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TRANSFER OF GOVERNMENTAL POWERS TO GERMAN BUSINESS

PRELIMINARY VERSION

August 6, 1948

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Division of Research for Europe
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH

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TRANSFER OF GOVERNMENTAL POWERS TO GERMAN BUSINESS

I. THE ISSUE

Official control over production and distribution of industrial goods in the American and British Zones of Germany lost so much of its efficiency in the course of the first three years of occupation that by the spring of 1948 the economic authorities were unable to assure satisfaction of vital consumer needs and of export demands. This development coincided with a slow but steady industrial recovery and expansion of industrial production.

The decisive element for the deterioration of governmental controls over business was the breakdown of the monetary system. German business, like all other groups of the German population, anticipated a currency reform and was reluctant to sell goods and services for what was generally considered money without value. The extent of illegal hoarding of manufactured goods by German business firms, only surfaced before June 1948, became evident after the reform when a great volume of consumers' goods suddenly appeared in shops throughout the two zones.

Although the impact of the monetary situation was quite obvious, leading German officials and politicians agreed with the businessmen that the German governments were not able to dis-
charge their economic control functions effectively and that as far as controls were necessary they should be exercised by business itself under government guidance and supervision. Specific proposals to this effect were submitted to the American and British occupation authorities. On the Allied side, too, plans were worked out for a reorganization of the economic control system along these lines.\*\*\* Shortly before the currency reform was to take place, the Allied authorities decided to revise the whole system of economic controls and to transfer substantial powers to German business. This was to be done by vesting the trade associations (discussed below) with governmental functions in the field of production and distribution. The original plan, however, was dropped due to objections made by some Allied officials, and the US and UK Military Governors decided to set up new nongovernmental bodies, each composed of leading representatives of the industry concerned, to assume official powers over designated fields of economic affairs. In order to evaluate the full implications of the new policy, it is necessary to recapitulate the basic Allied attitudes to trade associations and their role in economic life.

\*\*\* War Information No. No. 400, Proposals for Transfer of Governmental Powers to German Business Associations in the Bizone Area, June 4, 1948, CONFIDENTIAL.

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II. THE LEGAL AND ACTUAL ROLE OF TRADE ASSOCIATIONS

The policies of the four Allies in regard to trade associations and their role in the economic system of occupied Germany differed from the beginning of the occupation.

The Soviet authorities dissolved all existing trade and employers' associations in September 1945 and prohibited the formation of new ones. Instead they introduced a new type of economic organization, in the form of chambers composed of representatives of business, labor, and government, to assume the traditional functions of trade associations and chambers of commerce. In each state one such chamber was set up, with branches in each district. Although the chambers of the Soviet Zone have a semiofficial status, they do not act as economic control agencies on behalf of the government but have only advisory functions. Economic controls are exercised by the governmental administration.

In the three western zones the business organizations of the Nazi period were dissolved, too, but the pre-Nazi pattern of voluntary trade associations and chambers was revived with only slight changes, such as the prohibition of supreme zonal and nationwide organizations. The new trade associations, how-

1. The reason for this prohibition was to prevent the associations from exercising influence on governmental policies as they had done to a considerable extent under the Weimar Republic and in Imperial Germany.
ever, were not assigned the same roles in the three zones.

In the French Zone, where, so far, military government agencies have not relinquished any important powers in the field of economic control, the trade associations seem to be restricted to the functions which they held before 1933. British MG, on the other hand, at an early period vested trade associations with considerable economic control powers and used them to regulate the distribution of industrial materials, etc. US Military Government, although intent upon transfer of controls into German hands, was directed to prohibit trade associations from exercising public functions, especially from regulating marketing conditions. In approving the constitutions of the German Länder MG acted on the specific principle that "governmental powers may not be delegated to private or quasi-public economic bodies." This principle was also incorporated into the Military Government Regulations concerning Non-Governmental Economic Organizations, which stipulated that "except in an advisory capacity, an association shall not participate in nor exercise governmental powers nor act as means for the restriction or control of trade...."

2. Basic directive on relationship between military and civil governments, September 30, 1946.
After the merger of the US and UK Zones the American policy on trade associations was adopted by the British. On February 4, 1948 the Joint Chairman of the Bipartite Control Office agreed on a policy statement on Non-Governmental Economic Organizations which closely followed US Military Government Regulations. The German bizonal authorities were given the policy statement as terms of reference for the necessary legislation. At the same time the contents of the policy statement were incorporated into the revised US MG Regulations (11-111) issued on March 10, 1948.

The German Bizonal authorities have not yet implemented the policy directive by passing legislation to establish uniform rules for the establishment and operation of non-governmental economic organizations. Moreover, the actual situation in the bizonal area does not correspond to the legal form set by the Allies. In May 1948 it was admitted officially that "trade associations are exercising on behalf of government (and in fact with the knowledge of Military Government) many powers which they are at present forbidden to exercise." This statement referred particularly to the distribution of industrial materials -- a function which in many cases seems to have remained in the hands

1. DICO/P (45) 50 and Appendix A to DICO/WEA (45) 15, February 12, 1948.
2. DICO/P (45) 135, CONFIDENTIAL.

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of the trade associations from the time when they were used as instruments of economic administration (in the British Zone), or to have been usurped by them when they were vested with advisory functions in regard to the government (in the US Zone).

III. THE PROPOSED REVISION OF THE DIESCHAL LAW

Shortly after the binonal policy statement had been adopted by the Bipartite Control Office a revision of the legislation restricting trade associations was initiated jointly by Allied and German officials. On April 8, 1948 German newspapers reported on a plan for simplification of foreign trade controls by transfer of considerable authorities to trade associations. On April 19, 1948 the Co-Chairman of the Control Office appointed a Working Party on Trade Associations which was "to explore the possibilities of utilizing trade associations in the economic recovery of the Combined Area within established US/UK policy and to make recommendations to the Co-Chairman." Ludwig Erhard, Bizonal Director of Economics, accurately foretold the contents of these recommendations in his speech before the Economic Council on April 21, 1948: "In consultation

1. See ERE Information Note No. 400, cited.
2. BCC/P (46) 155, CONFIDENTIAL.

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with BICQ, I am examining the question of relaxation of controls; and whether it would not be more in line with the reasonable division of functions if the authorities confine themselves to the sovereign tasks of controls whereby, as heretofore, the functional and Länder committees are responsible for planning, with regard to raw and other materials and production, but whereby the purely technical manipulation and control -- although under the supervision of the authority, as in the case of the Crafts -- devolves upon the self-governing bodies."

The Working Party submitted its report on May 12, 1948, and, as Dr. Erhard had anticipated, proposed a revision of the policy of barring trade associations from exercising governmental functions except in an advisory capacity.

The report of the Working Party was approved by the Co-Chairman of the Bipartite Control Office on May 27, 1948. It reiterated the principle that no trade association should under any circumstances participate in or exercise governmental powers by acting as an instrument for the restriction of trade, including the regulation of prices, rates and charges, sales, licensing of businesses or persons, or as a means for the distribution of food-stuffs, finished goods or semifinished goods for further manufacture. However, unlike the statement of February 4, 1948, the new proposals did not prohibit trade associations to act as a

1. Appendix A to BICQ/9 (48), 136.
means for control of trade, especially the regulation of distribution, allocation of materials and fuels, and assignment of production or delivery quotas.

During the current period of acute scarcity trade associations were to be allowed (1) to participate in or exercise executive functions in regard to the sub-allocation of materials or fuels allocated by the government to the particular industry as a whole, and (2) to arrange for the equitable distribution of production or delivery quotas. The economic administration was authorized to employ a trade association to secure information as to plant capacity, output, import requirements, and export deliveries from its members as well as nonmembers operating in the field covered by it. Those functions were to be exercised by trade associations "nominated" for this purpose by the German economic administration. Employees of the diagonal administration were to exercise control over the activities of nominated trade associations. Decisions and actions of trade associations exercising executive functions were subject to change or overruling by the administration, and their "nomination" was to be subject to revocation. Within the trade associations policy was to be determined by democratic procedures, especially majority rule, and each member was to have only one vote. Any firm which considered its legitimate interests damaged by any action of a
nominated trade association was to have the right to appeal to
the government. The law on deconcentration of economic power
was to be applied to trade associations, but the exercise of
governmental powers by the representatives of industrial firms
within the association was not to be considered contrary to the
spirit of the law.

The Bipartite Control Office submitted this draft to the
Bipartite Board for acceptance, but the two Military Governors
decided on a different procedure. The legislation prohibiting
trade associations from exercising governmental functions was
retained in force, and on June 2, 1948 the Bipartite Board ordered
the setting up of "industrial groups" to assume the prerogatives
which the trade associations were to have been given under the
first proposal.

IV. THE INDUSTRIAL GROUPS

In accordance with the decision of the Bipartite Board
of June 2, 1948 a policy statement entitled "Decentralized German
Economic Controls" was drawn up, and was transmitted on June 9.

1. The new statement incorporated many of the features of the plan
for transfer of governmental powers to German business drafted in
the spring of 1948 by the Foreign trade division of the National
Department for Economics (see BDK Information File No. 456,
June 4, 1948, cited).

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1948 by the Control Office to the German bizonal authorities for implementation.1

The policy statement on "Decentralized German Economic Controls" provides for the establishment of "industrial groups" in all production branches where raw materials essential for manufacturing operations are in short supply, as a result either of a shortage in the world market or of Germany's shortage of foreign exchange. Industrial groups are to be set up either by appointment of representative members of a particular industry by the German Department of Economics,2 or by permitting an existing trade association to nominate the members of the group responsible for its field of activities. An industrial group is to have all or some of the following functions:

1. The Department of Economics may delegate to an industrial group the authority to sub-allocate materials in short supply to individual manufacturers out of the total quota of domestic and imported materials which the Department of Economics will allocate to the industry as a whole. The group will be forbidden to discriminate among the firms and specifically to pay any regard to whether or not a firm is a member of the trade.

2. Or the Departments for Food, Agriculture and Forestry in cases where the industries are in the field of that administration.

1. DICO/3azo (48) 40.
2. Or the Departments for Food, Agriculture and Forestry in cases where the industries are in the field of that administration.
Association. Allocation of materials is to be based on "the relative position" of the firm in the industry.

(2) The Department of Economics may use an industrial group for gathering statistical information from all firms in the industry concerning current inventories, monthly production figures and programs, requirements of raw materials under allocation, and other matters.

(3) The industry groups are to play an important role in the German export trade by (a) assisting foreign buyers in locating sources of supply on a nondiscriminatory basis; (b) recommending to the Department of Economics which firms should be ordered to accept specific export contracts if such directives should become necessary in order to reach the industrial export target; (c) issuing certificates to export firms enabling them to get export licenses; and (d) by delegation of the Joint Export Import Agency, issuing export licenses under their own names.

The industrial groups would be organized separately from the trade associations in their respective branches but would be authorized to utilize the services of the staff of the respective trade associations. Apart from this stipulation, the policy statement does not contain any provisions specifying how the industrial groups should be organized or how they should operate. Such provisions were left to the Department of Economics, which is to
exercises control and supervision over the industrial groups. For each group the Department is to appoint a resident official who would have full access to all information bearing on the activities of the industrial group, the trade association, and the industrial manufacturers within the respective branch. The official is to assure compliance with policy and regulations, prevent discrimination as between members and nonmembers, and watch over the interests of the public. All firms are to have free access to him. The resident official may reverse or change any decision of the industrial group. On the other hand, appeal against decisions of the official or actions of the industrial group may be taken by any member of the industry, the group itself, or the trade association.

Military Government will supervise the industrial groups only so far as to assure that Military Government laws and policies with respect to trade associations and decartelization are not violated. The observers appointed by Military Government may recommend to the Bipartite Central Office action necessary to prevent violation of these laws and policies, but will not interfere with or influence the allocation of raw materials as such.

Whenever the materials required by a specific industry cease to be in short supply the respective industrial group is to be abolished.

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V. GERMANY OPPOSITION TO THE PROPOSED REORGANIZATION OF ECONOMIC CONTROLS

Upon receipt of the Bipartite policy statement on "Decentralized German Economic Controls" the Economic Council drafted an ordinance to implement the new policy, amending the Emergency Ordinance on Economic Controls of October 30, 1947, which is the basic law on the organization of economic controls. The ordinance was passed by the Economic Council on June 18, 1948 as Ordinance No. 38 and submitted to the States Council. This body, however, vetoed the ordinance.

Ordinance No. 38 gave the directors of the Departments for Economics and Transport the authority to form "functional economic agencies" composed of representatives of the various industries and trades concerned, to discontinue governmental economic control agencies, and to assign the following functions to the functional economic agencies:

(a) Redistribution among the individual enterprises of quotas allocated to them by the Department of Economics;

(b) The execution of tasks in connection with imports and exports;

(c) The execution of tasks concerning the use of transportation facilities.

1. Against the votes of the Social Democratic and Communist Parties (see discussion see BICM/GL (48) 49).
Advisory committees including representatives of the trade-unions were to be established and attached to each functional economic agency. A representative of the Department of Economics was to supervise the measures taken by each agency with respect to their legality and to issue instructions to it in accordance with general directives of the Department. The agencies were to collect fees and to exercise governmental rights in regard to requesting information from business firms.

Ordinance No. 38 was drafted in much vaguer terms than the Bipartite policy statement. The economic agencies established according to this ordinance could be vested by the Department of Economics with greater powers, and made much more independent of legal restrictions, than the industrial groups proposed by the Allied policy statement. This discrepancy between the Allied policy statement and the proposed German legislation is indicative of the spirit in which the German authorities would implement the new Allied policy, namely, as an opportunity to establish an administrative system which would not be subject to control by parliamentary bodies.

In the Status Council the ordinance was sharply attacked by several members, and only one member spoke in its favor.1

Footnote:
1. For discussion see DICO/GL (48) 30.
Of 12 members present 8 voted against the draft and two for it, while two abstained. In other words, not even all of the Christian Democratic members voted for the draft, although their own party had carried it through the Economic Council. The criticism voiced in the States Council was based essentially on the following grounds:

(a) Intrusion upon states' rights: The ordinance would change the existing division of powers between the Bismarck Administration and the states by depriving the latter of the right to allocate industrial materials to individual firms. This was considered objectionable not only for political reasons, but also because it was felt that industrialization of the poorer states would be hampered by the preferential treatment which established industries would necessarily enjoy in the allocation of materials.

(b) Character and composition of the economic agencies: According to the declared policy of the occupation powers, trade associations are to be voluntary and independent organizations and as such cannot exercise governmental functions. However, the composition of the proposed economic agencies is not defined and the elected bodies of the bismarck area are not able to influence it. There is danger that only employers will be represented.

(c) Danger of misuse and of cartels: The transfer of allocating powers to economic organizations might result in the establishment of new cartels. The trade associations will gain insight into the business operations of nonmembers.
Although opposing the ordinance, the Social Democratic members stressed that they were in favor of positive action and suggested that the semiofficial economic agencies should be staffed in a balanced way by employers and employees, and that guarantees should be given that they would not reach their decisions without consulting the Land ministers concerned.

After rejection of Ordinance No. 58 by the States Council no further steps were taken by the German administration to implement the policy directive on establishment of industrial groups. One of the main reasons for the reluctance of the non-socialist parties to carry their own proposals any further seems to be the attitude of German industry itself. Most of the influential trade associations are quite satisfied with the present situation, in which they work in close cooperation with the government in an advisory capacity. Moreover, they take into account the fact that the economic administrations of the Länder are opposed to the policy and are anxious not to disturb the good relations which at present exist between them and the Land agencies.

1. T-60, Frankfurt, July 21, 1940, RESTRICTED.
VI. EVALUATION OF THE NEW POLICY

In justification of the transfer of control powers to German business, organized in industrial groups or in trade associations, reference was made to the cumbersome character of governmental controls, the overburdening of governmental officers with control activities, and the need for decentralization and use of the expert knowledge of German business. It was further claimed that the setting up of industrial groups would serve to prevent violations of Military Government policy in regard to trade associations such as were not taking place to a considerable extent. In this way, it was asserted, the revival of the cartel system and of trade association practices typical of the corporate state would be prevented. However, there are serious doubts whether the new policy will assure compliance with these basic policies.

2. By substituting the industrial groups for trade associations the Bipartite Board has changed only the form but not the substance of the original plan for transfer of governmental powers to German business. The new policy statement permits and even suggests that the trade associations appoint the members of

1. WIC/30 (49) 46, WIC/2 (48) 88 and 135 and H1/P (48) 72.
the industrial groups and supply the administrative staff which the groups will need to discharge their functions. While the trade associations and the industrial groups are to be legally separate bodies they will in most cases be practically identical inasmuch as the same persons will occupy the leading positions and the same staff will do the administrative work. It follows that the new policy will not prevent the trade associations from exercising governmental powers. Insofar as there were justified objections against vesting trade associations with such powers those objections apply also to the industrial groups.

The industrial groups envisaged by the new policy would in fact be cartel organizations set up by the leading industrialists of each particular trade but controlling all firms belonging to it and enjoying the benefits of legal enforcement powers; specifically, they would establish production quotas for each enterprise, and control or influence the volume, kind, and direction of exports.

2. The new policy is contrary to the principle that governmental controls over business and industry should not be placed in the hands of private individuals or organizations without official status. This principle is well established in:

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1. The British press release H.R/H/577/9/1 of June 14, 1948 states in fact that "the industry may choose its own trade association as its representative." This serves to be an erroneous interpretation but is significant as a reflection of the spirit in which the policy is being put into effect.
occupation policy, especially in JCS 1067 (par. 36); in the basic
directive of September 30, 1946; in the basic directive of July
15, 1946 superseding JCS 1057 (par. 21 a.), and in Military
Government Regulations 11-111, c. A democratic economy and the
interest of the occupier demand that insofar as any governmental
interference with free enterprise and competition takes place,
the exercise of those powers should remain in the hands of govern-
ment officials and should not be entrusted to selected individuals
who do not hold public office and are not obligated to put the
public interest before their own.

3. Transfer of control powers to industrial groups organized
in accordance with the new policy would radically change the basic
objectives of the industrial control system set up by the occupa-
tion authorities. In exercising economic controls the government
aims at maximizing exports and expanding domestic consumption.
The objective of private control over business is to maximize
profits. These two generally contradictory objectives will certainly
be irreconcilable in postwar Germany. As a result of the war and
defeat German domestic markets may be expected to show a sustained
demand for industrial products at good prices, whereas foreign
markets will become more and more competitive and exports will
become less remunerative than domestic sales. Faced with
such divergent developments of their alternative markets, the
German businessmen in charge of industrial controls in specific
industries will be anxious to protect the immediate interests of their firms and industries and will be unwilling to expand production for export at the expense of the more profitable domestic sales. There is also the specific danger that when controlling exports the businessmen might try to protect the domestic market and the profits realized there from foreign competition and might enter into agreements with foreign competitors reducing German sales abroad in return for promises by the foreign manufacturers to restrict selling in Germany.

It follows that transfer of controls into the hands of industrialists might easily hamper expansion of German exports and would be contrary to the basic objectives of the occupation authorities of making Germany pay her own way as fast as possible.

4. The transfer of governmental powers into the hands of businessmen would result in an undesirable shift in the pattern of political power in western Germany by strengthening the influence of businessmen's organizations in economic and also political matters and weakening the authority of democratic institutions.

German industry has survived the postwar period of economic chaos and inflation much better than have the German people at large. Its production facilities were repaired at a time when labor was available for worthless money, and its liquid assets were replenished as a result of the substantial hoarding of its
products during the period of ineffective government controls.

Those products can now be sold for good money. The new policy would enable German industry to rebuild its prewar cartel organisation under a new name, and endowed with public functions and powers. German industry might once again use those economic advantages -- the value of which is greatly enhanced by the simultaneous pauperisation of the middle classes and the working population -- to recover also the political power which it held before the war.

On the other hand, governmental control over industrial groups cannot be expected to prevent abuses of their power. The position of the resident official would be rather weak as against the leading man in the industry: he would lack an independent staff and as a rule would have to rely on the findings and formulations of the industrial groups. Without the support of consumer and employee representatives in some kind of supervisory committee the resident official would not be expected to protect the interests of the public, a duty assigned to him under the new policy.

Military Government supervision would also be likely to be impaired by lack of personnel which could devote adequate time to each industry and acquire the necessary factual knowledge.

It is also to be considered that the transfer of powers to industrial groups would not reduce the amount of work to be done but would simply result in its being done by different people. However, the cost to the consumer might even be higher than what
the taxpayer would save.

5. Of considerable importance, although perhaps quite justified from the economic point of view, is the fact that as a result of the establishment of functional agencies (industrial groups) as allocating bodies the allocation of raw materials to German industry would in effect be centralized. At present, the regional (Land) agencies distribute the materials on behalf of the bizonal department of economics. In this manner, the individual Länder have decisive powers in regard to the distribution of materials among the enterprises located within their respective boundaries and at times even succeed in influencing the over-all distribution among the various regions. The industrial groups, however, would be completely independent of the Länder and their decisions would be based solely on economic considerations.

VII. CONCLUSION

The industrial groups which are to be established in Eastern Germany in order to decentralize governmental control over industry and make them more efficient would be the equivalent of private cartels vested by law with monopolistic control over the particular industries. The establishment of such bodies as instruments of governmental power would hamper the revival of free enterprise in Germany and strengthen the deeply rooted

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tendencies of German business toward monopolistic market control and cartelization. It would, in effect, reestablish the prewar cartels of German industries and act as a restraint of international trade. It might easily hinder the expansion of German exports. The establishment of industrial groups might also prove a great obstacle to the reestablishment of a competitive price system in Germany. It might hamper the effort to reduce the scope of economic controls and to let competitive factors decide the type and volume of Germany's foreign trade.

Inasmuch as the German democratic representatives of the bizonal area have rejected in the Status Council the ordinance implementing the new policy, the US and UK Military Governments would either have to exercise direct pressure on the German political parties, especially the Social Democrats, to assure passage of the necessary legislation, or to issue it as Military Government law. Either method of enforcing the new policy would appear to be highly objectionable, mainly for two reasons. First, the use of such strong measures in a matter which cannot be classified as vital for the achievement of basic occupation objectives seems inappropriate at this time, a few weeks before the occupation statute becomes law and the German powers of self-government are expanded.

Secondly, the inherent inconsistency of the new policy with American occupation directives and basic principles is well known to the German public and would certainly be publicized.
The fact that the denazification laws have not resulted in any substantial changes in the leading personnel in German business, and that socialization of basic industries is at least temporarily prohibited by Military Government, is bound to strengthen the opposition to the new policy. If forced to agree to the establishment of industrial groups the Social Democrats would be subject to attacks from the Communists, to whom the new policy would prove an extremely welcome propaganda instrument.

The recent developments in the German economy also make reconsideration of the policy desirable. The currency reform of June 1948 has radically changed the economic situation in Germany. At present it can no longer be claimed that the government cannot efficiently control production and distribution of essential goods. The new money is being accepted as a valuable means of payment.

Governmental control of industrial production and distribution no longer relies exclusively on the efficiently or law-enforcing agencies, but to a greater extent use the mechanism of the market economy and the credit system, which is under the direct and effective control of the government. The present situation is therefore radically different from that which obtained in the spring of 1948, when the policy was drafted.
FRENCH MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY

Description

This study was prepared in RAA/ETU and is based largely on a thousand mile trip through the French Zone in Germany during the first half of August. It describes the organization, aims, and policies of the French Military Government in Germany; the relations between it and the German civilian authorities; and the attitude of the German toward French MG officials.

Washington, D.C.

25 September 1945

Copy No.: 1

[Handwritten Note: 'This report was prepared in RAA/ETU and is based largely on a thousand mile trip through the French Zone in Germany during the first half of August. It describes the organization, aims, and policies of the French Military Government in Germany; the relations between it and the German civilian authorities; and the attitude of the German toward French MG officials.']
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FRENCH MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN GERMANY

Summary

In most matters of broad policy and in the day to day handling of MG affairs, the French administration largely parallels the American. This parallelism results in part from the similarity of MG organization and recruiting, which dates from the period when SHAEF imposed a certain uniformity on the western Allies, and in part from the essential sameness of conditions in the two zones. The late nomination of certain top French officials and the late arrival of the French in a large portion of their zone have contributed to the fact that in some things French MG is behind the American. In general, French officials, although they have certain complaints against Allied policies in Germany, are anxious to bring MG in the four zones into line and for close cooperation between zones.

I. INTRODUCTION

By mid-August, French Military Government had about finished the shake-down period. It had been operating in some areas for over three months, had had a month to get used to the loss of Karlsruhe and Stuttgart to the Americans and to acquaint itself with the extension of the French zone into the Saar and the Rhineland. General Koenig
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF INDUSTRY IN EUROPE STAGES V & VI

Description

This is the first of a series of studies of selected European countries analyzing the degree of industrial rehabilitation since V-E Day. The industrial recovery of Belgium, Denmark, France, Luxembourg, Italy, and Spain is covered in this study.

Washington, D.C.
June 30, 1946
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This study of industrial reactivation in Europe covers the following countries: Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, and the four occupation zones of Austria and of Germany. In comparing the figures for different countries, several points should be kept in mind. It should be emphasized that the study is limited to industrial recovery and makes no attempt to estimate the degree of recovery in agriculture or other non-industrial segments of the economy concerned. It will be observed that particular emphasis is placed on the relationship between industrial reactivation and the available energy supply, particularly coal. While an adequate supply of coal is an essential element of industrial reactivation and is a problem common to all the countries studied, its significance is not uniform from country to country. Varying conditions of political stability, together with shortages of foodstuffs and other goods generally, factors which lie outside the scope of this study, render hazardous any attempt to trace a single element or set of elements common to the progress of industrial reactivation in the countries studied.

It should further be noted that there is great variation from country to country, both in the quality and the quantity of available information bearing on industrial activity in the post-war period. Furthermore there is, of course, great variation in the significance of industry, and particularly heavy industry, to the economy of each of these countries.

Bearing in mind these various qualifications, the general level of industrial production and energy supply can be roughly summarized as follows:
General Level of Industrial Production and Energy Supply: March 1946 as Percent of Pre-war.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Industrial Production</th>
<th>Coal</th>
<th>Electric Power</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>30°</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>d</td>
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a. October - December 1945 monthly average  
b. Estimated  
c. January 1946  
d. Not available

Similar data are not available for truncated Germany and for Austria; however, coal production in Western Germany in March 1946 was 32 percent of pre-war, and the general level of industrial production is estimated to be of the order 15 - 20 percent of pre-war. For Austria as a whole, coal availability amounted to 80 percent of pre-war while the general level of industrial production is estimated to be 10 - 20 percent of pre-war.

The supply of coal has been and continues to be inadequate to meet effective demand in all countries under study. While coal is the most important commodity in short supply, this deficiency, as noted above, is of varying significance as it affects industrial recovery from country to country. Given the present administrative disorganization of Italy, for example, it is probable that an increase in the supply of coal would show proportionately less return in the form of increased industrial output than would a similar increase in coal availability in the case of France and Belgium.

Shortages of raw materials, other than coal, currently seem to be of less significance than such nonmeasurable factors as the general scarcity of consumer's goods and foodstuffs, with its depressing effect on labor productivity, and producer-hostility in the face of general marketing uncertainties.
TREATMENT OF FORMER FASCISTS BY THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

Description

An analysis of the process of defascistization in Italy from July 1943 to March 1945

Washington
17 March 1945

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, 50 U.S.C. 31 and 32, as amended. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

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Norway they formed a mobile reserve employed in case of riots or anti-German actions. The vast majority of such police troops were employed in Poland, the Ostland, and the Ukraine. Operating as complete battalions, they were also used at the front or in heavy actions against partisans. Artillery support was available to them where this was required. Broken down into small groups, they searched for concealed weapons, controlled refugees, and protected road and rail supply lines against sabotage. One battalion, it is claimed, was assigned to guard a 1,400-km stretch of railroad track. Under such conditions the individual policeman had to be both resourceful and highly dependable.

German Protective and Rural Police were used as cadres for native guard units and, in some instances, were entrusted with the administration of police affairs in relatively large areas. One report describes a rural policeman who controlled the destinies of 35,000 persons.

(2) The Administrative Police

In addition to taking care of all matters pertaining to the internal administration of the police (pay, supply, quarters, equipment, etc.), the Administrative Police were used in establishing and operating certain civilian controls. Identification cards for the general public, passports, and weapon permits were issued by them in areas where the native police were not considered sufficiently reliable to be entrusted with this work. They were also responsible for price regulations and, to a limited extent, for factory laws in occupied areas. The highest Administrative Police agency in each of the occupied areas was the Office of Administration and Law (Verwaltung und Recht), which was attached to the headquarters of the Commander of the Order Police.

1/ Deutsche Verwaltung, 10 December 1942, p. 466.
During the first stage of occupation high-ranking Administrative Police experts were engaged in the re-organization of native police systems. Traffic specialists, it is stated, were used in the drive to make German traffic-law standard for the whole of occupied and satellite Europe.1

(3) The Fire Protection Police
Two mobile regiments of German Fire Protection Police were at one time assigned to occupied areas; one to Holland and the other to the Protectorate. 2/ It is altogether possible that they were recalled later because of the increased threat to Germany proper and because police experts of this branch assisted in the establishment of thoroughly modern fire departments in most of the cities of occupied Europe.

(4) Other Order Police Units
The Coast Guard Service and the Organization Todt Police operated in the areas under consideration in much the same manner as was described above.

e. The Security Police
(1) The Criminal Police
In the areas under consideration, German nationals ordinarily could not be searched, investigated, or arrested by native police officials. For this reason the German Criminal Police operated abroad with respect to their own countrymen in a manner similar to that which they followed in the Reich. In addition, they completely dominated the native police. In the Protectorate they operated directorates and offices exactly as in Germany. Each of these agencies

1 Deutsche Verwaltung, 10 December 1942, p. 466.
2/ Ibid.
maintained files of fingerprints, aliases, and crime reports for a given district. Although there is no evidence of the existence of similar offices elsewhere, it is assumed that the German Criminal Police established their own control files wherever it was possible to do so.

(2) The Gestapo and the SD

The German secret police services had one of the most important functions allotted to any agency operating in occupied territory. Their investigations prior to occupation were amazingly thorough. Within a few hours after the Army had taken a given area, suspects had been ferreted out and imprisoned. Special teams of Gestapo and SD agents would accompany the advance troops into an area, proceed to the headquarters of political party, labor, and business organizations, seize the files and begin an immediate round-up of political opponents, engineers, technicians, and other key persons.\(^1\) In this way sabotage was largely prevented and the restoration of production facilitated.

Once established in an area, the Gestapo and SD created a network of informers, set up and operated files similar to those of the Criminal Police, took control of native secret police organizations, and, to the extent that was necessary, created auxiliary police organizations. The control of identification cards and passes was one of their most important functions.\(^2\) For this purpose order patrols and local police were placed under their supervision. In the occupied East the Germans introduced a very rigid system of population stabilization. In some areas the permission of a German security agent was necessary before

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2/ Ibid., 15 February 1943.
persons could move from one place to another. This system, which appears both extreme and cumbersome, developed in response to the threat of guerrilla activity. Other duties included reporting on available labor, providing for the movement of ‘Racial Germans’ back to the Reich, and supervising the work of native constables.

The Gestapo, extended as it was, depended on whatever reliable German or collaborationist personnel was available in a given area to make arrests and carry out its orders. Clear evidence regarding the number of such persons in the service of the Gestapo cannot be obtained, since German secret agents were either the uniform of the SS or that of the Waffen-SS, or went about in plain clothes.

There is some evidence to the effect that the SD had been granted executive police powers in the occupied East and Serbia. In the Netherlands the SD reportedly was in charge of curbing the black market.

f. The Reorganization of Native Police and the Establishment of German Control

In Norway, Holland, the Protectorate, parts of the Ostland (the Baltic states), and Serbia, the native police organizations, although radically reorganized, were retained on a nation-wide basis. In Norway and Holland, the native local police forces were formerly administered by the separate communities (such as is the case in the United States). After the Nazis came in, a hierarchical system modeled after that existing in Germany was introduced, and, to a certain extent, branches of police resembling those in Germany were organized. Control over the police was assured by placing the head of native police under a German Higher SS and Police Leader and by infiltrating German police officials into strategic positions throughout the system.
In the Protectorate the Secret State Police and such parts of the Criminal Police as were needed for the prosecution of crimes punishable under German criminal law were in German hands, while the Czech counterparts of the Order Police and some Criminal Police were also placed under German command.

In Serbia and the former Baltic states the state police were retained but under very rigid control by the Germans.

No nation-wide police organization as such survived in the General Government or in the formerly Russian parts of the Ostland or the Ukraine. In the General Government the former state police were reorganized on a communal basis with local jurisdiction only. All Racial Germans and members of the SS, SA, and NSKK were subject to call as police auxiliaries. In the former Russian territory the Germans, assisted by native auxiliaries, performed most of the police duties. Local constables in rural areas were controlled by German officials.

In all occupied countries the native police were subjected to a thorough purging, including the dissolution of entire branches. Subsequently those forces were built up again by the recruitment of pro-German personnel. Former soldiers, Racial Germans, racial minorities, renegades, and criminal elements were used for this purpose. Economic controls everywhere necessitated the creation of a special corps of economic, food, or price-control police. Training of native specialists in these fields was largely in the hands of the Administrative Police.

6. The Special Native Police of the New Order

In addition to the regular native police in the occupied countries, the Germans organized auxiliary police, guard units, rural police, and combat formations. In some
cases they were established by, the police, in others, by the Waffen-SS. Normally they were not given general police functions since no provision had been made to train them elaborately. In their particular roles, however, these special units contributed enormously to the German system of repression.

The SS played a prominent role in organizing such units in Norway and Holland. Waffen-SS guard battalions in Norway and the militia (Landmacht) in Holland were both under SS leadership. Native leaders, to the extent that they could be used, were drawn from the ranks of the Waffen-SS because, it was believed, they had demonstrated their dependability by their willingness to fight.

In the General Government and Serbia, Racial Germans were used extensively as auxiliaries. Their duties included the mounting of special guards and the enforcement of economic regulations in rural areas.

In parts of the General Government, in Serbia, Slovakia, and in the Ostland and Ukraine, the chief problem confronting the German police was security against guerrillas. In Slovakia, Volksdeutsche (Racial Germans) formed the Heimatschutz to fight the partisans. Highly militarized militia (Schutzmannschaften) were organized in the Ostland and the Ukraine. Made up of former soldiers and, wherever possible, of minority racial groups, these units could be mobilized and placed in the field wherever danger arose. Some units received intensive military training and were sent away to fight guerrillas in distant areas.

Wherever guerrillas existed on a small scale the Security Police and the SD had the special duty of tracking them down. It became a common practice for the German Security Services to build up detachments of native personnel (sometimes called Einheimische Scholfer) for guard duties.
and for small actions against guerrillas. Good food and clothing, a position of prestige, and an opportunity to share in the fruits of a German victory were the inducements offered. Training included infantry tactics, security measures, and a certain amount of Nazi ideology. These units were raised on the land and, when their usefulness ended, summarily disbanded.

4. The Police and SS as Terror Organizations

The sober and methodical steps taken by the Nazis to build up their system of police controls were supplemented by methods of terrorism. The men who created the administrative machinery described above were the same individuals who were responsible for the machine-gunning of civilians packed tightly into cellars or even churches, for the use of gas chambers and crematories for the innocent victims of Nazi racial theories, and for the execution of hostages. The police and the SS are both responsible for the greatest part of Nazi terrorism.

In the West and in the Protectorate the application of Nazi racial theories and the Nazi dream of a peaceful, satisfied Europe under their control dictated a less extreme policy than elsewhere. Stern and brutal measures were used in these areas, but they were by no means as common as those employed against the unfortunate populations of Eastern Europe. In the West and the Protectorate, hostages were carefully counted -- so many for the killing of a policeman, so many for the life of a high official. In the East, countless thousands went to their death simply because they were Jews or Slavs.
D. MILITARY POLICE AND SECURITY UNITS

Control over occupied Europe was accomplished by employing military police, guards, and security units as well as the German civilian police system. In the policing of occupied territory, the commander or authority in charge may have used any of these units depending on his mission and the elements available to him. In the main, however, these military units dealt with military personnel and only secondarily with the civilian population of occupied countries. Although much personnel was taken over from the civilian police, there is evidence of competition and confusion in the activities of civilian and military police. In most instances the SS-dominated civilian police, backed by Heinrich Himmler, its all-powerful leader, won out.

1. The Field Gendarmerie (Feldgendarmerei)

The German organization which was most similar to the American military police was the Feldgendarmerei. Its functions, however, were less comprehensive than those of the American MP’s. The foremost duty of the German gendarmes was military traffic control. Their functions were limited and their number presumably small because the German civilian police were highly organized, well trained, and capable of policing military personnel, especially within Germany; moreover, discipline in the German Army was rigid and officers and non-commissioned officers assumed the responsibility of control on and off duty. Officers and men of any arm or branch could be and were assigned police duties as required and, as a consequence, military police were used chiefly in conjunction with combat units, e.g., in rear areas.

a. Duties

The normal duties of the Feldgendarmerei, especially in home territory, comprised not only military traffic control,
but also other military protection and security services that might become necessary. The transport of military personnel and prisoners seemed to be a duty of the Feldgendarmerie. In occupied territory they could even have to fulfill all police functions if so required, with the exception of those specifically assigned to secret police and security units.

For example, MP's have been detailed to local town commanders for the purpose of patrolling streets. Feldgendarmerie reportedly have been used in assisting the civilian population.

Zollfahndungstellen (customs intelligence offices). Their chief functions in traffic control were the giving of first aid and the establishment of responsibility in traffic accidents. An officer of the Feldgendarmerie could be detailed as road commissary over special sections of roads. In addition, units could be called upon to assist in the maintenance of military discipline and control of military personnel on roads and in cities. These gendarmes may also have been used for the rounding up of available civilian population capable of labor.

b. Organization

The Feldgendarmerie was composed principally of officers and men drawn from the civilian police force.

Detachments within Germany were under the command of the various Corps area commanders. On the front MP detachments assigned to combat organizations received orders from divisional staffs. In a rear area their commands controlled the police service in the name of army headquarters.

In occupied territory, the chain of command was reportedly as follows: a höherer Stabsoffizier (senior staff officer) of the Feldgendarmerie, regularly a colonel, was attached to the staff of the Militärbefehlshaber (military commander of an occupied country). He gave orders to staff officers, regularly of major's rank, attached to
the staffs of the military commanders of sub-districts. On the next lower level were officers, mostly of first lieutenant's rank, attached to the Feldkommandanturen (administrative sub-area headquarters). Subordinated to them were Feldkommandantur lieutenants attached to urban Ortskommandanturen (town headquarters) or rural Kreiskommandanturen (county headquarters).

2. The Patrol Service (Streifendienst)

a. Duties

The Wehrmachtstreifendienst (Patrol Service of the Wehrmacht Armed Forces—Army, Navy, and Air Force—as well as Waffen-SS) investigated and combated the undermining of military discipline. The chief duty of the service was the maintenance of discipline outside the unit. One of the chief functions popularly attributed to an American MP, the checking of travel and leave papers, was the duty of the Streifendienst, not of the Feldkommandantur. Other aspects of the service were the "welfare" of military personnel outside the unit and the supervision of coffee kitchens and similar installations. These functions were exercised in the Reich area, including Bohemia-Moravia, and the General Government, in all occupied countries, and in Italy, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Finland, Slovakia, Croatia, and Denmark.

b. Organization

The corresponding patrol services of the three branches of the Armed Forces and of the Waffen-SS were unified in May 1944. The decree setting up the unified service stressed that the organization and its numerical strength was to be kept down to a minimum. The chief of the service received the status of a corps commander and was subordinated to the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces directly. Personnel was to be recruited from suitable energetic soldiers with...
records of meritorious service at the fronts and, if possible, with decorations. To an ever increasing extent, the service employed wounded soldiers physically capable of performing the duties of the patrol service.

The authority of the Streifendienst greatly exceeded that of the ordinary military police. They could impose and carry out punishment for disciplinary infractions that were not offenses against penal laws and appeals had no postponing effect. For offenses against penal laws the culprit was turned over to the nearest court of his branch of the Armed Forces or of the Waffen-SS.

Contacts between the Streifendienst and the civilian population of occupied territories were probably limited, although the population was affected indirectly by the Patrol Service's disciplinary measures.

Units with more far-reaching authority than even the Streifendienst were the Feldjäger (field chasseurs), who could use every means at their disposal to combat breakdowns of military morale in front sectors to which they were assigned. The civilian population was not likely to come in contact with these units.

3. The Secret Field Police (Geheime Feldpolizei, GFF)

a. Duties

The Secret Field Police were designed mainly to combat subversive activities within the Armed Forces. Their duties included supervision of soldiers, especially in their contacts with the civilian population on the streets, in restaurants, and brothels, and on trains, and censorship of correspondence between soldiers and the civilian population.

The Secret Field Police as a political-control organization cooperated closely with the Gestapo and the
Security Service of the Party, as well as with the "Abwehr" organization (military intelligence and counter-intelligence). With Himmler's enlargement of his powers any competition between GFP and Gestapo was decided in favor of the latter, with a great deal of resulting confusion. But the Secret Field Police are said to have assisted the Gestapo and Abwehr in emergency situations, in France, for example.

The relation between Secret Field Police and Feldpolizeidirektoren seems to have been restricted to the turning over of prisoners to the latter for transport.

b. Organization

The leading personnel of the GFP were in most instances recruited from the civilian Security Police. This fact did not always make for unity with the soldiers. Members of the GFP retained, moreover, the right to wear civilian clothes.

The GFP was organized into Gruppen (groups) and attached to Army or Air Force units. The Navy had a similar organization. Normally, one group was attached to one Army and one or more groups to the military commander of each occupied country.

The Feldpolizeichef der Wehrmacht (Chief of Field Police of the Armed Forces) holds the rank of colonel. In occupied countries the central direction of the secret field police work seems to have rested with the military commander. Feldpolizeidirektoren (Directors of Field Police), of major's rank, were in charge of individual groups, reportedly attached to each office of a commander of an occupied district. Subordinate offices (Dienststellen), usually headed by a Feldpolizeikommissar of captain's rank, are said to have been located in all important military garrisons.
4. **Military Security Units**

A number of military security and guard units were organized within the Armed Forces.

**Lanösschützen** / regiments and battalions, employed for guard duties within Germany and for support of the military administration of occupied countries, were composed of older personnel and of soldiers temporarily or permanently unfit for field service. They specialized in the protection of prisoner-of-war camps, railroad, and river communications, power plants, etc., in Germany as well as in occupied countries and in rear areas of operations.

Such units could be upgraded and receive the designation **Sicherungsbataillone** (Security Battalions). This designation characterized more mobile units with better equipment (even artillery) than the regular Laneösschützen. Such units were used to guard military installations against partisans. They have reportedly been used in mopping-up operations in communication zones.

The terms **Wachregiment** and **Bataillone** (guard regiments or battalions) seem to have been used for detachments guarding headquarters in larger cities especially, Paris, for example, had its own German Wachregiment. Such units reportedly used draftees fit for limited service only.

The Navy had similar formations. Thus, in France the civilian guards, composed to a large extent of Frenchmen (for the protection of wharves and other naval installations), in accordance with Hague regulations were militarized as **Wachwehr** (Guard Militia) and subordinated to the **Oberwerftstab** (Higher Naval Staff) of the Navy Group Command West.

1/ This is the traditional name of a Tyrolian crack unit. A literal translation would be "provincial rifle men." More fitting is the term "local defense units," which is not to be confused with the new Volkssturm, or home guard.
E. THE ALLGEMEINE SS (GENERAL SS)

Members of the Allgemeine SS were active in the Security Police and its two subdivisions—the State Police and the Criminal Police. They also formed the Security Service.

The Allgemeine SS was organized into Oberabschnitte (main sections), subdivided into Abschnitte (sections) and Standarten of about regimental size with numerous smaller units. The main sections were regularly headed by an SS Obergruppenführer (senior group leader, equivalent to German full general, American lieutenant general). Such an official could hold the position of Höherer SS und Polizeiführer (Higher SS and Police Leader), thus combining the commands of Allgemeine SS and police in a region.

In the incorporated or annexed territories main sections were set up in Danzig (called "Reichsgau"), Salzburg ("Alpenland"), Vienna ("Donau"), Pozan ("Warteland") and in 1944 in Prague ("Böhmen und Mähren"). An SS section for the occupied parts of France was established in Strasbourg.

The Allgemeine SS in the Netherlands was organized as main section "Northwest" in The Hague, that of Norway as main section "North" in Oslo.

While SS men were engaged as individual officials in all the occupied countries, SS Oberabschnitte and Abschnitte were established only in those areas where the population was considered worthy.
F. THE WAFFEN-SS (MILITARIZED SS)

1. General

The Waffen-SS was a voluntary military organization consisting of at least twenty divisions, several brigades, and some smaller units.1/ About half of these were Panzer Divisions and most of the others were motorized. Its function was twofold: First, it served at the front, where it was placed at the disposal of the Army High Command and fought in conjunction with other elements of the Wehrmacht. Second, the SS played an important role in occupied Europe. There it recruited Racial Germans, pro-German aliens, and foreigners whose local partisan interests ran parallel to those of the German Government. These "Volunteers" were trained and put to use as front soldiers. After service at the front, some of them were returned to their native countries to assist the work of the police or the local SS.

2. History

a. Early Development: Verf"Hunstruppen and Totenkopfverbände

Early in 1933 a group of one hundred twenty members of the SS were organized into a separate command and placed on full-time military duty. They became the "SS Staff-Guard Adolf Hitler" and were equipped with steel helmets and carbines. Shortly thereafter they were organized as Hitler's own regiment, the Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler and placed under the command of Sepp Dietrich with Berlin as their home station. Within the next few months similar units were organized elsewhere: SS Standarte Deutschland in Munich; SS Standarte Germania in Hamburg.

1/ Order of Battle information with respect to these units is published by the Military Intelligence Service of the War Department.
Arolson, and Radolfzell; SS Pioniersturmbann in Dresden; the SS Nachrichtensturmbann in Ulm. For the training of leaders the SS Junkerschulen in Tübingen (Baden). and Braunschweig were established. In March 1938 Hitler ordered the formation of a fourth regiment, Der Führer, with its home stations in Vienna, Graz, and Klagenfurt. These troops were known as the SS Verfügungsgruppen.

A similar organization, the SS Deathhead Formations (SS Totenkopfverbände), constituted a second source of the Waffen-SS. This organization was originally made up of volunteers from the allgemeine SS who were used to replace the Storm Troopers (SA) in guarding concentration camps. Their reputation for cruelty hardly seems exaggerated.

b. Pre-war Role

The pre-war role of these troops was to provide protection for the Führer, to guard concentration camps, and to constitute a mobile striking force for crushing any internal disorder. For this purpose the Verfügungsgruppen were placed at the disposal (Verfügung) of Hitler. They were also expected to provide leadership for the allgemeine SS, the police, and the Party Security Service from among the members of their corps who had completed the four-year enlistment.

c. Development after 1938

The development of the Waffen-SS out of the Verfügungsgruppen and the Totenkopfverbände is closely related to the events of 1938 and 1939. Units of the SS took part in the occupation and policing of Austria, Sudetenland, and the Protectorate, partly in order to demonstrate that they had also participated, and partly to apprehend the "enemies of the Reich" in those territories. The SS functioned as military police for all German forces during the events of 1938. During the march into
Czechoslovakia: (March 1939) the Army, however, was provided with military police formations of its own. During the early summer of 1939 the SS Verfolgungstruppe proceeded to equip itself with artillery.

With the coming of war and the building up of separate SS divisions, the Waffen-SS came into being. The Verfolgungstruppen regiments were built up into divisions, with the aid of cadres from the Army for the specialized arms and branches. Some of these units took part in campaigns as early as 1940.

During this period Social Germans and "Germanic" foreigners were first introduced into the ranks of the military SS. The SS aimed to foster in every way the development of a strong, dependable pro-German group in the occupied and satellite countries of Europe. Military and ideological training in the ranks of the Waffen-SS was an obvious means to this end. However, with the failure of the German Army to win an easy victory in Russia and the threat of invasion from the west, the ability of the SS to tap sources of manpower beyond the reach of the Reichswehr became an important factor in the German war effort. Evidence of this fact was seen in the reorganization of the unwieldy but showy foreign "legions" first into regiments and later into brigades and divisions, in the conscription of Baltic and Balkan populations, and in the employment of non-Germanic Ruthenians, Ukrainians, White Russians, and Croats, including Esphemodian.

3. Recruitment, Training, and Employment of Personnel

There were three general groups in the Waffen-SS: German nationals, Social Germans (Volksdeutsche), and foreigners. Only the two latter groups are pertinent to the problem of German policies and measures in occupied Europe.
a. Racial Germans (Volksdeutsche)

"Racial Germans" were persons of German ancestry who were citizens of non-German countries. In accordance with the broad program of bringing such persons living in occupied or satellite countries into the service of the Reich, a special effort was made to enlist in the Waffen-SS those of military age who measured up to the special Waffen-SS physical and political qualifications. To facilitate this program special arrangements were made with the satellite countries to provide for recruiting within their borders and for the transfer of Racial Germans from their armies.

The training of Racial Germans followed the usual pattern of SS political and military education. However, in view of the fact that these recruits had not had the benefits of a Hitler Youth education, more emphasis was placed on National Socialist ideology, especially as it related to Germany's European mission. Military training may have been abbreviated in some instances because of the training which personnel received in foreign armies. Officers and non-commissioned officers who graduated from the Junkerschule at Tölz (eventually used exclusively for the training of Racial Germans and alien SS) were thoroughly trained in assault techniques, bunker storming, and street fighting. They mastered the use of all firearms, including flamethrowers and trench mortars. Great emphasis was laid on political training, and the students were imbued with the idea that they fought for Gross Deutschland. They were taught to think and act as the privileged elite of their country.

Racial German Waffen-SS personnel were to be found in almost every combat unit. A large number of those from Rumania, the Banat, and Hungary were in the mountain division Prinz Eugen, stationed in Serbia. Other Waffen-SS units
were incorporated into the framework of the Hungarian Army. (After
Hungary's defection from the Axis a pro-German
Hungarian Legion was organized under Waffen-SS auspices. The
latter was presumably composed of non-Germanic elements.)

A number of Racial German units were transferred
from duty at the front to police duty in occupied areas
and in Germany proper. It is said that Himmler considered
them to be the most reliable forces at the disposal of the
Germans.

b. Foreign Waffen-SS Personnel

(1) General

Recruitment of foreigners into the ranks of the
Waffen-SS was undertaken originally for political and
psychological purposes. The reorganization of national
legions into regiments and divisions, and the introduction
of a larger element of compulsion in recruiting, made it
evident that the Germans meant to exploit this source of
manpower to the limit. The general pattern was to draft
individual foreigners into the Wehrmacht proper, while
entire foreign legions were incorporated into the Waffen-
SS. Recruiting, training, and employment of foreigners
followed different lines in the various regions of controlled
Europe.

(2) The West

(a) General. In the West, the population as
a whole was hostile. Consequently, recruiting was voluntary
and addressed itself to the minority pro-German group.
As in the case of the Volksdeutsche, military service in
the SS was a prerequisite for younger men before the
assumption of responsibility in the local SS, police, or
government.

Recruitment and assignment of personnel from the
West was in the hands of the Head Office for Germanic

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Volunteers of the Military SS (Germanische Freiwilligenleitstelle der Waffen-SS) in Berlin. Many "Germanic" volunteers were assigned to the SS training depot at Sennheim in Alsace. There, in numbers up to four thousand, they received their basic political training and some military drill without arms. Training with arms followed at Klagenfurt and Graz. Those who held commissions before were sent to the Junkerschule at Tölfz. Others may have been sent there after they had distinguished themselves in the field. Their training was similar to that which is given the Volksdeutsche. However, there was no Germanization of alien students. Regional origins were honored, but the German language was taught, especially the language of military command, because orders were given in German in all Waffen-SS units.

(b) Norway. Recruitment in Norway offered a clear example of the development of stages in Waffen-SS policy. In the period 1940-41, only young men between the ages of seventeen and twenty-three were allowed to apply for admission into the Regiment Nordland. They were required to be unmarried, of good physique, and "Nordic." In 1941 the upper age limit was lifted to forty. Finally, volunteers for the SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment Norge could be married or single, seventeen to forty-five years old, and 5'9" in height. This regiment was later incorporated into the SS Panzer Grenadier Division "Viking." Candidates who applied for Waffen-SS guard duties within Norway were assured that their appointment carried with it no political ties. Although these guard units were subjected to ideological training, National Socialists reportedly composed much less than 50 percent of the membership.

(c) Denmark. Danish volunteers were invited to join the Viking and Nordland units of the Waffen-SS. The Danish "Free Corps" was founded in 1941 by a Danish army.
officer and served until 1943 as part of the 1st SS Infantry Brigade. Recruiting for this Free Corps was supervised by the SS. The corps was withdrawn from the Eastern Front for reorganization of a Panzergrenadier Regiment, Denmark that was later incorporated into the Panzergrenadier Division Nordland. The return of trained SS men for use within Denmark followed the same pattern as in Norway, although no Danish Allgemeine SS organization existed as such.

(d) The Netherlands. "To defend the Netherlands against domestic and foreign elements," the Landwacht was organized under the supervision of the German Waffen-SS in May 1943. However, the suppression of disturbances was first left to German SS units. Later, in 1943, the Landwacht was changed into a fully militarized Landstorm, and a new Landwacht organized for police duties. In 1944, the Landstorm Nederland, combat unit, was enlarged from a Grenadier Regiment into a brigade.

(e) Belgium. In 1940 Flemish volunteers entered the SS Regiment Westland. Later, this unit became part of the Viking Division. In 1944, a special Flemish division, the SS Grenadier Division Flanders, was formed out of the SS Sturmbrigade Lommelmark and other quisling Flemings.

Recruitment among Walloons began in the summer of 1942. A sufficient number enlisted to justify the formation of a separate Walloon brigade, which was expanded into a Grenadier Division in 1944.

(f) France. Although French volunteer "legions" were active on the Eastern Front as part of the Wachhund as early as 1941, the formation of a Waffen-SS regiment composed of Frenchmen was not undertaken until the middle of 1943. Sanctioned by the Vichy law of 22 July 1943, the French Waffen-SS was utilized in the Russian theater of operations, and in France for the guarding of military
installations. Late in 1944, French quislings of the former French Air assault brigade and of the Darnand Franc-Garde were merged into the SS Brigade Charlemagne.

(g) Baltic States. Recruitment of personnel in the Baltic states was carried out on a mass basis. The first non-Germanic unit to be taken into the Waffen-SS was the Estonian Legion, which was inducted in the fall of 1942. As the manpower requirements of the German Army increased, government pressure was used to force members of civil defense corps and ex-soldiers into the Waffen-SS. The head of the Estonian civil administration ordered that all officers and non-commissioned officers join the Legion (later called SS Volunteer Division) in conformity with their oath to defend the country.

The development in Latvia followed the typical pattern: first, several regiments were formed; these were expanded into brigades, and finally, in 1944, into two SS Grenadier divisions. Resistance to the Waffen-SS was strongest in Lithuania, where a "volunteer" division was not recruited until 1944.

(h) Southeastern Europe. Hungary formed two Waffen-SS divisions; the German-occupied remainder of Italy formed an Italian Legion; the Polish Ukrainians, a Waffen-SS Schutzstaffel Galizien with German and Austrian commissioned and non-commissioned officers.

The SS Division Bosnia included one regiment of Roman Catholic Croats and one regiment of Mohammedans. The latter, first used in combating Serbian guerrillas, was an example of the completely opportunistic methods of the SS. This Mohammedan unit as well as the Muslim Division Skanderbeg, composed largely of Albanians, had no ideological foundations. Similarly, the Waffen-SS comprised Caucasian, Arab, and Indian units.