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Address by W. Anthony Lake
National Security Advisor

The Council on Foreign Relations
September 12, 1994

"THE STRUCTURES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY"

I. Introduction: The Need for Engagement

Ladies and Gentlemen, I'm delighted to be here. And Mort, thank you for that generous introduction. It's always a pleasure to hear words of praise from the Fourth Estate. I still vividly remember the last time that happened to me, during the Carter Administration.

Not so long ago, I was listening with one ear to National Public Radio. The correspondent was talking about a "council", which he described as "a stodgy group of foreign policy wonks." I assumed he was referring to the National Security Council. Turns out he was talking about the Council on Foreign Relations. That's what happens when you've been around longer than the Rolling Stones.

In fact, the Council has been influencing policy since 1921, from Coolidge to Clinton. Based on the conversations I've had with many of you in this room, and recent articles in Foreign Affairs, the word "stodgy" is not what comes to mind when I think about this institution. Let me suggest a few more accurate adjectives: Dynamic. Thoughtful. Provocative. As we enter a radically new foreign policy environment, these are much needed qualities.

Entering any new world is disorienting. It forces us to leave behind a trusted frame of reference, and graph new maps by which to move forward. All of us here tonight would agree that we're now at a break point similar to the ones we confronted after the two World Wars. Sometimes it seems that we agree on little else. But then, charting a new course has never been simple. While the policy of containment may look
obvious to us in retrospect, we should remember that it took the likes of Harry Truman and Dean Acheson a good five years to find their way and build a policy consensus. And they had the advantage of an ideologically and geographically defined adversary with whom to contend.

The dangers we face today are less immediately threatening. But understanding their nature and agreeing upon the proper response is more complicated than ever.

It's a jumble out there. "Traditional" aggression by malicious nation states mixes with emerging transnational threats like environmental decay, over-population and famine. Information, ideas, money and people zig zag around the world in blissful disregard of national borders. This new global free-for-all means increased wealth and opportunity, but it also produces fear and uncertainty. And we are witness to a terrible fragmentation. In places like Bosnia and Nagorno Karabakh, ethnic passions and national aspirations once held in check by communism or by the Cold War stand-off now run amok.

In setting our nation's foreign policy, the Clinton Administration has one core working assumption: The United States cannot sit idly on the sidelines, hoping to remain unscathed, while conflicts elsewhere proliferate or intensify. We are engaged beyond our borders -- economically, politically, militarily -- whether we like it or not. Isolationism is simply not an option, because the problems of the world will find us, no matter how hard we might try to avoid them.

Besides, as the sole remaining superpower -- and as Americans -- we have an obligation, born of both interest and idealism, to do what is within our means to deter aggression, defuse altercations, defend the victims of violence, and devise solutions to common concerns.

Parrying threats is not enough. American foreign policy must also seize opportunities to increase our wealth and enhance our security. After World War II, a remarkable generation of Americans helped create the institutions -- like NATO, the Marshall Plan, GATT, the IMF and the World Bank -- that guaranteed for us and our
allies half a century of peace and prosperity. Matching those achievements for the next fifty years and beyond demands our involvement, and our leadership.

In short, if we are to ward off threats to our interests, if we are to continue to prosper, if we are to remain secure, the issue is not whether to engage, but rather how to engage. As citizens deeply involved in the formulation of American foreign policy, our opportunity and our obligation is to lead a national debate on that question -- a debate that so far has been lacking -- and, over time, set a steady new course for the nation.

Let me join the debate by sketching for you how the Clinton Administration has shaped American engagement in the world. First and foremost, we have sought to build new structures that will guarantee the safety and freedom of our people and promote our economic vitality. You might call these forward looking initiatives our "big picture" foreign policy. I hope you will like what you see.

Of course, policy makers are partial to big pictures. It takes the focus away from day-to-day details that may blot the work in progress. To me, the crisis, or crises, of the moment cannot be painted over. Bosnia and Haiti, for example, are not simply transitory, if tragic, dilemmas. Rather, they are part of something bigger and more menacing that threatens to undermine the foreign policy structures we are working so hard to build. That's why any productive debate on how we engage must grapple with our short term responses to crises like Bosnia and Haiti. And that's why the structures I'll describe are being designed both to withstand challenges to their integrity, and to make it less likely, in the long term, that such challenges will arise in the first place.

In a letter to Eleanor Roosevelt in 1945, President Truman noted the pressure he felt to devise a new, post-War foreign policy and concluded: [Patience is the best virtue. TK. TK exact quote]. This remains good advice. The structures we are creating or revitalizing today will determine, as President Clinton has said, "what we want the world to look like 20 years from now." As we strive to resolve the problems of the present, we must not be distracted from our engagement to build for the future.
II. Building Foreign Policy Structures

Before starting a project, any good architect sits down with the client and asks a few basic questions: what's the building for; what are your needs; how much time do you spend in each room; what direction do the high winds and storm fronts come from? As the newly designated architects for foreign policy, such are the questions we asked ourselves eighteen months ago.

The theoretical answers were not hard to come by. The structures to be built should enhance our security and promote our prosperity. Further, they should do the same for those who would build them with us, and they should be open to all those who would be willing to live by the rules of the house. Finally, they should be designed with the flexibility to withstand shifting threats to their stability, much like skyscrapers in Los Angeles or Mexico City are built with enough give to weather an earthquake.

[The Clinton Administration has made a good start at moving from the drawing board to the construction site.] As I hope to show, by creating new security arrangements, or revitalizing old ones, and by devising pro-trade economic institutions, or modernizing existing ones, we are building sturdy foreign policy structures for the future.

Security

The end of the Cold War has not changed human nature. So this administration's first responsibility remains the physical security of our country and our people. But the varied and evolving nature of the threats to our well-being compel us to revisit the institutions designed to protect us. Let me address two areas of primary concern: Europe and Asia.

In Europe, we are deeply engaged in transforming existing structures to fulfill President Clinton's vision for an integrated continent. NATO must remain the foundation of security and stability for the trans-Atlantic community. Only NATO has the military forces, the multilateral staff, and the habits of political and military cooperation to enable us to respond flexibly and forcefully to the post-Cold War threats.
But NATO was conceived to conduct large, multi-division operations in defense of Alliance territory. While this traditional mission remains paramount, NATO increasingly is being called upon to undertake new tasks, to operate "out of area", and to do so in cooperation with non-NATO partners. If Europeans and Americans are to stake their future security on NATO, it must adapt to changing times so as to keep the peace -- and, if necessary, make the peace.

That's why President Clinton has taken the lead in outlining a new strategy and new missions for NATO, which the alliance endorsed at last January's Summit.

First, NATO agreed to establish Combined Joint Task Forces. The CJTFs will be our principle tool for peacekeeping and crisis management, charged with planning, training and exercising for these non-traditional missions. Focused preparations should produce more timely, effective responses to crises and unprecedented flexibility for military operations. For example, non-Alliance states might be asked to train and operate with NATO members, and European Alliance members will be able to call upon a Task Force to conduct operations involving neither U.S. interests nor U.S. forces.

Second, NATO created the "Partnership for Peace" so as to begin the practical process of expanding security in Europe eastward. The Partnership lies at the heart of our answer to an extraordinary strategic challenge: the need to show the central and eastern Europeans that their future is with the West, and not trapped in some gray zone between two adversarial blocs.

Both by what it stands for, and what it does, the Partnership is a powerful vehicle for European integration. President Clinton has made clear to the CEE countries that the relevant questions for NATO expansion are not "whether" and "if" but rather "when" and "how." And the President has held out membership in the Partnership as the way to answer those questions. The new European democracies know that the Partnership for Peace is the lighthouse at the entrance to NATO's harbor. Through very real, very practical military and defense cooperation with NATO and with each other, many partner
nations soon will develop the capacity to assume the responsibilities of full NATO membership.

At the same time, by reaching out and making Russia a part of the process, the Partnership gives a boost to reformers in that country. And it commits Russia to promote transparency in defense planning and budgeting and to maintain democratic control of its defense forces. All of these are key Western security objectives. Should reform experience a reversal of fortune in Russia, NATO can re-evaluate its needs and those of the Central and Eastern Europeans, who, in any event, will have enhanced their military readiness through Partnership activities. While keeping us prepared -- just in case -- for the worst, the Partnership allows us to work toward the best possible outcome for Europe -- an undivided community of democratic and stable nations.

In Asia, this Administration also seeks to create integrated security structures, but with different building blocks.

Like Europe, Asia represents a tremendous investment of our blood and toil -- we fought three wars there in this century. Unlike Europe, Asia has no single security institution to revitalize. So our task has been to develop a series of arrangements that will function, as President Clinton has put it, "like overlapping plates of armor, individually providing protection and together covering the whole body of our common security concerns."

These plates may include bilateral arrangements, such as our treaty commitments to Japan, Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand. We know that our forces play a vital stabilizing role in the region. That is why President Clinton decided to freeze U.S. troop levels in Asia, and not reduce them as we are doing elsewhere.

Or the plates might consist of multilateral efforts, such as our partnership with South Korea, Japan and others to excise the North Korean nuclear threat and defuse tension on the Korean Peninsula.
And, finally, the plates may involve increased regional-security dialogs. Last year, for the first time ever, the ASEAN countries -- including the United States, Russia, and Vietnam -- gathered around a table to discuss security issues. These types of dialogs can help prevent the outbreak of dangerous rivalries and promote regional integration.

Prosperity

From the outset of this Administration, President Clinton recognized that a strong foreign policy must begin with a sound economic foundation. But he also knows that prosperity at home requires that we maintain focus abroad. Put another way, the line between our foreign and domestic economic policies has increasingly blurred -- where it has not disappeared. Now, more than ever before, our economic well-being is tied to that of other nations.

In the new global economy, governments no longer exert the control they once did over their nations' commerce. While the possibilities for growth and creativity are endless, the loss of sovereignty can breed confusion; especially among people left behind. Those opposed to our engagement in the world, be it military or economic, feed on people's fears and uncertainties to promote their misguided cause. In such an environment, protectionism takes on a facile allure.

There is a powerful lesson here for those of us concerned with sustaining our country's prosperity in the decades to come. That is the need to design structures with the every day, real interests of Americans in mind, rooted in their lives, and able to produce tangible benefits.

After a lot of heavy lifting, we successfully completed the GATT Uruguay Round, begun eight years ago. By lowering barriers to trade and bringing more nations into an open trading system, this accord promises to lift substantially American wages and living standards, and to do the same for other nations around the world. GATT's successor, the World Trade Organization, will help us resolve trade disputes more efficiently, and ensure that our workers and businesses compete on an even international playing field.
Neither GATT nor the WTO diminish the need to enforce national fair trade legislation, or the importance of bilateral and regional compact. For example, last year we sent $120 billion in goods and services to Asia, which translates into almost 2.5 million American jobs. That's just a snapshot. If you could project that image into the future, it would show that Asia, above any other region, is where we must find our growth in the years ahead.

With that fact in mind, President Clinton hosted the first ever gathering of the Organization for Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders in Seattle last November. The 15 members of APEC account for nearly half of the world's output and most of the fastest-growing economies. By setting pro-growth policies, toppling trade barriers, and cutting regulatory red tape within the Asian-Pacific, we can take tangible steps to improve our peoples' lives. Our engagement with APEC is clear evidence of President Clinton's vision for an integrated Asian-Pacific community, a community of shared prosperity, shared growth, and shared strength.

Still closer to home, President Clinton went to the mat to secure passage for NAFTA. For all it promises to achieve in its own right, NAFTA is just the starting point for hemispheric integration that we will pursue at the Summit of the Americas, convened by the President in Miami next December. [There, our region's democracies will gather to discuss job creation through trade and sustainable development. And they will celebrate and look to accelerate progress toward democratic reform in the region.]

It's a remarkable fact that of the 36 countries in the Americas, only two -- Haiti and Cuba -- do not have freely elected leaders at their helm. This rising tide of democracy -- not just in the Americas, but around the world -- is a powerful force that can wash over contrary trends like fragmentation and closed trading systems.

Our own experience tells us that democracy is the most enlightened form of governance yet devised. As Americans, we have long enjoyed the freedom and prosperity that democracy helps secure. We want others to share in its benefits. And we know that
if they do, it will be to our advantage, too, because democracies make for reliable trading partners and they are not likely to wage war on one another. We are not starry-eyed about democracy -- it will not take hold everywhere. But we will do all that we can to expand the community of free and open societies.

Democracy is at once the foundation and the end product of our foreign policy. It is the foundation, because the culture and language of democracy are what make the structures we're building vital. As my predecessor Zbig Brzezinski has put it, "If one builds only with bricks and mortar we will find that something profound is missing, and the structure may not prove enduring, because societies as viable entities exist on the basis of conviction, of commitment, of certain shared values that give societies cohesion." Foremost among those shared values, whether in NATO or APEC or NAFTA, is democracy.

Democracy also is the final product of our foreign policy. As the structures we build make us more secure and more prosperous, they set a bedrock within which to better root emerging democracies, and upon which to construct new ones. In short, democracy both infuses the new structures of foreign policy, and gains strength from their solidity.

III. Contending with Structural Threats

I suggested earlier that one essential question an architect asks her client before inking a design is "what direction do the high winds and storm fronts come from?" As we strive to raise new foreign policy institutions, we need to be concerned not so much with winds and storms, but with more fundamental threats to the structural integrity of our efforts. You might call these threats tremors within states and quakes across borders.

Tremors Within States

Bosnia, Haiti. Crises in these tragic lands, and elsewhere, dominate the news. This should not surprise us. It is, after all, inherently more dramatic to watch a wrecking ball knock down a house that it is to witness the tedious, slow rise of a new building.
In saying this, my aim is not simply to lament our tendency to fixate on the crisis du jour at the expense of longer term policy efforts -- although a little lamenting on this score does the soul of a policy maker good from time to time. The fact is, these crises matter a great deal, on two distinct levels.

First, people are suffering and dying. To look the other way would be to abandon our compassion.

At the same time, such crises are evidence of a dangerous phenomenon that transcends their particulars. In a more complex, interdependent world, it is increasingly difficult for governments to govern, Interest groups clamor to be heard. Ethnic minorities vie for attention. Even within stable democracies, political margins have become razor thin. All too easily -- particularly in wobbly or dysfunctional systems -- this maelstrom of competing needs and demands can spiral out of control.

The resulting chaos and humanitarian disasters sorely test existing institutions, and threaten to undermine support for the new structures we're constructing. Tremendous pressure builds on us to intervene, even when our core interests are not a stake. This contradiction breeds confusion, and even a perverse nostalgia for the more predictable days of the Cold War.

Much as we might like it, there is no bright line test for intervention. While our finite means do not allow us to take responsibility for every crisis, our interests dictate that we assume the burden of some. The trick is to make distinctions, to get away from sterile all-or-nothing debates.

As we weigh our response to a given crisis, we must ask ourselves some hard questions. What interests are at stake? What are our objectives? Is there a viable exit strategy? What are the costs involved? Answers to these queries will dictate the sum and substance of our response. If our core interests are at stake, we must be prepared to act, and to do so alone, if necessary. Where we share an interest with other countries, or with the international community writ large, intervention may come through the United
Nations, with regional security institutions like NATO, or in partnership with concerned allies.

Ultimately, the only test for intervention is pragmatism, a pragmatism that marries interest and idealism. Compassion should animate, but not dictate, our policies. If we intervene and fail, we're not doing good, no matter how principled our motives or how right the cause. But when our interests demand it, we cannot back down from the good fight. Our challenge is to be both pure of heart and focused of mind.

With this thought in mind, let me briefly touch upon Bosnia and Haiti.

This Administration believes that while the tragedy in Bosnia does not pose an immediate threat to our security, important U.S. interests are nonetheless at stake. Our response has been strong but measured. We have pressed the U.N. Security Council to maintain one of the most thorough sanctions regimes in history. We brokered a Federation agreement between two of the three parties to the conflict -- the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Croat minority. We established a Contact Group to negotiate a territorial settlement. We helped organize and fund a war crimes tribunal. We have provided more humanitarian assistance to the region than any other country. And if the Bosnian Serbs refuse to accept the settlement offer now on the table, we will lift the arms embargo -- which unfairly handicaps the Muslims -- even if that means acting unilaterally.

The restoration of democracy in Haiti is a clear and compelling U.S. interest. To allow General Cedras and his cohorts to flout the will of the Haitian people would undermine the remarkable democratic advances made throughout the Americas. The devastating humanitarian consequences of Haiti's military rule also demand our attention. The Cedras regime has engaged in widespread human rights abuses, killing and maiming its own people -- women and children, even priests. And it has led Haiti to the brink of economic ruin, both by its failed policies and by a pattern of conduct that has made necessary the imposition of tough economic sanctions. Finally, our interest in restoring
democracy is magnified by the refugee crisis provoked by the deteriorating human rights and economic situations.

Last year, working with the U.N. and the Organization of American States, we negotiated a solution to the Haitian crisis, but the military coup leaders failed to cede power, as they had agreed. Since then, U.S. leadership has produced two important U.N. Security Council Resolutions, one barring all trade with Haiti except for humanitarian supplies, the other authorizing member states to form an international military corps to restore democracy by force if necessary. Make no mistake: the military thugs responsible for usurping Haiti's democracy will go.

It hardly bears noting that our policies in both Bosnia and Haiti have had their share of critics. Moving from the theoretical to the practical is fraught with difficulty, all the more so in a period of change when we haven't finished defining all the questions, never mind finding the right answers. For any given crisis, people of good will genuinely will disagree. Constructive criticism is essential. It produces better policy. Reflexive or partisan diatribes which fail to offer real alternatives do not. Those of us who make, report on or criticize policy would do well to bear those facts in mind. We owe that much to the American people.

Quakes Across Borders

In a recent talk, the historian Paul Kennedy neatly encapsulated how the world has changed in a few short years. "The navies of Spain, France and Italy, which in the good old days of the Cold War had the task of detecting Soviet submarines coming through the Mediterranean, are now on day and night patrol attempting, if you like, to erect a maritime cordon sanitaire against the large numbers of people who would like to move into Europe." Mass migrations and refugees. The population explosion. An endangered environment. A nefarious nexus of crime, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. These are the so-called transnational threats that our institutions must be built to
withstand, and ultimately to vanquish. I'd like to touch briefly on two of them: refugees and the crime, terrorism and nuclear weapons troika.

There are an estimated 19 million refugees worldwide, fleeing war, repression, poverty and famine. We cannot ignore their plight. At the same time, refugee assistance is expensive. Prosperous countries can only absorb so many newcomers before an intolerable strain overextends social services. In times of economic distress, illegal aliens and legal immigrants alike become grist for the extremist mill -- witness the dangerous appeals to racism and xenophobia of a Le Pen in France or the Skinheads in Germany.

Humanitarian assistance, and intervention, aim in part to avert refugee catastrophes. But while we must remain willing to say yes to calls for help, we must also be prepared to say no. This means getting over the reflex to take responsibility for a crisis whenever and wherever it arises. Often, the best we will be able to do is help provide a breathing space for others to sort out their own problems. In so doing, we fulfill our duty to meet the crisis of the moment. But as Secretary of State Christopher has said, "The challenge of diplomacy is to anticipate, and to prevent, the crises of the future." And that is precisely the function of many of the structures we are building, like the Combined Joint Task Forces.

The growing nexus between organized crime, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction has horrific potential. Four times in the last month, police seized weapons-quality plutonium smuggled into Germany from Russia. We should be thankful that superior police work and cooperation among various intelligence services -- including our own -- intercepted this deadly cargo. But we also should be concerned. Imagine, for example, what would have happened if the World Trade Center terrorists had detonated a nuclear, not a conventional device.

This nexus demands a coordinated, international response. Mere vigilance will not suffice. The amount of plutonium needed to make a bomb is no bigger than a can of Coke. Intensified cooperation among various criminal justice systems is one of the most
potent weapons in our arsenal. Over the past few years, we have greatly enhanced our
intelligence sharing with allies, increased regular consultations, and engaged in joint anti-
terrorist training. Most recently, in July, FBI director Louis Freeh visited several Eastern
European countries and Russia, where he stressed the risks of nuclear proliferation
through the efforts of organized crime. Ultimately, this informal network of concerned
nations will likely evolve into a new structure to counter what must rank as one of the
greatest long term threats to our security.

IV. Conclusion: Building for the Future

Choice, not chance, determines destiny. The Clinton Administration has chosen
Rather than throw up our hands in despair at the complexities of the post-Cold War era,
we have thrown ourselves with determination into the task of creating new institutions for
a rapidly changing world. We have chosen to engage, not retreat.

I believe that the security and economic structures we are building will enable us to
better manage threats to our well-being. And they promise to prevent many of the crises
that now challenge us from arising in the first place. A more secure and prosperous world
will help defuse ethnic violence, and avert refugee crises. A more secure and prosperous
world will be better placed to show vigilance in the fight against terrorism and organized
crime, and to refrain from selling weapons and nuclear technology to pariah states. A
more secure and prosperous world will be less likely to fall prey to the rhetoric of hate
mongers and demagogues. And a more secure and prosperous world will enhance the
strength and promote the spread of democracy.

As we go about the task of creating new structures, we build on a foundation of
timeless truths. First and foremost, power still matters. Street toughs continue to disrupt
peaceful neighborhoods. The United States must be -- and is -- prepared to defend our
interests wherever they are threatened, by any means necessary. This requires maintaining
and modernizing the finest military in the world so we can deter aggression -- and counter
it when the need arises. Second, principles still matter. We know from our own bitter

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experience that power unhinged from principle will leave us rudderless and adrift. The American people will not -- and should not -- support policies divorced from our values.

Americans are animated by a "can-do" attitude. When we see a problem, we want to fix it. This is a laudable quality, but one that needs to be held in check when it comes to foreign policy. You don't "fix" two hundred years of ethnic tension, or five centuries of national rivalry. You make them better or worse. You don't "fix" a hot war or a refugee crisis. You make them better or worse. Through painstaking diplomacy in places like the Middle East and Northern Ireland, the United States has helped to make things better, to turn tragedy into hope. Through our on-going efforts in the former Soviet Union, we have made things better by helping to win agreements to withdraw all Russian troops from the Baltics, rid the Ukraine of nuclear weapons, and, eventually, close the Chernobyl nuclear facility. Over time, by building new foreign policy structures, we can make the world a safer, more prosperous place.

Foreign policy, in short, is not for those seeking instant gratification. It is for those who are engaged in the problems of our world, who are prepared to slog along, day in and day out, and work pragmatically toward solutions, and who aren't afraid to make mistakes. As President Roosevelt once said, it's better to err occasionally in the cause of activism than to be frozen in the ice of indifference.

[This Administration may have made a few mistakes, but we cannot be accused of indifference.] We know that Americans must do even more than remain engaged in the world beyond our borders. We must lead. And we are. In NATO and APEC, with NAFTA and the NPT, through bilateral cooperation and unilateral initiative, the United States is showing the way in an era of change and uncertainty. We don't pretend to have all the answers. No one does. And we need help from this important group, and the individuals who animate it. But the Clinton Administration is moving forward, building structures for the future. In so doing, we rely on decidedly American attributes: optimism and a pioneering spirit that rises to new challenges.
Address by W. Anthony Lake  
National Security Advisor  
The Council on Foreign Relations  
September 12, 1994  

Ladies and Gentlemen, it's a pleasure to be here. And Les, thank you for that generous introduction. I must tell you that I admire your career choices. At the Times you wrote about foreign policy. This allowed you the satisfaction of pummeling misguided policy makers, but maybe left you feeling a little frustrated that you were not one of them. At the State Department, you knew the pleasures of actually making policy. But this subjected you to the barbs of your former friends in the media. Now, as President of this august Council, you are ideally positioned to influence policy, surely the best of both worlds.

Not so long ago, I was listening with one ear to National Public Radio, which is the Beltway crowd's favorite cultural pastime after watching John Sununu on Crossfire. The correspondent was talking about a "council", which he described as "a stodgy group of foreign policy wonks." I assumed he was referring to the National Security Council. Turns out he was talking about the Council on Foreign Relations. That's what happens when you've been around longer than the Rolling Stones.

In fact, the Council has been influencing policy since 1921, from Coolidge to Clinton. And Foreign Affairs has served as the forum of choice for our most important foreign policy debates for nearly as-long. Based on the conversations I've had with many of you in this room, and recent articles in Foreign Affairs, the word "stodgy" is not what comes to mind when I think about this remarkable institution. I'd suggest "dynamic." "Vibrant." And, after all these years, most certainly "enduring."
Like the Council, certain foreign policy rules are eternal. First and foremost, power still matters. Rough neighborhoods and street toughs continue to spill over into more peaceful environs. The United States must be -- and is -- prepared to defend our interests wherever they are threatened, by any means necessary. This requires maintaining and modernizing the finest military in the world so as to deter aggression, and to counter aggression when the need arises. Second, principles still matter. We know from our own bitter experience that power unhinged from principle will leave us rudderless and adrift. The American people will not -- and should not -- support policies divorced from democratic values.

That said, the advent of global communications and the end of the Cold War compel us to apply those timeless rules to a new game. When I had the honor to speak to the Council late last year, I noted that two compelling and contradictory forces now shape the world in which we live. On the one hand, there is a pronounced tendency toward integration. Information, ideas, money and people zig zag across the globe in blissful disregard of national borders. This resulting growth in wealth and opportunity is tempered by our need to address the fears of those concerned for their livelihoods in the new global free-for-all. It also produces uncertainty among those we've elected to serve.

On the other hand, we see a frightening fragmentation. In places like Bosnia and Nagorno Karabakh, ethnic passions and national aspirations once held in check by communism or by the Cold War stand-off now run amok. The United States cannot sit idly on the sidelines, hoping to remain unscathed, while these conflicts rage. As the world's sole superpower, we have an obligation, born of both interest and duty, to do what is within our means to defuse dangerous altercations and defend the victims of aggression.

In this new world, old debates have become sterile. For example, zero-sum games that would pit "multilateralists" against "unilateralists", or "interventionists" against "isolationists" are meaningless. More than ever, we must retain the flexibility to act
unilaterally, or bilaterally, or multilaterally as the case demands. As to isolationism, it is simply no longer an option. We are engaged in the world -- economically, politically, militarily -- whether we like it or not. True, we might succumb to the temptation to look inward, intentionally blinding ourselves to the real world beyond our borders. Such a shift would be indescribably dangerous. It would rob us of the ability to fashion proactive policies and manage problems that will find us, no matter how hard we might try to avoid them.

Entering a new world is disorienting. It forces us to leave behind a trusted frame of reference, and grasp new maps by which to move forward. Twice before in this century, we made radical breaks with the past. After World War I, we chose withdrawal, leaving a vacuum that was filled by the forces of hatred and tyranny. After World War II, a dynamic generation of leaders and wise men chose engagement, creating the institutions that guaranteed half a century of peace and prosperity.

We stand at a similar break point today. Charting a new course is no simple matter. While the policies of engagement and containment may look obvious to us in retrospect, we should remember that it took the likes of Harry Truman, Dean Acheson and post-war CFR leaders like Allen Dulles and John McCloy a good five years to see their way and build a policy consensus. And they had the advantage of an ideologically and geographically defined adversary against whom to rally. The threats we face today are just as dangerous, but much more diffuse -- ethnic strife, environmental decay, overpopulation, refugee crises, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. As citizens deeply involved in the formulation of our foreign policy, we in this room have a special obligation -- and an opportunity -- to creatively and responsibly lead the debate and set a new course.

I'd like to tell you how the Clinton Administration sees this emerging world, describe the structures we're building to ensure another half century of peace and prosperity, and identify the threats to those structures that we must counter. I hope you
will end up with a big picture of our policy, and that you will like what you see. Of course, policy makers are partial to big pictures. It takes the focus away from day-to-day details that may blot the work in progress. To me, the crisis, or crises, of the moment cannot be painted over. Bosnia and Haiti, for example, are not simply transitory, if tragic, dilemmas. Rather, they are part of something bigger and more menacing that I will address in a few moments. Let me begin, though, by discussing the structures we are trying to build with our foreign policy.

I. BUILDING FOREIGN POLICY STRUCTURES

Before starting a project, any architect worth her salt sits down with the client and asks a few basic questions: what's the building for; what are your needs; how much time do you spend in each room; what direction do the high winds and storm fronts come from? As the newly designated architects for foreign policy, such are the questions we asked ourselves eighteen months ago.

The theoretical answers were not hard to come by. The structures to be built should enhance our security and promote our prosperity. Further, they should do the same for those who would build them with us, and they should be open to all those who would be willing to live by the rules of the house. Finally, they should be designed to withstand potential threats to their stability, much like skyscrapers in Mexico City are built with enough give to weather an earthquake.

The Clinton Administration has made a good start at moving from the drawing board to the construction site. As I hope to show, by creating new security arrangements, or revitalizing old ones, and by devising pro-trade economic institutions, or modernizing existing ones, we are laying solid foreign policy foundations for the future.
Security

The end of the Cold War has not transformed human nature. So this administration's first responsibility remains the physical security of our country and our people. But the changing nature of the threats to our well-being compel us to revisit the institutions designed to protect us.

In Europe, we are deeply engaged in transforming existing structures to meet new challenges. President Clinton has laid out our vision for an integrated continent. At the same time, we see in ethnic and regional conflict evidence of centrifugal forces that seem to overwhelm the trend toward integration. If Europeans are to stake their future security on a united, democratic alliance of nations, our institutions must adapt to changing times so as to keep the peace—and, if necessary, make the peace.

This Administration believes that NATO must remain the foundation of security and stability in Europe. Only NATO has the military forces, the multilateral staff, and the habits of political and military cooperation to enable us to respond flexibly and forcefully to the post-Cold War threats. But NATO was conceived to conduct large, multi-division operations in defense of Alliance territory. While this traditional mission remains paramount, NATO increasingly is being called upon to undertake new tasks, to operate "out of area," and to do so in cooperation with non-NATO partners. That's why President Clinton has taken the lead in outlining a new strategy and new missions for NATO.

At the NATO Summit last January, the alliance endorsed two key U.S. initiatives to bolster our common security.

First, we agreed to establish Combined Joint Task Forces. The CJTFs will be our principle tool for peacekeeping and crisis management, charged with planning, training and exercising for these non-traditional missions. Such focused peacetime preparations should produce more timely, effective responses to a crisis. And they will provide unprecedented flexibility for military operations. For example, non-Alliance states might be asked to train and operate with NATO members, and European Alliance members will
be able to call upon a Task Force to conduct operations involving neither U.S. interests nor U.S. forces.

Second, we created the "Partnership for Peace" so as to begin the practical process of expanding security in Europe to the central and eastern reaches of the continent.

Let me say a few words about the "Partnership for Peace." H.L. Mencken once noted that "for every complex problem, there is a solution which is neat, plausible, and wrong." Determined to extend the West's security apparatus eastward, this Administration easily could have settled on a tempting, but wrong, solution: invite the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, but not Russia, to join NATO now. President Clinton recognized that it will take several years before the Central and Eastern Europeans are ready for NATO. He also understood that to admit them now would only give fodder to extreme nationalists in Russia. So, rather than draw a new line through Europe, the Administration convinced NATO to make expansion an evolutionary process open to all through the Partnership for Peace.

By engaging in very real, very practical military and defense cooperation with NATO and with each other, many partner nations soon will develop the capacity to assume the responsibilities of full NATO membership. Indeed, twenty-one states, including Russia, have signed up for the Partnership to date. They are busy drafting work plans and preparing for exercises this year.

At the same time, by reaching out and making Russia a part of the process, the Partnership gives a boost to reformers in that country. And it commits Russia to promote transparency in defense planning and budgeting and to maintain democratic control of its defense forces. All of these are key Western security objectives. Should reform experience a reversal of fortune in Russia, NATO can re-evaluate its needs and those of the Central and Eastern Europeans, who, in any event, will have enhanced their military readiness through Partnership activities. While keeping us prepared -- just in case -- for
the worst, the Partnership allows us to work toward the best possible outcome for Europe -- an undivided community of democratic and stable nations.

In Asia, this Administration is pursuing similar goals of security integration with different means. Like Europe, Asia represents a tremendous investment of our blood and toil -- we fought three wars there in this century. Today, our forces play a vital stabilizing role in the region. That is why President Clinton decided to freeze our troop levels in Asia, and not reduce them as we are doing elsewhere.

Unlike Europe, Asia has no single security institution to revitalize. So our task has been to develop a series of arrangements that will function, as President Clinton has put it, "like overlapping plates of armor, individually providing protection and together covering the whole body of our common security concerns." These plates include:

For example, working with South Korea, Japan and others, we have sought to excise the North Korean nuclear threat. This is delicate surgery, best done with a scalpel, not a meat cleaver. Our careful efforts produced an agreement in August whereby North Korea renounced its nuclear weapons ambitions and agreed to return to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT. As a result, we now have the best opportunity in 45 years to end our confrontation with Pyongyang and make the Korean Peninsula and Asia, more secure.

The United States also strongly supports increased regional security dialogs. Last year, for the first time ever, the ASEAN countries -- including the United States, Russia, and Vietnam -- gathered around the same table to discuss security issues. These types of dialogs, in parallel with our bilateral treaty commitments to Japan, Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand, can help prevent the outbreak of regional rivalries. They are the foundation upon which we build security in the Asian Pacific.
Prosperity

President Clinton took office with one fundamental priority: to get our economic house in order. The President recognizes that a strong foreign policy begins with a sound economic foundation. But he also knows that prosperity at home requires that we maintain our focus abroad. Now, more than ever before, our economic well-being is tied to that of other nations. A generation ago, imports and exports accounted for about $1 in every $10. Today, they represent $1 in every $5. And over 7 million jobs in America are export dependent.

Put another way, the line between our foreign and domestic economic policies has increasingly blurred -- where it has not disappeared. In the new global economy, governments no longer exert the control they once did over their nations' commerce. Capital zips across the globe in minutes, twenty-four hours a day. Companies set up corporate headquarters in one country, manufacture product in another, and import parts from a third. The very notion of the office is becoming obsolete as high speed travel, cellular phones, notebook computers and fax modems unchain us from our desks.

In this frenetic, exciting world, the possibilities for growth and creativity are endless -- for those willing and able to compete. But there is a downside to the ledger. The loss of sovereignty in the global economy can breed confusion, especially among those left behind. People everywhere become acutely aware of the shortcomings of governments. And those opposed to our engagement in the world, be it military or economic, feed on people's fears and uncertainties to promote their misguided cause. In such an environment, protectionism takes on a facile allure.

There is a powerful lesson here for those of us concerned with sustaining our country's prosperity in the decades to come. That is the need to design structures with the every day, real interests of Americans in mind, rooted in their lives, and able to produce tangible benefits. By that scorecard, the Clinton Administration deserves high marks for its accomplishments.
After a lot of heavy lifting, we successfully completed the GATT Uruguay Round. By lowering barriers to trade and bringing more nations into an open trading system, this accord promises to lift American wages and living standards substantially, and to do the same for other nations around the world.

A laundry list of the areas in which we reached agreement under GATT is impressive: industrial markets; services; textiles and clothing; intellectual property; and, of course, agriculture. Now, we turn our attention to some unresolved problems, such as audiovisual; steel; and aircraft subsidies. And we will need to address so-called next generation issues, like trade and the environment and trade and labor standards. If we can continue to build on our GATT success to ensure an open trading system, we will go a long way toward guaranteeing our future prosperity.

Some 40% of our trade is with Asia. Last year, we sent $120 billion in goods and services to the region, which translates into almost 2.5 million American jobs. That's just a snapshot. If you could project that image into the future, it would show that Asia, above any other region, is where we must find our growth in the years ahead.

With that fact in mind, President Clinton hosted the first ever gathering of the Organization for Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders in Seattle last November. The 15 members of APEC account for nearly half of the world's output and most of the fastest-growing economies. By setting pro-growth policies, toppling trade barriers, and cutting regulatory red tape within the Asian-Pacific -- and the APEC leaders made a good start on all those fronts in Seattle -- we can take tangible steps to improve our peoples' lives. More broadly, this first APEC meeting was the kick-off to creating conditions for the economic integration of the region. It was concrete evidence of President Clinton's vision for a new Asian-Pacific community, a community of shared prosperity, shared growth, and shared strength.

Still closer to home, President Clinton went to the mat to secure passage for NAFTA. That accord will create numerous jobs in the United States, Mexico and
Canada. Its side-agreements will better the environment and improve working conditions in our countries. But for all it promises to achieve in its own right, NAFTA is just the starting point for hemispheric integration that we will pursue at the Summit of the Americas, convened by President Clinton in Miami next December. There, our region’s democracies will gather to discuss job creation through trade and sustainable development. And they will celebrate and look to accelerate progress toward democratic reform in the region.

It's a remarkable fact that of the 34 countries in the Americas, only two -- Haiti and Cuba -- do not have freely elected leaders in power. This rising tide of democracy -- not just in the Americas, but around the world -- is a powerful force that can wash over contrary trends like fragmentation and closed trading systems.

Our own experience tells us that democracy is the most enlightened form of governance yet devised. As Americans, we have long enjoyed the freedom and prosperity that democracy helps secure. We want others to share in its benefits. And we know that if they do, it will be to our advantage, too, because democracies make for reliable trading partners and they are not likely to wage war on one another.

Democracy is at once the foundation and the end product of our foreign policy. It is the foundation, because the culture and language of democracy are what make the structures we're building vital. As one of my esteemed predecessors as National Security Adviser, Zbig Brzezinski, has put it, "If one builds...only with bricks and mortar we will find that something profound is missing, and the structure may not prove enduring, because societies as viable entities exist on the basis of conviction, of commitment, of certain shared values that give societies cohesion." Foremost among those shared values, whether in NATO or APEC or NAFTA, is democracy.

Democracy also is the final product of our foreign policy. As the structures we build make us more secure and more prosperous, they set a bedrock within which to root...
democracy. In short, democracy both infuses the new structures of foreign policy, and gains strength from their solidity.

II. COUNTERING EMERGING THREATS

I suggested earlier that one essential question an architect asks her client before inking a design is "what direction do the high winds and storm fronts come from?" As we strive to raise new foreign policy institutions, we need to be concerned not so much with winds and storms, but with more fundamental threats to the structural integrity of our efforts. You might call these threats tremors within states and quakes across borders.

Tremors Within States

Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda. Crises in these tragic lands, and elsewhere, dominate the news. This should not surprise us. It is, after all, inherently more dramatic to watch a wrecking ball knock down a house that it is to witness the tedious, slow rise of a new building.

In saying this, my aim is not simply to lament our tendency to fixate on the crisis du jour at the expense of longer term policy efforts -- although a little lamenting on this score does the soul of a policy maker good from time to time. The fact is, these crises matter a great deal, on two distinct levels.

First, people are suffering and dying. To look the other way would be to abandon our compassion. It would diminish all of us as human beings.

At the same time, such crises are evidence of a dangerous phenomenon that transcends their particulars. In a more complex, interdependent world, it is increasingly difficult for governments to govern. Interest groups clamor to be heard. Ethnic minorities vie for attention. Even within stable democracies, political margins have become razor thin. All too easily -- particularly in wobbly or disfunctional systems -- this maelstrom of competing needs and demands can spiral out of control.
The combination of a humanitarian imperative and the need to avoid chaos puts tremendous pressure on us to engage, even when our core interests are not a stake. This contradiction creates confusion, which has been exacerbated by the end of the Cold War. The fact is, we have lost the major conceptual basis for thinking about when to intervene. That's a fact, not an excuse. During the Cold War, every crisis was potentially important - failure to prevent or manage a blow-up threatened to leave a vacuum that our communist adversaries would quickly occupy. For better or worse, the presumption was for intervention.

The challenge before us -- which must be met if we are to sustain the strength and vitality of our foreign policy structures -- is to make sense of when and how we intervene. Much as we might like it, there is no bright line test. While our finite means do not allow us to take responsibility for every crisis, our interests dictate that we assume the burden of some. The trick is to make distinctions, to get away from sterile all-or-nothing debates.

As we weigh our response to a given crisis, we must ask ourselves some hard questions. What interests are at stake? What are our objectives? Is there a viable exit strategy? What are the costs involved? Answers to these substantive queries will define the form of our response. If our core interests are at stake, we must be prepared to act alone, if necessary. Where we share an interest with other countries, or with the international community writ large, intervention may come through the United Nations, with regional security institutions like NATO, or in partnership with concerned allies.

Moving from the theoretical to the practical is fraught with difficulty, all the more so in a period of change. For any given crisis, people of good will genuinely will disagree on the answers to the hard questions raised. Constructive criticism is good, even essential. It produces better policy. Reflexive or partisan diatribes which fail to offer real alternatives do not. Those of us who make, report on or criticize policy would do well to bear those facts in mind. We owe that much to the American people.
Quakes Across Borders

In a recent talk, the historian Paul Kennedy neatly encapsulated how the world has changed in a few short years. "The navies of Spain, France and Italy, which in the good old days of the Cold War had the task of detecting Soviet submarines coming through the Mediterranean, are now on day and night patrol attempting, if you like, to erect a maritime cordon sanitaire against the large numbers of people who would like to move into Europe." Mass migrations and refugees. The population explosion. An endangered environment. A nefarious nexus of crime, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. These are the so-called transnational threats that our institutions must be built to withstand, and ultimately to vanquish. I’d like to touch briefly on each one.

There are an estimated 19 million refugees worldwide, fleeing war, repression, poverty and famine. We cannot ignore their plight. At the same time, refugee assistance is expensive. In fact, refugee affairs has become the State Department’s single largest program.

Prosperous countries can only absorb so many newcomers before an intolerable strain overextends social services. In times of economic distress, illegal aliens and legal immigrants alike become grist for the extremist mill -- witness the dangerous appeals to racism and xenophobia of a Le Pen in France or the Skinheads in Germany.

Humanitarian assistance, and intervention in places like Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia aim in part to avert refugee catastrophes. Working unilaterally, with allies, or through multilateral organizations, we have done our best to contain, and if possible to reverse, these tragedies. In so doing, we fulfill our duty to meet the crisis of the moment. But as Secretary of State Christopher has said, "The challenge of diplomacy is to anticipate, and to prevent, the crises of the future." And that is precisely the function of many of the structures we are building, like the Combined Joint Task Forces.
Every ten years, we add a billion human beings to the planet. At that rate, by the end of the next century the world's population will triple, from 5.6 billion to nearly 15 billion people. Already, in too many countries, growing populations stretch existing resources and institutions to the limit.

Extreme bursts of population growth help trigger humanitarian crises. Inevitably, the world's prosperous nations are solicited for help in alleviating famine and malnutrition. These crises sap our resources. And they create internal and regional instability which sometimes demand our outright intervention.

The Clinton Administration has taken the lead in promoting an international consensus for stabilizing world population growth. We seek universal access to family planning, guaranteed reproductive health care, and coordination between population policy and sustainable development. A key forum for advancing this agenda will be the U.N. International Conference on Population and Development, which will be held this month in Cairo. In the run up to the Conference, the United States, working with other nations and with non-governmental organizations, has led the way to build consensus and mobilize the resources necessary to fund an effective action plan.

Environmental decline degrades our planet's life support systems. Human activity already has destroyed 10 percent of the globe's arable land, threatening our ability to sustain even today's population. Meanwhile, pollution, waste management and climate change pose a threat to the health of our citizenry.

Environmental protection must begin at home. The United States is committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. In partnership with the automobile industry, we are working toward producing a "clean" car within the next decade.

Still, environmental degradation is by definition a global problem. It requires global thinking and global solutions. Greenhouse emissions, ozone depletion, soil erosion and ocean contamination have no respect for borders.
At the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio, we made a good start toward invigorating international cooperation to protect the environment. And in signing NAFTA, the U.S., Mexico and Canada agreed to landmark environmental side agreements that will help reduce air and water pollution in North America. In the years ahead, working closely with our G-7 partners and the WTO, we will build on the progress achieved in Rio and through NAFTA by focusing on population strategy, climate change, biodiversity and the relationship between trade and the environment.

Four times in the last month, police seized weapons-quality plutonium smuggled into Germany from Russia. We should be thankful that superior police work and cooperation among various intelligence services -- including our own -- intercepted this deadly cargo. But we also should be concerned. The growing nexus between organized crime, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction has horrific potential. Imagine, for example, what would have happened if less than a hundred blocks from where we are gathered, the World Trade Center terrorists had exploded a nuclear, and not a conventional device. (For one thing, the CFR might be on the market for a new building.)

This nexus demands a coordinated, international response. Mere vigilance will not suffice. The amount of plutonium needed to make a bomb is no bigger than a can of coke. Increased, proactive cooperation among various criminal justice systems is one of the most potent weapons in our arsenal. Over the past few years, we have greatly enhanced our intelligence sharing with allies, increased regular consultations, and engaged in joint anti-terrorist training. Most recently, in July, FBI director Louis Freeh visited several Eastern European countries and Russia, where he stressed the risks of nuclear proliferation through the efforts of organized crime. The FBI will work closely with officials in these and other countries to counter what must rank as one of the greatest long term threats to our security.
CONCLUSION

At the risk of emphasizing the obvious: many of the challenges I've just described are perversely interrelated. For example, overpopulation and environmental degradation produce the kind of climate in which ethnic tensions flourish. Similarly, extreme regimes often manipulate problems like famine and refugee flows to fan the flames of ethnic hatred or defeat their enemies.

These interrelationships are both bad news and good news. Bad news because as a result, many of the problems we face feed upon and exacerbate one another. Good news because successfully managing one problem can have a positive, ripple effect on the others.

I believe that the security and economic structures we are building will enable us to better manage these threats to our well-being. And they promise to prevent many of the crises that now challenge us from arising in the first place. A more secure and prosperous world will help defuse ethnic violence, and avert refugee crises. A more secure and prosperous world will be more able to clean up the environment, and set effective standards for its protection. A more secure and prosperous world will be better placed to show vigilance in the fight against terrorism and organized crime, and to refrain from selling weapons and nuclear technology to pariah states. A more secure and prosperous world will be less likely to fall prey to the rhetoric of hate mongers and demagogues.

For our efforts to succeed, Americans must do more than remain engaged in the world beyond our borders. We must lead. And we are. In NATO and APEC, with NAFTA and the NPT, through bilateral cooperation and unilateral initiative, the United States is meeting its obligations as a superpower, and showing the way in an era of change and uncertainty. We don't pretend to have all the answers. No one does. And we need help from this important group, and the individuals who animate it. But the Clinton Administration is moving forward, building on the work of our predecessors, and setting a
In so doing, we rely on a decidedly American attribute: a pioneering spirit that rises to the challenge offered by new frontiers.
I'm delighted to be here. And Mort, thank you for that generous introduction. It's always a pleasure to hear any words of praise from a prominent member of the Fourth Estate. Still vivid in my memory are the times that's happened before -- both of them.

I want to talk to you tonight about the purpose of American power in the world, as we chart a course in a radically new international environment.

Charting such a course has never been easy. While the policy of containment looks obvious to us in retrospect, we should remember that it took President Truman and Dean Acheson several years to define their way and build a policy consensus behind it. And they had the advantage of an ideologically and geographically distinct adversary with whom to contend.

Today, we -- all of us in this room who believe in American engagement -- have a still more difficult challenge. We must seek to be as creative and constructive -- in the literal sense of that word -- as the generation of the late 1940's. For we see a world of opportunity for such construction. But we must do it in the domestic circumstances not of the 1940's but of the 1920's, when there was no single, foreign threat against which to rally public opinion.

To most Americans, the post-Cold War era seems chaotic. The easy divisions of the Cold War have given way to a confused complex of problems: "Traditional" threats of aggression by regional bullies. Emerging transnational threats like environmental decay, over-population and
refugees. A global economic and information free-for-all that increases wealth and opportunity, but also produces fear and uncertainty within all nations. And the carnage of terrible ethnic conflicts.

In short, for too many of our people and commentators, we seem to face an incomprehensible chaos that prevents us from setting a clearly defined goal for the exercise of American power and diplomacy.

I believe that view is profoundly and dangerously wrong.

For there is a simple truth about this new world. That truth is this: the same idea that was under attack by fascism and then by communism remains under attack today, but on many fronts at once.

In defeating fascism, and prevailing over communism, we were defending an idea that comes under many names -- democracy, liberty, civility, pluralism -- but has a constant face. It is the face of the tolerant society, in which leaders and governments exist not to use or abuse people, but to provide them with freedom and opportunity, to preserve individual human dignity. Societies in which the wonderful paradox of democracy is at work -- the paradox that a central devotion to pluralism best allows the unity of the free.

Today, those societies -- from the fragile to the mature -- remain under assault. Far from reaching the end of history, we are at the start of a new stage in this old struggle. This is not a clash of civilizations. Rather, it is a contest that pits nations and individuals guided by openness, responsive government and moderation against those animated by isolation, repression and extremism. The enemies of the tolerant society are not some nameless, faceless force. They are
extreme nationalists and tribalists, terrorists, organized criminals, coup plotters, rogue states and all those who would return newly freed societies to the intolerant ways of the past.

But for all its dangers this new world presents immense opportunities — the chance to reshape and create new international security and economic structures that are not merely adapted to post-Cold War realities, but are specifically designed to consolidate the victory of the idea of democracy and open markets.

The issue for the next decade is whether our efforts at this construction can succeed in the face of the centrifugal forces at work within and among nations. This requires designing structures with the flexibility to withstand shifting threats to their stability, much like skyscrapers in Los Angeles or Mexico City are built with enough give to weather an earthquake. And it means that we must infuse these structures with the ideals and habits of democracy.

Democracy is at once the foundation and the purpose of the international structures we must build. It is the foundation because, as Zbig Brzezinski has put it, “If one builds...only with bricks and mortar we will find that something profound is missing, and the structure may not prove enduring, because societies as viable entities exist on the basis of conviction, of commitment, of certain shared values.” It is also the purpose because the security structures that defend our safety and the economic institutions that expand trade and create jobs, give democracy the chance to flourish.

We are not starry eyed about the prospects for spreading democracy -- it will not soon take hold everywhere. But we know that the larger the pool of democracies, the better off we will be. Democracies create free markets that offer economic opportunity and make for more reliable trading partners. They tend not to abuse the civil and political rights of their citizens. And democracies are far less likely to wage war on one another. Civilized behavior within borders
encourages it beyond them. So it is in our interest to do all that we can to enlarge the community of free and open societies, especially in areas of greatest strategic interest, as in the former Soviet Union.

I. Building New Structures

I believe that over the past nineteen months, building often on the work of our predecessors, we have made a good start at this process of construction. Working with our allies, President Clinton has moved to create new security arrangements, or revitalize old ones, and to devise pro-trade economic institutions, or modernize existing ones.

To meet the new reality in Europe, we are deeply engaged in transforming existing structures to fulfill President Clinton's vision of an integrated continent. While NATO is and must remain the foundation of security and stability for the trans-Atlantic community, it must adapt to changing times so as to keep the peace -- and, if necessary, make the peace. That's why President Clinton has taken the lead in establishing the Combined Joint Task Forces for peacekeeping and crisis management, and the "Partnership for Peace," to begin the process of expanding security in Europe eastward.

For the new European democracies, the Partnership for Peace is the lighthouse at the entrance to NATO's harbor, offering real, practical military and defense cooperation with NATO. For Russia, the Partnership gives a boost to reformers and commits Moscow to open up and democratize its defense forces. While keeping us prepared for the worst, the Partnership allows us to work toward the best possible outcome for Europe -- a community of democratic and stable nations.
In Asia, because there is no equivalent to NATO, we must develop a series of arrangements that will function, as President Clinton has put it, “like overlapping plates of armor, individually providing protection and together covering the whole body of our common security concerns.” These plates include the deployment of American forces to meet bilateral treaty arrangements and varied multilateral efforts -- from our attempt to defuse the North Korean nuclear threat to our participation in regional security dialogues, such as last year’s unprecedented gathering of the ASEAN countries, including the United States, Russia, and Vietnam.

While the new global economy has delivered wonderful possibilities for growth and creativity, it also has limited governments' ability to control their nations' economic future. This has bred fear and insecurity within each of our societies -- especially among those left behind, and who blame their personal predicament on ominous, unidentified international forces.

There is a powerful lesson here for those of us concerned with sustaining our country’s prosperity in the decades to come. That is the need to design structures with the every day, real interests of Americans in mind, that produce tangible benefits for them and turn their uncertainty into hope.

One striking example is NAFTA, whose passage President Clinton went to the mat to secure. Already, NAFTA has dramatically accelerated the exchange of goods and ideas between the United States, Mexico and Canada. For all it promises to achieve in its own right, NAFTA is just the starting point for the integration of our hemisphere. Other regional compacts modeled after NAFTA will follow. And we will pursue hemispheric integration at the Summit of the Americas, convened by the President in Miami next December.

In Asia, where our trade translates into almost 2.5 million American jobs, President Clinton took the lead and hosted the first ever gathering of the Organization for Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders. By setting pro-growth policies, toppling trade barriers, and cutting
regulatory red tape within the fast growing Asian-Pacific economies, we can take tangible steps to improve our peoples' lives. And a heavier flow of American goods, services and people in the region will help spread the ideals and the wealth of tolerant societies and build an integrated Asian-Pacific community.

Our difficult but successful completion of the GATT Uruguay Round, begun eight years ago, also will make a real difference in real lives. By lowering barriers to trade and bringing more nations into an open trading system, this accord promises to lift substantially American wages and living standards, and to do the same for other nations around the world. GATT's successor, the World Trade Organization, not only will ensure a more even international playing field, but also will provide a forum to resolve disputes openly and amicably.

The process of construction also involves the patient application of diplomacy, and the measured exercise of power.

We use diplomacy to pursue peace. But peace is not just an end in itself. It also creates conditions necessary for the habits of democracy and community to thrive. Thus, when we support and foster peace in the Middle East or Northern Ireland or Southern Africa, we are promoting the tolerant society as well. It is no accident that the enemies of peace in such areas are also apostles of intolerance and extremism.

Effective diplomacy today — as throughout human history — depends not only on the skill of our diplomats, but also on the power that lies behind it.

The progress we have made in Bosnia, for example, came when power — implicit or explicit — was tied to our diplomatic ends. The Sarajevo ultimatum largely succeeded because the threat of NATO air power was judged real. It provided the catalyst for the agreement on a federation
between the Croatians and Muslims in Bosnia, in itself a development of great strategic
importance there. And I believe that after the recent rejection of peace by the Bosnian Serbs, it
was the threat of further action by NATO, combined with the effect of our sanctions, that led
Slobodan Milosevic to promise to effectively close Serbia’s border with them.

Our approach to Haiti has also relied on diplomacy backed by power — the power of our
sanctions as well as the real threat of the use of force. The responsible course has been to pursue
every possible diplomatic way to reach our goal there. But make no mistake: when diplomacy
fails, the power behind it then becomes the only alternative.

Our goal is clear. For two Administrations, that goal has been the restoration of democratic
government.

For almost twenty months we have vigorously pursued every diplomatic avenue available to
achieve a peaceful transfer of power from the coup leaders back to the democratically elected
government. We have tightened sanctions all we can without crushing the Haitian people. Our
efforts have failed to move the military leaders. Their brutality, if anything, gets worse. They
alone are responsible for Haiti’s terrible predicament.

In response, the international community has spoken clearly and authoritatively, through the
United Nations Security Council. Resolution 940 authorizes the use of all necessary means,
including force, to restore democracy to Haiti.

Thus far, more than a dozen countries have told us they will join the international coalition in
some form, and others are considering it. Additional nations will sign up when the coalition is
replaced by the UN mission.
I believe there is a great deal at stake here. First is the essential reliability of the United States and the international community. Having exhausted all other remedies, we must make it clear that we mean what we say. Our actions in Haiti will send a message far beyond our region -- to places like North Korea and Iraq and wherever else our interests are threatened.

Second, there is a new wave of democracy sweeping over this hemisphere. But it is not irreversible. Haiti is a critical test of our commitment to defend democracy, especially where it is most fragile.

Third, the United States has a particular interest in curbing gross abuses of human rights when they occur so close to our shores. Murder, rape and intimidation are a systematic part of this regime's reign of terror. The victims are women, children, orphans and even priests. These abuses will end only when the dictators are gone.

Finally, the consequences of this festering problem will not be confined to Haiti. We risk a further explosion of refugees, a mass exodus that could de-stabilize the region and prove difficult for us to contain.

So the military leaders must go. We still hope that they will do so voluntarily. The more resolute and united we are, the more likely it is that they will.

But it must be absolutely clear to them: we will act if we must, and time is running out.

II. The Threats to Construction

As we build new structures and wield the tools of power and diplomacy, we must keep an eye to the long term threats to our efforts. In effect, we have to adopt the habits of the architect. Before starting a project, any good designer sits down with the client and asks a few basic
questions: what’s the building for; what are your needs; how much time do you spend in each room? And in New England, we know also to ask this question: what direction do the high winds and storm fronts come from?

The threats to our international construction come from many quarters. Bosnia and Haiti, for example, are not simply transitory tragedies, immediate crises that can divert us from the “big picture.” Rather they are part of something bigger and more menacing that threatens to undermine the foreign policy structures we are working so hard to build: the ethnic and other historic divisions within nations that tear them apart and in some regions threaten the definition of the nation itself.

It cannot and must not be the responsibility of the international community or this nation finally to resolve those conflicts. We cannot force a reversal of centuries of animosity in a few years. To attempt to do so would condemn peacekeeping efforts to costly failure.

But where practical, we can save lives, as in Rwanda, and we can offer conflicted societies a breathing space in which to sort out their own affairs. Whether or not they do so must, in the end, be their own responsibility.

Where and when UN peacekeeping can and should engage cannot, in a world of such rapid changes, clearly be predicted on some briefer’s multicolored map. But we can be very clear about the criteria to use in making those decisions. Following our very careful policy review, we are insisting, for example, that every peacekeeping operation have a clear mission, with adequate funding and a reasonable plan for completion.
These explosions within nations -- in the former Soviet Union, in Africa and elsewhere -- while rooted in historic hatreds, are also exacerbated by the so-called transnational problems whose dimensions have been more clearly exposed by the end of the Cold War.

Mass migration and refugees. The population explosion. An endangered environment. A nefarious nexus of crime, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Our institutions must be built to withstand, and ultimately to reverse, these threats.

The Cairo Conference on population growth and sustainable development rightly addresses perhaps the single most important underlying transnational threat before us, and America is leading in the response.

But more attention must also be given, I believe, to the horrific prospect of the growing links among organized crime, drug trafficking, terrorism, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Four times in the last month, police seized weapons-quality plutonium smuggled into Germany from Russia. We should be thankful that superior police work and cooperation among various intelligence services -- including our own -- intercepted this deadly cargo. But we also should be concerned. Imagine, for example, what would have happened if the World Trade Center terrorists had detonated a non-conventional device.

This nexus demands a coordinated, international response. Mere vigilance will not suffice. The amount of plutonium needed to make a bomb is no bigger than a can of Coke. Intensified cooperation among various criminal justice systems is one of the most potent weapons in our arsenal. Over the past few years, we have greatly enhanced our intelligence sharing with allies and through Interpol, increased regular consultations, and engaged in joint anti-terrorist training. Most recently, in July, FBI director Louis Freeh visited several Eastern European countries and Russia, where he stressed the risks of nuclear proliferation through the efforts of organized crime.
and proposed new cooperative initiatives in response. Ultimately, this informal network of concerned nations will likely evolve into a new structure to counter what must rank as one of the greatest long term threats to our security.

And, as I said before, there is the immediate threat to our efforts at construction posed by the regional rogue states who seek to develop and traffic in the weapons of mass destruction, who support terrorism, who are no less dedicated to the destruction of the tolerant society than were the defeated leaders of fascism and communism.

That is why this President is determined to maintain and modernize the finest military in the world so we can deter aggression -- and counter it when the need arises. Why we have developed and are pursuing a strategy of "dual containment" of both Iraq and Iran. And why we will maintain our commitment to our South Korean allies, even as we negotiate a resolution of the nuclear issue with the North.

III. Our Challenge

The struggle before us, while in the tradition of the centuries-old fight between the ideas of freedom and authoritarianism, is also very new. Because we must fight on so many fronts at once, we can only make progress over time, in small victories, not only through the exercise of our power but also through patience, persistence and pragmatic experimentation.

We Americans are an impatient people. But patience, persistence and pragmatism are not evidence of indecision: they are the hallmarks of determination.

Choice, not chance, determines destiny. After World War I, we chose withdrawal, leaving a vacuum that was filled by the forces of hatred and tyranny. After World War II, we chose engagement, creating the institutions that guaranteed 50 years of freedom and prosperity.
Today, at this century's third major turning point, the Clinton Administration has chosen. Rather than throw up our hands in despair at the complexities of the post-Cold War era, we have thrown ourselves with determination into the fight against those who would deny people their human rights, terrorists who threaten innocents, and pariah states who choose repression and extremism over openness and moderation. We have thrown ourselves, in short, into the long struggle for democracy and the order it brings.

In so doing, we take up the challenge previous generations met so well. Inspired by their example, aware of the responsibility they left, we are helping to create a world where tolerance, freedom and democracy prevail.
Address by W. Anthony Lake
National Security Advisor

The Council on Foreign Relations
September 12, 1994

"THE STRUCTURES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY"

I. Introduction: The Need for Engagement

Ladies and Gentlemen, I'm delighted to be here. And Mort, thank you for that generous introduction. It's always a pleasure to hear words of praise from the Fourth Estate. I still vividly remember the last time that happened to me, during the Carter Administration.

Not so long ago, I was listening with one ear to National Public Radio. The correspondent was talking about a "council", which he described as "a stodgy group of foreign policy wonks." I assumed he was referring to the National Security Council. Turns out he was talking about the Council on Foreign Relations. That's what happens when you've been around longer than the Rolling Stones.

In fact, the Council has been influencing policy since 1921, from Coolidge to Clinton. Based on the conversations I've had with many of you in this room, and recent articles in Foreign Affairs, the word "stodgy" is not what comes to mind when I think about this institution. Let me suggest a few more accurate adjectives. Dynamic. Thoughtful. Provocative. As we enter a radically new foreign policy environment, these are much needed qualities.

Entering any new world is disorienting. It forces us to leave behind a trusted frame of reference, and graph new maps by which to move forward. All of us here tonight would agree that we're now at a break point similar to the ones we confronted
after the two World Wars. Sometimes it seems that we agree on little else. But then, charting a new course has never been simple. While the policy of containment may look obvious to us in retrospect, we should remember that it took the likes of Harry Truman and Dean Acheson a good five years to find their way and build a policy consensus. And they had the advantage of an ideologically and geographically defined adversary with whom to contend.

The dangers we face today are less immediately threatening. But understanding their nature and agreeing upon the proper response is more complicated than ever.

It's a jumble out there. "Traditional" aggression by malicious nation states mixes with emerging transnational threats like environmental decay, over-population and famine. Information, ideas, money and people zig zag around the world in blissful disregard of national borders. This new global free-for-all means increased wealth and opportunity, but it also produces fear and uncertainty. And we are witness to a terrible fragmentation. In places like Bosnia and Nagorno Karabakh, ethnic passions and national aspirations once held in check by communism or by the Cold War stand-off now run amok.

In setting our nation's foreign policy, the Clinton Administration has one core working assumption: The United States cannot sit idly on the sidelines, hoping to remain unscathed, while conflicts elsewhere proliferate or intensify. We are engaged beyond our borders -- economically, politically, militarily -- whether we like it or not. Isolationism is simply not an option, because the problems of the world will find us, no matter how hard we might try to avoid them.

Besides, as the sole remaining superpower -- and as Americans -- we have an obligation, born of both interest and idealism, to do what is within our means to deter aggression, defuse altercations, defend the victims of violence, and devise solutions to common concerns.

Parrying threats is not enough. American foreign policy must also seize opportunities to increase our wealth and enhance our security. After World War II, a
remarkable generation of Americans helped create the institutions -- like NATO, the Marshall Plan, GATT, the IMF and the World Bank -- that guaranteed for us and our allies half a century of peace and prosperity. Matching those achievements for the next fifty years and beyond demands our involvement, and our leadership.

In short, if we are to ward off threats to our interests, if we are to continue to prosper, if we are to remain secure, the issue is not whether to engage, but rather how to engage. As citizens deeply involved in the formulation of American foreign policy, our opportunity and our obligation is to lead a national debate on that question -- a debate that so far has been lacking -- and, over time, set a steady new course for the nation.

Let me join the debate by sketching for you how the Clinton Administration has shaped American engagement in the world. First and foremost, we have sought to build new structures that will guarantee the safety and freedom of our people and promote our economic vitality. You might call these forward looking initiatives our "big picture" foreign policy. I hope you will like what you see.

Of course, policy makers are partial to big pictures. It takes the focus away from day-to-day details that may blot the work in progress. To me, the crisis, or crises, of the moment cannot be painted over. Bosnia and Haiti, for example, are not simply transitory, if tragic, dilemmas. Rather, they are part of something bigger and more menacing that threatens to undermine the foreign policy structures we are working so hard to build. That's why any productive debate on how we engage must grapple with our short term responses to crises like Bosnia and Haiti. And that's why the structures I'll describe are being designed both to withstand challenges to their integrity, and to make it less likely, in the long term, that such challenges will arise in the first place.
II. Building Foreign Policy Structures

Before starting a project, any good architect sits down with the client and asks a few basic questions: what's the building for; what are your needs; how much time do you spend in each room; what direction do the high winds and storm fronts come from? As the newly designated architects for foreign policy, such are the questions we asked ourselves eighteen months ago.

The theoretical answers were not hard to come by. The structures to be built should enhance our security and promote our prosperity. Further, they should do the same for those who would build them with us, and they should be open to all those who would be willing to live by the rules of the house. Finally, they should be designed with the flexibility to withstand shifting threats to their stability, much like skyscrapers in Los Angeles or Mexico City are built with enough give to weather an earthquake.

The Clinton Administration has made a good start at moving from the drawing board to the construction site. As I hope to show, by creating new security arrangements, or revitalizing old ones, and by devising pro-trade economic institutions, or modernizing existing ones, we are building sturdy foreign policy structures for the future.

Security

The end of the Cold War has not changed human nature. So this administration's first responsibility remains the physical security of our country and our people. But the varied and evolving nature of the threats to our well-being compel us to revisit the institutions designed to protect us. Let me address two areas of primary concern: Europe and Asia.

In Europe, we are deeply engaged in transforming existing structures to fulfill President Clinton's vision for an integrated continent. NATO must remain the foundation of security and stability for the trans-Atlantic community. Only NATO has the military forces, the multilateral staff, and the habits of political and military cooperation to enable us to respond flexibly and forcefully to the post-Cold War threats.
But NATO was conceived to conduct large, multi-division operations in defense of Alliance territory. While this traditional mission remains paramount, NATO increasingly is being called upon to undertake new tasks, to operate "out of area"; and to do so in cooperation with non-NATO partners. If Europeans and Americans are to stake their future security on NATO, it must adapt to changing times so as to keep the peace -- and, if necessary, make the peace.

That's why President Clinton has taken the lead in outlining a new strategy and new missions for NATO, which the alliance endorsed at last January's Summit.

First, NATO agreed to establish Combined Joint Task Forces. The CJTFs will be our principle tool for peacekeeping and crisis management, charged with planning, training and exercising for these non-traditional missions. Focused preparations should produce more timely, effective responses to crises and unprecedented flexibility for military operations. [For example, non-Alliance states might be asked to train and operate with NATO members, and European Alliance members will be able to call upon a Task Force to conduct operations involving neither U.S. interests nor U.S. forces.]

Second, NATO created the "Partnership for Peace" so as to begin the practical process of expanding security in Europe eastward. The Partnership lies at the heart of our answer to an extraordinary strategic challenge: the need to show the central and eastern Europeans that their future is with the West, and not trapped in some gray zone between two adversarial blocs.

Both by what it stands for, and what it does, the Partnership is a powerful vehicle for European integration. President Clinton has made clear to the CEE countries that the relevant questions for NATO expansion are not "whether" and "if" but rather "when" and "how." And the President has held out membership in the Partnership as the way to answer those questions. The new European democracies know that the Partnership for Peace is the lighthouse at the entrance to NATO's harbor. Through very real, very practical military and defense cooperation with NATO and with each other, many partner
nations soon will develop the capacity to assume the responsibilities of full NATO membership.

At the same time, by reaching out and making Russia a part of the process, the Partnership gives a boost to reformers in that country. And it commits Russia to promote transparency in defense planning and budgeting and to maintain democratic control of its defense forces. All of these are key Western security objectives. Should reform experience a reversal of fortune in Russia, NATO can re-evaluate its needs and those of the Central and Eastern Europeans, who, in any event, will have enhanced their military readiness through Partnership activities. While keeping us prepared -- just in case -- for the worst, the Partnership allows us to work toward the best possible outcome for Europe -- an undivided community of democratic and stable nations.

In Asia, this Administration also seeks to create integrated security structures, but with different building blocks.

Like Europe, Asia represents a tremendous investment of our blood and toil -- we fought three wars there in this century. Unlike Europe, Asia has no single security institution to revitalize. So our task has been to develop a series of arrangements that will function, as President Clinton has put it, "like overlapping plates of armor, individually providing protection and together covering the whole body of our common security concerns."

These plates may include bilateral arrangements, such as our treaty commitments to Japan, Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand. We know that our forces play a vital stabilizing role in the region. That is why President Clinton decided to freeze U.S. troop levels in Asia, and not reduce them as we are doing elsewhere.

Or the plates might consist of multilateral efforts, such as our partnership with South Korea, Japan and others to excise the North Korean nuclear threat and defuse tension on the Korean Peninsula.
And, finally, the plates may involve increased regional security dialogs. Last year, for the first time ever, the ASEAN countries -- including the United States, Russia, and Vietnam -- gathered around a table to discuss security issues. These types of dialogs can help prevent the outbreak of dangerous rivalries and promote regional integration.

Prosperity

From the outset of this Administration, President Clinton recognized that a strong foreign policy must begin with a sound economic foundation. But he also knows that prosperity at home requires that we maintain focus abroad. Put another way, the line between our foreign and domestic economic policies has increasingly blurred -- where it has not disappeared. Now, more than ever before, our economic well-being is tied to that of other nations.

In the new global economy, governments no longer exert the control they once did over their nations' commerce. While the possibilities for growth and creativity are endless, the loss of sovereignty can breed confusion, especially among people left behind. Those opposed to our engagement in the world, be it military or economic, feed on people's fears and uncertainties to promote their misguided cause. In such an environment, protectionism takes on a facile allure.

There is a powerful lesson here for those of us concerned with sustaining our country's prosperity in the decades to come. That is the need to design structures with the every day, real interests of Americans in mind, rooted in their lives, and able to produce tangible benefits.

After a lot of heavy lifting, we successfully completed the GATT Uruguay Round, begun eight years ago. By lowering barriers to trade and bringing more nations into an open trading system, this accord promises to lift substantially American wages and living standards, and to do the same for other nations around the world. GATT's successor, the
World Trade Organization, will help us resolve trade disputes more efficiently, and ensure that our workers and businesses compete on an even international playing field.

Neither GATT nor the WTO diminish the need to enforce national fair-trade legislation, or the importance of bilateral and regional compact. For example, last year we sent $120 billion in goods and services to Asia, which translates into almost 2.5 million American jobs. That's just a snapshot. If you could project that image into the future, it would show that Asia, above any other region, is where we must find our growth in the years ahead.

With that fact in mind, President Clinton hosted the first ever gathering of the Organization for Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders in Seattle last November. The 15 members of APEC account for nearly half of the world's output and most of the fastest-growing economies. By setting pro-growth policies, toppling trade barriers, and cutting regulatory red tape within the Asian-Pacific, we can take tangible steps to improve our peoples' lives. Our engagement with APEC is clear evidence of President Clinton's vision for an integrated Asian-Pacific community, a community of shared prosperity, shared growth, and shared strength.

Still closer to home, President Clinton went to the mat to secure passage for NAFTA. For all it promises to achieve in its own right, NAFTA is just the starting point for hemispheric integration that we will pursue at the Summit of the Americas, convened by the President in Miami next December. [There, our region's democracies will gather to discuss job creation through trade and sustainable development. And they will celebrate and look to accelerate progress toward democratic reform in the region.]

It's a remarkable fact that of the 36 countries in the Americas, only two -- Haiti and Cuba -- do not have freely elected leaders at their helm. This rising tide of democracy -- not just in the Americas, but around the world -- is a powerful force that can wash over contrary trends like fragmentation and closed trading systems.
Our own experience tells us that democracy is the most enlightened form of governance yet devised. As Americans, we have long enjoyed the freedom and prosperity that democracy helps secure. We want others to share in its benefits. And we know that if they do, it will be to our advantage, too, because democracies make for reliable trading partners and they are not likely to wage war on one another. We are not starry-eyed about democracy -- it will not take hold everywhere. But we will do all that we can to expand the community of free and open societies.

Democracy is at once the foundation and the end product of our foreign policy. It is the foundation, because the culture and language of democracy are what make the structures we're building vital. As my predecessor Zbig Brzezinski has put it, "If one builds...only with bricks and mortar we will find that something profound is missing, and the structure may not prove enduring, because societies as viable entities exist on the basis of conviction, of commitment, of certain shared values that give societies cohesion." Foremost among those shared values, whether in NATO or APEC or NAFTA, is democracy.

Democracy also is the final product of our foreign policy. As the structures we build make us more secure and more prosperous, they set a bedrock within which to better root emerging democracies, and upon which to construct new ones. In short, democracy both infuses the new structures of foreign policy, and gains strength from their solidity.

III. Contending with Structural Threats

I suggested earlier that one essential question an architect asks her client before inking a design is "what direction do the high winds and storm fronts come from?" As we strive to raise new foreign policy institutions, we need to be concerned not so much with winds and storms, but with more fundamental threats to the structural integrity of our efforts. You might call these threats tremors within states and quakes across borders.
Tremors Within States

Bosnia, Haiti. Crises in these tragic lands, and elsewhere, dominate the news. This should not surprise us. It is, after all, inherently more dramatic to watch a wrecking ball knock down a house that it is to witness the tedious, slow rise of a new building.

In saying this, my aim is not simply to lament our tendency to fixate on the crisis du jour at the expense of longer term policy efforts -- although a little lamenting on this score does the soul of a policy maker good from time to time. The fact is, these crises matter a great deal, on two distinct levels.

First, people are suffering and dying. To look the other way would be to abandon our compassion.

At the same time, such crises are evidence of a dangerous phenomenon that transcends their particulars. In a more complex, interdependent world, it is increasingly difficult for governments to govern. Interest groups clamor to be heard. Ethnic minorities vie for attention. Even within stable democracies, political margins have become razor thin. All too easily -- particularly in wobbly or dysfunctional systems -- this maelstrom of competing needs and demands can spiral out of control.

The resulting chaos and humanitarian disasters sorely test existing institutions, and threaten to undermine support for the new structures we're constructing. Tremendous pressure builds on us to intervene, even when our core interests are not a stake. This contradiction breeds confusion, and even a perverse nostalgia for the more predictable days of the Cold War.

Much as we might like it, there is no bright line test for intervention. While our finite means do not allow us to take responsibility for every crisis, our interests dictate that we assume the burden of some. The trick is to make distinctions, to get away from sterile all-or-nothing debates.

As we weigh our response to a given crisis, we must ask ourselves some hard questions. What interests are at stake? What are our objectives? Is there a viable exit
strategy? What are the costs involved? Answers to these queries will dictate the sum and substance of our response. If our core interests are at stake, we must be prepared to act, and to do so alone, if necessary. Where we share an interest with other countries, or with the international community writ large, intervention may come through the United Nations, with regional security institutions like NATO, or in partnership with concerned allies.

Ultimately, the only test for intervention is pragmatism. If we intervene and fail, we’re not doing good, no matter how principled our motives or how right the cause. A pure heart must be married to a focused mind.

With this thought in mind, let me briefly touch upon our policies in Bosnia and Haiti.

This Administration believes that while the tragedy in Bosnia does not pose an immediate threat to our security, important U.S. interests are nonetheless at stake. Our response has been strong but measured. We have pressed the U.N. Security Council to maintain one of the most thorough sanctions regimes in history. We brokered a Federation agreement between two of the three parties to the conflict -- the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Croat minority. We established a Contact Group to negotiate a territorial settlement. We helped organize and fund a war crimes tribunal. We have provided more humanitarian assistance to the region than any other country. And if the Bosnian Serbs refuse to accept the settlement offer now on the table, we will lift the arms embargo -- which unfairly handicaps the Muslims -- even if that means acting unilaterally.

The restoration of democracy in Haiti is a clear and compelling U.S. interest. To allow General Cedras and his cohorts to flout the will of the Haitian people would undermine the remarkable democratic advances made throughout the Americas. The devastating humanitarian consequences of Haiti’s military rule also demand our attention. The Cedras regime has engaged in widespread human rights abuses, killing and maiming
its own people—even Priests, women and children. And it has led Haiti to the brink of economic ruin, both by its failed policies and by a pattern of conduct that has made necessary the imposition of tough economic sanctions. Finally, our interest in restoring democracy is magnified by the refugee crisis provoked by the deteriorating human rights and economic situations.

Last year, working with the U.N. and the Organization of American States, we negotiated a solution to the Haitian crisis, but the military coup leaders failed to cede power, as they had agreed. Since then, U.S. leadership has produced two important U.N. Security Council Resolutions, one barring all trade with Haiti except for humanitarian supplies, the other authorizing member states to form an international military corps to restore democracy by force if necessary. Make no mistake: the military thugs responsible for usurping Haiti's democracy will go.

It hardly bears noting that our policies in both Bosnia and Haiti have had their share of critics. Moving from the theoretical to the practical is fraught with difficulty, all the more so in a period of change when we haven't finished defining all the questions, never mind finding the right answers. For any given crisis, people of good will genuinely will disagree. Constructive criticism is essential. It produces better policy. Reflexive or partisan diatribes which fail to offer real alternatives do not. Those of us who make, report on or criticize policy would do well to bear those facts in mind. We owe that much to the American people.

Quakes Across Borders

In a recent talk, the historian Paul Kennedy neatly encapsulated how the world has changed in a few short years. "The navies of Spain, France and Italy, which in the good old days of the Cold War had the task of detecting Soviet submarines coming through the Mediterranean, are now on day and night patrol attempting, if you like, to erect a maritime cordon sanitaire against the large numbers of people who would like to move into Europe." Mass migrations and refugees. The population explosion. An endangered
environment. A nefarious nexus of crime, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. These are the so-called transnational threats that our institutions must be built to withstand, and ultimately to vanquish. I'd like to touch briefly on two of them: refugees and the crime, terrorism and nuclear weapons troika.

There are an estimated 19 million refugees worldwide, fleeing war, repression, poverty and famine. We cannot ignore their plight. At the same time, refugee assistance is expensive. Prosperous countries can only absorb so many newcomers before an intolerable strain overextends social services. In times of economic distress, illegal aliens and legal immigrants alike become grist for the extremist mill — witness the dangerous appeals to racism and xenophobia of a Le Pen in France or the Skinheads in Germany.

Humanitarian assistance, and intervention, aim in part to avert refugee catastrophes. But while we must remain willing to say yes to calls for help, we must also be prepared to say no. This means getting over the reflex to take responsibility for a crisis whenever and wherever it arises. Often, the best we will be able to do is help provide a breathing space for others to sort out their own problems. In so doing, we fulfill our duty to meet the crisis of the moment. But as Secretary of State Christopher has said, "The challenge of diplomacy is to anticipate, and to prevent, the crises of the future." And that is precisely the function of many of the structures we are building, like the Combined Joint Task Forces.

The growing nexus between organized crime, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction has horrific potential. Four times in the last month, police seized weapons-quality plutonium smuggled into Germany from Russia. We should be thankful that superior police work and cooperation among various intelligence services -- including our own -- intercepted this deadly cargo. But we also should be concerned. Imagine, for example, what would have happened if the World Trade Center terrorists had detonated a nuclear, not a conventional device.
This nexus demands a coordinated, international response. Mere vigilance will not suffice. The amount of plutonium needed to make a bomb is no bigger than a can of Coke. Intensified cooperation among various criminal justice systems is one of the most potent weapons in our arsenal. Over the past few years, we have greatly enhanced our intelligence sharing with allies, increased regular consultations, and engaged in joint anti-terrorist training. Most recently, in July, FBI director Louis Freeh visited several Eastern European countries and Russia, where he stressed the risks of nuclear proliferation through the efforts of organized crime. Ultimately, this informal network of concerned nations will likely evolve into a new structure to counter what must rank as one of the greatest long term threats to our security.

IV. Conclusion: Building for the Future

Choice, not chance, determines destiny. The Clinton Administration has chosen. Rather than throw up our hands in despair at the complexities of the post-Cold War era, we have thrown ourselves with determination into the task of creating new institutions for a rapidly changing world. We have chosen to engage, not retreat.

I believe that the security and economic structures we are building will enable us to better manage threats to our well-being. And they promise to prevent many of the crises that now challenge us from arising in the first place. A more secure and prosperous world will help defuse ethnic violence, and avert refugee crises. A more secure and prosperous world will be better placed to show vigilance in the fight against terrorism and organized crime, and to refrain from selling weapons and nuclear technology to pariah states. A more secure and prosperous world will be less likely to fall prey to the rhetoric of hate mongers and demagogues. And a more secure and prosperous world will enhance the strength and promote the spread of democracy.

As we go about the task of creating new structures, we build on a foundation of timeless truths. First and foremost, power still matters. Street toughs continue to disrupt peaceful neighborhoods. The United States must be -- and is -- prepared to defend our
interests wherever they are threatened, by any means necessary. This requires maintaining and modernizing the finest military in the world so we can deter aggression -- and counter it when the need arises. Second, principles still matter. We know from our own bitter experience that power unhinged from principle will leave us rudderless and adrift. The American people will not -- and should not -- support policies divorced from democratic values.

Americans are animated by a "can do" attitude. When we see a problem, we want to fix it. This is a laudable quality, but one that needs to be held in check when it comes to foreign policy. You don't "fix" two hundred years of ethnic tension, or five centuries of national rivalry. You make them better or worse. You don't "fix" a hot war or a refugee crisis. You make them better or worse. Through painstaking diplomacy in places like the Middle East and Northern Ireland, the United States has helped to make things better, to turn tragedy into hope.

Foreign policy, in short, is not for those seeking instant gratification. It is for those who are engaged in the problems of our world, who are prepared to slog along, day in and day out, and work pragmatically toward solutions, and who aren't afraid to make mistakes. As President Roosevelt once said, it's better to err occasionally in the cause of activism than to be frozen in the ice of indifference.

This Administration may have made a few mistakes, but we cannot be accused of indifference. We know that Americans must do even more than remain engaged in the world beyond our borders. We must lead. And we are. In NATO and APEC, with NAFTA and the NPT, through bilateral cooperation and unilateral initiative, the United States is showing the way in an era of change and uncertainty. We don't pretend to have all the answers. No one does. And we need help from this important group, and the individuals who animate it. But the Clinton Administration is moving forward, building structures for the future. In so doing, we rely on decidedly American attributes: optimism and a pioneering spirit that rises to new challenges.
Ladies and gentlemen, I'm delighted to be here. And Mort, thank you for that generous introduction. It's always a pleasure to hear words of praise from a prominent member of the Fourth Estate. I still vividly remember the last time that happened to me, during the Carter Administration...

I want to talk to you tonight about the purpose of American engagement in the world beyond our borders. As we enter a radically new foreign policy environment, it's easy to feel a little lost. But then, charting a new course has never been easy. While the policy of containment looks obvious to us in retrospect, we should remember that it took the likes of President Truman and Dean Acheson several years to find their way and build a policy consensus. And they had the advantage of an ideologically and geographically defined adversary with whom to contend.

At first glance, it would seem that confusion about our mission is unavoidable, because the easy divisions of the Cold War have given way to a complex of problems. "Traditional" aggression by malicious nation-states. Emerging transnational threats like environmental decay, over-population and refugees. A global economic and information free-for-all that increases wealth and opportunity, but also produces fear and uncertainty. And terrible ethnic and religious fragmentation.

Yet, digging beneath the surface reveals a more fundamental and enduring challenge. In defeating fascism, and prevailing over communism, we were defending an idea that comes under many names -- democracy, freedom, decency, civility, pluralism -- but has a constant face. It is the face of the tolerant society, in which every person is given the chance to achieve his or her full potential.
Today, tolerant society remains under assault, albeit from a more varied collection of enemies. Far from reaching the end of history, we are at the dawn of a new struggle. This is not a clash of civilizations or religions. Rather, it is a contest that pits nations and individuals guided by openness, responsive government and moderation against those animated by isolation, repression and extremism. The enemies of the tolerant society are not some nameless, faceless force. They are terrorists, organized criminals, coup plotters, rogue states; and those who, in newly-free societies, would return to the intolerant ways of the past. Meeting their challenge requires America's leadership, strength, persistence and power.

Our engagement must combine short-, medium- and long-term efforts. Crises demand immediate attention. Thorny problems of diplomacy necessitate a more patient approach. And fundamental success in the struggle for tolerant societies involves slowly building the structures that bolster existing democracies and create the conditions for new ones to emerge.

It is this long-term effort that lies at the heart of the Clinton Administration's foreign policy. We are not starry-eyed about the prospects for spreading democracy -- it will not take hold everywhere. But we know that the larger the pool of democracies, the better off we will be. Democracies are less likely to wage war on one another and they make for more reliable trading partners. Our own experience tells us that democracy is the most enlightened form of governance yet devised. As Americans, we have long enjoyed the freedom and prosperity that democracy helps secure, and the political and civil rights it guarantees. We want others to share its benefits. So we must do all that we can to expand the community of free and open societies.

Democracy is at once the foundation and the end-product of the foreign policy we are building. It is the foundation because, as my predecessor Zbig Brzezinski has put it, "If one builds...only with bricks and mortar we will find that something profound is missing, and the structure may not prove enduring, because societies as viable entities exist on the basis of conviction, of commitment, of certain
shared values." Foremost among those shared values, whether in NATO or NAFTA is democracy. Democracy is also the final product of our foreign policy. As the structures we build make us more secure and more prosperous, they set a bedrock within which to better root existing democracies, and upon which to construct new ones.

Unfortunately, we do not have the luxury of building in a vacuum. Those who oppose the ideals of democracy never rest. Day-to-day conflicts lay claim to our energy and resources. We dare not shirk this responsibility. Bosnia and Haiti, for example, are not transitory tragedies. Rather, they are part of the larger threat to tolerant society. That's why any discussion of the purpose of American engagement must grapple with our short term responses to crises. And that's why the structures President Clinton is helping design must not only withstand challenges to their integrity, but also make it less likely, in the long term, that such challenges will arise in the first place.

As we meet immediate threats to our interests, and build the structures that will deter or defeat new ones, we are guided by three timeless truths. First, isolationism is simply not an option. The problems of the world will find us, no matter how hard we might try to avoid them. Second, power still matters. The United States must be -- and is -- prepared to defend our interests wherever they are threatened, by any means necessary. This requires maintaining and modernizing the finest military in the world so we can deter aggression -- and counter it when the need arises. Finally, principles still matter. We know from our own bitter experience that power unhinged from principle will leave us rudderless and adrift. The American people will not -- and should not -- support policies divorced from our values.

With these thoughts in mind, I'd like to describe for you some of the long term structures we're building, and then discuss how we deal with short term challenges to our ideals and interests. In so doing, I hope to give you a broad overview of the Clinton Administration's effort to defend and enlarge, the community of free and open societies.
II. Building Foreign Policy Structures

In designing new foreign policy structures for the post Cold War era, the Clinton Administration, like any good architect, focused on needs and purposes. The structures to be built should enhance our security and promote our prosperity, and that of those who build them with us. These structures should be open to all who would be willing to live by the rules of the house. Finally, they should be designed with the flexibility to withstand shifting threats to their stability, much like skyscrapers in Los Angeles or Mexico City are built with enough give to weather an earthquake.

Working with our allies, President Clinton has moved from the drawing board to the construction site. By creating new security arrangements, or revitalizing old ones, and by devising pro-trade economic institutions, or modernizing existing ones, our Administration is helping to build sturdy, integrated, foreign policy structures for the future.

Security

The end of the Cold War has not changed human nature. So this administration's first responsibility remains the physical security of our country and our people. But the varied and evolving nature of the threats to our well-being compel us to revisit the institutions designed to protect us. Let me address two areas of primary concern: Europe and Asia.

In Europe, we are deeply engaged in transforming existing structures to fulfill President Clinton's vision for an integrated continent. NATO must remain the foundation of security and stability for the trans-Atlantic community. While its traditional defensive mission remains paramount, NATO increasingly is being called upon to undertake new tasks and to cooperate with non-NATO partners. If Europeans and Americans are to stake their future security on the Alliance, it must adapt to changing times so as to keep the peace — and, if necessary, make the peace.
That's why President Clinton has taken the lead in outlining a new strategy and new missions for NATO, including the establishment of the Combined Joint Task Forces for peacekeeping and crisis management, and the "Partnership for Peace," to begin the process of expanding security in Europe eastward.

Above all else, the Partnership is a concrete answer to an extraordinary strategic challenge -- the need to draw a unified map of Europe, one that reflects a continent no longer divided into two adversarial blocs. For the new European democracies, the Partnership for Peace is the lighthouse at the entrance to NATO's harbor, offering real, practical military and defense cooperation with NATO. For Russia, the Partnership gives a boost to reformers. And it commits Moscow to promote transparency in defense planning and budgeting -- and to maintain democratic control of its defense forces. While keeping us prepared -- just in case -- for the worst, the Partnership allows us to work toward the best possible outcome for Europe -- an undivided community of democratic and stable nations.

In Asia, this Administration also seeks to create integrated security structures, but with different building blocks. Because there is no equivalent to NATO, we must develop a series of arrangements that will function, as President Clinton has put it, "like overlapping plates of armor, individually providing protection and together covering the whole body of our common security concerns."

These plates may include bilateral arrangements with regional democracies, such as our treaty commitments to Japan, Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand; and the deployment of American forces to help stabilize the region. The plates might also consist of multilateral efforts, such as our partnership with South Korea, Japan and others to defuse the North Korean nuclear threat and reduce tension on the Korean Peninsula. Or they may involve increased regional security dialogues. Last year, for the first time ever, the ASEAN countries -- including the United States, Russia, and Vietnam -- gathered around a table to discuss security issues. These types of structured dialogs can help prevent the outbreak of dangerous rivalries and promote regional integration.
Prosperity From the outset of his Administration, President Clinton recognized that a strong foreign policy must begin with a sound economic foundation. But he also knows that prosperity at home requires that we maintain focus abroad. Now, more than ever before, our economic well-being is tied to that of other nations.

In the new global economy, governments no longer exert the control they once did over their nations' commerce. While the possibilities for growth and creativity are endless, the loss of sovereignty can breed confusion, especially among people left behind. Those opposed to our engagement in the world, be it military or economic, feed on people's fears and uncertainties to promote their misguided cause. In this environment, protectionism becomes alluring. It must be our task to foster stability and fight these uncertainties.

There is a powerful lesson here for those of us concerned with sustaining our country's prosperity in the decades to come. That is the need to design structures -- either bilateral or multilateral in form -- with the everyday, real interests of Americans in mind, rooted in their lives, and able to produce tangible benefits for our citizens.

One striking example is NAFTA, whose passage President Clinton went to the mat to secure. For all it promises to achieve in its own right, NAFTA is just the starting point for the structural integration of our hemisphere. Other regional compacts modeled after NAFTA will follow. And we will pursue hemispheric integration at the Summit of the Americas, convened by the President in Miami next December.

Last year, we sent $120 billion in goods and services to Asia, which translates into almost 2.5 million American jobs. That's just a snapshot. If you could project that image into the future, it would show that Asia, above any other region, is where we must find our growth in the years ahead.

With that fact in mind, President Clinton hosted the first ever gathering of the Organization for Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders in Seattle last November. The 15 APEC members account for nearly half of the world's output and most of the fastest-growing economies. By setting pro-growth policies, toppling trade barriers,
and cutting regulatory red tape within the Asian-Pacific, we can take tangible steps to improve our peoples' lives. Our engagement with APEC, which the President will pursue in Indonesia in November, is clear evidence of his vision for an integrated Asian-Pacific community, a community of shared prosperity, shared growth, and shared strength.

After a lot of heavy lifting, we successfully completed the GATT Uruguay Round, begun eight years ago. By lowering barriers to trade and bringing more nations into an open trading system, this accord promises to lift substantially American wages and living standards, and to do the same for other nations around the world. And GATT's successor, the World Trade Organization, will help us resolve commercial disputes more efficiently, and ensure that our workers and businesses compete on an even international playing field.

### III. Contending with Crises

As we strive to build new foreign policy institutions, we must contend with threats to their structural integrity and to the health and well-being of tolerant societies. These threats come increasingly from conflicts within states, which both feed on and fuel transnational dangers like over-population, environmental decay, refugee crises, and weapons proliferation.

Bosnia, Haiti: Crises in these tragic lands, and elsewhere, dominate the news. This should not surprise us. It is, after all, more dramatic to watch a wrecking ball knock down a house that it is to witness the tedious, slow rise of a new building.

In saying this, my aim is not simply to lament our tendency to fixate on the crisis du jour at the expense of longer term policy efforts -- although a little lamenting on this score does the soul of a policy maker good from time to time. The fact is, these crises matter a great deal, on two distinct levels.

First, people are suffering and dying. To look the other way would be to abandon our compassion. That must animate, but not dictate, our policy.

At the same time, such crises evidence a dangerous phenomenon that transcends their particulars. In a more complex, interdependent world, it is increasingly difficult for
The result of the U.S. policy in the Balkans has been a chronic crisis of the Cold War,
establish a Contact Group to negotiate a territorial settlement; and organize and fund a war crimes tribunal. We have provided more humanitarian assistance to the region than any other country. And if the Bosnian Serbs refuse to accept the settlement offer now on the table, we will lift the arms embargo -- which unfairly handicaps the Muslims -- even if that means acting unilaterally.

In Haiti, our interests compel and our values demand that democracy be restored.

We cannot allow General Cedras and his accomplices to continue to flout the will of the Haitian people. To do so would undermine the extraordinary advances democratic rule has made throughout the Western Hemisphere. Nor can we turn a blind eye to terrible human rights abuses. The Cedras regime is maiming and murdering its own people -- women, children, even priests. Getting worse

At the same time, Cedras has led Haiti to the brink of economic ruin, both by his failed policies and by a pattern of conduct that has made necessary the imposition of tough economic sanctions. The deteriorating human rights situation and the economic free fall have provoked a mass exodus that challenges our ability to control American borders. This too must stop.

For three years, the United States and the international community pursued every possible avenue for the peaceful restoration of democracy in Haiti. Time and again, Cedras met our good faith efforts with contempt and scorn. Now, our patience is exhausted.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 940, which was approved on July 31, authorizes the use of all necessary means to remove Haiti's illegal government. If Cedras refuses to cede power, the United States will remove him, restore the democratic process, curb human rights abuses, place security forces in civilian hands, repatriate refugees, and renew the flow of relief and development assistance. Only in this manner will Haiti once again be on the road to freedom and prosperity.

Restoring democracy in Haiti is not enough. It must also be nurtured. In recent weeks, the United States has enlisted a Hemispheric force to keep the peace until the
democratic Haitian government is able to do the job itself. A large consortium of international aid donors, working with the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, is poised to support Haitian democracy with assistance that will create jobs, rebuild the degraded infrastructure, and give Haitians hope for the future. The international community, led by the U.N. and the Organization of American States, also will monitor parliamentary elections this Fall and Presidential elections in December, 1995.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the Cedras regime's days are numbered. The time for democracy in Haiti is at hand.

In dealing with crises like Bosnia and Haiti, day in and day out, it sometimes seems that the forces of intolerance and enmity have the upper hand. In part, this stems from a very American inclination to want to fix everything, right away. But you don't "fix" two hundred years of ethnic tension, or five centuries of national rivalry. You make it better or worse. You don't "fix" a hot war or a refugee crisis. You make it better or worse.

Seen in this light, our struggle to defend and expand the community of tolerant societies has known some dramatic victories. Through painstaking diplomacy in places like Northern Ireland, Southern Africa and the Middle East, the United States has helped to make things better, to turn tragedy into hope. Through our on-going efforts in the former Soviet Union, we have made things better by helping to win agreements to withdraw all Russian troops from the Baltics, rid the Ukraine of nuclear weapons, and, eventually, close the Chernobyl nuclear facility.

A new challenge that will place demands on our diplomacy, perseverance and strength is the growing nexus between organized crime, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction. Four times in the last month, police seized weapons-quality plutonium smuggled into Germany from Russia. We should be thankful that superior police work and cooperation among various intelligence services -- including our own -- intercepted this deadly cargo. But we also should be concerned. Imagine, for example, what would have happened if the World Trade Center terrorists had detonated a nuclear, not a conventional device.
This nexus demands a coordinated, international response. Mere vigilance will not suffice. The amount of plutonium needed to make a bomb is no bigger than a can of Coke. Intensified cooperation among various criminal justice systems is one of the most potent weapons in our arsenal. Over the past few years, we have greatly enhanced our intelligence sharing with allies and through Interpol, increased regular consultations, and engaged in joint anti-terrorist training. Most recently, in July, FBI director Louis Freeh visited several Eastern European countries and Russia, where he stressed the risks of nuclear proliferation through the efforts of organized crime and proposed new cooperative initiatives in response. Over time, this informal network of concerned nations will likely evolve into a new structure to counter what must rank as one of the greatest long term threats to our security.

The struggle for free and open societies, in short, is not for those seeking instant gratification. It is for those who are engaged in the problems of our world, who are prepared to toil patiently and pragmatically, and who aren't afraid to make mistakes. As President Roosevelt once said, it's better to err occasionally in the cause of activism than to be frozen in the ice of indifference.

IV. Conclusion: Building for the Future

Choice, not chance, determines destiny. After World War I, we chose withdrawal, leaving a vacuum that was filled by the forces of hatred and tyranny. After World War II, we chose engagement, creating the institutions that guaranteed 50 years of freedom and prosperity.

Today, at this century's third major turning point, the Clinton Administration has chosen. Rather than throw up our hands in despair at the complexities of the post-Cold War era, we have thrown ourselves with determination into the fight for tolerance and democracy. We have taken on with vigor those who would deny human rights to terrorists who threaten innocents, and

Democracies are more likely to keep the peace. Democracies are better placed to defuse ethnic violence, and produce proud citizens, not terrorized refugees. Democracies
are more vigilant in the fight against terrorism and organized crime, and the prevention of the sale of weapons and nuclear technology to pariah states. Democracies are less likely to fall prey to the rhetoric of hate mongers and demagogues. Democracies are more dependable trading partners. Defending and enlarging the community of democratic, tolerant societies must be the purpose of American engagement in the world.

In the end, this Administration believes that Americans must do even more than remain engaged in the world beyond our borders. We must lead. And we are. With the new structures we are building, through bilateral cooperation and unilateral initiative, the United States is helping to create a new foreign policy landscape. We don't pretend to have all the answers. No one does. And we need help from this important group, and the individuals who animate it. But the Clinton Administration has taken up the struggle for tolerance and democracy. In so doing, we rely on decidedly American attributes: optimism and a pioneering spirit that rises to new challenges.
"THE STRUCTURES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY"

I. Introduction: The Need for Engagement

Ladies and Gentlemen, I'm delighted to be here. And Mort, thank you for that generous introduction. It's always a pleasure to hear words of praise from the Fourth Estate. I still vividly remember the last time that happened to me; during the Carter Administration... "I want to talk to you — 20 years/50 years.

Not so long ago, I was listening with one ear to National Public Radio. The correspondent was talking about a "council", which he described as "a stodgy group of foreign policy wonks." I assumed he was referring to the National Security Council. Turns out he was talking about the Council on Foreign Relations. That's what happens when you've been around longer than the Rolling Stones.

In fact, the Council has been influencing policy since 1921, from Coolidge to Clinton. Based on the conversations I've had with many of you in this room, and recent articles in Foreign Affairs, the word "stodgy" is not what comes to mind when I think about this institution. Let me suggest a few more accurate adjectives. Dynamic. Thoughtful. Provocative. As we enter a radically new foreign policy environment, these are much needed qualities.

Entering any new world is disorienting. It forces us to leave behind a trusted frame of reference, and graph new maps by which to move forward. All of us here tonight would agree that we're now at a break point similar to the ones we confronted after the two World Wars. Sometimes it seems that we agree on little else. But then, charting a new course has never been simple. While the policy of containment may look
obvious to us in retrospect, we should remember that it took the likes of Harry Truman and Dean Acheson a good five years to find their way and build a policy consensus. And they had the advantage of an ideologically and geographically defined adversary with whom to contend.

The dangers we face today are less immediately threatening. But understanding their nature and agreeing upon the proper response is more complicated than ever.

It's a jumble out there. "Traditional" aggression by malicious nation states mixes with emerging transnational threats like environmental decay, over-population and famine. Information, ideas, money, and people zig-zag around the world in blissful disregard of national borders. This new global free-for-all means increased wealth and opportunity, but it also produces fear and uncertainty. And we are witness to a terrible fragmentation. In

places like Bosnia and Nagorno-Karabakh, ethnic passions and national aspirations once held in check by communism or by the Cold War stand-off now run amok.

In setting our nation's foreign policy, the Clinton Administration has one core working assumption: The United States cannot sit idly on the sidelines, hoping to remain unscathed, while conflicts elsewhere proliferate or intensify. We are engaged beyond our borders -- economically, politically, militarily -- whether we like it or not. Isolationism is simply not an option because the problems of the world will find us, no matter how hard we might try to avoid them.

Besides, as the sole remaining superpower -- and as Americans -- we have an obligation, born of both interest and idealism, to do what is within our means to deter aggression, defuse altercations, defend the victims of violence, and devise solutions to common concerns.

Parrying threats is not enough. American foreign policy must also seize opportunities to increase our wealth and enhance our security. After World War II, a remarkable generation of Americans helped create the institutions -- like NATO, the Marshall Plan, GATT, the IMF and the World Bank -- that guaranteed for us and our
pomp among our allies. Matching those achievements for the next fifty years and beyond demands our involvement, and our leadership.

In short, if we are to ward off threats to our interests, if we are to continue to prosper, if we are to remain secure, the issue is not whether to engage, but rather how to engage. As citizens deeply involved in the formulation of American foreign policy, our opportunity and our obligation is to lead a national debate on that question -- a debate that so far has been lacking -- and, over time, set a steady new course for the nation.

The best way to start this debate on the content of engagement is to fast forward to our end goals. That's because the policies we adopt today will determine, as President Clinton has said, "what we want the world to look like 20 years from now." I believe that we would all wish to see a larger community of democracies. The Clinton Administration has shaped U.S. engagement in the world to move us toward that end.

Our own experience tells us that democracy is the most enlightened form of governance yet devised. As Americans, we have long enjoyed the freedom and prosperity that democracy helps secure. We want others to share in its benefits. And we know that if they do, it will be to our advantage, too, because democracies make for reliable trading partners and they are not likely to wage war on one another. We are not starry eyed about democracy -- it will not take hold everywhere. But we will do all that we can to expand the community of free and open societies.

Indeed, I would argue that, far from reaching the end of history, we are at the dawn of a new struggle that pits nations guided by the institutions and ideals of democracy against those animated instead by arbitrariness, repression, and hate. It is a fundamental American interest to ensure that the countries that have only just emerged from the totalitarian dark remain in liberty's light, and to create conditions that allow more nations to move toward democracy.
The Clinton Administration has sought to enlarge the pool of democracies by building new foreign policy structures designed to guarantee the security and promote the prosperity of an ever-growing number of countries, and their citizens.

Democracy is at once the foundation and the end product of these foreign policy structures. It is the foundation, because the culture and language of democracy are what make the structures we're building vital. As my predecessor Zbig Brzezinski has put it, "If one builds...only with bricks and mortar we will find that something profound is missing, and the structure may not prove enduring, because societies as viable entities exist on the basis of conviction, of commitment, of certain shared values that give societies cohesion." Foremost among those shared values, whether in NATO or NAFTA, is democracy.

Democracy also is the final product of our foreign policy. As the structures we build make us more secure and more prosperous, they set a bedrock within which to better root emerging democracies, and upon which to construct new ones. In short, democracy both infuses the new structures of foreign policy, and gains strength from their solidity.

As we go about the task of creating new structures, we build on a foundation of timeless truths. First and foremost, power still matters. "Street toughs continue to disrupt peaceful neighborhoods. The United States must be -- and is -- prepared to defend our interests wherever they are threatened, by any means necessary. This requires maintaining and modernizing the finest military in the world so we can deter aggression -- and counter it when the need arises. Second, principles still matter. We know from our own bitter experience that power unhinged from principle will leave us rudderless and adrift. The American people will not -- and should not -- support policies divorced from our values.

That's the big picture, which I will endeavor to fill in. Of course, policy-makers are partial to big pictures. It takes the focus away from day-to-day details that may blot the work in progress. To me, the crisis, or crises, of the moment cannot be painted over. Bosnia and Haiti, for example, are not simply transitory, if tragic, dilemmas. Rather, they
are part of something bigger and more menacing that threatens to undermine the foreign policy structures we are working so hard to build. That's why any productive debate on how we engage must grapple with our short term responses to crises like Bosnia and Haiti. And that's why the structures I'll describe are being designed both to withstand challenges to their integrity, and to make it less likely, in the long term, that such challenges will arise in the first place.

II. Building Foreign Policy Structures

Before starting a project, any good architect sits down with the client and asks a few basic questions: what's the building for; what are your needs; how much time do you spend in each room; what direction do the high winds and storm fronts come from? As the newly designated architects for foreign policy, such are the questions we asked ourselves eighteen months ago.

The theoretical answers were not hard to come by. The structures to be built should enhance our security and promote our prosperity. Further, they should do the same for those who would build them with us, and they should be open to all those who would be willing to live by the rules of the house. Finally, they should be designed with the flexibility to withstand shifting threats to their stability, much like skyscrapers in Los Angeles or Mexico City are built with enough give to weather an earthquake.

The Clinton Administration has made a good start at moving from the drawing board to the construction site. As I hope to show, by creating new security arrangements, or revitalizing old ones, and by devising pro-trade economic institutions, or modernizing existing ones, we are building sturdy foreign policy structures for the future.

Security

The end of the Cold War has not changed human nature. So this administration's first responsibility remains the physical security of our country and our people. But the
varied and evolving nature of the threats to our well-being compel us to revisit the institutions designed to protect us. Let me address two areas of primary concern: Europe and Asia.

In Europe, we are deeply engaged in transforming existing structures to fulfill President Clinton's vision for an integrated continent. NATO must remain the foundation of security and stability for the trans-Atlantic community. Only NATO has the military forces, the multilateral staff, and the habits of political and military cooperation to enable us to respond flexibly and forcefully to the post-Cold War threats.

But NATO was conceived to conduct large, multi-division operations in defense of Alliance territory. While this traditional mission remains paramount, NATO increasingly is being called upon to undertake new tasks, to operate "out of area", and to do so in cooperation with non-NATO partners. If Europeans and Americans are to stake their future security on NATO, it must adapt to changing times so as to keep the peace -- and, if necessary, make the peace.

That's why President Clinton has taken the lead in outlining a new strategy and new missions for NATO, which the alliance endorsed at last January's Summit.

First, NATO agreed to establish Combined Joint Task Forces. The CJTFs will be our principle tool for peacekeeping and crisis management, charged with planning, training and exercising for these non-traditional missions. Focused preparations should produce more timely, effective responses to crises and unprecedented flexibility for military operations.

Second, NATO created the "Partnership for Peace" so as to begin the practical process of expanding security in Europe eastward. The Partnership lies at the heart of our answer to an extraordinary strategic challenge: the need to show the central and eastern Europeans that their future is with the West, and not trapped in some gray zone between two adversarial blocs.
Both by what it stands for, and what it does, the Partnership is a powerful vehicle for European integration. President Clinton has made clear to the CEE countries that the relevant questions for NATO expansion are not "whether" and "if" but rather "when" and "how." And the President has held out membership in the Partnership as the way to answer those questions. The new European democracies know that the Partnership for Peace is the lighthouse at the entrance to NATO's harbor. Through very real, very practical military and defense cooperation with NATO and with each other, many partner nations soon will develop the capacity to assume the responsibilities of full NATO membership.

At the same time, by reaching out and making Russia a part of the process, the Partnership gives a boost to reformers in that country. And it commits Russia to promote transparency in defense planning and budgeting and to maintain democratic control of its defense forces. All of these are key Western security objectives. Should reform experience a reversal of fortune in Russia, NATO can re-evaluate its needs and those of the Central and Eastern Europeans, who, in any event, will have enhanced their military readiness through Partnership activities. While keeping us prepared -- just in case -- for the worst, the Partnership allows us to work toward the best possible outcome for Europe -- an undivided community of democratic and stable nations.

In Asia, this Administration also seeks to create integrated security structures, but with different building blocks.

Like Europe, Asia represents a tremendous investment of our blood and toil -- we fought three wars there in this century. Unlike Europe, Asia has no single security institution to revitalize. So our task has been to develop a series of arrangements that will function, as President Clinton has put it, "like overlapping plates of armor, individually providing protection and together covering the whole body of our common security concerns."
These plates may include bilateral arrangements, such as our treaty commitments to Japan, Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand. We know that our forces play a vital stabilizing role in the region. That is why President Clinton decided to freeze U.S. troop levels in Asia, and not reduce them as we are doing elsewhere. The plates might consist of multilateral efforts, such as our partnership with South Korea, Japan and others to excise the North Korean nuclear threat and defuse tension on the Korean Peninsula. Or the plates may involve increased regional security dialogs. Last year, for the first time ever, the ASEAN countries -- including the United States, Russia, and Vietnam -- gathered around a table to discuss security issues. These types of dialogs can help prevent the outbreak of dangerous rivalries and promote regional integration.

Prosperity

From the outset of this Administration, President Clinton recognized that a strong foreign policy must begin with a sound economic foundation. But he also knows that prosperity at home requires that we maintain focus abroad. Put another way, the line between our foreign and domestic economic policies has increasingly blurred -- where it has not disappeared. Now, more than ever before, our economic well-being is tied to that of other nations.

In the new global economy, governments no longer exert the control they once did over their nations' commerce. While the possibilities for growth and creativity are endless, the loss of sovereignty can breed confusion, especially among people left behind. Those opposed to our engagement in the world, be it military or economic, feed on people's fears and uncertainties to promote their misguided cause. In such an environment, protectionism takes on a facile allure.

There is a powerful lesson here for those of us concerned with sustaining our country's prosperity in the decades to come. That is the need to design structures with the every day, real interests of Americans in mind, rooted in their lives, and able to produce tangible benefits.
After a lot of heavy lifting, we successfully completed the GATT Uruguay Round, begun eight years ago. By lowering barriers to trade and bringing more nations into an open trading system, this accord promises to lift substantially American wages and living standards, and to do the same for other nations around the world. GATT's successor, the World Trade Organization, will help us resolve trade disputes more efficiently, and ensure that our workers and businesses compete on an even international playing field.

Neither GATT nor the WTO diminish the need to enforce national fair trade legislation, or the importance of bilateral and regional compact. For example, last year we sent $120 billion in goods and services to Asia, which translates into almost 2.5 million American jobs. That's just a snapshot. If you could project that image into the future, it would show that Asia, above any other region, is where we must find our growth in the years ahead.

With that fact in mind, President Clinton hosted the first ever gathering of the Organization for Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders in Seattle last November. The 15 members of APEC account for nearly half of the world's output and most of the fastest-growing economies. By setting pro-growth policies, toppling trade barriers, and cutting regulatory red tape within the Asian-Pacific, we can take tangible steps to improve our peoples' lives. Our engagement with APEC is clear evidence of President Clinton's vision for an integrated Asian-Pacific community, a community of shared prosperity, shared growth, and shared strength.

Still closer to home, President Clinton went to the mat to secure passage for NAFTA. For all it promises to achieve in its own right, NAFTA is just the starting point for hemispheric integration that we will pursue at the Summit of the Americas, convened by the President in Miami next December.

It's a remarkable fact that of the 36 countries in the Americas, only two -- Haiti and Cuba -- do not have freely elected leaders at their helm. This rising tide of democracy
-- not just in the Americas, but around the world -- is a powerful force that can wash over contrary trends like fragmentation and closed trading systems.

III. Contending with Structural Threats

I suggested earlier that one essential question an architect asks her client before inking a design is "what direction do the high winds and storm fronts come from?" As we strive to raise new foreign policy institutions, we need to be concerned not so much with winds and storms, but with more fundamental threats to the structural integrity of our efforts. You might call these threats tremors within states and quakes across borders.

Tremors Within States

Bosnia, Haiti. Crises in these tragic lands, and elsewhere, dominate the news. This should not surprise us. It is, after all, inherently more dramatic to watch a wrecking ball knock down a house that it is to witness the tedious, slow rise of a new building.

In saying this, my aim is not simply to lament our tendency to fixate on the crisis du jour at the expense of longer term policy efforts -- although a little lamenting on this score does the soul of a policy maker good from time to time. The fact is, these crises matter a great deal, on two distinct levels.

First, people are suffering and dying. To look the other way would be to abandon our compassion.

At the same time, such crises are evidence of a dangerous phenomenon that transcends their particulars. In a more complex, interdependent world, it is increasingly difficult for governments to govern. Interest groups clamor to be heard. Ethnic minorities vie for attention. Even within stable democracies, political margins have become razor thin. All too easily -- particularly in wobbly or dysfunctional systems -- this maelstrom of competing needs and demands can spiral out of control.

The resulting chaos and humanitarian disasters sorely test existing institutions, and threaten to undermine support for the new structures we're constructing. Tremendous
pressure builds on us to intervene, even when our core interests are not a stake. This contradiction breeds confusion, and even a perverse nostalgia for the more predictable days of the Cold War.

Much as we might like it, there is no bright line test for intervention. While our finite means do not allow us to take responsibility for every crisis, our interests dictate that we assume the burden of some. The trick is to make distinctions, to get away from sterile all-or-nothing debates.

Ultimately, the only test for intervention is pragmatism, a pragmatism that marries interest and idealism. Compassion should animate, but not dictate, our policies. If we intervene and fail, we’re not doing good, no matter how principled our motives or how right the cause. But when our interests demand it, we cannot back down from the good fight. Our challenge is to be both pure of heart and focused of mind.

That said, let me briefly touch upon Bosnia and Haiti. Our very different interests in these countries mitigate the injustice common to both, and so cause us to adopt different policies.

This Administration believes that while the tragedy in Bosnia does not pose an immediate threat to our security, important U.S. interests are nonetheless at stake. Our response has been strong but measured. Rather than go it alone, we have worked closely with our allies to maintain one of the most thorough sanctions regimes in history; broker a Federation agreement between the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Croat minority; establish a Contact Group to negotiate a territorial settlement; and organize and fund a war crimes tribunal. We have provided more humanitarian assistance to the region than any other country. And if the Bosnian Serbs refuse to accept the settlement offer now on the table, we will lift the arms embargo -- which unfairly handicaps the Muslims -- even if that means acting unilaterally.

The restoration of democracy in Haiti is a clear and compelling U.S. interest. To allow General Cedras and his cohorts to flout the will of the Haitian people would
undermine the remarkable democratic advances made throughout the Americas. The devastating humanitarian consequences of Haiti's military rule also demand our attention. The Cedras regime has engaged in widespread human rights abuses, killing and maiming its own people -- women and children, even priests. And it has led Haiti to the brink of economic ruin, both by its failed policies and by a pattern of conduct that has made necessary the imposition of tough economic sanctions. Finally, our interest in restoring democracy is magnified by the refugee crisis provoked by the deteriorating human rights and economic situations.

Working with the U.N. and the Organization of American States, we initially sought to mediate, and then to compel, a solution to the Haitian crisis. U.S. leadership has produced two important U.N. Security Council Resolutions, one barring all trade with Haiti except for humanitarian supplies, the other authorizing member states to form an international military corps to restore democracy by force if necessary. Because the international community -- starting with the democracies in our Hemisphere -- share our goal of restoring democracy to Haiti, we will continue to work cooperatively to meet that objective. But make no mistake: the military thugs responsible for usurping Haiti's democracy will go, even if that means unilateral U.S. intervention.

Moving from the theoretical to the practical is fraught with difficulty, all the more so in a period of change when we haven't finished defining all the questions, never mind finding the right answers. For any given crisis, people of good will genuinely will disagree. Constructive criticism is essential. It produces better policy. Reflexive or partisan diatribes which fail to offer real alternatives do not. Those of us who make, report on or criticize policy would do well to bear those facts in mind. We owe that much to the American people.

Quakes Across Borders

These are the so-called transnational threats that our institutions must be built to withstand, and ultimately to vanquish. I'd like to touch briefly on two of them: refugees and the crime, terrorism and nuclear weapons troika.

There are an estimated 19 million refugees worldwide, fleeing war, repression, poverty and famine. We cannot ignore their plight. At the same time, refugee assistance is expensive. Prosperous countries can only absorb so many newcomers before an intolerable strain overextends social services. In times of economic distress, illegal aliens and legal immigrants alike become grist for the extremist mill -- witness the dangerous appeals to racism and xenophobia of a Le Pen in France or the Skinheads in Germany.

Humanitarian assistance, and intervention, aim in part to avert refugee catastrophes. But while we must remain willing to say yes to calls for help, we must also be prepared to say no. This means getting over the reflex to take responsibility for a crisis whenever and wherever it arises. Often, the best we will be able to do is help provide a breathing space for others to sort out their own problems. In so doing, we fulfill our duty to meet the crisis of the moment. But as Secretary of State Christopher has said, "The challenge of diplomacy is to anticipate, and to prevent, the crises of the future." And that is precisely the function of many of the structures we are building, like the Combined Joint Task Forces.

The growing nexus between organized crime, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction has horrific potential. Four times in the last month, police seized weapons-quality plutonium smuggled into Germany from Russia. We should be thankful that superior police work and cooperation among various intelligence services -- including our own -- intercepted this deadly cargo. But we also should be concerned. Imagine, for example, what would have happened if the World Trade Center terrorists had detonated a nuclear, not a conventional device.

This nexus demands a coordinated, international response. Mere vigilance will not suffice. The amount of plutonium needed to make a bomb is no bigger than a can of
Coke. Intensified cooperation among various criminal justice systems is one of the most potent weapons in our arsenal. Over the past few years, we have greatly enhanced our intelligence sharing with allies, increased regular consultations, and engaged in joint anti-terrorist training. Most recently, in July, FBI director Louis Freeh visited several Eastern European countries and Russia, where he stressed the risks of nuclear proliferation through the efforts of organized crime. Ultimately, this informal network of concerned nations will likely evolve into a new structure to counter what must rank as one of the greatest long term threats to our security.

IV. Conclusion: Building for the Future

Choice, not chance, determines destiny. The Clinton Administration has chosen. Rather than throw up our hands in despair at the complexities of the post-Cold War era, we have thrown ourselves with determination into the task of creating new institutions for a rapidly changing world. We have chosen to engage, not retreat.

I believe that the security and economic structures we are building will enable us to better manage threats to our well-being. And they promise to prevent many of the crises that now challenge us from arising in the first place. A more secure and prosperous world will help defuse ethnic violence, and avert refugee crises. A more secure and prosperous world will be better placed to show vigilance in the fight against terrorism and organized crime, and to refrain from selling weapons and nuclear technology to pariah states. A more secure and prosperous world will be less likely to fall prey to the rhetoric of hate mongers and demagogues. And a more secure and prosperous world will enhance the strength and promote the spread of democracy.

When Americans see a problem, our natural inclination is to try to fix it. This is a laudable quality, but one that needs to be held in check when it comes to foreign policy. You don't "fix" two hundred years of ethnic tension, or five centuries of national rivalry. You make them better or worse. You don't "fix" a hot war or a refugee crisis. You make
them better or worse. Through painstaking diplomacy in places like the Middle East and Northern Ireland, the United States has helped to make things better, to turn tragedy into hope. Through our on-going efforts in the former Soviet Union, we have made things better by helping to win agreements to withdraw all Russian troops from the Baltics, rid the Ukraine of nuclear weapons, and, eventually, close the Chernobyl nuclear facility. Over time, by building new foreign policy structures, we can make the world a safer, more prosperous place.

Foreign policy, in short, is not for those seeking instant gratification. It is for those who are engaged in the problems of our world, who are prepared to toil patiently, day in and day out, and move pragmatically toward solutions, and who aren't afraid to make mistakes. As President Roosevelt once said, it's better to err occasionally in the cause of activism than to be frozen in the ice of indifference.

In the end, this Administration believes that Americans must do even more than remain engaged in the world beyond our borders. We must lead. And we are. In NATO and APEC, with NAFTA and the NPT, through bilateral cooperation and unilateral initiative, the United States is showing the way in an era of change and uncertainty. We don't pretend to have all the answers. No one does. And we need help from this important group, and the individuals who animate it. But the Clinton Administration is moving forward, building structures for the future. In so doing, we rely on decidedly American attributes: optimism and a pioneering spirit that rises to new challenges.