

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

03-Mar-1993 13:41 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

VAX MAIL@OEOB
 PRIMOSCH@A1@OEOB
 GATI@A1@OEOB
 FICKLIN@A1@OEOB
 BURNS@A1@OEOB

DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526

2016-0128-M (1.01)
 KBH 12/11/2019

FROM: White House Situation Room
 (WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK TO PRESIDENT

<DIST>

PRT: FAUVER SIT

SIT: BURNS FICKLIN GATI PRIMOSCH SUM SUM2 VAX WHSR_IN

<PREC>

IMMEDIATE

<CLAS>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

<OSRI>

RUEHKVA

<DTG>

031800Z MAR 93

<ORIG>

AMEMBASSY KIEV

<TO>

SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5628

<SUBJ>

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK TO PRESIDENT
 CLINTON -- RESUMPTION OF CCC PROGRAM

<TEXT>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ KIEV 001175

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: EAGR, ECON, ECIN, UP, US

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK TO PRESIDENT
 CLINTON -- RESUMPTION OF CCC PROGRAM

1. > - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ON MARCH 3 EMBASSY RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING LETTER
 DATED FEBRUARY 26 TO PRESIDENT CLINTON FROM PRESIDENT
 KRACHUK UNDER COVER OF A MFA DIPLOMATIC NOTE. ORIGINAL
 IS BEING POUCHED TO EUR/ISCA/ECA BOND.

3. BEGIN UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION OF TEXT:

FEBRUARY 26, 1993

KIEV

HONORABLE MR. PRESIDENT,

IN OCTOBER 1992 I TURNED TO THE FORMER PRESIDENT OF THE

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

USA WITH A REQUEST TO GIVE UKRAINE A CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF 600 MILLION DOLLARS FOR THE PURCHASE OF U.S. AGRICULTURAL GOODS.

WE WERE FORCED TO DO THIS, BASED ON THE COMPLEX SITUATION IN WHICH UKRAINE FINDS ITSELF TODAY DUE TO THE GREAT DIFFICULTIES ON THE PATH TO STABILIZATION OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY, AND THE DIFFICULT EFFECTS OF THE 1992 DROUGHT.

ON OCTOBER 16 THE GOVERNMENTS OF UKRAINE AND USA SIGNED AN AGREEMENT ON GIVING UKRAINE CREDIT ASSISTANCE TO PURCHASE GRAIN IN THE AMOUNT OF 200 MILLION DOLLARS IN THE USA. FROM THIS AMOUNT 70 MILLION DOLLARS HAS BEEN UTILIZED, FOR WHICH 610 THOUSAND TONS OF CORN HAVE BEEN PURCHASED AND SENT TO UKRAINE.

MR. PRESIDENT, I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY DEEP GRATITUDE TO (YOU PERSONALLY AND) THE GOVERNMENT OF THE USA FOR THIS TIMELY ASSISTANCE.

THE REST OF THE CREDIT (130 MILLION DOLLARS) SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISTRIBUTED IN TWO TRANCHES: 65 MILLION FROM FEBRUARY 1, 1993 AND 65 MILLION FROM JUNE 1, 1993.

UNDER THE SECOND CREDIT, WHICH WAS TO COME INTO EXISTENCE FROM FEBRUARY 1, WE WERE SUPPOSED TO PURCHASE 300 THOUSAND TONS OF WHEAT FOR HUMAN CONSUMPTION AND 200 THOUSAND TONS OF CORN.

HOWEVER, BASED ON THE NOTIFICATION OF THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE OF THE USA, IT CANNOT CONTINUE SHIPMENTS UNDER THE SECOND PART OF THE CREDIT DUE TO THE LACK OF RESOLUTION BETWEEN UKRAINE AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON THE FSU FOREIGN DEBT REPAYMENT QUESTION.

WITH REFERENCE TO THIS I WOULD LIKE TO POINT OUT THAT INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS ARE CURRENTLY ONGOING WITH THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON THIS ISSUE WITH THE GOAL OF REACHING IN THE NEAREST FUTURE AN APPROPRIATE AGREEMENT, ACCEPTABLE NOT ONLY TO UKRAINE AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, BUT ALSO TO THE CREDITORS.

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE AFOREMENTIONED (TALKS), I ASK YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, TO SUPPORT RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION REGARDING CONTINUED DELIVERIES OF GRAIN TO UKRAINE, FORESEEN BY THE SECOND PART OF THE PROVIDED CREDIT.

IN TODAY'S ECONOMIC SITUATION, THIS ASSISTANCE IS PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT FOR UKRAINE.

WITH DEEP RESPECT

/S/

LEONID KRAVCHUK

END TEXT OF INFORMAL TRANSLATION. POPADIUK

BT

#1175

NNNN

<SECT>

SECTION: 01 OF 01

<SSN>

1175

<TOR>

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

03-Mar-1993 13:41 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

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DECLASSIFIED
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2016-0128-M (1.02)
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END TEXT OF INFORMAL TRANSLATION. POPADIUK

BT

#1175

NNNN

<SECT>

SECTION: 01 OF 01

<SSN>

1175

<TOR>

TO: KRAVCHUK, LENOID

CHRON FILE

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 02 APR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: UKRAINE

HS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR TO PRES KRAVCHUK FM PRES

ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE: 07 APR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BURNS

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BURNS
GOTTEMOELLER
MERCHANT
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH


OPENED BY: NSJDA

CLOSED BY: NSBTM

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY



CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2169

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ AVO _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	_____	_____	_____
ExecSec	_____	_____	_____
Staff Director	_____	_____	_____
D/APNSA	_____	_____	_____
APNSA	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>1</u>	<u>JDA #103 4/3 JD</u>	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS: To state ASAP!

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS: Orig letter will be handcarried by Rep ~~B~~ Laphant

TIME OF TRANSMISSION

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

1993 APR -3 PM 1:00

TIME OF RECEIPT

**WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM**

'93 APR -3 P1:25

Bjme

PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: *T-9*

DTG: _____

MESSAGE NO. 0588 CLASSIFICATION CONFIDENTIAL PAGES 2

FROM WILLIAM H. ITOH
(NAME) (PHONE NUMBER) (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION HS LTR TO PRES KRAVCHUK
LOG # 2169

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
STATE	EXECUTIVE SECRETARY		

REMARKS:

FOR IMMEDIATE CABLING, HAND-CARRIED BY REP. GEPHARDT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KBH Date: 12/11/2019
2016-0123-M

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9302169
DATE 03 APR 1993

SUBJECT: HS LTR TO PRES KRAVCHUK
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION; ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

MR. MARC GROSSMAN
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE
2201 C STREET, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20506

DATE TIME SIGNATURE

4-3-93 1:30 M. G. Grossman

COPY: ORIGINAL 

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBM/NARA, Date 12/11/2019

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 2, 1993

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you very much for your letter of March 22, which expresses your interest in strong relations between our countries. Your commitment in the letter to continue the process of democratic and market economic reforms and maintain interethnic accord in Ukraine is very welcome.

I was also pleased to be able to meet with Foreign Minister Zlenko during his recent visit to Washington. As you and I discussed during our January telephone call, regular, direct contact between our governments to explore issues of common interest will be necessary as our relationship grows.

I want to stress to you, as I did with Minister Zlenko, the great importance the United States government attaches to the fulfillment by the government of Ukraine of its bilateral obligations. We are engaged in an historic effort to reduce our own arsenal of nuclear weapons and to lessen the worldwide risk of nuclear conflict. The steps you will take are an integral part of this process. This is an issue of very great importance to me and my government. We are absolutely committed to seeing START reductions through to a successful conclusion, and, as you know, it is a goal of U.S. policy to ensure that all states adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The START Treaty, the NPT, and the Lisbon Protocol are the mechanisms developed for achieving the end that the United States, Ukraine, and the rest of the democratic world so urgently seek. In this context, I am sure you understand my comments to Minister Zlenko that I see relations between our two countries developing rapidly once Ukraine takes these two steps: ratification of START and accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear state. Ukraine must fulfill the commitments it undertook in signing the Lisbon Protocol.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

We have already discussed with your government several ways in which we might address your concerns on issues such as security assurances, missile dismantlement assistance, and the sharing of proceeds from the sale of highly-enriched uranium. We are also anxious to develop our economic relations, and to support your reform efforts.

The American people and I understand and appreciate the great challenges Ukraine faces as it seeks to build a new state. I assure you that the United States wants to see Ukraine develop and prosper as a sovereign, independent state, and we stand ready to assist that process.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Bill Clinton". The signature is written in a cursive, slightly slanted style.

His Excellency
Leonid M. Kravchuk
President of the Ukraine
Kiev

TO: KRAVCHUK, LEONID

FROM: PRESIDENT

DOC DATE: 07 MAY 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: UKRAINE

HS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PRES LTR TO PRES KRAVCHUK OF UKRAINE RE EMISSARIES GATI & STROBE

ACTION: PRES SGD LTR

DUE DATE: 05 MAY 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GOTTEMOELLER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

GATI
GOTTEMOELLER
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: ORIGINAL HANDLED VIA GOTTEMOELLER

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSCLG CLOSED BY: NSWEA DOC 3 OF 3

~~SECRET~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By: KBY/NARA, Date 12/11/2019
2016-0128-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE
002 PRESIDENT
003

Z 93050313 FWD TO PRES FOR SIG
Z 93050718 FOR SIGNATURE
X 93051321 PRES SGD LTR

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 930507
002 930507
003 930507 KRAVCHUK, LEONID

VICE PRESIDENT
WH CHIEF OF STAFF

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 7, 1993

Dear President Kravchuk:

I am pleased to be sending Ambassador Strobe Talbott and Special Assistant to the President Toby Gati to Kiev as my personal emissaries. I have asked them to extend to you my sincerest greetings and to tell you of my desire to expand U.S.-Ukrainian relations. Ukraine is the first country on their itinerary on their first Presidential Mission to the newly independent states.

Ambassador Talbott and Mrs. Gati are prepared to discuss with you a full range of economic, political and security issues. I have asked them to begin a process of consultations with you which will deepen our understanding of Ukraine. They are there to listen, to learn and to present my views on the future of our relationship. I would like to suggest that we follow their visit to Kiev with a visit to Washington by your own high-level representatives. In that way, we will be able to make rapid progress toward defining and implementing our new agenda.

I look forward to hearing the results of your discussions in Kiev and welcome the beginning of a new phase in our relationship.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Leonid M. Kravchuk
President of Ukraine
Kiev

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 7, 1993

93 MAY 7 P6:47

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ANTHONY LAKE ✓

SUBJECT:

U.S. Policy toward Ukraine

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0128-M (1.04)
KBM 12/11/2019

This memorandum outlines a set of initiatives on U.S. policy towards Ukraine aimed at energizing our bilateral relations. We have been insisting that Ukraine rid itself of the nuclear weapons on its territory as a condition for improved relations with the United States and the West. We have tried to use the promise of a good long-term relationship with the Ukrainians to pursue our strategic goal of denuclearization. But beyond this nuclear issue, the Ukrainians perceive that the West is ignoring them, despite their major security problems with Russia. Our promise of future cooperation has not generated enough confidence to spur the Ukrainians to see their security as enhanced by eliminating nuclear weapons.

What is needed now is a shift in our tactics. While by no means backing off our top priority -- Ukrainian ratification of START I and accession to the NPT -- our aim now is to build up Ukrainian confidence in the United States and the West. We would like them to understand clearly that their long-term interest lies in becoming a democratic, free-market society fully integrated into Europe, not in a state isolated by its insistence on retaining nuclear weapons. We will accomplish that goal through a series of visible steps which will serve as "confidence-building" measures to lay the groundwork for a long-term policy in the political, security and economic spheres.

Short-Term Objectives

The next weeks will be critical as the Ukrainian parliament will be actively debating START and NPT. Our public posture toward Ukraine during this time must stress the value to both our nations of a broad-gauged relationship that addresses Ukrainian security interests. The emphasis will be on engaging the Kravchuk government and other political actors: parliamentarians, opposition leaders, the public at large. A proposed agenda:

- Presidential statement. A speech beamed to Kiev that would clearly sketch the U.S. vision of a healthy, long-term relationship with Kiev would build Ukrainian confidence in the U.S. and would counteract the residual ill feelings from the "Chicken Kiev" speech of two years ago. One approach

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

would be a telebridge that would allow you to speak and take some questions directly from Ukrainian viewers.

- Initial high-level dialogue. Strobe Talbott and Toby Gati will be travelling to Kiev on May 8 to initiate a high-level dialogue on security, economic and political issues. They made a point of stopping first in Ukraine to underscore our commitment to the relationship. Their trip has been designated a Presidential mission, and we suggest that they carry a letter from you to President Kravchuk laying out our ideas for near-term cooperation. We will make it clear to the Ukrainians that this marks the first of a series of high-level visits and discussions with Ukraine, as outlined below. (A draft letter from you to President Kravchuk is appended.)
- Information on START and Vancouver/Tokyo. Our specialists will be in Kiev this week to engage parliamentarians on START and NPT and provide basic information and answer questions on the treaties. Other delegations could visit later to provide information on the elements of the Vancouver and Tokyo economic packages that might be available to Ukraine.
- Other high-level visits. Secretary Aspin is inviting Defense Minister Morozov to visit the United States in June. If President Kravchuk suggests it, we should also revive the visit of Prime Minister Kuchma by inviting him to meet with high-level administration officials, including with you, if your schedule permits, and with Vice President Gore. Although we were reluctant to invite Kuchma until Ukraine ratified START and NPT, his visit here would be a welcome sign to the Ukrainian government of our change in tactics. (We would, of course, have made clear that the goal of Ukrainian adherence to START and NPT remains as firm as ever over the long term.) Another high-level meeting will be scheduled to discuss defense conversion. This will be headed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Perry and Minister of Industry Antonov.

Long Term Development

The Ukrainians' concerns about their sovereignty, independence and related worries over the security challenge from Russia are deeply rooted and will have to be addressed over the long term. For that reason, we must make it clear to the Ukrainians that we are committed to developing our ties for the long term so that the goal we both share -- an independent Ukraine well-integrated into Europe and at peace with Russia -- becomes a reality.

If we are to succeed, we will need to develop multiple forums for regular dialogue with Ukraine, much like the multi-level relationships that we have with the Russians. To the maximum extent possible, we should coordinate our policies toward Russia and Ukraine in a way that serves our basic objective of stabilizing their relationship. Important focal points for

~~SECRET~~

attention will be the role of Ukraine and Russia in the future of Europe, conventional force planning, nuclear issues in the European context, interaction on high-technology projects, cooperation on peacekeeping and economic cooperation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you approve the initiatives outlined above.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That you sign the letter to President Kravchuk at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A Letter to President Kravchuk

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0128-M (1.07)
KBH 12/11/2019

May 6, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: TOBY T. GATI *TTG*

FROM: ROSE GOTTEMOELLER *R*

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy toward Ukraine: Talbott-Gati Trip Preparations

Attached is an abbreviated version of the memorandum to the President on U.S. policy toward Ukraine that you reviewed earlier this week. This version highlights the nature of our change in tactics, as you suggested, and asks the President to approve the initiatives outlined as well as a letter to President Kravchuk (appended at Tab A). Strobe and Toby would like to deliver this letter during their trip to Kiev, which departs on Saturday, May 8.

If you and the President approve, Strobe and Toby will use the policy outlined in the memorandum as the basic guide for their discussions, and will also take up some of the short-term initiatives with the Ukrainians. Key among these is the idea of a Presidential speech via a telebridge, which would also allow the President to answer questions from Ukrainian viewers.

We append for your comments and approval the longer paper on U.S. policy toward Ukraine, but we have not included it in the President's package. Once you approve it, we will be using it as a basis for our policy, building on it as new recommendations are developed in our discussions with the Ukrainians and among agencies here in Washington.

Concurrences by: R. Nicholas Burns *NB*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Presidential Letter to Ukrainian President Kravchuk
- Tab II Paper on U.S. policy toward Ukraine

U.S. POLICY TOWARD UKRAINE


I. U.S. Interests

If not for the presence of Soviet nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine, the full range of U.S. interests in the region would have been more immediately apparent. In the aftermath of the collapse of the USSR, however, our pressing interest in single command and control of nuclear weapons, the denuclearization of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan, and the reduction of remaining Russian nuclear weapons to START II levels constituted an understandable focus of attention. The fate of Yeltsin's effort in Russia constituted a second, equally important preoccupation.

Recognizing our continued interest in these two objectives, the U.S. has other critical interests beyond them. The maintenance of an independent, stable Ukraine is key, for several reasons: Ukraine, a country the size of France and rich in potential, sees itself as a bridge between Russia and Europe. Without reference to the nuclear issue, Ukraine's conventional army is the largest in Europe. An independent Ukrainian foreign policy can serve as a counterweight to Russia, for even a democratic Russia is likely to define its interests in these regions in ways not identical to our own. Finally, continued disputes between Russia and Ukraine, left unattended, will threaten the stability and unity of Europe, preventing us from consolidating one of the main achievements of the end of the cold war.

The separation and continued independence of Ukraine from Moscow is important for cutting an important psychological link to the Soviet and older Russian traditions of imperialism. Russian territorial ambitions against Ukraine could result from a failure of reform in Russia itself. Historically, Russian and Soviet statesmen have found it impossible to combine genuine limited government at home with expansion abroad.

An independent Ukraine at peace with Russia enhances U.S. security by adding weight to the group of Central and East Europe states that lie between Western Europe and Russia.



Ukraine also has an important role to play in the economic and political development of the Black Sea states, particularly Romania, Georgia and Turkey. Ukraine could be a partner as the U.S. seeks to encourage stability, reform and economic development in these states.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

But we should recognize that there are concerns that must be addressed in pursuing this strategy. Many of the East European states have expressed reservations about being too closely associated with Ukraine until serious efforts at economic and political reform are evident. They feel that Ukraine in its present condition would be a drag on their own development, and that Ukraine has not made the same qualitative break with the Soviet past as they have.

Nevertheless, in its relations with Ukraine, the U.S. has an opportunity to help the Ukrainians build a lasting and democratic state on Russia's borders, further shoring up the fledgling community of reform states in Eastern and Central Europe.

The U.S. also has trade and economic interests in the Central/Eastern European region which are not limited to Russia alone. If Ukraine steps up to the hard choices involved in pursuing economic reform it has a reasonable chance to succeed. Its climate, successful agriculture prior to Stalin's collectivization, and the existence of an active Ukrainian diaspora who are eager to provide both capital (albeit limited) and know-how are assets for Ukrainian reformers. A Ukrainian market, linked to the growing markets of Poland and Hungary, could strengthen U.S. trade throughout the region and subsequently, benefit the U.S. economy.

But we should realize that there are risks in this strategy to U.S. domestic interests. For example, Ukraine has the potential to be a substantial market for U.S. agricultural-related products in the short run, but could in the medium and long term become a major competitor for agricultural sales to Western Europe and elsewhere.

By linking virtually all elements of our policy toward Ukraine to the nuclear issue, we have so far not been able to exploit the myriad of other interests we have in this region and have, to some degree, undermined these broader objectives. Calls in Ukraine to retain nuclear weapons stem principally from its broader concerns about its place in Europe, its relationship with Russia, and its future security, economic and political challenges. Thus far, our policies, including our denuclearization policies, have not sufficiently addressed these broader issues. In fact, it can be argued that the perception that the only issue in which the U.S. is interested is the nuclear question has had the paradoxical effect of convincing some Ukrainians:

- That these weapons have greater value for Ukraine's security than is really the case, and
- That the U.S. will completely lose interest in Ukraine and its problems once the nuclear weapons are no longer on Ukrainian territory.

The result has been to increase rather than decrease Ukraine's stubbornness on this issue.

Nonetheless, the main factor influencing those who truly think Ukraine should retain nuclear weapons is not the attention given this issue by the United States, but the Ukrainians' own conviction that Russia will eventually try to reassert its control over Ukraine. There are measures that we could take to help reassure the Ukrainians on this score--for example, taking a public stand against statements and actions by the Russian parliament that call into question Ukrainian territorial integrity--but such actions would not be well-received in Moscow.

Under no circumstances should Ukraine be encouraged to think that the new Administration would accept a nuclear Ukraine. That outcome would deal a potentially catastrophic blow to stability in the region and the entire arms control regime negotiated over the past 25 years. We must continue to make it clear that we are serious about holding Ukraine accountable to its international commitments, and that we place great importance on the early deactivation and dismantlement of the strategic offensive arms on its territory.

Parallel to this message, however, we must continue to acknowledge Ukraine as an important and independent European state. We should acknowledge Ukraine's legitimate security concerns, especially with regard to Russia, and stress that Kiev's real security lies both in taking its rightful place in Europe and in the West, and in fashioning good relations with its largest neighbor, Russia.

To the extent that the United States participates in this process, we should recognize that it imposes a difficult balancing act on the United States. While we will conceptually separate our policies for Ukraine and Russia, each policy, in practice, will have serious implications for the other. Both Ukraine and Russia will watch critically our treatment of the other. As a result, we must be aware that any decision we make benefitting one will potentially impose serious costs on the other side. Our aim should be to clearly and independently identify U.S. interests in Ukraine and in Russia, and to search for creative ways to minimize the damage when interests in one country conflict with those in the other.

II. Overall Objectives

The central short-term objective is to ensure Ukraine's fulfillment of its Lisbon pledges in the shortest possible time. Ukraine's delay in doing so is growing increasingly troublesome, and it is important that Ukraine adhere to the NPT well before the 1995 NPT Extension Conference. To achieve this objective, we should focus more on deeds, particularly those actions which reveal U.S. appreciation for Ukraine's real, underlying security concerns. By giving greater specificity to what we intend for our overall, long-term relationship with Ukraine while continuing to press for our Lisbon objective, we will increase our leverage in seeking it.

Our primary long-term objective, which should be developed in parallel to our Lisbon-related initiatives, is the transformation of Ukraine into a democratic, free market society fully integrated into Europe whose sense of security is supported by a defensive, civilian-led military and undergirded by stable relations with Russia.

Pursuing both longer and short-term objectives will require proceeding on several parallel tracks:

- Treat Ukraine as a Separate, Sovereign State: U.S. policy toward Ukraine should not be derivative of our policy toward Russia. We should be sensitive to the fact that the Ukrainians read our attitude toward their sovereignty as much from symbolic as from substantive acts. At the same time, the U.S. should adopt a no-tilt stance which actively discourages perceptions that the U.S. is "pro-Russian" or "pro-Ukrainian".
- Recognize Ukraine's Strategic Importance: Ukraine has the potential to be a major player in Europe and the Black Sea region, independent of Moscow. The U.S. has a strategic interest in promoting stability there. We need to relay this clearly to Ukraine in a way which dispels its suspicion that the U.S. would not be interested in Ukraine once the nuclear weapons are gone.
- Encourage Stable Ukrainian-Russian Relations: We have watched the Russian-Ukrainian dialogue unravel without a real strategy for intervention, except in the denuclearization/HEU area. Yet, the two have a full agenda of disagreements to resolve, many of which have repercussions in the nuclear debate. These include: Russia's conditional recognition of Ukrainian borders and calls by the Russian parliament for a re-examination of the status of Crimea; the implementation of the agreement to divide the Black Sea Fleet; differences over the nature of CIS obligations; the need to agree on levels and price of Russian oil and gas exported to Ukraine. We need to set a strategy where U.S. honest brokerage may help smooth out Russian-Ukrainian relations. Such intervention also might take place in partnership with other allies, such as the British. Our strategy must allow for the fact that U.S. involvement will not be desired by one side or the other in many cases. Even if we are asked to become involved, the Russian or Ukrainian side will often intend for us to weigh in on its side, not to be neutral or impartial.
- Draw Ukraine Toward Europe. Ukraine, with its strong historical ties to Europe, should be drawn increasingly into working with both established and emerging actors there. Its already existing ties to entities such as the CSCE, the EC and NACC should be built up, as well as its relations with individual countries, including its neighbors in Central Europe. Despite problems associated with it, Ukraine's participation in UNPROFOR is an example of

concrete actions which can help to integrate Ukraine into the West as a participating member, rather than a suppliant.

- Engage on Economic Issues: The United States should work to develop economic cooperation with Ukraine that is distinct from that being developed with Russia, but which also encourages these two states to work together in the economic sphere. The Kuchma government's economic reform package provides Washington with an opportunity to engage Ukraine in a more multi-dimensional relationship. Under any circumstances, bilateral assistance (beyond humanitarian programs) can only be provided after certain economic reform preconditions are met. We should identify and support reform-minded Ukrainians to help them follow through on commitments to reform. Moreover, the support of international financial institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and EBRD is linked to overall economic conditions. Once Ukraine makes progress in establishing macroeconomic discipline and promoting structural reform, the U.S. will push these institutions to provide the support needed to translate this progress into viable, established programs. This linkage to economic reform and macroeconomic discipline should, in the near term, be the prime factor shaping discussions with the Ukrainians on economic issues. In that way, assistance programs can be developed and some funds can begin to flow to illustrate the benefits of cooperation and reform. But as President Clinton has made clear since his first telephone call to President Kravchuk, a broad-gauged relationship with Kiev will not be possible unless Ukraine votes to ratify START I and accede to the NPT. This basic reality is the constant backdrop for progress in economic assistance: If Kiev does not live up to its Lisbon protocol commitments, then the United States will not commit to a normal economic relationship with Ukraine or deliver substantial assistance to it.

- Encourage Development of Rational Conventional Force Posture: Engage Ukraine more regularly on its longer term security concerns and help Kiev develop a vision of its future security posture. The development of a rational conventional force structure should encourage Ukraine to feel more secure and to consider alternatives to the retention of nuclear weapons.

III. Addressing a Crisis in Confidence

Recent reporting from Ukraine indicates that at least some critics in government and parliament are experiencing a crisis in confidence in the United States. Some parliamentarians and government officials have complained that Washington is imposing undue pressure on Ukraine to ratify START and accede to the NPT, and is favoring Moscow at the expense of Kiev. Longstanding complaints continue to be heard, e.g., that the United States sees Kiev only in the context of Moscow, not giving it its due as an independent and sovereign state.

Near-term U.S. policy must focus on addressing this crisis of confidence. Confidence-building measures developed for this purpose can be explicitly linked to U.S. objectives in the political, economic and security arenas. It must be stressed that such measures do not represent a change from our basic insistence on Ukrainian fulfillment of its Lisbon commitments. Rather, they represent an enhancement of the carrot-and-stick approach: confidence-building measures are used to create an environment in which the prospects for START ratification and NPT accession are enhanced. They also create more leverage in the form of up-and-running programs. If sticks are needed, there will be actual programs to turn off, rather than simply the promise of programs.

Like most confidence-building measures, the purpose of these is limited. They create an environment in which key policy priorities--in this case, fulfillment of Ukraine's Lisbon commitments--can be worked more productively. They do not represent a resolution of the policy problem itself.

The following are examples of confidence-building measures. The list is not exhaustive:

o Political:

- Work with the Ukrainians on the draft of a Ukrainian-American charter that will lay out the basic tenets of our long-term relationship. This charter would be signed once the Lisbon commitments are fulfilled.
- Revive the Lisbon II proposal to establish a foreign ministers' group, to be convened after all parties complete their Lisbon commitments, and to be used for high-level problemsolving during the denuclearization transition. In reviving the idea with the Russians, raise it also with the Ukrainians.
- Offer high-level U.S. good offices in mediating Russia-Ukraine problems, especially in areas where we have an interest such as the HEU sharing arrangements.
- Establish a multilateral dialogue to develop criteria by which Ukraine could be folded into at least some European Community institutions.
- Indicate to that U.S. efforts to do away with Cold War trade restraints such as COCOM will benefit Ukraine as well as Russia.

Objectives served: Treat Ukraine as separate, sovereign state; draw Ukraine toward Europe; encourage stable Ukrainian-Russian relations.

o Economic:

- Reinststate the second tranche of CCC credits, which will allow agricultural assistance to flow to Ukraine. Movement in this area has been made possible by resolution, for the time being, of the debt issue with Moscow.
- Communicate to Ukraine the funds that will potentially be available to them under major assistance efforts, e.g. Vancouver, Tokyo G-7, if the nuclear issue is resolved.
- Begin visible preparations for cooperation in privatization, making clear that the U.S. is prepared to launch a significant program as the reform effort allows. This could be pointed out in senior contacts and reinforced through advisors prepared to be on the ground in mid-May.
- Reinvigorate technical assistance to Ukraine, particularly to strengthen the private sector (e.g. through trade policy advisors or banking specialists; or by targetting small business development), and to promote sustainable energy and environmental practices.
- Establish a mechanism for high-level, regular dialogue in the economic and commercial areas, e.g. a bilateral business development committee.

Objectives served: Treat Ukraine as separate, sovereign state; engage on economic issues.

o Security:

- Move promptly to try to sign the Nunn-Lugar umbrella agreement, complete and sign agreements on small projects, and work out the terms of a major assistance package on SNDV dismantlement that could be quickly signed following START/NPT ratification.
- Make clear to Ukrainian officials that our offer of \$175 million in Nunn-Lugar assistance is a floor, and that we are prepared to listen to additional, concrete proposals for Nunn-Lugar aid. They should also be made aware, however, that other worthy claimants such as Belarus might come forward for these funds if the Ukrainians do not move on the Lisbon decisions.
- Begin to explore with Ukraine (and Russia) a program of international inspections and monitoring to account for Ukrainian concerns about

the storage of warheads and disposition of warhead material following the removal of warheads from missiles in Ukraine. Inspection teams might be formed under the auspices of the UN, IAEA, NACC, the Lisbon signatory states, or some combination of them.

- Establish a program of military contacts to help Ukraine build a defensively-oriented, civilian-controlled armed forces.

Objectives served: Treat Ukraine as a separate, sovereign state; recognize Ukraine's strategic importance; draw Ukraine toward Europe; encourage stable Ukrainian-Russian relations; encourage development of rational conventional force posture.

IV. Road Map for the Near Term

It will be particularly important to act in the next few weeks to turn words into deeds and to engage a wider range of people throughout Ukraine's political spectrum. We need to develop a public line that stresses some of the themes mentioned above as well as a private line for use with Ukrainian officials that will become the basic talking points for our official interactions. Too often we have focused on merely one or two contacts within the MFA and MOD to get our message across. Little effort has been made to engage parliamentarians, opposition figures, or even the public at large. Little effort has been directed at various regional leaders who represent increasingly important constituencies as Kiev debates key domestic and foreign policy issues.

- Presidential Statement: We ought to begin our effort with a Presidential statement or address. One approach would be to a telebridge to Ukraine that would take advantage of the President's success at engaging audiences through television. The President would both speak and take some Q's & A's from Ukrainian viewers.

The speech should clearly sketch the U.S. vision of a healthy long-term relationship with Ukraine, one that builds on mutual economic, cultural and political as well as security interests.

The President should draw on his campaign statement of December 1991, which called for U.S. recognition of Ukraine, to underline the U.S. interest in an independent Ukraine. The speech should also outline U.S. willingness to provide support for Ukrainian economic reform. It would stress that the broader relationship could not really get under way until ratification and accession were completed. Careful balancing of this point with the remainder of the speech will be important, since some Ukrainians have been complaining of undue U.S. pressure on START and NPT in recent weeks.

-- Debrief on Russia Summit/Information on START: Send a team to Kiev to debrief Ukrainian parliamentarians and government officials on the Vancouver Summit and the Tokyo G-7 Ministerial. This team should stress the elements of the economic package that will be available to Ukraine. Members of this team should stay in Kiev to further engage parliamentarians on START and NPT and answer questions/provide clarifications. Specific efforts should be made to engage opposition figures in the Ukrainian Rada.

-- Resume Regular, High-Level Political Dialogue: Ambassador Strobe Talbott should lead a Presidential mission (with an interagency team) to Kiev to initiate an ongoing dialogue on security and other issues. This would mark the first of the new Administration's regular, biannual discussions between the U.S. and Ukraine. Ambassador Talbott would also meet with appropriate leaders of the parliament and of the opposition.

An already agreed Bilateral Review Group (chaired by Larry Napper) would meet immediately afterward to review consular, embassy housekeeping and other bilateral issues.

-- Establish a Perry-Antonov Group on Defense Conversion: This group would seek to find ways for our governments to work together in the crucial area of defense conversion.

-- Revive the Kuchma visit: Invite Prime Minister Kuchma to meet with Vice President Gore and other administration officials.

-- Schedule a visit of Defense Minister Morozov: Morozov is one of the staunchest defenders of non-nuclear Ukraine, but is under pressure at home. A U.S. visit would shore him up. For maximum impact we should seek to do it in June, with a bilateral working group meeting either immediately before or immediately after.

-- Schedule a Bilateral Working Group: A BWG should be offered to Morozov during his proposed June visit and should take place before August. This meeting will allow us to better understand Ukraine's broader military restructuring challenges and priorities and to develop a concrete assistance plan for the near future.

-- Privatization action plan: Use the three-week AID privatization mission beginning May 17 as an inducement to move ahead on economic reform. This assistance was requested by the Minister of Defense Conversion, the Chairman of the State Property Fund, the Chairman of the Anti-Monopoly Committee, and the Deputy Minister of


Economy. The mission will develop an action plan for implementing existing Ukrainian privatization laws.

V. Long-Term Efforts:

- Develop a dialogue with Ukraine on the future of Europe and concepts for a post-Cold War pan-European security order. This dialogue should be developed in a multilateral forum such as the CSCE or NACC, but the issues can also be previewed and explored with the Ukrainians alone. At the same time, we should begin to explore internally the criteria for NATO membership for Ukraine, the other NIS, and East European states.
- Under the NACC, develop a nuclear planning group-like entity (NPG) to be used to discuss policy on nuclear questions, especially in the European context.
- Develop interaction on conventional force planning issues, perhaps beginning in the context of the Ukrainian-U.S. bilateral working group, but also taking advantage of multilateral forums such as the CSCE and NACC.
- Build a forum for interaction on high-technology issues that can be used to channel cooperation, including on export controls, as well as defense conversion efforts. This forum should encourage multilateral projects involving the NIS (e.g. Russia, Belarus), the United States, and other countries.
- Cooperate on peacekeeping, developing a program of joint training and exercises similar to that foreseen for Russia, and fully incorporating Ukraine into discussions of peacekeeping issues in the UN context.
- Engage Ukrainians in an on-going discussion of economic policy issues and provide technical assistance to spur change. Such discussions should involve a broad range of government and private individuals on both sides. Technical assistance would target reform in energy, environment, banking, defense conversion and privatization.
- Encourage Ukrainian resumption of discussions with the World Bank and IMF on Ukraine's economic reform effort.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

May 1, 1993



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH:

TOBY T. GATI

T.T.G. ok

FROM:

ROSE GOTTEMOELLER

RJ

SUBJECT:

U.S. Policy toward Ukraine

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2016-0128-M (1.11)

KBH 12/11/2019

Attached is a paper representing the finished product of our deliberations on U.S. policy toward Ukraine, and a memorandum outlining the main points and recommendations of the paper for the President. The interagency process proceeded smoothly, with little debate over the key issues addressed in the paper, and a great deal of productive discussion on how to build up Ukrainian confidence and move forward in the U.S.-Ukrainian relationship.

Although there was no controversy among agencies on the approach outlined, we hoped that you would quickly be able to review the results of the process with the President so that both he and you will be comfortable with the approach prior to Strobe Talbott's and Toby Gati's trip to Kiev next Friday, May 7. With your approval, they will use the policy laid out in the paper as the basic guide for their discussions.

In addition, Strobe and Toby would like to take up some particular short-term steps with the Ukrainians, if the President and you consent. The key proposal is the idea of a Presidential speech via a telebridge, which would also allow the President to answer questions from Ukrainian viewers. We envision that this speech would go a long way toward building up Ukrainian confidence in the United States, would impact positively on the current parliamentary debate over START and NPT, and would deal with residual bad feelings from the "Chicken Kiev" speech of two years ago.

We would like to suggest that Strobe and Toby meet with you early next week to discuss these issues in preparation for their trip. If you think it is necessary, they would also be pleased to meet with the President to review the paper and to hear whatever message he would like to convey to Ukrainian President Kravchuk.

Since you have discussed the question of U.S. policy toward Ukraine with Secretary of State Christopher and Secretary of Defense Aspin at one of your lunches, you might want to use the opportunity of your next lunch to note that both process and

outcome were very positive. Both DOD and State made extraordinarily valuable contributions.

Concurrence by: ^{*in brief*} Nick Burns

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab II Paper on U.S. Policy Toward Ukraine

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0128-M (1.12)
KBH 12/11/2019

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy toward Ukraine

This memorandum outlines the main points and recommendations of the just-completed interagency review of U.S. policy toward Ukraine. The process proceeded smoothly, with little debate over the key issues, and a great deal of productive discussion on how to build up Ukrainian confidence and move forward in the U.S.-Ukrainian relationship. The key points:

U.S. Interests

- An independent Ukraine at peace with Russia enhances U.S. security by strengthening the stability of the Central European states that lie between Western Europe and Russia. By contrast, continued disputes between Russia and Ukraine threaten the unity of Europe, which is one of the main achievements of the end of the cold war.
- Ukraine can contribute to the economic and political development of the Black Sea states, especially Romania, Georgia and Turkey. As the U.S. seeks to encourage stability, reform and development in these states, Ukraine could be a partner.
- If Ukraine steps up to the hard choices that will be involved in the reform of its economy, then U.S. assistance will contribute to the development of trade and investment between the U.S. and Ukraine. An expanding Ukrainian market, linked to the growing markets of Poland, Hungary and the other European states, could strengthen U.S. trade opportunities.

The denuclearization of Ukraine remains a key U.S. interest, because the alternative outcomes--a nuclear Ukraine, or a Ukraine professing nonnuclear status but stretching out the removal of the weapons from its territory--has profound implications. They will affect international nonproliferation regimes, the stability of Europe, and our future relationship with Russia. However, our overwhelming stress on this issue has had the paradoxical effect of convincing some Ukrainians of the value of nuclear weapons not

only as a source of security, but also as an attention-getter. In the final analysis, the main factor influencing Ukrainian views on this issue is not the attitude of the United States, but the Ukrainian conviction that Russia will eventually try to reassert control over Ukraine. To the extent that U.S. policy toward Moscow promotes a democratic and stable Russia that does not threaten its neighbors, it helps to address this key Ukrainian concern. However, U.S. policy cannot decisively resolve this problem. At best, we can actively work to encourage Ukraine and Russia to resolve their differences.

Main Objectives

While our central short-term objective is to ensure that Ukraine fulfills its commitments to ratify START and accede to the NPT in the shortest possible time, our long-term objective must be to transform of Ukraine into a democratic, free-market society fully integrated into Europe. Ukraine must be supported by a defensively oriented, civilian-led military and undergirded by stable relations with Russia.

Agencies agreed that pursuing both the long- and short-term objectives will require proceeding on several parallel tracks:

- Treat Ukraine as a separate, sovereign state;
- Recognize Ukraine's strategic importance;
- Encourage stable Ukrainian-Russian relations;
- Draw Ukraine toward Europe;
- Engage on economic issues;
- Encourage development of a rational conventional force posture.

Strategy

Recent reports from Kiev indicate that at least some parliamentarians and government officials are experiencing a crisis of confidence in the United States. They complain that Washington is imposing undue pressure on Ukraine to ratify START and accede to the NPT, and is favoring Moscow at the expense of Kiev.

While pursuing our main political and security objectives, the United States must also address this crisis of confidence. Confidence-building measures developed for this purpose can in fact serve our main objectives by increasing the volume and visibility of U.S. activity in Ukraine and enhancing our influence there.

Such measures do not represent a change from our basic insistence on Ukrainian fulfillment of its START and NPT commitments. Rather, they create an environment in which key policy priorities

can be worked more productively. They are not a resolution of the nuclear problem, nor a downgrading of its priority to us, but a way to deal simultaneously with all aspects of Ukrainian-American relations.

Agencies crafted a broad menu of confidence-building measures in the political, economic and security spheres. Some, such as a Presidential speech, can serve as symbols of the renewed priority that we attach to the relationship. Others indicate a desire to broaden our involvement in and support of Ukraine. They include such measures as offering U.S. mediation in Russia-Ukraine negotiations; reinstating credits for agricultural assistance (CCC program); and establishing a program of military contacts. All will serve both our near-term strategy to build confidence and our longer term effort to develop Ukraine's independence and draw it toward Europe.

Near Term Implementation

The next few weeks will be critical, for the Ukrainian parliament will be actively debating START and NPT. As we work to improve the overall climate, we will develop a public line that stresses the value to both sides of a broad-gauged relationship.

The emphasis will be on engaging elements of Ukraine's political spectrum that we have neglected in the past: parliamentarians, opposition leaders, the public at large. Proposed elements of a roadmap:

- Presidential statement. A clear step in building Ukrainian confidence would be a speech by the President that would clearly sketch the U.S. vision of a healthy, long-term relationship with Kiev, and would counteract the residual ill feelings from the "Chicken Kiev" speech of two years ago. One approach would be a telebridge that would take advantage of the President's success at engaging audiences through television. The President could both speak and take some questions from Ukrainian viewers.
- High-level dialogue. Strobe Talbott and Toby Gati will be travelling to Kiev on May 7 to initiate a high-level dialogue on security, economic and political issues. We suggest that their trip be designated a Presidential mission. We will make it clear to the Ukrainians that this marks the first of a series of high-level visits and discussions with Ukraine.
- Information on START and Vancouver/Tokyo. USG specialists will be in Kiev for the week of May 2, to engage parliamentarians on START and NPT, provide basic information and answer questions on the treaties. Other delegations could visit later to provide information on the elements of the Vancouver and Tokyo packages that might be available to Ukraine.

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-- Other high-level visits. Secretary Aspin is inviting Defense Minister Morozov to visit the United States in June. We might also revive the visit of Prime Minister Kuchma by inviting him to meet with Vice President Gore and other administration officials. Another high-level meeting might be scheduled in the course of establishing a group on defense conversion headed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Perry and Minister of Defense Conversion.

Long Term Development

Our renewed interaction with Ukraine will begin quickly, with highly visible events that will restart the dialogue in a positive way and build up Ukrainian confidence in the relationship. The long term, however, will be just as important and more challenging, for that is the context in which the conceptual and practical basis will be built for an independent Ukraine that is well-integrated into Europe.

In the longer term, therefore, we will need to develop multiple forums for regular dialogue with Ukraine, much like the multi-level relationships that we have with the Russians. To the maximum extent possible, we should coordinate our policies toward Russia and Ukraine, in a way that serves our basic objective of helping them toward a stable relationship. Important focal points for attention will be the role of Ukraine and Russia in the future of Europe, conventional force planning, nuclear issues in the European context, interaction on high-technology projects, cooperation on peacekeeping, and economic cooperation.

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U.S. POLICY TOWARD UKRAINE


I. U.S. Interests

If not for the presence of Soviet nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine, the full range of U.S. interests in the region would have been more immediately apparent. In the aftermath of the collapse of the USSR, however, our pressing interest in single command and control of nuclear weapons, the denuclearization of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakstan, and the reduction of remaining Russian nuclear weapons to START II levels constituted an understandable focus of attention. The fate of Yeltsin's effort in Russia constituted a second, equally important preoccupation.

Recognizing our continued interest in these two objectives, the U.S. has other critical interests beyond them. The maintenance of an independent, stable Ukraine is key, for several reasons: Ukraine, a country the size of France and rich in potential, sees itself as a bridge between Russia and Europe. Without reference to the nuclear issue, Ukraine's conventional army is the largest in Europe. An independent Ukrainian foreign policy can serve as a counterweight to Russia, for even a democratic Russia is likely to define its interests in these regions in ways not identical to our own. Finally, continued disputes between Russia and Ukraine, left unattended, will threaten the stability and unity of Europe, preventing us from consolidating one of the main achievements of the end of the cold war.

The separation and continued independence of Ukraine from Moscow is important for cutting an important psychological link to the Soviet and older Russian traditions of imperialism. Russian territorial ambitions against Ukraine could result from a failure of reform in Russia itself. Historically, Russian and Soviet statesmen have found it impossible to combine genuine limited government at home with expansion abroad.

An independent Ukraine at peace with Russia enhances U.S. security by adding weight to the group of Central and East Europe states that lie between Western Europe and Russia.



Ukraine also has an important role to play in the economic and political development of the Black Sea states, particularly Romania, Georgia and Turkey. Ukraine could be a partner as the U.S. seeks to encourage stability, reform and economic development in these states.

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But we should recognize that there are concerns that must be addressed in pursuing this strategy. Many of the East European states have expressed reservations about being too closely associated with Ukraine until serious efforts at economic and political reform are evident. They feel that Ukraine in its present condition would be a drag on their own development, and that Ukraine has not made the same qualitative break with the Soviet past as they have.

Nevertheless, in its relations with Ukraine, the U.S. has an opportunity to help the Ukrainians build a lasting and democratic state on Russia's borders, further shoring up the fledgling community of reform states in Eastern and Central Europe.

The U.S. also has trade and economic interests in the Central/Eastern European region which are not limited to Russia alone. If Ukraine steps up to the hard choices involved in pursuing economic reform it has a reasonable chance to succeed. Its climate, successful agriculture prior to Stalin's collectivization, and the existence of an active Ukrainian diaspora who are eager to provide both capital (albeit limited) and know-how are assets for Ukrainian reformers. A Ukrainian market, linked to the growing markets of Poland and Hungary, could strengthen U.S. trade throughout the region and subsequently, benefit the U.S. economy.

But we should realize that there are risks in this strategy to U.S. domestic interests. For example, Ukraine has the potential to be a substantial market for U.S. agricultural-related products in the short run, but could in the medium and long term become a major competitor for agricultural sales to Western Europe and elsewhere.

By linking virtually all elements of our policy toward Ukraine to the nuclear issue, we have so far not been able to exploit the myriad of other interests we have in this region and have, to some degree, undermined these broader objectives. Calls in Ukraine to retain nuclear weapons stem principally from its broader concerns about its place in Europe, its relationship with Russia, and its future security, economic and political challenges. Thus far, our policies, including our denuclearization policies, have not sufficiently addressed these broader issues. In fact, it can be argued that the perception that the only issue in which the U.S. is interested is the nuclear question has had the paradoxical effect of convincing some Ukrainians:

- That these weapons have greater value for Ukraine's security than is really the case, and
- That the U.S. will completely lose interest in Ukraine and its problems once the nuclear weapons are no longer on Ukrainian territory.

The result has been to increase rather than decrease Ukraine's stubbornness on this issue.

Nonetheless, the main factor influencing those who truly think Ukraine should retain nuclear weapons is not the attention given this issue by the United States, but the Ukrainians' own conviction that Russia will eventually try to reassert its control over Ukraine. There are measures that we could take to help reassure the Ukrainians on this score--for example, taking a public stand against statements and actions by the Russian parliament that call into question Ukrainian territorial integrity--but such actions would not be well-received in Moscow.

Under no circumstances should Ukraine be encouraged to think that the new Administration would accept a nuclear Ukraine. That outcome would deal a potentially catastrophic blow to stability in the region and the entire arms control regime negotiated over the past 25 years. We must continue to make it clear that we are serious about holding Ukraine accountable to its international commitments, and that we place great importance on the early deactivation and dismantlement of the strategic offensive arms on its territory.

Parallel to this message, however, we must continue to acknowledge Ukraine as an important and independent European state. We should acknowledge Ukraine's legitimate security concerns, especially with regard to Russia, and stress that Kiev's real security lies both in taking its rightful place in Europe and in the West, and in fashioning good relations with its largest neighbor, Russia.

To the extent that the United States participates in this process, we should recognize that it imposes a difficult balancing act on the United States. While we will conceptually separate our policies for Ukraine and Russia, each policy, in practice, will have serious implications for the other. Both Ukraine and Russia will watch critically our treatment of the other. As a result, we must be aware that any decision we make benefitting one will potentially impose serious costs on the other side. Our aim should be to clearly and independently identify U.S. interests in Ukraine and in Russia, and to search for creative ways to minimize the damage when interests in one country conflict with those in the other.

II. Overall Objectives

The central short-term objective is to ensure Ukraine's fulfillment of its Lisbon pledges in the shortest possible time. Ukraine's delay in doing so is growing increasingly troublesome, and it is important that Ukraine adhere to the NPT well before the 1995 NPT Extension Conference. To achieve this objective, we should focus more on deeds, particularly those actions which reveal U.S. appreciation for Ukraine's real, underlying security concerns. By giving greater specificity to what we intend for our overall, long-term relationship with Ukraine while continuing to press for our Lisbon objective, we will increase our leverage in seeking it.

Our primary long-term objective, which should be developed in parallel to our Lisbon-related initiatives, is the transformation of Ukraine into a democratic, free market society fully integrated into Europe whose sense of security is supported by a defensive, civilian-led military and undergirded by stable relations with Russia.

Pursuing both longer and short-term objectives will require proceeding on several parallel tracks:

- Treat Ukraine as a Separate, Sovereign State: U.S. policy toward Ukraine should not be derivative of our policy toward Russia. We should be sensitive to the fact that the Ukrainians read our attitude toward their sovereignty as much from symbolic as from substantive acts. At the same time, the U.S. should adopt a no-tilt stance which actively discourages perceptions that the U.S. is "pro-Russian" or "pro-Ukrainian".
- Recognize Ukraine's Strategic Importance: Ukraine has the potential to be a major player in Europe and the Black Sea region, independent of Moscow. The U.S. has a strategic interest in promoting stability there. We need to relay this clearly to Ukraine in a way which dispels its suspicion that the U.S. would not be interested in Ukraine once the nuclear weapons are gone.
- Encourage Stable Ukrainian-Russian Relations: We have watched the Russian-Ukrainian dialogue unravel without a real strategy for intervention, except in the denuclearization/HEU area. Yet, the two have a full agenda of disagreements to resolve, many of which have repercussions in the nuclear debate. These include: Russia's conditional recognition of Ukrainian borders and calls by the Russian parliament for a re-examination of the status of Crimea; the implementation of the agreement to divide the Black Sea Fleet; differences over the nature of CIS obligations; the need to agree on levels and price of Russian oil and gas exported to Ukraine. We need to set a strategy where U.S. honest brokerage may help smooth out Russian-Ukrainian relations. Such intervention also might take place in partnership with other allies, such as the British. Our strategy must allow for the fact that U.S. involvement will not be desired by one side or the other in many cases. Even if we are asked to become involved, the Russian or Ukrainian side will often intend for us to weigh in on its side, not to be neutral or impartial.
- Draw Ukraine Toward Europe. Ukraine, with its strong historical ties to Europe, should be drawn increasingly into working with both established and emerging actors there. Its already existing ties to entities such as the CSCE, the EC and NACC should be built up, as well as its relations with individual countries, including its neighbors in Central Europe. Despite problems associated with it, Ukraine's participation in UNPROFOR is an example of

concrete actions which can help to integrate Ukraine into the West as a participating member, rather than a suppliant.

- Engage on Economic Issues: The United States should work to develop economic cooperation with Ukraine that is distinct from that being developed with Russia, but which also encourages these two states to work together in the economic sphere. The Kuchma government's economic reform package provides Washington with an opportunity to engage Ukraine in a more multi-dimensional relationship. Under any circumstances, bilateral assistance (beyond humanitarian programs) can only be provided after certain economic reform preconditions are met. We should identify and support reform-minded Ukrainians to help them follow through on commitments to reform. Moreover, the support of international financial institutions such as the IMF, World Bank and EBRD is linked to overall economic conditions. Once Ukraine makes progress in establishing macroeconomic discipline and promoting structural reform, the U.S. will push these institutions to provide the support needed to translate this progress into viable, established programs. This linkage to economic reform and macroeconomic discipline should, in the near term, be the prime factor shaping discussions with the Ukrainians on economic issues. In that way, assistance programs can be developed and some funds can begin to flow to illustrate the benefits of cooperation and reform. But as President Clinton has made clear since his first telephone call to President Kravchuk, a broad-gauged relationship with Kiev will not be possible unless Ukraine votes to ratify START I and accede to the NPT. This basic reality is the constant backdrop for progress in economic assistance: If Kiev does not live up to its Lisbon protocol commitments, then the United States will not commit to a normal economic relationship with Ukraine or deliver substantial assistance to it.

- Encourage Development of Rational Conventional Force Posture: Engage Ukraine more regularly on its longer term security concerns and help Kiev develop a vision of its future security posture. The development of a rational conventional force structure should encourage Ukraine to feel more secure and to consider alternatives to the retention of nuclear weapons.

III. Addressing a Crisis in Confidence

Recent reporting from Ukraine indicates that at least some critics in government and parliament are experiencing a crisis in confidence in the United States. Some parliamentarians and government officials have complained that Washington is imposing undue pressure on Ukraine to ratify START and accede to the NPT, and is favoring Moscow at the expense of Kiev. Longstanding complaints continue to be heard, e.g., that the United States sees Kiev only in the context of MOSCOW, not giving it its due as an independent and sovereign state.

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Near-term U.S. policy must focus on addressing this crisis of confidence. Confidence-building measures developed for this purpose can be explicitly linked to U.S. objectives in the political, economic and security arenas. It must be stressed that such measures do not represent a change from our basic insistence on Ukrainian fulfillment of its Lisbon commitments. Rather, they represent an enhancement of the carrot-and-stick approach: confidence-building measures are used to create an environment in which the prospects for START ratification and NPT accession are enhanced. They also create more leverage in the form of up-and-running programs. If sticks are needed, there will be actual programs to turn off, rather than simply the promise of programs.

Like most confidence-building measures, the purpose of these is limited. They create an environment in which key policy priorities--in this case, fulfillment of Ukraine's Lisbon commitments--can be worked more productively. They do not represent a resolution of the policy problem itself.

The following are examples of confidence-building measures. The list is not exhaustive:

o Political:

- Work with the Ukrainians on the draft of a Ukrainian-American charter that will lay out the basic tenets of our long-term relationship. This charter would be signed once the Lisbon commitments are fulfilled.
- Revive the Lisbon II proposal to establish a foreign ministers' group, to be convened after all parties complete their Lisbon commitments, and to be used for high-level problemsolving during the denuclearization transition. In reviving the idea with the Russians, raise it also with the Ukrainians.
- Offer high-level U.S. good offices in mediating Russia-Ukraine problems, especially in areas where we have an interest such as the HEU sharing arrangements.
- Establish a multilateral dialogue to develop criteria by which Ukraine could be folded into at least some European Community institutions.
- Indicate to that U.S. efforts to do away with Cold War trade restraints such as COCOM will benefit Ukraine as well as Russia.

Objectives served: Treat Ukraine as separate, sovereign state; draw Ukraine toward Europe; encourage stable Ukrainian-Russian relations.

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o Economic:

- Reinststate the second tranche of CCC credits, which will allow agricultural assistance to flow to Ukraine. Movement in this area has been made possible by resolution, for the time being, of the debt issue with Moscow.
- Communicate to Ukraine the funds that will potentially be available to them under major assistance efforts, e.g. Vancouver, Tokyo G-7, if the nuclear issue is resolved.
- Begin visible preparations for cooperation in privatization, making clear that the U.S. is prepared to launch a significant program as the reform effort allows. This could be pointed out in senior contacts and reinforced through advisors prepared to be on the ground in mid-May.
- Reinvigorate technical assistance to Ukraine, particularly to strengthen the private sector (e.g. through trade policy advisors or banking specialists; or by targetting small business development), and to promote sustainable energy and environmental practices.
- Establish a mechanism for high-level, regular dialogue in the economic and commercial areas, e.g. a bilateral business development committee.

Objectives served: Treat Ukraine as separate, sovereign state; engage on economic issues.

o Security:

- Move promptly to try to sign the Nunn-Lugar umbrella agreement, complete and sign agreements on small projects, and work out the terms of a major assistance package on SNDV dismantlement that could be quickly signed following START/NPT ratification.
- Make clear to Ukrainian officials that our offer of \$175 million in Nunn-Lugar assistance is a floor, and that we are prepared to listen to additional, concrete proposals for Nunn-Lugar aid. They should also be made aware, however, that other worthy claimants such as Belarus might come forward for these funds if the Ukrainians do not move on the Lisbon decisions.
- Begin to explore with Ukraine (and Russia) a program of international inspections and monitoring to account for Ukrainian concerns about

the storage of warheads and disposition of warhead material following the removal of warheads from missiles in Ukraine. Inspection teams might be formed under the auspices of the UN, IAEA, NACC, the Lisbon signatory states, or some combination of them.

- Establish a program of military contacts to help Ukraine build a defensively-oriented, civilian-controlled armed forces.

Objectives served: Treat Ukraine as a separate, sovereign state; recognize Ukraine's strategic importance; draw Ukraine toward Europe; encourage stable Ukrainian-Russian relations; encourage development of rational conventional force posture.

IV. Road Map for the Near Term

It will be particularly important to act in the next few weeks to turn words into deeds and to engage a wider range of people throughout Ukraine's political spectrum. We need to develop a public line that stresses some of the themes mentioned above as well as a private line for use with Ukrainian officials that will become the basic talking points for our official interactions. Too often we have focused on merely one or two contacts within the MFA and MOD to get our message across. Little effort has been made to engage parliamentarians, opposition figures, or even the public at large. Little effort has been directed at various regional leaders who represent increasingly important constituencies as Kiev debates key domestic and foreign policy issues.

- Presidential Statement: We ought to begin our effort with a Presidential statement or address. One approach would be to a telebridge to Ukraine that would take advantage of the President's success at engaging audiences through television. The President would both speak and take some Q's & A's from Ukrainian viewers.

The speech should clearly sketch the U.S. vision of a healthy long-term relationship with Ukraine, one that builds on mutual economic, cultural and political as well as security interests.

The President should draw on his campaign statement of December 1991, which called for U.S. recognition of Ukraine, to underline the U.S. interest in an independent Ukraine. The speech should also outline U.S. willingness to provide support for Ukrainian economic reform. It would stress that the broader relationship could not really get under way until ratification and accession were completed. Careful balancing of this point with the remainder of the speech will be important, since some Ukrainians have been complaining of undue U.S. pressure on START and NPT in recent weeks.

- Debrief on Russia Summit/Information on START: Send a team to Kiev to debrief Ukrainian parliamentarians and government officials on the Vancouver Summit and the Tokyo G-7 Ministerial. This team should stress the elements of the economic package that will be available to Ukraine. Members of this team should stay in Kiev to further engage parliamentarians on START and NPT and answer questions/provide clarifications. Specific efforts should be made to engage opposition figures in the Ukrainian Rada.

- Resume Regular, High-Level Political Dialogue: Ambassador Strobe Talbott should lead a Presidential mission (with an interagency team) to Kiev to initiate an ongoing dialogue on security and other issues. This would mark the first of the new Administration's regular, biannual discussions between the U.S. and Ukraine. Ambassador Talbott would also meet with appropriate leaders of the parliament and of the opposition.

An already agreed Bilateral Review Group (chaired by Larry Napper) would meet immediately afterward to review consular, embassy housekeeping and other bilateral issues.

- Establish a Perry-Antonov Group on Defense Conversion: This group would seek to find ways for our governments to work together in the crucial area of defense conversion.

- Revive the Kuchma visit: Invite Prime Minister Kuchma to meet with Vice President Gore and other administration officials.

- Schedule a visit of Defense Minister Morozov: Morozov is one of the staunchest defenders of non-nuclear Ukraine, but is under pressure at home. A U.S. visit would shore him up. For maximum impact we should seek to do it in June, with a bilateral working group meeting either immediately before or immediately after.

- Schedule a Bilateral Working Group: A BWG should be offered to Morozov during his proposed June visit and should take place before August. This meeting will allow us to better understand Ukraine's broader military restructuring challenges and priorities and to develop a concrete assistance plan for the near future.

- Privatization action plan: Use the three-week AID privatization mission beginning May 17 as an inducement to move ahead on economic reform. This assistance was requested by the Minister of Defense Conversion, the Chairman of the State Property Fund, the Chairman of the Anti-Monopoly Committee, and the Deputy Minister of

Economy. The mission will develop an action plan for implementing existing Ukrainian privatization laws.

V. Long-Term Efforts:

- Develop a dialogue with Ukraine on the future of Europe and concepts for a post-Cold War pan-European security order. This dialogue should be developed in a multilateral forum such as the CSCE or NACC, but the issues can also be previewed and explored with the Ukrainians alone. At the same time, we should begin to explore internally the criteria for NATO membership for Ukraine, the other NIS, and East European states.
- Under the NACC, develop a nuclear planning group-like entity (NPG) to be used to discuss policy on nuclear questions, especially in the European context.
- Develop interaction on conventional force planning issues, perhaps beginning in the context of the Ukrainian-U.S. bilateral working group, but also taking advantage of multilateral forums such as the CSCE and NACC.
- Build a forum for interaction on high-technology issues that can be used to channel cooperation, including on export controls, as well as defense conversion efforts. This forum should encourage multilateral projects involving the NIS (e.g. Russia, Belarus), the United States, and other countries.
- Cooperate on peacekeeping, developing a program of joint training and exercises similar to that foreseen for Russia, and fully incorporating Ukraine into discussions of peacekeeping issues in the UN context.
- Engage Ukrainians in an on-going discussion of economic policy issues and provide technical assistance to spur change. Such discussions should involve a broad range of government and private individuals on both sides. Technical assistance would target reform in energy, environment, banking, defense conversion and privatization.
- Encourage Ukrainian resumption of discussions with the World Bank and IMF on Ukraine's economic reform effort.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF LANGUAGE SERVICES

Translating Division

LS No. 141653
JS
Ukrainian

PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE

May 14, 1993
Kiev

Dear Mr. President:

I was pleased to learn from your letter of May 7, which was conveyed to me by Ambassador Strobe Talbott during our meeting on May 10, about your desire to expand relations between the United States and Ukraine.

That is fully in accord with our own wishes, and I avail myself of this opportunity to reaffirm this fact.

I trust that the latest Ukraine-U.S. consultations in Kiev helped you to gain a better understanding of the true nature of Ukraine's foreign policy as an independent state, its national interests, and the exceedingly complex problems that have arisen at this crucial juncture in its history, to identify the obstacles hindering the development of Ukrainian-American relations, and to plan joint steps aimed at attaining a new level of cooperation.

His Excellency
Mr. Bill Clinton
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

I fully support your proposal to hold another bilateral meeting in the near future with the participation of my representatives. At the same time, Mr. President, I would be glad to welcome you in Ukraine.

I wholeheartedly share the desire of your Administration to begin "a new phase in our mutual relations," and am willing for my part to promote this in every way possible. I am convinced that this endeavor will be furthered by your representative's proposal for the drafting of a Charter or Treaty Regarding the Basis of Cooperation between Ukraine and the United States of America as well as other documents that would create the necessary legal basis for the encouragement and strengthening of our relations.

I expect that we shall soon witness the practical implementation of these plans.

Respectfully yours,
[s] Leonid Kravchuk



ПРЕЗИДЕНТ УКРАЇНИ

14 травня 1993 року
м.К и ї в

Шановний Пане Президенте,

Нам було приємно дізнатися з Вашого листа від 7 травня цього року, якого мені передав Посол Струоб Телботт під час нашої зустрічі 10 травня, про Ваше бажання розширити відносини між Сполученими Штатами Америки і Україною.

Це повністю співпадає і з нашим бажанням, і я користуюсь цією нагодою, щоб ще раз це підтвердити.

Гадаю, що останні українсько-американські консультації в Києві, допомогли краще і глибше зрозуміти дійсну сутність зовнішньої політики України як нової незалежної держави, її національні інтереси і ті надзвичайно складні проблеми, які постали в цей винятково відповідальний час нашої історії, визначити перешкоди, що постали на шляху розвитку українсько-американських відносин, і намітити спільні кроки по виходу на новий рівень співробітництва.

Цілком підтримую Вашу пропозицію провести в найближчому часі чергову двосторонню зустріч за участю моїх представників. В той же час був би широким радієм вітати Вас, шановний Пане Президенте, в Україні.

Його Високоповажності
Пану Біллу КЛІНТОНУ,
Президентові
Сполучених Штатів Америки
м. Вашингтон

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Я від щирого серця поділяю прагнення очолюваної Вами Адміністрації започаткувати "новий етап у наших взаємовідносинах" і з свого боку готовий всіляко цьому сприяти. Перекоаний, що цьому буде відповідати внесена Вашим представником пропозиція щодо укладення Хартії чи Договору про основи співробітництва між Україною і Сполученими Штатами Америки, як і інших документів, які створили б необхідну правову основу для активізації і поглиблення наших відносин.

Сподіваюсь, що ми найближчим часом станемо свідками практичної реалізації цих намірів.

З найліпшими побажаннями і повагою


Леонід КРАВЧУК

Item Subject: LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT

PAGE 01 STATE 0246255 121856Z AUG 93

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT

1. ~~1~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. PLEASE DELIVER ASAP THE LETTER IN PARA 3 BELOW FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK IN RESPONSE TO THE LATTER'S CORRESPONDENCE OF JULY 2.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I WANTED TO LET YOU KNOW HOW PLEASED I WAS WITH LAST MONTH'S TALKS BETWEEN DEFENSE MINISTER MOROZOV AND SECRETARY ASPIN. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER TARASYUK AND AMBASSADOR TALBOTT ALSO HAD GOOD EXCHANGES HERE IN WASHINGTON. THESE HAVE GIVEN NEW MOMENTUM AND SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT TO OUR BILATERAL DIALOGUE ON POLITICAL AND SECURITY QUESTIONS. MOREOVER, THE CHARTER ON U.S.-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS THAT WE ARE DRAFTING WILL SET OUT A FRAMEWORK FOR A COMPREHENSIVE RELATIONSHIP OF VALUE TO BOTH SIDES AS WELL AS MAKE CLEAR U.S. SUPPORT FOR AN INDEPENDENT, DEMOCRATIC AND SECURE UKRAINE.

YOUR LETTER TO ME OF JULY 2 RAISED A NUMBER OF ECONOMIC ISSUES IN CONNECTION WITH THE TOKYO SUMMIT OF THE GROUP OF SEVEN. LET ME ASSURE YOU THAT THE SEVEN ARE FULLY COMMITTED TO SUPPORTING UKRAINE'S MOVE TO A MARKET ECONOMY. I URGE YOU TO WORK WITH THE IMF ON A SYSTEMIC TRANSFORMATION FACILITY AGREEMENT. THIS WOULD BE A VERY CONSTRUCTIVE FIRST STEP TOWARDS STABILIZATION OF UKRAINE'S ECONOMY. THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED TO EXPANDING BILATERAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND SUPPORTING EFFORTS AT RESTRUCTURING AND PRIVATIZATION IN YOUR ECONOMY.

WHILE WE ARE WORKING HARD TO BROADEN OUR RELATIONSHIP, YOU WILL APPRECIATE THAT THE ISSUE OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN UKRAINE REMAINS A CRITICAL ONE FOR THE UNITED STATES. WE CONSIDER YOUR GOVERNMENT'S DECISION TO BEGIN EARLY DEACTIVATION A VERY POSITIVE STEP, ONE THAT WE ARE READY TO SUPPORT WITH ASSISTANCE FOR MISSILE DISMANTLEMENT AND FUEL DISPOSITION, AS SOON AS THE NECESSARY NUNN-LUGAR AGREEMENTS ARE IN FORCE.

AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE DISCUSSED THE POSSIBILITY OF AN UNDERSTANDING AMONG THE UNITED STATES, UKRAINE AND RUSSIA ON DEACTIVATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON YOUR TERRITORY. IT WOULD PROVIDE FOR TEMPORARY STORAGE OF WARHEADS IN UKRAINE,

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PER E.O. 13526

2016-0123-M (1.20)

KBH 12/11/2019

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Item Subject: LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT

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AS SECRETARY ASPIN AND AMBASSADOR TALBOTT HAVE EMPHASIZED TO YOUR COLLEAGUES, WE BELIEVE IT CRUCIAL THAT EARLY DEACTIVATION APPLY TO ALL THREE NUCLEAR-WEAPONS SYSTEMS ON YOUR TERRITORY -- THE SS-19 AND SS-24 ICBMS, AND BOMBER WEAPONS. WE ARE EAGER TO CONTINUE TECHNICAL DISCUSSIONS ON WHAT THIS MIGHT MEAN IN PRACTICE. BUT I WANTED YOU TO KNOW DIRECTLY AND PERSONALLY FROM ME THAT I ATTACH THE HIGHEST POLITICAL IMPORTANCE TO THIS ISSUE, AND I HOPE YOU WILL DO EVERYTHING IN YOUR POWER TO ENABLE OUR GOVERNMENTS TO COME SWIFTLY TO A RESOLUTION OF THE MATTER SO THAT WE CAN PROCEED WITH OUR COOPERATION ON A VARIETY OF IMPORTANT FRONTS.

WE BOTH FACE VERY BUSY SCHEDULES THIS AUTUMN. HOWEVER, IF THERE IS A TRILATERAL UNDERSTANDING AND PROGRESS TOWARDS EARLY DEACTIVATION OF ALL THREE TYPES OF

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS IN UKRAINE, WE SHOULD CONSIDER A MEETING IN WASHINGTON IN THE FALL, PERHAPS AS EARLY AS SEPTEMBER.

SINCERELY,

WILLIAM J. CLINTON
CHRISTOPHER

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PAGE 01 STATE 246255 121856Z

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Item Subject: LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT

@INFO: S(00) SS(00) EUR(01) INRX(01) X(00)
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TAGS: PARM, PREL, UP

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2016-0128-M (1.23)

KBH 12/11/2019

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EUR/ISCA:LNAPPER

EUR/RPM:DCAGAN

T:JTIMBIE S/S-O:CHEINECK

PM/STP:JSTACY

OSD:SGARNETT

NSC:KAKENNEY

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TO AMEMBASSY KIEV IMMEDIATE

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TAGS: PARM, PREL, UP

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

03-Jul-1993 09:38 EDT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR:

VAX_MAIL@OEOB
SANNER@A1@OEOB
GOTTEMOELLER@A1@OEOB
FICKLIN@A1@OEOB

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0128-M (1.26)
KBH 12/11/2019

FROM: White House Situation Room
(WHSR@A1@WHSR)

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK TO PRESIDENT

<DIST>

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG
SIT: FICKLIN FILE GOTTEMOELLER SANNER SUM SUM2 VAX WHSR_IN

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AMEMBASSY KIEV

<TO>

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0781

RHEHAAA/THE WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

<SUBJ>

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK TO PRESIDENT

CLINTON - JULY 2, 1993

<TEXT>

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 KIEV 004034

OP CENTER PLEASE ALERT EUR/ISCA DUTY OFFICER

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ISCA NAPPER, S/NIS/TALBOTT/EDELMAN,

T/TIMBIE

WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC/LAKE/GOTTEMOELLER, SIT ROOM/BETH

SANNER

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, PARM, START, MNUC, KSUM, UP

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK TO PRESIDENT

CLINTON - JULY 2, 1993

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: ON JULY 3, THE EMBASSY RECEIVED A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK TO PRESIDENT CLINTON, IN ENGLISH, WITH AN ACCOMPANYING NOTE FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN UKRAINIAN. TEXTS FOLLOW. END

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SUMMARY.

3. BEGIN INFORMAL EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF TEXT OF MFA NOTE:

VNES/49-203

THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF UKRAINE EXPRESSES ITS RESPECT TO THE EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN UKRAINE AND, IN CONNECTION WITH THE UPCOMING SUMMIT AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL IN TOKYO, HAS THE HONOR TO GIVE A TRANSLATION IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE OF A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE L. M. KRAVCHUK TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MR. BILL CLINTON.

THE ORIGINAL OF THE LETTER WILL BE SENT LATER.

THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF UKRAINE TAKES THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW TO THE EMBASSY ASSURANCES OF ITS HIGHEST ESTEEM.

END TEXT OF NOTE.

4. BEGIN ENGLISH TEXT OF THE LETTER, AS RECEIVED:

JULY 2, 1993

KYIV

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

THE LEADERS OF THE SEVEN WILL HOLD A MEETING FROM 7 TO 9 JULY IN TOKYO, WHICH DRAWS ATTENTION OF THE WHOLE WORLD. SUCH AN INTEREST TO THIS EVENT IS CLEARLY UNDERSTANDABLE AS FAR AS THIS FORUM, GENERALLY, HAS A GREAT IMPACT NOT ONLY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARTICIPATING STATES BUT INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN A WHOLE.

UKRAINE WAITS FOR THE OUTCOME OF THIS MEETING WITH DEEP INTEREST. WISHING IT WAS SUCCESSFUL, I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE SOME OBSERVATIONS.

1. AS A NEW EUROPEAN STATE, UKRAINE FIRMLY INTENDS TO INTEGRATE STEP-BY-STEP INTO EUROPEAN AND WORLD ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, TO DEEPEN ITS RELATIONS OF COMPREHENSIVE COOPERATION WITH STATE MEMBERS OF THE SEVEN. WE SEEK TO DEVELOP OUR RELATIONS IN THE SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP, MUTUAL RESPECT AND PARTNERSHIP ON EQUAL FOOTING. UKRAINE'S ECONOMIC, TECHNOLOGICAL AND HUMAN POTENTIAL IS LARGE ENOUGH TO MAKE SUCH A COOPERATION MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL AND MULTIFACETED.

HOWEVER UKRAINE, AS ANY NEWLY EMERGED STATE, IS GOING THROUGH A COMPLEX TRANSITIONAL PERIOD OF STATE FORMATION. TODAY ITS ECONOMY EXPERIENCES THE MOST ACUTE PROBLEMS. THERE IS A NEED TO STABILIZE ECONOMY AND, AT THE SAME TIME, TO ACCELERATE ECONOMIC REFORMS ON THE BASIS OF MARKET PRINCIPLES.

IN SUCH A SITUATION, EXPANSION OF THE COOPERATION BETWEEN UKRAINE AND STATE MEMBERS OF THE SEVEN, FIRST AND FOREMOST, IN THE FIELD OF INVESTMENTS AND ATTRACTION OF FOREIGN CAPITALS WOULD CONSTITUTE AN IMPORTANT STABILIZING FACTOR IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF UKRAINIAN ECONOMY. I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE THAT UKRAINE IS CONSISTENTLY CREATING A LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK APPROPRIATE FOR FOREIGN INVESTORS. UKRAINIAN

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GOVERNMENT HAS PREPARED INFORMATION ON MORE THAN 1000 FACILITIES THAT COULD BE INVESTED FROM ABROAD, AS WELL AS DEVELOPED 110 SPECIFIC PROJECTS FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT AMOUNTING TOTALLY 7,220 MILLION U.S. DOLLARS.

2. ONE OF THE FACTORS THAT RESTRAINS REFORMS AND PRIVATE INITIATIVES IS THE ABSENCE OF MARKET INFRASTRUCTURE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF SMALL-SCALE BUSINESSES.

IN THIS CONNECTION I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU TO ASSIST IN ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 KIEV 004034 OP CENTER PLEASE ALERT EUR/ISCA DUTY OFFICER DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ISCA NAPPER, S/NIS/TALBOTT/EDELMAN, T/TIMBIE

WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC/LAKE/GOTEMOELLER, SIT ROOM/BETH SANNER

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, PARM, START, MNUC, KSUM, UP

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK TO PRESIDENT CLINTON - JULY 2, 1993

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FUND FOR SMALL-SCALE (PRIVATE) BUSINESSES IN UKRAINE (WITH AFFILIATES THROUGHOUT ALL REGIONS OF UKRAINE) IN THE AMOUNT OF 100 MILLION US DOLLARS. THE EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT IS READY TO TAKE TO THE ORGANIZATION OF SUCH A FUND WHICH COULD STILL BE ESTABLISHED IN 1993.

3. A GREAT IMPORTANCE FOR US ACQUIRE NOT ONLY THE OPENING OF NEW PRIVATE ENTERPRISES BUT THE PRIVATIZATION OF EXISTING ONES AS WELL. THUS, IT WOULD BE EXPEDIENT TO ESTABLISH A PRIVATIZATION FUND IN UKRAINE IN THE AMOUNT OF 300 MILLION US DOLLARS. SPEEDY INSTALLATION OF SUCH A STRUCTURE COULD BE IMPLEMENTED BY THE EUROPEAN BANK IN COOPERATION WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS.

WE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE ADVISORY AND FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE OF THE SEVEN IN REFORMING ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND PRIVATIZATION OF UKRAINIAN ENTERPRISES AN IMPORTANT FIELD OF OUR COOPERATION.

4. UKRAINE, WHICH IS DEVELOPING ITS OWN INDEPENDENT MONEY CIRCULATION SYSTEM, PROPOSES TO THE SEVEN THAT A STABILIZATION FUND IN THE AMOUNT OF 1000-1500 MILLION US DOLLARS BE CREATED WITH A VIEW TO BACKING UP THE NEW UKRAINIAN CURRENCY - GRYVNA.

5. THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR RELATIONS WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY PROMOTED IF PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT COULD BE APPLIED IN SEPARATE DOMAINS OF FOREIGN TRADE BEARING COMMON INTEREST, PARTICULARLY TRADE IN TEXTILES, COAL, STEEL, NUCLEAR MATERIALS, AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS.

6. THE UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENT AT THIS TIME IS FINALIZING THE DISCUSSION ON THE RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AS WELL AS THE ACCESSION TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ONE OF THE IMPORTANT MATTERS UPON WHICH WILL DEPEND THE POSITIVE DECISION ON

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THIS QUESTION BY THE SUPREME RADA IS TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, ADEQUATE TO UKRAINE'S EXPENSES FOR THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE HOPE THAT THE SEVEN WILL BE LEADERS IN ORGANIZING SUCH AN ASSISTANCE TO UKRAINE, IN PARTICULAR THROUGH AN INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR INTERNATIONAL DISARMAMENT IN UKRAINE. THE INITIATIVE TO CREATE THIS FUND WAS PUT FORWARD BY LEONID KRAVCHUK, THE PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE, AT THE WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM WHICH WAS HELD IN DAVOS LAST FEBRUARY.

7. AMONG THE STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION, UKRAINE IS THE ONLY ONE WHICH, SINCE THE VERY BEGINNING OF THE CONVERSION FROM MILITARY PRODUCTION, HAS NOT ONLY A CLEAR CONCEPTION BUT STATE CONVERSION PROGRAM AS WELL. THIS PROGRAM CONTAINS 540 SPECIFIC SECTIONS FOR 22 PRIORITIES.

IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT EXPERTS FROM THE COMMISSION OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, WHICH MADE AN ANALYSIS OF THE UKRAINIAN VERSION OF THE CONVERSION, ASSESSED IT AS RESULTING TO THE LARGE EXTENT IN REAL QUANTITATIVE REDUCTION OF WEAPONS AND DEMILITARIZATION OF ECONOMY. BUT CONVERSION IN UKRAINE IS GOING PARALLEL WITH DEEP TRANSFORMATIONS RELATING TO THE TRANSITION TO MARKET ECONOMY, REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES, REMOVAL OF CHERNOBYL DISASTER CONSEQUENCES, SOLUTION OF OTHER ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS. ALL THESE ACTIVITIES REQUIRE CONSIDERABLE EXPENDITURES. WE BELIEVE THAT COOPERATION IN THIS FIELD COULD BE EFFICIENT AND FRUITFUL.

8. UKRAINE NEEDS HELP IN SOLVING THE WHOLE NUMBER OF TECHNICAL, ECONOMIC AND HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CHERNOBYL DISASTER, INCLUDING THE TRANSFORMATION, AS A RESULT OF AN INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION, OF THE SARCOPHAGUS AT THE CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR POWER PLANT INTO AN ECOLOGICALLY SAFE SYSTEM.

WE ALSO PROPOSE TO EXPAND COOPERATION IN STUDYING WHAT IMPACT THE CHERNOBYL DISASTER CONSEQUENCES HAVE UPON HUMAN HEALTH AND, ACCORDINGLY, TO ESTABLISH A CENTER OF RADIOBIOLOGICAL RESEARCH ON THE BASIS OF EXISTING SCIENTIFIC AND CLINICAL INSTITUTIONS OF THE UKRAINIAN MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 KIEV 004034
OP CENTER PLEASE ALERT EUR/ISCA DUTY OFFICER
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ISCA NAPPER, S/NIS/TALBOTT/EDELMAN,
T/TIMBIE
WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC/LAKE/GOTEMOELLER, SIT ROOM/BETH
SANNER

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, PARM, START, MNUC, KSUM, UP
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK TO PRESIDENT
CLINTON - JULY 2, 1993

9. UKRAINE HIGHLY APPRECIATES INTENTIONS OF THE SEVEN IN RESPECT OF THE ELABORATION OF BASIC AGREEMENT ON THE

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

EUROPEAN POWER CHARTER WHICH MAY CONSTITUTE A FRAMEWORK FOR THE PREPARATION OF A MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT AIMED AT WORKING OUT RULES AND STANDARDS IN THE FIELD OF INVESTMENTS INTO THE POWER SECTOR OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION STATES. AS FAR AS THE UKRAINIAN ECONOMY DEPENDS TO A LARGE EXTENT UPON ENERGY CARRIER SUPPLIES FROM ABROAD, WE EXPECT THAT THIS CHARTER WILL SECURE RELIABLE SUPPLIES AND GUARANTEES AGAINST DRASTIC RISE IN PRICES.

I HOPE THAT YOU WILL UNDERSTAND THE ABOVE MENTIONED OBSERVATIONS AND PROPOSALS AND WILL FACILITATE THEIR THOROUGH EXAMINATION AND SEARCH OF THE WAY FOR THEIR SOLUTION DURING THE TOKYO MEETING.

RESPECTFULLY,

(SIGNED)

L. KRAVCHUK

END TEXT OF LETTER.

POPADIUK

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 18, 1993

Dear Leonid:

I am writing to you on an issue of critical importance for both of our countries which I discussed with Foreign Minister Zlenko during his recent visit to Washington. I wanted to underscore for you the principal message Mr. Zlenko heard from Secretary Christopher and my National Security Advisor, Anthony Lake: if our governments can, in the coming days, reach an understanding on the nettlesome problem of the SS-24 missiles and agree that Ukraine will move swiftly to ratify START I and accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, then you and I can personally open a new chapter in U.S.-Ukrainian relations. Our future focus should be broad economic, political and security cooperation rather than a sole emphasis on the nuclear issue.

In this regard, my Special Assistant, Nicholas Burns, is leading a delegation to Kiev this week to talk primarily about how to broaden and deepen support for economic reform in Ukraine. I have followed with mounting concern the difficulties you, your government and your people have encountered in your struggle with the legacy of a command economy imposed on Ukraine when it was part of the Soviet Union. The United States wants to help as you set about the great but daunting task of reform; so does the American business community; so does the Group of Seven major industrialized democracies; and so do the international financial institutions. Mr. Burns will bring to his meetings with members of your government a variety of ideas about what we can do in this important area.

As you know, Secretary of State Warren Christopher will also visit Kiev next week. I have given Secretary Christopher one assignment above all others: to follow up on his good discussions with Mr. Zlenko in New York three weeks ago and to reach an understanding that will move us toward resolution of the nuclear question that has so dominated -- and, I fear, distorted -- the spirit and substance of our dialogue in the past.

As you know from our telephone conversations and correspondence, as well as from the messages carried to Kiev by Ambassador Talbott in May, Secretary of Defense Aspin in June and Assistant Secretary of Defense Allison two weeks ago, our goal is to make sufficient progress on the nuclear issue so that we can shift the focus of our dialogue to a broader range of issues, especially economics.

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The key, I believe, is our proposed trilateral plan for early deactivation of the nuclear weapons. At your request, conveyed by Minister Zlenko to Secretary Christopher in New York, we have re-engaged the Russian government on this subject. We are prepared to use our good offices in Kiev and Moscow to advance this plan, building on the agreements you reached with President Yeltsin at Massandra and preparing the way for your government's fulfillment of its Lisbon Protocol commitments.

In this connection, it is absolutely essential to demonstrate that the SS-24s are not exempt from the early deactivation plan. I am fully aware of how sensitive this question is from your standpoint, but I want you to understand just as clearly how critical it is from mine. In close consultation with your government, we have been working hard to develop ideas that will reconcile the requirements, sensitivities and interests on all sides. An experts delegation is in Kiev this week to discuss the issue with your Ministry of Defense, to be followed by a senior delegation just before Secretary Christopher arrives. This intense activity can, I believe, produce an understanding whereby your government will commit itself to early deactivation of an agreed number of SS-24s according to an agreed timetable. We are prepared to keep this understanding private, and so are the Russians.

I hope that Secretary Christopher will be able to report to me from Kiev that your government has formally accepted such an understanding and reiterated its determination to seek the earliest possible ratification of START I and accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. As Secretary Christopher and Mr. Lake underscored several times to Mr. Zlenko, this is an approach about which I personally feel very strongly -- and for reasons I believe you share: our first meeting should look to the future, not to the past; we should concentrate on the new business of our broader relationship, not the old business of the nuclear question. With this hope in mind, I have instructed Secretary Christopher to be prepared, when he sees you, to discuss these concerns and the possibility of your coming to Washington for a working visit this autumn.

We have much important work to do together, and I am eager to move forward.

Sincerely,



His Excellency
Leonid M. Kravchuk
President of Ukraine
Kiev

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

8019

PAGE 01 OF 04

PRT. BERGER FUERTH HALL ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG
SIT COO FILE SUM2

PREC IMMEDIATE CLAS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DTG 190407Z OCT 93

FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

TO RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
OOOO

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0128-m (1.30)
KBM 12/11/2019

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO NICK BURNS FOR DELIVERY
TO PRESIDENT LEONID M. KRAVCHUK: SIGNED ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW.

BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR LEONID:

I AM WRITING TO YOU ON AN ISSUE OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE FOR
BOTH OF OUR COUNTRIES WHICH I DISCUSSED WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
ZLENKO DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON. I WANTED TO
UNDERScore FOR YOU THE PRINCIPAL MESSAGE MR. ZLENKO HEARD
FROM SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER AND MY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR,
ANTHONY LAKE: IF OUR GOVERNMENTS CAN, IN THE COMING DAYS,
REACH AN UNDERSTANDING ON THE NETTLESOME PROBLEM OF THE SS-24
MISSILES AND AGREE THAT UKRAINE WILL MOVE SWIFTLY TO RATIFY
START I AND ACCEDE TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, THEN YOU
AND I CAN PERSONALLY OPEN A NEW CHAPTER IN U.S. -UKRAINIAN
RELATIONS. OUR FUTURE FOCUS SHOULD BE BROAD ECONOMIC,
POLITICAL AND SECURITY COOPERATION RATHER THAN A SOLE
EMPHASIS ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE.

IN THIS REGARD, MY SPECIAL ASSISTANT, NICHOLAS BURNS, IS
LEADING A DELEGATION TO KIEV THIS WEEK TO TALK PRIMARILY
ABOUT HOW TO BROADEN AND DEEPEN SUPPORT FOR ECONOMIC REFORM
IN UKRAINE. I HAVE FOLLOWED WITH MOUNTING CONCERN THE
DIFFICULTIES YOU, YOUR GOVERNMENT AND YOUR PEOPLE HAVE

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04

ENCOUNTERED IN YOUR STRUGGLE WITH THE LEGACY OF A COMMAND ECONOMY IMPOSED ON UKRAINE WHEN IT WAS PART OF THE SOVIET UNION. THE UNITED STATES WANTS TO HELP AS YOU SET ABOUT THE GREAT BUT DAUNTING TASK OF REFORM. SO DOES THE AMERICAN BUSINESS COMMUNITY. SO DOES THE GROUP OF SEVEN MAJOR INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES. AND SO DO THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. MR. BURNS WILL BRING TO HIS MEETINGS WITH MEMBERS OF YOUR GOVERNMENT A VARIETY OF IDEAS ABOUT WHAT WE CAN DO IN THIS IMPORTANT AREA.

AS YOU KNOW, SECRETARY OF STATE WARREN CHRISTOPHER WILL ALSO VISIT KIEV NEXT WEEK. I HAVE GIVEN SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER ONE ASSIGNMENT ABOVE ALL OTHERS: TO FOLLOW UP ON HIS GOOD DISCUSSIONS WITH MR. ZLENKO IN NEW YORK THREE WEEKS AGO AND TO REACH AN UNDERSTANDING THAT WILL MOVE US TOWARD RESOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR QUESTION THAT HAS SO DOMINATED -- AND, I FEAR, DISTORTED -- THE SPIRIT AND SUBSTANCE OF OUR DIALOGUE IN THE PAST.

AS YOU KNOW FROM OUR TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE, AS WELL AS FROM THE MESSAGES CARRIED TO KIEV BY AMBASSADOR TALBOTT IN MAY, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ASPIN IN JUNE AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ALLISON TWO WEEKS AGO, OUR GOAL IS TO MAKE SUFFICIENT PROGRESS ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE SO THAT WE CAN SHIFT THE FOCUS OF OUR DIALOGUE TO A BROADER RANGE OF ISSUES, ESPECIALLY ECONOMICS.

THE KEY, I BELIEVE, IS OUR PROPOSED TRILATERAL PLAN FOR EARLY DEACTIVATION OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AT YOUR REQUEST, CONVEYED BY MINISTER ZLENKO TO SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER IN NEW YORK, WE HAVE RE-ENGAGED THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT ON THIS SUBJECT. WE ARE PREPARED TO USE OUR GOOD OFFICES IN KIEV AND MOSCOW TO ADVANCE THIS PLAN, BUILDING ON THE AGREEMENTS YOU REACHED WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT MASSANDRA AND PREPARING THE WAY FOR YOUR GOVERNMENT'S FULFILLMENT OF ITS LISBON PROTOCOL COMMITMENTS.

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 04

IN THIS CONNECTION. IT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE SS-24S ARE NOT EXEMPT FROM THE EARLY DEACTIVATION PLAN. I AM FULLY AWARE OF HOW SENSITIVE THIS QUESTION IS FROM YOUR STANDPOINT. BUT I WANT YOU TO UNDERSTAND JUST AS CLEARLY HOW CRITICAL IT IS FROM MINE. IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH YOUR GOVERNMENT. WE HAVE BEEN WORKING HARD TO DEVELOP IDEAS THAT WILL RECONCILE THE REQUIREMENTS, SENSITIVITIES AND INTERESTS ON ALL SIDES. AN EXPERTS DELEGATION IS IN KIEV THIS WEEK TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE WITH YOUR MINISTRY OF DEFENSE. TO BE FOLLOWED BY A SENIOR DELEGATION JUST BEFORE SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER ARRIVES. THIS INTENSE ACTIVITY CAN, I BELIEVE, PRODUCE AN UNDERSTANDING WHEREBY YOUR GOVERNMENT WILL COMMIT ITSELF TO EARLY DEACTIVATION OF AN AGREED NUMBER OF SS-24S ACCORDING TO AN AGREED TIMETABLE. WE ARE PREPARED TO KEEP THIS UNDERSTANDING PRIVATE. AND SO ARE THE RUSSIANS.

I HOPE THAT SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER WILL BE ABLE TO REPORT TO ME FROM KIEV THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT HAS FORMALLY ACCEPTED SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING AND REITERATED ITS DETERMINATION TO SEEK THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE RATIFICATION OF START I AND ACCESSION TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. AS SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER AND MR. LAKE UNDERScoreD SEVERAL TIMES TO MR. ZLENKO, THIS IS AN APPROACH ABOUT WHICH I PERSONALLY FEEL VERY STRONGLY -- AND FOR REASONS I BELIEVE YOU SHARE. OUR FIRST MEETING SHOULD LOOK TO THE FUTURE, NOT TO THE PAST; WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON THE NEW BUSINESS OF OUR BROADER RELATIONSHIP, NOT THE OLD BUSINESS OF THE NUCLEAR QUESTION. WITH THIS HOPE IN MIND, I HAVE INSTRUCTED SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER TO BE PREPARED, WHEN HE SEES YOU, TO DISCUSS THESE CONCERNS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF YOUR COMING TO WASHINGTON FOR A WORKING VISIT THIS AUTUMN.

WE HAVE MUCH IMPORTANT WORK TO DO TOGETHER, AND I AM EAGER TO MOVE FORWARD.

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 04 OF 04

SINCERELY.
BILL CLINTON

HIS EXCELLENCY
LEONID M. KRAVCHUK
PRESIDENT OF UKRAINE
KIEV

END TEXT
DECL: OADR

BT

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8019

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN
10-18-93

October 18, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Letter to President Kravchuk of Ukraine

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0128-m (1.33)
K8H 12/11/2019

Purpose

To come to terms with Ukrainian President Kravchuk on the steps necessary to achieve a successful parliamentary vote on START I and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to establish progress that must be made before you can invite him to meet with you in Washington.

Background

The letter at Tab A to Ukrainian President Kravchuk indicates that you would like to move forward and broaden our relationship with Ukraine through a working visit with him this autumn. To make that visit possible, however, you underscore that we must reach an understanding with the Ukrainians on the deactivation of SS-24 missiles and receive assurances that Kravchuk will press for the earliest possible ratification of START I and accession to the NPT.

Secretary Christopher and Strobe Talbott recommend, and I concur, that we must push Kravchuk hard now for progress on the nuclear issue. Without progress, we don't believe you should invite him to Washington this autumn, as he desires. Lack of progress will also complicate your decision concerning whether or not you should visit Kiev after Moscow in January. Secretary Christopher will be in Kiev early next week to follow up on this letter with Kravchuk. If he can elicit a promise to begin dismantlement of the SS-24s and push for a parliamentary vote on START and NPT, then Christopher will announce that you would like to invite Kravchuk to visit Washington. If this is not possible, he will not make that announcement.

Kravchuk, like President Yeltsin in Russia, is entering an election campaign that will culminate in parliamentary elections in March and presidential elections in June of 1994. During this unsettled election period, the first concern of our policy toward Ukraine is to continue momentum toward our priority goal of ensuring that all nuclear weapons leave Ukraine. We continue to pursue this goal along two tracks: by showing the Ukrainian

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

government the carrots of broader economic, political and security cooperation, and by pressing Ukraine to agree to deactivation of the nuclear weapons on its territory while it continues to pursue START I ratification and accession to the NPT with the Ukrainian Parliament.

This "early deactivation" is especially important because while the Ukrainian Parliament is preparing for elections, START I and the NPT are unlikely to come to a vote unless Kravchuk presses hard for them. We have stressed that he should do so but have also reiterated that Ukraine should include all types of nuclear weapons on its territory in early deactivation. Older SS-19 ballistic missiles are already being deactivated and the air-launched cruise missiles were essentially deactivated when the Russians removed their guidance systems. Some Ukrainians have resisted including the newer SS-24 ballistic missiles (which are still targeted at us), arguing that they can form the core of a small Ukrainian nuclear deterrent force. Although this view continues to be in the minority, the issue of SS-24 deactivation has become highly politicized. The missiles were built in Ukraine and for many are a powerful symbol not only of Ukrainian patrimony but also of Ukraine's potential to become a nuclear weapon state.

We have told the Ukrainians that while we can be flexible on what constitutes the onset of SS-24 deactivation, we must see some steps undertaken as a good-faith expression of Ukraine's continued commitment to ratify START I and accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. Your letter underscores these points for President Kravchuk and stresses that you are ready to move forward to a relationship based on broader economic, political and security cooperation. As evidence of that readiness, you note that a senior delegation led by Nick Burns will travel to Kiev in advance of Secretary Christopher's visit to talk about broadening support for economic reform in Ukraine.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to President Kravchuk at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A Letter to President Kravchuk

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 15, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: NICHOLAS BURNS *NB*

FROM: ROSE GOTTEMOELLER *RA*

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Ukrainian President Kravchuk

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2016-0128-m (1.36)
KBH 12/11/2019

As Nick mentioned to you in a message last evening, Secretary Christopher would like to have the authority to announce, during his trip to Kiev on October 24-25, that the President has invited President Kravchuk to Washington for a working visit later this autumn. The Presidential letter attached at Tab A conveys to Kravchuk that Christopher will be in a position to do so if he and the Ukrainian President reach an understanding that Ukraine is prepared to begin deactivation of SS-24 ICBMs and if Kravchuk reiterates his intent to press for ratification of START I and accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the earliest possible date.

We believe that it is important that this message be communicated clearly and at a Presidential level so that Kravchuk understands both how much we want to broaden the relationship beyond the nuclear question and how seriously we view the potential for drift in Ukraine's Lisbon Protocol commitments during the pre-election period.

Because Nick would like to carry the letter with him to Kiev on Monday, October 18, it would be helpful to have it signed by mid-day on Monday. If that is not possible, it would be necessary to cable the text to him in Kiev by no later than COB October 19. We would like to deliver the letter by then to give the Ukrainians a few days to think about it before Secretary Christopher arrives on October 24.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President attached at Tab I.

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Letter to President Kravchuk

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

PRT: BERGER COMM FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG
SIT: BEYRLE BURNS COQ FICKLIN FILE GOTTEMOELLER HILLIARD POTTS SUM2 WHSR_IN

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 230204Z DEC 93

FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

TO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT NIACT
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV NIACT
RUEHC/INFO SECSTATE WASH DC
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0128-m (1.60)
K8H 12/11/2019

QQQQ

FOR KIEV: AMBASSADOR SHOULD DELIVER PRIOR TO PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK'S
9:00 A.M. DEPARTURE FOR ASHGABAT ON DECEMBER 23. IF UNABLE TO
DELIVER BEFORE KRAVCHUK DEPARTURE, EMBASSY SHOULD INFORM AMEMBASSY
ASHGABAT TO DELIVER THE MESSAGE UPON KRAVCHUK'S ARRIVAL.

FOR ASHGABAT: AMBASSADOR SHOULD DELIVER COPY TO PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK
ON MARGINS OF CIS SUMMIT, IF AMEMBASSY KIEV IS UNABLE TO DELIVER
MESSAGE.

BEGIN TEXT:
DEAR LEONID:

THE VICE PRESIDENT HAS TOLD ME OF THE VERY PRODUCTIVE CONVERSATION
THAT HE HAD WITH YOU IN BUDAPEST LAST SATURDAY. I WANTED TO FOLLOW
UP ON IT IN ADVANCE OF YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN IN
ASHGABAT, TO CONVEY TO YOU HOW ENCOURAGED I AM BY THE PROGRESS THAT
WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ACHIEVE IN THE PAST FEW WEEKS ON THE ISSUES OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN UKRAINE. AMBASSADOR TALBOTT HAS REPORTED TO ME
THAT HIS TALKS WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER SHMAROV IN KIEV LAST WEEK
WERE FRUITFUL. THROUGH OUR TRILATERAL CONSULTATIONS, I BELIEVE OUR
SPECIALISTS HAVE ARRIVED AT THE OUTLINES OF A WORKABLE SOLUTION FOR
THESE REMAINING ISSUES.

IN A PHONE CONVERSATION I HAD WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN THIS MORNING,
HE AND I AGREED THAT WE WOULD WORK INTENSIVELY WITH YOU TO RESOLVE
THE REMAINING ISSUES IN ADVANCE OF OUR SUMMIT MEETING IN JANUARY.
THE VICE PRESIDENT CONVEYED TO ME THAT THIS DEADLINE IS ACCEPTABLE
TO YOU AS WELL. TO MAKE THE NEEDED PROGRESS, I WOULD LIKE TO
PROPOSE THAT OUR SPECIALISTS RECONVENE THEIR TRILATERAL TALKS HERE
IN WASHINGTON ON JANUARY 3. AMBASSADOR TALBOTT WILL LEAD
DISCUSSIONS ON OUR SIDE, AND DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MAMEDOV ON THE
RUSSIAN SIDE. WE WOULD BE PLEASED TO WELCOME WHOMEVER YOU DESIGNATE
FOR THESE DISCUSSIONS.

WE HAVE ALSO MADE MUCH PROGRESS ON ANOTHER KEY ISSUE THAT IS

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

RELEVANT TO YOUR CONCERNS--U.S. ASSISTANCE FOR THE ELIMINATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN UKRAINE. I AM GLAD THAT WE HAVE NOW SIGNED THE AGREEMENTS THAT WILL ENABLE US TO PROVIDE FUNDS FOR THE SAFE AND SECURE DISMANTLEMENT OF WEAPON SYSTEMS IN UKRAINE AS WELL AS OTHER IMPORTANT PROJECTS. I AM ALSO PLEASED THAT WE HAVE BEGUN DISCUSSIONS OF BROADER ASSISTANCE FOR DEFENSE CONVERSION AND DEMILITARIZATION.

SUCH BROADER THEMES WILL PLAY AN INCREASING ROLE IN OUR MUTUAL CONSIDERATION OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND THE REFORM PROCESS. WE WANT TO WORK WITH YOU TO BUILD A MUCH BROADER AND STRONGER ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP. AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE CURRENTLY PREPARING FURTHER CONSULTATIONS ON ECONOMIC ISSUES, TO CONTINUE THOSE BEGUN IN OCTOBER. WE WILL LOOK FORWARD TO WELCOMING YOUR HIGH-LEVEL DELEGATION TO WASHINGTON AT THE END OF JANUARY. I AM HOPING THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO LAY A SOLID FOUNDATION FOR THE DISCUSSIONS THAT YOU AND I WILL BE HAVING DURING YOUR VISIT HERE SOON THEREAFTER. IN THAT REGARD, I HOPE THAT WE CAN SET A SPECIFIC DATE SOON FOR AN OFFICIAL VISIT HERE IN WASHINGTON BEFORE YOUR ELECTIONS. LEONID, I WANTED TO THANK YOU FOR THE STATESMANSHIP THAT YOU HAVE SHOWN ON THESE VERY CHALLENGING ISSUES. I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO THE NEW YEAR AS THE BEGINNING OF A NEW ERA IN U.S.-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS.

SINCERELY,

BILL CLINTON

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

BT

#2415


NNNN

<MSGID> M0795200

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 22, 1993



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: NICHOLAS BURNS *NB*
FROM: ROSE GOTTEMOELLER *R*
SUBJECT: Presidential Message to President Kravchuk of Ukraine

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0128-M (1.41)
KBH 12/11/2019

As a follow-up to the President's telephone conversation with President Yeltsin this morning, we would like to send a message to President Kravchuk of Ukraine in time for their meeting tomorrow in Ashgabad. In the letter, we extend the same invitation to Kravchuk for further trilateral talks that we extended to Yeltsin this morning. In that way, the two men will go into their meeting tomorrow with the same information, i.e., that we are proposing to meet on January 3 here in Washington. Kravchuk, we believe, should feel on an equal footing with Yeltsin--at least with regard to attention from us--as he goes into this important meeting in Ashgabad.

I apologize for this short turn-around. Our understanding was that the two men would meet on Friday or Saturday, so Yeltsin's comment that they would be meeting tomorrow was news. We have doubletracked the message to Ashgabad in case Ambassador Miller cannot catch Kravchuk prior to his departure for the airport early tomorrow morning. Strobe Talbott has cleared this message.

Concurrence by: Robert Bell *RB*

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve transmittal of the attached message.

Approve *R* Disapprove _____

*via State channels
info SecState
signed -
Bill Clinton*

Attachment
Tab I Message to President Kravchuk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

MESSAGE IS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ IN ITS ENTIRETY. PLEASE SEND NIACT IMMEDIATE TO KIEV WITH A COPY TO ASHGABAD.

FOR KIEV: AMBASSADOR SHOULD DELIVER PRIOR TO PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK'S 9:00 A.M. DEPARTURE FOR ASHGABAD ON DECEMBER 23.

FOR ASHGABAD: AMBASSADOR PLEASE DELIVER COPY TO PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK ON MARGINS OF CIS SUMMIT.

DEAR LEONID:

THE VICE PRESIDENT HAS TOLD ME OF THE VERY PRODUCTIVE CONVERSATION THAT HE HAD WITH YOU IN BUDAPEST LAST SATURDAY. I WANTED TO FOLLOW UP ON IT IN ADVANCE OF YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN IN ASHGABAD, TO CONVEY TO YOU HOW ENCOURAGED I AM BY THE PROGRESS THAT WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ACHIEVE IN THE PAST FEW WEEKS ON THE ISSUES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN UKRAINE. AMBASSADOR TALBOTT HAS REPORTED TO ME THAT HIS TALKS WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER SHMAROV IN KIEV LAST WEEK WERE FRUITFUL. THROUGH OUR TRILATERAL CONSULTATIONS, I BELIEVE OUR SPECIALISTS HAVE ARRIVED AT THE OUTLINES OF A WORKABLE SOLUTION FOR THESE REMAINING ISSUES.

IN A PHONE CONVERSATION I HAD WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN THIS MORNING, HE AND I AGREED THAT WE WOULD WORK INTENSIVELY WITH YOU TO RESOLVE THE REMAINING ISSUES IN ADVANCE OF OUR SUMMIT MEETING IN JANUARY. THE VICE PRESIDENT CONVEYED TO ME THAT THIS DEADLINE IS ACCEPTABLE TO YOU AS WELL. TO MAKE THE NEEDED PROGRESS, I WOULD LIKE TO PROPOSE THAT OUR SPECIALISTS RECONVENE THEIR TRILATERAL TALKS HERE IN WASHINGTON ON JANUARY 3. AMBASSADOR TALBOTT WILL LEAD DISCUSSIONS ON OUR SIDE, AND DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MAMEDOV ON THE RUSSIAN SIDE. WE WOULD BE PLEASED TO WELCOME WHOMEVER YOU DESIGNATE FOR THESE DISCUSSIONS.

WE HAVE ALSO MADE MUCH PROGRESS ON ANOTHER KEY ISSUE THAT IS RELEVANT TO YOUR CONCERNS--U.S. ASSISTANCE FOR THE ELIMINATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN UKRAINE. I AM GLAD THAT WE HAVE NOW SIGNED THE AGREEMENTS THAT WILL ENABLE US TO PROVIDE FUNDS FOR THE SAFE AND SECURE DISMANTLEMENT OF WEAPON SYSTEMS IN UKRAINE AS WELL AS OTHER IMPORTANT PROJECTS. I AM ALSO PLEASED THAT WE HAVE BEGUN DISCUSSIONS OF BROADER ASSISTANCE FOR DEFENSE CONVERSION AND DEMILITARIZATION.

SUCH BROADER THEMES WILL PLAY AN INCREASING ROLE IN OUR MUTUAL CONSIDERATION OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND THE REFORM PROCESS. WE WANT TO WORK WITH YOU TO BUILD A MUCH BROADER AND STRONGER ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP. AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE CURRENTLY PREPARING FURTHER CONSULTATIONS ON ECONOMIC ISSUES, TO CONTINUE THOSE BEGUN IN OCTOBER. WE WILL LOOK FORWARD TO WELCOMING YOUR HIGH-LEVEL DELEGATION TO WASHINGTON AT THE END OF JANUARY. I AM HOPING THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO LAY A SOLID FOUNDATION FOR THE DISCUSSIONS THAT YOU AND I WILL BE HAVING DURING YOUR VISIT HERE SOON THEREAFTER. IN THAT REGARD, I HOPE THAT WE CAN SET A SPECIFIC DATE SOON FOR AN OFFICIAL VISIT HERE IN WASHINGTON BEFORE YOUR ELECTIONS.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0128-M (1.61)
KBH 12/11/2019

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

LEONID, I WANTED TO THANK YOU FOR THE STATESMANSHIP THAT YOU HAVE SHOWN ON THESE VERY CHALLENGING ISSUES. I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO THE NEW YEAR AS THE BEGINNING OF A NEW ERA IN U.S.-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS.

SINCERELY

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03

PRT: BERGER COMM FUERTH HALL ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG
SIT: BEYRLE BURNS COQ FICKLIN FILE GOTTEMOELLER HILLIARD PONEMAN SIGLER SUM2

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ <DTG> 030407Z FEB 94

FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

TO RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV NIACT
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

QQQQ

FOR THE AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2016-0128-M (1.62)

KBH 12/11/2019

AMBASSADOR PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE ON AN URGENT BASIS
TO PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK AT OPENING OF BUSINESS ON FEBRUARY 3.
NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW. AMBASSADOR SHOULD CONVEY THAT WE
HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THIS LETTER BEING RELEASED IN WHOLE OR IN PART.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR LEONID:

I ENJOYED MEETING YOU AT BORISPOL ON JANUARY 12 AND AM VERY
PLEASED THAT WE WERE ABLE TO HAVE SUCH A GOOD DISCUSSION
ABOUT THE FUTURE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
UKRAINE. I WAS ENCOURAGED BY OUR MEETING AND WANT YOU TO
KNOW THAT I INTEND TO WORK HARD TO MAKE OUR NEW RELATIONSHIP
PRODUCTIVE AND SUCCESSFUL. SINCE WE MET, OUR GOVERNMENTS
HAVE MADE FURTHER PROGRESS IN BUILDING NEW ECONOMIC TIES AND
IN CONSOLIDATING OUR SECURITY COOPERATION. I LOOK FORWARD TO
DISCUSSING THESE AND OTHER ISSUES WITH YOU WHEN YOU VISIT
WASHINGTON.

THE STATEMENT THAT YOU, PRESIDENT YELTSIN AND I SIGNED IN
MOSCOW ON JANUARY 14 LAUNCHES A CLEAR PROCESS TO RESOLVE
OUTSTANDING NUCLEAR ISSUES IN AN EQUITABLE MANNER. I LOOK
FORWARD TO CONTINUING TO WORK WITH YOU AND PRESIDENT YELTSIN
TO ENSURE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACCORDS. IN PARTICULAR,
I AM COMMITTED TO WORK WITH YOU TO ENSURE THAT UKRAINE WILL
RECEIVE FAIR COMPENSATION FOR THE HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM IN
ALL THE WARHEADS TRANSFERRED FROM UKRAINE TO RUSSIA. I
APPLAUD YOU ONCE AGAIN FOR THE STATESMANSHIP AND LEADERSHIP
THAT YOU HAVE SHOWN IN THIS ENDEAVOR.

YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT WE ARE PLANNING TO EXPAND THE ASSISTANCE
AVAILABLE TO YOU FOR THE DISMANTLEMENT OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
SYSTEMS ON YOUR TERRITORY AS WELL AS FOR DEFENSE CONVERSION
AND RELATED PROJECTS. IN ADDITION TO THE \$175 MILLION IN

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IMMEDIATE

~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03

NUNN-LUGAR ASSISTANCE ALREADY AVAILABLE TO YOU, WE WILL MAKE AVAILABLE AN ADDITIONAL \$175 MILLION IN 1994 AND 1995. AT LEAST \$100 MILLION OF THOSE FUNDS CAN BE EXPENDED THIS YEAR. THIS WILL RAISE TO \$350 MILLION THE TOTAL OF NUNN-LUGAR ASSISTANCE TO UKRAINE AND WILL GREATLY FACILITATE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRILATERAL ACCORDS. WE CAN DISCUSS THE DETAILS OF THIS PLAN IF YOU WISH DURING YOUR VISIT.

I AM VERY PLEASED THAT OUR WORK TO DEVELOP OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONS HAS TAKEN ON THE SAME URGENCY WITH WHICH WE HAVE ADDRESSED THE NUCLEAR ISSUES. I AM FULLY AWARE OF THE ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES YOU FACE. I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL BE HELPFUL TO YOU AND YOUR ADVISORS AS YOU FACE THESE CHALLENGES. IN THAT REGARD, I THINK THE VISIT OF YOUR SENIOR ECONOMIC DELEGATION TO WASHINGTON LAST WEEK WAS A GREAT SUCCESS. MY OFFICIALS FOUND MINISTER ROMAN SHPEK AND HIS COLLEAGUES TO BE IMPRESSIVE AND KNOWLEDGEABLE. WE LOOK FORWARD TO FURTHER CLOSE WORK WITH MINISTER SHPEK AND HIS TEAM IN KIEV AND IN WASHINGTON IN THE FUTURE. I HAVE ASKED MY SPECIAL ASSISTANT NICHOLAS BURNS AND UNDER SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY LARRY SUMMERS TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH MINISTER SHPEK AND TO CONSIDER A VISIT TO KIEV BEFORE YOUR TRIP HERE, IF THAT IS NECESSARY, TO WORK OUT THE FINAL DETAILS OF OUR ECONOMIC PROGRAM.

THE PROGRESS MADE IN THE ECONOMIC TALKS LAST WEEK GIVES ME HOPE THAT WE HAVE AT LAST ACHIEVED A NEW BEGINNING IN THIS CRITICAL AREA. AS MINISTER SHPEK HAS UNDOUBTEDLY REPORTED TO YOU, THE U.S. IS COMMITTED TO DOUBLING OUR BILATERAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FOR UKRAINE TO \$350 MILLION IN 1994 IN ORDER TO SUPPORT YOUR REFORM EFFORTS. IN ADDITION, WE HOPE TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF PRIVATE TRADE AND INVESTMENT TIES BY SIGNING THE BILATERAL INVESTMENT AND TAX TREATIES DURING YOUR VISIT. SECRETARY OF COMMERCE RON BROWN WILL CHAIR ON THE U.S. SIDE A NEW JOINT COMMISSION TO BUILD GREATER TRADE AND INVESTMENT BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES.

FINALLY, I AM DELIGHTED THAT MINISTER SHPEK HAD PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE IMF AND WORLD BANK AND THAT BOTH INSTITUTIONS WILL SOON SEND REPRESENTATIVES TO KIEV. IN MY VIEW, IT WILL BE CRITICALLY IMPORTANT NOW FOR UKRAINE TO DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAM FOR PRESENTATION TO THEM. IF YOU DECIDE TO DEVELOP SUCH A PLAN AND TO IMPLEMENT IT, THE U.S. WILL PUSH HARD TO SECURE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR IT. I THINK THIS SHOULD BE ONE OF THE TOP ISSUES ON THE AGENDA OF OUR WASHINGTON MEETING.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~

IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

I KNOW THAT WE AGREED AT BORISPOL THAT WE SHOULD MEET DURING THE SECOND WEEK OF MARCH IN WASHINGTON, BUT I WOULD LIKE TO PROPOSE INSTEAD THAT WE HAVE A MEETING, LUNCH AND PRESS CONFERENCE TOGETHER ON FRIDAY, MARCH 4. ALTHOUGH THAT DATE IS A WEEK EARLIER THAN WE HAD DISCUSSED, I HOPE THAT IT WILL NEVERTHELESS BE CONVENIENT FOR YOU. AMBASSADOR MILLER WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH YOUR OFFICIALS TO WORK OUT THE SPECIFIC PLANS FOR OUR MEETING. UNTIL THEN, YOU HAVE MY BEST WISHES FOR SUCCESS IN THE MANY CHALLENGES THAT YOU FACE.

SINCERELY,

BILL CLINTON

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

BT

#2720

NNNN

<MSGID> M0860854

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0128-M (1.45)
KSH 12/11/2019

February 2, 1994



ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

THROUGH: NICHOLAS BURNS NB
FROM: ROSE GOTTEMOELLER
SUBJECT: Presidential Message to President Kravchuk of
Ukraine

The Presidential message at Tab I presents to President Kravchuk the results of the work accomplished since his meeting with the President at Borispol to expand U.S. assistance and cooperation with Ukraine. It underscores the achievement of the Trilateral Statement and reconfirms the President's commitment to work closely with both Kravchuk and Yeltsin to ensure its implementation. It also communicates to Kravchuk the broad expansion in Nunn-Lugar assistance we are willing to undertake, doubling the \$175 million extended to Ukraine in FY 92 and FY 93 with a second tranche of \$175 million in FY 94 and FY 95.

The message also details the results of the visit by the senior economic team to Washington last week. It describes the expansion in bilateral assistance that we are willing to undertake but emphasizes at the same time the urgent need for economic reform. We will continue to work with Ukraine on the plan for such reforms in order to engage the International Monetary Fund and World Bank.

We need to firm up a date for Kravchuk's visit to Washington, since the President and he agreed at Borispol that it should take place in the week of March 13. At Will Itoh's suggestion, we have inserted the date of March 7, which appears to make sense from a scheduling point of view--there are currently several international visitors planned for the week of March 13. We understand that Will will clear this date with Scheduling.

Ambassador Miller has informed us that the Rada will vote tomorrow, February 3, on the Trilateral Statement and Annex and the START I/Lisbon Protocol package. Kravchuk is apparently trying to achieve the "clean" vote on ratification of START I and the NPT that he promised the President at Borispol. The outlook appears better than we might have expected (see article at Tab II, the substance of which has been confirmed by our intelligence community), but the vote will be a difficult one. Miller urgently appealed for this message to be sent overnight so that it can be delivered at opening of business in Kiev tomorrow.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Kravchuk will need all the help he can get in tomorrow's debate.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve transmittal of the Presidential message at Tab I.

Approve Disapprove

(Hold for Itoh)

Attachments

- Tab I Presidential message to President Kravchuk of Ukraine.
- Tab II Article on prospects for Rada vote.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

AMBASSADOR PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE ON AN URGENT BASIS TO PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK AT OPENING OF BUSINESS ON FEBRUARY 3. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW. AMBASSADOR SHOULD CONVEY THAT WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THIS LETTER BEING RELEASED IN WHOLE OR IN PART.

DEAR LEONID:

I ENJOYED MEETING YOU AT BORISPOL ON JANUARY 12 AND AM VERY PLEASED THAT WE WERE ABLE TO HAVE SUCH A GOOD DISCUSSION ABOUT THE FUTURE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND UKRAINE. I WAS ENCOURAGED BY OUR MEETING AND WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I INTEND TO WORK HARD TO MAKE OUR NEW RELATIONSHIP PRODUCTIVE AND SUCCESSFUL. SINCE WE MET, OUR GOVERNMENTS HAVE MADE FURTHER PROGRESS IN BUILDING NEW ECONOMIC TIES AND IN CONSOLIDATING OUR SECURITY COOPERATION. I LOOK FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THESE AND OTHER ISSUES WITH YOU WHEN YOU VISIT WASHINGTON.

THE STATEMENT THAT YOU, PRESIDENT YELTSIN AND I SIGNED IN MOSCOW ON JANUARY 14 LAUNCHES A CLEAR PROCESS TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING NUCLEAR ISSUES IN AN EQUITABLE MANNER. I LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUING TO WORK WITH YOU AND PRESIDENT YELTSIN TO ENSURE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACCORDS. IN PARTICULAR, I AM COMMITTED TO WORK WITH YOU TO ENSURE THAT UKRAINE WILL RECEIVE FAIR COMPENSATION FOR THE HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM IN ALL THE WARHEADS TRANSFERRED FROM UKRAINE TO RUSSIA. I APPLAUD YOU ONCE AGAIN FOR THE STATESMANSHIP AND LEADERSHIP THAT YOU HAVE SHOWN IN THIS ENDEAVOR.

YOU SHOULD KNOW THAT WE ARE PLANNING TO EXPAND THE ASSISTANCE AVAILABLE TO YOU FOR THE DISMANTLEMENT OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS ON YOUR TERRITORY AS WELL AS FOR DEFENSE CONVERSION AND RELATED PROJECTS. IN ADDITION TO THE \$175 MILLION IN NUNN-LUGAR ASSISTANCE ALREADY AVAILABLE TO YOU, WE WILL MAKE AVAILABLE AN ADDITIONAL \$175 MILLION IN 1994 AND 1995. AT LEAST \$100 MILLION OF THOSE FUNDS CAN BE EXPENDED THIS YEAR. THIS WILL RAISE TO \$350 MILLION THE TOTAL OF NUNN-LUGAR ASSISTANCE TO UKRAINE AND WILL GREATLY FACILITATE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRILATERAL ACCORDS. WE CAN DISCUSS THE DETAILS OF THIS PLAN IF YOU WISH DURING YOUR VISIT.

I AM VERY PLEASED THAT OUR WORK TO DEVELOP OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONS HAS TAKEN ON THE SAME URGENCY WITH WHICH WE HAVE ADDRESSED THE NUCLEAR ISSUES. I AM FULLY AWARE OF THE ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES YOU FACE. I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL BE HELPFUL TO YOU AND YOUR ADVISORS AS YOU FACE THESE CHALLENGES. IN THAT REGARD, I THINK THE VISIT OF YOUR SENIOR ECONOMIC DELEGATION TO WASHINGTON LAST WEEK WAS A GREAT SUCCESS. MY OFFICIALS FOUND MINISTER ROMAN SHPEK AND HIS COLLEAGUES TO BE IMPRESSIVE AND KNOWLEDGEABLE. WE LOOK FORWARD TO FURTHER CLOSE WORK WITH MINISTER SHPEK AND HIS TEAM IN KIEV AND IN WASHINGTON IN THE FUTURE. I HAVE ASKED MY SPECIAL ASSISTANT NICHOLAS BURNS AND UNDER SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY LARRY SUMMERS TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH MINISTER SHPEK AND TO CONSIDER A VISIT TO KIEV

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0128-m (1.65)
K8H 12/11/2019

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BEFORE YOUR TRIP HERE, IF THAT IS NECESSARY, TO WORK OUT THE FINAL DETAILS OF OUR ECONOMIC PROGRAM.

THE PROGRESS MADE IN THE ECONOMIC TALKS LAST WEEK GIVES ME HOPE THAT WE HAVE AT LAST ACHIEVED A NEW BEGINNING IN THIS CRITICAL AREA. AS MINISTER SHPEK HAS UNDOUBTEDLY REPORTED TO YOU, THE U.S. IS COMMITTED TO DOUBLING OUR BILATERAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FOR UKRAINE TO \$350 MILLION IN 1994 IN ORDER TO SUPPORT YOUR REFORM EFFORTS. IN ADDITION, WE HOPE TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF PRIVATE TRADE AND INVESTMENT TIES BY SIGNING THE BILATERAL INVESTMENT AND TAX TREATIES DURING YOUR VISIT. SECRETARY OF COMMERCE RON BROWN WILL CHAIR ON THE U.S. SIDE A NEW JOINT COMMISSION TO BUILD GREATER TRADE AND INVESTMENT BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES.

FINALLY, I AM DELIGHTED THAT MINISTER SHPEK HAD PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE IMF AND WORLD BANK AND THAT BOTH INSTITUTIONS WILL SOON SEND REPRESENTATIVES TO KIEV. IN MY VIEW, IT WILL BE CRITICALLY IMPORTANT NOW FOR UKRAINE TO DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAM FOR PRESENTATION TO THEM. IF YOU DECIDE TO DEVELOP SUCH A PLAN AND TO IMPLEMENT IT, THE U.S. WILL PUSH HARD TO SECURE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR IT. I THINK THIS SHOULD BE ONE OF THE TOP ISSUES ON THE AGENDA OF OUR WASHINGTON MEETING.

I KNOW THAT WE AGREED AT BORISPOL THAT WE SHOULD MEET DURING THE SECOND WEEK OF MARCH IN WASHINGTON, BUT I WOULD LIKE TO PROPOSE INSTEAD THAT WE HAVE A MEETING, LUNCH AND PRESS CONFERENCE TOGETHER ON FRIDAY, MARCH 4. ALTHOUGH THAT DATE IS A WEEK EARLIER THAN WE HAD DISCUSSED, I HOPE THAT IT WILL NEVERTHELESS BE CONVENIENT FOR YOU. AMBASSADOR MILLER WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH YOUR OFFICIALS TO WORK OUT THE SPECIFIC PLANS FOR OUR MEETING. UNTIL THEN, YOU HAVE MY BEST WISHES FOR SUCCESS IN THE MANY CHALLENGES THAT YOU FACE.

SINCERELY,

BILL CLINTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BEFORE YOUR TRIP HERE, IF THAT IS NECESSARY, TO WORK OUT THE FINAL DETAILS OF OUR ECONOMIC PROGRAM.

THE PROGRESS MADE IN THE ECONOMIC TALKS LAST WEEK GIVES ME HOPE THAT WE HAVE AT LAST ACHIEVED A NEW BEGINNING IN THIS CRITICAL AREA. AS MINISTER SHPEK HAS UNDOUBTEDLY REPORTED TO YOU, THE U.S. IS COMMITTED TO DOUBLING OUR BILATERAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FOR UKRAINE TO \$350 MILLION IN 1994 IN ORDER TO SUPPORT YOUR REFORM EFFORTS. IN ADDITION, WE HOPE TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF PRIVATE TRADE AND INVESTMENT TIES BY SIGNING THE BILATERAL INVESTMENT AND TAX TREATIES DURING YOUR VISIT. SECRETARY OF COMMERCE RON BROWN WILL CHAIR ON THE U.S. SIDE A NEW JOINT COMMISSION TO BUILD GREATER TRADE AND INVESTMENT BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES.

FINALLY, I AM DELIGHTED THAT MINISTER SHPEK HAD PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE IMF AND WORLD BANK AND THAT BOTH INSTITUTIONS WILL SOON SEND REPRESENTATIVES TO KIEV. IN MY VIEW, IT WILL BE CRITICALLY IMPORTANT NOW FOR UKRAINE TO DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAM FOR PRESENTATION TO THEM. IF YOU DECIDE TO DEVELOP SUCH A PLAN AND TO IMPLEMENT IT, THE U.S. WILL PUSH HARD TO SECURE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR IT. I THINK THIS SHOULD BE ONE OF THE TOP ISSUES ON THE AGENDA OF OUR WASHINGTON MEETING.

I KNOW THAT WE AGREED AT BORISPOL THAT WE SHOULD MEET DURING THE SECOND WEEK OF MARCH IN WASHINGTON, BUT I WOULD LIKE TO PROPOSE INSTEAD THAT WE HAVE A MEETING, LUNCH AND PRESS CONFERENCE TOGETHER ON MONDAY, MARCH 24 ALTHOUGH THAT DATE IS A WEEK EARLIER THAN WE HAD DISCUSSED, I HOPE THAT IT WILL NEVERTHELESS BE CONVENIENT FOR YOU. AMBASSADOR MILLER WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH YOUR OFFICIALS TO WORK OUT THE SPECIFIC PLANS FOR OUR MEETING. UNTIL THEN, YOU HAVE MY BEST WISHES FOR SUCCESS IN THE MANY CHALLENGES THAT YOU FACE.

SINCERELY,

William

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

HOLD FOR W. ITOH

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0128-M (1.68)
KBH 12/11/2019

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
* * * * *

TOR 1222106 NCN 01164774 PAGE 1

>>> I M M E D I A T E <<<

** DEMAND PRINT **

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MATCH = ** NONE **

ACTION =

INFO =

TOTAL COPIES = 0

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0128-M (1.71)
KBH 12/11/2019

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O 022106Z MAY 94

FM THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC

TO RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV

INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC

BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

QQQQ

AMBASSADOR MILLER: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO
PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK IN YOUR MARCH 4 MEETING WITH HIM.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR LEONID:

AS WE AGREED DURING YOUR VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN MARCH, A
HIGH-LEVEL DELEGATION OF ECONOMIC EXPERTS FROM THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT WILL BE IN UKRAINE FROM MAY 2-6. THIS DELEGATION,
LED BY MY SPECIAL ASSISTANT NICHOLAS BURNS, INTENDS TO WORK
CLOSELY WITH MINISTER ROMAN SHPEK AND OTHER UKRAINIAN
OFFICIALS TO ADVANCE OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP. YOU AND I

PAGE 2 RHEHAAA3336 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

SHARE A COMMON INTEREST IN MAKING ECONOMIC RELATIONS A
PRIORITY BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. I HOPE VERY MUCH THAT THE
DELEGATION'S VISIT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO STRENGTHENING THOSE
TIES.

THE DELEGATION WILL FOCUS ON THE THREE MAJOR ASPECTS OF OUR
ECONOMIC RELATIONS THAT WE DISCUSSED IN MARCH. FIRST, WE ARE
NOW PREPARED TO PRESENT TO YOUR GOVERNMENT A DETAILED
DESCRIPTION OF THE \$350 MILLION ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
THAT WAS ANNOUNCED DURING YOUR VISIT, INCLUDING SPECIFIC
TARGETS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE VARIOUS PROJECTS. I HAVE ASKED

* * * * *
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
* * * * *

* * * * *
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
* * * * *

TOR 1222106 NCN 01164774 PAGE 2

>>> I M M E D I A T E <<<

THAT THIS EFFORT BE CARRIED OUT RAPIDLY SO THAT UKRAINE WILL FEEL THE BENEFITS OF OUR ASSISTANCE THIS YEAR. I AM ALSO VERY PLEASSED TO LET YOU KNOW THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO LAUNCH THE U.S.-UKRAINE ENTERPRISE FUND THIS SUMMER. THIS FUND WILL PROVIDE LOANS TO NEW BUSINESSES AND TAKE EQUITY POSITIONS IN EXISTING BUSINESSES IN SUPPORT OF THE GOAL OF OVERALL ECONOMIC REFORM IN UKRAINE.

SECOND, THE DELEGATION WILL ALSO DISCUSS WITH YOUR OFFICIALS

PAGE 3 RHEHAAA3336 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

THE NEED FOR UKRAINE AND THE U.S. TO MAKE GREATER PROGRESS IN EXPANDING TRADE AND INVESTMENT. WE WOULD LIKE YOUR AGREEMENT TO SCHEDULE A MEETING THIS SUMMER OF THE NEW JOINT COMMISSION ON TRADE AND INVESTMENT. I ALSO HOPE THAT UKRAINE WILL MAKE GREATER PROGRESS IN ESTABLISHING CONDITIONS FAVORABLE TO ATTRACTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND TRADE. IN THE LONG-TERM, THERE IS NO MORE EFFECTIVE WAY OF ATTRACTING WESTERN CAPITAL TO SUPPORT YOUR ECONOMIC REFORM.

THIRD, WE WANT TO CONTINUE THE GOOD DISCUSSIONS WE HAVE HAD ON UKRAINE'S EFFORTS TO REFORM ITS ECONOMY. IN MY VIEW, THE ADOPTION OF A COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAM IS THE BEST ROUTE TO SECURE UKRAINE'S LONG-TERM ECONOMIC PROSPERITY AND INTEGRATION WITH THE WEST. AS I MENTIONED TO YOU IN MARCH, IF UKRAINE CAN ADOPT SUCH A PROGRAM, THE U.S. WILL WORK CLOSELY WITH ITS G-7 PARTNERS AND THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS TO EXTEND SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO UKRAINE IN SUPPORT OF THE REFORMS. I EXPECT THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE TO BE DISCUSSED AT THE NAPLES SUMMIT OF G-7 COUNTRIES IN JULY. I WISH TO BE FRANK, HOWEVER, THAT I

PAGE 4 RHEHAAA3336 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

DO NOT BELIEVE SUCH ASSISTANCE WILL BE POSSIBLE WITHOUT A GREATER AND MORE CONCRETE COMMITMENT TO A REFORM PROGRAM BY UKRAINE.

I WOULD LIKE TO BE AS HELPFUL TO YOU AS POSSIBLE AS YOU CONSIDER AN ECONOMIC REFORM PLAN. ACCORDINGLY, I PROPOSE THAT WE CREATE A U.S.-UKRAINE ECONOMIC ADVISORY GROUP TO ASSIST YOUR GOVERNMENT IN DEVELOPING A MARKET ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAM. I AM READY TO ASK SEVERAL PROMINENT AMERICAN ECONOMISTS TO FORM A SMALL GROUP TO WORK DIRECTLY WITH YOUR LEADING ECONOMIC ADVISORS TOWARD THIS END. THEY WOULD AGREE TO BE AVAILABLE TO YOU IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD. THE DELEGATION WILL PROVIDE MORE DETAIL ON THIS PROPOSAL TO MINISTER SHPEK.

* * * * *
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
* * * * *

* * * * *
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
* * * * *

TOR 1222106 NCN 01164774 PAGE 3

>>> I M M E D I A T E <<<

LET ME CLOSE BY REAFFIRMING MY KEEN INTEREST IN DEVELOPING
CLOSE RELATIONS BETWEEN UKRAINE AND THE U.S. AND BETWEEN US
PERSONALLY. WE HAVE MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS ON BOTH
ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ISSUES THIS YEAR AND I WANT YOU TO KNOW
THAT I REMAIN COMMITTED TO CONTINUING OUR CLOSE RELATIONSHIP
IN THE PERIOD AHEAD.

PAGE 5 RHEHAAA3336 ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

SINCERELY YOURS,

BILL CLINTON

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

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* * * * *
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~
* * * * *

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0128-m (1.72)
KBH 12/11/2019

April 29, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: NICHOLAS BURNS NB

SUBJECT: Message to Ukrainian President Kravchuk

I have attached at Tab I a message from the President to President Kravchuk for your approval.

It would be helpful if this message could be approved for transmission to Kiev by Monday, May 2.

The message is intended to focus Kravchuk on the new priority in our relationship, our economic ties, and alerts him to the objectives of the economic delegation I will be leading to Ukraine from May 2-6. The President promised Kravchuk during their March 4 meeting that he would send such a delegation to advance progress in our economic relationship. We will meet with Kravchuk on May 3 or 4 and it would be useful to be able to hand this message to him.

The message outlines our interest in moving forward quickly on the \$350 million assistance program the President announced in March. In addition, it promises U.S. leadership in securing substantial western financial assistance for Ukraine but only after Kiev adopts a comprehensive reform program. It also offers the creation of a U.S.-Ukraine Economic Advisory Group (comprised of private American economists, probably led by MIT's Stan Fischer) to advise the Ukrainians in the development of their reform program.

Concurrences by: Bob Fauver, Rose Gottemoeller

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached message for transmission to Kiev

Approve OV Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Message to President Kravchuk

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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PER E.O. 13526

2016-0123-M (1.72)

KBM 12/11/2019

AMBASSADOR MILLER: PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO
PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK IN YOUR MARCH 4 MEETING WITH HIM.

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR LEONID:

AS WE AGREED DURING YOUR VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN MARCH, A HIGH-LEVEL DELEGATION OF ECONOMIC EXPERTS FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WILL BE IN UKRAINE FROM MAY 2-6. THIS DELEGATION, LED BY MY SPECIAL ASSISTANT NICHOLAS BURNS, INTENDS TO WORK CLOSELY WITH MINISTER ROMAN SHPEK AND OTHER UKRAINIAN OFFICIALS TO ADVANCE OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP. YOU AND I SHARE A COMMON INTEREST IN MAKING ECONOMIC RELATIONS A PRIORITY BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. I HOPE VERY MUCH THAT THE DELEGATION'S VISIT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO STRENGTHENING THOSE TIES.

THE DELEGATION WILL FOCUS ON THE THREE MAJOR ASPECTS OF OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONS THAT WE DISCUSSED IN MARCH. FIRST, WE ARE NOW PREPARED TO PRESENT TO YOUR GOVERNMENT A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE \$350 MILLION ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM THAT WAS ANNOUNCED DURING YOUR VISIT, INCLUDING SPECIFIC TARGETS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE VARIOUS PROJECTS. I HAVE ASKED THAT THIS EFFORT BE CARRIED OUT RAPIDLY SO THAT UKRAINE WILL FEEL THE BENEFITS OF OUR ASSISTANCE THIS YEAR. I AM ALSO VERY PLEASED TO LET YOU KNOW THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO LAUNCH THE U.S.-UKRAINE ENTERPRISE FUND THIS SUMMER. THIS FUND WILL PROVIDE LOANS TO NEW BUSINESSES AND TAKE EQUITY POSITIONS IN EXISTING BUSINESSES IN SUPPORT OF THE GOAL OF OVERALL ECONOMIC REFORM IN UKRAINE.

SECOND, THE DELEGATION WILL ALSO DISCUSS WITH YOUR OFFICIALS THE NEED FOR UKRAINE AND THE U.S. TO MAKE GREATER PROGRESS IN EXPANDING TRADE AND INVESTMENT. WE WOULD LIKE YOUR AGREEMENT TO SCHEDULE A MEETING THIS SUMMER OF THE NEW JOINT COMMISSION ON TRADE AND INVESTMENT. I ALSO HOPE THAT UKRAINE WILL MAKE GREATER PROGRESS IN ESTABLISHING CONDITIONS FAVORABLE TO ATTRACTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND TRADE. IN THE LONG-TERM, THERE IS NO MORE EFFECTIVE WAY OF ATTRACTING WESTERN CAPITAL TO SUPPORT YOUR ECONOMIC REFORM.

THIRD, WE WANT TO CONTINUE THE GOOD DISCUSSIONS WE HAVE HAD ON UKRAINE'S EFFORTS TO REFORM ITS ECONOMY. IN MY VIEW, THE ADOPTION OF A COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAM IS THE BEST ROUTE TO SECURE UKRAINE'S LONG-TERM ECONOMIC PROSPERITY AND INTEGRATION WITH THE WEST. AS I MENTIONED TO YOU IN MARCH, IF UKRAINE CAN ADOPT SUCH A PROGRAM, THE U.S. WILL WORK CLOSELY WITH ITS G-7 PARTNERS AND THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS TO EXTEND SUBSTANTIAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO UKRAINE IN SUPPORT OF THE REFORMS. I EXPECT THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE TO BE DISCUSSED AT THE NAPLES SUMMIT OF G-7 COUNTRIES IN JULY. I WISH TO BE FRANK, HOWEVER, THAT I DO NOT BELIEVE SUCH ASSISTANCE WILL BE POSSIBLE WITHOUT A GREATER AND MORE CONCRETE COMMITMENT TO A REFORM PROGRAM BY UKRAINE.

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Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

I WOULD LIKE TO BE AS HELPFUL TO YOU AS POSSIBLE AS YOU CONSIDER AN ECONOMIC REFORM PLAN. ACCORDINGLY, I PROPOSE THAT WE CREATE A U.S.-UKRAINE ECONOMIC ADVISORY GROUP TO ASSIST YOUR GOVERNMENT IN DEVELOPING A MARKET ECONOMIC REFORM PROGRAM. I AM READY TO ASK SEVERAL PROMINENT AMERICAN ECONOMISTS TO FORM A SMALL GROUP TO WORK DIRECTLY WITH YOUR LEADING ECONOMIC ADVISORS TOWARD THIS END. THEY WOULD AGREE TO BE AVAILABLE TO YOU IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD. THE DELEGATION WILL PROVIDE MORE DETAIL ON THIS PROPOSAL TO MINISTER SHPEK.

LET ME CLOSE BY REAFFIRMING MY KEEN INTEREST IN DEVELOPING CLOSE RELATIONS BETWEEN UKRAINE AND THE U.S. AND BETWEEN US PERSONALLY. WE HAVE MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS ON BOTH ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ISSUES THIS YEAR AND I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I REMAIN COMMITTED TO CONTINUING OUR CLOSE RELATIONSHIP IN THE PERIOD AHEAD.

SINCERELY YOURS,

BILL CLINTON

(END TEXT)

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

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S/S-O PLS PASS TO THE PRESIDENT'S PARTY

DEPT PLS PASS TO NSC-BURNS/GOTTEMOELLER

DEPT FOR S/NIS-COLLINS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, ECON, UP, US

SUBJECT: KRAVCHUK LETTER TO PRESIDENT CLINTON

1. ~~C~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE CHARGE WAS CALLED TO THE MFA THIS AFTERNOON (JULY 6) TO RECEIVE A LETTER, DATED JULY 6, FROM UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK TO PRESIDENT CLINTON, ON THE EVE OF THE NAPLES G-7 SUMMIT. FOLLOWING IS AN INFORMAL EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF THE LETTER (ORIGINAL BEING POUCHED TO THE DEPT, EUR/ISCA).

3. BEGIN TEXT.

"DEAR BILL,

I WISH TO ADDRESS YOU, ONCE AGAIN, ON THE EVE OF YOUR VISIT TO EUROPE, WITH WORDS OF SINCERE THANKS FOR THE EFFORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE USA, AND YOU PERSONALLY, WHICH MADE POSSIBLE THE INCLUSION OF THE QUESTION OF ASSISTANCE TO UKRAINE ON THE AGENDA OF THE NAPLES SUMMIT OF THE G-7.

I RECALL IN THIS CONTEXT THE SHORT MEETING AT BORISPIL AIRPORT IN JANUARY OF THIS YEAR, DURING THE COURSE OF WHICH YOU STRESSED SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE IN ITS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION. POSITIVE MOVEMENT IN UKRAINIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS AFTER THAT SHORT MEETING BECAME A REAL FACT, WHICH IS DIFFICULT TO OVERESTIMATE. WE CONSIDER THAT UKRAINE'S FIDELITY IN UPHOLDING ITS INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS, ESPECIALLY IN THE SPHERE OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, HAD AN ESSENTIAL INFLUENCE ON THESE CHANGES. A KEY ELEMENT IN THIS CONTEXT IS, OF COURSE, THE TRILATERAL STATEMENT OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE USA, UKRAINE AND RUSSIA OF 14 JANUARY OF THIS YEAR, WHICH IS CREATING A CORRESPONDINGLY FAVORABLE ATMOSPHERE FOR THE PROGRESSIVE DYNAMIC DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR STATES.

YOU KNOW THAT UKRAINE TODAY IS UNDERGOING A COMPLICATED

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2014-0123-M (1.73)
KBM 12/11/2019

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02

PERIOD IN ITS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. WE ARE FULLY DETERMINED TO CONTINUE THE COURSE TO ECONOMIC REFORM IN THE COUNTRY, AND THIS COURSE IS IRREVERSIBLE. THE EFFORTS OF THE NEW PRIME MINISTER OF UKRAINE ARE DIRECTED TOWARDS THIS AS WELL. THE PRIORITIES FOR REFORM SET BY US ARE FORESEEN BY THE INTRODUCTION OF MASS-SCALE PRIVATIZATION WITH BROAD INCENTIVES FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT, CHANGES IN THE METHODOLOGY OF THE FORMULATION OF THE FINANCIAL-BUDGETARY SYSTEM, INCLUDING TAXATION AND PRICE POLICY, AND ALSO MODERNIZATION OF LEGISLATION IN THE CONTEXT OF PROTECTING THE INDISPENSABLE GUARANTEES OF BUSINESS ACTIVITY.

I HOPE THAT THE MEETING AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF THE G-7, WITH YOUR PERSONAL SUPPORT, CAN LEAD TO THE ADOPTION OF OPTIMAL DECISIONS DIRECTED TOWARDS SUPPORT OF THE EFFORTS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF UKRAINE IN THE ABOVE DIRECTIONS. YOU ARE ALREADY ACQUAINTED WITH OUR PROPOSALS IN THIS CONNECTION.

HIGHLY VALUING THE ACTIVE DIALOGUE BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES, WHICH HAS RECENTLY EXPANDED, I WANT TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT IT WILL IN THE FUTURE CONTINUE AND DEEPEN IN A SPIRIT OF PARTNERSHIP, FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION, THAT WILL ASSIST IN STRENGTHENING STABILITY IN OUR REGION, EUROPE AND IN THE WORLD AS A WHOLE.

WITH SINCERE RESPECT
LEONID KRAVCHUK"
END TEXT.

4. USA AND CANADA DEPARTMENT CHIEF POTEKHIN, WHO HANDED OVER THE LETTER, SAID IT WOULD NOT/NOT BE DELIVERED BY THE UKRAINIAN EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, POTEKHIN SAID THAT THIS IS NOT A CIRCULAR LETTER AND THAT PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK IS NOT WRITING TO OTHER G-7 LEADERS. FINALLY, POTEKHIN STRESSED THAT THE LETTER'S MAIN POINTS ARE APPRECIATION FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE TO DATE, THE HIGH ASSESSMENT OF THE STATE OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AND THE RENEWAL OF A COMMITMENT TO REAL ECONOMIC REFORM. POTEKHIN IN PARTICULAR POINTED OUT THAT THE LETTER SIGNALS THAT NEW PRIME MINISTER MASOL' IS COMMITTED TO GENUINE REFORM.

BYRNES

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PRIVACY CHANNEL MESSAGE FOR FORMER PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK OF UKRAINE. AMBASSADOR PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE AT THE EARLIEST APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR LEONID:

I AM WRITING TO SEND YOU MY VERY BEST WISHES AS YOU FINISH YOUR TERM AS UKRAINE'S FIRST DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED PRESIDENT. IN THE PAST THREE YEARS, YOU HAVE DONE MUCH TO BRING TO LIFE THE VISION OF AN INDEPENDENT AND SOVEREIGN UKRAINE. I KNOW THE TRANSITION HAS NOT BEEN EASY, BUT YOU HAVE ACCOMPLISHED IT PEACEFULLY AND IN A MANNER THAT ENSURES UKRAINE AN IMPORTANT PLACE IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY. YOU HAVE MY ADMIRATION AND THE ADMIRATION OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FOR THE HISTORIC ROLE YOU HAVE PLAYED.

I ALSO WANTED TO THANK YOU PERSONALLY FOR THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP THAT YOU AND I HAVE ENJOYED. OUR WORK TOGETHER HAS CREATED A SOLID FOUNDATION FOR THE PARTNERSHIP EMERGING BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. THE TRILATERAL STATEMENT, WHICH YOU AND I SIGNED TOGETHER WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN IN JANUARY, HAS MOVED THE NUCLEAR QUESTION FROM THE FOREFRONT OF OUR RELATIONSHIP AND ALLOWED MUCH BROADER AND RICHER COOPERATION TO DEVELOP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. I COMMEND YOU, ONCE AGAIN, FOR THE STATESMANSHIP AND LEADERSHIP THAT YOU SHOWED IN CHOOSING THIS PATH.

IN CLOSING, I WANTED TO ASSURE YOU THAT UKRAINE, THE NATION THAT YOU HAVE SERVED SO WELL, WILL REMAIN AMONG MY TOP PRIORITIES. I REMAIN COMMITTED TO ITS FUTURE AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE, SECURE AND STABLE WITHIN ITS CURRENT BORDERS. I ALSO LOOK FORWARD TO THE TIME WHEN UKRAINE'S ECONOMY WILL HAVE PASSED THE TRANSITION OF REFORM AND BECOME HEALTHY AND PROSPEROUS. ~~AT THAT TIME, UKRAINE WILL TRULY TAKE ITS PLACE IN THE CENTER OF EUROPEAN NATIONS.~~ *stet*

AGAIN, WITH MY BEST WISHES

STRONG

~~AS THE PEOPLE~~
DESERVE.

SINCERELY,

BILL CLINTON

PROPER

Comm:

(END TEXT)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0128-M (1.74)
KBH 12/11/2019

CONFIDENTIAL

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02

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PER E. O. 13526

TO  KIEV

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ VIA PRIVACY CHANNELS

QQQQ

FOR THE AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE

2016-0128-M [1.75]

KBH 12/11/2019

PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON TO
PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY.
NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR LEONID:

I AM WRITING TO SEND YOU MY VERY BEST WISHES AS YOU FINISH YOUR TERM
AS UKRAINE'S FIRST DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED PRESIDENT. IN THE PAST
THREE YEARS, YOU HAVE DONE MUCH TO BRING TO LIFE THE VISION OF AN
INDEPENDENT AND SOVEREIGN UKRAINE. I KNOW THE TRANSITION HAS NOT
BEEN EASY, BUT YOU HAVE ACCOMPLISHED IT PEACEFULLY AND IN A MANNER
THAT ENSURES UKRAINE AN IMPORTANT PLACE IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY. YOU
HAVE MY ADMIRATION AND THE ADMIRATION OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE FOR THE
HISTORIC ROLE YOU HAVE PLAYED.

I ALSO WANTED TO THANK YOU PERSONALLY FOR THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP
THAT YOU AND I HAVE ENJOYED. OUR WORK TOGETHER HAS CREATED A SOLID
FOUNDATION FOR THE PARTNERSHIP EMERGING BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.
THE TRILATERAL STATEMENT, WHICH YOU AND I SIGNED TOGETHER WITH
PRESIDENT YELTSIN IN JANUARY, HAS MOVED THE NUCLEAR QUESTION FROM
THE FOREFRONT OF OUR RELATIONSHIP AND ALLOWED MUCH BROADER AND
RICHER COOPERATION TO DEVELOP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. I COMMEND
YOU, ONCE AGAIN, FOR THE STATESMANSHIP AND LEADERSHIP THAT YOU
SHOWED IN CHOOSING THIS PATH.

IN CLOSING, I WANTED TO ASSURE YOU THAT UKRAINE, THE NATION THAT YOU
HAVE SERVED SO WELL, WILL REMAIN AMONG MY TOP PRIORITIES. I AM
COMMITTED TO ITS FUTURE AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE, SECURE AND STABLE
WITHIN ITS CURRENT BORDERS. I ALSO LOOK FORWARD TO THE TIME WHEN
UKRAINE'S ECONOMY WILL HAVE PASSED THE TRANSITION OF REFORM AND
BECOME STRONG AND PROSPEROUS. AT THAT TIME, UKRAINE WILL TRULY TAKE
ITS PROPER PLACE IN THE COMMUNITY OF EUROPEAN NATIONS.

AGAIN, WITH MY BEST WISHES,

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PAGE 02 OF 02

SINCERELY,

BILL CLINTON

END TEXT

DECL: OADR

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<MSGID> M1149473

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PRIVACY CHANNEL MESSAGE FOR FORMER PRESIDENT KRAVCHUK OF UKRAINE.
AMBASSADOR PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE AT THE EARLIEST
APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY. NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.

(BEGIN TEXT)

DEAR LEONID:

I AM WRITING TO SEND YOU MY VERY BEST WISHES AS YOU FINISH YOUR
TERM AS UKRAINE'S FIRST DEMOCRATICALLY-ELECTED PRESIDENT. IN THE
PAST THREE YEARS, YOU HAVE DONE MUCH TO BRING TO LIFE THE VISION
OF AN INDEPENDENT AND SOVEREIGN UKRAINE. I KNOW THE TRANSITION
HAS NOT BEEN EASY, BUT YOU HAVE ACCOMPLISHED IT PEACEFULLY AND IN
A MANNER THAT ENSURES UKRAINE AN IMPORTANT PLACE IN THE WORLD
COMMUNITY. YOU HAVE MY ADMIRATION AND THE ADMIRATION OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE FOR THE HISTORIC ROLE YOU HAVE PLAYED.

I ALSO WANTED TO THANK YOU PERSONALLY FOR THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP
THAT YOU AND I HAVE ENJOYED. OUR WORK TOGETHER HAS CREATED A
SOLID FOUNDATION FOR THE PARTNERSHIP EMERGING BETWEEN OUR TWO
COUNTRIES. THE TRILATERAL STATEMENT, WHICH YOU AND I SIGNED
TOGETHER WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN IN JANUARY, HAS MOVED THE NUCLEAR
QUESTION FROM THE FOREFRONT OF OUR RELATIONSHIP AND ALLOWED MUCH
BROADER AND RICHER COOPERATION TO DEVELOP BETWEEN OUR TWO
COUNTRIES. I COMMEND YOU, ONCE AGAIN, FOR THE STATESMANSHIP AND
LEADERSHIP THAT YOU SHOWED IN CHOOSING THIS PATH.

IN CLOSING, I WANTED TO ASSURE YOU THAT UKRAINE, THE NATION THAT
YOU HAVE SERVED SO WELL, WILL REMAIN AMONG MY TOP PRIORITIES. I
REMAIN COMMITTED TO ITS FUTURE AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE, SECURE
AND STABLE WITHIN ITS CURRENT BORDERS. I ALSO LOOK FORWARD TO
THE TIME WHEN UKRAINE'S ECONOMY WILL HAVE PASSED THE TRANSITION
OF REFORM AND BECOME STRONG AND PROSPEROUS. AT THAT TIME UKRAINE
WILL TRULY TAKE ITS PROPER PLACE IN THE CENTER OF EUROPEAN
NATIONS.

AGAIN, WITH MY BEST WISHES.

SINCERELY,

BILL CLINTON

(END TEXT)