____

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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001a. fax cover sheet	ADDO to Anthony Lake et al; re: CHODs Meeting in London (1 page)	07/17/1995	P1/b(1) <i>LBH 9/8/2017</i>
001b. memo	CJCS to Secretary of Defense; re: CHODs Meeting in London [partial] (3 pages)	07/16/1995	P1/b(1), PS <i>LBH 9/8/2017</i>
002. cable	From CJCS; re: Execute Order for Support to Presidential Determination (3 pages)	07/01/1995	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	Jim Seaton to Andrew Sens; re: Presidential Meeting with CINCs (1 page)	07/19/1995	P1/b(1) <i>v2 3/3/2020</i>
003b. memcon	Memorandum of Conversation Between POTUS, Secretary Perry, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, & Regional & Functional Commanders-in-Chief; re: Current Regional Security & Defense Issues (12 pages)	07/13/1995	P1/b(1)
004. cable	Presidential Message to NATO Capitals; re: London Bosnia Conference (3 pages)	07/22/1995	P1/b(1) <i>v2 3/3/2020</i>
005. notes	re: Handwritten Notes U.S./Russian Talks Annapolis (3 pages)	09/20/1995	P1/b(1) <i>v2 3/3/2020</i>

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Robert Bell (Defense Policy)
OA/Box Number: 1588

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia, July-September 1995

2006-0647-F
jp2120

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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~~SECRET~~ FILE: BOSNIA

EYES ONLY

JCS/PENTAGON

EYES ONLY

TIME TRANSMITTED (LOCAL)

MSG NBR

063

TIME RECEIVED (LOCAL)

FROM ADDO OFFICE/DESK Nmcc PHONE NBR 695-0038
SUBJECT CHOD'S Meeting in London

DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS:

PAGES _____
(INCLUDING COVER)

- HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS/ROUTINE
- IMMEDIATELY/URGENT

NOTE: FURNISH AFTER DUTY HOUR CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER FOR EACH ADDRESSEE REQUIRING AFTER DUTY HOUR DELIVERY

TRANSMIT TO

AGENCY	INDIVIDUAL (NAME)	OFFICE	ROOM NBR	PHONE NBR
WHA	MR. Lake T	NSA		
	Sandy Berger	NSA		
	BASS			
	SIDELBERG			
	DoHse			
	SENS			
	HARMON			
	VERSHTAROV			
	DREW			
	Bell			
	SESTAT			
	SHEEHAN			
	CLACK			

REMARKS:

WASHFAX COVER SHEET

WASHFAX OPERATOR (703) 695-

EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: KBN Date: 2/27/2017
2013-0656-M

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CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

16 July 1995

Memorandum for Secretary of Defense

Subject: CHODs Meeting in London

- Met in London today with French and British CHODs, along with staffs. Purpose of the meeting was to consider the current strategic and tactical situation of the UNPF in Bosnia and to develop and recommend military options to the meeting of Foreign and Defense Ministers in London on 21 July.
- In atmospherics the meeting was serious and candid. There was a consensus that the prospects for peace were increasingly distant, that the military balance had shifted against the GOBH, and that little could be expected from Mladic's remarks about his intent not to attack Gorazde now or to provide access to Sarajevo and the enclaves.
- The participants entered the meeting with sharply distinguished positions, and not surprisingly no consensus emerged at the conclusion.

EO 13526 1.4a, 1.4b, 1.4d

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

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PER E. O. 13526

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2/27/2017 KBH


89MXS CRYPTO

SUN 16 JUL 95 21:34

PG.04

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

- The meeting concluded with the following options for Sarajevo and Gorazde: ..




EO 13526 1.4a, 1.4b, 1.4d

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

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~~SECRET/NOFORN~~



EO 13526 1.4a, 1.4b, 1.4d

- ♦ I believe our option on Gorazde represents not only the best hope for consensus but also the most realistic option to forestall disaster there. However, we owe the French an answer the helicopter issue as soon as possible. I don't believe it is either feasible or wise to attempt to disregard the situation in Gorazde at this point in favor of Sarajevo. Rather, I suggest that you, Chris, Tony and I must work with our counterparts to forge a consensus on robust air around Gorazde, and then it will follow naturally as the preferred means to strengthen Sarajevo. Clearly we need to do our utmost to keep these results as private as possible until we can develop the requisite consensus.

Respectfully,

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

5389

July 19, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

THROUGH: ROBERT BELL *RB*

FROM: JIM SEATON *JS*

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting With CINCs, July 13, 1995

Attached for your approval is a Memorandum of Conversation (Tab I) for the July 13, 1995 meeting between the President, Secretary Perry, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the regional and functional Commanders-in-Chief. The participants discussed current regional security and defense issues.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the MEMCON at Tab I and file as a memorandum for the record.

Approve *Dohe* Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I MEMCON for July 13, 1995 Meeting

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VR NARA, Date 11/5/2019

2013-0656-u

APPR:	RF	<u>RCF</u>
DRAFT:	JC	<u>JC</u>
OTHER:	SB	<u>SB</u>
OTHER:	WFD	_____
OTHER:	ML	_____
OTHER:		_____
OTHER:		_____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

S/S-O:JCUNNINGHAM:JLD
07/22/95 72188
EUR:RFRASURE

P:SBREMNER
S/S:MLINO

S/S-O:WFDVAVNIE
NSC:

NIACT IMMEDIATE ANATO
IMMEDIATE USUN, MOSCOW, KIEV

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: NATO, MARR

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE TO NATO CAPITALS

1. ~~C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT. NIACT IMMEDIATE PRECEDENCE BECAUSE OF ONGOING NAC MEETINGS AND BECAUSE TEXT MUST BE DELIVERED AT OOB MONDAY, JULY 24, AND TOMORROW IS SUNDAY.

2. NATO CAPITALS EXCEPT LONDON AND PARIS SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT AT OOB MONDAY, JULY 24. THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL WILL MEET AT 3:30 PM THAT DAY TO REVIEW PROGRESS IN THE NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE ON FORMULATING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE DECISIONS REACHED AT THE LONDON BOSNIA CONFERENCE LAST FRIDAY. EMBASSIES LONDON AND PARIS SHOULD INFORM AUTHORITIES OF THE FACT AND CONTENT OF THIS MESSAGE.

3. BEGIN TEXT.

(FOR BRUSSELS, OTTAWA, COPENHAGEN, BONN, ITALY, THE HAGUE, OSLO, MADRID, AND ANKARA) WE WENT TO LONDON CONVINCED THAT THE STATUS QUO IN BOSNIA WAS UNTENABLE AND THAT ONLY STRONG AND DECISIVE ACTION WOULD BE

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 202 NARA, Date 6/6/2013 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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2

SUFFICIENT TO HALT SERB AGGRESSION, RESTORE UNPROFOR'S EFFECTIVENESS, AND REESTABLISH CONDITIONS THAT COULD LEAD TO A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. WE WERE PARTICULARLY DETERMINED THAT CLEAR DECISIONS BE TAKEN TO PREVENT THE BOSNIAN SERBS FROM ATTACKING THE LAST REMAINING SAFE AREA IN EASTERN BOSNIA, GORAZDE, AND THAT MEASURES BE ADOPTED FOR RELIEVING THE SERBS' SIEGE OF SARAJEVO. THE LONDON MEETING ACHIEVED THESE OBJECTIVES. OUR EFFORTS THERE MUST NOW BE PURSUED WITHIN NATO, WITHOUT DELAY, IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM AND TO CONFIRM THE SERIOUSNESS OF OUR PURPOSE.

(FOR ATHENS, LUXEMBOURG, REYKJAVIK, AND LISBON) THE LONDON CONFERENCE ON BOSNIA WAS SUCCESSFUL IN SENDING AN IMPORTANT SIGNAL TO THE BOSNIAN SERBS OF RESOLVE AND DETERMINATION. THAT EFFORT MUST NOW BE PURSUED WITHIN NATO, WITHOUT DELAY, IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM AND TO CONFIRM THE SERIOUSNESS OF OUR PURPOSE.

(CONTINUATION FOR ALL) LONDON WAS IN OUR VIEW AN IMPORTANT SUCCESS. THE CONFERENCE SEIZED THE INITIATIVE, DESPITE THE VARIETY OF VIEWS REPRESENTED THERE, AROUND THE BASIC PROPOSITIONS OUTLINED IN MALCOLM RIFKIND'S CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT. CLARITY OF WILL, AND EXPEDITIOUS ACTION AT NATO IN THE NEXT DAYS, WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO AVOIDING ANY CONFUSION IN PALE LEADING TO MISCALCULATION. WE CANNOT AFFORD ANY MISSTEPS OR HESITATION IF WE ARE TO AVOID THE SORT OF ESCALATION OF CONFLICT WHICH WE WISH TO AVOID. AT THE SAME TIME, NATO MUST BE PREPARED TO RESPOND QUICKLY IF THE WARNINGS OF LONDON ARE NOT HEEDED.

IT IS BY MOVING FORWARD RESOLUTELY TOGETHER THAT WE CAN BEST ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES, INCLUDING THE RETENTION OF UNPROFOR. BY STANDING TOGETHER AS ALLIES WE PROVIDE THE STRONGEST DETERRENT TO FURTHER ATTACKS, AND THE BEST PROTECTION TO UNPROFOR ON THE GROUND. THE COURAGE OF THOSE TROOPS, AND THE COMMITMENT OF THE NATIONS WHO HAVE PROVIDED THEM, MERITS NATO'S STRONG SUPPORT. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE OUTCOME OF THE LONDON CONFERENCE, COUPLED WITH A CLEAR AND RAPID DISPLAY OF ALLIANCE DECISIVENESS, IS THE BEST HOPE FOR TURNING THE BOSNIAN SERBS FROM THE BATTLEFIELD.

SATURDAY'S DISCUSSIONS AT NATO ON FOLLOWUP TO THE LONDON CONFERENCE WENT WELL AND DEMONSTRATED A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE OF CONSENSUS. NATO'S MILITARY AUTHORITIES WILL NOW EXAMINE THE SPECIFICS OF HOW NATO WILL IMPLEMENT THE LONDON DECISIONS, AND THE COUNCIL WILL MEET MONDAY

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

AFTERNOON TO MOVE FORWARD. WE WOULD HOPE THAT ON MONDAY DECISIONS CAN BE TAKEN THAT ARE FIRM AND CLEAR IN SUPPORT OF THE LONDON MEETING. AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, NATO SHOULD STATE THAT IT IS PREPARED TO USE ITS AIR POWER IN A SUBSTANTIAL AND DECISIVE RESPONSE TO ANY ATTACKS ON GORAZDE.

AS THE CONFERENCE CHAIRMAN STATED IN LONDON, THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA AND THE FUTURE OF THE UN MISSION IS NOW AT A TURNING POINT. THERE ARE OBVIOUS QUESTIONS, GIVEN PAST EXPERIENCE, ABOUT WHETHER WE WILL BE PREPARED TO FOLLOW THROUGH. NATO MUST MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IT IS.

END TEXT.

YY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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US/Russian Talks - Annapolis
9/20/95

Mamedov intro

File: BOSNIA

- actual but uncomfortable partners
- real differences
- crowded markets (trade, appl. of pol. influence, mil/tech links)
- knew there would always be a gap in our relationship between "desirable" and "real". But have tried to hold to minimum.
- Neither side could by itself solve probs left at end of Cold War. Need to work thru multilateral institutions.
- Never as freeing and worrisome sit as now - maybe lost our way - a revision taking place now compared to 1993.
- May Summit went very well - still guided by these agreements - Good statements were made.
- Nick Burns: "relations very good now" Why? What is this goodness? What is "very good" about our relations. Attempt to show what is desirable ^{but} not real.
- I'm not going to give an interview there.
- Recently arisen probs cannot be ignored.
- For 1st time there has arisen the issue of the use of military force - modalities, consultations - not in Vietnam or in periphery - but right in the heart of Europe - looks like repetition of 1950's, when there was "we" and there was NATO. Like Korea.
- Didn't come here to complain. Not befitting a great power. (But you used to meet in Moscow)

- In Bosnia, interests of R are at best ignored - can set a precedent for future.
- People in R react to CNN images from Pale.
- US interpreting mandates very broadly.
- Not looking anything - will still work with Lujan, Leon. But nothing exists in a vacuum.
- History of Bosnia did not start w/ NATO bombings - began with joint efforts w/ direct participation or at the initiative of Russia in Contact Group. We have a common goal. Not an "Iraq version" to settle. No real victories can bring us to a settlement.
- Dangerous myth that Russia is "for the Serbs" or that it's easier to reach a deal through a cruise missile rather than through Moscow. Very dangerous to assume Moscow can be left out of settlement process.
- Settlement in Bosnia could be showcased at Summit as great success, not a major irritant. Want to finish on this optimistic note.
- Apologize for lengthy, maybe boring didactic speech. But this issue defines backdrop to our discussions, our frame of mind. Not trying to "put you in your place".

STROBE

- no sword.
- "Partnership fatigue" voices questioning whether Clinton can be trusted or personal trust.
- magnificent in campaign politics.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

- 2 Presidents at center of rel. - each under attack, wrongly, for appeasement
- Hyde Park Intg - want Nick Burns to accurately describe our rel as "very good"

- Bosnia: both opportunity and a danger. Been working together, but represents most serious threat between R + West of Europe. Not just bilateral prob. Disagree w/ you here most frankly. Bosnia a cancer - potentially fatal, virulent. Must be dealt w/ by comb. of force + dipl. Surgery + chemotherapy. Want use of force. I honestly think we would not be where we are. Our goal not Serbian capitulation. Agreement UNW in Ruck p. 14, a great deal for RS, Gedulla, Bosnia - must be test of our rel. that we can pass.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001 -memo	Richard Schifter to Anthony Lake; re: A Proposal for a Southeastern European Cooperative Development Initiative (3 pages)	09/18/1995	P1/b(1), P5 RDs 6/6/2013

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Mort Halperin (Democracy/Human Rights)
OA/Box Number: 491

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - War Crimes Tribunal [3]

2006-0647-F

jp2112

RESTRICTION CODES

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

September 18, 1995

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM RICHARD SCHIFTER *RS*

SUBJECT: A Proposal for a Southeastern European Cooperative Development Initiative

More Balkanization?

I had a visit last week from a delegation from Sanjak. Sanjak, a Turkish generic term for district, is the label given to an area lying immediately east of Bosnia, now divided between Serbia and Montenegro and populated predominantly by persons who refer to themselves as Bosniaks. They are Muslims. The delegation was in Washington to gain support for their effort to establish an autonomous region of Sanjak within the FRY.

I heard the delegation out, explained that we now sought to end the fighting and suggested that they could assert their cause at a later date, when an effort is made to reach an overall settlement. But before the delegation left, I asked its leader what his native language was. He said it was Serbo-Croatian. I asked him whether people who saw him in the street would be able to identify him as a "Bosniak," as distinct from a Serb. He conceded that most people think he looked like a German. I asked whether he thought that a fervent religious belief separated the people in his region from the Serbs. He said that that was not the case. When I then asked what this effort at separation was all about, he spoke vaguely about different cultures. I did not embarrass him by asking him to spell out the cultural differences for me.

A Vision of a Better Regional Order

The Sanjak delegation's outlook contrasted sharply with the world view expressed to me over a year ago by one of the leaders of the ethnic Greeks of Albania. He made the point that he was committed to the preservation of the ethnic and linguistic identity of Albania's Greeks but was not interested in the redrawing of borders or in autonomy. He was impressed by the progress made by the European Union in making borders increasingly irrelevant and was hopeful that in twenty years his region will have reached the same level of political development.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By: PDS, NARA, Date 6/6/2013

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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2012-0800-44 (1,14)

It now seems as if the end of the war in the former Yugoslavia is in sight. Even if that end does not arrive immediately, it is likely to come about in the foreseeable future. We have begun to plan the funding of a major construction effort to bind up the area's wounds. I recommend that without adding to the cost of the Bosnia reconstruction effort, we try to do more than recreate the status quo ante, that we use the opportunity to deal with the region's underlying problems.

To be specific, I recommend that we embed the Bosnia reconstruction efforts in a comprehensive regional initiative designed to realize the dream of my Greek-Albanian interlocutor. The initiative would seek to bring the countries of Southeastern Europe together in a joint effort to develop their respective economies, build a coordinated transportation and communications system, deal jointly with the problem of intergroup distrust and hatred, and create a sturdy democratic infrastructure. This project would contribute to our objective of enlargement of democratic space and would help solidify Western ties to countries that might not be early candidates for NATO and EU membership. It would also be an exercise which Russia could not rationally view as threatening.

Under the OSCE Umbrella

The effort could appropriately be undertaken under the umbrella of the OSCE, with its emphasis on security, economic development, and human rights. It should encompass Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, the states of the former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania. The OSCE should create a Southeastern European Cooperative Development Initiative (SECDI?), led by a Coordinating Board on which the countries of the region and the donors of assistance would be represented. (Perhaps we need to find an excuse for giving Russia a seat as well.) The Board would plan and recommend development projects, first and foremost relating to reconstruction and coordinated regional economic development (giving real meaning to the OSCE second basket), but also focusing on improving relations among the countries of the region and among its ethnic groups (first basket), and creating governmental institutions protective of human rights (third basket). With regard to the latter, the establishment of OSCE jurisdiction would allow linkage of economic development with third-basket issues in countries such as Croatia, the FRY, Albania, and Slovakia.

The Board's role should be to coordinate rather than direct. Each donor would be free to adopt its own program and each recipient would be free to make its own arrangement with any donor. But the Board, if effectively led, would seek to enlist the cooperation of all donors and of the relevant international lending agencies and would from that base be able to urge the regional recipients to cooperate as well.

The Board should not have a staff of its own. Secretarial assistance should be rendered by the OSCE. Each board members should be supported by technical staff from the country the member represents. The Board would seek to work closely with the IMF, the IBRD, the EBRD, UNHCR, OECD, and COE. The staffs of these agencies could be enlisted in providing relevant studies.

As distinct from the OSCE coordinating role with regard to economic development, effective centralized authority will be needed to make certain that Helsinki human-rights standards are applied. Problems posed by the OSCE consensus principle can be overcome by entrusting application of third-basket standards to the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities and insisting at the outset on a broad grant of authority to him. As national minority issues are closely related to the region's human rights problems, he would be the logical person to take the lead regarding third-basket issues.

U.S. Leadership

If we decide to go forward with such an effort and are able to persuade the donors and the countries of the region to join in it, we should make a major effort to gear ourselves up for the exercise of effective leadership. A USG support group for SECDI should be established by Executive Order. In contrast to the OSCE Coordinating Board, which should coordinate by persuasion, the support group should have directive authority over all USG funds allocated for economic development and democracy building in the region (AID and USIA) and should work closely with such USG-funded organizations as USIP and NED. It should also coordinate closely with all Federal agencies which could contribute to this effort (Treasury and Commerce could play a particularly significant role) and should seek to enlist the support of the private sector, both profit and nonprofit. Given the region's great humanitarian needs, the churches should be involved in a major way.

A high-profile effort of this kind would be right and proper on its own merits. It would also be appreciated by members of the general public, because of its humanitarian character, by the churches, by the ethnic groups with roots in the region, and by the U.S. businesses which could be invited to play a constructive role in this effort. Our leadership in this undertaking, as a follow-up to our leadership in bringing peace to the region, could overcome the negative image created by our inability to solve the problem earlier. It would be an effort with which the White House could appropriately identify itself.

Can we discuss this idea?

cc: Dan Fried, Mort Halperin, Sandy Vershbow

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. list	re: Bosnia Calendar Prior to Hyde Park (2 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1) v2 3/3/2020
002a. memo	Matthew Lorin to Anthony Lake; re: Public Diplomacy & Public Affairs in Support of Balkans Peace Initiative & Implementation Force (3 pages)	09/20/1995	P1/b(1) v2 3/3/2020
002b. memo	Matthew Lorin to Anthony Lake; re: Information Coordination & Public Diplomacy in the Balkans (2 pages)	10/09/1995	P1/b(1) v2 3/3/2020
002c. paper	re: Background Paper - U.S. Military Information Support Teams [MIST] (1 page)	10/06/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Mort Halperin (Democracy/Human Rights)
 OA/Box Number: 491

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - War Crimes Tribunal [4]

2006-0647-F
jp2113

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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BOSNIA CALENDAR PRIOR TO HYDE PARK

Sunday, October 15

evening Holbrooke Team departs U.S. for Paris.

Monday, October 16

am Holbrooke Team meets with Quad Political Directors in Paris, departing for Moscow late afternoon.

DC Meeting on Bosnia

pm Holbrooke Team arrives in Moscow for Contact Group working dinner.

Tuesday, October 17

am Contact Group session continues.

afternoon Talbott/Slocombe team arrives Moscow for bilateral discussions on Russian participation in IFOR.

afternoon Holbrooke team departs for Belgrade and working dinner with Milosevic.

U.S. site selected for proximity talks.

Wednesday, October 18

am Holbrooke team met in Belgrade by Russian Deputy Minister Ivanov and Carl Bildt, meet with Milosevic.

am Talbott/Slocombe team continues bilateral discussions in Moscow

afternoon Talbott/Slocombe team departs for Paris

pm Talbott/Slocombe team bilateral consultations in Paris

Thursday, October 19

am Holbrooke/Ivanov/Bildt depart for joint trip to Sarajevo.

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017

By W NARA, Date 11/5/2019

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2019-0656-44

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-2-

am Talbott/Slocombe team travels to Brussels
am Talbott/Slocombe team consults at NATO on Russia
afternoon NATO-Russia meeting on IFOR
afternoon Holbrooke team departs Sarajevo for Zagreb meeting
with Tudjman. Holbrooke team returns to U.S.
afternoon Talbott/Slocombe team returns to to U.S.

Friday, October 20

Final position/briefing on the issues for Hyde Park

Sunday, October 22

Possible Clinton-Izetbegovic-Tudjman trilateral in
New York.

Monday, October 23

Hyde Park meeting. Issuance of statement/points on
Russian participation.

September 20, 1995

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: MORTON H. HALPERIN AND SANDY VERSHBOW

FROM: MATTHEW LORIN

SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs in support of
Balkans peace initiative and Implementation Force

There is a general consensus within the bureaucracy that we should utilize public diplomacy, public affairs and psychological operations (PSYOPS) in support of the U.S. peace initiative in the Balkans. Such operations would be instrumental in reducing risk to U.S. personnel on the ground as well as enhancing our ability to achieve policy goals.

This Memorandum is to inform you of the establishment of an informal working group subordinate to the Vershbow interagency working group on the Balkans that would be dedicated exclusively to public diplomacy, public affairs and information coordination in the Balkans. Chaired by the NSC, this sub-IWG would include State, USIA, OSD, JCS, CIA, OVP and NSC Communications.

The increasing probability of a significant presence of U.S. military and civilian personnel in Bosnia demands the development of a comprehensive strategy to reduce unnecessary exposure to risk, and increase overall likelihood of policy success. This can be achieved through an enhanced information campaign designed to inform allies and influence perceptions, and perhaps ultimately the behavior, of our intended audiences.

The need to coordinate the public diplomacy, public affairs, and PSYOPS methods of communicating with foreign audiences has been widely acknowledged. Our successful effort in support of U.S. policy toward Haiti provides strong evidence to that effect. Yet, in the case of the Balkans, no similar effort has been undertaken in support of U.S. policy.

Admittedly, the situation in Bosnia is complicated -- considerations of NATO, the UN, the Contact Group, U.S./Russian relations -- but these considerations affect the formulation of policy, not our need to use all the informational capabilities of the USG to articulate that policy in a culturally tailored, coherent, coordinated and persuasive manner.

The below examples of informational efforts by the USG are meant to be illustrative of the issues to be discussed by the sub-IWG. I am NOT seeking your approval of these issues at this time.

Immediate Activity

- In the event of the introduction of U.S. military personnel in the Implementation Force, a coordinated internal and external information program, in collaboration with NATO, SHAPE, and the United Nations, will be essential to minimize risk to those participating in the peacekeeping operations. U.S. PSYOPS and public affairs personnel should be employed to support the peacekeeping effort well in advance of the arrival of forces (much as they were in Haiti) to ensure local populations have a proper understanding of the role the forces will play in implementing the provisions of a cessation of hostilities and to gain the support of those populations for that role.
- Once an effective, coordinated information mechanism targeted on the Balkans has been developed and campaigns initiated, this mechanism would be available to support these and other diplomatic initiatives.
- USIA could enhance its radio and television broadcast coverage of events in the Balkans. VOA's WorldNet satellite delivery system provides objective news files and other broadcast offerings. Through it, films, newscasts, and documentaries (produced and/or acquired by USIA) are placed overseas.
- USIS PAOs, augmented by DoD personnel, should mount an aggressive public diplomacy effort detailing the successes of the cease fire and the contribution of the USG, along with U.S. PVOs/NGOs to the re-establishment of viable infrastructures throughout the region.

Long-term

- Over the longer term, more complex and sophisticated operations as well as public diplomacy should be expanded to support moderate elements throughout the region while undercutting support for radical ultranationalist attitudes.
- Encouragement of conferences and other public activities in which Balkan moderates could interact with Western European counterparts on global issues would tend to diffuse insular views, as would enhanced USIA cultural and academic exchanges.

- Stimulating the independent media sector as well as the flow of Western media into the region should also be encouraged, as well as developing local media contacts who can exert some influence over content.

All agencies mentioned in this Memorandum have been contacted and are in concurrence.

Concurrence by: Dick Clarke

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

October 9, 1995

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: MORTON H. HALPERIN and SANDY VERSHBOW

FROM: MATTHEW LORIN

SUBJECT: Information Coordination and Public Diplomacy in
the Balkans

This memorandum is to bring you up to date concerning the activities of the informal working group on information coordination and public diplomacy in the Balkans. It is the intention of this group to have mechanisms and channels of communication in place prior to the beginning of proximity talks when information coordination and dissemination, both domestically and in the Balkan region, will be critical.

I. Purpose

- Coordinate the Public Diplomacy and Information Coordination elements of the comprehensive Political-Military Strategy for the Balkans.
- Define themes, resources, and activities associated with a USG-directed strategic, culturally and politically tailored public diplomacy and information coordination campaign in support of U.S. policies and objectives in the Balkans.

II. Assumptions

- Role of UN will diminish over time;
- Peace initiative will remain on track;
- A multilateral coalition (IFOR) will be established under NATO with a significant USG military component;
- International organizations will play significant roles in implementation of comprehensive plan.

III. Goals

- To enhance U.S. peace initiatives in the Balkans;
- To promote a cessation of hostilities;
- To prepare for the introduction of U.S. forces;

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- To support stabilization and de-militarization;
- To assist reconstruction and democratization.

IV. Activities

- Deploy PAO officer to fill vacant USIS slot in Sarajevo;
- Begin daily fact and theme sheet for dissemination to principals;
- Following authorization by Under Secretary of Defense and invitations from U.S. embassies, deploy Military Information Support Teams (MISTs) in support and under operational command of USIS posts;
- Task NSC Communications Office to develop domestic media campaign in support of the U.S. peace initiative in the Balkans;
- Establish and exercise communication links between Information Coordination Working Group, NATO, and non-NATO participants of IFOR;
- Commence Worldnet interviews with Holbrooke and U.S. negotiators;
- Initiate development of audio-visual and print material.

Long-term

- Development of human resources;
- Programs in municipal rehabilitation, enterprise development and public administration training and assistance;
- Programs to promote independent media;
- Public opinion polling as one basis for development of policies and programs in support of the reconstruction effort.

Attachment

Tab A Background on Military Information Support Team (MIST).

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001 - email	Eric Schwartz to Anthony Lake; re: Shattuck Phone Call on Humanitarian Issues on Bosnia (1 page)	09/01/1995	P1/b(1) <i>VL 3/3/2020</i>

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Mort Halperin (Democracy/Human Rights)
 OA/Box Number: 491

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - War Crimes Tribunal [5]

2006-0647-F
jp2114

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Halperin, Morton H.

From: Schwartz, Eric P.
To: @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor
Cc: /R, Record at A1; Halperin, Morton H.; Malley, Robert; Sheehan, Michael A.
Subject: Shattuck Phone Call on Humanitarian Issues on Bosnia ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Date: Friday, September 01, 1995 6:50PM

Tony/Sandy:

FYI.

John Shattuck called to brief on three activities he and Phyllis Oakley are undertaking and he asked that I pass the information to you:

1. Srebrenecia disappearances: they are requesting that the ICRC and the intelligence community attempt to provide us an informed assessment of just what has become of the many thousands (Shattuck says up to 10,000) who remain unaccounted for.
2. Gorazde: they are seeking to enhance early warning of abuses through obtaining information from UNMOs, ICRC and other sources.
3. Krajina refugees: they have asked Embassy Zagreb to investigate reports of atrocities and abuses in the Krajina region.

We'll hear more from them on this later.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. fax cover sheet	David Scheffer to Mort Halperin & Matt Lorin; re: War Crimes (partial) (1 page)	06/02/1995	b(2)
002. fax cover sheet	David Scheffer to Mort Halperin & Matt Lorin; re: War Crimes Proposal (partial) (1 page)	05/22/1995	b(2)
003. fax cover sheet	David Scheffer to Mort Halperin & Matt Lorin; re: Proposal for Appointment of a Special Adviser to the President on War Crimes (partial) (1 page)	05/24/1995	b(2)
004. fax cover sheet	David Scheffer to Mort Halperin & Matt Lorin; re: War Crimes (partial) (1 page)	05/17/1995	b(2)
005. fax cover sheet	David Scheffer to Mort Halperin & Matt Lorin; re: War Crimes Proposal (partial) (1 page)	05/22/1995	b(2)
006a. report	re: Intelligence Community Activities in Support of Information Sharing with the Office of the Prosecutor of the International War Crimes Tribunal (2 pages)	01/24/1996	P1/b(1)
006b. memo	To War Crimes Working Group: re: Yugoslavia (1 page)	11/01/1995	P1/b(1)
006c. report	re: Operations (9 pages)	11/01/1995	P1/b(1)
007a. paper	re: The Importance of the "High Representative" to the Clinton Administration's War Crimes Policy [partial] (4 pages)	12/04/1995	P5 ; b(6) DB 1/21/2013
007b. talking points	re: Bildt Talking Points (2 pages)	12/04/1995	P5 DB 1/21/2013
008. paper	re: War Crimes (2 pages)	02/10/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Matt Lorin (Democracy/Human Rights)
 OA/Box Number: 802

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia: War Crimes [2]

2006-0647-F

jp2116

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009. fax cover sheet	Bill Woodward to Tony Lake; re: Albright Speech (partial) (1 page)	11/16/1995	b(2)
010. publication	re: Basic Reports - Newsletter on International Security Policy (partial) (1 page)	10/16/1995	P6/b(6)
011a. fax cover sheet	To Rick Saunders; re: Srebrenica - Background (1 page)	10/25/1995	P1/b(1)
011b. memo	To Rick Saunders; re: Information Paper on Srebrenica (1 page)	10/25/1995	P1/b(1)
011c. paper	re: Assessment of Information on Srebrenica Massacres [partial] (6 pages)	10/06/1995	P1/b(1) <i>re 3/3/2020</i>
011d. chronology	re: Balkan Crisis (7 pages)	08/03/1995	P1/b(1)
011e. cable	American Embassy, The Hague to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C.; re: Dutch Report on Srebrenica (4 pages)	10/13/1995	P1/b(1) <i>RDS 10/1/2013 CIA Historical Collection: AR 70-14</i>

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Matt Lorin (Democracy/Human Rights)
OA/Box Number: 802

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia: War Crimes [2]

2006-0647-F
jp2116

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
011c. paper	re: Assessment of Information on Srebrenica Massacres [partial] (6 pages)	10/06/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Matt Lorin (Democracy/Human Rights)
OA/Box Number: 802

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia: War Crimes [2]

2006-0647-F
jp2116

RESTRICTION CODES

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INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Assessment of Information on Srebrenica Massacres (U)

1. Purpose: To provide the CJCS with an assessment of overall available information on Bosnian Serb military operations and reported atrocities in the Srebrenica area in July 1995.

2. Key Points:

Prior knowledge of the planned Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) military operation.

a. (S/NF) In late June increased tensions were noted between the factions in and around the Srebrenica enclave region. BSA artillery attacks in the Safe Area increased in response to Bosnian Government force raids against several Bosnian Serb villages. BSA Chief Mladic claimed Bosnian Army forces conducted a massacre of Serbs in two small Serb villages (Banja Lucica and Visnjica). Following probing and reconnaissance activity, significant BSA attacks began in earnest in the region on 6 July with UN observers describing it as the heaviest in 2 years. (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

BSA troops advanced 3kms towards Srebrenica from the south on 8-9 July, capturing 30 Dutch troops and several APCs in the process. The Dutch peacekeepers then gave up their positions to the south of the town and relocated to the Dutch Battalion mainbase at Potocari. Masses of refugees followed, moving from Srebrenica to Potocari. Srebrenica was considered lost on 11 July when the BSA overran the town.

b. (S/NF) (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c analysis of the events prior to the overrun pointed to the intention of the BSA to follow prior actions, i.e., to 'shave' or 'reduce' the size of the UN designated Safe Area. We continue to assess that the initial and expressed intent of the BSA was not to overrun the entire Safe Area. However, the rapid collapse of Bosnian Army defenses allowed the BSA to capture key high ground necessary for the defense of the enclave, to surround and disarm Dutch peacekeepers, and to enter the town in a matter of days. A review of available (b)(1), 1.4(c)

(b)(1), E.O. 12958 1.4(c)

concerning the BSA activities prior to 10-11 July does not reveal any tangible evidence of their intention to completely take control of the enclave and occupy Srebrenica.

3. (S/NF) Information released to the UN concerning BSA military operations. Upon the perception of a crisis in the Srebrenica enclave, Yugoslavia Task Forces analysts and the DIA representative to the UN exchanged several information points as to the current activity and status of the situation in the Srebrenica Safe Area. The UN also received daily current situation reports on the

Declassified in Part

Per E.O. 13526

VZ 11/05/2019 (1.29)

Srebrenica situation via the Yugoslav Task Force 'Defense Intelligence Report.'

4. (S/NF) Information released to the Dutch concerning the BSA military situation. USMI was not directly involved in passing any information to the Dutch concerning activities in the Srebrenica region. (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

5. (S/NF) Prior knowledge of planned atrocities. (b)(1)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

(b)(1) all parties knew of the history of ethnic cleansing and atrocities by all sides in the conflict. We did anticipate that the Serbs would commit some form of ethnic cleansing, although it was not clear that it would involve massacres, as opposed to the forced expulsion of Srebrenica residents. (b)(1), 1.4(c)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

6. (S/NF) Information released to the Dutch about atrocities. According to a 20 September memorandum for the DIA representative to SHAPE, the US intelligence community was legally prohibited from complying with a request for information by Dutch General Blomjous on the Srebrenica massacres. The US Government was asked directly by the Office of the International War Crimes Tribunal Prosecutor about events surrounding the fall of Srebrenica, as were other cooperating governments. As a result, the US Government was obligated to make any relevant releasable information responsive to that request available to the Prosecutor through established US Government channels to insure independent national lines of response to the Prosecutor's office. The notable exception to this guidance was showing to the Dutch Defense Minister and Dutch permanent representative to NATO, at their request, (b)(1), 1.4(c)

1.4(c) apparent groups of detainees and possible mass grave sites in the Srebrenica area. The 1.4(c) was also shown to the international war crimes tribunal prosecutor. Beyond the 1.4(c) evidence noted here 1.4(c)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c we had no intelligence information to give them.

*Added
for him
to pass to
the
prosecutor*

7.. Later information concerning the massacres.

a. (S/NF) [redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c
[redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c
[redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) confirmed in mid-September that about 8,000 Muslims remain unaccounted for in the Srebrenica area. Dutch peacekeepers also reported in mid-September that they took video footage of several BSA war crimes, but later destroyed the film to ensure their own safety, according to the Dutch Defense Ministry. The tapes featured hundreds of Muslim men who have since disappeared, along with images of several UN personnel who saw the atrocities. In one incident, Dutch peacekeepers observed Bosnian Serb soldiers take nine Muslim men into custody and take them into a vacant building. These men were later found dead from gunshot wounds. The Dutch troops also found the personal effects--shoes and backpacks--of about 100 people in an area where Muslim refugees had earlier reported seeing bodies. One peacekeeper also saw bodies piled on a cart, a dumptruck, and an earthmover.

b. (S/NF) In July 1995, [redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c numerous suspected mass graves and two large groups of probable Muslim prisoners immediately after the fall of the Srebrenica enclave. The suspected mass graves were identified on [redacted] (b)(1), 1.4(c) [redacted] (b)(1) 27 July -- two in Sahanici, one near the town of Srebrenica, three at Kasaba, one at Tatar, and one at Sandici. [redacted] EO 13526 1.4c [redacted] 1.4(c) on 13 July [redacted] 1.4(c) an estimated 600 people on a soccer field at Kasaba, and another 400 on a road at Sandici. Suspected mass graves were identified at both of these locations two weeks later.

c. (C) Muslim evacuees from Srebrenica told UN Special Rapporteur for the Former Yugoslavia, Tadeusz Mazowiecki in August, of seeing civilians--including children--tortured, mutilated, and murdered. Numerous refugees have provided similar accounts of bodies by the road and hanging from trees, as well as women--even young girls--being abducted by Serb soldiers, and almost certainly raped. Many remain missing and unaccounted for.

d. (S/NF/OC) The Yugoslav Army (VJ) conducted an independent investigation of the Srebrenica situation in early August after hearing press claims about atrocities. The VJ concluded that "human rights abuses" did indeed occur, partly as a result of inadequate control over Bosnian Serb forces by BSA Commander Mladic. Mladic was subsequently summoned to Belgrade and told to exercise firmer control over his troops so as to avoid a repeat of such incidents.

8. (U) See attached [redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c


9. (U) See attached UNCLASSIFIED addendum.

Prepared by: Yugoslavia ITF, DIA/J2M, STU III [redacted] (b)(3)
NISTS 960-3575;

~~TOP SECRET~~ (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

DATE: 06 October 1995

ADDENDUM



(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

UNCLASSIFIED

BOTTOM LINES: Following are direct answers to possible issues:

a. We did not know any more about the Bosnian Serbs' intent to attack and take Srebrenica than the U.N. In fact, much of the information we had was from U.N. sources, including the Dutch Battalion in Srebrenica.

b. We did not "warn" anyone, including the Dutch, of the fall of Srebrenica, because we did not assess that the BSA intended to take the enclave until 10 July. At that point, the Dutch and the U.N. were painfully aware of the probability that the enclave would fall. We remain convinced that the enclave fell because the Bosnian Army defenders failed to hold their positions and lost their will to fight.

necessarily shared language
c. We did not have evidence relating to a large movement of significant BSA forces to the Srebrenica area which would have indicated a determined preplanned intent to take the enclave. It is important to note that Srebrenica had been a besieged enclave for nearly three years and the BSA force around the city was capable of military action at any time. We did assess that all of the eastern enclaves were indefensible unless reinforced by ground units and supported by close air support.

d. We did not have any information on any BSA intent to commit atrocities against the Moslem defenders or population of Srebrenica. We did know of the possibility of such activity given the history of genocide and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans.

e. We now have evidence indicating that atrocities, including mass murder, did occur.

UNCLASSIFIED

Cl. Saunders -

- points d & e above are consistent with my judgment.*
- the thrust, as we understand it, of point a above is largely correct, but is unfortunately phrased and could inadvertently hurt at sources and methods.*
- in point b, we disagree with the last sentence.*
- re: point c, more to the point, large movements of significant numbers of troops were not necessary to take the enclave. The second sentence is on the mark.*

(b)(6)

HEADER:

OO RUEAIIB
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
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FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0082
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 1646
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 0361
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO 0093
RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS
RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
BT

CONTROLS:

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ THE HAGUE 005512

E.O. 12356: DECL: 10/13/15

BODY:

TAGS: MARR, PREL, UN, NATO, BK, NL
COMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJECT: DUTCH REPORT ON SREBRENICA TO OFFER GRIST
FOR DEFENDERS AND DETRACTORS OF BLUE HELMET ACTIONS

REFS: A) THE HAGUE 5452

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

2. THE OFFICIAL MOD REPORT ON DUTCH ACTIONS DURING
AND AFTER THE FALL OF SREBRENICA IS LIKELY TO OFFER
SOME GRIST FOR BOTH DEFENDERS AND DETRACTORS OF DUTCH
ACTIONS, ACCORDING TO AN MOD OFFICIAL FAMILIAR WITH
THE REPORT. THE MOD BELIEVES THE REPORT -- SCHEDULED
FOR RELEASE OCTOBER 23 -- WILL CLARIFY A NUMBER OF
MISPERCEPTIONS REGARDING DUTCH ACTIONS THAT HAVE

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Page: 1

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *RVS* NARA, Date *10/1/2013*
A2-70-14 CIA Historical Collections

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APPEARED BOTH IN THE DUTCH AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA IN RECENT WEEKS. IN PARTICULAR, THE REPORT WILL HIGHLIGHT THE MILITARY LIMITATIONS UNDER WHICH THE DUTCH OPERATED AND THE RISKS TO REFUGEES AND BLUE HELMETS ALIKE IF THE DUTCH RESPONSE HAD BEEN MORE AGGRESSIVE. ON THE DOWNSIDE FOR THE MOD AND GON, THE REPORT WILL CONTAIN REFERENCES TO MISBEHAVIOR ON THE PART OF DUTCH TROOPS, INCLUDING SELLING OF WEAPONS, RIGHT-WING SYMPATHIES, AND POOR TREATMENT OF WOMEN THAT WILL NOT HELP THE ARMY'S EMBATTLED IMAGE.

3. ALTHOUGH THE REPORT COULD BE DAMAGING POLITICALLY TO DEFENSE MINISTER VOORHOEVE, MOD OBSERVERS DO NOT SEE A HIGH RISK OF HIS BEING FORCED TO RESIGN. AS SEPTEL WILL ELABORATE, THE REPORT IS LIKELY TO HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS RELATING TO PEACEKEEPING PARTICIPATION. AT THIS STAGE WE DO NOT SEE, EXCEPT IN CERTAIN QUARTERS, ANY SIGNS OF REDUCED DUTCH WILLINGNESS TO UNDERTAKE SUCH MISSIONS GENERALLY. THIS CONTROVERSY HAS ALSO MOTIVATED DUTCH EFFORTS WITH THEIR EU COLLEAGUES TO GET SOMETHING IN A BOSNIA PEACE SETTLEMENT REQUIRING AN ACCOUNTING OF THE MEN TAKEN AWAY IN SREBRENICA AND ZEPA. END SUMMARY.

REPORT NOT TO PULL PUNCHES

4. AN MOD OFFICIAL FAMILIAR WITH THE DEFENSE MINISTRY'S SOON-TO-BE-RELEASED REPORT ON DUTCH ACTIONS DURING AND AFTER THE FALL OF SREBRENICA SAFE AREA INDICATED THAT THE REPORT WOULD CONTAIN INFORMATION THAT COULD BE USED TO BOLSTER THE ARGUMENTS OF BOTH DEFENDERS AND DETRACTORS OF DUTCH ACTIONS. ON BALANCE, HOWEVER, HE BELIEVED THE REPORT WOULD OFFER A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION IN SREBRENICA, PARTICULARLY THE LIMITATIONS UNDER WHICH THE TROOPS OPERATED AND THE RISKS OF ALTERNATIVE, TOUGHER ACTIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE REPORT POINTS OUT THAT DUTCH FORCES LINED UP OBSERVING REFUGEES BOARD A BUS -- A PHOTOGRAPH OF WHICH HAS BEEN USED TO DEPICT THE DUTCH AS HAVING COLLUDED IN ETHNIC CLEANSING -- HAD IN FACT FORMED A COLUMN TO PREVENT WOMEN AND CHILDREN FROM BEING TRAMPLED IN THE RUSH FOR THE BUSES.

IN DEFENSE OF DUTCH ACTIONS

5. AMONG THE KEY POINTS THE REPORT WILL EMPHASIZE TO BACK UP DUTCH ACTIONS ARE:

-- THE DUTCH TROOPS DID UNDERTAKE MILITARY MANEUVERS PRIOR TO AND DURING THE COURSE OF THE SERB ATTACK TO PREVENT THE TAKEOVER OF THE SAFE AREA.

-- FOLLOWING THE TAKEOVER, THE DUTCH TROOPS' FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WAS SHARPLY CIRCUMSCRIBED, LIMITING THEIR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Page:

2

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ABILITY TO WITNESS EVENTS OUTSIDE THE COMPOUND.

-- GIVEN THIS RESTRICTED MOVEMENT, THE TROOPS HAD NO MEANS OF KNOWING THAT MASS EXECUTIONS WERE TAKING PLACE.

-- ACTIVE DUTCH RESISTANCE TO THE SERBS WOULD NOT HAVE PREVENTED THE SERB TAKEOVER, AND COULD HAVE RESULTED IN HIGH CASUALTIES AMONG REFUGEES. THE REPORT NOTES THAT THE POTOCARI COMPOUND, WHERE THE DUTCH AND MUSLIM REFUGEES WERE CONCENTRATED, WAS SURROUNDED BY SERB ARTILLERY. ANY USE OF THAT ARTILLERY COULD HAVE KILLED HUNDREDS OF REFUGEES.

POTENTIALLY DAMAGING REVELATIONS

6. ON THE DOWNSIDE OF THE LEDGER, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF FACTS THAT COULD CAUSE POTENTIAL PROBLEMS FOR THE MOD. ALTHOUGH SOME REVELATIONS RELATING TO THE PERSONAL BEHAVIOR OF SOLDIERS ARE NOT SPECIFICALLY RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE DUTCH DID ALL THEY COULD TO AVERT HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES, THEY ARE LIKELY TO BECOME INEXTRICABLY INTERWOVEN WITH PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY PERCEPTIONS OF THE DUTCH ROLE IN SREBRENICA. THESE INCLUDE:

-- THE DUTCH DID NOT REPORT EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS OF ATROCITIES TO THE U.N. UNTIL THEY WERE DEBRIEFED IN ZAGREB JULY 22 OUT OF A DESIRE NOT TO ANTAGONIZE THE SERBS AND ENDANGER THE SAFETY AND SAFE DEPARTURE OF THE TROOPS.

-- THERE WERE DISCIPLINARY PROBLEMS AMONG THE DUTCH FORCES THAT INCLUDED SELLING EQUIPMENT, EXTREME RIGHT-WING SYMPATHIES, AND POOR TREATMENT OF WOMEN, SPECIFICALLY WOMEN WITHIN THEIR OWN UNITS.

COMPREHENSIVE AND UNJUDGMENTAL

7. THE FINAL REPORT, WHICH WILL BE RELEASED FOLLOWING CABINET REVIEW OCTOBER 23, IS BASED ON INTERVIEWS WITH 490 OF THE 499 SOLDIERS IN SREBRENICA CONDUCTED BY 189 DEBRIEFERS. EACH INTERVIEW TOOK AN AVERAGE OF FOUR HOURS, WITH SOME LASTING UP TO TEN HOURS. ACCORDING TO THE MOD, THE REPORT DOES NOT PRESCRIBE A JUDGEMENT, BUT IS DESIGNED TO LET PEOPLE COME TO THEIR OWN -- BUT BETTER INFORMED -- OPINIONS, WHICH THEY HOPE WILL LEAD TO A MORE NUANCED PERSPECTIVE OF DUTCH ACTIONS.

IMPLICATIONS FOR IFOR

8. NEITHER MOD NOR MFA OFFICIALS EXPECT THE REPORT WILL NEGATIVELY AFFECT DUTCH PARTICIPATION IN IFOR.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IN FACT, THE MOD SAID THEY EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO POINT TO IFOR'S MORE ROBUST APPROACH AND BETTER COMMAND AND CONTROL MECHANISMS AS EVIDENCE THAT THE GOVERNMENT AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAVE DRAWN THE LESSONS OF THE FAILURE OF SREBRENICA AND HAVE ALREADY MOVED TO ENSURE SUCH EVENTS DO NOT OCCUR AGAIN. NEVERTHELESS, ALL FUTURE DEPLOYMENTS, INCLUDING IFOR, WILL BE MORE CLOSELY SCRUTINIZED AND HIGHLY POLITICIZED.

SEEKING AN ACCOUNTING IN PEACE ACCORD

9. AS THE DEPARTMENT MAY BE AWARE, MFA OFFICIALS HAVE INDICATED THAT THE NETHERLANDS HAS BEEN WORKING WITHIN THE EU TO SEEK TO BUILD INTO AN EVENTUAL PEACE SETTLEMENT A REQUIREMENT FOR AN ACCOUNTING OF THE MEN WHO WERE TAKEN AWAY OR OTHERWISE MISSING FROM SREBRENICA AND ZEPA. THEY FEAR THAT IF NOTHING IS WRITTEN INTO THE SETTLEMENT NOW, THERE WILL NEVER BE AN ADEQUATE ACCOUNTING.

COMMENT

10. THERE HAS BEEN SOME LIMITED SPECULATION THAT ELEMENTS OF THE REPORT COULD DAMAGE DEFENSE MINISTER VOORHOEVE POLITICALLY, AND POTENTIALLY FORCE HIS RESIGNATION. GIVEN THE REPORT'S MIXTURE OF GOOD AND BAD NEWS, THE KEY FACTOR WILL BE WHAT USE PARLIAMENT CHOOSES TO MAKE OF THE REPORT. IF THEY ARE LOOKING TO PUT THE ISSUE TO REST, THE REPORT WILL GIVE THEM THE MEANS TO DO SO; CONVERSELY, IF THEY WANT A SCAPEGOAT, THEY COULD FIND ENOUGH AMMUNITION TO DAMAGE VOORHOEVE. MOST OF OUR CONTACTS (INCLUDING IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE, MFA, AND MOD) DOUBT VOORHOEVE IS AT RISK. THEY BELIEVE PARLIAMENT IS INCREASINGLY COGNIZANT OF THE DAMAGE THEIR CONTINUED FOCUS ON THE ISSUE IS DOING TO THE DUTCH REPUTATION INTERNATIONALLY, AND WILL LIKELY LET THE ISSUE GO AFTER A THOROUGH AIRING OF THE REPORT.

MINIMIZE CONSIDERED
DORNBUSH
ADMIN;
END OF MESSAGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Page: 4

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. briefing paper	re: Croatia (2 pages)	08/17/1995	P1/b(1)
002. briefing paper	re: Croatia (1 page)	n.d.	P1/b(1)
003. map	re: Croatia (1 page)	08/09/1995	P1/b(1)
004. agenda	re: War Crimes Tribunal (1 page)	09/08/1995	P1/b(1) <i>re 3/3/2010</i>
005. draft	Matthew Lorin to Tony Lake; re: Support for War Crimes Tribunals [2 copies] (2 pages)	11/16/1995	P1/b(1)
006a. fax cover sheet	From Jim O'Brien; re: Bosnia-Herzegovina Enclaves [50 USC 403(g), Section 6] (partial) (1 page)	n.d.	b(2), P3/b(3)
006b. cable	re: Bosnia-Herzegovina Enclaves [50 USC 403(g), Section 6] (partial) (1 page)	10/30/1995	P3/b(3)
007. paper	re: Procedure for Transmitting & Responding to Requests from ICTY (1 page)	n.d.	P1/b(1)
008. memo	Wendy Sherman et al to The Secretary; re: Report to Congress on War Crimes Information Sharing (3 pages)	11/03/1995	P1/b(1)
009a. paper	re: USG Information Sharing Arrangements with ICTY (2 pages)	11/10/1995	P1/b(1)
009b. draft	Katherine Schwing to Matt Lorin; re: Information on ICTY Mechanism for Info-Sharing (1 page)	11/09/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Matt Lorin (Democracy/Human Rights)
 OA/Box Number: 802

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia: War Crimes [3]

2006-0647-F
 jp2117

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010a. fax cover sheet	Katherine Schwering to Matt Lorin; re: Discussions of Justice Goldstone. [Unclassified Upon Removal of Classified Documents] (1 page)	11/22/1995	P1/b(1) v2 11/5/2019
010b. memo	David Scheffer to Nicholas Burns et al; re: Goldstone Meetings [Declassification review No (b)(1)] (2 pages)	11/22/1995	P1/b(1) v2 11/5/2019
010c. report	re: Summary of Justice Richard Goldstone's Visit to Washington, D.C. (18 pages)	11/22/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Matt Lorin (Democracy/Human Rights)
 OA/Box Number: 802

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia: War Crimes [3]

2006-0647-F
ip2117

RESTRICTION CODES

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- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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~~SECRET~~

AGENDA
War Crimes Tribunal
SVTS - September 8, 1995 - 10:00 AM

I. Review of U.S. Position

[U.S. support for the Tribunal; issue of amnesty; relationship of the Tribunal to negotiations; relationship of the Tribunal to settlement]

II. "Outer Wall" Sanctions

[Definition; viability of outer wall once economic sanctions are lifted; degree of USG control over outer wall]

III. Position of Allies and others on Above

[To the extent it is known]

IV. Role of Tribunal Post-Settlement

["fit" between Constitutional Accords and Tribunal; responsibilities of implementation force, ombudsmen and political oversight body with regard to Tribunal]

V. Relationship between Other Actors (national governments, UN) and Tribunal

VI. Current Data on Tribunal, including Number of Indictees, Status of Proceedings, etc.

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By ~~VP~~ NARA, Date 11/5/2014
20131 0656-m (1.40)

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

B

S/S #

C

MESSAGE NO. 029159 CLASSIFICATION SECRET No. Pages 20
 FROM: K. Schwernig INR/EUC 6-7970 4743
(Officer name) (Office symbol) (Extension) (Room number)
 MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Report on Goldstone's
visit

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
<u>NSC</u>	<u>Math Lorin</u>	<u>456-9247</u>	<u>389</u>

FOR CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS: URGENT - Please call Mr.
Lorin upon receipt.
Math: I have real problems with

S/S Officer: _____
Scheffer's idea to turn this over
to the ICTY.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
 OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
 Initials: JK Date: 11/5/2016
 7-3-10496-m

VS OFFICE

Wednesday 11/22/95 06:56 am Page: 1

To: Toby T. Gati 6531
From: David Scheffer Security: General
Subject: Summary: Goldstone mtgs. Date Received: 11/21/95

Recipients:

Nancy Ely-Raphel	Crystal L. Nix
John Z. Shattuck	George F. Ward
Stuart Jones	Robert B. Rosenstock
Toby T. Gati	Daniel C. Kurtzer
MICHAEL J. MATHESON	JAMISON S. BOREK
John Withers	Victoria Nuland
Nicholas Burns	David Scheffer

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VS OFFICE

Wednesday 11/22/95 06:56 am Page:

2

Package Subject: Summary: Goldstone mtgs.

Item Title: Scheffer cover memo

To all recipients at State: Please review carefully the attached paper recording the discussions Justice Goldstone had during his visit of last week. Focus on the meeting you attended and whether I faithfully recorded the conversations as you recall them. I am classifying this SECRET and will be secure faxing it to other relevant agencies. Then, when cleared, I will transmit it to Goldstone via our secure channel at Embassy Hague (Mathias). Goldstone has requested this document from me because I was his notetaker (he was alone) at all meetings. However, we agreed that it would remain classified in transmission to him, and should not be disclosed to the public. His staff needs this no later than Thursday morning for his return from Rwanda on Friday morning, when he wants to read it.

37

State recipients: Borek (and Matheson), Shattuck, Nix, Gati, Ward, Withers (and Nuland), Ely-Raphel, Burns, Stu Jones (for Amb. Albright).

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2

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	William Studeman to Director, Defense Intelligence Agency et al; re: Support to War Crimes Prosecutor (2 pages)	03/16/1995	P1/b(1)
002a. report	Alexander Vershbow & Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake; re: CIA Paper [Action Data Summary Report] (2 pages)	01/04/1995	P1/b(1) VL 3/3/2020
002b. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake; re: CIA Paper [partial] (1 page)	01/04/1995	P1/b(1) VL 2/27/2017
002c. report	re: Bosnia [partial] (31 pages)	12/1994	P1/b(1) DJS 10/1/2013 CIA Historical Coll
003. fax cover sheet	Jim O'Brien to Rob Malley; re: Budget for War Crimes Tribunal (partial) (1 page)	02/27/1995	b(2)
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C 20506

January 4, 1995

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

FROM: DON KERRICK *(DK)*

SUBJECT: CIA Paper on Serb Ethnic Cleansing

Attached CIA paper prepared by the Task Force on Serb ethnic cleansing is based on the 1.4c, 3.5c briefing you received last month. Flagging it for your attention as a heads-up as it will go to the Hill where it could fuel sentiment in favor of tougher action against the Serbs.

Attachment

Tab A CIA Paper - Bosnia: Serb Ethnic Cleansing

cc: Bill Danvers
Alan Kreczko
Rick Saunders

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
Intelligence Report

DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

Bosnia: Serb Ethnic Cleansing

3.5c

A Research Paper



EO 13526 3.5c

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**Bosnia: Serb Ethnic
Cleansing** 3.5c

**A Definition of
Ethnic Cleansing**

The US Department of State, in its 1993 Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Bosnia-Herzegovina, stated that *"techniques that the [Bosnian Serb Army itself] referred to as ethnic cleansing included: laying siege to cities and indiscriminately shelling civilian inhabitants; "strangling" cities (i.e., withholding food deliveries and utilities so as to starve and freeze residents); executing non-combatants; establishing concentration camps where thousands of prisoners were summarily executed and tens of thousands were subjected to torture and inhumane treatment; using prisoners as human shields; employing rape as a tool of war to terrorize and uproot populations; forcing large numbers of civilians to flee to other regions; razing villages to prevent the return of displaced persons; and interfering with international relief efforts, including attacks on relief personnel."* 3.5c

EO 13526 3.5c

iii

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Areas of Control in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mid-December 1994



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**Bosnia: Serb Ethnic
Cleansing** 3.5c

Summary

Evidence- (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c
(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c
(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c -indicates
that ethnic Serb forces have carried out at least 90 percent of the destruc-
tion, displacement, and loss of life associated with ethnic cleansing.

- *Croats and Muslims in Bosnia have also committed atrocities and forced other ethnic groups to flee—the Croat destruction of Mostar is one example—but the ethnic cleansing actions of the Bosnian Serbs are unrivaled in scale, intensity, and ferocity. We have no evidence that Croats or Muslims have planned or carried out calculated, large-scale ethnic cleansing.* 3.5c

Sustained campaigns of ethnic cleansing by Bosnian Serbs since 1992 have resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of non-Serbs, the displacement of hundreds of thousands more, and the radical recasting of Bosnia's demographic makeup.

- Ninety percent of non-Serbs who lived in the 70 percent of Bosnia now under Serb control have been forced to flee or have been killed. A majority of the 1,300,000 displaced persons within Bosnia are Muslims, most of them expelled from their homes as a result of ethnic cleansing. 3.5c

The Bosnian Serb Army, paramilitary groups, Bosnian Serb political leaders, and police have played pivotal coordinating roles in ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.

- *Consistent patterns of political-military collusion and coordination are apparent in Serb seizures of Bosnian towns; many non-Serb refugees from throughout Bosnia have described such takeovers in strikingly similar terms.*
- *The bloodiest rounds of ethnic cleansing took place earlier in the Bosnian conflict in 1992 and 1993, but Serb efforts to expel non-Serbs are continuing, with more than 12,000 evicted since last summer.* 3.5c

We lack conclusive evidence that the most senior Bosnian Serb or Serbian leaders directed or planned large-scale ethnic cleansing; but the systematic, widespread nature of Serb actions strongly suggests that Pale—and perhaps Belgrade—have exercised a carefully veiled role in the purposeful destruction and dispersal of Bosnia's non-Serb population. 3.5c

EO 13526 3.5c

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EO 13526 3.5c

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(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

(5)

**Bosnia: Serb Ethnic
Cleansing** 3.5c

Introduction

Ethnic cleansing has been carried out in Bosnia since at least early 1992, primarily by Bosnian Serb political and military forces opposed to the Bosnian Government's declaration of independence following a republicwide referendum in early March 1992. The Bosnian Serbs boycotted the vote.

- (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c
 (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c Bosnian Serbs were planning takeovers of some towns, such as Brcko, before the referendum and were seeking assistance from the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and paramilitary units formed in Serbia. 3.5c

In many cases, ethnic Serbs did not constitute majorities or significant pluralities in key multiethnic towns they subjected to ethnic cleansing.

- Official census data show, for example, that—in early 1992—Muslims constituted a majority of 56 percent in the northeastern city of Brcko. They also comprised a plurality (38 percent) of the population in the northwestern town of Prijedor that nearly equaled the size of the Serb community (40 percent). Both areas have since been virtually depopulated of non-Serb residents. 3.5c

Well over a million of those displaced mainly by Serb ethnic cleansing since early 1992 remain in Bosnia. A majority are Muslims forced into overcrowded enclaves and towns in Bosnian Government-held areas.

- Ethnic cleansing by Bosnian Serbs continues today, although the most brutal and widespread incidents took place in 1992 and 1993, when some of the most notorious detention camps were forced to close following extensive international publicity. More than 12,000 non-Serbs have been expelled from Serb-controlled areas since July 1994, according to press and UN reports, with 4,500 forced out in one week last September alone. 3.5c

3.5c

**The Demographic Impact of Bosnian Serb
Ethnic Cleansing**

The number of non-Serbs living in territory now held by the Bosnian Serbs:

*Before the war (early 1992): 1,730,000
November 1994: Approximately 165,700*

Source: United Nations High Commission for Refugees

3.5c

Croats and Muslims have also committed atrocities during the Bosnian conflict, but their actions have consisted overwhelmingly of random, discrete—though sometimes ferocious—episodes that lack the sustained intensity, orchestration, and scale of the Bosnian Serbs' efforts (see inset).

- The vast majority of refugee accounts—corroborated by information from the UN, international relief organizations, (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c—indicate that ethnic Serbs are probably responsible for at least 90 percent of the destruction, displacement, and loss of life associated with ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. 3.5c

The Key Players in Ethnic Cleansing

A substantial body of evidence (b)(1), 1.4(c)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

indicates that political, security, military, and paramilitary elements all played central, coordinated roles in carrying out ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.



Croat and Muslim Atrocities in Bosnia

The vast majority of deaths and expulsions because of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia have been the work of ethnic Serbs, (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

1.4(c) but Bosnian Muslims and Croats have also been responsible for atrocities against each other and ethnic Serbs. Both groups have detained, abused, expelled, and been responsible for the deaths of civilians—particularly in central Bosnia.

- Some notorious detention sites, such as the Tarcin Silos run by the Bosnian Government Army, are still operating, (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c and may hold some civilians along with Bosnian Serb Army POWs.

Reports also persist of localized brutality and harassment of minorities.

- Many detention sites, such as those run by Muslim forces in Bugojno in central Bosnia, reportedly have been closed. Refugee reports, however, indicate that harassment and expulsions of Serb civilians continued as late as last spring.

- Press reports note that Bosnian Croats have been trying since last spring to evict Muslims from western Mostar, which the Croats control.

Despite this record of offenses, there is no information—nor is there a pattern of events—suggesting that either Bosnian Muslim or Bosnian Croat leaders have encouraged large-scale ethnic cleansing efforts in conjunction with their military forces to gain and hold territory. Non-Serb forces in Bosnia have not pursued sustained campaigns of ethnic cleansing as have the Bosnian Serbs, but most often have committed atrocities or forced expulsions in response to such acts perpetrated against their own ethnic group 3.5c

- Estimates by the UNHCR and ICRC of the number of deaths and displaced persons in Bosnia suggest, when compared with 1991 census data for Bosnia, that far fewer ethnic Serbs than Muslims and Croats have been killed or expelled from their homes.

EO 13526 3.5c

The statements of refugees from ethnically cleansed towns as distant from each other as Prijedor, Brcko, and Foca recount a strikingly similar pattern. They describe how non-Serbs were disarmed and Serb political, security, and military forces took control of their towns, setting up new civic structures with identical names or functions, and systematically rounding up, interrogating, torturing, and imprisoning or expelling members of non-Serb elites—usually Muslims. The almost simultaneous timing of the takeovers of many towns in the spring of 1992 also suggests collusion among Bosnian Serb authorities.


The balance among these political and military elements appears to have shifted over the past two years—the military, for example, has expanded its

role in ethnic cleansing—but all remain involved, according to recent information from a range of sources. 3.5c

The Serbian Democratic Party and Internal Security

Local and regional members of Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic's Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) appear to have been responsible for many tactical decisions involving the ethnic cleansing of non-Serbs.

- Numerous refugee accounts name the SDS as having orchestrated Serb takeovers of previously multi-ethnic towns, where they put in place new regimes, set up interrogation centers, established mock "courts," and moved thousands of non-Serb civilian prisoners to detention camps 1.4(c), 3.5c



(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

10

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

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- The SDS mayor of Prijedor, who took office following the takeover of the town in April 1992, stated to a US news organization in a fall 1992 interview that the three principal detention sites in the area—Keraterm, Trnopolje, and Omarska, where thousands reportedly were tortured and died—were “formed on decisions of the Prijedor civil authorities” [redacted]

3.5c

- Many ethnic Serbs identified as local SDS activists have also been affiliated with local paramilitary or irregular units reported to have terrorized the non-Serb populace. [redacted]

3.5c

Local SDS officials also work closely with internal security elements.

- Interior Ministry officials traditionally control the local police, and their authority for dealing with civil disorder gives them access to municipal records. Many refugees have reported that, in town takeovers, prominent local non-Serbs have been quickly rounded up by police using organized lists.
- Bosnian Serb internal affairs officials also have commanded interrogation sites and detention camps for civilians, such as Omarska, according to several refugees [redacted]

3.5c

Karadzic has consistently denied that Serbs have engaged in ethnic cleansing or that his self-appointed regime is responsible for any atrocities, but he and his associates have operated some of the most notorious Bosnian Serb detention camps.

[redacted]
(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

- Journalists told (b)(1), 1.4(c) of having to arrange visits to detention camps in 1992 through Karadzic's office, and a US official toured one camp accompanied by SDS “escorts.” [redacted]

1.4(c)

EO 13526 1.4c

This information and the consistent patterns evident in the takeovers of towns throughout Bosnia strongly suggest that top SDS leaders, including Karadzic, knew about ethnic cleansing plans from the outset—and that they probably initiated them in coordination with internal security organs and the military. [redacted]

3.5c

The Bosnian Serb Military

The Bosnian Serb Army (BSA), which was formed from the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) in mid-May 1992, has been a central participant in ethnic cleansing campaigns against Muslims and Croats.

- BSA units have conducted systematic ethnic cleansing operations, controlled detention camps, and methodically destroyed Muslim villages, in particular. BSA forces have often operated in conjunction with Serb paramilitary units identified (by many refugees who claim eyewitness status) as the perpetrators of some of the worst atrocities of the Balkan conflict. [redacted]


3.5c

From April through September 1992, the BSA and the JNA before it, carried out operations aimed at removing by force much of the substantial Muslim and smaller Croat populations from the northwestern Bosnian towns of Prijedor and Sanski Most and their surrounding areas.

- A broad range of sources reveals that this was probably the most well-organized and comprehensive ethnic cleansing effort conducted in Bosnia since the onset of hostilities. Information from refugee debriefings indicates that these actions were carried out jointly by the Bosnian Serb internal affairs “ministry” under the direction of the Serbian Democratic Party (see figure 5).


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(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

Figure 5
Ethnic Cleansing by the 5th Kozarska and 6th Krajiska
Brigades in Bosnia, April - September 1992



EO 13526 3.5c

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- Extensive [1.4(c)] reporting has identified two Bosnian Serb military brigades that were formerly part of the Territorial Defense Force, the 5th Kozarska and 6th Krajiska, as having had major roles in rounding up Muslim citizens in these areas for transport to detention camps or killing Muslims and destroying their towns.

- These two units operated initially under the control of the JNA and then the BSA. [1.4(c)]

[redacted]

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

The BSA has operated many of the detention camps that have held primarily Muslim and Croat civilians—rather than POWs [redacted]

[redacted] EO 13526 1.4c [redacted] BSA-run camps, notorious for their reported brutality and high death tolls, include facilities at Manjaca and Batkovic, [redacted]

[redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

- A significant part of the Serb detention camp and prison system in Bosnia was an integrated entity organized within the corps structure of the BSA.

[redacted]

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

- The BSA's security service reportedly exercised command and control of the camp system using military police as guards. [redacted]

[redacted]

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, 3.5c

As the BSA, under the command of General Ratko Mladic, has intensified its military operations, its role in ethnic cleansing has grown. The BSA has incorporated


[redacted]

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

into its campaigns the systematic destruction of villages—primarily Muslim—to ensure that the inhabitants will not return to the area [redacted] EO 13526 3.5c

- BSA forces in both the January-April 1993 Srebrenica offensive and the April 1994 Gorazde attack razed Muslim villages well after Bosnian Serb troops had seized control of the areas surrounding the villages [redacted] EO 13526 3.5c

(5)




(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

During its 1994 offensive to capture the Bosnian-Muslim-controlled town of Gorazde, the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) destroyed the only remaining Muslim villages in the area—driving out the population to claim the land for ethnic Serbs [EO 13526 3.5c]


necessity but was aimed at preventing a return of their Muslim inhabitants.

- *There are no reports that paramilitary groups of the type associated with destruction, looting, and atrocities elsewhere in Bosnia in the wake of BSA assaults were present during the offensive, suggesting that BSA troops burned the villages.*



(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c


The small size of the villages, the absence of significant local Muslim resistance, and the flight of most residents in the face of the BSA's advance suggest that the destruction of the towns was not a military



(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

[EO 13526 3.5c]

16



(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

17

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

18

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

The Serbian Connection

The most tangible link between Serb authorities in Belgrade and actions against non-Serbs in Bosnia has been through the presence in Bosnia of paramilitary units formed partly in Serbia. Serbian nationals have led these units, which are implicated in ethnic cleansing by numerous military, refugee, and press reports.

Paramilitary Forces

Numerous Bosnian refugees have provided information to US Government debriefers indicating that both Bosnian Serb and Serbian paramilitary units initially operated in conjunction with the JNA and later the BSA, as well as local police forces, to seize control of territory and ethnically cleanse these areas in 1992.

- A range of reporting provides at least circumstantial evidence that the JNA/BSA and the Serbian Interior Ministry armed Bosnian Serb and Serbian paramilitaries in 1992.
- In many cases, the JNA/BSA secured the area around a town and fired artillery or tank rounds into the area to terrorize the population, according to a variety of reports. Paramilitary units appeared to operate in close coordination with the Army, if not under its command, typically following up on the Army's encirclement of the town by entering it to ethnically cleanse it through murder, terror tactics, and expulsion.
- The BSA appears to have disbanded most paramilitary units or incorporated them into the Army in late 1992 largely because of concerns that paramilitary commanders were unreliable and could serve as a rival armed force. Volunteer paramilitary units that have operated since that time appear to have functioned under BSA command or as part of a BSA unit. 3.5c

- (b)(1), 1.4(c) reporting (b)(1), 1.4(c) indicates that, at least early on in the Bosnian conflict, Belgrade knew of ethnic cleansing activity, allowing Serbian forces to intervene on behalf of Bosnian Serbs. In one case, Serbian troops even restrained overzealous Serb paramilitary forces whose brutal actions in the northeastern Bosnian city of Brcko apparently risked attracting unwelcome attention. 3.5c


Mihajlo Kertes and Radmilo Bogdanovic, intimates of Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic who have helped him to establish control over Serbia's intelligence and security services, are likely central figures in any planning or directing role that Serbia may have played in ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.

- (b)(1), 1.4(c) press reporting indicates that both have been involved in the oversight of Serbian paramilitaries since early 1992. 3.5c

Such officials generally have been careful, however, to avoid overt signs that they have sanctioned or directed the ethnic cleansing of non-Serbs in Bosnia.

- The "irregular" status of Serb paramilitary units, for example, affords Serbian leaders plausible deniability when confronted with reports of especially brutal action by those forces. 3.5c

19



(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

Information has not emerged that conclusively links top Serbian officials to the planning or direction of ethnic cleansing.

- Documents that have surfaced in the West purporting to be evidence of Belgrade's direction of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia have proved spurious and virtually impossible to authenticate. The individuals offering such "evidence" often appear to have dubious or self-serving motives and unsavory backgrounds. In addition, the possibility exists that Serbia's rivals in the region—or Serbs trying to spoil the chain of evidence for potential war crimes trials—have fabricated this "evidence." [redacted] 3.5c

The Toll of Serb Ethnic Cleansing


There is no reliable estimate of how many Bosnians have died as a result of Serb ethnic cleansing, but [redacted] (b)(1), 1.4(c), 3.5c reports suggest that they number in the tens of thousands.

- Extensive US Government refugee debriefings alone have yielded information on more than 200 mass graves in Bosnia that are said to contain a total of more than 40,000 bodies. Although this information is mostly anecdotal and not the result of formal



(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

(21)



(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

investigations or exhumation, the refugees reporting it claim in most cases to have witnessed the atrocities involved. 3.5c


Nearly 1,000,000 refugees from the former Yugoslavia have fled abroad, according to UNHCR, most of them to Europe.

Approximately 2,000,000 people from states of the former Yugoslavia have been displaced but remain elsewhere in the former Balkan country.


- Neither UNHCR nor host governments can provide firm estimates of the breakdown of Balkan refugee populations by ethnic group, either within the former Yugoslavia or abroad. Most agree, however, that a clear, though unspecified, majority are Bosnian Muslims (see figure 17). 3.5c

- About 1,300,000 of those displaced persons are in Bosnia, a majority of them Muslims forced to leave Serb-controlled areas. 3.5c






(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c



(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c


24



(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

~~Top Secret~~
~~SC 0039397~~


25



(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

26

Figure 15
Decline in the Non-Serb Population
of Bosnia, 1992-94



Conclusion

Widespread, sustained Serb ethnic cleansing campaigns in Bosnia over three years have radically altered the formerly multiethnic state. Restoring its pre-war demographic balance and ethnic distribution now appears virtually impossible. The actions of ethnic Serb political and military forces have created a Bosnian—mainly Muslim—diaspora. At the same time, ethnic Serbs have succeeded in securing their hold over large parts of Bosnian territory and made significant strides toward their apparent objective of establishing, or expanding, an ethnically pure Serb state.

3.5c


Unclassified

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SC.0039894

27

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UMTRA~~




(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

28

~~Top Secret
SC 0039074~~

Figure 17
People Displaced by the Yugoslav Conflict, 1 December 1994*



EO 13526 3.5c

~~Top Secret~~
SC 00390994

(29)

Appendix A

Agreements and Treaties of International Law Applicable to the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia

Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949 (Geneva Convention Number III).

Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949 (Geneva Convention Number IV, especially Article 47, "women shall be especially protected against rape.")

Convention on the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide, December 8, 1949.

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Armed Conflicts (Protocol I). Opened for signature December 12, 1977. (This may make blocking humanitarian aid convoys a war crime.)

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II). Opened for signature December 12, 1977. (This may make blocking humanitarian aid convoys a war crime.)

Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions (December 12, 1949) bestows the protections of Geneva Convention Number IV to civilian persons in armed conflicts not of an international nature.

Grave breaches of one or more of the Geneva Conventions relevant to the situation in Bosnia include:

- Willful killing.
- Torture or inhuman treatment.
- Willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health.
- Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity, and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.
- Compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the armed forces of foreign power.
- Willfully depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial.
- Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian.
- Taking civilians as hostages.

This appendix is EO 13526 3.5c

Appendix B

Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia: An Abbreviated Chronology of Significant Events

- 1991**
- 25 June* War breaks out in the Balkans almost immediately after Slovenia and Croatia declare independence. Although Slovenia and Croatia conclude cease-fire agreements with Belgrade by fall 1991, the status of Bosnia-Herzegovina remains uncertain.
- 3 October* Serbia and Montenegro seize control of Yugoslavia's Federal Presidency.
- 23 December* Germany recognizes Slovenia and Croatia as independent states.
- 1992**
- 15 January* EC member states and 14 other countries recognize Croatia and Slovenia as independent states.
- February* Bosnian Serbs organize paramilitary units in northeastern city of Brcko.
- 27 February-1 March* Bosnia holds a referendum on independence from Yugoslavia. Bosnian Serbs react violently to the vote in favor of independence. President Izetbegovic tries to make concessions to the Serbs by including them in his government.
- 7 March* Advance team of UN peacekeepers arrives in Yugoslavia.
- Early April* Bosnia-Herzegovina declares independence.
- 6 April* The EC recognizes Bosnia-Herzegovina.
- 7 April* The United States recognizes Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serbs move almost immediately to partition the republic. The JNA stages assaults on Muslim towns, and ethnic cleansing campaigns begin throughout Bosnia.
- April-May* Bosnian Serbs nationalists, working with JNA and Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) forces, stage civic takeovers of Prijedor, Sanski Most, and neighboring towns in northwestern Bosnia and begin ethnic cleansing of the Muslim population that continues into the fall.

1992

1 May

Fighting breaks out in Brcko, signaling the start of Serb ethnic cleansing there.

19 May

The JNA formally disassociates itself from ethnic Serb forces in Bosnia. The newly formed BSA under General Ratko Mladic continues the ethnic cleansing of non-Serbs.

1993

January-April

BSA conducts Srebrenica offensive, carrying out extensive ethnic cleansing of Muslim settlements in eastern Bosnia.

22 February

The UN Security Council authorizes establishment of an international tribunal to prosecute war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia since 1991.

1994

1 March

Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims sign agreement to establish a federation in Bosnia.

30 March-April

Bosnian Serbs launch offensive against Bosnian Government-held enclave of Gorazde, ethnically cleansing seized villages along the way.

Mid-July

Anticipating Bosnian Government approval of the Contact Group's "51-49" peace plan, Bosnian Serb forces show defiance by launching a new ethnic cleansing campaign in northern Bosnia to drive out remaining non-Serb residents.

18 July

The Bosnian Assembly approves the Contact Group peace plan.

3 August

The Bosnian Serb "parliament" votes unanimously to hold a referendum on the Contact Group plan.

27-28 August

Bosnian Serb referendum overwhelmingly rejects the Contact Group plan.

September

Concerned about the potential impact of the lifting of the UN arms embargo on Bosnia, Bosnian Serbs step up their ethnic cleansing campaign in northern Bosnia. Since the onset of fighting in Bosnia, some 90 percent of non-Serbs have been driven from the territory now controlled by Bosnian Serb forces.

This appendix is EO 13526 3.5c

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. fax cover sheet	Jim O'Brien to Rob Malley; re: War Crimes Tribunal (partial) (1 page)	02/24/1995	b(2)
002. paper	re: Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of NSC Principals Committee (3 pages)	02/13/1995	P1/b(1) <i>DO 10/1/2013 CIA Historical Collect AR 70-14</i>
003. fax cover sheet	Jim O'Brien to Rob Malley; re: War Crimes Tribunal (partial) (1 page)	03/03/1995	b(2)
004. cable	re: Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal - British Information Sharing (2 pages)	03/27/1995	P1/b(1)

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Bosnia - War Crimes Tribunal [2]

2006-0647-F

jp2127

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Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: February 13, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room

TIME: 6:00 - 7:00pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Bosnia and Croatia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

CIA
Douglas MacEachin

OVP
Leon Fuerth

JCS
Admiral William Owens

State
Peter Tarnoff

White House
Samuel Berger
Nancy Soderberg

DOD
Dr. William Perry

NSC
Alexander Vershbow

USUN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright

Summary of Conclusions

1. Principals met to review the U.S. position on additional sanctions relief for Milosevic in return for Serbian recognition of Bosnia, Croatia, and other former Yugoslav republics within their existing borders. While they agreed that mutual recognition, in itself, will not lead to political settlements, the potential of recognition to alter the strategic equation and to head off a new war in Croatia justified the risks of our support. Therefore, Principals authorized our Contact Group representative to agree to offer a total suspension of sanctions on the FRY in return for mutual recognition, subject to the following conditions:

A. Conditions proposed by State:

- that Milosevic's recognition of Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia and Slovenia in their internationally recognized borders be genuine and unequivocal;
- that sanctions be suspended for 2-month periods, with a positive vote by the UN Security Council required to renew each time;
- that the sanctions enforcement regime against the FRY remain in place, so that sanctions can be reimposed on short notice;
- that the "outer wall" of sanctions be kept in place, i.e. measures going beyond UNSC resolutions: no assistance from the IFIs or the EU; no granting of a UN seat to the FRY; and no readmission to OSCE (for our part, we would not recognize the FRY at this time);
- that there be a significant toughening up of the monitoring regime on the Bosnia/Serbia and Croatia/Serbia borders, including several hundred more monitors plus equipment such as radars to help deal with the helicopter problem;
- that there must be continued firm adherence by Milosevic to the Contact Group plan for Bosnia;
- that Milosevic must endorse the principles in the Zagreb-4 peace plan for Croatia, i.e. the reintegration of the occupied areas under Croatian sovereignty, with autonomy for historically Serb-majority areas; and
- that nothing should be done that in any way affects the commitment to the War Crimes Tribunal.

B. Additional conditions added by Principals:

- that before we pursue Milosevic's recognition of Croatia, we insist that Tudjman agree that he will extend UNPROFOR's mandate in return for recognition.
- that the sanctions relief not go into effect until after the inter-Serbian border is more tightly closed and the Europeans have deployed the additional monitors required; and

-- that we secure from Tudjman his agreement to terminate economic relations with the Krajina Serbs, since this could undermine the effects of Milosevic's cut-off of support to the Krajina and permit the Bosnian Serbs to receive support through the back door.

2. Principals directed our Contact Group representative to put down a marker that, if this initiative fails and the war resumes, our partners will reciprocate our flexibility by supporting the kinds of coercive measures against the Bosnian Serbs that they agreed to previously, but never implemented. We would not, however, make their commitment to such measures a quid pro quo.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS, re: Telephone Call with French President Chirac (2 pages)	07/13/1995	P1/b(1), P5 v2 3/3/2020
001b. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with French President Jacques Chirac (1 page)	07/13/1995	P1/b(1) v2 3/3/2020
002. draft	re: Bosnia Endgame Strategy [partial] (5 pages)	07/10/1995	P1/b(1), P5 v2 3/3/2020
003. report	re: Srebrenica Civilian Evacuation Options (3 pages)	07/12/1995	P1/b(1)
004. report	re: The Bosnian Serbs & the Enclaves (5 pages)	07/12/1995	P1/b(1)
005. paper	re: Options for UNPROFOR Extraction from Eastern Enclaves (4 pages)	07/11/1995	P1/b(1) v2 3/3/2020
006. paper	re: Srebrenica & a UN Firebreak (2 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1) v2 3/3/2020
007. notes	re: Handwritten Notes - Conversation with Mike Durkee (5 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1)
008. letter	Alija Izetbegovic to POTUS, re: Srebrenica Crisis [two copies] (2 pages)	07/09/1995	P1/b(1) v2 3/3/2020
009. memo	Nelson Drew to Sandy Berger; re: July 11 Deputies' Meeting on Bosnia (4 pages)	07/11/1995	P1/b(1), P5
010. agenda	re: NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	07/11/1995	P1/b(1)
011. notes	re: Handwritten Notes - Bosnia Options (2 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1)

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2006-0647-F

jp2099

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TELEPHONE CALL WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT CHIRAC

DATE: July 13, 1995

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 3:15 p.m.

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

I. PURPOSE

To discuss the worsening situation in Bosnia.

II. BACKGROUND

Chirac has reacted to the fall of Srebrenica by calling for military action to retake the enclave and reestablish the safe area, and he has offered use of French elements of the Rapid Reaction Force to do this. The French military is privately skeptical about the feasibility (since the RRF does not yet have its air-mobile elements) and most allies believe Chirac is simply posturing on the assumption that no one (including the U.S.) will back the French proposal. French diplomats and Defense Ministry officials have been more pragmatic, arguing that the priority should be to respond to the Serb attack on Srebrenica by demonstrating UNPROFOR's effectiveness in other areas -- in particular, using the RRF to establish secure access to Sarajevo over the Mt. Igman route, and to protect Gorazde, the strategically most important of the eastern enclaves. This is consistent with our own thinking.

Chirac phoned Kohl today, however, and made clear that he is still committed to military action in Srebrenica on the grounds that the Serbs' humiliation of the UN has to be answered directly or else UNPROFOR is finished. Chirac's phone call may be aimed at lining up U.S. political support and, possibly, logistical assistance, such as the provision of helicopter airlift to move the French RRF elements to Srebrenica. It is not inconceivable that Chirac plans to use U.S. refusal to support the French as grounds for calling for UNPROFOR withdrawal. If he makes a specific request, we suggest you respond in non-committal fashion, noting that our military experts would first need to

understand the French plans before we could decide whether we could assist. You should then try to encourage Chiraç to think about UNPROFOR taking a stand where it is more feasible, in Sarajevo and Gorazde.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
President Chirac

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer

Attachment
Tab A Points to be Made

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC

- Fall of Srebrenica and new round of ethnic cleansing presents us with new and dangerous situation in Bosnia.
- Dutch performed valiantly in trying to block overwhelming Serb assault and deserve our thanks. Showed under fire why they are trusted and valued allies.
- In wake of Srebrenica, we must regroup and devise strategy for making UN presence work, so that we can halt pattern of Serb aggressiveness and avert UNPROFOR withdrawal.
- Know you have called for military action to reestablish safe area at Srebrenica using RRF. Is that still feasible?
 - (If Chirac seeks U.S. support) We voted for your proposed UN resolution and are prepared to support efforts to implement it. But our military experts would need to understand your military plans before we could decide on whether we could assist in some way.
- In our view, may be more practical for UNPROFOR to demonstrate resolve in other areas.
- Most important place is Sarajevo. We fully support your efforts to open Mt. Igman route, using RRF as necessary, to prevent Serbs from strangling capital.
- Believe it also important to make serious effort to hold Gorazde. If we do not, Serbs will feel they have carte blanche to move on Sarajevo.
- We are talking to British, who have 300 peacekeepers in Gorazde, about possibilities for Bosnians to defend enclave. RRF may be able to provide reinforcement to British peacekeepers in holding off Serbs.
- Want to stay in close touch over coming days as we try to devise strategy to reestablish UNPROFOR's effectiveness and credibility.
- Failure in this effort will mean devastating setback for NATO and UN and humanitarian disaster of large proportions. It will also make it harder to defeat legislation to lift arms embargo unilaterally.

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002. draft	re: Bosnia Endgame Strategy [partial] (5 pages)	07/10/1995	P1/b(1)
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BOSNIA ENDGAME STRATEGY

The Context: Our current strategy on Bosnia will, at best, delay UNPROFOR withdrawal, and has virtually no chance of producing a political settlement. The Rapid Reaction Force will soon be in place and put to the test; while it may succeed in restoring convoy access to Sarajevo, it is not likely to be of much use in staving off the collapse of the eastern enclaves. Allies are no longer willing to use NATO air power to enforce the exclusion zones and the Bosnian Serbs' integrated air defense system has effectively "denied flight" to NATO planes, thereby eliminating the stick from our negotiating leverage. Milosevic continues to demand more than we can give on sanctions relief, while backing away from a readiness to genuinely recognize Bosnia or cut off support for the Bosnian Serbs; even if Carl Bildt comes to acceptable terms with Milosevic, it is not clear that this will lead to any change in the Bosnian Serbs' rejection of the Contact Group plan as the starting point for negotiations. The Bosnian Government, increasingly skeptical of the value of keeping UNPROFOR in place, may soon decide to withdraw its consent to UNPROFOR's presence and push for a lifting of the arms embargo and a solution on the battlefield. Meanwhile, Tadjman seems poised for a military assault on Sectors North and South by fall.

The Perils of Drift: There is a high probability that our Allies will decide this summer that UNPROFOR withdrawal can no longer be avoided. Even if we muddle through and gain another winter's respite, the situation next spring is likely to be even more difficult to control. In the midst of the U.S. presidential election campaign, our Allies could force the decision to implement OPLAN 40104 upon us, while the Bosnian government will have every incentive to try and draw us into the conflict -- through our protracted presence during the NATO withdrawal operation or, subsequently, through an open-ended lift, arm and strike policy. The flexibility needed to make critical decisions would be severely constrained by the glare of the campaign, which argues for bringing the Bosnia issue to a head this year. To this end, we should:

- make an all-out, high-risk effort to obtain a political settlement this fall, before a decision is taken to withdraw UNPROFOR; and
- if that effort fails, force the issue of UNPROFOR withdrawal and lifting the arms embargo this year, rather than having to confront those issues during the election year.

The Path to an Early Settlement: We are not going to obtain a settlement this year unless we recreate some real leverage vis-à-vis the Bosnian Serbs, in terms of both sticks and carrots:

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14B7A-19 1 OCT 2018

Sticks: The arrival of the RRF and the specter of defeat that UNPROFOR withdrawal would signify should be used to convince the Allies of the need for tougher action against the Serbs on the ground and from the air. This could include:

- using the RRF to protect convoys using a ground corridor to Sarajevo and to reestablish UNPROFOR control over Sarajevo airport, permitting the humanitarian air lift (grounded since April) to resume;
- restoring the credibility of Operation Deny Flight by broadening the ROE to permit attacks on all elements of the Serb integrated air defense system displaying hostile intent and retaliatory attacks on airfields used to launch no-fly zone violations;
- issuing new NATO ultimatums regarding air strikes to enforce the heavy-weapons exclusion zones;

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(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

- working with Dole and other key Congressional leaders to ensure that language in any unilateral lift resolution provides leverage in negotiations before being triggered;
- in order to deprive the Bosnian Serbs of Krajina Serb support, quietly encouraging Tudjman to maintain the threat of increased Croatian attrition operations against Sectors North and South;
- if necessary to gain Allied agreement to the above measures, agreeing to assist in the reconfiguration of UNPROFOR, possibly including emergency extraction from the eastern enclaves, with Allied equipment left in the hands of Bosnian Government forces.

In tandem with these steps, we and our Contact Group partners should tell Milosevic the time has come for him to put up or shut up, i.e. that:

- we will terminate the current limited sanctions relief in September if he has not recognized Bosnia and taken visible action to terminate military and economic support for Pale (and Knin);

-- moreover, if sanctions relief is terminated and the ICFY mission departs, any resumption of large-scale support for Pale will be met not only by a **tightening of economic sanctions** against the FRY, but by U.S. or NATO **air strikes** against **key supply routes and military targets**, including those inside Serbia (similar to our Kosovo warning).

Carrots: To bring the Allies along, convince the Bosnian Serbs to seek a political settlement, and manage the Russians, we will need to be prepared to break the logjam surrounding "acceptance" of the Contact Group plan. This will entail:

- having a **heart-to-heart talk with the Bosnians**, stressing that, in light of renewed Western readiness for tougher action (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) they need to agree to at least exploratory contacts by the Contact Group or proximity talks with Pale;
- in the talks with Pale, advancing **possible modifications to the Contact Group map** consistent with the 51:49 ratio but providing for a more compact and cohesive territory for the Federation (e.g. trading Srebrenica, Zepa and a widening of the Posavina corridor for full Federation control over Sarajevo and additional territory in central Bosnia); consistent with a recent Silajdzic proposal to Juppé, we could state that up to 10 percent of the Contact Group map was subject to renegotiation;
- similarly, developing the Contact Group's proposed **constitutional principles** to show the Serbs the amount of autonomy their republic would have within the Union and the scope of the "parallel special relationship" with Serbia;
- if necessary, pressing the Bosnians to agree that the Serbs can conduct a **referendum on secession after 2-3 years**, as had been agreed in the 1993 *Invincible* package;
- proposing to the Allies and Russians mutual participation in funding a **post-settlement "mini-Marshall Plan" for the Balkans** designed to foster regional economic recovery and integration and thereby to give all parties a stake in good-faith implementation of a peace settlement.

At the same time, in conjunction with the threat of terminating sanctions relief for non-compliance, we should **increase the rewards to Milosevic** for initial positive steps, such as lifting vice suspending phase-one sanctions if he recognizes Bosnia. This could be especially helpful in keeping Moscow on board.

If UNPROFOR withdrawal must occur: As noted above, if the last-ditch effort to obtain a settlement fails, or if the RRF fails to improve the situation on the ground, we should force the issue of UNPROFOR withdrawal this year rather than having to deal with it in the middle of the election campaign. We should also seek to maximize Congressional co-responsibility in our withdrawal and post-withdrawal strategy.

40104 Lite? If we hope to avoid being drawn into the conflict, we need to use the withdrawal period, to the extent possible, to lay the groundwork for effective implementation of a post-withdrawal strategy of lift, arm and train. This argues for minimizing the time involved in extracting forces from areas where NATO forces are most likely to encounter Serb resistance, as well as Government maneuvers designed to prolong NATO's stay.

- Specifically, this would require shifting the emphasis to reliance on the RRF and rapid airborne extraction of UNPROFOR troops in the eastern enclaves (if necessary, destroying some equipment or handing it over to the Bosnian Government).
- The bulk of the remaining UNPROFOR troops would be in or near Federation-controlled territory, where a lighter NATO force may be sufficient to cover the withdrawal. (In this regard, we may want to make the case to our Allies for maintaining a rump UNPROFOR presence in central Bosnia to continue to assist in implementing the Federation agreements and dampening Muslim-Croat tensions.)

Transition to Lift: As soon as most UNPROFOR troops are out of harm's way, we should accelerate the transition to a pro-Bosnian lift, arm and train strategy:

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(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.3(b)(5), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

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-- In the UNSC, we would prepare for passage of a resolution to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia following UNPROFOR's departure:

- To secure a Russian abstention, we may need to make the resolution applicable to all republics of the former

Yugoslavia (including Serbia-Montenegro) and/or agree to substantial sanctions relief for Belgrade.

- If the Russians threatened to veto the UNSCR, we would seek a joint Allied agreement that, with UNPROFOR's departure, the UNSC was no longer "seized of the matter," that Article 51 rights of collective self-defense were now preeminent, and that we were therefore no longer bound by the arms embargo.
- As we moved in the UNSC, we would begin to mobilize a multinational effort to arm and train the Bosnians, with a view toward spreading the burden and thereby reducing the overall U.S. role and responsibility.

Implementing the post-withdrawal strategy: Following UNPROFOR's departure and passage of the UNSCR lifting the arms embargo, we would enter the implementation phase of our lift, arm and train strategy. Our objective would be to facilitate the provision to the Bosnian Government of military capabilities sufficient to recover territory allotted to the Federation under the Contact Group proposal.

- We have recently backed away from a commitment to air strikes in tandem with lift on the grounds that an air campaign could draw us too deeply into the conflict. We would, however, need to reexamine the "no strike" decision to the extent that Bosnian Government forces needed help in repelling Serbian offensives before they obtained arms and training sufficient to level the playing field.
- We would also need to implement a regional containment strategy, to include: a strong warning to Serbia to refrain from direct intervention; reinforcing UNPREDEP in Macedonia to prevent Serbian border encroachments and deter a new crackdown in Kosovo; strengthening UNCRO to prevent a resumption of full-scale war in Krajina and limit Krajina Serb support to the Bosnian Serbs; and possibly deploying preventive peacekeeping forces along Hungary's and Albania's borders with the FRY.
- We would, at the same time, intensify efforts to sustain the Federation and Bosnian-Croat military cooperation.
- We would make clear that we stand ready to broker a political settlement and assist in its implementation, although at this stage we would probably want to set aside the Contact Group approach and devise a basis for a "fresh start" to the negotiations.

11 July, 1995

TALKING PAPER

Subject: **Options for UNPROFOR Extraction from Eastern Enclaves (U)**

1. (U) **Purpose.** Provide CJCS options for extraction of UNPROFOR units from the Eastern Enclaves of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

2. ~~(S)~~ **Situation.**

- **Threat**

- ⇒ BSA ground forces attacking eastern enclaves.
- ⇒ Bosnian Serb air defenses.
- ⇒ BIH and Bosnian Govt forces (known to have fired on and to have blockaded UNPROFOR forces) may attempt use UNPROFOR forces as a shield.
- ⇒ Refugees fleeing enclaves and are attaching themselves to UNPROFOR forces.
- ⇒ Civilians may demonstrate against/interfere with troop movement.

- **Risk Assessment**

- ⇒ All extraction options are high risk military, not peacekeeping, operations
- ⇒ Forces will have difficulty maintaining readiness edge over time without periodic refresher training.
- ⇒ In place contingency plans were built on the assumption that extraction would take place in a permissive - semi permissive environment. Risk has increased due to loss of operational surprise (Serbs have the initiative), probability that Serbs possess IR capable SAM missiles, and increased willingness of Serbs to directly confront UN/NATO forces.

3. ~~(S)~~ **Options for Evacuation.** It is assumed all options involving force will be opposed at a minimum by ground troops and Bosnian Serb air defenses.

- **NATO Options.** Includes the OPLAN 40104 Quick Reaction Options--

Classified by J-3
Declassify on OADR

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 12 NARA, Date 11/5/2019
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MEU and SETAF variants. Heliborne extraction of UNPROFOR forces using NATO forces operation from ship or forward operating bases.

⇒ **Forces include:**

MEU Option -- 2100 personnel/23 aircraft
SETAF Option -- 5500 personnel/130(+) helicopters
DENY FLIGHT air forces; including CV(s) and JSOTF2 assets

⇒ **Time to execution** (from receipt of order):

MEU Option -- 60 hours
SETAF Option -- 14 days.

⇒ **Pros:** Plans exist; forces trained; most robust capability; expandable to all enclaves; combination of MEU and SETAF options may provide near simultaneous multiple enclave extraction capability; does provide reserve capability for single extraction..

⇒ **Cons:** Requires US ground forces in B-H; requires UN/NAC approval and time for force positioning; and will likely trigger full 40104 execution (US EXORD); large resource expenditure to maintain 14 day alert status.

- **UN Option.** In place UN RPF conduct ground extraction. With French approval, limited day heliborne extraction capability could be included using French amphibious forces on the FOCH.

⇒ **Forces include:**

Multinational Bde -- 4000-5000 personnel
French Amphibious Force -- 675 personnel/20-30 aircraft.
DENY FLIGHT air forces; including CV(s)

⇒ **Time to execution** (from receipt of order):

Multinational Bde -- Minimal forces 2 x Battallions(-) available now

French Amphibious Force -- 4-6 Days

⇒ **Pros:** Uses existing UNPROFOR forces; reinforces UN credibility; limited US involvement (DENY FLIGHT); does not trigger 40104

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- ⇒ **Cons:** RRF not in place; Ground extraction option; force may have to fight its way in and out; FR helicopters (if provided) have **day-only** lift capability; high risk operation.
- **US SOF Option.** SOCEUR planned JSOTF night helicopter extraction. operating from Italy and Croatia; night extraction using helos and MC130. Principally US operation; may include use of NATO air.
 - ⇒ **Forces include:**
 - JSOTF Brindisi -- 700 personnel/10 aircraft
 - DENY FLIGHT air forces; including CV(s)
 - SOCOM -- MH-53s and JSOC planning cell
 - ⇒ **Time to execution** (from receipt of order):
 - JSOTF Brindisi -- 96 hours (minimal risk)
 - (Additional SOF forces can be in theater within 24-48 hours).
 - To meet 96 hour response time, NLT D-3 a 4 man SOF led ESAT team must be inserted into evacuation area:
 - ⇒ **Pros:** Quickest; US unilateral; most capable, best trained, cleanest C2
 - ⇒ **Cons:** US ground forces; high risk night helicopter operation. Undermines NATO. Policy implications of US only option would run counter to stated policy that US forces would be used in NATO context only.
- **Negotiation/self-evacuation (unopposed).** UN/NATO/TCN/US apply diplomatic pressure to permit unopposed land movement of NL (or other force) to either Serbia or B-H core area.
 - ⇒ **Forces include:**
 - DENY FLIGHT air forces; including CV(s)
 - ⇒ **Time to execution** (from receipt of order):
 - Dependent on agreement with Bosnian Serbs/Govt forces
 - ⇒ **Pros:** lowest military risk; no trigger to 40104; lowest likelihood of casualties; lowest likelihood of hostage-taking; works toward a negotiated settlement.

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⇒ **Cons:** Perceived as reward for aggression; possible domino effect for other enclaves or all of UNPROFOR; possible opposition by elements not party to negotiations.

Prepared by: Bill Pennypacker, LTC, U.S. Army
EUCOM, J-3, Ext 46700

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SREBRENICA & A UN FIREBREAK

This paper addresses where the international community realistically could take a stand in light of the recent Serb offensive (and signs that offensive may continue). That stand would be designed to maintain a credible UNPROFOR, thereby avoiding the necessity of implementing the NATO withdrawal operation and lessen the potential for passage of a unilateral Lift law in the US Congress.

Assumption

Restoration of the status quo ante in Srebrenica is not feasible because the UK and France are not willing to commit sufficient force to restore an effective UN presence there.

Military Situation

Key points:

- enclaves are military indefensible (terrain, isolation, and forces available)
- RRF is not in place; forces previously not contemplated would be required to reestablish UN protection of Srebrenica or the other two enclaves
- current UNPROFOR forces are not capable of reinforcing isolated units in the enclaves
- restoration of status quo ante puts UN back into a militarily untenable military situation (greatly complicating any future withdrawal operation)
- airpower alone cannot protect the enclaves
- BSA has capability and will to defy UNPROFOR in the eastern enclaves

Firebreak Options

I. Zepa, Gorazde and other Safe Areas except Srebrenica.

Discussion. UN defense of Zepa is even less tenable than Srebrenica. It is more isolated, terrain is equally unfavorable, and the number and quality of UN troops is less (100 Ukrainian troops at Zepa). Fall of Srebrenica frees up seasoned BSA troops to attack Zepa. On the other hand, since Zepa remains in UN hands it can be reinforced. A UN stand at Zepa would lessen the political impact brought about by the fall of Srebrenica.

II. Gorazde and other Safe Areas except Srebrenica and Zepa.

Discussion. Although also isolated, Gorazde has a larger and more capable UN force. There are approximately 300 British and 100 Ukrainian troops there defending a population of about 65,000 refugees and residents. Reportedly,

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By: [redacted] NARA, Date 11/5/2019

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Bosnian government defenders in the area are also stronger than they are in the vicinity of Zepa and Srebrenica. Gorazde is one of the two heavy weapons exclusion zones and therefore retains considerable political importance. That said, however, giving up Zepa and Srebrenica may establish irresistible momentum setting in train a process leading to the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from all of the eastern enclaves.

III. Consolidate in central Bosnia and Bihac.

Discussion. This option would allow the possibility of subsequent peace proposals based on more realistic distribution of territory and protects the all-important Bosnian national capital of Sarajevo. UNPROFOR troops would be deployed in less exposed positions. NATO withdrawal planning would also be simplified somewhat. At this point, credibility of UNPROFOR and the RRF would necessarily need to be reestablished by broadening its mission to include, as necessary, active defense of Sarajevo and opening of routes by force if required for delivery of humanitarian relief. To do less would only encourage the BSA to move on central Bosnia as it did on the eastern enclaves.

Recommendation

The UN's ability to establish a "firebreak" in Bosnia depends on the availability of military forces to respond to attacks on the safe areas and the will of UNPROFOR to use that force. Without the military capability and political will to confront the Bosnian Serbs, a firebreak concept is not feasible. The US should encourage UNPROFOR contributors, particularly the British, French and Dutch, to support the firebreak concept. Of the options above, the most realistic course of action is selection option II -- the firebreak is at Gorazde -- but elements of Option III should also be included. A modified option II includes more active efforts to secure humanitarian relief for Sarajevo and Gorazde and more commitment of UNPROFOR to defend the remaining government controlled areas. This approach would serve our broader goals of maintaining the credibility of the UN and of NATO while preserving the viability of the Bosnian nation pending resumption of peace talks among the parties.

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Republika Bosna i Hercegovina
PRESIDENCY
PRESIDENT

Sarajevo, July 9, 1995

Excellency,

The crisis around Srebrenica, which has been besieged since the beginning of the aggression, has persisted for a long period of time.

Srebrenica has been declared a safe area, according to Security Council Resolutions 824(1993) and 836(1993). Furthermore, by the agreement with UNPROFOR, this enclave was demilitarized in 1993.

Despite these facts, the city of Srebrenica and its surroundings have been continuously exposed to shelling. However, since yesterday, the Serb aggressor has initiated a massive mechanized - infantry attack. UNPROFOR troops, which are not numerous in this enclave, are not willing nor capable of protecting the city under attack. More than 60,000 civilians, predominantly women, children and elderly, have found themselves in life-threatening danger.

I urge you to exercise your influence in order for the international community to fulfill its commitments and obligations towards this UN protected area and to prevent a new act of terrorism and genocide against the civilian population of Srebrenica.

I hope for your urgent action.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,
(signed)
Alija Izetbegovic

H.E. William J. CLINTON
President of the United States
of America
Washington, DC

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Sincerely,

Sarajevo, July 9, 1995.

Alija Izetbegovic

H.E.
Mr. William J. CLINTON
President of the USA

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	re: Elements of a Post-UNPROFOR Strategy - Support the Rump Bosnia; Contain the Conflict (8 pages)	07/01/1995	P1/b(1), P5 <i>✓ 3/3/2020</i>
002a. email	Nelson Drew to Anthony Lake; re: NATO Proposals (1 page)	07/06/1995	P1/b(1) <i>✓ 3/3/2020</i>
002b. paper	re: NATO Analyses [NATO] (2 pages)	07/06/1995	P1/b(1)
003. paper	re: NATO Forces (1 page)	n.d.	P1/b(1) <i>✓ 3/3/2020</i>
004a. memo	Eric Schwartz & Nelson Drew to Anthony Lake; re: Humanitarian Assistance Planning for Bosnia - Memorandum from Brian Atwood (2 pages)	07/07/1995	P1/b(1) <i>✓ 3/3/2020</i>
004b. memo	Brian Atwood to Anthony Lake; re: Humanitarian Assistance Planning for Bosnia (2 pages)	06/28/1995	P1/b(1), P5
005. report	re: The Balkans - The Bosnian Government & UNPROFOR [partial] (4 pages)	07/07/1995	P1/b(1), P3/b(3) <i>✓ 3/3/2020</i>

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Discussion Paper

Elements of a Post-UNPROFOR Strategy: Support the Rump Bosnia; Contain the Conflict

Overview

At the May 23 Principals Committee meeting there was a general consensus that U.S. policy following UNPROFOR withdrawal would be to seek multilateral lift of the arms embargo, limited support for arming and training the Bosnian Army, but no commitment to air strikes. Principals also agreed that U.S. security assistance should be largely limited to the provision of financing for Bosnian arms purchases from other suppliers and that training should be conducted by a third party, if possible. There was also agreement that such policies would have to be accompanied by enhanced efforts to contain the fighting within current bounds, including maintaining, and possibly reinforcing, peacekeepers in Macedonia.

Principals agreed that all these elements of a possible post-UNPROFOR strategy need further analysis, as do several other questions including: What relief and other military operations could or should remain in place? How would we work with Allies and friends to contain the fighting? What are Russia's likely responses to our efforts to lift the arms embargo and bolster the security of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

Political/Military Goals

Our principal goals following UNPROFOR's partial or complete withdrawal would be to:

- Preserve the sovereignty of the GOBH over as much of its territory as possible;
 - We could continue to recognize the borders of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as of 1992 and not accept the territorial status quo created by Serb military operations and ethnic cleansing, just as we did with Soviet conquest of the Baltics in the 1940s.
- Maintain the Bosniac-Croat Federation and good relations between Zagreb and Sarajevo;
 - Whether these alliances of convenience can endure remains to be seen. The Federation offers the best prospect for developing a counterweight to extreme nationalism and Serbian regional hegemony. Maintaining some common sense of purpose between Zagreb and Sarajevo is the best way to safeguard the GOBH from a Serb-Croat grand bargain that could leave Bosnia a Balkan Palestine in the middle of Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By ~~826~~ NARA, Date 12/13/2013

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- Croatian support would be essential to success of efforts to arm and train the Bosnian Army, if only to ensure transit of equipment. But Zagreb would surely want some similar security assistance and closer ties to NATO (through PFP) and the EU.
- Prevent a widening of the conflict and bolster regional stability;
 - This remains our abiding strategic interest. We must prevent the conflict from widening into a general Balkan War that could engage two NATO allies (with very different agendas), threaten the stability of fragile new democracies in the region, and increase the risks of deeper U.S. engagement.
- Deter further aggression by Belgrade, while keeping a line open to Milosevic and his successors.
 - Threats to Kosovo, Macedonia, and other neighbors would have to be deterred, but moderation of Serb policies is the long-term goal.

General Elements of the Strategy

Security Assistance

We would seek support of all NATO allies, PFP Partners, and moderate Islamic states for a security assistance package for the GOBH. But we should be prepared to proceed with a coalition of the willing.

Allies would balk at supporting lift for fear that it would prolong the war and exacerbate the risks of its widening. We would need to convince them that we only want to give the GOBH a chance to survive and be able to negotiate a viable settlement. A convincing containment strategy would also be essential to enlisting their support.

Security assistance to Bosnian government would be designed to give it sufficient military capacity to defend the territory still under its control and enhance its ability to regain, by force or at the negotiating table, territory now controlled by the BSA. The magnitude of assistance could range from what would be required to defend the status quo, to a more robust package that would allow it to make strategic gains, to an extensive reequipping that would allow it to reestablish its control over territory allotted it under the Contact Group Plan. Clearly cost will be a major factor here, and past estimates of the robust package have exceeded \$1 billion.

We and the GOBH would have to balance various goals with the risks of triggering engagement of superior Yugoslav Army (VJ) and Krajina Serb Army (KSA) forces in the fighting in ways that could only be countered by direct U.S. and/or Allied

military support. All but the first option risk bringing other Serb forces to Pale's defense.

Bosnian/Croat Harmony

Sarajevo has few alternatives other than alliance with Zagreb. Zagreb, on the other hand, may need additional incentives stay with the program. We and other Allies might offer Zagreb certain rewards for cooperation with Sarajevo such as additional technical and military assistance, deeper bilateral economic and political ties, and membership in PFP.

Dealing With Serbia

Deterring further Serb aggression would likely require reinforcing the "Christmas warning" to Milosevic about responding to Serb-triggered violence in Kosovo, and adding threats to take unspecified military actions against Serbia if it escalates its support to the Bosnian Serbs or intimidates Macedonia or other neighbors. ✓

Forging^{an} anti-Milosevic coalition could cause divisions within the Alliance and the EU and reinforce Serb nationalism unless we make it clear our efforts are not directed against Serbia proper but at the aggressive nationalism sponsored by the current government. At the same time, we could take steps to support opposition political groups in Serbia who favor more moderate regional policies. We could continue to hold out to Milosevic the promise of further integration if he really breaks with Pale and respects international norms. ✓

Regional Containment

Our regional containment efforts might include:

- Retain some residual UNPROFOR or other peacekeeping presence in the Federation territory to maintain Bosniac-Croat harmony.
- Retain a robust UNCRO to prevent a reeruption of the Serb-Croat war and limit KSA support, the BSA. ✓
 - KSA support was instrumental in the BSA's ability to beat back the Bosnian V Corps offensive in Bihac during the fall of 1994.
 - There is intelligence suggesting that if the KSA were driven out of UN Sectors North and South by the Croatian Army, they would move into the Posavina corridor and support BSA operations against the Gorazde pocket.
- Maintain and possibly augment UNPREDEP in Macedonia to help stabilize that country and deter a Serb crackdown in Kosovo. In the context of arming the Bosnians, we would

have to be careful not to give Kosovar Albanians the sense that U.S. or Allied forces would come to the aid of an armed uprising against Serb authorities.

- Deploy some other border monitoring forces like UNPREDEP in Hungary and Albania. This and other actions to prevent spillover could be organized by NATO through PFP.
- Reinforce stability along the periphery by redirecting resources currently used for peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance to promote economic development and cooperation among the front-line Balkan states.

Efforts Prior to Withdrawal

To be effective, elements of this strategy would need to be in place well before extraction of UNPROFOR actually begins. The military imbalance is such that the BSA could readily put pressure on the enclaves and Sarajevo before and during UNPROFOR withdrawal. Also, as the SNIE 95-7 notes, the Bosnian government would be likely to strongly resist a partial or complete withdrawal of UNPROFOR unless the U.S. or NATO commits to military support. This commitment would just as surely trigger BSA actions to preclude complete withdrawal.

- We would need to build consensus among the Allies and other potential partners and secure at least Russian acquiescence for the main goals of this approach.
- To give the GOBH forces a chance, we would need to explore ways to help the Bosnians "creep out" of the restrictions of the arms embargo. This might include:

- Providing some intelligence support to ^{the}GOBH to enhance their ability to organize defenses against BSA actions. For example, we might start providing the GOBH with data from the Predator UAV flights and other sources.
- Developing military-to-military contacts between the GOBH and third countries (Croatia, Turkey, or non-front-line CE states such as Poland or the Czech Republic), that would enable rapid launching of the envisioned training programs.
- Reconsider the option of allowing UNPROFOR units, on a national basis, to turn their equipment over ^{to} the GOBH upon withdrawal. In this way the Bosnian Army could also provide some protection to the evacuation force. Our assumption has been that this would trigger hostile Serb action against these forces, but if the extraction environment is hostile in any event this may not be so decisive in the Serb calculus.

Lifting Options

Multilateral

We would call for an end of the arms embargo because its continuation in the absence of a peacekeeping force or other UNSC action to preserve the peace would deny Bosnia-Herzegovina its right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. It would seem difficult for Russia or other states to justify continuation of the arms embargo in this context. Indeed, Russian Rep Churkin proposed lifting the arms embargo last year as part of the Contact Group's package of incentives and disincentives if Bosnia accepted the CG plan and the Serbs did not. Still, one could expect Russia and even some NATO allies to argue that lifting the embargo would only escalate the violence without altering the outcome fundamentally and run the risk of widening of the conflict. Allies would also be wary of lift because of the inevitable pressures to provide military assistance to the Bosnian government.

NATO/Coalition

If Russia or some another UNSC member (China) appeared to be the principal obstacle to multilateral lift, we might press for a NATO/coalition action to achieve the desired goal. Our argument would hinge on rights to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. However, absent a UNSC action to remove the embargo, we would still be vulnerable to the criticisms we have leveled at proponents of unilateral lift and risk losing support for compliance with other UN-mandated sanctions regimes. ✓

Lift Only

"Lift and pray" would seem to be a completely indefensible strategy both at home and abroad. Even the most isolationist Republicans are not advocating this approach. While this would end the stigma of supporting UNPROFOR, it would create the impression that we had decided to leave the Bosnian government to fend for itself on the black market or rely on Islamic states.

The GOBH might well resist withdrawal in this context. Indeed, the only advantage of this approach would seem to be that it would decrease the BSA's incentive to complicate or resist withdrawal. However, the BSA would know that the GOBH would receive arms from Islamic and other countries, even if the U.S. and Europe had made no commitments. This outcome would put pressure on the Federation and would risk the ensuing conflict ~~from~~ becoming a clash between Muslims and Christians. ✓

Arming and Training

On the face of it, arming and training by "third countries" has a number of benefits. It would limit the extent of U.S. engagement, making it easier to avoid the "Americanization" of

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the post-withdrawal conflict. In turn, this could help prevent the struggle from becoming a surrogate conflict between Russian-backed Serbs and the U.S.-backed GOBH.

Identifying likely "third countries" is more problematic. As for arming, many West European governments might be reluctant to fuel the conflict due to fears of widening. Some front-line Central European governments might have similar fears, and enlisting them in such an enterprise would run contrary to our efforts to continue the demilitarization of these societies. This leaves Turkey, Iran, and/or other Islamic countries, all of whom have lots of capacity and high motivation. But if these states get involved, modulating the flow will become more complicated, not to mention the polarizing impact of making this a clash between Islam and Christianity.

As for training, if the Bosniac/Croat Federation holds, Croatia would offer proximity, high motivation, and an eagerness to cooperate with NATO. The downside risks are that enlisting Croatia so frontally in the conflict against the Bosnian Serbs would risk reopening the Serb-Croat conflict in a bigger way. Clearly, Croatia's cooperation would be essential to any arming and training package for Bosnia. However, its use as a transit and staging area are different than its use as the training ground and launch pad for offensive operations against Serbs.

Robust Lift and Strike

Here the assessment is in many ways unchanged from the early days of the war in 1992. Lifting the arms embargo and beginning some arming and training of the GOBH forces will take time. During that time they would be very vulnerable to BSA military actions. The most effective way to mitigate this would be to conduct supporting air strikes against BSA heavy weapons, military facilities, and operations. If liaison with the Bosnian Army ^{was} established, it might be possible to use Bosnian forces as forward air controllers and target designators. At a minimum, we could argue that NATO's August 1993 decisions to undertake airstrikes to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo and other safe areas remain valid.

An even more robust option ^g would be designed to limit VJ involvement by threatening to target VJ military installations in the FRY and the Drina River Bridges and other transit points between the FRY and Bosnia if military support continues.

This would give the GOBH the best chance for survival, but it has several significant risks. Such strong action against the Serbs might trigger more direct Russian support. It could also spark an uprising in Kosovo or Vojvodina provinces that could trigger the wider war we seek to avoid.

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Strike, No Lift

This option, also considered in 1992, is gaining supporters outside government once again for different reasons. This approach would seek to "level the playing field" by targeting BSA heavy weapons and other military targets. Once UNPROFOR was out, it could be accomplished without fear of hostage taking. Forward air controllers would be required, but it might be possible to train Bosnian government forces to perform that function for NATO forces. Most military assessments have concluded that air strikes alone would be insufficient to save the enclaves and break a siege of Sarajevo. However, air strikes might be successful in achieving other, less demanding goals at the negotiating table.

Humanitarian Relief: Over to the Bosnians

PRM's paper explains in great detail how the withdrawal of UNPROFOR would disrupt relief efforts by international organizations. However, we need to explore the feasibility of turning over management and delivery of relief efforts to the Bosnian government. Our provision of security assistance might free resources and personnel for such efforts and the Bosnians could operate without current restrictions on UN and international agencies. Also, if we can hold the Federation together, these regions and Croatia could remain secure supply bases.

Assessing/Managing the Russian Reaction

In Moscow's fractious political environment, an expanded U.S.-NATO role in Bosnia would appear at first glance to be a tempting target either for Yeltsin's opponents or for Yeltsin himself and others eager to posture in defense of Russian national interests in the run up to parliamentary and presidential elections. While some pointed criticism of U.S. moves would be inevitable, the overall impact on elite and popular sentiment may be more manageable and less explosive than generally predicted.

How Strong is Pan-Slavism?

U.S. and Russian polling data routinely highlight the absence of any significant popular Russian support for Serbia or its agenda in the Balkans. Despite constant Russian (and Western) assertions to the contrary, the Russian view of Serbia corresponds roughly with attitudes toward Poland or Turkey (i.e., these states are seen as mildly friendly to Russia at best). Like most foreign policy issues, events in a post-UNPROFOR Bosnia would resonate faintly with a Russian electorate preoccupied with day-to-day socioeconomic concerns. Politicians from across the political spectrum would find it difficult to rouse average Russians out of their indifference or to stir up serious opposition to the Yeltsin government for its reactions to U.S.-NATO policy.

Russia's strategic interests in the Balkans, despite Zhirinovskiy's rhetoric, are far from evident to the electorate. Given the lingering outrage over the war in Chechnya -- much closer to home -- Moscow would have a hard time justifying direct military involvement in Serbia, even advisors/trainers, to the Russian public.

Russian Elite Perceptions

To be sure, the Moscow-based elite is likely to bristle at a more muscular U.S.-NATO posture in Bosnia. Although most foreign policy circles have embraced great power rhetoric and bluster on many high-profile issues, there is little fire in the belly left for the Balkans. The elite's Bosnia anxieties reached their high-water mark more than a year ago and were sparked largely by the April 1994 airstrikes around Sarajevo. A growing Bosnia fatigue has been fed by the actions of the Bosnian Serbs on the ground and by Moscow's high-profile diplomatic forays -- and failures -- in the region, the Contact Group, and the UNSC.

The steady downgrading of Russian priorities in the Balkans also is linked implicitly to the Russian elite's growing preoccupation with NATO expansion. While Yeltsin and Kozyrev would still be the key players in how the Russian internal debate on post-UNPROFOR Bosnia develops, they will need a clear understanding of the potential costs of opposing international consensus on this issue. Given the Russian leadership's overriding stake in holding the line on NATO expansion and repairing the damage caused by Chechnya, we can expect that Moscow will be far less inclined to fan a new round of crisis in relations with the U.S. and its Allies over Bosnia. Still, it will be particularly important for the U.S. to engage directly with Russian elite and official opinion at an early stage as our overall direction becomes clearer.

Russian arms sales now operate on a cash basis. Russia lacks the resources and political motivation to provide significant amounts of military assistance on credit to a bankrupt Serbia.

Vershbow, Alexander R.

From: Drew, S. Nelson
To: @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor
Cc: /R, Record at A1; @EUROPE - European Affairs; @DEFENSE - Defense Policy
Subject: NATO IMS Deny Flight Proposals ~~{CONFIDENTIAL}~~
Date: Thursday, July 06, 1995 7:55PM
Priority: High

Attached are the NATO International Military Staff's (IMS) analyses of three possible options for restoring the credibility of Deny Flight operations in the face of the new threat posed by Bosnian Serb use of their integrated air defense (IAD) capabilities:

- Increase SEAD presence at a level capable of supporting the previous Deny Flight operational tempo: rejected as not providing effective protection against current Bosnian Serb tactics.
- Pre-emptive SEAD operations to take out the Bosnian Serb C3I used to integrate air defense operations: the preferred option from a military standpoint -- it would require the Bosnian Serbs to revert to use of individual SAM radars, which would then be vulnerable to SEAD.
- Pre-emptive airstrikes against Bosnian Serb airfields and aircraft on the ground: while this would resolve the Deny Flight problem, Bosnian Serb SAMs would still be a major threat to Close Air Support missions and air resupply efforts.

The IMS also calls for the NAC to grant authority to NATO commanders (subject to dual key provisions) to retaliate against any portion of the Bosnian Serb IAD network for threats to NATO aircraft and to attack any airfield or facility used to support a NFZ violation in which a hostile act is committed.

The MC has placed the IMS recommendations under silence to expire on Tuesday, with the goal of seeking NAC approval next Wednesday. These policy options were under development well in advance of the most recent attacks in Bihac in violation of the NFZ.

JCS and OSD are jointly developing a U.S. position on these same issues. JCS briefed SECDEF on their initial analysis today. Decision to follow shortly.

<< File Attachment: DENYFLT.DOC >>

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. paper	re: NATO Analyses [NATO] (2 pages)	07/06/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Alexander Vershbow (European)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995 (Early July) [2]

2006-0647-F
jp2100

RESTRICTION CODES

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What flexibility exists between an emergency extraction operation and the full-blown, three-month deliberate extraction under OPLAN 40104?

Is there any other NATO or national planning for intermediate-level extraction options? How would withdrawal of troops and associated equipment be carried out if it were just from the eastern enclaves? If it was just one or two nations?

What would the NATO forces accomplish on the ground that UNPROFOR, with the RRF and adequate NATO air cover, could not accomplish if withdrawal is required?

Under what circumstances would a "lighter" NATO ground force be sufficient? How much lighter could the force be than the 110,000 now being contemplated?

What is the shortest time possible for a full UNPROFOR withdrawal under OPLAN 40104? What are the factors that would require a three-month operation? What would be the savings in time and manpower if most UNPROFOR equipment were left behind for the Bosnian government? If the equipment were left behind and destroyed?

If the situation becomes so untenable that UNPROFOR must withdraw throughout all of Bosnia, what role will the UNPROFOR units be expected to play while waiting for the full NATO force under OPLAN 40104? How would they be protected during the weeks preceding the arrival of the NATO forces?

If the Bosnian Serbs see UNPROFOR withdrawal as a prelude to the use of NATO airpower against them, what response options are available to NATO forces under OPLAN 40104 in reaction to the taking of UNPROFOR hostages at the outset of a withdrawal operation? Have the troop-contributing nations agreed to these options?

If circumstances change and the Bosnian government -- or a local Bosnian commander -- opposes withdrawal but UNPROFOR decides to come out anyway, would NATO forces be used against Bosnian government forces in order to execute OPLAN 40104? What, if any, changes in the concept of operations would be required? In the timeline for withdrawal?

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By 12 NARA, Date 11/5/2019

7013-0656-m (1.77)

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5034

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 7, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH:

RICHARD CLARKE / SANDY VERSHBOW *N*

FROM:

ERIC SCHWARTZ / NELSON DREW *RD*

SUBJECT:

Humanitarian Assistance Planning for Bosnia:
Memorandum from Brian Atwood

In the attached memorandum, Brian Atwood makes several proposals relating to humanitarian assistance planning in anticipation of a possible UNPROFOR withdrawal.

First, he recommends the establishment of a humanitarian assistance planning cell in Washington composed of JCS planners, USAID humanitarian experts and State Department political officers to integrate humanitarian assistance concerns into the military operations plan.

Brian also offers to send a humanitarian assistance expert to Naples to assist with NATO planning there. And he offers to deploy humanitarian experts should NATO be called on to assist an UNPROFOR withdrawal. These experts would advise senior commanders on the ground on humanitarian issues which would arise and which could interfere with efforts to carry out the military mission.

NATO and JCS military planners have insisted that NATO OPLAN 40104 remain focused on the military requirement for UNPROFOR withdrawal and not unduly encumber the withdrawal force or its commanders with responsibility for an additional humanitarian assistance plan. However, the OPLAN, as approved by NATO, recognizes that troops on the ground could not ignore humanitarian issues and establishes some general guidelines in this area. If implemented, Atwood's proposal would help to ensure that such guidelines translate into effective humanitarian action in the context of an UNPROFOR withdrawal.

We would like your approval to move forward on Brian's ideas, which would augment and elevate the efforts of an already-existing working-level interagency humanitarian group that meets weekly at State. We would consult with AID, State and DOD on whether Brian's "planning cell" should be independent from or grow out of this interagency group.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By: [redacted] NARA, Date 11/5/2019

2013-0656-1M (1.79)

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RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize NSC staff to seek to implement the proposals in the Atwood memorandum.

Approve *R* Disapprove

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum from Brian Atwood

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. report	re: The Balkans - The Bosnian Government & UNPROFOR [partial] (4 pages)	07/07/1995	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

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National Security Council
Alexander Vershbow (European)
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(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

Defense Intelligence Report

7 July 1995
J2-110-95

THE BALKANS: The Bosnian Government and UNPROFOR (U)

Key Judgments

(C) Increased anti-UNPROFOR rhetoric and frustration with the UN suggests Sarajevo sees less utility in UNPROFOR remaining in Bosnia. Nonetheless, in the next few months, the Bosnian Government is unlikely to undertake actions that might prompt a precipitous UNPROFOR withdrawal.

(C) The emboldened Bosnian Army increasingly views UNPROFOR as an impediment to its military offensives in some regions, such as Sarajevo. Increasing restrictions on UNPROFOR movements will likely continue throughout the summer.

(C) The UNPROFOR presence is viewed by key Sarajevo officials as the primary factor preventing lifting of the arms embargo.

(C) Sarajevo is highly suspicious of the UN's Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), believing that force, which is to support and protect UNPROFOR, could serve to restrict its own military objectives.

Document Released in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 11/05/2019 (1.82)
2013-0656-M

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Discussion

(C) Bosnian Government political and military leaders still believe that a UNPROFOR presence will keep the international community engaged on their behalf. To some extent, the Bosnians also assess that UNPROFOR serves as a deterrent against possible Bosnian Serb offensives in some areas, such as the eastern enclaves.

(C) Nonetheless, since the introduction of UN troops into Bosnia in 1992, the Muslim-led Bosnian Government has claimed that UNPROFOR has not adequately fulfilled its mission. Bosnian leaders often point to the UN's inability to protect civilian populations in the Sarajevo region and other UN-designated "safe areas" as a demonstration of this situation. Sarajevo argues that UNPROFOR's impartiality has favored the main aggressor in the conflict, the Bosnian Serbs.

(C) Bosnian officials stepped up their criticism of UNPROFOR during the past several weeks follow-

ing such events as the Bosnian Serb detention of UNPROFOR personnel after NATO airstrikes.

- (C) Newly appointed Bosnian Foreign Minister Sacirbey recently sent a letter informing the UN Security Council that Sarajevo intended to review the current mandate for the UN presence in Bosnia before its expiration in November. Sacirbey added that Sarajevo could ask UNPROFOR to leave if that was "the price of lifting the arms embargo."

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

- (C) Bosnian Government officials claimed that they will reserve the right to review consent for deployment of the RRF, a step partly intended to assert Bosnian sovereignty over its territory. Bosnian officials appear to be making the point that the UN must consult them before making extensive new plans for use of UNPROFOR troops.

(C/NF) The Bosnian Army also continues to take active measures concerning UN troops, such as restricting their movements. Recent reports indicate that the Bosnian Army views UNPROFOR as an impediment to its continuing and planned military offensives in some regions, particularly the Sarajevo area.

- (C/NF) As part of their preparations for attacks around the Sarajevo area in mid June, Bosnian Army forces blockaded Canadian UNPROFOR movements around Visoko. The Bosnian Army claimed that UNPROFOR was not providing timely—24-hour advance—notification of its movements.

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- ~~(C/NF)~~ The Bosnian Army retrieved most of the weapons from the one UN Weapon Control Point in the Bosnian Government-held area of Sarajevo. UN sources reported in mid-June that Bosnian Government soldiers were wearing blue helmets inside the city.
- ~~(C/NF)~~ Bosnian Army troops restricted the movement of UNPROFOR personnel in other regions such as the Bihac enclave and around Gorazde.

(C) UN Commander in Bosnia Lt Gen Smith expressed his concerns about increasing Bosnian Army suspicions about the continued utility of the UNPROFOR presence. In discussions with US officials in mid-June, Smith characterized the Bosnian Government's attitude toward UNPROFOR as one of defiance. The UN Bosnia Commander assessed that Bosnian Army forces now have a "resigned resignation" that they must undertake large-scale military actions to pursue their goals, regardless of the UNPROFOR presence in areas such as Sarajevo.

Outlook

(C) Increased anti-UNPROFOR rhetoric by key Bosnian Government officials suggests the government sees less utility in UNPROFOR remaining in Bosnia than in the past. This is most likely the result of Sarajevo's belief in the overall ineffectiveness of the UN effort, combined with a more emboldened and confident Bosnian military. Nonetheless, Sarajevo is unlikely to take steps that might lead to a precipitous UNPROFOR withdrawal, at least for the near term.

- (C) In Sarajevo's view, the UN presence for now still serves to focus international attention on its plight.
- (C) However, Bosnian officials will remain increasingly worried that a continued UNPROFOR presence may not be in their long-term interest, since it may only serve to "freeze" the "areas of control" and restrict Bosnian Government military movements.
- (C) Sarajevo also views the UN presence as blocking lifting the arms embargo. Bosnian leaders will

- likely step up their rhetoric on this issue during the summer.

(C) Sarajevo remains suspicious of recent Anglo-French moves to strengthen UNPROFOR—such as the RRF—and is concerned that such a force could serve to restrict Bosnian Army offensive initiatives.

- (C) The Bosnian Government does not object to the RRF being used for missions such as humanitarian convoy escorts, particularly if such escorts were intended to pressure the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) to allow unrestricted humanitarian access into Sarajevo.
- (C) However, for the most part, Bosnian leaders view the RRF as a force supporting only UNPROFOR and one unlikely to serve any tangible benefit to Sarajevo's military aims.
- (C) Although not wanting to directly engage the RRF, Bosnian Army troops could take steps to inhibit or block its movement. Bosnian Army troops also might try to indirectly engage the RRF, hoping to blame such attacks on the Bosnian Serbs.

Bosnia Views UNPROFOR's Continued Presence

PROs

- Keeps international community actively engaged in Bosnian situation.
- Deters possible large-scale Bosnian Serb offensives in areas such as the eastern enclaves.
- Protects humanitarian aid deliveries.

CONS

- Restricts operations and movement of Bosnian Army personnel.
- Ineffective in protecting Bosnian civilians in safe areas.
- Impediment to lifting of arms embargo.

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(C) Overall, Bosnian Government attitudes toward UNPROFOR will be dependent on Sarajevo's confidence in its own military capability. Should the Bosnian Army demonstrate the ability to make consistent and significant gains against the BSA—an ability they have yet to demonstrate—the government will become less tolerant of, and more belligerent toward UNPROFOR. Bosnian attitudes toward UNPROFOR over the next several months may

largely depend upon the success of the Bosnian Army offensives around Sarajevo. If the Bosnian Army is able to make major territorial gains and relieve the so-called BSA siege of Sarajevo—still an unlikely possibility—the Bosnian Government could ask UNPROFOR to leave, expecting an eventual lifting of the arms embargo.

(b)(3)

Balkans Task Force, DIA/J2M

(b)(3)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. note	Fred Beauchamp to Mr. Pardon et al; re: Deny Flight Issues (1 page)	07/06/1995	P1/b(1) <i>VL 3/3/2020</i>
001b. memo	G.J. Folmer to Members of the Military Committee - The Chief, French Military Mission; re: Operation Deny Flight [NATO] (2 pages)	07/05/1995	P1/b(1)
001c. memo	Peter Carstens to Director, International Military Staff; re: Deny Flight Issues [NATO] (4 pages)	07/05/1995	P1/b(1)
001d. memo	Peter Carstens to Director, International Military Staff; re: Request for Authorization [NATO] (1 page)	06/27/1995	P1/b(1)
001e. memo	Peter Carstens to Director, International Military Staff; re: Request for Additional Deny Flight Authorizations [NATO] (2 pages)	06/19/1995	P1/b(1)
002. table	re: Food Shortages (1 page)	07/03/1995	P1/b(1)
003. report	re: Food Supplies (3 pages)	07/03/1995	P1/b(1)
004. memo	Resident Clerk to Private Secretary, Miss Neville Jones & Charlton; re: Bildt/Milosevic - Recognition Package (3 pages)	07/05/1995	P1/b(1) <i>VL 3/3/2020</i>
005. report	re: Prospects for "Yugoslav" Military Intervention in Bosnia & Croatia (6 pages)	07/03/1995	P1/b(1)
006. table	re: UNHCR Convoys Experience Mixed Results (1 page)	05-06/1995	P1/b(1) <i>VL 3/3/2020</i>
007a. memo	Bruce Pease to Anthony Lake; re: Possible Dialogue with Serbian Leaders (1 page)	06/30/1995	P1/b(1), P5

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007b. talking points	re: Weekly Meeting (4 pages)	06/20/1995	P1/b(1)
008a. memo	Nelson Drew to Anthony Lake; re: Proposed U.S. Demarche (3 pages)	07/03/1995	P1/b(1), P5
008b. memo	The Secretary of Defense & DCI to POTUS et al; re: Evaluation of Demarche [partial] (2 pages)	06/29/1995	P1/b(1), P5 <i>v2 7/3/2020</i>
008c. talking points	re: Possible Talking Points (1 page)	06/29/1995	P1/b(1) <i>v2 3/3/2020</i>
008d. report	re: Inter-Serbian Sanctions: Shortcomings in Serbian Enforcement Persist. [partial] (10 pages)	06/23/1995	P1/b(1), P3/b(3) <i>v2 3/3/2020</i>

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Sandy -
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w/ Tony.

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6 JUL 95

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2. B GEN OSTERMALZER		
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REMARKS

THIS IS THE IMSWM THAT IS BEING CONSIDERED BY THE MILITARY COMMITTEE TODAY. THE 5 JULY SHAPE DOCUMENT SUBJECT "DENY FLIGHT ISSUES" SPELLS OUT SHAPE'S ASSESSMENT OF THE SEAD SITUATION. I'LL LET YOU KNOW WHEN I HEAR THE RESULTS OF THE MC DELIBERATIONS.

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2013-0656-m

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From: Sandy Vershens

TO: Tony Lake
 Sandy Berger
 Leon Fuerth
 Rick Saunders
 Nelson Drew

RESIDENT CLERK PLEASE PASS TO PRIVATE SECRETARY, MISS NEVILLE-JONES
 AND CHARLTON

SUBJECT: BILDT/MILOSEVIC: RECOGNITION PACKAGE

SUMMARY

1. Bildt stresses need for rapid progress on political and military fronts. Queries use of integrated air defence systems and mobilisation of refugees. Milosevic looks for "critical mass" of elements in recognition package. Bildt to devise possible formulae. But stresses that recognition must be accompanied by rapid progress on the ground. Believe Milosevic ready to deal.

DETAIL

2. Below is Carl Bildt's assessment of his second meeting with Milosevic.
3. For Bonn, Paris, Washington, Madrid: Grateful if you would pass this to relevant MFA Political Directors as soon as possible.

Begins

4. On 1 July I spent almost nine hours with Milosevic at his villa outside Belgrade. Austin and Milinovic (Milosevic's chef de cabinet) were also present.
5. I began by stressing that time was critical. If there was no progress on the political front within weeks rather than months then Bosnia risked going belly up. If the situation on the ground

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 White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
 By VL NARA, Date 11/5/09
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did not improve then UNPROFOR may have no option but to withdraw (a nightmare scenario). Congressional pressure and forthcoming elections in the US were reducing Clinton's room for manoeuvre on a recognition package. The arms embargo may be lifted. For all these reasons we had to move fast. And political progress must be accompanied by an improvement on the ground. UNPROFOR had to have freedom of movement and humanitarian aid had to get through to Sarajevo and the enclaves as a matter of urgency. Sarajevo could not suffer a fourth winter under siege. If negotiations failed to open a land route to Sarajevo then the Bosnian government would continue its military efforts to relieve the siege.

6. Milosevic countered that the Muslims would fail if they tried to break the siege. Mladic, who had been in Belgrade on 30 June, had been very confident. Initially, Milosevic did not appear concerned by the time factor but I believe took the point as I kept referring back to it.

7. I said that the integrated air defence system had raised doubts as to whether Milosevic was still helping Pale. I also brought up the FRY's help in mobilising refugees to fight in the Krajinas and Bosnia. Milosevic simply commented that allegations over air defences were nothing new and that regarding refugees, all the FRY had done was round up 2-3,000 criminals who had no right to live in Serbia.

8. Discussion then turned to the recognition package. The major sticking point was not surprisingly the sanctions reimposition formula although Milosevic also raised the oil regime (not likely to be a problem), his preference for the EU list of strategic goods and frozen assets. Milosevic said that the Nordwijk formula was unacceptable. He accused the Americans of backtracking on what he had agreed with Frasure. He had made all the concessions he could. Any more concessions would cripple the package. He needed to have a critical mass of factors to enable him to sell the package to the Serbs on both sides of the Drina. There had to be a mechanism whereby suspension was not reliant on the arbitrary behaviour of one state. Why could not the international community trust the UN Security Council or Secretary General? The US need not fear a Russian veto: after all, Russia had not vetoed resolutions imposing sanctions on the FRY.

9. I said that Milosevic's most recent formula would not run. But I accepted the critical mass point and agreed that one country should not be able to reimpose sanctions unilaterally. Nevertheless I would have to be able to sell the formula in Washington. I spent some time trying to get him to agree to possible parameters for reimposition formula which would not make it possible for any one country to arbitrarily reimpose sanctions but would at the same time avoid the possibility of another country blocking the reimposition of sanctions if there was a good case to be made for it. He reluctantly accepted those parameters and I undertook to look at/devise possible formulae based on this which would at the same time give Milosevic his critical mass and satisfy the international community and then return to him with it.

LNWBAN 6433

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10. However, I said that a deal on recognition was not enough in itself. It had to be accompanied by a real improvement on the ground, especially on access to Sarajevo. Milosevic said that once a deal was reached, he would need only two weeks to pull Serb opinion (in both the FRY and Bosnia) behind him and force Karadzic and Krajisnik to the negotiating table. Access to Sarajevo could be negotiated then. I said that that was not enough. Izetbegovic would be reluctant to call off his offensive and negotiate until after the siege had been lifted.

PALE

11. Milosevic was very dismissive of the two Ks. They did not want to negotiate. Karadzic would lie to me, break all his promises and refuse to get down to specific negotiations. That is why Pale must be by-passed. Milosevic kept coming back to his theme of "Come to me. I think we can achieve peace. Just give me sufficient critical mass". Milosevic hoped that Mladic would not be a problem but could not guarantee it.

COMMENT

12. My main aim of the meeting was to bring the critical time factor home to him. I believe that we ended the meeting with him being more aware of the urgency of the matter than he was at the beginning of the meeting. I also wanted to make clear to him that success on the package was not enough in order to prevent things sliding away into disaster but that there must be rapid progress on the ground primarily around Sarajevo but also the enclaves. This seemed to be news to him and he was somewhat reluctant to see that linkage.

13. I believe that Milosevic is ready to deal. My task now is to find a suitable formula for sanctions reimposition. With that in the bag the rest should follow. But Milosevic's insistence that once he has his "critical mass" Pale will rapidly sue for peace ~~is~~ asking the international community to take a lot on trust. But he is absolutely convinced that he can achieve this.

14. Milosevic's mood fluctuated during the meeting. He was by and large a genial and charming host but got very agitated when the conversation turned to Kosovo (which he insisted Serbia would never give up, not even at the cost of 1,000 years excommunication). He showed typical Serb traits: a selective view of history emphasising wrongs done to them, a victim complex ("why does the world continue to punish this little country?", "I was naive towards the Bosnian Serbs"). Milosevic also contradicted himself on more than one occasion when speaking about the Bosnian Muslims. He described Izetbegovic as "sensible, moderate" and later as "extremist and fundamentalist". Muslims were "good people" but who "don't care about human life".

15. I agreed to meet Milosevic again at 1400 hrs on 7 July. I will not be surprised if he brings Mladic along to that meeting.

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UNHCR CONVOYS EXPERIENCE MIXED RESULTS

- Convoys arrive at Sarejevo / Bihac; 30 June (UNHCR)
- BSA continued to deny UNHCR convoys to eastern enclaves; 2 July (UNHCR, JTF)
 - BSA claim situation "too dangerous" to allow convoys

~~SECRET REL NATO~~

JUNE CONVOYS	Last Convoy	Total MT	% Monthly Target
Zepa	21 JUN	50	32
Sarajevo	30 JUN	403	10
Srebrenica	27 JUN	230	39
Gorazde	21 MAY	0	0
Tuzla	27 JUN	1,517	53
Bihac	30 JUN	403	21



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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008b. memo	The Secretary of Defense & DCI to POTUS et al; re: Evaluation of Demarche [partial] (2 pages)	06/29/1995	P1/b(1), P5

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Alexander Vershbow (European)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995 (Early July) [3]

2006-0647-F
jp2101

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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29 June 1995

Declassified in Part

Per E.O. 13526

VZ 11/05/2019 (1.93)

(IN)

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.
Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

FROM: The Secretary of Defense
Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Demarche to Milosevic on
Terminating Serbian Assistance to Bosnian Serb
Air Defenses (S-NF)

1. (TS/ [redacted] 1.4(c) At the Foreign Policy Team meeting on 21 June, the idea was raised of preparing a demarche to Serbian President Milosevic with specific demands aimed at reducing Serbian support for Bosnian Serb air defenses. In response, the Joint Staff and Intelligence Community have conducted a careful review of the structure of the Serbian and Bosnian Serb air defenses. [redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

[redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

2. (TS/ [redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c evidence that the FRY [redacted] EO 13526 1.4c [redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c does provide information to Bosnian Serbs is overwhelming. However, the Intelligence Community indicates that the Bosnian Serbs have the capability to generate comprehensive air defense information with their systems; therefore, denial of FRY data to the Bosnian Serbs would have limited effect. [redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

[redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c total denial would be difficult.

3. (TS/ [redacted] 1.4(c) It may be worth using this FRY-Bosnian Serb relationship to measure the FRY's commitment to peace and stability in Bosnia. [redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

[redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

[redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c However, by demanding FRY curtail the provision of this information, the United States would be placing them at a decision point of compliance with our policies-- [redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c Compliance or noncompliance by FRY would better inform us of their political will.

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#

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~~TOP SECRET~~
EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c

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4. (TS, 1.4(c)) Operational DENY FLIGHT forces may benefit if the FRY took minimal steps to curtail the flow of information about air traffic to the Bosnian Serbs. If military action were taken against the Bosnian Serb radar and air traffic control sites in the future, that action could be more meaningful 1.4(c)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

5. (S/NF) Given the above considerations, recommend we demarche the FRY government in general terms only demanding that they cease providing any air surveillance data on UN and NATO aircraft to the Bosnian Serbs. If, for any reason, the demarche must use specific terms, we recommend (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

William J. Perry
William J. Perry

EO 13526 3.5c

John Deutch

Attachment: Talking Point

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

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29 Jun 95

Talking points on Serb Radar Net

-- One of the basic premises of the partial sanctions suspension is that Belgrade will not provide military support to Pale.

-- We have reason to believe that, in fact, the Belgrade Serb radar system is used to provide air surveillance information to the Bosnian Serb military, which information is then available for their use for air defense purposes against aircraft carrying out UN-authorized missions over Bosnia.

-- (If asked for evidence: Specifically, voice transmissions on a high frequency (HF) radio wave system are used to pass information of this character.)

---- Thus, Belgrade, through the passage of air surveillance information, is providing to Pale military support of the most fundamental kind -- current operational intelligence.

-- This is particularly serious as it threatens aircraft and their crews engaged in enforcing UN mandates, notably the NFZ, and standing ready to provide CAS to UN peacekeeping forces.

Further -- The US therefore believes that it is an essential condition of extension of the ~~current~~ sanctions relief that Belgrade agree to take effective action during the next extension period to cease providing air surveillance information to the Bosnian Serbs and confirm to the UN that such information is not being provided ~~by any means.~~

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008d. report	re: Inter-Serbian Sanctions: Shortcomings in Serbian Enforcement Persist. [partial] (10 pages)	06/23/1995	P1/b(1), P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Alexander Vershbow (European)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995 (Early July) [3]

2006-0647-F
jp2101

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Intelligence Report

DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

23 June 1995



Inter-Serbian Sanctions: Shortcomings in Serbian Enforcement Persist

3.5c



Since the United Nations extended Belgrade's limited sanctions relief on 22 April, Serbia and Montenegro have not rectified the deterioration in enforcement observed in February and March.



(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

Compared to likely pre-August 1994 shipments, however, Serbian President Milosevic probably continues to restrict shipments to Bosnia as a means of pressuring Pale and in hopes of obtaining additional sanctions relief:

- There are some reports of some deterioration in the BSA's inventories and financial condition due to the inter-Serbian sanctions and the long term effects of the war.
- Reports of a sharp decline in Bosnian Serb industrial activity appear to substantiate a reduction in Serbian-Bosnian economic ties.

President Milosevic has little incentive to further restrict support to the BSA or reduce economic ties to Bosnia.

EO 13526 3.5c

This memorandum was prepared by analysts of the DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force. The report was requested by Leon Fuerth, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs, to provide information on Serbia's sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force on

(b)(3)

EO 13526 3.5c

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EO 13526 3.5c

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3.5c

Update on Border Activity


Although overall Serbian and Montenegrin (FRY) trade with the Bosnian Serbs probably is below the level prior to Belgrade's imposition of sanctions in August 1994, persistent [1.4(c)] reporting of prohibited shipments entering Bosnia indicates Belgrade's enforcement has not tightened since 22 April, leaving the deterioration in enforcement observed in February and March unaddressed. The "ant trade" of numerous automobiles, buses, and tractors crossing the 340-mile border daily appears to be a primary source of non-military violations. Although FRY border officials have confiscated some goods and arrested a few violators, ICFY's limited presence enables it to capture only a fraction of actual violations and most vehicles carrying small amounts of prohibited goods enter Bosnia largely unimpeded.

3.5c

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

3.5c

Border Crossings Monitored 24 Hours by ICFY



(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

The onset of good weather coincident with ICFY funding and staffing problems undercut the mission's already limited ability to monitor the border, increasing the chance that large violations occurred:

- Many back roads that were impassable during the winter opened at a time when the number of crossings monitored around-the-clock and the number of roving patrols decreased.
- Belgrade announced that some crossings will be open for extended hours this summer.
- Security threats forced the mission to withdraw about one-third of its personnel from the border for more than a week in early June and has further restricted monitors' ability to conduct patrols.

After having declined to about 110 members in April, well below ICFY's declared minimum acceptable level of 150 people, mission staffing has risen and is projected to reach 200 monitors by 1 July. *Even with 200 monitors, however, the mission would be unable to verify closure of a 340-mile border with 125 known crossings--most of which the monitors consider minor. ICFY probably needs 300-400 monitors to significantly increase its ability to assess Belgrade's enforcement of sanctions against Pale.*

3.5c

Shortcomings and inconsistencies in FRY cooperation and enforcement continued to hamper the effectiveness of the ICFY mission. State Department reporting indicates that ICFY judges the level of overall cooperation is good and unchanged since 22 April, although it remains inconsistent. On several occasions, for example, FRY police cited jurisdictional problems when refusing to investigate apparent violations occurring within sight of border crossings.

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

3.5c

3.5c

3.5c


The "Back Door" via Croatia: Still Open

Despite the Croatian Sanctions Assistance Mission's (SAM) reports that Zagreb's renewed control over the Zagreb-Belgrade highway has ended Bosnian Serb use of the highway, Bosnian Serb imports continue via Croatia's Dalmatian Coast. SAM Croatia suspects that trucks entering Bosnia from the Dalmatian Coast support considerable trade between the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs, according to US Embassy reporting. Moreover, many Croatian customs officers, unaware of the areas of Bosnia that are Serb controlled, allow trucks with commercial and humanitarian shipments to enter Bosnia that may be destined for Serb areas. Once inside Bosnia, these trucks are not effectively controlled. On several occasions, non-humanitarian goods, including military clothing, have been discovered on trucks entering Bosnia. SAM headquarters in Brussels estimates that SAM Croatia needs a staff of 250 people to achieve results comparable to the ICFY mission in Serbia.

3.5c

Ongoing Serbian Support for the Bosnian Serb Army

1.4(c) reporting since late April provides mounting evidence that Belgrade continues to supply the BSA, *bolstering previous reports that indicated Serbian President Milosevic and VJ Chief of Staff Perisic, in particular, had agreed to provide support:*



(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

EO 13526 3.5c

3.5c

- The VJ continues to provide military intelligence to the BSA, (b)(1), E.O. 12958 1.4(c), 3.5c EO 13526 1.4c

Serbian-Bosnian Serb Air Defense Systems: Linked But Autonomous

Although the Serbian and Bosnian Serb integrated air defense systems (IADS) are tied together, the relationship probably extends only to the exchange of early warning information and not to the authorization to fire weapons. Both countries have dedicated early warning facilities capable of monitoring their airspace, however, and authorization to engage aircraft with anti-aircraft weapon systems, such as surface-to-air missiles or anti-aircraft artillery, probably rests with each party's senior political and military leaders. Belgrade does not appear to have the authority to order an engagement in Bosnia or stop an engagement ordered by the Bosnian Serbs.

3.5c

There is also evidence that the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) helps the VJ and Serbian military suppliers make shipments to the Bosnian Serbs:

- EO 13526 1.4c that the MUP continues to facilitate weekly shipments of 60-100 tons of munitions to the BSA.
- Supplies regularly are transported to Bosnia in autos or light trucks, according to military reporting.
- Since late fall 1994, the MUP has been assisting the FRY munitions firm Krusik--located in Valjevo and has Bosnian Serb personnel working at its plant--in supplying weapons and ammunition to the BSA, EO 13526 1.4c EO 13526 1.4c A special program at Krusik produces weapons and ammunition that are shipped by truck to the BSA. The MUP prevents the ICFY monitors from detecting the truck shipments.

• (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

Beyond the supply of military goods, ongoing VJ-BSA meetings and contacts indicate that cooperation continues.

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

VJ-BSA contacts apparently extend down through the ranks. Many VJ officers maintain close ties to the BSA and believe that they have a duty to aid their former colleagues now fighting in Bosnia, according to military reporting. Although Mladic is often in Belgrade, mid-and low-level VJ and BSA officers are most frequently in

3.5c

3.5c

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3.5c

contact, according to US Defense Attache reporting. (b)(1), 1.4(c)
hundreds of soldiers in uniform transiting the FRY-Bosnia border since 22 April.

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

The Helicopter Investigation: Inconclusive
The ICFY investigation into the pre-April radar tracks suspected to be helicopter flights from Bosnia into Serbia proved to be inconclusive. Experts from Britain, France, Russia and the United States could not agree on whether the tracks were helicopters involved in cross-border violations or aberrations of the radar's signal. The problem was compounded because only one of the tracks was corroborated by either NATO AWACS aircraft or visual observers. Several of the tracks were highly suspect, but could not be confirmed. The confirmed trackings of helicopter flights were determined to have been authorized medical evacuation flights. The radar's orientation, however, was determined better suited for monitoring high-flying airliner traffic than slow-moving, low-flying aircraft. The mountainous terrain also limits monitoring operations. The investigation concluded that ICFY is neither equipped nor organized to monitor the airspace over the border. A lack of helicopter detections since the investigators arrived indicates either Belgrade has halted cross-border helicopter activity or it is occurring too low to be detected. (b)(1), 1.4(c)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

Pale's Military Procurement Efforts

The Bosnian Serbs also appear to make direct procurements from Serbian munitions suppliers—with Belgrade almost certainly aware of their business contacts. (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

EO 13526 3.5c

Separately, Pale is using a network of individuals in at least Greece and Cyprus to procure strategic imports, (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

(b)(1), 1.4(c) The procurement ring appears to route shipments via Serbia and is establishing offices in Thessaloniki and Belgrade. (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

Impact on the BSA

Despite the military aid Belgrade reportedly is supplying, the embargo appears to be exacerbating the supply, distribution, and financial difficulties the BSA faced prior to August. The BSA is overstretched and suffering from manpower, ammunition, fuel, and money shortages--which are eroding BSA morale. These problems have not, however, severely hindered the BSA's ability to defend its areas of control:

- **Manpower.** The number of new BSA conscripts continues to fall, and an estimated 170,000 young men have already fled to Serbia, (b)(1), 1.4(c) (b)(1), 1.4(c) During a Mladic visit to Belgrade seeking assistance in early June, Milosevic agreed to deport Bosnian Serb males from Serbia to Bosnia, (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c
- **Ammunition.** Mladic told the officer corps in late April to conserve ammunition, (b)(1), 1.4(c) in mid-April that BSA artillery ammunition reserves, particularly for howitzers, were depleted, (b)(1), 1.4(c) An advisor to Mladic stated in May that the BSA also lacks raw materials to produce ammunition, (b)(1), 1.4(c)
- **Fuel.** A Mladic advisor stated in May that BSA fuel supplies were adequate for defensive actions, (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c Mladic told the officer corps in late April that the BSA needed "more than a lot" of fuel, (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c Bosnian Serb forces on the front lines in western Bosnia are suffering extreme shortages of fuel and food, (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c
- **Money.** (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c the BSA above all lacks money, (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c BSA troops have gone unpaid for 10 months.
- **Morale.** (b)(1), 1.4(c) stated that, as of April and May, morale in the BSA was at its lowest ever, (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c Salary problems are a primary reason for morale problems. EO 13526 3.5c

B

Impact on the Bosnian Serb Economy

The Bosnian Serb economy has deteriorated significantly since August 1994, and Belgrade's embargo appears to have also accelerated a decline in the populace's standard of living. The populace has become increasingly dependent on the black market for consumer goods:

- [redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c press indicate that Pale's economy is operating at or near subsistence. In late May, Bosnian Serb "President" Karadzic declared the economy cannot be strangled because the Bosnian Serbs are "peasants who can make their own food, weapons, and munitions," [redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c
- [redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c foodstuffs were readily available in Bosnian Serb territory in April, but inter-Serb sanctions had created cash shortages. [redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c food prices in Bosnian Serb-occupied areas fell in 1994 from 1993 levels because of a shift of resources to farming and higher yields. [redacted] 3.5c

Belgrade's blockade has hit Pale's industrial sector the hardest. Bosnian Serb imports of bulk raw materials and exports to and via Serbia appear to have been sharply curtailed. Shortages of petroleum products, and the money to pay for them, also have limited Bosnian Serb industry. Moreover, Belgrade's apparent ending of banking ties, limits on financial subsidies, and the drying up of domestic and foreign capital available to Pale has essentially ended domestic investment. [redacted] EO 13526 1.4c

[redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

- The embargo has reduced many factories to operations at only 10-15 percent of capacity, caused the recent shutdown of several industries, and cut operations by the textile and wood processing firms in half to about 17 percent of capacity, according to press reporting. As priority sectors, however, the arms and the medical industries reportedly have maintained output near pre-embargo levels.
- [redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c inter-Serb sanctions cut off Bosnian Serb banks from correspondent banks in Serbia. Because the Pale regime used the Serbian new dinar as currency, the regime now relies on hard currency--mostly German marks--to conduct trade and pay smugglers. [redacted] 3.5c

Pale has had only minor success in restructuring its economy in response to Belgrade's embargo and UN sanctions. Pale's efforts to centralize control over taxes and spending were rebuffed by local authorities and the leading taxpayers--businesses and profiteers. [redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c *Many industries have oriented their limited production toward domestic, often wartime, needs.* [redacted] 3.5c

Outlook

Serbian President Milosevic has little incentive to further restrict support to the BSA or reduce economic ties to Bosnia. Milosevic wants to use the embargo to pressure Pale but not seriously undermine the BSA's capabilities, particularly given rising tensions and fighting in Bosnia. Moreover, Belgrade's current enforcement posture has been sufficient to induce the ICFY mission to verify to Milosevic's compliance to the United Nations while still allowing him to aid the BSA using methods that ICFY has not detected. Milosevic probably also wants to use ongoing assistance to maintain influence with military and political leaders in Bosnia, facilitate any future assistance to the Krajina Serbs, and to ensure that the BSA does not sustain a major defeat.

EO 13526 3.5c

EO 13526 3.5c

~~Top Secret~~

EO 13526 3.5c

10
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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	re: Options Paper - Position on French Request for Assistance in Defense of Gorazde (2 pages)	07/17/1995	P1/b(1), P5 v 3/3/2020
002a. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS; re: Phone Call to French President Chirac to Follow-Up on London Conference on Bosnia (2 pages)	07/24/1995	P1/b(1), P5 v 3/3/2020
002b. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with French President Jacques Chirac (1 page)	07/24/1995	P1/b(1) v 3/3/2020
002e. notes	re: Handwritten Notes - Reservations (1 page)	n.d.	P1/b(1) v 3/3/2020
003a. note	To Tony Lake & Sandy Vershbow; re: Tri-Lateral Agreement (partial) (1 page)	n.d.	b(2)
003b. paper	re: Graduated Response for Use of Air Power (5 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1) v 3/3/2020
004a. map	re: Bosnia & Herzegovina (1 page)	07/1995	P1/b(1)
004b. note	re: Azerbaijan (1 page)	n.d.	P1/b(1)
005. paper	re: Russia (2 pages)	07/21/1995	P1/b(1)
006. fax	Mac Friesner to POTUS; re: Bosnia (partial) (2 pages)	06/30/1995	P6/b(6)
007. list	re: Bildt Proposal - Key Points (2 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1) v 3/3/2020
008a. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS; re: Message to Yeltsin Regarding Bosnia (1 page)	07/20/1995	P1/b(1) v 3/3/2020

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Alexander Vershbow (European)
 OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995 (Mid-July) [1]

2006-0647-F
jp2102

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008b. letter	POTUS to President Yeltsin; re: Bosnia Issue (2 pages)	07/20/1995	P1/b(1) v 3/3/2010
009. paper	re: UN Personnel (2 pages)	07/19/1995	P1/b(1)
010. paper	re: Warring Parties (2 pages)	07/19/1995	P1/b(1)
011. paper	re: Milosevic (2 pages)	07/20/1995	P1/b(1)
012a. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS; re: Telephone Call with French President Chirac (2 pages)	07/20/1995	P1/b(1), P5 v 3/3/2010
012b. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with French President Jacques Chirac (2 pages)	07/20/1995	P1/b(1) v 3/3/2010

COLLECTION:

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 OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995 (Mid-July) [1]

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Options Paper: Position on French Request For Assistance in Defense of Gorazde

Background: The French and British remain far apart following Sunday's meeting of CHODS in London on their approach to the issue of reinforcing Gorazde against potential Bosnian Serb attack: The French have portrayed the survival of Gorazde as a litmus test of UNPROFOR's future viability; they are prepared to support our proposals for robust use of air power to protect Gorazde, but have tied this to their proposal to reinforce the peacekeepers on the ground as a deterrent to Serb aggression; moreover, they insist that only a visible commitment of additional U.S. support in Gorazde, i.e. helicopter airlift, will satisfy Chirac and head off a French decision to withdraw. The UK argues against anything that would change the nature of the existing UNPROFOR mission, is skeptical about robust use of air power, and has indicated it does not see the survival of Gorazde as essential to the continuation of UNPROFOR. The British have indicated, however, that they may be willing to consider the option of a "private" warning to the Bosnian Serbs that if they attack Gorazde, NATO will retaliate with a massive air campaign (similar to the UK/U.S./French warning delivered in early June with respect to the hostages).

Our own military analysis (and that of Bosnian Foreign Minister Sacirbey) is that a truly robust air campaign would be far more critical to the defense of Gorazde than the addition of French troops; but it may be difficult to persuade the French to delink this from the deployment of additional ground forces. The challenge is to find a means of satisfying the French concerns over Gorazde that will not be blocked by the UK, while at the same time bolstering UNPROFOR for the more critical task of protecting Sarajevo and central Bosnia and avoiding making the fall of Gorazde the trigger for UNPROFOR withdrawal.

Options: There are two basic options for a U.S. response to the French in preparation for the Foreign and Defense Ministers' meeting scheduled for London on Friday, July 21.

- **Option 1 "Yes, but..."** Tell the French that we are prepared to support their request, but that we view the reinforcement of UNPROFOR in Gorazde as mainly symbolic (as they have implied). The numbers and mission therefore could be scaled back, with emphasis on enhancing the ability to coordinate NATO air support for the enforcement of the exclusion zone and for the Bosnian Government's defense of the enclave. We would make clear that there can be no compromise on insisting that preemptive SEAD and a robust air campaign, without the existing dual key, are the preconditions for U.S. support in lifting the troops: we do not intend to take part in flying troops into harm's way if there is no additional realistic capability to defend their positions once they are in place. We would also stress that we are not committing to participation in any resupply effort. And we would state that, while we are in favor of making a determined effort to deter a Serb offensive against Gorazde, we would still favor maintaining UNPROFOR in Sarajevo and Central Bosnia in the event Gorazde falls.
- **Option 2 "No, because..."** Tell the French that, absent their ability to present a realistic mission for the forces they are proposing to send to Gorazde, the troops could be more effectively employed around Sarajevo, and that therefore we could not justify providing helicopters to move them. However, agree with the French that a major change in UNPROFOR credibility must be signaled at Gorazde, and encourage them to join us in persuading the British to support a robust air campaign, supported by preemptive SEAD, to enforce the exclusion zone and assist the Bosnian forces in protecting the Gorazde Safe Area.

Analysis: Either option may be rejected by the British and other troop-contributing Allies, probably resulting in a French decision to pull out of UNPROFOR. Option 1 would reduce French ability to pin the blame on us in that event. If accepted and our questions are satisfactorily answered, Option 1 would require us to make good on the offer to provide helicopter air lift. This would prompt Congressional and public opposition to crossing the "red line" toward ground involvement -- opposition that could become unmanageable if one of our helicopters were shot down. Moreover, it could commit us to follow-on actions to save Gorazde if the Serbs attacked and threatened to overrun the enclave.

The robust air campaign envisaged by both options would increase the risk of UN personnel being taken hostage, but without this, neither Gorazde nor Sarajevo may prove viable in the long term. The British willingness to issue a "private" warning (that would, of course, leak) of a massive air response to an attack on Gorazde could be incorporated into either option. It may not, however, go far enough to satisfy the French interest in visible action on the ground, but it may be the means to unlocking the UN key on SEAD and robust air strikes. If we support this approach, the authority for single-key SEAD and air strikes must be granted in advance, triggered by a Bosnian Serb attack on Gorazde. If also linked to a robust campaign to open land routes to Sarajevo, this might be sufficient to bring the French along, but probably not without direct lobbying by the President with Chirac.

Hooper at Field

*Allegiance - y pop the subject
backed off*

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
7-24-95

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 24, 1995

95 JUL 24 P1:44

*Smith
Mi Caud
Gud Cud*

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE *TL*

*Normal Mail -
Shali -*

SUBJECT: Phone Call to French President Chirac to Follow-Up on London Conference on Bosnia

Purpose

Provide talking points for call to President Chirac to ensure French remain on board for prompt NATO follow-up to London agreement.

Background

The UK, France and the U.S. agreed at the London Conference on Bosnia that NATO would launch a sustained air campaign against the Bosnian Serbs if they attacked Gorazde and that this policy could be extended to other safe areas if required. An ultimatum to that effect was delivered yesterday by a joint U.S./UK/French team to the Bosnian Serb leadership.

Saturday, NATO nations expressed broad support for this approach and referred it to the Military Committee for further refinement. However, at meetings of the Military Committee Sunday and today, several key allies seem to have begun to backslide.

The French in particular appear to be having second thoughts about supporting a massive air campaign. Following a call by Boutros-Ghali to Chirac, the French have moved away from their agreement in London that sound military policy required that the UN "key" be delegated to the UNPROFOR ground commander, General Smith. They are now indicating that General Janvier, the UN theater commander, should retain the key. While we can sympathize with their desire to keep a key in the hands of a French officer, Janvier in the past has proven far too sympathetic to the reluctance of Akashi and Boutros-Ghali to authorize the use of air power in a timely manner. (Over the weekend, Janvier reportedly refused to meet with Admiral Smith, CINCSOUTH, to discuss even preliminary steps for coordinating the air campaign because he had no instructions from New York.)

You should press Chirac to return to the agreement reached in London concerning placing the UN key in the hands of the UNPROFOR

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By FC-NARA, Date 4/17/09

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Vice President
Chief of Staff

2013-0656-m (1.98)

ground forces commander. Failure to agree on the appropriate level for military coordination will cause us even more serious problems with Congress than we already face.

While the London discussion concentrated on the Gorazde Safe Area, it left open the door for expanding the ultimatum to include other Safe Areas. Saturday, two French UNPROFOR soldiers were killed in a Bosnian Serb attack on the Mt. Igman road, and the Bosnian Serbs launched a massive attack on the Bihac enclave. You should signal our view that the NATO decision cannot be silent regarding responses to attacks on Bihac, Tuzla and Sarajevo.

RECOMMENDATION

That you use the attached talking points during your conversation with President Chirac.

Attachment

Tab A Points to be Made for Telephone Call to Chirac

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC

- Want to extend condolences for loss of your brave soldiers in Sarajevo over weekend.
 - Continue to be outraged by Bosnian Serb behavior. Highlights once again need to send strong deterrent message.
 - In that regard, want to thank you for your leadership and flexibility in dealing with London Conference on Friday.
 - By your decision, you made it possible to send forceful and united signal to Karadzic and Mladic.
 - Key now is expeditious action at NATO. Hoped we could have had NAC decision today. Must press for decision tomorrow. Must maintain momentum by clear and rapid display of Allied decisiveness. Cannot hesitate now.
 - Need clear and firm decision on our concept of operations based on London agreement.
 - Concept endorsed in London would permit extended air operations over wide area and wide variety of targets, but limited to ~~that~~ necessary to stop Serb attack.
 - Know you may still have reservations about massive air campaign. But we must send firm, unambiguous signal to Bosnian Serbs. To hesitate now, after having issued ultimatum, would send opposite signal and invite disaster.
 - Should also stick to agreement to change previous dual-key arrangement by delegating UN authority to General Smith. This is right level for effective military operations. Must be able to tell our people and Congress that our action is consistent with sound military practice.
 - We cannot return to old status quo, which hamstrung our ability to use air power in timely, effective manner.
- Understand we have had some disagreement over these points among our delegations in Brussels. Hope you can agree to move forward together on this and that you will help convince Boutros-Ghali to go along.
- Know London discussion focussed on Gorazde. In light of massive Bosnian Serb offensive in Bihac, believe we must consider strengthening language for other safe areas.
- We will need to stay in close touch in days ahead. Believe we now face our best remaining chance to turn Bosnian Serbs from battlefield toward negotiated settlement.

*Ally on
Serbs on
Gorazde*

*1) Clear air support
2) Large air action
3) Jambur
* Zone of Op*

*Majority
Sub-Committee
to
Congress
on
Bosnia
and
Herzegovina
11/15/94*

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Shadi will
Still have some
reservations -
Tanner covers
Bosnia, Croatia
& Macedonia,
whereas
Smith covers
all of Bosnia

But will consult
w/ Shadi & consider it.
↳ ~~Hit~~ send barrages w/
artillery - attach at
night → 90 shells
↳ ~~Shadi~~ Shadi Clinton Clinton

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GRADUATED RESPONSE FOR THE USE OF AIR POWER

Aim - To restore the viability of UNPROFOR in the face of Bosnian Serb attacks on UN safe areas.

- To achieve more effective and timely use of air power within terms of UNSCRs, particularly 836, and related NAC decisions in respect of both Close Air Support and Air Strikes for the defence of Gorazde [and other Safe Areas in Bosnia].

Key Approach

- Considerable authority exists already under SCRs and NAC decisions for use of airpower in support of UNPROFOR. UN and NATO commanders will use that authority to protect Gorazde and UNPROFOR [designated Safe Areas] threatened by military force.

- Airpower has to facilitate task of Commanders on the ground and support the political process if it is to be effective in helping to defend Gorazde.

- Considerable scope exists for more effective and timely use of airpower to deter Bosnian Serb aggression and to counter military action on the ground which conflict with the terms of the UNSCRs.

- Such use of airpower is potentially escalatory. But if

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viewed as a series of graduate steps appropriate use of air power under effective command and control arrangements, could deliver a clear and painful politico-military deterrent to the Bosnian Serbs.

- A phased, militarily effective, response affords a means of controlling the overall situation and of ensuring that political approval is given before resort to an expanded air campaign throughout B-H. Such an expanded campaign could be perceived by the Bosnian Serbs as a declaration of war against them and therefore the end of UNPROFOR's current mandate and mission.

Requirements

~~The construct of the air campaign would involve:~~

- Firm and unequivocal warning to the Bosnian Serbs that attacks on Safe Areas would result in effective, sustained and timely use of airpower.
- Acceptance by the international community that such a warning once issued must be followed through and that any reluctance to demonstrate the necessary political will would leave UNPROFOR and NATO worse off in terms of credibility.
- A related preparedness to accept the risk of, and

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consequences, for hostages of such use of force; the taking of all practicable steps before the issue of the warning to reduce the degree of risk (accepting that it cannot be removed entirely); and acceptance of the risk of Bosnian Serb retaliation and military action against other enclaves including interruption of resupply.

Way Ahead

- Revise command and control arrangements so that the political control for use of airpower in respect of Safe Area and Exclusion Zone around Gorazde is exercised, by UN and NATO Commanders, in accordance with provision of UNSCRs and existing NAC decisions.

- The expectation would be that the Force Commander UNPF would delegate the tactical decision on the use of airpower to Force Commander UNPROFOR, on the advice of the subordinate commander.

- Require UN and NATO Commanders to develop urgently Operating Procedures and Concept of Operations for an [phased] air campaign on the lines of matrix at Annex for engaging forces involved in direct attack on Safe Area exclusion zones.

- Proceed to the NAC at the earliest possible date to seek

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authorization for conducting the air campaign. In going to the NAC consideration should be given to any proposal by the Force Commander UNPROFOR to replace the exclusion zone with a Zone of Action, should he consider that necessary.

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⑤

GRADUATED AIR CAMPAIGN

SER	EVENT	TARGETS	B-H AUTHORISATION	REMARKS
1	BSA concentrating forces and or heavy weapons, and conducting other military preparations which, in the common judgement of the UN and NATO Military Commanders, presents a direct threat to Gorazde.	Targets would include, but not be limited to, BSA forces and heavy weapons (arty, mortars etc) and their direct and essential support (such as C2, munitions and fuel sites) within the Zone on Action, in order to deny manoeuvre capability and concentration of troops. SEAD as required.	1. CAS requested by on-scene ground Commander, authorised by FC UNPROFOR. 2. Campaign plan for fixed targets pre-coordinated between UN and NATO Military Commanders, once initiated will be carried out by CINCSOUTH in support of FC UNPROFOR. 3. UN and NATO Commanders will continue to coordinate to ensure the effectiveness of attacks against mobile targets in the Zone of Action.	1. Enforcement of 20 KM EZ as established under UNSCR 836 and NAC decision of 22 Apr 94. 2. Heavy weapons may be attacked if outside EZ, if firing in. 3. Consideration of NAC authority to : a. Replace 20 KM EZ by Zone of Action to be defined by FC UNPROFOR. b. Include concentration of troops as targets to be attacked.
	Direct BSA attack on Gorazde, other than local skirmish.	1. CAS. Targets are forces directly attacking, including heavy weapons, in order to defend enclave. 2. Heavy weapons and direct and essential support facilities in order to destroy heavy weapons and deny Serb forces logistical support. 3. Attack follow-on forces, as required. 4. SEAD as required.	See above.	See above.
	BSA continue offensive.	1. Continue attacks on heavy weapons and support facilities. 2. Continue CAS. 3. SEAD as required. 4. Attack targets Bosnia-wide, as authorised.	See above.	Carries wider strategic implications. Need new NAC authorisation for Option 3 targets, in accordance with provisions of UNSCR 836 and the addition of infrastructure targets that support the BSA military.

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Note: Battlefield conditions may well dictate that Serials 1 and 2 occur simultaneously.

Subject: The Bildt Proposal -- Key Points

Analysis of proposal:

What Milosevic gives us:

- Recognition of B-H in its internationally recognized borders
- Agreement to a set of principles for constitutional and territorial settlement of the dispute (unspecified)
- Reinforcement of the ICFY monitoring mission

What Milosevic gets:

- 9 months of trade sanctions relief
- New reimposition mechanism (by 3-out-of-5 vote of Perm-5 at end of 9 months if there is strong evidence that Milosevic has gone back on his support of the CG plan and/or is supporting the Bosnian Serbs -- unclear whether sanctions could be reimposed for any reason during the 9-month period)
- Reduced list of "Strategic Sanctions" (the EU list with undefined loophole for "normal steel production")
- 375,000 metric tonnes of oil per month

Very unlikely could be reimposed later.

Delta from last US position:

- We insisted on single-PermRep veto of extension of sanctions relief, this requires 3 votes to ~~extend~~ *terminate*
- Bildt plan has narrower list of strategic goods... plus steel production loophole is undefined.
- We sought much greater specificity on increased border closure requirements.
- We opposed oil quota system -- amounts far in excess of Serb requirements *(factor of 2x or more higher)*
- We sought Croatia linkage in final steps -- no Croatia linkage } in Bildt plan.

Implications:

We see critical need for tough sanctions relief policy -- with real threat of reimposition -- to motivate FRY to end all support for the Bosnian Serbs and to adopt a recognition formula that is acceptable to GOBH, and to Croatia as well. Isolation of BSA is critically important if we must support GOBH after UNPROFOR withdrawal and/or lift -- small amounts of FRY support to BSA can seriously complicate GOBH efforts to gain enough military power to defend/expand territory.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By *FR* NARA, Date *11/5/2014*

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Acceptance of Bildt plan now spends sanctions relief too soon for too little and retains little or no residual leverage over Belgrade's future behavior.



effectively lifts sanctions,
possibly pressure

before we get

into any workable
negotiations with

Pole

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Message to Yeltsin Regarding Bosnia

Purpose

To approve a message to Yeltsin regarding Bosnia.

Background

Secretary Christopher reports that his discussions with Foreign Minister Kozyrev this evening in London did not go well. Kozyrev said he had been "disempowered" to discuss military questions and that Defense Minister Grachev had been instructed "not to give an inch" on greater military action in Bosnia. Kozyrev suggested that you be in direct touch with Yeltsin. The message at Tab A:

- previews for Yeltsin our plan for an ultimatum to Pale threatening a NATO air campaign if the Bosnian Serbs move against Gorazde;
- urges Yeltsin to use Russian diplomatic leverage with Pale to persuade the Bosnian Serbs to cease the attacks that would trigger NATO action; and
- stresses the importance of the Contact Group maintaining a united front in London on Friday.

We may well be in for a rough patch with Moscow over Bosnia. The Russians will not endorse our proposed NATO air campaign. But giving Yeltsin an early advance word of our intention and, just as important, the opportunity to persuade the Bosnian Serbs to cease and desist, increases the possibility of a muted Russian reaction if we should actually execute the campaign.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the message to Yeltsin at Tab A.

Attachment
Tab A Presidential Message to Yeltsin

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By V2 NARA, Date 11/5/2009
2013-0656-m (2.07)

AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM
PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT THE EARLIEST REPEAT
EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY ON JULY 21. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED
ORIGINAL.

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR BORIS:

I HOPE YOU ARE FEELING BETTER AND THAT YOUR RECOVERY CONTINUES TO
PROGRESS. I SAW YOUR INTERVIEW ON TELEVISION JULY 18 AND WAS
GLAD TO SEE YOU LOOKING HEALTHY.

WARREN CHRISTOPHER HAS REPORTED BACK TO ME ABOUT HIS TALK
THURSDAY NIGHT WITH ANDREY KOZYREV IN LONDON. IN LIGHT OF THAT
MEETING, THERE ARE SOME THINGS I NEED TO SAY TO YOU DIRECTLY.

IN RECENT DAYS, THE BOSNIAN SERBS' ONSLAUGHTS AGAINST UN SAFE
AREAS -- SREBRENICA, ZEPA, GORAZDE, BIHAC AND SARAJEVO -- REFLECT
A GENERAL MILITARY OFFENSIVE BY PALE'S FORCES. THIS OFFENSIVE
HAS INFLECTED SUBSTANTIAL HARM TO CIVILIAN POPULATIONS, TO
STABILITY IN THE BALKANS, AND TO THE CREDIBILITY OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

THE BOSNIAN SERBS HAVE THUS FAR IGNORED ALL OUR EFFORTS TO
PERSUADE THEM TO RESPECT THE SAFE AREAS, WHICH WERE ESTABLISHED
BY UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS. THIS CANNOT GO ON. WORKING
WITH OUR OTHER PARTNERS IN THE CONTACT GROUP, WE ARE CONSIDERING
SENDING PALE AN ULTIMATUM THAT, IF THE ATTACKS ON GORAZDE
CONTINUE, NATO FORCES WILL RESPOND WITH AN INTENSE AIR CAMPAIGN
AGAINST BOSNIAN SERB MILITARY TARGETS. THIS WOULD BE COUPLED
WITH EFFORTS TO RELIEVE THE BOSNIAN SERBS' SIEGE OF SARAJEVO,
INCLUDING USE OF THE RAPID REACTION FORCE TO OPEN SECURE ROUTES
INTO THE CITY.

I FULLY UNDERSTAND RUSSIAN RESERVATIONS ABOUT USE OF FORCE. THE
ALTERNATIVES, HOWEVER, ARE EITHER MASSIVE TROOP DEPLOYMENTS TO
SHORE UP UNPROFOR OR THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNPROFOR. THE FORMER
WOULD, I FEAR, PRODUCE GREATER MILITARIZATION OF THE SITUATION,
WHILE THE LATTER COURSE WOULD SEVERELY DAMAGE THE UN'S
CREDIBILITY AND TRIGGER A POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC ESCALATION OF
THE FIGHTING AND MASSIVE REFUGEE FLOWS. I FIND BOTH OF THESE
ALTERNATIVES EQUALLY UNACCEPTABLE.

BORIS, I WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE FOR YOU TO JOIN ME IN TRYING TO
PERSUADE PALE TO STOP ITS ASSAULTS ON THE SAFE AREAS, INCLUDING
GORAZDE AND SARAJEVO. WHEN WE WERE AT A SIMILARLY CRITICAL
JUNCTURE IN FEBRUARY 1994, RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY PROVED KEY IN
PERSUADING THE BOSNIAN SERBS TO CEASE THEIR ATTACKS. THAT
AVERTED THE USE OF NATO AIR POWER. WE HOPE YOU WILL AGAIN IN

DECLASSIFIED

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5(b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 11/5/2019

2013-0656-11 (2.08)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THIS INSTANCE BE ABLE TO HELP DEFUSE A VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION
AND REESTABLISH CONDITIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON A POLITICAL
SETTLEMENT.

A HALT TO THE BOSNIAN SERB ATTACKS ON THE SAFE AREAS IS BY FAR
THE BEST OUTCOME. BUT THE BOSNIAN SERBS MUST UNDERSTAND THAT, IF
THE ASSAULTS CONTINUE, NATO WILL TAKE APPROPRIATE MILITARY
ACTION.

KARADZIC AND HIS CLIQUE APPEAR BENT ON HUMILIATING THE UN AND ALL
OF THE MAJOR POWERS, INCLUDING RUSSIA AND THE U.S., WHICH HAVE
TRIED SO HARD TO STOP THIS CONFLICT ON TERMS THAT ARE FAIR TO ALL
PARTIES, INCLUDING THE BOSNIAN SERB POPULATION. KARADZIC MUST
NOT SUCCEED IN DEFYING THE U.S., RUSSIA AND THE REST OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. HIS ACTIONS ARE, IN EFFECT, HOLDING THE
SERBIAN POPULATION HOSTAGE FROM REINTEGRATION IN THE WORLD
COMMUNITY.

I WANTED TO COMMUNICATE EARLY WITH YOU ON THIS QUESTION, NOT JUST
TO SEEK YOUR HELP WITH PALE, BUT IN THE SPIRIT OF OUR BILATERAL
COOPERATION. OUR PRACTICE OF CONSULTING PROMPTLY AND OF AVOIDING
SURPRISES IS ESSENTIAL IN MANAGING SENSITIVE ISSUES LIKE THE ONE
WE CURRENTLY FACE IN BOSNIA.

IT IS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT THAT WE STAY TOGETHER ON THIS, AND I
HOPE THAT YOU WILL SEND INSTRUCTIONS TO MINISTERS KOZYREV AND
GRACHEV IN LONDON TO WORK IN A WAY THAT ALLOWS THE CONTACT GROUP
TO MAINTAIN A UNITED STAND.

BORIS, LET ME ASSURE YOU THAT I HAVE THOUGHT HARD ABOUT THE
CHOICES FACING US. I SEE NO ALTERNATIVE TO USING FORCE IF THE
BOSNIAN SERBS PERSIST IN THEIR ATTACKS AGAINST THE UN SAFE AREAS.
HOPEFULLY, BY WORKING TOGETHER, WE CAN GET THE BOSNIAN SERBS TO
DESIST IN THESE ATTACKS, SO THAT THE USE OF AIR POWER WILL NOT BE
NECESSARY.

I LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR THOUGHTS ON THIS QUESTION. IF IT WOULD BE
USEFUL, I AM PREPARED AND WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THIS WITH YOU BY
PHONE, PERHAPS OVER THE WEEKEND.

WITH WARM REGARDS.

SINCERELY

BILL

(END TEXT)

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TELEPHONE CALL WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT CHIRAC

DATE: July 20, 1995
LOCATION: Oval Office
TIME: 1:00 p.m.

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

I. PURPOSE

To discuss the outstanding issues for Friday's meeting on Bosnia and press for a U.S.-UK-French united front.

II. BACKGROUND

The French are still pressing their proposal to insert 1000 peacekeepers, although their military has indicated that Paris does not insist that the U.S. provide the airlift. In a phone call with Chris last night, Foreign Minister De Charette claimed France would not agree to our air-power-only option without agreement to the French proposal and repeated Chirac's concerns about the risks of massive use of air power. In a call this morning, however, he was somewhat more positive about our proposal, but still stressed the importance of action on the ground.

Discussions with the French today in London suggest that the French will not block a U.S.-UK decision to threaten a massive air campaign at Friday's meeting, but they may not endorse it without acceptance of some variant of their proposal. Such a tepid response would be very embarrassing; moreover, without French backing, the chances of getting the other Allies to go along with the necessary NAC decisions (on expanded ROE and modified dual key) would be slim.

You should tell Chirac that we and the British are now in agreement on the idea of an ultimatum threatening massive air strikes to protect Gorazde, outline once again the elements of our approach, and stress that we need strong French backing if the London meeting is to succeed. You should repeat our military arguments against the French proposal, noting that the need to suppress air defenses before airlifting in the peacekeepers would trigger the

confrontation with the Bosnian Serbs that the ultimatum is designed to prevent.

De Charette also stressed the importance of having the London meeting endorse the package Carl Bildt has been negotiating with Milosevic and which is close to completion. We still have reservations, both on the details (in particular, the mechanism for reimposing sanctions if Milosevic doesn't deliver) and the whole idea of giving new rewards to Milosevic in the wake of Srebrenica and Zepa. We suggest a positive but non-committal response.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
President Chirac

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer

Attachment
Tab A Points to be Made

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC

- Calling to see whether we can come together on common position among U.S., Britain and France as we go into tomorrow's meeting in London.
- Critically important we emerge with united front and clear decisions on strong steps to draw line at Gorazde and to end Serbs' stranglehold on Sarajevo.
- I spoke with John Major yesterday and we had extensive meetings with Malcolm Rifkind.
- We and British are now in essential agreement on issuing ultimatum to Serbs that, if they attack Gorazde, we will respond with massive air campaign, one going beyond what John called "slaps on the wrist."
- This was endorsed by British cabinet today. Final details being hammered out now by General Shalikashvili and British counterpart.
- My military advisors remain convinced this is best way to respond if Serbs mount offensive against Gorazde: hitting at artillery and tanks attacking city, but also going further to hit other military targets.
- If Serbs believe we are serious and will inflict real damage, we can stop them as we did last February in Sarajevo, without having to carry out the air campaign.
- To do this, need to tell Serbs explicitly the targets we would hit and convince them we will carry through on our threats no matter what they do.
- Hope you can endorse this option strongly at London meeting. Need France solidly on board if we are to bring rest of Alliance along.

French proposal

- I've had my advisors look further at your proposal to insert up to 1000 peacekeepers into Gorazde.
- We remain skeptical about the military value. 1000 peacekeepers couldn't do much to defend Gorazde, yet would

add to the problem of resupplying and reinforcing UK and Ukrainian forces already there.

- If we were to do it, we could not airlift in your troops on U.S. helicopters without large-scale bombing to suppress all Bosnian Serb air defenses in the area.
- That mission would inevitably provoke Serb response even before new peacekeepers in place. Could even precipitate the assault on Gorazde we are trying to prevent. Yet no way we could insert your troops without suppressing defenses.
- Key advantage of the U.S.-British proposal is that no bombing would occur if Serbs heeded warning and backed down.
- Strongly urge you rethink and work with us and British to come to a common position.
- After your extraordinary efforts to rally world opinion behind strong action at Gorazde, would be a shame if we could not agree on the means.
- (If necessary) Simply not blocking U.S.-UK approach not enough. Without France's active support, will be hard to convince other Allies to support necessary decisions in NAC.

Diplomatic Track

- Believe strong military action should be accompanied by new push for diplomatic solution. As we saw last February, decisive action by NATO can open window of opportunity, but it won't last long.
- We are encouraged by Carl Bildt's reports of progress in talks with Milosevic on recognition of Bosnia and sealing of border in return for suspension of sanctions.
- Still have concerns, however, that Bildt package would make it hard, if not impossible, to reimpose sanctions if Milosevic failed to live up to his side of bargain.
- Moreover, after fall of Srebrenica and Zepa (which Milosevic did nothing to stop), will be hard to defend any sanctions relief for Belgrade. Can we really expect Milosevic to deliver Bosnian Serb support for Contact Group plan?
- Christopher and Foreign Minister De Charette should speak further on this in London tonight.
- But prerequisite for any diplomatic initiative will be agreement on strong military measures to back it up.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS; re: Telephone Call with French President Chirac (2 pages)	07/20/1995	P1/b(1), P5 VL 3/3/2020
001b. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with French President Jacques Chirac (2 pages)	07/20/1995	P1/b(1) VL 3/3/2020
002a. memo	Andrew Sens to Kenneth Brill; re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between POTUS & French President Chirac (1 page)	07/19/1995	P1/b(1) VL 11/5/2019
002b. telcon	Telephone Conversation Between POTUS & French President Chirac; re: Bosnia Question (6 pages)	07/19/1995	P1/b(1) ISCAP 7/3/2019
003a. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS; re: Telephone Call with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (1 page)	07/19/1995	P1/b(1) VL
003b. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with German Chancellor Kohl (2 pages)	07/19/1995	P1/b(1) VL
004. paper	re: Gorazde (1 page)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1)
005. paper	re: Croatia (2 pages)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1)
006. report	re: Bosnian Army [partial] (4 pages)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1) CIA Bosnia Conference 10/1/2013
007. memo	Leon Fuerth to Tony Lake; re: Safety of ICFY Monitors (1 page)	07/19/1995	P1/b(1), P5 VL 3/3/2020
008a. memo	Richard Holbrooke to The Secretary; re: Srebrenica - Implications for the Federation (1 page)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1)
008b. paper	re: What Should be Done if the Enclaves Fall? (3 pages)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1), P5

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Alexander Vershbow (European)
 OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995 (Mid-July) [2]

2006-0647-F
 jp2103

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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009a. memo	Andrew Sens to Kenneth Brill; re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between POTUS & British Prime Minister Major (1 page)	07/17/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 3/3/2020
009b. telcon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between POTUS & Prime Minister Major; re: Bosnia Problem [partial] (7 pages)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1) KDE 5/26/2016
010. cable	American Embassy, Belgrade to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C. & American Embassy, London; re: Bildt Close to Agreement with Milosevic on Bosnian Recognition (1 page)	07/19/1995	P1/b(1)
011a. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS; re: Telephone Call with Canadian Prime Minister Chretien (1 page)	07/19/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 3/3/2020
011b. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with Canadian Prime Minister Chretien (2 pages)	07/19/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 3/3/2020
012a. memo	Nelson Drew to Anthony Lake; re: Telephone Call with Dutch Prime Minister Kok (1 page)	07/19/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 3/3/2020
012b. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with Netherlands Prime Minister Kok (2 pages)	07/19/1995	P1/b(1) VZ 3/3/2020
013. paper	re: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)	07/25/1995	P1/b(1) RDS 10/1/2013 Bosnia Conference
014. paper	re: Summary of Conclusions for Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)	07/25/1995	P1/b(1) RDS 10/1/2013 Bosnia Conference

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TELEPHONE CALL WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT CHIRAC

DATE: July 20, 1995

LOCATION: Oval Office

TIME: 1:00 p.m.

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

I. PURPOSE

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III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
President Chirac

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer

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Tab A Points to be Made

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TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC

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- That mission would inevitably provoke Serb response even before new peacekeepers in place. Could even precipitate the assault on Gorazde we are trying to prevent. Yet no way we could insert your troops without suppressing defenses.
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- (If necessary) Simply not blocking U.S.-UK approach not enough. Without France's active support, will be hard to convince other Allies to support necessary decisions in NAC.

Diplomatic Track

- Believe strong military action should be accompanied by new push for diplomatic solution. As we saw last February, decisive action by NATO can open window of opportunity, but it won't last long.
- We are encouraged by Carl Bildt's reports of progress in talks with Milosevic on recognition of Bosnia and sealing of border in return for suspension of sanctions.
- Still have concerns, however, that Bildt package would make it hard, if not impossible, to reimpose sanctions if Milosevic failed to live up to his side of bargain.
- Moreover, after fall of Srebrenica and Zepa (which Milosevic did nothing to stop), will be hard to defend any sanctions relief for Belgrade. Can we really expect Milosevic to deliver Bosnian Serb support for Contact Group plan?
- Christopher and Foreign Minister De Charette should speak further on this in London tonight.
- But prerequisite for any diplomatic initiative will be agreement on strong military measures to back it up.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the
President and French President Chirac (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and French President Chirac is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our Embassy in Paris for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. ~~(C)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

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E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VR NARA, Date 1/5/2009

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with French President Chirac (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Chirac
Interpreter: Carol Wolter
Notetakers: Alexander Vershbow, Nelson Drew,
Katherine O'Loughlin

DATE, TIME July 19, 1995
AND PLACE: 8:20 - 9:00 a.m.

President Chirac: Hello Bill. (U)

The President: Hello Jacques. How are you? (U)

President Chirac: Fine and you? Do you mind if we use an interpreter. It will be easier. (U)

The President: That will be fine. I would like to talk about where we are here on the Bosnia question. I agree with you that the status quo is clearly no longer tolerable. You have done tremendous service in rallying support in Europe for stronger action. I agree with you that we need to draw the line at Gorazde. The issue is how, finding the best way to do this militarily. ~~(C)~~

Our military advisors here feel strongly the best thing is to be able to bring air power to bear in a decisive manner and not in a timid way as has been done lately. We propose issuing a clear warning to Bosnian Serbs that any attack on Gorazde or Sarajevo will be met by a sustained air campaign that will actually cripple their military capability. Now if we do this we must all be prepared to follow through, without wavering. Of course, we should begin now, or soon, to reduce the exposure of UN personnel to keep them from being taken hostage. ~~(C)~~

Our planners believe the first targets would have to be a full range of Bosnian Serb air defense capabilities: SAMs, anti-aircraft artillery, radar and command centers. They also believe once air defenses are neutralized, we would be able to a mount a

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major air campaign against any Bosnian Serb forces attacking Gorazde or Sarajevo or any military targets elsewhere. But to do this and make it work we would have to have some changes. The dual key could not be maintained in its present form. Of course local ground commanders could retain a voice in close air support and close-proximity airstrikes directly affecting their troops. But there could be no UN political veto over individual missions. Also current restrictions regarding strict proportionality would also have to be removed. We would have to have the ability to strike strategic targets throughout Bosnia, and that would be a big deterrent to them doing anything to UN forces. Now, I have talked to John Major yet, but Warren Christopher met with Rifkind last night urging the British to get on board with this. In order to get there, we will also need to get other Allies and Boutros Ghali on board. ~~(C)~~

In addition to supporting an effective Bosnian defense of Gorazde, it is important to open secure land access routes to Sarajevo. I believe this should be the most pressing mission for the RRF. ~~(C)~~

With regard to the suggestion you made last week regarding deploying 1000 of your troops to Gorazde -- I would like to talk to you about that for a few minutes. Our military people believe that since the primary threat to Gorazde is from artillery shells, adding 1000 troops might increase deterrence but it would not materially change the military balance, and might create an increased problem of resupply and reinforcement. They also say that if we were to do it, we have to take pre-emptive action against air defenses. Otherwise French troops and our helicopters will be sitting ducks and the likelihood that we will lose helicopters with your troops on board is quite strong. ~~(C)~~

I agree with you that we cannot abandon Gorazde, but we must make certain we have what are the most effective means we can take to defend it. I know in sending another 1000 troops -- especially French troops -- it may have a psychological effect on the Serbs. But in sending in troops our military people believe (and I agree with them) that there would be considerable risks and that it wouldn't change the military balance in Gorazde. At any rate, I think it's imperative that you and I work together between now and Friday. We have to make sure we have a common approach that together we can sell to John Major. I'm sure Kohl will support us if we are in this together. We can't let this go on. It will mean disaster for Bosnia and the West if it happens. ~~(C)~~

Let me make one more point, and then I'd like to listen to you. In the two years I have labored with this problem, since before you became President, the only thing that has made things better has been a clear and credible threat that the UN will let NATO

take strong air action. It has always bought us time for the political process. It got the peace process back on track, allowed the creation of the safe areas, the end of the shelling of Sarajevo, the weapons collection points, etc. It has worked. But when the UN has moved away from a position of strength, the Serbs have taken advantage. I believe this will work if we stay together behind it. (C)

President Chirac: Bill, I understand your position very well, but it would be difficult to implement. If there were no troops on the ground it would be the right approach; but we do have troops there and airstrikes may be too dangerous. The Serbs are very tough people. The minute we attack, and we're not sure if the strikes will be effective, they will retaliate by taking soldiers hostage or attacking with the massive artillery they have. The plan proposed by the U.S. military presupposes the withdrawal of UNPROFOR but we have UN troops everywhere there. If we want to adopt it, we have to regroup or extract our forces. It will be a long and difficult procedure and this presupposes that the U.S. is in a war situation with Serbia. It will be difficult to implement and I believe John Major will never accept this. (C)

If you want to do something to the Serbs using airstrikes, first we have to withdraw the blue helmets...It could be a good solution, but time is necessary to implement the solution. This would mean the loss of Gorazde and probably Sarajevo. This is the reason we made a compromise solution that in any case would maintain the rights of the UN in Gorazde and, in other words, guarantee the safety of 60,000 Muslims in Gorazde. In order to do this, we think 1000 men would be enough. I don't mean blue helmets, but real soldiers with real equipment. I realize the problem is transporting them to Gorazde, and there only U.S. intervention makes the transport possible, using air power to open a corridor to ensure the safety of the helicopters. If we adopt airstrikes as the objective, it's a solution but not an immediate solution. I think Gorazde will have fallen by then. This is our position - the least bad solution would be to defend Gorazde. (C)

The President: Let me comment on the points you have made. First, with any solution, greater action carries a risk of greater danger. If we put 1000 French troops in Gorazde as part of a real defense of the city, that would also go beyond the UN mandate and past what the British said they would do. It also would increase the risk of hostage taking throughout the country. If French troops were killed in the actual defense of Gorazde, I believe we would have to take retaliatory action. I do not agree with you if we carry out the plan for air power, we have to withdraw UN troops. But we would have to concentrate them in

Gorazde, Sarajevo and Central Bosnia in places the Government controls. (C)

President Chirac: Bill, the minute our troops start to move, the Serbs will understand the maneuver and grab people. (C)

The President: I understand the practical problems. You said that if we issue the threat, it amounts to the U.S. being willing to go to war with Serbia. If you go back to when we got the agreement to establish the safe areas and put all Serb heavy artillery in collection areas, this happened only because two things occurred at the same time: we threatened strong air action through NATO, and the Russians told the Serbs that they had to do this and get back to the negotiations. They thought that the air action would be disproportionate, not selectively calibrated to take out one or two guns or a single tank here or there. (C)

Let me say another thing with regard to your proposal. It seems to me that if we work with you and deploy your forces and the Serbs shoot down one helicopter, or if we redeploy forces and one of your soldiers is killed, even by distant shelling, that we would have to take the most effective retaliatory action, which is from the air. We may have to do some in advance to create a security corridor for the helicopters. We will have to carry out our option one way or another. Before you became President, our UN and NATO allies agreed on two previous occasions that an air threat is the only way to save the UN mission without involving NATO troops on the ground in combat. (C)

Let me say two other things and then I will listen. I want to reemphasize that this will not mean war on the Serbs if they don't attack. There will be no air action if Gorazde is not hit and Sarajevo is not shelled. We simply will be reestablishing the weapons exclusion zones that have eroded. I have also been handed a note that the British are prepared to keep their 300 troops in Gorazde under this proposal and not withdraw. (C)

Jacques, I have to give a speech today, but after that I will be working on this for the next 48 hours. Perhaps you would like to talk to your military people some more. You have done a tremendous job putting unity into the Allied effort, but we want something that works. We don't want to collapse the UN mission. Those in Congress who say otherwise are wrong. Based on my experience over the past two years, this will work. It is our best chance, particularly if coupled with a new diplomatic initiative along the lines you have already discussed with me. (C)

President Chirac: O.K. Well, I don't mind talking to the experts Bill, but with troops scattered throughout territory, airstrikes are extraordinarily dangerous for those who are there. The difference between one year ago is that the Serbs have recovered all their artillery and are prepared to fight. They have the feeling they can win. I am convinced that they have the full support of Milosevic and the Belgrade Serbs. (C)

I have one question. Will Congress succeed in lifting the arms embargo? (C)

The President: They likely will vote to lift it in some form. I will veto it and believe I can sustain the veto if, and only if, all of us are working on an alternate program with some chance of success. Otherwise I'm afraid that if they voted today, they would override the veto. They believe the UN has failed and the embargo denies the Bosnian Government the ability to defend themselves. (C)

Let me ask two questions. First, several months ago when the safe areas were worked out for the first time, the Serbs had artillery and they gave it up; and I still believe Milosevic would like some relief from sanctions. If we put 1000 French troops in Gorazde and the Serbs attack the city what will the French do? Will they shoot back? (C)

President Chirac: Of course, naturally. These won't be "blue helmets." Real soldiers will be sent. (C)

The President: All right, but if that happens, then you can argue that that is as much a change in the UN mission as dropping bombs. Mladic is a smart man. If you repel him, he'll take action elsewhere. He will take Ukrainians or Canadians hostage. If we fly you in there and they take action, shoot down a helicopter, we both have to take action. So please think it through. Either our option or yours, or the two of them in combination, will increase the risk they will take UN peacekeepers hostage. But we have to protect Gorazde. The question is the best way to do it. Either course runs the risk of hostages. We have never in the past had to take extreme action when they really thought we would follow through, and not just hit one or two tanks. We got Gorazde, Srebrenica, the safe areas. Somehow, we have to recreate those conditions. We only have a few months ago get a peace agreement. We can't keep doing this for another three or four more years. We have to create the environment in which we can push for a diplomatic solution. (C)

President Chirac: Yes, I understand. But I am pretty sure that all of the people on the ground will ask to regroup before airstrikes and this will take time. Gorazde will be taken in 10

days, and after that Sarajevo. We need time for this strategy. Let's ask our Chiefs of Staff. ~~(C)~~

The President: I understand. I really want to work on this with you. Here's the question: Ask your staff if there is a greater likelihood of hostage taking if air power is used as opposed to the chance hostages will be taken if the French fight back and kill a lot of Serbs. Our expectation is that Mladic is very smart and will go elsewhere. He works the country as one big piece. If they shoot down a helicopter and kill Frenchmen, we have to strike hard. Talk to your people. I think we can sell our proposal to the Brits. They don't want to pull out. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: There are also others beyond us - Canadians and Ukrainians. ~~(C)~~

The President: I know. There's a lot of work to do. We have to discuss it with Canada. We have a close relationship with the Ukrainians. We also need to work with Russia. I think I can convince Yeltsin to go along. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I don't think Yeltsin is ready to do anything because of his domestic political situation. ~~(C)~~

The President: We don't want to do anything that would imperil him. But last time, Yeltsin went to Milosevic saying you can't do this to yourself or me, and you need to stop the attacks. He was helpful because he didn't want us to use force to protect these areas. We need to explore whether he is in the position to do anything. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Let's get back in touch within 48 hours. ~~(C)~~

The President: Maybe we should talk in 24 hours. We cannot afford to go to the London meeting and have it be a disaster. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: I agree completely, but we must get in touch with the others. ~~(C)~~

The President: I have talked to Chretien and Kohl, but not yet to the Ukrainians, Dutch or Yeltsin. You and I need to agree on a strategy, work together, and sell it to Major and the others. We must get close on an agreement. ~~(C)~~

President Chirac: Okay, thank you very much. (U)

The President: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TELEPHONE CALL WITH
GERMAN CHANCELLOR HELMUT KOHL

DATE: JULY 20, 1995

LOCATION: OVAL OFFICE

TIME: OPEN

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

I. PURPOSE

To discuss the worsening situation in Bosnia.

II. BACKGROUND

Kohl will be anxious to insure that the London meeting does not highlight alliance discord. You should bring him up to speed on the results of your phone conversations with Major and Chirac. Kohl will also be concerned about the implications of our plan for air strikes on the German Tornados deployed to assist the RRF and on the Dutch battalion currently isolated at Srebrenica. You should suggest that the Tornados would be a useful addition to an air campaign. You should also enlist his aid in approaching Dutch Prime Minister Kok to urge him to move his forces out of harm's way at the earliest possible time.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
Canadian Prime Minister Chretien

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer

V. SEQUENCE

Telephone call

Attachment

Tab A Points to be Made

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA Date 11/5/2019

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
GERMAN CHANCELLOR KOHL

- Calling to continue our discussions regarding decisions on what to do about Gorazde and Sarajevo.
- I've spoken with Jacques Chirac and John Major again since we last talked. We agree on need to work closely to ensure meeting in London is a success. Must not result in public discord or become a forum for mere posturing by participants.
- Also seem to have agreement on need to draw line at Gorazde, make UN presence work, so we can halt Serb aggressiveness and avert UN withdrawal.
- Issue remains finding the best way to do this.
- Jacques still favors putting up to 1000 French forces on the ground in Gorazde. He wants them to be a fighting force, although he seems unclear about what their military mission would be. He's concerned that initiating an air campaign would require too much lead time to allow UNPROFOR to retrench and hunker down.
- I told him I thought the risk of Serbs taking UN hostages would be just as great in response to a land battle with French UNPROFOR troops as from an air campaign, and that to protect his 1000 troops, an air campaign would probably be necessary anyway. Do you agree?
- John remains cautious about reinforcing Gorazde, and seems more inclined to support a decisive air campaign. But he's worried that the end result of an air campaign might be the end of the UNPROFOR mission and a requirement for a NATO-assisted withdrawal.
- We are all agreed on the need to open access to Sarajevo, regardless of what we do at Gorazde.
- My military advisors feel strongly that most important thing is to be able to bring air power to bear decisively, not in timid manner done to date.
- They propose issuing a clear warning to Bosnian Serbs: any attack on Gorazde or Sarajevo will be met by a massive air campaign that will cripple their military capability. Would mean going beyond proportionality and eliminating dual key. Local commander could have voice, but no political veto.

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
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2013-0656-M (2.22)

PHOTOCOPY

- Under our approach, first targets would have to be Bosnian Serb air defense capabilities: SAMs, Anti-aircraft guns, radar and command centers. Your Tornados would be very useful in support of a SEAD effort.
- Do not intend to cross line to all-out war against Bosnian Serbs. If they heed warning and do not attack, there will be no air campaign. This worked in February 1994 in Sarajevo, when they took our warning seriously.
- Key is that this cannot be empty threat. If Bosnian Serbs ignore our warning and attack, we must all be prepared to follow through, without wavering. As a first step, will need to begin now to reduce exposure of UN personnel.
- We should both talk with Kok about what Dutch UNPROFOR forces at Srebrenica will do. Remaining at Srebrenica would not appear to be a viable option.
- Know they have said they will stay until all refugees and wounded have left, and until Serbs let them take their equipment out. But if we agree on air campaign -- or another robust option -- in London, we need to encourage them to get out ASAP.
- Should warn Serbs that, if they block the departure of the Dutch, it will be grounds for air strikes.
- In addition to supporting defense of Gorazde, important to open secure land access routes to Sarajevo. We see this as most pressing mission for RRF.
- Would like your support in coming to agreement on this before Friday's meeting in London.
- Christopher, Perry and Shali are in London now and will work with their counterparts to ensure we have common strategy. Also will need to develop united approach to handling Russians.
- Know the course we propose entails risks. But I see no alternative to decisive action if we want to avoid collapse of UNPROFOR with all the hard choices and risks that would bring.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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006. report	re: Bosnian Army [partial] (4 pages)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1)
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Alexander Vershbow (European)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995 (Mid-July) [2]

2006-0647-F
jp2103

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force
18 July 1995



The Bosnian Army's Defense of Gorazde: Plans, Capabilities, and Possible Outcomes

Summary



The Bosnian Government almost certainly will make a determined effort to defend Gorazde with the forces available in the enclave. The Bosnian Government, however, has little ability to reinforce or assist its forces in Gorazde, except possibly by mounting offensives elsewhere to relieve pressure on the city. In the long run, the isolated Bosnian Army forces in Gorazde probably would be unable to withstand a strong BSA offensive.

3.5c



Bosnian Army Defensive Plans

Despite some Bosnian Government statements that they would not attempt to defend the enclave, it is unlikely that the Bosnian Government will surrender Gorazde without a fight. Although Sarajevo probably believes that Gorazde would eventually fall in the face of an all-out BSA attack, it cannot afford to allow Gorazde--with some 60,000 civilians--to fall without a fight.

- A Bosnian Government official stated on 12 July that Gorazde would be the next Bosnian Serb target after Zepa, and that it would be attacked as soon as the British peacekeepers rotated out this summer. The Bosnian official also claimed that the Bosnian Government had no plan for the "strategic defense" of either Zepa or Gorazde, and that Sarajevo had been relying on NATO and UNPROFOR for the defense of the enclaves. While the official's claim that the government was essentially relying on the West for the defense of the enclaves is credible--especially given Sarajevo's marginal capability to assist Gorazde from central Bosnia--this does not necessarily mean that the Bosnian Army has no tactical plans to defend the city, or that the enclave would surrender without a fight.

3.5c

Indeed, the Bosnian Government has long hoped to reestablish an overland corridor from Sarajevo to Gorazde since the connection was lost in the summer of 1993.

- Recent government offensive operations in the Trnovo area south of Sarajevo--part of the government's effort to relieve the siege of the capital--could provide a starting point for eventual offensives toward Gorazde. However, Trnovo is still some 25 kilometers from the western

edge of the Gorazde enclave, and the odds of a breakthrough this year are small.

- The Bosnian Government could carry out attacks near Sarajevo in an attempt to relieve pressure on Gorazde in the event of a major BSA offensive. It is unclear whether the Bosnian Army intends to do so.

3.5c

Bosnian Army Forces in Gorazde/Efforts to Strengthen the Enclave

The Gorazde enclave is defended by the Bosnian Army's 81st Division, organized into eight infantry brigades. One of these is believed to be an "assault" brigade, a more mobile force intended to spearhead attacks or respond to Bosnian Serb breakthroughs. The other seven are light infantry units equipped with small arms and probably limited numbers of field guns and mortars of varying calibers. The Bosnian Army's forces in Gorazde have been organized into regular brigades since 1992, but their combat power there has remained limited by a lack of heavy weapons and supply problems.

- The Bosnian Army reorganized its forces in the enclave following the April 1994 Serb offensive, increasing the number of brigades from five to eight and raising the number of Bosnian Army troops from about 6,000 to some 8,000-10,000. 3.5c

By investing manpower, resources, and effort--within its limited capabilities to do so--in the defense of the enclave, the Bosnian Government has demonstrated an intent to keep Gorazde if at all possible. The Bosnian Army's efforts to improve its capabilities in the region by improving the training, provisioning, and deployments of its troops suggest that the government plans to try to provide adequate defense forces for the enclave.

- The Bosnian Army has recently tried--with limited success--to take the strategic high ground around Gorazde being used by the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) to launch attacks and to take additional key terrain features in the region. Partially in response, the BSA has shelled the Gorazde enclave almost daily for the past month.
- The Bosnian Army has apparently had marginal success in supplying its forces in Gorazde with munitions and equipment from central Bosnia. As a result, the forces in the enclave probably have not improved as much as the government forces in central Bosnia, which have benefited from the increased availability of arms since the Croat-Muslim Federation was established last year. The Bosnian Army may have a limited military production capability in Gorazde, where a detonator and explosives production facility was located at the start of the war. 3.5c

Given the limited sources of weaponry available to the cut-off Gorazde defenders, government forces have recently begun seizing equipment from the Ukrainian peacekeepers deployed in the enclave. After a prolonged confrontation and a brief exchange of gunfire, Bosnian Army soldiers seized armored vehicles, small arms, and ammunition from Ukrainian troops in Gorazde on 15 July, according to UN spokesmen.

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

Possible Outcomes of a Bosnian Serb Offensive

Although the Bosnian Government almost certainly will make some effort to defend Gorazde, Bosnian Army forces in the enclave probably would be unable to withstand a strong BSA offensive. Bosnian Army forces resisted Serb attacks in April 1994, and are unlikely to give up immediately in the event of a Serb attack. Even if the central government is not committed to the defense of Gorazde, local civilians and central Bosnian refugees in the enclave are unlikely to surrender without resistance unless some outside factor--such as possible Western intervention--alters their thinking.

- A protracted battle with high media attention would give the government an opportunity to argue the case in the international community for an arms embargo lift and/or direct Western intervention. Conversely, an outright surrender of the enclave would damage Bosnian Army and civilian morale.
- A Bosnian Serb capture of Gorazde would increase calls for lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian Government, since the fall of the enclaves would end one of the primary arguments against the "lift" option.
- The fall of Gorazde--especially if perceived as a failure of the UN to defend another "safe area"--would also strengthen the hand of those within the Bosnian Government who want UNPROFOR to withdraw.

EO 13526 3.5c

Forces In and Around Gorazde

	<u>Troops</u>	<u>Tanks/APCs</u>	<u>Artillery/Heavy Mortars</u>
Bosnian Army	8,000-10,000* (8 brigades)	N/A	6-12**
Bosnian Serb Army	5350 (7 brigades)	10	88-92**
UN (British/ Ukrainian)	500	Unknown	Unknown

* Revised CIA/DIA coordinated estimate, based on an average assessed ABiH brigade strength of roughly 1,000-1,250 troops apiece, and consideration of the manpower pool in the enclave.

** Includes field artillery 76mm and above, as well as heavy mortars.

Above table is classified EO 13526 3.5c



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

July 19, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR TONY LAKE

FROM:

Leon Furth
LEON FURTH

SUBJECT:

Safety of ICFY Monitors

The Chief of the ICFY monitoring mission on the Serbia-Bosnia border today ordered full deployment of U.S. ICFY monitors, who had been on limited duty because of security threats received during May's UNPROFOR hostage crisis.

There are 46 U.S. monitors in Serbia as part of the 185-member mission. The American, French, British, Dutch, and Nordic monitors may become prime candidates for hostage-taking if Bosnian Serbs or their FRY sympathizers want easy targets in retaliation for an aggressive air campaign.

We are suggesting that UNPROFOR hunker down in the next few days as part of a strategy to threaten the Bosnian Serbs with credible military action. I propose that we and our allies also recommend that ICFY reduce its vulnerabilities as well. This will probably involve removing monitors from the most exposed border posts and limiting roving patrols. As a result, the Serbs will have more opportunities to circumvent the border closure, and we will lose our primary source of information about border traffic. Nevertheless, I believe this is a price worth paying -- at least in the short run -- to avoid American and other Western hostages.

If you agree, I will ask State to ensure that we include ICFY when we talk to our allies about reducing the vulnerability of international organizations operating in the region.

CC: Sandy Berger
Sandy Vershbow

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By *VC* NARA, Date *4/5/2016*
7013-0056-m (1.27)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

5487

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the
President and British Prime Minister Major (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and British Prime Minister Major is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our Embassy in London for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. ~~(C)~~

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

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White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VJ NARA, Date 11/5/2019
2013-0656-44

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009b. telcon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between POTUS & Prime Minister Major; re: Bosnia Problem [partial] (7 pages)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Alexander Vershbow (European)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995 (Mid-July) [2]

2006-0647-F
jp2103

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with British Prime Minister John Major
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Prime Minister John Major
Notetakers: Mary Ann Peters, Nelson Drew,
Katherine O'Loughlin, Celina Realuyo, Lyle
Harrison and Kenneth Baldwin

DATE, TIME July 14, 1995, 3:39 - 4:08p.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello, John? (U)

Prime Minister Major: Hi Bill. It has been an interesting day. We just had a three-hour meeting on Bosnia and I had a livelier conversation than usual with Chirac. In our assessment, the situation looks awful. Backtracking a little bit - (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

(b)(1) They are presently attacking Zepa as we speak, and it is one or two days before Zepa falls. The next question is whether they will move down the eastern enclaves from Zepa to Gorazde. We judge they will, but before mounting a proper attack in Gorazde, they will have to regroup and will need at least four to five days. We have some pretty experienced people inside at Gorazde, and they tell us they probably will attack in 4 to 5 days. We expect the Bosnian government forces will defend it. We have 3-400 of our Royal Welsh fusiliers there. The question is what to do militarily and politically? I think you spoke with Chirac? (C)

The President: (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

Prime Minister Major: He seems to have shifted off that somewhat now. (C)

The President: Now he wants to reinforce Gorazde. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Yes. He wants to reinforce Gorazde, retake Srebrenica and reinforce Sarajevo as well. (C)

The President: We have to do that on Sarajevo anyway. Helmut said that any of these military actions, besides defending Sarajevo or Goradze, would require UNSC action. I hadn't thought about it. He seemed to think so, at least. (C)

Prime Minister Major: They're on a peacekeeping mission. It would have to require a fairly loose interpretation of self defense. As far as Chirac is concerned... (C)

LINE DROPPED AND REESTABLISHED

Prime Minister Major: Sorry, God knows what happened there. (U)

The President: We were talking about the French point of view and the status of things. What is your thinking about it? (C)

Prime Minister Major: Regarding Gorazde, France wants to reinforce it.

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

We expect our Chief of the Defense Staff, General Shalikashvili and Admiral Lanxade to meet over the weekend. (C)

The President: Lanxade asked for helicopters to support it, but they would be sitting ducks without taking out their, the Serbs, ability to shoot them down. (C)

Prime Minister Major:

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

(b)(1)

The President: (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

Prime Minister Major: [redacted]

The President: (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b

Prime Minister Major: (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

The President: I have been in touch with my military commanders. They were all here in Washington for a military conference, except for Joulwan, who stayed behind in Europe. Actually, Admiral Boorda, EUCOM commander, who was in charge of the whole Bosnia thing before Joulwan, is here in Washington. And General Shalikashvili was there before Joulwan. Yesterday we went over it in great detail. I called Colin Powell too, to make sure of a balanced view. He said if you change the nature of the mission and decide to fight, screwing around is not an option. You must be willing to take casualties, inflict casualties and use air power, which may hurt civilians. You must decide if you think it is a sustainable strategy in the long run and are prepared to enter the war on the side of the Bosnian Muslims. I was moved by the report that 3,000 Bosnian government troops left Srebrenica without fighting -- how can you blame the Dutch? (C)

Prime Minister Major: The Dutch made a fair showing. They are not to blame [redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b (C)

The President: [redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4d

[redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4d

Prime Minister Major: You and I have presses that help, but I have no intention to react because the stakes are higher than that. (C)

The President: I'm just going let it go. Look, I think it is very important, if possible, to hold Gorazde. If it falls, Sarajevo will be more vulnerable. It is psychologically and strategically more important. We have to look at other options. Serbia says they are not cooperating, but they have more sophisticated equipment now to shoot our planes down. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Gorazde won't go down quickly. But there are 5,000 government troops who won't hold out long against 12,000-14,000 Serbs. [redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

The President: I'm open to provide help, but we don't want to do anything militarily stupid. We have to have an understanding. We can't just kick the can down the road. If there is a consensus on this issue, [redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4d

[redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4d They do not want UNPROFOR to leave but at the same they have this [redacted] 1.4(d) idea to urge the U.S. Congress to lift the arms embargo here. They are telling the Congress that that is the only reason that they lost Srebrenica, because they have no heavy equipment. (C)

Prime Minister Major: They're wrong. (C)

The President: Before we make any decisions, they will have to decide what they want! (C)

Prime Minister Major: When is the vote? (C)

The President: Sometime next week. It will be a hell of a vote the first time around; unless I can figure out some alternative (C)

Prime Minister Major: Oh. (U)

The President: There are two relevant facts that are ignored: the casualty rate has gone way down and central Bosnia is at peace because of contributions made by UNPROFOR. The average TV viewer sees it. He thinks it's as bad or worse than it was in 1992. (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4d Those safe areas were always there at the sufferance of the Serbs, particularly when the Serbs started taking hostages. (C)

Prime Minister Major: (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

The President: I remember that well. It is not inconceivable that the lifting of arms embargo will pass by overriding my veto. Izetbegovic and Silajdzic have been lobbying Congress. (C)

Prime Minister Major: (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

The President: If they do I'll try to veto it and sustain it. But they are in a dream world over there. What they see is Muslims being split by sexes, ethnic cleansing on TV which they think is just as bad as in '92. There's no telling them it's different. It all helps support the lifting of the embargo movement. They see the UN failure and believe we should give the Muslims guns. They are telling Congress that if they had guns they would be kicking the crap out of them. But if the French and British leave, the American public is not willing to send U.S. troops to Bosnia. They are just kicking the can down the road. No one likes to appear weak but we are at step 10 now, not step 2. I wouldn't be alarmed by that or condition our conduct on it but if it looks like there is a certain resolve and clarity of explanation it would help me to moderate a firestorm. We'll have to act together. It will help. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I see. Let me check the timetable. The Senate votes next week, then the House. The lift wouldn't take effect until September? (C)

The President: The vote can be done in a few days and the override vote a few days after that. They can set an effective time sometime later, or even immediately. They might set a date soon, because of their perception that the UN is routed. The perception is that the U.S. is on the side of the Government and the problem is that UNPROFOR has no mandate to enter into war. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I have a pretty full report of your problems. (C)

The President: I am not hung up about vetoing it. This issue and a domestic one have me in a fun house. All the press is one way and facts are irrelevant. (U)

Prime Minister Major: I am very familiar with that. (U)

The President: Our citizens have good motives. Compassion and neo-isolationism are leading to support for lifting the arms embargo. They don't want our soldiers there, but they badmouth the UN and want to give them arms. I just want you to know what is going on. The press is playing on popular emotions in the most irresponsible way. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Yes, I understand. (U)

The President: There is a possibility it'll happen quicker than you suggest. It could be the law of our country. (C)

Prime Minister Major: I'll keep my fingers crossed. I sympathize with you about the Whitewater stuff. I'm sorry it keeps coming up. You don't need that sort of rubbish. (U)

The President: I do not understand it. They have now spent \$12 million on the investigation of a land deal I lost \$40,000 on and a \$20,000 campaign contribution. Every report says that neither I nor Hillary did anything wrong. (U)

Prime Minister Major: Yes. (U)

The President: How worried should I be about the violence in Northern Ireland? Senator Mitchell passed on your request that I make a statement that I look forward to visiting a peaceful Ireland. I will do it before the cease-fire anniversary. (U)

Prime Minister Major: There are problems on both sides. The

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d McCartney is the newly elected independent. (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

There has been no progress on decommissioning. We are in contact and trying to stitch a way forward. We are worried as we get closer to August 31. We are approaching the 12-month deadline. The marching season caused some problems but with less damage than expected. August 31 is the next worry date. I have had good meetings with Bruton and discussions continue. Your visit in November is vital

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

The President: If you need to talk on Bosnia, we'll be in touch. I'll be available. (C)

Prime Minister Major: You probably know by now we have decided to call a conference at the ministerial level next week in London to discuss the Bosnian issue and the UNPROFOR mission. I hope Warren and Perry will attend. We need to get a coordinated look at what is to happen there. (C)

The President: Yes, I will talk to them about going. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Very well. I'll be here to chat anytime. I may call you Monday after we look at the military options. (C)

The President: By the way, thank you for your decision to buy the Apaches. (C)

Prime Minister Major: Oh, yes. That did not add to my conversation with Chirac. Chirac and the French were not particularly happy about it. We felt it was the best helicopter. We made the right choice. I have not a shred of regret about it. (C)

The President: OK then, we'll be in touch. (U)

Prime Minister Major: Good-bye. God bless. (U)

The President: OK. Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TELEPHONE CALL WITH
FRENCH PRIME MINISTER CHRETIEN

DATE: JULY 19, 1995
LOCATION: OVAL OFFICE
TIME: OPEN

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

I. PURPOSE

To discuss the worsening situation on Bosnia.

II. BACKGROUND

Chretien will likely express concerns about the implications for his and other UNPROFOR troops of the massive air campaign we have proposed. You should underscore the importance of all UN personnel hunkering down before the decision is taken to reduce the risk of hostage-taking. If Chretien wants to remove his troops from harm's way, however, you should indicate that we would respect his decision.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
Canadian Prime Minister Chretien

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer

V. SEQUENCE

Telephone call


Attachment
Tab A Points to be Made

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By RL NARA, Date 1/5/2019

2013-0656-m (2.31)

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER CHRETIEN

- Calling to update you regarding decisions on what to do about Gorazde and Sarajevo.
- Status quo is clearly no longer tolerable.
- Imperative to ensure meeting in London is a success. Must not result in public discord or become a forum for mere posturing by participants.
- We have reached a critical moment. We need to draw line at Gorazde, make UN presence work, so we can halt Serb aggressiveness and avert UN withdrawal.
- Issue is finding the best way to do this.
- My military advisors feel strongly that most important thing is to be able to bring air power to bear decisively, not in timid manner done to date.
- They propose issuing a clear warning to Bosnian Serbs: any attack on Gorazde or Sarajevo will be met by a massive air campaign that will cripple their military capability.
- Do not intend to cross line to all-out war against Bosnian Serbs. If they heed warning and do not attack, there will be no air campaign. This worked in February 1994 in Sarajevo, when they took our warning seriously.
- Key is that this cannot be empty threat. If Bosnian Serbs ignore our warning and attack, we must all be prepared to follow through, without wavering. As a first step, will need to begin now to reduce exposure of UN personnel.
- Need to know your thinking on what Canadian UNPROFOR forces will do. Would seem at less risk than some other countries since in Muslim controlled territory. Whatever your decision, should act quickly.



Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 11/05/2019 2:32
2013-0656-M

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TELEPHONE CALL WITH
DUTCH PRIME MINISTER KOK

DATE: JULY 19, 1995
LOCATION: OVAL OFFICE
TIME: OPEN

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

I. PURPOSE

To discuss the worsening situation on Bosnia.

II. BACKGROUND

The Dutch have indicated that they believe that taking a stand at Sarajevo is much more important than defending Gorazde. You will need to explain why Gorazde has taken on political and psychological importance that makes it imperative that we make a stand there, even though ultimately Sarajevo is the linch-pin.

The key concern for Kok is the fate of the Dutch peacekeepers still in Srebrenica. They have remained to safeguard the remaining Muslim refugees and have also refused to depart until the Serbs drop their demand that the Dutch leave behind their equipment. You should urge Kok to avoid the risk of hostage taking that could increase if we threaten the Serbs with a massive air campaign by withdrawing immediately (even if this means destroying some equipment).

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
Dutch Prime Minister Kok

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer

V. SEQUENCE

Telephone call

Attachment
Tab A Points to be Made

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VC NARA, Date 11/5/2018

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
NETHERLANDS PRIME MINISTER KOK

- Calling to update you regarding decisions on what to do about Gorazde and Sarajevo.
- Status quo is clearly no longer tolerable.
- Imperative to ensure meeting in London is a success. Must not result in public discord or become a forum for mere posturing by participants.
- We have reached a critical moment. We need to draw line at Gorazde, make UN presence work, so we can halt Serb aggressiveness and avert UN withdrawal.
- Issue is finding the best way to do this.
- While we agree that Sarajevo is ultimately more important, Gorazde has assumed such political and psychological importance that we believe a strong stand must be made there as well.
- My military advisors feel strongly that most important thing is to be able to bring air power to bear decisively, not in timid manner done to date.
- They propose issuing a clear warning to Bosnian Serbs: any attack on Gorazde or Sarajevo will be met by a massive air campaign that will cripple their military capability.
- Do not intend to cross line to all-out war against Bosnian Serbs. If they heed warning and do not attack, there will be no air campaign. This worked in February 1994 in Sarajevo, when they took our warning seriously.
- Key is this cannot be just another empty threat. If Bosnian Serbs ignore our warning and attack, we must all be prepared to follow through without wavering. Will need to begin now to reduce exposure of UN personnel.
- Need to know your thinking on what Dutch UNPROFOR forces at Srebrenica will do. Remaining at Srebrenica would not appear to be a viable option.
- Know you have said they will stay until all refugees and wounded have left, and until Serbs let them take their equipment out. But if we agree on air campaign -- or

another robust option -- in London, you should get out ASAP, if possible by Friday.

- If we proceed, first targets would have to be full range of Bosnian Serb air defense capabilities: SAMs, Anti-aircraft guns, radar and command centers.
- Once air defenses neutralized, mount major air campaign against any Bosnian Serb forces attacking Gorazde or Sarajevo.
- However, dual key could not apply in its current form. Local ground commanders would of course retain a voice in CAS and close-proximity air strikes directly affecting their troops. But there could be no UN political veto over individual missions.
- Current restrictions regarding strict proportionality would also have to be removed. Would want ability to strike strategic targets throughout Bosnia, if necessary.
- In addition to supporting effective Bosnian defense of Gorazde, important to open secure land access routes to Sarajevo. We see this as most pressing mission for RRF.
- Would like your support in coming to agreement on this before Friday's meeting in London.
- Know the course we propose entails risks. But I see no alternative to decisive action if we want to avoid collapse of UNPROFOR with all the hard choices and risks that would bring.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: July 11-12, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room/SVTS
TIME: 11:00 - 11:30 a.m.
12:30 p.m. - 1:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meetings
on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR

Sandy Berger

Rick Inderfurth (7/12 only)
David Scheffer

OVP

Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders (7/12 only)

OMB

Gordon Adams (7/12 only)
Keith Bickel (7/12 only)

STATE

Peter Tarnoff
John Kornblum
Christopher Hill (7/11 only)

CIA

George Tenet (7/12 only)
Dennis Blair (7/11 only)
Norman Schindler

DEFENSE

John White (7/11 only)
Walter Slocombe
Joe Kruzel (7/12 only)

JCS

William Owens
Wesley Clark
Howell Estes (7/11 only)

USUN

Ambassador Madeleine Albright
(7/11 only -- via secure
video)

NSC

Alexander Vershbow
Nelson Drew

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies met on July 11 and 12 to consider appropriate responses to the Bosnian Serb assault and occupation of the UN Safe Area at Srebrenica. (U)

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2. Deputies agreed on the need to reassert UNPROFOR's ability to carry out its humanitarian and protection missions in Bosnia, and to halt the pattern of successful Bosnian Serb military aggressiveness that has marked the past month. They also agreed that failure to reverse this pattern will result in attacks on the other enclaves and renewed strangulation of Sarajevo, precipitating the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission and initiation of a withdrawal under circumstances that will be perceived as defeat for the UN, NATO and our allies. They also expressed concern that it would accelerate passage of unilateral lift legislation by the Congress in a manner that would damage relations with our allies. ~~(S)~~

3. Deputies agreed on the following immediate actions (U):

- To support the UNSCR introduced by the French calling for the use of all available resources to restore the Srebrenica Safe Area, although acknowledging privately that UNPROFOR does not now possess the military capability to reverse the Bosnian Serb occupation of Srebrenica (nor, in all likelihood, to prevent the fall of Zepa). (Action: State/USUN) ~~(S)~~
- To weigh in with Milosevic (and, through the UN, with Karadzic and Mladic) to obtain support for UNHCR efforts to assist in the movement, care and supply of the refugees and the Dutch UNPROFOR troops in Srebrenica; at the same time, to work with the Bosnian government to obtain their consent for the evacuation of the refugees to Tuzla rather than forcing them to remain unsupported behind Serb lines. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- To use public statements and consultations with allies to send a clear signal of continuing U.S. resolve to support the retention of UNPROFOR as the best available option for resolving the crisis short of a major Balkan war. (Action: All) ~~(S)~~
- To review the viability of U.S. and NATO quick/emergency withdrawal options as a matter of highest priority, in light of the speed with which Srebrenica was overrun. (Action: OSD/JCS) ~~(S)~~

4. Beyond these immediate actions, Deputies also agreed on the need to work with allies on the development of a follow-on strategy to deter further Serb provocations and prevent the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission (Action: NSC/State/OSD): ~~(S)~~

- At a minimum, this strategy must preserve Bosnian government presence in and access to Sarajevo, and it must sustain

UNPROFOR deployments in Federation territory so as to continue maintaining peace where it exists. ~~(S)~~

- To this end, we will support robust use of the existing elements of the RRF to secure overland access to Sarajevo using the Mt. Igman route, and possibly to restore control over Sarajevo airport. ~~(S)~~
 - Given the political imperative not to be seen as abandoning all of the eastern enclaves, and the fact that NATO credibility (through commitment to enforcing the weapons exclusion zone) is engaged in Gorazde, the strategy should include a commitment to protect this safe area, even if protection of Zepa proves unfeasible. ~~(S)~~
5. Finally, Deputies agreed that efforts to stabilize the situation will be critical to our efforts to avoid Congressional action on unilateral lift. ~~(C)~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: July 14, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room/SVTS

TIME: 3:00 - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting
on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OMB
Alice Rivlin

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

Chief of Staff
Leon Panetta

State
Secretary Christopher
Peter Tarnoff
Richard Holbrooke

CIA
John Deutch
Dennis Blair

DOD
Secretary Perry
Jan Lodal

JCS
General Shalikashvili
Wesley Clark
Howell Estes

USUN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright
(via secure video)
Rick Inderfurth (via secure
video)

White House
Sandy Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Alexander Vershbow
Nelson Drew

Summary of Conclusions

1. Principals met on July 14 to consider appropriate responses to the Bosnian Serb assault and occupation of the UN Safe Area at Srebrenica. (U)

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

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By: 1 NARA, Date: _____
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Response to French Proposal to Reinforce Gorazde:

2. Principals agreed that we should not ~~be~~ say "no" to the French on efforts to make UNPROFOR more robust or their specific proposal to reinforce Gorazde. But we must find ways to turn the discussion to options that are militarily feasible. The immediate decision is to send General Shalikashvili to London to meet on Sunday, July 16, with his French and British counterparts for the purpose of reviewing the military options being considered in the aftermath of Srebrenica. He will raise a series of issues about the French Gorazde option (including U.S. helicopter lift for French reinforcements) designed to focus the discussion on what is realistic from a military standpoint. He will return with answers before a decision is made on whether or not to provide U.S. helicopter lift. (Action: JCS) ~~(S)~~

3. Principals agreed that if there was to be a decision for UNPROFOR to make a stand at Gorazde, it would be a decision for Sarajevo, London, Paris and Kiev to make. We will not seek to drive such a choice if they are not willing to implement it. We will, however, signal to allies at the meeting in London that we believe such a decision would require robust use of air power, and that we stand ready to provide it in conjunction with a NATO effort to restore air supremacy over Bosnia. (Action: JCS/OSD) ~~(S)~~

4. It was agreed that, in the end, Sarajevo is more important to a successful UNPROFOR strategy than Gorazde. Principals agreed that we should not only support using the RRF to open a secure land route, but measures to enable UNPROFOR to counter Serb artillery attacks on the city. The JCS will develop a list of equipment deemed essential to the protection of Sarajevo, such as advanced counter-battery artillery systems, that could be provided as part of our planned \$50 million in drawdown contributions to the RRF. (Action: JCS) ~~(S)~~

5. Principals determined that the risk of Serbian attempts to take hostages would dramatically increase if UNPROFOR adopted a more robust policy of actively defending the remaining enclaves, and that therefore it would be necessary for the UNMO missions to be withdrawn from Serb-controlled territory. (Action: State/USUN) ~~(S)~~

Dole Resolution on Lift:

6. Principals agreed that, as a strategy for opposing the unilateral lift bill being put forward by Senator Dole, the administration should encourage efforts to amend the language in order to remove the most onerous provisions of the legislation, but serve notice that even with amendments, a requirement that

the U.S. unilaterally violate binding UNSC resolutions would be subject to Presidential veto. Secretary Perry will take the lead in approaching Senator Nunn to seek his assistance in getting amendments to:

- extend the time allowed before lift would take effect from 12 weeks to the 22 weeks necessary to implement OPLAN 40104;
- link any requirement for lifting the arms embargo to its likely consequences by including Congressional authorization for U.S. participation in a NATO-led withdrawal operation;
- ensure that the trigger for implementation of lift is not just a request from the Bosnian government, but rather a decision by the UN Security Council; and
- change unilateral lift to multilateral lift.

Secretary Perry will make clear to Nunn that, even if he succeeds on the first three points, the bill will be subject to veto as long as it still requires unilateral lift. (Action: NSC/OSD)

~~(S)~~

Negotiations with Milosevic:

7. Principals received word of a new agreement that EU mediator Carl Bildt was close to concluding with Milosevic to obtain a mutual recognition package between Bosnia and Serbia. They agreed that the deal would go too far in restricting U.S. ability to reimpose sanctions if Milosevic did not live up to his commitment to seal the border. (It would require a majority among either the five Contact Group members or the five UNSC Permanent members to reimpose sanctions after 9 months.) Ambassador Frasure will meet with Bildt next week to explain our reservations. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS, re: Telephone Call with French President Chirac (1 page)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1) <i>VL</i>
001b. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with French President Jacques Chirac (2 pages)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1) <i>VL</i>
002. cable	USMission, USNATO to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C.; re: July 21 Ministers Meeting on Bosnia - A View from NATO [NATO] (3 pages)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1)
003. paper	re: The Bosnian Serbs & the Enclaves (5 pages)	07/12/1995	P1/b(1)
004. paper	re: Gorazde (2 pages)	07/12/1995	P1/b(1)
005. memo	Sir Robin Renwick, British Ambassador to The Secretary et al; re: British Cabinet's Decisions on Bosnia (1 page)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1)
006. memo	Sir Robin Renwick, British Ambassador to The Secretary et al; re: British Cabinet's Decisions on Bosnia (1 page)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1)
007. paper	re: Military Options in Bosnia [partial] (2 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1) <i>VL</i>
008a. memo	Mary Ann Peters to Anthony Lake; re: Your Meeting with British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind [partial] (3 pages)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1), P5 <i>VL</i>
008b. talking points	re: Talking Points for Meeting with British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind [partial] (4 pages)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1) <i>VL</i>
009a. letter	Jacques Chirac to John Major; re: Gorazde (2 pages)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1)

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Bosnia - July 1995 [Mid-July] [3]

2006-0647-F

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009b. letter	Jacques Chirac to John Major; re: Gorazde [in French] (2 pages)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1)
010. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with British Prime Minister John Major (2 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1) <i>VZ</i>
011. paper	re: Talking Paper - July 16, 1995 Chiefs of Defense Meeting in London Concerning Bosnia (6 pages)	07/15/1995	P1/b(1)
012. note	Jim Pardew to Mr. Slocombe et al; re: Gorazde (1 page)	07/17/1995	P1/b(1), P5 <i>KDE 5/2/11</i>
013a. memo	Nelson Drew to Anthony Lake; re: Response to Fall of Srebrenica (1 page)	07/12/1995	P1/b(1) <i>RDS 6/6/2013</i>
013b. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS; re: Response to Fall of Srebrenica (2 pages)	07/12/1995	P1/b(1), P5
014a. memo	Andrew Sens to Kenneth Brill; re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (1 page)	07/15/1995	P1/b(1) <i>VZ 11/5/2014</i>
014b. telcon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between POTUS & Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany; re: Bosnia (3 pages)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1) <i>JSCAR 7/3/2014</i>
014c. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Helmut Kohl [partial] (1 page)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1) <i>RDS 6/6/2013</i>
015a. memo	Andrew Sens to Kenneth Brill; re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between POTUS & French President Jacques Chirac (1 page)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1) <i>VZ 11/5/2014</i>
015b. telcon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between POTUS & French President Jacques Chirac; re: Bosnia [partial] (5 pages)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1) <i>RDS 6/6/2013</i>

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TELEPHONE CALL WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT CHIRAC

DATE: JULY 18, 1995
LOCATION: OVAL OFFICE
TIME: OPEN

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

I. PURPOSE

To inform Chirac of your decisions on Bosnia.

II. BACKGROUND

The French continue to promote their idea of reinforcing Gorazde with 600-800 peacekeepers. In a letter he sent to John Major today, Chirac linked massive use of air power to reinforcement on the ground, which would require U.S. helicopter airlift. Based on a conversation I had today with Chirac's military advisor, however, it is possible the French might go along with our air power-only approach if the British are on board.

You should make the case that we do not believe the ground reinforcements would enhance the protection of Gorazde. If he insists on linking the two proposals, however, you should suggest that Shali continue to discuss options with Lanxade, but nail down support for the air campaign in any event.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
French President Chirac

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer

V. SEQUENCE

Telephone call

Attachment
Tab A Points to be Made

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By vr NARA, Date 11/5/2015

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POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
FRENCH PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC

- Calling to update you regarding our decisions on what to do about Gorazde and Sarajevo in coming weeks.
- This is defining moment for our policy in Bosnia. This is last chance to make UN presence work, halt Serb aggressiveness, and avert UN withdrawal.
- Status quo is clearly no longer tolerable. You have done tremendous service in rallying support for stronger action.
- Agree with you we need to draw line at Gorazde. Issue is finding best way to do this militarily.
- My military advisors feel strongly that most important thing is to be able to bring air power to bear in decisive manner, and not in timid way done to date.
- We propose issuing a clear warning to Bosnian Serbs that any attack on Gorazde or Sarajevo will be met by a massive air campaign that will cripple their military capability.
- Cannot be just another empty threat. We must all be prepared to follow through, without wavering, if we suffer losses or additional hostages taken. Of course, should begin now to reduce exposure of UN personnel.
- First targets would have to be full range of Bosnian Serb air defense capabilities: SAMs, anti-aircraft artillery, radar and command centers.
- Once air defenses neutralized, we would be able to mount major air campaign against any Bosnian Serb forces attacking Gorazde or Sarajevo, and against military targets elsewhere.
- However, dual key could not apply in its current form. Local ground commanders could retain a voice in CAS and close-proximity air strikes directly affecting their troops. But there could be no UN political veto over individual missions.
- Current restrictions regarding strict proportionality would also have to be removed. Would want ability to strike strategic targets throughout Bosnia, if necessary.

- British seem to be coming around to idea of threatening massive air campaign, but we will both need to talk to John.
- We will also need your help in bringing other Allies along and in approaching Boutros-Ghali.
- In addition to supporting effective Bosnian defense of Gorazde, important to open secure land access routes to Sarajevo. This is most pressing mission for RRF.
- My military advisors are concerned that deploying 1000 of your troops to Gorazde will diminish ability of RRF to move quickly in Sarajevo, without materially contributing to improved military balance in Gorazde.
- Adding 1000 might increase deterrence, but would create increased problem of resupply and reinforcement.
- Agree we cannot abandon Gorazde, but we must make certain we have plans for a serious military effort to defend it.
- Need to work together between now and Friday to arrive at a common approach. I know I can count on your continued leadership within Europe to ensure we have political support needed at London meeting and in NAC to move forward together on this.

((ONLY IF PRESSED ON THE NEED FOR DEPLOYING TROOPS TO GORAZDE))

- We still have serious questions about military feasibility.
- If you are that determined, we should have our military staffs look at other ways to bolster the effectiveness of the peacekeepers in Gorazde.
- Whatever they recommend, we should agree now on the massive air campaign.

If we were to do it, prerequisite would be pre-emptive suppression of air defenses, (to reduce risks to our helicopter crews and the French troops on board).

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. cable	USMission, USNATO to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C.; re: July 21 Ministers Meeting on Bosnia - A View from NATO [NATO] (3 pages)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. paper	re: Military Options in Bosnia [partial] (2 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008a. memo	Mary Ann Peters to Anthony Lake; re: Your Meeting with British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind [partial] (3 pages)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1), P4/b(4)

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July 18, 1995



INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: : ALEXANDER VERSHBOW ✓

FROM: MARY ANN PETERS ✓

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with British Foreign Secretary
Malcolm Rifkind, July 19, 1995, 1:30 p.m.

This is Rifkind's first visit to Washington since assuming his new position. He will meet with Secretary Christopher prior to his meeting with you, and with the Vice President at 4:00 pm. With you, Rifkind wants to discuss Bosnia, NATO enlargement, Northern Ireland, Russia, and UN finances and reform. He may also raise the trans-Atlantic relationship and the purchase of American Apache helicopters and Tomahawk missiles. He plans to focus on Bosnia and Northern Ireland with the Vice President.

In addition to Rifkind and Ambassador Renwick, the British participants will be Pauline Neville-Jones, Political Director and Deputy Under Secretary of State; William Ehrman, Principal Private Secretary; and Nigel Sheinwald, Head of News Department. Assistant Secretary Holbrooke will attend, as will Sandy Vershbow and Mary Ann Peters.

Bosnia. Detailed talking points are attached. Your basic thrust should be that we need to make the UN presence work and that we need to avoid public discord among the Allies. You should describe our military's view that we need to bring air power to bear decisively, and ask HMG's help in getting the NAC and UN on board.

NATO Enlargement/Russia. The NATO study on enlargement's "how" and "why" should be ready for presentation to interested partners this fall. Allies, the British included, continue to fear that too rapid an enlargement process will play into the hands of Russian hardline nationalists. You should reassure Rifkind that we intend to proceed in a gradual, deliberate manner; we see no reason to press for answers to the "who" and "when" questions prior to the June 1996 Russian presidential election, but we need

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to keep the process moving to maintain credibility with the CEE countries.

With Russia having agreed to develop a relationship with NATO, the task is to give it content and form. We should keep pushing the Russians to engage; we want them to have a stake in the relationship that they will be reluctant to give up when NATO begins to consider the "who" and "when." You should tell Rifkind that we intend to pursue the dual tracks of enlargement and the NATO-Russian relationship in steady parallel.

Russia/Yeltsin. We have nothing to contradict the official line that Yeltsin's condition is stable, but the longer he remains hospitalized, the greater the questions. Two big unknowns: what impact the illness will have on Yeltsin's desire to run again in 1996, and how much political damage it will do if he decides to run. Chernomyrdin is positioning himself to take up the mantle should Yeltsin step aside. Yeltsin's part in the July 1 no-confidence compromise and his announcement of December 17 for Duma elections are reassuring signs that he is not out to derail the political process.

Northern Ireland. The peace process is still stalled over the weapons decommissioning issue, with the British insisting on a beginning of decommissioning before all-party talks can begin and Sinn Fein refusing to engage on the issue. Prime Minister Major told the President over the phone on July 14 that the Unionists are weak and divided and Sinn Fein is under pressure from IRA hardliners not to make concessions on decommissioning, but HMG and the Irish government are in constant touch to work something out.

You will recall that Senator Mitchell described Irish Prime Minister Bruton's suggested way around the decommissioning impasse: parallel talks (political and on decommissioning) and some form of gesture, short of actually turning in weapons. You should probe Rifkind on HMG's flexibility and indicate that we would welcome a creative solution that would allow talks to get underway.

The other big issue is HMG's treatment of paramilitary prisoners. A move to speed up transfers of prisoners from the UK to Ireland to be closer to family, or to restore the remission rate to 50% would be welcomed by Dublin and in both the republican and loyalist communities. Some UK officials have said publicly that the legislation to change the remission rate will be introduced in the next session of Parliament but Prime minister Major was less forthcoming. You should tell Rifkind we would welcome a move on prisoners.

UN Finances/Reform. The British are skeptical about UN reform. Although they supported the language that came out of Halifax, some in the UK have opined that it was nothing new and that a modest, piecemeal, agency-by-agency approach remained the surest way to achieve results. They have opposed Ambassador Albright's suggestion to use a General Assembly Working Group to look at the whole issue.

Apache/Tomahawk Deal. On July 13 Defense Secretary Portillo announced the UK decision to buy 67 Apache helicopters with Rolls Royce engines (worth almost \$4 billion) and progress with plans to acquire Tomahawk missiles, (b)(1), 1.4(d), (b)(4) We expect approval of release of the Tomahawk system in time to meet the UK's desire to place the first order in October. (b)(1)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4a, EO 13526 1.4g

Trans-Atlantic Relationship. Rifkind has been a leading proponent of efforts to broaden trans-Atlantic relations beyond traditional security concerns. At the June 14 U.S.-EU Summit, Presidents Clinton, Chirac and Santer agreed to appoint senior-level representatives to develop concrete ideas for presentation at the next Summit, which the Spanish would like to hold in Madrid in December. Spanish Foreign Minister Solana and EU Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan will meet with Secretary Christopher July 24 to set the terms of reference for the representatives.

Concurrences by: John Schmidt, Steve Pifer, Nelson Drew, Mike Sheehan, Joe Sestak, Tony Gardner *no for all*

Attachment
Tab A Talking Points

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008b. talking points	re: Talking Points for Meeting with British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind [partial] (4 pages)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1)

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TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH
BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY MALCOLM RIFKIND

Bosnia

- Given the events of the past few weeks, it is clear that staying with the status quo is totally unacceptable.
- This will be a defining moment for our policy toward Bosnia. [redacted] making UN presence work, so we can halt Serb aggressiveness and avert UN withdrawal.
- Issue is finding the best way to do this.
- Must ensure that the meetings in London are a success. They must not result in public discord or become a forum for posturing.
 - Warren Christopher has already discussed our views on approaching the meetings with you. Do you have any further thoughts?
- Our military advisors feel strongly that the most important thing is to be able to bring air power to bear decisively, not in the timid manner done to date.
 - Do not intend to cross the line and become all-out war against the Bosnian Serbs. If they keep their word and do not attack, there will be no air campaign.
- However -- cannot be just another empty threat. If Bosnian Serbs ignore our warning and attack, we must all be prepared to follow through, without wavering even if we suffer losses or additional hostages are taken. Will need to begin now to reduce exposure of UN personnel.
 - First targets would have to be full range [redacted]
 - [redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4a
 - However, [redacted] could not apply in its current form. Local ground commanders would of course retain a voice in [redacted] directly affecting their troops. But there could be no UN political veto over individual missions.
 - Current restrictions regarding strict proportionality would also have to be removed. Would want ability to strike strategic targets throughout Bosnia, if necessary.

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VZ 11/05/2019 (2.49)

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- Will need your help in moving this to a NAC decision, and in approaching Boutros Ghali.
- In addition to supporting [redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4a, EO 13526 1.4d
[redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4a, EO 13526 1.4d
Sarajevo. We see this as the most pressing mission for the RRF.
- My military advisors agree with your assessment [redacted] (b)(1)
[redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4a, EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d
- Need to work together to bring the other allies along. I hope we will be able to generate the political support needed on Friday and in the NAC to move forward together on this.
- While we intend to make every effort to sustain a veto of any unilateral lift legislation, you should be aware there is a real chance that a veto could be overridden, especially if we fail to take action to restore UNPROFOR credibility.
- [redacted] (b)(1), 1.4(b), 1.4(d) could make things more difficult on the Hill.

NATO/Enlargement/Russia

- Although some issues remain to be worked out, pleased with the NATO study on enlargement.
- Once we see how they react, we will be better able to decide on next steps.
- Committed to proceeding with enlargement in a gradual, deliberate manner, and we are mindful of the danger of playing into the hands of nationalists during the Presidential campaign.
- Forging a genuinely substantive NATO-Russia relationship should be goal. Need to give them a stake in the relationship.
- Enlargement will remain neuralgic for Moscow. Should pursue enlargement and NATO-Russia relationship in steady parallel.

Russia/Yeltsin

- No reason to doubt official line on Yeltsin's health, but the longer he is hospitalized, the greater the questions.

-- Have to see how illness affects Yeltsin's desire to run in 1996 and his public standing; Chernomyrdin appears on upswing.

-- (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4d

Northern Ireland

- See our role as doing what we can to support the peace process your government and Irish government have set in motion.
- We delivered a tough message to Gerry Adams on the need to address decommissioning of weapons seriously. Adams appears adamant that turning in weapons before talks begin is not possible. We have the sense, though that he is beginning to realize he cannot ignore decommissioning.
- Hope your government will find a way to get Sinn Fein's agreement to a model for decommissioning that will allow all-party talks to begin. Will require flexibility and creativity.
- Has there been any progress in the talks with the Irish Government announced at Cannes on June 26 on an agreed model for decommissioning?
- Many of our interlocutors on both sides would welcome a gesture from your government on prisoners, as would we.

UN Finances/Reform

- In Halifax we all agreed to the basic principles of UN reform. Hard part will be in implementation.
- Very important to us that we move on UN reform. The President made it a centerpiece of his speech in San Francisco.
- Not just an exercise to deal with our budget problems with the Congress; we are committed to reinventing the UN to deal with the problems of next 50 years. Right now it is not ready for "prime time."
- However, real UN reform will certainly help us gain support for continuing a broad agenda in the UN.

Trans-Atlantic Relationship

- Pleased to learn that you consider strengthening the (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4d your top priority as Foreign Secretary.
- We share that goal and want to work with the UK to identify concrete steps we can take in that direction.
- On July 24, Secretary Christopher will meet with Foreign Minister Solana and Commissioner Brittan to set the terms of reference for the senior-level representatives who will present ideas to the next U.S.-EU Summit. What are your views on the initiatives that should be looked at?

Apaches/Tomahawks

- (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4a, EO 13526 1.4d, EO 13526 1.4g
- We intend to get approval for your procurement of this system in time for you to place the first order of (b)(1) in October, as you desire.

(If asked)

- (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4d, EO 13526 1.4g

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
BRITISH PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR

- Calling to update you regarding our decisions on what to do about Gorazde and Sarajevo in the coming weeks.
- Status quo is clearly no longer tolerable.
- Need to ensure meeting in London is success. Must not result in public discord or become forum for mere posturing by participants.
- Chris will discuss our views on London meeting in more detail with Malcolm Rifkind later on tonight.
- We have reached defining moment for our policy toward Bosnia. We need to draw line at Gorazde, make UN presence work and avert UN withdrawal.
- Issue is finding the best way to do this.
- My military advisors feel strongly most important thing is to be able to bring air power to bear decisively, not in timid manner done to date.
- They propose issuing clear warning to Bosnian Serbs: any attack on Gorazde or Sarajevo will be met by a sustained air campaign.
- Do not intend to cross line to all-out war against Bosnian Serbs. If they heed warning and do not attack, there will be no air campaign.
- Would have effect of restoring strict enforcement of heavy weapons exclusion zones, without complication of weapons collection points. This means UNPROFOR neutrality is retained.
- However -- cannot be just another empty threat. If Bosnian Serbs ignore our warning and attack, we must all be prepared to follow through, without wavering even if we suffer losses or additional hostages are taken. Will need to begin now to reduce exposure of UN personnel.
- First targets would have to be full range of Bosnian Serb air defense capabilities: SAMs, Anti-aircraft guns, radar and command centers.

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Declassify on: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KDS, NARA, Date 6/6/2013
2012-080-001 (1.01)
[2012-0612-01, 2.55]

- Once air defenses neutralized, mount major air campaign against any Bosnian Serb forces attacking Gorazde or Sarajevo.
- However, dual key could not apply in its current form. Local ground commanders would of course retain voice in Close Air Support role and close-proximity air strikes directly affecting their troops. But there could be no UN political veto over individual missions.
- Current restrictions regarding strict proportionality would also have to be removed. Would want ability to strike strategic targets throughout Bosnia, if necessary.
- Will need your help in moving this to a NAC decision and in approaching Boutros-Ghali.
- In addition to supporting effective Bosnian defense of Gorazde, important to open secure land access routes to Sarajevo. We see this as most pressing mission for RRF.
- My military advisors agree with your assessment that deploying 1,000 French troops to Gorazde will diminish the ability of RRF to act in Sarajevo, without materially contributing to improved the military balance in Gorazde. I have relayed (will relay) this to Jacques.
- We will need to work together to arrive at common U.S.-UK-French approach by Friday, and then bring other allies along. I hope we will be able to generate the political support needed at the London meeting and in the NAC to move forward together on this.

"found on post"

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
For International Security Affairs
BOSNIA TASK FORCE

DATE: July 17, 1995

NOTE FOR: Mr. Slocombe
Dr. Nye
Dr. Kruzal

FROM: Jim Pardew, Director, Task Force on the Former Yugoslavia

SUBJECT: Gorazde

Dr. Kruzal's note from the Trilateral CHOD meeting on Gorazde in London this weekend describes a condition of motion but no real change. Without change in UNPROFOR's commitment to prevent the forcible seizure of Gorazde, reinforcement of UNPROFOR in Gorazde would be a military folly.

I recommend that our policy actions this week be guided by a two step standard:

-Step 1: UNPROFOR, and particularly the British, must make an unambiguous commitment to prevent the Serb military seizure of Gorazde and to support the enclave by military force. Bosnia today is a raw test of wills. The issue at Gorazde--in fact, with UNPROFOR in general--is a question of will, not of force. Our attention should not be diverted from this reality by military options, British shading of wording or diplomatic compromises seeking to put the best face on a bad situation. Without a change of will to resist the Serbs by UNPROFOR, Gorazde will fall. The Serbs have the capability and will to seize it.

-Step 2: If UNPROFOR makes a public commitment to prevent the seizure of Gorazde by force, we can then move on to realistic military options. There are many of them, starting with an air campaign that is coordinated and sustained.

I recommend the Secretary not go to London unless Step 1 has some hope of success. UNPROFOR must show some resolve immediately or unilateral lift is going to happen. Without an UNPROFOR commitment to act firmly quickly, fall-back strategies, including Sarajevo, won't work either and won't prevent a US unilateral lift law.

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PER E.O. 13526

2013-01050-M
05/20/16 KCE (2/95)
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 12, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *N*

FROM: NELSON DREW *D*

SUBJECT: Response to the Fall of Srebrenica

The attached memorandum to the President outlines the policy recommendations that have emerged from discussions in the last two days among Deputies and, informally, Principles concerning the appropriate U.S. response to the fall of the Safe Area at Srebrenica.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By *vr* NARA, Date *11/5/2019*
2013-0656-02

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Response to the Fall of Srebrenica

Deputies met on July 11 and 12 to consider appropriate responses to the Bosnian Serb assault and occupation of the UN Safe Area at Srebrenica. Chris, Bill Perry, Shali and I have also been in continuing contact in shaping a U.S. strategy.

Everyone agrees on the need to reassert UNPROFOR's ability to carry out its humanitarian and protection missions in Bosnia, and to halt the pattern of successful Bosnian Serb military aggressiveness that has marked the past month. Failure to reverse this pattern will result in attacks on the other enclaves and renewed strangulation of Sarajevo, precipitating the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission and initiation of a withdrawal under circumstances that will be perceived as defeat for the UN, NATO and our allies. It will also accelerate passage of unilateral lift legislation by the Congress in a manner that will damage relations with our allies.

Deputies agreed on the following immediate actions:

- To support the UNSCR introduced by the French calling for the use of all available resources to restore the Srebrenica Safe Area, although acknowledging privately that UNPROFOR does not now possess the military capability to reverse the Bosnian Serb occupation of Srebrenica (nor, in all likelihood, to prevent the fall of Zepa).
- To weigh in with Milosevic (and, through the UN, with Karadzic and Mladic) to obtain support for UNHCR efforts to assist in the movement, care and supply of the refugees and the Dutch UNPROFOR troops in Srebrenica; at the same time, to work with the Bosnian government to obtain their consent for the evacuation of the refugees to Tuzla rather than forcing them to remain unsupported behind Serb lines.
- To use our public statements and our consultations with allies to send a clear signal of continuing U.S. resolve to support the retention of UNPROFOR as the best available option for resolving the crisis short of a major Balkan war.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on:

CLINTON

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2009
By: [redacted] NARA, Date: 6/6/2012

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

2012-0800-m (1.03)

[2013-01-15-10-151]

- To review the viability of U.S. and NATO quick/emergency withdrawal options as a matter of highest priority, in light of the speed with which Srebrenica was overrun.

Beyond these immediate actions, Deputies also agreed on the need to work with allies on the development of a follow-on strategy to deter further Serb provocations and prevent the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission:

- At a minimum, this strategy must preserve Bosnian government presence in and access to Sarajevo, and it must sustain UNPROFOR deployments in Federation territory so as to continue maintaining peace where it exists.
- To this end, we will support robust use of the existing elements of the RRF to secure overland access to Sarajevo using the Mt. Igman route, and possibly to restore control over Sarajevo airport.
- Given the political imperative not to be seen as abandoning all of the eastern enclaves, and the fact that NATO credibility (through commitment to enforcing the weapons exclusion zone) is engaged in Gorazde, the strategy should include a commitment to protect this safe area, even if protection of Zepa proves unfeasible.

Deputies agreed that efforts to stabilize the situation will be critical to our efforts to avoid Congressional action on unilateral lift. The current Dole language, while not requiring immediate lifting of the embargo, would require unilateral U.S. action in violation of binding UN resolutions within 12 weeks of a request by the Bosnian Government for UNPROFOR withdrawal. Failure to demonstrate that UNPROFOR retains a viable mission after the fall of Srebrenica will virtually guarantee passage of the bill and encourage the Bosnian government to pull the trigger.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 15, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with
Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Germany for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (c)


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By VL NARA, Date 11/5/2015

2013-0650-02

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Helmut Kohl
Notetakers: Alexander Vershbow and Anthony Gardner

DATE, TIME July 13, 1995, 6:15-6:35 p.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Hello, Bill? (U)

The President: Yes, Helmut. I'd like to talk to you about Bosnia. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Yes. I can well imagine your concern. The situation is catastrophic. (U)

The President: We need to decide what we are going to do about UNPROFOR. Jacques Chirac just called me with a radical proposal: either we retake Srebrenica by military action with U.S., French, UK and German ground troops, or we withdraw immediately because otherwise we can't defend the honor of the UN. I told him that this wasn't a good idea. Even if we retook Srebrenica, what would we do to defend it? We couldn't be sure that the Muslims would be any more ready to defend it than before. We agreed to talk to our Chiefs of Staff and that they would follow up. General Shalikashvili spoke to Admiral Lanxade. The French military agrees that retaking Srebrenica would be a big risk for little gain. They are focusing on reinforcing Gorazde with 1,000 French peacekeepers and reopening the Mount Igman road to Sarajevo with the Rapid Reaction Force. We think that is more realistic. I know you spoke to him earlier today. What do you think? Does Chirac earnestly want to pull out UNPROFOR if we don't agree? (G)

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PER E.O. 13526
ISCAP 7/3/2014 2016-034

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Let me just say one thing before turning to you: here in the U.S., the Congress is saying that the fall of Srebrenica proves that UNPROFOR is no good and that we should lift the embargo unilaterally. I'm still opposing that. I think I can defeat it, but I may have to veto it. I wanted to talk to you about the situation and get your opinion. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: Thank you, Bill. I was not able to talk to Chirac himself, but spoke to Juppe. I spoke with Chirac yesterday and the day before. In my opinion, he is, correctly, extremely upset by the whole situation. However, I think we need to clarify a few things before we go any further. First, Chirac's proposal would require UN Security Council approval. (C)

The President: Absolutely. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I might add that the blessing of the UN is unlikely. Second, and most important, we are talking primarily about Dutch soldiers. The Dutch Government is adamantly opposed to any military action that would put their soldiers at risk. They are there and are all hostages. Any decision to take military action would clearly countervene the decision of the Dutch Government, which would be impossible for us to do. But regardless of that fact, the UN Security Council would probably withhold approval. (C)

The third problem which we should explore in greater detail is preventing the other "safe areas" from being taken. This is one of Chirac's other ideas. We need to find out if we can rally Major's support since that is where he has his soldiers. Troops from smaller countries are also on the ground; we shouldn't overlook that. (C)

The real problem at the core of the situation is that the Serbs and their leadership have been reduced to outsiders. They have great difficulty seeing any future for themselves. They are being blamed by the outside world. They have developed a "bunker mentality," in other words: "After me, chaos and the hell with it." I would favor one more discussion between the Chiefs of Staff with British participation. As you know, we don't have troops on the ground and don't plan to. What do you think? (C)

The President: I think you have made some good points. I agree that the Chiefs of Staff need to talk again. We can't do something stupid. Defending Gorazde and opening the Mount Igman road is a better course. It is still better to keep UNPROFOR there than to withdraw it. (C)

Chancellor Kohl: I agree completely: UNPROFOR should stay. On the other hand, we need to recognize that the situation is inextricable, even impossible. How can we avoid the fact that UNPROFOR troops may be taken hostage? The situation is catastrophic in the eyes of world opinion. The Serbs, these gangsters, have been taking the whole world for a ride. In that respect, Chirac is correct. ~~(C)~~

What are we going to do about the Dutch? The vote taken by their government is of utmost importance. Unfortunately, a dispute has already arisen with regard to the following occurrence: either the French Foreign Minister or Defense Minister has publicly accused the troops in Srebrenica of cowardice. The Dutch thought this referred to them. ~~(C)~~

The President: Perhaps he meant the Bosnians? ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: Whatever the case, the Dutch took it personally. ~~(C)~~

The President: That's not good. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: No, it's not. The whole situation is catastrophic. The pictures we see of refugees are terrible. Bill, this is what I would suggest we do. I would be available for further talks Friday, Saturday or Sunday between 2000 and 2400 our time, that is 1400 and 1800 Washington time. I'll be at home in Ludwigshafen, so your side should provide an interpreter. (U)

The President: We need to stay together on this. I will call you on Friday, Saturday or Sunday. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: You can count on my entire support. You can talk very frankly with me. I know what the U.S. Congress might plan. The last thing I want is for you to be maneuvered into a dead end. ~~(C)~~

The President: I understand and agree. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: My best to your wife. (U)

The President: And to yours. Good-bye. (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

*try to meet
O'Brien
F. Brundage*

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
CHANCELLOR HELMUT KOHL

- Calling about Bosnia situation after fall of Srebrenica.
- We need to regroup and devise strategy for making UN presence work, so we can halt Serb aggressiveness and avert UN withdrawal.
- Jacques Chirac has just called with a more radical proposal: to retake Srebrenica militarily by deploying ground forces of the four major powers.
- Jacques posed this as an either/or choice: large-scale intervention in Srebrenica, or UNPROFOR must pull out.
- I told Jacques that we believe UNPROFOR should not withdraw, but that I agreed we need to shore up its credibility after Srebrenica.
- We agreed our Chiefs of Staff would follow up so that we could get a better understanding of the proposal and its implications.
- Shali spoke to Admiral Lanxade this evening, learned that French military believes retaking Srebrenica too risky. They are focusing on reinforcement of Gorazde (possibly with 1000 French peacekeepers) as well as opening Mt. Igman route into Sarajevo using Rapid Reaction Force.
- We think that is more realistic approach: to reestablish UNPROFOR's resolve in more important areas.
- Understand he spoke to you earlier today. What is your interpretation of Chirac's proposal? Do you think he really wants to pull out if we don't agree?
- Want to stay in close touch with you over coming days so that we can avoid a rift with France and come up with a realistic approach to reestablish UNPROFOR's effectiveness and credibility.
- Failure in this effort will mean devastating setback for NATO and UN, and humanitarian disaster of large proportions. Will also make it harder to defeat unilateral lift legislation in Congress.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the
President and French President Jacques Chirac (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and French President Jacques Chirac is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our Embassy in Paris for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (C)

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By v2 NARA, Date 11/5/2009

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
015b. telcon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between POTUS & French President Jacques Chirac; re: Bosnia [partial] (5 pages)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Alexander Vershbow (European)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995 [Mid-July] [3]

2006-0647-F
jp2104

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with French President Jacques Chirac
PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Jacques Chirac
Notetaker: Alexander Vershbow and Anthony Gardner
DATE, TIME: July 13, 1995, 3:22-3:58 p.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office

The President: Hello, Jacques? (U)

President Chirac: Hello, Bill. How are you? I will speak in French. I'm very worried about Bosnia and there are things we want you to know. *(Switching to French)* First of all, my congratulations on the strong statement you issued that if we cannot restore the UN mission, then the days of UNPROFOR are numbered and that that causes you concern. Our analysis is the same. The fall of Srebrenica, the probable fall of Zepa tomorrow and the real threat to Gorazde represent a major failure of the UN, NATO and all the democracies. You see what we are seeing on TV, how the Serbs are separating men from women, sending women to be raped and killing men who are old enough to bear arms. In my opinion, we can no longer just stand by and watch this. (b)(1)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b

Therefore we must restore the situation to the way it was guaranteed by the UN. That means restoring the situation in the eastern enclaves. (C)

Therefore, firm and limited military action is called for. France is ready to put all of its forces behind the mission. I don't yet know what the British want to do. They are directly concerned since they are in Gorazde, next door to Srebrenica. I wonder whether or not their intention is to pick up and leave Gorazde just as the Dutch left Srebrenica. I don't want France to be an accomplice to such a situation. Either we agree to carry out a joint military intervention to protect the three enclaves -- to recapture Srebrenica and guarantee the integrity of Gorazde and Zepa, which account for 100,000 Muslims (today 20,000 to 40,000 Muslims are fleeing Srebrenica) and we use military intervention to impose the will of the UN, which can

Declassified in Part

Per E.O. 13526

RDS 06/06/2013 (1.05)

2012-0800-M [2013-0656-M, 2.59]

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only come from the U.S., France, the UK and Germany -- and France is prepared to throw all of its forces into the effort to restore the situation in Srebrenica -- or we do nothing. But if the option is to do nothing, then that is exactly the situation we were in in 1939, and France will withdraw -- of course, by agreement with our British friends and the rest of UNPROFOR. So the issue is whether the U.S. is prepared to cooperate in combating ethnic cleansing, or do we sit back and let these people fight each other and we go home. We cannot allow ourselves to be accomplices! (E)

The President: Let me first say that we appreciate the strong stance you have taken and your determination to do something. Obviously, we have been thinking about this a lot. I will take up your specific proposals with my military commanders, but I wanted to speak with you first. I would like you to think about a few things. Gorazde is much more important than Zepa and Srebrenica in terms of its size and psychological impact. The Bosnian Government has 9000 troops in Gorazde, who are apparently are willing to fight. In Srebrenica there were about 3000 Bosnian troops but, as you know, they left under pressure of shelling. They left without putting up a fight, although I think they could have done so. The British have 300 troops in Gorazde, so I think they will be more inclined to take a stand there. We all know that if something happens to Gorazde, the Bosnian Serb army will feel they have a free hand to move on to Sarajevo. Our military advisers say there are significant hazards in attempting to land a force with helicopters in Srebrenica and that UNPROFOR might be better off securing Gorazde first and then move back eastward due to the inherent difficulty of defending the area there. (E)

The other issue I would like to raise with you -- which we discussed in Halifax and here during your visit, and which has become more pressing -- is the necessity of knowing what the rules of engagement are going to be if you take the initiative in Srebrenica, Zepa or Gorazde. You cannot be in a position to fight in Zepa and then ask for NATO support without clear rules of engagement. If there is going to be fighting, it has to be different than in the past. Before we provide air power, we have to know that it would be used and that we could inflict real pain on the Serbs in other areas. Before UNPROFOR gets into a military campaign, we must have a clear sense of what the next move is and what the acceptable military options are under UNPROFOR and NATO. Now that you have told me what you want to do, I will talk to our military advisers, but they are very skeptical about bringing in forces with helicopters, especially if the Bosnians won't fight. I think we should first secure Gorazde and then Sarajevo. I will have conversations with them and get back in touch with you. (E)

I would like to make two more points. First, I think your stated intentions to reopen Mount Igman road is very important -- a critical point. Second, we need General Shalikashvili to speak with Admiral Lanxade or have Secretary Christopher speak with your foreign minister to talk in detail about what you have in mind for the enclaves. We need to consider whether the Muslims will return to the enclaves, how we will protect them if they come back, and whether it would be under the old UN rules of engagement. Will the Bosnian Serb Army just end their advances? Therefore, I believe we should focus on Gorazde and press for ministerial and military talks. You have given me many things to think about. I would like to have a follow up between the generals and foreign ministers on the details. (C)

President Chirac:

(b)(1)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(d)

The President: We cannot defend democratic values in the abstract. My military advisers tell me the Muslims could have made a hell of a fight in Srebrenica and raised the price of the Serbs' occupation, but they wouldn't do it. We can't fight just because the UN says they are "safe areas". We can't send the Muslims back and commit ourselves to stay forever if they won't

defend themselves. That's the problem with the strategy you suggest. Yesterday we saw the effects of the imbalance in arms. Have you had any second thoughts about lifting the arms embargo?
(C)

President Chirac:

(b)(1), 1.4(b)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(d)

The President: If we intervene to regain the enclaves on their behalf and they won't fight, how do we keep them open? UNPROFOR's mission would be completely changed and you would have entered into combat on the side of the Bosnian Government when they don't fight for themselves. I agree the Serbs have made a mockery of the UN. They took Srebrenica and got it for free. We didn't even bomb them. We should raise the price, and even hit Pale. I have argued that we should allow NATO to take tougher action, but that was not to be. If we enter the war to defend the Bosnians, they have to be ready to defend themselves. That's what worries me. (C)

President Chirac: When does the Congress vote on lifting the embargo? (C)

The President: Next week. I'm trying to defeat it. I agree with you: I am vehemently opposed to unilateral lift. If they pass it, I will veto it, and they would be obliged to override my veto. (C)

President Chirac: Can Congress override the veto? (C)

The President: Yes, with a two-thirds vote, but I don't think they'll have two thirds. I'm not worried about it. I would like

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5

to confer with my military advisers and get back in touch on this matter. (C)

President Chirac: OK, I quite agree. I will ask Admiral Lanxade to contact General Shalikashvili as soon as possible. Thank you very much. (C)

The President: OK. Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Nelson Drew to Anthony Lake; re: Your Meeting with Bosnian Foreign Minister Sacirbey (1 page)	07/17/1995	P1/b(1), P5 VL 3/3/2020
001b. talking points	re: Talking Points for Use with Bosnian Foreign Minister Sacirbey (1 page)	07/17/1995	P1/b(1) VL 3/3/2020
002. cable	Letter from Prime Minister John Major to POTUS; re: Gorazde, UNPROFOR, & Bosnia (3 pages)	07/17/1995	P1/b(1)
003. talking points	re: Talking Points to be Used in Response to Deliberations by British Cabinet Over Bosnia (2 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1) VL 3/3/2020
004. memo	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense; re: CHODs Meeting in London [partial] (3 pages)	07/16/1995	P1/b(1), P5 VL 3/3/2020
005. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS; re: Principals' July 14 Conclusions on Bosnia (3 pages)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1) PDE 10/1/2013 Bosnia Conference
006. paper	re: Gorazde (3 pages)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1)
007. report	re: Srebrenica (3 pages)	07/13/1995	P1/b(1)
008a. memo	Nelson Drew to Anthony Lake; re: July 14 Principals Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1), P5
008b. agenda	re: NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1) VL 11/5/2019
008c. paper	re: Discussion Paper - Elements of a Post-UNPROFOR Strategy - Support the Federation; Contain the Conflict (9 pages)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1) PDE 10/1/2013 Bosnia Conference

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Alexander Vershbow (European)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995 (Mid-July) [4]

2006-0647-F
ip2105

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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009a. memo	Nelson Drew to Anthony Lake; re: July 14 Principals Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1), P5
009b. agenda	re: NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1) vL 11/5/2019
009c. paper	re: Discussion Paper - Elements of a Post-UNPROFOR Strategy - Support the Federation; Contain the Conflict (9 pages)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1) RDE 10/1/2013 Bosnia Conference
010. cable	US Mission, USUN New York to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C.; re: July 12 - Resolution Adopted on Srebrenica (4 pages)	07/13/1995	P1/b(1)
011a. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS; re: Telephone Call with Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok (1 page)	07/13/1995	P1/b(1) vL 3/3/2020
011b. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok (1 page)	07/13/1995	P1/b(1) vL 3/3/2020
012. email	Alexander Vershbow to Nancy Soderberg et al; re: Thoughts on Strategy for Opposing Dole (1 page)	07/12/1995	P1/b(1) vL 3/3/2020
013a. email	Alexander Vershbow to Anthony Lake; re: Bosnia Strategy Paper (1 page)	07/13/1995	P1/b(1), P5 vL 3/3/2020
013b. paper	re: Bosnia Strategy [partial] (4 pages)	07/12/1995	P1/b(1), P5 RDE 10/1/2013
014. paper	re: Bosnia Endgame Strategy [partial] (4 pages)	07/17/1995	P1/b(1), P5 RDE 10/1/2013
015. paper	re: Bosnia Strategy [partial] (4 pages)	07/12/1995	P1/b(1), P5 RDE 10/1/2013
016. paper	re: Bosnia Endgame Strategy [partial] (4 pages)	07/17/1995	P1/b(1), P5 RDE 10/1/2013

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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017. agenda	re: Checklist for Deputies' Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	07/12/1995	P1/b(1)
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 17, 1995


INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

FROM: NELSON DREW *ND*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Bosnian Foreign Minister
Sacirbey on July 17, 1995



You are currently scheduled to meet with Bosnian Foreign Minister Sacirbey at 2:45 p.m. on Monday, July 17, 1995. Attached at TAB A are talking points for your use in that meeting.

Sacirbey's arrival in the U.S. corresponds with Senator Dole's scheduled consideration of his unilateral lift resolution. In a meeting on July 12 with NATO SYG Claes, Sacirbey argued that one reason his government was considering requesting UNPROFOR withdrawal was that getting UNPROFOR out was a precondition for lift. You should restate our opposition to unilateral lift, but not expect Sacirbey to change his position.

In his meeting with Claes, Sacirbey also indicated that the official position of the Bosnian government was that if UNPROFOR would not retake Srebrenica, they would be asked to leave. The next day, in a meeting with UK Foreign Secretary Rifkind, Sacirbey was less strident on the need for UNPROFOR withdrawal, but did indicate a preference for a framework other than the UN in which friendly governments would provide troops to assist in the defense of Bosnia. You should stress the need to give efforts now underway to make UNPROFOR more robust a chance to succeed.

During the Sacirbey-Rifkind meeting, Sacirbey also argued that the care of refugees from Srebrenica and Zepa was the responsibility of the UN, not his government. The British have asked us to make the point that the Bosnians should treat their own refugees better. The Bosnian position seems to have eased somewhat over the weekend.

Attachment
Tab A Talking Points

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 11/5/2019

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**TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH
BOSNIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SACIRBEY
2:45 P.M. MONDAY, JULY 17, 1995**

- No one can be anything but outraged by the Bosnian Serbs' brazen attack on UN safe areas at Srebrenica and Zepa, and the new wave of ethnic cleansing.
 - Despite these tragic events, we remain convinced that UNPROFOR's withdrawal would lead to an even greater tragedy.
 - While I know you will be speaking with Senator Dole in support of his efforts to obtain unilateral lift, it is the specter of this greater tragedy for your country that compels the administration to continue to oppose Dole's efforts.
 - Nevertheless, should our current efforts to strengthen UNPROFOR fail, and withdrawal take place, we then would strongly support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo.
- We stand ready now to assist in efforts to shore up UNPROFOR so that it lives up to its name as a "protection" force. But if UNPROFOR is to remain and carry out its humanitarian mission, it will need to deal more firmly with the Serbs' aggressive behavior
 - We have sent General Shali to London to meet with his French and British counterparts to evaluate proposals to mount a defense of Gorazde and Sarajevo.
 - We do not intend to support a mere rhetorical posture: we are insisting that any option to strengthen UNPROFOR's military role must be realistic and militarily feasible.
 - You should be under no illusions: the main responsibility for mounting and sustaining a defense around Gorazde and Sarajevo will still be yours, but we believe that a more robust UNPROFOR fulfillment of its mandate to enforce the Weapons Exclusion Zones and protect the Safe Areas will make your task far less difficult.
 - The U.S. is still not prepared to put forces on the ground, but we are ready to support a robust effort on the ground with an equally robust air campaign.
 - For this to be effective, we will need the help of our allies in authorizing a full SEAD effort against the Bosnian Serb air defenses. Neither CAS, nor air lift of troops and equipment, nor resupply of the remaining enclaves can take place safely without first neutralizing the air defense capabilities in the region.
- A commitment by UNPROFOR to make a stand against further Serb encroachment will only be politically sustainable if your government is seen to be supportive of the effort.
- This will entail not just a willingness to have UNPROFOR remain, but also active cooperation in developing and implementing a plan for the humanitarian care of the additional refugees.
 - Many of those now displaced from Srebrenica and Zepa were already refugees from the surrounding areas. They are once again without homes, through no fault of their own.
 - While I appreciate your government's position of not wanting to take any action that is seen as condoning or contributing to further ethnic cleansing, it is unacceptable to make these people suffer further. You must assist in providing food and shelter for them.

- OUR OWN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY TEAM MET THIS MORNING AND WILL MEET AGAIN TOMORROW TO CONSIDER MANY OF THE POINTS YOU ARE DEALING WITH IN YOUR CABINET MEETING.
- DEFINITIVE ANSWERS TO SEVERAL OF THE QUESTIONS YOU RAISE WILL HAVE TO AWAIT THE OUTCOME OF TOMORROW'S SESSION
- I CAN PROVIDE YOU WITH OUR GENERAL THINKING ON MOST OF THE ISSUES THE PM RAISED IN HIS LETTER.
- WHILE WE INTEND TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SUSTAIN A VETO OF ANY UNILATERAL LIFT LEGISLATION, YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THERE IS A REAL CHANCE THAT A VETO COULD BE OVERRIDDEN, ESPECIALLY IF WE FAIL TO TAKE ACTION TO RESTORE UNPROFOR CREDIBILITY
 - IF GORAZDE FALLS, COULD MAKE THINGS MORE DIFFICULT ON THE HILL.
- I AM MEETING WITH SACIRBEY THIS AFTERNOON, AND WILL PRESS HIM ON GIVING US A CHANCE TO RESTORE UNPROFOR CREDIBILITY. THIS MUST INCLUDE ALLOWING UNPROFOR TO REMAIN, AND ASSISTING IN THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE RRF. BUT AGAIN, WE MUST BE WILLING TO DO MAKE UNPROFOR MORE CREDIBLE. THE STATUS QUO WILL NOT SUFFICE.
- REGARDING THE OPTIONS FOR GORAZDE, YOU ARE RIGHT IN YOUR VIEW THAT WE WOULD NOT BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT DEPLOYMENT OF 5000-15,000 TROOPS TO REPEL A SERB ATTACK ON ITS OWN.
- WE AGREE THAT THE WEIGHT OF THE EFFORT TO DEFEND GORAZDE ON THE GROUND STILL RESTS WITH THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT.
- WE DO SOME MERIT IN THE FRENCH PROPOSAL FOR A MORE MODEST REINFORCEMENT OF THE UN PEACEKEEPERS THERE, AND ARE WEIGHING THE PROS AND CONS OF PROVIDING THE NECESSARY LIFT FOR A SMALL FRENCH DEPLOYMENT.
 - SUCH A DEMONSTRATION OF RESOLVE, IF DONE IN PARALLEL WITH A ROBUST AIR CAMPAIGN, WOULD PROVIDE A DETERRENT TO THE BOSNIAN SERBS THAT WAS CLEARLY LACKING AT SREBRENICA AND ZEPA.
- YOUR THIRD OPTION, WHICH AMOUNTS TO SIMPLY STAYING WITH THE STATUS QUO, IS CLEARLY UNACCEPTABLE.
- IF UNPROFOR MAKES NO EFFORT TO CHANGE THE CALCULUS OF THE SITUATION FOLLOWING THE BRUTAL ETHNIC CLEANSING OF SREBRENICA:
 - THE FRENCH HAVE ALREADY INDICATED THAT THEY WILL WITHDRAW,
 - THE U.S. CONGRESS WILL BE CERTAIN TO PASS A UNILATERAL LIFT BILL OVER A VETO, AND
 - THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT IS INCREASINGLY LIKELY TO DEMAND UNPROFOR'S WITHDRAWAL.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By KDS/NAA, Date 6/6/2013

2012-0800-m (1.06)

[2013-0630-m, 2.63]

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- REALISTICALLY, HOWEVER, IT MAY BE MORE IMPORTANT TO LAY DOWN A MARKER OF CHANGED UNPROFOR RESOLVE AT GORAZDE THAN TO COMMIT TO HOLDING IT AT ALL COSTS INDEFINITELY. BUT CLEARLY SOMETHING MUST BE DONE NOW TO KEEP THE FRENCH ON BOARD AND AVOID ENCOURAGING A SERB ONSLAUGHT NOT ONLY AGAINST GORAZDE, BUT SARAJEVO AS WELL.
- TURNING TO OUR PROPOSAL FOR THE USE OF AIR POWER, SINCE THE BOSNIAN SERBS HAVE INDICATED THAT ANY USE OF NATO AIR POWER WOULD BE REGARDED AS AN ACT OF WAR, THEIR VIEWS ON THIS MATTER CANNOT BE THE DETERMINING FACTOR.
 - THE USE OF AIR POWER HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED BY THE UN AS PART OF THE CHAPTER VII APPROACH TO THE MANDATE TO WHICH WE HAVE ALL AGREED.
 - THUS FAR, THERE HAS BEEN NO SERIOUS EFFORT TO APPLY THAT AIR POWER IN A MANNER THAT MIGHT ACTUALLY HAVE AN IMPACT ON BOSNIAN SERB FORCES VIOLATING UN MANDATES.
 - AS A RESULT, THE THREAT TO UN PERSONNEL FROM BOSNIAN SERBS WILLING TO RESORT TO CRIMINAL TACTICS OF HOSTAGE-TAKING HAS OUTWEIGHED THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS.
 - CLEARLY, ANY RENEWED AIR CAMPAIGN WOULD NEED UNPROFOR TO TAKE REALISTIC MEASURES TO REMOVE ITS PERSONNEL FROM HIGH THREAT AREAS WHERE THEY ARE UNNECESSARILY DEPLOYED.
- WHAT WE PROPOSE FOR GORAZDE IS A MILITARILY SOUND AIR CAMPAIGN TO RESTORE SERB RESPECT FOR THE HEAVY WEAPONS EXCLUSION ZONE, AND, IF NECESSARY, ATTACK FORCES VIOLATING IT AS PART OF A SERB OFFENSIVE EARLY ENOUGH TO SUPPORT EFFORTS TO DEFEND THE SAFE AREA.
- SUCH A CAMPAIGN WOULD GREATLY ENHANCE THE DETERRENT POSTURE OF THE UN AND THEREBY CONTRIBUTE TO SUCCESSFUL MAINTENANCE OF THE UN'S ROLE IN SARAJEVO.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. memo	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense; re: CHODs Meeting in London [partial] (3 pages)	07/16/1995	P1/b(1), P5

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~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

16 July 1995

Memorandum for Secretary of Defense

Subject: CHODs Meeting in London

- Met in London today with French and British CHODs, along with staffs. Purpose of the meeting was to consider the current strategic and tactical situation of the UNPF in Bosnia and to develop and recommend military options to the meeting of Foreign and Defense Ministers in London on 21 July.
- In atmospherics the meeting was serious and candid. There was a consensus that the prospects for peace were increasingly distant, that the military balance had shifted against the GOBH, and that little could be expected from Mladic's remarks about his intent not to attack Gorazde now or to provide access to Sarajevo and the enclaves.
- The participants entered the meeting with sharply distinguished positions, and not surprisingly, no consensus emerged at the conclusion.

EO 13526 1.4a, 1.4b, 1.4d

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PER E. O. 13526

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
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- The meeting concluded with the following options for Sarajevo and Gorazde:



EO 13526 1.4a, 1.4b, 1.4d

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EO 13526 1.4a, 1.4b, 1.4d

- I believe our option on Gorazde represents not only the best hope for consensus but also the most realistic option to forestall disaster there. However, we owe the French an answer the helicopter issue as soon as possible. I don't believe it is either feasible or wise to attempt to disregard the situation in Gorazde at this point in favor of Sarajevo. Rather, I suggest that you, Chris, Tony and I must work with our counterparts to forge a consensus on robust air around Gorazde, and then it will follow naturally as the preferred means to strengthen Sarajevo. Clearly we need to do our utmost to keep these results as private as possible until we can develop the requisite consensus.

Respectfully,

**SECRET/NOFORN**

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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PER E.O. 13526
CIA Historical Collections Division
ML 70-14 10CT 2013
[2013-0656-h, 7.05]

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Principals' July 14 Conclusions on Bosnia

Response to Fall of Srebrenica: Principals agreed that we should not be seen as saying "no" to the French on efforts to make UNPROFOR more robust or their specific proposal to reinforce Gorazde. But we must find ways to turn the discussion to options that are militarily feasible without falling into the trap of either having to put forces in on the ground or be blamed for the failure of UNPROFOR. The immediate decision is to send General Shali to London to meet on Sunday with his French and British counterparts for the purpose of reviewing the military options being considered in the aftermath of Srebrenica. Shali will raise a series of issues about the French Gorazde option designed to focus the discussion on what is realistic from a military standpoint:

- the need to ensure that the mission makes sense and that the Bosnian government will mount an active defense where UNPROFOR makes its stand;
- the need for preemptive suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) to support an UNPROFOR stand either at Gorazde or Sarajevo;
- the need to eliminate the dual key in enforcing the heavy weapons exclusion zone around Gorazde (and Sarajevo), to bolster the more robust posture on the ground;
- the need for UNPROFOR to act as though under Chapter VII provisions throughout Bosnia, to reduce the likelihood of additional hostages being taken in response to tough UNPROFOR action in Gorazde;
- the fact that it will take 10-14 days for a U.S. helicopter lift package to be in place and ready to assist with French redeployments;
- the need for UNPROFOR troops assisting in the defense of Gorazde to be effectively integrated with and supported by Bosnian government forces who would bear the primary responsibility for active defense of the enclave;

- ensuring that a clear line of NATO command and control exists for any U.S. lift and/or logistical support;
- a commitment from the French that if we assist in redeployment of their forces to provide a more robust UNPROFOR posture, they will not turn around and withdraw from UNPROFOR anyway; and
- a clear signal that any U.S. assistance is a one-time deal that implies neither any commitment of U.S. ground forces nor willingness to engage in a similar operation again.

Principals agreed that if there was to be a decision for UNPROFOR to make a stand at Gorazde, it would be a decision for Sarajevo, London, Paris and Kiev to make. We would not seek to drive such a choice if they are not willing to implement it. We will, however, signal to allies at the meeting in London this weekend that we believe such a decision would require robust use of air power, and that we stand ready to provide it in conjunction with a NATO effort to restore air supremacy over Bosnia.

It was agreed that, in the end, Sarajevo is more important to a successful UNPROFOR strategy than Gorazde. Principals agreed that we should not only support using the RRF to open a secure land route, but measures to enable UNPROFOR to counter Serb artillery attacks on the city. The JCS will develop a list of equipment deemed essential to the protection of Sarajevo, such as advanced counter-battery artillery systems, that could be provided as part of our planned \$50 million in drawdown contributions to the RRF.

Principals determined that the risk of Serbian attempts to take hostages would dramatically increase if UNPROFOR adopted a more robust policy of actively defending the remaining enclaves, and that therefore it would be necessary for the UNMO missions to be withdrawn from Serb-controlled territory.

Dole Resolution on Lift: All of us agreed that, as a strategy for opposing the unilateral lift bill being put forward by Bob Dole, we should encourage efforts to amend the language in order to remove the most onerous provisions of the legislation, but serve notice that even with amendments, a requirement that the U.S. would unilaterally violate binding UNSC resolutions would be subject to your veto. Secretary Perry will take the lead in approaching Senator Nunn to seek his assistance in getting amendments to:

- extend the time allowed before lift would take effect from 12 weeks to the 22 weeks necessary to implement OPLAN 40104;
- link any requirement for lifting the arms embargo to its likely consequences by including Congressional authorization for U.S. participation in a NATO-led withdrawal operation;

- ensure that the trigger for implementation of lift is not just a request from the Bosnian government, but rather a decision by the UN Security Council; and
- change unilateral lift to multilateral lift.

Secretary Perry will make clear to Nunn that, even if he succeeds on the first three points, the bill will be subject to your veto as long as it still required unilateral lift. However, in the event that a veto is overridden, his assistance in gaining the amendments we are seeking could be instrumental in saving the lives of UNPROFOR troops and the NATO soldiers, including U.S., helping to extract them should the lift bill trigger withdrawal -- as the French have assured us it will.

Negotiations with Milosevic: Finally, we received word of a new agreement that EU mediator Carl Bildt is close to concluding with Milosevic to obtain a mutual recognition package between Bosnia and Serbia. The deal would go too far in restricting our ability to reimpose sanctions if Milosevic did not live up to his commitment to seal the border. (It would require a majority among either the five Contact Group members or the five UNSC Permanent members to reimpose sanctions after 9 months, thus giving the Russians, British and French the ability to block.) Ambassador Frasure will meet with Bildt next week to explain our reservations.

NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: July 14, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 3:00 - 4:00 p.m.

Agenda

- I. Post-Srebrenica Enclave Strategy
 - A. French Proposal to Reinforce Gorazde.....OSD/JCS
 - B. UNPROFOR Reconfiguration/Evacuation of Safe Areas...JCS
- II. Reconsideration of Post-UNPROFOR Withdrawal Options
 - A. Lift & Strike or Just Lift, Arm & Train.....All
 - B. UN Mandate and NAC Decision Requirements.....State/OSD
- III. Legislative Issues
 - A. Dole Unilateral Lift Opposition Strategy.....All
 - B. 614 Authority Problems.....JCS/State
- IV. Negotiations Update.....State

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Discussion Paper

Elements of a Post-UNPROFOR Strategy:
Support the Federation; Contain the Conflict

Overview

At the May 23 Principals Committee meeting there was a general consensus that U.S. policy following UNPROFOR withdrawal would be to seek multilateral lift of the arms embargo, limited support for arming and training the Bosnian Army, but no commitment to air strikes. Principals also agreed that U.S. security assistance should be largely limited to the provision of financing for Bosnian arms purchases from other suppliers and that training should be conducted by a third party, if possible. There was also agreement that such policies would have to be accompanied by enhanced efforts to contain the fighting within current bounds, including maintaining, and possibly reinforcing, peacekeepers in Macedonia.

Principals agreed that all these elements of a possible post-UNPROFOR strategy need further analysis, as do several other questions including: What relief and other military operations could or should remain in place? How would we work with Allies and friends to contain the fighting? What are Russia's likely responses to our efforts to lift the arms embargo and bolster the security of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

Political/Military Goals

Our principal goals following UNPROFOR's partial or complete withdrawal would be to:

- Preserve the sovereignty of the GOBH over as much of its territory as possible;
 - We could continue to recognize the borders of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as of 1992 and not accept the territorial status quo created by Serb military operations and ethnic cleansing, just as we did with Soviet conquest of the Baltics in the 1940s.
- Maintain the Bosniac-Croat Federation and good relations between Zagreb and Sarajevo;
 - Whether these alliances of convenience can endure remains to be seen. The Federation offers the best prospect for developing a counterweight to extreme nationalism and Serbian regional hegemony. Maintaining some common sense of purpose between Zagreb and Sarajevo is the best way to safeguard the GOBH from a Serb-Croat grand bargain that could leave Bosnia a Balkan Palestine in the middle of Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia.

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- Croatian support would be essential to success of efforts to arm and train the Bosnian Army, if only to ensure transit of equipment. But Zagreb would surely want some similar security assistance and closer ties to NATO (through PFP) and the EU.
- Prevent a widening of the conflict and bolster regional stability;
 - This remains our abiding strategic interest. We must prevent the conflict from widening into a general Balkan War that could engage two NATO allies (with very different agenda), threaten the stability of fragile new democracies in the region, and increase the risks of deeper U.S. engagement.
- Deter further aggression by Belgrade, while keeping a line open to Milosevic and his successors.
 - Threats to Kosovo, Macedonia, and other neighbors would have to be deterred, but moderation of Serb policies is the long-term goal.

General Elements of the Strategy

Security Assistance

We would seek support of all NATO allies, PFP Partners, and moderate Islamic states for a security assistance package for the GOBH. But we should be prepared to proceed with a coalition of the willing.

Allies would balk at supporting lift for fear that it would prolong the war and exacerbate the risks of its widening. We would need to convince them that we only want to give the GOBH a chance to survive and be able to negotiate a viable settlement. A convincing containment strategy would also be essential to enlisting their support.

Security assistance to Bosnian government would be designed to give it sufficient military capacity to defend the territory still under its control and enhance its ability to regain, by force or at the negotiating table, territory now controlled by the BSA. The magnitude of assistance could range from what would be required to defend the status quo, to a more robust package that would allow it to make strategic gains, to an extensive reequipping that would allow it to reestablish its control over territory allotted it under the Contact Group Plan. Clearly cost will be a major factor here, and past estimates of the robust package have exceeded \$1 billion.

We and the GOBH would have to balance various goals with the risks of triggering engagement of superior Yugoslav Army (VJ) and Krajina Serb Army (KSA) forces in the fighting in ways that could only be countered by direct U.S. and/or Allied

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military support. All but the first option risk bringing other Serb forces to Pale's defense.

Bosnian/Croat Harmony

Sarajevo has few alternatives other than alliance with Zagreb. Zagreb, on the other hand, may need additional incentives stay with the program. We and other Allies might offer Zagreb certain rewards for cooperation with Sarajevo such as additional technical and military assistance, deeper bilateral economic and political ties, and membership in PFP.

Dealing With Serbia

Deterring further Serb aggression would likely require reinforcing the "Christmas warning" to Milosevic about responding to Serb-triggered violence in Kosovo, and adding threats to take unspecified military actions against Serbia if it escalates its support to the Bosnian Serbs or intimidates Macedonia or other neighbors.

Forging anti-Milosevic coalition could cause divisions within the Alliance and the EU and reinforce Serb nationalism unless we make it clear our efforts are not directed against Serbia proper but at the aggressive nationalism sponsored by the current government. At the same time, we could take steps to support opposition political groups in Serbia who favor more moderate regional policies. We could continue to hold out to Milosevic the promise of further integration if he really breaks with Pale and respects international norms.

Regional Containment

Our regional containment efforts might include:

- Retain some residual UNPROFOR or other peacekeeping presence in the Federation territory to maintain Bosniac-Croat harmony.
- Retain a robust UNCRO to prevent a reeruption of the Serb-Croat war and limit KSA support the BSA.
 - KSA support was instrumental in the BSA's ability to beat back the Bosnian V Corps offensive in Bihac during the fall of 1994.
 - There is intelligence suggesting that if the KSA were driven out of UN Sectors North and South by the Croatian Army, they would move into the Posavina corridor and support BSA operations against the Gorazde pocket.
- Maintain and possibly augment UNPREDEP in Macedonia to help stabilize that country and deter a Serb crackdown in Kosovo. In the context of arming the Bosnians, we would

have to be careful not to give Kosovar Albanians the sense that U.S. or Allied forces would come to the aid of an armed uprising against Serb authorities.

- Deploy some other border monitoring forces like UNPREDEP in Hungary and Albania. This and other actions to prevent spillover could be organized by NATO through PFP.
- Reinforce stability along the periphery by redirecting resources currently used for peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance to promote economic development and cooperation among the front-line Balkan states.

Efforts Prior to Withdrawal

To be effective, elements of this strategy would need to be in place well before extraction of UNPROFOR actually begins. The military imbalance is such that the BSA could readily put pressure on the enclaves and Sarajevo before and during UNPROFOR withdrawal. Also, as the SNIE 95-7 notes, the Bosnian government would be likely to strongly resist a partial or complete withdrawal of UNPROFOR unless the U.S. or NATO commits to military support. This commitment would just as surely trigger BSA actions to preclude complete withdrawal.

- We would need to build consensus among the Allies and other potential partners and secure at least Russian acquiescence for the main goals of this approach.
- To give the GOBH forces a chance, we would need to explore ways to help the Bosnians "creep out" of the restrictions of the arms embargo. This might include:
 - Providing some intelligence support to GOBH to enhance their ability to organize defenses against BSA actions. For example, we might start providing the GOBH with data from the Predator UAV flights and other sources.
 - Programs that Gen. Sewell has broached with the Federation for rear area operations, NCO training, etc.
 - Developing military-to-military contacts between the GOBH and third countries (Croatia, Turkey, or non-front-line CE states such as Poland or the Czech Republic), that would enable rapid launching of the envisioned training programs.
 - Reconsider the option of allowing UNPROFOR units, on a national basis, to turn their equipment over the GOBH upon withdrawal. In this way the Bosnian Army could also provide some protection to the evacuation force. Our assumption has been that this would trigger hostile Serb action against these forces, but if the extraction environment is hostile in any event this may not be so decisive in the Serb calculus.

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Lifting Options

Multilateral

We would call for an end of the arms embargo because its continuation in the absence of a peacekeeping force or other UNSC action to preserve the peace would deny Bosnia-Herzegovina its right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. It would seem difficult for Russia or other states to justify continuation of the arms embargo in this context. Indeed, Russian Rep Churkin proposed lifting the arms embargo last year as part of the Contact Group's package of incentives and disincentives if Bosnia accepted the CG plan and the Serbs did not. Still, one could expect Russia and even some NATO allies to argue that lifting the embargo would only escalate the violence without altering the outcome fundamentally and run the risk of widening of the conflict. Allies would also be wary of lift because of the inevitable pressures to provide military assistance to the Bosnian government.

NATO/Coalition

If Russia or some another UNSC member (China) appeared to be the principal obstacle to multilateral lift, we might press for a NATO/coalition action to achieve the desired goal. Our argument would hinge on rights to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. However, absent a UNSC action to remove the embargo, we would still be vulnerable to the criticisms we have leveled at proponents of unilateral lift and risk losing support for compliance with other UN-mandated sanctions regimes.

Lift Only

"Lift and pray" would seem to be a completely indefensible strategy both at home and abroad. Even the most isolationist Republicans are not advocating this approach. While this would end the stigma of supporting UNPROFOR, it would create the impression that we had decided to leave the Bosnian government to fend for itself on the black market or rely on Islamic states.

The GOBH might well resist withdrawal in this context. Indeed, the only advantage of this approach would seem to be that it would decrease the BSA's incentive to complicate or resist withdrawal. However, the BSA would know that the GOBH would receive arms from Islamic and other countries, even if the U.S. and Europe had made no commitments. This outcome would put pressure on the Federation and would risk the ensuing conflict from becoming a clash between Muslims and Christians.

Arming and Training

On the face of it, arming and training by "third countries" has a number of benefits. It would limit the extent of U.S. engagement, making it easier to avoid the "Americanization" of

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the post-withdrawal conflict. In turn, this could help prevent the struggle from becoming a surrogate conflict between Russian-backed Serbs and the U.S.-backed GOBH.

Identifying likely "third countries" is more problematic. As for arming, many West European governments might be reluctant to fuel the conflict due to fears of widening. Some front line Central European governments might have similar fears, and enlisting them in such an enterprise would run contrary to our efforts to continue the demilitarization of these societies. This leaves Turkey, Iran, and/or other Islamic countries, all of whom have lots of capacity and high motivation. But if these states get involved, modulating the flow will become more complicated, not to mention the polarizing impact of making this a clash between Islam and Christianity.

As for training, if the Bosniac/Croat Federation holds, Croatia would offer proximity, high motivation, and an eagerness to cooperate with NATO. The downside risks are that enlisting Croatia so frontally in the conflict against the Bosnian Serbs would risk reopening the Serb-Croat conflict in a bigger way. Clearly, Croatia's cooperation would be essential to any arming and training package for Bosnia. However, its use as a transit and staging area are different than its use as the training ground and launch pad for offensive operations against Serbs.

Robust Lift and Strike

Here the assessment is in many ways unchanged from the early days of the war in 1992. Lifting the arms embargo and beginning some arming and training of the GOBH forces will take time. During that time they would be very vulnerable to BSA military actions. The most effective way to mitigate this would be to conduct supporting air strikes against BSA heavy weapons, military facilities, and operations. If liaison with the Bosnian Army was established, it might be possible to use Bosnian forces as forward air controllers and target designators. At a minimum, we could argue that NATO's August 1993 decisions to undertake airstrikes to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo and other safe areas remain valid.

An even more robust option, would be designed to limit VJ involvement by threatening to target VJ military installations in the FRY and the Drina River Bridges and other transit points between the FRY and Bosnia if military support continues.

This would give the GOBH the best chance for survival, but it has several significant risks. Such strong action against the Serbs might trigger more direct Russian support. It could also spark an uprising in Kosovo or Vojvodina provinces that could trigger the wider war we seek to avoid.

Strike, No Lift

This option, also considered in late 1992, is gaining supporters outside government once again for different reasons. This approach would seek to "level the playing field" by targeting BSA heavy weapons and other military targets. Once UNPROFOR was out, it could be accomplished without fear of hostage taking. Forward air controllers would be required, but it might be possible to train Bosnian government forces to perform that function for NATO forces. Most military assessments have concluded that air strikes alone would be insufficient to save the enclaves and break a siege of Sarajevo. However, air strikes might be successful in achieving other, less demanding goals at the negotiating table.

Humanitarian Relief: Over to the Bosnians

PRM's paper explains in great detail how the withdrawal of UNPROFOR would disrupt relief efforts by international organizations. However, we need to explore the feasibility of turning over management and delivery of relief efforts to the Bosnian government. Our provision of security assistance might free resources and personnel for such efforts and the Bosnians could operate without current restrictions on UN and international agencies. Also, if we can hold the Federation together, these regions and Croatia could remain secure supply bases.

Assessing/Managing the Russian Reaction

In Moscow's fractious political environment, an expanded U.S.-NATO role in Bosnia would appear at first glance to be a tempting target either for Yeltsin's opponents or for Yeltsin himself and others eager to posture in defense of Russian national interests in the run up to parliamentary and presidential elections. While some support to the Serbs and pointed criticism of U.S. moves would be inevitable, the overall impact on elite and popular sentiment may be more manageable and less explosive than generally predicted.

How Strong is Pan-Slavism?

U.S. and Russian polling data routinely highlight the absence of any significant popular Russian support for Serbia or its agenda in the Balkans. Despite constant Russian (and Western) assertions to the contrary, the Russian view of Serbia corresponds roughly with attitudes toward Poland or Turkey (i.e., these states are seen as mildly friendly to Russia at best). Like most foreign policy issues, events in a post-UNPROFOR Bosnia would resonate faintly with a Russian electorate preoccupied with day-to-day socioeconomic concerns. Politicians from across the political spectrum would find it difficult to rouse average Russians out of their indifference or to stir up serious opposition to the Yeltsin government for its reactions to U.S.-NATO policy.

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Moscow has been actively working to retain and expand its political influence in the Balkans (including with Greece) and clearly does not want to be marginalized by Western decisions on Bosnia. But a confrontation with the West over efforts to save the rump Bosnia would not necessarily advance those interests. Moreover, such a stance would also be perceived as anti-Muslim and therefore do damage to Moscow's warming relations with Iran and other Islamic states.

Russia's strategic interests in the Balkans, despite Zhirinovskiy's rhetoric, are far from evident to the average Russian. Given the lingering outrage over the war in Chechnya -- much closer to home -- Moscow would have a hard time justifying direct military involvement in Serbia, even advisors/trainers, to the Russian public.

The Duma has gone on record as favoring military support to the Serbs if the arms embargo on Bosnia is lifted. But Russian arms sales now generally operate on a cash basis. It is not clear that Russia has either the resources or the political motivation to provide significant amounts of military assistance on credit to a bankrupt Serbia. The possibility of non-official Russian support to the Serbs, in the form of volunteers and arms, is a real possibility, but the magnitude of such support seems unlikely to be decisive.

Managing Russian Elite Perceptions

To be sure, the Moscow-based elite is likely to bristle at a more muscular U.S.-NATO posture in Bosnia. Although most foreign policy circles have embraced great power rhetoric and bluster on many high-profile issues, there is little fire in the belly left for the Balkans. The elite's Bosnia anxieties reached their high-water mark more than a year ago and were sparked largely by the April 1994 airstrikes around Sarajevo. This growing Bosnia fatigue has also been fed by the actions of the Bosnian Serbs on the ground and by Moscow's high-profile diplomatic forays -- and failures -- in the region, the Contact Group, and the UNSC. Churkin's unproductive visit and gloomy assessment are another example of this frustration.

The steady downgrading of Russian efforts in the Balkans also is linked implicitly to the Russian elite's growing preoccupation with NATO expansion. While Yeltsin and Kozyrev would still be the key players in how the Russian internal debate on post-UNPROFOR Bosnia develops, they will need a clear understanding of the potential costs of opposing international consensus on this issue. Given the Russian leadership's overriding stake in trying to hold the line on NATO expansion and repairing the damage caused by Chechnya, we can expect that Moscow will be far less inclined to fan a new round of crisis in relations with the U.S. and its Allies over Bosnia.

Still, it will be particularly important for the U.S. to engage directly with Russian officials early and try to

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influence elite opinion as our overall direction becomes clearer. In addition to giving Russian officials a sense of engagement in the development of policy, we should also look at face-savers that would make it easier for Moscow to abstain from a UNSC vote on lifting the arms embargo. For example, we could advance a UNSC resolution that would lift the arms embargo on all the Yugoslav successor states. This would have little practical impact on Serbia's military potential.

Shifting Alignments

In the post-UNPROFOR environment, we would likely have to deal with shifting alignments among Contact Group members. While Germany and the UK would probably be supportive of efforts to isolate Serbia, one can imagine Russo-French resistance to this tack and even collusion to cut deals with Belgrade and Pale. The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy would offer countervailing pressures that might limit the depth of such fissures. But maintaining even the limited degree of Western unity we have today would be difficult as old biases and differing geopolitical interests became more pronounced.

Drafted: S/P: SFlanagan
6/14/95, Revised 7/7/95, SPEUR 5169

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NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON BOSNIA

DATE: July 14, 1995
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Agenda

- I. Post-Srebrenica Enclave Strategy
 - A. French Proposal to Reinforce Gorazde.....OSD/JCS
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- IV. Negotiations Update.....State

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TELEPHONE CALL WITH
DUTCH PRIME MINISTER WIM KOK

DATE: OPEN

LOCATION: OVAL OFFICE

TIME: Open

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

I. PURPOSE

To discuss the worsening situation in Bosnia and express our appreciation for the efforts of Dutch peacekeepers in Srebrenica.

II. BACKGROUND

The Dutch are concerned by criticisms that their peacekeepers did not do enough to defend Srebrenica. Your call is an opportunity to express our deep appreciation for the courageous efforts of the Dutch battalion under near-impossible conditions, as well as to share our thinking on how to reestablish UNPROFOR's credibility in the wake of the fall of Srebrenica.

Most of the 400 Dutch peacekeepers are now at the UN camp in Potocari outside Srebrenica. Roughly 48 are being held hostage by the Serbs. Despite the fall of the enclave to the Bosnian Serbs, the Dutch are still attempting to perform their humanitarian mission by protecting the refugees, pressing the Serbs to treat them humanely, and accompanying the refugees as they are moved to Federation territory.

III. PARTICIPANTS

The President
Prime Minister Wim Kok

IV. PRESS PLAN

White House photographer

Attachment
Tab A Points to be Made

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
DUTCH PRIME MINISTER WIM KOK

Dutch Battalion's Role

- Want to express my admiration for courage and dedication with which your troops handled an extremely difficult situation in Srebrenica.
- Dutch battalion's action, under fire, to care for the wounded and thousands of refugees was truly heroic.
- Priority you placed on safety of the refugees, at risk of your own soldiers, is an example of your country's leading role in addressing humanitarian crises all over the world.
- As we discussed during your visit, Srebrenica was the most exposed enclave and the most difficult assignment in Bosnia. When the crisis came, brave Dutch soldiers averted what could have been a much greater humanitarian catastrophe.
- These deeds, along with your long and significant contribution to UNPROFOR, have shown once again why the Netherlands is such a valued and trusted ally.

Next Steps

- Fall of Srebrenica and a new round of ethnic cleansing presents us with a new and dangerous situation in Bosnia.
- In wake of Srebrenica, we must regroup and devise a strategy for making the UN presence work, so that we can halt pattern of Serb aggressiveness and avert UNPROFOR withdrawal.
- In our view, most important place where UNPROFOR must demonstrate its effectiveness is Sarajevo. We should support French efforts to open Mt. Igman route, using RRF as necessary, to prevent Serbs from strangling the capital.
- Also important to hold Gorazde. If we do not, Serbs will feel they have carte blanche to move on Sarajevo.
- We will want to consult closely in coming days as we try to devise a strategy to reestablish UNPROFOR's effectiveness and credibility.
- Failure in this effort will mean a devastating setback for NATO and the UN, and a humanitarian disaster of large proportions. It will also make it harder to defeat legislation to lift the arms embargo unilaterally.

Vershbow, Alexander R.

From: Vershbow, Alexander R.
To: Soderberg, Nancy E.; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs; @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor; Drew, S. Nelson
Cc: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Thoughts on Strategy for Opposing Dole ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~
Date: Wednesday, July 12, 1995 4:41 PM

For Tony, Sandy and Nancy

We are handicapped by the fact that Dole has made his unilateral lift resolution more compatible with Administration policy in that it would mandate lift only if 1) UNPROFOR decides to leave; or 2) the Bosnian Government asks UNPROFOR to leave. It allows up to 12 weeks for UNPROFOR to get out before the President would have to implement lift; that period is substantially less than would be needed to implement 40104, but I expect Dole would accept a change from 12 to 16 or 20 weeks -- that's simply a problem of detail.

The only objection of principle we can make is that lift would be unilateral and thereby violate a binding UNSC resolution -- undermining other UNSC sanctions regimes (e.g. Iraq), the authority of the UNSC in general, and transatlantic relations, as well as conferring sole responsibility for the conflict on the U.S. These arguments, however, fall on deaf ears on Capitol Hill.

Therefore, we have to rely on the more indirect argument that passage of the Dole resolution would undermine our efforts to strengthen UNPROFOR so that it can continue its mission (to which Dole will counter that: raising the spectre of lift will encourage the Serbs to stop their provocative behavior that threatens to drive UNPROFOR out).

I would recommend that, because of the unilateral element alone, the President should veto Dole if it passes. This would show faith with our Allies and uphold our commitment to the UN Charter, even if it might not be enough to prevent an override.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By WZ NARA, Date 11/5/2019
2013-0656-m (2.77)

Cicio, Kristen K.

From: Vershbow, Alexander R.
To: @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor
Cc: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Bosnia Strategy Paper ~~(SECRET)~~
Date: Thursday, July 13, 1995 8:17AM

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 11/5/2019
2013-0656-M (278)

Please pass to TL and SRB:

Here it is. Draft is too long, but I wasn't sure whether you wanted to include the material at the bottom of page 1/top of page 2 on ways to recreate military leverage (most of which may be unrealistic while UNPROFOR is still there) and the regional containment strategy on page 4. After your comments, I will work heroically to shorten it.

<<File Attachment: JUL12BS.DOC>>

7/11

TL/SV:

→ Good cut. See comments.
→ I would add explicit warning to both parties that UNPROFOR will leave if it is not allowed to reassert its mission in central Bosnia. Despite all rhetoric, Saccary still only says they may not seek renewal of in Nov -- strongly suggests they are not ready for UNPROFOR to leave. May get ~~less~~ less from left than they hope and a horrific humanitarian problem. Serbs, despite being up now, could easily get ~~lift~~ lift if UNPROFOR leaves. In fact if UNPROFOR cannot/does not

reassert its mission soon, it will be forced to leave (by Europeans, Bosnians and/or Congress). We should seek to get some leverage from this inevitability.

(A)

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013b. paper	re: Bosnia Strategy [partial] (4 pages)	07/12/1995	P1/b(1), P5
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
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FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995 (Mid-July) [4]

2006-0647-F
jp2105

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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July 12, 1995

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BOSNIA STRATEGY

Summary: With the fall of Srebrenica, we need to make an all-out effort to restabilize the situation on the ground, restore UNPROFOR's credibility, and press for a realistic diplomatic settlement this year. If that effort fails and UNPROFOR must withdraw, we should move quickly to help the Bosnians obtain the military capabilities needed to level the playing field while minimizing U.S. involvement, so that an ultimate solution is not dependent on our support or the actions of the international community.

May not have that much time to restore UNPROFOR credibility

Restabilization post-Srebrenica: The Bosnian Serb attack on Srebrenica is simply the most dramatic development in a pattern of increasingly aggressive Serb actions over the past few months. If we and our Allies fail to reverse this pattern, it will only encourage Serb attacks on the other enclaves and renewed strangulation of Sarajevo, precipitating UNPROFOR's collapse and a protracted NATO withdrawal operation in circumstances that will be perceived as a defeat for the UN and the Alliance. It will also guarantee passage of unilateral lift legislation by the Congress in a manner that will damage relations with our allies.

halt

In the short term, we should give political support to French-led efforts to restore the Srebrenica safe area as a demilitarized enclave, while recognizing that there is no sensible military option for saving Srebrenica or Zepa. **The more important task is to devise a strategy to reestablish UNPROFOR's credibility where it counts:** using the lead elements of the RRF immediately to establish secure humanitarian access routes to Sarajevo; and using the full RRF, once deployed, to protect Gorazde, the strategically most important of the eastern enclaves and the one where NATO is most directly engaged (through the exclusion zone). If UNPROFOR and the RRF can prove their effectiveness in this way, we may be able to deter further Serb provocations, restabilize the situation on the ground, and avert an early UNPROFOR withdrawal.

avoid military support from CAS?

In order for this strategy to succeed, we need to **persuade the Bosnian Government that it is in its interest to keep UNPROFOR** even if this means writing off Srebrenica and Zepa and concentrating UNPROFOR's efforts in Sarajevo and Central Bosnia. We would also need to be sure, before employing the RRF to help protect Gorazde, that Bosnian Government forces there will defend the enclave, since the RRF is not designed to do this on its own.

Pressing for a political settlement this year: We are not going to obtain a settlement this year unless we recreate some real leverage vis-à-vis the Bosnian Serbs, and unless we are prepared to offer inducements to break the logjam surrounding "acceptance" of the Contact Group plan.

Sticks: The more assertive UNPROFOR/RRF actions suggested above will not, in themselves, provide much negotiating leverage. We should use the specter of defeat that UNPROFOR withdrawal would represent to convince Allies of the need to raise the stakes in other ways, such as:

- restoring the credibility of Operation Deny Flight by broadening the ROE to permit attacks on all elements of the Serb integrated air defense system displaying hostile intent and retaliatory attacks on airfields used to launch no-fly zone violations;

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Declassify on: OADR

redeploy UNPROFOR to reduce vulnerabilities (e.g. STAN VNMOS)

- issuing new **NATO ultimatums** regarding air strikes to enforce the **exclusion zones**;

[Redacted]

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

- in order to deprive the Bosnian Serbs of Krajina Serb support, quietly **encouraging Tudjman to maintain the threat of increased Croatian attrition operations against Sectors North and South** (but not to launch a full-scale assault).

In tandem with these steps, we and our Contact Group partners should tell Milosevic the time has come for him to put up or shut up, i.e. that:

- we will **terminate the current sanctions relief** in September if he has not recognized Bosnia and taken visible action to terminate military support for Pale (and Knin);
- moreover, if sanctions relief is terminated and the ICFY mission departs, any resumption of large-scale support for Pale will be met not only by a **tightening of economic sanctions against the FRY, but by U.S. or NATO air strikes against key supply routes and military targets, including those inside Serbia.**

Carrots: To bring the Allies along, convince the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate, and manage the Russians, we will need to **adapt** elements of the Contact Group plan while preserving its essential core (one state, 51:49). This will entail:

- having a heart-to-heart talk with the Bosnians, stressing that, in light of the fall of Srebrenica, renewed Western readiness for tougher action [Redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(d) they need think more realistically about the shape of a settlement, and agree to at least exploratory Contact Group contacts or proximity talks with Pale;
- in the talks with Pale, advancing possible modifications to the Contact Group map consistent with the 51:49 ratio but providing for a more compact and cohesive territory for the Federation (e.g. trading Srebrenica, Zepa and a widening of the Posavina corridor for full Federation control over Sarajevo and additional territory in central Bosnia); consistent with a recent Silajdzic proposal to Juppé, we could state that up to 10 percent of the Contact Group map was subject to renegotiation;
- similarly, developing the Contact Group's proposed constitutional principles to show the Serbs the amount of autonomy their republic would have within the Union and the scope of the "parallel special relationship" with Serbia;
- if necessary, pressing the Bosnians to agree that the Serbs can conduct a **referendum on secession after 2-3 years**, as had been agreed in the 1993 *Invincible* package;
- proposing to the Allies and Russians mutual participation in funding a **post-settlement "mini-Marshall Plan" for the Balkans** designed to foster regional economic recovery and integration and thereby give all parties a stake in peace.

*is that credible?
let's not
consider
threats we
are not
prepared
to make*

*border may be more
recognition now*

*[don't we have to be
abandon 51:49 if
this is at all
realistic*

will need to

At the same time, in conjunction with the threat of terminating sanctions relief for non-compliance, we may want to increase the rewards offered to Milosevic for initial positive steps, such as lifting vice suspending phase-one sanctions if he recognizes Bosnia. This could be especially helpful in keeping Moscow on board.

If UNPROFOR withdrawal must occur: If the last-ditch effort to obtain a settlement fails and the RRF fails to restabilize the situation on the ground, we will need to face up to the issue of UNPROFOR withdrawal and implementing a post-withdrawal strategy. (Indeed, it may be preferable to face the issue this year rather than having to implement a messy and protracted NATO withdrawal operation in the middle of the election campaign, when the parties will have every incentive to try to draw us into the conflict.)

Leveling the playing field: Our post-withdrawal strategy should have as its goal providing the Bosnians with sufficient military capability to survive the immediate Serb onslaught and, within a short period of time, to begin to regain territory allotted to them under the Contact Group proposal. This would make the ultimate resolution of the conflict the result of a balance of power on the ground rather than dependent on the actions of the international community.

*we should
guarantee
of what was
make
difference
on ground*

- **Our preferred approach would be to lift the arms embargo multilaterally through passage of a UNSC resolution.** This could be made part of the resolution terminating UNPROFOR's mandate and authorizing withdrawal. Our allies have indicated they will go along with lift after UNPROFOR withdrawal. To secure a Russian abstention, we may need to make the lift applicable to all republics of the former Yugoslavia (including Serbia-Montenegro) and/or agree to substantial sanctions relief for Belgrade.

•

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(c), 1.4(d)

While the Bosnians' survival in the short term may require U.S. or NATO air strikes, we would want to set a time limit to any air strike commitment and then restrict our involvement to the provision of arms and training, making clear to the Bosnians that once the playing field is leveled, they are on their own.

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(c), 1.4(d)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(c), 1.4(d)

We would continue to use a mixture of sanctions relief and threats to keep the Serbian border closed and to deter full-scale intervention by Belgrade; but we would tell the Bosnians bluntly that if their offensives went beyond retaking territory on the Contact Group map and provoked Serbian intervention, they should not expect us or NATO to come to their rescue.

Regional containment strategy: As we moved to arm the Bosnians, we would need to take a range of steps to prevent a widening of the conflict to other parts of the region, to include:

- a strong warning of retaliation against Serbia in the event of direct intervention in Bosnia, coupled with sanctions relief to encourage a sealing of the border;
- reinforcing UNPREDEP in Macedonia to prevent Serbian border encroachments and to deter a new crackdown in Kosovo;
- strengthening UNCRO and providing other carrots to Tudjman to prevent a resumption of full-scale war in Krajina (while at the same time encouraging continued low-level attrition operations that could help limit Krajina Serb support to the Bosnian Serbs);
- and possibly deploying preventive peacekeeping forces along Hungary's and Albania's borders with the FRY.

We would, at the same time, intensify our efforts to **sustain the Federation and Bosnian-Croat military cooperation**. And we would make clear that we stand ready to **broker a political settlement and assist in its implementation**, although at this stage we would probably want to set aside the Contact Group approach and devise a basis for a "fresh start" to the negotiations.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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014. paper	re: Bosnia Endgame Strategy [partial] (4 pages)	07/17/1995	P1/b(1), P5
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Alexander Vershbow (European)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995 (Mid-July) [4]

2006-0647-F
jp2105

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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BOSNIA ENDGAME STRATEGY



→ Sandy V

Summary: With the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa, we need to make an all-out effort in the coming weeks to restabilize the situation on the ground, restore UNPROFOR's credibility in Sarajevo, Central Bosnia and possibly Gorazde, and press for a realistic diplomatic settlement this year. If this effort fails, we should move quickly to withdraw UNPROFOR this year and help the Bosnians obtain the military capabilities needed to level the playing field. This would be underpinned during a one-year transition period by air strikes to protect Sarajevo and the other safe areas, reinforced if possible by an UNPROFOR successor force based on a coalition of the willing. Following the transition, the Bosnians would be on their own.

Restabilization post-Srebrenica and Zepa: We have only a few weeks to devise and implement steps to strengthen UNPROFOR and halt the pattern of increasingly aggressive Serb behavior. If we do not change the status quo, the Serbs will move on Gorazde and renew the strangulation of Sarajevo, and the French will likely decide to withdraw -- leading to UNPROFOR's collapse and a protracted NATO withdrawal operation in circumstances that will represent a defeat for the UN and the Alliance. It will also guarantee passage of unilateral lift by the Congress in a manner that will damage relations with our allies, and create ~~an untenable~~ an untenable ~~with~~ with ~~override~~ override ~~legitimacy~~ legitimacy

Our priority is to shore up UNPROFOR in Sarajevo and Central Bosnia by reducing its vulnerability, using the RRF to open secure routes to Sarajevo, and making more aggressive use of NATO air power (under a single key) to halt Serb artillery attacks on the exclusion zones. We should also support reinforcing Gorazde if a feasible approach can be found, recognizing that a U.S. contribution to this effort may be needed to prevent a French decision to pull out. In order for this strategy to succeed, we need to persuade the Bosnian Government that it is in its interest to keep UNPROFOR even if this means writing off Srebrenica and Zepa and concentrating UNPROFOR's efforts in Sarajevo and Central Bosnia. We would also need to be sure, before embarking on steps to reinforce Gorazde, that Bosnian forces will defend the enclave, since even a reinforced UNPROFOR presence is not capable of doing this on its own.

last
ambivalent
in G.

Pressing for a political settlement this year: The best way of avoiding an UNPROFOR withdrawal and the new challenges of a post-withdrawal strategy would be to make an all-out effort at obtaining a political settlement this year. The strengthened UNPROFOR and more aggressive use of NATO air power described above will restore some of the leverage we have lost over the past year vis-à-vis the Bosnian Serbs. But we will also need to offer some new inducements to break the logjam surrounding "acceptance" of the Contact Group plan. The loss of Srebrenica and Zepa may open the way to more realistic territorial solutions, and we will need to have a heart-to-heart discussion with the Bosnians to urge greater flexibility on the map, constitutional arrangements, and possibly the Bosnian Serbs' right to secede from the Union after an initial period. We will also need to sweeten our offers to Milosevic in order to encourage him to put real pressure on the Bosnian Serbs. At Annex I is a more detailed gameplan for an early diplomatic breakthrough.

really a
negotiation
w/ Bosnians
have
headed
draft off

Supporting Bosnia's Survival post-UNPROFOR: If the last-ditch effort to obtain a settlement fails and/or we fail to restabilize the situation on the ground, we will need to face up to the issue of UNPROFOR withdrawal and implementing a post-withdrawal strategy. Indeed, it would be preferable to face these issues this year rather than having to implement a messy and protracted

impl
w/ draw
need to
assume
Cong supp
debate

NATO withdrawal operation in the middle of the election campaign, when the parties will have an even greater incentive to embarrass us or try to draw us into the conflict. **We should begin consulting with our key Allies now on our post-withdrawal strategy** in order to bolster their resolve to strengthen UNPROFOR in the short term, and to force them to face up to their responsibility to help support Bosnia's survival if withdrawal must occur.

Leveling the playing field: Our post-withdrawal strategy should have as its goal providing the Bosnians with sufficient military capability to survive the immediate Serb onslaught, consolidate their authority over Sarajevo and Central Bosnia and, within a short period of time, to begin to regain territory allotted to them under the Contact Group proposal. This would make the ultimate resolution of the conflict the result of a balance of power on the ground rather than dependent on the actions of the international community.

- **Our preferred approach would be to lift the arms embargo multilaterally through passage of a UNSC resolution, perhaps part of the same resolution terminating UNPROFOR's mandate and authorizing withdrawal.** Our allies have indicated they will go along with lift after UNPROFOR withdrawal. To secure a Russian abstention, we may need to make the lift applicable to all republics of the former Yugoslavia (including Serbia-Montenegro) and/or agree to substantial sanctions relief for Belgrade.

•

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(c), 1.4(d)

Additional Support during the Transition: Although the Bosnians are stronger now than when we first pushed lift-and-strike in 1993, until they acquire and assimilate new arms, they will still need additional support to survive the Serbs' preemptive offensives. At a minimum, we will need to help the Bosnians ensure the survival of Sarajevo as the linchpin of a future Bosnian state. Therefore, for a one-year transition period, we would:

- Press our NATO Allies to continue enforcing the no-fly zone, to deprive the Serbs of air superiority (this would, of course, require preemptive SEAD);
- **Conduct aggressive air strikes against a broad range of Bosnian Serb military targets to protect Sarajevo (and possibly the other remaining safe areas) against Serb artillery attacks.** This would preferably be done through NATO or, if our allies refused to renew the NATO mandate post-UNPROFOR, through a U.S.-led coalition of the willing. The air strikes would be based on new UNSC authority (since existing authority under 836 and 844 is tied to UNPROFOR) or, as a fallback, on a Bosnian Government request for collective self-defense. Forward air controllers would be provided by the Bosnians or by members of the UNPROFOR successor force, if available (see below). We would limit the commitment to Sarajevo and possibly the other safe areas to avoid becoming full-scale combatants; in any case, Bosnian ground forces, with HVO cooperation, can hold their own in Central Bosnia.

- Support the deployment of a successor force to UNPROFOR to reinforce the Bosnians' hold on Sarajevo and the other safe areas, and to continue to promote stability in Federation-controlled areas of Central Bosnia. Such a force would be a coalition of the willing composed of those UNPROFOR contributors willing to remain plus new forces from Islamic countries. If possible, the force would be deployed under a Chapter VII UN mandate with the explicit mission of supporting Bosnia against Serb aggression. Otherwise, the force would deploy at the request of the Bosnian Government. (The humiliating prospect of Islamic countries taking the place of European countries in solving a European problem could prompt some of our Allies to stay and participate in the successor force.)

We would set a time limit of one year (the end of 1996) on the NFZ and air strike commitments and on the mandate of the successor force, making clear to the Bosnians that once the playing field is leveled, they are on their own. In addition to providing arms and training to reinforce their ground force capabilities, we would ensure they obtained effective air defenses to counter Bosnian Serb air capabilities when the NFZ lapsed.

(b)(1), E.O. 12958 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(c), 1.4(d)

Keeping Belgrade Out: Leveling the playing field becomes a much more formidable challenge if Belgrade intervenes on a large scale in support the Bosnian Serbs. We would offer substantial sanctions relief to induce Milosevic to stay out, seal the border and accept a much larger international monitoring force. We would at the same time warn Milosevic that, if we detect Serbian military support, we will use air power against Serbian forces operating inside Bosnia and against the Drina bridges and other supply routes, and that we do not rule out strikes against military targets inside Serbia.

Regional containment strategy: As we moved to arm the Bosnians, we would need to take a range of steps to prevent a widening of the conflict to other parts of the region, to include:

- Reinforcing UNPREDEP in Macedonia to deter Serbian border encroachments and a new crackdown in Kosovo, together with a reaffirmation of our warnings to Milosevic regarding air strikes against Serbia in the event he provokes armed conflict in Kosovo;
- Strengthening UNCRO and providing increased economic assistance to Croatia to discourage Tudjman from launching a full-scale war in Krajina in the near term (while at the same time encouraging continued low-level attrition operations that could help limit Krajina Serb support to the Bosnian Serbs); and
- Possibly deploying preventive peacekeeping forces along Hungary's and Albania's borders with the FRY.

We would, at the same time, intensify our efforts to sustain the Federation and Bosnian-Croat military cooperation. And we would make clear that we stand ready to broker a political settlement and assist in its implementation, although at this stage we would jettison the Contact Group approach and devise a new basis for the negotiations.

*UN-FAA
What is logic of on year?
Does it make sense to
Shaker period all started by milt need*

*What is rationale for UNPREDEP?
We already have trip presence. Larger be militarily significant would be substantial*

Annex I: Gameplan for a Diplomatic Breakthrough in 1995

To achieve an agreement this year that reflects the changing strategic realities, we will need to adapt elements of the Contact Group plan while preserving its essential core as the starting point.

- We would begin with a heart-to-heart talk with the Bosnians, stressing that, in light of the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa and renewed Western readiness for tougher action, they need think more realistically about the shape of a settlement. They also need to bend in their demand that the Serbs "accept" the Contact Group plan as the "starting point" and agree to at least exploratory Contact Group contacts or proximity talks with Pale.
- In talks with Pale, we would float possible modifications to the Contact Group map. At the outset, these would preserve the 51:49 ratio, but provide for a more compact and cohesive territory for the Federation (e.g. trading Srebrenica, Zepa and a widening of the Posavina corridor for full Federation control over Sarajevo and additional territory in central Bosnia). Consistent with a recent Silajdzic proposal to Juppé, we could state that up to 10 percent of the Contact Group map was subject to renegotiation.
- Ultimately, we should be prepared to press the Bosnians to accept less than 51% if they can obtain higher-quality territory and more defensible frontiers for the Federation in Central Bosnia.
- We would, similarly, develop the Contact Group's proposed constitutional principles to show the Serbs the amount of autonomy their republic would have within the Union and the scope of the "parallel special relationship" with Serbia.
- If necessary, we would press the Bosnians to agree that the Serbs can conduct a referendum on secession after 2-3 years, as had been agreed in the 1993 *Invincible* package. We would argue that, if the Bosnians cannot persuade the Serb population that their best future lies in reintegration, there is no point in blocking the peaceful separation of the Union along the lines of the Czechoslovak model.
- We would propose to the Allies and Russians mutual participation in funding a post-settlement "mini-Marshall Plan" for the Balkans designed to foster regional economic recovery and integration and thereby give all parties a stake in peace.

Shouldn't we deal w/ this upfront w/ Bosnians

In tandem with these steps, we and our Contact Group partners should tell Milosevic the time has come for him to put up or shut up, i.e. that:

- We will terminate the current sanctions relief in September if he has not recognized Bosnia and taken visible action to terminate military support for Pale (and Knin);
- Moreover, if sanctions relief is terminated and the ICFY mission departs, any resumption of large-scale support for Pale will be met not only by a tightening of economic sanctions against the FRY, but by U.S. or NATO air strikes against the Drina bridges and key supply routes.
- At the same time, in conjunction with the threat of terminating sanctions relief for non-compliance, we would increase the rewards offered to Milosevic for initial positive steps, such as lifting vice suspending phase-one sanctions if he recognizes Bosnia.

better alternative: deep more extensive suspension in return for border;

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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015. paper	re: Bosnia Strategy [partial] (4 pages)	07/12/1995	P1/b(1), P5
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COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Alexander Vershbow (European)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995 (Mid-July) [4]

2006-0647-F

jp2105

RESTRICTION CODES

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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BOSNIA STRATEGY

Summary: With the fall of Srebrenica, we need to make an all-out effort to restabilize the situation on the ground, restore UNPROFOR's credibility, and press for a realistic diplomatic settlement this year. If that effort fails and UNPROFOR must withdraw, we should move quickly to help the Bosnians obtain the military capabilities needed to level the playing field while minimizing U.S. involvement, so that an ultimate solution is not dependent on our support or the actions of the international community.

Restabilization post-Srebrenica: The Bosnian Serb attack on Srebrenica is simply the most dramatic development in a pattern of increasingly aggressive Serb actions over the past few months. If we and our Allies fail to reverse this pattern, it will only encourage Serb attacks on the other enclaves and renewed strangulation of Sarajevo, precipitating UNPROFOR's collapse and a protracted NATO withdrawal operation in circumstances that will be perceived as a defeat for the UN and the Alliance. It will also guarantee passage of unilateral lift legislation by the Congress in a manner that will damage relations with our allies.

In the short term, we should give political support to French-led efforts to restore the Srebrenica safe area as a demilitarized enclave, while recognizing that there is no sensible military option for saving Srebrenica or Zepa. **The more important task is to devise a strategy to reestablish UNPROFOR's credibility where it counts:** using the lead elements of the RRF immediately to establish secure humanitarian access routes to Sarajevo; and using the full RRF, once deployed, to protect Gorazde, the strategically most important of the eastern enclaves and the one where NATO is most directly engaged (through the exclusion zone). If UNPROFOR and the RRF can prove their effectiveness in this way, we may be able to deter further Serb provocations, restabilize the situation on the ground, and avert an early UNPROFOR withdrawal.

In order for this strategy to succeed, we need to **persuade the Bosnian Government that it is in its interest to keep UNPROFOR** even if this means writing off Srebrenica and Zepa and concentrating UNPROFOR's efforts in Sarajevo and Central Bosnia. We would also need to be sure, before employing the RRF to help protect Gorazde, that Bosnian Government forces there will defend the enclave, since the RRF is not designed to do this on its own.

Pressing for a political settlement this year: We are not going to obtain a settlement this year unless we recreate some real leverage vis-à-vis the Bosnian Serbs, and unless we are prepared to offer inducements to break the logjam surrounding "acceptance" of the Contact Group plan.

Sticks: The more assertive UNPROFOR/RRF actions suggested above will not, in themselves, provide much negotiating leverage. We should use the specter of defeat that UNPROFOR withdrawal would represent to convince Allies of the need to raise the stakes in other ways, such as:

- **restoring the credibility of Operation Deny Flight** by broadening the ROE to permit attacks on all elements of the Serb integrated air defense system displaying hostile intent and retaliatory attacks on airfields used to launch no-fly zone violations;

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

Declassified in Part

Per E.O. 13526

RDS 10/01/2013 (AR 70-14)

[281A-0636-M 2-81]

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- issuing **new NATO ultimatums** regarding air strikes to enforce the **exclusion zones**;

-

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(d)

- in order to deprive the Bosnian Serbs of Krajina Serb support, quietly **encouraging Tudjman to maintain the threat of increased Croatian attrition operations against Sectors North and South** (but not to launch a full-scale assault).

In tandem with these steps, we and our Contact Group partners should tell Milosevic the time has come for him to put up or shut up, i.e. that:

- we will **terminate the current sanctions relief** in September if he has not recognized Bosnia and taken visible action to terminate military support for Pale (and Knin);
- moreover, if sanctions relief is terminated and the ICFY mission departs, any resumption of large-scale support for Pale will be met not only by a **tightening of economic sanctions** against the FRY, but by **U.S. or NATO air strikes against key supply routes and military targets, including those inside Serbia.**

Carrots: To bring the Allies along, convince the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate, and manage the Russians, we will need to adapt elements of the Contact Group plan while preserving its essential core (one state, 51:49). This will entail:

- having a **heart-to-heart talk with the Bosnians**, stressing that, in light of the fall of Srebrenica, renewed Western readiness for tougher action (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4(d) (b)(1) they need think more realistically about the shape of a settlement, and agree to at least exploratory Contact Group contacts or proximity talks with Pale;
- in the talks with Pale, advancing **possible modifications to the Contact Group map** consistent with the 51:49 ratio but providing for a more compact and cohesive territory for the Federation (e.g. trading Srebrenica, Zepa and a widening of the Posavina corridor for full Federation control over Sarajevo and additional territory in central Bosnia); consistent with a recent Silajdzic proposal to Juppé, we could state that up to 10 percent of the Contact Group map was subject to renegotiation;
- similarly, **developing the Contact Group's proposed constitutional principles** to show the Serbs the amount of autonomy their republic would have within the Union and the scope of the "parallel special relationship" with Serbia;
- if necessary, pressing the Bosnians to agree that the Serbs can conduct a **referendum on secession after 2-3 years**, as had been agreed in the 1993 *Invincible* package;
- proposing to the Allies and Russians mutual participation in funding a **post-settlement "mini-Marshall Plan" for the Balkans** designed to foster regional economic recovery and integration and thereby give all parties a stake in peace.

At the same time, in conjunction with the threat of terminating sanctions relief for non-compliance, we may want to **increase the rewards offered to Milosevic** for initial positive steps, such as lifting vice suspending phase-one sanctions if he recognizes Bosnia. This could be especially helpful in keeping Moscow on board.

If UNPROFOR withdrawal must occur: If the last-ditch effort to obtain a settlement fails and the RRF fails to restabilize the situation on the ground, we will need to face up to the issue of UNPROFOR withdrawal and implementing a post-withdrawal strategy. (Indeed, it may be preferable to face the issue this year rather than having to implement a messy and protracted NATO withdrawal operation in the middle of the election campaign, when the parties will have every incentive to try to draw us into the conflict.)'

Leveling the playing field: Our post-withdrawal strategy should have as its goal providing the Bosnians with sufficient military capability to survive the immediate Serb onslaught and, within a short period of time, to begin to regain territory allotted to them under the Contact Group proposal. This would make the ultimate resolution of the conflict the result of a balance of power on the ground rather than dependent on the actions of the international community.

- **Our preferred approach would be to lift the arms embargo multilaterally through passage of a UNSC resolution.** This could be made part of the resolution terminating UNPROFOR's mandate and authorizing withdrawal. Our allies have indicated they will go along with lift after UNPROFOR withdrawal. To secure a Russian abstention, we may need to make the lift applicable to all republics of the former Yugoslavia (including Serbia-Montenegro) and/or agree to substantial sanctions relief for Belgrade.

- (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(c), 1.4(d)

While the Bosnians' survival in the short term may require U.S. or NATO air strikes, we would want to set a time limit to any air strike commitment and then restrict our involvement to the provision of arms and training, making clear to the Bosnians that once the playing field is leveled, they are on their own.

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(c), 1.4(d)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(c), 1.4(d)

We would continue to use a mixture of sanctions relief and threats to keep the Serbian border closed and to deter full-scale intervention by Belgrade; but we would tell the Bosnians bluntly that if their offensives went beyond retaking territory on the Contact Group map and provoked Serbian intervention, they should not expect us or NATO to come to their rescue.

Regional containment strategy: As we moved to arm the Bosnians, we would need to take a range of steps to prevent a widening of the conflict to other parts of the region, to include:

- a strong warning of retaliation against Serbia in the event of direct intervention in Bosnia, coupled with sanctions relief to encourage a sealing of the border;
- reinforcing UNPREDEP in Macedonia to prevent Serbian border encroachments and to deter a new crackdown in Kosovo;
- strengthening UNCRO and providing other carrots to Tudjman to prevent a resumption of full-scale war in Krajina (while at the same time encouraging continued low-level attrition operations that could help limit Krajina Serb support to the Bosnian Serbs);
- and possibly deploying preventive peacekeeping forces along Hungary's and Albania's borders with the FRY.

We would, at the same time, intensify our efforts to **sustain the Federation and Bosnian-Croat military cooperation**. And we would make clear that we stand ready to **broker a political settlement and assist in its implementation**, although at this stage we would probably want to set aside the Contact Group approach and devise a basis for a "fresh start" to the negotiations.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
016. paper	re: Bosnia Endgame Strategy [partial] (4 pages)	07/17/1995	P1/b(1), P5

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Alexander Vershbow (European)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995 (Mid-July) [4]

2006-0647-F
jp2105

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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SECRET

July 17, 1995

Sam

BOSNIA ENDGAME STRATEGY

Summary: With the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa, we need to make an all-out effort in the coming weeks to restabilize the situation on the ground, restore UNPROFOR's credibility in Sarajevo, Central Bosnia and possibly Gorazde, and press for a realistic diplomatic settlement this year. If this effort fails, we should move quickly to withdraw UNPROFOR this year and help the Bosnians obtain the military capabilities needed to level the playing field. This would be underpinned during a one-year transition period by air strikes to protect Sarajevo and the other safe areas, reinforced if possible by an UNPROFOR successor force based on a coalition of the willing. Following the transition, the Bosnians would be on their own.

Restabilization post-Srebrenica and Zepa: We have only a few weeks to devise and implement steps to strengthen UNPROFOR and halt the pattern of increasingly aggressive Serb behavior. If we do not change the status quo, the Serbs will move on Gorazde and renew the strangulation of Sarajevo, and the French will likely decide to withdraw -- leading to UNPROFOR's collapse and a protracted NATO withdrawal operation in circumstances that will represent a defeat for the UN and the Alliance. It will also guarantee passage of unilateral lift by the Congress in a manner that will damage relations with our allies.

Our priority is to shore up UNPROFOR in Sarajevo and Central Bosnia by reducing its vulnerability, using the RRF to open secure routes to Sarajevo, and making more aggressive use of NATO air power (under a single key) to halt Serb artillery attacks on the exclusion zones. We should also support reinforcing Gorazde if a feasible approach can be found, recognizing that a U.S. contribution to this effort may be needed to prevent a French decision to pull out. In order for this strategy to succeed, we need to persuade the Bosnian Government that it is in its interest to keep UNPROFOR even if this means writing off Srebrenica and Zepa and concentrating UNPROFOR's efforts in Sarajevo and Central Bosnia. We would also need to be sure, before embarking on steps to reinforce Gorazde, that Bosnian forces will defend the enclave, since even a reinforced UNPROFOR presence is not capable of doing this on its own.

Pressing for a political settlement this year: The best way of avoiding an UNPROFOR withdrawal and the new challenges of a post-withdrawal strategy would be to make an all-out effort at obtaining a political settlement this year. The strengthened UNPROFOR and more aggressive use of NATO air power described above will restore some of the leverage we have lost over the past year vis-à-vis the Bosnian Serbs. But we will also need to offer some new inducements to break the logjam surrounding "acceptance" of the Contact Group plan. The loss of Srebrenica and Zepa may open the way to more realistic territorial solutions, and we will need to have a heart-to-heart discussion with the Bosnians to urge greater flexibility on the map, constitutional arrangements, and possibly the Bosnian Serbs' right to secede from the Union after an initial period. We will also need to sweeten our offers to Milosevic in order to encourage him to put real pressure on the Bosnian Serbs. At Annex I is a more detailed gameplan for an early diplomatic breakthrough.

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Supporting Bosnia's Survival post-UNPROFOR: If the last-ditch effort to obtain a settlement fails and/or we fail to restabilize the situation on the ground, we will need to face up to the issue of UNPROFOR withdrawal and implementing a post-withdrawal strategy. Indeed, it would be preferable to face these issues this year rather than having to implement a messy and protracted

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[2013-0656-M, 2-82]

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NATO withdrawal operation in the middle of the election campaign, when the parties will have an even greater incentive to embarrass us or try to draw us into the conflict. **We should begin consulting with our key Allies now on our post-withdrawal strategy** in order to bolster their resolve to strengthen UNPROFOR in the short term, and to force them to face up to their responsibility to help support Bosnia's survival if withdrawal must occur.

Leveling the playing field: Our post-withdrawal strategy should have as its goal providing the Bosnians with sufficient military capability to survive the immediate Serb onslaught, consolidate their authority over Sarajevo and Central Bosnia and, within a short period of time, to begin to regain territory allotted to them under the Contact Group proposal. This would make the ultimate resolution of the conflict the result of a balance of power on the ground rather than dependent on the actions of the international community.

- **Our preferred approach would be to lift the arms embargo multilaterally through passage of a UNSC resolution**, perhaps part of the same resolution terminating UNPROFOR's mandate and authorizing withdrawal. Our allies have indicated they will go along with lift after UNPROFOR withdrawal. To secure a Russian abstention, we may need to make the lift applicable to all republics of the former Yugoslavia (including Serbia-Montenegro) and/or agree to substantial sanctions relief for Belgrade. *we must*

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(c), 1.4(d)

Additional Support during the Transition: Although the Bosnians are stronger now than when we first pushed lift-and-strike in 1993, until they acquire and assimilate new arms, they will still need additional support to survive the Serbs' preemptive offensives. At a minimum, we will need to help the Bosnians ensure the survival of Sarajevo as the linchpin of a future Bosnian state. Therefore, for a one-year transition period, we would:

- Press our NATO Allies to **continue enforcing the no-fly zone**, to deprive the Serbs of air superiority (this would, of course, require preemptive SEAD);
- **Conduct aggressive air strikes against a broad range of Bosnian Serb military targets to protect Sarajevo (and possibly the other remaining safe areas) against Serb artillery attacks.** This would preferably be done through NATO or, if our allies refused to renew the NATO mandate post-UNPROFOR, through a U.S.-led coalition of the willing. The air strikes would be based on new UNSC authority (since existing authority under 836 and 844 is tied to UNPROFOR) or, as a fallback, on a Bosnian Government request for collective self-defense. Forward air controllers would be provided by the Bosnians or by members of the UNPROFOR successor force, if available (see below). We would limit the commitment to Sarajevo and possibly the other safe areas to avoid becoming full-scale combatants; in any case, Bosnian ground forces, with HVO cooperation, can hold their own in Central Bosnia. ?

- Support the deployment of a successor force to UNPROFOR to reinforce the Bosnians' hold on Sarajevo and the other safe areas, and to continue to promote stability in Federation-controlled areas of Central Bosnia. Such a force would be a coalition of the willing composed of those UNPROFOR contributors willing to remain plus new forces from Islamic countries. If possible, the force would be deployed under a Chapter VII UN mandate with the explicit mission of supporting Bosnia against Serb aggression. Otherwise, the force would deploy at the request of the Bosnian Government. (The humiliating prospect of Islamic countries taking the place of European countries in solving a European problem could prompt some of our Allies to stay and participate in the successor force.)

We would set a time limit of one year (the end of 1996) on the NFZ and air strike commitments and on the mandate of the successor force, making clear to the Bosnians that once the playing field is leveled, they are on their own. In addition to providing arms and training to reinforce their ground force capabilities, we would ensure they obtained effective air defenses to counter Bosnian Serb air capabilities when the NFZ lapsed. [redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(c), 1.4(d)

[redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(c), 1.4(d)

Keeping Belgrade Out: Leveling the playing field becomes a much more formidable challenge if Belgrade intervenes on a large scale in support the Bosnian Serbs. We would offer **substantial sanctions relief to induce Milosevic to stay out, seal the border and accept a much larger international monitoring force.** We would at the same time warn Milosevic that, if we detect Serbian military support, we will use air power against Serbian forces operating inside Bosnia and against the Drina bridges and other supply routes, and that we do not rule out strikes against military targets inside Serbia. wlor
w.c.

Regional containment strategy: As we moved to arm the Bosnians, we would need to take a range of steps to prevent a widening of the conflict to other parts of the region, to include:

- Reinforcing UNPREDEP in Macedonia to deter Serbian border encroachments and a new crackdown in Kosovo, together with a reaffirmation of our warnings to Milosevic regarding air strikes against Serbia in the event he provokes armed conflict in Kosovo;
 - Strengthening UNCRO and providing increased economic assistance to Croatia to discourage Tudjman from launching a full-scale war in Krajina in the near term (while at the same time encouraging continued low-level attrition operations that could help limit Krajina Serb support to the Bosnian Serbs); and
 - Possibly deploying preventive peacekeeping forces along Hungary's and Albania's borders with the FRY.
- CROATIA
Ser

We would, at the same time, intensify our efforts to sustain the Federation and Bosnian-Croat military cooperation. And we would make clear that we stand ready to broker a political settlement and assist in its implementation, although at this stage we would jettison the Contact Group approach and devise a new basis for the negotiations.

Annex I: Gameplan for a Diplomatic Breakthrough in 1995

To achieve an agreement this year that reflects the changing strategic realities, we will need to adapt elements of the Contact Group plan while preserving its essential core as the starting point.

- We would begin with a **heart-to-heart talk with the Bosnians**, stressing that, in light of the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa and renewed Western readiness for tougher action, they need think more realistically about the shape of a settlement. They also need to bend in their demand that the Serbs "accept" the Contact Group plan as the "starting point" and agree to at least exploratory Contact Group contacts or proximity talks with Pale.
- In talks with Pale, we would float **possible modifications to the Contact Group map**. At the outset, these would preserve the 51:49 ratio, but provide for a more compact and cohesive territory for the Federation (e.g. trading Srebrenica, Zepa and a widening of the Posavina corridor for full Federation control over Sarajevo and additional territory in central Bosnia). Consistent with a recent Silajdzic proposal to Juppé, we could state that up to 10 percent of the Contact Group map was subject to renegotiation.
- Ultimately, **we should be prepared to press the Bosnians to accept less than 51%** if they can obtain higher-quality territory and more defensible frontiers for the Federation in Central Bosnia.
- We would, similarly, **develop the Contact Group's proposed constitutional principles** to show the Serbs the amount of autonomy their republic would have within the Union and the scope of the "parallel special relationship" with Serbia.
- If necessary, we would press the Bosnians to agree that the Serbs can conduct a **referendum on secession after 2-3 years**, as had been agreed in the 1993 *Invincible* package. We would argue that, if the Bosnians cannot persuade the Serb population that their best future lies in reintegration, there is no point in blocking the *peaceful* separation of the Union along the lines of the Czechoslovak model.
- We would propose to the Allies and Russians mutual participation in funding a **post-settlement "mini-Marshall Plan" for the Balkans** designed to foster regional economic recovery and integration and thereby give all parties a stake in peace.

In tandem with these steps, we and our Contact Group partners should tell Milosevic the time has come for him to put up or shut up, i.e. that:

- We will terminate the current sanctions relief in September if he has not recognized Bosnia and taken visible action to terminate military support for Pale (and Knin);
- Moreover, if sanctions relief is terminated and the ICFY mission departs, any resumption of large-scale support for Pale will be met not only by a tightening of economic sanctions against the FRY, but by U.S. or NATO air strikes against the Drina bridges and key supply routes.
- At the same time, in conjunction with the threat of terminating sanctions relief for non-compliance, we would **increase the rewards offered to Milosevic for initial positive steps**, such as lifting vice suspending phase-one sanctions if he recognizes Bosnia.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	John Feeley, Jr. to James Steinberg; re: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia War Criminals (1 page)	01/22/1997	P1/b(1)
001b. memo	Andrew Sens to Leon Fuerth et al; re: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting (1 page)	01/17/1997	P1/b(1)
001c. paper	re: Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee (1 page)	01/17/1997	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	John Feeley, Jr. to James Steinberg; re: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia War Criminals (1 page)	01/22/1997	P1/b(1)
002b. memo	Andrew Sens to Leon Fuerth et al; re: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia War Criminals (1 page)	01/17/1997	P1/b(1)
002c. paper	re: Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee (2 pages)	01/17/1997	P1/b(1)
003. paper	re: Modalities for Consultations with Potential Partners & NATO [partial] (2 pages)	01/17/1997	P1/b(1) <i>re 3/3/2020</i>
004. paper	re: Deputies Committee on Bosnia War Criminals (2 pages)	01/17/1997	P1/b(1), P5
005a. memo	John Feeley, Jr. to James Steinberg; re: January 17 Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (4 pages)	01/16/1997	P1/b(1), P5
005b. agenda	re: NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	01/17/1997	P1/b(1)
005c. paper	re: Multinational Organization & Command & Control Structure (6 pages)	01/16/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Alexander Vershbow (European)
 OA/Box Number: 1076

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - War Crimes, January 1997 [1]

2006-0647-F
 ip2130

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005d. paper	re: General Concept of Operations for Support to ICTY (15 pages)	01/16/1997	P1/b(1), P5
005e. paper	re: Discussion Paper - Projects (9 pages)	01/16/1997	P1/b(1)
006. agenda	re: NSC Deputies Committee on Bosnia (1 page)	01/15/1997	P1/b(1)
007a. memo	Andrew Sens to William Burns; re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between POTUS & German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (1 page)	01/13/1997	P1/b(1) v2 3/3/2020
007b. telcon	Telephone Conversation Between POTUS & German Chancellor Helmut Kohl; re: Boris Yeltsin & NATO Enlargement (4 pages)	01/06/1997	P1/b(1) v2 3/3/2020

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Alexander Vershbow (European)
 OA/Box Number: 1076

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - War Crimes, January 1997 [1]

2006-0647-F
 jp2130

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. paper	re: Modalities for Consultations with Potential Partners & NATO [partial] (2 pages)	01/17/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Alexander Vershbow (European)
OA/Box Number: 1076

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - War Crimes, January 1997 [1]

2006-0647-F
jp2130

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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**MODALITIES FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH
POTENTIAL PARTNERS AND NATO**

1. Background

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

2. Precedence and Scope of Consultations

If possible, we should conduct consultations with the 3.3(b)(6) at least at the level of Political Director, and we should meet with CINCEUR General Joulwan and Secretary General Solana. The exact timing and precedence of these meetings will depend on the availability of the principals with whom we intend to meet.

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

3. Composition of the Team

The team should be composed of an inter-agency group led by the State Department and consisting of senior members of OSD, JCS, and the Department of Justice. Participation of members of the NSC is at their prerogative.

4. Timing

The Deputies have urged that consultations began at the earliest opportunity. Given the Inauguration next week and the preparation necessary to ensure attendance by appropriate officials, the earliest feasible window for beginning consultations is Thursday, 23 January. It will be necessary to plan for approximately one day each in (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

Declassified in Part

Per E.O. 13526

VZ 11/05/2019 (3.29)

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CONSULTATIONS WITH OPERATIONAL PARTNERS AND NATO

Terms of Reference

- **Multinational Coalition, not unilateral.** If a decision is made for the United States to participate in this operation, the apprehension operation should be undertaken by a small coalition of nations, [redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) [redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) The organizational structure would be based on a model of a Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force (CJIATF), which is similar to what has been used in counter-drug operations.
- **Operational Composition.** Participating nations will likely provide a mix of national personnel to staff the operation and provide support elements. Investigative and apprehension teams may consist of a combination of military, intelligence, law enforcement, and/or special operations personnel depending on the nation and its designated contributions.
- **Only suspects in areas under international military control.** For political, legal, and security reasons, the territorial scope of the apprehension operation will be limited to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Eastern Slavonia.
- **Targets are indictees other than Karadzic and Mladic.** A preliminary list of indictees has been developed, which categorize indictees according to several different criteria. For operational reasons a likely target set of 12 to 20 indictees will be developed in conjunction with ICTY's priorities for prosecution.
- **SFOR will provide support.** SFOR will not participate directly in the apprehension phase of the operation, but will provide support such as area security, emergency evacuation, communications, logistics, and transport of indictees to The Hague.
- **Phases of the Operation.** The operation will be divided into four basic phases: 1) Development of detailed operational plans and actionable information on indictees; 2) Tracking/monitoring of indictees; 3) Apprehension of indictees; and 4) Post-operational assessment and force protection.
- **Consultations with Allies and Partners.** This operation is dependent on gaining the cooperation and active participation of various international organizations and potential operational partners. Consultations of varying degrees would be required with: 1) Participating operational partners; 2) the International Tribunal; 3) NATO military and civilian leadership; 4) other nations and international organizations; and 5) the Government of Bosnia.


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

January 13, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the
President and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Chancellor Kohl is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our embassy in Bonn for the Char é only. (C)



Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Telcon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Andrew D. Sens
Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 1/9/07

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017
By 12 NARA, Date 11/5/2015

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Helmut Kohl

Interpreter: Gisela Marcuse
Notetakers: Katherine O'Loughlin, Peter Huggins, Lyle Harrison, Larry Wright, Marianna Papadimitriou, John Schmidt, Steve Pifer and Dan Fried

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: January 6, 1997, 1110 - 1133 a.m. EST
The Oval Office

The President: Hello? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: Bill, hello. How are you? (U)

The President: I'm fine. It's good to hear your voice. How are you? (U)

Chancellor Kohl: I'm doing well. I have started work. I was at home for a few days over Christmas. I was thinking about a few things and wrote a few of them down. I spent lots of time in the woods. For the first time in many years, we have had a hard winter on the Rhine, lots of snow, with low temperatures of about -5 or -6 degrees centigrade. I hope soon that you will have completed setting up your new government. I hope all works out well. I have been looking at a few things for the new year, and I believe this will be a very important year for all of us, with the developments in the former Yugoslavia, for example, the question of NATO enlargement, and a number of developments in Asia that are of interest to all of us. It is a wise idea that you will embark on direct, high-level talks with the Chinese leadership. (c)

The purpose of my call is to give you a first-hand report on my conversation with Boris Yeltsin. Per my request, we met at a place outside of Moscow, to avoid the protocol paraphernalia in

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on 1/8/07

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By 2 NARA Date 11/5/2015

2013-0656-m (3,44)

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the Kremlin. We were quite alone. It was basically a one-on-one meeting with just two notetakers and interpreters present. I wanted to give you my impressions right away. I believe Yeltsin has come through the operation well, but basically his general shape is certainly not good at all. I would like to word this very carefully. The Boris Yeltsin that was around last year from January to May, for example, was a quite different person from the Yeltsin we see today. There is virtually nothing left of his vitality, and also his tendency to show his physical strength, to overpower people with his physical presence, is diminished. As far as his mental state is concerned, he has all his faculties. He still has a very good memory. He still reacts logically and his remarks are to the point, but he is much stiffer in his performance. He is more static and he seems to have slowed down significantly. We all saw him and I believe you saw him on TV. He seems to be very rigid, his face is very mask-like. But there are no signs that he has resigned himself to his fate or become despondent. He is very determined to do his job, but won't be able to do it at the same speed as before. This may change, since he is still in a period of convalescence. He may improve over time. He also had a bad cold which may have slowed him down, but it may also be that this is the Boris Yeltsin we will continue to see. Though this may seem blunt or brutal, but we are well advised to use this new year, 1997, to the best of our ability, and he himself wants to make the best use of his time. (C)-

Of all the issues we discussed, there are three of particular interest to you. They quite evidently are going to continue to improve their relations with the People's Republic of China, and he expects a visit from the President of China soon and Prime Minister Li Peng was already there. Another thing is the relationship with Iran. I asked personal questions quite specifically and he answered that they are not selling the Iranians any sort of nuclear or modern, he underlined modern, weapons technology. But for them the overriding argument is that in the neighboring republics, fundamentalism is on the rise. They are quite worried about it and want to play the Iranian card against it. On economics, it is quite evident they have made great strides against inflation, but on jobs there is still stagnation. He claims, and I don't know, I am not a judge, that he will be able in the next few weeks to pay pensions to the elderly and soldiers' pay to members of the armed forces. (C)-

Regarding NATO enlargement, I put it to him quite clearly and unequivocally that he has no veto powers, but that this is something we all want to bring about together. His position was quite clear; he is against it. He thinks it is unnecessary and fraught with enormous psychological problems. He is afraid that a new cold war is imminent and that people won't understand it.

My impression is that we would be able to bring this about if we try to come to an agreement with him personally. I do not believe we will be successful if we do this through normal, official channels. This is obviously something we have to try to do anyway. ~~(C)~~

What I believe, however, is that it would be desirable for us -- for you, me, Jacques Chirac and John Major -- to have direct, bilateral talks with him and formulate one line of argument that will convince him. This would be, as I see it, an agreed position and a concerted effort by all of us. We should try to put this forward as soon as possible, and if possible, engage in this kind of dialogue before we enter negotiations leading to the accession of new members. So, if we want to stick to the agreement that has been set -- namely, the date of the NATO meeting this summer (because delaying would cause great irritation in prospective members, in Poland, Hungary and others) -- we need to come up with fresh ideas of what we can do as soon as possible. Now as I understand it, you will receive him as your guest in March or April? ~~(C)~~

The President: Yes, that's right. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: That is why I believe we should make the best possible use of our time before then. My greatest fear is that if it is handled only in official channels, we will fail. I would like to ask you who's in charge of this - Strobe Talbott? Because if he is, I ask that he come here as soon as possible before his planned visit to Moscow. I would really love to talk to him directly before that, if he is indeed the man responsible. ~~(C)~~

The President: First, let me say, that I am basically encouraged by what you have said. Strobe Talbott will represent us on this issue. I understand we cannot work through the normal NATO bureaucracy. I will have Strobe talk with Bitterlich today to work this on a personal basis. I will send Strobe to Bonn before Moscow and he can represent me and Madeleine Albright. You are right, we need to have a coordinated, diplomatic effort. So I believe that if you, me, John and Jacques can come up with a united approach to present to Boris and a creative position -- one that is based on no Russian veto, no slowdown of the process, no explicit exclusion of anyone, and no compromise of NATO decision-making -- I think we will be all right. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: What I am most interested in, Bill, so as not to be misunderstood, is that Strobe Talbott come here as soon as possible, and not just when he is en route to Moscow. Because I think it would be important to have him here to have a good,

lengthy conversation about these issues, and then go back and talk to you, before going to Moscow. ~~(C)~~

The President: I agree with that. He can go this week or next week. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: He can talk to Bitterlich and work out the details and then we can talk again. I believe you understood me that we need to make the best possible use of our time right now. I am not a member of the medical community or a prophet, but I think time is running out. ~~(C)~~

The President: Let me say two things. I agree we have to make the most of our time and I will have Strobe come over there. The second thing is, I have had a lot of friends who have had the same operation Boris had. My father-in-law had it as well. The typical experience is that after the operation, there is a period of psychological slowness or even depression for a few months, but usually within six months people are performing at a higher level of efficiency and in a better frame of mind than a couple of years before the operation. It is too soon to draw conclusions. Boris may rebound not just physically but psychologically as well, and be better than before the operation. It is too soon to tell. We have to see how it goes. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: That may well be, but unfortunately, we do not know for sure. ~~(C)~~

The President: You're right, we have to make the most of every day. I'm not like you, I can only stay in office for eight years. I can't stay for 18 or 20 years. I can't keep up with Bismarck or Adenauer like you can, so I have to work hard every day and make the most of it. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: Very well, thank you. We will welcome Strobe Talbott soon. ~~(C)~~

The President: Thank you. He will be there soon. Give my best to Hannelore. Bye-bye. ~~(C)~~

Chancellor Kohl: Bye-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. fax cover sheet	[Personally Identifiable Information] [partial] (1 page)	01/13/1997	P1/b(1)
001b. memo	Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (S&R) to Alexander Vershbow et al; re: Access List Update (3 pages)	01/13/1997	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	Andrew Sens to Leon Fuerth et al; re: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia War Criminals (1 page)	01/13/1997	P1/b(1)
002b. paper	re: Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee (3 pages)	01/09/1997	P1/b(1)
003a. memo	Alexander Vershbow to Samuel Berger; re: Bosnia War Crimes [partial] (1 page)	01/13/1997	P1/b(1) v2 3/3/2020
003b. memo	Andrew Sens to William Burns et al; re: Bosnia War Crimes [partial] (1 page)	01/14/1997	P1/b(1) v2 3/3/2020
003c. memo	Samuel Berger to The Secretary of State et al; re: Bosnia War Crimes [partial] (1 page)	01/14/1997	P1/b(1) v2 3/3/2020
003d. paper	re: Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee (3 pages)	01/09/1997	P1/b(1)
004. paper	re: Discussions Paper - Projects (9 pages)	01/16/1997	P1/b(1)
005. paper	re: Multinational Organization & Command & Control Structure (6 pages)	01/16/1997	P1/b(1)
006. paper	re: General Concept of Operations for Support to ICTY (15 pages)	01/16/1997	P1/b(1), P5-

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Alexander Vershbow (European)
OA/Box Number: 1076

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - War Crimes, January 1997 [2]

2006-0647-F

jp2131

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. memo	Daniel Seikaly to Andy Blair; re: Revised Concept of Operations (4 pages)	01/15/1997	P1/b(1), P5
008. paper	re: How We Get Actionable Intelligence (6 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1)
009. paper	re: Apprehension of War Criminals - Issues for Principals (5 pages)	01/10/1997	P1/b(1), P5

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Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Alexander Vershbow (European)
 OA/Box Number: 1076

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - War Crimes, January 1997 [2]

2006-0647-F
 jp2131

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	Alexander Vershbow to Samuel Berger; re: Bosnia War Crimes [partial] (1 page)	01/13/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Alexander Vershbow (European)
OA/Box Number: 1076

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - War Crimes, January 1997 [2]

2006-0647-F

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RESTRICTION CODES

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C. 20504

January 13, 1997


ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: JAMES STEINBERG 

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHOBOR 

SUBJECT: Bosnia War Crimes -- EO 13526 1.4c



Per your luncheon on Friday with Secretaries Christopher and Perry, we have prepared the attached memorandum to them and other Principals involved in this issue endorsing the Deputies' conclusions on a possible operation to support the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in apprehending indicted war criminals and authorizing initiation of consultations with Allies on the concept.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign attached memorandum at Tab A and authorize Andy Sens to transmit memorandum to agency counterparts.

Approve @ Disapprove

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to Agencies
- Tab A Memorandum to Principals
- Tab B Summary of Conclusions of January 9 Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia War Crimes

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 11/05/2019 (3.48)
2013-0656-M

~~SECRET~~ EO 13526 1.4c

Reason: 1.5 (a,c,d)
Declassify On: 1.6 X1, X4

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003b. memo	Andrew Sens to William Burns et al; re: Bosnia War Crimes [partial] (1 page)	01/14/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Alexander Vershbow (European)
OA/Box Number: 1076

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - War Crimes, January 1997 [2]

2006-0647-F

jp2131

RESTRICTION CODES

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

January 14, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. LEON PANETTA
Chief of Staff to the
President

COL. JAMES N. MATTIS
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. JAMES G. MCADAMS, III
Counsel for Intelligence Policy
Department of Justice

COL. F. C. WILSON, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Bosnia War Crimes - EO 13526 1.4c

Please forward the attached memorandum from Samuel R. Berger to Principals. It should be handled via EO 13526 1.4c channels.



Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachments

- Tab A Memorandum from Samuel R. Berger to Agency Heads
- Tab B Summary of Conclusions of January 9 Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia War Crimes

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 11/05/2019 (3.48a)
2013-0656-M

~~SECRET~~ - EO 13526 1.4c

Classified by: Andrew Sens
Reason: 1.5 (a,c,d)
Declassify On: 1.6 X1, X4

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003c. memo	Samuel Berger to The Secretary of State et al; re: Bosnia War Crimes [partial] (1 page)	01/14/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Alexander Vershbow (European)
OA/Box Number: 1076

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - War Crimes, January 1997 [2]

2006-0647-F

jp2131

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 14, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Bosnia War Crimes -- EO 13526 1.4c

As you know, the NSC Deputies Committee met on January 9 and made recommendations on next steps in our planning for a possible operation to support the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in apprehending indicted war criminals in Bosnia (see Summary of Conclusions, attached).

Deputies agreed that, before Principals can make a decision on the concept of operations and its implementation, we need to consult with other potential participants and conduct more detailed planning, including on the mix of civilian and military resources to be deployed in conducting investigations and arrests.

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

Based on discussions with Warren Christopher and Bill Perry, I believe there is general agreement that, on basis of the Deputies' conclusions, the Departments of State and Defense should move ahead with consultations with third countries on the concept of operations and with USCINCEUR, General Joulwan and NATO Secretary General Solana to seek their commitment to the planning effort. This consultation should proceed with the understanding that we have made no decision to participate. Principals should meet when these consultations are completed and a more detailed plan for the proposed operation has been prepared for final review and submission to the President for his approval.


Samuel R. Berger

Acting Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Attachment Summary of Conclusions of January 9 Deputies
Committee Meeting on Bosnia War Crimes

SECRET - EO 13526 1.4c

Reason: 1.5 (a, c, d)

Declassify On: 1.6 X1, X4

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7-11-96

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. fax cover sheet	Chuck English to Sandy Vershbow et al; re: Cable from London (2 pages)	01/10/1997	P1/b(1)
001b. cable	American Embassy, London to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C.; re: Bosnia - War Criminals (1 page)	01/10/1997	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	John Feeley, Jr. to James Steinberg; re: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia War Criminals (1 page)	01/09/1997	P1/b(1) v 3/3/2020
002b. memo	Andrew Sens to Leon Fuerth et al; re: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia War Criminals (1 page)	01/09/1997	P1/b(1) v 3/3/2020
002c. paper	re: Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of NSC Deputies Committee (2 pages)	01/09/1997	P1/b(1)
003. memo	John Feeley, Jr. & Nicholas Dowling to Jim Steinberg; re: January 9 Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (6 pages)	01/08/1997	P1/b(1), P5
004. paper	re: Apprehension of War Criminals - Issues for Deputies (3 pages)	01/08/1996	P1/b(1)
005. report	re: Plans to Support the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia - For the Joint Interagency Task Force - Bosnia (16 pages)	01/08/1997	P1/b(1), P5
006. paper	re: Multinational Organization & Command & Control (4 pages)	01/02/1997	P1/b(1)
007a. list	re: International and Domestic Legal Authorities [partial] (2 pages)	01/08/1997	P1/b(1) v 3/3/2020
007b. paper	re: International Authorities [partial] (5 pages)	01/08/1997	P1/b(1), P5 v 3/3/2020

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Bosnia - War Crimes, January 1997 [3]

2006-0647-F
jp2132

RESTRICTION CODES

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007c. memo	The Deputy Attorney General to the National Security Advisor; re: Apprehension of War Criminals in Bosnia [partial] (4 pages)	01/08/1997	P1/b(1), P5 vL 3/3/2020
007d. paper	re: Preliminary Legal Analysis of Proposed Support to ICTY [partial] (2 pages)	01/08/1997	P1/b(1), P5 vL 3/3/2020
007e. paper	re: Authority for Assistance to ICTY (4 pages)	01/08/1997	P1/b(1), P5
007f. paper	re: Role of USG Personnel with ICTY - Issues for Decisions by the Deputies (4 pages)	01/07/1996	P1/b(1), P5
008a. paper	re: Intelligence & Database on Indictees (2 pages)	01/07/1997	P1/b(1), P5
008b. memo	re: War Crimes (11 pages)	12/27/1996	P1/b(1)
009. paper	re: Training, Military Support, & Logistics (3 pages)	01/08/1997	P1/b(1)
010. paper	re: Personnel & Resources Requirements (3 pages)	01/08/1997	P1/b(1)
011. report	re: Risk Analysis - War Criminals (6 pages)	01/08/1997	P1/b(1)
012. paper	re: Implementation of Brcko Arbitral Decision (3 pages)	01/06/1997	P1/b(1), P5
013. paper	re: Strategy for Facilitating the Return of Bosnian Refugees (11 pages)	08/28/1996	P1/b(1), P5
014. paper	re: Managing Muslim Returns to the Zone of Separation - Discussion Paper for Principals (6 pages)	12/13/1996	P1/b(1), P5 vL 3/3/2020

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Alexander Vershbow (European)
OA/Box Number: 1076

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - War Crimes, January 1997 [3]

2006-0647-F

jp2132

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.


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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C. 20504

January 9, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES STEINBERG



THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

FROM: JOHN F. FEELEY, JR *JFF*

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for the Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia War Criminals, January 9, 1997

Attached at Tab A is the Summary of Conclusions from the Deputies Committee meeting on Bosnia War Criminals that was held on January 9, 1997.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Andrew Sens to sign the memo to the agencies.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to the Agencies
- Tab A Summary of Conclusions

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

AMB. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the Representative
of the U.S. to the United
Nations

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

COL. JAMES N. MATTIS
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. F. C. WILSON, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

MR. JAMES G. MCADAMS, III
Counsel for Intelligence
Policy
Department of Justice

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions, Deputies Committee Meeting
on Bosnia War Criminals, January 9, 1997

Please pass to Deputies the Summary of Conclusions attached at
Tab A. It should be handled in EO 13526 1.4c channels. (S)

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007a. list	re: International and Domestic Legal Authorities [partial] (2 pages)	01/08/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Alexander Vershbow (European)
OA/Box Number: 1076

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - War Crimes, January 1997 [3]

2006-0647-F
jp2132

RESTRICTION CODES

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8 Jan. 1997

Annex 2:

· International and Domestic Legal Authorities

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 11/05/2019 (3.77)
2013-0656-M

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ANNEX 2: LEGAL AUTHORITIES

There are two basic categories of legal authorities which are germane to this operation:
1) Authority to act internationally; and 2) authority to task U.S. law enforcement agencies to support this mission. In addition, the issue of the ability to continue to supply the Tribunal with U.S. personnel on a seconded basis bears on the potential viability and success of this plan. Therefore, the Legal Authorities annex is divided into three Parts:

- Part I: International Authorities
- Part II: Legal Analysis of U.S. Domestic Issues
- Part III: Role of USG Personnel with ICTY

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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007b. paper

re: International Authorities [partial] (5 pages)

01/08/1997

P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Alexander Vershbow (European)
OA/Box Number: 1076

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - War Crimes, January 1997 [3]

2006-0647-F
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Part I: International Authorities**A. Traditional Authority**

The traditional authority for the arrest of an individual is established by the laws of the State in which the individual is found (the "Host State"); in the absence of consent by the Host State, an arrest not authorized under the laws of the Host State is generally considered to be a breach of the Host State's territorial integrity and, accordingly of the UN Charter and customary international law. Exceptions to this general proposition exist for actions taken by another State in self-defense and actions taken pursuant to the authorization of the United Nations Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. There is no apparent self-defense rationale for U.S. action in the current circumstances, although a change in circumstances could provide such a rationale. Consent and the authority provided by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII are discussed below.

B. Authority Derived from UN Security Council Decisions

In Resolution 827 (1993), the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, established the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and adopted its Statute. Paragraph 4 of Resolution 827 provided that:

"Decides that all States shall cooperate fully with the International Tribunal and its organs in accordance with the present resolution and the Statute of the International Tribunal and that consequently all States shall take any measures necessary under their domestic law to implement the provisions of the present resolution and the Statute, including the obligation of States to comply with requests for assistance or orders issued by a Trial Chamber under Article 29 of the Statute"

Article 29 of the Statute provides that:

- "1. States shall cooperate with the International Tribunal in the investigation and prosecution of persons accused of committing serious violations of international humanitarian law.
2. States shall comply without undue delay with any request for assistance or an order issued by a Trial Chamber, including, but not limited to:
 - ... (d) the arrest and detention of persons;
 - (e) the surrender or the transfer of the accused to the International Tribunal."

Because the Security Council was acting under Chapter VII in establishing the Tribunal and adopting its Statute, the obligations stated in Paragraph 4 of the Resolution, as well as those set forth in Article 29 and elsewhere in the Statute, are binding on all States. Failure of a State to cooperate fully with the Tribunal and its organs, or to comply without undue delay with an order issued by a Trial

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Chamber, constitutes a breach of the State's international legal obligations. As long as the Tribunal and its organs act within the limits to the powers granted to them by the Security Council in the Statute, the obligations that they impose on States constitute binding legal obligations that supersede other international legal obligations of the States.

The Security Council has reaffirmed the obligation of States to cooperate with the Tribunal on several occasions subsequent to its consideration of Resolution 827. In resolution 1031 (1995), of December 15, 1995, for example, the Council, again acting under Chapter VII, decided as follows:

"4. Reaffirms its resolutions concerning compliance with international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia, reaffirms also that all States shall cooperate fully with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and its organs in accordance with the provisions of Resolution 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993 and the Statute of the International Tribunal, and shall comply with requests for assistance or orders issued by a Trial Chamber under Article 29 of the Statute, and calls upon them to allow the establishment of offices of the Tribunal"

As recently as Resolution 1088 (1996) of December 12, 1996, the Council, again acting under Chapter VII, reaffirmed its support of ICTY:

"Reminds the parties that, in accordance with the Peace Agreement, they have committed themselves to cooperate fully with all entities involved in the implementation of this peace settlement, or which are otherwise authorized by the Security Council, including the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, as it carries out its responsibilities for dispensing justice impartially, and underlines that full cooperation by States and entities with the International Tribunal includes, *inter alia*, the surrender for trial of all persons indicted by the Tribunal and provision of information to assist in Tribunal investigations"

C. Authority Derived from the ICTY Statute and Rules

Article 19, Paragraph 2 of the ICTY Statute authorizes a Judge of the Tribunal to "issue such orders and warrants for the arrest, detention, surrender, or transfer of persons, and any other orders as may be required for the conduct of the trial." The Tribunal Rules provide alternative mechanisms for the arrest of indicted persons.

The arrest procedure established by Rules 55 through 59 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunal ("the Rules") relies upon the traditional role for the Host State in the arrest of an indicted person within its borders,

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modified in this case, by the fact that the Host State has a binding international legal obligation to execute the Tribunal's arrest warrant. Rule 55 provides that:

“A warrant for the arrest of the accused and his surrender to the Tribunal shall be transmitted by the Registrar to the national authorities of the State in whose territory or under whose jurisdiction or control the accused resides, or was last known to be, together with instructions that at the time of arrest the indictment and the statement of the rights of the accused be read to him in language he understands and that he be cautioned in that language.”

The fact that the obligation of the Host State to execute the warrants is a binding one is reflected in Rule 56, which implements Article 29 of the Statute. Rule 56 provides that:

“The State to which a warrant of arrest is transmitted shall act promptly and with all due diligence to ensure proper and effective execution thereof, in accordance with Article 29 of the Statute.”

Notwithstanding their obligations to do so, however, while Host States have executed arrest warrants in some cases, in most cases they have not done so, and the vast majority of persons indicted by the Tribunal remain at large.

In the absence of Host State execution of ICTY arrest warrants, the Tribunal has created an alternative process in implementation of Article 19, which is set forth in Article 59 *bis* of the Rules. Article 59 *bis* (A) provides that:

“Notwithstanding Rules 55 to 59, on the order of a Judge, the Registrar shall transmit to an appropriate authority or international body or the Prosecutor a copy of a warrant for the arrest of an accused, on such terms as the Judge may determine together with an order for his prompt transfer to the Tribunal in the event that he be taken into custody by that authority, international body or the Prosecutor.”

Under Rule 59 *bis*, a Tribunal Judge may issue a warrant for the arrest of an indicted person and direct that warrant, not to the Host State, but to “an appropriate authority or international body or the Prosecutor,” on such terms as the Judge may determine. Pursuant to Rule 59 *bis*, therefore, an “international body,” such as SFOR, or another organ of the Tribunal, the Prosecutor, may be authorized by a Tribunal Judge to execute an arrest warrant against an indicted person. Under the Rule, the warrant itself is to set forth the terms upon which such an arrest will be undertaken. Once such a warrant is issued, the international body or the Prosecutor will be authorized, subject to the terms set forth in the warrant, to arrest the accused.

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The terms of a warrant addressed to the Prosecutor under Rule 59 *bis* could include a provision concerning the assistance of States in executing the arrest. Such assistance would have a basis both in Article 29 of the Statute, quoted above, and in paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 827, which provides:

“Urges States and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to contribute funds, equipment and services to the International Tribunal, including the offer of expert personnel.”

Because Rule 59 *bis* implements Article 19 of the Statute, which, as discussed above, was adopted by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII and thus constitutes superseding international legal authority binding on all States, actions undertaken by an international body or the Prosecutor pursuant to warrants issued under Rule 59 *bis* are authorized under international law and thus do not require the consent of the Host State.

D. Consent

While, for reasons noted above, arrests carried out by international bodies or the Prosecutor pursuant to a warrant issued under Rule 59 *bis* would not require Host State consent under international law, there is a basis for taking the position that one or more of the States of the former Yugoslavia have, in fact, consented to such arrests.

The Dayton Peace Accords constitute one source of such consent. In Article IX of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, signed by representatives of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in Paris on December 14, 1995, the Parties undertook to:

“cooperate fully with all entities ... which are ... authorized by the United Nations Security Council, pursuant to the obligation of all Parties to cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law.”

Article X of Annex 1-A, the Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement, signed by representatives of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republika Srpska, and endorsed by representatives of the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, provides that:

“The Parties shall cooperate with all entities involved in implementation of this peace settlement, as described in the General Framework Agreement, or which are otherwise authorized by the United Nations

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Security Council, including the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.”

With respect to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, an additional basis for consent is found in its Government’s December 1995 pronouncement that:

“With regard to the arrest warrants of the international war crimes Tribunal in the Hague concerning the citizens of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina we agree that these tasks be performed along with our police force also by members of IFOR. We also agree that those persons arrested in connection with the warrants of the Tribunal be handed over by the IFOR to the International Tribunal for war crimes.”

SFOR, as the successor force to IFOR, would reasonably be regarded as succeeding to IFOR’s authorities under this pronouncement.

Even in the absence of Security Council authorization under Chapter VII for arrests by an international body or the Prosecutor pursuant to Rule 59 *bis*, consent of the Host State would provide an independent legal basis for such arrests. Such consent could be adequate to authorize action by another State or group of States, or by an international body or organization.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007c. memo	The Deputy Attorney General to the National Security Advisor; re: Apprehension of War Criminals in Bosnia [partial] (4 pages)	01/08/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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National Security Council
Alexander Vershbow (European)
OA/Box Number: 1076

FOLDER TITLE:

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Part II: Legal Analysis of U.S. Domestic Issues

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U. S. Department of Justice
Office of the Deputy Attorney General

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The Deputy Attorney General

Washington, D.C. 20530

January 8, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

FROM: The Deputy Attorney General 
SUBJECT: Apprehension of War Criminals in Bosnia

I have reviewed the current proposals of the interagency team which is examining how we might execute an initiative to arrest indicted war criminals in Bosnia. I am concerned -- as I expressed at the Deputies Committee meeting -- about the assumption that such an operation should be led by law enforcement.

It appears to me that this assumption of a law enforcement lead is driven by a restricted view of the role that the U.S. military could play in such an operation. The discussion to date has revolved around the U.S. military's participation only within the context of its SFOR mission, which does not include authority to search for and arrest indicted war criminals. While some consideration has been given to modification of that mission through the North Atlantic Council, none has been given to a unilateral U.S. military contribution apart from SFOR.

I have discussed this issue with Jan Lodal at DOD, and neither of us believes a unilateral U.S. military contribution is automatically precluded. This view is supported by the fact that both EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) are offering military forces as their contribution to the arrest operation. That two of the participating NATO/SFOR nations believe that the mission can be achieved using military forces either to augment SFOR or to act independently of SFOR indicates that they may have a different view on either the prospects for NAC's expanding the SFOR mission or on any potential negative reaction that might arise from non-SFOR military arrest operations. In any event, while unilateral U.S. military forces may not be necessary, at this stage they should be considered as part of the mix of talents and resources -- including SFOR, the British and Dutch complements, and U.S. law enforcement -- that can make such a mission a success.

Our concerns about the use of U.S. law enforcement agents are deep. Our agents have neither the capability nor the training to perform law enforcement activities in a combat zone. Whoever undertakes the investigative activities or apprehensions

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will be a target of armed opposition of the sort with which law enforcement agents are not equipped or trained to deal. I seriously doubt that the SFOR can provide sufficient security to allow law enforcement to conduct investigations or arrests, though I am open to the possibility that some exceptions might arise.

Enclosed are three points that I believe are the baseline for law enforcement participation in this operation. Merrick Garland, my Principal Deputy, will attend the Deputies Committee meeting to further discuss this.

cc: The Deputies

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- A. U.S. civilian law enforcement does not have the capacity to carry out field investigation or arrest of indicted war criminals in the hostile environment which currently exists in differing degrees in different parts of Bosnia. It lacks language skills, knowledge of the area, and force protection capabilities. Its rules of engagement are inappropriate for operating in this kind of environment. A military unit is required for apprehension or detention in such an environment; and some form of military or paramilitary unit is required for field investigation and tracking.
- B. U.S. civilian law enforcement does have the capacity to train, advise and task other field investigators, and to organize specific investigations, if this work is conducted from a location deemed secure by law enforcement.
- C. U.S. civilian law enforcement does have the capacity to arrest indicted war criminals, after apprehension and detention by a military unit, at a location deemed secure by law enforcement. There may also be some circumstances where the location would be deemed sufficiently secure by law enforcement to permit direct apprehension and arrest. An assessment of whether such circumstances exist with respect to specific targets must be undertaken on the ground in Bosnia, before law enforcement can determine whether it has the capacity to make such an apprehension.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007d. paper	re: Preliminary Legal Analysis of Proposed Support to ICTY [partial] (2 pages)	01/08/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

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National Security Council
Alexander Vershbow (European)
OA/Box Number: 1076

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - War Crimes, January 1997 [3]

2006-0647-F

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PRELIMINARY LEGAL ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED SUPPORT TO ICTY

The Department of Justice has reviewed relevant legal authority and drawn the following preliminary conclusions:

o The President's inherent authorities in the realm of foreign affairs and in his capacity as commander in chief provide some authority to direct law enforcement or military forces to engage in the proposed operations. The nature of the planned operation, however, will dictate whether those authorities are sufficient to provide the legal basis for U.S. participation.

o The most difficult issue relates to the authority of the President to provide law enforcement support to the ICTY under the theory that he is acting pursuant to obligations imposed by international law or treaty.

o DoJ is not convinced that the Statute of the ICTY imposes a binding obligation on states to execute warrants issued by the ICTY outside their national boundaries.

o Unilateral US participation in conducting investigations and effecting arrests would therefore not be pursuant to any obligation on the part of the President or of the United States, but would, instead, be based on the consent of the United States to lend this assistance.

o DoJ is concerned that the voluntary nature of the U.S. participation would necessarily undercut the argument that the President's order is pursuant to his inherent foreign affairs authority.

o The FY 1997 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act authorizes the President to direct the drawdown of services from U.S. Government agencies to support the ICTY. The term "services" is defined in a manner that specifically excludes military assistance.

o This authority appears sufficiently broad to allow the President to direct law enforcement agents to support the activities of the ICTY aimed at apprehending war criminals.

o The total value of such a drawdown may not exceed \$25 million.

o DoJ cautions, however, the greater the military involvement in the operation, the greater risk the operation might be viewed as "military assistance" and therefore not authorized by the drawdown authority.

o Exercise of this authority requires reports to Congress.

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Per E.O. 13526

VZ 11/05/2019 (3.79)

2013-0656-M

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- o The President or the head of an agency may detail law enforcement personnel to the ICTY under section 3343 of Title 5, U.S. Code.

- o Law enforcement personnel might then act on behalf of the ICTY to conduct investigations and effect arrests.

- o This argument is strengthened if the activities undertaken by the law enforcement agents are "compatible" or "parallel" to activities authorized for those agents under U.S. domestic law.

- o Issue remaining for resolution by DoD and DoS:

- o In view of the lack of clear authority of the IFOR to engage in these apprehension operations under the Dayton Accords, the clear statement that the IFOR would be under the direction and political control of the North Atlantic Council, and the clear statement that the enumerated duties of the IFOR might be expanded by the NAC, may SFOR itself participate in these operations without the approval of the NAC--either as a matter of U.S. or international law?

- o Issues for resolution by the Deputies Committee:

- o Assuming that the President may lawfully order participation of U.S. law enforcement agents in the proposed activities, should he do so in the face of the potential risk to the law enforcement agents themselves during the operation and the possible later risk to U.S. and allied military personnel that comprise the SFOR?

- o If U.S. military personnel are used, even if only to support a law enforcement apprehension operation, must the President consult with or notify Congress regarding the expanded U.S. military role? If that is the case, is there sufficient congressional support to warrant execution of these operations?

~~SECRET~~ E.O. 12958 1.4(c)

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Managing Muslim Returns to the Zone of Separation Discussion Paper for Principals

Issue

How to ensure that in exercising their right of return to homes in the Zone of Separation (ZoS) across the Inter-Entity Boundary Line, no renewed hostilities are precipitated between Bosnian Serbs and Muslims.

Background

During the war in Bosnia over 60 percent of all Bosnians fled their homes or were ethnically cleansed. More than 1.2 million people are displaced within Bosnia and over 1.3 million refugees now live in asylum countries. The return, repatriation, and relocation of these people is one of the most vexing issues confronting Bosnia today. The Muslims' desire to return to former homes in Srpska and the Bosnian Serb determination to protect the Serb entity by preventing the return of Muslims represent the core of the conflict between the two communities. In essence, it was what the war was about. At Dayton, all parties agreed to respect the right of all Bosnians freely to return to their homes of origin or to such other destination as they freely choose.

In recent months, Muslims have organized returns to key villages in Serb-held areas along the Zone of Separation -- mainly in the U.S. Sector near the Posavina and Zvornik corridors, the Sapna thumb area, Brcko and Dobo. These attempts -- which take advantage of the protection afforded by the demilitarization of the zone and IFOR's presence -- demonstrate growing frustration with the slow progress on freedom of movement, repatriation and return. However, organized returns also have strategic dimensions -- reflecting a desire to prevent the RS from becoming *de facto* an independent, ethnically-pure state, to put Muslim forces in strategically critical positions in the event of a resumption of hostilities and to keep the IEHL from becoming a permanent border. The Serb reaction to these organized returns has at times been violent; as a preventive measure, this has included blowing up houses, mining of strategic areas, and preemptive settlement of Serb fighters and families in abandoned former Muslim villages.

The possibility of violent confrontations escalating to wider-scale conflict led the High Representative, together with UNHCR, IFOR, IPTF, and the European Commission, to promulgate on October 15 a set of procedures for guiding return to and reconstruction in the Zone of Separation. These procedures included:

- a requirement to submit applications accompanied by documentation to demonstrate ownership of the property to which return is sought and agreement to abide by the laws of the entity in which the property is located;

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified By: Andrew Sens

Reason: 1.5 (a,d)

Declassify On 12/13/06

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By: J. NARA, Date: 9/11/2019

2013-0656-4 (3,40)

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- obligations by the entities to issue appropriate documentation to those returning and to cooperate in ensuring access to appropriate infrastructure; and
- rights and responsibilities of local police forces, the IPTF, and IFOR regarding the security and safety of property and returning persons.

In addition, IFOR has stepped up its activity in the ZoS to ensure a safe and secure environment in the region. It has focused its efforts on enforcing the Procedures on Return and Reconstruction in the ZoS, deterring Muslim provocations, and deterring Bosnian Serb actions -- including blowing up and mining of houses -- designed to prevent Muslims from returning. To that end, IFOR has increased patrols in the areas concerned, conducted unannounced inspections of police stations, and confiscated a sizable quantity of heavy weapons, small arms, and explosives. SFOR will perform the same tasks within its capabilities and resources.

A Strategy of Gradual and Controlled Return

The international community's efforts represent an important but so far only limited and reactive effort to prevent further violence in and near the ZoS arising out of the organized return of displaced persons and refugees. What is needed is a longer-term commitment by the international community and the entities alike to a strategy of gradual and controlled return through enforcement of the existing Procedures on Return. The guiding precept of such a strategy should be to *facilitate the greatest possible return of all ethnic groups to the ZoS in a manner that does not lead to violent conflict and/or make more difficult the overall return of refugees and displaced persons to areas in which they are ethnic minorities.*

Based on the existing rules governing return and reconstruction in the Zone of Separation, we should encourage the entities to accept the following principles of a strategy of gradual and controlled return to the ZoS:

- Refugees and DPs should have a legitimate claim and be able to substantiate their right of return to the specific area to which they seek to return;
- Refugees and DPs cannot be active-duty military personnel or carry arms or other weaponry;
- Returns must not lead to a *de jure* change in the Inter-Entity Boundary Line;
- Returns should be measured, gradual, and geographically dispersed.

A Negotiated Compromise

The effectiveness of a strategy based on these principles to secure the return of refugees and DPs to their former homes in the ZoS without creating additional tensions depends, of course, on its acceptance by the Bosnian Serbs and Muslims. Neither side now regards compromise as being in its interest. For now, both appear to believe that forceful action will work to their advantage -- the Muslims believe

that the forceful occupation of Jusici worked to secure a presence there, while the Serbs believe that armed resistance in Gajevi prevented Muslims from returning.

Therefore, one critical part of the strategy must be to convince both sides that a compromise allowing for the gradual and controlled return of refugees and DPs serves their interests better than the absence of agreement. Otherwise, the flow of people across the IEBL into the ZoS this spring will likely be large and accompanied by increasing violence. A second vital part of the strategy is to create a mechanism for working these matters out. The U.S. has proposed establishment of a Freedom of Movement Commission (FMC) for, among other things, this purpose.

The FMC, which would operate under the Office of the High Representative, would be composed of representatives from UNHCR, IPTF, SFOR, the Bosnian Presidency, and Interior Ministries of both entities. Once established, the FMC would be the forum for overseeing and, if necessary, enforcing compliance with the Procedures on Return and Reconstruction and for encouraging the entities to agree to the principles of return described above.

Convincing the Bosnian Serbs

Making the case to the Bosnian Serbs that agreement with the Muslims on the issue of the right of return is in their interest, includes the following points:

- The right of all Bosnians to return to their former homes is a fundamental provision of the Dayton Accords.
- Absent agreement between you and the Muslims on a process of gradual and controlled return, come spring there will likely be large-scale, unregulated movement from the Federation by illegally armed groups to areas in the ZoS where Muslims used to reside.
- It is in your interest to adhere not only to the Procedures for Return and Reconstruction in the ZoS agreed last October, but also to accept the principles of return.
- We understand you are concerned about the right of Serb refugees to return to their previous homes, both in Bosnia and in Croatia.
- We want to work with you to make this possible by targeting economic assistance generally, and housing and infrastructure programs specifically, to areas where those Serbs that have been displaced have settled or where Serb refugees wish to return. International pledges of funds for housing to the World Bank are currently oversubscribed, permitting a large and possibly rapid infusion of funds to these areas.
- Part of these resources will go to sustain returnees, but a substantial portion of the funds will be available for use in Serb areas if you continue to adhere to the

Procedures on Return and Reconstruction and accept of the principles of return. Of course, such assistance will cease immediately in case of active opposition to returns, including if houses and other property are deliberately destroyed or damaged.

- Success of this strategy depends on creating a climate allowing those returning to live in peace and tranquility. The international community will be vigorous in its efforts to ensure that this will be the case:
 - The IPTF will carefully monitor local police to ensure democratic policing norms are upheld, and the IPTF Commissioner will demand the removal of any police officer who does not strictly adhere to these norms.
 - The High Representative, acting through the FMC, will demand the removal from public office of any officials found to be obstructing the process of return, and the OSCE will bar any such officials from running for office in or receiving campaign funds for the municipal elections.
 - SFOR will act swiftly and forcefully in case of any violent act against property or persons -- including blowing up houses or laying mines -- designed to prevent Muslim returns.
 - SFOR, in carrying out its mandate to enforce Article 1A, will work proactively and evenhandedly to enforce the demilitarization of the ZoS. If the Muslims violate Annex 1A and other established procedures and rules governing return to the ZoS, SFOR will take appropriate action, e.g., by confiscating and destroying any unauthorized weapons found in the ZoS.
- A process of gradual and controlled return will safeguard your interests and will commit the international community to assist in creating conditions necessary for the return and relocation of the Serb population as well. But such assistance is dependent on your cooperation and acceptance of the principles of return.

Convincing the Muslims

Making the case to the Muslims that agreement with the Bosnian Serbs on a gradual and controlled process of return is in their interest, includes the following points:

- We remain strongly committed to fulfilling the right of all Bosnians to return to their former homes. However, we are deeply disturbed by violent incidents in the Zone of Separation in recent months accompanying returns of groups of Muslims. While we share your frustration at the slow pace of return, the use or threat of force or intimidation will only increase the probability of violence and confrontation.
- We want to work with you to forge agreement in the Freedom of Movement Commission between you and Republika Srpska on a process of gradual and

controlled return that safeguards both your interest in returning people to their former homes and the Serbs' interest in not overwhelming local conditions.

- Success of this strategy depends on you continuing to adhere to the Procedures on Return and Reconstruction in the ZoS and the principles of return. If you do, the international community will act vigorously to create a climate of peace and tranquility in those areas people will be returning to:
 - Economic assistance generally, and housing and infrastructure programs specifically, will be targeted to areas where displaced persons have settled or refugees wish to return. International pledges of funds for housing to the World Bank are currently oversubscribed, permitting a large and possibly rapid infusion of funds to these areas.
 - The IPTF will carefully monitor local police to ensure democratic policing norms are upheld, and the IPTF Commissioner will demand the removal of any police officer who does not strictly adhere to these norms.
 - The High Representative, acting through the FMC, will demand the removal from public office of any officials found to be obstructing the process of return, and the OSCE will bar any such officials from running for office in or receiving campaign funds for the municipal elections.
 - SFOR will act swiftly and forcefully in case of any violent act against property or persons -- including blowing up houses or laying mines -- designed to prevent refugees and DPs returning.
 - SFOR, in carrying out its mandate to enforce Article 1A, will work proactively and evenhandedly to enforce the demilitarization of the ZoS. In case of violations of Annex 1A or other established procedures and rules governing return to the ZoS, SFOR will take appropriate action, e.g., by confiscating and destroying any unauthorized weapons found in the ZoS.
- A process of gradual and controlled return will safeguard your interests and will commit the international community to assist in creating the conditions necessary to ensure the safety of those returning.
- At the same time, the international community's willingness to assist you in this process depends on your cooperation and acceptance of the principles of return. Deliberate, organized returns for political/strategic reasons into the ZoS will lead to a moratorium of returns to that site for a lengthy period. It is therefore in your interest that you agree to negotiate a compromise on this issue with the other Entity.

Implementation of the Strategy – A Plan for Action

A strategy of gradual and controlled return will require prior agreement from key players in the international community. The following action plan responds to that requirement:

- We should forge agreement within the Contact Group and, subsequently, with the EU and the High Representative on the immediate establishment of a Freedom of Movement Commission which, operating under the OHR, would be composed of representatives from UNHCR, IPTF, SFOR, the Bosnian Presidency, and Interior Ministries of the Entities. The FMC would be a forum for negotiating and enforcing principles and rules on freedom of movement and the return of refugees and displaced persons
- The President's Special Representative in Bosnia (and, after his appointment, the Deputy HiRep for Reconstruction) should work with his partners in the Economic Task Force to develop a housing and infrastructure repair plan that targets resources at key communities in Srpska to sustain Muslim and Serb refugees and DPs once they return; any such program will be designed to ensure it does not ratify ethnic cleansing;
- State and AID will work with DoD to develop points and supporting materials to persuade Congress that U.S. funding for housing construction and infrastructure repair in critical communities in the Zone of Separation inside the U.S. Sector relates directly to the efforts of U.S. troops to promote peace in the region (current law prohibits expenditure of funds for these purposes unless this criterion is met);
- We should propose to the IPTF Commissioner that he agree to:
 - instruct monitors to enforce democratic policing norms and verify the absence of weapons in communities where refugees and DPs have returned;
 - seek the immediate removal of any local officers who do not adhere to these norms.
- We should propose that UNHCR, IPTF, SFOR and ECMM, working within the framework of the FMC, monitor the behavior of officials in localities where refugees and DPs have or soon will be returned to enable the High Representative to demand the removal from office of any officials found to be obstructing returns.
- We should propose to the OSCE to enunciate new rules for the PEC and EASC banning from candidacy in the municipal elections any official or candidate found to be obstructing the process of return.
- We should work through the NATO commanders to ensure that, in carrying out its mandate to enforce Annex 1A, SFOR:
 - acts forcefully and proactively to prevent interference with the managed process of return;
 - confiscates and destroys any unauthorized weapons found in the ZoS, including especially in communities where refugees and DPs have settled.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. fax cover sheet	Dan Seikaly & Jamie Gorelick to Sandy Berger et al; re: Apprehension of War Criminals in Bosnia (1 page)	01/08/1997	P1/b(1) v2 11/5/2019
001b. memo	The Deputy Attorney General to the National Security Advisor; re: Apprehension of War Criminals in Bosnia [partial] (3 pages)	01/08/1997	P1/b(1), P5 v2 3/3/2020
002. memo	The Deputy Attorney General to the National Security Advisor; re: Apprehension of War Criminals in Bosnia [partial] (3 pages)	01/08/1997	P1/b(1), P5 v2 3/3/2020
003a. memo	Andrew Sens to Leon Fuerth et al; re: Papers for Deputies Committee Discussion of War Crimes [partial] (1 page)	01/08/1997	P1/b(1) v2 3/3/2020
003b. paper	re: Apprehension of War Criminals - Issues for Deputies (4 pages)	01/08/1996	P1/b(1), P5
003c. receipt	re: National Security Council Distribution Receipt (1 page)	01/08/1997	P1/b(1) 368 8/16/2010
004. talking points	re: Concept of Operations - Major Points of Consensus [partial] (1 page)	01/09/1997	P1/b(1) v2 3/3/2020
005. talking points	re: Law Enforcement Participation in Apprehension of War Criminals in Bosnia [partial] (1 page)	01/08/1997	P1/b(1) v2 3/3/2020
006. email	Alexander Vershbow to Jim Steinberg; re: Issues Paper (1 page)	01/08/1997	P1/b(1) v2 3/3/2020
007a. report	re: Plans to Support the ICTY - For the Joint Interagency Task Force - Bosnia (16 pages)	01/06/1997	P1/b(1), P5
007b. paper	re: Multinational Organization & Command & Control (4 pages)	01/02/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Alexander Vershbow (European)
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FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - War Crimes, January 1997 [4]

2006-0647-F
jp2133

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007c. paper	re: Preliminary Legal Analysis of Proposed Support to ICTY [partial] (3 pages)	01/06/1997	P1/b(1), P5 <i>vr 3/3/2010</i>
007d. memo	re: War Crimes (12 pages)	12/27/1996	P1/b(1)
007e. paper	re: Training, Military Support, & Logistics (3 pages)	01/06/1997	P1/b(1)
007f. report	re: Risk Analysis - War Criminals (5 pages)	01/06/1997	P1/b(1)
008. paper	re: Apprehension of War Criminals - Issues for Deputies (3 pages)	01/07/1996	P1/b(1), P5
009. paper	re: Data Collection & Management Issues (2 pages)	01/06/1997	P1/b(1), P5
010. map	re: Alleged War Criminals (1 page)	01/1997	P1/b(1)

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B	State	James Steinberg			
B	State	Robert Gelbard			
N	DOD	John White			
N	DOD	Jan Lodal			
B	USUN	David Scheffee			
A	CIA	John Gordon			
D	JCS	Joseph Ralston			
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E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 10, 2017

By VZ NARA, Date 11/05/2019

2016-0656-n

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. memo	The Deputy Attorney General to the National Security Advisor; re: Apprehension of War Criminals in Bosnia [partial] (3 pages)	01/08/1997	P1/b(1)

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2006-0647-F
jp2133

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U. S. Department of Justice
Office of the Deputy Attorney General

SECRET -- HANDLE IN EO 13526 1.4c CHANNELS

The Deputy Attorney General

Washington, D.C. 20530

January 8, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

FROM: The Deputy Attorney General 

SUBJECT: Apprehension of War Criminals in Bosnia

I have reviewed the current proposals of the interagency team which is examining how we might execute an initiative to arrest indicted war criminals in Bosnia. I am concerned -- as I expressed at the Deputies Committee meeting -- about the assumption that such an operation should be led by law enforcement.

It appears to me that this assumption of a law enforcement lead is driven by a restricted view of the role that the U.S. military could play in such an operation. The discussion to date has revolved around the U.S. military's participation only within the context of its SFOR mission, which does not include authority to search for and arrest indicted war criminals. While some consideration has been given to modification of that mission through the North Atlantic Council, none has been given to a unilateral U.S. military contribution apart from SFOR.

I have discussed this issue with Jan Lodal at DOD, and neither of us believes a unilateral U.S. military contribution is automatically precluded. This view is supported by the fact that both EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) are offering military forces as their contribution to the arrest operation. That two of the participating NATO/SFOR nations believe that the mission can be achieved using military forces either to augment SFOR or to act independently of SFOR indicates that they may have a different view on either the prospects for NAC's expanding the SFOR mission or on any potential negative reaction that might arise from non-SFOR military arrest operations. In any event, while unilateral U.S. military forces may not be necessary, at this stage they should be considered as part of the mix of talents and resources -- including SFOR, the British and Dutch complements, and U.S. law enforcement -- that can make such a mission a success.

Our concerns about the use of U.S. law enforcement agents are deep. Our agents have neither the capability nor the training to perform law enforcement activities in a combat zone. Whoever undertakes the investigative activities or apprehensions

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Per E.O. 13526

VZ 11/05/2019 (3.91)

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will be a target of armed opposition of the sort with which law enforcement agents are not equipped or trained to deal. I seriously doubt that the SFOR can provide sufficient security to allow law enforcement to conduct investigations or arrests, though I am open to the possibility that some exceptions might arise.

Enclosed are three points that I believe are the baseline for law enforcement participation in this operation. Merrick Garland, my Principal Deputy, will attend the Deputies Committee meeting to further discuss this.

cc: The Deputies

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- A. U.S. civilian law enforcement does not have the capacity to carry out field investigation or arrest of indicted war criminals in the hostile environment which currently exists in differing degrees in different parts of Bosnia. It lacks language skills, knowledge of the area, and force protection capabilities. Its rules of engagement are inappropriate for operating in this kind of environment. A military unit is required for apprehension or detention in such an environment; and some form of military or paramilitary unit is required for field investigation and tracking.
- B. U.S. civilian law enforcement does have the capacity to train, advise and task other field investigators, and to organize specific investigations, if this work is conducted from a location deemed secure by law enforcement.
- C. U.S. civilian law enforcement does have the capacity to arrest indicted war criminals, after apprehension and detention by a military unit, at a location deemed secure by law enforcement. There may also be some circumstances where the location would be deemed sufficiently secure by law enforcement to permit direct apprehension and arrest. An assessment of whether such circumstances exist with respect to specific targets must be undertaken on the ground in Bosnia, before law enforcement can determine whether it has the capacity to make such an apprehension.

*Study - Jim Steinberg asked me
to send to you : to tell you
that Justice is asking why
State RSO's ~~to~~ shouldn't be
considered for this mission.
Kathy West*

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002. memo	The Deputy Attorney General to the National Security Advisor; re: Apprehension of War Criminals in Bosnia [partial] (3 pages)	01/08/1997	P1/b(1)

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U. S. Department of Justice
Office of the Deputy Attorney General

~~SECRET~~ — HANDLE IN [EO 13526 1.4c] CHANNELS

The Deputy Attorney General

Washington, D.C. 20530

January 8, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

FROM: The Deputy Attorney General 
SUBJECT: Apprehension of War Criminals in Bosnia

I have reviewed the current proposals of the interagency team which is examining how we might execute an initiative to arrest indicted war criminals in Bosnia. I am concerned -- as I expressed at the Deputies Committee meeting -- about the assumption that such an operation should be led by law enforcement.

It appears to me that this assumption of a law enforcement lead is driven by a restricted view of the role that the U.S. military could play in such an operation. The discussion to date has revolved around the U.S. military's participation only within the context of its SFOR mission, which does not include authority to search for and arrest indicted war criminals. While some consideration has been given to modification of that mission through the North Atlantic Council, none has been given to a unilateral U.S. military contribution apart from SFOR.

I have discussed this issue with Jan Lodal at DOD, and neither of us believes a unilateral U.S. military contribution is automatically precluded. This view is supported by the fact that both [EO 13526 3.3(b)(6), (b)(1)] are offering military forces as their contribution to the arrest operation. That two of the participating NATO/SFOR nations believe that the mission can be achieved using military forces either to augment SFOR or to act independently of SFOR indicates that they may have a different view on either the prospects for NAC's expanding the SFOR mission or on any potential negative reaction that might arise from non-SFOR military arrest operations. In any event, while unilateral U.S. military forces may not be necessary, at this stage they should be considered as part of the mix of talents and resources -- including SFOR, the British and Dutch complements, and U.S. law enforcement -- that can make such a mission a success.

Our concerns about the use of U.S. law enforcement agents are deep. Our agents have neither the capability nor the training to perform law enforcement activities in a combat zone. Whoever undertakes the investigative activities or apprehensions

Declassified in Part

Per E.O. 13526

VZ 11/05/2019 (3.92)

2013-0656-M

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will be a target of armed opposition of the sort with which law enforcement agents are not equipped or trained to deal. I seriously doubt that the SFOR can provide sufficient security to allow law enforcement to conduct investigations or arrests, though I am open to the possibility that some exceptions might arise.

Enclosed are three points that I believe are the baseline for law enforcement participation in this operation. Merrick Garland, my Principal Deputy, will attend the Deputies Committee meeting to further discuss this.

cc: The Deputies

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- A. U.S. civilian law enforcement does not have the capacity to carry out field investigation or arrest of indicted war criminals in the hostile environment which currently exists in differing degrees in different parts of Bosnia. It lacks language skills, knowledge of the area, and force protection capabilities. Its rules of engagement are inappropriate for operating in this kind of environment. A military unit is required for apprehension or detention in such an environment; and some form of military or paramilitary unit is required for field investigation and tracking.
- B. U.S. civilian law enforcement does have the capacity to train, advise and task other field investigators, and to organize specific investigations, if this work is conducted from a location deemed secure by law enforcement.
- C. U.S. civilian law enforcement does have the capacity to arrest indicted war criminals, after apprehension and detention by a military unit, at a location deemed secure by law enforcement. There may also be some circumstances where the location would be deemed sufficiently secure by law enforcement to permit direct apprehension and arrest. An assessment of whether such circumstances exist with respect to specific targets must be undertaken on the ground in Bosnia, before law enforcement can determine whether it has the capacity to make such an apprehension.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003a. memo	Andrew Sens to Leon Fuerth et al; re: Papers for Deputies Committee Discussion of War Crimes [partial] (1 page)	01/08/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Alexander Vershbow (European)
OA/Box Number: 1076

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - War Crimes, January 1997 [4]

2006-0647-F
jp2133

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C. 20504

January 8, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. JAMES G. MCADAMS, III
Counsel for Intelligence
Policy
Department of Justice

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS
Executive Secretary
Department of State

MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency


COL. JAMES N. MATTIS
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

COL. F. C. WILSON, USMC
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Papers for Deputies Committee Discussion of War
Crimes, January 9, 1997

Attached for transmission to Deputies is an NSC issues paper for discussion at the Deputies Committee meeting on January 9. The package of papers prepared by the interagency working group on Apprehension of War Criminals has been forwarded to agencies by the Department of State. Note the new starting time of 1:30 p.m.

This paper should only be distributed through EO 13526 1.4c channels.


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A NSC Issues Paper

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 11/05/2019
2016-0656-M

~~SECRET~~ EO 13526 1.4c
Reason: 1.5 (a, c, d)
Declassify On: 1.6., x1, x4, x6

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended,
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By JG/NARA, Date 8/16/10
2006-0647-F

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9720012
DATE 08 JAN 97

SUBJECT: DISCUSSION PAPERS FOR 9 JAN DC MTG ON WAR CRIMES
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET/COMINT~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
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MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX +1</u>
COL JAMES N. MATTIS DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ROOM 3E880 PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
MR. JAMES G. MCADAMS, III DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ROOM 6325, MAIN JUSTICE 10TH & PENNSYLVANIA AVE, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20530	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
MR. RICK E. YANNUZZI CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ROOM 7E12, HEADQUARTERS WASHINGTON, DC 20505	_____	_____	_____ PRINT LAST NAME: _____ COPY: <u>VIA FAX</u>
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PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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2006-0647-F

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. talking points	re: Concept of Operations - Major Points of Consensus [partial] (1 page)	01/09/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Alexander Vershbow (European)
OA/Box Number: 1076

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - War Crimes, January 1997 [4]

2006-0647-F

jp2133

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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EO 13526 1.4c

9 January 1997

**Concept of Operations
Major Points of Consensus**

- **Multinational Coalition, not unilateral.** If a decision were made for the United States to participate, the apprehension operation should be undertaken by a small coalition of nations [redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) with the requisite political will and capabilities that would plan and execute the operation. The organizational structure would be based on the model of a combined joint interagency-task force (CJIATF), similar to what is used in counter-drug operations.
- **Only suspects within Bosnia.** For political, legal and security reasons, the territorial scope of the apprehension operation would be limited to Bosnia-Herzegovina.
- **Targets** [redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) We have already developed a preliminary list of 12-20 priority indictees and would continue to work with the ICTY and others to refine that list during the detailed planning process..
- **There is adequate legal basis for this operation..** While details still need refinement, the international legal basis for UN members states to conduct such an operation exists within the relevant Security Council Resolutions. Domestic law also permits participation of appropriate U.S. agencies and departments in such an effort.
- **This operation would take place under the authority of the ICTY.** The Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY would convey the legal authority to nations to conduct the operation and they would work closely with the ICTY to coordinate their planning.
- **SFOR's Role would be support.** SFOR would not participate in the apprehension of indictees but has the mandate and capability to provide support such as area security, logistics, communications and transportation of indictees to the Hague.
- **Phasing of Operation.** The operation would be divided into five basic phases: phase 1) gather basic information on indictees and beginning the detailed planning process; 2) track indictees; 3) apprehend indictees; 4) transport captured indictees to Hague; 5) post-apprehension force protection.
- **Need for Consultations.** Operation is dependent on gaining the cooperation, agreement and, in some cases, approval of various organizations and nations. Consultations of varying degrees would be required with: 1) participating allies; 2) the ICTY; 3) NATO military and civilian leadership; 3) other nations and international organizations; 5) the government of B-H.
- **Congress and Public Affairs.** Detailed strategies on consultations with Congress and public affairs are also needed.

CLASSIFIED BY: USDP
DECLASSIFY BY: 8 Jan 2007

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
005. talking points	re: Law Enforcement Participation in Apprehension of War Criminals in Bosnia [partial] (1 page)	01/08/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Alexander Vershbow (European)
OA/Box Number: 1076

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - War Crimes, January 1997 [4]

2006-0647-F

jp2133

RESTRICTION CODES

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- C. U.S. civilian law enforcement does have the capacity to arrest indicted war criminals, after detention by a military unit, at a location deemed secure by law enforcement. There may also be some circumstances where the location is deemed sufficiently secure by law enforcement to permit direct apprehension and arrest.

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 11/05/2019 (3.97)
2013-0656-M

Veit, Katherine M.

From: Vershbow, Alexander R.
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: /R, Record at A1; Feeley, John F.
Subject: Urgent for Jim Steinberg ~~(SECRET)~~
Date: Wednesday, January 08, 1997 10:29AM

Jim: Attached is our proposed issues paper for Deputies Meeting. We'll send you the State paper when the final text is received later this morning.

Jan Lodal may call you to complain that all the basic questions in section B can't be answered until we have built a coalition, established a planning cell in theater, and have a full-fledged OPLAN for approval. Therefore, they simply want Deputies to endorse the concept and approve the follow-up steps on the last page.

While OSD is right that you can't make a final judgment on the risks until you have a final OPLAN and are at the stage of a go/no-go decision, we think Deputies (and Principals) need to take a preliminary cut at the basic questions before we set operational activities in motion. We also need to settle some basic design issues with respect to the roles of the military and the law enforcement community.

We will send you the attached through the system for release to other agencies shortly. Any preliminary comments would be welcome.

<< File Attachment: WCDEP2.DOC >>

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007c. paper	re: Preliminary Legal Analysis of Proposed Support to ICTY [partial] (3 pages)	01/06/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Alexander Vershbow (European)
OA/Box Number: 1076

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - War Crimes, January 1997 [4]

2006-0647-F
jp2133

RESTRICTION CODES

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6 Jan. 1997

Annex 2:

International and Domestic Legal Authorities

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 11/05/2019 (4.04)
2013-0656-M

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EO 13526 1.4c

PRELIMINARY LEGAL ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED SUPPORT TO ICTY

The Department of Justice has reviewed relevant legal authority and drawn the following preliminary conclusions:

o The President's inherent authorities in the realm of foreign affairs and in his capacity as commander in chief provide some authority to direct law enforcement or military forces to engage in the proposed operations. The nature of the planned operation, however, will dictate whether those authorities are sufficient to provide the legal basis for U.S. participation.

o The most difficult issue relates to the authority of the President to provide law enforcement support to the ICTY under the theory that he is acting pursuant to obligations imposed by international law or treaty.

o DoJ is not convinced that the Statute of the ICTY imposes a binding obligation on states to execute warrants issued by the ICTY outside their national boundaries.

o Unilateral US participation in conducting investigations and effecting arrests would therefore not be pursuant to any obligation on the part of the President or of the United States, but would, instead, be based on the consent of the United States to lend this assistance.

o DoJ is concerned that the voluntary nature of the U.S. participation would necessarily undercut the argument that the President's order is pursuant to his inherent foreign affairs authority.

o The FY 1997 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act authorizes the President to direct the drawdown of services from U.S. Government agencies to support the ICTY. The term "services" is defined in a manner that specifically excludes military assistance.

o This authority appears sufficiently broad to allow the President to direct law enforcement agents to support the activities of the ICTY aimed at apprehending war criminals.

o The total value of such a drawdown may not exceed \$25 million.

o DoJ cautions, however, the greater the military involvement in the operation, the greater risk the operation might be viewed as "military assistance" and therefore not authorized by the drawdown authority.

o Exercise of this authority requires reports to Congress.

~~SECRET~~

EO 13526 1.4c

o The President or the head of an agency may detail law enforcement personnel to the ICTY under section 3343 of Title 5, U.S. Code.

o Law enforcement personnel might then act on behalf of the ICTY to conduct investigations and effect arrests.

o This argument is strengthened if the activities undertaken by the law enforcement agents are "compatible" or "parallel" to activities authorized for those agents under U.S. domestic law.

o Issue remaining for resolution by DoD and DoS:

o In view of the lack of clear authority of the IFOR to engage in these apprehension operations under the Dayton Accords, the clear statement that the IFOR would be under the direction and political control of the North Atlantic Council, and the clear statement that the enumerated duties of the IFOR might be expanded by the NAC, may SFOR itself participate in these operations without the approval of the NAC--either as a matter of U.S. or international law?

o Issues for resolution by the Deputies Committee:

o Assuming that the President may lawfully order participation of U.S. law enforcement agents in the proposed activities, should he do so in the face of the potential risk to the law enforcement agents themselves during the operation and the possible later risk to U.S. and allied military personnel that comprise the SFOR?

o If U.S. military personnel are used, even if only to support a law enforcement apprehension operation, must the President consult with or notify Congress regarding the expanded U.S. military role? If that is the case, is there sufficient congressional support to warrant execution of these operations?

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. paper	re: War Crimes & Other Violations of International Humanitarian Law - Proposals for International Tribunals (6 pages)	09/02/1993	P1/b(1)
002a. memo	Sandy Berger to Deputies Committee; re: Assistance to War Crimes Investigations (2 pages)	08/05/1993	P1/b(1) v2 3/2/2020
002b. memo	Sandy Berger to IWG Sub-Group on War Crimes Evidence [partial] (2 pages)	08/05/1993	P1/b(1) , P3/b(3) v2 3/2/20
002c. memo	Sandy Berger to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence; re: Assistance for War Crimes Investigations (1 page)	08/05/1993	P1/b(1)
002d. memo	William Itoh to Leon Fuerth et al; re: Establishing an IWG Sub-Group on War Crimes Evidence (2 pages)	05/24/1993	P1/b(1) v2 3/2/2020

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Eric Schwartz (Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 3476

FOLDER TITLE:

War Crimes - Ex-Yugoslavia

2006-0647-F
ip2122

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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War Crimes

INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM FOR

The Deputies Committee

SUBJECT: Assistance for War Crimes Investigations

On May 24, the Deputies Committee approved the establishment of a Sub-group of the Yugoslav IWG to "coordinate, collate, and organize" relevant information available in the U.S. Government, with the aim of helping the U.N. in preparing evidence for prosecutions. It is important that Deputies reiterate to their agencies that the U.S. Government attaches great importance to the success of the Tribunal and that their agencies should provide resources adequate to the accomplishment of its purposes.

To that end, the Chairs of the Sub-Group request that the Deputies Committee approve the provision of a limited set of resources for a finite time for the two projects described below. Both are of high priority to the United Nations.

(1) Ethnic Cleansing Analysis, Spring-Summer 1992.

An analysis of Serb ethnic cleansing operations in a region of Bosnia (to be specified) between April and August 1992 would collate important information on specific atrocities and assist in determining what officials were responsible for the command and control of forces, and directly respond to a U.N. request. This analysis could, if successful, serve as the foundation for the Chief Prosecutor's case.

Two analysts working full-time for roughly six weeks, with some additional analytic support, should be sufficient to complete the project. NPIC has agreed to provide one analyst full-time, as well as the services of additional analysts as needed. I will direct that the project (and the NPIC analyst) be assigned to the Balkan Task Force, which will provide one additional analyst on a full-time basis for the duration of the project. The Task Force will coordinate its work on the project with the Chairs of the Sub-Group.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 12 NARA, Date 11/5/2015
203-0656-11 (4.23)

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- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -

- 2 -

(2) Additional Debriefings of Refugees.

The U.S. Government now has an extensive program to debrief Bosnian refugees, but our debriefers cannot always ensure rapid access to information that U.N. investigators and U.S. analysts consider most pressing. To augment our efforts on behalf of the U.N., special teams of debriefers should be assigned to search for refugees with information relevant to cases which the U.N. is currently investigating. It is anticipated that the first team will concentrate on events at Brcko. It should begin work promptly and attempt to complete its undertaking within three months. The Sub-Group believes that a focused, supplementary debriefing program of this kind can contribute substantially to the U.N.'s effort.

Based on the Sub-Group's experience in examining information of war crimes, it believes that the teams should consist of: one person experienced in debriefing (from the Intelligence Community); one attorney (from DOD, which can provide lawyers with knowledge of military operations); and possibly one forensics artist (who will be requested from the FBI). Operational details (such as the location of debriefings, number of teams, and control of teams in the field) will be decided by the Sub-Group, in coordination with the U.N., once the DC has approved the concept. There are a number of options. The members of each team could be detailed as appropriate to the State Department, which would make their services available on a non-reimbursable basis to the United Nations. The teams would provide their reports directly to the United Nations. (Currently, their reports are classified for cover purposes and to protect identities but do not otherwise merit classification, and declassification prevents supplying them to the United Nations as expeditiously as is desirable.) Their reports would also be made available to the United States.

If there is no objection, I will transmit the attached memorandum to the agencies represented on the Sub-Group.

Sandy Berger

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MEMORANDUM FOR

IWG SUB-Group on War Crimes Evidence

The Deputies Committee emphasizes that the International Tribunal established for the former Yugoslavia is an important element of U.S. policy in the region and that their agencies should provide resources adequate to the accomplishment of its purposes and agrees with the following taskings.

(1) Ethnic Cleansing Analysis, Spring-Summer 1992.

The Balkan Task Force is directed to conduct an analysis (as described by the Chairs of the Sub-Group) of Serb ethnic cleansing operations in a region of Bosnia (to be specified) between April and August 1992. Two analysts are to be assigned to the project full-time for six weeks. Work on the project should begin by August [], 1993.

In a separate tasking (a copy of which is attached), NPIC is directed to detail one analyst to the Task Force for the duration of the project and to provide that person with access to an additional number of analysts to use as necessary. That additional number is now believed to be three.

(2) Refugee Interviews.

The State Department is directed to establish an appropriate number of special refugee debriefing teams and to coordinate their activities with the United Nations. The Department is directed to arrange for their interviews to be available to the U.S. Government.

The teams will be established in the following way. The Intelligence Community is directed to detail on a non-reimbursable basis, for each team, one person skilled in refugee interviews and in local languages to the State Department. The Department of Defense is similarly directed to make available, for each team, one attorney with prosecutorial experience for work with the debriefers. Operational details will be decided by the Sub-Group. If necessary, these people would be detailed on a non-reimbursable basis to the State Department (and further to the United Nations if the Department, in coordination with the home agency, decides that is appropriate). The Department of Justice is asked to make available forensics identification experts on the same conditions. The first of the teams should be ready to begin work in the field on or about August [], 1993 and should expect to complete work on October [], 1993.

Sandy Berger

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By VJ NARA, Date 11/5/2019

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2013-0656-m (4.25)

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. memo	Sandy Berger to IWG Sub-Group on War Crimes Evidence [partial] (2 pages) (1 page)	08/05/1993	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Eric Schwartz (Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 3476

FOLDER TITLE:

War Crimes - Ex-Yugoslavia

2006-0647-F

jp2122

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

^{JOB}
drafted: State L/PM - Jim O'Brien;72282;7/12/93

cleared: USUN/W - Dave Scheffer	
JCS - Maj. Steve Lepper	OSD/ISA - Lt. Col. Linda Arndt
CIA/GC - [redacted] (b)(3)	EUR - Jim Finkel
CIA/GC - [redacted]	OVP - Brad Wiss
IO/UNP - Sheila Berry	HA/MLA - Liz Barnett
EUR/EE - Steve Walker	INR - Jon Western
OSD - Walter Slocumbe	

Handwritten notes: "SUB fm" is written vertically next to the first four rows. "JOB fm" is written vertically next to the last two rows.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

20504

May 24, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH
Assistant to the Vice
President for National
Security Affairs

MR. JOHN A. LAUDER
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

CAPTAIN H. L. SHEFFIELD
Secretary
Joint Chiefs of Staff

COL MICHAEL B. SHERFIELD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MR. RICK INDERFURTH
Office of the U.S. Permanent
Representative to the
United Nations

MR. DOUGLAS FRAZIER
Associate Deputy Attorney
General
Department of Justice

SUBJECT: Establishing an IWG Sub-Group on War Crimes
Evidence (S)

The UN Secretary General's report on establishment of a War
Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has now been issued.
For a Tribunal to be successful, however, there must be
substantiation of war crimes. The UN Commission of Experts has
collected some useful information, but, by all accounts, does not
yet have enough good information to build a solid case for
indictments of war criminals, except in a few low-level cases.
(S)

To assist in the UN effort, we will need all available U.S.
Government information on possible war crimes and those who
authorized or permitted these activities. Most seriously needed
is a "paper trail" tying atrocities to those at a higher level
who set them in motion (e.g. systematic rape and torture,
establishment of concentration camps, "ethnic cleansing," etc.).
(S)

Therefore, I am directing that a sub-group of the Yugoslav IWG be
formed to coordinate, collate, and organize on a timely basis
information for the use of the Tribunal. The State Department
and USUN will co-chair the sub-group on war crimes evidence.
The initial meeting of the members of the sub-group will be
scheduled soon. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

CLINTON ~~SECRET~~ PHOTOGRAPHY

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By: [redacted] NARA, Date: 11/5/2019

2017-0656-1m (4,24)

SECRET~~SECRET~~

7

Please inform Jim O'Brien at 647-7818³ or via fax at 647-1037 which individual from your agency will have primary responsibility for the IWG Sub-Group's work. (S)

for Justice A. Kenney
William H. Itoh
Executive Secretary

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. fax cover sheet	The Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights to Eric Schwartz; re: No Immunity for Slobodan Milosevic (partial) (1 page)	10/06/2000	P6/b(6)
002. cable	re: Yugoslavia (3 pages)	10/16/2000	P1/b(1)
003. cable	USMission, USNATO to NSC; re: ICTY Chief Prosecutor Del Ponte Briefs EAPC (5 pages)	10/19/2000	P1/b(1)
004. cable	re: Guidance for EAPC [Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council] Discussion with ICTY Prosecutor Del Ponte (2 pages)	10/17/2000	P1/b(1)
005. notes	re: Handwritten Notes Meeting with Madeleine Albright (1 page)	10/6/2000	P1/b(1) v
006. notes	re: Handwritten Notes Staff Meeting, Cuba Sanctions (1 page)	10/6/2000	P1/b(1) v
007. notes	re: Handwritten Notes ICC [International Criminal Court] (2 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1) v
008. notes	re: Handwritten Notes Phone Call (1 page)	n.d.	P5 v 1/21/2003
009. notes	re: Handwritten Notes Teleon (1 page)	n.d.	P1/b(1) v
010. draft	re: USUN Reporting Cable Following June PrepCom (3 pages)	10/12/2000	P1/b(1) v
011. email	Dorothy Shea to Eric Schwartz; re: ICC Meeting (1 page)	10/11/2000	P1/b(1) v
012. letter	Minister Lekota to Secretary Cohen; re: UN/ICC Relationship Agreement (partial) (1 page)	09/29/2000	b(2)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Dorothy Shea (Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs)
OA/Box Number: 3348

FOLDER TITLE:

ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia] - FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]

2006-0647-F

jp2097

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Ø FRY -
PIFWCS

10/6/2000 Tom Warrick -
DJS mtg w/ MKA

L/PM - Todd Buchwald

(?) actual Milosevic arrest warrant; what is US authority?

(-7) Press report quotes church official as saying
Ivanov met w/ Milosevic

STAT 193823 => READ ensuring FRY official don't
empty coffers.

Urge host govt to detain until inquiries
made, then call Kostunica (but don't
Slobo or other PIFWCS head to EU country)

Lautenberg comments w/ NGOs (previously - scheduled)

U.S. should not do what it did in Bosnia; throwing lot
of money at contractors. Ends up in large amounts of \$
going to Milosevic cronies, use NGOs / civil society.

Lautenberg's cuts of vital assistance

requires us to cut off IFA if not arrest PIFWCS

Serbia as a listed country

* => only waiver "if directly supports implementation of Dayton or its
annexes."

Croatia has never been sanctioned under Lautenberg. We bent
over backwards to find uncles sources saying PIFWCS were in
Pala not Croatia. Tuta - we guessed. ^{Determination}
_{They had at least arrested & working thru judicial syst.}

Country that ~~fact to take~~ where:
"competent authorities have failed, as determined by SecState, to
take necessary & significant steps to apprehend & transport
the tribunal all persons who have been publicly indicted by
the tribunal."

Waivers:
- written determination that such assistance directly support
implementation of Dayton Agreement & its annexes
- shall not apply to an entity that is not a sanctioned country or its
country.
- humanitarian assistance
- democratization assistance
- cross border
- if promote peace
- 565 (f) "special rule" (e.g., Kosovo)

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SEC. 565 f
HR 4811
of FY01

Staff Mtg.
Cuba sanctions -

Child Soldiers

10/6

Telcom w/ Ghana Davidson

We were so focussed on goal in negotiations
after November - no harm done in being more vocal.

generally some shame

DOD on implementation: Do nothing.

Why should we change our practices? we've made concessions
for sake of advancing a common goal.

Getting thru Senate to more impl.

Having DOD implement would be a real sore pt. In committee staff

upset them an ass

they've already told us that

they would take it as a sign that Admin doesn't care about

Senate's role in advice + consent.

It's been w/ Senate for short time.

Ø ICC

Draene orientlicher

7-yr. exemption

As a fall back when it becomes clear that the current USG position isn't going to fly, this could be considered. This will not meet USG red-lines.

Basic idea opt out of WC jurisdiction for 7yrs. this proposal similar opt-out for non-state parties. so let US have what

feels that people like Bruce B => potential for being accepted.

potential

U.S. vulnerability = almost entirely on WC.

After 7 yrs. possible to amend statute so gives U.S. coverage when it needs it.

Pentagon doesn't know what the Court is going to be like this would allow the U.S. to observe the Court, stay in the game.

Best protection for U.S. is being a player.

How does U.S. get maximum coverage in the real world

ES. what would vehicle be?

(Ask Bruce) fixable, if practical will. Protocol would do it.

Decision of Assembly of States Parties

Preplan could make decision that recommends that Assembly of States Parties adopts a rule.

Would rule be legally binding?

Eric: R.A.? (well think about - must be beyond pursuit)

This proposal can't even initiate investigation, so gives more coverage than USG proposal

Eric - crimes against humanity causes apprehension, too.

Incentive - anything that makes statute better is welcome. What did Dan't say would be negotiable?

Might be easier to feel fall back once clear how little support there is for R.A.

problem w/ that \Rightarrow limited time to negotiate w/ like minded. there's a bit of a "you first" impulse.

Want U.S. to say "we will be a good neighbor."

afraid of being smothered by U.S. which will oppose court.

U.S.G. says: accept it as last recourse, but you offer it.

Concern: If U.S.G. waits until current position dies, there might not be sufficient time

Q Is commitment to good neighborliness enough?

A. Minimum, but of course they want more: signature.

Eric: not optimistic that we'll get to here.

this sort of shift would require cabinet-level decision.

§ ICC

Telcon of JCS

Chairman DID make a decision
clearly consistent of what had been done by Administration

Keep focus on what has been JCS position
Don't want to get wrapped up in legislative
Real issue is ICC

Full protection

may mean of stated intent - to protect US.

No comment on any other aspect of legislation.

No letter will go back.

Then legislative off?

Or will JCS call?

request later.

don't know answer yet
What is vehicle to get

φ/CC gave to State 10/12. They'll turn into demarche cable.

Cable should go action to: Paris, London, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Berlin, Greece, Norway, Canada. *Pretonia*

Info addressees: USUN New York, and EU collective.

Refs: A) USUN reporting cable following June PrepCom
B) State cables that had our original proposal

This is an Action Request. See paras xyz.

Background: The Sixth Committee (Legal) of the UN General Assembly will meet October 18-20 to review progress on the International Criminal Court (ICC). We have been told that many governments plan to make statements at this session that will take issue with the U.S.-proposed fix to the ICC Treaty regime. The U.S. proposal, presented in March, would address our fundamental concern about the ICC, i.e., the Court's purported jurisdiction over the nationals of non-party states engaged in official acts. Although we were able to achieve consensus on the U.S.-proposed rule to Article 98 of the Treaty, host countries continue to object to our proposed "fix" in the UN-ICC Relationship Agreement, which will be negotiated at the November/December PrepCom. (See Ref ϕ for a full explanation of the U.S. proposal.)

Action request: Embassies are requested to demarche appropriate host country government officials at the highest appropriate political level to convey our strong request that their Sixth Committee statements not make unequivocal assertions on the ~~subject of the U.S.-proposed fix in the Relationship Agreement~~ that would foreclose the opportunity for us to continue to work toward a mutually-agreeable outcome. Host country governments often relegate ICC issues to their legal experts, but because this is a political request, action addressees should seek to avoid carrying this message only to host country government legal officials. Embassies should avoid being drawn into lengthy discussions about the merits of the U.S. ~~proposal~~ *position*. Rather, Embassies should deflect any such questions to the U.S. ICC delegation, headed by Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, which will be in New York from October 18-20. Posts may draw on the following Talking Points:

replace U.S. pro

Talking Points:

-- As you may know, the Sixth Committee (Legal) of the UN General Assembly is meeting next week (October 18-20) to review progress on the International Criminal Court (ICC).

-- The United States looks forward to participating in that meeting, as we have in previous Sixth Committee sessions on the ICC and in the ICC Preparatory Commissions.

-- We approached your government last March regarding the USG's concerns about the ICC Treaty, and there have been many communications between our principals on this subject.

-- We are pleased with the progress that we have made to date in addressing our concerns, and we are thankful for your government's support.

-- We understand, ~~though~~, that our governments have different views on the ICC.

-- We would hope though, that we not allow our differences to prejudice our ability to work together to find mutually agreeable solutions.

-- The UN-ICC Relationship Agreement will be the subject of negotiations at the November/December PrepCom. It is very important that the United States has the opportunity to address our concerns at the next ICC PrepCom.

-- Therefore, we would greatly appreciate it if your government would refrain from making any unequivocal statements at the Sixth Committee about the forthcoming negotiations at the November/December Preparatory Commission.

-- *In particular* Specifically, it would be unhelpful to have statements that would foreclose serious consideration of our proposal for the UN-ICC Relationship Agreement.

-- By early next week, we intend to share with your UN mission an advance copy of the statement we will deliver before the Sixth Committee. We hope this will help demonstrate our continued commitment to working to find an agreeable solution.

[If, and only if, the host country indicates that it opposes the U.S. modification and that it thus should be able to say so publicly in the Sixth Committee:]

-- We understand your view, but we fear that an unequivocal statement by your delegation in the Sixth Committee could foreclose the opportunity for meaningful discussion on workable alternatives that address both our concerns and ultimately permits the US to be supportive of the ICC.

Shea, Dorothy C. (MULTILAT)

From: Shea, Dorothy C. (MULTILAT)
Sent: Wednesday, October 11, 2000 10:52 AM
To: Schwartz, Eric P. (MULTI)
Subject: Briefer for this afternoon's ICC meeting (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~)

Ø/CC

Eric:

This is just a quickie to brief you on what to expect at this afternoon's ICC meeting. I'm off to a working ICC meeting now, and I may find out more, which I can supplement orally. (I'll also be at a Sierra Leone meeting and then a quick Eastern DROC meeting, but on pager if you need me.)

David has drafted a statement for the Sixth Committee meeting, which takes place Oct 18-20. I have a copy and will leave it with my edits with Theresa for you. David's plan is to get clearances on the statement by tomorrow, then send it out to Embassies so they can preview it with capitals, in hopes that governments will tone down their own statements accordingly. The demarche instructions will say something along the lines of: here's what we'll be saying in our 6th Committee statement. We hope you don't say anything in yours that shuts door on us...

At meeting with Mort/David this afternoon, David will emphasize that the goal is still the same as agreed by Deputies. He will make a pitch, though, that we consider whether a one-off attempt at fix (Relationship Agreement) best serves our policy. He will argue that a broader matrix of safeguards, including the R.A. should also be sought.

He will preview that we can anticipate some kind of compromise language coming out of our Relationship Agreement proposal. Need to give some thought to how to respond to various scenarios.

- we get the language we gave the Aussies;
- we get some other language;
- this issue gets punted (the Japanese(?) compromise?)

Of course, we'll also need to consider a slam dunk scenario.

Re: signing: He will not make case for signing, but for chance to give POTUS the basis on which to consider signing. Right now, we're locked into not.

David has Pickering's support for the strategy that he'll be laying out for us, which involves a melange of 98/SOFAs/and other conditionalities.

More later.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By W NARA, Date 11/5/2019

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. email	James E. Baker to Nancy E. Soderberg; re: Information for Bosnia PC (1 page)	07/14/1995	P5 v 1/21/2013
001b. email	James E. Baker to Nancy E. Soderberg et al; re: Legal Availability of 614 Waiver (1 page)	07/14/1995	P5 v 1/21/2013
002a. email	Alexander Vershbow to Anthony Lake; re: Bosnia Strategy Paper (1 page)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1) v 11/5/2019
002b. paper	re: Bosnia Strategy [partial] (2 pages)	07/12/1995	P1/b(1) PDS 10/1/2013

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Nancy Soderberg (Staff Director)
OA/Box Number: 1402

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia, July 1995 [1]

2006-0647-F

jp2106

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Darby, M. Brooke

From: Emery, Mary C.
To: @CROSS - Cross Hatches
Cc: /N, NonRecord at A1
Subject: FW: Bosnia Strategy Paper ~~(SECRET)~~
Date: Friday, July 14, 1995 12:20PM

From: Vershbow, Alexander R.
To: @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Bosnia Strategy Paper ~~(SECRET)~~
Date: Thursday, July 13, 1995 08:17 AM

<<File Attachment: JUL12BS.DOC>>

Please pass to TL and SRB:

Here it is. Draft is too long, but I wasn't sure whether you wanted to include the material at the bottom of page 1/top of page 2 on ways to recreate military leverage (most of which may be unrealistic while UNPROFOR is still there) and the regional containment strategy on page 4. After your comments, I will work heroically to shorten it.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. paper	re: Bosnia Strategy [partial] (2 pages)	07/12/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Nancy Soderberg (Staff Director)
OA/Box Number: 1402

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia, July 1995 [1]

2006-0647-F

jp2106

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BOSNIA STRATEGY

Summary: With the fall of Srebrenica, we need to make an all-out effort to restabilize the situation on the ground, restore UNPROFOR's credibility, and press for a realistic diplomatic settlement this year. If that effort fails and UNPROFOR must withdraw, we should move quickly to help the Bosnians obtain the military capabilities needed to level the playing field while minimizing U.S. involvement, so that an ultimate solution is not dependent on our support or the actions of the international community.

Restabilization post-Srebrenica: The Bosnian Serb attack on Srebrenica is simply the most dramatic development in a pattern of increasingly aggressive Serb actions over the past few months. If we and our Allies fail to reverse this pattern, it will only encourage Serb attacks on the other enclaves and renewed strangulation of Sarajevo, precipitating UNPROFOR's collapse and a protracted NATO withdrawal operation in circumstances that will be perceived as a defeat for the UN and the Alliance. It will also guarantee passage of unilateral lift legislation by the Congress in a manner that will damage relations with our allies.

In the short term, we should give political support to French-led efforts to restore the Srebrenica safe area as a demilitarized enclave, while recognizing that there is no sensible military option for saving Srebrenica or Zepa. **The more important task is to devise a strategy to reestablish UNPROFOR's credibility where it counts:** using the lead elements of the RRF immediately to establish secure humanitarian access routes to Sarajevo; and using the full RRF, once deployed, to protect Gorazde, the strategically most important of the eastern enclaves and the one where NATO is most directly engaged (through the exclusion zone). If UNPROFOR and the RRF can prove their effectiveness in this way, we may be able to deter further Serb provocations, restabilize the situation on the ground, and avert an early UNPROFOR withdrawal.

In order for this strategy to succeed, we need to **persuade the Bosnian Government that it is in its interest to keep UNPROFOR** even if this means writing off Srebrenica and Zepa and concentrating UNPROFOR's efforts in Sarajevo and Central Bosnia. We would also need to be sure, before employing the RRF to help protect Gorazde, that Bosnian Government forces there will defend the enclave, since the RRF is not designed to do this on its own.

Pressing for a political settlement this year: We are not going to obtain a settlement this year unless we recreate some real leverage vis-à-vis the Bosnian Serbs, and unless we are prepared to offer inducements to break the logjam surrounding "acceptance" of the Contact Group plan.

Sticks: The more assertive UNPROFOR/RRF actions suggested above will not, in themselves, provide much negotiating leverage. We should use the specter of defeat that UNPROFOR withdrawal would represent to convince Allies of the need to raise the stakes in other ways, such as:

- **restoring the credibility of Operation Deny Flight** by broadening the ROE to permit attacks on all elements of the Serb integrated air defense system displaying hostile intent and retaliatory attacks on airfields used to launch no-fly zone violations;

- issuing new NATO ultimatums regarding air strikes to enforce the exclusion zones;

-

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(c), 1.4(d)

- in order to deprive the Bosnian Serbs of Krajina Serb support, quietly encouraging Tudjman to maintain the threat of increased Croatian attrition operations against Sectors North and South (but not to launch a full-scale assault).

In tandem with these steps, we and our Contact Group partners should tell Milosevic the time has come for him to put up or shut up, i.e. that:

- we will terminate the current sanctions relief in September if he has not recognized Bosnia and taken visible action to terminate military support for Pale (and Knin);
- moreover, if sanctions relief is terminated and the ICFY mission departs, any resumption of large-scale support for Pale will be met not only by a tightening of economic sanctions against the FRY, but by U.S. or NATO air strikes against key supply routes and military targets, including those inside Serbia.

Carrots: To bring the Allies along, convince the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate, and manage the Russians, we will need to adapt elements of the Contact Group plan while preserving its essential core (one state, 51:49). This will entail:

- having a heart-to-heart talk with the Bosnians, stressing that, in light of the fall of Srebrenica, renewed Western readiness for tougher action and (b)(1), 1.4(b), 1.4(d) 1.4(d) they need think more realistically about the shape of a settlement, and agree to at least exploratory Contact Group contacts or proximity talks with Pale;
- in the talks with Pale, advancing possible modifications to the Contact Group map consistent with the 51:49 ratio but providing for a more compact and cohesive territory for the Federation (e.g. trading Srebrenica, Zepa and a widening of the Posavina corridor for full Federation control over Sarajevo and additional territory in central Bosnia); consistent with a recent Silajdzic proposal to Juppé, we could state that up to 10 percent of the Contact Group map was subject to renegotiation;
- similarly, developing the Contact Group's proposed constitutional principles to show the Serbs the amount of autonomy their republic would have within the Union and the scope of the "parallel special relationship" with Serbia;
- if necessary, pressing the Bosnians to agree that the Serbs can conduct a referendum on secession after 2-3 years, as had been agreed in the 1993 *Invincible* package;
- proposing to the Allies and Russians mutual participation in funding a post-settlement "mini-Marshall Plan" for the Balkans designed to foster regional economic recovery and integration and thereby give all parties a stake in peace.

At the same time, in conjunction with the threat of terminating sanctions relief for non-compliance, we may want to **increase the rewards offered to Milosevic** for initial positive steps, such as lifting vice suspending phase-one sanctions if he recognizes Bosnia. This could be especially helpful in keeping Moscow on board.

If UNPROFOR withdrawal must occur: If the last-ditch effort to obtain a settlement fails and the RRF fails to restabilize the situation on the ground, we will need to face up to the issue of UNPROFOR withdrawal and implementing a post-withdrawal strategy. (Indeed, it may be preferable to face the issue this year rather than having to implement a messy and protracted NATO withdrawal operation in the middle of the election campaign, when the parties will have every incentive to try to draw us into the conflict.)

Leveling the playing field: Our post-withdrawal strategy should have as its goal providing the Bosnians with sufficient military capability to survive the immediate Serb onslaught and, within a short period of time, to begin to regain territory allotted to them under the Contact Group proposal. This would make the ultimate resolution of the conflict the result of a balance of power on the ground rather than dependent on the actions of the international community.

- **Our preferred approach would be to lift the arms embargo multilaterally through passage of a UNSC resolution.** This could be made part of the resolution terminating UNPROFOR's mandate and authorizing withdrawal. Our allies have indicated they will go along with lift after UNPROFOR withdrawal. To secure a Russian abstention, we may need to make the lift applicable to all republics of the former Yugoslavia (including Serbia-Montenegro) and/or agree to substantial sanctions relief for Belgrade.

- (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(c), 1.4(d)

While the Bosnians' survival in the short term may require U.S. or NATO air strikes, we would want to set a time limit to any air strike commitment and then restrict our involvement to the provision of arms and training, making clear to the Bosnians that once the playing field is leveled, they are on their own.

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(c), 1.4(d)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d

We would continue to use a mixture of sanctions relief and threats to keep the Serbian border closed and to deter full-scale intervention by Belgrade; but we would tell the Bosnians bluntly that if their offensives went beyond retaking territory on the Contact Group map and provoked Serbian intervention, they should not expect us or NATO to come to their rescue.

Regional containment strategy: As we moved to arm the Bosnians, we would need to take a range of steps to prevent a widening of the conflict to other parts of the region, to include:

- a strong warning of retaliation against Serbia in the event of direct intervention in Bosnia, coupled with sanctions relief to encourage a sealing of the border;
- reinforcing UNPREDEP in Macedonia to prevent Serbian border encroachments and to deter a new crackdown in Kosovo;
- strengthening UNCRO and providing other carrots to Tudjman to prevent a resumption of full-scale war in Krajina (while at the same time encouraging continued low-level attrition operations that could help limit Krajina Serb support to the Bosnian Serbs);
- and possibly deploying preventive peacekeeping forces along Hungary's and Albania's borders with the FRY.

We would, at the same time, intensify our efforts to **sustain the Federation and Bosnian-Croat military cooperation**. And we would make clear that we stand ready to **broker a political settlement and assist in its implementation**, although at this stage we would probably want to set aside the Contact Group approach and devise a basis for a "fresh start" to the negotiations.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Alexander Vershbow to Nelson Drew et al; re: Thoughts on Strategy for Opposing Dole (1 page)	07/12/1995	P1/b(1), P5 v 3/3/2020
002. email	Alexander Vershbow to APNSA Special Assistants et al; re: The French & Drawdown (1 page)	07/13/1995	P1/b(1) v 3/3/2020

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Nancy Soderberg (Staff Director)
 OA/Box Number: 1402

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia, July 1995 [2]

2006-0647-F
jp2107

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Sandy V. wanted you to
see before S. scope call

Darby, M. Brooke

From: Vershbow, Alexander R.
To: Drew, S. Nelson; Soderberg, Nancy E.; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs; @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor
Cc: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Thoughts on Strategy for Opposing Dole ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~
Date: Wednesday, July 12, 1995 4:41 PM

For Tony, Sandy and Nancy

We are handicapped by the fact that Dole has made his unilateral lift resolution more compatible with Administration policy in that it would mandate lift only if 1) UNPROFOR decides to leave; or 2) the Bosnian Government asks UNPROFOR to leave. It allows up to 12 weeks for UNPROFOR to get out before the President would have to implement lift; that period is substantially less than would be needed to implement 40104, but I expect Dole would accept a change from 12 to 16 or 20 weeks -- that's simply a problem of detail.

The only objection of principle we can make is that lift would be unilateral and thereby violate a binding UNSC resolution -- undermining other UNSC sanctions regimes (e.g. Iraq), the authority of the UNSC in general, and transatlantic relations, as well as conferring sole responsibility for the conflict on the U.S. These arguments, however, fall on deaf ears on Capitol Hill.

Therefore, we have to rely on the more indirect argument that passage of the Dole resolution would undermine our efforts to strengthen UNPROFOR so that it can continue its mission (to which Dole will counter that: raising the spectre of lift will encourage the Serbs to stop their provocative behavior that threatens to drive UNPROFOR out).

I would recommend that, because of the unilateral element alone, the President should veto Dole if it passes. This would show faith with our Allies and uphold our commitment to the UN Charter, even if it might not be enough to prevent an override.

Hawkins, Ardenia R.

From: Vershbow, Alexander R.
To: @UP - APNSA Special Assistants; @LEGISLAT-Legislative Affairs; @GLOBAL - Global Affairs
Cc: /R, Record at A1; Drew, S. Nelson
Subject: French want drawdown to go to UN, not nations! [CONFIDENTIAL]
Date: Thursday, July 13, 1995 8:53AM

For Bill Danvers, Mike Sheehan and Nancy Soderberg (cc TL/SRB)

After all our agonizing and all that Congressional abuse on whether to use 506 or 614 authority, the French have thrown us for a loop. They want the stuff to go the UN.:

PREC: PRIORITY CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG:131210Z JUL 95
FM: AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3932

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 16621

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MASS, MARR, MOPS, PREL, FR
SUBJECT: INITIAL FRENCH REACTION NEGATIVE TO EXCHANGE
- OF NOTES ON DRAWDOWN OF DEFENSE ARTICLES FOR RRF

REF: STATE 163564

~~(C)~~ THE GOF CANNOT ACCEPT THE BILATERAL EXCHANGE OF DIPLOMATIC NOTES PROPOSED REFTEL IN CONNECTION WITH PROVISION OF DEFENSE ARTICLES AS A CONTRIBUTION TOWARD THE VOLUNTARY FUNDING OF THE UN RAPID REACTION FORCE, FRENCH MFA IO DESK OFFICER STEPHANE VISCONTI TOLD US JULY 11. VISCONTI POINTED OUT THAT THE U.S. WOULD NOT BE PROVIDING ANY DEFENSE ARTICLES TO THE FRENCH MILITARY -- DEFENSE ARTICLES WOULD BE PROVIDED ONLY TO THE UNITED NATIONS' RAPID REACTION FORCE. THUS, THE GOF CONSIDERS THAT ANY REQUIREMENT THAT NEEDS TO BE MET UNDER U.S. LAW SHOULD BE DEALT WITH BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE UN. HARRIMAN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 11/5/2019

Page 1

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001- memo	Rob Malley to Anthony Lake; re: Human Rights Atrocities in Bosnia (2 pages)	08/04/1995	P1/b(1) v2 3/3/2020

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Srebrenica or War Crimes or ICTY or Atrocities or Genocide])
 OA/Box Number: 599

FOLDER TITLE:

9506054

2006-0647-F
jp2136

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8/7
Nancy S 6054

August 4, 1995


ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: MORTON HALPERIN ^{RM fa}

FROM: ROB MALLEY ^{RM}

SUBJECT: Human Rights Atrocities in Bosnia



There is increasingly solid evidence of atrocities committed by the Bosnian Serb army during its attack on Srebrenica and Zepa. During a mission to central and northeastern Bosnia, A/S Shattuck was able to confirm through interviews with refugees, reports and intelligence we have been receiving. Approximately 12,000 persons from the two former enclaves are still missing and unaccounted for. Hundreds, perhaps up to a thousand, persons (principally men and boys) appear to have been killed in mass executions. Others are either in detention or seeking to flee the area. Reports of other brutalities, including rape, sexual abuse and mutilations abound. There also are some indications that chemical weapons might have been used.

State is undertaking a series of steps to pressure the Bosnian Serbs to grant access to and permit free passage for those still at large or in detention:

1. Demarche to Belgrade to communicate the requirement that an international mission be permitted to enter the former safe areas and extract all former residents.
2. Demarche to Russia and Greece to exercise pressure on Belgrade and Pale.
3. Efforts at the UNSC for the issuance of a statement on the need for accounting, access to and safe passage for those remaining in enclaves.

White House action will be needed to support this effort which, given the unknown fate of thousands of persons, is of the utmost urgency. A first step would be a presidential statement that condemns the atrocities, calls for access to and safe passage for those remaining in the enclaves, and reminds perpetrators of these actions that they will be held accountable. (A draft statement is attached at Tab A). The statement would be released in conjunction with a fact sheet detailing known incidents of

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By ML/NRA Date 11/5/2019

[7013-0656-m (4,4)]

2012-0800-m (1.31) 6/6/2013

atrocities (attached at Tab B). If these initial efforts prove to be unsuccessful, more forceful action should be considered.

Concurrence by: John Schmidt^{ns for}; Eric Schwartz^{ns for}

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve release of the attached presidential statement and fact sheet.

Approve AL Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab A Presidential Statement
- Tab B Fact Sheet

as amended

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: The View from Tuzla and the Plight of the "UN" (5 pages)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1)
002. cable	re: Dutch Foreign Minister... (3 pages)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1)
003. cable	re: Netherlands Minister Expects Gorazde... [50 U.S.C. 403g, Section 6] [partial] (3 pages)	07/18/1995	P3/b(3)
004. cable	re: Balkan Crisis Bulletin (46 pages)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1)
005. cable	re: Netherlands Foreign Minister... [50 U.S.C. 403g, Section 6] [partial] (2 pages)	07/18/1995	P3/b(3)
006. cable	re: Telcon with French President Jacques Chirac [partial] (5 pages)	07/20/1995	P1/b(1) v 3/3/2020
007. cable	re: Foreign Minister Calls for Srebrenica War Crimes Trials [50 U.S.C. 403g, Section 6] [partial] (2 pages)	07/21/1995	P3/b(3)
008. cable	re: Telephone Conversation Between UK Prime Minister John Major and President Clinton, July 14, 1995 [partial] (7 pages)	07/22/1995	P1/b(1) v 3/3/2020
009. cable	re: The Balkans: Situation Update (5 pages)	07/24/1995	P1/b(1)
010. cable	re: Support Cable for European... (7 pages)	07/24/1995	P1/b(1)
011. cable	re: Dutchbat Soliders Report... (2 pages)	07/24/1995	P1/b(1)
012. cable	re: Balkan Crisis: Croatian... (4 pages)	07/24/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Cables
 Jan 1995- Dec 1996 ([Srebrenica and Ethnic Cleans...])
 OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:

[07/18/1995-07/25/1995]

2006-0647-F

rs493

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013. cable	re: Balkan Crisis: Human Rights... (4 pages)	07/24/1995	P1/b(1)
014. cable	re: Survivor Tells of Mass Shooting... [50 U.S.C. 403g, Section 6] [partial] (2 pages)	07/25/1995	P3/b(3)
015. cable	re: Yugoslavia Tribunal... (2 pages)	07/25/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Cables
 Jan 1995- Dec 1996 ([Srebrenica and Ethnic Cleans...])
 OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:

[07/18/1995-07/25/1995]

2006-0647-F

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. cable	re: Telcon with French President Jacques Chirac [partial] (5 pages)	07/20/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1995- Dec 1996 ([Srebrenica and Ethnic Cleans...])
OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:

[07/18/1995-07/25/1995]

2006-0647-F

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHCAA3906 2011821-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O 201818Z JUL 95 ZFF4
 LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 OSRI: RUEHC
 DTG: 201818Z JUL 95
 ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
 TO: AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000
 INFO: ////
 SUBJ: TELCON WITH FRENCH PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC

PARTICIPANTS:
 THE PRESIDENT
 PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC

TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 173906

NODIS

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR AND DCM

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: OPDC, FR
 SUBJECT: TELCON WITH FRENCH PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC

PARTICIPANTS:
 THE PRESIDENT
 PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC
 NOTETAKER: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW AND ANTHONY GARDNER

DATE, TIME AND PLACE:
 JULY 13, 1995, 3:22-3:58 P.M. OVAL OFFICE

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. BEGIN TEXT:

THE PRESIDENT: HELLO, JACQUES?

PRESIDENT CHIRAC: HELLO, BILL. HOW ARE YOU? I WILL
 SPEAK IN FRENCH. I'M VERY WORRIED ABOUT BOSNIA AND THERE
 ARE THINGS WE WANT YOU TO KNOW.
 SWITCHING TO FRENCH
 FIRST OF ALL, MY CONGRATULATIONS ON THE STRONG STATEMENT
 YOU ISSUED THAT IF WE CANNOT RESTORE THE UN MISSION, THEN
 THE DAYS OF UNPROFOR ARE NUMBERED AND THAT THAT CAUSES YOU

CONCERN. OUR ANALYSIS IS THE SAME. THE FALL OF
 SREBRENICA, THE PROBABLE FALL OF ZEPA TOMORROW AND THE

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 RDS 6/6/2013 (1.05)
 2012-0800-M

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REAL THREAT TO GORAZDE REPRESENT A MAJOR FAILURE OF THE UN, NATO AND ALL THE DEMOCRACIES. YOU SEE WHAT WE ARE SEEING ON TV, HOW THE SERBS ARE SEPARATING MEN FROM WOMEN, SENDING WOMEN TO BE RAPED AND KILLING MEN WHO ARE OLD ENOUGH TO BEAR ARMS. IN MY OPINION, WE CAN NO LONGER JUST STAND BY AND WATCH THIS.

(b)(1). EO 13526 1.4b

(b)(1). EO 13526 1.4b

(b)(1). EO 13526 1.4b THEREFORE WE MUST RESTORE THE SITUATION TO THE WAY IT WAS GUARANTEED BY THE UN. THAT MEANS RESTORING THE SITUATION IN THE EASTERN ENCLAVES.

THEREFORE, FIRM AND LIMITED MILITARY ACTION IS CALLED FOR. FRANCE IS READY TO PUT ALL OF ITS FORCES BEHIND THE MISSION. I DON'T YET KNOW WHAT THE BRITISH WANT TO DO. THEY ARE DIRECTLY CONCERNED SINCE THEY ARE IN GORAZDE, NEXT DOOR TO SREBRENICA. I WONDER WHETHER OR NOT THEIR INTENTION IS TO PICK UP AND LEAVE GORAZDE JUST AS THE DUTCH LEFT SREBRENICA. I DON'T WANT FRANCE TO BE AN ACCOMPLICE TO SUCH A SITUATION. EITHER WE AGREE TO CARRY OUT A JOINT MILITARY INTERVENTION TO PROTECT THE THREE ENCLAVES -- TO RECAPTURE SREBRENICA AND GUARANTEE THE INTEGRITY OF GORAZDE AND ZEPA, WHICH ACCOUNT FOR 100,000 MUSLIMS -- (TODAY 20,000 TO 40,000 MUSLIMS ARE FLEEING SREBRENICA, AND WE USE MILITARY INTERVENTION TO IMPOSE THE WILL OF THE UN, WHICH CAN ONLY COME FROM THE U.S., FRANCE, THE UK AND GERMANY -- AND FRANCE IS PREPARED TO THROW ALL OF ITS FORCES INTO THE EFFORT TO RESTORE THE SITUATION IN SREBRENICA -- OR WE DO NOTHING. BUT IF THE OPTION IS TO DO NOTHING, THEN THAT IS EXACTLY THE SITUATION WE WERE IN IN 1939, AND FRANCE WILL WITHDRAW -- OF COURSE, BY AGREEMENT WITH OUR BRITISH FRIENDS AND THE REST OF UNPROFOR. SO THE ISSUE IS WHETHER THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO COOPERATE IN COMBATING ETHNIC CLEANSING, OR DO WE SIT BACK AND LET THESE PEOPLE FIGHT EACH OTHER, AND WE GO HOME. WE CANNOT ALLOW OURSELVES TO BE ACCOMPLICES!

THE PRESIDENT: LET ME FIRST SAY THAT WE APPRECIATE THE STRONG STANCE YOU HAVE TAKEN AND YOUR DETERMINATION TO DO SOMETHING. OBVIOUSLY, WE HAVE BEEN THINKING ABOUT THIS A LOT. I WILL TAKE UP YOUR SPECIFIC PROPOSALS WITH MY MILITARY COMMANDERS, BUT I WANTED TO SPEAK WITH YOU FIRST. I WOULD LIKE YOU TO THINK ABOUT A FEW THINGS. GORAZDE IS MUCH MORE IMPORTANT THAN ZEPA AND SREBRENICA IN TERMS OF ITS SIZE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT. THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT HAS 9,000 TROOPS IN GORAZDE, WHO ARE APPARENTLY WILLING TO FIGHT. IN SREBRENICA THERE WERE

ABOUT 3,000 BOSNIAN TROOPS, BUT AS YOU KNOW, THEY LEFT UNDER PRESSURE OF SHELLING. THEY LEFT WITHOUT PUTTING UP A FIGHT, ALTHOUGH I THINK THEY COULD HAVE DONE SO. THE BRITISH HAVE 300 TROOPS IN GORAZDE, SO I THINK THEY WILL BE MORE INCLINED TO TAKE A STAND THERE. WE ALL KNOW THAT IF SOMETHING HAPPENS TO GORAZDE, THE BOSNIAN SERB ARMY WILL FEEL THEY HAVE A FREE HAND TO MOVE ON TO SARAJEVO. OUR MILITARY ADVISERS SAY THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS IN ATTEMPTING TO LAND A FORCE WITH HELICOPTERS IN SREBRENICA AND THAT UNPROFOR MIGHT BE BETTER OFF SECURING GORAZDE FIRST AND THEN MOVE BACK EASTWARD DUE TO THE INHERENT

DIFFICULTY OF DEFENDING THE AREA THERE.

THE OTHER ISSUE I WOULD LIKE TO RAISE WITH YOU -- WHICH WE DISCUSSED IN HALIFAX AND HERE DURING YOUR VISIT, AND WHICH HAS BECOME MORE PRESSING -- IS THE NECESSITY OF KNOWING WHAT THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ARE GOING TO BE IF YOU TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN SREBRENICA, ZEPA OR GORAZDE. YOU CANNOT BE IN A POSITION TO FIGHT IN ZEPA AND THEN ASK FOR NATO SUPPORT WITHOUT CLEAR RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. IF THERE IS GOING TO BE FIGHTING, IT HAS TO BE DIFFERENT THAN IN THE PAST. BEFORE WE PROVIDE AIR POWER, WE HAVE TO KNOW THAT IT WOULD BE USED AND THAT WE COULD INFLICT REAL PAIN ON THE SERBS IN OTHER AREAS. BEFORE UNPROFOR GETS INTO A MILITARY CAMPAIGN, WE MUST HAVE A CLEAR SENSE OF WHAT THE NEXT MOVE IS AND WHAT THE ACCEPTABLE MILITARY OPTIONS ARE UNDER UNPROFOR AND NATO. NOW THAT YOU HAVE TOLD ME WHAT YOU WANT TO DO, I WILL TALK TO OUR MILITARY ADVISERS, BUT THEY ARE VERY SKEPTICAL ABOUT BRINGING IN FORCES WITH HELICOPTERS, ESPECIALLY IF THE BOSNIANS WON'T FIGHT. I THINK WE SHOULD FIRST SECURE GORAZDE AND THEN SARAJEVO. I WILL HAVE CONVERSATIONS WITH THEM AND GET BACK IN TOUCH WITH YOU.

I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE TWO MORE POINTS. FIRST, I THINK YOUR STATED INTENTIONS TO REOPEN MOUNT IGMAN ROAD IS VERY IMPORTANT -- A CRITICAL POINT. SECOND, WE NEED GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI TO SPEAK WITH ADMIRAL LANXADE OR HAVE SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER SPEAK WITH YOUR FOREIGN MINISTER TO TALK IN DETAIL ABOUT WHAT YOU HAVE IN MIND FOR THE ENCLAVES. WE NEED TO CONSIDER WHETHER THE MUSLIMS WILL RETURN TO THE ENCLAVES, HOW WE WILL PROTECT THEM IF THEY COME BACK AND WHETHER IT WOULD BE UNDER THE OLD UN RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. WILL THE BOSNIAN SERB ARMY JUST END THEIR ADVANCES? THEREFORE, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD FOCUS ON GORAZDE AND PRESS FOR MINISTERIAL AND MILITARY TALKS. YOU HAVE GIVEN ME MANY THINGS TO THINK ABOUT. I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE A FOLLOW UP BETWEEN THE GENERALS AND FOREIGN MINISTERS ON THE DETAILS.

PRESIDENT CHIRAC: BILL, (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b

THE PRESIDENT: WE CANNOT DEFEND DEMOCRATIC VALUES IN THE ABSTRACT. MY MILITARY ADVISERS TELL ME THE MUSLIMS COULD HAVE MADE A HELL OF A FIGHT IN SREBRENICA AND RAISED THE PRICE OF THE SERBS' OCCUPATION, BUT THEY WOULDN'T DO IT. WE CAN'T FIGHT JUST BECAUSE THE UN SAYS THEY ARE "SAFE AREAS." WE CAN'T SEND THE MUSLIMS BACK AND COMMIT OURSELVES TO STAY FOREVER IF THEY WON'T DEFEND THEMSELVES. THAT'S THE PROBLEM WITH THE STRATEGY YOU SUGGEST. YESTERDAY WE SAW THE EFFECTS OF THE IMBALANCE IN ARMS. HAVE YOU HAD ANY SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO?

PRESIDENT CHIRAC:

(b)(1), 1.4(b)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b

THE PRESIDENT: IF WE INTERVENE TO REGAIN THE ENCLAVES ON THEIR BEHALF AND THEY WON'T FIGHT, HOW DO WE KEEP THEM OPEN? UNPROFOR'S MISSION WOULD BE COMPLETELY CHANGED AND YOU WOULD HAVE ENTERED INTO COMBAT ON THE SIDE OF THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT WHEN THEY DON'T FIGHT FOR THEMSELVES. I AGREE THE SERBS HAVE MADE A MOCKERY OF THE UN. THEY TOOK SREBRENICA AND GOT IT FOR FREE. WE DIDN'T EVEN BOMB THEM. WE SHOULD RAISE THE PRICE, AND EVEN HIT PALE. I

HAVE ARGUED THAT WE SHOULD ALLOW NATO TO TAKE TOUGHER ACTION BUT THAT WAS NOT TO BE. IF WE ENTER THE WAR TO DEFEND THE BOSNIANS, THEY HAVE TO BE READY TO DEFEND THEMSELVES. THAT'S WHAT WORRIES ME.

PRESIDENT CHIRAC: WHEN DOES THE CONGRESS VOTE ON LIFTING THE EMBARGO?

THE PRESIDENT: NEXT WEEK. I'M TRYING TO DEFEAT IT. I AGREE WITH YOU: I AM VEHEMENTLY OPPOSED TO UNILATERAL LIFT. IF THEY PASS IT, I WILL VETO IT, AND THEY WOULD BE OBLIGED TO OVERRIDE MY VETO.

PRESIDENT CHIRAC: CAN CONGRESS OVERRIDE THE VETO?

THE PRESIDENT: YES, WITH A TWO-THIRDS VOTE, BUT I DON'T THINK THEY'LL HAVE TWO-THIRDS. I'M NOT WORRIED ABOUT IT. I WOULD LIKE TO CONFER WITH MY MILITARY ADVISERS AND GET BACK IN TOUCH ON THIS MATTER.

PRESIDENT CHIRAC: OK, I QUITE AGREE. I WILL ASK ADMIRAL LANXADE TO CONTACT GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

THE PRESIDENT: OK. GOOD-BYE.
END OF CONVERSATION.
END TEXT.

TALBOTT

BT

#3906

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 SUBJ: TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN UK PRIME MINISTER
 JOHN MAJOR AND PRESIDENT CLINTON, JULY 14, 1995

PARTICIPANTS: THE PRESIDENT
 - PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR

TEXT: ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 175869

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FOR THE AMBASSADOR AND DCM ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, UK
 SUBJECT: TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN UK PRIME MINISTER
 JOHN MAJOR AND PRESIDENT CLINTON, JULY 14, 1995

PARTICIPANTS: THE PRESIDENT
 - PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR
 - NOTETAKERS: MARY ANN PETERS, NELSON DREW
 - KATHERINE O'LOUGHLIN, CELINA REALUYO, LYLE
 - HARRISON AND KENNETH BALDWIN

DATE, TIME JULY 14, 1995, 3:39 - 4:08 P.M.
 AND PLACE: OVAL OFFICE

THE PRESIDENT: HELLO, JOHN? (U)

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: HI BILL. IT HAS BEEN AN
 INTERESTING DAY. WE JUST HAD A THREE-HOUR MEETING ON
 BOSNIA AND I HAD A LIVELIER CONVERSATION THAN USUAL WITH
 CHIRAC. IN OUR ASSESSMENT, THE SITUATION LOOKS AWFUL.
 BACKTRACKING A LITTLE BIT

(h)(1), 1.4(h), 1.4(d)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

(b)(1) THEY ARE PRESENTLY ATTACKING ZEPA AS WE
 SPEAK, AND IT IS ONE OR TWO DAYS BEFORE ZEPA FALLS. THE
 NEXT QUESTION IS WHETHER THEY WILL MOVE DOWN THE EASTERN

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ENCLAVES FROM ZEPA TO GORAZDE. WE JUDGE THEY WILL, BUT BEFORE MOUNTING A PROPER ATTACK IN GORADZE, THEY WILL HAVE TO REGROUP AND WILL NEED AT LEAST FOUR TO FIVE DAYS. WE HAVE SOME PRETTY EXPERIENCED PEOPLE INSIDE AT GORAZDE, AND THEY TELL US THEY PROBABLY WILL ATTACK IN 4 TO 5 DAYS. WE EXPECT THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT FORCES WILL DEFEND IT. WE HAVE 300-400 OF OUR ROYAL WELSH FUSILIERS THERE. THE QUESTION IS WHAT TO DO MILITARILY AND POLITICALLY? I THINK YOU SPOKE WITH CHIRAC? (C)

THE PRESIDENT: (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(d)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(d)

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: HE SEEMS TO HAVE SHIFTED OFF THAT SOMEWHAT NOW. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: NOW HE WANTS TO REINFORCE GORAZDE. (C)

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: YES. HE WANTS TO REINFORCE GORAZDE, RETAKE SREBRENICA AND REINFORCE SARAJEVO AS WELL. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: WE HAVE TO DO THAT ON SARAJEVO ANYWAY. HELMUT SAID THAT ANY OF THESE MILITARY ACTIONS, BESIDES DEFENDING SARAJEVO OR GORADZE, WOULD REQUIRE UNSC ACTION. I HADN'T THOUGHT ABOUT IT. HE SEEMED TO THINK SO, AT LEAST. (C)

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: THEY'RE ON A PEACEKEEPING MISSION. IT WOULD HAVE TO REQUIRE A FAIRLY LOOSE INTERPRETATION OF SELF DEFENSE. AS FAR AS CHIRAC IS CONCERNED. (C)

LINE DROPPED AND REESTABLISHED

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: SORRY, GOD KNOWS WHAT HAPPENED THERE. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: WE WERE TALKING ABOUT THE FRENCH POINT OF VIEW AND THE STATUS OF THINGS. WHAT IS YOUR THINKING ABOUT IT? (C)

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: REGARDING GORAZDE, FRANCE WANTS TO REINFORCE IT. (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(d)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(d)

(b)(1) WE EXPECT OUR CHIEF OF THE DEFENSE STAFF, GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI AND ADMIRAL LANXADE TO MEET OVER THE WEEKEND. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: LANXADE ASKED FOR HELICOPTERS TO SUPPORT IT, BUT THEY WOULD BE SITTING DUCKS WITHOUT TAKING OUT THEIR, THE SERBS, ABILITY TO SHOOT THEM DOWN. (C)

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(d)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4d

THE PRESIDENT: (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4d

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(d)

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(d)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(d)

THE PRESIDENT: (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(d)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(d)

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(d)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(d)

THE PRESIDENT: I HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH MY MILITARY COMMANDERS. THEY WERE ALL HERE IN WASHINGTON FOR A MILITARY CONFERENCE, EXCEPT FOR JOULWAN, WHO STAYED BEHIND

IN EUROPE. ACTUALLY, ADMIRAL BOORDA, EUCOM COMMANDER, WHO WAS IN CHARGE OF THE WHOLE BOSNIA THING BEFORE JOULWAN, IS HERE IN WASHINGTON. AND GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI WAS THERE BEFORE JOULWAN. YESTERDAY WE WENT OVER IT IN GREAT DETAIL. I CALLED COLIN POWELL TOO, TO MAKE SURE OF A BALANCED VIEW. HE SAID IF YOU CHANGE THE NATURE OF THE MISSION AND DECIDE TO FIGHT, SCREWING AROUND IS NOT AN OPTION. YOU MUST BE WILLING TO TAKE CASUALTIES, INFLICT CASUALTIES AND USE AIR POWER WHICH MAY HURT CIVILIANS. YOU MUST DECIDE IF YOU THINK IT IS A SUSTAINABLE STRATEGY IN THE LONG RUN AND ARE PREPARED TO ENTER THE WAR ON THE SIDE OF THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS. I WAS MOVED BY THE REPORT THAT 3,000 BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT TROOPS LEFT SREBRENICA WITHOUT FIGHTING -- HOW CAN YOU BLAME THE DUTCH? (C)

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: THE DUTCH MADE A FAIR SHOWING. THEY ARE NOT TO BLAME AT ALL. (b)(1), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

(b)(1), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)(C)

THE PRESIDENT: (b)(1), 1.4(d)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4d

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: YOU AND I HAVE PRESSES THAT HELP, BUT I HAVE NO INTENTION TO REACT BECAUSE THE STAKES ARE HIGHER THAN THAT. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: I'M JUST GOING TO LET IT GO. LOOK, I THINK IT IS VERY IMPORTANT, IF POSSIBLE, TO HOLD GORAZDE. IF IT FALLS, SARAJEVO WILL BE MORE VULNERABLE. IT IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY AND STRATEGICALLY MORE IMPORTANT. WE HAVE TO LOOK AT OTHER OPTIONS. SERBIA SAYS THEY ARE NOT COOPERATING, BUT THEY HAVE MORE SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT NOW TO SHOOT OUR PLANES DOWN. (C)

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: GORAZDE WON'T GO DOWN QUICKLY. BUT THERE ARE 5,000 GOVERNMENT TROOPS WHO WON'T HOLD OUT LONG AGAINST 12,000-14,000 SERBS. (b)(1)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(d)

THE PRESIDENT: I'M OPEN TO PROVIDE HELP, BUT WE DON'T WANT TO DO ANYTHING MILITARILY STUPID. WE HAVE TO HAVE AN UNDERSTANDING. WE CAN'T JUST KICK THE CAN DOWN THE ROAD. IF THERE IS A CONSENSUS ON THIS ISSUE, (b)(1)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(d)

(b)(1) THEY DO NOT WANT UNPROFOR TO LEAVE BUT AT THE SAME THEY HAVE THIS CRAZY IDEA TO URGE THE U.S. CONGRESS TO LIFT THE ARMS EMBARGO HERE. THEY ARE TELLING THE CONGRESS THAT THAT IS THE ONLY REASON THAT THEY LOST SREBRENICA, BECAUSE THEY HAVE NO HEAVY EQUIPMENT. (C)

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: THEY'RE WRONG. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: BEFORE WE MAKE ANY DECISIONS. THEY WILL

HAVE TO DECIDE WHAT THEY WANT. (C)

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: WHEN IS THE VOTE? (C)

THE PRESIDENT: SOMETIME NEXT WEEK. IT WILL BE A HELL OF A VOTE THE FIRST TIME AROUND; UNLESS I CAN FIGURE OUT SOME ALTERNATIVE. (C)

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: OH. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: THERE ARE TWO RELEVANT FACTS THAT ARE IGNORED: THE CASUALTY RATE HAS GONE WAY DOWN AND CENTRAL BOSNIA IS AT PEACE BECAUSE OF CONTRIBUTIONS MADE BY UNPROFOR. THE AVERAGE TV VIEWER SEES IT. HE THINKS IT'S AS BAD OR WORSE THAN IT WAS IN 1992. (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4d
1.4(d) THOSE SAFE AREAS WERE ALWAYS THERE AT THE SUFFERANCE OF THE SERBS, PARTICULARLY WHEN THE SERBS

STARTED TAKING HOSTAGES. (C)

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(d)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(d)

THE PRESIDENT: I REMEMBER THAT WELL. IT IS NOT INCONCEIVABLE THAT THE LIFTING OF THE ARMS EMBARGO WILL PASS BY OVERRIDING MY VETO. IZETBEGOVIC AND SILAJDZIC HAVE BEEN LOBBYING CONGRESS. (C)

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(d)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(d)

THE PRESIDENT: IF THEY DO I'LL TRY TO VETO IT AND SUSTAIN IT. BUT THEY ARE IN A DREAM WORLD OVER THERE. WHAT THEY SEE IS MUSLIMS BEING SPLIT BY SEXES ETHNIC CLEANSING ON TV WHICH THEY THINK IS JUST AS BAD AS IN '92. THERE'S NO TELLING THEM IT'S DIFFERENT. IT ALL HELPS SUPPORT THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO MOVEMENT. THEY SEE THE UN FAILURE AND BELIEVE WE SHOULD GIVE THE MUSLIMS GUNS. THEY ARE TELLING CONGRESS THAT IF THEY HAD GUNS THEY WOULD BE KICKING THE CRAP OUT OF THEM. BUT IF THE FRENCH AND BRITISH LEAVE, THE AMERICAN PUBLIC IS NOT WILLING TO SEND U.S. TROOPS TO BOSNIA. THEY ARE JUST KICKING THE CAN DOWN THE ROAD. NO ONE LIKES TO APPEAR WEAK BUT WE ARE AT STEP 10 NOW, NOT STEP 2. I WOULDN'T BE ALARMED BY THAT OR CONDITION OUR CONDUCT ON IT BUT IF IT LOOKS LIKE THERE IS A CERTAIN RESOLVE AND CLARITY OF EXPLANATION IT WOULD HELP ME TO MODERATE A FIRESTORM. WE'LL HAVE TO ACT TOGETHER. IT WILL HELP. (C)

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: I SEE. LET ME CHECK THE TIMETABLE. THE SENATE VOTES NEXT WEEK, THEN THE HOUSE. THE LIFT WOULDN'T TAKE EFFECT UNTIL SEPTEMBER? (C)

THE PRESIDENT: THE VOTE CAN BE DONE IN A FEW DAYS AND THE OVERRIDE VOTE A FEW DAYS AFTER THAT. THEY CAN SET AN EFFECTIVE TIME SOMETIME LATER, OR EVEN IMMEDIATELY. THEY MIGHT SET A DATE SOON, BECAUSE OF THEIR PERCEPTION THAT

THE UN IS ROUTED. THE PERCEPTION IS THAT THE U.S. IS ON THE SIDE OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PROBLEM IS THAT UNPROFOR HAS NO MANDATE TO ENTER INTO WAR. (E)

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: I HAVE A PRETTY FULL REPORT OF YOUR PROBLEMS. (E)

THE PRESIDENT: I AM NOT HUNG UP ABOUT VETOING IT. THIS ISSUE AND A DOMESTIC ONE HAVE ME IN A FUN HOUSE. ALL THE PRESS IS ONE WAY AND FACTS ARE IRRELEVANT. (E)

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: I AM VERY FAMILIAR WITH THAT. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: OUR CITIZENS HAVE GOOD MOTIVES. COMPASSION AND NEO-ISOLATIONISM ARE LEADING TO SUPPORT FOR LIFTING THE ARMS EMBARGO. THEY DON'T WANT OUR SOLDIERS THERE, BUT THEY BADMOUTH THE UN AND WANT TO GIVE THEM ARMS. I JUST WANT YOU TO GIVE THEM ARMS. I JUST WANT YOU TO KNOW WHAT IS GOING ON. THE PRESS IS PLAYING ON POPULAR EMOTIONS IN THE MOST IRRESPONSIBLE WAY. (E)

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: YES, I UNDERSTAND. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: THERE IS A POSSIBILITY IT'LL HAPPEN QUICKER THAN YOU SUGGEST. IT COULD BE THE LAW OF OUR COUNTRY. (E)

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: I'LL KEEP MY FINGERS CROSSED. I SYMPATHIZE WITH YOU ABOUT THE WHITEWATER STUFF. I'M SORRY IT KEEPS COMING UP. YOU DON'T NEED THAT SORT OF RUBBISH. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: I DO NOT UNDERSTAND IT. THEY HAVE NOW SPENT 12 MILLION ON THE INVESTIGATION OF A LAND DEAL I LOST DOLS 40,000 ON AND A DOLS 20,000 CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION. EVERY REPORT SAYS THAT NEITHER I NOR HILLARY DID ANYTHING WRONG. (U)

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: YES. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: HOW WORRIED SHOULD I BE ABOUT THE VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND? SENATOR MITCHELL PASSED ON YOUR REQUEST THAT I MAKE A STATEMENT THAT I LOOK FORWARD TO VISITING A PEACEFUL IRELAND. I WILL DO IT BEFORE THE CEASE-FIRE ANNIVERSARY. (U)

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: THERE ARE PROBLEMS ON BOTH SIDES.

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(d)

1.4(d)

MCCARTNEY IS THE NEWLY ELECTED INDEPENDENT.

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(d)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(d)

THERE HAS BEEN NO PROGRESS ON DECOMMISSIONING. WE ARE IN CONTACT AND TRYING TO STITCH A WAY FORWARD. WE ARE WORRIED AS WE GET CLOSER TO AUGUST 31. WE ARE APPROACHING THE 12-MONTH DEADLINE. THE MARCHING SEASON CAUSED SOME PROBLEMS BUT WITH LESS

DAMAGE THAN EXPECTED. AUGUST 31 IS THE NEXT WORRY DATE.
I HAVE HAD GOOD MEETINGS WITH BRUTON AND DISCUSSIONS
CONTINUE. YOUR VISIT IN NOVEMBER IS VITAL (b)(1), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(d)

THE PRESIDENT: IF YOU NEED TO TALK ON BOSNIA, WE'LL BE IN TOUCH. I'LL BE AVAILABLE. (C)

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: YOU PROBABLY KNOW BY NOW WE HAVE DECIDED TO CALL A CONFERENCE AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL NEXT WEEK IN LONDON TO DISCUSS THE BOSNIAN ISSUE AND THE UNPROFOR MISSION. I HOPE WARREN AND PERRY WILL ATTEND. WE NEED TO GET A COORDINATED LOOK AT WHAT IS TO HAPPEN THERE. (C).

THE PRESIDENT: YES, I WILL TALK TO THEM ABOUT GOING. (C)

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: VERY WELL. I'LL BE HERE TO CHAT ANYTIME. I MAY CALL YOU ON MONDAY AFTER WE LOOK AT THE MILITARY OPTIONS. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: BY THE WAY, THANK YOU FOR YOUR DECISION TO BUY THE APACHES. (C)

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: OH, YES. THAT DID NOT ADD TO MY CONVERSATION WITH CHIRAC. CHIRAC AND THE FRENCH WERE NOT PARTICULARLY HAPPY ABOUT IT. WE FELT IT WAS THE BEST HELICOPTER. WE MADE THE RIGHT CHOICE. I HAVE NOT A SHRED OF REGRET ABOUT IT. (C)

THE PRESIDENT: OK THEN, WE'LL BE IN TOUCH. (U)

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: GOOD-BYE. GOD BLESS. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: OK. GOOD-BYE. (U)

-- END OF CONVERSATION -- TALBOTT
BT
#5869

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: Balkan Crisis: UN Investigation (3 pages)	08/17/1995	P1/b(1)
002. cable	re: ICRC Follow-Up on Missing Detainees in Bosnia... (2 pages)	08/21/1995	P1/b(1)
003. cable	re: Balkan Crisis: UNHCR (2 pages)	08/22/1995	P1/b(1)
004. cable	re: Mazowiecki Report: Summary Killings Occurred in Srebrenica [50 U.S.C. 403g, Section 6] [partial] (2 pages)	08/23/1995	P3/b(3)
005. cable	re: More on Mazowiecki Report of Executions in Srebrenica [50 U.S.C. 403g, Section 6] [partial] (3 pages)	08/23/1995	P3/b(3)
006. cable	re: Balkans Crisis Summary (11 pages)	08/28/1995	P1/b(1)
007. cable	re: Minister Prepares Defense Over Fall of Srebrenica [50 U.S.C. 403g, Section 6] [partial] (3 pages)	08/28/1995	P3/b(3)
008. cable	re: Premier Feels 'Sorry' for Downplaying Srebrenica Genocide [50 U.S.C. 403g, Section 6] [partial] (2 pages)	08/29/1995	P3/b(3)
009. cable	re: Demarche to ICRC on Access to Missing Persons... (2 pages)	08/31/1995	P1/b(1)
010. cable	re: Bosnia/Croatia: Contact Group Discusses Presidential Statements... (5 pages)	09/06/1995	P1/b(1) RVS 2/15/2016
011. cable	re: Italy's UN Ambassador Fulci on B-H Atrocities, Other Issues [50 U.S.C. 403g, Section 6] [partial] (3 pages)	09/06/1995	P3/b(3)
012. cable	re: German Human Rights Congress Accuses Dutchbat of Cowardice [50 U.S.C. 403g, Section 6] [partial] (2 pages)	09/07/1995	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Cables
 Jan 1995- Dec 1996 ([Srebrenica and Ethnic Cleans...])
 OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:

[08/17/1995-10/13/1995]

2006-0647-F

rs496

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013. cable	re: 9/07/95 Pres. Statements Condemning Human Rights... (4 pages)	09/08/1995	P1/b(1) RDS 9/15/2016
014. cable	re: Take 1 of 2-Mazowiecki on Dutchbat's Role in Srebrenica [50 U.S.C. 403g, Section 6] [partial] (3 pages)	09/11/1995	P3/b(3)
015. cable	re: Request for Reference to ICRC in Yugoslav Peace Agreement (4 pages)	09/15/1995	P1/b(1) RDS 9/15/2016
016. cable	re: Highlight Cable 26 Sep 95 (4 pages) <i>partial release</i>	09/26/1995	P1/b(1) KDE 5/26/2016
017. cable	re: The Balkans: Situation Update (5 pages)	09/27/1995	P1/b(1) RDS 9/15/2016
018. cable	re: Bosnia/Croatia: Discussion of the SYG's Report on UNCRO... (4 pages)	10/11/1995	P1/b(1) RDS 9/15/2016
019. cable	re: Demarche to FRY Foreign Minister Milutinovic... (2 pages)	10/11/1995	P1/b(1) RDS 9/15/2016
020. cable	re: Bosnia/Croatia: Council Adopts a Presidential Statement Condemning "Ethnic Cleansing"... (4 pages)	10/12/1995	P1/b(1) RDS 9/15/2016
021. cable	re: Dutch Report on Srebrenica to Offer Grist for Defenders... (5 pages)	10/13/1995	P1/b(1) RDS 9/15/2016

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Cables
 Jan 1995- Dec 1996 ([Srebrenica and Ethnic Cleans...])
 OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:

[08/17/1995-10/13/1995]

2006-0647-F
rs496

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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 RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 1562
 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 3750
 RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 0893
 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 2068
 RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2791
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 RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 3004
 SUBJ: BOSNIA/CROATIA: CONTACT GROUP DISCUSSES
 -- PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
 -- VIOLATIONS IN SREBRENCIA, SECTORS NORTH AND
 -- SOUTH

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 003368

JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2, CHAIRMAN,
 USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
 POLAD MINISTER PENNER

E.O.12356: DECL: 08/14/05
 TAGS: PREL, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
 SUBJECT: BOSNIA/CROATIA: CONTACT GROUP DISCUSSES
 -- PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
 -- VIOLATIONS IN SREBRENCIA, SECTORS NORTH AND
 -- SOUTH

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

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DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
 White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
 By SP-1 NARA, Date 9/15/2016
 2013-0831-01 (1.06)

[2013-0456-01, 5.05]

2. COUNSELORS FROM THE CONTACT GROUP PLUS ITALY MET AFTERNOON OF SEPTEMBER 5 TO DISCUSS A GERMAN DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT RESPONDING TO THE SYG'S AUGUST 30 REPORT REGARDING THE FATE OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF ZEPA AND SREBRENICA. (THE GERMAN DRAFT CIRCULATED DURING THE MEETING ALREADY CONTAINED U.S. PROPOSED LANGUAGE THAT STATES GIVE THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL ACCESS TO SITES IT DEEMS IMPORTANT FOR ITS INVESTIGATIONS.) ALL MEMBERS OF THE GROUP AGREED THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD RESPOND TO THE REPORT BY ADOPTING A PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT. THE UK, FRENCH, ITALIAN AND RUSSIAN DELEGATIONS ARGUED THAT THE COUNCIL SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS GIVING DIRECTIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL WHICH WAS AN AUTONOMOUS BODY. THEY THEREFORE SUGGESTED THE DELETION OF THE SENTENCE IN THE ORIGINAL DRAFT WHICH EXPRESSED THE COUNCIL'S HOPE THAT THE TRIBUNAL'S INVESTIGATION INTO THE INCIDENTS MENTIONED IN THE SYG'S REPORT BE INTENSIFIED. THE GERMAN REPRESENTATIVE AGREED TO THE DELETION.

3. THE RUSSIAN REPRESENTATIVE SAID THAT THE STATEMENT SHOULD ALSO REFLECT CONCERNS ABOUT VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROATIA THAT HAD BEEN MENTIONED IN THE SYG'S AUGUST 23 REPORT ON UNCRO. HE CIRCULATED TWO PARAGRAPHS CONTAINING SPECIFIC LANGUAGE. ALL OTHER DELEGATIONS SUGGESTED THAT THE COUNCIL TAKE UP THE QUESTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN SECTORS NORTH AND SOUTH IN A SEPARATE PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT. THE RUSSIAN REPRESENTATIVE AGREED THAT HIS DELEGATION COULD ACCEPT THE PRINCIPAL OF TWO PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS WHICH WERE ADOPTED SIMULTANEOUSLY.

4. COUNSELORS WENT THROUGH THE GERMAN TEXT PARAGRAPH BY PARAGRAPH AND AGREED TO SEND THE TEXT FOUND BELOW TO CAPITALS. THEY ALSO WENT THROUGH THE RUSSIAN PROPOSALS AND TURNED THEM INTO A FREE STANDING STATEMENT THAT WOULD ALSO BE SENT TO CAPITALS. THE BRITISH REPRESENTATIVE RAISED A QUESTION ABOUT THE REFERENCE TO "SECTORS" NORTH, SOUTH AND WEST, AND THE USE OF THE TERM "KRAJINA SERB" POPULATION IN THE RUSSIAN STATEMENT. THE GROUP AGREED THAT IT WILL RECONVENE AT 1100 SEPTEMBER 6 TO CONTINUE ITS DISCUSSION OF THE TWO TEXTS.

5. BEGIN TEXT OF GERMAN DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON ZEPA AND SREBRENICA:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF 30 AUGUST (S/1995/755) SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO ITS RESOLUTION 1010 OF 10 AUGUST 1995.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL STRONGLY CONDEMNS THE FAILURE OF THE BOSNIAN SERB PARTY TO COMPLY WITH THE DEMANDS CONTAINED IN RESOLUTION 1010 (1995). THE BOSNIAN SERB PARTY'S REFUSAL TO COOPERATE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR) AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) CANNOT

BUT REINFORCE THE DEEP CONCERN EXPRESSED IN THAT RESOLUTION AND IN PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS AND STATEMENTS.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL STRESSES ITS DETERMINATION THAT THE FATE OF PERSONS DISPLACED FROM SREBRENICA AND ZEPA BE ESTABLISHED. IT REAFFIRMS ITS DEMANDS TO THE BOSNIAN SERB PARTY TO GIVE IMMEDIATE ACCESS FOR
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 003368

JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2, CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER PENNER

E.O.12356: DECL: 08/14/05
TAGS: PREL, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: BOSNIA/CROATIA: CONTACT GROUP DISCUSSES
-- PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
-- VIOLATIONS IN SREBRENCIA, SECTORS NORTH AND
-- SOUTH

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNHCR, THE ICRC AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES TO PERSONS DISPLACED FROM SREBRENICA AND ZEPA WHO ARE WITHIN THE AREAS OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA WHO ARE WITHIN THE AREAS OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA UNDER THE CONTROL OF BOSNIAN SERB FORCES, AND TO PERMIT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ICRC TO VISIT AND REGISTER ANY PERSONS DETAINED AGAINST THEIR WILL.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL ALSO REAFFIRMS ITS DEMANDS TO THE BOSNIAN SERB PARTY TO RESPECT FULLY THE RIGHTS OF ALL SUCH PERSONS, TO ENSURE THEIR SAFETY AND TO RELEASE THEM.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL TAKES NOTE OF THE INVESTIGATIONS WHICH ARE BEING CARRIED OUT BY THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO ITS RESOLUTION 827 (1993). THE COUNCIL REITERATES IN THIS CONTEXT THAT ALL STATES SHALL COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE TRIBUNAL AND ITS ORGANS, INCLUDING BY PROVIDING ACCESS TO SITES THE TRIBUNAL DEEMS IMPORTANT FOR ITS INVESTIGATIONS. THE SECURITY COUNCIL REITERATES THAT ALL THOSE WHO COMMIT VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW WILL BE HELD INDIVIDUALLY RESPONSIBLE IN RESPECT OF SUCH ACTS.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS AND TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL NO LATER THAN 6 OCTOBER 1995 REGARDING COMPLIANCE WITH RESOLUTION 1010 (1995) AND ANY FURTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION THAT MAY BECOME AVAILABLE.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.

END TEXT OF GERMAN DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT.

6. BEGIN TEXT OF RUSSIAN DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT

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ON CROATIA:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL EXPRESSES ITS DEEP CONCERN AT THE GRAVE SITUATION OF REFUGEES AND PERSONS DISPLACED FROM THEIR HOMES AS A RESULT OF THE CROATIAN OFFENSIVE IN SECTORS WEST, SOUTH AND NORTH IN CROATIA AND AT REPORTS OF VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AS DESCRIBED IN THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF 23 AUGUST 1995 (S/1995/730). THE COUNCIL SHARES THE VIEW OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL THAT THE MASS EXODUS OF THE KRAJINA SERB POPULATION HAS CREATED A HUMANITARIAN CRISIS OF SIGNIFICANT PROPORTIONS. THE COUNCIL IS ALSO CONCERNED BY REPORTS OF VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS INCLUDING THE BURNING OF HOUSES, LOOTING OF PROPERTY AND KILLINGS IN SECTORS SOUTH AND NORTH AND DEMANDS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF CROATIA IMMEDIATELY TAKES APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO PUT AN END TO SUCH ACTS.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL WELCOMES EFFORTS MADE BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN COORDINATION WITH INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS IN RESPONSE TO THIS ACUTE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION. ITS CALLS UPON ALL MEMBER STATES TO PROVIDE URGENT HUMANITARIAN RELIEF AND ASSISTANCE TO THESE REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS. THE SECURITY COUNCIL REITERATES THAT ALL THOSE WHO COMMIT VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW WILL BE HELD INDIVIDUALLY RESPONSIBLE IN RESPECT OF SUCH ACTS.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 003368

JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2, CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER PENNER

E.O.12356: DECL: 08/14/05

TAGS: PREL, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: BOSNIA/CROATIA: CONTACT GROUP DISCUSSES
-- PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
-- VIOLATIONS IN SREBRENICA, SECTORS NORTH AND
-- SOUTH

THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE
MATTER.

END TEXT OF RUSSIAN DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON
CROATIA.

7. SARAJEVO MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

GNEHM
BT
#3368

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03
<^SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03

SSN: 3368
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TOR: 950905204830 M1840784
<^TOR>950905204832 M1840785
<^TOR>950905204834 M1840786

DIST:
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Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
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 RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
 RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 1569
 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2867
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 RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 1570
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 RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA 4070
 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 2083
 RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2799
 RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 0901
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 RUCBSAA/USCINCOM NORFOLK VA
 SUBJ: 9/07/95 PRES. STATEMENTS CONDEMNING HUMAN
 RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN BOSNIA AND CROATIA

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 003401

JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2, CHAIRMAN,
 USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
 POLAD MINISTER PENNER

E.O.12356: DECL: 09/07/05
 TAGS: PREL, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
 SUBJECT:9/07/95 PRES. STATEMENTS CONDEMNING HUMAN
 RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN BOSNIA AND CROATIA

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADOPTED TWO PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS CONDEMNING THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN BOSNIAN AND CROATIA.

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By 205 NARA, Date 9/16/2016

2013-0831-m (1.07)

[2013-0831-m (1.07)]

3. IN THE INFORMAL SESSION OF THE COUNCIL, THE DELEGATION OF OMAN SUGGESTED THAT THE STATEMENT ON BOSNIA INCLUDE A DEMAND FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE BOSNIAN SERBS FROM THE SAFE AREAS OF ZEPA AND SREBRENICA. THE MEMBERS OF THE CONTACT GROUP RESPONDED THAT THE STATEMENT SHOULD REMAIN FOCUSED ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION, THE DELEGATION OF OMAN WITHDREW ITS PROPOSAL.

4. BEGIN TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON ZEPA AND SREBRENICA:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF 30 AUGUST 1995 (S/1995/755) SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO ITS RESOLUTION 1010 (1995) OF 10 AUGUST 1995.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL STRONGLY CONDEMNS THE FAILURE OF THE BOSNIAN SERB PARTY TO COMPLY WITH THE DEMANDS CONTAINED IN RESOLUTION 1010 (1995). THE BOSNIAN SERB PARTY'S REFUSAL TO COOPERATE WITH THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR) AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE RED CROSS (ICRC) CANNOT BUT REINFORCE THE DEEP CONCERN EXPRESSED IN THAT RESOLUTION AND IN PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS AND STATEMENTS.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL STRESSES ITS DETERMINATION THAT THE FATE OF PERSONS DISPLACED FROM SREBRENICA AND ZEPA BE ESTABLISHED. IT REAFFIRMS ITS DEMANDS TO THE BOSNIAN SERB PARTY TO GIVE IMMEDIATE ACCESS FOR REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNHCR, THE ICRC AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES TO SUCH PERSONS WHO ARE WITHIN THE AREAS OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA UNDER THE CONTROL OF BOSNIAN SERB FORCES, AND TO PERMIT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ICRC TO VISIT AND REGISTER ANY PERSONS DETAINED AGAINST THEIR WILL.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL ALSO REAFFIRMS ITS DEMANDS TO THE BOSNIAN SERB PARTY TO RESPECT FULLY THE RIGHTS OF ALL SUCH PERSONS, TO ENSURE THEIR SAFETY AND TO RELEASE THEM.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL REITERATES THAT ALL THOSE WHO COMMIT VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW WILL BE HELD INDIVIDUALLY RESPONSIBLE IN RESPECT OF SUCH ACTS.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL TAKES NOTE OF THE INVESTIGATIONS WHICH ARE BEING CARRIED OUT BY THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO ITS RESOLUTION 827 (1993). THE COUNCIL REITERATES IN THIS CONTEXT THAT ALL STATES SHALL COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE TRIBUNAL AND ITS ORGANS, INCLUDING BY PROVIDING ACCESS TO SITES THE TRIBUNAL DEEMS IMPORTANT FOR ITS INVESTIGATIONS.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS AND TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL NO

LATER THAN 6 OCTOBER 1995 REGARDING COMPLIANCE WITH RESOLUTION 1010 (1995) AND ANY FURTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION THAT MAY BECOME AVAILABLE.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 003401

JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2, CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER PENNER

E.O.12356: DECL: 09/07/05
TAGS: PREL, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT:9/07/95 PRES. STATEMENTS CONDEMNING HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN BOSNIA AND CROATIA

MATTER.

END TEXT

5. BEGIN TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON CROATIA:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS CONSIDERED THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF 23 AUGUST 1995 (S/1995/730) SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO ITS RESOLUTION 1009 OF 10 AUGUST 1995 ON CROATIA AND IN PARTICULAR THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS DESCRIBED THEREIN.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL EXPRESSES ITS DEEP CONCERN AT THE GRAVE SITUATION OF REFUGEES AND PERSONS DISPLACED DURING THE CROATIAN OFFENSIVE AND AT REPORTS OF VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW DESCRIBED IN THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF 23 AUGUST 1995 (S/1995/730). THE COUNCIL SHARES THE VIEW OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL THAT THE MASS EXODUS OF THE LOCAL SERB POPULATION HAS CREATED A HUMANITARIAN CRISIS OF SIGNIFICANT PROPORTIONS. THE COUNCIL IS ALSO CONCERNED BY REPORTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS INCLUDING THE BURNING OF HOUSES, LOOTING OF PROPERTY AND KILLINGS AND DEMANDS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF CROATIA IMMEDIATELY INVESTIGATE ALL SUCH REPORTS AND TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO PUT AN END TO SUCH ACTS.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL REITERATES ITS DEMAND THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA RESPECT FULLY THE RIGHTS OF THE LOCAL SERB POPULATION INCLUDING THEIR RIGHT TO REMAIN OR RETURN TO SAFETY.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL WELCOMES EFFORTS MADE BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL IN COORDINATION WITH INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS IN RESPONSE TO THIS ACUTE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION. IT CALLS UPON ALL MEMBER STATES TO PROVIDE URGENT HUMANITARIAN RELIEF AND ASSISTANCE TO THESE REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL REITERATES THAT ALL THOSE WHO COMMIT VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW WILL BE HELD INDIVIDUALLY RESPONSIBLE IN RESPECT OF SUCH ACTS. THE COUNCIL REITERATES IN THIS CONTEXT THAT

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ALL STATES SHALL COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO ITS RESOLUTION 827
(1993) AND ITS ORGANS.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE
MATTER.

END TEXT

6. SAREJEVO MINIMIZED CONSIDERED.

GNEHM
BT
#3401

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
SSN: 3401
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DIST: SIT: BELL BREMNER CLARKER DAALDER FLANAGAN HALPERIN LORIN MALLEY NSC
PETERS SAUNDERS SCHWARTZ SESTAK VERSHBOW VERVILLE

□

Cable

PREC: ROUTINE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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 DTG: 151118Z SEP 95
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 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6268
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 RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 9374
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
 RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 1010
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 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3841
 RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO 0125
 SUBJ: REQUEST FOR REFERENCE TO ICRC IN YUGOSLAV PEACE
 - AGREEMENT; NO PROGRESS ON SREBRENICA MISSING

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 007023

E.O. 12356: 09/14/1996
 TAGS: PEF, PHUM, ICRC, UN, BK
 SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR REFERENCE TO ICRC IN YUGOSLAV PEACE
 - AGREEMENT; NO PROGRESS ON SREBRENICA MISSING

REF: STATE 207727

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST: ICRC PRESIDENT SOMMARUGA MADE A REQUEST TO AMB. SPIEGEL THAT ANY PEACE AGREEMENT REACHED IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA INCLUDE AN EXPRESS REFERENCE TO THE ICRC AS THE ENTITY THROUGH WHICH THE ISSUES OF DETAINEES AND THE MISSING SHOULD BE PURSUED. HE CAUTIONED, HOWEVER, THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO LINK THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUES THEMSELVES TO THE NEGOTIATIONS. WITH RESPECT TO THE SREBRENICA MISSING, SOMMARUGA TOLD AMB. SPIEGEL THAT HE IS SENDING A VERY STIFF LETTER TO KARADZIC DEMANDING AN EXPLANATION. ICRC INTERVIEWS OF SREBRENICA REFUGEES IN TUZLA INDICATE THAT 3,000 ARRESTED BY THE BOSNIAN SERBS IN SREBRENICA/POTOCARI ARE MISSING AND THAT ANOTHER 1,000 - 2,000 OF THOSE WHO FLED SREBRENICA ARE STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR. ICRC'S DEMANDS FOR ACCESS TO ALL DETAINEES HAS SO FAR RESULTED IN VISITS TO ONLY 164.

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
 White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
 By ADS NARA, Date 9/16/2016
 2013-0831-m (1.0x)
 [2013-056-m, 5.02]

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ICRC WOULD APPRECIATE ANY FURTHER INFORMATION THAT THE

MASS GRAVE SITES NEAR KASABA DEPICTED IN THE DEPARTMENT-PROVIDED PHOTOGRAPHS ACTUALLY CONTAIN CORPSES. ICRC REPORTS THAT THE EVACUATION FROM ZEPA WAS MUCH CLEANER IN COMPARISON AND THAT THE NUMBER OF MISSING IS A GOOD DEAL LESS THAN ONE HUNDRED. THEY ALSO INDICATE THAT GORAZDE HAS AN ESTIMATED POPULATION OF 30,000 - 40,000 WITH OVERCROWDED LIVING CONDITIONS IN GORAZDE CITY, BUT WITH ADEQUATE FOODS WATER AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES UNTIL THE BRIDGES LEADING TO GORAZDE WERE RECENTLY DESTROYED. END SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST.

3. AMB SPIEGEL BRIEFED ICRC PRESIDENT SOMMARUGA ON SEPTEMBER 13 ON THE OUTCOME OF THE YUGOSLAVIA PEACE TALKS HELD IN GENEVA SEPTEMBER 8. SOMMARUGA IN TURN REQUESTED THAT ANY PEACE AGREEMENT INCLUDE A PROVISION EXPRESSLY IDENTIFYING ICRC AS THE ORGANIZATION THROUGH WHICH THE ISSUES RELATING TO DETAINEES AND MISSING PERSONS SHOULD BE PURSUED. IN SOMMARUGA'S VIEW THE PROVISION IN THE TEXT SHOULD GO NO FURTHER THAN STATING THAT ICRC WILL WORK WITH THE PARTIES ON THESE ISSUES. IT SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO DEAL WITH THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUES LEST THEY BECOME ENTANGLED WITH POLITICAL ISSUES.

4. SOMMARUGA NOTED THAT ICRC HAS ALREADY BEEN THE FACILITATOR FOR DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES ON THESE TOPICS. IT IS PRESENT AT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN BELGRADE AND ZAGREB AND PLAYS THE SUPPORTING ROLE AT THE THREE PARTIES' REGULAR DISCUSSIONS AT THE SARAJEVO AIRPORT CONCERNING DETAINEES AND MISSING.

5. AMB. SPIEGEL UNDERTOOK TO PASS ON SOMMARUGA'S REQUEST. HE NOTED THAT PROGRESS ON THESE ISSUES MIGHT SERVE AS CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES BETWEEN THE PARTIES. SOMMARUGA AGREED, BUT CAUTIONED THAT WORK ON THE DETAILS OF THE ISSUES SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN DISCUSSIONS OF POLITICAL ISSUES. OTHERWISE PROGRESS ON BOTH COULD BE SLOWED.

THE SREBRENICA MISSING

6. IN RESPONSE TO AMB. SPIEGEL'S INQUIRY, SOMMARUGA SAID THAT HE WILL SEND A VERY STIFF LETTER TO KARADZIC ON THE SREBRENICA MISSING. ICRC HAS REPORTS FROM SREBRENICA REFUGEES IN TUZLA OF APPROXIMATELY 8000

MISSING. OF THESE, ABOUT THREE THOUSAND WERE REPORTED TO BE IN SREBRENICA/POTOCARI WHEN SREBRENICA FELL AND WERE ARRESTED BY THE SERBS. THE OTHER FIVE THOUSAND REPORTEDLY FLED SREBRENICA BEFORE THE ENCLAVE FELL.

7. SOMMARUGA SAID THAT ICRC HAS BEEN TOLD BY SERBIAN AUTHORITIES THAT IT MAY HAVE A

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ACCESS TO ALL THE
DETAINEES, BUT SO FAR IT HAS BEEN GIVEN ACCESS TO ONLY
164 HELD AT FIVE POINTS OF DETENTION- ICRC DOES NOT
KNOW WHETHER THERE ARE OTHER DETENTION LOCATIONS.
SOMMARUGA'S LETTER TO KARADZIC WILL CONTAIN NAMES OF THE
MISSING, STATE THE ALLEGATIONS THAT A MASSACRE HAS TAKEN
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 GENEVA 007023

E.O. 12356: 09/14/1996

TAGS: PREF, PHUM, ICRC, UN, BK

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR REFERENCE TO ICRC IN YUGOSLAV PEACE
- AGREEMENT; NO PROGRESS ON SREBRENICA MISSING

PLACE AND ASK IN POINTED TERMS ABOUT THE FATE OF THE
MISSING THREE THOUSAND WHO WERE ARRESTED. (ICRC TOLD US
THAT WHEN THEY RAISED THE ISSUE WITH BOSNIAN SERB VICE
PRESIDENT KOLJEVIC WHEN HE WAS IN GENEVA SEPTEMBER 8, HE
DID NOT DENY THE ALLEGATIONS OF A MASSACRE BUT SIMPLY
SAID THAT HE WOULD LOOK INTO THEM.)

8. WITH RESPECT TO DETAINEES, SOMMARUGA SAID THAT ICRC
IS AWARE OF ABOUT 2000 IN ALL OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
- 800 HELD BY THE CROATS, 600-800 BY THE BOSNIAN SERBS
AND 300 BY THE BOSNIACS AND HVO.

9. IN SEPARATE DISCUSSIONS WITH ICRC OFFICIALS IN
RESPONSE TO REFTEL WE WERE TOLD THAT THE 164 VISITED ARE
HELD IN FIVE LOCATIONS NEAR BATKOVIC AND PRESUMABLY ARE
IN THE GROUP OF FIVE THOUSAND WHO FLED FROM SREBRENICA.
THERE ARE VARYING ESTIMATES OF THE NUMBER OF PERSONS IN
THIS GROUP WHO HAVE SAFELY ESCAPED BOSNIAN SERB
TERRITORY. BOSNIAN MINISTER MURATOVIC TOLD ICRC THAT IT
IS BETWEEN THREE AND FOUR THOUSAND, LEAVING ANOTHER ONE
TO TWO THOUSAND MISSING. ICRC IS WORKING ON COMPILING
THE NAMES OF THE MISSING IN THIS GROUP AND ASKING THE
BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT FOR WHATEVER INFORMATION IT HAS ON
THEM.

10. WE ALSO PASSED TO ICRC, UNHCR AND THE UN HUMAN
RIGHTS CENTER DEPARTMENT-PROVIDED PHOTOGRAPHS OF MASS
GRAVE SITES NEAR KASABA. ICRC ASKED WHETHER WE HAD ANY
FURTHER INFORMATION TO INDICATE THAT THE SITES ACTUALLY
CONTAINED CORPSES. BOTH ICRC AND UNHCR HAVE TOLD US
THAT THEY HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN ACCESS TO THE
SITES. ICRC, HOWEVER, NOTED THAT IT IS NOT PRESSING THE
ISSUE WITH THE BOSNIAN SERBS. IT DOES NOT VIEW ITS ROLE
AS THAT OF AN INVESTIGATOR" IT WILL RECITE THE
ALLEGATIONS TO THE BOSNIAN SERBS, BUT IT IS UP TO THE
BOSNIAN SERBS TO PROVIDE THEM WITH ANSWERS.

ZEP

11. ICRC ALSO TOLD US THAT THE EVACUATION OF ZEP
A MUCH CLEANER OPERATION. ICRC IS STILL IN THE PROCESS OF
TRACING THE MISSING AND HAVE VISITED 796 WHO FLED ZEP
TO SERBIA. THEY BELIEVE THAT THE NUMBER OF ZEP
MISSING

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WILL TURN OUT TO BE A GOOD DEAL LESS THAN A HUNDRED.

GORAZDE

12. IN GORAZDE, ICRC HAS TWO EXPATS AND 10 LOCAL STAFF. THEY ESTIMATE THAT THE POPULATION OF THE GORAZDE ENCLAVE IS 30,000 - 40,000. GORAZDE CITY IS OVERCROWDED AND LIVING CONDITIONS ARE POOR. UNTIL VERY RECENTLY, HOWEVER, FOOD SUPPLIES HAVE BEEN ADEQUATE, HELPED BY AN ACTIVE BLACK MARKET. MEDICAL SUPPLIES HAVE ALSO BEEN ADEQUATE UNTIL RECENTLY, SUPPLIED BY MSF. LOCAL WELLS PROVIDE SUFFICIENT WATER. HOWEVER, WITH THE RECENT DESTRUCTION OF BRIDGES LEADING TO GORAZDE, FOOD AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES ARE RAPIDLY DWINDLING"

13. SARAJEVO MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
SPIEGEL
BT
#7023

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
SSN: 7023
<^SSN>7023
TOR: 950915072553 M1856690
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DIST:
SIT: NSC
□

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
016. cable	re: Highlight Cable 26 Sep 95 [partial] (4 pages)	09/26/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1995- Dec 1996 ([Srebrenica and Ethnic Cleans...])
OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:

[08/17/1995-10/13/1995]

2006-0647-F
rs496

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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PREC: PRIORITY

CLASS: SECRET

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), 1.4c

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526
2013-0831-M 5/26/16 KDF

[2013-0831-M, 5.03] (1.09)

SUBJ: NPIC HIGHLIGHT CABLE 26 SEP 95

THIS IS NPIC HIGHLIGHT CABLE 95-8591 FOR 26 SEPTEMBER 1995.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), 1.4c

TEXT:

SECRET NOFORN

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), 1.4c

SUBJ: NPIC HIGHLIGHT CABLE 26 SEP 95

THIS IS NPIC HIGHLIGHT CABLE 95-8591 FOR 26 SEPTEMBER 1995.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), 1.4c

INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT IS CLASSIFIED, CONTROLLED, AND ELIGIBLE FOR FOREIGN RELEASE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CIO IMAGERY POLICY SERIES (CIPS). EACH PARAGRAPH IS SEPARATELY CLASSIFIED.
(S)

THE VIEWS EXPRESSED HEREIN HAVE NOT BEEN FORMALLY COORDINATED WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. COMMENTS AND QUERIES REGARDING ITEMS IN THIS REPORT SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO THE APPROPRIATE ANALYST.
(U)

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1. BALKAN HIGHLIGHTS

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: PROBABLE MASS GRAVE NEAR KARAKAJ AND ZVORNIK (E/ 3.3(b)(1))

TEXT:

1. BALKAN HIGHLIGHTS (E/ 13526 3.3(b)(1), 1.4c

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: PROBABLE MASS GRAVE NEAR KARAKAJ AND ZVORNIK (E/ 3.3(b)(1))

ANOTHER PROBABLE MASS GRAVE SITE AND TWO SUSPECTED GRAVE SITES ASSOCIATED WITH THE BOSNIAN SERB ARMY SIEGE OF THE FORMER SREBRENICA UN SAFE AREA HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED IN EASTERN BOSNIA NEAR THE TOWNS OF KARAKAJ AND ZVORNIK.

(E/ 3.3(b)(1), 1.4c)

CONTINUING ANALYSIS OF U-2 IMAGERY AND NUMEROUS SURVIVOR REPORTS OF THE ALLEGED MASS EXECUTIONS OF MEN FROM SREBRENICA SUGGEST THAT EXECUTIONS MAY HAVE OCCURRED NEAR TWO SEPARATE BRIGADE GARRISONS OF THE DRINA ARMY CORPS AFTER THE FALL OF SREBRENICA. THIS MOST RECENT DISCOVERY IS NEAR A GARRISON AND FIELD DEPLOYMENT AREA OF THE 1ST ZVORNIK LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE NEAR LAZETE (E/ 3.3(b)(1), 1.4c) AND THE ZVORNIK RESERVOIR 4 KM TO THE NORTH. ALL THREE AREAS OF DISTURBED SOIL NEAR SAHANICI AT 44-25-29N 019-02-55E (UTM 345T CQ446209) WERE THE SAME IN APPEARANCE AS FOUR POSSIBLE MASS GRAVES AT KASABA AND TATAR, AND A FIFTH SUSPECTED SITE AT SANDICI NEAR THE FORMER UN SAFE AREA OF SREBRENICA. KASABA IS A GARRISON TOWN ASSOCIATED WITH THE 1ST MILICI LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE. (E/ 3.3(b)(1))

TWO AREAS OF DISTURBED SOIL NEAR SAHANICI HAD BEEN PREPARED (E/ 3.3(b)(1)) AND APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN EXCAVATED BY HEAVY EQUIPMENT SUCH AS A BULLDOZER OR TRACKED BACKHOE. A LARGE PROBABLE GRAVE SITE IS ABOUT 800 SQUARE METERS IN SIZE, AND A SMALLER SUSPECTED SITE IS ABOUT 100 SQUARE METERS IN SIZE. A TRAIL CREATED BY A TRACKED VEHICLE ALSO WAS NEWLY IDENTIFIED (E/ 3.3(b)(1)) LEADING TO THE LARGE PROBABLE GRAVE SITE FROM A HIGHWAY IN THE DIRECTION OF KARAKAJ AND ZVORNIK. (E/ 3.3(b)(1))

#6816

NNNN
~~S E C R E T~~ NOFORN

(E/ 3.3(b)(1), 1.4c)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)

ANOTHER AREA OF ABOUT 20 SQUARE METERS OF RECENTLY DISTURBED SOIL WAS IMMEDIATELY SOUTHEAST OF THE EARTHEN DAM OF THE ZVORNIK RESERVOIR, 5 KM TO THE NORTH. A PROBABLE UNIT OF THE 1ST ZVORNIK LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE HAS BEEN DEPLOYED NEAR THE RESERVOIR SINCE AT LEAST 1993. (e/ 3.3(b)(1))

THE SAHANICI PROBABLE MASS GRAVE SITE IS ALSO 1,200 METERS NORTHWEST OF A GARRISON OF THE 1ST ZVORNIK LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE OF THE BOSNIAN SERB ARMY-S DRINA CORPS. THE BUILDINGS IN THE GARRISON, SIMILAR TO THOSE DESCRIBED BY ONE REFUGEE, MAY HAVE BEEN USED IN THE PAST AS AN INN, SCHOOL, OR GYMNASIUM, AND COULD HAVE BEEN USED FOR DETENTION OF MUSLIM MEN FROM SREBRENICA PRIOR TO THEIR REPORTED MASS EXECUTIONS ON OR ABOUT 3.3(b)(1) ONE SURVIVOR OF THE ALLEGED MASS EXECUTIONS REPORTED THAT SUBJECTS WERE TRANSPORTED BY TRUCK FROM SANDICI AND BRATUNAC TO A SCHOOL (IN THE DIRECTION OF KARAKAJ, (THEN AT NIGHT TO A FIELD WHERE ALLEGEDLY HUNDREDS OF MUSLIM MEN WERE SHOT. OTHER REPORTS CLAIMED THAT A MASS GRAVE WAS DUG AND BODIES WERE COVERED BY A BULLDOZER. (e/ 3.3(b)(1))

SOLDIERS, TANKS AND ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS OF THE 1ST ZVORNIK LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE WERE VERY LIKELY USED IN THE SIEGE OF THE FORMER SREBRENICA SAFE AREA IN EARLY JULY 1995, AND PROBABLY WOULD HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH ANY EXECUTIONS THAT MAY HAVE OCCURRED NEAR THEIR GARRISON AFTER THE SIEGE. THESE SOLDIERS AND VEHICLES (THREE M-84 TANKS AND THREE M60 APC-S) HAD RETURNED TO THEIR GARRISON 3.3(b)(1) ACCORDING TO ANALYSIS OF U-2 IMAGERY. (e/ 3.3(b)(1))

SURVIVORS OF ALLEGED MASS EXECUTIONS THAT REPORTEDLY OCCURRED IN THE AREAS OF KASABA AND KARAKAJ SAID THAT THEY WERE DETAINED IN A SCHOOL BUILDING, OPEN FIELDS, AND SOCCER STADIUMS ACCORDING TO VARIOUS US, MEDIA, AND UN DEBRIEFINGS CONDUCTED AT REFUGEE LOCATIONS NEAR TUZLA. SIMILAR REPORTS OF MASS EXECUTIONS HAVE BEEN MADE BY DUTCH UN SOLDIERS WHO WERE DETAINED IN THE SREBRENICA AREA WHILE MUSLIMS WERE BEING FORCIBLY REMOVED AND EXECUTED BY THE BOSNIAN SERBS, ACCORDING TO DUTCH PRESS. THE REPORTED MASS EXECUTIONS AND POSSIBLE MASS GRAVES AT KASABA AND TATAR WERE ALSO NEAR ONE OF THE GARRISONS OF A DRINA CORPS BRIGADE, THE 1ST MILICI LIGHT INFANTRY BRIGADE. THE PROXIMITY OF PROBABLE MASS GRAVES AND ALLEGATIONS OF MASS EXECUTIONS WITHIN 1 KM OF SEPARATE BRIGADES OF THE SAME ARMY CORPS STRONGLY SUGGESTS THAT THERE WAS HIGH-LEVEL BOSNIAN SERB ARMY PLANNING AND COORDINATION OF MASS EXECUTIONS. (e/ 3.3(b)(1))

3.3(b)(1)

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), 1.4c

COLLATERAL REFERENCES:
031610Z AUG 95, FM AMEMBASSY ZAGREB, HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES - SREBRENICA, (e)

IMAGERY REFERENCE:

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EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)

#6817

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), 1.4c, 3.5c

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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 LINE3: O 110105Z OCT 95
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 RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE 0340
 RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 2918
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
 RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 1670
 RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2960
 RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 0981
 RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
 RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 3095
 RUCBACM/USCINCOM NORFOLK VA
 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 3867
 RUFNBUT/HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT//POLAD//
 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 9158
 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 2254
 RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 1652
 RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2896
 RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA 4210
 SUBJ: BOSNIA/CROATIA: DISCUSSION OF THE SYG'S
 ----- REPORT ON UNCRO; SYG'S BRIEFING ON UNPROFOR
 ----- REDUCTIONS; SYG'S UPDATE ON REQUEST FOR
 ----- ACCESS TO ZEPA AND SREBRENICA DETAINEES;
 ----- BRIEFING ON CURRENT SITUATION.
 TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 003936
 JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2, CHAIRMAN,
 USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
 POLAD MINISTER DURKEE
 E.O.12356: DECL:10/05/2005
 TAGS: PREL, NATO, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
 SUBJECT: BOSNIA/CROATIA: DISCUSSION OF THE SYG'S
 ----- REPORT ON UNCRO; SYG'S BRIEFING ON UNPROFOR
 ----- REDUCTIONS; SYG'S UPDATE ON REQUEST FOR
 ----- ACCESS TO ZEPA AND SREBRENICA DETAINEES;
 ----- BRIEFING ON CURRENT SITUATION.

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DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
 White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
 By RZZ NARA, Date 9/15/2016
 2013-0831-M (1.11)
 [2013-0656-m, 5.05]

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. IN INFORMALS ON 10 OCTOBER, THE COUNCIL WELCOMED THE 29 SEPTEMBER REPORT OF THE SYG ON UNCRO AND APPROVED A DRAFT LETTER FROM THE COUNCIL PRESIDENT TO THE SYG AGREEING WITH THE REPORT'S CONCLUSIONS. AMBASSADOR GHAREKHAN INFORMED THE COUNCIL OF THE SYG'S DECISION TO REDUCE UNPROFOR. GHAREKHAN REPORTED ON UNPROFOR'S CONTINUED EFFORTS TO GAIN ACCESS TO CIVILIANS FROM ZEPA AND SREBRENICA DETAINED BY THE BOSNIAN SERBS. HE ALSO BRIEFED THE COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF THE CEASE-FIRE BROKERED BY HOLBROOKE ON 5 OCTOBER. END SUMMARY.
3. AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH STATED THAT WE SUPPORTED THE SYG'S DECISION TO WITHDRAW UNCRO BATTALIONS FROM SECTORS NORTH, SOUTH, AND WEST. INDERFURTH STRESSED THAT THE CROATIAN GOVERNMENT MUST DO MORE TO ENSURE THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE SERB MINORITIES AND UNDERLINED US SUPPORT FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS ACTION TEAMS TO MONITOR THE SITUATION IN THOSE AREAS.
4. COUNCIL MEMBERS SUPPORTED THE SYG'S RECOMMENDATION REDUCING UNCRO TO 2,500 BY THE END OF OCTOBER. MEMBERS AGREED TO ISSUE A LETTER TO THE SYG ON BEHALF OF THE COUNCIL NOTING THEIR AGREEMENT WITH THE SYG'S REPORT. TEXT FOLLOWS PARA 10. MEMBERS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE CONTINUING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND BURNING/LOOTING OF HOUSES IN KRAJINA. ITALIAN DEP PERMREP FERRARIN STATED THAT THE GOC "SHOULD INTERVENE AND BRING THE CULPRITS TO JUSTICE."
5. AMBASSADOR GHAREKHAN INFORMED THE COUNCIL OF THE SYG'S DECISION TO REDUCE UNPROFOR BY 9,000 TROOPS LEAVING 21,000 TROOPS IN THEATER. GHAREKHAN SAID THAT SEVERAL FACTORS, INCLUDING THE FALL OF ZEPA AND SREBRENICA, THE HV/HVO AND BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT RECENT OFFENSIVES, AND THE CREATION OF THE RRF WARRANTED THE REDUCTION IN UNPROFOR PERSONEL. RECONFIGURATION OF UNPROFOR WILL ENHANCE OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY BY CREATING "GENERALIZED BATTALIONS" WITH FLEXIBLE OPERATION CAPABILITIES. THE REDUCTION WILL HELP ALLEVIATE SOME PRESSURE ON THE SECRETARIAT TO REDUCE COSTS IN RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF THE UN.
6. AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH STATED THAT ALTHOUGH THE US DID NOT QUESTION THE AUTHORITY OF THE SYG, THE COUNCIL SHOULD BE INFORMED BEFORE AN ALTERATION TO A MANDATE IS MADE. INDERFURTH SAID A SC MANDATE ESTABLISHES A LINK BETWEEN THE OPERATION AND ITS SIZE WHICH USUALLY REQUIRES A SC DECISION TO ALTER. RUSSIAN DEP PERMREP FEDOTOV EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE "PROCEDURE OF INFORMATION" WHICH ALLOWED CNN ACCESS TO INFORMATION BEFORE THE COUNCIL WAS NOTIFIED. FRENCH PERMREP DEJAMAIS URGED THE SYG TO EXERCISE CAUTION IN WITHDRAWING UNPROFOR SINCE THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE IN SUCH A DELICATE STAGE.

7. GHAREKHAN REPORTED TO THE COUNCIL ON THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN SREBRENICA AND ZEPA AS CALLED FOR IN SCR 1010. UNHCR AND ICRC ARE STILL BEING DENIED ACCESS TO DETAINEES. THE BOSNIAN SERBS WERE DENYING UNPROFOR ACCESS TO THAT AREA, CONSEQUENTLY, NO INVESTIGATION OF THE ALLEDGED MASS GRAVES WAS POSSIBLE. OF THE 8,000 PERSONS REPORTED AS MISSING
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 003936

JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2, CHAIRMAN,
 USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
 POLAD MINISTER DURKEE

E.O.12356: DECL:10/05/2005

TAGS: PREL, NATO, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
 SUBJECT: BOSNIA/CROATIA: DISCUSSION OF THE SYG'S
 ----- REPORT ON UNCRO; SYG'S BRIEFING ON UNPROFOR
 ----- REDUCTIONS; SYG'S UPDATE ON REQUEST FOR
 ----- ACCESS TO ZEPA AND SREBRENICA DETAINEES;
 ----- BRIEFING ON CURRENT SITUATION.

AFTER THE BSA OFFENSIVE IN SREBRENICA, 3,000 HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS BEING DETAINED, THE OTHER 5,000 HAVE "SIMPLY DISAPPEARED".

8. MANY DELEGATIONS EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE RESTRICTED ACCESS OF UNPROFOR TO THE SITES OF THE ALLEDGED MASS GRAVES. AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH STATED THAT THE RESTRICTION SEEMED TO INDICATE THAT "OUR FEARS WERE WELL-FOUNDED".

9. GHAREKHAN INFORMED THE COUNCIL THAT THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT OF 5 OCTOBER WAS NOT YET IN EFFECT BECAUSE GAS AND ELECTRICITY HAD NOT BEEN RESTORED TO SARAJEVO. ELECTRICITY WAS PREDICTED TO RESUME 10 OCTOBER AND GAS WOULD BE FORTHCOMING PENDING THE RESOLUTION OF TECHNICAL PROBLEMS. WITHOUT A CEASE-FIRE, FIGHTING CONTINUED. BOSNIAN ARMY LAUNCHED AN OFFENSIVE AT MT. VLUK SUPPORTED BY ARTILLERY SOUTH OF TUZLA. THE ATTACK ELICITED A BSA RESPONSE WHICH RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF ONE NORWEGIAN PEACEKEEPER. FIGHTING WAS INTENSE IN DOBOJ AND MAGLAI. A REFUGEE CAMP IN ZEVENICA WAS HIT RESULTING IN THE DEATH OF 10 CIVILIANS AND THE INJURY OF 34 OTHERS.

10. BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER TO THE SYG ON BEHALF OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON UNCRO:

--THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAVE CONSIDERED YOUR REPORT OF 29 SEPTEMBER PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1009 (1995) (S/1995/835). THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AGREE WITH THE ARRANGEMENTS SET OUT IN THAT REPORT FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE CURRENT MANDATE OF UNCRO PENDING, IN THE CASE OF EASTERN SLAVONIA, THE OUTCOME OF THE ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS ON THE SUBJECT.

END TEXT.

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11. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

ALBRIGHT

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#3936

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

SSN: 3936
<^SSN>3936

TOR: 951010221318 M1895096
<^TOR>951010221420 M1895097

DIST: SIT: BELL CLARKER DAALDER FEELEY NSC PETERS SAUNDERS SCHWARTZ SESTAK
VERSHBOW
□

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHBWA5004 2841609-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O 111609Z OCT 95
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
 OSRI: RUEHBW
 DTG: 111609Z OCT 95
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7367
 INFO: RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1847
 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0480
 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0750
 RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 2696
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1473
 RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE 0216
 RUEHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE 4111
 SUBJ: DEMARCHE TO FRY FOREIGN MINISTER MILUTINOVIC
 ABOUT BANJA LUKA ETHNIC CLEANSING

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BELGRADE 005004

E.O. 12356:DECL:OADR

TAGS: PRE, PGOV, PHUM, SR

SUBJECT: DEMARCHE TO FRY FOREIGN MINISTER MILUTINOVIC
 ABOUT BANJA LUKA ETHNIC CLEANSING

REF: HILL-PERINA TELCON 10/10/95

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PER REFTELCON, I CALLED FRY FOREIGN MINISTER MILUTINOVIC TO REGISTER WASHINGTON'S STRONG ANGER ABOUT RENEWED REPORTS OF ETHNIC CLEANSING IN THE BANJA LUKA AREA.

3. I SIAD THAT UN REPORTS OF NEW BOSNIAN SERB ATROCITIES IN THE REGION WERE BEING PICKED UP BY ALL THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA, INCLUDING A FRONT-PAGE STORY THAT WOULD BE PUBLISHED IN THE NEW YORK TIMES. THIS INCLUDED CHARGES THAT UP TO FIVE THOUSAND CIVILIAN MUSLIM MEN WERE MISSING AND UNACCOUNTED FOR. IF TRUE, THIS COULD NOT HELP BUT EVOKE IMAGES OF NEW MASSACRES SUCH AS HAD TAKEN PLACE IN SREBRENICA. IN ADDITION, THE CONTINUED EXPULSION OF THOUSANDS OF MUSLIM CIVILIANS WAS UNDENIABLE AND DOCUMENTED ON TELEVISION ALMOST EVERY EVENING. SUCH ACTIONS WERE VICIOUS AND TOTALLY CONTRARY TO OUR JOINT EFFORTS TO INITIATE PEACE TALKS. INDEED, THEY COULD ENDANGER THE PEACE

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 E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
 White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By PDS NARA, Date 9/15/2016

2013-0831-m (1.12)

[2013-0831-m, 9.06]

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PROCESS IF NEW MASSACRES WERE DOCUMENTED.

4. MILUTINOVIC PROFESSED SHOCK AND DISMAY AT THE REPORTS AND SAID THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST HE HAD HEARD OF THEM. "WHAT SHOULD WE DO?" HE ASKED. I SAID THAT BELGRADE MUST INSIST THAT BOSNIAN SERB AUTHORITIES STOP SUCH ACTIONS IMMEDIATELY, ARREST ANY PARAMILITARY FORCES THAT MAY BE RESPONSIBLE, AND COOPERATE WITH UN INVESTIGATION OF MISSING INDIVIDUALS. MILUTINOVIC AGREED THAT THIS WAS A VERY NEGATIVE DEVELOPMENT FOR THE PEACE PROCESS AND SAID HE WOULD DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH MILOSEVIC. (NOTE: I PLAN ALSO TO SEND BOTH MILUTINOVIC AND MILOSEVIC A COPY OF THE NYT ARTICH, WHEN RECEIVED.)

5. IN A SIDE DISCUSSION OF THE CEASEFIRE, MILUTINOVIC SAID IT WAS "INCREDIBLY STUPID" OF "RSK FOREIGN MINISTER" BUHA TO HAVE REJECTED AGREEMENT TO A DELAYED CEASEFIRE, ALTHOUGH THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT SIDE BORE THE MAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR SEEKING ARTIFICIAL DELAYS. MILUTINOVIC CALLED ME BACK AT MIDDAY OCTOBER 11 TO SAY THAT BUHA HAD JUST SIGNED A DOCUMENT AGREEING TO A CEASEFIRE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. HE SAID HE HOPED THERE WOULD BE NO FURTHER DELAYS FROM EITHER SIDE AND THE CEASEFIRE COULD GO INTO EFFECT IMMEDIATELY. PERINA

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#5004

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 5004

TOR: 951011111948 M1896180

DIST:

PRT: SIT

SIT: BELL CLARKER DAALDER FEELEY NSC PETERS SAUNDERS SCHWARTZ SESTAK SUM
SUM2 VERSHBOW

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Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH

LINE3: O 122307Z OCT 95

LINE4: FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

OSRI: RUCNDT

DTG: 122307Z OCT 95

ORIG: USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8046

INFO: RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE 0346

RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 1676

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 2924

RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY

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RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA 4218

RUCBACM/USCINCOM NORFOLK VA

RUEHTHAMEMBASSY ATHENS 1658

RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 3101

RUFNBUT/HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT//POLAD//

SUBJ: BOSNIA/CROATIA: COUNCIL ADOPTS A PRESIDENTIAL

-- STATEMENT CONDEMNING "ETHNIC CLEANSING" IN

-- WESTERN BOSNIA, SECRETARIAT'S BRIEFING ON THE

-- CURRENT SITUATION

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 003981

JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2, CHAIRMAN,
 USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
 POLAD MINISTER DURKEE

E.O.12356: DECL:10/12/2005

TAGS: PREL, NATO, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,

SUBJECT: BOSNIA/CROATIA: COUNCIL ADOPTS A PRESIDENTIAL

-- STATEMENT CONDEMNING "ETHNIC CLEANSING" IN

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-- CURRENT SITUATION

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By EDS NARA, Date 9/15/2016

13-0831-M (1.13)

(1013-0656-m, 5.07)

PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ADOPTED

2. AMBASSADORS FROM THE CONTACT GROUP PLUS ITALY MET MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 12 TO DISCUSS A FRENCH REVISION OF THE GERMAN PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON BOSNIAN SERB "ETHNIC CLEANSING." THE FRENCH DRAFT WAS BASED ON THE GERMAN TEXT OF OCTOBER 12, BUT INCLUDED LANGUAGE WELCOMING THE FACT THAT THE OCTOBER 5 CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT HAD ENTERED INTO FORCE, AND DEMANDING THAT BOTH SIDES COMPLY WITH THE CEASE FIRE. IN AN EFFORT TO ACCOMODATE THE RUSSIAN CONCERNS THE TEXT EXPRESSED DEEP CONCERN ABOUT ANY OPERATION THAT PROVOKES LARGE SCALE MOVEMENTS OF CIVILIAN POPULATIONS.

3. THE RUSSIAN REPRESENTATIVE PRESSED CONTACT GROUP MEMBERS TO ACCEPT SPECIFIC REFERENCES TO THE RECENT MILITARY OFFENSIVES BY THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT AS A WAY TO "BALANCE" THE TEXT. AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT SAID THE SUGGESTION WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE USG. SHE POINTED OUT THAT THE PRACTICE OF "ETHNIC CLEANSING" WAS NOT AKIN TO MILITARY OPERATIONS AND THEREFORE, DID NOT DESERVE EQUAL CONDEMNATION BY THE COUNCIL.

4. IN INFORMALS, THE COUNCIL WELCOMED THE DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT AND AGREED THAT THE URGENT NATURE OF THE SITUATION CALLED FOR AN IMMEDIATE RESPONSE. OMANI, ARGENTIN AND INDONESIAN AMENDMENTS WERE ADDED TO THE TEXT.

5. AFTER ADDITIONAL DEBATE THE COUNCIL ADOPTED ON OCTOBER 12 THE PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT FOUND BELOW.

BRIEFING BY THE SECRETARIAT

6. ASSISTANT SECRETARY-GENERAL RIZA BRIEFED THE COUNCIL ON CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS. THE CEASE-FIRE IN BOSNIA TOOK EFFECT ON 11 OCTOBER AT 0001 LOCAL TIME. LIMITED ACCESS TO FRONT LINES PREVENTED UNPROFOR FROM MONITORING COMPLIANCE WITH CEASE-FIRE. RIZA SAID THAT BOSNIAN SERB ETHNIC CLEANSING IN WESTERN BOSNIA WAS CONTINUING. THE BOSNIAN SERBS GAVE 1,200 MUSLIMS AND CROATS 2 MINUTES TO LEAVE THEIR HOMES IN THE BANJA LUKA AREA. UNHCR REPORTS INDICATED WIDE SPREAD HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN NORTHERN ?!BERY. A LARGE NUMBER OF DRAFT-AGE MEN WERE SEPARATED FROM THE EXPELLED PERSONS AND ARE CURRENTLY UNACCOUNTED FOR. UNHCR FEARS THAT IF THE BOSNIAN SERB EXPULSION CAMPAIGN CONTINUED AS MANY AS 20,000 MAY SOON BE DISPLACED.

7. BEGIN TEXT OF PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT:

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT

THE SECURITY COUNCIL WELCOMES THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE BOSNIAN PARTIES OF 5 OCTOBER 1995.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL TAKES THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS ITS GRATITUDE TO ALL THOSE WHO NEGOTIATED THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT, AND TO THE UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE AND OTHERS WHO, OFTEN AT RISK TO THEIR OWN LIVES, HAVE MADE POSSIBLE, WITH THE COOPERATION OF ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 003981

JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2, CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCOMFOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER DURKEE

E.O.12356: DECL:10/12/2005

TAGS: PREL, NATO, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: BOSNIA/CROATIA: COUNCIL ADOPTS A PRESIDENTIAL
-- STATEMENT CONDEMNING "ETHNIC CLEANSING" IN
-- WESTERN BOSNIA, SECRETARIAT'S BRIEFING ON THE
-- CURRENT SITUATION

1. ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

ALL THE PARTIES, THE RESTORATION OF GAS AND ELECTRICITY SUPPLIES TO THE INHABITANTS OF SARAJEVO ENABLING THEM TO LIVE IN MORE DECENT CONDITIONS.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES FULLY COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT AND REFRAIN FROM ANY MILITARY ACTIVITY THAT COULD JEOPARDIZE THE PEACE PROCESS. IT EXPRESSES ITS DEEPEST CONCERN AT ANY OPERATION THAT PROVOKES LARGE-SCALE MOVEMENTS OF POPULATION DETRIMENTAL TO THE PEACE PROCESS AND A FINAL AND FAIR SETTLEMENT. THE COUNCIL IS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED ABOUT NEW REPORTS RELATED TO THE MOVEMENTS OF THE DISPLACED POPULATION IN THE AREAS OF SANSKI MOST AND MRKONJIC GRAD.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL REITERATES ITS STRONG CONDEMNATION OF ALL PRACTICES OF ETHNIC CLEANSING WHEREVER THEY OCCUR AND BY WHOMSOEVER COMMITTED. IT DEMANDS THEIR IMMEDIATE CESSATION AND UNDERLINES THE NEED TO ALLEVIATE THE SUFFERINGS CAUSED BY THESE ACTS. THE COUNCIL URGES ALL BOSNIAN PARTIES TO RESPECT FULLY THE RIGHTS OF ALL COMMUNITIES INCLUDING THEIR RIGHT TO REMAIN WHERE THEY ARE OR TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES IN SAFETY.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS IN PARTICULAR DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT NEW REPORTS CONCERNING ACTS OF ETHNIC CLEANSING COMMITTED IN THE BANJA LUKA AND PRIJEDOR AREAS, ESPECIALLY ABOUT REPORTS, INCLUDING THOSE BY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS, THAT NON-SERB MEN AND BOYS OF DRAFT AGE ARE BEING TAKEN AWAY BY BOSNIAN SERB AND OTHER PARAMILITARY FORCES. THE COUNCIL DEMANDS THAT THESE PERSONS BE IMMEDIATELY RELEASED.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEMANDS THAT THE BOSNIAN SERB PARTY GRANTS IMMEDIATE AND UNIMPEDED ACCESS FOR UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL AND THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS TO ALL THE AREAS OF CONCERN. IT ALSO DEMANDS THAT ICRC

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REPRESENTATIVES BE ALLOWED TO VISIT AND REGISTER ANY PERSONS DETAINED AGAINST THEIR WILL. THE COUNCIL REITERATES IN THIS CONTEXT THE DEMANDS SET OUT IN RESOLUTION 1010 (1995) AND IN THE STATEMENT OF ITS PRESIDENT OF 7 SEPTEMBER 1995 ON SREBRENICA AND ZEPA.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL REAFFIRMS THAT THOSE WHO HAVE COMMITTED OR HAVE ORDERED THE COMMISSION OF VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW WILL BE HELD INDIVIDUALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THEM. THE COUNCIL RECALLS IN THIS CONTEXT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL PURSUANT TO ITS RESOLUTION 827 (1993) AND REITERATES THAT ALL STATES SHALL COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE TRIBUNAL AND ITS ORGANS.

THE SECURITY COUNCIL WILL REMAIN ACTIVELY SEIZED OF THE MATTER.
END TEXT.

8. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
SSN: 3981
<^SSN>3981
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 RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
 RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 1646
 RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 0361
 RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO 0093
 RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS
 RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
 SUBJ: DUTCH REPORT ON SREBRENICA TO OFFER GRIST
 FOR DEFENDERS AND DETRACTORS OF BLUE HELMET ACTIONS
 TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 005512
 E.O. 12356: DECL: 10/13/15
 TAGS: MARR, PREL, UN, NATO, BK, NL
 SUBJECT: DUTCH REPORT ON SREBRENICA TO OFFER GRIST
 FOR DEFENDERS AND DETRACTORS OF BLUE HELMET ACTIONS
 REFS: A) THE HAGUE 5452

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.

 SUMMARY

2. THE OFFICIAL MOD REPORT ON DUTCH ACTIONS DURING AND AFTER THE FALL OF SREBRENICA IS LIKELY TO OFFER SOME GRIST FOR BOTH DEFENDERS AND DETRACTORS OF DUTCH ACTIONS, ACCORDING TO AN MOD OFFICIAL FAMILIAR WITH THE REPORT. THE MOD BELIEVES THE REPORT -- SCHEDULED FOR RELEASE OCTOBER 23 -- WILL CLARIFY A NUMBER OF MISPERCEPTIONS REGARDING DUTCH ACTIONS THAT HAVE APPEARED BOTH IN THE DUTCH AND INTERNATIONAL MEDIA IN RECENT WEEKS. IN PARTICULAR, THE REPORT WILL HIGHLIGHT THE MILITARY LIMITATIONS UNDER WHICH THE DUTCH OPERATED AND THE RISKS TO REFUGEES AND BLUE HELMETS ALIKE IF THE DUTCH RESPONSE HAD BEEN MORE AGGRESSIVE. ON THE DOWNSIDE FOR THE MOD AND GON, THE REPORT WILL CONTAIN REFERENCES TO MISBEHAVIOR ON THE

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 White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
 By: RDS NARA, Date: 9/15/2016
 2013-0831-m (1.14)
 [2013-0656-m, 5.05]

PART OF DUTCH TROOPS, INCLUDING SELLING OF WEAPONS, RIGHT-WING SYMPATHIES, AND POOR TREATMENT OF WOMEN THAT WILL NOT HELP THE ARMY'S EMBATTLED IMAGE.

3. ALTHOUGH THE REPORT COULD BE DAMAGING POLITICALLY TO DEFENSE MINISTER VOORHOEVE, MOD OBSERVERS DO NOT SEE A HIGH RISK OF HIS BEING FORCED TO RESIGN. AS SEPTTEL WILL ELABORATE, THE REPORT IS LIKELY TO HAVE AN IMPACT ON THE DECISIONMAKING PROCESS RELATING TO PEACEKEEPING PARTICIPATION. AT THIS STAGE WE DO NOT SEE, EXCEPT IN CERTAIN QUARTERS, ANY SIGNS OF REDUCED DUTCH WILLINGNESS TO UNDERTAKE SUCH MISSIONS GENERALLY. THIS CONTROVERSY HAS ALSO MOTIVATED DUTCH EFFORTS WITH THEIR EU COLLEAGUES TO GET SOMETHING IN A BOSNIA PEACE SETTLEMENT REQUIRING AN ACCOUNTING OF THE MEN TAKEN AWAY IN SREBRENICA AND ZEPA. END SUMMARY.

REPORT NOT TO PULL PUNCHES

4. AN MOD OFFICIAL FAMILIAR WITH THE DEFENSE MINISTRY'S SOON-TO-BE-RELEASED REPORT ON DUTCH ACTIONS DURING AND AFTER THE FALL OF SREBRENICA SAFE AREA INDICATED THAT THE REPORT WOULD CONTAIN INFORMATION THAT COULD BE USED TO BOLSTER THE ARGUMENTS OF BOTH DEFENDERS AND DETRACTORS OF DUTCH ACTIONS. ON BALANCE, HOWEVER, HE BELIEVED THE REPORT WOULD OFFER A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE SITUATION IN SREBRENICA, PARTICULARLY THE LIMITATIONS UNDER WHICH THE TROOPS OPERATED AND THE RISKS OF ALTERNATIVE, TOUGHER ACTIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE REPORT POINTS OUT THAT DUTCH FORCES LINED UP OBSERVING REFUGEES BOARD A BUS -- A PHOTOGRAPH OF WHICH HAS BEEN USED TO DEPICT THE DUTCH AS HAVING COLLUDED IN ETHNIC CLEANSING -- HAD IN FACT FORMED A COLUMN TO PREVENT WOMEN AND CHILDREN FROM BEING TRAMPLED IN THE RUSH FOR THE BUSES.

IN DEFENSE OF DUTCH ACTIONS

5. AMONG THE KEY POINTS THE REPORT WILL EMPHASIZE TO BACK UP DUTCH ACTIONS ARE:

-- THE DUTCH TROOPS DID UNDERTAKE MILITARY MANEUVERS PRIOR TO AND DURING THE COURSE OF THE SERB ATTACK TO PREVENT THE TAKEOVER OF THE SAFE AREA.

-- FOLLOWING THE TAKEOVER, THE DUTCH TROOPS' FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WAS SHARPLY CIRCUMSCRIBED, LIMITING THEIR ABILITY TO WITNESS EVENTS OUTSIDE THE COMPOUND.

-- GIVEN THIS RESTRICTED MOVEMENT, THE TROOPS HAD NO MEANS OF KNOWING THAT MASS EXECUTIONS WERE TAKING PLACE.

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-- ACTIVE DUTCH RESISTANCE TO THE SERBS WOULD NOT HAVE PREVENTED THE SERB TAKEOVER, AND COULD HAVE RESULTED IN HIGH CASUALTIES AMONG REFUGEES. THE REPORT NOTES THAT THE POTOCARI COMPOUND, WHERE THE DUTCH AND MUSLIM REFUGEES WERE CONCENTRATED, WAS
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 THE HAGUE 005512

E.O. 12356: DECL: 10/13/15
 TAGS: MARR, PREL, UN, NATO, BK, NL
 SUBJECT: DUTCH REPORT ON SREBRENICA TO OFFER GRIST FOR DEFENDERS AND DETRACTORS OF BLUE HELMET ACTIONS

SURROUNDED BY SERB ARTILLERY. ANY USE OF THAT ARTILLERY COULD HAVE KILLED HUNDREDS OF REFUGEES.

 POTENTIALLY DAMAGING REVELATIONS

6. ON THE DOWNSIDE OF THE LEDGER, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF FACTS THAT COULD CAUSE POTENTIAL PROBLEMS FOR THE MOD. ALTHOUGH SOME REVELATIONS RELATING TO THE PERSONAL BEHAVIOR OF SOLDIERS ARE NOT SPECIFICALLY RELEVANT TO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE DUTCH DID ALL THEY COULD TO AVERT HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES, THEY ARE LIKELY TO BECOME INEXTRICABLY INTERWOVEN WITH PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY PERCEPTIONS OF THE DUTCH ROLE IN SREBRENICA. THESE INCLUDE:

-- THE DUTCH DID NOT REPORT EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS OF ATROCITIES TO THE U.N. UNTIL THEY WERE DEBRIEFED IN ZAGREB JULY 22 OUT OF A DESIRE NOT TO ANTAGONIZE THE SERBS AND ENDANGER THE SAFETY AND SAFE DEPARTURE OF THE TROOPS.

-- THERE WERE DISCIPLINARY PROBLEMS AMONG THE DUTCH FORCES THAT INCLUDED SELLING EQUIPMENT, EXTREME RIGHT-WING SYMPATHIES, AND POOR TREATMENT OF WOMEN, SPECIFICALLY WOMEN WITHIN THEIR OWN UNITS.

 COMPREHENSIVE AND UNJUDGMENTAL

7. THE FINAL REPORT, WHICH WILL BE RELEASED FOLLOWING CABINET REVIEW OCTOBER 23, IS BASED ON INTERVIEWS WITH 490 OF THE 499 SOLDIERS IN SREBRENICA CONDUCTED BY 189 DEBRIEFERS. EACH INTERVIEW TOOK AN AVERAGE OF FOUR HOURS, WITH SOME LASTING UP TO TEN HOURS. ACCORDING TO THE MOD, THE REPORT DOES NOT PRESCRIBE A JUDGEMENT, BUT IS DESIGNED TO LET PEOPLE COME TO THEIR OWN -- BUT BETTER INFORMED -- OPINIONS, WHICH THEY HOPE WILL LEAD TO A MORE NUANCED PERSPECTIVE OF DUTCH ACTIONS.

 IMPLICATIONS FOR IFOR

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8. NEITHER MOD NOR MFA OFFICIALS EXPECT THE REPORT WILL NEGATIVELY AFFECT DUTCH PARTICIPATION IN IFOR. IN FACT, THE MOD SAID THEY EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO POINT TO IFOR'S MORE ROBUST APPROACH AND BETTER COMMAND AND CONTROL MECHANISMS AS EVIDENCE THAT THE GOVERNMENT AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAVE DRAWN THE LESSONS OF THE FAILURE OF SREBRENICA AND HAVE ALREADY MOVED TO ENSURE SUCH EVENTS DO NOT OCCUR AGAIN. NEVERTHELESS, ALL FUTURE DEPLOYMENTS, INCLUDING IFOR, WILL BE MORE CLOSELY SCRUTINIZED AND HIGHLY POLITICIZED.

SEEKING AN ACCOUNTING IN PEACE ACCORD

9. AS THE DEPARTMENT MAY BE AWARE, MFA OFFICIALS HAVE INDICATED THAT THE NETHERLANDS HAS BEEN WORKING WITHIN THE EU TO SEEK TO BUILD INTO AN EVENTUAL PEACE SETTLEMENT A REQUIREMENT FOR AN ACCOUNTING OF THE MEN WHO WERETAKEN AWAY OR OTHERWISE MISSING FROM SREBRENICA AND ZEPA. THEY FEAR THAT IF NOTHING IS WRITTEN INTO THE SETTLEMENT NOW, THERE WILL NEVER BE AN ADEQUATE ACCOUNTING.

COMMENT

10. THERE HAS BEEN SOME LIMITED SPECULATION THAT ELEMENTS OF THE REPORT COULD DAMAGE DEFENSE MINISTER VOORHOEVE POLITICALLY, AND POTENTIALLY FORCE HIS RESIGNATION. GIVEN THE REPORT'S MIXTURE OF GOOD AND BAD NEWS, THE KEY FACTOR WILL BE WHAT USE PARLIAMENT CHOOSES TO MAKE OF THE REPORT. IF THEY ARE LOOKING TO PUT THE ISSUE TO REST, THE REPORT WILL GIVE THEM THE MEANS TO DO SO; CONVERSELY, IF THEY WANT A SCAPEGOAT, THEY COULD FIND ENOUGH AMMUNITION TO DAMAGE VOORHOEVE. MOST OF OUR CONTACTS (INCLUDING IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE, MFA, AND MOD) DOUBT
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 THE HAGUE 005512

E.O. 12356: DECL: 10/13/15
TAGS: MARR, PREL, UN, NATO, BK, NL
SUBJECT: DUTCH REPORT ON SREBRENICA TO OFFER GRIST FOR DEFENDERS AND DETRACTORS OF BLUE HELMET ACTIONS

VOORHOEVE IS AT RISK. THEY BELIEVE PARLIAMENT IS INCREASINGLY COGNIZANT OF THE DAMAGE THEIR CONTINUED FOCUS ON THE ISSUE IS DOING TO THE DUTCH REPUTATION INTERNATIONALLY, AND WILL LIKELY LET THE ISSUE GO AFTER A THOROUGH AIRING OF THE REPORT.

MINIMIZE CONSIDERED
DORNBUSH
BT
#5512

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03
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<^SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03

SSN: 5512
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TOR: 951013125546 M1900625
<^TOR>951013125550 M1900628
<^TOR>951013125555 M1900629

DIST: SIT: BELL CLARKER DAALDER FEELEY NSC PETERS SAUNDERS SCHWARTZ SESTAK
VERSHBOW
□

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: United Nations Report on the Humanitarian and Human Rights Situation in Bosnia (5 pages)	10/23/1995	P1/b(1)
002. cable	re: Highlight Cable 24 Oct 95 [partial] (4 pages)	10/24/1995	P1/b(1), P3/b(3), b(7)(C) RDS 9/15/2016
003. cable	re: Mitosevic Pledges Access, Accountability... (4 pages)	10/24/1995	P1/b(1) RDS 9/15/2016
004. cable	re: Highlight Cable 27 Oct 95 [partial] (4 pages)	10/27/1995	P1/b(1), P3/b(3), b(7)(C) RDS 9/15/2016
005. cable	re: Bosnia/Croatia in Security Council... (4 pages)	10/31/1995	P1/b(1) RDS 9/15/2016
006. cable	re: Voorhoeve Blames Bosnian Serbs for Srebrenica Fall [50 U.S.C. 403g, Section 6] [partial] (3 pages)	10/31/1995	P3/b(3)
007. cable	re: Balkan Crisis: Site (4 pages)	10/31/1995	P1/b(1)
008. cable	re: Balkan Crisis: RBH Foreign Ministry (18 pages)	11/01/1995	P1/b(1)
009. cable	re: Bosnia: U.S. Circulates a Draft Resolution... (4 pages)	11/01/1995	P1/b(1) RDS 9/15/2016
010. cable	re: Balkans Crisis Summary for 1 November 1995 (7 pages)	11/02/1995	P1/b(1)
011. cable	re: Bosnia: Contact Group Discusses American (4 pages)	11/02/1995	P1/b(1) RDS 9/15/2016
012. cable	re: Balkans Crisis Summary for 05 November 1995 (9 pages)	11/06/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Cables
 Jan 1995- Dec 1996 ([Srebrenica and Ethnic Cleans...])
 OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:

[10/23/1995-11/16/1995]

2006-0647-F

rs497

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013. cable	re: Balkan Crisis: Medecins Sans Frontieres (3 pages)	11/07/1995	P1/b(1)
014. cable	re: Balkan Crisis: Convictions Grow (2 pages)	11/14/1995	P1/b(1)
015. cable	re: UN: Arrest Warrants to be Issued for Karadzic, Mladic [50 U.S.C. 403g, Section 6] [partial] (3 pages)	11/16/1995	P3/b(3)
016. cable	re: Highlight Cable 16 Nov 95 (12 pages)	11/16/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Cables
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 OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:

[10/23/1995-11/16/1995]

2006-0647-F

rs497

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. cable	re: Highlight Cable 24 Oct 95 [partial] (4 pages)	10/24/1995	P1/b(1), P3/b(3), b(7)(C)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1995- Dec 1996 ([Srebrenica and Ethnic Cleans...])
OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:

[10/23/1995-11/16/1995]

2006-0647-F

rs497

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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Cable

PREC: PRIORITY

CLASS: SECRET

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)

SUBJ: NPIC HIGHLIGHT CABLE 24 OCT 95

THIS IS NPIC HIGHLIGHT CABLE 95-1025 FOR 24 OCTOBER 1995.

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)

(b)(1), 3.3(b)(1)

TEXT:

~~S E C R E T~~ NOFORN

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)

SUBJ: NPIC HIGHLIGHT CABLE 24 OCT 95

THIS IS NPIC HIGHLIGHT CABLE 95-1025 FOR 24 OCTOBER 1995.

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)

(b)(1), 3.3(b)(1)

INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT IS CLASSIFIED, CONTROLLED, AND ELIGIBLE FOR FOREIGN RELEASE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CIO IMAGERY POLICY SERIES (CIPS). EACH PARAGRAPH IS SEPARATELY CLASSIFIED.
(S)

THE VIEWS EXPRESSED HEREIN HAVE NOT BEEN FORMALLY COORDINATED WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. COMMENTS AND QUERIES REGARDING ITEMS IN THIS REPORT SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO THE APPROPRIATE ANALYST.
(U)

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
RDS 09/15/2016 (1.16)
2013-0831-M

[2013-0656-M, 5.10]

1. BALKAN HIGHLIGHTS

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: PROBABLE EXHUMATION OF MASS GRAVE NEAR SBREBRENICA (S)

TEXT:

1. BALKAN HIGHLIGHTS (b)(1), 3.3(b)(1)

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: PROBABLE EXHUMATION OF MASS GRAVE NEAR SBREBRENICA (S)

ONE OF SIX POSSIBLE MASS GRAVES IDENTIFIED ON IMAGERY AFTER THE FALL OF THE SREBRENICA SAFE AREA HAS PROBABLY BEEN EXHUMED BY THE BOSNIAN SERBS. THE POSSIBLE GRAVE SITE IS AT TATAR, A SMALL MUSLIM VILLAGE DESTROYED IN EARLY 1993. IT IS 5.5 KM NORTHWEST OF BRATUNAC ALONG THE PAVED ROAD TOWARD THE VILLAGE OF KONJEVIC POLJE. (S) 3.3(b)(1)

THE EXHUMATION OF THE TATAR POSSIBLE MASS GRAVE (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(1) APPEARED TO BE NEARLY COMPLETE (b)(1), 3.3(b)(1) (b)(1) THE LAST INTERPRETABLE U-2 IMAGERY OF THE POSSIBLE GRAVE SITE 3.3(b)(1) REVEALED NO CHANGE SINCE ITS INITIAL (b)(1) IDENTIFICATION. THE AMOUNT OF MATERIAL OR BODIES REMOVED (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(1) IS UNCERTAIN. (S) (b)(1) 3.3(b)(1)

ACTIVITY AT THE POSSIBLE MASS GRAVE INCLUDED THE EXCAVATION OF AN IRREGULARLY SHAPED, LARGE TRENCH BETWEEN 30 AND 50 METERS IN LENGTH. ONE TRACKED EXCAVATOR OR BACKHOE WAS OBSERVED WITH THE EXCAVATION BUCKET IN DIFFERENT POSITIONS ON U-2 IMAGERY (b)(1), 3.3(b)(1) 3.3(b)(1) IT APPEARED THAT THE BOTTOM OF THE TRENCH HAD BEEN EXCAVATED BY A BULLDOZER, BUT NONE WAS OBSERVED NEARBY. UNIDENTIFIED LIGHT-TONED MATERIAL HAD APPARENTLY BEEN MOVED FROM THE POSSIBLE GRAVE SITE TO ANOTHER LOCATION ALONG A DIRT ROAD ABOUT 100 METERS TO THE EAST. THE POSSIBLE GRAVE SITE AT TATAR IS THE LARGEST IDENTIFIED (ABOUT 850 SQUARE METERS OF SURFACE AREA), AND THE CLOSEST TO SREBRENICA. IT IS ALSO THE ONLY POSSIBLE GRAVE SITE IDENTIFIED ON IMAGERY THAT HAS NOT BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH A SURVIVOR REPORT. THE PROBABLE EXHUMATION WAS FIRST SUSPECTED ON 3.3(b)(1) U-2 IMAGERY OF POOR INTERPRETABILITY. (S) 3.3(b)(1)

#1972

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S E C R E T NOFORN

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)

COMMENTS: THE USE OF A HEAVY EXCAVATOR SUGGESTS THE LACK OF CONCERN FOR FORENSIC EVALUATION OF EXHUMED BODIES, AND PROBABLY A DESIRE FOR SPEED IN THE EXCAVATION PROCESS. THIS ACTIVITY, AND THE ABSENCE OF VEHICLES NORMALLY SEEN IN BOSNIA WITH NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS OR THE UNITED NATIONS, SUGGESTS THAT THE OPERATION IS PROBABLY BEING CONDUCTED BY THE BOSNIAN SERBS TO DISPOSE OF EVIDENCE OF MASS EXECUTIONS. NO EXCAVATION ACTIVITY WAS OBSERVED AT ANY OF THE OTHER FIVE POSSIBLE GRAVE SITES ASSOCIATED WITH THE FALL OF THE SREBRENICA SAFE AREA (SEE TABLE BELOW).--END OF COMMENTS. (S) 3.3(b)(1)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)

THE FOLLOWING ARE THE LOCATIONS OF THE SIX POSSIBLE MASS GRAVES AND TWO SMALLER SUSPECTED GRAVE SITES.

TATAR POSSIBLE MASS GRAVE	44-12-34N 019-16-03E UTM 34T CP 615965
ZVORNIK-SAHANICI PROB MASS GRAVES (TWO EXCAVATIONS)	44-25-29N 019-02-55E UTM 34T CQ 446209
KASABA POSSIBLE MASS GRAVE	44-13-49N 019-06-11E UTM 34T CP 483991
KASABA POSSIBLE MASS GRAVES (TWO EXCAVATIONS)	44-13-59N 019-06-24E UTM 34T CP 486994
SANDICI SUSPECTED GRAVE SITE	44-13-11N 019-10-42E UTM 34T CP 543978
ZVORNIK-SAHANICI SUSPECTED GRAVE SITE	44-27-41N 019-04-54E UTM 34T CQ 472248

(THE ABOVE TABLE IS CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 3.3(b)(1))

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), (b)(3), (b)(7)c

REFERENCE(S) :

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)

NNNN

~~S E C R E T~~ NOFORN

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHBWA5248 2972354-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZZK
 LINE3: O 242354Z OCT 95 ZFF4
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
 OSRI: RUEHBW
 DTG: 242354Z OCT 95
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
 TO: SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 7504
 INFO: ////
 SUBJ: MILOSEVIC PLEDGES ACCESS, ACCOUNTABILITY IN
 WAKE OF RECENT ETHNIC CLEANSING BY BOSNIAN SERBS

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 005248

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY AND A/S HOLBROOKE FROM A/S SHATTUCK

E.O. 12958: DECL:10/24/05

TAGS: PREL, BK, SR

SUBJECT: MILOSEVIC PLEDGES ACCESS, ACCOUNTABILITY IN
 WAKE OF RECENT ETHNIC CLEANSING BY BOSNIAN SERBS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY RUDOLF V. PERINA, CHIEF OF MISSION
 PER 1.5(B). NIACT PRECEDENCE AS REQUESTED BY A/S
 HOLBROOKE.

2. ~~(c)~~ SUMMARY: DURING A MEETING WITH SERBIAN
 PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC ON OCTOBER 24, A/S SHATTUCK RAISED
 ISSUES OF ICRC, NGO AND PRESS ACCESS TO AREAS OF BOSNIA
 AND CROATIA WHERE GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES OR ETHNIC
 CLEANSING ARE TAKING OR HAVE TAKEN PLACE. MILOSEVIC
 PROMISED THAT HE WOULD DO HIS BEST TO INSIST ON ACCESS
 AND TO PRESS FOR THE ARREST OF THE GUILTY. A/S SHATTUCK
 URGED IMMEDIATE ACTION BY SERBIA AND THE BOSNIAN SERBS
 TO SAVE THE LIVES OF MISSING MUSLIMS FROM THE BANJA LUKA
 AREA, SAYING THAT WORDS ON THIS ISSUE ARE WELCOME BUT
 ACTIONS ARE CRITICAL AND THE TEST OF ANY REAL PROGRESS.
 A/S SHATTUCK ASKED FOR FULL AND ONGOING FRY COOPERATION
 WITH THE INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL. MILOSEVIC
 AGREED "IN PRINCIPLE," BUT NOTED THAT THE LEGAL ISSUES
 WERE "COMPLICATED." HE AGREED TO MEETINGS BETWEEN
 SERBIAN AUTHORITIES AND THE TRIBUNAL TO DISCUSS MEANS OF
 COOPERATION. MILOSEVIC AGREED TO A/S SHATTUCK'S
 SUGGESTION THAT THE CROATIAN MISSION IN BELGRADE BE
 ALLOWED TO ADD STAFF TO PROCESS APPLICATIONS OF KRAJINA
 SERBS WHO WISHED TO RETURN. LATER A PRESS STATEMENT
 FROM MILOSEVIC'S OFFICE, AIRED ON THE STATE-CONTROLLED

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
 White House Guidelines, September 11, 2001
 By ~~ROS~~ NARA, Date 9/15/2016
 2013-0831-um (1.17)
 [2013-0831-um, 9.11]

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TELEVISION CALLED FOR ACCESS BY HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS AND THE PRESS TO ANY LOCATIONS WHERE ALLEGED WAR CRIMES HAD TAKEN PLACE (SEPTEL). END SUMMARY.

3. ~~(C)~~ ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR JOHN SHATTUCK, ACCOMPANIED BY COM PERINA, MET OCTOBER 24 IN BELGRADE WITH SERBIAN PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC AND FOREIGN MINISTER MILUTINOVIC. PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC GREETED SHATTUCK AND TOLD HIM HE ESPECIALLY WANTED TO STRESS WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO ETHNIC SERBS IN CROATIA. NO ONE, HE SAID, UNDERSTOOD THE WORLD'S PASSIVE RESPONSE. THIS WAS THE THIRD GENOCIDE CARRIED OUT AGAINST SERBS IN EUROPE AND THE LARGEST GENOCIDE IN EUROPE SINCE WORLD WAR TWO. HE ESTIMATED A HALF MILLION SERBS HAD BEEN DRIVEN OUT OF CROATIA.

4. ~~(C)~~ SHATTUCK OPENED HIS STATEMENT BY SAYING THAT HIS VISIT WAS NOT PART OF THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS BUT HE WAS SENT BY THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE WITH A TWO-PART MESSAGE CONCERNING BANJA LUKA AND THE KRAJINA. j (NT ACCESS IMMEDIATELY FOR THE ICRC, NGOS AND THE PRESS TO THE BANJA LUKA AREA BECAUSE LIVES WERE AT STAKE AND URGENT ACTION TO SAVE THEM IS ESSENTIAL. HE ALSO APPEALED TO THE SERBIAN PRESIDENT ON BEHALF OF THE U.S. TO USE HIS INFLUENCE TO ALLOW INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND NGOS TO LOCATE PEOPLE WHO HAD BEEN SEPARATED FROM THEIR FAMILIES, INCLUDING THOSE LISTED BY ICRC AS MISSING.

5. ~~(C)~~ MILOSEVIC REPLIED THAT HE WAS NOT IN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND IN THE REPUBLIKA SRPSKA (RS) BUT WOULD DO HIS BEST TO SECURE THE ARREST OF THOSE GUILTY OF ETHNIC CLEANSING. HE CLAIMED HE HAD BEEN TOLD BY THE RS THAT INDIVIDUAL SOLDIERS HAD BEEN GUILTY OF EXCESSES BUT HE DID NOT NECESSARILY ACCEPT THIS POINT OF VIEW AND WOULD SEARCH FOR THE TRUTH. HE WOULD INSIST ON ACCESS FOR THE PRESS AND NGOS AND WOULD INSTRUCT FM MILUTINOVIC "TONIGHT" TO SEE THAT THE PEOPLE ON THE ICRC LIST WERE FOUND. MILOSEVIC ALSO CONFIDED THAT HIS "SPECIAL POLICE" WERE LOOKING FOR THE TWO FRENCH PILOTS MISSING SINCE THEIR PLANE WAS SHOT DOWN OVER BOSNIA.

6. ~~(C)~~ A/S SHATTUCK POINTED OUT THAT INDIVIDUALS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR CRIMES, AND THE INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL WAS VERY IMPORTANT. SHATTUCK URGED MILOSEVIC TO REQUIRE SERBIA'S FULL AND ONGOING COOPERATION WITH THE TRIBUNAL. MILOSEVIC RESPONDED THAT HE AGREED AND WOULD NOT OBSTRUCT WAR CRIMES INVESTIGATIONS. HOWEVER, WHILE "ALL CRIMINALS WOULD BE ARRESTED," THE CONSTITUTION OF SERBIA PROHIBITED THE EXTRADITION OF ITS CITIZENS. NEVERTHELESS, SERBIAN LAWS AGAINST "HATE CRIMES" WERE STRONGER THAN INTERNATIONAL LAWS. MILUTINOVIC ADDED THAT THE CORRECT LEGAL PROCEDURE IN THE FRY WAS TO ASK LOCAL COURTS TO MAKE INITIAL INVESTIGATIONS.

7. ~~(C)~~ WHEN A/S SHATTUCK BROUGHT UP THE QUESTION

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OF INVESTIGATING THE GRAVES NEAR SREBRENICA, MILOSEVIC RESPONDED IMMEDIATELY THAT HE WOULD RAISE THE ISSUE THE NEXT DAY AND SAW NO REASON WHY ACCESS SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED. HE WENT ON TO SAY HE WOULD ISSUE A PRESS RELEASE CALLING FOR BANJA LUKA TO BE OPEN TO PRESS AND NGOS.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 BELGRADE 005248

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY AND A/S HOLBROOKE FROM A/S SHATTUCK

E.O. 12958: DECL:10/24/05

TAGS: PREL, BK, SR

SUBJECT: MILOSEVIC PLEDGES ACCESS, ACCOUNTABILITY IN WAKE OF RECENT ETHNIC CLEANSING BY BOSNIAN SERBS

8. ~~(c)~~ WHEN A/S SHATTUCK URGED THAT COOPERATION WITH THE WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL BE INCLUDED IN THE PRESIDENT'S PRESS STATEMENT, MILOSEVIC RESPONDED THAT HE MUST FIRST LOOK INTO THE LEGAL ISSUES, WHICH WERE "COMPLICATED." SHATTUCK SUGGESTED THAT TRIBUNAL REPRESENTATIVES GET IN TOUCH WITH THE PROPER FRY AUTHORITIES TO ASSURE FULL COOPERATION CONSISTENT WITH FRY CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND MILOSEVIC RESPONDED THAT HE FELT THAT WAS A REASONABLE PROPOSAL.

9. ~~(c)~~ A/S SHATTUCK NOTED THAT THERE WERE MANY OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES OF CONCERN RAISED IN THE SERBIA/MONTENEGRO HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT INCLUDING KOSOVO, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND MINORITY RIGHTS. MILOSEVIC REPLIED THAT ALL HE ASKED WAS THAT SHATTUCK BE "OBJECTIVE." HE ASSERTED THERE WAS MORE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN THE FRY THAN IN SURROUNDING COUNTRIES AND COMPLAINED THAT THERE WERE 20 NEWSPAPERS IN KOSOVO, ALL OF WHICH ATTACKED HIM.

10. ~~(c)~~ TURNING TO THE PROBLEM OF SERB REFUGEES FROM THE KRAJINA, SHATTUCK TOLD MILOSEVIC THAT THE U.S. TOOK THIS PROBLEM VERY SERIOUSLY, AS EVIDENCED BY HIS THREE TRIPS TO CROATIA WITHIN THE LAST SIX WEEKS. OUR EMBASSY IN ZAGREB HAD JUST TURNED OVER TO CROATIAN AUTHORITIES A LIST OF 3,000 SERBS WHO WISHED TO RETURN TO KRAJINA. WE WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS ON THIS.

11. ~~(c)~~ SHATTUCK ASKED IF THE FRY WOULD SUPPORT ADDING STAFF TO THE CROATIAN MISSION IN BELGRADE TO PROCESS APPLICATIONS OF KRAJINA SERB REFUGEES WHO WISHED TO RETURN. MILOSEVIC AGREED AND MILUTINOVIC ADDED THAT THE REAL PROBLEM WAS THE CROATIAN PROPERTY LAW WHICH SET A LIMIT ON TIME FOR PEOPLE TO CLAIM PROPERTY.

12. ~~(c)~~ MILOSEVIC SEVERAL TIMES PROMISED A PRESS

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RELEASE FROM THE MEETING WHICH WOULD ADVOCATE NGO AND PRESS ACCESS TO BANJA LUKA, THE KRAJINA, AND THE SREBRENICA AREA. COM PERINA NOTED THAT QUESTIONS OF ACCESS HAD BEEN RAISED PREVIOUSLY WITH BOSNIAN VICE PRESIDENT KOLJEVIC WHO SEEMED TO BE PROCRASTINATING. A/S SHATTUCK CONCLUDED THAT THE PRESS STATEMENT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL BUT THAT ACTION ON GRANTING ACCESS WAS MOST IMPERATIVE BECAUSE LIVES WERE AT STAKE. ACTIONS BY SERBIA AND THE BOSNIAN SERB WOULD BE CAREFULLY MONITORED, AND REAL HUMAN RIGHTS PROGRESS WOULD NOT OCCUR UNTIL THESE ACTIONS WERE TAKEN.

13. ~~(e)~~ A MILOSEVIC OFFICE PRESS STATEMENT, SUBSEQUENTLY AIRED OVER STATE-RUN TV EVENING NEWS, CALLED FOR AN INVESTIGATION INTO ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN THE BANJA LUKA REGION AND URGED FULL ACCESS FOR HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS AND PRESS TO LOCATIONS WHERE ALLEGED WAR CRIMES WERE COMMITTED (FULL STATEMENT FOLLOWS SEPTTEL.)

14. ~~(e)~~ COMMENT: MILOSEVIC WAS OPEN AND EXPANSIVE; HE WAS CLEARLY ATTEMPTING TO PROJECT AN IMAGE OF COOPERATION. HIS STATEMENTS ON ACCESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY -- ALTHOUGH TEMPERED SLIGHTLY BY DISCLAIMERS THAT HE WAS NOT DIRECTLY IN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND -- WERE NEVERTHELESS POSITIVE. HIS WILLINGNESS TO GO PUBLIC WITH THIS POSITION IS CONSTRUCTIVE. THAT SAID, THE TEST LIES IN IMPLEMENTATION RATHER THAN STATEMENTS OF INTENT, AND REAL PROGRESS CAN ONLY BE MEASURED BY THAT STANDARD. WE WILL BE FOLLOWING UP PROMPTLY TO DISCOVER WHETHER THESE STATEMENTS ARE TRANSLATED INTO CONCRETE ACTIONS TO SAVE LIVES AND TO BRING THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR VIOLATIONS TO ACCOUNT.

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BT

#5248

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02
SSN: 5248
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TOR: 951024192530 M1918014
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SUM2 VERSHBOW WHSR_SPECIAL

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. cable	re: Highlight Cable 27 Oct 95 [partial] (4 pages)	10/27/1995	P1/b(1), P3/b(3), b(7)(C)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Cables
 Jan 1995- Dec 1996 ([Srebrenica and Ethnic Cleans...])
 OA/Box Number: 510000

FOLDER TITLE:

[10/23/1995-11/16/1995]

2006-0647-F
rs497

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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
- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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
Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
RDS 09/15/2016 (1.18)
2013-0831-M
[2013-0656-M, 5.12]

SUBJ: NPIC 1700 HIGHLIGHT CABLE 27 OCT 95

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT. (U)

TEXT:

~~TOP SECRET NOFORN~~



SUBJ: NPIC 1700 HIGHLIGHT CABLE 27 OCT 95

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT. (U)

WARNING: INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT IS CLASSIFIED,
CONTROLLED, AND ELIGIBLE FOR FOREIGN RELEASE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE

(b)(1) E.O. 13526-3-3(b)(1) CLASSIFICATION OF EACH PARAGRAPH IS SO DESIGNATED. (S)

THE VIEWS EXPRESSED HEREIN HAVE NOT BEEN FORMALLY COORDINATED WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. COMMENTS AND QUERIES REGARDING ITEMS IN THIS REPORT SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO THE APPROPRIATE ANALYST

(b)(1) E.O. 13526-3-3(b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) E.O. 13526-3-3(b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(7)C

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- 1. BALKAN HIGHLIGHTS
 - FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: PROBABLE MASS GRAVE EXHUMATION CONTINUES AT TATAR (S)

TEXT:

- 1. BALKAN HIGHLIGHTS (b)(1) E.O. 13526-3-3(b)(1)

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: PROBABLE MASS GRAVE EXHUMATION CONTINUES AT TATAR (S)

THIS INFORMATION IS IN ADDITION TO THAT REPORTED IN THE NPIC 1700 HIGHLIGHT CABLE HL9525342 FOR 27 OCTOBER. (b)(1) E.O. 13526-3-3(b)(1)

(b)(1) E.O. 13526-3-3(b)(1)

TATAR POSSIBLE MASS GRAVE (b)(1) E.O. 13526-3-3(b)(1)

THE PROBABLE EXHUMATION OF THE TATAR POSSIBLE MASS GRAVE (b)(1) E.O. 13526-3-3(b)(1)

(b)(1) E.O. 13526-3-3(b)(1)

A DUMP TRUCK AND A TRAILER WERE PARKED ALONGSIDE AN EXCAVATOR NEAR THE LARGE TRENCH, APPARENTLY PREPARING TO REMOVE EARTH AND POSSIBLY BODIES. TATAR IS A SMALL MUSLIM VILLAGE THAT WAS DESTROYED IN EARLY 1993. IT IS 5.5 KM NORTHWEST OF BRATUNAC ALONG THE PAVED

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T O P S E C R E T N O F O R N

(b)(1) E.O. 13526-3-3(b)(1)

(b)(1), EO 13526/3-3(b)(1)

ROAD TOWARD THE VILLAGE OF KONJEVIC POLJE. (S)(b)(1), EO 13526/3-3(b)(1)

COMMENTS -- PRESIDENT SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC OF SERBIA HAS RECENTLY OFFERED FREE ACCESS FOR AID WORKERS AND JOURNALISTS TO THE REPORTED MASS GRAVE SITES NEAR SREBRENICA ACCORDING TO AN ARTICLE IN THE 27 OCTOBER WASHINGTON POST. HOWEVER, A BOSNIAN SERB LEADER QUOTED IN THE SAME ARTICLE ONLY OFFERED TO DISCUSS THE DEMANDS FOR ACCESS, PERHAPS STALLING FOR TIME. (U)

THE USE OF A HEAVY EXCAVATOR SUGGESTS THE LACK OF CONCERN FOR FORENSIC EVALUATION OF EXHUMED BODIES, AND PROBABLY A DESIRE FOR SPEED IN THE EXCAVATION PROCESS. THIS ACTIVITY, AND THE ABSENCE OF VEHICLES NORMALLY SEEN IN BOSNIA WITH NON-GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS OR THE UNITED NATIONS, SUGGESTS THAT THE OPERATION IS PROBABLY BEING CONDUCTED BY THE BOSNIAN SERBS TO DISPOSE OF EVIDENCE OF MASS EXECUTIONS BEFORE GRANTING ACCESS TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OR THE PRESS. NO EXCAVATION ACTIVITY WAS OBSERVED AT ANY OF THE OTHER FIVE POSSIBLE GRAVE SITES ASSOCIATED WITH THE FALL OF THE SREBRENICA SAFE AREA. --- END OF COMMENTS. (S)(b)(1), EO 13526/3-3(b)(1)

RENEWED ACTIVITY AT THE SITE WAS FIRST OBSERVED (b)(1), EO 13526/3-3(b)(1) AND INCLUDED THE EXCAVATION OF AN IRREGULARLY SHAPED, LARGE TRENCH BETWEEN 30 AND 50 METERS IN LENGTH. EXCAVATION (b)(1), EO 13526/3-3(b)(1) HAS NEARLY DOUBLED THE SIZE OF THE TRENCH, AND A SECOND PROBABLE BURIAL SITE NEARBY WAS BEING DUG UP (b)(1), EO 13526/3-3(b)(1) ONE TRACKED EXCAVATOR OR BACKHOE HAS BEEN OBSERVED AT SEVERAL DIFFERENT POSITIONS (b)(1), EO 13526/3-3(b)(1) UNIDENTIFIED LIGHT-TONED MATERIAL HAD APPARENTLY BEEN MOVED FROM THE POSSIBLE GRAVE SITE TO ANOTHER LOCATION ALONG A DIRT ROAD ABOUT 100 METERS TO THE EAST. THE POSSIBLE GRAVE SITE AT TATAR WAS THE LARGEST IDENTIFIED (ABOUT 850 SQUARE METERS OF SURFACE AREA), AND THE CLOSEST TO SREBRENICA. IT IS ALSO THE ONLY POSSIBLE GRAVE SITE IDENTIFIED (b)(1), EO 13526/3-3(b)(1) THAT HAS NOT BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH A SURVIVOR REPORT. (b)(1), EO 13526/3-3(b)(1)

(b)(1), EO 13526/3-3(b)(1); (b)(3)


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
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~~T O P S E C R E T~~ NOFORN



#2539



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 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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 SUBJ: BOSNIA/CROATIA IN SECURITY COUNCIL:
 GHAREKHAN BRIEFING AND FATE OF MEN IN CONTESTED TOWNS.
 CLASSIFIED BY: CAMERON R HUME, POL MIN-COUNS
 TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 004265
 JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2, CHAIRMAN,
 USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
 POLAD MINISTER DURKEE
 E.O.12958: DECL:10/30/2005
 TAGS: PREL, NATO, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
 SUBJECT: BOSNIA/CROATIA IN SECURITY COUNCIL:
 GHAREKHAN BRIEFING AND FATE OF MEN IN CONTESTED TOWNS.
 CLASSIFIED BY: CAMERON R HUME, POL MIN-COUNS
 REASON: 1.5 (D)
 BOSNIAN UPDATE

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 E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
 White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
 By RD, NARA, Date 9/15/2016
 2018-0831-m (1.19)
 [2018-0656-m, 5.13]

1. ~~(C)~~ IN SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMALS ON 30 OCTOBER, USYG GHAREKHAN BRIEFED ON THE CURRENT SITUATION. GHAREKHAN SAID THAT THERE WAS NOT MUCH MILITARY ACTIVITY IN BOSNIA EXCEPT FOR A FEW SMALL ARMS FIRINGS IN SAREJEVO. GHAREKHAN REPORTED THAT FEDERATION TROOPS WERE STILL RESTRICTING UNPROFOR'S MOVEMENT IN NW BOSNIA.

NATO AIR STRIKES AND NATO PRESENCE IN BOSNIA

2. ~~(C)~~ IN RESPONSE TO RUSSIAN REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON DAMAGE ASSESMENTS OF NATO AIR OPERATION GHAREKHAN STATED THAT 816 SORTIES WERE FLOWN AGAINST BOSNIAN SERB INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS, FIXED MILITARY TARGETS, AND HEAVY WEAPONS. MOST OF THESE STRIKES WERE SUCCESSFUL ALTHOUGH BAD WEATHER PERIODICALLY LIMITED OPERATIONS. THE BSA RESPONDED QUICKLY TO THESE ATTACKS. CONSEQUENTLY, THE NUMBER OF HEAVY WEAPONS AROUND SARAJEVO WAS NOT SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED. BSA AIR DEFENSES REMAINED FUNCTIONAL. AFTER THE RESUMPTION OF THE AIR STRIKES 14 SEPTEMBER, NATO ASSESSED THAT EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS AND AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS AROUND BANJA LUKA WERE DISABLED AND COMMUNICATIONS SEVERELY DEGRADED. GHAREKHAN SAID THAT NATO DID NOT INCLUDE ANY REPORTS OF COLLATERAL DAMAGE IN ITS REPORT TO THE SYG.

3. ~~(C)~~ IN RESPONSE TO A RUSSIAN QUESTION ABOUT THE PRESENCE OF NATO PERSONNEL IN ZAGREB, GHAREKHAN SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT A "FORWARD DEPLOYMENT OF NATO." GHAREKHAN SAID THAT A LIMITED NUMBER OF NATO SPECIALISTS COMMISSIONED TO DEVISE NATO DEPLOYMENT FOR AN UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL UNDER HOSTILE CIRCUMSTANCES REMAINED IN THEATER WITH THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SYG AND THE GOC.

4. ~~(C)~~ RUSSIAN PERMREP LAVROV ASSERTED THAT COMPLIANCE BY THE BOSNIAN SERBS WITH THE CONDITIONS SET OUT BY THE 3 SEPTEMBER UN FORCE COMMANDER'S LETTER TERMINATED THE NATO AIR OPERATION. A RESUMPTION OF AIR STRIKES WOULD REQUIRE THE CONSENT OF BOTH NATO AND THE UN. GHAREKHAN ANSWERED THAT UN AND NATO AGREED ON 20 SEPTEMBER THAT A RESUMPTION OF AIR STRIKES WAS NOT NEEDED AT THAT TIME. AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT SAID THAT, WHILE WE HOPE THERE IS NO RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES IN BOSNIA, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE AIR STRIKES WERE SUSPENDED, NOT TERMINATED.

PENDING FATE OF NON-SERB DRAFT-AGED MEN IN
SREBRENICA, ZEPA AND BANJA LUKA AREA

5. ~~(C)~~ GERMAN PERMREP EITEL EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE NON-SERB, DRAFT-AGED MEN ROUNDED UP BY THE BSA IN SREBRENICA, ZEPA AND BANJA LUKA, EITEL URGED THE COUNCIL TO REACT IN LIGHT OF THE "WORST WAR CRIME IN

EUROPE SINCE WWII, THE SUMMARY KILLING OF 6,000 MEN."
EITEL UNDERLINED THAT THE COUNCIL CANNOT ACT ON
UNSUBSTANTIATED NEWSPAPER REPORTS AND THEREFORE
REQUESTED A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT BY THE SYG. EITEL
SUGGESTED THAT THE REPORT INCLUDE 5 ELEMENTS: (1) HOW
MANY MEN ARE UNACCOUNTED FOR? (2) ARE THE REPORTS OF
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 004265

JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2, CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER DURKEE

E.O.12958: DECL:10/30/2005

TAGS: PREL, NATO, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: BOSNIA/CROATIA IN SECURITY COUNCIL:
GHAREKHAN BRIEFING AND FATE OF MEN IN CONTESTED TOWNS.

BOSNIAN SERB SUMMARY KILL
INGS PROBABLE? (3) ARE THERE
EYEWITNESS ACCOUNTS OF BOSNIAN SERB HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSES? (4) TO WHAT EXTENT WERE FRY PARAMILITARY
FORCES INVOLVED? (5) WHAT ARE THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS
FOR BOSNIAN SERB ACTIONS?

6. ~~(C)~~ MOST COUNCIL MEMBERS AGREED THAT THERE WAS AN
URGENT NEED TO ESTABLISH THE FATE OF THE DETAINED MEN.
OMANI PERMREP AL-KHUSSAIBY REGRETTED THAT THE COUNCIL
HAD FAILED TO TAKE ACTION EARLIER. HE SUPPORTED THE
GERMAN SUGGESTION FOR A REPORT BY THE SYG AND APPEALED
TO THE COUNCIL TO TAKE STRONG ACTION AGAINST THE
BOSNIAN SERBS. ARGENTINE PERMREP CARDENAS CAUTIONED
THE COUNCIL AGAINST TAKING ON THE INVESTIGATIVE
RESPONSIBILITY; PROSECUTION OF CRIMINALS SHOULD BE
HANDLED BY THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL. RUSSIAN PERMREP
LAVROV QUESTIONED HOW THE COUNCIL WOULD PROCEED AFTER
THE FACTS WERE ESTABLISHED. HE REMINDED THE COUNCIL
THAT THE KILLING OF SERBS IN THE KRAJINA WAS DENOUNCED
BY THE CROATIAN AUTHORITIES AS BEING CARRIED OUT BY
GROUPS OUTSIDE OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL IN STOLEN
GOVERNMENT UNIFORMS.

7. ~~(C)~~ AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT SAID IT HAS BEEN DIFFICULT
TO GET INFORMATION FROM THE SYG. SHE SUPPORTED THE
GERMAN PROPOSAL THAT THE SECRETARIAT PREPARE A REPORT
TO THE COUNCIL CONTAINING ALL IT KNEW ABOUT HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN SREBRENICA, ZEPA AND BANJA LUKA.
ALBRIGHT EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT SOME EVIDENCE OF THE
ABUSES HAS BEEN DESTROYED AND SHE CALLED ON ALL PARTIES
TO TURN OVER EVIDENCE TO THE TRIBUNAL.

8. ~~(C)~~ COUNCIL AGREED TO HAVE THE SYG PROVIDE
INFORMATION ABOUT THE FATE OF THE DETAINED MEN. HOW TO
PROCEED AFTER SUCH FACTS ARE KNOWN IS TO BE DECIDED
LATER.

9. ~~(C)~~ USUN PLANS TO DRAFT A RESOLUTION CONTAINING THE
FOLLOWING ELEMENTS:

--DEMANDING THAT ALL STATES COOPERATE WITH THE WAR

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CRIMES TRIBUNAL;

--DEMANDING THAT THE PARTIES NOT DISTURB ANY EVIDENCE
OF WAR CRIMES;

--DEMANDING THAT THE BOSNIAN SERBS GRANT ACCESS TO THE
DETAINEES OR ALLEGED SITES OF MASS GRAVES TO
APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES INCLUDING THE
TRIBUNAL;

--REQUESTING THE SECRETARIAT TO ISSUE A WRITTEN REPORT
ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN SREBRENICA, ZEPA AND
BANJA LUKA AREAS.

10. ~~(C)~~ IF THE DEPARTMENT APPROVES THE DRAFT WE WILL
CIRCULATE IT IN THE CONTACT GROUP AND AMONG MEMBERS OF
THE COUNCIL.

ALBRIGHT
BT
#4265

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

SSN: 4265
<^SSN>4265

TOR: 951030223910 M1927451
<^TOR>951030223808 M1927450

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VERSHBOW

Cable

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 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
 RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 1717
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE 0384
 RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 2956
 RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 2995
 RUFNBUT/HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT//POLAD//
 RUCBACM/USCINCOM NORFOLK VA
 RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
 RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA 4373
 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 9412
 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 2352
 RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2971
 RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 1022
 RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 3137
 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 4037
 RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 1694
 SUBJ: BOSNIA: U.S. CIRCULATES A DRAFT RESOLUTION ON
 TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 004285

JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2, CHAIRMAN,
 USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
 POLAD MINISTER DURKEE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2005
 TAGS: PREL, NATO, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
 SUBJECT: BOSNIA: U.S. CIRCULATES A DRAFT RESOLUTION ON
 -- HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN BOSNIA TO MEMBERS
 -- OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

CLASSIFIED BY: CAMERON R HUME, POL MIN-COUNS
 REASON: 1.5 (D)

REF: USUN/IO-UNP TELECONS

1. ~~(C)~~ USUN CONVENED A COUNSELORS' LEVEL MEETING OF

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 E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
 White House Guidelines, September 11, 2000
 By RDS NARA, Date 1/15/2016
 2013-0831-m (1.22)
 [2013-0656-M, S. 16]

THE CONTACT GROUP PLUS ITALY TO GIVE OTHER CONTACT GROUP DELEGATIONS COPIES OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION FOUND BELOW. THE U.S. REPRESENTATIVE NOTED THAT THE DRAFT FOLLOWS UP ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S OCTOBER 30 DISCUSSION OF REPORTS OF SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY BOSNIAN SERB FORCES IN THE AREAS OF SREBRENICA, ZEPA, SANSKI MOST, AND BANJA LUKA. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE TEXT IS TIGHTLY FOCUSED ON HUMAN RIGHTS, AND IS BASED ON EXISTING LANGUAGE IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 1010 AND 827. HE ADDED THAT WE WOULD CIRCULATE THE TEXT TO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL DURING THE EVENING OF OCTOBER 31, THAT CONTACT GROUP AMBASSADORS SHOULD DISCUSS IT ON NOVEMBER 1, AND THAT IT WOULD BE ON THE AGENDA OF THE COUNCIL'S NEXT INFORMAL SESSION.

2. (C) WE ALSO SHOWED THE TEXT TO BOSNIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SACIRBEY WHO TOLD US THAT HE FULLY SUPPORTED IT. OMANI PERMREP AL-KHUSSAIBY (THE INCOMING COUNCIL PRESIDENT) SAID SUCH A RESOLUTION WAS OVERDUE AND THAT HE WOULD PUT IT ON THE AGENDA FOR THE FIRST INFORMAL SESSION DURING HIS PRESIDENCY. AL-KHUSSAIBY SAID THAT HE WOULD DISCUSS THE DRAFT DURING HIS NOVEMBER 1 ROUND OF BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH ALL COUNCIL MEMBERS, AND IF IT APPEARED TO ENJOY BROAD SUPPORT HE MIGHT CONVENE AN INFORMAL SESSION FOR THE AFTERNOON OF NOVEMBER 1. (THUS, WE MIGHT NEED AN EOY BY AS EARLY AS LATE AFTERNOON OF NOVEMBER 1.)

3. (C) BEGIN TEXT OF U.S. DRAFT RESOLUTION:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

RECALLING ALL ITS EARLIER RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS, AND REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 1004 (1995) OF 12 JULY 1995, AND 1010 OF (1995) OF 10 AUGUST 1995, AND THE STATEMENT OF ITS PRESIDENT OF 7 SEPTEMBER 1995 (S/PRST/1995/43), AND DEEPLY CONCERNED THAT DESPITE REPEATED CALLS THAT IT DO SO, THE BOSNIAN SERB PARTY HAS NOT COMPLIED WITH THE DEMANDS CONTAINED THEREIN,

DEEPLY CONCERNED AT REPORTS, INCLUDING BY THE SECRETARIAT OF THE UNITED NATIONS, OF GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN AND AROUND SREBRENICA, AND IN THE AREAS OF BANJA LUKA AND SANSKI MOST, INCLUDING REPORTS OF MASS MURDER, FORCED DETENTION, AND RAPE, OF MEMBERS OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION,

REITERATING ITS EXPRESSION OF STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE EFFORTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) IN SEEKING ACCESS TO DISPLACED PERSONS AND CONDEMNING IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS THE FAILURE OF THE BOSNIAN SERB PARTY TO COMPLY WITH THEIR COMMITMENTS TO THE ICRC IN RESPECT OF SUCH ACCESS,

EXPRESSING ITS STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO ITS

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

RESOLUTION 827,

-- 1. CONDEMNS IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS ALL
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 004285

JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2, CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER DURKEE

E.O.12958: DECL:10/30/2005

TAGS: PREL, NATO, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: U.S. CIRCULATES A DRAFT RESOLUTION ON
-- HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN BOSNIA TO MEMBERS
-- OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN THE
TERRITORY OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA;

-- 2. REAFFIRMS ITS DEMAND, THAT THE BOSNIAN S
ERB
PARTY GIVE IMMEDIATE ACCESS TO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, THE ICRC
AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES TO PERSONS DISPLACED
FROM SREBRENICA, ZEPA, AND THE REGIONS OF BANJA LUKA
AND SANSKI MOST WHO ARE WITHIN THE AREAS OF REPUBLIC OF
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA UNDER THE CONTROL OF BOSNIAN
SERB FORCES AND THAT THE BOSNIAN SERB PARTY PERMIT
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ICRC TO VISIT AND REGISTER ANY
PERSONS DETAINED AGAINST THEIR WILL, INCLUDING ANY
MEMBERS OF THE FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA;

-- 3. REAFFIRMS ALSO ITS DEMAND THAT THE BOSNIAN SERB

PARTY RESPECT FULLY THE RIGHTS OF ALL SUCH PERSONS AND
ENSURE THEIR SAFETY, AND TO RELEASE THEM;

-- 4. DEMANDS THAT ALL STATES, IN PARTICULAR THOSE IN
THE REGION OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, AND ALL PARTIES TO
THE CONFLICT IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, COMPLY FULLY
WITH ITS DECISION IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF RESOLUTION 827
(1993) AND COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO THAT RESOLUTION
INCLUDING BY PROVIDING ACCESS TO SITES THE TRIBUNAL
DEEMS IMPORTANT FOR ITS INVESTIGATIONS, AND BY
COMPLYING WITH THEIR OBLIGATION TO COMPLY WITH REQUESTS
FOR ASSISTANCE OR ORDERS ISSUED BY A TRIAL CHAMBER
UNDER ARTICLE 29 OF THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL;

-- 5. DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES, AND IN PARTICULAR THE
BOSNIAN SERB PARTY, REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTION INTENDED TO
DESTROY, ALTER, OR DAMAGE, ANY EVIDENCE OF VIOLATIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW;

-- 6. REQUESTS THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL SUBMIT TO
THE COUNCIL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE A WRITTEN REPORT

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

CONTAINING ALL INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO UNITED NATIONS
PERSONNEL CONCERNING RECENT VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN THE AREAS OF SREBRENICA, ZEPA,
BANJA LUKA AND SANSKI MOST;

-- 7. DECIDES TO REMAIN SEIZED OF THE MATTER.

END OF U.S. DRAFT RESOLUTION.

4. (U) SARAJEVO MINIMIZE CONSIDERED

ALBRIGHT

BT

#4285

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

SSN: 4285
<^SSN>4285

TOR: 951031203936 M1929452
<^TOR>951031203939 M1929453

DIST: SIT: BELL CLARKER DAALDER FEELEY NSC PETERS SAUNDERS SCHWARTZ SESTAK
VERSHBOW

□

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: OAACZYUW RUCNDDTA4313 3060128-CCCC--RHEHNSC RHEHAAA.
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 LINE3: O 020128Z NOV 95
 LINE4: FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
 OSRI: RUCNDT
 DTG: 020128Z NOV 95
 ORIG: USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATK 8648
 INFO: RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 1723
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO IMMEDIATE 0390
 RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 2962
 RHEHAAA/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
 RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3004
 RUFNBUT/HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT//POLAD//
 RUCBACM/USCINCOM NORFOLK VA
 RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 9436
 RUEHVEN/USMISSION USVIENNA 4398
 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 2368
 RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 2980
 RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST 1028
 RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 3143
 RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 4060
 RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 1700
 SUBJ: BOSNIA: CONTACT GROUP DISCUSSES AMERICAN
 TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 004313

JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2, CHAIRMAN,
 USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINCOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
 POLAD MINISTER DURKEE

E.O.12958: DECL:11/01/2005
 TAGS: PREL, NATO, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
 SUBJECT: BOSNIA: CONTACT GROUP DISCUSSES AMERICAN
 DRAFT RESOLUTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

CLASSIFIED BY: CAMERON R HUME, POL MIN-COUNS
 REASON: 1.5 (D)

1. ~~(C)~~ ON NOV 1, CONTACT GROUP PLUS ITALY MET AT THE
 COUNSELOR LEVEL TO DISCUSS US DRAFT RESOLUTION ON
 HUMANITARIAN ABUSES IN SREBRENICA, SANSKI MOST AND
 AREAS AROUND BANJA LUKA.

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DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
 White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
 By EDS NARA, Date 9/15/2016
 2013-0831-m (1.24)
 [2013-0656-m, 518]

2. ~~(c)~~ MEMBERS OF THE CONTACT GROUP PLUS ITALY AGREED TO THE 31 OCTOBER TEXT (REF A) WITH A FEW MINOR DRAFTING REVISIONS. THE GROUP ACCEPTED FRENCH PROPOSALS TO ADD ONE OPERATIVE AND ONE PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH AS FOLLOWS:

--PREAMBULAR 5: "COMMENDING THE EFFORTS BY THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCES AND OTHER UN PERSONNEL IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, IN PARTICULAR IN THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA DESPITE EXTREME DIFFICULTIES,"

--OPERATIVE 6: "REAFFIRMS ITS SUPPORT FOR THE ACTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCES AND OTHER UN PERSONNEL, STRESSES THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE OF THEIR CONTRIBUTION, AND DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES FULLY ENSURE THEIR SAFETY AND COOPERATE FULLY WITH THEM."

3. ~~(c)~~ THE RUSSIAN REPRESENTATIVE STATED THAT GOR COULD SUPPORT THE US DRAFT BUT URGED THE GROUP TO ALSO CONSIDER A RUSSIAN DRAFT ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN CROATIA, SO AS TO NOT IMPLY A DOUBLE STANDARD. THE RUSSIAN REPRESENTATIVE WAS FLEXIBLE AS TO THE NEXT STEP WITH THE DRAFT. HE SUGGESTED EITHER INCORPORATING ELEMENTS OF THE DRAFT INTO THE US TEXT OR ADOPTING TWO SEPARATE DRAFTS.

4. ~~(c)~~ OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GROUP SAID THAT THEY WOULD SEND THE RUSSIAN DRAFT TO THEIR CAPITALS, BUT DID NOT ENVISION ANY MAJOR PROBLEMS. MOST INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD LIKELY PREFER A SINGLE DRAFT INCORPORATING ELEMENTS OF THE RUSSIAN TEXT.

5. ~~(c)~~ USUN RECOMMENDS THAT WE INCORPORATE PREAMBULAR PARAGRAPH 2 AND OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS 2, 3, AND 4 INTO THE U.S. TEXT. SUCH A TEXT WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE COUNCIL CONDEMNED ALL VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS EQUALLY. WE NOTE THAT THE RUSSIAN TEXT DOES NOT TRY TO EQUATE THE SERIOUSNESS OF CROATIAN HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS WITH THOSE COMMITTED BY THE BOSNIAN SERBS. WE BELIEVE THAT A MERGED TEXT WOULD FIND CONSENSUS IN THE CONTACT GROUP AND COULD EASILY AND QUICKLY BE ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL. UNLESS INSTRUCTED OTHERWISE, WE INTEND TO PROCEED ALONG THOSE LINES WHEN THE CONTACT GROUP PLUS ITALY MEETS ON NOVEMBER 2.

6., BEGIN TEXT OF RUSSIAN DRAFT RESOLUTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN CROATIA:

RECALLING ALL ITS EARLIER RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS, AND REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 1009 (1995) OF 10 AUGUST 1995, AND THE STATEMENTS OF ITS PRESIDENT OF 7 SEPTEMBER 1995 (S/PRST/1995/44 , AND OF 3 OCTOBER 1995 (S/PRST/1995/49), .

DEEPLY CONCERNED AT REPORTS, INCLUDING BY UNCRO AND UN HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES, OF GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF

INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN KRAJINA, INCLUDING THE BURNING OF HOUSES, LOOTING OF PROPERTY AND KILLINGS OF MEMBERS OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION,

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 004313

JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5, J2, CHAIRMAN,
USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE, CINACOM FOR POLAD; SHAPE FOR
POLAD MINISTER DURKEE -

E.O.12958: DECL:11/01/2005

TAGS: PREL, NATO, UNSC, PHUM, NATO, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: BOSNIA: CONTACT GROUP DISCUSSES AMERICAN
DRAFT RESOLUTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR THE WORK OF THE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO ITS
RESOLUTION 827,

-1. CONDEMNS IN THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE TERMS ALL
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN THE
TERRITORY OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA BY WHOMEVER
COMMITTED;

--2. REAFFIRMS ITS DEMANDS THAT CROATIA TAKES URGENT
MEASURES TO PUT AN END TO HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, AND
INVESTIGATES ALL REPORTS OF SUCH VIOLATIONS SO THAT
THOSE RESPONSIBLE IN RESPECT OF SUCH ACTS BE JUDGED AND
PUNISHED;

--3. REITERATES ITS DEMAND THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF
CROATIA RESPECT FULLY THE RIGHTS OF THE LOCAL SERB
POPULATION INCLUDING THEIR RIGHT TO REMAIN OR RETURN IN
SAFETY;

--4. REITERATES ITS CALL UPON THE GOVERNMENT OF
CROATIA TO LIFT ANY TIME LIMITS PLACED ON THE RETURN OF
REFUGEES TO CROATIA TO RECLAIM THEIR PROPERTY;

--5. DEMANDS THAT ALL STATES, IN PARTICULAR THOSE IN
THE REGION OF THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, AND ALL PARTIES TO
THE CONFLICT IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, COMPLY FULLY
WITH ITS DECISION IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF RESOLUTION 827
(1993) AND COOPERATES FULLY WITH THE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO THAT RESOLUTION
INCLUDING BY PROVIDING ACCESS TO SITES THE TRIBUNAL
DEEMS IMPORTANT FOR ITS INVESTIGATIONS, AND BY
COMPLYING WITH THEIR OBLIGATION TO COMPLY WITH REQUESTS
FOR ASSISTANCE OF ORDERS ISSUED BY A TRIAL CHAMBER
UNDER ARTICLE 29 OF THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL;

--6. DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTIES REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTION
INTENDED TO DESTROY, ALTER, OR DAMAGE ANY EVIDENCE OF
VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW;

--7. DECIDES TO REMAIN SEIZED OF THE MATTER.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

END TEXT.

ALBRIGHT
BT
#4313

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

SSN: 4313
<^SSN>4313

TOR: 951101213430 M1931405
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DIST: PRT: SIT
SIT: BELL CLARKER DAALDER FEELEY NSC PETERS SAUNDERS SCHWARTZ SESTAK SUM
SUM2 VERSHBOW
□

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Eric Schwartz to Peter Bass et al. re: Bosnia: Humanitarian Update (2 pages)	07/12/1995	P1/b(1) v2
002. email	Anthony Gardner to Samuel Drew and Alexander Vershbow re: Chirac Telcon [partial] (6 pages)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1) RS 6/6/2013
003. email	Ralph Sigler to Gary Bresnahan re: Major Telcon [partial] (9 pages)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1) VOE 5/26/2016
004. email	Drew to Jane Baker et al. re: Lake Meeting with Sacirbey Monday (5 pages)	07/15/1995	P1/b(1), P5 v2
005. email	Sitroom to Steven Andreasen et al. re: WHSR PM Summary 14 July 1995 (5 pages)	07/15/1995	P1/b(1)
006. email	Vershbow to Bass et al. re: Massacres at Srebrenica [partial] (3 pages)	07/25/1995	P1/b(1) , b(6) 6/6/2013
007. email	Robert Malley to Eric Schwartz and Vershbow re: Bosnia (3 pages)	08/04/1995	P1/b(1) RS 6/6/2013

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Emails
 MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Srebrenica and Ethnic Cleans...])
 OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[07/12/1995-08/04/1995]

2006-0647-F

rs503

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 12 July 95 08:57

FROM Schwartz, Eric P.

CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT Subject: Bosnia: Humanitarian Update ~~[SECRET]~~

TO Bass, Peter E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Emery, Mary C.
Hall, Wilma G.
Veit, Katherine M.

CARBON_COPY Atkin, Timothy J.
Beers, Rand R.
Brown, Dallas
Clarke, Richard A.
Drew, Samuel N.
Eddy, Randolph P.
Lindsey, Wanda
Norman, Marcia G.
Rice, Susan E.
Roundtree, Beverly J.
Schwartz, Eric P.
Sheehan, Michael A.
Simon, Steven N.
Vershbow, Alexander R.

TEXT_BODY

There are an estimated 30,000 refugees in or around Potocari, some three miles north of the town of Srebrenica. This number is soft. (There are reports of Bosnian Serb activity in or around Potocari, but we do not have details as of 8:30 am.)

Dutch soldiers have been caring for some 70 wounded Bosnians.

As of yesterday, the Dutch troops were reported to have between 24 and 48 hours worth of food for about 30,000. The UN has readied two convoys in Belgrade; the first is leaving about now, but the Bosnian Serbs have yet to grant permission for the convoy to enter the Srebrenica area. We may want to demarche Milosevic on this -- will raise at the 9:30 SVTS meeting.

UNHCR is relatively confident that they can accomodate very large numbers of refugees in Tuzla. Moreover, we (the USG) have large amounts of foodstuffs and other supplies stockpiled in Germany, Italy and Denmark. The question is how and when refugees would seek to move west to Tuzla.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NARA, Date 11/5/2014
2013-0656-M (5.71)

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

UNHCR reports that they are not currently preparing an evacuation, although they have thought about this issue and have developed some plans in the past. US Mission Geneva will meet UNHCR today and one of the topics will include requirements for evacuation should that be necessary.

In a conversation I had with Ogata's deputy, he said they needed to have a better assessment of the situation before moving on an evacuation. Other factors may include concerns about about complicity in ethnic cleansing and Bosnian government opposition to evacuation. In fact, UNHCR will be meeting with Bosnian government officials today in Tuzla to discuss the refugee issue.

We will hear from US Mission Geneva later this morning and AID/OFDA will chair a humanitarian planning meeting this afternoon that will include JCS. We will update you after the meeting.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. email	Anthony Gardner to Samuel Drew and Alexander Vershbow re: Chirac Telcon [partial] (6 pages)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Srebrenica and Ethnic Cleans...])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[07/12/1995-08/04/1995]

2006-0647-F
rs503

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

MS Mail

DATE-TIME 14 July 95 18:47

FROM Gardner, Anthony

CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT chirac telcon [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

TO Drew, Samuel N.
Vershbow, Alexander R.

CARBON_COPY Maxfield, Nancy H.

TEXT_BODY
[[5425TEL.DOC : 4659 in 5425TEL.DOC]][[5425BRL.DOC : 4660 in
5425BRL.DOC]][[5425AS.DOC : 4661 in 5425AS.DOC]]

ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE 14 July 95 18:45

ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME 5425TEL.DOC
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
5425
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with French President Jacques
Chirac

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Jacques Chirac
Present: Alexander Vershbow
Notetaker: Anthony Gardner

DATE, TIME AND PLACE:
July 13, 1995, 3:22-3:58 p.m.,
Oval Office

The President: Hello, Jacques?

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
RDS 06/06/2013 (1.05)
2012-0800-M
[2013-0656-M, 5.72]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

President Chirac: Hello, Bill. How are you? I will speak in French. First of all, my congratulations on the strong statement you issued that if we cannot restore the UN mission, then the days of UNPROFOR are numbered and that that causes you concern. Our analysis is the same. The fall of Srebrenica and the probable fall of Zepa tomorrow and the real threat to Gorazde is a major failure of UN, NATO and all democracies. You see what we see on TV, how the Serbs are separating men from women, sending women to be raped and killing men who are old enough to bear arms. In my opinion, we can no longer just stand by and watch this.

(b)(1) E.O. 13526-1-4b

(b)(1) E.O. 13526-1-4b

(b)(1) E.O. 13526-1-4b That means restoring the situation in the Eastern enclaves. Therefore, firm and limited military action is called for.

France is ready to put all of its forces behind the mission. I don't yet know what the British want to do. They are directly concerned since they are in Gorazde. I wonder whether or not their intention is to pick up and leave Gorazde just as the Dutch left Srebrenica. I don't want France to be an accomplice in such a situation. Either we agree to a joint military intervention to protect the enclaves, recapture Srebrenica and guarantee Gorazde and Zepa which account for 100,000 Muslims -- today 20,000 to 40,000 Muslims are fleeing Srebrenica -- and we use military intervention to impose the will of the UN, which can only come from the U.S., France, the UK and Germany -- France is prepared to throw all of its forces into the effort to restore the situation in Srebrenica -- or we do nothing. But if the option is to do nothing, just as we did in 1939, then France will withdraw -- of course, in accordance with our British friends and the rest of UNPROFOR. So the issue is whether the U.S. is prepared to cooperate in combatting ethnic cleansing or do we sit back and let these people fight each other and we go home. We cannot allow ourselves to be accomplices!

The President: We appreciate the strong stance you have adopted. Obviously, we have been thinking about this a lot. I will take up

your specific proposals with my military commanders, but I wanted to speak with you first. I would like you to think about a few things. Gorazde is much more important psychologically than Zepa and Srebrenica due to its size. The Bosnian Government has 9,000 troops in Gorazde ready to fight. In Srebrenica there were about 3,000 Bosnian troops but, as you know, they left under pressure of shelling. They left although they could have stayed and fought. The British have 300 troops in Gorazde, so I think they will be more inclined to take a stand there. We all know that if something happens to Gorazde, the Bosnian Serb army will feel to move on Sarajevo. Our military advisers say there are significant hazards

in attempting to land a force with helicopters in Srebrenica and that UNPROFOR might be better off securing Gorazde first and then move back eastward due to the inherent difficulty of defending the area there. The other issue I would like to raise with you -- which we discussed in Halifax and here during your visit and has become more pressing -- is the necessity of knowing the rules of engagement in Bosnia. You cannot be in a position to fight in Zepa and then ask for NATO support without clear rules of engagement. If there is going to be fighting, it has to be different than in the past. Before we provide air power, we have to know that it would be effective. Before we get into a military campaign, we must have a clear sense of what the next move is and what the acceptable military options are under UNPROFOR and NATO. Now that you have told me what you want to do, I will talk to our military advisers, but they are very skeptical. We must first ensure that Gorazde can be held and then Sarajevo. I will have conversations with them and get back in touch with you.

I would like to make two more points. First, I think your stated intentions to reopen Mount Igman road is a critical point. Second, we need General Shalikashvili to speak with Admiral Lanxade or have Secretary Christopher speak with your foreign minister to talk in detail about what you have in mind for the enclaves. We need to consider whether the Muslims will return to the enclaves, how we will protect them if they come back, and whether it would be under old UN rules of engagement. Will the Bosnian Serb Army just end their advances? Therefore, I believe we should focus on Gorazde and press for ministerial and military talks. You have given me many things to work on. I would like to have a follow up between the generals or foreign ministers on the details.

President Chirac:

(b)(1) E.O. 13526-1-4b

(b)(1) E.O. 13526-1-4b

leave the situation like this. If we are not prepared to defend democracy, we should leave, let them fight, withdraw UNPROFOR and implement Oplan 40104. We cannot day after day be smacked in the face while ethnic cleansing is going on.

The President: We cannot defend democracies in the abstract. My military advisers tell me the Muslims could have defended Srebrenica more fiercely, but that they would not do it. We cannot fight just because the UN says they are "safe areas". We cannot commit ourselves to stay forever if they won't defend themselves. That's the problem with the strategy you suggest. Yesterday we saw the imbalance in their arms. Have you any thoughts about lifting the arms embargo?

President Chirac:

(b)(1), 14(b)

(b)(1), EO 13526, 1.4b

The President: If we intercede to regain the enclaves on their behalf and they won't fight, then UNPROFOR's mission is completely changed. I agree the Serbs have made a mockery of the UN. They took Srebrenica and got it for free. We didn't even bomb them. I have argued that we should allow NATO to take tougher action, but that was not to be. If we enter a war to defend the Bosnians, they have to be ready to defend themselves. That's what worries me.

President Chirac: When does the Congress vote on lifting the embargo?

The President: Next week. I agree with you: I am vehemently opposed to unilateral lift and am prepared to veto it.

President Chirac: Can Congress override the veto?

The President: Yes, with a two thirds vote, but I don't think there's a chance. I am not worried about it. I would like to confer with my military advisers and get back in touch on this

matter.

President Chirac: OK, I quite agree. I will ask Admiral Lanxade to contact General Shalikashvili as soon as possible. Thank you very much.

The President: OK. Good-bye.

-- End of Conversation --

ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE

14 July 95 17:4

ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME

5425BRL.DOC
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
5425
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
Between the President and French President Jacques
Chirac (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and French President Jacques Chirac is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our Embassy in Paris for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (C)

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

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Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE

14 July 95 17:4

ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME

5425AS.DOC

5425

July 13, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: ANTHONY GARDNER

SUBJECT: Telcon with French President Jacques
Chirac

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
between the President and French President Jacques Chirac on July
13, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of
Telephone Conversation to the Department of State.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. email	Ralph Sigler to Gary Bresnahan re: Major Telcon [partial] (9 pages)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Srebrenica and Ethnic Cleans...])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[07/12/1995-08/04/1995]

2006-0647-F
rs503

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 14 July 95 19:46 Declassified in Part
 FROM Sigler, Ralph Per E.O. 13526
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ KDE 05/26/2016 (1.09)
 SUBJECT Major Telcon [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~] 2012-0801-M
 TO Bresnahan, Gary E. [2013-0656-M, 5.73]
 CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
 TEXT_BODY

Gary - Attached is our final "draft" of the 14 July Major-Clinton call. Procedurally, we now send this to the staffer who went to the oval office and they turn into a final.

[[MAJOR14.DOC : 4957 in MAJOR14.DOC]]

ATTACHMENT FILE DATE 14 July 95 19:43

ATTACHMENT FILE NAME MAJOR14.DOC

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: TELEPHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT CLINTON AND PRIME MINISTER MAJOR OF GREAT BRITAIN

DATE: JULY 14, 1995
 TIME: 1539-1608 EDT
 PLACE: THE OVAL OFFICE

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Hello, John?

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: Hi Bill. It has been an interesting day. We just had a three
 -hour meeting on
 Bosnia, and I had a livelier conversation than usual with Chirac. The situation looks awful. Backtracking
 a little bit -

They are presently
 attacking Zepa and it is one or two days before Zepa falls. The next question is
 wh

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ether they will move
 from Zepa to Gorazde. We judge they will, but before mounting a proper attack
 in Go
 radze, they will
 have to regroup and will need at least four to five days. They are pretty experienc
 ed people so they
 probably won't attack for 4 to 5 days. We expect the Bosnian government forces
 will
 defend it. ...-we
 have 300 troops there: The question is what to do militarily and politically? I t
 hink you spoke with
 Chirac?

PRESIDENT CLINTON:

(b)(1); EO 13526-1-4d

(b)(1); EO 13526-1-4d

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: He wants to reinforce Gorazde and Sarajevo and
 retake Srebren
 ica.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: We have to do that on Sarajevo. Helmut said that any
 of these m
 ilitary actions
 besides defending Gorazde would require UNSC approval. I hadn't thought about
 it.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: As a peacekeeping mission it would have to be a
 loose interpr
 etation of the
 mission.

LINE DROPPED AND REESTABLISHED

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: Sorry, God knows what happened there

PRESIDENT CLINTON: We were talking about the French point of view and
 the status of
 things. What
 is your thinking about it?

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: Regarding Gorazde, France wants to reinforce it.


(b)(1); EO 13526-1-4b

(b)(1); EO 13526-1, 4b, 1.4(d) We

would have to determine whether it is a practical option. We expect our Chief of the Defense Staff, General Shalikashvili and Admiral Lanxade to meet over the weekend.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Lanxade asked for helicopters. They would be sitting ducks with out taking out their ability to shoot them down.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: (b)(1); EO 13526-1, 4b



These are the hard problems we'll have to face. Our defense minister is going to Bosnia this week end to see what has to be done.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: We must stay in close touch.. UNPROFOR seemed like the best of a ll bad alternatives.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: No shred of doubt that it was right. The whole of central Bosnia is at

peace. UNPROFOR has saved 150,000 lives. That's not a negligible contribution by UNPROFOR.

(b)(1) E.O. 13526-1.4b, 1.4(d)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: (b)(1)

(b)(1) E.O. 13526-1.4b, 1.4(d)

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: (b)(1) E.O. 13526-1.4d

(b)(1) E.O. 13526-1.4d

PRESIDENT CLINTON: ...

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: (b)(1) E.O. 13526-1.4d

(b)(1)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: I have been in touch with my military commanders. They were all here in Washington for a military conference, except for Joulwan, who stayed behind in Europ e. Actually, Admiral Boorda, EUCOM commander, who was in charge of the whole Bosnia thing before Joulwan, is here in Washington. Yesterday we went over it in great detail. I called Colin Powe ll too. He said if you change the nature of the mission and decide to fight, you have to win. You must be willing to take casualties, inflict casualties and use air power which may hurt civilians if you thi nk it is a sustainable strategy in the long run and are prepared to enter war on the side of the Bosnian Mu slims. I was moved when 3,000 Bosnian government troops left Srebrenica without fighting, you cannot bl ame the Dutch position.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: The Dutch made a fair showing. They are not to blame.

(b)(1)
(b)(1), EO 13526-1.4b, 1.4(d)

PRESIDENT CLINTON:

(b)(1), EO 13526-1.4d

(b)(1), EO 13526-1.4d

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: You and I have presses that help, but I have no intention to react because the stakes are higher than that.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: I'm just going let it go. Look, I think it is important to hold Gorazde. If it falls, Sarajevo will more vulnerable. It is psychologically and strategically more important. We have to look at other options. Serbia says they are not cooperating, but they have more sophisticated equipment now to shoot our planes down.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: Gorazde won't go down quickly. There are 5,000 government troops and 12,000-14,000 Serbs.

(b)(1), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)
(b)(1), EO 13526-1.4b, 1.4(d)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: We don't want to do anything militarily stupid. We have to have an

understanding. If there is a consensus on this issue, there must be

(b)(1), EO 13526-1.4b, 1.4(d)

(b)(1) They do not want UNPROFOR to leave but at the same they have this idea to urge the U.S.

Congress to lift the arms embargo here. They are telling the Congress that that is the only reason that they

lost Srebrenica. They will have to decide what the hell they want!

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: They're wrong.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: ?????

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: When is the vote?

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Sometime next week. It will be a hell of a vote the first time around.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: Oh.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: There are two relevant facts ignored: The casualty rate has decreased because of contributions made by UNPROFOR. The average TV viewer sees it as bad or worse as it was 1992.

(b)(1), 1.4(b) Those safe areas were always in Serb danger.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: (b)(1), 1.4(b), 1.4(d)
(b)(1), EO 13526, 1.4b, 1.4(d)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: I remember that well. It is not inconceivable that the lifting of arms embargo will pass by overriding my veto. Izetbegovic and Silajdzic have been lobbying Congress.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: (b)(1), EO 13526, 1.4b

PRESIDENT CLINTON: If they do I'll try to veto it and sustain it. What they see is Muslims being split by sexes, ethnic cleansing on TV which helps support the lifting of the embargo move. They see the UN failure and believe we should give the Muslims guns. They are telling Congress that if they had guns they would be kicking the crap out of them. But if the French and British leave, the American public is not willing to send U.S. troops to Bosnia. They are just kicking the can down the

r
oad. I wouldn't be
alarmed by that. We'll have to act together. It will help.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: I see. Let me check the timetable. The Senate votes
next we
ek then the
House and the lift wouldn't be until September?

PRESIDENT CLINTON: The Vote can be done in a few days and the override
vote a few d
ays after that.
They can set an effective time sometime later, or even immediately.
The U.S. is on the side of the Government and the perception is that UNPROFOR
has no
mandate to enter
into war.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: I have a pretty full report of your problems.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: I am not hung up about vetoing it. This issue and a
domestic on
e have me in a
fun house. All the press is one way and facts are irrelevant.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: I am very familiar with that.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Our citizens have good motives. Compassion and neo-
isolationism
is leading to
support for lifting arms embargo. They don't want our soldiers there, but they bad
mouth the UN and
want to give them arms. Press is playing on these emotions.
PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: Yes, I understand.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: There is a possibility it'll happen quicker than you
suggest.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: I'll keep my fingers crossed. I sympathize with you
about th
e Whitewater
stuff. You don't need that sort of rubbish.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: I do not understand it. They have spent 12 million on
the invest
igation to find
out that Hillary and I only lost \$40,000 on a land deal.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: Yes.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: How worried should I be about the violence in northern Ireland?

I was urged by Senator Mitchell to make a statement that I look forward to visiting a peaceful Ireland.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: (b)(1), E.O. 13526:1.4b, 1.4(d)

(b)(1), E.O. 13526:1.4b

(b)(1), E.O. 13526:1.4b McCartney, is the newly elected independent leader.

(b)(1), E.O. 13526:1.4b, 1.4(d)

(b)(1), E.O. 13526:1.4b, 1.4(d) There has been no progress over

decommissioning issues. We are worried as we get closer to August 31. We are approaching 12-month deadline. The marching season caused some problems but with less damage than expected. 31 August is the next worry date. I have had good meetings with Bruton. Your visit in November is vital

(b)(1), E.O. 13526:1.4b, 1.4(d)

PRESIDENT CLINTON: If you need to talk on Bosnia, we'll be in touch. I'll be available.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: You probably know by now we have invited ministerial missions to London next week to discuss Bosnian issue and the UNPROFOR mission. I hope Warren and Perry will attend to get a coordinated look at what is to happen there.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Yes, I will talk to them about going.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: Very well. I'll be here to chat anytime. I may call you Monday after we

look at the military options.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: By the way, thanks for buying the Apaches.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: Oh, yes...Chirac and the French were not particularly happy about it. We felt it was the best helicopter. We made the right choice. I have no regrets about it.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: OK then, we'll be in touch.

PRIME MINISTER MAJOR: Good-bye. God bless.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: OK. Good-bye.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 15 July 95 19:21
 FROM Drew, Samuel N.
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 SUBJECT Lake Meeting with Sacirbey Monday [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
 TO Baker, Jane E.
 Bass, Peter E.
 Cicio, Kristen K.
 Darby, Melanie B.
 Emery, Mary C.
 Gray, Wendy
 Hall, Wilma G.
 Hawkins, Ardenia R.
 Joshi, M. Kay
 Millison, Cathy L.
 Veit, Katherine M.

CARBON_COPY
 Atkin, Timothy J.
 Beardsley, Tyler S.
 Beers, Rand R.
 Brown, Dallas
 Clarke, Richard A.
 Drew, Samuel N.
 Eddy, Randolph P.
 Fuerth, Leon S.
 Gardner, Anthony
 Hilty, JoAnne M.
 Jensen, Noelle B.
 Lindsey, Wanda
 Marshall, Betty A.
 Marshall, Dana M.
 Maxfield, Nancy H.
 Moore, Lori A.
 Norman, Marcia G.
 Peters, Mary A.
 Reed, George
 Rice, Susan E.
 Roundtree, Beverly J.
 Saunders, Richard M.
 Schmidt, John R.
 Schmidt, Sandra E.
 Schwartz, Eric P.
 Sheehan, Michael A.
 Simon, Steven N.
 Sullivan, Kathryn

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
 White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
 By VZ NARA, Date 11/5/2017

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY 2017-0626-11 (5.74)

Marcel T. Thomas
 Van DeCar, Karen J.
 Vershbow, Alexander R.
 Verville, Elizabeth G.
 Wilhelm, Richard J.
 Wise, William M.
 Woolston, Ann E.

TEXT_BODY

Attached is advance copy memo and talking points. Hard copy to follow first thing Monday a.m.

[[JUL17TLS.DOC : 4869 in JUL17TLS.DOC]][[JUL17SAC.DOC : 4870 in JUL17SAC.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

15 July 95 19:17

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

JUL17TLS.DOC
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 JUL17ALS
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 15, 1995

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: NELSON DREW

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Bosnian Foreign
 Minister Sacirbey on July 17, 1995

You are currently scheduled to meet with Bosnian Foreign Minister Sacirbey at 2:45 p.m. on Monday, July 17, 1995. Attached at TAB A are talking points for your use in that meeting.

Sacirbey's arrival in the U.S. corresponds with Senator Dole's scheduled consideration of his unilateral lift resolution. In a meeting on July 12 with NATO SYG Claes, Sacirbey argued that one reason his government was considering requesting UNPROFOR withdrawal was that getting UNPROFOR out was a precondition for lift. You

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should restate our opposition to unilateral lift, but not expect Sacirbey to change his position.

In his meeting with Claes, Sacirbey also indicated that the official position of the Bosnian government was that if UNPROFOR would not retake Srebrenica, they would be asked to leave. The next day, in a meeting with UK Foreign Secretary Rifkind, Sacirbey was less strident on the need for UNPROFOR withdrawal, but did indicate a preference for a framework other than the UN in which friendly governments would provide troops to assist in the defense of Bosnia. You should stress the need to give efforts now underway to make UNPROFOR more robust a chance to succeed.

During the Sacirbey-Rifkind meeting, Sacirbey also argued that the care of refugees from Srebrenica and Zepa was the responsibility of the UN, not his government. The British have asked us to make the point that the Bosnians should treat their own refugees better. The Bosnian position seems to have eased somewhat over the weekend.

Attachment
Tab A Talking Points

ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE

15 July 95 19:17

ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME

JUL17SAC.DOC

TALKING POINTS FOR USE WITH
BOSNIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SACIRBEY
2:45 P.M. MONDAY, JULY 17, 1995

ù No one can be anything but outraged by the Bosnian Serbs' brazen attack on UN safe areas at Srebrenica and Zepa, and the new wave of ethnic cleansing.

-- Despite these tragic events, we remain convinced that UNPROFOR's withdrawal would lead to an even greater tragedy.

-- While I know you will be speaking with Senator Dole in support of his efforts to obtain unilateral lift, it is the specter of this greater tragedy for your country that compels the administration to continue to oppose Dole's efforts.

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-- Nevertheless, should our current efforts to strengthen UNPROFOR fail, and withdrawal take place, we then would strongly support a multilateral lifting of the arms embargo.

ù We stand ready now to assist in efforts to shore up UNPROFOR so that it lives up to its name as a "protection" force. But if UNPROFOR is to remain and carry out its humanitarian mission, it will need to deal more firmly with the Serbs' aggressive behavior

-- We have sent General Shali to London to meet with his French and British counterparts to evaluate proposals to mount a defense of Gorazde and Sarajevo.

-- We do not intend to support a mere rhetorical posture: we are insisting that any option to strengthen UNPROFOR's military role must be realistic and militarily feasible.

-- You should be under no illusions: the main responsibility for mounting and sustaining a defense around Gorazde and Sarajevo will still be yours, but we believe that a more robust UNPROFOR fulfillment of its mandate to enforce the Weapons Exclusion Zones and protect the Safe Areas will make your task far less difficult.

-- The U.S. is still not prepared to put forces on the ground, but we are ready to support a robust effort on the ground with an equally robust air campaign.

-- For this to be effective, we will need the help of our allies in authorizing a full SEAD effort against the Bosnian Serb air defenses. Neither CAS, nor air lift of troops and equipment, nor resupply of the remaining enclaves can take place safely without first neutralizing the air defense capabilities in the region.

ù A commitment by UNPROFOR to make a stand against further Serb encroachment will only be politically sustainable if your government is seen to be supportive of the effort.

ù This will entail not just a willingness to have UNPROFOR remain, but also active cooperation in developing and implementing a plan for the humanitarian care of the additional refugees.

-- Many of those now displaced from Srebrenica and Zepa were already refugees from the surrounding areas. They are once again without homes, through no fault of their own.

-- While I appreciate your government's position of not wanting to take any action that is seen as condoning or contributing to further ethnic cleansing, it is unacceptable to make these people suffer further. You must assist in providing food and shelter for them.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
006. email	Vershbow to Bass et al. re: Massacres at Srebrenica [partial] (1 page)	07/25/1995	b(6)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Srebrenica and Ethnic Cleans...])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[07/12/1995-08/04/1995]

2006-0647-F
rs503

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 25 July 95 20:42

FROM Vershbow, Alexander R.

CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT Subject: Massacres at Srebrenica [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]

TO Bass, Peter E.
Cicio, Kristen K.
Emery, Mary C.
Hall, Wilma G.
Veit, Katherine M.

CARBON_COPY Drew, Samuel N.
Gardner, Anthony
Marshall, Betty A.
Maxfield, Nancy H.
Peters, Mary A.
Schmidt, John R.
Vershbow, Alexander R.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By RDS NARA, Date 6/6/2013
2012-0800-2 (1.37)
[2013-0656-M, 577]

TEXT_BODY

For TL and SRB:

Whatever you think of Galbraith's recommendation re Zepa, the fact of Serb mass killings at Srebrenica is becoming increasingly clear. Grim reading.

PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG:251907Z JUL 95

FM: AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6565

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ZAGREB 002788

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: 07/25/00
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, BK, HR
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE MASS EXECUTION OF SREBRENICA
MALES IS REASON TO SAVE ZEPA

1. A UN OFFICIAL HAS RECOUNTED TO ME AN INTERVIEW SHE CONDUCTED OF A SREBRENICA REFUGEE IN TUZLA. THE ACCOUNT, WHICH SHE FELT WAS HIGHLY CREDIBLE, PROVIDES DISTURBING EVIDENCE THAT THE BOSNIAN SERBS HAVE MASSACRED MANY, IF NOT MOST, OF THE 5,000 PLUS

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MILITARY AGE MEN IN THEIR CUSTODY FOLLOWING THE FALL OF SREBRENICA.

2. IF THE BOSNIAN SERB ARMY MASSACRED THE DEFENDERS OF SREBRENICA, WE CAN BE SURE A SIMILAR FATE AWAITS MANY OF THE 16,000 PEOPLE IN ZEPA. THE LONDON DECLARATION IMPLICITLY WRITES OFF ZEPA. IN VIEW OF THE NUMEROUS ACCOUNTS OF ATROCITIES IN SREBRENICA AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A MAJOR MASSACRE THERE, I URGE RECONSIDERATION OF AIR STRIKES TO HELP ZEPA.

3. THE SREBRENICA REFUGEE IS A 35-YEAR-OLD MAN. HE FLED SREBRENICA AS THE SERBS TOOK OVER, BUT WAS LATER ROUNDED UP IN A FOREST ALONG WITH SEVERAL THOUSAND OTHER REFUGEES. AT LEAST OVERNIGHT HE WAS HELD IN A SMALL BUILDING PACKED WITH MEN. THROUGH THE NIGHT THE SERBS TOOK OUT MEN IN SMALL GROUPS AND THEY WERE NOT SEEN AGAIN. THE REFUGEES WERE TRANSPORTED IN TRUCKS AND BUSES TO A STADIUM, APPARENTLY AT BRATUNAC. ALONG THE WAY, SERBS FIRED INTO THE TRUCKS AND BUSES APPARENTLY KILLING NUMEROUS REFUGEES.

4. AT THE STADIUM, GENERAL MLADIC ADDRESSED THE PRISONERS, TAUNTING THEM THAT "THEIR ALIJA" HAD BEEN UNABLE TO HELP THEM AND THAT THE MUSLIMS OUGHT TO HAVE STAYED IN YUGOSLAVIA. HE THEN ASSURED THE MEN THAT, IF THEY WERE COOPERATIVE, THEY WOULD BE RETURNED TO THEIR FAMILIES. AT THIS STAGE, THE MEN WERE BOUND WITH HANDS TIED BEHIND THEIR BACKS.

5. FROM THE STADIUM, THE MEN WERE TAKEN ON TRUCKS TO KONJEVIC POLJE. THEY WERE TAKEN FROM THE TRUCKS, MADE TO LIE DOWN, AND THEN MACHINE GUNNED. THIS REFUGEE SURVIVED BECAUSE THE BULLET GRAZED HIS TEMPLE, CREATING A VERY BLOODY APPEARANCE BUT DOING LITTLE REAL DAMAGE. AFTER THE SOLDIERS LEFT, HE, AND ANOTHER MAN WHO ALSO SURVIVED, HID IN A DITCH. THE SOLDIERS CAME BACK AND BULLDOZED THE BODIES.

6. ACCORDING TO THE UN SOURCE, THE MAN HAD MARKS ON HIS WRISTS FROM WHERE HIS HANDS HAD BEEN BOUND. HE ALSO HAD WOUNDS ON HIS LEGS AND ARMS FROM WHERE MACHINE GUN BULLETS HAD SPRAYED ROCKS ONTO HIM.

7. THE REFUGEE BELIEVES THAT ALL THE MEN IN THE STADIUM WERE MURDERED IN THIS WAY. (b)(6)

(b)(6)
 (b)(6) TOLD ME THAT (b)(6)
 ALSO BELIEVES THAT THOUSANDS MAY HAVE DIED IN TRANSIT TO KONJEVIC POLJE OR AT THE EXECUTION SITE.

8. IF THIS ACCOUNT IS ACCURATE, THERE MAY BE NO SURVIVORS OF THE MEN ROUNDED UP IN SREBRENICA. WE SHOULD REDOUBLE EFFORTS TO SEE THESE MEN. IF THE SERBS REFUSE ACCESS, THE IMPLICATIONS ARE OBVIOUS.

9. AGAIN, IT IS NOT TOO LATE TO PREVENT A SIMILAR TRAGEDY AT ZEPA. ZEPA'S DEFENDERS VALIANTLY CONTINUE TO HOLD ON. UNDOUBTEDLY THEY REALIZE THE FATE THAT AWAITS THEM. THEY SHOULD NOT BE ABANDONED.
GALBRAITH

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 04 August 95 18:26
 FROM Malley, Robert
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 SUBJECT Bosnia [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
 TO Schwartz, Eric P.
 Vershbow, Alexander R.
 CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
 TEXT_BODY

Sandy B. asked us to draft a possible presidential statement on atrocities in Srebrenica and Zepa. Attached for your comments/concurrence is a package that includes a draft statement (I am still waiting for an attached fact sheet from the agency).

[[6054.DOC : 4662 in 6054.DOC]][[BOSNIA2.DOC : 4663 in BOSNIA2.DOC]]

ATTACHMENT FILE DATE 4 August 95 18:21

ATTACHMENT FILE NAME 6054.DOC
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 6054
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 4, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: MORTON HALPERIN

FROM: ROB MALLEY

SUBJECT: Human Rights Atrocities in Bosnia

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
 White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
 By ~~SP5~~ NARA, Date 6/6/2013
 2012-0800-W (1.31)
 [2013-056-m, 5.78]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

There is increasingly solid evidence of atrocities committed by the Bosnian Serb army during its attack on Srebrenica and Zepa. During a mission to central and northeastern Bosnia, A/S Shattuck was able to confirm through interviews with refugees reports and intelligence we have been receiving. Approximately 12,000 persons from the two former enclaves are still missing and unaccounted for. Hundreds, perhaps up to a thousand, persons (principally men and boys) appear to have been killed in mass executions. Others are either in detention or seeking to flee the area. Reports of other brutalities, including rape, sexual abuse and mutilations abound. There also are some indications that chemical weapons might have been used.

State is undertaking a series of steps to pressure the Bosnian Serbs to grant access to and permit free passage for those still at large or in detention:

1. Demarche to Belgrade to communicate the requirement that an international mission be permitted to enter the former safe areas and extract all former residents.
2. Demarche to Russia and Greece to exercise pressure on Belgrade and Pale.
3. Efforts at the UNSC for the issuance of a statement on the need for accounting, access to and safe passage for those remaining in enclaves.

White House action will be needed to support this effort which, given the unknown fate of thousands of persons, is of the utmost urgency. A first step would be a presidential statement that condemns the atrocities, calls for access to and safe passage for those remaining in the enclaves, and reminds perpetrators of these actions that they will be held accountable. (A draft statement is attached at Tab A). The statement would be released in conjunction with a fact sheet detailing known incidents of atrocities (attached at Tab B). If these initial efforts prove to be unsuccessful, more forceful action should be considered.

Concurrence by: Sandy Vershbow; Eric Schwartz

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve release of the attached presidential statement and fact sheet.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Tab A Presidential Statement
Tab B Fact Sheet

ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE

4 August 95 18:25

ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME

BOSNIA2.DOC

Evidence is mounting every day of unspeakable atrocities committed by Bosnian Serb armed forces during their attack on Srebrenica and Zepa. There are reports of mass executions, beatings, rape, sexual abuse and other flagrant violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. Thousands of civilians from Srebrenica and Zepa are missing and unaccounted for. As I have made clear before, the United States condemns these outrageous actions in the strongest terms.

Our first obligation is to the men, women and children held by the Bosnian Serbs or still at large in and around the former enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa. The Bosnian Serbs must provide international access to and safe passage for those persons still being detained. They must provide a full accounting of people from the two areas whose fate remains unknown. And they must not harm persons who have survived the Bosnian Serb onslaught and are in need of immediate protection and assistance. I have directed my Administration to make our concerns known to all relevant parties and to work with the international community to see to it that these basic requirements are met.

Public condemnation of the atrocities alone is insufficient. There also must be justice, and those who have committed these acts must be held accountable. To that end, I also have directed my Administration to intensify efforts to collect information on what happened in Srebrenica and Zepa. Evidence will be turned over to the War Crimes Tribunal and serve to prosecute those culpable of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. I urge States to fulfill their international obligation to arrest those already indicted by the Tribunal if they enter their territory and surrender them to the Tribunal.

Bosnian Serbs need to be on notice that such criminal actions constitute the single most important obstacle to a political solution. Ongoing atrocities make it impossible for the international community even to consider any sanctions relief. They must not and will not remain unpunished

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Alexander Vershbow to Samuel Drew re: FW: Bosnia Human Rights Issues (4 pages)	08/06/1995	P1/b(1) RD 6/6/2013
002. email	Robert Malley to Eric Schwartz and Vershbow re: Bosnia (2 pages)	08/07/1995	P1/b(1) RD 6/6/2013
003. email	[Duplicate of 002] (2 pages)	08/07/1995	P1/b(1) RD 6/6/2013
004. email	Drew to Drew et al. re: Krajina Refugee Lines for Shattuck Points (2 pages)	08/07/1995	P1/b(1) RD 6/6/2013
005. email	Malley to Drew and Schwartz re: Bosnia Statement (2 pages)	08/07/1995	P1/b(1) RD 6/6/2013
006. email	[Duplicate of 005] (2 pages)	08/08/1995	P1/b(1) RD 6/6/2013
007. email	Drew to Jane Baker et al. re: Bosnia Statement (3 pages)	08/09/1995	P1/b(1)
008. email	Sitroom to Steven Andreasen et al. re: 15 August 95 WHSR AM Summary (4 pages)	08/15/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Emails
 MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Srebrenica and Ethnic Cleans...])
 OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[08/06/1995-08/15/1995]

2006-0647-F

rs504

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 06 August 95 18:00
 FROM Vershbow, Alexander R.
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 SUBJECT FW: Bosnia Human Rights Abuses ~~{CONFIDENTIAL}~~
 TO Drew, Samuel N.
 CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
 TEXT_BODY

From: Malley, Robert
To: Schwartz, Eric P.; Vershbow, Alexander R.
CC: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Bosnia ~~{CONFIDENTIAL}~~
Date: Friday, August 04, 1995 06:26 PM

[[6054.DOC : 4671 in 6054.DOC]][[BOSNIA2.DOC : 4672 in BOSNIA2.DOC]]

Sandy B. asked us to draft a possible presidential statement on atrocities in Srebrenica and Zepa. Attached for your comments/concurrence is a package that includes a draft statement (I am still waiting for an attached fact sheet from the agency).

ATTACHMENT FILE DATE 4 August 95 18:21

ATTACHMENT FILE NAME 6054.DOC
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 6054
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 4, 1995

ACTION

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
 White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
 By VL NARA, Date 11/5/2015

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTO COPY 2018 0136 Ym (5.79)

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: MORTON HALPERIN

FROM: ROB MALLEY

SUBJECT: Human Rights Atrocities in Bosnia

There is increasingly solid evidence of atrocities committed by the Bosnian Serb army during its attack on Srebrenica and Zepa. During a mission to central and northeastern Bosnia, A/S Shattuck was able to confirm through interviews with refugees reports and intelligence we have been receiving. Approximately 12,000 persons from the two former enclaves are still missing and unaccounted for. Hundreds, perhaps up to a thousand, persons (principally men and boys) appear to have been killed in mass executions. Others are either in detention or seeking to flee the area. Reports of other brutalities, including rape, sexual abuse and mutilations abound. There also are some indications that chemical weapons might have been used.

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White House action will be needed to support this effort which, given the unknown fate of thousands of persons, is of the utmost urgency. A first step would be a presidential statement that condemns the atrocities, calls for access to and safe passage for those remaining in the enclaves, and reminds perpetrators of these actions that they will be held accountable. (A draft statement is attached at Tab A). The statement would be released in conjunction with a fact sheet detailing known incidents of atrocities (attached at Tab B). If these initial efforts prove to be unsuccessful, more forceful action should be considered.

Concurrence by: Sandy Vershbow; Eric Schwartz

RECOMMENDATION

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

That you approve release of the attached presidential statement and fact sheet.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments
Tab A Presidential Statement
Tab B Fact Sheet

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

4 August 95 18:25

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

BOSNIA2.DOC

Evidence is mounting every day of unspeakable atrocities committed by Bosnian Serb armed forces during their attack on Srebrenica and Zepa. There are reports of mass executions, beatings, rape, sexual abuse and other flagrant violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. Thousands of civilians from Srebrenica and Zepa are missing and unaccounted for. As I have made clear before, the United States condemns these outrageous actions in the strongest terms.

Our first obligation is to the men, women and children held by the Bosnian Serbs or still at large in and around the former enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa. The Bosnian Serbs must provide international access to and safe passage for those persons still being detained. They must provide a full accounting of people from the two areas whose fate remains unknown. And they must not harm persons who have survived the Bosnian Serb onslaught and are in need of immediate protection and assistance. I have directed my Administration to make our concerns known to all relevant parties and to work with the international community to see to it that these basic requirements are met.

Public condemnation of the atrocities alone is insufficient. There also must be justice, and those who have committed these acts must be held accountable. To that end, I also have directed my Administration to intensify efforts to collect information on what happened in Srebrenica and Zepa. Evidence will be turned over to the War Crimes Tribunal and serve to prosecute those culpable of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. I urge States to fulfill their international obligation to arrest those already indicted by the Tribunal if they enter their territory and surrender them to the Tribunal.

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Bosnian Serbs need to be on notice that such criminal actions constitute the single most important obstacle to a political solution. Ongoing atrocities make it impossible for the international community even to consider any sanctions relief. They must not and will not remain unpunished

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 07 August 95 09:01
 FROM Malley, Robert
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 SUBJECT Bosnia [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
 TO Schwartz, Eric P.
 Vershbow, Alexander R.
 CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
 TEXT_BODY

Attached is a proposed rewrite of the statement.

[[BOSNIA3.DOC : 2304 in BOSNIA3.DOC]]

ATTACHMENT
 FILE DATE 7 August 95 9:0

ATTACHMENT
 FILE NAME BOSNIA3.DOC

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
 White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
 By 12 NARA, Date 11/5/2019
 2013-0656-14 (S.80)

Over the past month, violence has escalated throughout the former Yugoslavia. The United States has urged and will continue to urge all parties to show restraint and, most importantly, to respect human rights and international humanitarian law.

The conduct of Bosnian armed forces during their attack on Srebrenica and Zepa is of particular concern. Evidence of unspeakable atrocities is mounting every day. There are reports of mass executions, beatings, rape, sexual abuse and other flagrant violations of human rights. Thousands of civilians from Srebrenica and Zepa are missing and unaccounted for. As I have made clear before, the United States condemns these outrageous actions in the strongest terms.

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M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 07 August 95 13:24
 FROM Malley, Robert
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 SUBJECT Bosnia human rights [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
 TO Baker, Jane E.
 Bass, Peter E.
 Cicio, Kristen K.
 Darby, Melanie B.
 Emery, Mary C.
 Gray, Wendy
 Hall, Wilma G.
 Hawkins, Ardenia R.
 Joshi, M. Kay
 Millison, Cathy L.
 Veit, Katherine M.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

PLEASE PASS TO SANDY AND NANCY:

There was an unfortunate typo in the last version I sent in para. 2.
 Should be BOSNIAN SERB, not Bosnian.

[[BOSNIA3.DOC : 3391 in BOSNIA3.DOC]]

ATTACHMENT
 FILE DATE 7 August 95 13:22

ATTACHMENT
 FILE NAME BOSNIA3.DOC

Over the past month, violence has escalated throughout the former Yugoslavia. The United States has urged and will continue to urge all parties to show restraint and, most importantly, to respect human rights and international humanitarian law.

The conduct of Bosnian Serb armed forces in the aftermath of their attack on Srebrenica and Zepa is of particular concern. Evidence of unspeakable atrocities is mounting every day. There are reports of mass executions, beatings, rape, sexual abuse and other flagrant violations of human rights. Thousands of civilians from Srebrenica and Zepa are missing and unaccounted for. As I have made clear before, the United States condemns these outrageous actions in the strongest terms.

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DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
 White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
 By RC NARA, Date 11/5/2019
 2013-0656-M (S, 81)

Our first obligation is to the men, women and children held by the Bosnian Serbs or still alive in the hills and woods in and around the former enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa. The Bosnian Serbs must provide international humanitarian organizations access to those persons still being detained. They must provide a full accounting of people from the two areas whose fate remains unknown. They must not harm persons who have survived the Bosnian Serb onslaught and are in need of immediate assistance. And they must grant the men, women and children from Srebrenica and Zepa safe passage to areas where they will be protected. I have directed my Administration to make our concerns known to all relevant parties and to work with the international community to see to it that these basic requirements are met.

Public condemnation of the atrocities alone is insufficient. There also must be justice, and those who have committed these acts must be held accountable. To that end, I also have directed my Administration to intensify efforts to collect information on what happened in Srebrenica and Zepa. Evidence will be turned over to the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and serve to prosecute those culpable of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. I urge States to fulfill their international obligation to arrest those already indicted by the Tribunal if they enter their territory and surrender them to the Tribunal.

Bosnian Serbs need to be on notice that such criminal actions constitute serious impediments to a political solution. They must not and will not remain unpunished.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 07 August 95 17:58
FROM Drew, Samuel N.
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SUBJECT Krajina Refugee lines for Shattuck points ~~[CONFIDENTIAL]~~
TO Malley, Robert
CARBON_COPY Drew, Samuel N.
 Gardner, Anthony
 Marshall, Betty A.
 Maxfield, Nancy H.
 Peters, Mary A.
 Schmidt, John R.
 Vershbow, Alexander R.

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
 White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
 By NR NARA, Date 11/5/09
 2013-0656-4 (S. 82)

TEXT_BODY

My Croatia/Krajina points are in bold. Understand rest of paper will change to be more directly in line with Shattuck trip report release.

[[BOSNIA4.DOC : 4409 in BOSNIA4.DOC]]

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE**

7 August 95 17:55

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME**

BOSNIA4.DOC

Over the past month, violence has escalated throughout the former Yugoslavia. The United States has urged and will continue to urge all parties to show restraint and, most importantly, to respect human rights and international humanitarian law. We are increasingly concerned by the plight of refugees and displaced persons forced to flee their homes as the lines of confrontation shift, most recently in the Krajina region of Croatia. We are adamantly opposed to the policy of ethnic cleansing, whether explicit or implicit in the actions and behavior of troops on the ground.

The conduct of Bosnian-Serb armed forces in the aftermath of their attack on Srebrenica and Zepa is of particular concern. Evidence of unspeakable atrocities is mounting every day. There are reports of mass executions, beatings, rape, sexual abuse and other flagrant violations of human rights. Thousands of civilians from Srebrenica and Zepa are missing and unaccounted for. As I have made clear before, the United States condemns these outrageous actions in the strongest terms.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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Bosnian Serbs need to be on notice that such criminal actions constitute serious impediments to a political solution. They must not and will not remain unpunished.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 07 August 95 19:41
 FROM Malley, Robert
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 SUBJECT Bosnia - statement [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
 TO Drew, Samuel N.
 Schwartz, Eric P.
 CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
 TEXT_BODY

I UNDERSTAND THIS IS NOW ON HOLD PENDING A DECISION
 TOMORROW.

Still, we should have a statement ready just in case. I am particularly
 concerned about what we say about the refugee crisis in Krajina, and about
 reports of human rights violations and atrocities there. (I understand
 Sandy is as well). We need more in the second paragraph. Please suggest
 wording. My view is that if we can get the statement right, we should issue
 it. WH silence will be impossible to justify in the future.

[[BOSNIA5.DOC : 4952 in BOSNIA5.DOC]]

ATTACHMENT 7 August 95 19:38
 FILE DATE
 ATTACHMENT BOSNIA5.DOC
 FILE NAME

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release August 8, 1995

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

The United States condemns in the strongest terms recent violations
 of human rights and international humanitarian law as well as
 ongoing ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5(b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By 1/2 NARA, Date 11/5/2014

2013-0656-m (5.83)

Tens of thousands of persons have been forced to flee their homes as the lines of confrontation have shifted, most recently in the Krajina region of Croatia. This has led to a refugee crisis of massive proportions. It is imperative that all parties respect the rights of these refugees and displaced persons.

The conduct of Bosnian-Serb armed forces in the aftermath of their attack on Srebrenica and Zepa also is of particular concern. Evidence of unspeakable atrocities is mounting every day. There are reports of mass executions, beatings, rape, and other flagrant violations of human rights. Thousands of civilians from Srebrenica and Zepa are missing and unaccounted for. The United States calls on the Bosnian Serbs to provide international humanitarian organizations access to those persons still being detained. Bosnian Serb forces also must provide a full accounting of people from the two areas whose fate remains unknown and refrain from harming persons who have survived the Bosnian Serb onslaught. Finally, they must grant the men, women and children from Srebrenica and Zepa safe passage to areas where they will be protected.

The United States has urged and will continue to urge all parties in the former Yugoslavia to show restraint and, most importantly, to respect human rights and international humanitarian law. In particular, the United States remains adamantly opposed to the policy of ethnic cleansing, whether explicit or implicit, in the actions and behavior of troops on the ground. The United States is making these concerns known to all relevant parties and will work with the international community to put an end to such intolerable conduct.

Public condemnation of the atrocities alone is insufficient. There also must be justice, and those who have violated international humanitarian law must be held accountable. To that end, the United States will intensify its efforts to collect information on what is happening on the ground. Evidence will be turned over to the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and serve to prosecute those culpable of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 08 August 95 10:48
 FROM Malley, Robert
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 SUBJECT Bosnia [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
 TO Drew, Samuel N.
 Schwartz, Eric P.
 CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
 TEXT_BODY

Attached is another proposed draft statement for your review.

[[BOSNIA5.DOC : 2573 in BOSNIA5.DOC]]

ATTACHMENT
 FILE DATE 8 August 95 10:47

ATTACHMENT
 FILE NAME BOSNIA5.DOC

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
 White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
 By VC NARA, Date 11/5/2015
 2013-0656-44 (5,84)

For Immediate Release August 8, 1995

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

The United States condemns in the strongest terms recent violations of human rights and international humanitarian law and ongoing ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia.

Tens of thousands of persons have been forced to flee their homes as the lines of confrontation have shifted, most recently in the Krajina region of Croatia. This has led to a refugee crisis of massive proportions. It is imperative that all parties respect the rights of these refugees and displaced persons and, in particular, that access to this population be granted to international humanitarian organizations.

The conduct of Bosnian-Serb armed forces in the aftermath of their

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attack on Srebrenica and Zepa also is of particular concern. Evidence of unspeakable atrocities is mounting every day. There are reports of mass executions, beatings, rape, and other flagrant violations of human rights. Thousands of civilians from Srebrenica and Zepa are missing and unaccounted for. The United States calls on the Bosnian Serbs to provide international humanitarian organizations access to those persons still being detained. Bosnian Serb forces also must provide a full accounting of people from the two areas whose fate remains unknown and refrain from harming persons who have survived the Bosnian Serb onslaught. Finally, they must grant the men, women and children from Srebrenica and Zepa safe passage to areas where they will be protected.

The United States has urged and will continue to urge all parties in the former Yugoslavia to show restraint and, most importantly, to respect human rights and international humanitarian law. In particular, the United States remains adamantly opposed to the policy of ethnic cleansing, whether explicit or implicit, in the actions and behavior of troops on the ground. The United States is making these concerns known to all relevant parties and will continue to work with the international community to seek an end to such intolerable conduct.

Public condemnation of the atrocities alone is insufficient. There also must be justice, and those who have violated international humanitarian law must be held accountable. To that end, the United States will intensify its efforts to collect information on what is happening on the ground. Evidence will be turned over to the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and serve to prosecute those culpable of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. Such criminal actions must not and will not remain unpunished.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	re: WHSR PM Summary 21 Aug 95 (4 pages)	08/21/1995	P1/b(1)
002. email	Sue Bremner to Alexander Vershbow re: Conversation with Verville, etc. (1 page)	09/01/1995	P1/b(1) <i>✓</i>
003. email	Jodi Kessinger to Jane Baker et al. re: Srebrenica (2 pages)	10/30/1995	P1/b(1) <i>✓</i>
004. email	Vershbow to Peter Bass et al. re: New Bosnian Line on Prisoners [50 U.S.C. 403g, Section 6] [partial] (2 pages)	01/17/1996	P3/b(3)
005. email	Vershbow to Bass et al. re: Transcripts from War Crimes Suspects (5 pages)	03/05/1996	P1/b(1) <i>✓</i>
006. email	Vershbow to Bass et al. re: Serbs Cooperating on War Crimes Suspects...So Far (4 pages)	03/07/1996	P1/b(1) <i>✓</i>
007. email	White House Situation Room to Steven Andreasen et al. re: WHSR Morning Summary 15 March 1996 (5 pages)	03/15/1996	P1/b(1)
008. email	Vershbow to Bass et al. re: Madeleine Recommended... (2 pages)	03/21/1996	P1/b(1)
009. email	John Feeley to Bass et al. re: Prlic Visit (5 pages)	03/25/1996	P1/b(1)
010. email	White House Situation Room to Andreasen et al. re: WHSR Evening Summary 29 May 1996 (4 pages)	05/29/1996	P1/b(1)
011. email	Robert Malley to Kelly Letts re: Package (5 pages)	01/30/1997	P1/b(1), P5 <i>✓</i>

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Emails
 MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Srebrenica and Ethnic Cleans...])
 OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[08/18/1995-01/30/1997]

2006-0647-F

rs505

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 01 September 95 15:13
FROM Bremner, Sue L.
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SUBJECT Conversation with Verville, etc. [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
TO Vershbow, Alexander R.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

I spent an interesting hour educating Liz Verville to the war crimes issue, the concepts of the inner and outer wall, the shape of the peace document the parties might sign, the issues that will have to be fleshed out in the constitutional arrangements, who might sign which papers, the status of international consultations on policy toward war crimes, the possibility Milosevic might request amnesty for mladic and karadzic as a condition for peace, what we might do if he did, the Albright thesis on inner wall linkage, atrocities in Croatia, etc.

Liz grasped the issues very quickly, seemed good at finding inoffensive words to say things that are controversial, and in general could turn out to be an asset for us when it comes time to consider settlement documents and the constitutional framework. (She reminded me she had written peace treaties (for Vietnam), and had personally hired and trained Jim O'Brien.) Although she is inclined to support the arguments for inner wall linkage in the Scheffer/B'Brien paper (I have finally read it), when someone else in the meeting took a particularly strong line in favor of them, she summarized my arguments against -- which she had just heard for the first time -- and told him it wasn't as simple as he was making it out to be.

I said our short-term goal should be to avoid having war crimes issues gum up the possibilities for settlement, while at the same time adhering to our commitment to the tribunal and taking as a long-term goal prosecution of as many bad guys as possible. I told Liz my instincts were strongly in favor of keeping the body as independent as possible, because making it into a bargaining point a la Albright could mean we bargain it away. And then people like Mladic, who seems to have been on the scene to supervise the mass killings in Srebrenica, would go scott free.

As we push closer to signing ceremonies and end-game ministerials, we should remember the work Jim O'Brien and Todd Buchwald did on the Federation documents and start thinking about what the peace treaty should actually say. If you every have time to collect your thoughts on this, I would be interested in hearing them.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By VI NAVA, Date 11/5/2019

2013-0656-M (5.91)

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M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 05 March 96 15:50
 FROM Vershbow, Alexander R.
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 SUBJECT Transcripts from War Crimes Suspects ~~{CONFIDENTIAL}~~
 TO Bass, Peter E.
 Cicio, Kristen K.
 Hall, Wilma G.
 Veit, Katherine M.
 Wiley, Mary C.
 CARBON_COPY Feeley, John F.
 TEXT_BODY

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
 White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
 By VZ NARA, Date 11/5/2019
 2013-0656-44 (5,94)

Pass TL and SRB.

Transcripts of the two fellows who participated in the mass executions at Srebrenica. REad part B in particular. As you know , the ABC videotape was stolen by Serbian authorities (no duplicate had been made) and the two guys have been arrested by Serbian police. Embassy Belgrade is pressing the Serbian government very hard to turn the two over to the War Crimes Tribunal, but don't be surprised if they have an "accident" while in custody.

 PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG:051349Z MAR 96

FM: AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8803
 RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 1340

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BELGRADE 001084

EXDIS
 FOR EUR/SCE; THE HAGUE FOR STEVE MATHIAS

E.O. 12958:DECL: 03/05/96
 TAGS: PREL, PHUM, SR
 SUBJECT: TRANSCRIPTS OF INTERVIEW WITH WAR CRIMES
 WITNESSES/CRIMINALS

1: (U) CLASSIFIED BY LAWRENCE E. BUTLER, CHARGE.
 REASON: SECTION 1.5(D)

2. ~~(C)~~ THIS CABLE CONVEYS THE TRANSCRIBED NOTES FROM THE
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ABC INTERVIEW WITH TWO WAR CRIMES WITNESSES. THE ABC VIDEOTAPE OF THE INTERVIEW DISAPPEARED FROM CHECKED-LUGGAGE ENROUTE BELGRADE - LONDON ON MARCH 2. THE NOTES WERE MADE BY THE ABC PERSON CONDUCTING THE INTERVIEW, DRAGANA JOVANOVIC, A YUGOSLAV NATIONAL, LOCAL STRINGER FOR ABC. THE INTERVIEW WAS CONDUCTED IN BECEJ AT A PRIVATE HOME. POST SECURE FAXED COPY OF THE NOTES TO EMBASSY THE HAGUE (STEVE MATHIAS), BUT WERE UNABLE TO DO SO VIA THE OPS CQER##### PERSON WITH A COPY OF THESE NOTES IS A LE FIGARO CORRESPONDENT. POST APOLOGIZES FOR THE LANGUAGE CONTAINED IN THE NOTES, WHICH WAS AS GIVEN. THE INTERVIEW IS ALSO GRAPHIC IN DEPICTING THE EXECUTION OF 1,200 UNARMED MEN.

3. (U) ACTION REQUESTED: FIONA TURNER OF ABC LONDON ALREADY HAS COPIES OF THE MATERIAL BELOW. PLEASE PASS COPIES TO ABC NEW YORK IF NECESSARY. UNLESS OTHERWISE INSTRUCTED, POST PLANS TO ALSO SUBMIT THE DATE BELOW IN DIA CHANNELS.

-----UNCLASSIFIED TEXT TEARLINE-----

A. LT. RADASLAV KREMENOVIC (OR KREMENKOVIC) (AKA "MAX")

- BORN 1967 IN BECEJ, SERBIA
- TWO YEARS OF MILITARY SCHOOL IN BELGRADE AND ONE YEAR IN BANJA LUKA. GRADUATED IN 1991. WENT TO THE MILITARY
- BEGINNING 1994, JOINED THE BSA, APPOINTED TO THE GENERAL STAFF IN HAN PIJESAK.
- JANUARY 1995, ASSIGNED TO THE LOTH "DIVERSION" UNIT (DIVERSANTSKI), WHICH HAD 30 COMMANDOS AND 50 LOGISTICS/SUPPORT STAFF, REPORTING DIRECTLY TO EITHER SALAPURA OR MLADIC.
- BEGINNING OF JULY, 1995, GIVEN A MISSION TO BLOW THE DAM AT GRAMACAC LAKE (BOSNIA). 10,000 PEOPLE LIVED THERE.
- QUOTE: THEY GAVE ME AN ORDER OF DESTRUCTION SIGNED BY PS DEPUTY MANOJLOVIC, ZORAN. THEY GAVE ME TWO WEEKS. I STARTED PREPARATIONS. I ASKED FOR 30,000 DM FOR ME AND NINE OF MY PEOPLE. LAST DROP IN THE ALREADY FULL GLASS. PELEMIS (COMMANDER OF LOTH DIVERSION UNIT) WAS LEADING A GLAMOUR LIFE. JULY 21 WE HAD A MEETING OF MY MEN AND SALAPURA WITH MODRICA. I ASKED FOR NORMALIZATION FOR MY MEN. HE SAID HE WOULD DO SOMETHING. I ASKED SALAPURA TO SIGN THAT I TOLD HIM THAT LOSSES WOULD (BE) AT LEAST 20 PCT OF MY MEN. THAT'S WHEN I WAS DISMISSED.

NOTE: WOUNDED IN SAME BAR FIGHT AS DRAZEN (THE OTHER

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WITNESS, SEE BELOW.)
END QUOTE

B. RECONSTRUCTED TRANSCRIPT (FROM HANDWRITTEN NOTES OF
DRAGANA JOVANOVIC)

SPEAKER: DRAZEN ERDEMOVIC, BORN 11/25/71, TUZLA.
NATIONALITY: CROAT FROM BOSNIA (BUT FATHER WITH A SERB
FIJ?IAGE.
SCHOOLING: HIGH SCHOOL, THEN MILITARY SERVICE. NO
SPECIAL PROFESSIONAL SKILLS.
FROM MAY 15 (BEGINNING OF WAR IN TUZLA - 1992?), STARTS
HELPING SERBS TO GET OUT FROM THE CITY.
IN 1993, MARRIES A HALF SERB/HALF CROAT GIRL. ONE
CHILD, 16 MONTHS OLD.
MID-NOVEMBER, 1993, CAPTURED WHILE HELPING 76 SERBS OUT
(FROM TUZLA.) GETS 15 DAYS IN JAIL. DIRECTOR OF THE
JAIL IS CROATIAN (FATHER'S FRIEND), LET HIM GO FOR A
FIVE DAY LEAVE. HE CROSSES WITH WIFE TO RS ON NOVEMBER
30, 1993, JOINS LOTH DIVERSION UNIT (ODRED) IN JANUARY, 1995.
MOTIVE FOR TALKING: REVENGE AGAINST HIS COMMANDER, MISA
PELEMIS, WHO NEVER SHARED THE MONEY OF PILLAGE AND THE
REWARDS OF HQ WITH HIS MEN. BADLY WOUNDED DURING THE
NIGHT OF JULY 22/23 IN A BAR FIGHT WITH MISA'S ASSOCIATE
STANKO SOVANOVIC -- WHO KILLED 700 MUSLIMS WITH PISTOL
SHOTS, UNTIL TODAY DID NOT RECOVER (NOTE: STOMACH
WOUND?), EXPELLED FROM HIS BIJELINA HOME BY MISA EARLY
FEBRUARY.

MORNING OF JULY 20, CALLED TO COMMANDER'S OFFICE, LT.
MISA PELEMIS, IN VLASENICA. MISSION: GO TO ZVORNIK AND
REPORT MILITARY POLICE. THERE WERE EIGHT MEN FROM A
SPECIAL UNIT, LOTH DIVERSION UNIT (ODRED).

QUOTE:

AT 10 A.M., A LT. COL FROM MILITARY SECURITY OF ZVORNIK,
WHOM I DID NOT KNOW, LED OUR VAN (COMBI) WITH HIS CAR TO
THE VILLAGE OF PILICE (SOUTH OF JANJA). THE TRIP TOOK
US SOME 15 MINUTES. WE STOPPED IN FRONT OF A
STATE-OWNED FARM AND THIS OFFICER JUST SAID: THE BUSES
WILL BE ARRIVING HERE.

I IMMEDIATELY REALIZED WHAT WAS THE ASSIGNMENT. FOUR OF
THE BOYS, ALL FROM VLASENICA AREA, HAD ALREADY
PARTICIPATED IN SUCH KILLINGS OF CIVILIANS NEAR NOVA
KASABA IN THE PAST COUPLE OF DAYS. BRANO GOJKOVIC, A
FRIEND OF MISA FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR, A
SPECIALIST OF DIRTY WORKS, TOOK THE LEAD OF THE GROUP.
HE HAD OBVIOUSLY BEEN BRIEFED. HE WAS THE ONE WHO

TALKED TO THE OFFICER IN ZVORNIK. HE TOLD US TO WAIT IN THE FIELD, 150 METERS FROM THE HANGAR FOR TRACTORS AND THE PLACE WHERE THE BUSES WERE SUPPOSED TO STOP. WE WERE CHATTING AND SMOKING CIGARETTES.

THE FIRST BUS ARRIVED AROUND 10:30. ABOUT 60 MEN IN IT, SOME YOUNG, SOME OLD, ALL OF MILITARY AGE. TWO POLICEMEN IN THE FRONT WATCHING WITH AK47S. BRANO TOLD US: YOU STAY THERE, AND I WILL ESCORT THEM HERE WITH TWO MORE MEN. A FIRST GROUP OF TEN, ONE AFTER ONE, CAME. BRANO WAS INSULTING THEM: "YOU MUSLIM MOTHERFUCKERS, YOU BALYAS, YOU HAVE BEEN FUCKED UP BY THIS PIG OF NASER (ORIC)", HURRYING THEM UP. THEY WERE IN A LINE, TEN METERS FROM US, WITH THEIR BACKS TURNED TO US. THE FIRST TO SHOOT WAS ONE OF THE FOUR FROM VLASENICA. I WOULD SHOOT, ONE SHOT AFTER THE OTHER, AIMING. AFTER THE TEN FIRST WERE KILLED, BRANO WENT TO FETCH A SECOND GROUP. THEY SAW THE CORPSES AND STARTED BEGGING, "DON'T KILL US! WE WILL CALL OUR FAMILIES IN AUSTRIA SO THAT THEY SEND YOU MONEY!" OTHERS WOULD SIMPLY SAY "ALLAH OU AKBAR." OTHERS WOULD CURSE US, "YOU SERBIAN MOTHERFUCKERS!" ONE OF US SAID, "WHO HAS GOT MONEY TO BE SPARED." BRANO ANSWERED, "DON'T BOTHER, THE MONEY HAS ALREADY BEEN TAKEN FROM THEM IN ZVORNIK." AND THE MUSLIMS CONFIRMED THAT.

WHEN THE SECOND BUS ARRIVED, I WAS FED UP WITH KILLINGS. I TRIED TO TALK TO MOSLEMS ON THE BUS. I SPENT HALF AN HOUR SPEAKING TO A MIDDLE-AGED MAN WHO HAS SAVED 20 SERBS FROM SREBRENICA. HE GAVE ME A PAPER WITH TELEPHONE NUMBERS IN SERBIA TO PROVE HIS SAYS. I BELIEVED HIM. I WANTED TO SAVE HIM. BUT BRANO SENT A MAN TO TAKE HIM TO THE SLAUGHTER PLACE, EXPLAINING ME THAT NO WITNESSES WERE ALLOWED.

THIS MUSLIM ALSO TOLD ME THAT ALL THE PEOPLE ON THE BUSES WERE THOSE WHO SURRENDERED TOGETHER WITH THE DUTCH UN IN POCARI.

WHEN THE FOLLOWING BUSES ARRIVED, THREE OF THE VLASENICA MEN STARTED TO HIT THE MUSLIMS WITH METAL BARS ON THEIR CHEST AS THEY WERE GETTING OFF THE BUSES. THEY WERE UNDER ALCOHOL. I SAID TO MY CROATIAN FRIEND, "GOD KNOWS HOW THIS WILL GET BACK TO US." HE ANSWERED, " SHUT UP, OTHERWISE THEY WILL ALSO KILL YOU: REMEMBER, YOU ARE A CROAT."

AT THIS POINT, THEY STARTED TO USE THE MACHINEGUN (M84

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SOVIET TYPE). PROBLEM, IT WOULD WOUND PEOPLE AND NOT KILL THEM. WE HAD A CONFLICT WITHIN OUR GROUP: WE, THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS FROM BIJELINA, WE KNEW THAT THIS MACHINEGUN WOULD NOT SOLVE THE PROBLEM (SIC). THE WOUNDED WOULD BEG US TO FINISH THEM. STANKO SOVANOVIC WAS ASSIGNED TO DO THAT WITH HIS 7.62 (TTAJ) PISTOL. HE USED 700 BULLETS ON THE JOB.

IT WAS A ROTATION OF FIVE BUSES COMING FROM ZVORNIK. THE DRIVERS WERE ASKED TO SHOOT ALSO, IN ORDER TO INVOLVE THEM. TOO SCARED TO REFUSE.

IN A WHOLE, THERE WERE BETWEEN 15 AND 20 BUSES.

WE DID NOT BURY THESE 1,200 CORPSES. BRANO TOLD US THAT A BULLDOZER WOULD COME STRAIGHT AWAY.

AT 1530, THE SHOOTING STOPPED. THE LT COL. CAME TO ASK US TO LIQUIDATE ANOTHER 500 PRISONERS WHO WERE HELD IN THE HOUSE OF CULTURE (DOM KULTURA) IN THE NEARBY VILLAGE OF PILICE. WE REFUSED, TELLING HIM THAT WE WOULD NEVER DO THAT AGAIN. LATER WE HAD DRINKS IN A CAFE OPPOSITE THE HOUSE OF CULTURE. WE SAW A UNIT OF BRATUNAC DOING THE JOB. THEY WERE THROWING ALL SORTS OF HANDGRENADES INSIDE THE BUILDING. I SAW OUTSIDE THE BODIES OF TWO GUYS WHO PROBABLY TRIED TO ESCAPE.

AT 1700, WE WERE BACK IN THE COMBI DRIVING TO VLASENICA. MOST OF US WERE SINGING AND DRINKING BEER.

I KEPT SILENT.

END QUOTE.

BUTLER

MS Mail

DATE-TIME 07 March 96 14:52
FROM Vershbow, Alexander R.
CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET~~
SUBJECT RE: Serbs cooperating on war crimes suspects...so far [SECRET]
TO Bass, Peter E.
 Cicio, Kristen K.
 Hall, Wilma G.
 Veit, Katherine M.
 Wiley, Mary C.
CARBON_COPY Cullin, Brian P.
 Daadler, Ivo H.
 Eisenhower, James J.
 Feeley, John F.
 Fetig, James L.
 Johnson, David T.
 Marshall, Betty A.
 Maxfield, Nancy H.
 Naplan, Steven J.
 Peters, Mary A.
 Saunders, Richard M.
 Schmidt, John R.
 Schuker, Jill A.
 Vershbow, Alexander R.
 Wozniak, Natalie S.

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
 White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
 By N NARA, Date 11/5/2019
 2013-0656-m (5,95)

TEXT_BODY

The latest is that ABC news will run the story tonight - they wouldn't accept a 10-day delay; Le Figaro will also move the story tomorrow. State says that Tribunal reps will meet with the two guys on Sunday, and that Milutinovic continues to assure our Embassy that the FRY intends fully to cooperate on this case. Kornblum and co. will press Milosevic for the two suspects' safe transfer to the Hague when they visit Belgrade next week.

The account given by the two suspects of their actions at Srebrenica has already enabled the intel community to identify two more mass grave sites in satellite photos from last summer. David Scheffer has spoken to JCS to alert IFOR to the need to ensure that the sites are monitored against tampering.

From: Cicio, Kristen K.

To: Vershbow, Alexander R.

CC: /R, Record at A1; @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor; @EUROPE - European Affairs

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Subject: FW: Serbs cooperating on war crimes suspects...so far ~~[SECRET]~~
 Date: Thursday, March 07, 1996 01:00 PM

Sandy,

Sandy asks..."What is follow-up?"

Kris

From: Vershbow, Alexander R.
 To: @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor
 CC: /R, Record at A1; Feeley, John F.
 Subject: Serbs cooperating on war crimes suspects...so far ~~[SECRET]~~
 Date: Wednesday, March 06, 1996 03:32 PM

For TL and SRB

So far so good -- but Serbs are setting the stage for backing out of the deal if ABC goes public too soon with the story

 PREC: IMMEDIATE CLASS: ~~SECRET~~ DTG:061328Z MAR 96

FM: AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

TO:SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8815

~~SECRET~~ BELGRADE 001105

NODIS

OPS CENTER PLEASE ALERT AT OOB EUR - KORNBLUM AND PERINA

E.O. 12958:DECL: 03/03/01

TAGS: PREL, ICTY, SR, BK

SUBJECT: FRY PLEDGES TO EXTRADITE SREBRENICA WAR CRIMES WITNESSES AND CRIMINALS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY LAWRENCE E. BUTLER, CHARGE REASON, SECTION 1.5(B) AND (D).

2. ~~(S)~~ IN A 1230 LOCAL MEETING TODAY (MARCH 6), FOREIGN MINISTER MILUTINOVIC GAVE "100 PCT" GUARANTEE THAT ERDEMOVIC AND KREMENKOVIC WOULD BE TURNED OVER TO ICTY, IN ADDITION TO A THIRD PERSON ALREADY IMPLICATED BY THE FIRST TWO AND UNDER POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN SERBIA. BUT, MILUTINOVIC CONTINUED TO PLEAD FOR A PERIOD OF MEDIA SILENCE ON THIS CASE, ASKING FOR ANOTHER TEN DAYS TO ALLOW SERB AUTHORITIES TO ROUND UP ADDITIONAL PERSONS,

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ESPECIALLY THOSE HIGHER IN THE COMMAND STRUCTURE.

3. ~~(S)~~ MILUTINOVIC SAID THAT THIS CASE, THE INVESTIGATION AND THE OFFER OF COOPERATION WITH THE TRIBUNAL WAS KNOWN ONLY TO A SELECT GROUP OF FIVE: MILOSEVIC, LILIC, STANISIC, SHAINOVIC AND MILUTINOVIC. EVEN GORAN MILINOVIC HAD BEEN EXCLUDED. MEETING WITH THE SERBIAN PRESIDENT LAST NIGHT, THE GROUP HAD AUTHORIZED THE TURNOVER TO ICTY OF THESE PERSONS, TO INCLUDE ANYONE THAT THE FRY CAN ARREST BASED ON INFORMATION NOW BEING GIVEN BY THE FIRST TWO ARRESTED.

-- THE GROUP AGREED TO A MARCH 12 VISIT TO BELGRADE OF TRIBUNAL PERSONNEL, WHO COULD IMMEDIATELY VISIT THE TWO ARRESTEES/WITNESSES TO VERIFY THEIR WELL BEING, AND TO CONCLUDE A COOPERATION AGREEMENT AND ESTABLISH THE TRIBUNAL OFFICE. ICTY PERSONS HAVE APPLIED FOR VISAS AND INSTRUCTIONS SENT TO THE FRY EMBASSY IN THE HAGUE TO ISSUE.

-- THE TWO WITNESSES ARE BEING CHARGED, AS REQUIRED BY FRY LAW AFTER THREE DAYS OF DETENTION, BUT IN CAMERA. FRY JUSTICE MINISTER KLIKOVIC IS A SUSPECT QUANTITY AND IS BEING KEPT OUT OF THE LOOP ON THIS. TO ENSURE A SMOOTH TRANSFER, THE BOSNIAN WITNESS WILL BE EXTRADITED TO THE HAGUE ONCE THE ICTY-FRY AGREEMENT IS FINALIZED, AND THE FRY RESIDENT (KREMENKOVIC) WILL BE INDUCED TO SIGN A WAIVER OF VOLUNTARY EXTRADITION TO SIDE-STEP THE FRY CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION.) ALL OF THIS IS TO BE CONSIDERED CLOSE-HOLD INFORMATION.

4. ~~(S)~~ WITH CHARGE IN THE ROOM, MILUTINOVIC CALLED AN AIDE TO GIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO SPEED UP THE EVICTION OF THE CURRENT OCCUPANTS OF A VILLA ON UZICKA STREET, IN BELGRADE'S DENDINJE NEIGHBORHOOD, WHICH WILL BE OFFERED TO THE TRIBUNAL. "SEND THE POLICE TO ENFORCE THE COURT ORDER," MILUTINOVIC ORDERED HIS INTERLOCUTOR, "THE TRIBUNAL IS COMING MARCH 12."

5. ~~(S)~~ MILUTINOVIC ASKED CHARGE TO CONVEY TO WASHINGTON VIA SECURE MEANS ONLY (NO CALLS OR UNENCRYPTED MESSAGES, HE ASKED) THIS INFORMATION, FURTHER ASKING US TO FRONT FOR HIM WITH THE TRIBUNAL AND THE MEDIA. HE REITERATED SEVERAL TIMES THAT HE CANNOT MAKE OPEN PHONE CALLS FROM BELGRADE TO ANYONE ON THIS DELICATE ISSUE WITHOUT CREATING PROBLEMS FOR THE OPERATION. HE SAID THAT IF THE STORY LEAKS, THE OTHERS BEING IMPLICATED, WHO ARE HEAVILY ARMED AND WELL SUPPLIED WITH MONEY, WOULD DISAPPEAR. HE STRESSED THAT HE HAS TO RELY ON US TO GET

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TO GOLDSTONE TO SECURE HIS COOPERATION IN KEEPING THE LID ON THE CASE. THIS INCLUDES BEING QUIET AFTER THE TWO (MAYBE THREE) WITNESSES/WAR CRIMINAL ARE TURNED OVER

-- AS EARLY AS NEXT WEEK. CHARGE APPRISED MILUTINOVIC THAT THIS STORY WILL BREAK SOONER OR LATER, BUT WE THAT WILL TAKE HIM AT HIS WORD THAT AT A MINIMUM, ICTY WILL HAVE TWO WITNESSES/POTENTIAL INDICTEES NO MATTER THE OUTCOME. MILUTINOVIC'S RESPONSE WAS THAT WE WILL HAVE THREE, NOT TWO.

6. (S) COMMENT: MILUTINOVIC GAVE A VERY CONVINCING PERFORMANCE, BUT PRESENTS US WITH A DAUNTING TASK OF RESTRAINING THE TRIBUNAL'S WISH TO GO PUBLIC AND CONVINCING ABC NEWS (AND LE FIGARO) THAT A DELAY IN BROADCASTING THE STORY IS MERITED. IF SINCERE, WE HAVE THE PROSPECT OF THE FRY DELIVERING A SUBSTANTIAL PACKAGE OF HIGH AND LOW-RANKING WAR CRIMINALS TO THE HAGUE, SOMETHING NO PARTY TO THE DAYTON ACCORDS HAS DONE YET, AND WOULD BE A BREAK-THROUGH IN OUR EFFORTS TO GET MILOSEVIC'S COOPERATION ON WAR CRIMES. IF THE STRY BREAKS PREMATURELY, UNDER THIS SCENARIO -- HOWEVER PLAUSIBLE, MILOSEVIC WILL POINT A FINGER BACK AT US FOR HAVING SPOILED THE OPERATION. BOTTOM LINE: WE STILL SEE NO DOWNSIDE, AND AT A MINIMUM, WE HAVE OUR TWO (MAYBE THREE) WITNESSES/CRIMINALS.

BUTLER

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 30 January 97 14:08
 FROM Malley, Robert
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 SUBJECT PACKAGE[~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
 TO Letts, Kelly J.
 CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
 TEXT_BODY

DECLASSIFIED
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January 28, 1997

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: ERIC SCHWARTZ

FROM: ROB MALLEY

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Justice Arbour

Background

You will be meeting with Justice Louise Arbour, Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)

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and Rwanda (ICTR). Also attending the meeting will be ICTY Deputy Prosecutor Graham Blewitt and David Scheffer. Justice Arbour is scheduled to hold meetings with Madeleine Albright, George Tenet, and Jamie Gorelick, as well as officials from DoD, CIA, and FBI.

The Yugoslav tribunal has eight of 74 indictees in custody. So far, one Bosnian Serb was convicted after confessing to participating in the Srebrenica massacre. A second trial has been completed, and a verdict is expected this spring. Other trials of Bosnian Croats and Muslims are scheduled for this spring. Refusal by the FRY and Croatia to hand over suspects has vastly complicated the tribunal's task. The Rwanda tribunal's main problems have been administrative, with charges of nepotism and corruption. An IG report on these charges is due to be released next month. The ICTR has 13 of 21 indictees in custody.

Issues for the Meeting

- USG support for the international criminal tribunals.

Background: The U.S. remains the largest contributor in terms of funding and personnel. However, problems have arisen regarding the presence of U.S. detailees on the tribunals.

Your goals: Arbour will be looking for a renewed expression of commitment. You should signal our continued support and elicit her forecast for new indictments and trials.

- Strategy on arresting war criminals indicted by the ICTY.

Background: By the time of your meeting, Arbour will have been briefed on the outlines of our proposed arrest strategy. She will know that a U.S. delegation will be traveling to Europe to discuss planning with some of our partners. So far, she has indicated general support for the strategy and appears willing to have the ICTY take charge of the indictees once they have been arrested.

Your goals: You should ask her what obstacles she believes we

would face in implementing an apprehension strategy and the scope of support the ICTY would be prepared to provide. You may want to reiterate that we have not made any final decision about the operation.

Administrative problems plaguing the Rwandan tribunal.

Background: The ICTR has been plagued by significant administrative problems, including mismanagement and corruption, which will be unveiled in the IG report. The report is extremely critical of the ICTR, especially its Deputy Prosecutor. Arbour apparently believes that significant changes are required.

Your goals: You should encourage Arbour to take strong action to address these problems, including changes in management and personnel. You also should seek information on how the ICTR will proceed with future trials given violence in eastern Rwanda where cases stem from and witnesses live and on efforts to guarantee witness safety before and after trials.

Cooperation by governments harboring indicted war criminals.

Background: Both the ICTY and the ICTR have suffered from lack of cooperation by third countries harboring indicted criminals. Attention in the case of the ICTY has focused on Croatia and Serbia; France, Kenya, and Tanzania need to be pressed in the ICTR's case. (Cameroon recently agreed to turn over Colonel Bagasora following sustained pressure from the United States, including a POTUS letter.)

Your goals: You should seek information from Arbour on the scope of cooperation she is receiving from these governments, and suggestions on steps that ought to be taken to press them. You should inform her the one known genocide suspect in the US remains incarcerated in Texas and legal proceedings are ongoing for his extradition.

Concurrences by : John Feeley; Shawn McCormick

Attachment
Tab I Talking Points

ATTACHMENT
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30 January 97 11:3

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Talking Points for Meeting with Justice Arbour

I. USG Support for International Criminal Tribunals

- Strongly support your work and that of the tribunals. Central to efforts to achieve peace and justice both in former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda.
- Remain committed to assisting the tribunals.
- Glad to see you are meeting with range of officials from USG. Reflects our determination to support tribunals in all respects -- diplomacy, intelligence sharing, bringing indictees to justice.
- What do you foresee in terms of future indictments/trials?

II. Strategy for arresting indicted criminals

- As others have discussed with you, we are exploring ways to assist ICTY in apprehension of indictees. USG is serious in intent to bring indictees to justice.
- As you know, US delegation will be traveling to Europe next week to discuss possible plans. Am interested in what you believe would be the main obstacles and risks in a tracking/apprehension operation?
- What are your views on coordination between tracking/apprehension unit and ICTY?

III. Rwandan Tribunal

- Very concerned about administrative problems plaguing ICTR, particularly in relation to Deputy Prosecutor and Administrator.
- Encourage you to take strong action after release of IG report -- including the replacement of these two individuals. We stand prepared to support you.
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- Will violence in eastern Rwanda and attacks by extremists

against survivors of the genocide prevent Tribunal from proceeding with future cases given inaccessibility of witnesses?

What steps can be taken to provide protection for witnesses both before and after trials?

Need may arise for Tribunal to establish witness protection program in third country. We stand ready to help you if there is a need for our support.

IV. Cooperation by other governments

Delighted that Col. Bagasora and three other defendants were safely transported from Cameroon to Arusha. We were happy to assist in this effort.

What is your assessment regarding cooperation by other governments? Following trip to Balkans, how do you judge commitment of parties? In the case of ICTR, have governments of Kenya, Tanzania, France been helpful?

The genocide suspect in this country against whom the Tribunal has issued an indictment remains incarcerated in Texas and legal proceeding are ongoing for his extradition.

What steps should we take to elicit greater cooperation from other countries?