

RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: Joseph F. Bouchard (CN=Joseph F. Bouchard/OU=NSC/O=EOP [NSC])

CREATION DATE/TIME: 9-NOV-1999 09:39:48.00

SUBJECT: Re: Final Draft NSS99

TO: "Corsetti, William V, Civ, JCS" <william.corsetti@js.pentagon.mil> ("Corsetti, William V, Civ, JCS" <william.
READ:UNKNOWN

TEXT:
Here it is. Comments due November 19.

===== ATTACHMENT 1 =====
ATT CREATION TIME/DATE: 0 00:00:00.00

TEXT:
> q vlbjbjt+t+ 6AAF-.] 8

Tt
34□33333333\$46L33ZZZZ3d3ZZZ-3@"R'
3I. Introduction

Our national security strategy is designed to meet the fundamental purposes set out in the preamble to the Constitution:

...provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity,...

Since the founding of the nation, certain requirements have remained constant. We must protect the lives and personal safety of Americans, both at home and abroad. We must maintain the sovereignty, political freedom and independence of the United States, with its values, institutions and territory intact. And, we must promote the well being and prosperity of the nation and its people.

Opportunities and Challenges

The 21st Century will be an era of great promise. Globalization is the process of accelerating economic, technological, cultural and political integration bringing citizens from all continents closer together, allowing them to share ideas, goods and information at the tap of a keyboard. Making

ny nations around the world have embraced Americas core values of representative governance, free market economics and respect for fundamental human rights and the rule of law, creating new opportunities to promote peace, prosperity and greater cooperation among nations. Former adversaries now cooperate with us. The dynamism of the global economy is transforming commerce, culture, communications and global relations, creating new jobs and economic opportunity for millions of Americans.

Globalization also means that the United States is increasingly affected by events beyond our borders. Outlaw states and ethnic conflicts threaten regional stability and economic progress in many important areas of the world. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime are global concerns that transcend national borders. Other problems that once seemed quite distant such as resource depletion, rapid population growth, environmental damage, new infectious diseases, child labor, and uncontrolled refugee migration have important implications for American security. Our workers and businesses will suffer if the global economy is unstable or foreign markets collapse or lock us out, and the highest domestic environmental standards will not protect us if we cannot get others to achieve similar standards. In short, our citizens have a direct and increasing stake in the prosperity and stability of other nations, in their support for international norms and human rights, in their ability to combat international crime, in their open markets, and in their efforts to protect the environment.

□ National Interests

Since there are always many demands for U.S. action, our national interests must be clear. These interests fall into three categories. The first includes vital interests those of broad, overriding importance to the survival, safety and vitality of our nation. Among these are the physical security of our territory and that of our allies, the health and safety of our citizens, our economic well-being, protection of the global environment from severe, irreparable harm, and protection of our critical infrastructures. We will do what we must to defend these interests, including when necessary and appropriate using our military might unilaterally and decisively.

The second category includes situations in which important national interests are at stake. These interests do not affect our national survival, but they do affect our national well-being and the character of the world in which we live for example, areas where we have a sizable economic stake or commitments to allies, or areas where there is a potential to generate substantial and highly destabilizing refugee flows. Our efforts to halt the flow of refugees from Haiti and restore democracy in that state and our pa

rticipation in NATO operations in Bosnia and Kosovo are examples.

The third category is humanitarian and other interests. In some circumstances our nation may act because our values demand it. Examples include responding to natural and manmade disasters; promoting human rights and seeking to halt gross violations of those rights; supporting democratization, adherence to the rule of law and civilian control of the military; assisting humanitarian demining; and promoting sustainable development and environmental protection. Often in such cases, the force of our example bolsters support for our leadership in the world. When we are faced with deliberate, organized campaigns to murder whole peoples or expel them from their land because of their ethnic, racial, religious tribal heritage, if the international community has the capability to end the violence, we should work to stop genocide and ethnic cleansing. Whenever possible, we seek to avert humanitarian disasters and conflict through diplomacy and cooperation with a wide range of partners, including other governments, international institutions and non-governmental organizations. This may not only save lives, but also prevent the drain on resources caused by intervention in crises.

Threats to U.S. Interests

The security environment in which we live is dynamic and uncertain, replete with a host of threats and challenges that have the potential to grow more deadly.

Regional or State-Centered Threats: A number of states still have the capabilities and the desire to threaten our national interests through coercion or aggression. They continue to threaten the sovereignty of their neighbors, economic stability, and international access to resources. In many cases, these states are also actively improving their offensive capabilities, including efforts to obtain or retain nuclear, biological or chemical weapons and, in some cases, long-range delivery systems.

Transnational threats:

Terrorism, international crime, drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, uncontrolled refugee migrations, and trafficking in human beings, particularly women and children, threaten U.S. interests, values, citizens and the U.S. homeland itself. The possibility of terrorists and other criminals using WMD is of special concern. We also face threats to critical national infrastructuresenergy, banking and finance, telecommunications, transportation, agriculture and food distribution, water systems and emergency serviceswhich increasingly could take the form of a cyber-attack in addition to physical attack or sabotage, and could originate from terrorist or criminal groups as well as hostile states.

Spr

Lead of dangerous technologies: Weapons of mass destruction pose the greatest potential threat to global stability and security. Proliferation of advanced weapons and technologies threatens to provide rogue states, terrorists and international crime organizations the means to inflict terrible damage on the United States, its allies and U.S. citizens and troops abroad.

Failed states: We can

not expect that, despite international prevention efforts, some states will be unable to provide basic governance, safety and security, services, and opportunities for their populations, potentially generating internal conflict, humanitarian crises or regional instability. As governments lose their ability to provide for the welfare of their citizens, mass migration, civil unrest, famine, mass killings, epidemic diseases, environmental disasters and aggression against neighboring states or ethnic groups can threaten U.S. interests and citizens. Certain other states fully in possession of their capacity to govern effectively may succumb to the inflammatory rhetoric of demagogues who blame their nations' ills on specific ethnic groups, singling those groups out for condemnation due to their religious, cultural, racial or tribal heritage. States that fail to respect the rights of their own citizens and tolerate or actively engage in human rights abuses, ethnic cleansing or acts of genocide often generate humanitarian crises that the United States and the international community cannot ignore. Such crises not only harm a country's own citizens, they can spark civil wars and refugee crises, and spill across national boundaries to destabilize a region.

Foreign intelligence collection: The threat from foreign intelligence services is more diverse, complex and difficult to counter than ever before. This threat is a mix of traditional and non-traditional intelligence adversaries that have targeted American military, diplomatic, technological, economic and commercial secrets. Some foreign intelligence services are rapidly adopting new technologies and innovative methods to obtain such secrets, including attempts to use the global information infrastructure to gain access to sensitive information via penetration of computer systems and networks. In the immediate future, the United States faces threats that are much broader in scope than traditional counterintelligence matters. We must be concerned about efforts by nonstate actors to penetrate and subvert government institutions or critical sectors of our economy. Nonstate actors could include legitimate organizations, both quasigovernmental and private, and illicit international criminal organizations. Their objectives might range from stealing vital statistical information about American commerce to tapping law enforcement data bases, attempting to influence our political process or compromising private data networks.

Environmental

and health threats: Environmental and health problems can undermine the health and welfare of U.S. citizens, and compromise our national security, economic and humanitarian interests abroad for generations. Such threats respect no national boundary and can be all the more pernicious because they emanate not from deliberate malicious acts, but from ignorance, inattention or mismanagement. History has shown that international epidemics can destroy human life on a scale as great as any war or terrorist act we have seen. In the future, we face potentially even more devastating threats if we fail to avert irreparable damage to regional ecosystems and the global environment. Deforestation and other forms of non-sustainable development, pursuit of industrial development at the expense of the environment, unchecked emissions of greenhouse gasses, and the growing black market in toxic waste and ozone-depleting chemicals all threaten the health and well being of our citizens. Other environmental issues could have near term national security consequences. For example, competition over transboundary fresh water resources is a potential threat to regional stability, and nearly two-thirds of the world's population is expected to experience some form of water deficit by the year 2025.

Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance

(ISR) capabilities are critical to our ability to thwart these dangers.

We place highest priority on monitoring the most serious threats to U.S. security: states hostile to the United States; countries or other entities that possess strategic nuclear forces or control nuclear weapons, other WMD or nuclear fissile materials; transnational threats, including terrorism, international crime and drug trafficking; potential regional conflicts that might affect U.S. national security interests; and threats to U.S. forces and citizens abroad.

A

Strategy of Engagement

Our strategy is founded on continued U.S. engagement and leadership abroad. The United States must lead abroad if we are to be secure at home, but we cannot lead abroad unless we are strong at home. We must be prepared and willing to use all appropriate instruments of national power to influence the actions of other states and non-state actors, to provide global leadership, and to remain the preferred security partner for the community of states that share our interests. The international community is often reluctant to act forcefully without American leadership. In many instances, the United States is the only nation capable of providing the necessary leadership and capabilities for an international response to shared challenges. By exerting our leadership abroad we have deterred aggression, fostered the resolution of conflicts, enhanced regional cooperation, strengthened democracies, stopped human rights abuses, opened foreign markets and tackled global problems such as preventing

the spread of weapons of mass destruction and protecting the environment. American leadership and engagement in the world are vital for our security, and our nation and the world are safer, healthier and more prosperous as a result.

Ac

achieving our core objectives--enhancing American security, bolstering our economic prosperity and promoting democracy abroad--will require sustained, long-term effort. Many of the threats to our national interests are persistent or recurring--they cannot be resolved or eliminated once and for all, and will continue to demand our attention. American engagement must be tempered by recognition that there are limits to Americas involvement in the world, and that decisions to commit resources today must be weighed against the need to sustain our engagement over the long term. Our engagement therefore must be selective, focusing on the threats and opportunities most relevant to our interests and applying our resources where we can make the greatest difference. Additionally, sustaining our engagement abroad over the long term will require the support of the American people and the Congress to bear the costs of defending U.S. interests in dollars, effort and, when necessary, with military force. We have an obligation to foster broad public understanding and bipartisan congressional support for international engagement.

Implementing the Strategy

Our national security ef

forts will continue to be guided by President Clinton's strategic priorities: to foster regional efforts led by the community of democratic nations to promote peace and prosperity in key regions of the world, to increase cooperation in confronting new security threats that defy borders and unilateral solutions, to strengthen international nonproliferation regimes, to protect our citizens at home and abroad, to protect our critical infrastructures, to protect the environment and the health of our citizens, to strengthen the military, diplomatic, economic and law enforcement tools necessary to meet these challenges, and to create more jobs and opportunities for Americans through a more open and competitive economic system that promotes prosperity around the world.

International

cooperation will be vital for building security in the next century because many of the threats we face cannot be addressed by a single nation. Many of our security objectives are best achieved or can only be achieved by leveraging our influence and capabilities through the United Nations, other multilateral institutions, our alliances, or as a leader of an ad hoc coalition formed around a specific objective. Leadership in the UN and other international organizations, and durable relationships with allies and friendly nations, are vital to our security. A central thrust of our strategy is to strengthen and adapt the forma

l relationships we have with key nations around the world, create new relationships and structures when necessary, and enhance the capability of friendly nations to exercise regional leadership in support of shared goals. At other times we harness our diplomatic, economic, military and information strengths and law enforcement relationships to shape a favorable international environment outside of formal structures. But building effective coalitions of like-minded nations is not enough, we must always be prepared to act alone when that is our most advantageous course, or when we have no alternative.

Success in countering

the wide range of threats we face requires an integrated approach that brings together all the capabilities and assets needed to achieve our security objectives particularly in this era when domestic and foreign policies increasingly overlap. To effectively shape the international environment and respond to the full spectrum of potential threats and crises, diplomacy, military force, law enforcement, our other foreign policy tools and our domestic preparedness efforts must be closely coordinated. We are continuing to strengthen and integrate our own diplomatic, military, intelligence and law enforcement capabilities so we can more effectively lead the international community in responding to these threats, as well as act on our own when we must.

At home, we must have effective

capabilities for thwarting and responding to terrorist acts, countering international crime and foreign intelligence collection, and protecting critical national infrastructures. Our efforts to counter these threats cross agency and governmental boundaries, requiring close cooperation among Federal agencies, state and local governments, the industries that own and operate critical national infrastructures, non-governmental organizations and others in the private sector.

The Power of Our Values

Underpinning our international leadership is the power of our democratic ideals and values. In crafting our strategy, we recognize that the spread of democracy, human rights and respect for the rule of law supports American values and enhances both our security and prosperity. Democratic governments are more likely to cooperate with each other against common threats, encourage free trade, promote sustainable economic development, and protect the rights of their people. Hence, the trend toward democracy and free markets throughout the world advances American interests. The United States will support this trend by remaining actively engaged in the world. This strategy will take us into the next century.

□III. Advancing U.S. National Interests

The

goals of the national security strategy are to protect the lives and safety of Americans, maintain the sovereignty of the United States with its values, institutions and territory intact, and promote the prosperity and well-being of the nation and its people. In our vision of the world, the United States provides leadership in key international institutions like the United Nations, has close cooperative relations with the world's most influential countries and has the ability to influence the policies and actions of those who can affect our national well-being. We seek to create a stable, peaceful international security environment one in which our nation, citizens and interests are not threatened; democratic values and respect for human rights and the rule of law are increasingly accepted; America continues to prosper through increasingly open international markets and sustainable growth in the global economy; the threat of global diseases is reduced; and the health and well-being of our citizens are enhanced by an increasingly cleaner global environment.

Enhancing Security at Home
and Abroad

Our strategy for enhancing U.S. security has three components: shaping the international environment, responding to threats and crises, and preparing for an uncertain future.

Shaping the International Environment

The United

States seeks to shape the global environment through a variety of means, including diplomacy, economic cooperation, international assistance, arms control and nonproliferation initiatives, military activities, international law enforcement cooperation and environmental and health initiatives. Such shaping activities enhance U.S. security by promoting regional security, enhancing economic development, and preventing or reducing the diverse threats we face today. These measures adapt and strengthen alliances, partnerships and friendships, maintain U.S. influence in key regions, and encourage adherence to international norms.

When signs of potential conflict emerge, or potential threats appear, we undertake initiatives to prevent or reduce these threats. Our shaping efforts also aim to discourage arms races and halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; reduce tensions in critical regions; encourage sustainable development, open markets and global economic cooperation; counter terrorism, drug trafficking, firearms trafficking and illegal immigration; improve law enforcement cooperation; and minimize environmental, health and other threats.

Diplomacy

Di

plomacy is a vital tool for countering threats to our national security. The daily business of diplomacy conducted through our missions and representatives around the world is an irreplaceable shaping activity. These efforts are essential to sustaining our alliances, forcefully articulating U.S. interests, resolving regional disputes peacefully, averting humanitarian catastrophe, deterring aggression against the United States and our friends and allies, promoting international economic cooperation and stability, fostering trade and investment opportunities, and projecting U.S. influence worldwide.

One of the lessons that

has been repeatedly driven home is the importance of preventive diplomacy in dealing with conflict and complex emergencies. Helping prevent nations from failing is far more effective than rebuilding them after an internal crisis. Helping people stay in their homes is far more beneficial than feeding and housing them in refugee camps. Helping relief agencies and international organizations strengthen the institutions of conflict resolution is far less taxing than healing ethnic and social divisions that have already exploded into bloodshed. In short, while crisis management and crisis resolution are necessary tasks for our foreign policy, preventive diplomacy is obviously far preferable.

Investment

in our diplomatic tools and the means to support them and keep them secure is essential for achieving our national security objectives. We must retain a strong international assistance program and an effective diplomatic corps if we are to maintain American leadership in the world and protect our national interests. Credible military force and the demonstrated will to use it are essential for defending our vital interests and keeping America safe. But force alone cannot solve all our problems. To be most effective, force, diplomacy, and our other policy tools must complement and reinforce each other for there will be many occasions and many places where we must rely on diplomatic shaping activities to protect and advance our interests.

Public Diplomacy

We also have an obli

gation and opportunity to harness the tools of public diplomacy to advance U.S. leadership around the world by engaging international publics on U.S. principles and policies. The global advance of democratic institutions and the global information infrastructure have increased the ability of individual citizens and foreign publics to influence the policies of their governments to an unprecedented degree. As a result, our public diplomacy programs are a vital component of our national security strategy. Our programs enhance our ability to inform

and influence foreign publics in support of U.S. national interests, and broaden the dialogue between American citizens and U.S. institutions and their counterparts abroad.

Information is a key component of every element of national power that must work hand-in-hand with diplomacy and other tools of national security. Effective use of our nations information capabilities to address misinformation and incitement, mitigate inter-ethnic conflict, promote independent media organizations and the free flow of information, and support democratic participation helps advance U.S. interests abroad. International Public Information (IPI) activities, as defined by the newly promulgated Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-68), are designed to improve our capability to coordinate independent public diplomacy, public affairs and other national security information-related efforts to ensure they are more successfully integrated into foreign and national security policy making and execution.

International Assistance

From

the U.S.-led mobilization to rebuild post-war Europe to more recent economic success stories across Asia, Latin America and Africa, U.S. foreign assistance has assisted emerging democracies, promoted respect for human rights and the rule of law, helped expand free markets, slowed the growth of international crime, contained major health threats, improved protection of the environment and natural resources, slowed population growth, and defused humanitarian crises. Crises are averted and U.S. preventive diplomacy actively reinforced through U.S. sustainable development programs that promote voluntary the rights of workers, family planning, basic education, environmental protection, democratic governance, the rule of law, religious freedom, and the economic empowerment of private citizens.

Debt relief is an important element of our overall effort to alleviate poverty and promote economic development. The Cologne Debt Initiative announced at the G-7 summit, together with earlier debt relief commitments, provides for reduction of up to 70 percent of the total debts for heavily indebted poor countries. This will be a reduction from the current level of about \$127 billion to as low as \$37 billion with the cancellation of official development assistance debt by G-7 and other bilateral creditors. The Cologne Debt Initiative also calls on international financial institutions to develop a new framework for linking debt relief with poverty reduction. These measures center around better targeting of budgetary resources for priority social expenditures, for health, child survival, AIDS prevention, education, greater transparency in government budgeting, and much wider consultation with civil society in the development and implementation of economic programs.

When combined effectively with other bilateral and multilateral activities, such as our cooperative scientific and technological programs, U.S. initiatives reduce the need for costly military and humanitarian interventions. When assistance programs succeed in promoting democracy and free markets, substantial growth of American exports has usually followed. Where crises have occurred, our assistance programs have helped staunch mass human suffering through targeted relief. Other assistance programs have created a path out of conflict and dislocation, helped to help restore elementary security and civic institutions, and promoted political stability and economic recovery.

Arms Control

Arms control efforts are an essential element of our national security strategy. We pursue verifiable arms control treaties and agreements that support our efforts to prevent the spread and use of weapons of mass destruction, halt the use of conventional weapons that cause unnecessary suffering, and contribute to regional stability at lower levels of armaments. By increasing transparency in the size, structure and operations of military forces and building confidence in the intentions of other countries, arms control agreements and confidence-building measures reduce incentives and opportunities to initiate an attack, reduce the mutual suspicions that arise from and spur on armaments competition, and help provide the assurance of security necessary to strengthen cooperative relationships and direct resources to safer, more productive endeavors.

Verifiable reductions in strategic offensive arms and the steady shift toward less destabilizing systems remain essential to our strategy. Entry into force of the START I Treaty in December 1994 charted the course for reductions in the deployed strategic nuclear forces of the United States and Russia. The other countries of the Former Soviet Union that had nuclear weapons on their soil Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine have become non-nuclear weapons states. Once the START II Treaty enters into force, the United States and Russia will each be limited to between 3,000-3,500 accountable strategic nuclear warheads. START II also will eliminate destabilizing land-based multiple warhead and heavy missiles. On September 26, 1997, the U.S. and Russia signed a START II Protocol extending the end date for reductions to 2007, and exchanged letters on early deactivation by 2003 of those strategic nuclear delivery systems to be eliminated by 2007.

At the Helsinki Summit in March 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that once START II enters into force, our two nations would immediately begin negotiations on a START III agreement. They agree

d to START III guidelines that, if adopted, will cap the number of strategic nuclear warheads deployed in each country at 2,000-2,500 by the end of 2007 reducing both our arsenals by 80 percent from Cold War heights. They also agreed that, in order to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions, a START III agreement will include measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads. The statement also committed the two nations to explore possible measures relating to non-strategic nuclear weapons, to include appropriate confidence building and transparency measures. At the Cologne G8 Summit in June 1999, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to a Joint Statement reaffirming that they will do all they can to secure prompt ratification of START II and to begin discussions on START III.

The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty remains a cornerstone of strategic stability, and the United States is committed to continued efforts to strengthen the Treaty and to enhance its viability and effectiveness. At the Helsinki Summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin reaffirmed their commitment to the ABM Treaty and recognized the need for effective theater missile defenses in an agreement in principle on demarcation between systems to counter strategic ballistic missiles and those to counter theater ballistic missiles. On September 26, 1997, the U.S. Secretary of State and Russian Foreign Minister, along with their counterparts from Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, signed or initialed five agreements relating to the ABM Treaty. At the Cologne G8 Summit in June 1999, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin reiterated their determination to achieve earliest possible ratification and entry into force of those agreements. The agreements on demarcation and succession will be provided to the Senate for its advice and consent following Russian ratification of START II. The two presidents also reaffirmed at Cologne their existing obligations under Article XIII of the ABM Treaty to consider possible changes in the strategic situation that have a bearing on the ABM Treaty and, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of the Treaty; they also agreed to begin discussions on the ABM Treaty, which are now underway in parallel with discussions on START II. The United States is proposing that the ABM Treaty be modified to accommodate possible deployment of a limited National Missile Defense system to counter the emerging ballistic missile threat from rogue states.

At the Moscow Summit in September 1998, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed on a new initiative for the exchange of information on missile launches and early warning. The agreement will significantly reduce the danger that ballistic missiles could be launched inadvertently on the basis of false warning of attack. It will also promote increased mutual confidence in the capabilities of the ballistic missile early warning systems of both sides. The United States and Russia will develop arrangements for providing each other with continuous information on the launches

s of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles that can be detected by their respective early warning systems. The United States and Russia will also work towards establishing a multilateral ballistic missile and space launch vehicle pre-launch notification regime in which other states would be invited to participate.

The United States remains committed to bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force. To this end, the United States will maintain its moratorium on nuclear testing, and is encouraging all other states to do the same. We are also encouraging all states that have not done so to sign and ratify the CTBT.

The CTBT ends nuclear testing worldwide. More than 150 countries have signed the Treaty so far, agreeing to stop all nuclear explosive testing. The CTBT would constrain nuclear weapons development and would also help prevent nuclear technologies from spreading to other countries. The United States ended nuclear testing seven years ago; the CTBT forces other countries to end testing, too. We have developed means of making sure our nuclear weapons work through non-nuclear tests and computer simulations, rather than by tests with nuclear explosions, and we spend \$4.5 billion a year to ensure that our nuclear weapons remain safe and reliable.

The CTBT puts in place a worldwide network for detecting nuclear explosions. With over 300 stations around the globe including 31 in Russia, 11 in China, and 17 in the Middle East this international monitoring system improves our ability to monitor suspicious activity and catch cheaters. The United States already has dozens of monitoring stations of its own; the CTBT allows us to take advantage of other countries stations and create new ones, too. The Treaty also provides the opportunity to inspect suspected nuclear testing sites in other countries.

To be secure, we must not only have a strong military; we must also take the lead in building a safer, more responsible world. We have a fundamental responsibility to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and reduce the danger of nuclear war. We will continue to work toward gaining Senate advice and consent to ratification of the CTBT. U.S. ratification will encourage other states to ratify, enable the United States to lead the international effort to gain CTBT entry into force, and strengthen international norms against nuclear testing.

The United States is pursuing a adaptation of the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, consistent with the Decision on Certain Basic Elements adopted on July 23, 1997, and the Joint Consultative Group decision of March 30, 1999, which was accepted by a

11 30 CFE states. Success in this negotiation will ensure that this landmark agreement remains a cornerstone of European security into the 21st century and beyond. We continue to seek Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian ratification of the 1992 Open Skies Treaty to increase transparency of military forces in Eurasia and North America. We also promote, through international organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), implementation of confidence and security-building measures, including the 1994 Vienna Document, throughout Europe and in specific regions of tension and instability.

P

President Clinton is committed to ending the tragic damage to innocent civilians due to anti-personnel landmines (APLs). The United States has already taken major steps in the spirit that motivated the Ottawa Convention, while ensuring our ability to meet international obligations and provide for the safety and security of our men and women in uniform. President Clinton has directed the Defense Department to end the use of all APLs, including self-destructing APLs, outside Korea by 2003 and to pursue aggressively the objective of having APL alternatives ready for Korea by 2006. We will also aggressively pursue alternatives to our mixed anti-tank systems that contain anti-personnel submunitions. We have made clear that the United States will sign the Ottawa Convention by 2006 if by then we have succeeded in identifying and fielding suitable alternatives to our self-destructing APLs and mixed anti-tank systems. Furthermore, U.S. ratification of the Amended Landmine Protocol to the Convention on Conventional Weapons in May 1999 was a major achievement. A key element of this agreement is a ban on the indiscriminate use of long-duration APLs that caused the worldwide humanitarian problem. We have established a permanent ban on APL exports and are seeking to universalize an export ban through the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. We are supporting humanitarian demining programs and through our "Demining 2010" initiative have challenged the world to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of removing landmines that threaten civilians.

Nonproliferation Initiatives

Nonproliferation initiatives enhance global security by preventing the spread of WMD, materials for producing them and means of delivering them. That is why the Administration is promoting universal adherence to the international treaty regimes that prohibit the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

The NPT

is the cornerstone of international nuclear nonproliferation efforts and reinforces regional and global security by creating confidence in the nonnuclear com

mitments of its parties. It was an indispensable precondition for the denuclearization of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus and South Africa. We seek to ensure that the NPT remains a strong and vital element of global security by achieving universal adherence and full compliance by its parties with their Treaty obligations. The 2000 NPT Review Conference will pose a major challenge to the future of this critical Treaty. We will vigorously promote the value of the NPT in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons while continuing policies designed to reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons and to work for their ultimate elimination.

To reinforce the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, we seek to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system and achieve a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. A Cutoff Treaty would cap the nuclear materials available worldwide for weapons, a key step in halting the spread of nuclear weapons. A coordinated effort by the intelligence community and law enforcement agencies to detect, prevent and deter illegal trafficking in fissile materials, and the Materials Protection, Security and Accounting (MPSA) program, which enhances security for nuclear materials having potential terrorist applications, are also essential to our counter-proliferation efforts.

We seek to strengthen the BWC with a new international regime to ensure compliance. We are negotiating with other BWC member states in an effort to reach consensus on a protocol to the BWC that would implement an inspection system to enhance compliance and promote transparency. We are also working hard to implement and enforce the CWC. The United States Congress underscored the importance of these efforts in October 1998 by passing legislation to implement full compliance with the commercial declarations and inspections required by the CWC.

The Administration also seeks to prevent destabilizing buildups of conventional arms and limit access to sensitive technical information, equipment and technologies by strengthening multilateral regimes, including the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, the Australia Group (for chemical and biological weapons), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Zangger Committee. At the NATO 50th Anniversary Summit, Allied leaders agreed to enhance NATO's ability to deal both politically and militarily with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery.

Regional nonproliferation efforts are particularly important in three critical proliferation zones. On the Korean Peninsula, we are implementing the 1994 Agreed Framework, which requires full compliance by North Korea with

its nonproliferation obligations. We also seek to convince North Korea to halt its indigenous missile program and exports of missile systems and technologies. In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, we encourage regional confidence building measures and arms control agreements that address the legitimate security concerns of all parties, and continue efforts to thwart and roll back Iran's development of WMD and long-range missiles, and Iraq's efforts to reconstitute its WMD programs. In South Asia, we seek to persuade India and Pakistan to refrain from weaponization or deployment of nuclear weapons, testing or deploying missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, as well as to adhere fully to international nonproliferation standards and to sign and ratify the CTBT.

Through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program and other initiatives, we aim to strengthen controls over weapons-usable fissile material and prevent the theft or diversion of WMD and related material and technology. The CTR Program has effectively supported enhanced safety, security, accounting and centralized control measures for nuclear weapons and fissile materials in the former Soviet Union. It has assisted Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus in becoming non-nuclear weapons states and will continue to assist Russia in meeting its START obligations. The CTR Program is also supporting measures to eliminate and prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons and biological weapon-related capabilities, and has supported many ongoing military reductions and reform measures in the former Soviet Union. We are working to strengthen the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to increase accountability and protection, which complements our effort to enhance IAEA safeguards.

In his 1999 State of the Union address, the President launched the Enhanced Threat Reduction Initiative (ETRI). This multi-agency effort is designed to address the new security challenges in Russia and the other Newly Independent States caused by the financial crisis, including preventing WMD proliferation, reducing the threat posed by residual WMD, and stabilizing the military. This initiative builds on the success of existing programs such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the Material Protection Control, and Accounting program and the Science Centers by accelerating current program activities and adding new program elements that make additional progress in the more challenging environment now facing Russia and the NIS states. For example, new ETRI initiatives will substantially expand our cooperative efforts to eliminate WMD in the NIS, a new component of our nuclear security program will greatly increase the security of fissile material by concentrating it at fewer, well protected sites, and new programs will increase the security of facilities and experts formerly associated with the Soviet Union's BW effort.

We are purchasing tons of highly enriched uranium from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons for conversion into commercial reactor fuel, and working with Russia to remove 34 metric tons of plutonium from each country's nuclear weapons programs and converting it so that it can never be used in nuclear weapons. We are redirecting dozens of former Soviet WMD facilities and tens of thousands of former Soviet WMD scientists in Eastern Europe and Eurasia from military to peaceful activities. We also are working to implement a new biological initiative aimed at increasing transparency in former Soviet biological weapons facilities and redirecting their scientists to civilian commercial, agricultural, and public health activities. In support of U.S. efforts to prevent proliferation of WMD by organized crime groups and individuals in the NIS and Eastern Europe, the Departments of Defense, Energy, Commerce, and the FBI are engaging in programs that assist governments in developing effective export control systems and capabilities to prevent, deter, or detect potential proliferation of WMD and weapons materials across borders. These programs provide training, equipment, expert advice, and services to law enforcement and border security agencies in these countries.

Military Activities

The U.S. military plays an important role in shaping the international security environment in ways that protect and promote U.S. interests, but is not a substitute for other forms of engagement, such as diplomatic, economic, scientific, technological, cultural and educational activities. Military forces have a unique role in our overall strategy of engagement. Through overseas presence and peacetime engagement activities such as defense cooperation, security assistance, and training and exercises with allies and friends, our armed forces help to deter aggression and coercion, build coalitions, promote regional stability and serve as role models for militaries in emerging democracies. With countries that are neither staunch friends nor known foes, military cooperation can serve as a positive means of building security relationships today that will contribute to improved relations tomorrow. Our concern for human rights remains high, and we will continue to ensure that we do not train or assist known human rights abusers.

Maintaining o

ur overseas presence promotes regional stability, giving substance to our bilateral and multilateral security commitments, helping to prevent the development of power vacuums and instability, contributing to deterrence by demonstrating our determination to defend U.S., allied, and friendly interests in critical regions, and better positioning the United States to respond rapidly to crises. Equally essential is effective global power projection, which is key to the flexibility demanded of our forces and provides options for responding to potential crises and conflicts even when we have no permanent presence or a limited infr

astructure in a region. Conversely, global power projection is enabled and facilitated by having combat credible forces forward deployed in peacetime. These two operational concepts forward presence and power projection are complementary, each increasing the potency of the other and together providing the broad range of military options needed for carrying out our strategy.

Although milit

ary activities make an essential contribution to shaping the international security environment in peacetime, we must be mindful that the primary mission of our Armed Forces is to deter and, if necessary, to fight and win conflicts in which our vital interests are threatened. Just as American engagement overall must be selective focusing on the threats and opportunities most relevant to our interests and applying our resources where we can make the greatest differences so must our use of the Armed Forces for shaping be selective. Shaping activities must be carefully managed to prevent erosion of our military's current and long-term readiness. The Defense Department's theater engagement planning process, which was approved by the President in 1997, will help ensure that military engagement activities are prioritized within and across theaters, and balanced against the availability of resources. In short, we must prioritize military shaping activities to ensure the readiness of our Armed Forces to carry out crisis response and warfighting missions, as well as to ensure that we can sustain an appropriate level of shaping activities over the long term.

Deterrence of agg

ression and coercion on a daily basis is crucial. Our ability to deter potential adversaries in peacetime rests on several factors, particularly on our demonstrated will and ability to uphold our security commitments when they are challenged. We have earned this reputation through both our declaratory policy, which clearly communicates costs to potential adversaries, and our credible warfighting capability. This capability is embodied in ready forces and equipment strategically stationed or deployed forward, in forces in the United States at the appropriate level of readiness to deploy when needed, in our ability to gain timely access to critical regions and infrastructure overseas, and in our demonstrated ability to form and lead effective military coalitions. Because terrorist organizations may not be deterred by traditional means, we must ensure a robust capability to accurately attribute the source of attacks against the United States or its citizens, and to respond effectively and decisively to protect our national interests.

Our nuclear deterrent posture is one of the most visible and important examples of how U.S. military capabilities can be used effectively to deter aggression and coercion against U.S. interests. Nuclear weapons serve as a hedge against an uncertain future, a guarantee of our security commitments to allies and a disincentive to those who would contemplate developing o

r otherwise acquiring their own nuclear weapons or other WMD. Our military planning for the possible employment of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons is focused on deterring a nuclear war and emphasizes the survivability of the nuclear systems and infrastructure necessary to endure a preemptive attack and still respond at overwhelming levels. The United States must continue to maintain a robust triad of strategic nuclear forces sufficient to deter any hostile foreign leadership with access to nuclear forces and to convince it that seeking a nuclear advantage would be futile. In addition, some U.S. non-strategic nuclear forces are maintained in a forward-deployed status in NATO as a visible reminder of our security commitment. We must also ensure the continued viability of the infrastructure that supports U.S. nuclear forces and weapons. The Stockpile Stewardship Program will provide high confidence in the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

We are committed to maintaining U.S. leadership in space. Unimpeded use of space is essential for protecting U.S. national security, promoting our prosperity and ensuring our well being. Consistent with our international obligations, we will deter threats to our interests in space, defeat hostile efforts against U.S. access to and use of space, and maintain the ability to counter space systems and services that could be used for hostile purposes against our military forces, command and control system, or other critical capabilities. We also will continue efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction to space, and will continue to pursue global partnerships addressing space-related scientific, economic, environmental and security issues.

We also are committed to maintaining information superiority the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting and/or denying an adversary's ability to do the same. Operational readiness as well as the command and control of forces rely increasingly on information systems and technology. We must keep pace with rapidly evolving information technology so that we can cultivate and harvest the promise of information superiority among U.S. forces and coalition partners while exploiting the shortfalls in our adversaries information capabilities.

Quality people civilian and military are our most critical asset in implementing our strategy. The quality of our men and women in uniform will be the deciding factor in future military operations. We must ensure that we remain the most fully prepared and best trained fighting force in the world. Accordingly, we will continue to place the highest priority on initiatives and programs that support recruiting, quality of life, and training and education.

International Law Enforcement Cooperation

As threats to our national security from drug trafficking, terrorism and international crime increase, U.S. and foreign law enforcement and judicial agencies must continue to find innovative ways to develop a concerted, global attack on the spread of international crime. One way to accomplish this is through cooperative activities, such as overseas law enforcement presence, to leverage resources and foster the establishment of effective working relationships with foreign law enforcement agencies. U.S. investigators and prosecutors draw upon their experience and background to enlist the cooperation of foreign law enforcement officials, keeping crime away from American shores, enabling the arrest of many U.S. fugitives and solving serious U.S. crimes. This presence develops substantive international links by creating personal networks of law enforcement professionals dedicated to preventing crime and bringing international criminals to justice. The Department of State and U.S. federal law enforcement agencies and are engaged in a cooperative effort to provide assistance to law enforcement agencies in Central and Eastern Europe and East Asia through the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA), with training centers established in Hungary and Thailand. The ILEA initiative is a multinational effort organized by the United States, the host nations, and other international training partners to provide mutual assistance and law enforcement training.

Recent advances in information technology offer unprecedented opportunities to collect, process, store, and electronically transmit vital information throughout the world. Law enforcement must begin to utilize this technology to facilitate the secure transfer of law enforcement data, in a manner consistent with U.S. law, among the international law enforcement community. This is accomplished through the linking of databases, and the establishment of worldwide standards for the interoperability of automated information systems. Achievements in this arena will accelerate the criminal identification process and provide an increasing basis of international support for the reduction of crime and terrorism around the world.

Environmental and Health Initiatives

Decisions today regarding the environment and natural resources can affect our security for generations. Environmental threats do not heed national borders and can pose long-term dangers to our security and well being. Natural resource scarcities can trigger and exacerbate conflict. To help cope with these sources of instability, it is in our national interest to increase the capacity of developing countries to successfully meet environmental and demographic challenges. Environmental threats such as climate change, stratospheric ozone d

pletion, introduction of nuisance plant and animal species, overharvesting of fish, forests and other living natural resources, and the transnational movement of hazardous chemicals and waste directly threaten the health and economic well-being of U.S. citizens. Additionally, the foods of indigenous populations, such as Alaskan Native Americans, are often vulnerable to transnational sources of environmental contaminants that threaten shared ecosystems. We have a full diplomatic agenda, working bilaterally and multilaterally to respond aggressively to environmental threats. For example, at Kyoto in December 1997, the industrialized nations of the world agreed for the first time to binding limits on greenhouse gases. This was a vital turning point, but we must press for participation by key developing nations and will not submit the Kyoto protocol for ratification until they have agreed to participate meaningfully in efforts to address global warming. We must also continue working to improve the safety of the nuclear power plants in Russia and China and Eastern Europe and help mobilize investments to replace unsafe reactors.

Diseases and health risks can no longer be viewed solely as a domestic concern. Like the global economy, the health and well being of all peoples are becoming increasingly interdependent. With the movement of over two million people per day across international borders and the expansion of international trade, health issues as diverse as importation of dangerous infectious diseases and bioterrorism preparedness profoundly affect our national security. Beyond the direct threat to Americans from disease, healthy populations internationally provide an essential underpinning for economic development, democratization and political stability. We are, therefore, taking a proactive leadership role to promote international cooperation on health issues.

Beyond these general concerns, a number of specific international health issues are critical for our national security. Because a growing proportion of our national food supply is coming from international sources, assuring the safety of the food we consume must be a priority. The Administration has announced a new and stronger program to ensure the safety of imported as well as domestic foods, to be overseen by the Presidents Council on Food Safety. New and emerging infections such as drug-resistant tuberculosis and the Ebola virus can move with the speed of jet travel. We are actively engaged with the international health community as well as the World Health Organization to stop the spread of these dangerous diseases. The worldwide epidemic HIV/AIDS is destroying peoples and economies in an unprecedented scale and is now the number one cause of death in Africa, killing over 5,500 per day. The Administration has taken bold new steps to combat this devastating epidemic, including reaching agreement in 1999 with the G-7 in Cologne to link debt relief with social programs such as HIV/AIDS prevention.

Responding to Threats and Crises

Because our

shaping efforts alone cannot guarantee the international security environment we seek, the United States must be able to respond at home and abroad to the full spectrum of threats and crises that may arise. Our resources are finite, so we must be selective in our responses, focusing on challenges that most directly affect our interests and engaging where we can make the most difference. We must use the most appropriate tool or combination of tools—diplomacy, public diplomacy, economic measures, law enforcement, military operations, and others. Our use of these tools may at times require that we strike a balance between our objectives of enhancing our security and bolstering our prosperity because economic sanctions imposed to counter specific threats to our security can have a diverse impact on U.S. exports and the global economy. We act in alliance or partnership when others share our interests, but unilaterally when compelling national interests so demand.

When efforts to deter an adversary by it an aggressor nation, terrorist group or criminal organization occur in the context of a crisis, they become the leading edge of crisis response. In this sense, deterrence straddles the line between shaping the international environment and responding to crises. Deterrence in crisis generally involves signaling the United States commitment to a particular country or interest by enhancing our warfighting capability in the theater. The U.S. may also choose to make additional statements to communicate the costs of aggression or coercion to an adversary, and in some cases may choose to employ U.S. forces to underline the message and deter further adventurism.

Transnational Threats

Transnational threats include terrorism, international crime, narcotics trafficking, and illegal trade in fissile materials, potential biological agents, toxic waste, ozone-depleting substances and other dangerous materials.

Terrorism

Our policy to counter international terrorists rests on the following principles: (1) make no concessions to terrorists; (2) bring all pressure to bear on all state sponsors of terrorism; (3) fully exploit all available legal mechanisms to punish international terrorists; and (4) help other governments improve their capabilities to combat terrorism. Following these principles, we seek to eliminate foreign terrorists and their support networks in our country, extend the reach of financial sanctions

to international terrorist support networks, eliminate terrorist sanctuaries, and counter state-supported terrorism and subversion of moderate regimes.

The

United States has made concerted efforts to deter and punish terrorists and remains determined to apprehend and bring to justice those who terrorize American citizens. Whenever possible, we use law enforcement and diplomatic tools to wage the fight against terrorism. In the wake of the August 1998 bombings in East Africa, the FBI established five Rapid Deployment Teams that are ready to respond quickly to terrorist events anywhere in the world. Following the initial response by the nearest FBI Legal Attach, an FBI Advance Team, comprised of 12 to 15 topical experts, will depart for the crisis site. When necessary, the full Team, consisting of approximately 160 personnel, will follow the Advance Team to the site. But there have been, and will be, times when law enforcement and diplomatic tools are simply not enough. As long as terrorists continue to target American citizens, or otherwise put their security at risk, we reserve the right to act in self-defense by striking at their bases and those who sponsor, assist or actively support them.

On August 20, 1998, acting on convincing information from a variety of reliable sources that the network of radical groups affiliated with Osama bin Laden had planned, financed and carried out the bombings of our embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, the U.S. Armed Forces carried out strikes on one of the most active terrorist bases in the world. It contained key elements of the bin Laden network's infrastructure and has served as a training camp for literally thousands of terrorists from around the globe. The strikes were a necessary and proportionate response to the imminent threat of further terrorist attacks against U.S. personnel and facilities, and demonstrated that no country can be a safe haven for terrorists.

International Crime

International crime is a serious threat to Americans at home and abroad. Drug trafficking, illegal trade in firearms, fissile material smuggling, financial crimes such as money laundering, counterfeiting, advanced fee and credit card fraud, and income tax evasion, illegal alien smuggling, extortion, kidnapping, trafficking in women and children, economic espionage, intellectual property theft, computer hacking, public corruption, and illegal shipments of toxic waste and ozone-depleting chemicals all have a direct impact on the security and prosperity of the American people. The efficiency of the market place depends on transparency and effective law enforcement, which limit distorting factors such as extortion and corruption. A free and efficient market requires elimination of unlawful activities that impede rational business decisions and fair competi-

on. Additionally, the integrity and reliability of the international financial system will be improved by standardizing laws and regulations governing financial institutions and improving international law enforcement cooperation in the financial sector. Finally, there must be no safe haven where criminals can roam free, beyond the reach of our extradition and legal assistance treaties.

In concert with our allies, efforts are under way to accelerate the criminal identification process and facilitate global participation in the investigation and prosecution of criminal activities. These efforts are being advanced through the linking of worldwide automated information system databases, and the establishment of international data sharing standards to facilitate the transfer of law enforcement data. This will be done in a manner that protects the privacy of U.S. citizens. As a result, more timely and accurate data is provided to the international law enforcement community.

We are negotiating and implementing new and updated extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties, making a concerted effort at home and abroad to shut down the illicit trade in firearms, ammunition and explosives that fuels the violence associated with terrorism, drug trafficking and international crime, and increasing our enforcement powers through bilateral and multilateral agreements on asset seizure, forfeiture and money laundering, and memoranda of cooperation on auto theft initiatives. No area of criminal activity has greater international implications than high technology crime because of the global nature of information networks. Computer hackers and other cyber-criminals are not hampered by international boundaries, since information and transactions involving funds or property can be transmitted quickly and covertly via telephone and information systems. Law enforcement faces difficult challenges in this area, many of which are impossible to address without international consensus and cooperation. We seek to develop and implement new agreements with other nations to address high technology crime, particularly cyber-crime.

Drug Trafficking

We have shown that with determined and relentless efforts, we can make significant progress against the scourge of drug abuse and drug trafficking. For much of this century, organized crime leaders inside the United States controlled Americas drug trade. Today, as result of aggressive law enforcement against U.S. crime syndicates, criminals based in foreign countries control the drug trade. International drug syndicates, especially those based in Mexico and Colombia, continue to diversify and seek new markets in the United States moving beyond large cities into smaller communities and rural towns.

The aim of our drug control strategy is to cut illegal drug use and availability in the United States by 50 percent by 2007 and reduce the health and social consequences of drug use and trafficking by 25 percent over the same period through expanded prevention efforts, improved treatment programs, strengthened law enforcement and tougher interdiction. Our strategy recognizes that, at home and abroad, prevention, treatment and economic alternatives must be integrated with law enforcement and interdiction efforts. Domestically, we seek to educate and enable Americas youth to reject illegal drugs, increase the safety of Americas citizens by substantially reducing drug-related crime and violence, reduce health and social costs to the public of illegal drug use, reduce domestic cultivation of cannabis and production of methamphetamines and other synthetic drugs, and shield Americas air, land and sea frontiers from the drug threat. Concerted efforts by the public, all levels of government and the private sector together with other governments, private groups and international organizations will be required for our strategy to succeed.

Internationally, our strategy recognizes that the most effective counterdrug operations are mounted at the source where illegal drugs are grown and produced. We seek to stop drug trafficking by bolstering the capabilities of source nations to reduce cultivation through eradication and development of alternative crops, and attack production through destruction of laboratories and control of chemicals used to produce illegal drugs. In the transit zone between source regions and the U.S. border, we support interdiction programs to halt the shipment of illicit drugs. In concert with allies abroad, we pursue prosecution of major drug traffickers, destruction of drug trafficking organizations, prevention of money laundering, and elimination of criminal financial support networks. Our strategy also includes efforts to build cooperative links with foreign law enforcement agencies, strengthen democratic institutions, assist source nations root out corruption, and safeguard human rights in both source and transit nations. Additionally, we are engaging international organizations, financial institutions and non-governmental organizations in counterdrug cooperation.

Defending the Homeland

Our potential enemies, whether nations or terrorist groups, may be more likely in the future to resort to attacks against vulnerable civilian targets in the United States rather than conventional military operations abroad. At the same time, easier access to sophisticated technology means that the destructive power available to aggressor nations and terrorists is greater than ever. Adversaries may be tempted to use long-range ballistic missiles or unconventional tools, such as WMD, financial destabilization or information attacks, to threaten our citizens and critical national infrastructures. The United States must act t

to deter or prevent such attacks and, if attacks occur despite those efforts, must be prepared to defend against them, limit the damage they cause, and respond decisively against the perpetrators. At home, we must forge an effective partnership of Federal, state and local government agencies, industry and other private sector organizations.

National Missile Defense

We are committed to meeting the growing danger that outlaw nations will develop and deploy long-range missiles that could deliver weapons of mass destruction against us and our allies. Informed by the Intelligence Community's analysis of the August 1998 North Korean flight test of its Taepo Dong I missile, as well as the report of the Rumsfeld Commission, the Administration has stated that the threat posed by a rogue state developing an ICBM capable of striking the United States is growing, and we expect it will soon pose a danger to Americans here at home.

In 2000, we

will determine whether to deploy a limited national missile defense against strategic ballistic missile threats to the United States. The Administration's decision will be based on an assessment of the four factors that must be taken into account in deciding whether to field this system: (1) whether the threat is materializing; (2) the status of the technology based on an initial series of rigorous flight tests, and the proposed systems operational effectiveness; (3) whether the system is affordable; and (4) the implications of going forward with NMD deployment for our objectives with regard to achieving further reductions in strategic nuclear arms under START II and START III.

In making our decision

in 2000, we will review progress in achieving our arms control objectives, including negotiating any amendments to the ABM Treaty that may be required to accommodate a possible limited NMD deployment. At the Cologne G8 Summit in June 1999, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to begin discussions on START III and the ABM Treaty. Their reaffirmation that under the ABM Treaty the two sides are obligated to consider possible changes in the strategic situation that have a bearing on the Treaty and possible proposals for further increasing the viability of the Treaty opened the door for discussion of proposals for amending the Treaty to accommodate NMD deployment. The United States will attempt to negotiate in good faith any amendments to the ABM Treaty that may be necessary to accommodate deployment of a limited NMD system. At the same time, the Administration has made clear that it will not give any state a veto over any missile defense deployment decision that is vital to our national security interests.

Cou

Countering Foreign Intelligence Collection

The United States is a primary target of foreign intelligence services due to our military, scientific, technological and economic preeminence. Foreign intelligence services aggressively seek information about U.S. political and military intentions and capabilities, and are stepping up their efforts to collect classified or sensitive information on U.S. weapons systems, emerging technologies with military applications, and related technical methods. Such information enables potential adversaries to counter U.S. political and military objectives, develop sophisticated weapons more quickly and efficiently, compete better with the United States in world arms markets, and develop countermeasures against U.S. weapons systems. Intelligence collection against U.S. economic, commercial and proprietary information enables foreign states and corporations to obtain shortcuts to industrial development and improve their competitiveness against U.S. corporations in global markets. Although difficult to quantify, industrial espionage results in the loss of millions of dollars and thousands of jobs annually.

To protect sensitive national

security information, we must be able to effectively counter the collection efforts of foreign intelligence services through vigorous counterintelligence efforts and security programs. Over the last five years, we have created new counterintelligence mechanisms and implemented procedures to improve coordination among intelligence, counterintelligence and law enforcement agencies. These measures have considerably strengthened our ability to counter the foreign intelligence collection threat. To keep pace with the rapid pace of globalization and the ever-changing intelligence collection threat, we will continue to refine and enhance our counterintelligence capabilities, coordination, and support for all levels of government and the private sector. As we enter the 21st century, our counterintelligence posture must change to meet the challenge of future threats. Toward that end, the CIA, FBI and Defense Department have launched a study of future foreign intelligence threats, particularly non-traditional threats emerging from globalization of information and commerce, as well as the capabilities that will be required to effectively counter those threats.

Domestic

Preparedness against Weapons of Mass Destruction

The Federal Government will respond rapidly and decisively to any terrorist incident in the United States involving WMD, working with state and local governments to restore order and deliver emergency assistance. The Domestic Terrorism Program is integrating the capabilities and assets of a number of Federal agencies to support the FBI, FEMA, the Department of Health and Human Services, and state and local governments i

n crisis response and managing the consequences of a WMD incident. We have a comprehensive strategy to protect our civilian population from the scourge of biological and chemical weapons. We are upgrading our public health and medical surveillance systems to enhance our preparedness for a biological or chemical weapons attack, and helping to ensure that federal, state and local emergency response personnel have the resources they need to deal with such a crisis.

Critical Infrastructure Protection

Our national security and our economic prosperity rest on a foundation of critical infrastructures, including telecommunications, energy, banking and finance, transportation, water systems and emergency services. These infrastructures are vulnerable to computer-generated and physical attacks. More than any nation, America is dependent on cyberspace. We know that other governments and terrorist groups are creating sophisticated, well-organized capabilities to launch cyber-attacks against critical American information networks and the infrastructures that depend on them.

The President has directed that a Plan for defending our critical infrastructures be in effect by May 2001, and fully operational by December 2003. Through this Plan we will achieve and maintain the ability to protect our critical infrastructures from intentional acts that would significantly diminish the abilities of the Federal Government to perform essential national security missions. This plan will also help ensure the general public health and safety; protect the ability of state and local governments to maintain order and to deliver minimum essential public services; and work with the private sector to ensure the orderly functioning of the economy and the delivery of essential telecommunications, energy, financial and transportation services.

The Federal government is committed to building this capability to defend our critical infrastructures, but it cannot do it alone. The private sector, as much as the Federal government, is a target for infrastructure attacks, whether by cyber or other means. A new partnership between the Federal government and the private sector is required. We are building this partnership. Acting jointly, we will work proactively to identify and eliminate significant vulnerabilities in our critical infrastructures and the information systems that support them. We are creating the systems necessary to detect and respond to attacks before they can cause serious damage. For the first time, law enforcement, intelligence agencies and the private sector will share, in a manner consistent with U.S. law, information about cyber-threats, vulnerabilities and attacks. The Government is developing and deploying new intrusion detection network technologies to protect Defense Department and other critical

ical Federal systems, and we are encouraging the private sector to develop and deploy appropriate protective technology as well. A nationwide system for quickly reconstituting in the face of a serious cyber-attack is being developed. Every Federal Department is also developing a plan to protect its own critical infrastructures, which include both cyber and physical dimensions. Finally, we will be building a strong foundation for continued protection of our critical infrastructures: increased Federal R&D in information security, increased investment in training and educating cyber-security practitioners, and evaluating whether legislation is necessary to protect both our civil liberties and our critical infrastructures.

National Security Emergency Preparedness

National security emergency preparedness is imperative. We will do all we can to deter and prevent destructive and threatening forces such as terrorism, WMD use, disruption of our critical infrastructures, and regional or state-centered threats from endangering our citizens. We must also maintain the strength and responsiveness of our industrial and technology base as a critical element of our national security emergency preparedness. If an emergency occurs, whether man-made or a natural disaster, we must be prepared to respond effectively to protect lives and property, mobilize the personnel, resources and capabilities necessary to effectively handle the emergency, and ensure the survival of our institutions and national infrastructures.

Smaller-Scale Contingencies

In addition to defending the U.S. homeland, the United States must be prepared to respond to the full range of threats to our interests abroad. Smaller-scale contingency operations encompass the full range of military operations short of major theater warfare, including humanitarian assistance, peace operations, enforcing embargoes and no-fly zones, evacuating U.S. citizens, reinforcing key allies, and limited strikes and intervention. These operations will likely pose the most frequent challenge for U.S. forces and cumulatively require significant commitments over time. These operations will also put a premium on the ability of the U.S. military to work closely and effectively with other U.S. Government agencies, non-governmental organizations, regional and international security organizations and coalition partners.

At times it will be in our national interest to proceed in partnership with others to preserve, maintain and restore peace. American participation in peace operations takes many forms, such as the NATO-led coalitions in Bosnia and Kosovo, the American-led UN force in Haiti, the recently concl

uded Military Observer Mission Ecuador and Peru (MOMEP), our participation in the multilateral coalition operation in the Sinai, and military observers in UN missions in Western Sahara, Georgia and the Middle East. The question of command and control in multinational contingency operations is particularly critical. Under no circumstances will the President ever relinquish his constitutionally mandated command authority over U.S. forces, but there may be times in the future, just as in the past, when it is in our interest to place U.S. forces under the temporary operational control of a competent allied or United Nations commander.

Not only must the U.S. military be prepared to successfully conduct multiple smaller-scale contingencies worldwide, it must be prepared to do so in the face of challenges such as terrorism, information operations and the threat or use of WMD. U.S. forces must also remain prepared to withdraw from contingency operations if needed to deploy to a major theater war. Accordingly, appropriate U.S. forces will be kept at a high level of readiness and will be trained, equipped and organized to be multi-mission capable.

Major Theater Warfare

Fighting and winning major theater wars is the ultimate test of our Armed Forces a test at which they must always succeed. For the foreseeable future, the United States, preferably in concert with allies, must have the capability to deter and defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames. Maintaining a two major theater war capability deters opportunism elsewhere when we are heavily involved in deterring or defeating aggression in one theater, or while conducting multiple smaller-scale contingencies and engagement activities in other theaters. It also provides a hedge against the possibility that we might encounter threats larger or more difficult than expected. A strategy for deterring and defeating aggression in two theaters ensures we maintain the capability and flexibility to meet unknown future threats, while continued global engagement helps preclude such threats from developing.

Fighting and winning major theater wars entails three particularly challenging requirements. First, we must maintain the ability to rapidly defeat initial enemy advances short of the enemy's objectives in two theaters, in close succession. The United States must maintain this ability to ensure that we can seize the initiative, minimize territory lost before an invasion is halted and ensure the integrity of our warfighting coalitions. Failure to defeat initial enemy advances rapidly would make the subsequent campaign to evict enemy forces from captured territory more difficult, lengthy, and costly, and also could undermine U.S. credibility, weaken coalition support, and increase the risk of conflict.

lict elsewhere.

Second, the United States must plan and prepare to fight and win under conditions where an adversary may use asymmetric means against us. Conventional approaches that avoid or undermine our strengths while exploiting our vulnerabilities. Because of our dominance in the conventional military arena, adversaries who challenge the United States are likely to use asymmetric means, such as WMD, information operations or terrorism. Such asymmetric attacks could be used to disrupt the critical logistics pipeline from its origins in the United States, along sea and air routes, at in-transit refueling and staging bases, to its termination at airfields, seaports and supply depots in theater as well as our forces deployed in the field.

We are enhancing the preparedness of our Armed Forces to effectively conduct sustained operations despite the presence, threat or use of WMD. These efforts include development, procurement and deployment of theater missile defense systems to protect forward-deployed troops, as well as improved intelligence collection capabilities, heightened security awareness and force protection measures worldwide. We are also enhancing our ability to defend against hostile information operations, which could in the future take the form of a full-scale, strategic information attack against our critical national infrastructures, government and economy as well as attacks directed against our military forces.

Third, our military must also be able to transition to fighting major theater wars from a posture of global engagement from substantial levels of peacetime engagement overseas as well as multiple concurrent smaller-scale contingency operations. Withdrawing from such operations would pose significant political and operational challenges. Ultimately, however, the United States must accept a degree of risk associated with withdrawing from contingency operations and engagement activities in order to reduce the greater risk incurred if we failed to respond adequately to major theater wars.

The Decision to Employ Military Forces

Our national security strategy recognizes that achieving our core objectives will require sustained, long-term effort and that our engagement must be selective. Although there will be many demands for U.S. involvement, the need to husband limited resources requires that we must carefully select the means and level of our participation in particular military operations. Responding to multiple concurrent contingencies requires careful consideration to ensure our forces are neither unable, nor perceived as unable, to respond to more critical threats. We must be as clear as possible

ble about when and how we will use our military forces.

The decision on whether to use force is dictated first and foremost by our national interests. In those specific areas where our vital interests are at stake, our use of force will be decisive and, if necessary, unilateral.

In situations posing a threat to important national interests, military forces should only be used if they advance U.S. interests, they are likely to be able to accomplish their objectives, the costs and risks of their employment are commensurate with the interests at stake, and other, non-military, means are incapable of achieving our objectives. Such uses of military forces should be selective and limited, reflecting the relative saliency of the interests at stake.

The decision to employ military forces to support our humanitarian and other interests focuses on the unique capabilities and resources the military can bring to bear, rather than on its combat power. Generally, the military is not the best tool for humanitarian concerns, but under certain conditions use of our Armed Forces may be appropriate. Those conditions are when the scale of a humanitarian catastrophe dwarfs the ability of civilian relief agencies to respond, when the need for relief is urgent and only the military has the ability to provide an immediate response, when the military is needed to establish the preconditions necessary for effective application of other instruments of national power, when a humanitarian crisis could affect U.S. combat operations, or when a response otherwise requires unique military resources. Such efforts by the United States, preferably in conjunction with other members of the international community will be limited in duration, have a clearly defined end state, entail minimal risk to American troops, and be designed to give the affected country the opportunity to restore its own basic services.

In all cases, the costs and risks of U.S. military involvement must be commensurate with the interests at stake. We will be more inclined to act where there is reason to believe that our action will bring lasting improvement. Our involvement will be more circumscribed when other regional or multilateral actors are better positioned to act than we are. Even in these cases, however, the United States will be actively engaged with appropriate diplomatic, economic and military tools.

In every case, we will consider several critical questions before committing military force: Have we explored or exhausted non-military means that offer a reasonable chance of achieving our goals? Is there a clearly defined, achievable mission? What is the threat environment and

what risks will our forces face? What level of effort will be needed to achieve our goals? What are the potential costshuman and financialof the operation?

What are the opportunity costs in terms of maintaining our capability to respond to higher-priority contingencies? Do we have milestones and a desired end state to guide a decision on terminating the mission?

Having decided that us

e of military forces is appropriate, the decision on how they will be employed is based on two guidelines. First, our forces will have a clear mission and th e means to achieve their objectives decisively. Second, as much as possible, w e will seek the support and participation of our allies, friends and relevant i nternational institutions. When our vital interests are at stake, we are prepa red to act alone. But in most situations, working with other nations increases the effectiveness of each nation's actions and lessens everyone's burden.

Sus

taining our engagement abroad over the long term will require the support of th e American people and the Congress to bear the costs of defending U.S. interest sincluding the risk of losing American lives. Some decisions to engage abroad could well face popular opposition, but must ultimately be judged by whether th ey advance the interests of the American people in the long run. When it is ju dged to be in Americas interest to intervene, we must remain clear in our purpo ses and resolute in our actions.

Preparing Now for an Uncertain Future

We mus

t prepare for an uncertain future even as we address today's security problems. We need to look closely at our national security apparatus to ensure it remai ns relevant by adapting its institutions to meet new challenges. This means we must transform our capabilities diplomatic, defense, intelligence, law enforc ement, economic to act swiftly and to anticipate new opportunities and threats in todays continually evolving, highly complex international security environm ent. Preparing for an uncertain future also means that we must have a strong, competitive, technologically superior, innovative and responsive industrial and research and development base.

Within the military, transformation requires

that we strike a balance among funding three critical priorities: maintaining the ability of our forces to shape and respond today, modernizing to protect th e long-term readiness of the force, and transforming our unparalleled capabilit ies to ensure we can effectively shape and respond in the future. We also must work with Allies and coalition partners to help improve their defense capabili ties and interoperability with our forces, in order to bolster the effectiveness

s of multinational operations across the full spectrum of potential military missions.

This transformation of our military forces is critical to meeting the military challenges of the next century. Transformation extends well beyond the acquisition of new military systems; it seeks to leverage technological, doctrinal, operational and organizational innovations to give U.S. forces greater capabilities and flexibility. Exploiting the revolution in military affairs is fundamental if U.S. forces are to retain their dominance in an uncertain world. Investment in research and development while closely monitoring trends in likely future threats are important elements of our transformation effort. Selected, focused research is a relatively inexpensive and prudent way to manage risk in an uncertain environment. Only a sustained research and development program can mitigate the risk of being unprepared to meet a new threat, the risk of developing the wrong capabilities, and the risk of an adversary developing an effective counters to a capability, making it obsolete. A carefully planned and focused modernization program will maintain our technological superiority and replace Cold War-era equipment with new systems and platforms capable of supporting the full spectrum of military operations.

To support the readiness, modernization and transformation of our military forces, we will work cooperatively with the Congress to enact legislation to implement the Defense Reform Initiative, which will free up resources through an exploitation of a Revolution in Business Affairs—an integral part of our strategy for the 21st century. This effort includes privatization, acquisition reform, transformation of logistics, and elimination of excess infrastructure through two additional base realignment and closure (BRAC) rounds. We will continue to explore new approaches for integrating the Active and Reserve components into a Total Force optimum for future missions, modernize our forces, ensure the quality of military personnel, and take prudent steps to position ourselves to effectively counter unlikely but significant future threats. The Administration, in partnership with the Congress, will continue to assure we maintain the best-trained, best-equipped and best-led military force in the world for the 21st century.

We must renew our commitment to America's diplomacy to ensure we have the diplomatic representation and voice in international organizations that are required to support our global interests. This is central to our ability to retain our influence on international issues that affect our well being. Our national security requires that we ensure international organizations such as the UN are as effective and relevant as possible. We must, therefore, ensure that our financial obligations to the UN and the UN system are met in full. Preserving our leadership, influence and credibility in the world demands that we maintain highly trained and exper

perienced personnel, a broad range of capabilities for diplomacy and public diplomacy, a secure diplomatic infrastructure abroad, and a respected voice in international organizations. The cost of doing this is a tiny fraction of the costs we otherwise will have to pay as our interests are increasingly ignored around the world and we are ever more frequently forced to employ our military forces to cope with crises that might have been averted or handled at less cost to us through collective international action.

In the area of law enforcement, technological advances are generating new opportunities for international criminals as well as providing powerful new tools for combating crime. In the future, the United States will face criminal threats that are much broader in scope and much more sophisticated than those we face today. Even technological and economic advances that are not inherently dangerous, such as the internet and globalization of markets, have national security implications. Anticipating and preparing for the law enforcement challenges arising from emerging technology, globalization of trade and finance, and other international dynamics must be part of our strategy for the future.

We also must continue efforts to construct appropriate twenty-first century national security programs and structures government-wide. We will continue to foster innovative approaches and organizational structures to better protect American lives, property and interests at home and abroad.

Promoting Prosperity

The second core objective of our national security strategy is to promote America's prosperity through efforts at home and abroad. Our economic and security interests are inextricably linked. Prosperity at home depends on stability in key regions with which we trade or from which we import critical commodities, such as oil and natural gas. Prosperity also demands our leadership in international development, financial and trade institutions. In turn, the strength of our diplomacy, our ability to maintain an unrivaled military and the attractiveness of our values abroad depend in large part on the strength of our economy. Over the long term, prosperity requires development abroad be sustainable and not generate environmental problems that undermine the economic benefits of development.

Strengthening Financial Coordination

As national economies become more integrated internationally, U.S. prosperity depends more than ever on economic developments abroad. Our economic health is v

ulnerable to disturbances that originate outside our borders. As such, cooperation with other states and international organizations is vital to protecting the health of the global economic system and responding to financial crises.

Global financial markets dominated by private capital flows provide both immense opportunities and great challenges. The ultimate objective of our reform efforts is a stable, resilient global financial system that promotes strong global economic growth providing benefits broadly to workers and investors in all countries. Implementing recent G-7 recommendations on ways to strengthen the international financial architecture is essential to the success of our reform efforts. International financial institutions, particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have a critical role to play in this effort by promoting greater openness and transparency, by building strong national financial systems, and by creating mechanisms so that the private sector shares more fully in the responsibility for preventing and resolving crises. The United States and the other leading industrialized nations are also promoting a range of World Bank and regional development bank reforms: substantially increasing the share of resources devoted to basic social programs that reduce poverty; safeguarding the environment; supporting development of the private sector and open markets; promotion of good governance, including measures to fight corruption, improve the administration of justice and protect human rights; and internal reforms of the multilateral development banks (MDBs) to increase their impact on development and the transparency of their operations.

Enhancing American Competitiveness

We

seek to ensure a global business environment in which the innovative and competitive efforts of the private sector can flourish. To this end, we will continue to encourage the development, commercialization and use of civilian technology, and will seek legislative and regulatory changes that promote civil-military industrial integration. We will invest in a world-class infrastructure for the twenty-first century, including intermodal transportation improvements integrating all forms of land, sea and air transportation, and the national information and space infrastructure essential for our knowledge-based economy. We will support a vigorous science and technology base that promotes economic growth, creates high wage jobs, sustains a healthy, educated citizenry, and provides the basis for our future military systems. We will invest in education and training to develop a workforce capable of participating in our rapidly changing economy. And we will continue our efforts to open foreign markets to U.S. trade and investment. In many important respects, UN agencies and other international organizations serve as the main fora in which the United States works with other nations to set standards in areas such as telecommunications, aviation safety, and the protection of intellectual property rights that serve as a foundat

ion for global commerce.

Enhancing Access to Foreign Markets

In a world wher

e over 96 percent of the worlds consumers live outside the United States, we mu
st continue to expand our international trade to sustain economic growth at hom
e. Our prosperity as a nation in the twenty-first century will depend upon our
ability to compete effectively in international markets. The rapidly expandin
g global economy presents enormous opportunities for American companies and wor
kers. Over the next decade, healthy growth can be expected to return to the gl
obal economy, with growth particularly strong in a number of emerging markets.

If we do not continue to seize these opportunities, our competitors surely wil
l. We must continue working hard to secure and enforce agreements that protect
intellectual property rights and enable Americans to compete fairly in foreign
markets. Trade agreement implementing authority is essential for advancing ou
r nations economic interests. Congress has consistently recognized that the Pr
esident must have the authority to break down foreign trade barriers and create
good jobs. Accordingly, the Administration will work with Congress to fashion
an appropriate grant of fast track authority.

The Administration will continu

e to press our trading partnersmultilaterally, regionally and bilaterallyto exp
and trade and investment opportunities for U.S. workers, farmers and companies.

We will position ourselves at the center of a constellation of trade relation
shipssuch as the World Trade Organization, APEC, the Transatlantic Economic Par
tnership, the Presidents new economic partnership with Sub-Saharan Africa, and
the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). We will seek to negotiate agreemen
ts, especially in sectors where the U.S. has the most to gain as we did in the
Information Technology Agreement and the World Trade Organization (WTO) Financi
al Services and Telecommunications Services Agreements. As we look ahead to th
e next WTO Ministerial meeting, to be held in Seattle in late 1999, we will agg
ressively pursue an agenda that fosters expanding WTO coverage to new areas of
trade liberalization and addresses U.S. trade objectives. We will also remain
vigilant in enforcing the trade agreements reached with our trading partners.

Promoting an Open Trading System

The Administration remains committed to carry

ing forward the success of the Uruguay Round under the General Agreement on Tar
iffs and Trade, and to the success of the WTO as a forum for openly resolving d
isputes. We have completed the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) which go
es far toward eliminating tariffs on high technology products and concluded a l
andmark WTO agreement that will dramatically liberalize world trade in telecomm

unications services. The WTO agenda includes further negotiations to reform agricultural trade, liberalize service sector markets, encourage unfettered development of electronic commerce, and strengthen protection for intellectual property rights. We also have a full agenda of accession negotiations with economies seeking to join the WTO. As always, the United States is setting high standards for accession in terms of adherence to the rules and market access. Accessions offer an opportunity to help ground new economies in the rules-based trading system and reinforce their own reform programs.

Through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) we are seeking to have OECD members outlaw bribery of foreign officials, eliminate the tax deductibility of foreign bribes, and promote greater transparency in government procurement. The convention also provides for obligatory monitoring and mutual evaluation by parties. We have also made important strides on labor issues. WTO members have affirmed their commitment to observing core labor standards: the right to organize and bargain collectively, and prohibitions against employment discrimination, child labor and forced labor. This has been an important U.S. objective since the Eisenhower Administration. We will continue pressing for better integration of the international core labor standards into the WTO's work, including through closer WTO interaction with the International Labor Organization (ILO).

We will continue to ensure that liberalization of trade does not come at the expense of national security or environmental protection. For example, the national security, law enforcement and trade policy communities worked together to make sure that the WTO agreement liberalizing global investment in telecommunications was consistent with U.S. national security interests. Moreover, our leadership in the Uruguay Round negotiations led to the incorporation of environmental provisions into the WTO agreements and creation of the Committee on Trade and Environment, where governments continue to pursue the goal of ensuring that trade and environment policies are mutually supportive.

Export Strategy and Advocacy Program

The Administration created America's first national export strategy, reforming the way government works with the private sector to expand exports. The new Trade Promotion Coordination Committee (TPCC) has been instrumental in improving export promotion efforts, coordinating our export financing, implementing a government-wide advocacy initiative and updating market information systems and product standards education.

The export strategy is working, with

the United States regarding its position as the worlds largest exporter. While our strong export performance has supported millions of new, export-related jobs, we must export more in the years ahead if we are to further strengthen our trade balance position and raise living standards with high-wage jobs.

Enhanced Export Control

The United States is a world leader in high technology exports, including satellites, cellular phones, computers and commercial aircraft. Some of this technology has direct or indirect military applications, or may otherwise be used by states or transnational organizations to threaten our national security. For that reason, the United States government carefully controls high technology exports by placing appropriate restrictions on the sale of goods and technologies that could be used for military purposes or otherwise impair our security. These controls recognize that in an increasingly competitive global economy where there are many non-U.S. suppliers, excessive restrictions will not limit the availability of high technology goods. Rather, they would serve only to make U.S. high technology companies less competitive globally, thus losing market share and becoming less able to produce cutting-edge products for the U.S. military and our allies.

Our current policy recognizes that we must balance a variety of factors. While acting to promote high technology exports by making license decisions more predictable and timely, we also expanded review of dual-use applications by the Departments of Defense, State and Energy, as well as ensuring rigorous processing by the Commerce Department. If any of these agencies disagree with a proposed export, it can put the issue into a dispute resolution process that can ultimately rise to the President. As a result, reviews of dual-use licenses are today more thorough than ever before. In the case of munitions exports, we are committed to a policy of responsible restraint in the transfer of conventional arms and technologies that could contribute to WMD. A key goal in the years ahead is to strengthen worldwide controls in those areas.

U.S. efforts to stem proliferation cannot be effective without the cooperation of other countries. We have strengthened multilateral cooperation through the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Zangger Committee, the Australia Group (for the control of chemical and biological weapons-related items), and the Wassenaar Arrangement. These multilateral efforts enlist the world community in the battle against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, advanced conventional weapons and sensitive technologies, while at the same time producing a level playing field for U.S. business by ensuring that our competitors face corresponding export controls.

ls.

Providing for Energy Security

The United States depends on oil for about 40 percent of its primary energy needs and roughly half of our oil needs are met with imports. Although we import less than 10% of the oil exported from the Persian Gulf, our allies in Europe and Japan account for about 85% of those exports, thus underscoring the continued strategic importance of the region. The Gulf will remain a region of vital strategic importance to U.S. national security due to the global nature of the international oil market. Any blockage of Gulf supplies or a substantial increase in price would immediately affect the international market, driving up energy costs everywhere -- ultimately harming the U.S. economy as well as the economies of our key economic partners in Europe and Japan. The United States is undergoing a fundamental shift away from reliance on Middle East oil. Venezuela is our number one foreign supplier and Africa supplies 15% of our imported oil. Canada, Mexico and Venezuela combined supply more than twice as much oil to the United States as the Arab OPEC countries.

The Caspian Basin, with potential oil reserves of 160 billion barrels, promises to play an increasingly important role in meeting rising world energy demand in coming decades. We have made it a priority to work with the countries of the region to develop multiple pipeline ventures that will ensure access to their oil.

Conservation measures and research leading to greater energy efficiency and alternative fuels are a critical element of the U.S. strategy for energy security. Our research must continue to focus on developing highly energy-efficient buildings, appliances, and transportation and industrial systems, shifting them where possible to alternative or renewable fuels, such as hydrogen, ethanol, or methanol from biomass. Conservation and energy research notwithstanding, the United States will continue to have a vital interest in ensuring access to foreign oil sources. We must continue to be mindful of the need for regional stability and security in key producing areas to ensure our access to, and the free flow of, these resources.

Promoting Sustainable Development Abroad

U.S. trade and investment have expanded most rapidly with developing countries that have achieved and sustained success in economic and social development. Successful development has been primarily the result of efforts to implement sound policies, strengthen institutions, and improve public investment in physical and social infrastructure. U.S. assistance programs have often supported these efforts. A large number of developing countries have achieved advanced status and

no longer depend on U.S. assistance. A significant number of others, including some of the largest and poorest, are making clear progress toward that goal.

Developing countries face an array of challenges in their efforts to achieve broad-based economic and social progress and participate more fully in the opportunities presented by globalization. Poor environmental and natural resource management can impede sustainable development efforts and promote regional instability. Many nations are struggling to provide jobs, education and other services to their citizens. Three billion people, half the world's population, subsist on less than two dollars a day. Their continued poverty leads to hunger, malnutrition, economic migration and political unrest. Malaria, AIDS and other epidemics, including some that can spread through environmental damage, threaten to overwhelm the health facilities of developing countries, disrupt societies and stop economic growth.

Sustainable development brings higher incomes and more open markets that create steadily expanding opportunities for U.S. trade and investment. It improves the prospects for democracy and social stability in developing countries and increases global economic growth, on which the demand for U.S. exports depends. It alleviates pressure on the global environment, reduces the attraction of the illegal drug trade and other illicit commerce, and improves health and economic productivity. U.S. foreign assistance focuses on five key elements of sustainable development: broad-based economic growth, human capacity development, environmental security, population and health, and democracy. We will continue to advocate environmentally sound private investment and responsible approaches by international lenders.

Promoting Democracy and Human Rights

The third core objective of our national security strategy is to promote democracy, human rights, and respect for the rule of law. The number of states moving away from repressive governance toward democratic and publicly accountable institutions is impressive. Since the success of many of those changes is by no means assured, our strategy must focus on strengthening their commitment and institutional capacity to implement democratic reforms, protect human rights, fight corruption and increase transparency in government.

Emerging Democracies

We seek international support in helping strengthen democratic and free market institutions and norms in all countries, particularly those making the transition from closed to open societies. This commitment to see freedom and r

respect for human rights take hold is not only just, but pragmatic, for strengthened democratic institutions enhance the stability and security of the United States and the world.

Democracy must be more than just elections. The slow development of democracy in some newly independent states demonstrates that elections should be regarded not as an end in themselves, but as the means to establish a political system that fosters the growth and self-fulfillment of its citizens by promoting and protecting their political and civil rights. Genuine democracy requires not just elections, but respect for human rights, including the right to political dissent; a robust civil society; the rule of law, characterized by vibrant political institutions, constitutionalism, and an independent judiciary; open and competitive economic structures; an independent media capable of engaging an informed citizenry; freedom of religion and belief; mechanisms to safeguard minorities from oppressive rule by the majority; and full respect for women's and workers rights. These principles combined with free and fair elections form the basis for true democracy.

The United States supports democracy for the long haul. We focus particularly on providing support to countries in transition, defending democracies under attack, and strengthening the network of established democracies. Each year, we invest hundreds of millions of dollars in these efforts. We do so not only because it is right, but also because it is necessary. Our own security as a nation depends upon the expansion of democracy worldwide, without which repression, corruption, and instability would almost inevitably engulf a number of countries and perhaps even entire regions.

The

United States is helping consolidate democratic and market reforms in Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS. Integrating the Central and Eastern European nations into European political, economic and security organizations, such as NATO, OSCE, the EU and the Council of Europe, will help lock in and preserve the impressive progress these nations have made in instituting democratic and market-economic reforms. It will also help prevent backsliding by emerging democracies. Continuing advances in democracy and free markets in our own hemisphere remain a priority. In the Asia Pacific region, economic dynamism is increasingly associated with political modernization, democratic evolution and the widening of the rule of law and it has global impacts. We are particularly attentive to states, such as South Africa and Nigeria, whose entry into the camp of market democracies may influence the future direction of an entire region.

The methods

for assisting emerging democracies are as varied as the nations involved. Our public diplomacy programs are designed to share our democratic experience in b

oth government and civil society with the publics in emerging democracies. We must continue leading efforts to mobilize international economic and political resources, as we have with Russia, Ukraine and other countries in Eastern Europe and Eurasia. We must take firm action to help counter attempts to reverse democracy, as we have in Guatemala, Haiti and Paraguay. We must give democratic nations the fullest benefits of integration into foreign markets, which is part of the reason NAFTA and the Uruguay Round of GATT ranked so high on our agenda and why we are now working to forge the FTAA. We must help these nations strengthen the pillars of civil society, supporting administration of justice and rule of law programs, promoting the principle of civilian control of the military, and training foreign police and security forces to solve crimes and maintain order without violating the basic rights of their citizens. And we must seek to improve their market institutions and fight corruption and political discontent by encouraging good governance practices, and a free and independent local media that promotes these principles.

Adherence to Universal Human Rights and Democratic Principles

We must sustain our efforts to press for adherence to democratic principles, and respect for basic human rights and the rule of law worldwide, including in countries that continue to defy democratic advances. Working bilaterally and through multilateral institutions, the United States promotes universal adherence to democratic principles and international standards of human rights. Our efforts in the United Nations and other organizations are helping to make these principles the governing standards for acceptable international behavior.

Ethnic conflict is one of the greatest challenges to the U.S. objective of promoting universal adherence to international principles of human rights. When it erupts in ethnic cleansing or genocide, ethnic conflict is a grave violation of universal human rights. In addition to being a cause for concern on humanitarian grounds, ethnic conflict often threatens regional stability, giving rise to potentially serious national security concerns. Innocent civilians should not be subject to forcible relocation or slaughter because of their religious or ethnic or racial or tribal heritage. When we are faced with deliberate, organized campaigns to murder whole peoples, or expel them from their land, the care of victims is important, but not enough. If the world community has the power to stop it, we should work to stop genocide and ethnic cleansing.

The United States and other countries cannot respond to every humanitarian catastrophe in the world. We cannot do everything everywhere. But simply because we have different interests in different parts of the world does not mea

n we can be indifferent to the destruction of innocents in any part of the world. Efforts by the United Nations and NATO in Bosnia and Kosovo are a warning to those tempted to engage in ethnic cleansing that they can find no refuge in the United Nations, no protection or justification in its charter.

We will work

to strengthen the capacity of the international community to prevent and, when ever possible, stop outbreaks of mass killing and displacement. Our response will not be the same in every case. Sometimes collective military action is both appropriate and feasible. Sometimes concerted economic and political pressure, combined with diplomacy, is a better answer. The way the international community responds will depend upon the capacity of countries to act, and on their perception of their national interests.

Events in the Bosnia conflict and preceding the 1994 genocide in Rwanda demonstrate the unfortunate power of inaccurate and malicious information in conflict-prone situations. We must enhance our ability to make effective use of our nations highly-developed communications and information capabilities to counter misinformation and incitement, mitigate ethnic conflict, promote independent media organizations and the free flow of information, and support democratic participation.

We will also continue to work

bilaterally and with multilateral institutions to ensure that international human rights principles protect the most vulnerable or traditionally oppressed groups in the world women, children, workers, refugees and persons persecuted on the basis of their religious beliefs or ethnic descent. To this end, we will seek to strengthen and improve the UN Human Rights Commission and other international mechanisms that promote human rights and address violations of international humanitarian law, such as the international war crimes tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. We also strongly support wide ratification of the International Labor Organization Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labor. To focus additional attention on the more vulnerable or traditionally oppressed people, we seek to spearhead new international initiatives to combat the sexual exploitation of minors, child labor, homelessness among children, violence against women and children, and female genital mutilation. We are encouraging governments to not return people to countries where they face persecution. We ask that they provide asylum or offer temporary protection to persons fleeing situations of conflict or generalized human rights abuses. We seek to ensure that such persons are not returned without due consideration of their need for permanent protection.

Promotion of religious freedom is one of the highest concerns in our foreign policy. Freedom of thought, conscience and religion is a bedr

ock issue for the American people. To that end, the President signed the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, which provides the flexibility needed to advance religious freedom and to counter religious persecution. The United States is active throughout the world assisting those who are persecuted because of their religion and promoting freedom of religious belief and practice. We will continue to work with individual nations and with international institutions to combat religious persecution and promote religious freedom.

Violence ag

ainst women and trafficking in women and children are international problems with national implications. We have seen cases of trafficking in the United States for purposes of forced prostitution, sweatshop labor and domestic servitude.

The United States is committed to combating trafficking in women and children with a focus on the areas of prevention, victim assistance and protection, and enforcement. We have expanded efforts to combat violence against women in the United States and around the world, including efforts to increase national and international awareness of trafficking in women and girls. To that end, the President has called upon the Senate to give its advice and consent to ratification to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, which will enhance our efforts to combat violence against women, reform unfair inheritance and property rights, and strengthen women's access to fair employment and economic opportunity.

The United States will continue to speak

out against human rights abuses and carry on human rights dialogues with countries willing to engage with us constructively. Because police and internal security services can be a source of human rights violations, we use training and contacts between U.S. law enforcement and their foreign counterparts to help address these problems, and we do not provide training to police or military units implicated in human rights abuses. In appropriate circumstances, we must be prepared to take strong measures against human rights violators. These include economic sanctions, visa restrictions and restricting sales of arms and police equipment that may be used to commit human rights abuses.

Humanitarian Activities

Our efforts to promote democracy and human rights are complemented by our humanitarian programs, which are designed to alleviate human suffering, help lay the foundations for democratic regimes that respect human rights and the rule of law, and pursue appropriate strategies for economic development. These efforts also enable the United States to help prevent humanitarian disasters with far more significant resource implications.

We also must seek to promote reconciliation in states experiencing civil conflict and to address migration and refugee crises. To this end, the United States will provide appropriate financial support and work with other nations and international bodies, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. We also will assist efforts to protect the rights of refugees and displaced persons and to address the economic and social root causes of internal displacement and international flight.

Private firms and non-governmental organizations are natural allies in activities and efforts intended to bolster democracy and market economies. We have natural partners in labor unions, human rights groups, environmental advocates, chambers of commerce and election monitors in promoting democracy and respect for human rights and in providing international humanitarian assistance; thus, we should promote democratization efforts through private and non-governmental groups as well as foreign governments.

Supporting the global movement toward democracy requires a pragmatic, longterm effort focused on both values and institutions. Our goal is a broadening of the community of free-market democracies, and stronger institutions and international non-governmental movements committed to human rights and democratization.

□III

. Integrated Regional Approaches

Our policies toward different regions reflect our overall strategy tailored to their unique challenges and opportunities.

Europe and Eurasia

European stability is vital to our own security. The United States has two strategic goals in Europe. The first is to build a Europe that is truly integrated, democratic, prosperous and at peace. This would be a natural continuation of the mission the United States launched 50 years ago with the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Our second goal is to work with our allies and partners across the Atlantic to meet the global challenges no nation can meet alone. This means working together to consolidate this region's historic transition in favor of democracy and free markets, to support peace efforts in troubled regions, to counter the growth of aggressive nationalism, to tackle global threats such as environmental and health problems, terrorism, narcotrafficking, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and other potentially dangerous technologies, and to build a more open world economy without barriers to transatlantic trade and investment.

Enhancing Security

NATO remains the anchor of American engagement in Europe and the linchpin of transatlantic security. It remains the institution of choice when Europe and North America decide to act together militarily. As the leading guarantor of European security and a force for European stability, NATO must play a leading role in promoting a more integrated and secure Europe, prepared to respond to new challenges. We will maintain approximately 100,000 military personnel in Europe to fulfill our commitments to NATO, provide a visible deterrent against aggression and coercion, contribute to regional stability, respond to crises, sustain our vital transatlantic ties and preserve U.S. leadership in NATO.

NATO

is pursuing several initiatives to enhance its ability to respond to the new challenges it will face in the 21st century. At NATO's Fiftieth Anniversary Summit in April 1999, Alliance leaders adopted an expansive agenda to adapt and prepare NATO for current and future challenges, including a new Strategic Concept, a Defense Capabilities Initiative, an enhanced European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance, a Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative, a Membership Action Plan as part of NATO's open door policy, and several measures that will strengthen NATO's relationship with Partnership for Peace nations. The objective of the Defense Capabilities Initiative is to improve defense capabilities and interoperability among NATO military forces, thus bolstering the effectiveness of multinational operations across the full spectrum of Alliance missions, to include Partner forces where appropriate.

NATO enlargement is a crucial element of the U.S. and Allied strategy to build an undivided, peaceful Europe. At the April 1999 NATO Summit, the alliance welcomed the entry of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic as new members. These three nations will make the Alliance stronger while helping to enlarge Europe's zone of democratic stability. Looking to the future, the summit advanced the common work of NATO allies and partners to build an undivided Europe that is peaceful, prosperous and democratic.

Together with our Allies, we are vigorously pursuing efforts to help other countries that aspire to membership become the best possible candidates, such as the NATO Membership Action Plan, enhancing the Partnership for Peace, and continuing political contacts with aspiring states. We are also continuing bilateral programs to advance this agenda, such as the Presidents Warsaw Initiative, which is playing a critical role in promoting Western-style reform of the armed forces of Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia and helping them become more

interoperable with NATO. Some European nations do not desire NATO membership, but do desire strengthened ties with the Alliance. The Partnership for Peace provides an ideal venue for such relationships. It formalizes relations, provides a mechanism for mutual beneficial interaction and establishes a sound basis for combined action should that be desired. For all these reasons, the Partnership for Peace will remain a central and permanent part of the European security architecture.

NATO also is pursuing several other initiatives to enhance its ability to respond to new challenges and deepen ties between the Alliance and Partner countries. NATO has launched the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council to strengthen political dialogue and practical cooperation with all Partners, and established a distinctive partnership with Ukraine, which provides a framework for enhanced relations and practical cooperation. As a result of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, NATO and Russia launched the Permanent Joint Council to enhance political consultation and practical cooperation, while retaining NATO's decision-making authority. Our shared goal remains to deepen and expand constructive Russian participation in the European security system.

The OSCE has a key role to play in fostering security and stability in Europe. It provides the United States with a venue for developing Europe's security architecture in a manner that complements our NATO strategy and preserves the flexibility of all European transatlantic institutions. In many instances, cooperating multilaterally through the OSCE to secure peace, deter aggression, and prevent, defuse and manage crises offers a comparative advantage because it is more cost effective than unilateral action. The United States will continue to give strong support to the OSCE as our best choice to engage all the countries of Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia multilaterally in an effort to advance democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and to encourage them to support one another when instability, insecurity and human rights violations threaten peace in the region.

The Balkans and Southeastern Europe: There are significant security challenges in the Balkans and Southeastern Europe. The United States has an abiding interest in peace and stability in this region because continued war in the region threatens Europe's stability and security. We are redoubling our efforts to advance the integration of several new democracies in Southeastern Europe (Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) into the European mainstream. More specifically, the President's Action Plan for Southeast Europe seeks to promote further democratic, economic and military reforms in these countries, to encourage greater regional cooperation, and to advance common interests, such as closer contact with NATO, and increased law enforcement training and exchanges to assist in the fight against organized crime.

Kosovo: NATO military operations against Serbia had three clear goals: withdrawal of all Serb military, paramilitary, and police forces from Kosovo, the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons to Kosovo, and deployment of an international security force, with NATO at its core, to protect all the people of Kosovo -- Serbs and Albanians, alike. Those goals are being achieved, and the result will be security and dignity for the people of Kosovo.

Several challenges must be met as we implement the agreement that ended the NATO air campaign. First, the Serbian authorities must meet all their commitments to the international community. Second, the people of Kosovo must have a safe and secure environment to begin rebuilding their lives. Toward that end, mine fields are being cleared, homes destroyed by Serb forces are being rebuilt, homeless people are being provided food, shelter and medicine, the fate of the missing is being determined, and the Kosovar Liberation Army is demilitarizing, as it agreed to do.

For these things to happen, security must be established. Some 43,000 troops from almost 30 countries have joined the Kosovo Force (KFOR). Our European allies will provide the vast majority of them; America will contribute about 7,000. Russian participation in KFOR remains an important step for resuming practical NATO-Russian cooperation and providing reassurance to all the people of Kosovo that they will live in peace and security. KFOR has NATO command and control and rules of engagement set by NATO. It has the means and the mandate to protect itself while doing its job. Under KFOR security, the United Nations is organizing a civilian administration, backed by a 3,100-person international police force, that will prepare the Kosovars to govern and police themselves. As local institutions take hold, NATO will be able to turn over increasing responsibility to them.

The third challenge is to put in place a plan for lasting peace and stability in Kosovo and through all the Balkans. For that to happen, the European Union and the United States must help to give the democracies of Southeastern Europe a path to a prosperous, shared future. Our European partners are providing most of the resources for this effort, and America is providing key staff and expertise to the international effort to establish democracies and market economies.

A final challenge will be to encourage Serbia to join its neighbors in this historic journey to a peaceful, democratic, united Europe. But as long as Milosevic remains in power we will not provide support for the reconstruction of Serbia. We are ready to provide humanitarian aid now, and will be willing to help build a better future for Serbia when

en its government represents tolerance and freedom, not repression and terror.

We will also provide support for democratic forces in Serbia to build and strengthen independent political parties and a free media. The objective of this assistance is to hasten Milosevic's departure from power and to accelerate Serbia's transition to democracy.

Bosnia: Full implementation of the Dayton Accords is the best hope for creating a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia. NATO-led forces are contributing to a secure environment in Bosnia and providing essential support for broader progress in implementing the Dayton Accords. However, further progress is necessary to create conditions that will allow implementation to continue without a large military presence. We are committed to full implementation of the Dayton Accords and success in Bosnia. We support the efforts of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and broader efforts to promote justice and reconciliation in Bosnia. We are working to accelerate market economic reforms in Bosnia and Croatia and support a transition to democracy in Croatia.

Cyprus and the Aegean: Tensions on Cyprus, Greek-Turkish disagreements in the Aegean and Turkey's relationship with the EU have serious implications for regional stability and the evolution of European political and security structures. Our goals are to stabilize the region by reducing long-standing Greek-Turkish tensions and pursuing a comprehensive settlement on Cyprus. A democratic, secular, stable and Western-oriented Turkey is critical to these efforts and has supported broader U.S. efforts to enhance stability in Bosnia, the NIS and the Middle East, as well as to contain Iran and Iraq.

The

Baltic States: The special nature of our relationship with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is recognized in the 1998 Charter of Partnership, which clarifies the principles upon which U.S. relations with the Baltic states are based and provides a framework for strengthening ties and pursuing common goals. These goals include integration of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia into the transatlantic community and development of close, cooperative relationships among all the states in Northeastern Europe. Through the Northern European Initiative we seek to strengthen regional cooperation, enhance regional security and stability, and promote the growth of Western institutions, trade and investment by bringing together the governments and private sector interests in the Baltic and Nordic countries, Poland, Germany and Russia.

Northern Ireland: In 1998 the people of Ireland and Northern Ireland seized the opportunity to turn the tragedy of Northern Ireland's past into a shared triumph for the future by strongly endorsing the peace accord that had been reached in April that year. This remains a dawn

ting challenge, but we will continue to work with the United Kingdom, the Irish Republic and Northern Ireland's leaders as they seek to transform the promise of the Accord into a reality with new democratic institutions and new economic opportunities for all of Northern Ireland's people. Working through the International Fund for Ireland and the private sector, we will help the people seize the opportunities that peace will bring to attract new investment to create new factories, workplaces and jobs, and establish new centers of learning to prepare for the 21st Century.

Russia and the Newly Independent States (NIS): The United States has vital security interests in the evolution of Russia, Ukraine and the other NIS into democratic market economies, peacefully and prosperously integrated into the world community. We are pursuing a wide range of security objectives and practical cooperation in Eastern Europe and Eurasia. We seek to bring Russia, Ukraine and the other newly independent states of Eastern Europe and Eurasia into a new, cooperative European security order, which includes strengthening their cooperation with NATO, such as through Partnership for Peace activities, as well as building effective NATO-Russia and NATO-Ukraine partnerships. We are working with several of these countries, Russia in particular, to reduce Cold War-era arsenals and counter the threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons and materials, other weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and associated weapons expertise, especially to rogue states.

Promoting Prosperity

Europe is a key element in America's global commercial engagement. Europe and the United States produce almost half of all global goods and services, more than 60% of total U.S. investment abroad is in Europe and fourteen million workers on both sides of the Atlantic earn their livelihoods from transatlantic commerce. As part of the New Transatlantic Agenda launched in 1995, the United States and the EU agreed to take concrete steps to reduce barriers to trade and investment through creation of an open New Transatlantic Marketplace and through Mutual Recognition Agreements in goods that eliminate redundant testing and certification requirements. Our governments are also cooperating closely with the civil society dialogues established under the New Transatlantic Agenda: the Transatlantic Business Dialogue, Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue, Transatlantic Environment Dialogue, and Transatlantic Labor Dialogue. These people-to-people dialogues create opportunities for increased communication focusing on best practices, and can help their governments identify and reduce barriers to greater transatlantic interaction. In return, our governments should be committed to listen, learn, and facilitate.

Building on the New Transatlantic Ag

enda, the United States and the EU launched the Transatlantic Economic Partnership in 1998 to deepen our economic relations, reinforce our political ties and reduce trade frictions. The first element of the initiative is reducing barriers that affect manufacturing, agriculture and services. In the manufacturing area we are focusing on standards and technical barriers that American businesses have identified as the most significant obstacle to expanding trade. In the agricultural area we are focusing on regulatory barriers that have inhibited the expansion of agriculture trade, particularly in the biotechnology area. In the area of services we seek to facilitate trade in specific service sectors, thereby creating new opportunities for the service industries that are already so active in the European market.

The second element of the Transatlantic Economic Partnership is a broader, cooperative approach to addressing a wide range of trade issues. We will continue not imposing duties on electronic transmissions and develop a work program in the WTO for electronic commerce. We will seek to adopt common positions and effective strategies for accelerating compliance with WTO commitments on intellectual property. We will seek to promote government procurement opportunities, including promoting compatibility of electronic procurement information and government contracting systems. To promote fair competition, we will seek to enhance the compatibility of our procedures with potentially significant reductions in cost for American companies.

The United States strongly supports the process of European integration embodied in the EU. We are also encouraging bilateral trade and investment in non-EU countries and supporting enlargement of the EU. We recognize that EU nations face significant economic challenges and that economic stagnation has eroded public support for funding outwardlooking foreign policies and greater integration. We are working closely with our European partners to expand employment, promote long-term growth and support the New Transatlantic Agenda.

By supporting historic market reforms in Central and Eastern Europe and in the NIS, we strengthen our own economy and help new democracies take root. The United States will continue helping the NIS economies integrate into international economic and other institutions and develop healthy business climates. We are working with many of these countries to promote their accession to the WTO on commercially meaningful terms. Building on successful accession of Kyrgyzstan, Latvia and Estonia, we have made significant progress on the accession of Georgia, Albania, Armenia, Croatia, Lithuania and Moldova. We also have held fruitful discussions with Russia and Ukraine. We will continue to mobilize the international community to provide assistance to support reform and to help the Central and Eastern European and NIS countries stimulate foreign and domestic private investment. We are

also encouraging investment in these countries, especially by U.S. companies. We are focusing particular attention on investment in NIS energy resources and their export to world markets, thereby expanding and diversifying world energy supplies and promoting prosperity in the region. A stable and prosperous Caucasus and Central Asia will facilitate rapid development and transport to international markets of the large Caspian oil and gas resources, with substantial U.S. commercial participation. Resolution of regional conflicts such as Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia is important for creating the stability necessary for development and transport of Caspian resources.

Promoting Democracy

Thoroughgoing

democratic and economic reforms in Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia are the best measures to avert conditions which could foster aggressive nationalism and ethnic hatreds. Already, the prospect of joining or rejoining the Western democratic family has dampened the forces of nationalism and strengthened the forces of democracy and reform in many countries of the region. Together with our West European partners we are helping these nations build a civil society. For example, the CIVITAS organization has carried out a joint civic education program in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and a similar project is planned for Ukraine.

Throughout the region, targeted exchange programs have familiarized key decision-makers and opinion-molders with the workings of American democracy on a first-hand basis.

The independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and democratic and economic reform of the NIS are important to American interests. To advance these goals, we are utilizing our bilateral relationships, our leadership of international institutions, and billions of dollars in private and multilateral resources. But the circumstances affecting the smaller countries depend in significant measure on the fate of reform in the largest and most powerful Russia. The United States will continue vigorously to promote Russian reform and international integration, and to build on the progress that already has been made. Our economic and political support for the Russian government depends on its commitment to internal reform and a responsible foreign policy.

East Asia

and the Pacific

President Clinton's vision of a new Pacific community links security interests with economic growth and our commitment to democracy and human rights. We continue to build on that vision, cementing America's role as a stabilizing force in a more integrated Asia Pacific region.

Enhancing Security

Our military presence has been essential to maintaining the stability that has enabled most nations in the Asia Pacific region to build thriving economies for the benefit of all. To deter aggression and secure our own interests, we will maintain approximately 100,000 military personnel in the region. Our treaty alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines serve as the foundation for America's continuing security role. We are maintaining healthy relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and supporting regional dialogues such as in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) on the full range of common security challenges.

Japan: The United States and Japan reaffirmed our bilateral security relationship in the April 1996 Joint Security Declaration. The alliance continues to be the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives and for maintaining a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia Pacific region as we enter the twenty-first century. The 1997 revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation will result in greater bilateral cooperation in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations in situations in areas surrounding Japan and in the defense of Japan itself. The revised Guidelines, like the U.S.-Japan security relationship itself, are not directed against any other country. In April 1998, in order to support the new Guidelines, both governments agreed to a revised Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) which expands the exchange of provision of supplies and services to include reciprocal provision of logistics support during situations surrounding Japan that have an important influence on Japan's peace and security. Japan approved implementing legislation for the Guidelines in the spring of 1999. Japan's generous host nation support for the U.S. overseas presence also serves as a critical strategic contribution to the alliance and to regional security. U.S.-Japan security cooperation extends to research and development on ballistic missile defense, promoting regional peace and stability, seeking universal adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and addressing the dangers posed by transfers of destabilizing conventional arms and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies. Japan is providing \$1 billion toward KEDO, and consults closely with the U.S. and ROK on issues relating to North Korea.

Korean Peninsula: Tensions on the Korean Peninsula remain the principal threat to peace and stability in East Asia. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has publicly stated a preference for peaceful reunification, but continues to dedicate a large portion of dwindling resources to maintain the combat capability of its huge military forces. Renewed conflict has been prevented since 1953 by a combination of the Armistice Agreement, which brought an end to open hostilities; the United Nations Command, which has visibly represented the will of the UN Security

Council to secure peace; and the physical presence of U.S. and ROK troops in the Combined Forces Command, which has demonstrated the alliances resolve.

Peace

ful resolution of the Korean conflict with a democratic, non-nuclear, reunified peninsula will enhance stability in the East Asian region and is clearly in our strategic interest. We are willing to improve bilateral political and economic ties with North Korea consistent with the objectives of our alliance with the ROK to draw the North into more normal relations with the region and the rest of the world. Our willingness to improve bilateral relations will continue to be commensurate with the North's cooperation in efforts to reduce tensions on the peninsula. South Korea has set a shining example for nonproliferation by forswearing nuclear weapons, accepting IAEA safeguards, and developing a peaceful nuclear program that brings benefits to the region. We are firm that North Korea must maintain the freeze and dismantle its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities and fully comply with its NPT obligations under the Agreed Framework. We also seek to halt North Korea's chemical and biological weapon programs and its ballistic missile program and proliferation activities. The United States, too, must fulfill its obligations under the Agreed Framework and the Administration will work with the Congress to ensure the success of our efforts to address the North Korean nuclear threat. The North must also engage in a productive dialogue with South Korea; continue the recently revived United Nations Command-Korean People's Army General Officer Dialogue at Panmunjom; participate constructively in the Four Party Talks among the United States, China, and North and South Korea to reduce tensions and negotiate a peace agreement; and support our efforts to recover the remains of American servicemen missing since the Korean War.

China: A stable, open, prosperous People's Republic of China (PRC) that respects international norms and assumes its responsibilities for building a more peaceful world is clearly and profoundly in our interests. The prospects for peace and prosperity in Asia depend heavily on China's role as a responsible member of the international community. Our policy toward China is both principled and pragmatic: expanding our areas of cooperation while dealing forthrightly with our differences. Despite strains in the relationship resulting from the tragic accidental bombing of the PRC embassy in Belgrade, we continue to engage China on these issues.

The United States and China have taken a number of steps to strengthen cooperation in international affairs: establishing a Washington-Beijing presidential communications link to facilitate direct contact, regular presidential visits to each other's capitals; establishing the Vice President-Premier Forum on environment and development; regular exchanges of visits by cabinet and sub-cabinet officials to consult on political, military, s

security, arms control and human rights issues; establishing a consultation mechanism to strengthen military maritime safety; holding discussions on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; and establishing working groups on law enforcement cooperation. China is also a major partner in science technology and health research.

U.S. interests have been advanced in discussions with China on arms control and nonproliferation issues, and areas of common concern have been addressed. In 1998, the United States and China announced that they will not target their strategic nuclear weapons at each other and confirmed their common goal of halting the spread of WMD. Our two nations have agreed to consultations on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and missile nonproliferation, and we continue to press China to avoid destabilizing missile technology sales to other countries. Both our nations have signed the Chemical Weapons Convention and we have agreed to further strengthen controls on the export of dual-use chemicals and related production equipment and technology to assure they are not used for production of chemical weapons. China also has expanded the list of chemical precursors that it controls. Both nations have called for strengthening of the Biological Weapons Convention and early conclusion of a protocol establishing a practical and effective mechanism to enhance compliance and improve transparency. We also reached agreement with China on practices for end-user visits on U.S. high technology exports to China.

China is working with the United States on important regional security issues. In June 1998, China chaired a meeting of the permanent members of the UN Security Council to forge a common strategy for moving India and Pakistan away from a nuclear arms race. China condemned both countries for conducting nuclear tests and joined us in urging them to conduct no more tests, to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, to avoid deploying or testing missiles, and to work to resolve their differences through dialogue. On the Korean Peninsula, the United States and China share an interest in peace and stability. We have both worked to convince North Korea to freeze its dangerous nuclear program, and believe the four-party peace talks are an important tool in moving forward.

Our key security objectives for the future include sustaining the strategic dialogue begun by the recent summits and other high-level exchanges; enhancing stability in the Taiwan Strait through peaceful approaches to cross-Strait issues and encouraging dialogue between Beijing and Taipei; strengthening China's adherence to international nonproliferation norms, particularly in export controls on ballistic missile and dual use technologies; achieving greater openness and transparency in China's military; encouraging a constructive PRC role in international affairs through active cooperation in ARF, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) and the Northe

East Asia Cooperation Dialogue; and improving law enforcement cooperation.

Southeast

Asia: Our strategic interest in Southeast Asia centers on developing regional and bilateral security and economic relationships that assist in conflict prevention and resolution and expand U.S. participation in the region's economies. U.S. security objectives in the region are to maintain our security alliances with Australia, Thailand and the Philippines, to sustain security access arrangements with Singapore and other ASEAN countries, and to encourage the emergence of a strong, cohesive ASEAN capable of enhancing regional stability and prosperity. The Philippine Senate's ratification of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in May 1999 is one example of how our continuing engagement enhances both bilateral defense cooperation as well as regional security interests.

Our policy

combines two approaches: First, maintaining our increasingly productive relationship with ASEAN and enhancing our security dialogue under the ARF. Second, pursuing bilateral initiatives with individual Southeast Asian nations to promote democracy, human rights and political stability, foster market-oriented economic reforms, and reduce or contain the effects of Asian organized crime, particularly the flow of heroin from Burma and other countries in the region.

In

1999, the United States, working in partnership with the member nations of ASEAN, opened the International Law Enforcement Academy in Bangkok, Thailand. Officials of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, the FBI and other U.S. agencies provide high caliber training in areas such as drug trafficking, alien smuggling, cyber crime, and other transnational threats. The International Law Enforcement Academy also promotes cooperation and information sharing, as well as significantly improving regional counterdrug capabilities.

Promoting Prosperity

A prosperous and open Asia Pacific is key to the economic health of the United States. On the eve of the recent financial problems in Asia, the 21 members of APEC contributed about one-half of total global gross domestic product and exports. Thirty percent of U.S. exports go to Asia, supporting millions of U.S. jobs, and we export more to Asia than Europe. Our economic objectives in East Asia include recovery from the recent financial crisis, continued progress within APEC toward liberalizing trade and investment, increased U.S. exports to Asian countries through market-opening measures and leveling the playing field for U.S. business, and WTO accession for the PRC and Taiwan on satisfactory commercial terms. Opportunities for economic growth abound in Asia and underli

e our strong commitment to multilateral economic cooperation, such as via the annual APEC leaders meetings.

Our economic strategy in Asia has four key elements: support for economic reforms and market opening; working with international financial institutions to provide well-targeted economic and technical assistance in support of economic reforms; providing bilateral humanitarian aid and contingency bilateral financial assistance if needed; and urging strong policy actions by Japan and the other major economic powers to promote global growth. The United States will continue to work with the IMF, the World Bank, other international financial institutions, the governments in East Asia and the private sector to help stabilize financial markets, restore investor confidence and deepen on-going reforms in the troubled East Asian economies. In doing so, we will remain mindful of the need to promote protection of worker rights. We will continue to support South Korea, Thailand and Indonesia as they implement economic reforms designed to foster financial stability and investor confidence in order to attract the capital flows required to restore economic growth. U.S. initiatives in APEC will open new opportunities for economic cooperation and permit U.S. companies to expand their involvement in substantial infrastructure planning and construction throughout the region. While our progress in APEC has been gratifying, we will explore options to encourage all Asia Pacific nations to pursue open markets.

China: Bringing the PRC more fully into the global trading system is manifestly in our national interest. China is a major potential market for our goods and services. As we look into the next century, our exports to China will support hundreds of thousands of jobs across our country. For this reason, we must continue our normal trade treatment for China, as every President has done since 1980, strengthening our economic relationship.

An important part of integrating China into the market-based world economic system is opening China's highly protected market through 1) eliminating trade barriers and removal of distorting restraints on economic activity. We have negotiated and vigorously enforced landmark agreements to combat piracy of intellectual property and advance the interests of our creative industries. We have also negotiated and vigorously enforced agreements on textile trade. We will continue to press China to open its markets (in goods, services and agriculture) as it engages in sweeping economic reform and to respect and adhere to core labor standards as codified by the ILO. It is in our interest that China become a member of the WTO; however, we have been steadfast in leading the effort to ensure that China's accession to the WTO occurs on a commercial basis. China maintains many barriers that must be eliminated, and we need to ensure that necessary reforms are agreed to before accession occurs.

Japan: The Administration continues to make progress on increasing market access in Asia's largest economy. Since the beginning of the first Clinton Administration, the United States and Japan have reached 38 trade agreements designed to open Japanese markets in key sectors, including autos and auto parts, telecommunications, civil aviation, insurance and glass. The Administration also has intensified efforts to monitor and enforce trade agreements with Japan to ensure that they are fully implemented. The United States also uses multilateral venues, such as WTO dispute settlement and negotiation of new multilateral agreements, to further open markets and accomplish our trade objectives with Japan. The US-Japan Common Agenda advances our bilateral cooperation with a major donor ally on global and regional environmental, scientific, and health issues.

Japan has a crucial role to play in Asia's economic recovery: generating substantial growth to help maintain a growing world economy and absorb a growing share of imports from emerging markets. To do this Japan must reform its financial sector, stimulate domestic demand, deregulate its economy, and further open its markets to foreign goods and services. We look forward to substantial and effective actions to achieve a domestic demand-led recovery, to restore health to the financial sector, and to make progress on deregulation and opening markets.

South Korea: The United States will continue its strong support for South Korean efforts to reform its economy, liberalize trade and investment, strengthen the banking system and implement the IMF program. We have committed to providing bilateral finance under appropriate conditions and will continue to explore concrete steps to promote growth in both our countries, to more fully open our markets, and to further integrate the Republic of Korea into the global economy.

ASEAN: The United States strongly supports efforts to sustain and strengthen economic recovery in the ten nations of ASEAN through maintaining our open market for Southeast Asian goods and services, as well as our support for IMF-led recovery programs for several ASEAN nations. We applaud ASEAN's 1998 Hanoi Action Plan, which calls for accelerated, WTO-consistent, regional economic integration. We are working toward completion of a broad commercial agreement with Vietnam, which will open markets and promote economic reform while allowing us to endorse Normal Trade Relations for Vietnam as well as Laos. Working with ASEAN members to address environmental degradation in Southeast Asia is a major priority, from forest fires and haze, to fisheries depletion, deforestation, and sustainable growth during the recovery from the Asian financial crisis.

Australia and New Zealand: We are building on our already close working relationship with Australia and New Zealand to strengthen our bilateral trade and economic relationships, build consensus for regional liberalization, and cooperate in the opening of the new round of international trade negotiations at the WTO.

Promoting Democracy

Some have argued that at democracy is unsuited for some Asian nations that Western support for international human rights standards simply mask a form of cultural imperialism. The democratic aspirations and achievements of the Asian peoples prove such arguments wrong. There is no cultural justification for tyranny, torture or denial of fundamental freedoms. We will continue to support those aspirations and to promote respect for human rights. Each nation must find its own form of democracy, and we respect the variety of democratic institutions that have emerged in Asia.

Our strategy includes a constructive, goal-oriented approach to achieving progress on human rights, religious freedom and rule of law issues with China; fostering meaningful political dialogue between the ruling authorities in Burma and the democratic opposition; working with the government of Indonesia to promote respect for human rights, promoting democracy and encouraging greater respect for human rights in Cambodia; and, in Vietnam, achieving the fullest possible accounting of missing U.S. service members, promoting greater respect for human rights, and pressing for full implementation of the Resettlement Opportunity for Vietnamese Returnees program.

Indonesia: The election in East Timor on August 30, 1999 was conducted fairly, with the agreement of the Indonesian Government. It produced a clear mandate for independence. The violence that has erupted since then is abhorrent to all people who care about democracy and human dignity. To stop the post-election violence, restore order and recognize the legitimate steps the people there have taken to secure their independence, the UN Security Council unanimously approved creation of a Multi-National Force (INTERFET) led by Australia. The U.S. contribution to INTERFET is relatively small, but performs highly important functions, drawing on the unique capabilities of the U.S. military. These include communications and logistical aid, intelligence, airlifts of personnel and materiel, and coordination of the humanitarian response to the tragedy. Additionally, elements of the U.S. Pacific Fleet have been providing support for the operation. This mission is in Americas interest for several compelling reasons: Indonesia holds enormous strategic importance, not only for its resources and waterways, but also for its size and limitless potential. More than two hundred million people are struggling through

a difficult but extremely hopeful transition to democracy. All Asians and Americans have an interest in a stable, prosperous, democratic Indonesia.

The Oc

tober 1999 election in which the people of Indonesia selected Abdurrahman Wahid as their new President was a triumph for democracy in that country. The election was conducted fairly and transparently, and resulted in a peaceful change of government. It was an historic moment for Indonesia, the worlds largest Muslim country and now the worlds third largest democracy. The U.S. strongly supports a united, prosperous and democratic Indonesia. We will do our part to help Indonesia consolidate democracy and restore its economy. We look forward to working with Indonesias new leaders to meet challenges of national reconciliation and economic recovery that lie ahead.

The Western Hemisphere

Our hemisphere

enters the twenty-first century with an unprecedented opportunity to secure a future of stability and prosperity building on the fact that every nation in the hemisphere except Cuba is democratic and committed to free market economies. The end of armed conflict in Central America and other improvements in regional security have coincided with remarkable political and economic progress throughout the Americas. The people of the Americas are already taking advantage of the vast opportunities being created as emerging markets are connected through electronic commerce and as robust democracies allow individuals to more fully express their preferences. Sub-regional political, economic and security cooperation in North America, the Caribbean, Central America, the Andean region and the Southern Cone have contributed positively to peace and prosperity throughout the hemisphere. Equally important, the people of the Americas have reaffirmed their commitment to combat together the difficult new threats of drug trafficking and corruption. U.S. strategy is to secure the benefits of the new climate in the hemisphere while safeguarding the United States and our friends against these threats.

Enhancing Security

The principal security concerns in the hemisphere are transnational in nature, such as drug trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, illegal immigration, firearms trafficking, and terrorism. In addition, our hemisphere is leading the way in recognizing the dangers to democracy produced by corruption and rule of law issues. These threats, especially narcotics, produce adverse social effects that undermine the sovereignty, democracy and national security of nations in the hemisphere.

Working bilaterally

and multilaterally through the Organization of American States (OAS) and other organizations, we are striving to eliminate the scourge of drug trafficking in our hemisphere. The Multilateral Counterdrug Alliance is striving to better organize and coordinate efforts in the hemisphere to stem the production and distribution of drugs. Efforts include improved cooperation on extraditing and prosecuting individuals charged with narcotics trafficking and related crimes; strengthened efforts against money laundering and forfeiture of assets used in criminal activity; reinforced international and national mechanisms to halt illicit traffic and diversion of chemical precursors; striking at the financial support networks of international drug traffickers; enhanced national programs for fostering greater awareness of the dangers of drug abuse, preventing illicit drug consumption and providing treatment, rehabilitation and reintegration; and elimination of illicit crops through national alternative development programs, eradication and interdiction. We are also pursuing a number of bilateral and regional counterdrug initiatives. As part of our partnerships with Mexico and Colombia, we are striving to increase counterdrug and law enforcement cooperation, while in the Caribbean we are intensifying a coordinated effort on counterdrug and law enforcement.

We are advancing regional security cooperation through

bilateral security dialogues, multilateral efforts in the OAS and Summit of the Americas on transparency and regional confidence and security building measures, exercises and exchanges with key militaries (principally focused on peacekeeping), and regular Defense Ministerials. Last year, the guarantor nations of the Peru-Ecuador peace process Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the United States brought the parties to a permanent solution to this decades-old border dispute, the resolution of which was important to regional stability. The Military Observer Mission, Ecuador-Peru (MOMEP), composed of the four guarantor nations, successfully separated the warring factions, creating the mutual confidence and security necessary to resolve the dispute. Our efforts to encourage multilateral cooperation are enhancing confidence and security within the region and will help expand our cooperative efforts to combat the transnational threats to the Western Hemisphere.

Colombia is of particular importance because its problems

extend beyond its borders and have implications for regional peace and security. Insurgency, narco-trafficking and a growing paramilitary movement are testing democracy in Colombia. To turn the tide, President Pastrana needs U.S. assistance to wage a comprehensive effort to promote the mutually reinforcing goals of peace, drug eradication, economic development, and respect for human rights. The Government of Colombia has developed an aggressive, three-year strategy, Plan Colombia, to revive their economy, strengthen the democratic pillars of society, promote the peace process and eliminate sanctuaries for narcotics

producers and traffickers. We are reviewing Plan Colombia to determine how best to provide support that would concurrently promote U.S. and Colombian interests.

Promoting Prosperity

Economic growth and integration in the Americas will profoundly affect the prosperity of the United States in the 21st century. This begins with our immediate neighbors, Canada and Mexico. Canada is our largest merchandise export market and trade partner in the world, and our exports to Canada have grown rapidly as the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement phased in. U.S. merchandise exports to Mexico have nearly doubled since the conclusion of NAFTA, making Mexico our second largest goods export market and trading partner in the hemisphere as a whole, our trade initiatives offer an historic opportunity to capitalize on and strengthen the unprecedented trend toward democracy and free market economics.

We seek to advance the goal of an integrated hemisphere of free market democracies by building on NAFTA and obtaining Congressional Fast Track trade agreement approval procedures. Formal negotiations are in progress to initiate the FTAA by 2005. The negotiations cover a broad range of important issues, including market access, investment, services, government procurement, dispute settlement, workers rights, agriculture, environmental degradation, intellectual property rights, competition policy, subsidies, anti-dumping and countervailing duties. We will seek to ensure that the agreement also supports environmental protection and sustainable development. We are also committed to delivering on the President's promise to pursue a comprehensive free trade agreement with Chile, if it remains interested, because of its economic performance and its active role in promoting hemispheric economic integration. To address the concerns of smaller economies during the period of transition to the global economy of the 21st century, and in light of the increased competition NAFTA presents to Caribbean trade, we are seeking Congressional approval to provide enhanced trade benefits under the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) to help prepare that region for participation in the FTAA.

We also view it as essential that economic prosperity in our hemisphere be pursued in an environmentally sustainable manner. From our shared seas and freshwater resources to migratory bird species and transboundary air pollution, the environmental policies of our neighbors can have a direct impact on quality of life at home. U.S. Government assistance to the region recognizes the vital link between sustainable use of natural resources and long-term prosperity, a key to developing prosperous trading partners in this hemisphere.

Promoting Democracy

Many Latin American n

ations have made tremendous advances in democracy and economic progress over the last several years. But our ability to sustain the hemispheric agenda depends in part on meeting the challenges posed by weak democratic institutions, persistently high unemployment and crime rates, and serious income disparities. In some Latin American countries, citizens will not fully realize the benefits of political liberalization and economic growth without regulatory, judicial, law enforcement and educational reforms, as well as increased efforts to integrate all members of society into the formal economy.

The hemisphere's leaders are

committed to strengthening democracy, justice and human rights. They have pledged to intensify efforts to promote democratic reforms at the regional and local level, protect the rights of migrant workers and their families, improve the capabilities and competence of civil and criminal justice systems, and encourage a strong and active civil society. Specific initiatives include ratification of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption to strengthen the integrity of governmental institutions, creation of a Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression as part of the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights, establishing an Inter-American Justice Studies Center to facilitate training of personnel, to exchange of information and other forms of technical cooperation to improve judicial systems. Education is the centerpiece of reforms aimed at making democracy work for all the people of the Americas. The Summit Action Plan adopted at Santiago in 1998 seeks to ensure by the year 2010 primary education for 100% of children and access to quality secondary education for at least 75% of young people. We are also seeking to strengthen norms for defense establishments that are supportive of democracy, transparency, respect for human rights and civilian control in defense matters. Through continued engagement with regional armed forces, facilitated by our own modest military activities and presence in the region, we are helping to increase civilian expertise in defense affairs and reinforce the positive trend in civilian control.

Haiti and Cuba are o

f special concern to the United States. In Haiti we continue to support the consolidation of democratic institutions, respect for human rights and economic growth by a Haitian government capable of managing its own security and paving the way for a fair presidential election in 2000. We are committed to working with our partners in the region and in the international community to meet the challenge of institutionalizing Haiti's economic and political development. The United States remains committed to promoting a peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba and forestalling a mass exodus that would endanger the lives of migrants and the security of our borders. While maintaining pressure on the regime t

o make political and economic reforms, we continue to encourage the emergence o f a civil society to assist the transition to democracy when the change comes.

As the Cuban people feel greater incentive to take charge of their own future, they are more likely to stay at home and build the informal and formal structu res that will make transition easier. Meanwhile, we remain firmly committed to bilateral migration accords that ensure migration in safe, legal and orderly c hannels.

The Middle East, North Africa, Southwest and South Asia

Choices made

in the Middle East, Southwest and South Asia will determine whether terrorists and narcotraffickers operating in and from the region are denied the support t hey need to perpetrate their crimes, whether weapons of mass destruction will i mperil the region and the world, whether the oil and gas fields of the Caucasus and Central Asia become reliable energy sources, whether the opium harvest in Afghanistan is eliminated, whether respect for basic human rights can be instit utionalized, and whether a just and lasting peace can be established between Is rael and the Arab countries.

Enhancing Security

The United States has endurin g interests in pursuing a just, lasting and comprehensive Middle East peace, en suring the security and well-being of Israel, helping our Arab friends provide for their security, and maintaining the free flow of oil at reasonable prices.

Our strategy reflects those interests and the unique characteristics of the re gion as we work to strengthen peace and stability.

The Middle East Peace Proce
ss

An historic transformation has taken place in the political landscape of th e Middle East: peace agreements are taking hold, requiring concerted implementa tion efforts. The United States as an architect and sponsor of the peace proces shas a clear national interest in seeing the process deepen and widen to includ e all Israels neighbors. We will continue our steady, determined leadershipsta nding with those who take risks for peace, standing against those who would des troy it, lending our good offices where we can make a difference and helping br ing the concrete benefits of peace to peoples daily lives. Future progress wil l require continued Israeli-Palestinian engagement on remaining issues in the I nterim Agreement, implementation of the Wye River Memorandum and negotiation of permanent status issues, resuming Israeli-Syrian and Israeli-Lebanese negotiat ions with the objective of achieving peace treaties, and normalization of relat

ions between Arab states and Israel. Through the Middle East Peace Process working groups on water and environment, we are seeking to promote regional cooperation to address transboundary environmental issues that impact all parties.

North Africa

Libya continues to pose a threat to regional stability and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. Although the government of Libya has taken an important positive step away from its support of terrorism by surrendering the Lockerbie suspects, our policy toward Libya is designed to compel Libya to completely cease its support of terrorism and block its efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction.

Southwest Asia

In Southwest

Southwest Asia, the United States remains focused on deterring threats to regional stability, countering threats posed by WMD and protecting the security of our regional partners, particularly from Iraq and Iran. We will continue to encourage members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to work closely on collective defense and security arrangements, help individual GCC states meet their defense requirements and maintain our bilateral defense relationships.

We will maintain

an appropriate military presence in Southwest Asia using a combination of ground, air and naval forces. We are maintaining a continuous military presence in the Gulf to enhance regional stability and support our on-going efforts to bring Iraq into compliance with UN Security Council resolutions. Our forces in the Gulf are backed by our ability to rapidly reinforce the region in time of crisis, which we have demonstrated convincingly. We remain committed to enforcing the no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq, which are essential for implementing the UN resolutions and preventing Saddam from taking large-scale military action against Kuwait or the Kurd and Shia minorities in Iraq.

Our policy

toward Iraq is comprised of three central elements: containment and economic sanctions, to prevent Saddam Hussein from again threatening the stability of the vital Gulf region; relief for the Iraqi people from humanitarian suffering via the UN oil-for-food program; and support to those Iraqis seeking to replace Saddams regime with a government that can live at peace with its neighbors and its people. Operation Desert Fox in December 1998 successfully degraded the threat posed by Iraqi WMD in the wake of Baghdad's decision to cease cooperation with UN weapons inspectors. We have adamantly maintained that the Iraqi regime can only have sanctions lifted when it has met its obligations to the international

al community. Saddams actions over the past decade make clear that his regime will never comply with its obligations under the UN Security Council resolutions designed to rid Iraq of WMD and their delivery systems. Because of that and because the Iraqi people will never be free under the brutal dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, we actively support those who seek to bring a new democratic government to power in Baghdad. We recognize that this may be a slow and difficult process, but we believe it is the only solution to the problem of Saddams regime

Our policy toward Iran is aimed at changing the practices of the Iranian government in several key areas, including its efforts to obtain WMD and long-range missiles, its support for terrorism and groups that violently oppose the peace process, its attempts to undermine friendly governments in the region, and its development of offensive military capabilities that threaten our GCC partners and the flow of oil. We view signs of change in Iranian policies with interest, both with regard to the possibility of Iran assuming its rightful place in the world community and the chance for better bilateral ties, and welcome statements by President Khatemi that advocate a people-to-people dialogue with the United States. However, these positive signs must be balanced against the reality that Iran's support for terrorism has not yet ceased, serious violations of human rights persist, its efforts to develop long range missiles, including the 1,300 kilometer-range Shahab-3 it flight tested in July 1998, and its efforts to acquire WMD continue. The United States will continue to oppose Iranian efforts to sponsor terror and transfers from any country to Iran of materials and technologies that could be used to develop long-range missiles or WMD.

We are ready to explore further ways to build mutual confidence and avoid misunderstandings with Iran. We will strengthen our cooperation with allies and friends to encourage positive changes in Iranian practices that threaten our shared interests. If a government-to-government dialogue can be initiated and sustained in a way that addresses the concerns of both sides, then the United States would be willing to develop with the Islamic Republic a road map leading to normal relations.

South Asia

Our strategy for South Asia is designed to help the peoples of that region enjoy the fruits of democracy and greater stability by helping resolve longstanding conflict, implementing confidence-building measures, and promoting nonproliferation. Regional stability and improved bilateral ties are also important for U.S. economic interests in a region that contains a fifth of the worlds population and one of its most important emerging markets. We seek to establish relationships with India and Pakistan that are defined in ter

ms of their own individual merits and reflect the full weight and range of U.S. strategic, political and economic interests in each country. In addition, we seek to work closely with regional countries to stem the flow of illegal drugs from South Asia, most notably from Afghanistan.

A key to our improving ties with India and Pakistan will be the extent to which both countries adopt responsible nonproliferation behavior. The United States has long urged both countries to take steps to reduce the risk of conflict and to exercise restraint in their nuclear and missile programs. The Indian and Pakistani nuclear and long-range missile tests were dangerously destabilizing and threaten to spark a dangerous arms race in South Asia. The recent fighting along the Line of Control is a reminder of the tensions in that part of the world and of the risk that relatively minor conventional confrontations could spin out of control, with the most serious consequences.

In concert with the other permanent members of the UN Security Council, the G-8 nations, and many others in the international community, the United States has called on both nations to renounce further nuclear tests, to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty immediately and without conditions, to take steps to prevent an arms race in nuclear weapons and long-range missiles, to resume their direct dialogue through the Lahore process, and take decisive steps to reduce tensions in South Asia. We also strongly urge these states to refrain from any actions that would further undermine regional and global stability, and urge them to join the clear international consensus in support of nonproliferation and a cut off of fissile material production.

Promoting Prosperity

The United States has two principal economic objectives in the region: to promote regional economic cooperation and development, and to ensure unrestricted flow of oil from the region. We seek to promote regional trade and cooperation on infrastructure through the peace process, revitalization of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) economic summits, and our Qualifying Industrial Zone program, which provides economic benefits for certain countries that enter into business arrangements with Israel. In South Asia, we will continue to work with the regions democracies in their efforts to implement market reforms, strengthen educational systems, and end the use of child and sweatshop labor.

The United States depends on oil for about 40 percent of its primary energy needs and roughly half of our oil needs are met with imports. Although we import less than 10% of Persian Gulf exports, our principal econom

ic partners in Europe and Japan account for about 85% of these exports. Previous oil shocks and the Gulf War underscore the strategic importance of the region and show the impact that an interruption of oil supplies can have on the world's economy. Appropriate responses to events such as Iraq's invasion of Kuwait can limit the magnitude of the crisis. Over the longer term, U.S. dependence on access to these and other foreign oil sources will remain important as our reserves are depleted. Thus, the United States must continue to demonstrate U.S. commitment and resolve in the Persian Gulf.

Promoting Democracy

We encourage the spread of democratic values throughout the Middle East, North Africa and Southwest and South Asia and will pursue this objective by a constructive dialogue with countries in the region. In Iran, for example, we hope the nation's leaders will carry out the people's mandate for a government that respects and protects the rule of law, both in its internal and external affairs. We will promote responsible indigenous moves toward increasing political participation and enhancing the quality of governance and will continue to vigorously challenge many governments in the region to improve their human rights records. Respect for human rights also requires rejection of terrorism. If the nations in the region are to safeguard their own citizens from the threat of terror, they cannot tolerate acts of indiscriminate violence against civilians, nor can they offer refuge to those who commit such acts.

U.S. policies in the Middle East, North Africa and Southwest Asia are not anti-Islamican allegation made by some opponents of our efforts to help bring lasting peace and stability to the region. Islam is the fastest-growing religious faith in the United States. We respect deeply its moral teachings and its role as a source of inspiration and instruction for hundreds of millions of people around the world. U.S. policy in the region is directed at the actions of governments and terrorist groups, not peoples or faiths. The standards we would like all the nations in the region to observe are not merely Western, but universal.

Africa

In recent years, the United States has engaged in a concerted effort to change its relationship with Africa and has supported efforts by many African nations to move toward multi-party democracy, hold free and fair elections, allow freedom of the press and association, reform their economies, and encourage respect for human rights. U.S.-Africa trade is expanding, and a pragmatic consensus on the need for economic reform is emerging across the continent. A new, post-colonial political order is e

merging in Africa, with emphasis on democratic and pragmatic approaches to solving political economic and environmental problems and developing human and natural resources. Sustaining these recent successes will require that we identify those issues that most directly affect our interests and where we can make a difference through efficient and effective targeting of our resources. A key goal is to promote regional stability through engagement with sub-regional organizations and key African states using carefully harmonized U.S. programs and initiatives. Our immediate objective is to increase the number of capable states in Africa, i.e. nations that are able to define the challenges they face, manage their resources to effectively address those challenges, and build stability and peace within their borders and their sub-regions.

Enhancing Security

Seri

ous transnational security threats emanate from pockets of Africa, including state-sponsored terrorism, narcotics trafficking, international crime, environmental degradation and infectious diseases, especially HIV/AIDS. Since these transnational threats transcend state borders, they are best addressed through effective, sustained sub-regional engagement in Africa. We have already made significant progress in countering some of these threats investing in efforts to combat environmental degradation and infectious disease, leading international efforts to remove mines planted in previous conflict areas and halt the proliferation of land mines. We continue efforts to reduce the flow of narcotics through Africa and to curtail international organized criminal activity based in Africa. We seek to keep Africa free of weapons of mass destruction by supporting South Africa's nuclear disarmament and accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state, supporting the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, and encouraging African nations to join the BWC and CWC. We must improve international intelligence sharing, and train and assist African law enforcement, intelligence and border control agencies to detect and prevent planned terrorist attacks against US targets in Africa. Growing multi-national terrorist organizations and networks directly threaten U.S. and African interests as demonstrated by the brutal August 1998 embassy bombings in East Africa.

Nigeria's rapid change from an autocratic, military regime to a civilian, democratically elected government affords us an opportunity to build productive security, political and economic relations with the most populous country in Africa. With nearly one in six Africans living in Nigeria, the impact of serious cooperative efforts to tackle mushrooming crime, narcotics trafficking and corruption problems could be enormously beneficial to the United States and a large proportion of Africans. The Sierra Leone peace accord signed in July 1999 illustrates the cooperative effort needed to settle Africa's conflicts. Nigeria played a leadership role as a West African

anchor state working in concert with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sub-regional organization and supported by the international community. The July 1999 Organization for African Unity (OAU) initiative, under Algerias energetic leadership, for peace between Eritrea and Ethiopia is another such example of cooperative peace efforts.

Sudan continues to pose a threat to

regional stability and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. We have moved to counter Sudans support for international terrorism and regional destabilization by imposing comprehensive sanctions on the Khartoum regime, continuing to press for the regimes isolation through the UN Security Council, and enhancing the ability of Sudans neighbors to resist Khartoum-backed insurgencies in their countries through our Frontline States initiative. We support regional efforts for a just and fair peace and national reconciliation in Sudan based on the Inter-Governmental Authority on Developments (IGAD) Declaration of Principles.

Persistent conflict and continuing political instability in some African countries remain chronic obstacles to Africas development and to our national security, political and economic interests there, including unhampered access to critical oil reserves and other vital natural resources. To foster regional stability and peace in Africa, the United States in 1996 launched the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) to work with Africans to enhance their capacity to conduct effective peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. We are coordinating with the French, British, other donor countries and African governments in developing a regional exercise program to promote common doctrines, command and control capability and build interoperability for peacekeeping missions. We are consulting closely on ACRI activity with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the OAU and its Crisis Management Center, and African sub-regional organizations already pursuing similar capability enhancements.

The United States also will be establishing the African Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) to promote the exchange of ideas and information tailored specifically for African security concerns. The goal is for ACSS to be a source of academic yet practical instruction in promoting civil-military relations and the skills necessary to make effective national security decisions in democratic governments. The curriculum will engage African military and civilian defense leaders in a substantive dialogue about defense policy planning, civil-military relations, and defense resource management in democracies. Our long-term goal is to support the development of regional security arrangements and institutions to prevent and manage armed conflicts and curtail transnational threats to our collective security.

Promoting Prosperity

A stable, democratic,

prosperous Africa will be a better economic partner, a better partner for security and peace, and a better partner in the fights against drug trafficking, crime, terrorism, infectious diseases and environmental degradation. An economically dynamic Africa will be possible only when Africa is fully integrated into the global economy. Further integrating Africa into the global economy will also directly serve U.S. interests by continuing to expand an already important new market for U.S. exports. The more than 700 million people of sub-Saharan Africa represent one of the world's largest basically untapped markets. Although the United States enjoys only a seven-percent market share in Africa, already 100,000 American jobs depend on our exports there. Increasing both the U.S. market share and the size of the African market will bring tangible benefits to U.S. workers and increase prosperity and economic opportunity in Africa. Our aim, therefore, is to assist African nations to implement economic reforms, create favorable climates for trade and investment, and achieve sustainable development.

To support the economic transformation underway in Africa, the President in June 1997 launched the Partnership for Economic Growth and Opportunity in Africa Initiative. The Administration has implemented many of the Initiative's objectives, and continues to work closely with Congress to implement remaining key elements of this initiative through rapid passage of the African Growth and Opportunity Act. By significantly broadening market access and spurring growth in Africa, this bill will better enable us to help African nations undertake difficult economic reforms and build better lives for their people through sustainable growth and development. At the same time, we are working with African governments on shared interests in the world trading system, such as developing electronic commerce, improving WTO's capacity-building functions, and eliminating agricultural export subsidies. We also are pursuing complementary initiatives to encourage U.S. trade with and investment in Africa, including targeted technical assistance, enhanced bilateral and multilateral debt forgiveness, and increased bilateral trade ties. To further our trade objectives in Africa, the Ron Brown Commercial Center was established in Johannesburg, South Africa in 1998.

The Center provides support for American companies looking to enter or expand into the sub-Saharan African market, promotes U.S. exports through a range of support programs, and facilitates business contacts and partnerships between African and American businesses. The historic trip of the President to Africa in March 1998, and the unprecedented U.S.-Africa Ministerial - with participation of nine members of the Cabinet and the President in a three day conference with over 80 African ministers - have built on this foundation and further solidified our partnership with African nations across a range of security, economic and political issues.

Helping Africans generate the food and income necessary to feed themselves is critical for promoting sustainable growth and development.

Despite some recent progress, the percentage of malnourished people and lack of diversified sustainable agricultural production in Africa is the highest of any region in the world and more U.S. help is greatly needed. In 1998 we launched the Africa Food Security Initiative, a 10-year U.S. Agency for International Development-led effort to help improve agricultural productivity, research, expand income-generating projects, and address nutritional needs for the rural poor.

Africa is, however, locked in battle with endemic diseases, such as malaria and tuberculosis, which sap economic productivity and development. Worse, the epidemic of HIV/AIDS is ravaging the continent, reversing hard won progress on development, reducing life expectancy, and decreasing GDPs in the hardest-hit nations. The Administration has made the battle against AIDS a priority for international action and investment in Africa.

Promoting Democracy

In Africa

as elsewhere, democracies have proved more peaceful, stable and reliable partners with which we can work and are more likely to pursue sound economic policies. We will continue to work to sustain the important progress Africans have achieved to date and to broaden the growing circle of African democracies.

The

restoration of civilian democratic government in Nigeria can help return that country to its place as a leader in Africa. Over the past year, the government and people of Nigeria have succeeded in restoring democratic civilian government, have freed political prisoners, have lifted onerous restrictions on labor unions, and have taken steps to restore the authority of the judicial system. Nigerias new civilian government has taken sweeping steps to ensure that the military remains in the barracks and that fighting corruption will be a top priority of all officials. The peaceful elections in February 1999 and inauguration of the new civilian government in May 1999 were important steps in this transformation. But, as in any democratic transition, Nigerias new government will face enormous challenges: creating accountable government, building support within the military for civilian rule, protecting human rights, and rebuilding the economy so it benefits all citizens. President Clinton met with Nigerian President-elect Olusegun Obasanjo in March and has spoken with him several times since to underscore our commitment to continue to work on these and other challenges and opportunities that face Nigeria. Thirteen agencies are working in concert to ensure a well-coordinated and robust program of assistance and partnership

with Nigeria on security, economic, political and social issues.

Through the G

reat Lakes Justice Initiative, the United States is helping to end the cycle of violence and impunity in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Burundi, and to support judicial systems that are impartial, credible, effective and inclusive. In addition, we will work with our allies to find an effective formula for promoting stability, democracy and respect for human rights in the Democratic Republic of Congo so that it and a democratic Nigeria can become the regional centers for economic growth, and democratic empowerment that they can and should be. In order to help post-apartheid South Africa achieve its economic, political, democratic and security goals for all its citizens, we will continue to provide substantial bilateral assistance, vigorously promote U.S. trade and investment, and pursue close cooperation and support for our mutual interests.

Ultimately, the prosperity and security of Africa depends on African leadership, strong national institutions and sub-regional organizations, and extensive political and economic reform. It is in the U.S. interest to support and promote such national reforms and the evolution of regional arrangements that build transparency and collective capability among African states.

□IV. Conclusions

Today, on the brink of the twenty-first century, we are building new frameworks, partnerships and institutions -- and adapting existing ones -- to strengthen Americas security and prosperity. We are working to construct new cooperative security arrangements, rid the world of weapons of mass destruction, build a truly global economy, promote democratic values and economic reform, and rid the world of ethnic cleansing and genocide. Because diplomatic and military responses alone may not deter threats to our national security from non-state actors such as criminals and terrorist groups, we must promote increased cooperation among law enforcement officials and improved methods for dealing with international crime and terrorism. Ours is a moment of historic opportunity to create a safer, more democratic, and more prosperous tomorrow -- to make a difference in the lives of our citizens.

This promising state of affairs did not just happen, and there is no guarantee that it will endure. The contemporary era was forged by steadfast American leadership over the last half century -- through efforts such as the Marshall Plan, NATO, the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The clear dangers of the past made the need for national security commitments and expenditures obvious to the American people. Today, the task of mobilizing public support for national security priorities is more complicated. The complex array of unique dangers, opportunities and responsi

bilities outlined in this strategy are not always readily apparent as we go about our daily lives focused on immediate concerns. Yet, in a more integrated and interdependent world, we must remain actively engaged in world affairs to successfully advance our national interests. To be secure and prosperous, America must continue to lead.

Our international leadership focuses on President Clinton's strategic priorities: to foster regional efforts led by the community of democratic nations to promote peace and prosperity in key regions of the world, to create more jobs and opportunities for Americans through a more open and competitive trading system that also benefits others around the world, to increase cooperation in confronting new security threats that defy borders and unilateral solutions, and to strengthen the intelligence, military, diplomatic and law enforcement tools necessary to meet these challenges. Our international leadership is ultimately founded upon the power of our democratic ideals and values. The spread of democracy supports American values and enhances our security and prosperity. The United States will continue to support the trend toward democracy and free markets by remaining actively engaged in the world.

Our engagement abroad requires the active, sustained support of the American people and the bipartisan support of the U.S. Congress. This Administration remains committed to explaining our security interests, objectives and priorities to the nation and seeking the broadest possible public and congressional support for our security programs and investments. We will continue to exercise our leadership in the world in a manner that reflects our national values, promotes prosperity and protects the security of this great nation.

PAGE 64

DRAFT

PAGE

PAGE 2

EFYZ+G[{ \$' \$b& () □.
.Z0{0s0t09999FFGI IIII7N8N]N^NO40S5CJ\$OJQJ□CJ\$OJQJB*OJQJ50

JQJ560JQJ□CJOJQJ5CJOJQJH*OJQJ5CJ OJQJ□CJ OJQJ60JQJ□CJ (OJQJOJQJ□CJ4OJQJ?

EFZ [DE

&Fh

h EFZ [DE

~\$\$ ((□.

.Z0[0t0u0J5K59999<<AADDFFGGIIIII7N8N^N_NOO5O6OSSSS@VAVYY\\\"#__EbFb_b`b
ee^i_iF

\~\$\$ ((□.

.Z0[0t0u0J5K59999<<AADD

&FF

!

&F

&F

&F

DDFFGGIIIII7N8N^N_NOO5O6OSSSS@VAVYY\\\"#__SSSS\\\"#__EbFb^b 1
llllgiqrjlopZ\`ab?@dede*+A\$%.&OJQJhnH 5CJ OJQJB*OJQJB*OJQJ□@OJQJ□CJOJQJH*OJQJB*
OJQJ5OJQJ□CJOJQJOJQJ5CJOJQJ□CJ OJQJB__EbFb_b`bee^i_i 1
llltouo2s3slwmw~_i 1
llltouo2s3slwmw~rsOPqrOPrsTU{|23efcd ?@=>opab?@efdeef*+AB\$%/0□crsOPqrOPrsTU{DC
\$E{|23efcd ?@=>oppab?@efdeef*
&□F*\$h
ODC\$E*+AB\$%/0&J*\$C\$
OE*\$
O*\$
O&'\$%

CD[\,-FG)~9:PQ|} %%%E)F)i)j)++..i5j5558888;;??AAAAAfEgE;H<H&K'KMM;P<PcPdPRRSS
UU#Z\$Z\\^^``bbcceehllpppuqu+xc&'\$%

CD[\,-FG)~9:PQ|} 1\$d

*\$

0

C[\E_-F9:PQ| !#\$\$%%F)i)i5j5555888899AADD;P<PcPgS
vSSTUU'Z*Z^`bchhnnpp"v>*OJQJhnH 5CJ OJQJ5OJQJhnH □CJ OJQJH*OJQJCJ OJQJhnH □@OJQ
JOJQJhnH 5CJOJQJB*OJQJOJQJ5OJQJ@ %%%E)F)i)j)++..i5j5558888;;??AAAAAfEgE;H<H&K
'KMM;P<PcPdPRRSSUU#Z\$Z\\^^``bbcceehllpppuqu+x,xPyQyfygy| | | :~;~s*\$"vvPyQyfygy
{ | | | | QrZ)rst+,RStuJv>?Ug+DE5@CJ OJQJ6OJQJ5OJQJ@CJ OJQJ5CJOJQJ□CJ OJQJ□@OJQJ□CJ
OJQJ5CJ OJQJOJQJB*OJQJC+x,xPyQyfygy| | | :~;~st+,RStu}z>?RSklrsJK&'=>ab.st+,RStud

\$`_>?hiDEjk}~, -CD\$

0*\$d_`>?hiDEjk}~, -CDSTvwJK~{xu_wx}^lm=>abVW%&
=>lmde.Ei}~
, -CD%:ST3IJK\Quvh5CJ OJQJ@CJ4OJQJ@CJOJQJ[CJ4OJQJ5@OJQJ[CJOJQJ5@CJOJQJ@CJ OJQJ5C
JOJQJ[CJ OJQJ@OJQJOJQJ5CJ\$OJQJ<DSTvwJK*\$uvFG`a

□□PQ.|yvggvjwjllnnqqlumubxcxs|t|s~t~□KMstyz^-uvFG`a*\$DEGLNk_`ast

x
STg"##&&+1246~78*:::q:::o=p@q@@@5CJ\$OJQJ5CJ OJQJB*OJQJhnH 5@CJ OJQJ5OJQJ5OJQJ5
@OJQJOJQJhnH B*OJQJH*OJQJOJQJ□@OJQJBa

□□PQ./ST""&&&+++*\$*\$

!*\$

h./ST""&&&+++//1144*:::?:@:p=q=p@q@@@AAAAWDXD3K4KNNT~{
xuC+D+. .44777788888;;???'(?KELEhGiGQJRJMmRnRRRdVeVYY\[__]bkb#e\$e,+//1144*:::?
:@:~p=q=p@q@@@AAAAWDXD3K4KNNTT|W*\$@AAA~CCC&DUDXD]D2K4KEKFKLL
NNNMPQ5STT:eJeHlI1^
lt_u`ufuguwx{ {
{ }f~rw\$2□bc□"\$!5CJ\$OJQJ55CJ OJQJ□CJ OJQJ@B*OJQJhnH 5@OJQJB*OJQJ5OJQJOJQJ5@CJ O
JQJ@CJ OJQJ□@OJQJBTT|W}WZZE_F_PbQb9e:eOhPh-j.jHlI1^1_loo_u`uww{(g~h~qr\$%ijbc}xu
PQ-.BC□OP45w x □□

\$%□

!!`\$a\$-|W}WZZE_F_PbQb9e:eOhPh-j.jHlI1^1_loo_u`uww{(g~h~*\$qr\$%ijbc□#\$DC\$E*\$

&□F*\$c□#\$[\]^12fg&'_`STrs"~{xu=>+, !deWXkl./FG-[\]^12fg&'_`*\$I\$[[]^r7D79C%!'&'^_
`ps|5CJ\$OJQJ@CJ OJQJ5@CJ OJQJ□CJ OJQJB*OJQJH*OJQJ@CJ OJQJhnH 6OJQJB*OJQJB*OJQJh
nH @B*OJQJ□CJOJQJ@CJOJQJ□@OJQJOJQJ□CJOJQJ5CJ OJQJ0`STrs"#k1XYde*\$STrs"#XYdeGH]b
Noc{|}~^c\$r\$t\$'&S'+--0//1D1□CJ4OJQJ5CJ4OJQJ□CJOJQJOJQJhnH 5CJ\$OJQJ5CJ OJQJ5@CJ
OJQJ5OJQJ5CJOJQJ□CJ OJQJOJQJ@CJ OJQJ□@OJQJ5@CJOJQJ5@OJQJ6"#k1XYdeCDGH]^NOcd{|^~
{xuzz~xyTU34
jkz{/0.CDGH]^NOcd{|^_*\$^_QR}~

{|vw""a\$b\$s\$t\$'++1/2/E1F1T1Z1[ldlelflnlolqlrlsl
tlulvl

J!JMM]Q^QTTTThViVYYa_b_````nbobddQlRlpppppttwwl_QR}~

{|vw""a\$b\$s\$t\$*\$

```

$(-*$t$''++1/2/E1F1R1S1T1Z1[ldlelflqlrlsltlulvlhh&`#$$&`#*$D1E1F1G1M1N1P1Q1T
1Y1[1\lb1c1d1f1g1m1n1o1p1q1lulv10JmH0J
j0JU5CJ OJQJmH jUOJQJ4 000P0&PP/ ="#$$%
[4@4NormalCJOJQJkHmH JJ Heading 1
$<5CJkHOJQJkH@@@ Heading 2*$#@&5CJ$OJQJ<A@<De
fault Paragraph Font, @,Footer

```

```

!&)&@Page NumberPoint1
&
F0>Th,@",Header

```

```

!,2,SubPoint
&(@A&Line Number:OR:p11$d
OJQJhnH ,Z@b,
Plain TextCJ6'@q6Comment ReferenceCJ00□Comment TextCJB@ Body TextC$EO:B*OJQJ22
Footnote TextCJ8&@8Footnote ReferenceH*2Q@2Body Text 3OJQJv-v-@□)+-,+)+ ,
-,□,
----,,-,-,-,-,+,, ,!,",#+$-%&,'()-*-+,-,-,+/-0-1,2,3+4,5,6,7,8+9-:++;+
<,>,>,"@G
#J1=EP]i&xf
e$1=KXdr@9{p,q9wFTbo|<(@_ c v-
'

```

```

c□y
sGE]& !!"#$$%&'(E)=*+y,-./012`34p5 6r78r9:;<=>? ---0S"vE@SD1v1D_{p*& AcsDa+
|W`_t$vl_i+x.Tc"^^v1

```

```

')0!4!!body2\w-\w-□□wGRTEyy22225;5LsRsxxxxz}!!!!!!#####% %!%$%%*%
-----!-"-%-F-Q-[-c-f-p-w-□□wGRTEyy22225;5LsRsxxxxz}F-Q-[-c-f-p-w-boucharjs\\majo
r\defense\Documents\BOUCHARD\NSSR\1999 NSSR\Draft 1999 NSSR\2 Second Draft\NSSR
99 Second Draft - Entered.docboucharj?C:\Temp\AutoRecovery save of NSSR 99 Sec
ond Draft - Entered.asdboucharjs\\major\defense\Documents\BOUCHARD\NSSR\1999 NS
SR\Draft 1999 NSSR\2 Second Draft\NSSR 99 Second Draft - Entered.docboucharj?C:
\Temp\AutoRecovery save of NSSR 99 Second Draft - Entered.asdboucharj?C:\Temp\A
utoRecovery save of NSSR 99 Second Draft - Entered.asdboucharj?C:\Temp\AutoReco
very save of NSSR 99 Second Draft - Entered.asdboucharjs\\major\defense\Documen
ts\BOUCHARD\NSSR\1999 NSSR\Draft 1999 NSSR\2 Second Draft\NSSR 99 Second Draft
- Entered.docboucharj?C:\Temp\AutoRecovery save of NSSR 99 Second Draft - Enter
ed.asdboucharjs\\major\defense\Documents\BOUCHARD\NSSR\1999 NSSR\Draft 1999 NSS
R\2 Second Draft\NSSR 99 Second Draft - Entered.docboucharjs\\major\defense\Doc
uments\BOUCHARD\NSSR\1999 NSSR\Draft 1999 NSSR\2 Second Draft\NSSR 99 Second Dr
aft - Entered.docFdA4 J

```

```

H#:V
n.QRH#|~H#n8 #^a"H#yi# (/o* cZw*H#L.A.@0H#?.1QT3 '43g4H#&4BUQt6H#J7 U 7 $7
=57}'#;#4C?PE@a DEH#1JFqG kSH@O =QW+YTNCVVE5Y$
\H#cJ+_d`y-cmcH#]5e Ae e$pf TfeAh^ ZhH#Uhi&iH#@k ]jn ~.nGq+q0WJrKr(s^vsx+tH#:#!

```

```

h~H#=w~*hhOJQJo(hhOJQJo(hhOJQJo(0o(.hhOJQJo(hhOJQJo( hhOJQJo(0o(.0o(.hhOJQJo(hh
OJQJo(0o(.hhOJQJo(hhOJQJo(hhOJQJo(0o(.hhOJQJo(0o(.hhOJQJo(hhOJQJo(hhOJQJo(0o(.4
HHCJ4o(.0o(.hhOJQJo(hhOJQJo(hhOJQJo(hhOJQJo(hhOJQJo(88o(.hhOJQJo(hhOJQJo(hhOJQJ
o(0o(.hhOJQJo(hhOJQJo(hhOJQJo(hhOJQJo(hhOJQJo(hhOJQJo(hhOJQJo(hhOJQJo(hhOJQJo(0
o(.hhOJQJo(hhOJQJo(hhOJQJo(0o(.hhOJQJo(hhOJQJo(hhOJQJo(hhOJQJo(hhOJQJo(hhOJQJo(
0o(.hhOJQJo(0o(.hh.hhOJQJo(hhOJQJo(hhOJQJo(hhOJQJo(hhOJQJo(hhOJQJo(hhOJQJo(@hhO
JQJo(0o(.0o(.hhOJQJo(F#=U 7)';'43TfVQ?.1Uhiy-clJF@Yn@kmc^ Zh&i
@0|~Qt6g4cZw*Ea"R:!h~$
\x+tE5Yd`#^eAha DOWJr:V
GqkSH(s(dA4]5eQT3n8/o* $7          =QL.A.NCVPE@=w~=57W+YTKrC?qGA
e]jncJ+_yi#J$pfJ7^vs~.ne+q&4@OLY@hhOJQJo(F#sssv-`@GTimes New Roman5Symbol3&Ari
al?5 Courier New"hg;f*); |u@W@0d8}_IboucharjboucharjOh+'0p
,[]8
DPX`hIss          boucharj oucNormal.dot boucharjt9ucMicrosoft Word 8.0@R@'*&@'@u.
+,D.+, ,[]hp|
[]NSCW81I[]Title 6>
_PID_GUIDAN{434194C8-6FC8-11D1-ABA8-006097731497}
[]
!"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNopqrstuvwxyz[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopq
rstuvwxyz{|}~
[]
!"#$%&'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMNopqrstuvwxyz[\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopq
rstuvwxyz{|}~Root Entry FP*&b'1Table7WordDocument6SummaryInformation(Docum
entSummaryInformation8CompObjjObjectPoolb'b'
FMicrosoft Word Document
MSWordDocWord.Document.89q===== END ATTACHMENT 1 =====

```

RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: Leanne A. Shimabukuro (CN=Leanne A. Shimabukuro/OU=OPD/O=EOP [OPD])

CREATION DATE/TIME: 9-NOV-1999 14:38:38.00

SUBJECT: Fact Sheet: The 21st Century Law Enforcement and Public Safety Act

TO: James R. Fallin (CN=James R. Fallin/OU=NSC/O=EOP@EOP [NSC])

READ:UNKNOWN

TEXT:

Press paper released on crime bill -- includes bioterrorism.
----- Forwarded by Leanne A. Shimabukuro/OPD/EOP on
11/09/99 02:38 PM -----

Jason H. Schechter
05/12/99 10:34:38 AM
Record Type: Record

To: See the distribution list at the bottom of this message
cc:
Subject: Fact Sheet: The 21st Century Law Enforcement and Public
Safety Act

The 21st Century Law Enforcement and Public Safety Act
May 12, 1999

Today, President Clinton will announce that his Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program has achieved an important milestone by helping communities to fund the hiring or redeployment of 100,000 police officers across the nation. Additionally, he will propose new legislation -- The 21st Century Law Enforcement and Public Safety Act -- that builds on the successful 1994 Crime Act, which has helped to cut the crime rate dramatically across the nation. This new legislation renews the Justice Department's COPS program and includes new provisions to reduce juvenile and drug crime, protect crime victims, and combat international crime and terrorism.

ú Helping fund 100,000 community-oriented police. President Clinton will announce grants of more than \$95 million for 526 communities to hire approximately 1,500 new police officers. With these new grants, the COPS office will have provided 11,300 cities with \$5.9 billion to help hire and redeploy more than 100,000 police officers across the country -- fulfilling the President's 1992 pledge to do so. More than half of these officers are already patrolling America's streets.

ú Building on what works. The President also will propose new legislation -- The 21st Century Law Enforcement and Public Safety Act -- that builds on the successful programs enacted as part of the 1994 Crime Act. The President's new legislation would:

- (1) Maintain our commitment to law enforcement by renewing the COPS program and providing funds to hire or redeploy between 30,000 and 50,000 more police, giving police the high-tech tools they need to do their job, and hiring more local prosecutors to target local crime problems.

(2) Punish and prevent youth crime and violence by giving prosecutors new tools to punish the most violent juveniles and curb witness intimidation by gang members, promoting swift and certain punishment for all juvenile offenders, and working to prevent at-risk youth from committing serious crimes in the first place.

(3) Break the cycle of drugs and crime by expanding drug courts, helping states and localities implement "zero tolerance" drug supervision programs that test, treat, and punish all drug offenders, and putting into place tough provisions on money laundering to help staunch the flow of illegal drug profits.

(4) Protect all crime victims by enhancing penalties for child abusers who kill and adults who commit violent crimes in the presence of a child; by providing new authorities for federal law enforcement to protect older Americans from illegal telemarketing, nursing home neglect and abuse, retirement rip-offs, and health care fraud; and by keeping up the fight against domestic violence.

(5) Combat international crime and terrorism by prohibiting certain possession and unsafe handling of biological agents and toxins, and making it more difficult for these agents to fall into the hands of terrorists.

KEEPING OUR COMMITMENT TO LAW ENFORCEMENT

ú Renewing the COPS program. The President's 21st Century Law Enforcement and Public Safety Act extends the COPS program and proposes spending \$1.3 billion annually to help communities continue to hire, redeploy, and retain police officers. It would also give law enforcement officers access to the latest crime-fighting technologies and target funds to engage the entire community in the fight against crime. Specifically, the bill provides:

- \$600 million for more police on the street. These funds would be used primarily to hire and redeploy between 30,000 and 50,000 more law enforcement officers over five years, with an effort to target new police officers to crime "hot spots." A portion of the funds also would be used to help economically distressed communities absorb the long-term costs of their new police hires and to fund programs to train, educate, and recruit police officers -- including efforts to train police officers in ethics and integrity and to promote minority recruitment.

- \$350 million for crime-fighting technologies. These funds would be used to help state and local enforcement agencies gain access to new technologies that will allow them to communicate more effectively, solve more crimes, and conduct comprehensive crime analysis. For instance, these funds could be used to: use computers and wireless communications to send data and images from a police department in one jurisdiction to a patrol car in the next; improve the state of the nation's overburdened and underfunded crime labs and make high-end laboratory technologies -- such as DNA analysis -- more widely available; and expand the use of crime mapping and other technologies that improve law enforcement's ability to analyze, predict, and respond to local crime trends and problems.

- \$200 million for community prosecutors and neighborhood district attorneys. As police and community residents have joined forces to fight crime on a proactive basis, communities also have turned to local prosecutors to play a more active role in community crime-fighting

efforts. These funds would help communities hire more prosecutors to target neighborhood crime problems.

- \$125 million for community-wide crime prevention. The President's new legislation specifically provides funds to engage the entire community in preventing and fighting crime. These funds could be used to: work with local school officials in adopting community-wide plans to prevent school violence; involve faith-based and other values-based organizations in juvenile crime prevention efforts; and establish citizens', police academies that teach neighborhood residents problem-solving skills.

ú Supporting Law Enforcement. The President's new crime legislation would also extend federal grants to help police departments purchase bullet-proof vests for their police officers and allow communities to use a portion of COPS funds to help current police officers pay for a college education or graduate school.

PUNISHING AND PREVENTING YOUTH CRIME AND VIOLENCE

ú Cracking down on gangs and violent youth. The 21st Century Law Enforcement and Public Safety Act incorporates key provisions of the Anti-Gang and Youth Violence Strategy announced by the President in 1997. It provides new tools to help federal prosecutors go after gang criminals and violent youth. Specifically, the bill will:

-- Give prosecutors the discretion to decide whether to try the most serious violent juveniles as adults, allowing prosecutors to treat appropriately the older and more serious offenders who may not be adequately punished in the juvenile justice system;

-- Expand law enforcement access to federal juvenile records by requiring that federal juvenile records involving gun offenses or other adult-type felonies be sent to the FBI and made available to all law enforcement officers in the same manner as adult records;

-- Make it easier to prosecute gang members and other violent criminals who attempt to intimidate or retaliate against witnesses; and

-- Authorize judges to hold gang members without bail pending trial if there is probable cause to believe they have been involved in criminal activity.

ú Provide swift, certain, and proportionate punishments for juvenile offenders. The President's legislation also authorizes new funds for states and localities to ensure swift, certain, and proportionate punishments whenever juvenile offenders violate the law -- sending the message that there are clear and certain consequences for breaking the rules. These grants could be used to fund:

- Graduated sanctions that hold youthful offenders accountable for every offense, and that escalate in intensity for repeat offenses;

- Teen courts or peer juries to promote zero-tolerance policies for misdemeanor offenses such as truancy, vandalism, and underage alcohol and tobacco use; and

- Restitution or victim mediation, which requires young offenders and their family members to meet face-to-face with the victims of their crimes and agree upon appropriate reparations, including restitution or community service.

ú Prevent serious juvenile crime in the first place. The President's bill authorizes \$95 million for comprehensive community-based prevention to target at-risk youth, including:

- Mentoring and after school programs to provide positive role models and responsible adult supervision for young people; and
- Anti-truancy initiatives to keep kids in school and off the streets, where they are more likely to become victims or perpetrators of crime.

BREAKING THE CYCLE OF DRUGS AND CRIME

ú Enforcing "zero tolerance" drug supervision. In 1997, more than three-quarters of the nation's prisoners reported past drug use, and one in six committed their crimes so they could purchase drugs. The 21st Century Law Enforcement and Public Safety Act addresses this problem by establishing a new \$100 million initiative to help states and localities systematically test, treat, and sanction drug-involved probationers, prisoners, and parolees. The bill also reauthorizes the successful drug court initiative established by the 1994 Crime Act and extends funding to provide intensive, long-term drug treatment to state prisoners with serious drug problems.

ú Enhancing drug penalties and enforcement. The President's bill contains targeted penalty increases for using kids to sell drugs and selling drugs on or near school property. It also grants the Attorney General emergency authority to reschedule certain controlled substances on a temporary basis.

ú Helping states fight drugs and crime. The President's bill extends the Violent Offender Incarceration/Truth-in-Sentencing prison grant program, while giving states additional flexibility to free up additional prison beds by seeking authorization to use up to 25 percent of previously awarded grant funds to implement graduated sanctions programs for non-violent offenders. Graduated sanction programs hold offenders accountable for every offense they commit, while escalating in intensity with repeat offenses. The bill also reauthorizes the Byrne block grant program, which funds statewide anti-drug plans and multi-jurisdictional drug enforcement task forces.

ú Cracking down on drug money laundering. Money laundering is a global problem, often involving international financial institutions and the smuggling of currency across borders. To continue the Administration's fight against international money laundering and drug crime, the President's bill would:

- Help stop the flow of cash drug proceeds by making it a federal crime to smuggle "bulk cash" (more than \$10,000 in currency) out of the United States and by cracking down on money transmitters who knowingly accept criminal proceeds from abroad or who fail to report large cash transactions;
- Hold foreign banks that violate our laws accountable by allowing federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over them;
- Thwart black market transactions by requiring persons who use drug proceeds to prove they did not know the money came from unlawful activity; and

-- Seize more illegal drug profits by doing more to confiscate the assets of criminals and encouraging more cooperation from foreign governments.

PROTECTING ALL CRIME VICTIMS

ú Establishing a new safety net for seniors. Falling violent and property crime rates mean our nation's seniors are safer, but these citizens remain threatened by telemarketing scams, retirement rip-offs, and abuse and neglect by caretakers. To help protect seniors from these crimes and punish the criminals who prey on elderly Americans, the President's bill would:

- Shut down fraudulent telemarketers by granting the Attorney General new authority to block and terminate telephone service to illegal telemarketers;
- Protect nursing home residents from abuse and neglect by giving federal prosecutors new tools to halt and punish nursing home operators who repeatedly abuse and neglect the residents in their care;
- Fight health care fraud and abuse by making it easier for the Justice Department to prosecute and punish illegal kickback schemes -- and harder for criminals to stick Medicare with the bills by declaring bankruptcy; and
- Safeguard retirement and pension plans by making it a federal crime to defraud employee pension benefit or retirement funds and increasing penalties for retirement plan managers who take bribes.

ú Protecting children exposed to violence. Each year millions of children and adolescents are victims of violent crime, and millions more witness serious violence or abuse. These children are more likely to go on to commit violent crimes themselves. The President's bill would make it easier for federal prosecutors to charge child abusers who kill with first degree murder and to bolster the prosecution of adults who commit violent crimes in front of children.

ú Continuing the fight against domestic violence. The historic Violence Against Women Act helped to strengthen law enforcement's response to violent crime committed against women. It helped promote comprehensive law enforcement strategies, encouraged pro-arrest policies for domestic violence crimes, and provided emergency shelter to women and children fleeing abusive situations. The President's bill extends these successful programs and also:

- Targets the illegal trafficking of women and children by giving federal prosecutors new tools to bring trafficking cases and increasing penalties for persons who transport women and children to the United States and coerce them to work in sweatshops and other forced labor; and
- Protects battered immigrant women and children by enabling them to file their own petitions for lawful status, without having to rely on abusive spouses.

COMBATING TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL CRIME

ú Keeping biological weapons out of the hands of terrorists. Biological weapons pose a serious threat to the United States,

particularly in the hands of terrorists or disaffected groups. The President's bill would help keep dangerous biological agents and toxins out of the wrong hands by:

- Barring unauthorized possession and transfer of harmful biological agents;
- Holding accountable persons who knowingly disregard public health and safety when handling deadly toxins;
- Making it a crime to perpetrate a hoax involving biological agents; and
 - Prohibiting violent felons and fugitives from possessing dangerous biological agents.

ú Implementing the President's International Crime Control Strategy. The President's bill includes key provisions from the International Crime Control Act he introduced last year, including measures to:

- Create a new federal criminal penalty for port-running, an evasion tactic employed by contraband smugglers passing through ports without stopping - that puts law enforcement and civilians at great risk;
- Strengthen our ability to intercept drug smuggling vessels by making it a criminal offense for failing to "heave to" a vessel at the direction of a Coast Guard or other federal law enforcement official seeking to board that vessel;
- Protect Americans abroad by strengthening our authority to investigate and prosecute organized crime groups who commit crimes against Americans abroad;
- Respond to emerging international crime problems by enhancing enforcement tools to combat international arms trafficking and requiring additional "end-use" verification of certain precursor chemicals used to manufacture illegal drugs; and
- Deny safe haven for international fugitives by excluding drug traffickers who attempt to enter the United States to avoid prosecution in another country.

###

Message Sent

To:

Christine A. Stanek/WHO/EOP@EOP
Lori E. Abrams/WHO/EOP@EOP
Anne M. Edwards/WHO/EOP@EOP
David E. Kalbaugh/WHO/EOP@EOP
Julie E. Mason/WHO/EOP@EOP
Cheryl D. Mills/WHO/EOP@EOP
G. Timothy Saunders/WHO/EOP@EOP
Laura D. Schwartz/WHO/EOP@EOP
Douglas B. Sosnik/WHO/EOP@EOP
Todd Stern/WHO/EOP@EOP
Barry J. Toiv/WHO/EOP@EOP
Michael Waldman/WHO/EOP@EOP

Dorian V. Weaver/WHO/EOP@EOP
Catherine T. Kitchen/WHO/EOP@EOP
Brenda M. Anders/WHO/EOP@EOP
Richard Socarides/WHO/EOP@EOP
Dag Vega/WHO/EOP@EOP
Barbara D. Woolley/WHO/EOP@EOP
Cynthia M. Jasso-Rotunno/WHO/EOP@EOP
Sara M. Latham/WHO/EOP@EOP
Andrew J. Mayock/WHO/EOP@EOP
Beverly J. Barnes/WHO/EOP@EOP
Megan C. Moloney/WHO/EOP@EOP
Laura S. Marcus/WHO/EOP@EOP
Virginia N. Rustique/WHO/EOP@EOP
Thomas D. Janenda/WHO/EOP@EOP
Brian D. Smith/WHO/EOP@EOP
Leanne A. Shimabukuro/OPD/EOP@EOP
Kim B. Widdess/WHO/EOP@EOP
1=US @ 2=WESTERN UNION @ 5=ATT.COM @ *ELN\62955104 @ MRX @ LNGTWY
62955104@eln.attmail.com @ inet
BARBUSCHAK_K@A1 @ CD @ LNGTWY
INFOMGT@A1 @ CD @ LNGTWY
JOHNSON_WC@A1 @ CD @ LNGTWY
SUNTUM_M@A1 @ CD @ LNGTWY
WOZNIAK_N@A1 @ CD @ LNGTWY
backup@wilson.ai.mit.edu @ inet
newsdesk@usnewswire.com @ inet
usia01@access.digex.com @ inet
usnwire@access.digex.com @ inet
GRAY_W@A1 @ CD @ LNGTWY
NAPLAN_S@A1 @ CD @ LNGTWY
WEINER_R@A1 @ CD @ LNGTWY
GRIBBEN_J@A1 @ CD @ LNGTWY
RILEY_R@A1 @ CD @ LNGTWY
tnewell@ostp.eop.gov @ INET @ LNGTWY
Elizabeth R. Newman/WHO/EOP@EOP
Jordan Tamagni/WHO/EOP@EOP
HEMMIG_M@A1 @ CD @ LNGTWY
Ashley L. Raines/OA/EOP@EOP
Peter A. Weissman/OPD/EOP@EOP
Douglas J. Band/WHO/EOP@EOP
Edwin R. Thomas III/WHO/EOP@EOP
Sherman A. Williams/WHO/EOP@EOP
William W. McCathran/WHO/EOP@EOP
Julia M. Payne/WHO/EOP@EOP
Robin J. Bachman/WHO/EOP@EOP
Nicole R. Rabner/WHO/EOP@EOP
June Shih/WHO/EOP@EOP
Brooks E. Scoville/WHO/EOP@EOP
Neera Tanden/WHO/EOP@EOP
Sarah S. Knight/WHO/EOP@EOP
Tracy F. Sisser/WHO/EOP@EOP
Woyneab M. Wondwossen/WHO/EOP@EOP
Judithanne V. Scourfield/WHO/EOP@EOP
Patrick E. Briggs/WHO/EOP@EOP
Debra S. Wood/WHO/EOP@EOP
Daniel W. Burkhardt/WHO/EOP@EOP
Maureen A. Hudson/WHO/EOP@EOP
Iana Dickey/WHO/EOP@EOP
Carmen B. Fowler/WHO/EOP@EOP
Lynn G. Cutler/WHO/EOP@EOP

Julianne B. Corbett/WHO/EOP@EOP
Walker F. Bass/WHO/EOP@EOP
Virginia Apuzzo/WHO/EOP@EOP
Michael V. Terrell/CEQ/EOP@EOP
Elliot J. Diringer/CEQ/EOP@EOP
Nanda Chitre/WHO/EOP@EOP
Melissa M. Murray/WHO/EOP@EOP
Lisa J. Levin/WHO/EOP@EOP
Phillip Caplan/WHO/EOP@EOP
Katharine Button/WHO/EOP@EOP
Douglas R. Matties/OA/EOP@EOP
Eli G. Attie/OVP@OVP
wh-outbox-distr@pub.pub.whitehouse.gov @ inet
Sean P. Maloney/WHO/EOP@EOP
Marsha Scott/WHO/EOP@EOP
Linda Ricci/OMB/EOP@EOP
Mark D. Neschis/WHO/EOP@EOP
Jeffrey A. Shesol/WHO/EOP@EOP
Heather M. Riley/WHO/EOP@EOP
McGavock D. Reed/OMB/EOP@EOP
Janelle E. Erickson/WHO/EOP@EOP
Delia A. Cohen/WHO/EOP@EOP
Maureen T. Shea/WHO/EOP@EOP
RUNDLET_P@A1 @ CD @ VAXGTWY
BUDIG_N@A1@CD@VAXGTWY
Fred DuVal/WHO/EOP@EOP
Pubs_Backup
William C. Haymes/OA/EOP@EOP
Jason H. Schechter/WHO/EOP@EOP
Sheyda Jahanbani/NSC/EOP@EOP
Marty J. Hoffmann/WHO/EOP@EOP
Dorinda A. Salcido/WHO/EOP@EOP
dmilbank@tnr.com
Julie B. Goldberg/WHO/EOP@EOP
Sarah E. Gegenheimer/WHO/EOP@EOP
kyle.mckinnon@kcrw.org
Thomas M. Rosshirt/OVP@OVP
Minyon Moore/WHO/EOP@EOP
Charles M. Brain/WHO/EOP@EOP
Dario J. Gomez/WHO/EOP@EOP
Carolyn T. Wu/WHO/EOP@EOP
Edward F. Hughes/WHO/EOP@EOP
Rajiv Y. Mody/WHO/EOP@EOP
Robin Leeds/WHO/EOP@EOP
Deborah B. Mohile/WHO/EOP@EOP
Sondra L. Seba/WHO/EOP@EOP
Tania I. Lopez/WHO/EOP@EOP
Maritza Rivera/WHO/EOP@EOP
Victoria A. Lynch/WHO/EOP@EOP
Jena V. Roscoe/WHO/EOP@EOP
Cheryl M. Carter/WHO/EOP@EOP
Jocelyn A. Bucaro/WHO/EOP@EOP
Kelley L. O'Dell/WHO/EOP@EOP
Jonathan M. Young/WHO/EOP@EOP
Jackson T. Dunn/WHO/EOP@EOP
Robert B. Johnson/WHO/EOP@EOP
Charles H. Cole/WHO/EOP@EOP
drosen@newsweek.com
Jennifer Ferguson/OMB/EOP@EOP
Joshua S. Gottheimer/WHO/EOP@EOP

Carrie A. Street/WHO/EOP@EOP
mhall@usatoday.com
spage@usatoday.com
bnichols@usatoday.com
Paul D. Glastris/WHO/EOP@EOP
Maria E. Soto/WHO/EOP@EOP
Alejandro G. Cabrera/OVP@OVP
Christopher K. Scully/WHO/EOP@EOP
JOHN.LONGBRAKE@MS01.DO.treas.sprint.com
kara.gerhardt@ost.dot.gov
Mindy E. Myers/WHO/EOP@EOP
meglynn@usia.gov @ INET @ LNGTWY
Larry.mcquillan@reuters.com
Deborin@aol.com
Jonathan A. Kaplan/OPD/EOP@EOP
Karen Tramontano/WHO/EOP@EOP
Skye S. Philbrick/WHO/EOP@EOP
Toby C. Graff/WHO/EOP@EOP
Samuel O. Spencer/WHO/EOP@EOP
Caroline R. Fredrickson/WHO/EOP@EOP
Matthew J. Bianco/WHO/EOP@EOP
Nancy.mathis@chron.com
Matt Gobush/NSC/EOP@EOP
James.gerstenzang@latimes.com
scott.barancik@americanbanker.com
IGCP@usia.gov
Evan Ryan/WHO/EOP@EOP
rsimoncol@aol.com
Brian S. Mason/OMB/EOP@EOP
Stacie Spector/WHO/EOP@EOP
Marty J. Hoffmann/WHO/EOP@EOP
Matthew W. Pitcher/WHO/EOP@EOP
David R. Goodfriend/WHO/EOP@EOP
photo@upi.com
kenneth.prewitt@ccMail.census.gov
Eli P. Joseph/WHO/EOP@EOP
Jeffrey M. Smith/OSTP/EOP@EOP
Neal Sharma/WHO/EOP@EOP
Jodi Enda <jenda @ krwashington.com>
Jeffrey L. Farrow/WHO/EOP@EOP
marhast@aol.com @ inet
mpena@efeamerica.com @ inet
mgarcia@pacific.org @ inet
info@elsoldetexas.com @ inet
durph@aol.com @ inet
Linda L. Moore/WHO/EOP@EOP
Orson C. Porter/WHO/EOP@EOP
Bridget T. Leininger/WHO/EOP@EOP
Craig Hughes/WHO/EOP@EOP
Simeona F. Pasquil/WHO/EOP@EOP
bob.davis@news.wsj.com
Victoria L. Valentine/WHO/EOP@EOP
Elena Kagan/OPD/EOP@EOP
jeanne.cummings@news.wsj.com
bob.davis@news.wsj.com
patricia.peart@MSNBC.COM
Jordan D. Matyas/OVP@OVP
Sean P. O'Shea/WHO/EOP@EOP
Abigail C. Smith/WHO/EOP@EOP
Veronica DeLaGarza/WHO/EOP@EOP

Clinton Presidential Records Automated Records Management System [EMAIL]

This is not a presidential record. This is used as an administrative marker by the William J. Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Hex Dump file is not in a recognizable format, has been incorrectly decoded or is damaged.

File Name: f_12154383_nsc.html

Attachment Number: [ATTACH.D42]ARMS258345122.336

RECORD TYPE: FEDERAL (NOTES MAIL)

CREATOR: Bennie C. Rogers (CN=Bennie C. Rogers/OU=OMB/O=EOP [OMB])

CREATION DATE/TIME:29-NOV-1999 14:28:27.00

SUBJECT: Comments are now due on LRM BCR40 - - LABOR Study on Wages, Benefits, Pove

TO: Katherine K. Wallman (CN=Katherine K. Wallman/OU=OMB/O=EOP@EOP [OMB])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Robin L. Lumsdaine (CN=Robin L. Lumsdaine/OU=CEA/O=EOP@EOP [CEA])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Melissa N. Benton (CN=Melissa N. Benton/OU=OMB/O=EOP@EOP [OMB])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Michael J. Brien (CN=Michael J. Brien/OU=CEA/O=EOP@EOP [CEA])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Michael Casella (CN=Michael Casella/OU=OMB/O=EOP@EOP [OMB])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Richard M. Samans (CN=Richard M. Samans/OU=OPD/O=EOP@EOP [OPD])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Richard B. Bavier (CN=Richard B. Bavier/OU=OMB/O=EOP@EOP [OMB])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Jack A. Smalligan (CN=Jack A. Smalligan/OU=OMB/O=EOP@EOP [OMB])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Charles F. Stone (CN=Charles F. Stone/OU=CEA/O=EOP@EOP [CEA])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Alejandra O. Ceja (CN=Alejandra O. Ceja/OU=OMB/O=EOP@EOP [OMB])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Randolph M. Lyon (CN=Randolph M. Lyon/OU=OMB/O=EOP@EOP [OMB])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Larry R. Matlack (CN=Larry R. Matlack/OU=OMB/O=EOP@EOP [OMB])
READ:UNKNOWN

TO: Sarah Rosen Wartell (CN=Sarah Rosen Wartell/OU=OPD/O=EOP@EOP [OPD])
READ:UNKNOWN

CC: Victoria J. Darnes (CN=Victoria J. Darnes/OU=NSC/O=EOP [NSC])
READ:UNKNOWN

CC: John W. Ficklin (CN=John W. Ficklin/OU=NSC/O=EOP [NSC])
READ:UNKNOWN

CC: llr@do.treas.gov (llr@do.treas.gov @ inet [UNKNOWN])
READ:UNKNOWN

CC: dol-sol-leg (dol-sol-leg @ dol.gov @ inet [UNKNOWN])
READ:UNKNOWN

CC: laffairs (laffairs @ ustr.gov @ inet [UNKNOWN])

READ:UNKNOWN

CC: rademachpr@state.gov (rademachpr@state.gov @ inet [UNKNOWN])
READ:UNKNOWN

CC: vince.ancell@usda.gov (vince.ancell@usda.gov @ inet [UNKNOWN])
READ:UNKNOWN

TEXT:

REMINDER: Comments were due on LRM BCR40, by 2:00 PM, today, Monday, November 29, 1999. Please send your comments to me ASAP.

----- Forwarded by Bennie C. Rogers/OMB/EOP on 11/29/99
09:25 AM -----

LRM ID: BCR40
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
Washington, D.C. 20503-0001

Wednesday, November 10, 1999

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer - See Distribution below
FROM: Janet R. Forsgren (for) Assistant Director for Legislative Reference
OMB CONTACT: Bennie C. Rogers PHONE: (202)395-7754 FAX: (202)395-6148
SUBJECT: LABOR Study on Wages, Benefits, Poverty Line, and Meeting Worker's Needs in the Apparel and Footwear Industries of Selected Countries.

DEADLINE: 2:00 PM Monday, November 29, 1999
In accordance with OMB Circular A-19, OMB requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President. Please advise us if this item will affect direct spending or receipts for purposes of the "Pay-As-You-Go" provisions of Title XIII of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.

COMMENTS: Labor's draft Wage Study is a by-product of the Apparel Industry Partnership agreement on the charter for the new Fair Labor Association (the anti-sweatshop monitoring organization created by 10 companies and selected human rights groups.) The charter called upon Labor to do a study within 6 months of wages, benefits, poverty, and meeting worker needs in the apparel and footwear industries in countries around the world.

PLEASE NOTE, IF WE HAVE NOT HEARD FROM YOU BY THE DEADLINE, WE WILL ASSUME THAT YOU HAVE NO OBJECTION.

DISTRIBUTION LIST

- AGENCIES:
52-HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES - Sondra S. Wallace - (202) 690-7760
7-AGRICULTURE - Marvin Shapiro - (202) 720-1516
110-Social Security Administration - Judy Chesser - (202) 358-6030
62-LABOR - Robert A. Shapiro - (202) 219-8201
114-STATE - Paul Rademacher - (202) 647-4463
118-TREASURY - Richard S. Carro - (202) 622-0650

25-COMMERCE - Michael A. Levitt - (202) 482-3151
128-US Trade Representative - Fred Montgomery - (202) 395-3475
83-National Security Council - Robert A. Bradtke - (202) 456-9221

EOP:

- Sarah Rosen Wartell
- Richard M. Samans
- Larry R. Matlack
- Michael Casella
- Randolph M. Lyon
- Michael J. Brien
- Alejandra O. Ceja
- Melissa N. Benton
- Charles F. Stone
- Robin L. Lumsdaine
- Jack A. Smalligan
- Katherine K. Wallman
- Richard B. Bavier

LRM ID: BCR40 SUBJECT: LABOR Study on Wages, Benefits, Poverty Line, and Meeting Worker's Needs in the Apparel and Footwear Industries of Selected Countries.
RESPONSE TO
LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL
MEMORANDUM

If your response to this request for views is short (e.g., concur/no comment), we prefer that you respond by e-mail or by faxing us this response sheet. If the response is short and you prefer to call, please call the branch-wide line shown below (NOT the analyst's line) to leave a message with a legislative assistant.

You may also respond by:

- (1) calling the analyst/attorney's direct line (you will be connected to voice mail if the analyst does not answer); or
- (2) sending us a memo or letter

Please include the LRM number shown above, and the subject shown below.

TO: Bennie C. Rogers Phone: 395-7754 Fax: 395-6148
Office of Management and Budget
Branch-Wide Line (to reach legislative assistant):
395-7362

FROM: _____ (Date)
 _____ (Name)
 _____ (Agency)
 _____ (Telephone)

The following is the response of our agency to your request for views on the above-captioned subject:

- _____ Concur
- _____ No Objection
- _____ No Comment

_____ See proposed edits on pages _____

_____ Other: _____

_____ FAX RETURN of _____ pages, attached to this response sheet