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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>SUBJECT/TITLE</th>
<th>DATE</th>
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<td>001. cable</td>
<td>re: Possible Yeltsin Letter on NATO (3 pages)</td>
<td>09/03/1993</td>
<td>P1/b(1) VZ 9/16/2019</td>
</tr>
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<td>09/03/1993</td>
<td>P1/b(1) VZ 9/16/2019</td>
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<td>re: Secretary Christopher's Meeting the President Yeltsin, 10/22/93, Moscow (6 pages)</td>
<td>10/25/1993</td>
<td>P1/b(1) VZ 9/16/2019</td>
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<td>004. cable</td>
<td>re: Draft Memo on President's Bilateral With Polish President Walesa, Premier Pawlak (9 pages)</td>
<td>01/12/1994</td>
<td>P1/b(1) VZ 9/16/2019</td>
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<tr>
<td>005. cable</td>
<td>re: Deputy Secretary's Meeting in Warsaw with President Walesa (5 pages)</td>
<td>04/18/1994</td>
<td>P1/b(1) VZ 9/16/2019</td>
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<td>006. cable</td>
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<td>05/13/1994</td>
<td>P1/b(1) VZ 9/16/2019</td>
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<td>re: Yeltsin's May 11-13 Visit to Germany: Kosyrev's Comments on PFP (4 pages)</td>
<td>05/26/1994</td>
<td>P1/b(1) VZ 9/16/2019</td>
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<td>008. cable</td>
<td>re: Foreign Minister Urges President Clinton to Focus on Polish Security During Visit (5 pages)</td>
<td>06/24/1994</td>
<td>P1/b(1) VZ 9/16/2019</td>
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<td>009. cable</td>
<td>re: Chancellor Kohl: NATO and EU Enlargement: The Future of Europe (4 pages)</td>
<td>09/10/1994</td>
<td>P1/b(1) VZ 9/16/2019</td>
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<td>11/02/1994</td>
<td>P1/b(1) VZ 9/16/2019</td>
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<td>re: Inter Agency Presentation on NATO Germany (3 pages)</td>
<td>11/03/1994</td>
<td>P1/b(1) VZ 9/16/2019</td>
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COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1993-Dec 1994
OA/Box Number: 505000

FOLDER TITLE:
[09/03/1993-11/03/1994]

RESISTION CODES

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisers, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Possible Yeltsin Letter on NATO

In a September 3 discussion with DCM, Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov drew upon a draft proposed letter from President Yeltsin to President Clinton and other Western leaders to clarify Russian views on NATO expansion and NATO’s role. Although not certain the letter would be sent, Mamedov suggested that the issue might, in any event, be raised by Foreign Minister Kozyrev with the Secretary in New York or Washington later this month. The letter calls for NATO, as it considers increasing its membership, also to reorient itself from a “bloc” designed to participate in an East-West confrontation to a collective security organization that will deal with the pan-European security concerns. It also calls for coordinating with Russia on NATO reforms and to seek to ensuring that NATO does not isolate Russia as it reaches out to the East. End summary.

In a September 3 meeting with DCM, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov brought up the subject of the Czech and Polish interest in “joining” NATO and...
RUSSIA'S VIEWS ON THIS. MAMEDOV, DRAWING FROM A DRAFT TEXT WHICH BORE YELTSIN'S SIGNATURE BLOCK, INDICATED THAT THE NATO ISSUE IS COMPLEX AND SENSITIVE. HE URGED THAT THE DRAFT LETTER'S CONTENT NOT BE WIDELY CIRCULATED AS IT MIGHT NOT REFLECT THE FINAL VERSION ULTIMATELY SIGNED BY YELTSIN -- IF, INDEED, SUCH A LETTER IS EVEN SENT. MAMEDOV SAID HE WAS PREVIEWING THE THEMES IN THE LETTER WITH DCM BECAUSE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF U.S. LEADERSHIP IN TRANSFORMING NATO AND BECAUSE IT WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR THE U.S. AND RUSSIA TO KEEP IN CLOSE CONTACT ON THIS SENSITIVE ISSUE.

4. MAMEDOV'S ACCOUNT OF THE LETTER (WHICH WAS A MARKED-UP DRAFT AND WHICH HE DID NOT HAND OVER) FOLLOWS:

-- ON THE ONE HAND RUSSIA FULLY ACKNOWLEDGES THE RIGHT OF SOVEREIGN STATES OF THE FORMER WARSAW PACT TO DECIDE HOW THEY WILL ADDRESS THEIR OWN SECURITY NEEDS. THIS INCLUDES THE OPTION OF SUCH STATES TO SEEK TO JOIN THE ALLIANCE.

-- BUT NATO SHOULD NOT PROCEED AS IF NOTHING HAS HAPPENED TO THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP. NATO NEEDS TO DEAL WITH THE EASTERN EUROPEANS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, AND BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE U.S.

-- NATO MUST BEGIN TO ADDRESS EUROPEAN SECURITY IN THE BROADEST SENSE. IT MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE CHALLENGES THE WHOLE CONTINENT FACES FROM EMERGING FORCES (E.G., ETHNICITY/SUB-NATIONAL GROUPS), AND NOT SEEK TO PERPETUATE AS A BLOC HOLDOVER, THE EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION.

-- RUSSIA WANTS TO BE REASSURED THAT, AS IT BEGINS TO REFORM ITS STRUCTURE AND PURPOSE, NATO WILL TAKE INTO ACCOUNT RUSSIA'S CONCERNS. NATO SHOULD ALSO NOT SEEK TO ISOLATE RUSSIA FROM THE FORMER WARSAW PACT MEMBERS. RATHER, RUSSIA WANTS TO COOPERATE WITH NATO, AND IN PARTICULAR THE U.S., THROUGH APPROPRIATE CHANNELS SUCH AS THE NACC TO DEVELOP A NEW SECURITY DOCTRINE AND STRUCTURE FOR EUROPE.

4. MAMEDOV WENT ON TO NOTE THAT RUSSIA'S OWN VIEWS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY ARE EVOLVING. HE SAID THAT WHILE RUSSIA NO LONGER VIEWS NATO AS A THREAT, THERE IS SERIOUS CONCERN THAT RUSSIA IS LAGGING BEHIND THE

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NSC FOR LAKE/ITOH, USNATO FOR AMBASSADOR PROCESS. HE INDICATED THAT THIS SUBJECT MIGHT BE RAISED BY KOZYREV IN UPCOMING MEETINGS WITH THE SECRETARY IN WASHINGTON OR NEW YORK.

5. COMMENT: MAMEDOV'S DEMARCHE -- AND THE DRAFT YELTSIN LETTER -- ARE PART OF A BROADER EFFORT WITHIN THE GOR TO CLARIFY RUSSIAN VIEWS ON NATO. MFA ACTION OFFICERS WERE MAKING THEIR OWN PRESENTATION TO EMBOFF (SEPTEL) AT THE SAME TIME MAMEDOV WAS TALKING TO DCM. THE THEME AT THE WORKING LEVEL WAS THAT POLAND AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC ARE FREE TO ACT AS THEY THINK BEST, BUT NATO SHOULD AVOID HASTY ACTIONS THAT END TO ISOLATE RUSSIA. IN ADDITION, THE SEPTEMBER 3
Edition of the newspaper, "Nezavisimaya Gazeta," possibly not coincidentally, carries an op-ed piece on NATO's current soul-searching over its role in the post-Cold War era and notes many questions that NATO members want to see answered over costs and commitments to potential new members, including Poland and the Czech Republic. In addition to Kozyrev's likely raising of this subject with the Secretary, Washington may want to be prepared to address this issue at upcoming U.S.-Russian Pol-Mil talks, if the Russians raise it. End comment.

Pickering unquote Christopher
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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
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SSN: 1447
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TOR: 930903201526 M0588365
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DIST: PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG
SIT: BELL BLEICKEN BURNS FILE FRIED KUPCHAN SUM SUM2 WALKER WHSR_SPECIAL
WITKOWSKY
□
MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. IN MY FIRST MEETINGS YESTERDAY, THREE TOP GERMAN OFFICIALS, INCLUDING CHANCELLOR KOHL, DISASSOCIATED THEMSELVES FROM DEFENSE MINISTER RUHE'S VIEWS ON NATO'S FUTURE.
3. DURING A MEETING AND PRIVATE DINNER AT HIS HOME FOR FIVE VISITING U.S. GOVERNORS, KOHL MADE FOLLOWING STATEMENT, "AS I TOLD PRESIDENT CLINTON, NATO CAN EXCLUDE TAKING IN COUNTRIES OF EASTERN EUROPE. AT THE NATO SUMMIT IN JANUARY, WE MUST TALK OF RESTRUCTURING AND REORIENTING NATO. WE MUST TELL THESE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES THAT THEY CAN COUNT ON OUR SUPPORT, BUT NOT MEMBERSHIP, AND I BELIEVE THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND I SEE EYE-TO-EYE ON THIS MATTER."
4. KOHL'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, JOACHIM BITTERLICH, THEN TOLD ME THAT THIS COMMENT WAS DESIGNED TO SIGNAL THAT RUHE IS "ON HIS OWN ON THIS ONE."
5. IN AN EARLIER INTRODUCTORY MEETING, STATE SECRETARY DIETER KASTRUP (NUMBER 2 IN FOREIGN MINISTRY) ADDRESSED THE SAME ISSUES, NOTING THAT RUHE'S VIEWS DID NOT REPRESENT MAINSTREAM THINKING IN BONN AND DENYING THE IDEA THAT
Perhaps his original proposals had been launched as a trial balloon for the Chancellor. (Full account of Kastrup meeting is reported Septel.)

6. Although these three meetings (plus one with Werner Weidenfeld, Kohl's advisor on U.S. relations) were only preliminary, all concerned stated great interest in getting a better sense of USG position. Bitterlich looks forward to his trip to Washington later this month or early November, and is changing his schedule in order to see Frank Wisner in Berlin, if possible, on October 16.

HOLBROOKE
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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01
SSN: 7340
TOR: 930930151135 M0634673
DIST: PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG | SIT: BLEICKEN FILE HOLL KUPCHAN SUM2 VAX WALKER
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN, 10/22/93, MOSCOW

1. SECRET--ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: PRESIDENT YELTSIN OPENED THE OCTOBER 22 MEETING BY PROVIDING A BRIEF RUNDOWN ON THE EVENTS OF SEPTEMBER 21 AND OCTOBER 3-4, EXPRESSING SPECIAL APPRECIATION TO PRESIDENT CLINTON AND SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER FOR THEIR EARLY AND EXTREMELY SUPPORTIVE BACKING. HE REVIEWED THE ELECTORAL SCENE, NOTING THAT WORK HAD BEGUN BY POLITICAL PARTIES, THAT ELECTIONS WOULD BE HELD FOR THE PARLIAMENT, AND THAT A REFERENDUM WOULD TAKE PLACE ON THE CONSTITUTION BASED ON THE TEXT APPROVED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE EARLIER THIS YEAR. THIS WOULD MARK THE END OF THE SOVIET ERA AND THE INCORPORATION OF A TRUE DEMOCRATIC FUTURE FOR RUSSIA. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER CONVEYED PRESIDENT CLINTON'S HIGH APPRECIATION OF PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S ACTIONS DURING THE RECENT CRISIS AND PASSED ON HIS GOOD WISHES AND CONTINUING STRONG SUPPORT. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER ACCEPTED, ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT CLINTON, PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S INVITATION TO VISIT IN THE SECOND WEEK IN JANUARY. TURNING TO THE QUESTION OF NATO EXPANSION, SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER EXPLAINED THE U.S. APPROACH OF ESTABLISHING A PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE, AND STRESSED THAT THE APPROACH TO FUTURE NEW MEMBERSHIP IN THE ALLIANCE WAS INCLUSIVE AND NON-DISCRIMINATORY. PRESIDENT YELTSIN CALLED IT A BRILLIANT PROPOSAL, PLEDGED HIS FULL SUPPORT, AND THANKED PRESIDENT CLINTON FOR HIS LEADERSHIP ON THIS ISSUE WHICH COULD HAVE PROVED EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR RUSSIA TO HANDLE. END SUMMARY.
3. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER MET PRESIDENT YELTSIN AT
Zavidovo, outside Moscow, for 45 minutes on the afternoon of October 22. Yeltsin was accompanied by foreign minister Kozyrev, foreign affairs advisor Ryurikov, and presidential assistant Ilyushin. Secretary Christopher was accompanied by ambassador at large strobe Talbott and ambassador Pickering. Both sides had interpreters present.

4. President Yeltsin warmly greeted Secretary Christopher on the threshold of the meeting room and during the exchange of greetings, the secretary told President Yeltsin how much President Clinton admires all that he has done in recent weeks and particularly his firmness in pursuing such a steady course in the face of heavy difficulties. In return, President Yeltsin noted that President Clinton had pursued an equally steady course ever since he had come into the White House. He had been fully and rapidly supportive of President Yeltsin in very difficult circumstances and the president wanted President Clinton (his friend Bill, as he kept saying) to know how much he appreciated this.

5. At President Yeltsin's invitation, the party moved to the meeting table. President Yeltsin began the conversation by noting that he had received a message from President Clinton regarding the Secretary's visit in which President Clinton had asked him to receive the secretary. He noted that the message referred to a number of important questions for the two of them to discuss. He remarked that with the United States it is obvious that there are always questions to discuss together and he was ready to do so. He also indicated that he had his own list of questions which he would like to discuss and he hoped that Secretary Christopher would agree with this. The secretary said, of course, but he did not wish to prolong the meeting especially since he had intruded on President Yeltsin's stay at his country house. President Yeltsin said that one obvious question is the coming visit of President Clinton to Russia and some of the approaches that we take to that question. I would like to discuss with you, he said to the secretary, suggestions which we then could pass on together to President Clinton. We can have very interesting conversations with the two of us here together. We should discuss the schedule of the visit. President Clinton should come not just to Moscow but perhaps also to St. Petersburg. There is the question of an agenda as well. We can perhaps discuss the general question and agree on the major points and after that the ministry of foreign affairs and the department of state could begin to put together the detailed program and ideas for this very important visit. "You should know," President Yeltsin said, "that I have a very large interest in making this visit a full success. The people of Russia will welcome President Clinton with enthusiasm." We ourselves have been speaking to the media about President Clinton in order to convey to the people of
Russia a sense of the importance which the government attaches to this visit. We want him to appear natural and without any special embellishment. We want to give him full credit for what he has done in his short time in office.

6. President Yeltsin said he understood that the secretary had a good meeting with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. He said it was essential to brief the secretary on the actual situation in the country. Following the events in October, the country has calmed down appreciably. There is no longer the problem of dual authority. There is one government and it is vigorous from top to bottom and from federal center to the local areas. There are no strikes and no appreciable unrest in the country. There is no overt discontent and the crime rate is down for the first time in the last two years. This is particularly worth noting, he emphasized. There is now an active process to prepare an election, with the appointment of the central election commission and district commissions. Constituencies, for the first time, have been established and for the first time, political parties are forming on a realistic basis. This will be the first free and fair election for the parliament since 1917 and it marks a clear end of Soviet power.

7. Yeltsin said Russia is now beginning to exercise its democracy much as it is done in the United States and elsewhere and things are fully on track. The parties and the blocs are making their nominations. There will be 225 seats for representatives of the parties elected at large proportionately in the country. There will be 225 representatives of the territories elected in their districts. What has come as a surprise to us, President Yeltsin said, is the very large interest in the political parties in the elections. The parties are active and vigorous, while the fascist groups and parties have hunkered down. They are the ones to blame and they bear responsibility for the attempted military blackmail.

8. Moving on, President Yeltsin emphasized that he was also going ahead with the new constitution draft. He wanted a decision on its adoption in a referendum to accompany the election on December 12. The text will be the one approved by the constitutional conference which had been attended by representatives of many other groups. This draft will enshrine popular democracy in Russia and the vote will, of course, take place on it on December 12. Russia will then have a constitution up to the standards of the best Western democracies.

9. President Yeltsin also noted that as Russia continued to move ahead, it would be moving consistently with the parties to end the old totalitarian regime, with the power assigned to the Soviets, mocking the people, as he described it, since 1917. He emphasized, again, that Russia would be
ADOPTING A NEW DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION WHICH MET THE HIGHEST STANDARDS. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING, "IT ONLY REMAINS FOR US TO RE-BURY LENIN."

10. THE SECRETARY IN REPLY NOTED THAT JUST BEFORE HE LEFT HE HAD A GOOD MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON. THE PRESIDENT WANTED HIM SPECIFICALLY TO COVER THREE SUBJECTS AND HE WOULD DO SO QUICKLY IN ORDER NOT TO TAKE TOO MUCH TIME FROM THE PRESIDENT WHILE HE WAS RESTING AT HIS COUNTRY RESIDENCE.

11. THE SECRETARY SAID FIRST THAT HE WANTED TO BRING CONGRATULATIONS ON HOW PRESIDENT YELTSIN HAD HANDLED RECENT EVENTS. PRESIDENT CLINTON HAD FOLLOWED EVENTS CLOSELY AND PERSONALLY. HE WAS EXTREMELY INTERESTED IN PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S SUPERB HANDLING OF THE CRISIS AND ADMIRE THE RESTRAINT WHICH THE PRESIDENT HAD PRACTICED AFTER SEPTEMBER 21. HE JOINED IN REGRETTING THAT ACTION HAD TO BE TAKEN WHEN THE REVOLT LED TO VIOLENCE. BUT THE WAY YOU DID IT WAS THE LEAST THREATENING AND CAUSED THE LEAST LOSS OF LIFE. PRESIDENT YELTSIN RESPONDED WITH A THANK YOU.

12. CONTINUING, THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT ON SUNDAY, OCTOBER 3, THE PRESIDENT ALSO CLOSELY FOLLOWED EVENTS AND WANTED TO TELL PRESIDENT YELTSIN THAT WE IN WASHINGTON FELT THE SERIOUS NATURE OF THE CRISIS AND THAT OUR THOUGHTS WERE WITH YOU IN MOSCOW ALL DAY. WE WERE GREATLY RELIEVED WHEN YOU RE-ESTABLISHED CONTROL.

13. THE SECRETARY ALSO NOTED THAT WE FELT THAT FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR RYURIKOV HAD MADE AN IMPORTANT STATEMENT ON SUNDAY EVENING, MOSCOW TIME, WHICH ESTABLISHED CONFIDENCE IN THE WORLD OUTSIDE. PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN AND FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV HAD ALSO DONE SUPERB WORK AND IT WAS A HIGH COMPLIMENT TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S JUDGEMENT AND TASTE.

14. THE SECRETARY NOTED THE HOLDING OF THE FIRST COMPLETELY DEMOCRATIC PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN RUSSIA SINCE 1917 AND THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON WOULD LIKE TO OFFER TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN ANY WAY THAT WOULD BE USEFUL. THERE ARE ALREADY NUMBERS OF OUR EXPERTS HERE WHO COULD BE HELPFUL BUT WE WOULD LIKE TO ASSIST IN ANY WAY IN WHICH WE COULD DO SO.

15. PRESIDENT YELTSIN NOTED THAT HE HAD ALREADY EXTENDED INVITATIONS TO OBSERVERS FROM THE G-7, THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE AND THE CSCE. IT WOULD BE GOOD TO HAVE REPRESENTATIVES TO VISIT DIFFERENT REGIONS OF RUSSIA. THEY WOULD HELP TO SEE THAT THE ELECTION IS DIRECT AND FREE AND MEETS THE HIGHEST DEMOCRATIC STANDARDS. WITH RESPECT TO THE IDEA OF ASSISTANCE, THIS WAS A NEW OFFER AND HE WOULD LIKE TO THINK IT THROUGH AND TAKE IT UNDER ADVISEMENT AND WOULD BE RESPONDING. PRESIDENT YELTSIN NOTED THAT THEY HAD ALREADY SET UP AN INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE TO COORDINATE ASSISTANCE AND HELP FROM OTHER COUNTRIES, AS THE SOLE COORDINATING BODY. HE AGAIN THANKED SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER FOR THE OFFER OF ELECTION TECHNICAL AID AND WOULD GET BACK TO US WITH HIS THOUGHTS.

16. PRESIDENT YELTSIN NOTED THAT FOR THE PAST SEVENTY-FIVE YEARS ANY ELECTION IN RUSSIA HAD BEEN CONDUCTED THROUGH THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THESE WERE
NOT ELECTIONS WHICH WERE FAIR TO OTHERS. BUT THERE HAD, OF COURSE, BEEN FREE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND NOW THIS WAS THE FIRST PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION UNDER THE NEW RUSSIAN DEMOCRACY.

17. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER THEN TURNED TO HIS SECOND SUBJECT. HE SAID THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON WISHED TO CONFIRM HIS ACCEPTANCE OF THE INVITATION TO COME TO RUSSIA AND WOULD LIKE TO COME IN THE SECOND WEEK OF JANUARY AFTER THE NATO SUMMIT. WHILE IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL BE ABLE TO VISIT ANY RUSSIAN CITY BESIDES MOSCOW, SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER AGREED THAT ST. PETERSBURG SHOULD CERTAINLY BE CONSIDERED. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY MIGHT BE YEKATERINBURG, "YOUR HOME CITY AND A CITY IN WHICH THE U.S. MAY SOON BE OPENING A CONSULATE."

18. PRESIDENT YELTSIN REPLIED ENTHUSIASTICALLY, "THAT WOULD BE A GREAT HONOR FOR ME. WE WILL LOOK FORWARD TO THIS AND WILL WARMLY WELCOME PRESIDENT CLINTON."

19. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER THEN TURNED TO HIS THIRD SUBJECT WHICH HE NOTED WOULD BE MORE SUBSTANTIVE. HE SAID THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON PARTICULARLY WANTED HIM TO TALK WITH YOU ABOUT PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S RECENT LETTER ON NAC. WITH A GREAT DEAL OF CARE AND STUDY, PRESIDENT CLINTON DECIDED ON WHAT RECOMMENDATION TO MAKE TO THE NATO SUMMIT IN JANUARY. "IN THIS RESPECT YOUR LETTER CAME AT EXACTLY THE RIGHT TIME AND IT PLAYED A DECISIVE ROLE IN PRESIDENT CLINTON'S CONSIDERATION." THERE COULD BE NO RECOMMENDATION TO IGNORE OR EXCLUDE RUSSIA FROM FULL PARTICIPATION IN THE FUTURE SECURITY OF EUROPE. AS A RESULT OF OUR STUDY, A "PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE" WOULD BE RECOMMENDED TO THE NATO SUMMIT WHICH WOULD BE OPEN TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE NACC INCLUDING ALL EUROPEAN AND NIS STATES. THERE WOULD BE NO EFFORT TO EXCLUDE ANYONE AND THERE WOULD BE NO STEP TAKEN AT THIS TIME TO PUSH ANYONE AHEAD OF OTHERS.

20. PRESIDENT YELTSIN JUMPED IN AT THIS POINT AND ASKED IF HE UNDERSTOOD CORRECTLY THAT ALL COUNTRIES IN CEE AND THE NIS WOULD, THEREFORE, BE ON AN EQUAL FOOTING AND THERE WOULD BE A PARTNERSHIP AND NOT A MEMBERSHIP. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER REPLIED, "YES, THAT IS THE CASE, THERE WOULD NOT EVEN BE AN ASSOCIATE STATUS." YELTSIN REPLIED, "THIS IS A BRILLIANT IDEA, IT IS A STROKE OF GENIUS."

21. PRESIDENT YELTSIN THEN SAID THAT THIS SERVES TO DISSIPATE ALL OF THE TENSION WHICH WE NOW HAVE IN RUSSIA REGARDING EAST EUROPEAN STATES AND THEIR ASPIRATIONS WITH RESPECT TO NATO. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN AN ISSUE FOR RUSSIA PARTICULARLY IF IT LEFT US IN A SECOND CLASS STATUS. NOW, UNDER YOUR NEW IDEA WE ARE ALL EQUAL AND IT WILL ENSURE EQUAL PARTICIPATION ON THE BASIS OF PARTNERSHIP. IT IS AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION FROM THE UNITED STATES. THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES WILL BE LEADING THE EUROPEANS. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THERE IS AN IDEA OF PARTNERSHIP FOR ALL AND NOT NEW MEMBERSHIP FOR SOME. WAXING ENTHUSIASTIC, PRESIDENT YELTSIN SAID, "IT REALLY IS A GREAT IDEA, REALLY GREAT." HE SAID "TELL BILL I AM
THRILLED BY THIS BRILLIANT STROKE.

22. THE SECRETARY SAID, "WE WILL TELL HIM THAT YOU BOUGHT HIS RECOMMENDATION WITH REAL ENTHUSIASM." PRESIDENT YELTSIN REPLIED, "OF COURSE, YES, YES."

23. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER ADDED THAT WE WILL IN DUE COURSE BE LOOKING AT THE QUESTION OF MEMBERSHIP AS A LONGER TERM EVENTUALITY. THERE WILL BE AN EVOLUTION, BASED ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF A HABIT OF COOPERATION, BUT OVER TIME. AND THIS TOO WILL BE BASED ON PARTICIPATION IN THE PARTNERSHIP. THOSE WHO WISH TO CAN PURSUE THE IDEA OVER TIME, BUT THAT WILL COME LATER.

24. CONTINUING, SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER SAID, "I SENT THE IDEA OUT TO MY COLLEAGUES IN NATO BY CABLE LAST TUESDAY EVENING (OCTOBER 19). I AM GLAD TO TELL YOU, PRESIDENT YELTSIN, THAT IT HAS BEEN WELL RECEIVED IN NATO CAPITALS. I AM DELIGHTED WITH YOUR APPROVAL AND NOW I PREDICT WIDESPREAD ACCEPTANCE OF THE IDEA. THE PRESIDENT, IN PARTICULAR, WANTED ME TO DELIVER THIS MESSAGE TO YOU AND HE IS MOST GRATEFUL FOR YOUR HAVING RECEIVED ME HERE."

25. CONCLUDING, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE HAD GOOD TALKS WITH BOTH THE PRIME MINISTER AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER, AND THAT HE DID NOT WANT TO TAKE UP MORE TIME BUT WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO PRESIDENT YELTSIN IF THERE WERE ANYTHING FURTHER HE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS. HE REAFFIRMED THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON PUT GREAT WEIGHT ON THE RUSSIAN-AMERICAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO ALL HE COULD TO SUPPORT IT.

26. PRESIDENT YELTSIN SAID THAT HE HAD NOTED THAT, OF LATE, THE U.S. PRESS HAD BEEN SOUNDING "PESSIMISTIC NOTES" CONCERNING OUR ALLIANCE/PARTNERSHIP. HE, HOWEVER, WAS ABSOLUTELY CONVINCED THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON WAS NO PESSIONIST. HE HAD COMPLETE TRUST IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN PRESIDENT CLINTON. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT HE APPRECIATED IMMENSELY PRESIDENT CLINTON'S EARLY CONTINUING AND EXTREMELY GENEROUS SUPPORT AND THAT HE WANTED TO PASS ON HIS HIGHEST ESTEEM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

27. IN A SHORT CONVERSATION UPON LEAVING, PRESIDENT YELTSIN, ONCE AGAIN ASKED THAT HIS VERY GOOD WISHES BE PASSED ON TO PRESIDENT CLINTON.

CHRISTOPHER
BT
#7027
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SECT:  SECTION: 01 OF 01
SSN:  7027
TOR:  931025123023 M0681800
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PRT:  BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG
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S/S PASS PRESIDENT'S PARTY
FOR NSC/STAFF ONLY - ITOH, WALKER, REED ONLY
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (CLINTON, WILLIAM J.)
SUBJECT: DRAFT MEMCON - PRESIDENT'S BILATERAL
- WITH POLISH PRESIDENT WALESA,
- PREMIER PAWLAK

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. PRESIDENT CLINTON AND PARTY MET WITH POLISH PRESIDENT WALESA AND PREMIER PAWLAK ON JANUARY 12 IN PRAGUE. THE FORTY-FIVE MINUTE DISCUSSION COVERED U.S. AND POLISH VIEWS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY WITH THE PRESIDENT OUTLINING THE CONCEPTUAL UNDERPINNINGS OF THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE INITIATIVE AND NOTING SOME U.S. ECONOMIC INITIATIVES FOR CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE. THE PRESIDENT ACCEPTED WALESA'S INVITATION TO VISIT POLAND, SAYING HE PLANNED TO VISIT IN JULY, FOLLOWING THE G-7 SUMMIT IN ROME. WALESA STATED THAT THE PFP WOULD TURN OUT TO BE A GOOD CONCEPT AND AT THE CLOSE OF THE MEETING HE THANKED THE PRESIDENT FOR OFFERING THE INITIATIVE. NEVERTHELESS, WALESA EXPRESSED STRONG CONCERNS ABOUT RUSSIA AND CALLED FOR A RAPID "GEOGRAPHIC ENLARGEMENT OF THE WEST." END SUMMARY.

3. PRESIDENT CLINTON AND PARTY MET IN PRAGUE JANUARY 12 AT ABOUT 10:00 WITH POLISH PRESIDENT LECH WALESA AND PREMIER WALDEMAR PAWLAK IN PRAGUE. THE MEETING'S VENUE WAS THE RESIDENCE OF U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE CZECH REPUBLIC ADRIAN BASORA. ACCOMPANYING THE PRESIDENT WERE SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER, AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT, CHIEF OF STAFF MCLARTY, NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISOR LAKE, MR. GERGAN, UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE WINER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE OXMAN, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO POLAND NICHOLAS REY, DAN FRIED (NSC/STAFF, NOTETAKER) AND AN INTERPRETER. WITH WALESKA AND PAWLAK WERE FOREIGN MINISTER ANDRZEJ OLECHOWSKI, PRESIDENTIAL CHEF DE CABINET MIECZESLAW WACHOWSKI, PRESIDENTIAL POLITICAL SECRETARY ANDRZEJ ZAKRZEWSKI, MFA AMERICA DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR ZBIGNIEW LEWICKI, MFA EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR ANDRZEJ TOWPIK, AN MFA NOTETAKER AND AN INTERPRETER.

4. FOLLOWING GREETINGS AND AN EXCHANGE OF PLEASANTRIES, JOURNALISTS WERE ALLOWED IN FOR A POOL SPRAY AND QUESTIONS WERE SHOUTED. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ABOUT WHETHER THE PRESIDENT HAD ELICITED HIS SUPPORT FOR PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE (PFP), WALESKA RESPONDED THAT THE PRESIDENT DOUBTLESS WOULD OBTAIN HIS SUPPORT, ("HE HAS SO MANY WAYS TO DO SO."), RESPONDING TO A QUESTION ABOUT CRITERIA AND A TIMETABLE FOR NATO EXPANSION, THE PRESIDENT OBSERVED THAT THE U.S. DID NOT WANT TO TAKE STEPS AT THIS TIME THAT WOULD INDICATE WHICH COUNTRY WAS OUT AND WHICH WAS IMMEDIATELY IN. MOREOVER, THE PRESIDENT ADDED, ACHIEVING AGREEMENT AMONG 16 NATO MEMBERS AS TO A DETAILED LIST OF CRITERIA MIGHT WELL HAVE GENERATED A LIST OF CONDITIONS WHOSE EFFECT COULD HAVE BEEN TO PUT OFF MEMBERSHIP FOR A COUNTRY. JOURNALISTS THEN WERE ESCORTED FROM THE ROOM AND THE MEETING BEGAN.

PRESIDENT'S OPENING REMARKS

5. THE PRESIDENT PROPOSED OPENING THE MEETING WITH A DISCUSSION OF THE PFP AND NATO MEMBERSHIP. HE OBSERVED THAT HE WISHED TO RAISE ECONOMIC ISSUES AS WELL, NOTING THAT THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE (CEE) AND POLAND DEPENDED ON REFORMS SUCCEEDING ECONOMICALLY, MEANING AMONG OTHER THINGS THAT CITIZENS NEEDED TO BELIEVE THEIR WORK WOULD BE FAIRLY REWARDED.

6. THE PRESIDENT CONTINUED THAT HE HAD BEGUN CONSIDERING THE ISSUE OF NATO EXPANSION AND RELATED QUESTIONS FOLLOWING FORCEFUL ARGUMENTS FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP BY WALESKA AND OTHER CEE LEADERS AT THEIR MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON LAST APRIL. THE PRESIDENT BEGAN TO DISCUSS THE
ISSUE WITH OTHER NATO LEADERS AND THE PFP
CONCEPT RESULTED. SOME IN EUROPE REGARDED THE
PFP AS LITTLE MORE THAN A WEAK COMPROMISE
BETWEEN DOING NOTHING -- AN UNSATISFACTORY
OPTION -- AND IMMEDIATE NATO EXPANSION TO SOME
EASTERN COUNTRIES -- AN OPTION UNACCEPTABLE TO
ALMOST ALL NATO MEMBERS.
7. THE PRESIDENT SAW PFP IN A VERY DIFFERENT
CONTEXT. PFP REPRESENTED A WAY TO BUILD TOWARD
FULL NATO MEMBERSHIP BY DEVELOPING MILITARY
SECURITY RELATIONS WHICH IN TURN WOULD PREPARE
PARTICIPATING NATIONS FOR THE RESPONSIBILITIES
OF NATO MEMBERSHIP. PFP WAS ALSO A WAY TO SEND
AN IMMEDIATE AND CLEAR SIGNAL THAT THE SECURITY
OF POLAND AND INDEED ALL OF CEE WAS "VITAL"
(INTERPRETED IN POLISHMAS "VERY IMPORTANT") TO
THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE WEST
AS A WHOLE. PFP ALSO WAS A WAY TO AVOID
ELIMINATING COUNTRIES FROM THE POSSIBILITY OF
NATO MEMBERSHIP -- COUNTRIES THAT MIGHT BE
READY FOR MEMBERSHIP AT A FUTURE POINT IF THAT
ROAD WERE HELD OPEN. VERY IMPORTANT IN THE
PRESIDENT'S THINKING ABOUT PFP, HE CONTINUED,
WAS THE POINT THAT AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT AND CJCS
SHALIKASHVILLI MADE IN WARSAW -- THAT PFP
REPRESENTED A WAY TO AVOID DRAWING YET ANOTHER
LINE DIVIDING EUROPE.
8. RUSSIAN BEHAVIOR MAY MAKE IT NECESSARY TO
DRAW A LINE AT SOME POINT, THE PRESIDENT
CONTINUED. AND IN LIGHT OF ITS HISTORY, POLAND
COULD HARDLY BE BLAMED FOR BELIEVING THIS
SCENARIO WILL OCCUR. YET IT WAS IMPORTANT TO
TRY TO FIND A WAY TO MAKE THE BEST POSSIBLE
FUTURE A REALITY -- A FUTURE INCLUDING
DEMOCRATIC STATES ACROSS EUROPE THAT WOULD
RESPECT THE TERRITORIAL BORDERS OF OTHER
EUROPEAN STATES -- WHILE ALSO WORKING TO HELP
CEE COUNTRIES PROGRESS TO NATO MEMBERSHIP AND
SENDING A STRONG SIGNAL OF CEE'S IMPORTANCE TO
THE U.S. IF THESE HOPES WERE NOT MET, THE U.S.
AND NATO COULD DO "THE RIGHT THING" WITH
RESPECT TO CEE.
9. ANOTHER POINT, NOT SO PUBLIC, HAD

CONFIDENTIAL

S/S PASS PRESIDENT'S PARTY
FOR NSC/STAFF ONLY - ITOH, WALKER, REED ONLY
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OVIP (CLINTON, WILLIAM J.)
SUBJECT: DRAFT MEMCON - PRESIDENT'S BILATERAL
- WITH POLISH PRESIDENT WALESA,
- PREMIER PAWLAK
INFLUENCED U.S. THINKING ABOUT THE PFP: IT WAS
IMPORTANT NOT TO TAKE STEPS THAT WOULD PUSH
NON-RUSSIAN FSU STATES BACK TO A RUSSIAN
ORBIT. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO SUPPORT THE
BUILDING OF INDEPENDENT FSU STATES EITHER AS A
BUFFER AGAINST THE WORST OR AS A SOURCE OF
CONSTRUCTIVE PRESSURE IN SUPPORT OF THE BEST.

10. THE PFP WAS A MEANS TO DO THOSE THINGS.
THE U.S. WAS SENSITIVE TO THE POLISH CONVICTION
ABOUT THE INEVITABLE COURSE OF EVENTS IN RUSSIA
AND WAS DETERMINED TO MAKE THE PFP A REAL,
FUNCTIONING INSTRUMENT VERY QUICKLY. BEFORE HE
LEFT NATO, THE PRESIDENT CONTINUED, HE HAD
ASKED NATO SECRETARY GENERAL WOERNER TO
INSTRUCT SACEUR CHIEF GENERAL JOULWAN TO
DEVELOP QUICKLY PLANS FOR JOINT EXERCISES UNDER
PFP. THE PLAN WAS TO BE IN TOUCH WITHIN A FEW
WEEKS WITH STATES WHO INDICATED INTEREST IN
JOINING THE PARTNERSHIP. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO
MOVE IMMEDIATELY AND THE PRESIDENT URGED THE
POLES TO NOTIFY HIM IF THEY BELIEVED MOVEMENT
IN IMPLEMENTING PFP WAS NOT TAKING PLACE
RAPIDLY. IN SHORT, THE PRESIDENT CONCLUDED,
PFP WAS A DOOR TO FULL NATO MEMBERSHIP, NOT A
FENCE NO ONE COULD CLIMB.

WALESA'S OPENING REMARKS

11. WALESA THANKED CLINTON FOR GIVING HIM THE
FLOOR. HE TOO RECALLED THEIR APRIL MEETING,
OBSERVING THAT HE HAD THEN NOTED THAT THE TASKS
FACED BY U.S. PRESIDENTS WERE ENORMOUS, WITH
GREAT RESPONSIBILITIES AT EACH TURN. IT SEEMED
TO WALESA THAT THE PFP WOULD TURN OUT TO BE A
GOOD CONCEPT, BUT POLAND'S EXPERIENCES WERE
DIFFERENT FROM THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES AND
WALESA HAD A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE ON THE
PROBLEM. POLAND HAD LEARNED THAT OPPORTUNITIES
SHOULD BE ACTED UPON AT ONCE, LEST THEY VANISH
FOR MANY YEARS. WALESA SAID HE LIKED TO USE A
IMPRECISE BUT TELLING PHRASE: GUARANTEES DO
NOT CREATE FACTS, FACTS CREATE GUARANTEES.

12. WALESA SAID THIS MEANT THAT TO GAIN REAL
SECURITY, POLAND SOUGHT NOT NOMINAL GUARANTEES
BUT REAL FACTS -- I.E., THE FACT OF GEOGRAPHIC
ENLARGEMENT OF THE WEST TO INCLUDE POLAND. THE
WEST RESPONDED THAT POLAND WAS NOT READY; THAT
THE OBLIGATIONS OF NATO MEMBERSHIP WERE BEYOND
BOTH POLAND'S MEANS AND THE MEANS OF NATO
ALLIES THAT WOULD HAVE TO EXTEND SECURITY
GUARANTEES. BUT SURELY WHEN IMMEDIATE FEAR
RECEDES, AS IT HAD IN TODAY'S EUROPE, THE NEED
FOR LARGE, ADDITIONAL MILITARY EXPENDITURES
RECEDES WITH IT.

13. THE U.S. FACED ENORMOUS, WORLD-WIDE
DEMANDS, WALESA CONTINUED; EVERYONE LOOKED TO
THE U.S. TO SOLVE THEIR PROBLEMS AND IT WAS
IMPORTANT NOT TO DEMAND TOO MUCH OF THE U.S.
ITS FRIENDS MUST DO EVERYTHING TO KEEP THE U.S.
STRONG. POLAND WOULD NOT BLOCK ANY U.S.
TAGS: OVIP (CLINTON, WILLIAM J.)
SUBJECT: DRAFT MEMCON - PRESIDENT'S BILATERAL
- WITH POLISH PRESIDENT WALESA,
- PREMIER PAWLAK

INITIATIVES.
14. NEVERTHELESS, THERE WAS A REAL CHANCE TO
ENLARGE EUROPE. RUSSIAN GENERALS FEARED THIS
PROCESS TERRIBLY AND SPOKE IN THREATENING TONES
TO POLAND ABOUT IT; IF THIS WAS THEIR ATTITUDE
NOW, ONE COULD ONLY IMAGINE WHAT IT COULD BE
WHEN THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY HAD GAINED STRENGTH.
RUSSIA BASES ITS POLICIES ONLY UPON FACTS AND
NOT UPON PAPER. IN WARSAW LAST SUMMER, YELTSIN
HAD MADE A SOLEMN BUT PAPER PROMISE NOT TO
BLOCK POLISH ENTRY INTO NATO, BUT HE HAD
CHANGED HIS MIND. THE WEST HAD WON A GREAT
VICTORY BUT ONLY A CHANGE IN THE POLITICAL
GEOGRAPHY OF EUROPE COULD SECURE THIS VICTORY.
AND ONLY THROUGH SUCH A VICTORY COULD EUROPE'S
CURRENT UNCERTAINTY BE REMOVED.
15. POLAND WAS NOT ANTI-RUSSIAN; INDEED,
POLAND BELIEVED THE WEST AND CENTRAL EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES SHOULD ASSIST RUSSIA. HELP FOR
RUSSIA COULD GO TOGETHER WITH THE ENLARGEMENT
OF EUROPE AND WOULD BENEFIT ALL SIDES. IT
WILL REDUCE UNCERTAINTY WITHIN THE VISEGRAD
GROUP (POLAND, HUNGARY, SLOVAKIA AND THE CZECH
REPUBLIC), AND REMOVE ONE OF THE BARRIERS TO
FOREIGN INVESTMENT. RUSSIA COULD AND SHOULD
CEASE THINKING IN CATEGORIES OF ENEMIES. CEE
WOULD GAIN THROUGH GREATER COMMERCIAL
OPPORTUNITIES OFFERED BY A MORE HEALTHY
RUSSIA. THE WEST NEED NOT FEAR THEIR MARKETS
WOULD BE FLOODED. YET CEE WAS TOO WEAK TO MAKE
A DIFFERENCE TO RUSSIA BY ITSELF. IT NEEDED
OUTSIDE SUPPORT.
PRESIDENT CLINTON'S REJOINER

16. ECONOMIC SUPPORT. THE PRESIDENT OBSERVED
THAT HE DID NOT DISAGREE WITH MUCH OF WHAT
WALESA HAD JUST SAID. HE BELIEVED STRONGLY
THAT POLAND AND EASTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE
SHOULD BE INTEGRATED WITH THE WEST. THIS
APPLIED ACROSS THE FULL AGENDA. WHILE IN
BRUSSELS EARLIER IN THE WEEK, THE PRESIDENT HAD
MET WITH U.S. BUSINESSMEN, TELLING THEM THAT
PPP WAS REAL AND WILL LEAD TO NATO MEMBERSHIP;
THAT CEE IS IMPORTANT TO U.S. SECURITY; AND
THAT U.S. BUSINESS SHOULD INVEST MORE IN THE
REGION.
17. THE USG WAS PLANNING TO INTENSIFY ITS OWN
EFFORTS IN SUPPORT OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN
THE REGION. THE U.S. WOULD HOLD A CONFERENCE
IN 1994 ON TRADE AND INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES
IN CEE. THE USG WAS ALSO EXPANDING OPIC
PROGRAMS TO FACILITATE MORE INVESTMENT.
FINALLY, THE PRESIDENT OBSERVED THAT HE HAD
STRESSED TO LEADERS OF THE EU WITH WHOM HE HAD
MET ON JANUARY 11 THAT WESTERN EUROPE AND THE U.S. SHOULD WORK ON WAYS TO INCREASE PURCHASES OF CEE EXPORTS AND TO LOWER TRADE BARRIERS. THE U.S. STRONGLY SUPPORTED WHAT POLAND HAD ALREADY ACHIEVED THROUGH ITS ECONOMIC REFORMS.


RUSSIA

19. IN RESPONSE TO FM OLECHOWSKI'S QUESTION ABOUT U.S. ASSESSMENTS OF RUSSIA, THE PRESIDENT ANSWERED THAT WHEN RUSSIA WITHDREW ITS FORCES FROM CEE AND LITHUANIA, HE HAD HOPE. OTHER ISSUES OF RUSSIA'S RELATIONS WITH ITS IMMEDIATE (NEAR ABROAD) NEIGHBORS RAISED MORE DIFFICULT QUESTIONS. THE VOTE FOR ZHIRINOVSKIY WAS SYMPTOMATIC OF RUSSIA INTERNAL DEBATE IN PROGRESS; NOT ALL THE ZHIRINOVSKIY VOTERS ACCEPTED HIS "CRAZY" IDEAS, BUT RUSSIA WAS INDEED INVOLVED IN AN INTERNAL POLITICAL BATTLE OF HISTORIC PROPORTIONS.

20. IT WAS SIMPLY NOT CLEAR HOW THIS HISTORIC PROCESS IN RUSSIA WOULD TURN OUT, THE PRESIDENT CONTINUED. IF RUSSIA DEFINED ITSELF IN TERMS OF PAST CATEGORIES AND HABITS, THE U.S. AND WEST WOULD ACT AS FAST AS POSSIBLE TO CONSOLIDATE GAINS AND MOVE EAST. BUT IF RUSSIA DECIDED TO PLACE ITS TRUST IN THE FUTURE -- BASING ITS NATIONAL VALUES ON TOLERANCE AND GENUINE HUMAN POTENTIAL RATHER THAN CRUSHING
STRENGTH -- THE PICTURE WOULD LOOK DIFFERENT.
21. WALESA AGREED THAT THE OUTCOME OF RUSSIA'S CURRENT TURMOIL WAS UNCLEAR. EVERY SECOND RUSSIAN THOUGHT LIKE ZHIRINOVSKY BUT NEVERTHELESS POLAND WANTED TO HELP. RUSSIA SHOULD BE HELPED, AND ONE WAY TO HELP RUSSIA WOULD BE TO HELP OTHERS -- SUCH AS CEE'S -- WHO COULD USE THEIR PROXIMITY TO RUSSIA AND KNOWLEDGE OF RUSSIAN MARKETS AND HABITS TO PROMOTE TRADE, INVESTMENT AND REFORM. ALL THIS WOULD HELP BRING RUSSIA "IN OUR DIRECTION." ALL EUROPE WOULD BENEFIT. RUSSIA WAS NO THREAT TO POLAND NOW, BUT THE FUTURE WAS ANOTHER THING. THE WEST SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT IF RUSSIA ENDANGERED POLAND, ALL EUROPE WOULD BE

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22. THE SOLUTION TO PUTTING TOGETHER A BROADENED EUROPEAN SECURITY MIGHT BE PRIMARILY THROUGH COOPERATION WITH EUROPE, WALESA CONTINUED. AMERICA HAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR SO MUCH AND SO MANY DEMANDS WERE PLACED UPON IT. STILL, EUROPE TOO DID NOT SEEM INCLINED TO THINK IN THE BIG CATEGORIES THE SITUATION REQUIRED. BOLD STEPS WERE NEEDED. PERHAPS CEE COULD MAKE THE TRANSITION TO ECONOMIC REFORM AND DEMOCRACY BASICALLY ON ITS OWN BUT RUSSIA COULD NOT; IT NEEDED HELP BUT EUROPE KEPT ITS DISTANCE; IT DID NOT SEEM TO HAVE A VISION.

PREMIER PAWLAK ON ECONOMICS

23. PAWLAK RAISED TRADE ISSUES. HE SAID THAT THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE NEEDED AN ECONOMIC COUNTERPART -- A PARTNERSHIP FOR ECONOMICS. THE PRESIDENT'S ACCOUNTS OF HIS DISCUSSIONS IN BRUSSELS ABOUT MARKET ACCESS HAD BEEN INTERESTING. AFTER THE URUGUAY ROUND, TARIFFS WERE GOING TO BE FAR LESS OF A BARRIER, SO NON-TARIFF BARRIERS WERE THE MOST IMPORTANT REMAINING ISSUE TO DEALT WITH. PAWLAK ALSO URGED THE U.S. CONSIDER HELPING WITH POLAND'S CURRENT GATT NEGOTIATIONS: IT WOULD BE A HELP IF POLAND COULD JOIN ANOTHER WESTERN INSTITUTION SOON AS A FULL MEMBER, EVEN IF NATO MEMBERSHIP APPEARED A MORE DISTANT OBJECTIVE.

24. THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED AGREEMENT WITH THE THRUST OF PAWLAK'S REMARKS. IT WAS STRANGE THAT WHILE THE EUROPEAN MARKET WAS LESS OPEN
THAN THE U.S., U.S. PURCHASES OF CEE PRODUCTS SEEMED FLAT. THE PRESIDENT REITERATED THAT THE U.S. WANTED TO WORK WITH ITS WESTERN PARTNERS TO COME UP WITH A STRATEGY TO DRIVE EUROPEAN TRADE BARRIERS DOWN AND INCREASE U.S. IMPORTS OF CEE PRODUCTS.


26. WALESKA ASKED RHETORICALLY WHETHER POLAND WOULD SUCCEED IN ITS POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND OTHER REFORMS IN TIME -- BEFORE RUSSIA "BROKE DOWN" DUE TO ITS ECONOMIC CHAOS. A TASK FOR THE PFP SHOULD BE TO REDUCE THE ZONE OF UNCERTAINTY IN EUROPE. PERHAPS THIS HAD TO BE A EUROPEAN SOLUTION AFTER ALL.

27. WALESKA RENEWED HIS INVITATION TO THE PRESIDENT TO VISIT POLAND. THE PRESIDENT OBSERVED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO VISIT IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE G-7 SUMMIT IN JULY AND ADDED THAT IF THIS TRIP COULD BE ARRANGED, HE WOULD BRING AS A GUEST LANE KIRKLAND.

LAKE'S INTERVENTION RE EUROPE

28. LAKE NOTED THAT SOME OF WALESKA'S REMARKS SUGGESTED THAT THE SOLUTION TO EUROPEAN PROBLEMS COULD BE FOUND IN COOPERATION BETWEEN POLAND AND OTHER CEE COUNTRIES ON ONE HAND AND WESTERN EUROPE ON THE OTHER. LAKE RECALLED THE PRESIDENT'S LEADERSHIP AND INITIATIVE AT THE NATO SUMMIT AND WITH THE EU IN BRUSSELS. THE PRESIDENT HAD LAUNCHED A MAJOR INITIATIVE THERE AND ALSO HAD RESTATE THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO MAINTAIN CLOSE TO 100,000 TROOPS IN EUROPE. THE U.S. WOULD REMAIN READY AND ENGAGED, AND WILL TAKE A LEADERSHIP ROLE IN EUROPE.

29. WALESKA OBSERVED THAT IT WAS STILL DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE WHAT VISION FOR EUROPE THE WEST EXPRESSED. THE PRESIDENT RECALLED WALESKA'S CONCERN THAT POLAND MIGHT NOT COMPLETE ITS REFORM PROCESS "IN TIME" BEFORE A SERIOUS BREAKDOWN IN RUSSIA. POLAND AND THE WEST WOULD BE ABLE TO REACT IN TIME, BECAUSE THE PACE OF CERTAIN PROCESSES OF INTEGRATION COULD BE
SPEEDED UP IN RESPONSE TO RUSSIAN DEVELOPMENTS. WALESÅ REJOINED THAT, "HONESTLY AND FRANKLY," HE DOUBTED THIS. THE U.S. OPERATED ACCORDING TO ONE SET OF RULES; RUSSIA ANOTHER. IN ONE HAND A RUSSIAN CARRIES A PEN TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT; IN THE OTHER, HE OPENS A GRADE. AFTER 70 YEARS WITHOUT DEMOCRACY, THE CHALLENGES IN RUSSIA WERE ENORMOUS.

30. AS THE MEETING BROKE UP, WALESÅ NOTED TO THE PRESIDENT HIS APPRECIATION FOR THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE INITIATIVE.

HOLBROOKE
BT
#0904
NNNN
DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING IN WARSAW WITH PRESIDENT WALESA

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

2. PRESIDENT WALESA TOLD DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT ON APRIL 11 THAT:
   -- THE U.S. MUST PREVENT RUSSIA FROM USING ITS PARTICIPATION IN P4P TO MANEUVER THE U.S. AND EUROPE INTO "PLAYING BY RUSSIA'S RULES", AND THAT -- THE U.S. SHOULD GIVE LIFE TO P4P ASAP BY "CREATING NEW FACTS" ON THE GROUND IN THE CEE REGION THAT WILL "SHRINK THE ZONE OF UNCERTAINTY" BETWEEN THE NATO AREA AND RUSSIA.
   -- POLAND WILL BE A LOYAL, ACTIVE PARTNER IN P4P BUT WILL NOT BE SHY ABOUT VOICING ITS DIFFERENCES WITH THE U.S. ON HOW TO APPROACH RUSSIA. END SUMMARY.

OPENING REMARKS

3. IN REMARKS IN FRONT OF REPORTERS, WALESA SAID THAT -- REDUCED U.S. ENGAGEMENT IN EUROPE IN THE FUTURE WOULD BODE ILL FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY;

-- UNFORTUNATELY, AFTER FOUR YEARS OF LOOKING FOR POST-COLD WAR SOLUTIONS, A VACUUM EXISTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE WHICH "DEMONS" ARE WAITING TO FILL, WHILE WESTERN EUROPE LOOKS AFTER ITS OWN INTERESTS AND NATO "REFUSES TO EXPAND."

-- THE QUESTION FACING THE FORMER WARSAW PACT AREA IS WHETHER THE OLD POWER RELATIONSHIP (WITH RUSSIA) WILL BE REBUILT, OR WHETHER THE REGION WILL MOVE TOWARD UNION WITH EUROPE.

4. THE DEPSEC RESPONDED AFTER THE PRESS DEPARTED BY ASSURING WALESA THAT:

-- PRESIDENT CLINTON WANTS TO FACTOR WALESA'S VIEWS INTO HIS STRATEGY IN EUROPE, IN VIEW OF WALESA'S ROLE IN BRINGING ABOUT THE "MIRACLE" ENDING COMMUNISM, AND

-- THAT POLAND IS CRITICAL TO U.S. POLICY BECAUSE OF ITS SIZE AND MORAL ROLE IN THE REGION.

THE DEPSEC ADDED THAT THE U.S.:

-- IS AWARE OF POLAND'S CONCERN THAT THE CEE REGION IS BECOMING A GRAY ZONE OR VACUUM; AND

-- WANTS THE VACUUM TO BE FILLED MAINLY BY THE CONTINUING PROCESS OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM WITHIN EACH OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION.

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P4P AS MEANS OF FILLING CEE VACUUM

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5. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY STRESSED THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON PROPOSED THE P4P AS A MEANS OF PREVENTING THE POWER VACUUM POLAND FEARS FROM DEVELOPING IN THE CEE REGION. HE ADDED THAT:

-- IT IS GRATIFYING TO SENSE THAT POLAND NOW UNDERSTANDS P4P IS MORE THAN A POOR SUBSTITUTE FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP, AND THAT IT OFFERS POLAND REAL SECURITY BENEFITS IN THE SHORT TERM;

-- THE U.S. HOPES DEFENSE MINISTER KOLODZIEJCZYK AND THE U.S. DEPUTY SECRETARY’S MEETING IN WARSAW WITH PRESIDENT WALESA;

SECDEF PERRY WILL MAKE P4P REAL FOR POLAND IN THE NEAR TERM;

-- PRESIDENT CLINTON WOULD LIKE TO HAVE PRACTICAL STEPS TO THIS END IN PLACE OR NEAR IMPLEMENTATION BY THE TIME HE VISITS POLAND, AND THE U.S. HOPES TO RECEIVE POLAND'S PRESENTATION DOCUMENT SOON SO THAT WORK CAN MOVE FORWARD;

-- PRESIDENT WALESA'S PERCEPTION THAT "NATO DOES NOT WANT TO EXPAND" IS NOT ACCURATE -- PRESIDENT CLINTON AND HIS REPRESENTATIVES HAVE REPEATEDLY STATED THAT THE U.S. IS COMMITTED TO THE ENLARGEMENT AND EXPANSION OF NATO, AND THAT P4P IS THE BEST PATH TO NATO MEMBERSHIP.
RUSSIAN INTENTIONS

6. WALESZA SAID THAT THE MAIN ISSUE THE U.S. AND POLAND MUST ADDRESS TOGETHER IS WHAT TO DO ABOUT RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY GOALS. WALESZA WARNED THAT:
-- RUSSIA IS ALREADY REBUILDING ITS FORMER SPHERE OF INFLUENCE, AND ONE CANNOT ASSUME THAT IT WILL BE CONTENT WITH RECOVERING WHAT IT HAD BEFORE; HISTORY SHOWS, WALESZA CLAIMED, THAT EACH TIME RUSSIA REBUILDS IT REACHES FURTHER AFIELD;
-- RUSSIA'S AMBITIONS ARE NOT LIMITED TO INFLUENCE OVER THE CEE COUNTRIES; RUSSIA IS INTERESTED IN INFLUENCE OVER GERMANY AND FRANCE AS WELL.
-- THEREFORE, WHEN THINKING ABOUT THE FUTURE OF NATO AND EUROPE, ONE MUST THINK ABOUT RUSSIA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH ALL OF EUROPE, NOT JUST THE CEE REGION.

A HISTORIC CROSSROADS

7. WALESZA STRESSED REPEATEDLY THAT THE POLICY CHOICES THE U.S. MAKES IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE WILL HAVE A MAJOR IMPACT ON EUROPEAN HISTORY IN THE NEXT CENTURY. HE URGED THAT THE U.S.:
-- KEEP IN MIND THE POSSIBILITY THAT RUSSIA MAY AT FIRST SEEM WILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN GOOD FAITH IN P4P BUT COULD LATER TURN IT INTO A DEVICE FOR "GIVING EUROPE TO RUSSIA PEACEFULLY", AS OCCURRED IN EASTERN EUROPE AFTER THE POST-WORLD WAR TWO YALTA AGREEMENT;
-- HEAD OFF RUSSIAN AMBITIONS TO DOMINATE EUROPE IN THE FUTURE BY STARTING NOW TO "SHRINK THE ZONE OF UNCERTAINTY" IN CENTRAL EUROPE; I.E., BY "TEARING AWAY FROM THE RUSSIAN ORBIT" AS MANY FORMER SATELLITES AS POSSIBLE NOW, WHILE RUSSIAN IS "IN CHAOS";
-- USE P4P TO "CREATE PHYSICAL FACTS" THAT WILL PREVENT FUTURE EXPANSION OF RUSSIAN INFLUENCE.
-- BE PREPARED TO COUNTER A LIKELY RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AGAINST JOINT POLISH-NATO EXERCISES;
-- PERSUADE NATO NOT TO INSIST THAT CEE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS BE FULLY UP TO NATO STANDARDS PRIOR TO ADMISSION, BECAUSE WITHOUT A CLEAR AND PRESENT THREAT FROM RUSSIA THERE IS NO LONGER A NEED FOR "ALL LINKS IN THE NATO CHAIN" TO BE EQUALLY STRONG.
-- UNDERSTAND THAT IF U.S. INFLUENCE IN EUROPE DOES NOT EXPAND QUICKLY THROUGH P4P, THEN INEVITABLY RUSSIAN INFLUENCE WILL INCREASE.

HELP RUSSIA OVERCOME ITS PAST

8. WALESZA INSISTED THAT RUSSIA NEEDS OUTSIDE PRESSURE IN ORDER TO FORCE IT TO ADOPT A DEMOCRATIC, FREE-MARKET SYSTEM AND A LIVE-AND-LET-LIVE FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD ITS NEIGHBORS. BUT WALESZA STRESSED THAT THE WESTERN ALLIANCEioned should be careful not to undermine Russia's progress by: WITHDRAWAL FROM THE UEB, WHERE RUSSIA IS A KEY PLAYER IN THE POST-COLD WAR ENVIRONMENT.

DEPT FOR EUR/EEA - JOHNSON
BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC
PARIS ALSO FOR USOECD
ROME ALSO FOR VATICAN
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, PINR, PL, RS, US, NATO
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MEETING IN WARSAW WITH
PRESIDENT WALESA
NEIGHBORS, TO WIT:
-- RUSSIA MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO JOIN P4P UNDER SPECIAL
CONDITIONS THAT GRANT IT SUPERPOWER STATUS, NOR SHOULD IT
BE FREE TO USE ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS IT SEEKS FIT;
-- FOR RUSSIA'S OWN GOOD, THE WEST MUST CREATE CONDITIONS
THAT WILL ELIMINATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A RESURGENT
RUSSIAN EMPIRE. THE WEST MUST REJECT RUSSIA'S DEMANDS
FOR A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE "NEAR ABROAD;"
OTHERWISE AS RUSSIA'S ECONOMIC GROWS STRONGER ITS DEMANDS
WILL EXPAND.

U.S. COMMITMENT IN EUROPE

9. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY ASSURED WALESA THAT THE U.S.
COMMITMENT IN THE REGION IS DEEP AND PERMANENT AND THAT
IN NO WAY DOES THE U.S. INTEND TO RETREAT FROM THAT
COMMITMENT.
-- PRESIDENT CLINTON WOULD NEVER ACCEPT ANY REQUEST FROM
ANY RUSSIAN LEADER TO VIOLATE THE HARD-WON SOVEREIGNTY OF
THOSE COUNTRIES. U.S. POLICY TOWARD NATO AND THE P4P ARE
INTENDED TO REPUDIATE THE IDEA OF A RUSSIAN SPHERE OF
INFLUENCE IN EUROPE.
-- THE U.S. WILL WORK AS HARD TO PROTECT THE FREEDOM AND
INDEPENDENCE OF THE STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET EMPIRE AS
IT DID TO CONTAIN SOVIET COMMUNISM DURING THE COLD WAR.
-- THE U.S. DOES NOT KNOW THE FATE OF DEMOCRACY IN
RUSSIA, AND WANTS TO REMAIN IN CLOSE COOPERATION WITH
POLAND IN PREPARING STRATEGY FOR ALL POSSIBLE
EVENTUALITIES.
-- RUSSIAN MEMBERSHIP IN P4P WILL FORCE RUSSIA TO COMMIT
TO STANDARDS OF BEHAVIOR, INCLUDING RESPECT FOR OTHER
NATIONS' SOVEREIGNTY.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

10. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY:
-- USG AND WALESA COULD AGREE TO DISAGREE ON
PREDICTING RUSSIA'S FUTURE AND ON TACTICS IN DEALING WITH
RUSSIA, BUT COULD AGREE ON MAKING THE MOST OF THE P4P;
-- THERE SHOULD BE NO/NO MISUNDERSTANDING THAT THE U.S.
REJECTS RUSSIAN SPHERES OF INFLUENCE AND THE U.S. WILL
NOT ALLOW A REPETITION OF THE YALTA EXPERIENCE.
WALESA:
-- THE U.S. AND POLAND COULD AGREE THAT RUSSIA SHOULD NOT
BE ALLOWED TO DISTORT THE SOUND CONCEPT UNDERLYING P4P;
-- POLAND WILL BE A GOOD ALLY AND WILL COOPERATE WITH THE
P4P, BUT WILL "SPEAK THE TRUTH" ABOUT RUSSIA, WITH THE
UNDERSTANDING THAT THE U.S. WILL CHOOSE POLICY OPTIONS
TOWARD RUSSIA THAT BEST SUIT ITS INTERESTS.

PARTICIPANTS

11. PARTICIPANTS FROM THE BELWEDER STAFF INCLUDED
MINISTER OF STATE MIECZYSŁAW WACHOWSKI, CHANCELLOR CHIEF JANUSZ ZIOLKOWSKI, SPOKESMAN ANDRZEJ ZAKRZEWSKI, POLITICAL ADVISER ANDRZEJ ZAKRZEWSKI, AND CHAPLAIN REV. CEBULI. DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER JERZY KOZMINSKI, CHIEF OF PROTOCOL JANUSZ SWITKOWSKI, AND NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS DIRECTOR ZBIIGNIEW LEWICKI PARTICIPATED FROM MFA. U.S. PARTICIPANTS INCLUDED AMBASSADOR REY, BGEN JAMES A. RILEY, EUR/EE DIRECTOR TERRY SNELL, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT VICTORIA NULAND, SPECIAL ASSISTANT JOHN WITHERS, POLITICAL COUNSELOR STEVE MULL, AND EMBASSY NOTETAKER. 12. THIS CABLE HAS BEEN CLEARED BY THE DEPUTY SECRETARY. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. REY BT #5470 NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 04 <"SECT">SECTION: 02 OF 04 <"SECT">SECTION: 03 OF 04 <"SECT">SECTION: 04 OF 04

SSN: 5470 <"SSN">5470 <"SSN">5470 <"SSN">5470

TOR: 940418120301 M0999798 <"TOR">940418120405 M0999801 <"TOR">940418120402 M0999799 <"TOR">940418120403 M0999800

DIST: SIT: BURNS FRIED GOTTEMOELLER SCHIPTER VAX
Cable

PRC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: SSSS
LINE1: OAASZYUW RUEHOLA1493 1331629-SSSS--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY SSSSS ZZH
LINE3: O 131629Z MAY 94
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY BONN
OSRI: RUEHOL
DTG: 131629Z MAY 94
ORIG: AMEMBASSY BONN
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4400
     RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO: RUEHDL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
SUBJ: MAY 12 KOHL/YELTSIN TALKS
TEXT:
SECRET BONN 11493

OPS CENTER PLEASE PASS TO SECRETARY'S PARTY
EXDIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, GM, RS
SUBJECT: MAY 12 KOHL/YELTSIN TALKS
1. SECRET—ENTIRE TEXT.
2. HERewith A SUMMARY OF THE HIGH POINTS OF JOACHIM
BITTERLICH’S DEBRIEFING TO FRANK WISNER AND MYSELF
CONCERNING THE FIRST DAY OF THE KOHL-YELTSIN
CONVERSATIONS. (WE DO NOT YET HAVE INFORMATION ON THE
SECOND DAY — PRIVATE TALKS WITHOUT AIDES — BUT BITTERLICH
PROMISED US THIS INFORMATION ONCE HE GETS IT FROM THE
CHANCELLOR.)
3. ON A "MOST SENSITIVE BASIS", BITTERLICH BEGAN BY SAYING
THAT IN THE DINNER AND AFTER DINNER HE FELT THAT YELTSIN
HAD DRUNK FAR TOO MUCH. "HE WAS DRINKING WINE LIKE I DRINK
WATER," BITTERLICH OBSERVED, "AND HE WAS NOT ONE-HUNDRED
PERCENT ON HIS FEET. HIS BACK WAS IN PAIN. BUT,
NONETHELESS, HE ALWAYS KNEW WHAT HE WAS SAYING AND SEEMED
IN CONTROL OF HIMSELF INTELLECTUALLY."
4. DURING THE TALKS, THERE WAS MUCH DISCUSSION OF THE
DEPARTURE OF THE RUSSIAN TROOPS FROM GERMANY. THE
CHANCELLOR SAID HE WISHED TO AVOID INCREASING YELTSIN'S
DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES ON THIS SENSITIVE POINT. HE WOULD
MAKE SURE THAT THE RUSSIAN DEPARTURE WAS "DIGNIFIED AND
RESPECTFUL." THEY DISCUSSED A JOINT VISIT TO BUCHENWALD,
SIMILAR TO THE KOHL-MITTERMANN RECONCILIATION EVENT AT
VERDUN IN 1987. BUCHENWALD'S SYMBOLISM IS OBVIOUS,
BITTERLICH SAID: "IT IS WHERE THE GERMANS KILLED THOUSANDS
OF RUSSIANS DURING THE WAR AND THE RUSSIANS KILLED
THOUSANDS OF GERMANS AFTER THE WAR." YELTSIN SAID HE
AGREE WITH THE CONCEPT OF USING IT AS A SITE FOR
RECONCILIATION BUT THAT HIS MILITARY WAS NOT YET READY TO
ACCEPT SUCH AN EVENT. "LET US WAIT TWO OR THREE YEARS," HE
REPORTEDLY TOLD KOHL.
5. IN THE SAME VEIN, KOHL ASKED YELTSIN TO GET HIS
GENERALS UNDER CONTROL IN PUBLIC ON THE PARADE ISSUE--
SPECIFICALLY GRACHEV AND BULAKOV. BITTERLICH SAID "YELTSIN
TURNED TO GRACHEV AND SO INSTRUCTED HIM DURING THE MEETING."
6. ON THE "MORE DIFFICULT" ISSUE OF CULTURAL TREASURES
"STOLEN" BY RUSSIA AT THE END OF THE WAR, BITTERLICH SAID
THAT THERE WERE STILL "TREMENDOUS DIFFICULTIES." HE SAID
KINKEL AND FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD MADE A MESS OF THESE
IMPORTANT NEGOTIATIONS. YELTSIN FURTHER COMPLICATED THE
ISSUE BY SAYING GERMANY MUST PROVE FOR EACH PIECE THAT
GERMANY WAS THE RIGHTFUL OWNER. IN REGARD TO SUCH
TREASURES AS THE SCHLIEHMANN DISCOVERY AT TROY THIS COULD
INVOLVE PROBLEMS WITH BOTH GREECE AND TURKEY.
7. "WE HAD ONE SUCCESS IN THIS CULTURAL AREA," BITTERLICH
SAID, WHEN KOHL PROPOSED, AND YELTSIN AGREED, TO CREATE A
JOINT HISTORICAL COMMISSION TO EXAMINE THE GERMAN AND
RUSSIAN ARCHIVES, "NOT TO WRITE OFFICIAL AGREED UPON
HISTORY, BUT TO WORK ON THE HISTORICAL TRUTH, AND ALLOW
MORE THAN ONE VERSION OF HISTORY."
8. PFP: THE DISCUSSION WAS PREDICTABLE. YELTSIN SAID HE
ACCEPTED PFP, IN PRINCIPLE, BUT NEEDS A STATEMENT OR
"PROTOCOL" THAT MAKES IT CLEAR THAT RUSSIA IS DIFFERENT
FROM ALL OTHER COUNTRIES JOINING PFP - "A GREAT COUNTRY
WITH A GREAT ARMY WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS."
9. BITTERLICH PROPOSED THAT THE POLITICAL DIRECTORS IN THE
QUAD DEVELOP SUCH A STATEMENT IN TIME FOR GRACHEV'S
FORTHCOMING VISIT TO BRUSSELS. "THIS SHOULD NOT BE DONE IN
NATO, BUT IN THE QUAD," HE SAID.
10. AS IS WELL KNOWN, BITTERLICH SAID, YELTSIN IS NOT
HAPPY WITH RUSSIA'S STANDING IN THE G-7. HE MADE THE USUAL
ARGUMENTS. KOHL RESPONDED THAT IN THE LONG RUN WE HAVE TO
MOVE TO A POLITICAL G-8 BUT WE CANNOT MAKE RUSSIA PART OF
AN ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK BECAUSE THIS WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE
TO THE FACTS. BITTERLICH SAID THAT THIS IS THE POINT ON
WHICH YELTSIN WAS THE MOST EMOTIONAL.
11. IN ANSWER TO KOHL'S QUESTION, YELTSIN SAID THE UKRAINE
WAS A DISASTER IN WHICH KRAVCHUK WAS CONSTANTLY CHANGING
SIGNALS. THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF A SPLIT BETWEEN THE
EAST AND THE WEST, AND "I SEE BLACK." YELTSIN SAID HE
WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPLY OIL, BUT ONLY IN SMALL TRANCHES.
12. KOHL ASKED TO OPEN THREE CONSULATES IN RUSSIA. THE
FIRST TWO WERE FINE WITH YELTSIN, BUT THE THIRD STARTLED
THE RUSSIANS AND LED TO AN IMMEDIATE NEGATIVE RESPONSE,
BECAUSE IT WAS KALININGRAD. AFTER INTERNAL DISCUSSIONS AMONG
THE RUSSIAN TEAM, YELTSIN CAME BACK WITH A COUNTER
SUGGESTION WHICH KOHL ACCEPTED: THE GERMANS WOULD OPEN OR
INTENSIFY CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRAMS IN KALININGRAD AND
OPEN A CONSULATE AT A DATE TO BE DETERMINED LATER.
13. FINALLY, ESTONIA: "UNDER THE PRESENT CONDITIONS, I
CANNOT LEAVE," BITTERLICH QUOTED YELTSIN AS SAYING. I WANT
TO LEAVE, YELTSIN SAID, BUT "I NEED YOUR HELP IN PERSUADING
THE ESTONIANS TO GIVE THE RUSSIANS THERE THE SAME
CONDITIONS AS THEY HAVE IN LATVIA AND LITHUANIA."
14. CITING RUSSIA'S CHAOTIC INVESTMENT LAWS AND RAMPANT
CRIME, KOHL TOLD YELTSIN THE FRG COULD NOT PROMOTE
ADDITIONAL INVESTMENT IN RUSSIA, AS THE RUSSIANS DESIRED.
YELTSIN DID NOT DISAGREE. HOWEVER, HE NOTED HIS LACK OF
EXPERTISE FOR REFORMING INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY AND ASKED
KOHL FOR HELP.
15. THIS CONCLUDED BITTERLICH'S SUMMARY, PRESENTED WITHOUT NOTES. THERE WAS ALSO SOME DISCUSSION OF BOSNIA, WHICH IS ALREADY OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS. WILL REPORT FURTHER AS MORE INFORMATION ARRIVES.##
HOLBROOKE
BT
#1493
NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01
SSN: 1493
TOR: 940513131630 M1045829

DIST:
SIT: BEYRLE BURNS LEBOURGEOIS VAX WALKER
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<td>05/26/1994</td>
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**COLLECTION:**
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Cables
Jan 1993-Dec 1994
OA/Box Number: 505000

**FOLDER TITLE:**
[09/03/1993-11/03/1994]

**RESTRcITION CODES**

- **P1** National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- **P2** Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- **P3** Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- **P4** Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- **P5** Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- **P6** Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- **C.** Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- **PRM.** Personal record misuse defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- **RR.** Document will be reviewed upon request.

- **b(1)** National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- **b(2)** Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- **b(3)** Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- **b(4)** Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- **b(6)** Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- **b(7)** Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- **b(8)** Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- **b(9)** Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
SECRET BONN 12613
EXDIS/NOFORN
USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, NATO, CSCE, GM, RS
SUBJECT: YELTSIN'S MAY 11-13 VISIT TO GERMANY: KOSYREV'S
- COMMENTS ON PFP

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. POLOFF HAD THE OPPORTUNITY ON MAY 25 TO READ A DRAFT
MEMCON OF FOREIGN MINISTER KINKEL'S MAYHQW DISCUSSION WITH
RUSSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KOSYREV. JUDGING BY THE MEMCON,
MOST OF THE DISCUSSION CENTERED ON RUSSIA'S ATTITUDE
TOWARD THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE. SEPTELS REPORT ON OTHER
TOPICS OF DISCUSSION.
3. AT THE OUTSET OF THIS SECTION OF THE MEMCON, THE
AUTHOR DESCRIBED THE DISCUSSION AS "INCONCLUSIVE" AND
CHARACTERIZED KOSYREV AS REPEATEDLY POSTING VERY CRITICAL
QUESTIONS ABOUT THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF NATO AND THE
PURPOSE OF THE PFP PROGRAM. BY COMPARISON, KOSYREV'S
COMMENTS APPEAR MUCH MORE CRITICAL THAN GRACHEV'S (SEPTEL).
4. KOSYREV'S OPENING QUESTION WAS, WHAT WOULD BECOME OF
NATO AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF THE WARSAW PACT? KINKEL
RESPONDED BY LISTING FOUR CONTINUING TASKS: DEFENSE
(CURRENTLY LESS URGENT), PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS,
PEACEMAKING MEASURES IN SPECIFIC CASES, AND KERNEL OF A
EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE THAT WOULD EVENTUALLY
INCORPORATE THE CEE STATES. A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
NEEDED TO BE BUILT UP BETWEEN NATO AND RUSSIA AND
UKRAINE. NATO WAS NOT DIRECTED AGAINST ANYONE, BUT SERVED
TO BRACKET THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP.
5. KOSYREV SAID HE COULD NOT EXPLAIN THESE FOUR FUNCTIONS
TO THE DUMA. IN THE DUMA ONE ASKED WHY NATO SAYS
PEACEKEEPING AND PEACEMAKING ARE ITS TASKS WHEN IT DID NOT
HAVE THE DECISIONMAKING STRUCTURES FOR THESE FUNCTIONS. ONLY THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL HAD THIS KIND OF AUTHORITY. SHOULD NOT THE UN BE STRENGTHENED AND CONCLUDE AGREEMENTS WITH NATO (FOR THESE TASKS)? ONE ALSO ASKED HOW MANY TROOPS WERE ACTUALLY NECESSARY FOR PEACEKEEPING. THE U.S. WAS REDUCING ITS PARTICIPATION, AND IN GERMANY PARTICIPATION WAS STILL UNDER DISCUSSION.

6. KOSYREV ASKED WHY CEE STATES SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO NATO? ONLY THE UN WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR PEACEKEEPING. IF NATO WAS GOING TO TAKE OVER THE FUNCTION OF A REGIONAL ORGANIZATION UNDER CHAPTER 8 OF THE UN CHARTER, THEN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY WOULD HAVE TO BE ALTERED, OR IT WOULD HAVE TO OPERATE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CSCE.

7. RUSSIA COULD ALSO JOIN NATO -- ALTHOUGH IT WOULD REQUIRE GREAT EFFORT TO INTEGRATE 2.5 MILLION RUSSIAN SOLDIERS INTO NATO STRUCTURES. RUSSIAN OFFICERS WOULD HAVE TO GET THE APPROPRIATE COMMAND POSITIONS. WAS NATO READY FOR THIS? KINKEL RESPONDED THIS WAS CURRENTLY NOT THE CASE.

8. KOSYREV THEN ASKED, WHY DID NATO NOT WANT RUSSIA? WERE THERE HIDDEN REPROACHES? SUSPICIONS? PERHAPS EVEN ENMITY? IF SO, THEN THE OFFER OF A PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE DID NOT MEAN THAT RUSSIA WAS ACTUALLY WANTED AS A PARTNER. DID NATO WANT TO FULFILL ENTIRELY DIFFERENT TASKS FROM THOSE OF THE UN? IT APPEARED THAT NATO DID NOT WANT TO RESTRICT ITSELF TO PEACEKEEPING MEASURES WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, BUT OUT-OF-AREA -- FOR EXAMPLE, IN YUGOSLAVIA.

9. KINKEL COMMENTED THAT THE RUSSIAN ATTITUDE WAS MORE CRITICAL THAN TWO YEARS AGO. THIS WAS NOT GOOD. HE STRESSED THAT NATO DID NOT WANT TO ACT WITHOUT A UN MANDATE. THE UN HAD A MONOPOLY ON THE USE OF FORCE. YUGOSLAVIA DEMONSTRATED THAT.

10. KOSYREV PERSISTED: THEN WHY WAS PFP NECESSARY, IF ONE ONLY WANTED TO ACT UNDER UN AUSPICES? EVERY COUNTRY DECIDED FOR ITSELF IN ANY CASE WHETHER TO SUPPLY TROOPS -- THIS WAS THE SAME FOR THE U.S. AS FOR GERMANY.

11. KINKEL GAVE A CONCRETE EXAMPLE: THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND SLOVAKIA WANTED TO JOIN NATO BECAUSE THEY WANTED MORE SECURITY. THEY WOULD ALSO PARTICIPATE IN NATO'S NEW MISSIONS. KOSYREV COUNTERED, AGAINST WHOM MUST THEY DEFEND THEMSELVES? IF THEY WANTED TO PARTICIPATE IN PFO'S, THEY DID NOT HAVE TO JOIN NATO. POLAND WAS ABLE TO PARTICIPATE WHEN IT WAS A MEMBER OF THE WARSAW PACT. KINKEL SAID THE CEE STATES CONTINUE TO WORRY ABOUT RUSSIA, WHETHER THIS WAS JUSTIFIED OR NOT. (KINKEL SAID HE HIMSELF THOUGHT IT WAS NOT JUSTIFIED.) KOSYREV REPLIED, IF THESE CONCERNS ARE NOT JUSTIFIED, THEN SERIOUS POLICIES CANNOT BE BUILT ON THEM. THIS WOULD LEAD TO MISTAKES. IF THE CEE STATES REALLY WANTED TO JOIN NATO, THEN THE QUESTION WAS, WHEN COULD RUSSIA JOIN? KINKEL SAID HISTORY COULD NOT BE CHANGED. POLAND FEARED RUSSIA AND WANTED TO JOIN NATO. HE DISPUTED POLAND'S FEARS, BUT THE POLES WOULD NOT BE CONVINCED.

12. KOSYREV ASKED HOW WAS THIS SUPPOSED TO LEAD TO A NEW SECURITY SYSTEM. WHAT POLAND WANTED WAS TO JOIN THE OLD SECURITY SYSTEM THAT CONTINUED TO BE DIRECTED AGAINST RUSSIA. KINKEL SAID THIS WAS EXACTLY WHAT WE WANT TO
PREVENT. KOSYREV SAID THAT IN THE DUMA ONE ASKED HOW NATO WAS TRANSFORMING ITSELF INTO A NEW SECURITY SYSTEM AND HOW PFP WAS HELPFUL TO THIS END. SHOULD RUSSIA STAND ASIDE WHILE POLAND SEeks SECURITY IN NATO? THEN RUSSIA WOULD HAVE TO EXPAND ITS MILITARY POWER. THE CORRECT QUESTION WAS WHY WILL NATO NOT NEGOTIATE A NEW SECURITY SYSTEM (WITH RUSSIA)? PFP SEEMS TO BE THE WRONG WAY, SINCE PRO AGREEMENTS MUST BE MADE WITH THE UN AND NOT WITH NATO.

13. TO THIS KINKEL RESPONDED THAT SINCE THE UN HAD NO TROOPS, IT NEEDED AN INSTRUMENT, WHICH NATO COULD PROVIDE. THE GERMAN GOAL WAS STRENGTHENING THE UN, AND THE SPECIAL GERMAN SITUATION WOULD BE CLEARED UP IN THE SUMMER.

14. KOSYREV SAID RUSSIA DID NOT WANT TO GIVE THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL HIS OWN TROOPS; THESE DECISIONS SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE MADE THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THE FACT THAT SOME NATO COUNTRIES PROVIDE TROOPS -- FRANCE, BRITAIN, BELGIUM, AND SPAIN -- AND OTHERS DO NOT SPEAKS FOR THE "UN" APPROACH. RUSSIA COULD ALSO PARTICIPATE WITHOUT BEING A MEMBER OF NATO OR PFP. AGAIN AND AGAIN, THE QUESTION WAS POSED, WHY DOES ONE NEED NATO AND PFP?


16. KINKEL CONCLUDED THE DISCUSSION WITH THE ASSURANCE THAT THE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD KNOW THAT GERMANY SAW THE SENSITIVITY OF THE PROBLEM AND WAS DOING EVERYTHING TO PREVENT NEW TENSIONS. GERMANY KNEW THAT NO NEW ORDER COULD BE CREATED IN EUROPE WITHOUT RUSSIA.

17. COMMENT:

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

WE WONDER IF THE RUSSIAN APPROACH SHOWN AT THEIR MEETING IS A FORETASTE OF WHAT WE MIGHT EXPECT IN THE RUN-UP TO THE ISTANBUL MINISTERIAL.

HOLBROOKE
BT
#2613
NNNN
SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01
SSN: 2613
TOR: 940526150601 M1068037
DIST: SIT: BEYRLE LEBOURGEOIS VAX
Cable

**Foreign Minister Urges President Clinton to Focus on Polish Security During Visit**

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**SUBJ:** FOREIGN MINISTER URGES PRESIDENT CLINTON TO FOCUS ON POLISH SECURITY DURING VISIT

**TEXT:**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**WARSAW 009178**

**VIENNA** PLEASE HOLD FOR BRATISLAVA

**EXDIS**

E.O. 12356: DECLASSIFIED

**TAGS:** OVIP (CLINTON, WILLIAM J.), PREL, PL

**SUBJECT:** FOREIGN MINISTER URGES PRESIDENT CLINTON TO FOCUS ON POLISH SECURITY DURING VISIT

**REFTEL:** (A) WARSAW 9067 (B) WARSAW 8288 (C) STATE 165244 (D) WARSAW 1003

1. **CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.**

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**SUMMARY**

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2. AMBASSADOR REY AND FOREIGN MINISTER OLECHOWSKI ON JUNE 22 REVIEWED OUTSTANDING BILATERAL ISSUES IN PREPARATION FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON'S VISIT TO POLAND:

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**THE POLES HOPE FOR A MORE EXPLICIT COMMITMENT TO NATO EXPANSION TO THE EAST, AND WANT TO ENGAGE US ON HOW TO MAKE THAT HAPPEN WHILE TAKING ACCOUNT OF RUSSIAN SENSITIVITIES.**

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**THE AMBASSADOR TOOK NOTE OF POLAND'S REQUEST FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO HELP PAY COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE (PFP), BUT SAID THERE IS NO FORMAL RESPONSE YET.**

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**THE AMBASSADOR SAID THE U.S. CONTINUES TO URGE**
POLAND TO CANCEL A SALE OF T-72 TANKS TO IRAN;
--ON OUTSTANDING BILATERAL AGREEMENTS, THE
AMBASSADOR ASKED THAT THE POLISH GOVERNMENT GIVE
RAPID APPROVAL TO THE BILATERAL ASSISTANCE
AGREEMENT, AND HE APPEALED FOR POLISH ACCESSION TO
THE BERNE CONVENTION AS A CONDITION FOR EXCHANGING
RATIFICATION INSTRUMENTS ON OUR BUSINESS AND
ECONOMIC TREATY;
--OLECHOWSKI WELcomed THE GENERAL OUTLINE OF OUR
EMERGING SOCIAL SECTOR ASSISTANCE STRATEGY, BUT HE
ALSO APPEALED FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE IN CREATING A
SCHOLARSHIP FUND FOR POLISH STUDENTS.
ON REGIONAL COOPERATION, OLECHOWSKI SAID HE WOULD SOON
PRESS HIS CZECH COUNTERPART TO SUPPORT THE U.S. REGIONAL
AIRSPACE INITIATIVE. HE ALSO URGED THAT PRESIDENT
CLINTON USE HIS SPEECH TO THE SEJM PRIMARILY TO ADDRESS
POLES, WITH SECONDARY ATTENTION TO REGIONAL COOPERATION.
END SUMMARY.

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SECURITY: HOW DO WE ADDRESS RUSSIAN CONCERNS?
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3. THE AMBASSADOR AND FOREIGN MINISTER MET FOR AN HOUR
FOR A TOUR D'HORIZON OF BILATERAL ISSUES, PARTICULARLY
THOSE PRESIDENT WALESA RAISED IN HIS JUNE 10 LETTER TO
PRESIDENT CLINTON (REF B). OLECHOWSKI SAID POLISH AND
RUSSIAN THINKING ON EUROPEAN SECURITY HAD BOTH GONE
THROUGH A SIGNIFICANT EVOLUTION SINCE THE BEGINNING OF
THE YEAR. HE NOTED THAT RUSSIAN FEDERATION COUNCIL

CHAIRMAN VLADIMIR SHUPEYKO DURING HIS VISIT TO POLAND
JUNE 14-16 HAD UNDERSCORED RUSSIA'S COMMITMENT NOT TO
INTERFERE WITH POLISH ASPIRATIONS TO JOIN NATO WITH
PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S EVIDENT APPROVAL. HE ALSO EXPRESSED
SATISFACTION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV'S JUNE 21
STATEMENTS IN BRUSSELS ON THE PROSPECTS OF EASTERN
EUROPEAN MEMBERSHIP IN NATO.
4. OLECHOWSKI SAID POLAND, TOO, NOW UNDERSTANDS THE NEED
TO EXPAND NATO WHILE TAKING RUSSIAN SENSITIVITIES INTO
ACCOUNT. "YOU DON'T HAVE TO WORRY ABOUT MAKING US SHIVER
WHEN YOU MENTION RUSSIA WHEN WE MENTION NATO," HE SAID.
HE SAID THAT POLAND IS EAGER TO SHARE IDEAS WITH THE
UNITED STATES ON HOW RUSSIAN CONCERNS COULD BE ADDRESSED
WHILE WORK ON EXPANDING NATO TO THE EAST PROCEEDS.
5. OLECHOWSKI SAID HE WOULD DISCUSS POLISH SECURITY
CONCERNS WITH FRENCH PRIME MINISTER BALLADUR DURING THE
LATTER'S JULY 1 VISIT TO POLAND, AS WELL AS WITH GERMAN
CHANCELLOR KOHL AND FOREIGN MINISTER KINKEL IN BONN ON
JULY 8 BEFORE THEIR DEPARTURE FOR THE G-7. HE SAID WE
SHOULD BE AWARE THAT HIS EUROPEAN INTERLOCUTORS CITE
OPPOSITION FROM THE UNITED STATES AS THE CHIEF REASON FOR
NATO'S RELUCTANCE TO EXPAND TO THE EAST.
6. OLECHOWSKI SAID THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD MOVED ON
MEMBERSHIP SO "NOW IT IS YOUR TURN TO BE MORE CONCRETE."

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MILITARY ASSISTANCE
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7. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED PRESIDENT WALESA'S RENEWED
APPEAL FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO HELP BEAR THE COSTS
ASSOCIATED WITH PFP AND SAID THAT THERE WAS STILL NO
FORMAL ANSWER FROM WASHINGTON. OLECHOWSKI SAID THAT THE
TOTAL AMOUNT OF SUCH AID WAS NOT AS IMPORTANT -- WHAT
MATTERS IS HAVING POLAND APPEAR ON A LIST OF COUNTRIES
WHICH RECEIVE U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE. "THAT WILL MARK
US AS YOUR FRIEND," HE SAID.
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TRADE AND INVESTMENT
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8. THE AMBASSADOR ALSO TOOK NOTE OF PRESIDENT WALESA'S
APPEAL FOR PROGRESS ON TRADE ISSUES AND INFORMED HIM OF
USTR KANTOR'S APPEAL TO MINISTER OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC
RELATIONS PODKANSKI FOR FLEXIBILITY ON POULTRY, CIVIL
AIRCRAFT AND COMPUTER EQUIPMENT. IF WE ARE UNABLE TO WIN
GATT AGREEMENT BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT, THE
PRESIDENT WOULD LIKELY MAKE AN APPEAL DURING HIS MEETINGS
IN WARSAW. ON ANOTHER ISSUE HE SAID THAT THE U.S. IS NOT
PREPARED FOR A DISCUSSION OF A FREE TRADE AGREEMENT WITH
POLAND AND OTHER NATIONS IN THE REGION AT THIS TIME.
9. THE AMBASSADOR INFORMED OLECHOWSKI THAT PRESIDENT
CLINTON WOULD BE VISITING POLAND WITH TEN LEADING
AMERICAN BUSINESS LEADERS AS A SIGN OF HIS INTEREST IN
PROMOTING INVESTMENT IN POLAND. OLECHOWSKI
ENTHUSIATICALLY WELCOMED THE IDEA, AND SUGGESTED THE
BUSINESSPERSONS PLAN TO MEET WITH THE POLISH INVESTMENT
AGENCY AND THE POLISH AMERICAN ENTERPRISE FUND AS WELL AS
PRIVATE BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS.
-----------------
BILATERAL AGREEMENTS
-----------------
10. THE AMBASSADOR NOTED PER REP C THAT THE U.S. IS
DISAPPOINTED THAT THE POLISH GOVERNMENT HAS NOT YET
IMPLEMENTED THE BILATERAL ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT WHICH
GOVERS U.S.A.I.D.'S OPERATIONS IN POLAND. THE
AMBASSADOR SAID THE LACK OF AN AGREEMENT IS HINDERING THE
PROVISION OF U.S. ASSISTANCE TO POLAND. HE ASKED THAT
THE FOREIGN MINISTER WORK TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE BEFORE THE
PRESIDENT'S VISIT. OLECHOWSKI ACCEPTED THE POINTS
WITHOUT RESPONSE.
11. THE AMBASSADOR ALSO TOOK NOTE OF PRESIDENT WALESA'S
APPEAL TO EXCHANGE THE RATIFICATION INSTRUMENTS OF THE
BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC TREATY DURING PRESIDENT CLINTON'S
VISIT. HE SAID THAT THE U.S. STILL A WAITS POLISH
ACCESSION TO THE BERNE CONVENTION AS WELL AS THE
APPOINTMENT OF AN OMBUDSMAN FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE
POLISH GOVERNMENT BEFORE IT WILL BE PREPARED TO EXCHANGE
THE INSTRUMENTS. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THE PRIME
MINISTER'S OFFICE HAD RESPONDED POSITIVELY TO A JOINT
APPEAL FROM HIM AND A NUMBER OF OTHER WESTERN AMBASSADORS
ON THE OMBUDSMAN ISSUE, BUT BERNE CONVENTION STATUS IS
STILL UNCLEAR.
-----------------
TANKS TO IRAN
-----------------
12. THE AMBASSADOR POINTED OUT THAT THE PROPOSED POLISH
SALE OF T-72 TANKS TO IRAN IS STILL AN OPEN ISSUE. HE
SAID THAT PRESIDENT WALESA AND PRIME MINISTER PAWLAK CAN
EXPECT TO HEAR ABOUT THE ISSUE DURING THE PRESIDENT'S
VISIT IF IT IS NOT CANCELLED BEFORE THEN. OLECHOWSKI REITERATED HIS EARLIER POINT TO SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER (REF D) THAT THERE WILL BE NO SUCH FUTURE SALES BUT THAT THIS SALE WILL PROBABLY GO FORWARD. HE SAID THAT THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS WOULD SHORTLY TAKE UP A CONTROL MECHANISM TO PREVENT SUCH ACTIVITY.

------------------
U.S. ASSISTANCE
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12. THE AMBASSADOR BRIEFED OLECHOWSKI ON THE BROAD OUTLINE OF THE NEW U.S. ASSISTANCE PROGRAM TO POLAND'S SOCIAL SECTOR, INCLUDING:
- TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, SOCIAL INSURANCE OFFICE, AND MINISTRIES OF HEALTH AND LABOR;
- A SMALL PILOT HOUSING PROGRAM WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF POLAND'S EXISTING MORTGAGE SYSTEM;
- A MICRO-LENDING PROGRAM TO PROMOTE JOB CREATION;
- A PILOT TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM ON MANAGEMENT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC ISSUES IN SELECT PROVINCES.

OLECHOWSKI WARMLY WELCOMED THE IDEAS, BUT ALSO FLOATED AN IDEA OF LAUNCHING A SCHOLARSHIP FUND TO FINANCE THE EDUCATION OF POLISH STUDENTS AT AMERICAN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES. "YOU HAVE THE BEST IN THE WORLD," HE SAID, "AND WE WANT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THEM." HE SUGGESTED THAT IF THE U.S. STARTED THE FUND, THE POLISH GOVERNMENT WOULD SET UP AND ADMINISTER A SELECTION SYSTEM, COURT CONTRIBUTIONS FROM THE POLISH-AMERICAN COMMUNITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND POSSIBLY MAKE CONTRIBUTIONS ITSELF.

------------------
REGIONAL COOPERATION
------------------
13. OLECHOWSKI NOTED THAT THE PRESENCE OF EIGHT OTHER CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN FOREIGN MINISTERS IN POLAND ON THE FRINGES OF THE PRESIDENTIAL VISIT WOULD NECESSARILY LEAD TO A REGIONAL FLAVOR. BUT HE STRONGLY URGED THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON'S SPEECH TO THE SEJM PRIMARILY ADDRESS A POLISH AUDIENCE, AND GIVE SUBORDINATE ATTENTION TO REGIONAL CONCERNS.

14. ON ANOTHER REGIONAL ISSUE, OLECHOWSKI SAID THAT CZECH RELUCTANCE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE U.S. REGIONAL AIRSPACE INITIATIVE TROUBLES POLAND. HE SAID HE WOULD SHORTLY SEND A LETTER TO CZECH FOREIGN MINISTER ZIENELIEC URGING CZECH PARTICIPATION.

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COMMENT
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15. OLECHOWSKI AND HIS STAFF ARE CLEARLY IN AN UPBEAT MOOD IN THE COUNTDOWN TO PRESIDENT CLINTON'S VISIT, WHICH THEY LOOK TO PROVIDE AN IMPORTANT SYMBOLIC MESSAGE OF POLAND'S IMPORTANCE TO THE UNITED STATES. WE FIND THEIR MORE REALISTIC APPROACH ON RUSSIAN SENSITIVITIES ABOUT EASTERN EUROPEAN MEMBERSHIP IN NATO REFRESHING AND SINCERE AND A GOOD STARTING POINT FOR SERIOUS DIALOGUE.
#9178

SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 9178

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SUBJ: CHANCELLOR KOHL: NATO AND EU ENLARGEMENT: THE FUTURE OF EUROPE

1. CONFIDENTIAL - COMPLETE TEXT.

2. IN MY FAREWELL CALL ON CHANCELLOR KOHL SEPTEMBER 9, I URGED WASHINGTON TO INCREASE ITS INvolvement in the ongoing effort to chart the future of Europe. Close consultation is necessary, but EU enlargement, an EU defense component, and NATO expansion can all be made complementary. Even France's attitude toward NATO is significantly more positive. He also stated Germany could support Claeys for NATO Secretary General.

3. "PLEASE TELL YOUR COLLEAGUES AND THE PRESIDENT," KOHL SAID AT THE END OF THE MEETING, "THAT THERE ARE CERTAIN TIMES, IN BOTH DOMESTIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WHEN WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY OPEN. MOST PEOPLE FAIL TO NOTICE AT ALL, AND THE RESULTS ONLY SHOW YEARS LATER." KOHL URGED US NOT TO LET THE CURRENT OPPORTUNITY PASS WITHOUT SETTING A COURSE WHICH WILL HELP ENSURE SMOOTH SAILING IN THE YEARS AHEAD.

4. KOHL MENTIONED IN THIS REGARD THAT HE HOPES TO TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON SOMETIME THIS WINTER FOR A WEEKEND OF MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT, PERHAPS AT CAMP DAVID.

TIME TO SET COURSE FOR THE FUTURE

5. THE CHANCELLOR SAID THIS WAS A TIME OF GREAT OPPORTUNITY FOR THE UNITED STATES. FORTUNATELY FOR ALL OF US, HE SAID, PRESIDENT CLINTON IS FROM A GENERATION LESS BURDENED WITH PREJUDICES FROM WORLD WAR II AND THE COLD WAR. THE PREVIOUS U.S. ADMINISTRATION'S BELIEF THAT THE
EUROCORPS WOULD UNDERCUT NATO WAS ONE EXAMPLE OF THIS. KOHL SAID HE DEEPLY DISAGREED WITH THE "OLD THINKING" OF PEOPLE LIKE DICK CHENEY ON THESE MATTERS.

6. WE NEED A HOUSE, THE CHANCELLOR WENT ON, IN WHICH WE CAN ALL MAINTAIN SEPARATE APARTMENTS. ONLY THEN CAN THERE BE A COMMUNITY.

TAKING THE MESSAGE TO CENTRAL EUROPE

7. ONE IMPORTANT TASK WHICH WE SHOULD UNDERTAKE IS MAKING CLEAR TO THOSE IN CENTRAL EUROPE HOW ADJUSTMENT IN OUR SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AFFECTS THEM. KOHL EMPHASIZED THERE IS NO SIMPLE RECIPE FOR DEALING WITH CENTRAL EUROPE - WE MUST STOP REFERRING, HE ADDED, TO THAT REGION AS "EASTERN EUROPE."


OLD FEARS IN CENTRAL EUROPE

9. KOHL EMPHASIZED THAT ANY NEW FORMS OF INTERNAL COOPERATION IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION WILL LEAD TO INCREASING ANXIETY IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IN THIS REGARD, POLAND AND HUNGARY ARE PSYCHOLOGICALLY THE MOST AFFECTED. HUNGARY WORRIES ABOUT ITS PROXIMITY TO THE BALKANS AND THE FATE OF HUNGARIAN MINORITIES THERE AND IN SLOVAKIA, AS WELL AS ROMANIA.

10. POLAND IS EVEN MORE CRITICAL. SOMETIMES WE FAIL TO APPRECIATE TO WHAT EXTENT POLAND LOOKS WARILY AT BOTH GERMANY AND THE EAST. KOHL RECOUNTED THAT THE NEW POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER HAD COME TO SEE HIM IN AUGUST. THE POLISH FM OPENED THE MEETING BY SHOWING KOHL A POLISH NEWSPAPER FEATURING A PICTURE OF KOHL EMBRACING YELTSIN. THE HEADLINE READ "WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR POLAND?" WHETHER IRRATIONAL OR NOT, THE POLES WILL ALWAYS OBSERVE VERY CLOSELY WHETHER RUSSIA AND GERMANY ARE MAKING ARRANGEMENTS TO THE DETRIMENT OF POLAND.

11. IT IS FOR THIS REASON, KOHL SAYS, THAT POLAND IS SO EAGER TO JOIN NATO, AND THE POLES DO NOT CARE AT ALL WHAT PRICE WE MAY HAVE TO PAY TO MOSCOW AS A RESULT.

INEQUITIES IN EUROPEAN DEFENSE

12. KOHL NOTED THAT THE MAASTRICHT INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE WOULD TAKE PLACE IN 1996. EUROPE HAD TO WORK TO CONSOLIDATE RECENT EXPANSION BEFORE PROCEEDING TOO QUICKLY WITH EXPANSION TO THE EAST. BY 1996 AT THE LATEST, EUROPEANS MUST ASK EXPLICITLY: WHAT CONTRIBUTION ARE THE EU NATIONS, INCLUDING ITS NEWER MEMBERS, WILLING TO MAKE TO EUROPEAN SECURITY?

13. THERE ARE CURRENTLY CERTAIN "PECULIARITIES," KOHL SAID, COMPLICATING EU AND NATO EXPANSION. IRELAND COMES
TO MIND, HE SAID. IT IS A COUNTRY WHERE YOUNG MEN DO NOT NECESSARILY SERVE IN THE MILITARY. EVEN WORSE, FROM THE GERMAN POINT OF VIEW, IS THE POSITION OF AUSTRIA. WHILE IT MAY MAKE LITTLE DIFFERENCE FROM A PURELY MILITARY POINT OF VIEW WHETHER AUSTRIAN FORCES JOIN A EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMPONENT, PSYCHOLOGICALLY IT IS VERY IMPORTANT, KOHL INSISTED. GERMANY AND AUSTRIA SHARE A LONG BORDER AND A COMMON LANGUAGE. MANY AUSTRIANS HAVE LEADING POSITIONS IN GERMANY. YOUNG GERMANS CANNOT HELP BUT ASK THEMSELVES WHY THEY SHOULD GET DRAFTED WHEN YOUNG PEOPLE RIGHT ACROSS THE AUSTRIAN BORDER DO NOT. KOHL ADDED THAT HE HAD ALREADY HEARD SUCH COMPLAINTS AND EXPECTED THEM TO INCREASE.

14. According to Kohl, the defense component of the European Union must begin to take real shape by 1996 at the latest, with all participating. Hungary, for example, would immediately contribute militarily if admitted. 15. Kohl predicted that Switzerland would be an EU member by the year 2000. The Swiss are now "crying large tears," as they worry about being excluded from a united Europe. Kohl said he was in constant demand ("pestered" even) in Switzerland. In fact he had recently been on prime time Swiss television for an hour and twenty minutes, speaking on possible Swiss membership in the EU.

-------------------------------------------
NATO MORE INDISPENSABLE THAN EVER
-------------------------------------------

16. Kohl said the European Union could not deal with its defense component without the U.S. It had to bring NATO along with it. Integration with NATO was indispensable for the EU. Kohl particularly emphasized, and repeated later at several points during the conversation, that an American must continue to be the Supreme Commander of NATO, even though others in Europe may not agree.

-------------------------------------------
FRANCE'S CHANGING ATTITUDE TOWARD NATO
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17. Kohl noted a shift in French attitudes toward NATO, even in Mitterand, who, he said has gradually adopted a middle-of-the-road position on France's involvement in NATO. In the old days, Kohl joked, Mitterand had put on his "Buddha face" whenever NATO was mentioned 18. Mitterand is now older and "milder." Kohl believes Mitterand would move France back into NATO within the next four years if he stayed in office. But in any case, France needs to learn to live with changing realities. The Germans are back, he said. Interestingly, he never mentioned the British.

19. Kohl went on to caution that the French will expect a "sign" of some sort as price for moving closer to NATO. This is another reason to be absolutely firm about having an American as Supreme Commander of NATO, so there should be no discussion at all of changing this.

20. Kohl concluded by saying that he looked forward to a "personal visit" with the President in either Washington or Camp David this fall after the U.S. and German elections -- a trip he said he had discussed directly with the President. He was in a highly confident mood after the Berlin farewell ceremonies, and clearly felt that he
NOT ONLY WAS NOW THE DOMINANT FIGURE IN EUROPE BUT THAT
HIS ELECTION PROSPECTS WERE LOOKING VERY GOOD. (NOTE:
HIS LEAD IN MOST POLLS IS STILL, HOWEVER, FAIRLY NARROW,
AND RESTS
AT ABOUT THE MARGIN OF ERROR.) COVEY
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<th>DATE</th>
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**COLLECTION:**
- Clinton Presidential Records
- NSC Cables
- Jan 1993-Dec 1994
- OA/Box Number: 505000

**FOLDER TITLE:**
- [09/03/1993-11/03/1994]

**RESTRICTION CODES**

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Cable

SUBJ: INTER-AGENCY PRESENTATION ON NATO - GERMANY

TEXT:  

CONFIDENTIAL  BONN 26966

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MILADDEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PARM, MARR, NATO, GM
SUBJECT: INTER-AGENCY PRESENTATION ON NATO - GERMANY

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. INTER-AGENCY TEAM LED BY UR/RPM DIRECTOR CUNNINGHAM AND OSD NATO DIRECTOR JUHL, ACCOMPANIED BY DCM AND USNATO REPS, REVIEWED INITIAL U.S. THINKING ON THE "HOW" AND "WHY" OF NATO EXPANSION, AND DISCUSSED NEXT STEPS WITH CHANCELLERY DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR BERTRAM, FOREIGN OFFICE DEPUTY POLITICAL DIRECTOR KLAIBER, AND MOD REPS ON OCT. 31.

3. CUNNINGHAM SUGGESTED THAT THE U.S. PRESENTATION MIGHT FORM THE BASIS FOR NATO PERMREPS BRAINSTORMING ON THE "HOW" OF EXPANSION IN ABOUT TWO WEEKS. THE NAC MINISTERIAL COULD THEN MANDATE FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSION AND DEVELOPMENT OF AN ALLIANCE PRESENTATION ON THESE LINES. THE NAC COULD ALSO STATE THAT THE ALLIANCE INTENDED TO BEGIN A DIALOGUE WITH PARTNERS IN 1995.

4. THE INITIAL GERMAN RESPONSE WAS CAUTIOUS. KLAIBER QUESTIONED THE NEED TO MOVE SO QUICKLY, AND Pressed THE QUESTION OF RUSSIA'S REACTION. BERTRAM TOLD CUNNINGHAM AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE DISCUSSION THAT HE COULD NOT (YET) COMMIT GERMANY TO THIS APPROACH. EARLIER, DURING THE
DISCUSSION, HE HAD ASKED WHY THE DISCUSSION HAD TO BEGIN THIS FALL? WASN'T IT TOO EARLY TO GO PUBLIC WITH ALLIANCE DISCUSSION? SHOULDN'T LEADERS REACH AGREEMENT FIRST ON THE "WHO"? THERE WERE ALSO QUESTIONS FROM OTHER PARTICIPANTS ABOUT THE RUSSIAN REACTION AND ABOUT HOW THE STEPS WOULD BE COORDINATED WITH STEPS IN THE EU AND WEU. THE GERMANS BELIEVED THAT AN INTERCONNECTION BETWEEN NATO AND EU EXPANSION SHOULD BE MAINTAINED, AND OPINED THAT EU EXPANSION WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED RELATIVELY EARLY (1998-99), WITH A LONG ECONOMIC AND LEGISLATIVE TRANSITION TO FOLLOW.

5. NOTING THAT STEPS TO BROADEN THE CONTEXT WOULD BE TAKEN IN THE EU, WEU, AND CSCE, CUNNINGHAM REPLIED THAT THE STEPS WE WERE PROPOSING IN NATO WERE PART OF AN OVERALL PROCESS OF ADDRESSING EUROPEAN SECURITY CONCERNS. THE NATO STEPS WOULD AT THE SAME TIME ADDRESS THE CONCERNS OF THE CEE STATES THAT WANTED TO BECOME MEMBERS OF NATO AND DEMONSTRATE TO RUSSIA, UKRAINE AND OTHERS HOW WE INTEND TO PROCEED AND THAT OUR ULTIMATE GOAL IS STABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE. WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT TO MAKE CLEAR THAT BOTH THE PROCESS OF NATO EXPANSION AND THE BROADER PROCESS OF CONTINUING THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPE'S SECURITY STRUCTURES ARE UNDERWAY.

6. KLAIBER, WHO UNEXPECTEDLY HAD TO LEAVE EARLY TO CHAIR A STABILITY PACT ROUNDTABLE FORAILING AMBASSADOR CITRON, TOLD DCM AND CUNNINGHAM THAT HE THOUGHT THE PROPOSED "FRAMEWORK PRINCIPLES" WERE A GOOD BASIS UPON WHICH TO PROCEED. CHANCELLERY ADVISER KISCHLAT SEEMED RELIEVED TO LEARN THAT THE U.S. ONLY ENVISAGED ALLIANCE DISCUSSION OF THE "HOW" AND "WHY."

7. IN SUM, THE GERMANS SEEMED WILLING TO BEGIN INTRA-ALLIANCE DISCUSSIONS, PLACED GREAT STORE IN DISCUSSING THE EU/NATO RELATIONSHIP, THE EFFECT OF EXPANSION ON RUSSIA, AND ARE STILL VERY RELUCTANT TO BEGIN CONTACTS WITH POTENTIAL PARTNERS (DESPITE THE CLARIFICATION THAT WE HAD IN MIND A NATO-AGREED PRESENTATION AVAILABLE TO ALL PARTNERS, AND SAW REAL DANGERS WITH INDEFINITE DELAY). THEY AGREED WE SHOULD BEGIN BRAINSTORMING SESSIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AND WORK ON NAC COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE.

8. GERMAN PARTICIPANTS IN THE BRIEFING, BESIDES BERTRAM, KLAIBER, AND KISCHLAT, WERE FOREIGN OFFICE ACTING NATO DIRECTOR ULRICH, WEU DIRECTOR WEGENER, CSCE DIRECTOR HONSONITZ, AND TWO MOD JOINT STAFF OFFICERS, COLONEL SAMMET AND MAJOR VOLLMER.

9. COMMENT: THE GERMANS HAVE PROMISED TO PROVIDE FURTHER COMMENTS BY THE END OF THE WEEK. IN THE WAKE OF THE KINKEL-RUEHE EXCHANGE DURING THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN, KOHL INSTRUCTED ALL HIS MINISTERS AND THEIR MINISTRIES TO AVOID PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF NATO EXPANSION AND TO PURSUE THE MATTER FIRST IN BILATERAL TALKS LIKE THESE, THEN DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH CLOSE ALLIES, AND FINALLY TAKE IT UP AT NATO. THE CHANCELLOR HAS DECLARED THIS QUESTION "A MATTER FOR HEADS OF GOVERNMENT" ("EINE CHEFSACHE") AND EXPECTS
THEM TO DECIDE IT.
REDMAN
BT
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<td>re: The Secretary's Meeting with Polish PM Pawlak</td>
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<td>004. cable</td>
<td>re: PM Horn Welcomes NATO Expansion Plans</td>
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<tr>
<td>005. cable</td>
<td>re: Dialogue with Prime Minister Horn at Spanish Embassy</td>
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<tr>
<td>006. cable</td>
<td>re: Presidential Aide Says Yeltsin Angered…</td>
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<tr>
<td>007. cable</td>
<td>re: Clinton-Kohl Telecon of September 23, 1995</td>
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<tr>
<td>008. cable</td>
<td>re: Memcon: President Clinton's Meeting with President Iliescu</td>
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<td>009. cable</td>
<td>re: Change in Style not Substance in Poland's Campaign for NATO Membership</td>
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<td>010. cable</td>
<td>re: Responding to President Chirac's Call for an Agreement with Russia</td>
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<td>011. cable</td>
<td>re: Slovakia: Kramer Fells Kuchar No Benefit</td>
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P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor’s deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
A/S HOLBROOKE BRIEFS PM PAWLAK ON NATO EXPANSION; URGES GREATER POLITICAL STABILITY

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT

SUMMARY

2. NATO WILL EXPAND AND POLAND AND OTHER INTERESTED PARTNERS WILL RECEIVE IN THE SECOND HALF OF 1995 A BRIEFING ON HOW EXPANSION WILL WORK, A/S HOLBROOKE TOLD PAWLAK JANUARY 26. POLAND SHOULD BUILD AN ESPECIALLY CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH GERMANY TO MOVE THE PROCESS ALONG, HE SAID. HE URGED PAWLAK TO IMPROVE POLAND'S FOREIGN IMAGE BY COMING TO QUICK AGREEMENT WITH WALESA ON THE VACANT FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTRIES. HE URGED THAT THE PRIME MINISTER SPEED UP THE PROCESS OF PRIVATIZATION TO ENSURE POLAND'S CONTINUED ECONOMIC RECOVERY. END SUMMARY.

NATO EXPANSION

3. A/S HOLBROOKE MET THE PRIME MINISTER IN WARSAW BEFORE TRAVELLING TO KRAKOW TO TAKE PART IN CEREMONIES MARKING THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE LIBERATION OF AUSCHWITZ.
PAWLAK OPENED THE MEETING BY CITING HIS GOVERNMENT’S ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN 1994, INCLUDING:

- Economic growth of 4.5%, that could improve to 5% and more in 1995;
- A 9% cut in the inflation rate;
- Improved situation in the international bond market following the conclusion of the London and Paris Club negotiations;
- Poland’s accession to NATO’s partnership for peace and European Union association status; and
- Poland’s membership in the new World Trade Organization.

4. A/S HOLBROOKE NOTED THAT 1994 ALSO MARKED THE YEAR IN WHICH NATO COMMITTED TO EXPANSION, AND THAT POLAND WOULD BE A LIKELY BENEFICIARY OF THAT DECISION. IN THE SECOND HALF OF 1995, HE SAID POLAND WOULD RECEIVE A NATO BRIEFING IN WARSAW ON HOW THE EXPANSION PROCESS WILL WORK. HE SAID THAT THE CONSULTATION PROCESS WOULD BE DIFFICULT. AFTER THE UNITED STATES, GERMANY WOULD BE THE MOST CRITICAL NATO ALLY IN DETERMINING THE PACE OF NATO EXPANSION. HE URGED THAT POLAND DEVELOP A CLOSER WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE GERMAN DEFENSE AND FOREIGN MINISTRIES, AS WELL AS WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL’S OFFICE. PAWLAK NOTED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD DEVOTED MANY EFFORTS TO ESTABLISHING AN EXCELLENT WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH GERMANY.

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POLAND’S DOMESTIC POLITICAL STABILITY
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5. WHILE THE NATO EXPANSION DEBATE TAKES SHAPE, A/S HOLBROOKE SAID POLAND COULD HELP THE PROCESS ALONG BY ENSURING DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF THE MILITARY AND MAINTAINING POLITICAL STABILITY. ALTHOUGH THE VACANCIES IN POLAND’S FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTRIES ARE INTERNAL MATTERS, HE NOTED THE IMPACT THEY HAVE ON POLAND’S FOREIGN IMAGE. HE SAID THAT THE VACANCIES COMBINED WITH RECENT TALK ABOUT THE POSSIBLE DISSOLUTION OF POLAND’S PARLIAMENT HAD RAISED CONCERNS ABOUT POLAND’S STABILITY, AND THAT WOULD HAVE A DIRECT IMPACT ON THE NATO DEBATE.

6. PAWLAK SAID POLAND’S POLITICAL SYSTEM IS SIMILAR TO FRANCE’S AND THAT CONFLICT BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND GOVERNMENT IS INEVITABLE. HE ASCRIBED THE MINISTERIAL VACANCIES TO POLAND’S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION POLITICS, BUT HE SAID THAT POLITICAL INFIGHTING LEAVES POLAND’S FOREIGN POLICY UNCHANGED. HE SAID THAT RECENT TENSIONS BETWEEN THE DEFENSE MINISTRY AND THE GENERAL STAFF HAD DISAPPEARED AND THAT NOW THE UNIFORMED MILITARY IS CONCENTRATING ON "DOING ITS JOB." HE NOTED THAT POLAND HAD SUCCESSFULLY NEGOTIATED FRIENDSHIP TREATIES WITH ALL OF ITS NEIGHBORS, AND THAT IT SUFFERS FROM NO PROBLEMS WITH ETHNIC MINORITIES. "POLAND IS THE MOST STABLE COUNTRY IN THE REGION," HE SAID.
PRIVATIZATION

7. THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY ALSO NOTED SERIOUS CONCERNS IN THE WEST ABOUT THE DEPTH OF THE PAWLAK GOVERNMENT'S COMMITMENT TO PRIVATIZATION. He urged that Pawlak accelerate the mass privatization program and bank privatization process slated for March. Pawlak said that privatization in Poland in 1994 had produced more revenue than ever before, and that the process would continue this year.

8. Pawlak closed the meeting with a detailed review of Poland's defense priorities. He asserted Poland's interest in acquiring F-16's, which he said are a key element of Poland's plans to develop its military. He said other elements include an enhanced air defense system that features a mid- and long-range missile defense system, and a strong anti-tank defense force. In that regard, Pawlak expressed gratitude for the recent U.S. decision to license Martin-Marietta's sale of Gatling guns for Polish helicopters.

COMMENT

9. Pawlak seemed intent on proving groundless foreign minister Olechowski's recent charges that Pawlak is tilting away from the West. He has obviously worked hard to develop fluency in military matters and seems to desire an active role in charting Poland's growing military cooperation with the West. Re: #1304
SIT: FRIED HARRIS KERRICK NSC SCHIFTER WITKOWSKY
Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
LINE1: OAACYUW RUEHCAG1006 0380208-CCCC--RHEHAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 0702032 FEB 95 ZFF6
LINE4: FM SECGATE WASHDC
OSRI: RUEHC
DTG: 0702032 FEB 95
ORIG: SECGATE WASHDC
TO: AMEMBASS WARSZAW IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO: // /
SUBJ: THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH POLISH PM PAWLAK

TEXT:

CONFIDENTIAL STATE 031006

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PRL PARM, PL
SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH POLISH PM PAWLAK

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY:
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2. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER AND POLISH PM PAWLAK MET FOR ONE HOUR ON FEBRUARY 2. THE SECRETARY REVIEWED US INTENTIONS ON NATO EXPANSION NOTING THAT NATO WOULD BRIEF INTERESTED PPP MEMBERS IN 1995. THE PRIME MINISTER EMPHASIZED THAT THERE WAS FULL CONSENSUS IN POLAND ON THE MAIN DIRECTION AND OBJECTIVES OF POLISH FOREIGN POLICY ACCESSION TO NATO AND THE EU. THE SECRETARY WELCOMED POLAND'S COMMITMENTS TO STOP ARMS TRADE WITH IRAN, BUT NOTED THAT WE HAD SOME RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO THEIR PROPOSED LETTER TO THE VICE PRESIDENT THAT WOULD SERVE TO CLARIFY THAT COMMITMENT. ALSO, HE EXPLAINED, WE WOULD LIKE POLAND TO MAKE A PUBLIC COMMITMENT ABOUT BANNING FUTURE SALES, BUT IT NEED NOT BE AN EXPOSE OF PAST SALES OR CONTRACTS. PAWLAK REJECTED NEITHER SUGGESTION, BUT SAID LAWYERS ON BOTH SIDES MUST WORK TO REACH A "GOOD PRECISE FORMULATION." THE SECRETARY SUGGESTED THAT THIS ISSUE SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO THE WHITE HOUSE BY THE TIME OF THE VISIT OF THE POLISH (ACTING) DEFENSE MINISTER ON FEBRUARY 17. THE PRIME MINISTER APPEALED FOR INCREASED COOPERATION BETWEEN THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES IN ORDER TO HELP SOLVE SOME OF THE PROBLEMS STEMMING FROM THE IRAN TRADE ISSUE. PAWLAK EMPHASIZED THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF POLAND HAD ALREADY DECIDED TO STOP SUCH TRADE AND THE MECHANISMS FOR DOING SO WERE IN PLACE. ACCOMPANYING THE
PRIME MINISTER WERE JERZY KOZMINSKI POLISH AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S.; ANDRZEJ WIECZORKIEWICZ, UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE AND FRANCISZEK MLECZKO, CHIEF ADVISOR TO THE PM. PARTICIPATING WITH THE SECRETARY WERE EUR A/S RICHARD HOLBROOK AND T U/S DAVIS. END SUMMARY.

DOMESTIC POLITICS
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3. AFTER A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE PRAYER BREAKFAST EVENT, SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER NOTED THAT WE WERE WATCHING WITH GREAT INTEREST POLISH POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE SECRETARY SAID, WE WERE KEEPING A PROPER IMPARTIALITY. OUR INTEREST DURING THIS TURBULENT PERIOD WAS SIMPLY TO ENSURE THAT THE POLISH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN AND RELATED POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS DID NOT THREATEN THE DEMOCRATIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION PROCESSES THAT WERE UNDERWAY. THE PRIME MINISTER RESPONDED THAT THERE WERE NO OBJECTIVE REASONS FOR THE TURBULENCE NOW INFLECTING THE POLISH POLITICAL CLIMATE. RATHER, HE SAID, IT WAS IN THE INTEREST OF POLAND AND THE REGION THAT THESE POLITICAL TENSIONS BE ATTENUATED.

NATO EXPANSION
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5. PAWLAK WELcomed THESE "NEW FACTS" OR "NEW SIGNPOSTS" ON THE ROAD TO EXPANSION. HE NOTED THAT IN 1994 THE PFP HAD ALREADY CREATED A NEW SITUATION THAT WOULD STRENGTHEN THE MOVE TOWARD EXPANSION. RUSSIA HAD ALREADY RETREATED FROM ITS ORIGINAL POSITION, PAWLAK SAID, ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE NOT YET SAID SO PUBLICLY. HE PREDICTED THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD NOT "COMPLAIN TOO LOUDLY" IF NEW STEPS WERE TAKEN IN THAT DIRECTION. THE SECRETARY EXPLAINED THAT IN OUR OWN POLITICAL SCENE THERE WERE THOSE WHO THOUGHT WE WERE MOVING TOO RAPIDLY AND OTHERS WHO THOUGHT WE WERE MOVING TOO SLOWLY. THE POLES SHOULD NOT BE ALARMED BY DIFFERING REPORTS OF WASHINGTON VIEWS AS THESE DIFFERENT POINTS OF VIEW ARE PLAYED OUT. RATHER, WE ARE DETERMINED TO FOLLOW A DELIBERATE COURSE TOWARD NATO EXPANSION. BY KEEPING OUR LINES OF COMMUNICATION OPEN, WE CAN CLARIFY ANY REPORTS THAT MIGHT CAUSE THE POLES SOME CONCERN.

6. PAWLAK EMPHASIZED THAT, IN THE POLISH POLITICAL CONTEXT, THERE WAS NO DEBATE ABOUT THE MAIN DIRECTIONS OF POLISH FOREIGN POLICY. THAT POLICY REMAINS CLEAR AND STABLE THERE IS NO SERIOUS DISCUSSION, NO QUESTIONING OF
THE MAIN PRIORITIES OF THAT POLICY, I.E., POLISH ACCESSION TO NATO AND THE EU. THE PRIME MINISTER CONCEDED THAT IN POLAND, TOO -- AS IN THE US -- THERE WAS SOME DEBATE ABOUT APPROPRIATE SPEED TOWARD ACCESSION TO THESE INSTITUTIONS, BUT THAT THE DIRECTION AND OBJECTIVES WERE "ABSOLUTELY NOT QUESTIONS."

ARMS SALES TO IRAN

7. TURNING TO THE ISSUE OF POLISH ARMS SALES TO IRAN, SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER SAID THAT WE WERE "PLEASED AND GRATEFUL" FOR THE LETTER THE PRIME MINISTER HAD PROPOSED TO GIVE TO THE VICE PRESIDENT IN WHICH POLAND UNDERTOOK TO STOP ARMS SALES TO IRAN. THE SECRETARY SAID THIS WAS A VERY IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD AND WE WERE GRATEFUL FOR THE COOPERATION IT REFLECTS. HE NOTED THAT OUR EXPERTS HAD SOME MINOR SUGGESTIONS THAT WOULD SERVE TO CLARIFY THE COMMITMENTS CONTAINED IN THE LETTER, AND ALSO THAT WE PROPOSED A PUBLIC STATEMENT BY THE POLES REFLECTING THAT COMMITMENT. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE PUBLIC STATEMENT NEED BE ONLY "PROSPECTIVE IN CHARACTER" AND NEED NOT COMMENT ON PAST CONTRACTS OR SALES. THE SECRETARY SUGGESTED THAT HE AND THE PM LEAVE IT TO THEIR COLLEAGUES TO IRON OUT THE FEW CHANGES. WE WOULD LIKE TO BRING THIS ISSUE TO A CONCLUSION NOW, WHILE THE PM IS IN WASHINGTON, THE SECRETARY SAID, BUT IF NOT, WE COULD RESOLVE THE REMAINING DETAILS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. HE NOTED THAT THE POLISH (ACTING) DEFENSE MINISTER WAS TO BE IN WASHINGTON IN TWO WEEKS TIME AND SUGGESTED THAT THAT WOULD BE AN APPROPRIATE TARGET DATE TO REACH AGREEMENT.

8. IN RESPONSE, THE PRIME MINISTER COMPLAINED MILDLY THAT "SOME AMERICAN INTENTIONS" HAD NOT BEEN EXPRESSED CLEARLY ENOUGH. UNTIL YESTERDAY, HE SAID, HE HAD UNDERSTOOD THAT WE REQUIRED COMMITMENTS CONCERNING ONLY THIS ONE CONTRACT WITH IRAN. NOW HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE LETTER WAS A "PRETEXT FOR COOPERATION." PAWLAK SAID HE MUST DISCUSS THE LEGAL DETAILS OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES WITH HIS EXPERTS. HE SAID HE WOULD "LOOK AT THE DOCUMENTS WITH OUR LAWYERS, THEN FINALIZE IT." HE WANTED POLAND AND THE US TO "PAINT A PICTURE OF THE FUTURE JOINTLY." CONCERNING THE PROPOSED PUBLIC STATEMENT, PAWLAK SAID THAT HE "UNDERSTOOD THE MAIN INTENTION OF THE STATEMENT IS TO EXPRESS CONCERN WITH REFERENCE TO COUNTRIES CONSIDERED SENSITIVE. I THINK WE CAN TRY TO AGREE ON THIS," HE SAID, "SO WE CAN HAVE A GOOD PRECISE FORMULATION."

HELP FOR DEFENSE INDUSTRIES

9. THE PRIME MINISTER ALSO NOTED THAT ENHANCED COOPERATION WITH THE US DEFENSE INDUSTRIES COULD HELP SOLVE THE PROBLEMS STEMMING FROM THE ISSUE OF CEASING ARMS TRADE WITH IRAN. HE SAID THAT POLAND WAS INTERESTED IN AGREEMENTS WITH THE US THAT WOULD BRING ABOUT SOME "CONCRETE COOPERATION" BETWEEN THE ARMS INDUSTRIES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES. HE HAD HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK WITH DEFENSE INDUSTRY REPRESENTATIVES DURING HIS TRIP HERE AND SAW SOME CHANCES FOR INCREASED COOPERATION. PAWLAK HOPED

10. PAWLAK EXPLAINED THAT THE "MECHANISM" FOR CONTROL OF SALES OF WEAPONS AND TECHNOLOGIES TO COUNTRIES OF CONCERN HAD ALREADY BEEN INTRODUCED BY THE POLISH GOVERNMENT AND WAS A SYSTEM OF "TIGHT CONTROL." HE SUGGESTED THAT THE TWO SIDES SHOULD ARRIVE AT A "MORE PRECISE" MEANS OF CONSULTATION IN CASES WHERE TRANSFERS WERE ALLEGED SO THAT ANY DOUBTS COULD BE RESOLVED BY CONTACTS BETWEEN OUR "SPECIAL SERVICES." CHRISTOPHER

BT
#1006

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01
SSN: 1006
TOR: 950206212650 M1500173
DIST:
PRT: SIT
SIT: BELL BURNS FRIED SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW WHSR_SPECIAL
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PRL, ECON, EINV, PHUM, NATO, HU, RO
SUBJECT: EUR ASSISTANT SECRETARY A/S HOLBROOKE'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ILIESCU

REF: BUCHAREST 2010

1. **CONFIDENTIAL** -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. EUR ASSISTANT SECRETARY RICHARD HOLBROOKE MET FOR ABOUT AN HOUR WITH PRESIDENT ION ILIESCU AT COTROCENI PALACE ON FEBRUARY 23. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE U.S. GAVE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE TO ITS RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL EUROPE. FOR THE LONG TERM, WE WERE SEEKING A EUROPE WHOSE INSTITUTIONS COVERED THE SAME TERRITORY AS THE EUROPE OF THE MAP, ALTHOUGH THE TIMETABLE WOULD VARY FROM INSTITUTION TO INSTITUTION.

3. WHEN A/S HOLBROOKE NOTED THAT THERE REMAINED SOME MISGIVINGS IN WASHINGTON WHICH COULD HAMPER THE ADMINISTRATION'S PLANS TO EXTEND MULTI-YEAR MFN TO ROMANIA, ILIESCU REACTED DEFENSIVELY AND SAID THAT THE U.S. DISCRIMINATED AGAINST HIS COUNTRY, A CHARGE WHICH A/S HOLBROOKE DENIED.

4. MOST OF THE REST OF THE MEETING WAS SPENT ON QUESTIONS RELATING TO NATO ENLARGEMENT, IN WHICH ROMANIA HAS A STRONG INTEREST, AND RELATIONS WITH HUNGARY AND THE SITUATION OF ROMANIA'S ETHNIC HUNGARIAN MINORITY. IT WAS MADE PLAIN TO ILIESCU THAT UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS IN EITHER AREA WOULD HAMPER ROMANIA'S CHANCES OF JOINING NATO. THE PRESIDENT, AS HE OFTEN DOES ON SUCH OCCASIONS, DESCRIBED AND
DEFENDED THE ROMANIAN POSITION AT LENGTH. A/S HOLBROOKE OBSERVED THAT, AS IN OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE AREA WHICH HAD EXPERIENCED DIFFICULT AND COMPLEX PASTS, ROMANIA WOULD NEED TO CHOOSE WHETHER TO COME TO TERMS WITH ITS HISTORY AND MOVE AHEAD, OR ELSE BE DOMINATED BY IT. IF THE LATTER APPROACH WERE FOLLOWED, ONE WOULD INEVITABLY ARRIVE AT THE KINDS OF SITUATIONS REPRESENTED BY BOSNIA, NORTHERN IRELAND, AND LEBANON. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM A/S HOLBROOKE, THE PRESIDENT EXPLAINED THAT MISGUIDED PATRIOTISM AND ANTI-RUSSIA SENTIMENTS, ESPECIALLY AMONG VETERANS' GROUPS, WERE LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE EFFORTS TO REHABILITATE MARSHAL ANTONESCU, EFFORTS WHICH HE HAD PUBLICLY OPPOSED AS DAMAGING TO ROMANIA'S INTERESTS.

5. IN THE LAST OF HIS FOUR OFFICIAL CALLS IN BUCHAREST, EUR ASSISTANT SECRETARY RICHARD HOLBROOKE WAS ACCOMPANYED BY AMBASSADOR MOSES, NSC DIRECTOR DAN FRIED, EUR/NCE DIRECTOR TERRY SNELL, EUR SPECIAL ASSISTANT ROSEMARIE PAULI-GIKAS, AND THE DCM (NOTETAKER). ON THE ROMANIAN SIDE WERE FOREIGN MINISTER TEODOR MELESCANU, PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR AMBASSADOR TRAIAN CHELBELEU, AND MFA NORTH AMERICA DIRECTOR GHEORGHE DUTA.

THE TOP PRIORITY THE ECONOMY, ESPECIALLY PRIVATIZATION AND FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT

6. A/S HOLBROOKE SAID HE WAS DISTURBED BY THE RELATIVELY SMALL AMOUNT OF U.S. PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN ROMANIA THUS FAR, UNDER USD 150 MILLION. THE OPPORTUNITIES AVAILABLE WERE NOT WIDELY KNOWN. MOREOVER, OTHER CENTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAD BEEN ABLE TO CREATE MORE OPEN ECONOMIES, REDUCE BUREAUCRACY, AND PRIVATIZE MORE BROADLY. HOLBROOKE THOUGHT THAT THE WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND INVESTMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE IN CLEVELAND IN JANUARY HAD BEEN A HELPFUL STEP IN OPENING THE WAY TO EXPANDED BILATERAL TRADE AND GREATER U.S. INVESTMENT IN ROMANIA. HE SAW THE FACT THAT PARLIAMENT HAD OVERSIGHT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PRIVATE OWNERSHIP FUND (POF) AND STATE OWNERSHIP FUND (SOF) AS FACTORS INHIBITING SPEEDIER PRIVATIZATION.

7. THE PRESIDENT RESPONDED THAT, UNLIKE ROMANIA, HUNGARY HAD STARTED LIBERALIZING ITS ECONOMY OVER 20 YEARS AGO. ALTHOUGH ROMANIA HAD BEEN THE FIRST WARSAW PACT COUNTRY TO OPEN ITS ECONOMIC DOORS TO THE WEST, IN THE 1960'S, IT LATER ADOPTED PERHAPS THE MOST RESTRICTIVE, HIGHLY-CENTRALIZED ECONOMIC SYSTEM IN THE REGION. THAT MADE GENUINE ECONOMIC REFORM MORE DIFFICULT TODAY -- THE LEGAL PROVISIONS, ECONOMIC STRUCTURES, AND ESPECIALLY MENTALITY ALL HAD TO CHANGE. MUCH HAD ALREADY BEEN DONE IN THE
FIRST TWO AREAS, BUT THE "OLD MENTALITY" FACTOR SLOWED THE RATE OF CHANGE. THE OTHER GREAT NEED WAS FOR FOREIGN CAPITAL -- NEITHER THE STATE NOR THE DOMESTIC PRIVATE SECTOR HAD THE CAPITAL NECESSARY TO TRANSFORM THE ECONOMY. NEVERTHELESS, THERE HAD BEEN PROGRESS SINCE 1989. FOR EXAMPLE, ABOUT HALF A MILLION NEW PRIVATE ECONOMIC ENTITIES HAD APPEARED, ALREADY, ARREARS NUMEROUS ADJUSTMENT MEETING THE MEDIAN-SIZED HOPES TO COMPLETE. TROUBLESOME. UNEMPLOYMENT NOW ACCOUNTED FOR ABOUT ONE-THIRD OF GDP, AND 82 PERCENT OF AGRICULTURAL LAND WAS NOW IN PRIVATE HANDS.

8. ANOTHER BENEFIT FROM THE RISE IN PRIVATE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, IBLIESCU SAID, WAS THE NUMEROUS NEW JOBS IT CREATED. OTHERWISE, ROMANIA'S CURRENT UNEMPLOYMENT (AROUND 11 PERCENT) WOULD HAVE BEEN MUCH WORSE. UNEMPLOYMENT AND INFLATION, VIRTUALLY UNKNOWN BEFORE 1990, HAD BEEN THE BIGGEST PSYCHOLOGICAL SHOCKS TO THE POPULATION SINCE THE REVOLUTION. PEOPLE HAD BEEN LARGELY SHIELDED FROM BOTH PHENOMENA DURING THE COMMUNIST PERIOD. SINCE THEN, THE ECONOMIC CIRCUMSTANCES OF MANY PEOPLE HAD BECOME WORSE, RATHER THAN BETTER, WHICH WAS VERY DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO ACCEPT. A PSYCHOLOGICAL ADJUSTMENT WAS REQUIRED, AND IT WAS STILL GOING ON.

9. WHILE ROMANIA'S ECONOMY PRESENTED SOME ELEMENTS OF MACROECONOMIC STABILITY, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT NUMEROUS PROBLEMS PERSISTED. FOR EXAMPLE, MANY (STATE) ENTERPRISES HAD BECOME DECAPITALIZED DUE TO INFLATION AND OTHER FACTORS. INTER-ENTERPRISE ARREARS AND THE RESULTING FINANCIAL BLOCKAGES WERE TROUBLESOME. RESTRUCTURING WAS ONGOING BUT FAR FROM COMPLETE. RESTARTING THE ECONOMY AND PROMOTING ECONOMIC REFORM REMAINED "OUR BIGGEST PROBLEMS," HE SAID.

10. IBLIESCU DESCRIBED THE MASS PRIVATIZATION BILL CURRENTLY BEFORE THE HOUSE OF DEPUTIES, WHICH HE HOPED WOULD BE PASSED SOON AND HELP MOVE PRIVATIZATION AHEAD. ALTHOUGH ABOUT 1,000 SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED STATE ENTERPRISES HAD BEEN PRIVATIZED ALREADY, THE LARGE ONES HAD NOT. IN THE ABSENCE OF LOCAL CAPITAL, FOREIGN INVESTMENT WOULD BE NEEDED TO ACHIEVE SUCCESSFUL PRIVATIZATION. THE GOVERNMENT WAS LOOKING FOR WAYS IN WHICH TO ENCOURAGE SUCH INVESTMENT. THE "FREE ZONE" BEING SET UP AT CONSTANTA, WHERE FOREIGN INVESTORS WOULD HAVE ALL THE NECESSARY FACILITIES PLUS VARIOUS TAX ADVANTAGES, WAS ONE SUCH MECHANISM. RECAPITULATING, THE PRESIDENT ASSERTED THAT THE RELATIONS BETWEEN PARLIAMENT AND THE POP AND SOF, BUREAUCRACY, AND
CORRUPTION WERE ALL PROBLEMS FOR THE ECONOMY. HOWEVER, THE GREATEST BARRIER OF ALL WAS THE LACK OF CAPITAL AND "FINANCIAL BLOCKAGES."

11. A/S HOLBROOKE ADVISED THAT TO ATTRACT FOREIGN CAPITAL, ROMANIA SHOULD IDENTIFY AND COPY THE MOST SUCCESSFUL, RELEVANT MODELS. WE WANTED TO ASSIST WITH PRIVATIZATION, AN AREA IN WHICH ROMANIA LAGGED BEHIND ITS CENTRAL EUROPEAN NEIGHBORS. AMBASSADOR MOSES, WITH HIS VAST EXPERIENCE AS A CORPORATE LAWYER, COULD BE VERY HELPFUL. THE ADMINISTRATION WANTED TO "GRADUATE" ROMANIA TO MULTI-YEAR MFN STATUS, WHICH ALSO WOULD HELP. HOWEVER, THERE WERE SOME OBSTACLES, SOME QUESTIONS BEING ASKED ABOUT ROMANIA IN CONGRESS AND ELSEWHERE IN WASHINGTON.

ILIESCU BELIEVES ROMANIA DISCRIMINATED AGAINST BY THE U.S.

12. PRESIDENT ILIESCU RESPONDED THAT HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE EXISTENCE OF AN ANTI-ROMANIAN LOBBY IN WASHINGTON. PEOPLE THERE PICKED ON ROMANIA BUT DID NOT DO SO WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN OR SOME OTHER LEADERS IN REGION AND THEIR COUNTRIES WHICH WERE LESS DEMOCRATIC THAN ROMANIA. HE CONSIDERED THAT STRANGE AND UNFAIR.

MORE ON NATO ENLARGEMENT

13. STATING THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED NATO ENLARGEMENT EXTENSIVELY WITH FOREIGN MINISTER MELESCANU EARLIER, A/S HOLBROOKE SAID HE WISHED TO UNDERSCORE THE FACT THAT EACH NEW MEMBER OF THE ALLIANCE WOULD HAVE TO BE APPROVED INDIVIDUALLY BY A TWO-THIRDS VOTE OF THE U.S. SENATE. THUS THE NATO ALLIANCE NOT ONLY INVOLVED COLLECTIVE GUARANTEES BUT ALSO BILATERAL TREATIES BETWEEN EACH CURRENT MEMBER AND CANDIDATE FOR MEMBERSHIP. SINCE 1949, ONLY FOUR NEW MEMBERS HAD BEEN ADMITTED -- GREECE, TURKEY, GERMANY, AND SPAIN. EVEN THOSE WHO FAVORED NATO ENLARGEMENT IN PRINCIPLE WOULD LOOK VERY CLOSETLY AT EACH NEW STATE PROPOSED FOR MEMBERSHIP. THAT WAS ONE REASON WHY IT WAS SO IMPORTANT FOR ROMANIA AND HUNGARY TO REACH A SOLID BILATERAL UNDERSTANDING.

HUNGARIAN-ROMANIAN BILATERAL RELATIONS ON COURSE

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 03 OF 05 BUCHAREST 002218

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, EINV, PHUM, NATO, HU, RO
SUBJECT: EUR ASSISTANT SECRETARY A/S HOLBROOKE'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ILIESCU
14. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT RECENT TALKS BETWEEN THE GOR AND HUNGARY HAD BEEN VERY POSITIVE. THE TWO COUNTRIES WERE INEXTRICABLY LINKED BY HISTORY AND CULTURE. WHAT THE OUTSIDE WORLD VIEWED AS THE PROBLEM BETWEEN THEM WAS IN FACT SOMETHING ARTIFICIAL PROMOTED BY THE HUNGARIAN DIASPORA, SOME EXTREME NATIONALISTS IN HUNGARY, AND ELEMENTS OF ROMANIA'S MAGYAR DEMOCRATIC UNION (UDMR). PROPAGANDA WAS ALL THAT KEPT IT ALIVE. IN REALITY, ROMANIA HAD BETTER RELATIONS AND MORE EXTENSIVE TRADE WITH HUNGARY THAN WITH ANY OF ITS OTHER NEIGHBORS. ACCORDING TO ILIESCU, ROMANIA WOULD NEVER ACCEPT THE IDEA, PROPAGATED BY SOME, THAT THE COMPLAINTS OF THE ETHNIC HUNGARIAN MINORITY IN TRANSYLVANIA CONSTITUTED THE KEY SECURITY PROBLEM IN EUROPE. WHILE THE EQUIVALENT OF ONE-THIRD OF HUNGARY'S CURRENT POPULATION CONSISTED OF ETHNIC HUNGARIANS LIVING ABROAD, THERE WERE EVEN MORE ETHNIC ROMANIANS OUTSIDE ROMANIA'S BORDERS. CERTAIN POLITICIANS IN HUNGARY PROMOTED THE CONCEPT THAT THE TREATMENT OF HUNGARIAN MINORITIES OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY'S BORDERS WAS A PROBLEM OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO EUROPE. HOWEVER, THEY WERE UNINTERESTED IN THE FATE OF OTHER SUCH EUROPEAN MINORITIES LIVING AWAY FROM THEIR "HOME" COUNTRIES. THE APPROACH OF THOSE HUNGARIAN POLITICIANS HARKED BACK TO THE "FIFTH COLUMN" TACTICS OF NAZI GERMANY IN SUCH AREAS AS THE SUDETENLAND. THAT WAS UNACCEPTABLE, AS WAS THE UDMR-PROPOSED ETHNIC AUTONOMY FOR MINORITIES. THAT WAS A POLICY WHICH RAN COUNTER TO THE MAIN TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE. IT WOULD LEAD TO SEGREGATION AND "BANTUSTANIZATION" AT A TIME WHEN EUROPE WAS MOVING TOWARD GREATER POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION. HOW WOULD THE U.S. REACT, ILIESCU ASKED, TO DEMANDS BY HISPANICS, FOR EXAMPLE, FOR ETHNIC AUTONOMY AND SELF-RULE WITHIN OUR BORDERS?

15. A/S HOLBROOKE RESPONDED THAT THE U.S. LONG HAD OPPOSED THE CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE RIGHTS. AS A COUNTRY COMPOSED OF MANY DIFFERENT MINORITIES, WE STRESSED STRICT OBSERVANCE OF INDIVIDUAL CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS AS THE BEST WAY TO ENSURE THAT THE INTERESTS OF ALL MINORITIES WERE WELL PROTECTED. HOWEVER, IN THE LAST TWENTY YEARS OR SO WE HAD CREATED A SYSTEM TO PROVIDE CERTAIN GROUPS ADDITIONAL PROTECTION BEYOND THAT THEY RECEIVED THROUGH THE OBSERVANCE OF THEIR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, BUT WITHOUT GRANTING THEM ADDITIONAL RIGHTS. DEALING FAIRLY AND EFFECTIVELY WITH DISADVANTAGED MINORITIES HAD POSED HUGE PROBLEMS FOR AMERICAN SOCIETY, AND WE DID NOT CLAIM TO HAVE FOUND ALL THE ANSWERS.

16. A/S HOLBROOKE SAID HE WELCOMED THE PRESIDENT'S EXPLANATION OF ROMANIA'S POSITION, NOTING THAT HE WAS SURE TO HEAR A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE IN
BUDAPEST, WHERE HE WOULD BE GOING SHORTLY.

CONDITIONS OF MINORITIES IN ROMANIA AND HUNGARY COMPARED

17. THE PRESIDENT SUGGESTED THAT A COMPARISON BE MADE BETWEEN THE OBSERVANCE OF ETHNIC MINORITY RIGHTS IN ROMANIA AND HUNGARY. IN ROMANIA, ALL FIFTEEN RECOGNIZED MINORITIES WERE GUARANTEED ONE MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT EACH TO REPRESENT THEIR INTERESTS IN THE LEGISLATURE. ROMANIA'S ETHNIC HUNGARIAN MINORITY NOT ONLY HAD ITS OWN POLITICAL PARTY AND FULL REPRESENTATION IN PARLIAMENT, IT ALSO HAD STATE-FUNDED SCHOOLS, HIGHER EDUCATION, THEATERS, BOOKS, RADIO, TELEVISION, NEWSPAPERS, ETC. IN THE HUNGARIAN LANGUAGE. IN HUNGARY, ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE HAD BEEN ABOUT 200,000 ETHNIC ROMANIANS IN 1918, 160,000 IN 1946, AND 10,000-20,000 TODAY. THERE WAS ONLY ONE "ROMANIAN" SCHOOL IN THE WHOLE COUNTRY, AND THE ONLY COURSES IT OFFERED IN ROMANIAN WERE IN THE ROMANIAN LANGUAGE ITSELF -- EVERYTHING ELSE WAS TAUGHT IN HUNGARIAN. IT WAS NOT FOR ROMANIA TO SAY WHETHER OR NOT THE HUNGARIAN APPROACH WAS THE CORRECT ONE FOR THAT COUNTRY. HOWEVER, ILIESCU FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT THE DEMANDS OF HUNGARIANS TO ACT DIFFERENTLY IN ROMANIA FROM WHAT THEY WERE DOING IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY.

ROMANIAN-HUNGARIAN TREATY READY IN MARCH?

18. A/S HOLBROOKE ASKED WHETHER OR NOT THE CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 04 OF 05 BUCHAREST 002218

BILATERAL TREATY COULD BE COMPLETED BY MARCH 21, IN TIME FOR THE EUROPEAN STABILITY PACT CONFERENCE. PRESIDENT ILIESCU REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO IMPEDIMENT TO THAT OUTCOME FROM THE ROMANIAN SIDE. A NECESSARY FACTOR IN THE EQUATION WAS THE SIGNING THIS MONTH BY ROMANIA OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES. THAT PUT ROMANIAN COMMITMENTS ON THE TREATMENT OF NATIONAL MINORITIES (OR, AS THE ROMANIANS PREFER TO SAY, "PERSONS BELONGING TO ETHNIC MINORITIES") AT THE HIGHEST EUROPEAN LEVEL. THE TWO ISSUES REMAINING TO BE RESOLVED IN THE TREATY WERE THE GUARANTEES OF EXISTING INTERNATIONAL BORDERS AND THE PROTECTION OF ETHNIC MINORITIES. FOREIGN MINISTER MELESCANU INTERJECTED THAT, ON THE FORMER, THERE WAS AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE AND ROMANIA HAD...
PROPOSED TREATY LANGUAGE, BUT HUNGARY HAD NOT YET INDICATED FINAL ACCEPTANCE.

UNRESOLVED BORDER PROBLEMS WOULD BLOCK ENTRY INTO NATO

19. A/S HOLBROOKE OBSERVED THAT THIS WAS AN IMPORTANT ISSUE WHERE ROMANIA'S (AND HUNGARY'S) BID FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP WAS CONCERNED. THE U.S. SENATE WOULD NOT RATIFY ANY AGREEMENT TO BRING IN A NEW NATO MEMBER WHICH HAD UNRESOLVED BORDER PROBLEMS WITH A NEIGHBOR. A/S HOLBROOKE ASSURED ILIESCU THAT HE WOULD BE SAYING EXACTLY THE SAME THING TO PRIME MINISTER HORN IN BUDAPEST. NSC DIRECTOR FRIED POINTED OUT THAT PRESIDENT CLINTON HAD STATED IN HIS CLEVELAND SPEECH IN JANUARY THAT COUNTRIES WITH CLOSED ECONOMIES WOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP. NOW WAS THE TIME TO RESOLVE THOSE PROBLEMS, WELL IN ADVANCE.

BORDERS AND MINORITIES REVISITED


WILL THE REGION COME TO TERMS WITH ITS PAST OR BE DOMINATED BY IT?

21. OBSERVING THAT AS AN AMATEUR HISTORIAN HE KNEW SOMETHING OF THE REGION'S PAST, A/S HOLBROOKE SAID THAT HE HEARD ABOUT THAT PAST WHEREVER HE TRAVELED IN THE AREA. IT WAS A REGION OBSESSED WITH ITS OWN HISTORY. HOWEVER, THE ISSUE TODAY WAS WHETHER THE REGION WOULD FIND WAYS TO COME TO TERMS WITH ITS DIFFICULT PAST AND MOVE AHEAD OR ALLOW ITSELF TO BE DOMINATED BY IT. IF THE LATTER PATH WERE CHOSEN AND HISTORICAL GRIEVANCES HAD TO BE "RESOLVED," RATHER THAN WORKED AROUND, ONE WOULD INEVITABLY ARRIVE AT THE KINDS OF SITUATIONS REPRESENTED BY BOSNIA,
NORTHERN IRELAND, AND LEBANON. AT LEAST IN THE CASE OF NORTHERN IRELAND SOME REAL PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE. IRISH LEADERS HAD TOLD HIM THAT IRELAND'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE EU HAD PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THAT PROCESS. THAT WAS ONE OF THE REASONS WHY PRESIDENT CLINTON WANTED EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS TO MOVE EASTWARD. BROADER MEMBERSHIP IN SUCH INSTITUTIONS COULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE RESOLUTION OF AGE-OLD PROBLEMS, OR AT LEAST HELP KEEP THEM IN CHECK.

MARSHAL ANTONESCU REHABILITATION CALLED AN ANTI-RUSSIA REACTION

22. A/S HOLBROOKE SAID HE WOULD BE SURE TO HEAR IN BUDAPEST ABOUT THE ANTI-HUNGARIAN RHETORIC OF CLUJ MAYOR GHEORGHE FUNAR AND EFFORTS TO REHABILITATE WARTIME DICTATOR MARSHAL ANTONESCU. IT WAS TIME TO MOVE BEYOND THE TENDENCIES WHICH BOTH REPRESENTED. A/S HOLBROOKE WANTED TO KNOW WHAT WAS THE EXPLANATION FOR THE ANTONESCU MONUMENTS. HOUSE OF DEPUTIES PRESIDENT ADRIAN NASTASE HAD TOLD HIM EARLIER THAT THERE WERE NO LEGAL GROUNDS FOR HALTING SUCH ACTIVITY. HOWEVER, PEOPLE IN THE U.S. BELIEVED IT WAS SOMEHOW BASED ON NOSTALGIA FOR THE NAZI PERIOD. HOW DID THE PRESIDENT EXPLAIN THIS PHENOMENON?

23. ILIESCU RESPONDED THAT SOME PRIVATE VETERANS' GROUPS AND OTHERS RETAINED A ROMANTIC VIEW OF ANTONESCU, BASED ON HIS MILITARY PROWESS AND THEIR OWN ANTI-SOVET, ANTI-RUSSIAN PREDILECTIONS. HE HAD TOLD THESE PEOPLE THAT THEY WERE WRONG AND THAT IF ROMANIA WERE TO FOLLOW THEIR PATH, IT WOULD EVENTUALLY RISK ADDING TRANSYLVANIA TO THE ALREADY LOST PROVINCES OF BESSARABIA AND NORTHERN BUKOVINA. ANTONESCU UNDOUBTEDLY WOULD REMAIN A CONTROVERSIAL FIGURE IN ROMANIAN HISTORY. SOME CRITICIZED ILIESCU FOR BEING INSUFFICIENTLY ANTI-RUSSIAN BY VIRTUE OF HIS STAND ON ANTONESCU. SUCH PEOPLE SIMPLY DID NOT UNDERSTAND -- IT WAS A PROBLEM OF MENTALITY. BE THAT AS IT MAY, IT WAS A FACT THAT ANTONESCU HAD RESISTED "THE FINAL SOLUTION" AFTER 1942, AND THAT THOUSANDS OF JEWISH LIVES HAD BEEN SAVED AS A CONSEQUENCE.

24. A/S HOLBROOKE SAID HE APPRECIATED THE PRESIDENT'S PUBLIC STAND AGAINST EFFORTS TO REHABILITATE ANTONESCU. HE KNEW THAT AMBASSADOR
MOSES HAD SPOKEN WITH ILIESCU RECENTLY ABOUT SEVERAL ISSUES OF BILATERAL CONCERN (REFTEL) AND THEREFORE WOULD NOT COVER THE SAME GROUND AGAIN. IN SUMMATION, HE SAID THAT ECONOMIC ISSUES SHOULD HAVE THE HIGHEST PRIORITY NOW, WITH SECURITY ISSUES (SUCH AS NATO MEMBERSHIP) TO FOLLOW LATER. FOR HIS PART, A/S HOLBROOKE WAS PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED BY THE NEED TO PROMOTE EXPANDED U.S. PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN ROMANIA TO ASSIST IN THE CRUCIAL PROCESS OF PRIVATIZATION. WE WOULD DO EVERYTHING WE COULD TO BE SUPPORTIVE IN THAT AREA.

25. COMMENT: A/S HOLBROOKE'S STRESS OF ECONOMIC ISSUES, ESPECIALLY PRIVATIZATION AND THE NEED FOR FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT, WAS TIMELY. ALSO VERY WELCOME WERE HIS EMPHASIS ON THE NON-DISCRIMINATORY NATURE OF NATO EXPANSION AND OUR GOAL OF A EUROPE WHERE INSTITUTIONS AND THE GEOPOLITICAL MAP COINCIDE. ON THE OTHER HAND, HIS ENTIRELY NECESSARY PROBING ON ROMANIAN-HUNGARIAN BILATERAL RELATIONS AND MINORITY ISSUES WITHIN ROMANIA EVOKED THE USUAL LONGWINDED, DEFENSIVE, AND EVEN PETULANT RESPONSE THAT PRESIDENT ILIESCU CAN BE EXPECTED TO DELIVER ON SUCH OCCASIONS. BY ENGAGING IN VERBAL OVERKILL ON THESE ISSUES, THE PRESIDENT TENDS TO DETRACT FROM THE GENERALLY POSITIVE IMPRESSION HE MAKES WHEN DISCUSSING MOST OTHER MATTERS. ALL IN ALL, HOWEVER, A/S HOLBROOKE'S PRESENTATION, ASSURANCES, AND INDEED EVEN HIS PRESENCE IN BUCHAREST CONTRIBUTED TO ADVANCING THE U.S. AGENDA WITH ILIESCU AND THE GOR.

26. THIS CABLE HAS BEEN CLEARED BY A/S HOLBROOKE.
RICKERT
BT
#2218
DIST:
  SIT: FRIED NSC
PM HORN WELCOMES NATO EXPANSION PLANS AND ASKS THAT RUSSIA'S CONCERNS BE CONSIDERED

1. CONFIDENTIAL--ENTIRE TEXT.

NATO EXPANSION: PLANS UNDERWAY

2. EUR A/S RICHARD HOLBROOKE, ACCOMPANIED BY NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR DAN FRIED, TREASURY DAS DAVID LIPTON, AND AMBASSADOR DONALD BLINKEN DISCUSSED NATO EXPANSION WITH PRIME MINISTER GYULA HORN ON FEBRUARY 25. A/S HOLBROOKE TOLD HORN THAT THE U.S. INTENDS TO REMAIN AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE EUROPEAN BALANCE OF POWER AND TO LEAD NATO'S EXPANSION TO INCLUDE CENTRAL EUROPE. HE INDICATED THAT IN SEPTEMBER OR OCTOBER, A NATO TEAM WILL VISIT BUDAPEST TO BRIEF LEADERS ON HOW NATO WILL EXPAND. THE SAME PRESENTATION WILL BE MADE IN EACH PFP CAPITAL, EVEN THOUGH SOME COUNTRIES, LIKE UZBEKISTAN AND ARMENIA, NEVER WILL JOIN NATO. BEFORE SEPTEMBER, AMBASSADOR BLINKEN WILL CONDUCT INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH GOH OFFICIALS TO PREPARE HUNGARY FOR ITS FALL MEETING WITH NATO. A/S HOLBROOKE POINTED OUT THAT SOME LEADERS BELIEVE THE U.S. IS MOVING TOO RAPIDLY TO EXPAND NATO TO CENTRAL EUROPE. IN THIS REGARD, HE ENCOURAGED HORN TO DISCUSS NATO EXPANSION WITH THE GERMANS, WHOSE SUPPORT HUNGARY WILL NEED; THE FRENCH, WHOSE VIEW OF FUTURE EUROPEAN SECURITY ACCORDS THE U.S. A LESSER ROLE; AND THE RUSSIANS, TO CONVINCE THEM THAT NATO...
EXPANSION IS NOT DIRECTED AGAINST THEM.

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HUNGARY WANTS NATO MEMBERSHIP

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3. PM HORN REPLIED THAT HUNGARY WILL SUBORDINATE EVERYTHING TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION. TWO WEEKS AGO, WHILE IN BRUSSELS, HE EXPLAINED HUNGARY'S OBJECTIVES TO SECGEN CLAES AND NATO PERMREPS. HORN SAID THAT HE WAS PLEASED THEN TO HEAR THE FRENCH PERMREP FOR THE FIRST TIME SPEAKING THE WAY HEANTED HIM TO (REGARDING NATO MEMBERSHIP). HORN STATED THAT HUNGARY WANTS TO BE INCLUDED IN CONSULTATIONS ON THE NATO WHITE PAPER, WHICH HE UNDERSTOOD WOULD BE PREPARED IN MARCH WITH FURTHER ANALYSES CONTINUING UNTIL SEPTEMBER. IN ADDITION, HUNGARY ALSO WANTS TO ENHANCE ITS MILITARY COMPATIBILITY WITH NATO. HE SAID HE WAS PLEASED WITH THE U.S. POSITION ON (AND ITS ASSISTANCE WITH) HUNGARY'S INTEGRATION INTO NATO. HE HOPED THAT THE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS COULD REACH AN AGREEMENT ON NATO EXPANSION THAT WOULD CREATE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR HUNGARY. HORN SAID THAT HE REALIZED THE IMPORTANCE (FOR NATO AND EU MEMBERSHIP) OF HUNGARY'S CONCLUDING BILATERAL TREATIES WITH SLOVAKIA AND ROMANIA AND HE RECOUNTED THE PROGRESS BEING MADE ON THESE (SEPTELS). HE STRESSED THE POINT THAT HE DID NOT WANT SLOVAKIA AND ROMANIA EXCLUDED FROM NATO.

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NATO EXPANSION AND RUSSIA

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4. TURNING TO NATO AND RUSSIA, HORN SAID HE WILL SEE YELTSIN AND CHERNOMYRDIN ON MARCH 6 IN MOSCOW AND NATO EXPANSION WILL BE ON THE AGENDA. HORN SUGGESTED THAT A NATO STATEMENT INDICATING THAT IN THE LONG RUN, UNDER VERY STRINGENT CONDITIONS, RUSSIA COULD HAVE A CHANCE OF JOINING NATO, WOULD EASE PRESSURE ON YELTSIN TO RESIST NATO EXPANSION.

5. A/S HOLBROOKE REPLIED THAT ON THREE OCCASIONS SINCE YELTSIN'S DECEMBER CSCE SPEECH, SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS HAVE ADDRESSED RUSSIA'S CONCERN: VICE PRESIDENT GORE IN HIS DECEMBER MOSCOW MEETING WITH CHERNOMYRDIN; SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER IN HIS JANUARY GENEVA MEETING WITH FM KOZYREV, AND DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE TALBOTT IN HIS FEBRUARY 24 WASHINGTON MEETING WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER MAMEDOV. WITHOUT CHANGING OUR POSITION, WE HAVE EXPLAINED TO RUSSIAN LEADERS THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF NATO EXPANSION IS NOT TO ANTAGONIZE RUSSIA, BUT INSTEAD TO ENHANCE STABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND INTEGRATE THESE COUNTRIES INTO EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS.

6. A/S HOLBROOKE EXPLAINED THAT THE U.S. HAS BEGUN A DIALOGUE WITH RUSSIA ON THE NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP. HOWEVER, THIS DIALOGUE IS AT A VERY EARLY STAGE. HE STATED THAT THIS DIALOGUE IS NOT INTENDED TO GIVE RUSSIA A VETO OVER NATO MEMBERSHIP. INSTEAD, THE OBJECTIVE IS TO
DEMONSTRATE THAT RUSSIA HAS A LEGITIMATE ROLE TO PLAY IN THE SECURITY OF EUROPE.

? WITH REGARD TO HORN'S SUGGESTION THAT NATO CONSIDER A STATEMENT ON EVENTUAL NATO MEMBERSHIP FOR RUSSIA UNDER STRINGENT CONDITIONS, A/S HOLBROOKE SAID THAT WHEN ASKED IF RUSSIA WILL JOIN NATO, THE ADMINISTRATION NEVER SAYS CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 02 BUDAPEST 002061

ATTN: AMBASSADOR PICKERING

E.O. 12356:DECL: OADR
TAGS: NATO, PREL, RU, HU
SUBJECT: PM HORN WELCOMES NATO EXPANSION PLANS AND ASKS THAT RUSSIA'S CONCERNS BE CONSIDERED NEVER. HE ADDED THAT IN THIS RESPECT, HORN'S MARCH 6 MEETING WITH YELTSIN AND CHERNOMYRDIN WILL BE VERY IMPORTANT, AND THEY WILL PROBABLY PRESS VERY HARD AGAINST NATO EXPANSION. HOLBROOKE URGED HORN ALSO TO CONVEY TO THEM, AS WE HAVE, THE MESSAGE THAT HUNGARY'S MEMBERSHIP IN NATO IS NOT BASED ON A FEAR OF HISTORY REPEATING ITSELF. INSTEAD, IT IS BASED ON HUNGARY'S DESIRE TO INTEGRATE FURTHER WITH THE WEST. NATO DOES NOT SEEK TO CREATE PROBLEMS IT WAS DESIGNED TO SOLVE. END TEXT.

BLINKEN
BT
#2061

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
SSN: 2061
TOR: 950303113620 M1545310
DIST: SIT: BEYRLE FRIED NSC SCHIFTER VERSHBOV WITKOWSKY
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<td>03/06/1995</td>
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**COLLECTION:**

- Clinton Presidential Records
- NSC Cables
- Jan 1995-Dec 1996
- OA/Box Number: 510000

**FOLDER TITLE:**

[01/30/1995-09/30/1996]

**REMARKS:***

- 2015-0771-M
- rs1247

**REVIEW CODES:**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

**RESTRICTION CODES:**

- Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
  - b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
  - b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
  - b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
  - b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
  - b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
  - b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
  - b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
  - b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
TEXT: Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 05/21/2019
2015-0771-M (1.16)

1. (C-ENTIRE-TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR BLINKEN ATTENDED A LUNCH ON FRIDAY, MARCH 3, FOR PM HORN HOSTED BY THE SPANISH AMBASSADOR. ALSO PRESENT: THE AMBASSADORS OF FRANCE, GERMANY, BELGIUM AND CANADA. MR. HORN REVIEWED THE SITUATION IN CROATIA, TREATY PROSPECTS WITH ROMANIA AND SLOVAKIA, NATO, RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA, GOH NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE EU, AND THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SCENE IN HUNGARY. WHILE HORN'S COMMENTS WERE CONSISTENT WITH HIS FEBRUARY 25 CONVERSATION WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY HOLBROOKE, DAS LIPTON AND DAN FRIED, HE EMPHASIZED THE FOLLOWING POINTS REFLECTING BOTH THE PASSAGE OF FIVE DAYS AND HIS IMMINENT TRIP TO VISIT YELTSIN IN RUSSIA.
CROATIA: DISMAL PROSPECT

3. HORN FULLY SUPPORTS THE U.S. VIEW THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNPROFOR MAY LEAD TO A FURTHER AND TERRIBLE ESCALATION OF FIGHTING IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. ALL WESTERN COUNTRIES SHOULD MAKE KNOWN TO TUDJMAN THEIR DEEP CONCERN AND DISAPPROVAL OF HIS DEMAND FOR UN WITHDRAWAL.

TREATIES WITH ROMANIA AND SLOVAKIA: A SLIGHT SURPRISE

4. HORN IS OPTIMISTIC BUT CANNOT GUARANTEE THAT TREATIES WILL BE SIGNED WITH ROMANIA AND SLOVAKIA ON MARCH 21 IN PARIS. IN ADDITION TO THEIR BILATERAL SIGNIFICANCE, THESE TREATIES WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT MESSAGE FOR THE ENTIRE REGION - INCLUDING CROATIA AND SERBIA. THE ONLY STICKING POINT IS COE RECOMMENDATION 1201, PARTICULARLY ITS REFERENCE TO AUTONOMY. THIS IS A PRESTIGE ISSUE WITH BOTH ILIESCU AND MECIAR. THE SURPRISE IS THAT NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN PROCEEDING MORE SMOOTHLY WITH THE ROMANIANS THAN WITH SLOVAKIA. HORN AND THE TWO FOREIGN LEADERS HAVE AGREED TO STAY IN DIRECT TOUCH IF THEIR SUBORDINATES FAIL TO MAKE PROGRESS. HORN NOW BELIEVES THAT EITHER BOTH TREATIES WILL BE SIGNED SIMULTANEOUSLY OR NEITHER. HUNGARIANS LIVING ABROAD HAVE BEEN POLITELY BUT FIRMLY ADVISED BY THE GOH THAT WHILE THEIR CONCERNS ARE TO BE NOTED, THEY ARE NOT PART OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. HORN ALSO NOTED THAT THE ROMANIAN EXTREMIST, FUMAR HAS BECOME MORE OF AN EMBARRASSMENT TO HIS GOVERNMENT.

NATO: HORN HAS THE MESSAGE


RUSSIA: IF YOU THINK WE HAVE PROBLEMS

6. HORN PLANS TO TELL YELTSIN THAT IT IS IN RUSSIA'S INTEREST THAT HUNGARY BE A MEMBER OF NATO. HE HOPES TO REVERSE RUSSIAN THINKING ON THIS SUBJECT. AS A RESULT OF THE CHECHNYAN DEBACLE, RUSSIA HAS LOST FACE AND RESPECT. IT IS IN A WEAK BARGAINING POSITION VIS-A-VIS CRITICISM OF CHECHNYA AND ATTEMPTS TO SLOW NATO EXPANSION SCHEDULE. HORN POINTED OUT THE IRONY OF RUSSIAN FORCES HAVING BEEN DEFEATED BY RUSSIAN ARMS. FURTHER EXACERBATING RUSSIA'S PROBLEMS IS THE FACT THAT SOME 25 MILLION RUSSIANS LIVE AROUND THE PERIPHERY OF RUSSIA IN THE NIS. THAT POSES SERIOUS PROBLEMS FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. BILATERAL ECONOMIC PROGRESS WITH RUSSIA IS HINDERED BY THE NECESSITY FOR YELTSIN TO SIGN OFF ON ANY MAJOR
TRANSACTION. CURRENTLY PENDING BUT WAITING ON YELTSIN APPROVAL ARE HUNGARIAN DEALS TO SELL IKARUS BUSES, MEDICAL EQUIPMENT, TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT, TOGETHER WITH A RESTRUCTURING OF THE RUSSIAN DEBT. HORN HOPES TO FOCUS YELTSIN'S ATTENTION ON THESE TRANSACTIONS.

DEPT PLEASE PASS EUR A/S HOLBROOKE AND EUR/CE TERRY SNELL

TREASURY FOR OASIA/LIPTON

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, ECON, NATO, HU, HR, BK, RS
SUBJECT: DIALOGUE WITH PRIME MINISTER HORN AT SPANISH EMBASSY

DOMESTIC HUNGARIAN AFFAIRS: ACTIONS WILL SPEAK MORE LOUDLY THAN WORDS

7. BY THE TIME HORN RETURNS FROM MOSCOW, THE NEW ECONOMIC PROGRAM PREPARED BY BOKROS AND SURANYI MUST BE READY FOR HIS REVIEW. THE ENTIRE PACKAGE WILL GO TO PARLIAMENT BEFORE THE END OF APRIL. THE PARLIAMENT AGREED LATE THURSDAY, MARCH 2, TO GIVE ABSOLUTE PRIORITY TO THE GOVERNMENT'S ECONOMIC STABILIZATION PROGRAM. OTHER MATTERS WILL BE PUT ASIDE. HORN OPTIMISTICALLY PREDICTED THAT THE PRESENT BUDGET DEFICIT OF 5-1/2 PERCENT WILL BE CUT BY THE END OF THE YEAR TO 4-1/2 PERCENT. HE ALSO COMMENTED THAT BOKROS IS MUCH ATTRACTED TO A PROPERTY TAX ALONG AMERICAN LINES. THE IMF HAD ALREADY RECOMMENDED SUCH A TAX TO THE GOH. THE NEW PACKAGE TO BE BROUGHT TO PARLIAMENT BY THE END OF APRIL WILL DEAL WITH STABILIZATION, TAXES, EDUCATION, SOCIAL SERVICES, EXPORT INCENTIVES AND TRADE MEASURES. THE LATTER MUST BE IN CONFORMITY WITH GATT. THE MAJOR MEASURES HOWEVER, WOULD PROBABLY NOT TAKE EFFECT UNTIL 1996.

COMPENSATION REPARATIONS: PATIENCE RUNNING OUT

8. THE DEMANDS ON THE GOVERNMENT FROM ALL QUARTERS, WHETHER DISPLACED HUNGARIANS OR JEWISH SURVIVORS, ARE GETTING OUT OF HAND AND MUST BE RATIONALIZED. THE GOVERNMENT IS FORMULATING NEW POLICIES TO CLOSE OUT THESE ISSUES AND IN EFFECT CAP THEM.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

BLINKEN
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Clinton Presidential Records
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OA/Box Number: 510000

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  - b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
  - b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
  - b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
  - b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
  - b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
  - b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
  - b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

- Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
  - P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
  - P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
  - P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
  - P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
  - P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
  - P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHMOA9356 0800839-CCCC--RHEAAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 210839Z MAR 95
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
OSRI: RUEHMO
DTG: 210839Z MAR 95
ORIG: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6185
INFO: RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN 2731
       RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
       RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS 2604
       RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA 2741
       RUEHXd/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
SUBJ: PRESIDENTIAL AIDE SAYS YELTSIN ANGERED OVER MFA MISHANDLING OF NATO EXPANSION ISSUE

TEXT:

EO CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 009356

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, RS
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL AIDE SAYS YELTSIN ANGERED OVER MFA MISHANDLING OF NATO EXPANSION ISSUE

REFTELS: A) MOSCOW 8766
         B) MOSCOW 4528

1. CONFIDENTIAL —ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY
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2. DURING A MARCH 18 MEETING, A PRESIDENTIAL NATIONAL SECURITY AIDE INDIICATED TO US:

   -- PRESIDENT YELTSIN IS VERY UNHAPPY OVER THE MFA'S RECENT HANDLING OF NATO EXPANSION;

   -- THERE IS GENERAL CONCERN WITHIN THE YELTSIN ADMINISTRATION THAT MISMANAGEMENT OF THIS ISSUE COULD HAVE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES IN THE UPCOMING DOMESTIC ELECTION CAMPAIGNS;

   -- THUS YELTSIN HAS INSTRUCTED FM KOZYREV TO FOCUS MORE ON QUESTIONING THE "WHETHER" OF NATO EXPANSION FROM RUSSIA'S PERSPECTIVE, RATHER THAN POSSIBLE CONDITIONS FOR MOSCOW'S ACQUIESCENCE IN THE PROCESS. END SUMMARY

3. POL/EXT CHIEF MET MARCH 18 WITH

   EO 13526 3.3(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

4. ACCORDING TO ________ FULLY HALF OF THE MEETING CENTERED ON DISCUSSION OF NATO EXPANSION. YELTSIN REPORTEDLY LAID INTO FM KOZYREV AND HIS STAFF (DPM MAMEDOV. OUT SICK, MISSED THE MEETING) FOR CONDUCTING AN UNCOORDINATED NATO POLICY WHICH WAS AT ODDS WITH YELTSIN'S OWN THINKING. AS ________PUT IT, THE PRESIDENT HAD BEEN UPSET TO LEARN THAT THE MFA WAS "NEGOTIATING ON CONDITIONS" FOR EXPANSION, WHEN THE RUSSIAN POLICY SHOULD REMAIN FOCUSED ON "WHETHER" MOSCOW COULD ACCEPT SUCH EXPANSION IN THE FIRST PLACE. KORTUNOV TOLD US KOZYREV'S PRESENTATION AT THE MARCH 22-23 GENEVA MINISTERIAL WITH SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER WOULD REFLECT THIS EMPHASIS.

5. SPEAKING MORE GENERALLY, ________TOLD US THE COMMON PERCEPTION OF NATO HERE REMAINED THAT OF AN AGGRESSIVE ORGANIZATION HOSTILE TO MOSCOW. THE RESULTING SENSE OF SKEPTICISM OVER NATO EXPANSION WAS CONTAINED BOTH IN YELTSIN'S BUDAPEST SUMMIT SPEECH LAST DECEMBER AND HIS FEBRUARY 16 ADDRESS TO THE RUSSIAN PARLIAMENT. IT WOULD ALSO BE A MISTAKE, ________CONTINUED, TO ASSUME THAT THIS NEGATIVE IMAGE WAS ACCEPTED ONLY BY THE RUSSIAN POLICY ELITE. THOUGH THE AVERAGE RUSSIAN CITIZEN WAS CURRENTLY MORE CONCERNED ABOUT ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS CLOSER TO HOME, THE ISSUE OF NATO EXPANSION WAS RIPE FOR POPULAR EXPLOITATION BY NATIONALIST EXTREMISTS IN THE UPCOMING ELECTORAL CAMPAIGNS. THIS WAS ONE REASON WHY YELTSIN HAD REACTED SO STRONGLY TO THE MFA'S RECENT HANDLING OF THE EXPANSION ISSUE.

6. THE CONTRATEMPS OVER NATO POLICY WAS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE QUESTION OF FOREIGN POLICY COORDINATION, ACCORDING TO ________ (SOMETHING HE HAS SPOKEN WITH US ABOUT AT LENGTH IN THE PAST - SEE REFTELS). THE PRESIDENTIAL EDICT ISSUED MARCH 15 ON MFA COORDINATION OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY WAS A REAFFIRMATION OF A 1992 EDICT ON THE SAME SUBJECT. BUT ACCORDING TO ________ THE MFA HAS NOW BEEN PUT ON NOTICE THAT IF FURTHER PROBLEMS LIKE THEIR MISHANDLING OF NATO EXPANSION OCCUR, THE PUSH TO CENTER FOREIGN POLICY COORDINATION IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION WILL PICK UP STEAM.

7. ECHOING A THEME WE HAVE HEARD RECENTLY FROM ACADEMICS LIKE SERGEY KARAGANOV (INSTITUTE OF EUROPE) AND SERGEY ROGOV (USA INSTITUTE), ________ LAMENTED THE ABSENCE OF A CENTRAL
COORDINATING BODY LIKE THE COMMUNIST PARTY INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT (ID). IN SOVIET TIMES THIS BODY DICTIONATED MAJOR POLICY LINES (SUITABLY CLEARED THROUGH THE POLITBURO) TO THE MFA, WHICH OBEDIENTLY CARRIED THE POLICY OUT. NOW, WITHOUT EITHER A COORDINATING BODY LIKE THE ID OR AN EXECUTIVE BODY WITH THE PRESTIGE AND STATU

CONFIDENTIAL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
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RE OF THE POLITBURO, POLICY COULD BE HIJACKED BY WHICHEVER MINISTRY HAD THE GREATEST INTEREST IN PUSHING A POSITION. THE MFA WAS NOT THE ONLY CULPRIT IN THIS, [3.3(b)(6)] ADDED, BRIEFLY NOTING PROBLEMS WITH THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE ORGAN AND VARIOUS ECONOMIC MINISTRIES. BUT IT WAS THE KEY PROTAGONIST.

COMMET

8. [3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)] MAKES NO BONES ABOUT HIS LOW APPRAISAL OF KOZYREV. AS WE WERE PARTING, HE FIRST CONGRATULATED SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER FOR HIS RECENT ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THEN ADDED IN A BITING FOOTNOTE, "IN CONTRAST TO OUR OWN FOREIGN MINISTRY'S AILED APPROACH." THAT SAID, HIS RENDITION OF LAT WEEK'S YELTSIN-MFA MEETING IS GENERALLY CONSISTENT WITH THE PUBLIC RECORD AND REPORTS WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM MFA COLLEAGUES. ASSUMING [3.3(b)(6)] CORRECT, WE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED TO SEE THE NEW EMPHASIS ON "WHETHER" NATO EXPANSION IN FM KOZYREV'S HANDLING OF THE SUBJECT WITH THE SECRETARY IN GENEVA. PICKERING BT

#9356
CONFIDENTIAL STATE 233388

NODIS

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR AND DCM

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PINS, PINR, BK, HR, SR, GM
SUBJECT: CLINTON-KOHL TELCON OF SEPTEMBER 23, 1995

1. CONFIDENTIAL/NODIS—ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS THE WHITE HOUSE MEMCON OF THE PRESIDENT'S SEPTEMBER 23 TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL, PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

3. BEGIN WHITE HOUSE TEXT.

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: TELECON WITH CHANCELLOR HELMUT KOHL OF GERMANY

PARTICIPANTS: THE PRESIDENT

CHANCELLOR HELMUT KOHL

INTERPRETER: GISELA MARCUSE
NOTETAKER: KAREN DRAGONE, MARY ANN PETERS, JOHN FEELEY AND ALEXANDER VERSH Bowen

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: SEPTEMBER 23, 1995, 2:56 - 3:14 P.M. EDT OVAL OFFICE

THE PRESIDENT: HELLO.
CHANCELLOR KOHL: HELLO BILL.

THE PRESIDENT: HELMUT, HOW ARE YOU?

CHANCELLOR KOHL: I'M FINE. I HAVE LOTS OF WORK. I'M QUITE CONTENT.

THE PRESIDENT: I THINK WE ARE MAKING SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN BOSNIA. MANY SERIOUS ISSUES REMAIN, BUT I THINK A SETTLEMENT CAN BE REACHED IN THE COMING WEEKS.

CHANCELLOR KOHL: FOR THE FIRST TIME I BELIEVE, TOO, THAT IT IS GOING TO WORK. YOUR PEOPLE ARE DOING A GOOD JOB.

THE PRESIDENT: I BELIEVE NOW WE CAN BRING NEGOTIATIONS TO A CONCLUSION. IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE CROATS AND MUSLIMS WORK CLOSELY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY IN THE FEDERATION. THE MEETING BETWEEN TUDJMAN AND IZETBEGOVIC IN ZAGREB WAS STORMY. THE BOSNIANS ARE CLEARLY WORRIED ABOUT TUDJMAN'S GROWING AMBITIONS IN WESTERN BOSNIA, THEY ARE AFRAID THIS COULD LEAD THE BOSNIAN CROATS TO PULL OUT OF THE FEDERATION. I UNDERSTAND YOUR AMBASSADOR, AT YOUR PERSONAL INSTRUCTION, RECENTLY DELIVERED A DEMARCHE TO TUDJMAN ON THE NEED FOR MILITARY RESTRAINT. I REALLY APPRECIATE YOUR STRESSING TO TUDJMAN THAT THE FEDERATION AND A STRONG BOSNIAN-CROAT ALLIANCE IS CRITICAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THE PEACE PROCESS. I HAVE WARNED HIM THAT OUR RELATIONS WITH CROATIA COULD BE AFFECTED IF HIS SUPPORT FOR THE FEDERATION IS INSUFFICIENT. IT IS VERY IMPORTANT WE KEEP TUDJMAN WITH US. IT MUST NOT BLOW UP. WE DON'T WANT TO SNATCH DEFEAT FROM THE JAWS OF VICTORY. AS WE GET CLOSER TO SETTLEMENT, IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT WE COMPLETE PREPARATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION AND POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION.

CHANCELLOR KOHL: NO, WE DON'T NEED THAT. WHICH ONE OF YOUR PEOPLE IS THERE NOW. IS THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY THERE?

THE PRESIDENT: THERE ARE TWO MEMBERS OF TH TEAM THERE NOW, BOB OWEN AND CHRIS HILL. HOLBROOKE IS COMING BACK TO BRIEF US.

CHANCELLOR KOHL: WHERE IS HOLBROOKE.

THE PRESIDENT: HE IS EITHER IN NEW YORK OR ON HIS WAY THERE. THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF BOSNIA, CROATIA AND SERBIA ARE MEETING IN NEW YORK ON TUESDAY.

CHANCELLOR KOHL: OKAY, ON MONDAY, I AM GOING TO TELL BITTERLICH TO CALL HOLBROOKE FOR A LONG TALK. THEN I WILL SEND SOMEONE TO SEE TUDJMAN.

THE PRESIDENT: IT WILL NOT BE HARD TO FIND HIM. HE IS IN NEW YORK.

CHANCELLOR KOHL: OKAY, THAT IS WHAT I WILL DO. I AM
GOING TO SEND SOMEONE TO SEE TUDJMAN, AND THEN I WILL CALL HIM DIRECTLY MYSELF.

THE PRESIDENT: IF THERE IS ANYTHING ELSE I CAN DO, PLEASE LET ME KNOW. I AM PLEASED THAT NATO IS MOVING AHEAD ON PLANNING FOR IMPLEMENTATION WITH NO SERIOUS DIFFERENCES BETWEEN USQ AND THE FRENCH ON NEED FOR NATO COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE OPERATION. I KNOW YOU DO. I AM CONCERNED ABOUT ITALY, GIVEN THEIR IMPORTANCE TO NATO OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS. THE ITALIANS SHOULD BE BROUGHT INTO THE "INNER CIRCLE" IN PLANNING FOR PEACE PLAN IMPLEMENTATION. WE HAVE PROPOSED THAT EXPERTS MEET THIS WEEK AS FIVE INSTEAD OF FOUR.

CHANCELLOR KOHL: I HAVE THE LEAST AMOUNT OF PROBLEMS WITH THAT! YOU KNOW WHERE THE PROBLEMS ARE.

THE PRESIDENT: OF COURSE. ALTHOUGH NEGOTIATION SESSIONS SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THE ORIGINAL CONTACT GROUP, WE SHOULD ALSO EXPAND THE CIRCLE FOR CONSULTATIONS ON THE PEACE PROCESS TO INCLUDE THE ITALIANS, CANADIANS AND SPANISH. I HOPE YOU WILL SUPPORT THAT. I WOULD LIKE TO RAISE A FEW OTHER ISSUES IF YOU HAVE TIME.

CHANCELLOR KOHL: OF COURSE I DO.

THE PRESIDENT: I AM PLEASED NATO'S STUDY ON ENLARGEMENT HAS BEEN COMPLETED, AND I WANT TO THANK YOU FOR GERMAN SUPPORT THAT WAS CRITICAL TO THE PROCESS. I AM GLAD THE BRIEFINGS FOR THE MEMBERS OF PFP WILL BEGIN IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. BUT I'M VERY CONCERNED BY RUSSIAN STATEMENTS REGARDING ENLARGEMENT THAT MAKE CLEAR THIS REMAINS A DIFFICULT ISSUE IN MOSCOW.

CHANCELLOR KOHL: AS YOU ARE AWARE THERE IS AN ELECTION CAMPAIGN GOING ON IN MOSCOW. THE ELECTIONS FOR THE DUMA ARE IN DECEMBER AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS ARE IN JUNE. IT IS A VERY DIFFUSED SITUATION. ZHIRINOVSKY'S INFLUENCE HAS ABATED; HE DOES NOT STAND A CHANCE. BUT THE CANDIDACY OF LEBED IS ASCENDANT, AND I THINK BORIS HIMSELF WON'T DECIDE WHAT HE IS GOING TO DO UNTIL FEBRUARY. QUITE FRANKLY, I SEE A MAJOR PROBLEM BY THINGS BEING SAID IN CONGRESS BY A FEW PEOPLE. YELTSIN TOLD ME HE DIDN'T HAVE ANY PROBLEMS WITH YOU (AND HE WILL MEET WITH YOU IN NEW YORK). BUT HE IS CONCERNED THAT THE REPUBLICANS WILL USE THE PRIMARIES TO GET POLISH-AMERICAN VOTES. YOU MUST MAKE SURE THAT THINGS DON'T DEGENERATE TO IRRATIONALITY.

THE PRESIDENT: MY POSITION HAS BEEN STEADILY IMPROVING. THE MORE IT DOES, THE MORE I WILL BE ABLE TO RESTRAIN THEM. I WILL DO MY BEST TO MAKE SURE THE WORLD KNOWS THAT CONGRESS DOESN'T RUN OUR FOREIGN POLICY.

CHANCELLOR KOHL: I KNOW THAT. THAT'S WHY YOU HAVE BROAD SUPPORT HERE. THE 15 HEADS OF THE EU JUST FINISHED MEETING IN MAJORCA AND TALKED ABOUT THAT AT LENGTH. THE VIEW IS UNANIMOUS AND CLEAR. THEY WANT NATO ENLARGEMENT, ESPECIALLY WITH A VIEW TOWARD POLAND, WHICH IS RUSSIA'S
MAIN CONCERN. AND, OF COURSE, A PROBLEM FOR RUSSIA. WE NEED TO BE CAREFUL THAT THE RUSSIAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN DOESN'T DESTROY EVERYTHING. ALL COLLEAGUES AGREED TO BE WITH YOU.... TO SUPPORT YOUR STEADY HAND, SO TO SPEAK. BUT WE DO HAVE SOME CONCERN THAT THE PRIMARIES ARE HAVING SOME KIND OF IMPACT. DO YOU UNDERSTAND?

THE PRESIDENT: ABSOLUTELY.

CHANCELLOR KOHL: YOU HAVE LOTS OF SUPPORT HERE. I CAN MAKE THAT PUBLIC. YOU MUST TELL ME WHEN IT WOULD BE USEFUL.

THE PRESIDENT: THANK YOU. IF WE CAN SOLVE THE CRISIS IN BOSNIA IT WILL HELP US ALL CALCULATE WHAT WE SAY ABOUT RUSSIA BEFORE THE ELECTIONS. WE WOULDN'T WANT TO PROMOTE THE ELECTION OF A REACTIONARY THAT COULD MAKE LIFE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT.

CHANCELLOR KOHL: AND IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THINGS BE DONE IN SEQUENCE, ONE AFTER ANOTHER.

THE PRESIDENT: ONE THING WE COULD DO TO HELP YELTSIN WOULD BE TO RESOLVE THE CFE FLANK PROBLEMS. THE RUSSIANS' INITIAL REACTION TO THE NATO CFE FLANK PROPOSALS HAS BEEN ENCOURAGING. THEY SEE PROBLEMS BUT ACKNOWLEDGE IT IS AN HONEST ATTEMPT TO MEET THEM HALF WAY. IT IS CRITICAL THAT YELTSIN BE ENCOURAGED PERSONALLY TO SUPPORT THE PROPOSAL. COULD YOU TALK TO YELTSIN AND GET HIS SUPPORT?

CHANCELLOR KOHL: AREN'T YOU GOING TO TELL HIM YOURSELF IN A FEW DAYS?

THE PRESIDENT: ABSOLUTELY.

CHANCELLOR KOHL: WHEN WILL YOU SEE HIM

THE PRESIDENT: NEXT MONTH, OCTOBER 23.

CHANCELLOR KOHL: I WILL HAVE A LONG TALK WITH YOU BEFORE YOU MEET HIM. IS THAT OKAY?

THE PRESIDENT: OF COURSE. YOU STILL TALK TO HIM ALL THE TIME, DON'T YOU?

CHANCELLOR KOHL: YES, I CERTAINLY WILL IN THE NEXT TWO WEEKS.

THE PRESIDENT: ONE LAST THING. I'M PLEASED TO HEAR THE END OF THE HUGO PRINCZ CASE. IT WAS A VERY THORNY ISSUE. I WANT TO THANK YOU FOR YOUR EFFORTS TO SOLVE IT. IF BITTERLICH WANTS TO CALL HOLBROOKE, HE CAN CALL THE WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM. THANK YOU, HELMUT.

CHANCELLOR KOHL: ALL THE BEST, BILL.

THE PRESIDENT: THANKS HELMUT.
CHANCELLOR KOHL: DON'T BELIEVE EVERYTHING THAT PEOPLE SAY. I BELIEVE IN YOU; AND I WANT YOU TO WIN.

THE PRESIDENT: YOU STILL MADE A GOOD BET.

THE PRESIDENT: GOOD-BYE.

CHANCELLOR KOHL: GOOD-BYE.

CHANCELLOR KOHL: REGARDS TO YOUR WIFE.

END OF CONVERSATION.

CHRISTOPHER

BT

#3388

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01
SSN: 3388
TOR: 950929222920 M1880879
DIST:

SIT: GARDNER VERSHBOW WHSR_SPECIAL

□
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By R. NARA, Date 8/24/04

SUBJ: MEMCOM: PRESIDENT CLINTON'S MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT IONESCU

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION OF THE
MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT CLINTON AND ROMANIAN PRESIDENT
IONESCU ON SEPTEMBER 26:

BEGIN TEXT:

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH ION IONESCU, PRESIDENT OF ROMANIA

PARTICIPANTS: U.S.

THE PRESIDENT
THE VICE PRESIDENT
STROBE TALBOTT, ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE
ANTHONY LAKE, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
SAMUEL R. BERGER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE
PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

ALFRED MOSES, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO ROMANIA
DANIEL FRIED, SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR CENTRAL
AND EASTERN EUROPE (NOTETAKER)
MARSHALL ADAIR, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

ROMANIA
PRESIDENT ION ILIESCU
TEODOR MELESCANU, MINISTER OF STATE FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
TRAIAN CHEBELEU, FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR TO
THE PRESIDENT AND SPOKESMAN
ION GORITA, AMBASSADOR (ACTING)
GHEORGHIE DUMITRU, DEPUTY DIRECTOR
OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS, MFA (NOTETAKER)

DATE, TIME: SEPTEMBER 26, 1995, 10:05 - 10:30 A.M.
AND PLACE: OVAL OFFICE

THE PRESIDENT: WELCOME AND I'M VERY GLAD TO SEE YOU HERE. (U)

PRESIDENT ILIESCU: THANK YOU, MR. PRESIDENT. MR. VICE
PRESIDENT, IT IS GOOD TO SEE YOU AS WELL. I HAS VERY
IMPRESSED WITH YOUR BOOK AND READ IT ON THE PLANE
YESTERDAY. I ENJOYED IT VERY MUCH. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: WELL, I HAVEN'T READ IT YET. (U)

THE VICE PRESIDENT: I'LL BE SURE TO GET YOU A COPY. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: ACTUALLY, MANY OF THE PREDICTIONS IN THAT
BOOK HAVE BEEN VERIFIED SINCE. SCIENTISTS HAVE JUST
ISSUED A REPORT ABOUT GLOBAL WARMING AND THE OZONE LAYER
OVER ANTARCTICA IS GROWING. (U)

PRESIDENT ILIESCU: THE ENVIRONMENT IS CLEARLY A CENTRAL
PROBLEM FOR US ALL. THE VICE PRESIDENT'S BOOK PROMOTED
THE CONCEPT THAT PROBLEMS MUST BE APPROACHED GLOBALLY.
ONE NEEDS A GLOBAL VISION TO DEAL WITH SUCH COMPLEX
MATTERS. THIS IS PRECISELY THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES
TODAY. YOU HAVE THE ABILITY TO REALIZE A VISION ON A
GLOBAL SCALE. THE ENVIRONMENT IS RELATED TO DRAMATIC
PROBLEMS WHICH POSSIBLY COULD LEAD TO SOCIAL EXPLOSIONS.
WE NEED A BROAD STRATEGY TO APPROACH THIS ISSUE. ONLY THE
UNITED STATES IS SUFFICIENTLY INTERCONNECTED WITH THE
EUROPEAN AND THE ASIAN SPACE -- WITH THE PACIFIC AND
EUROATLANTIC ZONES -- TO PUT TOGETHER A COMMON APPROACH.

NOW, THANKS TO CHANGES IN THE WORLD, WE HAVE A REAL CHANCE
TO DEVELOP A COMMON BASE OF DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC AND
ENVIRONMENTAL BALANCE. THIS SENSE FROM THE VICE
PRESIDENT'S BOOK INTERESTED ME GREATLY. (U)

THE VICE PRESIDENT: WE'LL GIVE YOU "PUTTING PEOPLE FIRST"
TO READ ON YOUR RETURN TRIP TO ROMANIA. (U)

PRESIDENT ILIESCU: WELL, TO BEGIN. THANK YOU AGAIN, MR.
PRESIDENT, FOR YOUR INVITATION. THIS IS A GREAT
OPPORTUNITY FOR CONTACTS AND MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON AND
CALIFORNIA ON THE POLITICAL LEVEL AND WITH BUSINESS, MEDIA
AND UNIVERSITY LEADERS. I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS SOME
POINTS WITH YOU NOW. I BROUGHT A LIST OF POINTS AND THIS
WILL BE PRESENTED BUT I WISH TO EMPHASIZE THREE MAIN
PROBLEMS FOR US NOW. (U)
FIRST, I APPRECIATE THE DEVELOPMENT IN BILATERAL RELATIONS OVER THE PAST TWO YEARS. THESE HAVE DEVELOPED WELL AT THE HIGH, POLITICAL LEVEL. OUR MILITARY RELATIONS ALSO HAVE DEVELOPED WELL, BOTH BILATERALLY AND THROUGH THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE. ROMANIA HAS THE FIRST NATION TO SIGN THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AND HAS PARTICIPATED ACTIVELY SINCE. WE GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR NON-DISCRIMINATORY APPROACH TO CENTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN THE PARTNERSHIP. DOING OTHERWISE WOULD CAUSE PROBLEMS AND TENSIONS. YOUR APPROACH IS THE CORRECT ONE. FINALLY, OUR ECONOMIC RELATIONS HAVE DEVELOPED WELL; OUR TRADE HAS DOUBLED. WE NOW SEEK PERMANENT MOST-FAVORED-NATION STATUS APPROVED BY CONGRESS. ROMANIA IS THE ONLY CENTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRY WITHOUT THIS STATUS, SO I ASK YOU FOR HELP IN FINDING A SOLUTION. U.S. BUSINESS ALSO DEMANDS THIS AS IT WOULD INCREASE PREDICTABILITY. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: OF COURSE WE WILL HAVE TO WORK WITH THE CONGRESS ON THIS ISSUE. IN MAY, WE FOUND ROMANIA IN FULL COMPLIANCE WITH JACKSON-VANIK AND TAKING THE NEXT STEP WILL REQUIRE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION. (U)

AMBASSADOR MOSES: WE WILL WORK TOGETHER ON THIS. (U)

PRESIDENT ILIESCU: MY SECOND POINT IS THAT WE WANT TO DEVELOP OUR RELATIONS WITH EUROPEAN AND EUROATLANTIC STRUCTURES. I HAVE MENTIONED OUR GOOD BILATERAL MILITARY COOPERATION. I WANT TO REPORT TO YOU OUR FIRM INTENTION TO INTEGRATE WITH EUROATLANTIC STRUCTURES, INCLUDING NATO. INDEED, A SEPARATION BETWEEN ROMANIA ON THE ONE HAND AND POLAND AND HUNGARY ON THE OTHER COULD CREATE TENSIONS. WE ALL MUST GO TOGETHER. ON A POSITIVE NOTE, I WISH TO POINT OUT THAT ALTHOUGH WE ARE REALLY IN A PERMANENT ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN ROMANIA, THERE DOES EXIST A CONSENSUS IN THE COUNTRY IN SUPPORT OF ROMANIA'S FUTURE NATO MEMBERSHIP AND ABOUT STRONG U.S.-ROMANIAN RELATIONS. IF YOU LOOK AT A MAP OF EUROPE, YOU WILL SEE THAT ROMANIA, LIKE POLAND AND TURKEY, IS LOCATED ON THE LONGITUDINAL CENTER OF EUROPE. YOU SHOULD REGARD ROMANIA AS A VALID PARTNER TO HELP ASSURE STABILITY IN THE REGION. THIS IS THE SECOND SPECIFIC ITEM THAT I WISHED TO MENTION.

THE THIRD MATTER CONCERNS ROMANIA'S ZONE, THAT IS, EVENTS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. I WANT TO EXPRESS OUR APPRECIATION OF RECENT U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE AREA. PRESIDENT BULATOVIC OF MONTENEGRO WAS IN ROMANIA TWO DAYS AGO AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE U.S. WOULD HELP PROMOTE A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT WHICH WOULD PUT AN END TO THE WAR. SO I WANT TO EXPRESS TO YOU OUR HOPE THAT A SOLUTION TO THIS PROBLEM CAN PROMPTLY BE FOUND.

I WANT TO MENTION ONE ASPECT OF THIS CONFLICT, HOWEVER. PLEASE TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONFLICT FOR ROMANIA. WE SUPPORT THE EMBARGO AGAINST SERBIA BUT WE HAVE SUFFERED LOSSES OF BETWEEN DOLLARS 8
BILLION AND DOLLARS 12 BILLION BECAUSE OF THE CONFLICT AND NO EXTERNAL RESOURCES OF COMPARABLE MAGNITUDE EXIST TO SUPPORT OUR ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION. OUR RELATIONS WITH INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS ARE DEVELOPING AND THESE BODIES ARE GOOD PARTNERS FOR US, BUT THEIR SUPPORT FOR ROMANIA IS ON THE ORDER OF DOLLARS 4-4 1/2 BILLION IN CREDITS AND SHORT TERM LOANS OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS. SO WE HAVE LOST IN AN OVERALL SENSE. BY COMPARISON, THE FORMER GDR RECEIVED FINANCIAL INJECTIONS OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS OF DOLLARS 600 BILLION. THIS REPRESENTS FOUR TIMES THE ENTIRE SUM OF THE MARSHALL PLAN FOR ALL OF WESTERN EUROPE OVER A PERIOD OF TEN YEARS. EASTERN COUNTRIES HAVE RECEIVED MUCH LESS. 

HUNGARY AND POLAND, OF COURSE, HAVE ENORMOUS FOREIGN DEBTS AND ROMANIA DOES NOT. HUNGARY'S DEBT HAS INCREASED TO DOLLARS 20 BILLION AND POLAND’S TO DOLLARS 50 BILLION. AS A RESULT, THEY HAVE RECEIVED RESCHEDULINGS AND OTHER FORMS OF SUPPORT FROM GOVERNMENTS AND COMMERCIAL BANKS AND WE HAVE NOT. ROMANIAN ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ARE DIFFICULT. OVER THE PAST FOUR YEARS OUR PRODUCTION HAS DECLINED, THOUGH NOW WE ARE DOING BETTER. WE HAVE PASSED A PRIVATIZATION BILL AND 37 PERCENT OF OUR GDP IS PRIVATE.

BY NEXT YEAR THIS FIGURE SHOULD REACH 50 OR 60 PERCENT. THIS IS A MOMENT OF DRAMATIC CHANGE. WE ARE PASSING THROUGH THIS PERIOD ON THE BASIS OF OUR OWN EFFORTS BUT WE WANT AND NEED TO RECEIVE PERMANENT MFN. 

THE PRESIDENT: THANK YOU FOR YOUR EXCELLENT STATEMENT. I AM VERY PLEASED WITH YOUR EFFORTS AND YOUR PROGRESS. I WANT THE UNITED STATES TO BE A PARTNER AND A FRIEND FOR ROMANIA. I BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT FOR YOU TO CONTINUE TO WORK WITH THE IMF AND IBRD. THE UNITED STATES CAN SUPPORT INVESTMENT THROUGH OPIC, WHICH IS ACTIVE IN ROMANIA, AND THROUGH THE ENTERPRISE FUND. WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK WITH YOU. I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU HAVE A LUNCH ON FRIDAY WITH SENIOR AMERICAN BUSINESS EXECUTIVES AT WHICH SECRETARY BROWN WILL BE PRESENT. HE HAS DONE A GREAT DEAL OF WORK IN THE REGION.

WITH ITS LARGE POPULATION, ROMANIA HAS A STRONG DOMESTIC MARKET AND YOU COULD MAKE REAL PROGRESS WITH YOUR ECONOMY IF YOUR RELATIONS WITH THE IMF AND WORLD BANK STAY ON TRACK. WE WILL TRY TO HELP WITH MFN AS WELL.

WE ALSO FAVOR A DISCIPLINED AND ORDERLY PROCESS OF INTEGRATING CENTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WITH THE WEST. THAT INCLUDES THE OSCE, A STRONG PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AND NATO ENLARGEMENT. I'M PLEASED THAT ROMANIA HAS BEEN A PARTICIPANT IN PFP -- A STRONG PARTICIPANT, AND WE APPRECIATE THIS. THANK YOU ALSO FOR YOUR SUPPORT OF SANCTIONS ON SERBIA. WE HAVE DONE OUR BEST TO HELP SUPPORT PEACE IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. FOREIGN MINISTERS ARE MEETING TODAY IN NEW YORK AND I WISH THAT YOU WERE AMONG THEM, HELPING OUT.

WE WILL STAY ENGAGED IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. WE FINALLY
HAVE THE SUPPORT OF OUR WESTERN ALLIES AND WE WANT TO MAINTAIN THIS SUPPORT AND SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE -- AND WITH THE BOMBING NOW SUSPENDED RUSSIA IS MORE SUPPORTIVE AS WELL. THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND HAS ALSO CHANGED AND THIS MAKES FINDING A SOLUTION EASIER BECAUSE TERRITORIAL CHANGES NOW CAN COME AROUND THE EDGES WITHOUT ANY PARTY HAVING TO GIVE UP TOO MUCH ON THE GROUND BEYOND WHAT THEY NOW POSSESS.

I KNOW YOU ARE MAKING PROGRESS WITH HUNGARY AND ON ISSUES CONCERNING THE ETHNIC HUNGARIAN MINORITY. THIS IS IMPORTANT. PROGRESS WOULD PAY BIG DIVIDENDS POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY. I ALSO APPRECIATE PROGRESS YOU ARE MAKING ON RESOLVING ISSUES OF PRIVATE AND COMMUNAL JEWISH PROPERTY.

ON BALANCE, RELATIONS ARE GOOD AND YOU ARE DOING WELL. YOU MIGHT ALSO CONSIDER SENDING YOUR SOCCER PLAYERS TO THE U.S. TO TRAIN US. I SAW THE ROMANIAN TEAM LAST YEAR AT THE WORLD CUP AND THEY WERE AWFULLY GOOD.

THE VICE PRESIDENT: THANK YOU FOR YOUR GENEROUS WORDS AT THE OUTSET. I CAN'T TELL YOU HOW MUCH INTEREST THERE IS IN ROMANIA NOW ON THE PART OF PRIVATE BUSINESS. ROMANIA WAS NOT THE OBJECT OF SO MUCH INTEREST EARLY ON, BUT AS YOU PROGRESS WITH YOUR REFORMS WE ARE SEEING A GOOD DEAL MORE.

PRESIDENT ILIESCU: WE HAVE HAD SOME REAL INVESTMENT SUCCESSES. COCA COLA IS VERY STRONG IN ROMANIA.

AMBASSADOR MOSES: THERE ARE 81,000 COCA COLA OUTLETS IN ROMANIA.

PRESIDENT ILIESCU: WE ARE ALSO MAKING GOOD PROGRESS WITH MARRIOTT AND WITH THE PACKAGING CORPORATION OF AMERICA. OF COURSE WE ALSO ARE INTERESTED IN OIL INVESTMENTS. ROMANIA WAS A MAJOR WORLD OIL PRODUCING COUNTRY IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 19TH CENTURY.

THE VICE PRESIDENT: MY FATHER DID SOME OIL BUSINESS IN ROMANIA.

PRESIDENT ILIESCU: THERE IS A STORY THAT IN THE ROMANIAN PARLIAMENT AT THAT TIME THE QUESTION WAS ASKED, IN ALL SERIOUSNESS, WHETHER IT WAS TRUE THAT A NEW NATION -- THE UNITED STATES -- HAD SURPASSED ROMANIA IN OIL PRODUCTION.

THE VICE PRESIDENT: LET ME ASK HOW YOU RATE OUR AMBASSADOR TO ROMANIA. (U)

PRESIDENT ILIESCU: HE IS SIMPLY GREAT. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: HE IS SO GOOD THAT I HAVE JOKED AND ASKED WHETHER ROMANIA IS PAYING HIS SALARY. (U)
SERIOUSLY, I AM VERY HOPEFUL ABOUT ROMANIA. I HAD A GOOD FEELING ABOUT YOUR COUNTRY THE FIRST TIME WE MET. YOU HAVE MADE IMPRESSIVE PROGRESS. IF WE COULD SETTLE THE CONFLICT IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, THIS WOULD HELP YOU ECONOMICALLY AS WELL. EVERY TIME I MEET LEADERS FROM THIS REGION THEY SEEM SO PHYSICALLY STRONG AND ENERGETIC. IF WE COULD TURN THAT ENERGY OUTWARD INTO DEVELOPMENT RATHER THAN INWARD INTO CONFLICT THIS AREA COULD BE A GARDEN SPOT IN 50 YEARS. IT HAS RESOURCES, NATURAL BEAUTY, EVERYTHING YOU NEED. (U)

PRESIDENT ILIESCU: YOU SHOULD VISIT US. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: I CERTAINLY WOULD LIKE TO. (U)

AMBASSADOR MOSES: WE ALMOST HAD THE VICE PRESIDENT LAST YEAR BUT SECURITY WOULD NOT PERMIT IT: IT WAS TOO CLOSE TO THE FIGHTING. (U)

PRESIDENT ILIESCU: WE ARE ON THE SAME ELECTORAL CYCLE -- WE BOTH HAD ELECTIONS IN 1992 AND WILL AGAIN IN 1996. (U)

THE PRESIDENT: NO DOUBT WE WILL BOTH BE REELECTED. OF COURSE, I HAVE HOPE BECAUSE POLLS SHOW THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WANT THEIR GOVERNMENT DIVIDED BETWEEN THE PARTIES. THEY ELECT A REPUBLICAN CONGRESS AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENT AND THEN THEY COMPLAIN WHEN WE FIGHT. (U)

I'M GLAD TO HAVE SEEN YOU. (U)

-- END OF CONVERSATION --

END TEXT.
CHRISTOPHER
BT
#4298

NNNN
SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01
SSN: 4298
TOR: 951002223242 M1883709
DIST:
PR: SIT
SIT: FRIED SCHMIDT SUM SUM2 WHSR_SPECIAL
SUBJ: CHANGE IN STYLE NOT SUBSTANCE IN POLAND'S CAMPAIGN FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP

TEXT:

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 03 WARSAW 016130

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/2005
TAGS: PREL, NATO, PGOV, PINR, PL
SUBJECT: CHANGE IN STYLE NOT SUBSTANCE IN POLAND'S CAMPAIGN FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP

1. CONFIDENTIAL. CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR NICHOLAS REY UNDER SECTIONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

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SUMMARY

2. KWASNIEWSKI AS PRESIDENT WILL MEAN A CHANGE OF STYLE IN POLAND'S APPROACH TO NATO ENLARGEMENT, BUT NO DEVIATION FROM THE GOAL OF MEMBERSHIP OR PACE OF ENLARGEMENT. SENIOR DEMOCRATIC LEFT ALLIANCE (SLD) LEADERS, INCLUDING PM OLEKSY, ARE ADAMANT THAT, WHILE EAGER TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA, KWASNIEWSKI IS COMMITTED TO POLAND'S EURO-ATLANTIC ORIENTATION. IN CONTRAST TO WALESA'S TABLE POUNDING, THEY PREDICT KWASNIEWSKI'S CALMER APPROACH WILL BE MORE EFFECTIVE. CRITICS BELIEVE MOMENTUM FOR ENLARGEMENT WILL SLOW WITHOUT WALESA'S AGITATIONS AND QUESTION THE DEPTH OF KWASNIEWSKI'S COMMITMENT. END SUMMARY.

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THE GOAL REMAINS: FULL NATO MEMBERSHIP
3. SENIOR SLD LEADERS, INCLUDING PM OLEKSY, HAVE EMPHASIZED TO US Kwasniewski's commitment to advancing Poland's goal of NATO membership. Kwasniewski has stressed this in interviews, particularly with the foreign press, and also expressed the hope for "Expansion of the alliance without conflict with Russia." To underline Kwasniewski's westward orientation, SLD leaders envision a first presidential trip abroad to Bonn, Brussels and Paris, in that order (unless an invitation from Washington arrives, in which case they say they would want to go to the U.S. first).

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"THE DIFFERENCE IS COMPETENCE"
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4. SEJM FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE VICE CHAIRMAN AND LEADING SLD FOREIGN POLICY SPOKESMAN, LONGIN PASTUSIAK, HIGHLIGHTED FOR US SLD'S VIEWS ON HOW KWASNIEWSKI WILL DIFFER FROM WALESA IN approachesING SECURITY POLICY:

-- COMPETENCE: KWASNIEWSKI IS "NOT IGNORANT LIKE WALESA." HE SPEAKS ENGLISH, GERMAN AND FRENCH. HE UNDERSTANDS THE ISSUES AND IS RESPECTED IN EUROPEAN LEADERSHIP CIRCLES, PARTICULARLY GERMANY. "UNLIKE WALESA, HE CAN SPEAK COMFORTABLY TO CLINTON AND KOHL, NOT JUST PARADE AROUND OR EXCHANGE FORMALITIES." KWASNIEWSKI WILL GET "PERSONALLY INVOLVED" IN 16 PLUS 1 DISCUSSIONS WITH NATO. WALESIA WOULD BE TOO "INCOMPETENT."

-- ON BOARD WITH PFP: KWASNIEWSKI "WON'T UNDERCUT PFP; HE WON'T POUND THE TABLE AS WALESIA DID WITH CLINTON IN PRAGUE (JANUARY 1994)." KWASNIEWSKI UNDERSTANDS THE "INTERNATIONAL REALITIES" THAT NECESSITATE A GRADUAL, NON-CONFRONTATIONAL ENLARGEMENT; WALESIA DOES NOT.

-- IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA: KWASNIEWSKI BELIEVES THERE IS "NO CONTRADICTION" BETWEEN IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA AND INTEGRATION INTO NATO. SLD PERCEIVES SIGNS THAT THE RUSSIANS MAY BE WILLING TO "DECOUPLE" SECURITY ISSUES FROM ECONOMIC AND BILATERAL ISSUES. IF KWASNIEWSKI IMPROVES POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS, HE WILL BASE THE WAY FOR POLAND'S ENTRY TO NATO. WALESIA WAS HOSTILE TO RUSSIA AND "THEY WOULDN'T DEAL WITH HIM."

-- TONE: WALESIA WAS "VERY EMOTIONAL;" KWASNIEWSKI WILL BE "RATIONAL AND MORE CONVINCING."

-- EFFECTIVENESS: KWASNIEWSKI HAS THE BACKING OF A STABLE COALITION. UNLIKE WALESIA, HE CAN DELIVER "NOT JUST POSTURE." THE GOVERNMENT AND PRESIDENCY WILL NOW SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE ON SECURITY POLICY.

5. BIO NOTE: PASTUSIAK WAS COY ABOUT WHOM KWASNIEWSKI AND OLEKSY WOULD SELECT FOR THE MINISTRIES OF DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS. HE CLEARLY WOULD LIKE ONE OF THE POSTS FOR HIMSELF. HE REGRETTED THAT OPPONENTS IN THE U.S.
HELPED TORPEDO HIS CANDIDACY FOR DEFENSE MINISTER EARLIER THIS YEAR BECAUSE OF "TWO ESSAYS I WROTE AGAINST NATO'S MASSIVE RETALIATION STRATEGY" IN THE 1980'S. HE SAID THE DEFENSE AND FOREIGN MINISTERS SHOULD COME FROM SLĐ "TO GIVE US THE CHANCE TO PROVE WE REALLY ARE PRO-NATO."

END NOTE.

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 03 WARSAW 016130

E.O. 12958: DECL:12/2005
TAGS: PREL, NATO, PGOV, PINR, PL
SUBJECT: CHANGE IN STYLE NOT SUBSTANCE IN POLAND'S CAMPAIGN FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP

NO MORE COMPLAINING: SHOW RESULTS INSTEAD

6. WOJCIECH LAMENTOWICZ, SEJM FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE VICE CHAIRMAN FROM THE UNION OF LABOR PARTY AND, OF LATE, A KWASNIEWSKI ADVISOR, PREDICTED TO US THAT UNDER KWASNIEWSKI THERE WOULD BE "NO MORE BITCHING AND MOANING" FROM POLAND ON NATO ENLARGEMENT. HE SAID HE HAD URGED KWASNIEWSKI TO AVOID "WAVING BANNERS" AND INSTEAD "PRESS FOR CONCRETE THINGS." THE BEST WAY FOR KWASNIEWSKI TO OVERCOME CRITICS AND PROVE HE HAS PRO-NATO ORIENTATION IS THROUGH ACTION, LAMENTOWICZ SAID. HE SAID KWASNIEWSKI SHOULD AIM TO SHOW CONCRETE RESULTS IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS IN HIS FIRST YEAR:

-- IFOR: STRONG SUPPORT WITH POLAND PAYING ITS WAY WITHOUT COMPLAINT;

-- A DEAL TO PURCHASE A U.S. FIGHTER: WHATEVER "UNBEATABLE" DEAL IS OFFERED FROM RUSSIA OR SWEDEN, THE DECISION IS "POLITICAL AND SHOULD TIE US TO THE U.S."
SUCH A DEAL WOULD SHOW BY "DEEDS NOT WORDS" THAT KWASNIEWSKI IS PRO-NATO AND PRO-U.S.

-- DEMOCRATIC OVERSIGHT: MAKE CLEAR THE PRIMACY OF THE DEFENSE MINISTER OVER THE GENERAL STAFF; FACILITATE PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT.

-- IMPROVED RUSSIAN RELATIONS: HAVE "NO INFERIORITY COMPLEX, BUT NO SUPERIORITY COMPLEX EITHER." PREDICTED A "COOL, PRAGMATIC" APPROACH TO RUSSIA VERSUS WALESA'S FOCUS ON "RESENTMENTS OF THE PAST."

7. BIO NOTE: LAMENTOWICZ ENDORSED KWASNIEWSKI IN ROUND TWO OF THE ELECTION (EVEN APPEARING IN A TV AD) AGAINST HIS PARTY'S DIRECTIVE. AS A RESULT, HE HAS BEEN EXPelled FROM THE PARTY LEADERSHIP. AN EXPERT IN SECURITY POLICY, LAMENTOWICZ TOLD US HE HAS A BETTER THAN EVEN CHANCE OF BEING NAMED KWASNIEWSKI'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR. END NOTE.

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"LOST IMPETUS" WITHOUT WALESA
8. WITOLD WASZCZYKOWSKI, MFA'S NATO UNIT CHIEF, SPEAKING PERSONALLY, TOLD US THAT HE EXPECTS A LOSS OF MOMENTUM ON NATO ENLARGEMENT IN THE NEXT YEAR AS A RESULT OF THE ELECTION. ALTHOUGH KWASNIEWSKI SUPPORTS ENLARGEMENT, HE LACKS WALESA'S "MORAL AUTHORITY" TO MOVE THE PROCESS FORWARD. WASZCZYKOWSKI ESTIMATED KWASNIEWSKI'S ELECTION WOULD ADD A YEAR OR TWO TO THE ENLARGEMENT TIMETABLE. "IT LOOKS LIKE A CHANCE FOR MY VACATION," HE JOKED.

9. TADEUSZ CHABIERA, A FOREIGN POLICY EXPERT AT THE PRESIDENTIAL CHANCELLORY, ALSO SPOKE TO US OF "LOST IMPETUS" ON ENLARGEMENT WITHOUT WALESA. CHABIERA NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH WALESA ANNOYED POLICY MAKERS IN THE WEST, HIS AGITATIONS ADDED ESSENTIAL MOMENTUM TO THE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS.

10. JAROSLAW BRATKIEWICZ, MFA DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR POLICY PLANNING, ALSO SPEAKING PERSONALLY, TOLD US HE EXPECTED KWASNIEWSKI WOULD OFFER "LIP SERVICE" ON ENLARGEMENT BUT THAT HIS COMMITMENT WAS "OPPORTUNISTIC AND CYNICAL" -- NOT HEARTFELT LIKE WALESA'S. BRATKIEWICZ TERMED KWASNIEWSKI'S ELECTION "A GIFT TO THOSE IN THE WEST WHO ARE HESITATING ON ENLARGEMENT."

11. EDWARD KRZEMIEN, A PROMINENT SECURITY AFFAIRS REPORTER FOR POLAND'S LARGEST DAILY, "GAZETA WYBORCZA," TOLD US HE QUESTIONED WHETHER THE SLD WOULD INCREASE MILITARY SPENDING GIVEN THE DEMANDS OF SLD SUPPORTERS FOR MORE SOCIAL SPENDING. HE EXPECTED THIS TO IMPede POLAND'S PROGRESS ON INTEROPERABILITY AND DELAY ACCESSION TO NATO.

Susceptible to Russian overtures?

12. KRZEMIEN ALSO UNDERLINED THAT MANY SLD LEADERS HAVE STRONG BUSINESS AND PERSONAL TIES TO RUSSIA AND DO NOT WANT DISPUTES OVER NATO ENLARGEMENT TO ENDANGER THEIR ECONOMIC INTERESTS. BRATKIEWICZ ECHOED THIS ADDING THAT HE EXPECTS RUSSIA TO TRY TO LAUNCH DIPLOMATIC OVERTURES IN TO CENTRAL EUROPE 1996 TO DELAY OR "GUT" ENLARGEMENT. HE BELIEVES SLD AND KWASNIEWSKI WOULD BE SUSCEPTIBLE. HE GUESSED THAT THE OVERTURES MIGHT INCLUDE AN EASING OF RUSSIAN OPPOSITION TO ENLARGEMENT IN RETURN FOR FORMAL PLEDGES OF NO NUKES, NO NEW NATO BASES, AND NO NATO EXPANSION TO UKRAINE OR THE BALTICS.
13. WALESA HAS REPEATEDLY LOCKED HORNS WITH THE SEJM IN RECENT YEARS OVER THE ISSUE OF DEMOCRATIC OVERSIGHT, VETOING BILLS WHICH WOULD STRENGTHEN THE ROLE OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE. KWASNIEWSKI CAMPAIGN CHIEF DANUTA WANIĄK TELLS US KWASNIEWSKI IS DETERMINED TO MOVE QUICKLY TO ENHANCE PARLIAMENTARY OVERSIGHT OF THE MILITARY AND SUBORDINATE THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF TO THE DEFENSE MINISTER.

14. WE EXPECT KWASNIEWSKI WILL BE QUIETER, AND MORE ORIENTED TO BEHIND-THE-SCENES DIPLOMACY ON NATO ENLARGEMENT, BUT THAT DOES NOT MEAN A DIMINISHED INTEREST IN MEMBERSHIP. KWASNIEWSKI WOULD LIKE POLAND TO BE IN NATO TOMORROW. WALESA, EVER IMPATIENT, TOLD THE AMBASSADOR BEFORE THE ELECTION THAT HE PLANNED TO ENERGIZE THE ENLARGEMENT ISSUE EARLY IN HIS SECOND TERM - - INCLUDING LOBBYING PERSONALLY IN THE U.S. IN 1996. KWASNIEWSKI, BY CONTRAST, WILL NOT HARP ON HISTORIC BETRAYALS OR THE NEED TO "CAGE THE BEAR."

15. THE DEGREE OF KWASNIEWSKI'S COMMITMENT TO ENLARGEMENT WILL BEST BE GAUGED, NOT BY HIS RHETORIC, BUT BY CONCRETE ACTIONS IN SUCH BENCHMARK AREAS AS SUPPORT FOR IFOR, IMPROVING DEMOCRATIC OVERSIGHT OVER THE MILITARY, FUNDING MILITARY MODERNIZATION, AND HIS HANDLING OF THE PURCHASE OF A NEW MULTI-ROLE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT. REY

BT
#6130
Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHCAA2972 1252057-CCCD--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCC ZZH
LINE3: 0 042055Z MAY 96 ZFP6
LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC
OSRI: RUEHC
DTG: 042055Z MAY 96
ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
TO: RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO: RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0000
SUBJ: RESPONDING TO PRESIDENT CHIRAC'S CALL FOR AN AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA PRIOR TO NATO ENLARGEMENT

TEXT:

CONFIDENTIAL STATE 092972

NODIS

E.O. 12958: DECL:3 MAY 06
TAGS: PREL, FR, RU, NATO
SUBJECT: RESPONDING TO PRESIDENT CHIRAC'S CALL FOR AN AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA PRIOR TO NATO ENLARGEMENT

REF: PARIS 9665

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY EUR HAS JOHN KORNBLUM. REASON: 1.5 (B).

2. (C) WASHINGTON WAS STRUCK BY A DISTURBING ELEMENT IN PRESIDENT CHIRAC'S CHARACTERIZATIONS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT IN REFTEL DISCUSSION BETWEEN AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN AND PRESIDENT CHIRAC, WITH ITS EXPlicit LINKAGE BETWEEN NATO ENLARGEMENT AND BOTH "AN AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA" AND NATO INTERNAL ADAPTATION. WHILE WORK ON INTERNAL ADAPTATION WILL PROCEED IN PARALLEL WITH THE PROCESS OF ENLARGEMENT, BOTH HAVE THEIR OWN RATIONALE FOR MOVING STEADILY FORWARD. WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE NOTION OF HAVING TO REACH AN EXPLICIT OR FORMAL AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA PRIOR TO NATO ENLARGEMENT WILL BE SEEN AS GIVING THE RUSSIANS A VETO. WE HAVE TRIED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT RUSSIAN CONCERNS BOTH ON THE TIMING AND PROCESS OF ENLARGEMENT, BUT ARE NOT PREPARED TO ALTER THE BASIC DECISION IN FAVOR OF ENLARGEMENT AS CONTAINED IN THE AGREED NATO PAPER ON THE SUBJECT AND LAST DECEMBER'S NAC COMMUNIQUE.

3. DCM SHOULD SEEK AN APPOINTMENT WITH CHIRAC'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR LEVITTE TO FOLLOW UP THE DISCUSSION BETWEEN AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN AND THE PRESIDENT AND SEEK
CLARITY ON THIS KEY ISSUE MAKING THE FOLLOWING POINTS.

-- WE APPRECIATED AND GREATLY VALUED PRESIDENT CHIRAC'S VIEWS ON YELTSIN'S SITUATION AND THE RUSSIAN ELECTIONS.

-- BUILDING UPON PRESIDENT CHIRAC'S VERY USEFUL DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON IN WASHINGTON EARLIER IN THE YEAR, WE HAVE BEEN PLEASED THAT SO FAR OUR THINKING AND HANDLING OF NATO ENLARGEMENT AND NATO RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA HAVE BEEN PROCEEDING ALONG CONSISTENT POLICY LINES.

-- IN THAT CONTEXT, HOWEVER, WASHINGTON NOTED PRESIDENT CHIRAC'S SUGGESTION IN HIS MAY 1 MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN THAT AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN NATO AND RUSSIA WOULD HAVE TO BE REACHED PRIOR TO ANY NATO ENLARGEMENT.

-- WE CERTAINLY AGREE THAT IN DEVELOPING A NEW POST-COLD WAR SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR EUROPE, WE MUST SEEK TO DEFINE AN APPROPRIATE ROLE FOR RUSSIA IN THAT ARCHITECTURE. ONE COMMENSURATE WITH ITS LEGITIMATE INTERESTS AND ITS POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTIONS. OUR STRATEGY SHOULD BE BUILT AROUND COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION, AND SHOULD PRESS TO CREATE A STRONG NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP. WE SHOULD WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER IN ANY ATTEMPT TO RESPOND TO SPECIFIC RUSSIAN CONCERNS.

-- IN THE CONTEXT OF NATO ENLARGEMENT, THIS MEANS THAT, AS DECISIONS ON THE WAY AHEAD COME AT THE END OF THIS YEAR AND INTO EARLY 1997, WE MUST MAINTAIN AN ACTIVE DIALOGUE WITH RUSSIA TO EXPLAIN OUR INTENTIONS, AVOID SURPRISES AND MAKE CLEAR WHAT THE ADDITION OF NEW MEMBERS TO THE ALLIANCE WOULD AND WOULD NOT INVOLVE.

-- INDEED, SUCH DECISIONS COULD PROVIDE THE OCCASION FOR REACHING OUT TO MOSCOW AND INTENSIFYING OUR EFFORTS TO BUILD A GENUINELY SUBSTANTIVE NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP.

-- BUT WHILE NATO MUST CONTINUE TO ENGAGE RUSSIA ACTIVELY, AT THE SAME TIME WE CANNOT LET RUSSIA DETER US FROM THE OBJECTIVES AND THE SCHEDULE WE AGREED LAST DECEMBER, UNDER WHICH NATO WOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE IMPORTANT DECISIONS ON THE WAY AHEAD THIS COMING DECEMBER.

-- WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE PERCEPTION OF A NEED TO REACH AN EXPLICIT OR FORMAL AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA PRIOR THE NEXT STEPS IN NATO ENLARGEMENT WOULD BE SEEN TO BE GIVING RUSSIA A DROIT DE REGARD OR VETO OVER ENLARGEMENT.

-- THIS IS SOMETHING WE COULD NEVER AGREE TO. IT WOULD PROVIDE THE RUSSIANS WITH A TOOL EITHER TO POSTPONE ENLARGEMENT OR IMPOSE ON IT CONDITIONS WHICH NATO WOULD CONSIDER UNACCEPTABLE. THIS WOULD HEARTEN THOSE IN RUSSIA WHO BELIEVE THAT ENLARGEMENT CAN BE AVERTED ENTIRELY.

-- AT THE SAME TIME, WE NEED TO BE SENSITIVE TO THE ANXieties OF THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES THAT UNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN THE WEST AND RUSSIA AMOUNT TO DECISIONS ON THEIR FATE BEING TAKEN ONCE AGAIN OVER THEIR HEADS.
-- THIS COULD PRECIPITATE A CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE THAT
COULD COME, IN TIME, TO THREATEN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
REFORMS.

-- AS PRESIDENT CLINTON SAID IN MOSCOW AFTER HIS
DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN, THE PROCESS OF NATO
ENLARGEMENT IS PROCEEDING IN A STEADY, DELIBERATE AND
TRANSPARENT MANNER BUT NO NON-NATO NATION SHOULD HAVE A
VETO OVER ANY ASPECT OF NATO ENLARGEMENT.

-- WE HOPE THAT WE CAN CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER
ON THIS ISSUE BOTH IN DEALING WITH RUSSIA BUT, AT THE SAME
TIME, IN MAINTAINING OUR STEADY BUT DELIBERATE COURSE AT
NATO.
CHRISTOPHER
BT
#2972

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01
SSN: 2972
TOR: 960504180824 M2211780
DIST: SIT: BELL BLACKER FEELEY FRIED GOLDSGIER HESLIN PASCUAL PASSDOWN PETERS
PIPER REZNIK SCHMIDT SUM SUM2 VERSHBOW WITKOWSKY
PRT: SIT{C2}
SIT: NODIS
SLOVAKIA: KRAMER TELLS KUCHAR NO BENEFIT OF DOUBT FOR SLOVAKIA ON NATO ENLARGEMENT

1. C—ENTIRE TEXT. CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RALPH R. JOHNSON. REASONS: 1.5(B) AND (D).

SUMMARY

2. DOD A/S FRANKLIN KRAMER, IN BRATISLAVA LEADING THE FOURTH U.S.-SLOVAK BILATERAL WORKING GROUP (BWG), MET WITH MFA POLITICAL DIRECTOR EMIL KUCHAR ON MAY 13. KRAMER NOTED CONTINUED U.S. CONCERN ABOUT SLOVAK
LEGISLATION POTENTIALLY LIMITING INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES AND ABOUT PM MECEJAR'S MANNER OF GOVERNANCE, SAYING THAT NATO WOULD NOT GIVE THE BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT TO SLOVAKIA WHEN THE TIME CAME FOR ENLARGING; EITHER SLOVAKIA SHARED DEMOCRATIC VALUES OR IT DID NOT. KRAMER AFFIRMED THAT RUSSIA WOULD HAVE NO VETO ON ENLARGEMENT, BUT SAID RUSSIAN CONCERNS WOULD BE LISTENED TO, SINCE ENLARGEMENT COULD NOT RESULT IN A SITUATION OF DECREASED SECURITY IN EUROPE. KUCHAR, WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THE IMPORTANCE OF SHARED DEMOCRATIC VALUES, CRITICIZED THE NATO ALLIES FOR HAVING A "LOW THRESHOLD OF SENSITIVITY" TO SLOVAK POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS. HE ALSO EXPRESSED FEAR THAT THE "SPIRIT OF YALTA" WOULD INFUSE ENLARGEMENT (I.E., U.S.-RUSSIA AGREEMENT OVER THE HEADS OF CANDIDATE STATES). ON SLOVAKIA'S SS-23 MISSILES, KUCHAR SAID HE THOUGHT THE SOLUTION WAS "MORE SIMPLE" THAN IT MIGHT APPEAR AT FIRST.

END SUMMARY.

3. ON MAY 13 DOD A/S FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS FRANKLIN KRAMER, IN BRATISLAVA LEADING THE U.S. DELEGATION TO THE FOURTH U.S.-SLOVAK BILATERAL WORKING GROUP, MET WITH SLOVAK MFA POLITICAL DIRECTOR EMIL KUCHAR. ALSO PRESENT ON THE U.S. SIDE WERE: DANIEL FRIED, NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR CENTRAL EUROPE; JONATHAN RICKERT, STATE DEPT OFFICE DIRECTOR FOR NORTH CENTRAL EUROPEAN AFFAIRS; COL ANTHONY ALDWELL, MILITARY ASST TO A/S KRAMER; BRUCE MESSELT, DOD COUNTRY DIRECTOR FOR SLOVAKIA; POLOFF (N); AND INTERPRETER. ALSO PRESENT ON THE SLOVAK SIDE WAS AN MFA NOTETAKER. HIGHLIGHTS FOLLOW.

NATO ENLARGEMENT: NO BENEFIT OF DOUBT FOR SLOVAKIA

4. NOTING NATO'S IMMINENT DECISION TO ENLARGE, KRAMER TOLD KUCHAR THAT THE KEY ISSUES WERE WHETHER SLOVAKIA WANTED TO JOIN, AND WHETHER THE NATO ALLIES WERE WILLING TO DEFEND SLOVAKIA. THE QUESTION, KRAMER WENT ON, WAS NOT WHETHER SLOVAKIA COULD SHOW THAT IT WAS NOT A TERRIBLE PLACE, OR THAT IT HAD GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.: A "HIGHER LEVEL" OF RELATIONS WAS REQUIRED FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP, SINCE THERE WOULD BE NO SECOND CLASS CITIZENS IN NATO. IN THIS SENSE, KRAMER SAID THAT, AT THE CREATION OF NATO, THE U.S., U.K. AND FRANCE, WITHOUT QUESTION, HAD SHARED THE SAME DEMOCRATIC VALUES, SO THAT THE NATO TREATY HAD BEEN MERELY A CONFIRMATION OF THIS FUNDAMENTAL REALITY. WHEN THE TIME CAME FOR DECIDING WHETHER TO ADMIT SLOVAKIA, THE ALLIES WOULD NOT GIVE SLOVAKIA THE "BENEFIT OF THE DOUBT"; EITHER SLOVAKIA SHARED THE ALLIES' COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRATIC VALUES, OR IT DID NOT.

5. KRAMER POINTED TO CURRENT SLOVAK LAWS (FOUNDATIONS LAW; PROTECTION OF REPUBLIC) WHICH HAD
THE POTENTIAL TO RESTRICT INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES, AND TO PM MECIAR'S "TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY" STYLE OF GOVERNANCE. WHILE NOT QUESTIONING THE SOVEREIGN BT #1046

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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 03 BRATISLAVA 001046

SECDEF FOR A/S ISA KRAMER
DEPT FOR EUR/NCE - NAGY, ALSO AID/ENI
NSC FOR SR DIR FRIED
FSI FOR PAHIGIAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/06
TAGS: PGOV, L0
SUBJECT: SLOVAKIA: KRAMER TELLS KUCHAR NO BENEFIT OF DOUBT FOR SLOVAKIA ON NATO ENLARGEMENT

RIGHT OF SLOVAKIA TO PASS THESE LAWS, HE SAID THE U.S. ALSO HAD THE RIGHT TO MAKE A JUDGMENT ABOUT SLOVAKIA BASED ON SUCH LEGISLATION. KRAMER SAID HE HEARD THE (FALSE) GOS ARGUMENT THAT THESE LAWS WERE SIMILAR TO WHAT WESTERN COUNTRIES HAD, OR ASSURANCES THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE IMPLEMENTED IN A THREATENING WAY. NOTING THAT WESTERN COUNTRIES HAD HAD YEARS OF EXPERIENCE WITH SUCH LAWS, KRAMER SAID THAT NATO WAS WILLING TO SEE HOW IMPLEMENTATION WENT ("NO DOORS ARE CLOSED"), BUT THAT IT HAD TO TAKE A DECISION ABOUT ENLARGEMENT.

FIRST NOT LAST, RUSSIA

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6. STRESSING THAT NATO ENTRY WAS NOT A RACE OR COMPETITION, KRAMER STATED THAT THE FIRST TO ENTER NATO WOULD NOT BE THE LAST, NOR WOULD FIRST-WAVERS HAVE ANY VETO RIGHTS OVER FUTURE MEMBERS. (COMMENT: AN OFT-STATED GOS FEAR IS THAT HUNGARY WILL GET IN BEFORE SLOVAKIA, AND THEN BAR THE DOORS. END COMMENT.)

7. KRAMER NOTED THAT RUSSIA HAD AGREED WITH NEARLY ALL U.S. IDEAS ABOUT POST-COLD WAR SECURITY IN EUROPE (PROBLEMS WITH INSECURITY/INSTABILITY IN EUROPE; THE NEED FOR A TRANSNATIONAL ALLIANCE, AND FOR THE U.S. TO REMAIN ENGAGED IN EUROPE, ETC.), BUT HAD REFUSED TO MAKE THE LAST LEAP ACCEPTING NATO AS THE ONLY ORGANIZATION IN PLACE AND FUNCTIONING WHICH COULD PROVIDE SECURITY. HOWEVER, HE ARGUED THAT, WHILE THE RUSSIANS WOULD NEVER BE GIVEN A VETO OVER ENLARGEMENT, THEIR CONCERNS WOULD BE LISTENED TO,
SINCE ENLARGEMENT COULD NOT HAPPEN IF SECURITY IN EUROPE DECREASED AS A RESULT. AS AN EXAMPLE OF COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA, KRAMER HIGHLIGHTED THE IFOR OPERATION IN BOSNIA. IN GENERAL, HE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT ENLARGEMENT WAS NOT THE ONLY NATO INITIATIVE: PFP HAD INCREASED COOPERATION, ALLOWING EVERYONE A CLOSER SECURITY DIALOGUE AND GREATER TRANSPARENCY IN DEFENSE MATTERS.

SS-23S, LOW THRESHOLD OF SENSITIVITY

8. KUCHAR OPENED BY ASKING HOW THE U.S.-SLOVAK BILATERAL WORKING GROUP (BWG) HAD ADDRESSED THE ISSUE OF SLOVAKIA'S SS-23S. (KRAMER QUIPPED THAT THEY WERE LOADED OUTSIDE ON TRUCKS.) KUCHAR STATED THAT THE SOLUTION TO THE SS-23 ISSUE WAS "MORE SIMPLE" THAN IT MIGHT APPEAR AT FIRST, AND SAID THE QUESTION WAS WHEN AND HOW THE ISSUE WOULD BE RAISED. HE ALSO SAID SLOVAKIA NOW REALIZED THAT QUESTIONS OF SECURITY WERE MORE COMPREHENSIVE THAN ORIGINALLY CONCEIVED.

(COMMENT: KUCHAR'S FIRST COMMENT IS PROBABLY A HINT THAT, IF PM MECIAR WERE DIRECTLY ASKED BY PRESIDENT CLINTON, THE ISSUE WOULD BE EASILY RESOLVED. AT THE BWG PLENARY SESSION (SEPTEL), THE SLOVAK MOD POSITION WAS FIRMLY AGAINST DESTRUCTION. END COMMENT.)

9. WHILE CALLING WESTERN INTEREST IN SLOVAKIA'S POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT A "POSITIVE THING," KUCHAR FAULTED THE "LOW THRESHOLD OF SENSITIVITY" ON THE PART OF NATO ALLIES, AND SAID THE DEGREE OF INFORMATION THE WEST RECEIVED ON SLOVAK DEVELOPMENTS "HAD ITS LIMITS." KUCHAR ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WHEN QUESTIONS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT ARE RAISED, WHAT MATTERS IS THE DEFENSE OF "CERTAIN VALUES."

DIFFERENT LEVELS OF SECURITY, NO YALTA SPIRIT

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#1046
DOUBT FOR SLOVAKIA ON NATO ENLARGEMENT

10. KUCHAR SAID SLOVAKIA FEARED THAT NATO ENLARGEMENT MIGHT CAUSE A SITUATION TO ARISE WHERE DIFFERING LEVELS OF SECURITY WERE PROVIDED TO DIFFERENT CENTRAL/EAST EUROPEAN STATES. AS SUCH, ENLARGEMENT MIGHT NOT LEAD TO SECURITY IN THE REGION, BUT TO SECURITY "JUST FOR THE ORIGINAL NATO ALLIES." KUCHAR'S SOLUTION FOR OPTIMAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE REGION, INCLUDING RELATIONS BETWEEN THESE STATES, WAS TO OFFER CANDIDATE STATES "QUICK AND FULL" MEMBERSHIP. HE STATED THAT SLOVAKIA WANTED TO PREVENT COMPETITION BETWEEN CANDIDATE STATES, AND LOOKED FORWARD TO DISCUSSING THIS ISSUE WITH THE ALLIES.

11. KUCHAR ALSO MENTIONED THAT MANY C/E COUNTRIES WERE AFRAID OF THE "SPIRIT OF YALTA" WITH RESPECT TO ENLARGEMENT (I.E., DECISIONS MADE OVER CANDIDATE MEMBERS' HEADS). THIS WAS PARTICULARLY TRUE, KUCHAR CONTINUED, BECAUSE "RUSSIA REFUSES TO DISCUSS ENLARGEMENT WITH US." IN THIS CONTEXT, HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THE FIRST AND SECOND STAGES OF ENLARGEMENT NOT BE "ABUSED," PRESUMABLY MEANING THAT IT BE A CLEAR AND TRANSPARENT PROCESS. KRAMER ASSURED KUCHAR NO SUCH SPIRIT WOULD INFUSE NATO ENLARGEMENT. FRIED ADDED THAT NATO WILL NEVER HOLD CONVERSATION WITH RUSSIA ABOVE SLOVAKIA'S HEAD ON THIS TOPIC.

COMMENT
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12. ALTHOUGH KUCHAR LATER CONFIDED TO DCM THAT HE HAD NEVER FELT SO CHASTISED IN A MEETING WITH AMERICANS, IT IS PRECISELY THIS KIND OF CLEAR MESSAGE ON NATO ENLARGEMENT WHICH GOS OFFICIALS NEED TO HEAR. THERE EXISTS THINKING WITHIN MANY GOS CIRCLES THAT SLOVAKIA'S GEOPOLITICAL POSITION WILL ULTIMATELY DETERMINE ENLARGEMENT, OR THAT PM MECIAR CAN CONTINUE TO CONSOLIDATE HIS POWER VIA AUTHORITARIAN MEANS AND STILL HAVE ENOUGH TIME TO APPEASE NATO AND ENTER IN THE FIRST WAVE. WHAT WE NEED TO FOCUS ON IN THE COMING MONTHS, AS SLOVAK MEMBERSHIP IN THE FIRST WAVE APPEARS LESS LIKELY, IS HOW TO MAINTAIN INCENTIVE FOR THE GOS TO KEEP ON THE DEMOCRATIC PATH. END COMMENT.

13. DOD CLEARANCE RECEIVED ON JUNE 14, 1996.

JOHNSON
BT
#1046
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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03
     ^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03
     ^SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03

SSN: 1046
     ^SSN>1046
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TOR: 960617053055 M2274059
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DIST:
SIT: BELL BLACKER FEELEY FRIED PASCUAL PIFER SCHMIDT VERSHBOW WITKOWSKY
     SIT: NSC
Cable

SUBJ: SLOVAK PRESIDENT TO A/S KRAMER: DON'T PUNISH

TEXT:

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 04 BRATISLAVA 001048

SECDEF FOR A/S KRAMER
STATE FOR EUR/NCE - NAGY
NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTOR FRIED
FSI FOR SPAS/POL

E.O. 12958: DECL: OADR (1.6X5, X6)
TAGS: PGOV, LO
SUBJECT: SLOVAK PRESIDENT TO A/S KRAMER: DON'T PUNISH
THE COUNTRY FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S FLAWS

1. -- ENTIRE TEXT. CLASSIFIED BY:
RALPH JOHNSON, AMBASSADOR. REASON: 1.5 (B) AND (D).

SUMMARY

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2. DURING A MAY 13 MEETING WITH U.S. BILATERAL WORKING GROUP (BWG) DELEGATION LEADER A/S FRANK
KRAMER, SLOVAK PRESIDENT MICHAL KOVAC APPEALED TO THE UNITED STATES TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE DILEMMA SLOVAKIA FACED. IT WOULD NOT BE FAIR TO PUNISH SLOVAK VOTERS, WHO SHARED WESTERN VALUES, FOR THE FACT THAT THEY DID NOT HAVE ACCESS TO OBJECTIVE INFORMATION ON THE BASIS OF WHICH THEY WOULD REALIZE THEIR GOVERNMENT HAD NOT LIVED UP TO ITS COMMITMENTS TO DEMOCRACY. THE PRESIDENT ARGUED THAT ADMISSION INTO NATO ALONG WITH THE OTHER VISEGRAD STATES WOULD CEMENT THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA. A/S KRAMER EXPLAINED THE USG APPROACH TO NATO ENLARGEMENT AND SLOVAKIA'S PROSPECTS, STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PERRY CRITERIA.

END SUMMARY.

3. ON MAY 13 A/S KRAMER, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR, CALLED ON SLOVAK PRESIDENT MICHAL KOVAC. ALSO PRESENT ON THE U.S. SIDE WERE NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR DANIEL FRIED, EUR/NCE DIRECTOR JONATHAN RICKERT, DCM (N), OSD SLOVAKIA DESK OFFICER BRUCE MESSELT, AND MILITARY ASSISTANT CAPT JO DEE JACOB. PRESENT ON THE SLOVAK SIDE WERE CHANCELLOR JAN FINDRA, FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISOR PAVOL DEMES, DEPUTY MILITARY ADVISOR COL IVAN SVEC, AND SPOKESMAN VLADIMIR STEFKO.

4. THERE FOLLOW KEY POINTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S OPENING STATEMENT:

-- THE BWG CONFIRMS USG INTEREST IN SLOVAKIA; IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE PUBLIC AND OTHER COUNTRIES SEE THE USG HAS NOT PUSHED SLOVAKIA OFF FOR NEXT STEPS, OR ONTO SOME SIDE TRACK.

-- U.S.-SLOVAK MILITARY/DEFENSE COOPERATION IS EXCELLENT, AND IS ONE REASON WHY THE SLOVAK ARMY TOPS OPINION POLLS ON PUBLIC TRUST.

-- U.S.-SLOVAK DISCUSSIONS ON SLOVAKIA'S INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION, THOUGH SOMETIMES CONFRONTATIONAL, ARE HELPFUL BECAUSE THEY ARE AIMED AT STRENGTHENING DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA.

-- PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF NATO ENTRY HAS NOT BEEN AS INTENSE AS IT NEEDS TO BE; THEREFORE VARYING VIEWS HAVE EMERGED. WHILE SOME INSIGNIFICANT POLITICAL GROUPS ADVOCATE "NEUTRALITY" (A POORLY UNDERSTOOD CONCEPT), MORE AND MORE COMMENTATORS EMPHASIZE THE DANGER THAT SLOVAKIA WILL BE ISOLATED, WHICH EVERYONE REALIZES WOULD BE BAD FOR THE COUNTRY. ALL SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL FORCES -- BOTH THE MOVEMENT FOR A DEMOCRATIC SLOVAKIA (HZDS) AND THE OPPOSITION -- ARE UNITED IN INSISTING SLOVAKIA SHOULD DO ALL IT CAN TO AVOID BEING ISOLATED.

-- IT WOULD BE A GREAT MISTAKE TO POSTPONE FOR TOO LONG ENLARGEMENT OF NATO TO INCLUDE CENTRAL EUROPEAN STATES. THE SECURITY ISSUE SHOULD NOT BE LEFT FOR
TOO LONG IN A VACUUM.

-- THOUGH RUSSIAN REPRESENTATIVES RESIST NATO
BT
#1048

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 04 BRATISLAVA 001048

SECDEF FOR A/S KRAMER
STATE FOR EUR/NCE - NAGY
NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTOR FRIED
FSI FOR SPAS/POL

E.O. 12958: DECL: OADR (1.6X5, X6)
TAGS: PGOV, LO
SUBJECT: SLOVAK PRESIDENT TO A/S KRAMER: DON'T PUNISH THE COUNTRY FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S FLAWS

ENLARGEMENT, SLOVAKIA IS COMPORLED BY CONSTANT EMPHASIS BY THE U.S. AND OTHER NATO ALLIES THAT IT IS NATO, AND NOT RUSSIA, THAT WILL DECIDE REGARDING THE ACCESSION OF NEW MEMBERS.

-- WHILE SLOVAK INTERNAL POLITICAL STRUGGLES MAY CONTINUE FOR A LONG TIME, IT WOULD BE A BIG MISTAKE TO POSTPONE SLOVAKIA'S ACCESSION OR TO SEPARATE IT FROM THE OTHER VISEGRAD STATES; NATO ACCESSION WILL PROVIDE ESSENTIAL GUARANTEES FOR THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA.


-- CONDITIONS FOR MINORITIES IN SLOVAKIA ARE NOT BELOW EUROPEAN STANDARDS, AND ARE MUCH MORE POSITIVE THAN HUNGARIAN LEADERS' DEMANDS WOULD LEAD ONE TO BELIEVE. HOWEVER, THE GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO PREPARE A NECESSARY LAW ON THE USE OF MINORITY LANGUAGES IN OFFICIAL BUSINESS HAS LED TO PROBLEMS IN PRACTICAL SITUATIONS AND AROUSED MINORITY CONCERNS.

-- THE RELEASE OF THE INDEPENDENT CITIZEN INVESTIGATION REPORT ON THE MICHAL KOVAC JR ABDUCTION, PREPARED WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THE FORMER INVESTIGATOR (FIRED BY THE GOVERNMENT) AND ANONYMOUS SIS PERSONNEL, WILL MAKE CLEAR THAT THE GOVERNMENT'S INVESTIGATION IS BEING CONDUCTED IN A
MANNER THAT WILL RENDER IT HARDER TO FIND THE REAL PERPETRATORS. THE RECENT DEATH OF THE CROWN WITNESS’S BEST FRIEND COULD INTIMIDATE FURTHER WITNESSES WHO FEAR TO COME FORWARD.

PRINCIPLES OF NATO ENLARGEMENT

5. IN REPLY, A/S KRAMER OUTLINED POSITIVE ELEMENTS OF U.S.-SLOVAK SECURITY COOPERATION; THanked THE PRESIDENT FOR SLOVAKIA’S RAPID FACILITATION OF THE TRANSIT OF U.S. IFOR TROOPS TO BOSNIA; AND RELAYED U.S. ADMINISTRATOR KLEIN’S PRAISE FOR THE CONTRIBUTION OF SLOVAK FORCES IN EASTERN SLAVONIA. TURNING TO NATO ENLARGEMENT, A/S KRAMER MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- U.S.-SLOVAK BILATERAL RELATIONS ARE EXCELLENT, AND THE U.S. WILL NOT "SET SLOVAKIA ASIDE." FAILURE TO ENTER NATO WOULD NOT MEAN SLOVAKIA’S ISOLATION.

-- ALL 16 NATO ALLIES WILL DECIDE ON ENLARGEMENT; THE USG MAKES RECOMMENDATIONS.

-- NATO ENLARGEMENT IS ONLY ONE OF FOUR KEY ELEMENTS IN OUR EFFORTS TO CREATE A NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE FOR ALL NATIONS IN EUROPE. NATO MUST DEFINE ITS NEW ROLES/MISSIONS, INCLUDING THE DEFEAT OF INSTABILITY. PFP WILL REDUCE SUSPICION AND INCREASE TRANSPARENCY; RUSSIAN PARTICIPATION IS A CRUCIAL DEMONSTRATION OF CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION.

-- NATO IS A NATURAL CONSEQUENCE OF SHARED VALUES, EMBODIED IN THE FIVE PERRY CRITERIA: DEMOCRACY; CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY; FREE MARKETS; NO DISPUTES WITH NEIGHBORS; AND INTEROPERABILITY.

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#1048
-- BECAUSE THE ENLARGEMENT DECISION WILL BE MADE BY PARLIAMENTS, THE PEOPLE THEY REPRESENT MUST FEEL READY TO GO TO WAR ON BEHALF OF THE NEW MEMBER STATE.

-- NO COUNTRY IS LINKED TO ANOTHER; EACH CAN ENTER NATO WHENEVER IT IS READY. NO MEMBER CAN BAR ANOTHER FROM ENTRY. RUSSIA HAS NO VETO; ENLARGEMENT IS NOT DIRECTED AGAINST RUSSIA.

SLOVAKIA'S PROSPECTS FOR NATO ENTRY

6. A/S KRAMER THEN TURNED TO ISSUES RELATED TO SLOVAKIA, FIRST CITING POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS SUCH AS THE BILATERAL TREATY WITH HUNGARY AND U.S.-SLOVAK MILITARY COOPERATION. HOWEVER, HE CONTINUED, ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES INCLUDING THOSE THE PRESIDENT HAD CITED, IT WAS NOT CLEAR TO THE USG WHETHER SLOVAKIA SHARED OUR VALUES. IT MIGHT TAKE TIME FOR CERTAIN ISSUES TO PLAY OUT (FOR EXAMPLE, THE AMENDED PENAL CODE, THE LAW ON FOUNDATIONS, THE KOVAC JR ABDUCTION), BUT THE USG WOULD HAVE TO DECIDE SOON WHETHER TO RECOMMEND A COMMITMENT TO DEFEND SLOVAKIA AS A FULL-FLEDGED NATO MEMBER. SLOVAKIA, AS A SOVEREIGN COUNTRY, WAS FREE TO DECIDE ITS COURSE, AND MIGHT NEED TIME TO BUILD ITS NEW STATE. THIS WAS NOT A RACE; THE FIRST NEW NATO MEMBER WOULD NOT BE THE LAST. WHEN THE USG EXPRESSED CONCERNS, IT DID SO AS A FRIEND.

DON'T PENALIZE THE PEOPLE

7. IN RESPONSE, THE PRESIDENT DREW A DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SLOVAK PEOPLE AND A GOVERNMENT WHICH, IN HIS VIEW, HAD DECEIVED ITS PEOPLE. HE SAW NO GREAT DIFFERENCE AMONG SLOVAKS, CZECHS, POLES AND HUNGARIANS IN TERMS OF THE DEGREE TO WHICH THEY SHARED DEMOCRATIC VALUES, THOUGH IN SOME WAYS, SINCE SLOVAKS HAD ALWAYS BEEN DOMINATED BY OTHERS, THEY HAD A HEIGHTENED APPRECIATION FOR DEMOCRACY. SLOVAK CITIZENS HAD ELECTED THE MOVEMENT FOR A DEMOCRATIC SLOVAKIA (HZDS) AND OTHER PARTIES BASED ON ELECTORAL PLATFORMS THAT INCLUDED ENTRY INTO NATO AND EU; DEMOCRACY; THE RULE OF LAW; AND THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

8. NOW, HOWEVER, THE PRESIDENT CONTINUED, IT WAS QUESTIONABLE WHETHER THE PUBLIC HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO MONITOR THE GOVERNMENT'S IMPLEMENTATION OF ITS STATED GOALS. A TEMPORARY SITUATION COULD ARISE IN WHICH THE GOVERNMENT, VIA THE PUBLIC MEDIA, TRIED TO INFORM CITIZENS IN A ONE-SIDED WAY (AS IN SOME OTHER COUNTRIES). TV AND RADIO HAD COME UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE RULING COALITION VIA DEMOCRATIC ELECTION BY PARLIAMENTARY DEPUTIES, SO FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW THEY HAD NOT BEHAVED UNDEMOCRATICALLY. THE PRESIDENT
DESCRIBED HIS RECENT LETTER TO THE TV COUNCIL, IN WHICH HE HAD VOICED CONCERN THAT PUBLIC TV HAD LOST ITS PUBLIC CHARACTER, EVEN REFUSING TO BROADCAST THE PRESIDENT'S FIVE-MINUTE SPEECH ON THE 51ST ANNIVERSARY OF THE END OF WWII. BETWEEN 80 AND 90 PERCENT OF ADULT CITIZENS WATCHED PUBLIC TV; PRIVATE TV WAS ALSO IN THE HANDS OF COALITION SYMPATHIZERS.

9. THUS, THE PRESIDENT CONCLUDED, ONE COULD NOT BLAME THE VOTERS IF THE GOVERNMENT DEPARTED FROM DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES. THE VOTERS WOULD HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO CORRECT THEIR MISTAKE IN THE NEXT ELECTIONS, PROVIDED THEY HAD ACCESS TO OBJECTIVE INFORMATION. IF SLOVAKIA WERE SET ASIDE IN THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS THIS WOULD BE A PUNISHMENT FOR ITS CITIZENS, AND WITHOUT OBJECTIVE INFORMATION THEY WOULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY IT HAD HAPPENED. THIS PRESENTED A DILEMMA.

USG SHOULD MAKE ITS CONCERNS CLEAR TO VOTERS

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10. IN BIDDING FAREWELL TO A/S KRAMER, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE WELCOMED OPEN DIALOGUE. SUCH DIALOGUE MUST BE CONCRETE, HE STRESSED, SO THAT CITIZENS WOULD KNOW EXACTLY WHAT HAD AROUSED DOUBTS REGARDING A PARTICULAR COUNTRY. HE APPEALED FOR THE UNITED STATES TO PAY SENSITIVE ATTENTION TO THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS AND DILEMMAS SLOVAKIA WAS FACING, SO THAT TOGETHER WE COULD FIND WAYS TO ENSURE THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRACY, A STATE OF LAW, AND RESPECT FOR THE VALUES THE MAJORITY OF THE CITIZENS -- HE WAS CONVINCED -- ADHERED TO. HE ASKED KRAMER AND FRIED PERSONALLY TO CONVEY HIS GREETINGS TO PRESIDENT CLINTON AND SECDEF PERRY. KRAMER ASSURED THE PRESIDENT THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD TAKE ACCOUNT
OF HIS FINAL POINT.

11. DOD CLEARANCE RECEIVED ON JUNE 14, 1996.

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 04
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SSN: 1048
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TOR: 960617054011 M2274076
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DIST:
SIT: FRIED
SIT: NSC
LATVIAN PRESIDENT DISCUSSES NATO ENLARGEMENT, URGES PRESIDENT CLINTON TO MEET BALTIC LEADERS IN JUNE
3. AS AGREED AMONG THE THREE BALTIC PRESIDENTS AT THEIR MEETING IN VILNIUS, PRESIDENT ULMANIS INVITED AMBASSADOR NAPPER TO RIGA CASTLE ON MAY 31 TO RECEIVE A COPY OF THE THREE PRESIDENTS' LETTER TO PRESIDENT CLINTON (REFTEL). ULMANIS CONFIRMED THAT THE ORIGINAL OF THE LETTER WOULD BE DELIVERED TO SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER DURING HIS MEETING WITH CENTRAL EUROPEAN AND BALTIC FOREIGN MINISTERS DURING THE BERLIN NAC/NACC MINISTERIAL. ACCORDING TO ULMANIS, THE LETTER REFLECTED GROWING CONCERNS ABOUT RUSSIAN PRESSURE ON THE BALTIC STATES Felt IN VARYING DEGREES OF INTENSITY BY THE THREE PRESIDENTS. ULMANIS DESCRIBED ESTONIAN PREQT MERI AS ESPECIALLY DISTURBED BY WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS ESCALATING RUSSIAN EFFORTS TO INTIMIDATE ESTONIA. THE LITHUANIANS WERE LESS WORRIED ABOUT CURRENT RUSSIAN POLICY, BUT WERE EAGER TO LOCK THE THREE PRESIDENTS INTO THEIR "WHO IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN WHEN" FORMULA ON NATO ENLARGEMENT.

4. ULMANIS DESCRIBED HIS OWN CONCERNS AS FOCUSED ON THE POSSIBLE FUTURE ROLE OF GERMANY IN THE NATO ENLARGEMENT PROCESS. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE FEARED A SCENARIO IN WHICH KOHL WOULD TRY TO REACH SOME ACCOMMODATION WITH A RE-ELECTED YELTSIN FOLLOWING THE RUSSIAN ELECTIONS. IN ULMANIS' VIEW, THE GERMANS MIGHT TRY TO PERSUADE YELTSIN TO AGREE TO POLISH AND CZECH MEMBERSHIP IN NATO IN RETURN FOR GERMAN ASSURANCES THAT NATO ENLARGEMENT WOULD EXTEND NO FURTHER TOWARD RUSSIA'S BORDERS. SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD END BALTIC HOPES OF EVENTUAL NATO MEMBERSHIP AND PERMANENTLY CONSIGN THEM TO THE SECURITY "GRAY ZONE" THEY MOST FEARED. ULMANIS SAID THAT HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT AGREE TO SUCH A BARGAIN. ACCORDING TO ULMANIS, THE BALTIC PRESIDENTS HOPED THAT THEIR LETTER WOULD ELICIT A FRESH REAFFIRMATION FROM PRESIDENT CLINTON THAT THE NATO DOOR WOULD NOT SLAM SHUT IN THE BALTS' FACES AS THE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS ENTERED ITS NEXT CRITICAL PHASE. SUCH A SIGNAL OF PRESIDENTIAL SUPPORT WOULD, IN ULMANIS' VIEW, HELP REIN IN GERMAN PROCLIVITIES TO CUT A DEAL AT BALTS EXPENSE.

5. IN THIS CONTEXT, ULMANIS REITERATED AND UNDERSCORED THE STRONG HOPE OF ALL THREE BALTIC PRESIDENTS THAT A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON WOULD BE POSSIBLE DURING THE PRESIDENTS' TRIP TO THE U.S. IN THE LAST WEEK OF JUNE. THE AMBASSADOR ASSURED ULMANIS THAT THE PRESIDENTS' REQUEST WAS BEING CAREFULLY CONSIDERED IN WASHINGTON. HE URGED ULMANIS TO PLAN TO GO TO WASHINGTON, SINCE A STRONG PROGRAM AND APPROPRIATE MEETINGS IN THE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS WOULD BE FORTHCOMING. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED THAT ULMANIS AND HIS COLLEAGUES CAREFULLY CONSIDER WHETHER AN EMPHASIS ON "WHO RATHER THAN WHEN" WOULD BEST SERVE THEIR INTERESTS AT THIS JUNCTURE. RATHER THAN FOCUS ON A QUESTION WHICH WASHINGTON COULD NOT NOW ANSWER, THE AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED THAT ULMANIS MIGHT USE MEETINGS IN WASHINGTON TO EXPLORE CONCRETE STEPS THAT THE U.S. AND THE BALTS
COULD TAKE TOGETHER TO ENSURE THAT BALTIC SECURITY WAS NOT DIMINISHED AS NATO ENLARGED. THE AMBASSADOR POINTED TO THIS SUMMER'S "BALTIC CHALLENGE" EXERCISE OF U.S. FORCES IN LATVIA AND THE IMPENDING OFFER OF U.S. EXCESS SMALL ARMS TO BALTBAT AND LATVIAN NATIONAL FORCES AS THE KIND OF NEW FACTS ON THE GROUND THAT COULD, IN THE AGGREGATE, COUNTER ANY PERCEPTION OF A NEW SECURITY "GRAY ZONE" IN THE BALTICS.

6. COMMENT AND ACTION REQUESTED: A MEETING BETWEEN THE BALTIC PRESIDENTS AND PRESIDENT CLINTON LATER THIS MONTH IS VITAL TO OUR EFFORTS TO PROVIDE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT TO LATVIA, LITHUANIA, AND ESTONIA. WHILE THEY APPRECIATE THE PRESSURES ON THE PRESIDENT'S CALENDAR, THE BALTIC PRESIDENTS' LETTER ACCURATELY DESCRIBES THEIR VIEW THAT A TRIP TO THE UNITED STATES WITHOUT AT LEAST A BRIEF MEETING WITH PRESIDENT CLINTON IS INCONCEIVABLE. THE IMPORTANCE OF SUCH A MEETING IS FURTHER UNDERSCORED BY THE BALTS' CONVICTION THAT THE CFE AGREEMENTS REACHED WITH THE RUSSIANS UNDERCUTS BALTIC SECURITY INTERESTS. WE JOIN EMBASSY VILNIUS IN URGING THAT A MEETING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE BALTIC PRESIDENTS BE SCHEDULED AND THAT WE BE INSTRUCTED TO SO INFORM PRESIDENT ULMANIS.

NAPPER
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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01
SSN: 1672
TOR: 960603083722 M2253113
DIST: SIT: NODIST
Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
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LINE2: ZNY CCCC ZZH
LINE3: 0 260624Z SEP 96
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
OSRI: RUEHFR
DTG: 260624Z SEP 96
ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO: RUEHC/SEOSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9033
INFO: RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE
       RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE
       RUEH2G/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
       RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
       RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
       RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
SUBJ: PRESIDENT CHIRAC AND NATO SYG SOLANA DISCUSS
      - NATO ADAPTATION, POST-IFOR, NATO SUMMIT

TEXT:

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 021520

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/17/06
TAGS: PREL, NATO, FR
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT CHIRAC AND NATO SYG SOLANA DISCUSS
         - NATO ADAPTATION, POST-IFOR, NATO SUMMIT

REF: A) PARIS 21421 B) PARIS 20967 C) PARIS 20377

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY POLMINCOUNS WILLIAM M BELLAMY. REASON: 1.5 (B).

SUMMARY

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2. (U) IN A SEPTEMBER 23 MEETING WITH NATO SYG SOLANA, PRESIDENT CHIRAC CALLED FOR A DE-DRAMATIZATION OF THE QUESTION OF FRANCE'S RAPPROCHEMENT WITH NATO, ADDING THAT IT WOULD NOT BE A DISASTER IF FRANCE DECIDED IT COULD NOT "GO ALL THE WAY" NOW. CHIRAC REITERATED HIS APPEAL FOR EUROPEAN COMMAND OF AF SOUTH, CITING EUROPE'S "FRONT-LINE RESPONSIBILITIES" IN THE REGION. SOLANA RESPONDED CAUTIOUSLY. CHIRAC SAID THE NATO SUMMIT SHOULD NOT TAKE PLACE BEFORE JULY; HE AND SOLANA BRIEFLY DISCUSSED ORGANIZATION OF THE SUMMIT. CHIRAC ACKNOWLEDGED DISCREET GOVERN PLANNING ON POST-IFOR AND AGREED WITH SOLANA THAT A FOLLOW-ON FORCE SHOULD NOT GET DRAGGED INTO POLICE WORK. SOLANA SAID PRIMAKOV'S VIEWS ON NATO ENLARGEMENT HAVE HARDENED. AN ELYSEE
SOURCE, TAKING NOTE OF U.S. SURPRISE OVER THE DETAILED NATURE OF CHIRAC'S AUGUST 28 LETTER, SAID CHIRAC IS AWARE OF WASHINGTON'S CONCERN ABOUT GOF "SALAMI SLICE" NEGOTIATING TACTICS. HE URGED WASHINGTON TO MAKE PROPOSALS REGARDING THE SOUTHERN COMMAND. END SUMMARY.

FRANCE AND NATO
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3. ELYSEE SECURITY AFFAIRS ADVISOR FRANCOIS DELATTRE GAVE POLMINCOUNS A READ-OUT OF THE SEPTEMBER 23 PARIS MEETING BETWEEN NATO SYG SOLANA AND PRESIDENT CHIRAC. ACCORDING TO DELATTRE, CHIRAC TOLD SOLANA THAT THE EXTENT OF FRANCE'S RAPPROCHEMENT WITH NATO SHOULD NOT BECOME A "DRAMA." IF INTERNAL ADAPTATION DOES NOT PROCEED AS FAR AS FRANCE WOULD LIKE, SO BE IT -- FRANCE WILL SHAPE ITS PARTICIPATION ACCORDINGLY, AND WILL DO SO CALMLY. THERE IS NO NEED FOR ALL OF THIS TO CAUSE A CRISIS IN THE ALLIANCE. CHIRAC ADDED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO RETURN TO THE "SUPER SACEUR" ISSUE IN THE FUTURE. (NOTE: WHEN THE FRENCH REFER TO "GOING ALL THE WAY" IN NATO RAPPROCHEMENT, THEY DO NOT MEAN, FOR NOW, INTEGRATING FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES. THE GOF MADE THAT CLEAR IN RECENT TALKS WITH THE BRITISH -- REF A.)

DEPUTY SACEUR
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4. CHIRAC REPEATED THE FRENCH POSITION THAT THE DEPUTY SACEUR SHOULD BE NOMINATED BY WEU AND APPROVED BY THE NAC. SOLANA SIMPLY SAID THAT ALLIES HAD MADE GOOD PROGRESS ON D/SACEUR AND WOULD ARRIVE AT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION.

AFSOUTH
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5. CHIRAC EMPHASIZED EUROPE'S VOCATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. NATO COMMAND STRUCTURES NEED TO REFLECT THAT EUROPE -- AND FRANCE -- ARE ON THE FRONT LINE IN THE REGION. VISIBILITY IS KEY, AND ONLY AFSOUTH COMMAND GIVES THE EUROPEANS THE REQUIRED PROFILE. CHIRAC CALLED FOR A TRANSATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP THAT WOULD REFLECT THE ENGAGEMENT OF BOTH THE U.S. AND EUROPE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. ACCORDING TO DELATTRE, SOLANA OFFERED NO COMFORT TO CHIRAC ON THE ISSUE, REPLACING SIMPLY THAT AFSOUTH WAS A DIFFICULT ISSUE THAT WOULD ONLY BE RESOLVED BY HEADS OF STATE.

ENLARGEMENT
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6. SOLANA SAID THAT PRIMAKOV TOOK A HARD LINE IN HIS SEPTEMBER 20 BILAT WITH THE NATO SYG, POSING SATISFACTORY INTERNAL NATO ADAPTATION AS A CONDITION FOR PROGRESS ON NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS. CHIRAC TOLD SOLANA THAT THE GOF SUPPORTS PARALLEL (NOT SEQUENTIAL) PROGRESS ON THE VARIOUS FACETS OF NATO ADAPTATION.
NATO SUMMIT

7. CHIRAC TOLD SOLANA HE FAVORS A SUMMIT NO EARLIER THAN JULY. THE GOF ENVISIONS A TWO-DAY MEETING: DAY ONE AT 16 TO DISCUSS NATO ADAPTATION; DAY TWO FOR THE EXTENDED SESSION, WHICH WOULD INCLUDE THE CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 021520

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/17/06
TAGS: PREL, NATO, FR
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT CHIRAC AND NATO SYG SOLANA DISCUSS - NATO ADAPTATION, POST-IFOR, NATO SUMMIT

NATO-RUSSIA CHARTER. SOLANA FORESAW A THREE-PHASE SUMMIT: (1) THE 16 ALLIES; (2) 16 PLUS 1; (3) 16 PLUS ALL OTHERS. CHIRAC SUGGESTED THAT BRUSSELS MIGHT BE A GOOD VENUE FOR THE SUMMIT.

POST-IFOR

8. CHIRAC NOTED THAT THE FRENCH HAD CONDUCTED DISCREET CONTINGENCY PLANNING ON POST-IFOR. (DELATTRE, EXPRESSING CHAGRIN THAT "LE MONDE" HAD RECENTLY PUBLISHED LEAKED DETAILS OF SUCH PLANNING -- REF C -- ALLOWED THAT THE REPORT WAS GENERALLY ACCURATE.) CHIRAC EMPHASIZED THAT THERE WILL BE NO FOLLOW-ON FRENCH GROUND PRESENCE WITHOUT THE UNITED STATES. HE ADDED THAT THE POST-IFOR FORCE MUST NOT GET BOGGED DOWN IN POLICE WORK; HE AND SOLANA AGREED THAT THE IPTF NEEDS TO BE BEEFED UP.

COMMENT


HARRIMAN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<"SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

SSN: 1520
<^SSN>1520
TOR: 960926023625 M2417910
<^TOR>960926023539 M2417908
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SIT: NSC
PRT: BASS BERGER DOHSE FUERTH HARMONPTR LAKE SENS SIT(C2) SODERBERG
INITIAL FRENCH REACTION TO PRESIDENT’S SEPTEMBER 26 LETTER TO CHIRAC ON NATO

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DCM DONALD K. BANDLER. REASON: 1.5 (B).

ELYSEE READ-OUT

2. (S) IN AN INITIAL RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT CLINTON’S LETTER (REF A), CHIRAC’S DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR JEAN-DAVID LEVITTE TOLD DCM THAT THE MESSAGE HAD POSITIVE ELEMENTS. FOCUSING ON THE CENTRAL POINT REGARDING CINCSOUTH, LEVITTE ASKED IF THE PHRASE "I CANNOT SUPPORT" (REFERRING TO ROTATING EUROPEAN COMMAND OF AFSOUTH) MEANT THAT THERE WAS STILL SOME DAYLIGHT IN THE U.S. POSITION. DCM REPLIED THAT THE PHRASE WAS POLITE BUT FIRM. PRESIDENT CLINTON’S LETTER INDICATED OPENNESS TO FURTHER DISCUSSION ON OTHER ASPECTS OF ADAPTATION, INCLUDING FLAG RANK SLOTS WITHIN AFSOUTH AND OTHER COMMANDS, BUT NOT THE CINCSOUTH POSITION. LEVITTE SAID IN THAT CASE "WE HAVE A REAL PROBLEM." HE WOULD RECOMMEND THAT CHIRAC RESPOND QUICKLY IN WRITING TO THE PRESIDENT’S LETTER AND THAT WE MOVE BACK INTO A HIGH-LEVEL DIALOGUE WITHOUT DELAY.
3. SEPARATELY, ELYSEE ADVISOR FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY DELATTRE ALSO EMPHASIZED TO US THAT THE AFSOUTH ISSUE WILL BE DIFFICULT. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, DELATTRE SAID CHIRAC IS IN A TOUGH SPOT POLITICALLY BECAUSE "OPTIONS ONE AND TWO" (SUPER SACEUR AND CINCSOUTH) HAVE BEEN SHOT DOWN. OPTION THREE -- DEPUTY SACEUR -- IS "NOT MARKETABLE" AS JUSTIFICATION FOR FRENCH RAPPROCHEMENT WITH NATO'S MILITARY SIDE. WE REMINDED DELATTRE THAT MUCH HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED ON ADAPTATION BEYOND DEPUTY SACEUR, AND THAT ALLIES CONTINUE TO WORK ON SEVERAL FRONTS. HE AGREED, NOTING THAT WE MUST "KEEP ALL BRIDGES OPEN."

4. DELATTRE EXPRESSED REGRET THAT THE FRENCH PRESS HAS BEGUN LEAKING STORIES ABOUT THE AFSOUTH DISPUTE. HE WAS PARTICULARLY UPSET ABOUT A SEPTEMBER 27 "LIBERATION" ARTICLE SUGGESTING THAT CHIRAC MAY BE "DUPED" BY THE U.S. IN THE ADAPTATION EXERCISE. WE TOLD DELATTRE THAT WE PREFERRED TO WORK ON THIS ISSUE DISCREETLY. DELATTRE AGREED, REITERATING THAT THERE IS STILL PLENTY OF TIME TO MAKE PROGRESS.

AN MFA PERSPECTIVE

5. MFA NATO AFFAIRS OFFICER FITOU SAID THE FRENCH WOULD RESPOND "CALMLY," AND SUGGESTED THAT EUROPEAN ROTATIONS IN AFSOUTH POSITIONS SUCH AS CHIEF OF STAFF OR CHIEF OF PLANNING MIGHT BE AVENUES WORTH EXPLORING. HE ADDED THAT DEPUTY SACEUR AND INTEGRATION OF WEU-LED OPERATIONS IN NATO'S DEFENSE PLANNING WERE CRITICAL AND PROCEEDING WELL. COMMAND STRUCTURES, HE SAID, WERE THE ONE AREA WHERE CURRENT DISCUSSIONS STILL WERE NOT "COMPATIBLE" WITH THE BERLIN NAC PRINCIPLES. HE SAID IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF NATO DID NOT RULE OUT "EVENTUAL" EUROPEAN COMMAND OF AFSOUTH.

HARRIMAN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01
SSN: 1877
TOR: 960930013248 M2423243
DIST: SIT: BELL DAALDER DOWLING FEELEY HARMON LAKEA PASSDOWN PETERS SCHMIDT SUM SUM2 VERSHOW WITKOWSKY PRT: BASS BERGER DOHSE FUERTH HARMONPTR LAKE SENS SIT{C2} SODERBERG SIT: NODIS
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TO: AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO: EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
SUBJ: ROMANIAN PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY, DEPUTY SECRETARY

TEXT:

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 133663

EXDIS -

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/16/07
TAGS: OVIP, PREL, MARR, NATO, RO
SUBJECT: ROMANIAN PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING WITH THE SECRETARY, DEPUTY SECRETARY

1. CLASSIFIED BY THE DEPUTY SECRETARY, FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. SUMMARY ROMANIAN PRIME MINISTER VICTOR CIORBEA AND DEPUTY SECRETARY TALEOTT WERE JOINED BY THE SECRETARY FOR A TIME DURING THE COURSE OF THEIR LONGER JUNE 18 MEETING AT THE DEPARTMENT. AFTER PRAISING THE RECENT PROGRESS OF ROMANIA'S REFORMS, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT KEEPING NATO STRONG AND COHESIVE AND THE DOOR TO ENLARGEMENT OPEN WAS THE BASIS FOR OUR APPROACH. SHE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR CIORBEA'S UNDERSTANDING OF OUR POSITION ON ENLARGEMENT. STATING THAT HE HAD COME NOT TO CREATE PROBLEMS BUT TO FIND SOLUTIONS, THE PRIME MINISTER EXPLAINED WHY ROMIA WAS IMPORTANT TO THE WEST AND WAS PROPOSING A SPECIAL STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH THE U.S. CONCERNING MADRID, HE HOPED THAT ROMANIA COULD BE MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY AS A PRIME CANDIDATE FOR THE SECOND ROUND OF ENLARGEMENT AND THAT A DATE FOR THAT EVENT COULD BE ANNOUNCED.

3. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY EXPLAINED WHY NEITHER PROPOSAL WAS FEASIBLE AND URGED THAT THE ROMANIANS FIND WAYS TO TAKE "YES" FOR AN ANSWER TO THEIR REQUESTS TO JOIN THE WEST. WHAT WAS IMPORTANT WAS THAT THE U.S. VIEW OF ROMANIA AND ITS NATO ASPIRATIONS WAS POSITIVE. NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR FRIED REITERATED THE VICE PRESIDENT'S EARLIER PROMISE THAT THE U.S. WOULD MAKE A POSITIVE "NATIONAL
STATEMENT" ON ROMANIA AT MADRID, AS WELL AS PRESENTING OUR FAVORABLE VIEWS DURING PRESS INTERVIEWS, BACKGROUNDERS, ETC. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE ROMANIAN PROPOSAL OF A SPECIAL STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP AND SUGGESTED THAT THE TWO SIDES DEVELOP SOME SPECIFIC IDEAS TO GIVE IT CONTENT OVER THE COMING DAYS AND WEEKS. CIORBEA AGREED AND HOPED THERE WOULD BE SOMETHING CONCRETE TO ANNOUNCE BY MADRID. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY CONCURRED THAT THE EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE. END SUMMARY.

4. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY MET WITH ROMANIAN PRIME MINISTER VICTOR CIORBEA AT THE DEPARTMENT FOR OVER AN HOUR AND A HALF ON JUNE 18. SECRETARY ALBRIGHT PARTICIPATED IN THE MEETING FOR ABOUT 15 MINUTES. ALTHOUGH CIORBEA WAS TRUE TO HIS WORD AND DID NOT ATTEMPT TO REVISIT THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION TO SUPPORT ONLY THREE COUNTRIES FOR THE FIRST WAVE OF NATO ENLARGEMENT, HIS PRIMARY INTEREST AND THE MAIN TOPICS OF THE DISCUSSION WERE NATO AND ROMANIA'S DESIRE TO ATTAIN MEMBERSHIP IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME.

ROMANIA IS ON TRACK


THE SECRETARY'S COMMENTS

6. THE SECRETARY ARRIVED AND EXPRESSED REGRET THAT HER HEAVY SCHEDULE ON THE EVE OF HER DEPARTURE FOR THE DENVER SUMMIT PREVENTED HER FROM SPENDING MORE TIME WITH THE PRIME MINISTER. AFTER PRAISING THE POSITIVE CHANGES WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE RECENTLY IN ROMANIA, SHE SAID THAT OUR APPROACH TO NATO ENLARGEMENT WAS BASED ON TWO FACTS -- FIRST, THAT NATO MUST BE KEPT STRONG AND COHESIVE; AND SECOND, THAT THE DOOR MUST REMAIN OPEN TO FUTURE MEMBERS. THE SECRETARY SAID SHE HAD BEEN INFORMED OF AND APPRECIATED THE PRIME MINISTER'S UNDERSTANDING FOR THE U.S. POSITION ON ENLARGEMENT, DESPITE THE GOR'S STRONG DESIRE TO BE INCLUDED IN THE FIRST WAVE.
7. THANKING THE SECRETARY FOR TAKING THE TIME TO SEE HIM, THE PRIME MINISTER REITERATED ROMANIA'S INTENTION TO SOLVE RATHER THAN CREATE PROBLEMS REGARDING NATO ENLARGEMENT. CITING REASONS WHY ROMANIA WAS IMPORTANT TO THE WEST, HE MENTIONED ITS EXTENSIVE INTERNAL REFORMS, GEOGRAPHIC POSITION IN A STRATEGIC ZONE TO THE STABILITY OF WHICH IT COULD CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY, AND THE PRO-AMERICAN FEELINGS AND NEAR-UNIVERSAL SUPPORT FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP AMONG THE ROMANIAN PEOPLE. THESE FACTORS MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR ROMANIANS TO UNDERSTAND THE U.S. DECISION AGAINST INCLUDING THEIR COUNTRY IN THE FIRST WAVE AND COULD LEAD TO SERIOUS DISAPPOINTMENT. THAT WAS WHY THE GOR WAS PROPOSING A SPECIAL STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP WITH THE U.S. IN ALL SPHERES -- STRATEGIC, MILITARY, POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC. CIORBEA HOPED TO SEE THE SAME WILL TO MOVE FORWARD FROM THE U.S. SIDE AND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

8. REGARDING MADRID, THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THE GOR UNDERSTOOD AND ACCEPTED THE REASONS FOR THE U.S. POSITION, PAINFUL THOUGH IT MIGHT BE, BUT LOOKED AHEAD TO SEEING WHAT COULD BE DONE TO SPEED ROMANIA'S INTEGRATION INTO THE WEST. SPECIFICALLY, HE WANTED ROMANIA MENTIONED IN THE MADRID COMMUNIQUE AS A PRIME CANDIDATE AND A DATE SET FOR THE SECOND WAVE. MAYBE EVEN AT THE DENVER SUMMIT SOME AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED AMONG THE PARTICIPATING NATO COUNTRY LEADERS AS TO ROMANIA'S FUTURE IN THE ALLIANCE. AND AFTER THE SPECIAL STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP HAD BEEN LAUNCHED, ROMANIA WOULD WARMLY WELCOME A VISIT BY PRESIDENT CLINTON, DURING WHICH THERE COULD BE DISCUSSION OF THE SPECIFIC ISSUES.

9. BEFORE LEAVING THE MEETING, THE SECRETARY EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR CIORBEA'S STATEMENT ABOUT ROMANIA'S DESIRE TO LOOK TOWARD THE FUTURE AND TO BE PART OF THE SOLUTION, RATHER THAN OF THE PROBLEM. SHE SAID THAT THE DEPUTY SECRETARY WOULD FOLLOW UP ON THE SPECIFIC POINTS THE PRIME MINISTER HAD RAISED. PRAISING THE WORK THAT CIORBEA AND PRESIDENT CONSTANTINESCU HAD DONE TO PROMOTE DEMOCRATIC PROGRESS AND REFORM IN ROMANIA, SHE SAID SHE HOPED TO MEET WITH THE PRIME MINISTER AGAIN IN THE FUTURE.

THE MADRID SUMMIT AND COMMUNIQUE

10. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY SAID HE WANTED TO URGE IN THE STRONGEST TERMS THAT THE PRIME MINISTER NOT INSIST ON SEEKING THE ANNOUNCEMENT AT MADRID OF ROMANIA FOR A SECOND WAVE OF ENLARGEMENT OR A SPECIFIC DATE FOR THE NEXT ROUND. ON THE FORMER, NAMING NAMES WOULD CREATE TWO TIERS OF NATO ASPIRANTS, SOMETHING WE NEEDED TO AVOID. ON THE LATTER, THE U.S. COULD NOT COMMIT THE OTHER 15 MEMBERS. CONCERNING DISCUSSIONS AT DENVER, WHILE ROMANIA UNDOUBTEDLY WOULD BE A TOPIC OF CONVERSATION WITH THE NATO STATE LEADERS, NOTHING WOULD BE DECIDED OR STATED PUBLICLY -- SIX COULD NOT SPEAK FOR THE SIXTEEN. ROMANIAN INSISTENCE ON THESE POINTS COULD LEAD TO FURTHER
DISAPPOINTMENTS.

11. **T**ALBOTT SAID THAT, IN OUR PUBLIC DIALOGUE, THE MOST IMPORTANT THING WAS TO AVOID THE WORD "NO" AND FIND WAYS TO EMBRACE THE WORD "YES." THE USG ATTITUDE TOWARD ROMANIA IN GENERAL AND ROMANIA'S MEMBERSHIP IN NATO IN PARTICULAR WAS POSITIVE. THAT WAS THE KEY POINT, AND "YES" SHOULD BE PROMINENT IN OUR PUBLIC DISCOURSE. WE WANTED THE PUBLIC TO SEE IN THE U.S. DECISION ON ENLARGEMENT NOT THAT ROMANIA AND SLOVENIA WERE REJECTED BUT THAT THEY WERE ALMOST ACCEPTED.

12. **NSC** SENIOR DIRECTOR FRIED ADDED THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT HAD SAID THE U.S. WOULD MAKE A "NATIONAL STATEMENT" ON ROMANIA AT MADRID. THAT MEANT THAT WE WOULD BE MAKING PUBLIC THE USG'S POSITIVE EVALUATION OF ROMANIA'S IMPORTANT PROGRESS IN RECENT MONTHS, AS WELL AS OTHER POINTS THE GOR WOULD WELCOME. THE U.S. WAS VERY SERIOUS ABOUT CONTINUED NATO ENLARGEMENT AFTER MADRID AND CONVINCED THAT IT WOULD HAPPEN. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, FRIED EXPLAINED THAT "NATIONAL STATEMENTS" INCLUDED FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENTS AND "EVERYTHING ELSE" -- PRESS INTERVIEWS, BACKGROUNDERs, ETC. HE EXPECTED THAT THE TONE AND CONTENT OF BOTH SORTS WOULD BE POSITIVE AND SUPPORTIVE OF ROMANIA, THOUGH HE COULD NOT PREDICT EXACTLY WHAT WOULD BE SAID. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY ADDED THAT ROMANIA HAD BOTH ASPIRATIONS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS. AT MADRID THE U.S. EXPECTED TO WELCOME, ENCOURAGE, AND SUPPORT THE FORMER, WHILE CALLING ATTENTION TO AND PRaising THE LATTER. WHEN THE PRIME MINISTER ASKED AGAIN IF THERE COULD BE MENTION AT MADRID OF ROMANIA AND SLOVENIA AS PRIME CANDIDATES FOR THE NEXT ROUND OF ENLARGEMENT, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY REITERATED HIS EXPECTATION THAT MUCH COULD AND WOULD BE SAID IN SUPPORT OF BOTH COUNTRIES IN UNILATERAL AND UNOFFICIAL STATEMENTS BUT NOT IN THE COMMUNIQUE.

THE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

13. **T**HE DEPUTY SECRETARY SAID HE PERSONALLY BELIEVES THAT ROMANIA WOULD ENTER NATO AS A FULL ALLY WITHIN THE REASONABLY NEAR FUTURE. OUR COMMON TASK OVER THE NEXT YEARS WAS TO MAKE THAT OUTCOME AS NATURAL, NON-CONTESTVERSIAL, AND INEVITABLE AS POSSIBLE. MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON THE GOR, BUT WE TOO COULD BE MORE ACTIVE IN SOME AREAS. WE WANTED TO TURN THE ROMANIAN SUGGESTION OF A STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP INTO SOMETHING REAL, NOT JUST A MOTTO. TALBOTT PROPOSED THAT THE TWO SIDES COME UP SOON WITH A SPECIFIC WORK PROGRAM. IT SHOULD BE IN PLACE IN TIME FOR FUTURE VISITS, SO THAT THERE WOULD BE MORE THAN BEAUTIFUL WORDS TO DEAL WITH BETWEEN OUR LEADERS. CIORBEA AGREED, REMARKING THAT, FOR THE NEEDS OF DOMESTIC PUBLIC OPINION, IT WOULD BE PARTICULARLY HELPFUL TO HAVE SOME CONCRETE ELEMENTS TO BE ANNOUNCED BEFORE MADRID. TALBOTT REPLIED THAT THERE WAS NO FIXED TIMETABLE, BUT SOME RESULTS WERE POSSIBLE WITHIN A MATTER OF DAYS AND WEEKS.
THIS WAS SOMETHING ON WHICH WE LOOKED FORWARD TO WORKING WITH THE ROMANIANS.


ALBRIGHT

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01
SSN: 3663
TOR: 970716230249 M2850940

DIST:
SIT: BRADEN BUJOLD FRIED SCHMIDT
SIT: NSC
PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
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LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 141848Z FEB 97
LINE4: FM AMBASSADY MOSCOW
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ORIG: AMBASSADY MOSCOW
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2333
INFO: RUEHRA/AMBASSADY RIGA 7442
RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXA/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHVL/AMBASSADY VILNIUS 7467
SUBJ: GOR PUBLICLY COMMITS TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH NATO

TEXT: CONFI DENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003619

USVIENNA FOR USDEL OSCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/13/07
TAGS: PRL, NATO, RS
SUBJECT: GOR PUBLICLY COMMITS TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH NATO

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY KYLE SCOTT, POL/EXT CHIEF. REASON: 1.5 (B) AND (D).

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SUMMARY
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2. (U) IN RECENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS, MOST NOTABLY AT FM PRIMAKOV'S CLOSED SESSION AT THE DUMA FEBRUARY 7, RANKING OFFICIALS HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT, WHILE OPPOSING NATO ENLARGEMENT, THE GOR WILL NEGOTIATE WITH NATO ON A DOCUMENT DEFINING THE NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP. WHILE RUSSIAN SENSITIVITIES REMAIN ACUTE, THERE IS A SHORTAGE OF PRACTICAL PROGRAMS TO RESPOND TO ENLARGEMENT. IN THE MEDIA AND AT SEMINARS -- WHILE THERE IS CONTINUED CONSENSUS THAT NATO ENLARGEMENT IS NOT IN RUSSIA'S INTERESTS -- WE SEE NO AGREEMENT ON HOW RUSSIA SHOULD RESPOND TO THE WEST, HOW RUSSIA GOT ITSELF INTO THIS SITUATION, OR EVEN WHY NATO ENLARGEMENT IS NOT IN RUSSIA'S INTEREST. CONCURRENTLY, SOME EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO MAKE UNCOORDINATED (AND AT TIMES IRRESPONSIBLE) STATEMENTS. END SUMMARY.
GOR POLICY: NEGOTIATE WITH NATO

3. AT A CLOSED SESSION OF THE DUMA ON FEBRUARY 7, FM PRIMAKOV REPORTEDLY PRESENTED THREE OPTIONS FOR RELATIONS WITH NATO AND SAID RUSSIA IS PURSUING THE SECOND OPTION: NEGOTIATIONS WITH NATO IN THE HOPE THAT "THE WEST WILL TAKE INTO ACCOUNT OUR OBJECTIVE, SERIOUS CONCERNS RELATED TO NATO ENLARGEMENT." IN SEVERAL PUBLIC STATEMENTS -- AND PRIVATELY TO THE CHARGE ON FEBRUARY 13 -- DFM AFANASYEVSKIY HAS ANNOUNCED RUSSIAN "READINESS AND WILLINGNESS" TO FIND A COMPROMISE WITH NATO. PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR DMITRIY RYURIKOV TOLD A PRESS ROUNDTABLE FEBRUARY 11 THAT "NATO IS A REALITY AND RUSSIA SHOULD COOPERATE WITH NATO AND HAVE RELATIONS WITH IT, AND THESE RELATIONS SHOULD BE BUILT ON A BROADER LEGAL BASIS THAN AN AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE PFP."

4. (SBU) WHILE THE GOR IS MAKING EFFORTS TO SELL ITS STRATEGY PUBLICLY, OFFICIALS ARE CAREFUL TO HEDGE THEIR BETS, UNDERSCORING THE NEED FOR LEGAL GUARANTEES, CO-DECISIONMAKING, AND A WILLINGNESS TO SEEK OTHER OPTIONS IF NATO IS INSUFFICIENTLY FORTHCOMING FROM THE RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE. RYURIKOV AND OTHERS ALSO REPEAT WELL-WORN ARGUMENTS ABOUT HOW NATO IS A THREAT TO RUSSIA, AND NOT MERELY A "PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEM."

RUSSIAN SENSITIVITIES

5. (SBU) THE RUSSIAN REACTION TO NATO SYG SOLANA'S TRIP TO FOUR FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS REVEALS THE DEPTH OF RUSSIAN SENSITIVITIES AND INSECURITY ON THE NATO ENLARGEMENT ISSUE. PRESIDENTIAL SPOKESMAN YASTRZHEMBSKIY SAID NATO HAD "UNDECLARED, BEHIND THE SCENES AIMS" IN SENDING SOLANA TO THE REGION AND DEFENSE COUNCIL SECRETARY BATURIN REACTED ANGRILY TO SOLANA'S STATEMENT REFERENCING THE 1994 AGREEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIAN TROOPS FROM MOLDOVA. BATURIN COMMENTED THAT RUSSIA WILL ACT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SITUATION, AND NOT ACCORDING TO SOLANA'S WORDS.

6. ACCORDING TO THE POLISH EMBASSY, RUSSIA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD NATO ENLARGEMENT HAS COME TO COLOR THE ENTIRE RUSSIAN-POLISH RELATIONSHIP. THE GOR IS NOT MOVING FORWARD ON THE NEW VISA-FREE TRAVEL AGREEMENT, WHICH WAS SUPPOSED TO BE SIGNED BY THE END OF MARCH, AND THE BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATY HAS BEEN WAITING FOUR AND A HALF YEARS FOR RATIFICATION. THE POLES TELL US
THAT EVEN ROUTINE BILATERAL ISSUES MOVE AT A SNAIL'S PACE, IF AT ALL.

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SPEAKING OUT

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7. (SBU) WHILE THE MFA GENERALLY TAKES A CALM, UNEMOTIONAL LINE IN REACTING TO EVENTS AND IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS, OTHERS IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH FEEL LESS CONSTRAINED. SECURITY COUNCIL CHAIRMAN RYBKIN SAID IN A RECENT INTERVIEW THAT IN THE EVENT OF A DIRECT MILITARY CHALLENGE, RUSSIA IS READY TO RESPOND WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. PRESIDENTIAL SPOKESMAN YASTRZHEMBSKIY LATER WALKED THIS BACK, NOTING THAT STRATEGIC FOREIGN POLICY POSITIONS DO NOT FALL INTO RYBKIN'S AREA OF COMPETENCE.

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A LIVELY MEDIA DEBATE

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8. (SBU) WHILE THE POLITICAL ELITE IS OVERWHELMINGLY OPPOSED TO NATO ENLARGEMENT, EXPERTS, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AND MEDIA COMMENTATORS AGREE ON LITTLE ELSE: HOW RUSSIA GOT INTO THIS FIX, HOW RUSSIA SHOULD REACT, OR EVEN WHY NATO ENLARGEMENT IS AGAINST RUSSIAN INTERESTS. THE MEDIA CONTINUE TO GRANT EXTENSIVE COVERAGE TO THE ISSUE AND TO REPRESENT A BROAD RANGE OF VIEWS. AMONG RECENT EXAMPLES:

-- INSTITUTE OF EUROPE DEPUTY DIRECTOR KARAGANOV CONTINUES TO ARGUE FOR STRONG RUSSIAN OPPOSITION TO NATO ENLARGEMENT AND "SETTING THE MAXIMUM PRICE." AT THE SAME TIME, HE DISMISSES ARGUMENTS THAT NATO ENLARGEMENT WILL UNDERMINE THE CURRENT REFORMIST GOVERNMENT OR LEAD TO A NEW ARMS RACE.

-- A COMMENTARY IN THE FEBRUARY 11 NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA ARGUES THAT PM CHERNOMYRDN'S COMMENTS ON NATO ENLARGEMENT IN DAVOS ARE AN ATTEMPT TO IMPROVE HIS DOMESTIC POPULARITY BY TAKING A STRONG STAND IN FOREIGN POLICY (IN THE SOVIET STYLE). THE ARTICLE CLAIMS THAT RUSSIAN PROTESTS AGAINST NATO ENLARGEMENT ARE ONLY A METHOD OF RESOLVING RUSSIA'S INTERNAL PROBLEMS.

-- AT A PRESS ROUNDTABLE ON FEBRUARY 11, DUMA DEPUTY ALEKSEY ARBATOV SAID THAT NATO ENLARGEMENT
IS THE WORST DECISION THE WEST HAS MADE SINCE THE COLD WAR. NONETHELESS, RUSSIA'S INCONSISTENT POLICY, INSTABILITY, THE WAR IN CHECHNYA, FAILURE TO RATIFY START II, AND FAILURE TO RESOLVE THE BLACK SEA FLEET ISSUE HAVE CREATED A FAVORABLE CLIMATE FOR WESTERN SUPPORTERS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT. ARBATOV ALSO CALLED PM CHERNOMYRDIN'S AND CHIEF OF STAFF CHUBAYS'S COMMENTS IN DAVOS WRONG AND UNACCEPTABLE. RUSSIA DOES NOT OPPOSE NATO ENLARGEMENT BECAUSE IT MAY BRING THE COMMUNISTS OR NATIONALISTS TO POWER. THAT WILL DEPEND ON SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES.

-- AT THE SAME ROUNDTABLE, USA/CANADA INSTITUTE DIRECTOR ROGOV SAID RUSSIA SHOULD NOT DRIVE ITSELF INTO A CORNER OR START A NEW CONFRONTATION. RUSSIA SHOULD REALIZE THAT THE ALIGNMENT OF FORCES IN THE WORLD HAS CHANGED DRAMATICALLY AND NOT IN RUSSIA'S FAVOR. THEREFORE, RUSSIA SHOULD USE THE TIME BETWEEN NOW AND MADRID FOR INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS WITH NATO LEADERS.

-- NATO ENLARGEMENT HAS ENTERED THE LOCAL PARLANCE AS A TERM OF REFERENCE. A RECENT IZVESTIYA HEADLINE READ: MAD COW DISEASE IS MOVING EAST FASTER THAN NATO.

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COMMENT
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9. THE NATO ENLARGEMENT ISSUE IS THE KEY FOREIGN POLICY QUESTION FOR THE RUSSIAN ELITE. IN RECENT WEEKS THE GOR HAS FINALLY BEGUN TO TAKE ITS POLICY MESSAGE TO THE DUMA AND PUBLIC, BUT HIGH-RANKING OFFICIALS STILL OFTEN VOICE STALE ARGUMENTS IN HYPERBOLIC TERMS AND REACT EMOTIONALLY TO NATO'S ACTIONS (SUCH AS SOLANA'S TRIP). AT THE SAME TIME, THE REFORM MEDIA MAINTAIN A HEALTHY SKEPTICISM TOWARD OFFICIAL PIETIES AND ARE EXPLORING THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS UNDERLYING RUSSIA'S OPPOSITION TO NATO ENLARGEMENT.
Cable

PRC: ROUTINE
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
LINE1: RAAACZYUW RUEHCAA4294 0570326-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: R 2603242 FEB 97
LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC
OSRI: RUEHC
DTG: 2603242 FEB 97
ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
TO: ///
INFO: AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0000
SUBJ: GUIDANCE: NATO-RUSSIA DISCUSSION AT THE FEBRUARY
TEXT:

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By YC—NARA, Date 2/11/2015
2015-0711-1M (1.25)

CONFIDENTIAL STATE 034294

EXDIS

FOLLOWING STATE 034294 DTD 2/25/97 SENT ACTION USNATO, MOSCOW, INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE. BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO. QUOTE:

CONFIDENTIAL STATE 034294

EXDIS - USNATO FOR PEKALA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/07
TAGS: NATO MARR FREL RS
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE: NATO-RUSSIA DISCUSSION AT THE FEBRUARY
-- 25 PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES LUNCH

REF: A) USNATO 581 B) HUNTER-TALBOTT 2/24/97 TELCON

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY EUR/RPM ROBERT SIMMONS. REASON
1.5(B) AND (D). THIS CABLE PROVIDES GUIDANCE FOR USNATO'S
USE AT THE FEBRUARY 25 PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES
DISCUSSION OF THE NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP AND THE
SECRETARY'S VISIT TO MOSCOW.

2. (U) THE AMBASSADOR SHOULD DRAW ON INFORMATION PROVIDED
IN REF B DURING HIS DISCUSSION AT THE 2/25 PERM REPS LUNCH
OF THE NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP AND THE SECRETARY'S TRIP
TO MOSCOW. THE AMBASSADOR MAY ALSO WISH TO DRAW ON THE
FOLLOWING POINTS DURING HIS PRESENTATION (INFO ADDRESSEE
POSTS SHOULD ALSO MAKE USE OF THESE POINTS WHEN TAKING TO
THEIR INTERLOCUTORS ABOUT THE SECRETARY'S MOSCOW TRIP).

BEGIN TALKING POINTS:

THE SECRETARY MET WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN FOR AN HOUR,
WITH PRIME MINISTER CHERNOMYRDIN FOR ALMOST AS LONG AND
HAD AN EXTENSIVE CONVERSATION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER PRIMAKOV.

O THE SECRETARY AFFIRMED THAT NATO AND RUSSIA CANNOT MISS THIS HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY TO DEAL WITH THE NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP AND THAT WE NEED TO THINK ABOUT THIS ISSUE IN NEW AND CREATIVE WAYS.

O THE SECRETARY STRESSED THAT WHILE THE U.S. WAS PREPARED TO WORK BILATERALLY WITH THE RUSSIANS TO HELP FOSTER A NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP, THE TALKS BETWEEN SECRETARY GENERAL SO LANA AND FOREIGN MINISTER PRIMAKOV ARE THE PROPER FORUM FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON THE NATO-RUSSIA CHARTER.

O ON THE BASIS OF THE SECRETARY'S TALKS, WE BELIEVE THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE RESOLVED, AT THIS TIME, TO EXPLORE IN EARNEST THE PROPOSED NATO-RUSSIA CHARTER AND ARE PREPARED TO DEVELOP A FRAMEWORK FOR A NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP.

O THIS IS AN INTERESTING AND WELCOME DEVELOPMENT. NONETHESLESS, THE COMING WEEKS WILL TEST THE PARAMETERS OF RUSSIAN ENGAGEMENT.

O THE RUSSIANS APPEARED PARTICULARLY CONCERNED WITH MANAGING THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ENLARGEMENT. THIS CONCERN WILL DRIVE MANY OF THEIR NEGOTIATING POSITIONS.

O THE RUSSIANS SUGGESTED THAT WE DISCUSS IDEAS ON HOW BEST TO STRUCTURE A NATO-RUSSIA CHARTER. THE SECRETARY OUTLINED THE BASIC ELEMENTS, WHICH THE SECRETARY GENERAL PRESENTED DURING HIS FIRST MEETING WITH PRIMAKOV.

O PRIMAKOV CONTINUED TO USE THE WORD "BINDING" TO DESCRIBE THE CHARTER, BUT DROPPED THE TERM "LEGAL." HE NOTED THAT THE RUSSIANS CONSIDERED THE CHARTER OF SUCH IMPORTANCE THAT THEY MIGHT WANT TO SUBMIT IT TO THE DUMA FOR RATIFICATION. WE BELIEVE THIS IS AN IMPORTANT, ALBEIT SMALL, CHANGE IN THE RUSSIAN POSITION.

O THE SECRETARY EMPHASIZED THAT WE DID NOT VIEW MADRID AS A DEADLINE. WHILE WE WOULD PREFER TO WORK OUT THE TERMS OF A NATO-RUSSIA CHARTER BEFORE MADRID, THE SECRETARY TOLD HER RUSSIAN INTERLOCUTORS THAT MADRID AND ENLARGEMENT WILL PROCEED EVEN IF THERE IS NO BREAKTHROUGH ON NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS.

O THE RUSSIANS DID RAISE THE ISSUES OF WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE A PAUSE AFTER THE FIRST NEW STATES ARE ADMITTED TO NATO AND DID NOT SUGGEST STOPPING ENLARGEMENT AFTER THE FIRST TRANCHE.

O THE SECRETARY REITERATED OUR VIEW THAT ENLARGEMENT IS AN INCLUSIVE PROCESS WHICH WE BELIEVE WILL ENHANCE SECURITY FOR ALL EUROPEAN STATES AND THAT THE PROCESS WILL CONTINUE AFTER THE FIRST NEW MEMBERS ARE ADMITTED TO THE ALLIANCE IN 1999.
O THE SECRETARY PROVIDED PRIMAKOV WITH A VERY DETAILED BRIEF ON THE SPECIFICS OF THE ALLIANCE'S CFE PROPOSAL, BUT DECLINED TO BE DRAWN INTO A NEGOTIATION ON THE DETAILS.

O OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE ONLY JUST BEGUN TO ABSORB THE ALLIANCE'S CFE PROPOSAL.

O THE RUSSIANS HAVE TWO VERY CLEAR CONCERNS: FIRST, INFRASTRUCTURE, WHICH THEY DEFINE VERY BROADLY, AND SECOND, NATO TROOP DEPLOYMENTS ON THE TERRITORIES OF NEW MEMBER STATES.

TALBOTT UNQUOTE ALBRIGHT

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01
SSN: 4294
TOR: 970225235853 M2633312
DIST: SIT: BELL DOWLING EGGERT FEELEY FORT FRIED MATERA PASCUAL PIFER SCHMIDT VERSHBOW WITKOWSKY

SIT: NSC
SUBJ: CHIRAC VISIT TO BUCHAREST

TEXT:

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR ALFRED H. MOSES DUE TO 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (U) SUMMARY. THE FEBRUARY 21-22 VISIT OF FRENCH PRESIDENT JACQUES CHIRAC TO BUCHAREST REVEALED THE FOLLOWING:

-- FRENCH SUPPORT FOR FIRST-WAVE NATO MEMBERSHIP FOR ROMANIA, IN RETURN FOR WHICH FRANCE IS ASKING ROMANIA TO SUBSTITUTE FRANCE FOR THE UNITED STATES AS ITS PREFERRED WESTERN RELATIONSHIP.

-- PROMOTION OF A "SPECIAL PARTNERSHIP" BETWEEN FRANCE AND ROMANIA BUILT ON THE PRINCIPLE OF EUROPEAN PREFERENCE.

-- THE VISIT GAVE ROMANIA A BOOST THOUGH UNDERLYING GOR CONCERNS REMAIN. END SUMMARY.

3. (U) DURING HIS THIRTY-HOUR VISIT TO BUCHAREST,
CHIRAC AND HIS DELEGATION OF FOREIGN MINISTER DE CHARETTE, INTERIOR MINISTER DEBRE, MINISTER-DELEGATE FOR FINANCE AND FOREIGN TRADE GALLAND AND ASSORTED BUSINESSMEN MET WITH PRESIDENT CONSTANTINESCU, PRIME MINISTER CIORBEA, FOREIGN MINISTER SEVERIN, FORMER PRESIDENT ILIESCU, AND A FULL LINE-UP OF ROMANIAN MINISTERS AND BUSINESSMEN. ON EVERY OCCASION, CHIRAC TOUTED FRENCH SUPPORT FOR THE GOR'S TOP POLICY PRIORITY, AN INVITATION FOR ROMANIA TO BEGAN NATO ACCESSION TALKS AT THE MADRID SUMMIT. CHIRAC CITED THE DEMOCRATIC CHANGE OF POWER IN LAST YEAR'S ELECTIONS, CONCLUSION OF THE ROMANIAN-HUNGARIAN TREATY, AND ROMANIAN FOCUS ON ECONOMIC REFORM AS FACTORS THAT FULLY QUALIFY ROMANIA FOR MEMBERSHIP.

4. (U) CHIRAC SAID THAT FRANCE "WOULD DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO CONVINCE (FRENCH) PARTNERS IN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE" TO SUPPORT ROMANIAN ADMISSION IN MADRID. HE CITED THE GERMAN POSITION AS IMPORTANT BUT NOTED THAT "THE GREATEST DIFFICULTY DOES NOT LIE THERE. WE WILL HAVE TO CONVINCE THE UNITED STATES TO ACCEPT THIS." HE SAID THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THE ISSUE AT LENGTH WITH U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE ALBRIGHT DURING HER RECENT VISIT TO PARIS.

5. IN A PRIVATE, POST-VISIT MEETING WITH THE AMBASSADOR, FOREIGN MINISTER SEVERIN SAID THAT BEHIND CLOSED DOORS CHIRAC AND DE CHARETTE HAD SAID THAT ROMANIAN MEMBERSHIP IN NATO WAS A REQUISITE CONDITION FOR FRANCE BUT IMPLIED THAT THIS WOULD BEAR A PRICE. CHIRAC COMPLAINED THAT THE FRENCH RELATIONSHIP WITH ROMANIA LAGGED BEHIND THE U.S. AND SAID THAT THE "SPECIAL PARTNERSHIP AND PREFERENCES" FRANCE SOUGHT INCLUDED CONTRACTS AND INVESTMENTS. CHIRAC SAID THAT HE WOULD NOT SEEK TO BLOCK A CO-PRODUCTION/PURCHASE DEAL FOR BELL COBRA HELICOPTERS IN FAVOR OF EUROCOPTER BUT ADVISED THE ROMANIANS TO ASK FOR PROMPT U.S. POLITICAL COMPENSATION FOR AMERICAN-SOURCED ARMS CONTRACTS.

6. (U) THE FRENCH DELEGATION APPARENTLY DID NOT GO AWAY EMPTY-HANDED. PRESS REPORTS INDICATE THAT MATRA-HACHETTE SIGNED A 650 MILLION FF CONTACT FOR TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS FOR THE DEFENSE AND INTERIOR MINISTRY. A AMMUNITION PRODUCTION JOINT VENTURE WITH MATHURINS CORPORATION WAS ALSO REPORTEDLY SIGNED. STATE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CONSTANTIN IONESCU HAS SINCE CONFIRMED TO THE AMBASSADOR THAT DISCUSSIONS OCCURRED BUT DENIES THAT ANY CONTRACTS WERE FINALIZED.
7. (U) CHIRAC STRESSED CULTURAL TIES BETWEEN FRANCE AND ROMANIA AND THE NEED FOR ROMANIA TO STRENGTHEN LINKS TO EU COUNTRIES WITH WHICH IT SHARES STRONG AFFINITIES. THE ROMANIANS SOUGHT MORE PALPABLE SIGNS OF AFFECTION, INCLUDING FRENCH SUPPORT FOR GREATER ROMANIAN INCLUSION IN THE EUROPEAN ROAD PROJECT, BEGINNING WITH A EU-SUBSIDIZED HIGHWAY FROM BUCHAREST TO BUDAPEST. BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT ROMANIAN ADMISSION TO THE EU WOULD TAKE TIME. CHIRAC SAID THAT ROMANIA MUST FIRST MEET BASIC ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CRITERIA TO QUALIFY, AND CONSTANTINESCU AGREED THAT ROMANIA COULD NOT PREMATURELY ENTER A NO-WIN COMPETITION.

PUBLIC BOOST, PRIVATE AMBIVALENCE

8. ROMANIA GOT WHAT IT WANTED MOST FROM THE VISIT -- A STRONG PUBLIC STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP FROM THE FIRST CHIEF OF STATE TO VISIT HERE SINCE THE INSTALLATION OF THE NEW ROMANIAN GOVERNMENT. HOWEVER, OTHER AREAS WERE LESS PERFECTLY SCRIPTED. THE FRENCH SIDE DID NOT AGREE TO LIFT VISA REQUIREMENTS FOR ROMANIANS, AS REQUESTED, ALTHOUGH VISA WAIVERS FOR ROMANIAN DIPLOMATS WILL BE STUDIED. IN A DIPLOMATIC CORPS BRIEFING, FRENCH AMBASSADOR BOYER AND SEVERIN SKIRMISHED OVER BOYER'S PRONOUNCEMENT THAT FRANCE HAD REPLACED THE U.S. AS ROMANIA'S PRE-EMINENT PARTNER. BOYER ALSO REFUTED SEVERIN'S ASSERTION THAT FRANCE WILL CONDITION NATO ENLARGEMENT ON ROMANIA'S ADMITTANCE.


KEEPING BAD COMPANY

10. (U) THE PUBLIC RELATIONS HIGHLIGHT OF THE VISIT WAS THE RECHRISTENING OF THE "AVIATORS SQUARE" AS
"CHARLES DE GAULLE SQUARE." THE EDITOR OF ROMANIA'S MOST POPULAR SATIRICAL WEEKLY SUBSEQUENTLY POINTED OUT THAT THE SAME SQUARE HAD IN OTHER TIMES BORNE THE NAMES OF ADOLPH HITLER AND JOE STALIN.

MOSES
SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01
SSN: 1247
TOR: 970227090225 M2635945
DIST: SIT: NSC
PREM: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHMOA7281 0841956-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 251956Z MAR 97
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
OSRI: RUEHMO
DTG: 251956Z MAR 97
ORIG: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4783
INFO: RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY Vilnius 7868
       RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY Riga 0220
       RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY Tallinn 7628
       RUNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
       RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
SUBJ: RUSSIAN REACTIONS TO HELSINKI

TEXT:

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 007281

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/25/07
TAGS: PREL, NATO, RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN REACTIONS TO HELSINKI

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY JOHN ORDWAY, ACTING DCM.
   REASON: 1.5 (B) AND (D).-------
   SUMMARY

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2. (U) WHILE THE KREMLIN AND MFA HAVE BEEN QUITE
   UPBEAT ON THE RESULTS IN HELSINKI, ARGUING THAT
   PRESIDENT YELTSIN DEFENDED RUSSIAN INTERESTS AND
   ACHIEVED CONCRETE RESULTS, OUTSIDE COMMENTATORS
   HAVE BEEN MORE SKEPTICAL. MEDIA COVERAGE WAS
   OBJECTIVE AND THOROUGH, BUT NOT TO THE POINT OF
   DISPLACING OTHER DOMESTIC STORIES, ESPECIALLY
   ONGOING CHANGES IN THE GOVERNMENT. MOST RUSSIANS
   SEEM TO HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE SUMMIT WAS
   ROUTINE AND REAFFIRMED RATHER THAN CHANGED
   RUSSIA'S (DECLINING) POSITION IN THE WORLD. END
   SUMMARY.

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THE OFFICIAL LINE

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3. (U) NOT SURPRISINGLY, THE KREMLIN AND MFA HAVE
   TAKEN AN UPBEAT LINE ON HELSINKI RESULTS (FM
   PRIMAKOV CALLED THE SUMMIT A "BREAKTHROUGH"),
   EMPHASIZING THAT YELTSIN DEFENDED RUSSIAN
   INTERESTS AND CAME AWAY WITH HARD-WON
   COMPROMISES. THE GOR REAFFIRMED ITS OPPOSITION
   TO NATO AND GAINED ASSURANCES REGARDING...
DEPLOYMENTS IN NEW-MEMBER STATES. FM PRIMAKOV WAS ALSO CAREFUL TO LAY DOWN (AGAIN) A MARKER ON BALTIC MEMBERSHIP IN NATO.

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REALISTIC COMPROMISES
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4. (U) AT A MARCH 24 PRESS CONFERENCE, INFLUENTIAL AND WELL-CONNECTED USA/CANADA INSTITUTE DIRECTOR SERGEY ROGOV ALSO TOOK A POSITIVE LINE, NOTING THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO WINNERS OR LOSERS IN HELSINKI. A COMPROMISE PACKAGE, EMBODIED IN THE FIVE STATEMENTS, HAD BEEN CONCLUDED, AND ALL CONTAINED ELEMENTS FAVORABLE FOR RUSSIA. ROGOV CALLED THE SUMMIT A "PERSONAL VICTORY" FOR PRESIDENT YELTSIN AND A CREDIT TO PRIMAKOV'S LEADERSHIP OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. HE EXPLAINED TO REPORTERS THE BINDING NATURE OF AN "EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT" SIGNED BY A U.S. PRESIDENT. HE WARNED THAT CONFRONTATION WITH THE WEST WOULD HAVE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES FOR RUSSIA: IN DOMESTIC POLITICAL TERMS, RUSSIA MIGHT TURN TOWARD ITS AUTOCRATIC PAST; IN PURELY ECONOMIC TERMS, RUSSIA CANNOT AFFORD AN ARMS RACE. (NOTE: ROGOV PRESENTED MUCH THE SAME LINE IN A FRONT PAGE PIECE IN THE MARCH 25 EDITION OF NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA. END NOTE.)

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SKEPTICS QUESTION RESULTS
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5. (U) REFORMIST COMMENTATORS AND POLITICIANS WERE SKEPTICAL THAT RUSSIA GAINED ANYTHING FROM THE SUMMIT, NOTING THAT YELTSIN WAS PLAYING FROM A POSITION OF WEAKNESS AND THAT MANY OF THE RESULTS MAY NEVER BE IMPLEMENTED (MANY DOUBT, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE DUMA WILL RATIFY START II, THE CWC, OR A NATO RUSSIA DOCUMENT). COMMENTS INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING:

-- REFORMIST IZVESTIA SAID HELSINKI HELPED AVOID RESTARTING THE COLD WAR, BUT ALSO THAT RUSSIA, PLAYING A WEAK HAND, WAS UNABLE TO STOP NATO ENLARGEMENT.

-- COMMENTARY IN THE MARCH 24 SEGODNIA CLAIMED THAT EITHER SIDE CAN INTERPRET THE RESULTS ANY WAY THEY WANT AND NOTED THE UNLIKELYHOOD OF THE DUMA RATIFYING A NATO-RUSSIA DOCUMENT.

-- NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA OBSERVED THAT RUSSIA MAY "MOVE EAST" THIS SPRING BY PLAYING ITS CHINA CARD IN RESPONSE TO NATO ENLARGEMENT, WHICH IT HAS BEEN UNABLE TO STOP.

6. (C) YABLOKO FACTION HEAD GRIGORIY YAVLINSKIY COMMENTED PUBLICLY THAT YELTSIN HAD EFFECTIVELY AGREED TO NATO ENLARGEMENT IN HELSINKI, BUT THAT
THIS IS LESS IMPORTANT THAN ADDRESSING DOMESTIC PROBLEMS. YABLOKO FACTION DUMA MEMBER MIKHAIL YURYEV TOLD VISITING SENATOR BIDEN THAT RUSSIA PROBABLY GOT THE BEST IT COULD HOPE FOR FROM

HELSEINKI, "BUT THAT'S NOT GOOD ENOUGH." BECOMING INCREASINGLY AGITATED THE MORE HE DISCUSSED THE ISSUE, YURYEV ADVOCATED ALLIANCES WITH IRAN, INDIA, AND CHINA "TO COUNTERBALANCE THE U.S. IN EUROPE,
" AS A RESPONSE TO NATO ENLARGEMENT.

VP GORE ON G-7

7. (U) MARCH 25 PAPERS WERE QUICK TO NOTE VP GORE'S REMARKS ON RUSSIAN MEMBERSHIP IN THE G-7/P-8. IZVESTIYA COMMENTED THAT THE HELSEINKI SUMMIT "SOAP BUBBLE" WAS BURST ONLY TWO DAYS LATER BY THE VICE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT. REFORMIST KOMMERSANT DAILY WROTE: "GORE'S DEMARCHE IS NOT JUST INSULTING, IT MAY DAMAGE OTHER HELSEINKI ACCORDS.... WITH SURPRISES LIKE THAT, THE HIGH PRICE PAID FOR AMERICAN STEPS TO MEET THE PARTNER HALFWAY MAY PROVE A WASTE."

NATIONALISTS AND COMMUNISTS SEE A DEFEAT

8. (U) COMMUNIST LEADER GENNADIY ZYUGANOV TOLD REPORTERS THAT YELTSIN HAD "BETRAYED RUSSIAN INTERESTS" IN HELSEINKI AND COMPARED THE AGREEMENTS REACHED TO THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES. NATIONALIT SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA CALLED HELSEINKI A RUSSIAN "CAPITULATION" TO THE U.S. AND NATO.

COMMENT

9. IN SUM, MOST RUSSIANS DID NOT HAVE HIGH HOPES THAT HELSEINKI WOULD CHANGE ANYTHING, AND THEY HAVE CONCLUDED THEY WERE RIGHT. NON-GOVERNMENTAL COMMENTATORS TAKING AN UPBEAT VIEW COUCH THEIR "OPTIMISM" IN TERMS OF "YELTSIN DOING THE BEST HE COULD GIVEN RUSSIA'S WEAKNESS." AFTER A REVIEW OF THE TEXTS, MUCH OF THE POLITICAL ELITE HAS BEEN UNABLE TO RECONCILE YELTSIN'S HARSH RHETORIC ON THE EVE OF THE SUMMIT WITH GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTS TO SPIN THE OUTCOME AS A BREAKTHROUGH. INSTEAD THEY APPEAR RESIGNED TO A PERIOD OF RUSSIAN WEAKNESS BUT ARE FRUSTRATED THAT NATO, UNDER U.S. LEADERSHIP, HAS CHOSEN TO ENLARGE, THUS "KICKING RUSSIA WHEN IT IS DOWN."
THEY ALSO DOUBT THAT THE STATEMENTS ISSUED IN HELSINKI WILL AMOUNT TO MUCH, EITHER BECAUSE THE DUMA WILL NOT RATIFY KEY DOCUMENTS OR BECAUSE NATO WILL CONTINUE "TO DO AS IT PLEASES," ALIENATING RUSSIA.

10. AT THE SAME TIME, MANY RUSSIANS RECOGNIZE THAT RUSSIA'S MOST PRESSING PROBLEMS ARE DOMESTIC. FOR THIS REASON, THE ONGOING GOVERNMENT RESHUFFLE OVERSHADOWED THE SUMMIT AND SUMMIT RESULTS WERE SEEN IN TERMS OF RUSSIA'S OVERALL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TROUBLES. DESPITE ITS POSITIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE SUMMIT, THE GOR WILL FACE CONTINUING SKEPTICISM FROM THE DUMA AND POLITICAL ELITE AS IT TRIES TO IMPLEMENT HELSINKI DECISIONS.

TEFFT

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

SSN: 7281
<SSN>7281

TOR: 970325121729 M2682716
<TOR>970325115852 M2682674

DIST:
SIT: BUJOLD EGGERT ELKIND FORT MATERA PASCUAL PASSDOWN PIFER RUMER SUM SUM2
SIT: NSC
PRT: SIT(C2)
TEXT:

CONTEMPORARY HELSINKI 001550

E.O. 12958: DECL:03/27/05
TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO, RS, FI
SUBJECT: THE MORNING AFTER: RUSSIAN/FINNISH
POST-SUMMIT BILATERALS FOCUS ON THE
BALTICS

1. CLASSIFIED BY R. DE VILLAFRANCA, POLCHIEF.
REASON: 1.5 (B) (D)

2. SUMMARY: IN POST-SUMMIT BILATERALS WITH THE
RUSSIANS MARCH 22, THE FINNS WERE STRUCK BY THE
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN YELTSIN'S TREATMENT OF BALTIC ISSUES
AND FM PRIMAKOV'S MUCH TOUGHER APPROACH. PRESIDENT
AHTISAARI TOLD AMBASSADOR SHEARER THAT, IN THEIR
SATURDAY MORNING TETE-A-TETE, YELTSIN'S TONE SEEMED
"CONCILIATORY." IN CONTRAST, FINNISH MFA OFFICIALS
RECOUNTED PRIMAKOV'S ADAMANT CRITICISM OF ESTONIA IN
HIS MEETING WITH FM HALONEN, ESPECIALLY ON MINORITY
ISSUES, WHERE THERE WAS "NO PROGRESS." RUSSIAN EMBASSY
COUNSELOR BARBIN LATER EXPLAINED TO POLCHIEF THAT THERE
WAS NO DAYLIGHT BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND PRIMAKOV ON
BALTIC ISSUES. YELTSIN, HE SAID, WAS BEING
"PRESIDENTIAL," BUT PRIMAKOV HAD TO BE PRACTICAL.
PRIMAKOV, APPARENTLY BEING PRACTICAL, VENTED SOME
Spleen over the Baltics in his meeting with FM Halonen, but later suggested a potentially useful approach to resolving Russian-Estonian problems: a trilateral foreign ministers' meeting. FM Halonen apprised Estonian FM Ilves of the idea in a brief encounter in Brussels on March 24, and will discuss it again in more detail March 26 in Tallinn. President Ahtisaari underscored to Ambassador Shearer that Finland could be a "facilitator," but not a mediator; U/S Blumberg repeated that message to Polchief, but with a different spin: Finld would not mediate "without the approval of both sides."

3. Although not directly summit-related, both Russians and Finns have recently made it clear to us that they would welcome the US as an observer in the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS). END SUMMARY.

4. Finnish President Ahtisaari briefed Ambassador Shearer March 22 on his post-summit meetings (tete-a-tete and plenary) with Russian President Yeltsin. MFA undersecretary Blumberg provided a readout of the Primakov-Halonen bilateral.

Sweet and sour

5. President Ahtisaari said that Yeltsin:

-- Said he had tried to get President Clinton to agree to no NATO expansion to former areas of the USSR, "but," Yeltsin admitted, "I failed."

-- Agreed that there was a "new" NATO, where both Finns and Russians could walk the corridors of NATO headquarters;

-- Expressed satisfaction with summit results.

-- Did not criticize the Baltic states, and supported their membership in the EU.

-- Expressed Russian interest in EU membership as recognition that Russia was a "full-fledged" European state.

-- Praised Finnish-Swedish cooperation in the Baltic states;

-- Confused his figures when discussing Finnish-Russian trade (claiming 40 percent of Finland's trade was with Russia instead of 7 percent, the correct figure);

-- Noted the "serious and positive" economic and trade meetings held on the summit's margins between external trade ministers Davydov and Norrback. In the
NORRBACK-DAVYDOV TALKS, PROGRESS WAS MADE ON:

-- IDENTIFYING HELSKINKI-MOSCOW ROUTES FOR BOTH RAIL AND HIGHWAY;
-- A ST. PETERSBURG-PORVOO OIL PIPELINE;
-- A JOINT AUTOMOBILE FACTORY IN VYBORG.

6. AGREEMENT WAS ALSO REACHED ON THE OPENING OF TWO ADDITIONAL BORDER CUSTOMS STATIONS, AT SALLA AND IMATRA. AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES ON THE BORDER STATIONS IS LIKELY WHEN PM LIPPOLEN VISITS MOSCOW IN APRIL; THIS WOULD FREE UP TACIS FUNDS FOR INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT TO SUPPORT THE BORDER STATIONS.

7. ACCORDING TO MFA UNDERSECRETARY BLOMBERG, FM PRIMAKOV WAS NOT AS NICE AS YELTSIN ABOUT THE BALTICS WHEN HE MET WITH FM HALONEN SATURDAY MORNING. ALTHOUGH HE ECHOED YELTSIN'S COMMENTS ABOUT BALTIC EU MEMBERSHIP, PRIMAKOV SAID THERE HAD BEEN "NO PROGRESS" ON MINORITY RIGHTS ISSUES. HE ARGUED THAT ESTONIA'S CITIZENSHIP TEST SHOULD BE ELIMINATED (IN FAVOR OF A "CITIZENSHIP LECTURE"). HE CLAIMED ESTONIAN CITIZENSHIP SHOULD BE AUTOMATIC FOR THOSE BORN IN ESTONIA. PRIMAKOV EXPRESSED ANTIPATHY TOWARD THE IDEA OF A BORDER TREATY RATIFICATION "STATEMENT" BY THE RIIGIKOGU EVOKING THE TARTU TREATY, AND WAS NOT WELL-DISPOSED TOWARD THE EU'S PLANNED STATEMENT. THE FINNS CONSIDER OUT OF BOUNDS PRIMAKOV'S IDEAS ON A "CITIZENSHIP LECTURE" AND AUTOMATIC CITIZENSHIP FOR THOSE BORN IN ESTONIA.

8. PRIMAKOV THEN SURPRISED THE FINNS BY SUGGESTING A POTENTIALLY POSITIVE WAY FORWARD. HE WONDERED ALOUD TO FM HALONEN WHETHER SOMETHING MIGHT COME OF A TRILATERAL FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING -- THAT IS, IF ESTONIAN FM ILVES THOUGHT IT WORTHWHILE. HALONEN WILL EXPLORE THIS IDEA WITH FM ILVES MARCH 26.

9. COMMENT: THE FINNS RECOGNIZE THAT THIS TRILATERAL FORUM COULD LEAD TO A FINNISH MEDIATION EFFORT, BUT THEY ARE AT GREAT PAINS TO AVOID BEING SEEN AS THE INITIATORS OF THE IDEA. THEY WANT TO BE DRAFTED. THEY RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS PROBABLY NOT MUCH SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PRIMAKOV AND YELTSIN ON THE BALTICS, BUT WHAT DIFFERENCES DO EXIST ARE POLITICAL. THE FINNS SEE POSSIBILITIES HERE: U/S BLOMBERG, THE PERSONIFICATION OF CAUTION, OBSERVED THAT THERE MIGHT BE "ROOM FOR MOVEMENT" IF ESTONIA MET OSCE CRITERIA. PRIMAKOV MIGHT BE CONVINCED TO RECOGNIZE THAT THIS WAS THE CASE, GIVEN YELTSIN'S MORE CONCILIATORY INCENTIVES ON BALTIIC ISSUES. AN OBVIOUS PITFALL FOR THE FINNS WOULD BE PRIMAKOV HIMSELF. BLOMBERG OPENLY WONDERED WHETHER, ON ESTONIA AT LEAST, PRIMAKOV HAD AN ATTITUDE. A FEW FINNS WITHIN THE MFA HAVE SPECULATED THAT PRIMAKOV MAY HAVE TAKEN PERSONALLY AN APPARENT MISCOMMUNICATION IN HIS LATE AUTUMN MEETING WITH THEN-ESTONIAN FM KALAS IN PETROZAVODSK, REGARDING THE METHODOLOGY THE TWO SIDES WOULD USE TO RESOLVE
RUSSIA'S CONCERNS ABOUT MINORITY RIGHTS IN ESTONIA. HOWEVER THAT MAY BE, THE FINNS ARE INTRIGUED WITH THE NOTION OF MEDIATION, WHICH WOULD BE A FIRST FOR FINLAND. BLOMBERG HASTENED TO ADD THAT, FOR NOW, FINLAND MERELY PLANNED TO CHECK OUT THE POSSIBILITIES.

SHEARER

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01
SSN: 1550
TOR: 970326142552 M2685004
DIST: SIT: NSC
Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: SECRET-
LINE1: OASZYUW RUEHOLA7047 1631124-SSSS--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY SSSSS ZZH
LINE3: O 1211242 JUN 97
LINE4: FM AMBASSADY BONN
OSRI: RUEHOL
DTG: 1211242 JUN 97
ORIG: AMBASSADY BONN
TO: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8987
INFO: ///
SUBJ: CHANCELLOR KOHL AND ROMANIA'S NATO CANDIDACY

TEXT:

GEBR BONN 007047

NODIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/12/07
TAGS: PREL, NATO, GM, RO
SUBJECT: CHANCELLOR KOHL AND ROMANIA'S NATO CANDIDACY

1. CLASSIFIED BY CHARGE J.D. BINDENAGEL FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. ⇔ JOACHIM BITTERLICH TOLD THE CHARGE ON JUNE 11 THAT THE CHANCELLOR HAD NOT AUTHORIZED AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT ON ROMANIA'S CANDIDACY, DESPITE THE EUROPEAN PEOPLE'S PARTY STATEMENT IN LUXEMBOURG CLAIMING GERMAN SUPPORT. BITTERLICH REITERATED THAT THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT VETO ANY NEW MEMBER AND WOULD JOIN A CONSSENSUS AT MADRID. THE CHARGE, HAVING HEARD THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND MOD HAD GIVEN KOHL A THREE-ONLY PROPOSAL, ASKED BITTERLICH WHETHER THE CHANCELLOR WAS PREPARED TO AGREE TO ONLY THREE NEW MEMBERS. BITTERLICH REPLIED BLUNTLY THAT GERMANY WOULD NOT SUPPORT PUBLIC ENDORSEMENT OF ONLY THREE AT THIS TIME. THE GERMANS DO NOT PLAN TO MAKE ANY DECISIONS UNTIL AFTER THE JULY 2 VISIT OF PRESIDENT CONSTANTINESCU.

3. ⇔ CHANCELLOR KOHL IS UNDER INTENSE DOMESTIC PRESSURE AS THOUSANDS OF DEMONSTRATORS MARCHED IN THE STREETS OF BONN JUNE 11 TO PROTEST FURTHER BUDGET CUTS TO MEET THE MAASTRICHT CRITERIA FOR MONETARY UNION. HE HAS CRAFTED A COMPROMISE WITH THE NEW FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO PRESERVE THE EMU STABILITY PACT IN EXCHANGE FOR A BINDING PLEDGE ON JOB CREATION. WITH THE FRANCO-GERMAN SUMMIT IN POITIERS TOMORROW AND THE EU SUMMIT IN AMSTERDAM NEXT WEEK, THE CHANCELLOR IS AIMING TO ENSURE THAT FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS -- AS WELL AS EMU AND THE IGC -- REMAIN ON TRACK. FRANCO-GERMAN DISPUTE ON
ROMANIA WOULD COST HIM SUPPORT ON THESE CRUCIAL ISSUES.

4. LAST FRIDAY, JUNE 6, KOHL TOLD TONY BLAIR THAT HE WAS "IMpressed" WITH THE PRESIDENT'S ARGUMENTS FOR EXTENDING INVITATIONS TO ONLY THREE NEW MEMBERS AT MADRID. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, HE ALSO DOES NOT WANT TO BE PERCEIVED AS BLOCKING ANY EUROPEAN COUNTRY'S ENTRY INTO NATO. MERTENS' STATEMENT AT THE EUROPEAN PEOPLE'S PARTY SUMMIT WAS "UNOFFICIAL," A CHANCELLERY PRESS SPOKESMAN CALLED IT AN "EXPRESSION OF SYMPATHY AND NOT A DECISION." WHETHER OFFICIAL OR NOT, THE CHANCELLOR DOES NOT WANT TO REBUFF ROMANIA.

5. THE CHANCELLOR IS UNWILLING TO CONFRONT THE FRENCH ON SUPPORT FOR ROMANIA IN NATO AT THIS TIME AND IS PREPARED TO LET THE UNITED STATES BEAR THE BRUNT OF CRITICISM FOR BLOCKING OTHER NATO ASPIRANTS IN THE FIRST TRANCHE. THE CHANCELLOR, ALTHOUGH PERSUADED THAT THE "SMALL" ENLARGEMENT SCENARIO MAY BE THE WISEST COURSE, HAS CALCULATED THAT HE CANNOT ANTAGONIZE THE NEW GOVERNMENT IN PARIS. MERTENS INDICATED THAT, IF EFFORTS TO INCLUDE ROMANIA IN THE FIRST ROUND FAIL, THEN A DATE MUST BE FIXED FOR A SECOND ROUND. THE CHANCELLOR IS PROBABLY PREPARED TO ACCEPT ROMANIA'S EXCLUSION IF SUCH A DATE CERTAIN WERE PUT FORWARD.

BINDENAGEL

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01
SSN: 7047
TOR: 970612073028 M2801463
Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
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LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 1214312 JUN 97
LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC
OSRI: RUEHC
DTG: 1214312 JUN 97
ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC

TO: EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
    RUEHLSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK IMMEDIATE 0000
    RUEHL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN IMMEDIATE 0000
    RUEHRA/AMEMBASSY RIGA IMMEDIATE 0000
    RUEHL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS IMMEDIATE 0000
    RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV IMMEDIATE 0000

INFO: ///
SUBJ: MEMCON OF DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT-S MEETING
      WITH ESTONIAN PRESIDENT LENNART MERI AND LATVIAN PRESIDENT
      GUNTIS ULMANIS, MAY 28, THE HAGUE.

TEXT:

CONFIDENTIAL STATE 110550

EXDIS, PARIS ALSO FOR USOECD, ROME ALSO FOR VATICAN,
USVIENNA FOR CSCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/05
TAGS: PREL, NATO, MARR, ZB, EN, LG, BO, LH, UP
SUBJECT: MEMCON OF DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT-S MEETING
WITH ESTONIAN PRESIDENT LENNART MERI AND LATVIAN PRESIDENT
GUNTIS ULMANIS, MAY 28, THE HAGUE.

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY RONALD D.
   ASMUS, REASON: 1.5 (B), (D).

2. (C) PARTICIPANTS: U.S.: DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT, EUR
   DAS ASMUS, ERIC EDELMAN, EMBASSY POLOFF J.P. SCHUTTE
   (NOTETAKER); ESTONIA: PRESIDENT MERI, FOREIGN MINISTER
   TOOMAS ILVES, AMBASSADOR TO THE NETHERLANDS JURI LUIK
   (NOTETAKER); LATVIA: PRESIDENT ULMANIS, AMBASSADOR TO THE
   BENELUX IMANTS LIEGIS (NOTETAKER), INTERPRETER.
   DATE AND PLACE: MAY 28, 1997, SOFITEL, THE HAGUE

3. (C) SUMMARY: DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT MET WITH THE
   BALTIIC LEADERS ON THE MARGINS OF THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY
   CELEBRATIONS OF THE MARSHALL PLAN TO REASSURE THEM OF THE
   U.S. COMMITMENT TO BALTIIC SECURITY, AND TO DISCUSS THE
   BALTIIC CHARTER AND NATO ENLARGEMENT IN THE WAKE OF THE
   NATO-RUSSIA FOUNDING ACT. LITHUANIAN PRESIDENT BRAZUSKAS

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CONTINUED IMPORTANCE OF BALTICS TO U.S.

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5. HE NOTED THAT THE SECURITY OF THE BALTIC STATES HAD BEEN VERY MUCH ON HIS MIND, AS WELL AS ON THE MIND OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE, IN RECENT WEEKS AND MONTHS AS THE U.S. HAD FOCUSED ON COMPLETING NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE NATORUSSIAN FOUNDING ACT AS WELL AS ENSURING THAT THE ALLIANCE WOULD ADOPT A ROBUST OPEN DOOR STRATEGY AT MADRID FOR THOSE PARTNER COUNTRIES NOT INCLUDED IN THE FIRST ROUND OF ENLARGEMENT. HE EMPHASIZED THAT EUROPE COULD NOT
BE SECURE UNTIL THE BALTIM STATES, TOO, WERE SECURE. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY STATED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT SOME BALTIM REPRESENTATIVES HAD STARTED TO VOICE FRUSTRATION ABOUT HOW LONG IT WAS TAKING TO RECEIVE THE U.S. DRAFT, BUT THAT THE PROGRESS THE U.S. HAD ACCOMPLISHED IN RECENT WEEKS IN NATO AND WITH RUSSIA WAS VERY MUCH IN THE INTERESTS OF THE BALTIM STATES AS WELL. THIS, IN TURN, BROUGHT HIM TO HIS SECOND MESSAGE WHICH WAS THAT THERE WAS NOTHING IN THE NATO-RUSSIAN FOUNDING ACT THAT IN ANY WAY WOULD HINDER EVENTUAL BALTIM MEMBERSHIP IN NATO. THE 'RED LINES' THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED WITH BALTIM AMBASSADORS IN BOTH WASHINGTON AND BRUSSELS ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS HAD CLEARLY NOT BEEN CROSSED. THE DOOR TO FUTURE NATO MEMBERSHIP IS AND WOULD REMAIN OPEN TO ALL EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES ELIGIBLE FOR MEMBERSHIP, A MESSAGE THAT HAD ALSO BEEN CONVEYED TO SENIOR RUSSIAN OFFICIALS ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS.

5. AS PRESIDENT CLINTON HAS RECENTLY REITERATED, NATO ENLARGEMENT IS ONGOING, NON-DISCRIMINATORY AND INCLUSIONARY. NO STATE WHICH ACHIEVES ELIGIBILITY WILL BE EXCLUDED. NOTHING IN THE FOUNDING ACT ITSELF, IN LARGE PRINT, FINE PRINT, OR BETWEEN THE LINES, AND NOTHING THAT WAS SAID IN PARIS WOULD BY INERENCE OR IMPLICATION LEAD TO THE EXCLUSION OF OTHER STATES. ALTHOUGH NATO MEMBERSHIP FOR BALTIM STATES IS A CONTENTIOUS ISSUE, RUSSIA UNDERSTANDS OUR INTENTIONS AND OUR RESOLVE. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY ALSO UNDERSCORED THE STRONG U.S. INTEREST IN ENSURING THAT NATO AT MADRID ANNOUNCED A ROBUST OPEN DOOR STRATEGY AND THAT THE U.S. WOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN THE ALLIANCE ON THIS "IN NO SMALL PART BECAUSE OF OUR CONCERN OVER YOUR SECURITY."

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DOUBTS ABOUT U.S. INTENTIONS
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6. WHILE BOTH BALTIM PRESIDENTS FORMALY WELCOMED THE SIGNING OF THE FOUNDING ACT IN PARIS, THEY NEVERTHELESS VOICED THEIR CONCERNS THAT THEIR NATIONS' FUTURE SECURITY MAY HAVE BEEN SACRIFICED TO SOME DEGREE IN THE NATO-RUSSIAN ACCOMMODATION. PRESIDENT ULMANIS CONFESSION HE WAS NOT SURE OF WHERE THE BALTIMICS AND RUSSIA FIT IN THE U.S. STRATEGIC VISION OF EUROPE. DESCRIBING THE LAST WEEK AS AMONG THE MOST DIFFICULT FOR HIS NATION IN MEMORY, PRESIDENT MERI SAID THAT "HIS PEOPLE HAD EXPECTED MORE AND GOT LESS." MERI NOTED THAT HE WAS GRATEFUL FOR TALBOTT'S "WORDS" BUT THAT THEY SHOULD BE MADE PUBLIC. THERE WERE ILLUSIONS IN MOSCOW THAT NEEDED TO BE DISPELLED AND ESTONIA COULD NOT DISPEL THESE. ONLY THE U.S. COULD. HE AND ILVES SUSPECTED THAT TWO RECENT U.S. ACTIONS SEND "PRECISELY THE WRONG SIGNALS" AND BETRAY A SHIFT IN U.S. POLICY:

-- THE SIGNING OF THE FOUNDING ACT AND THE DOWNGRADING OF BALTIM CHALLENGE MILITARY EXERCISES (PRESS BLACKOUT, CANCELLED FLYOVER, BAN ON UNIFORMS) ARE SURELY LINKED.
THE ESTONIANS CLAIMED THE U.S. HAD APPROACHED THE FINNS AT A LOW LEVEL AND TOLD THEM TO OBJECT TO BALTIC CHALLENGE IN ORDER TO HAVE AN EXCUSE TO DOWNGRADE IT. THE FINNS DUTY OBJECTED, NOT TO ESTONIA, BUT TO THE U.S.

-- VOA RECENTLY REFERRED TO THE BALTIC CHARTER AS A "CULTURAL AGREEMENT." SUCH A STATEMENT CAN ONLY FUEL SUSPICIONS THAT THE U.S. DOES NOT TAKE IT SERIOUSLY.

7. (c) THE LEADERS BOTH CRITICIZED THE UNITED STATES FOR NOT BEING CLEAR ENOUGH WITH THE RUSSIANS ON THE PROBABLE FUTURE OF BALTIC SECURITY. ULMANIS EXPOUNDED ON RUSSIA'S DESIRE TO PREVENT REAL EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND TO SOUR U.S.-BALTIC RELATIONS. MERI NOTED THAT THE RUSSIANS PERSIST IN THEIR BELIEF THAT THE FOUNDING ACT DOES NOT PROTECT THE BALTICS' RIGHT TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. THE U.S., HE SAID, HAS MADE NO CLEAR STATEMENT THAT THIS IS NOT THE CASE.

8. (c) TALBOTT RESPONDED THAT HE HIMSELF HAD ON A HALF A DOZEN OCCASIONS IN RECENT WEEKS MADE PRECISELY SUCH A PUBLIC STATEMENT. MOREOVER THE FOUNDING ACT IS ABSOLUTELY CLEAR ON THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM OF CHOICE FOR SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. THERE CAN BE NO POSSIBILITY OF MISINTERPRETATION. ESTONIAN CONCERNS ON BALTIC CHALLENGE WERE INACCURATE, UNFAIR, AND UNHELPFUL. ON THE CONTRARY, SENDING 2500 U.S. TROOPS WAS A CLEAR SIGN OF U.S. WILLINGNESS TO RISK ITS OWN MEN AND WOMEN IN THE INTEREST OF PEACE. THE ACCUSATIONS OF U.S. DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERING WITH THE FINNS WERE "JUST PLAIN WRONG."

9. (c) THE DEPUTY SECRETARY THEN ADDRESSED ESTONIAN PRESIDENT MERI, NOTING THAT HE AND MERI HAD KNOWN ONE ANOTHER FOR MANY YEARS AND HAD ALWAYS SPOKEN TO EACH OTHER OPENLY AND CANDIDLY. HE SUGGESTED THAT MERI NOT FORGET THAT THE BALTICS DID NOT HAVE A BETTER FRIEND IN THE WEST THAN THE UNITED STATES. IF IT WERE NOT FOR THE COMMITMENT OF THIS ADMINISTRATION AND ESPECIALLY THIS PRESIDENT, HE NOTED, NATO ENLARGEMENT WOULD NOT BE TAKING PLACE SIMILARLY, IF IT WERE NOT FOR THE UNITED STATES, ENLARGEMENT WOULD MOST SURELY BE LIMITED FOR A SINGLE ROUND.

10. (c) THE DISTRUST OF U.S. INTENTIONS SHOWN BY THE TWO HEADS OF STATE WAS A GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT TO US, SAID TALBOTT. HE SAID THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY ALBRIGHT WOULD BE SADDENED TO HEAR THAT AFTER ALL WE HAVE DONE, OUR BALTIC PARTNERS ARE STILL SUSPICIOUS OF AMERICAN POLICY. TALBOTT CHALLENGED THE LEADERS TO NAME A SINGLE INSTANCE WHEN THE UNITED STATES HAD FAILED TO DO WHAT IT HAD PROMISED. WHILE MAKING NO CLAIMS TO DIVINITY, THE UNITED STATES IS COMMITTED TO HELPING LEAD THE BALTICS BACK TO EUROPE, JUST AS MOSES HAD HELP.

11. (c) THE DEPUTY SECRETARY ADMITTED THAT THE RUSSIANS CERTAINLY ARE CONCERNED BY NATO ENLARGEMENT, AND WILL FIGHT US EVERY STEP OF THE WAY. THEY HAVE IN EFFECT DRAWN A NEW RED LINE. WE ARE WORKING HELP THE RUSSIANS SEE THAT
SECURITY IS NOT A ZERO-SUM GAME AND THAT "BROADENING AND DEEPENING OF NATO, PFP, AND THE EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL POSE NO THREAT TO THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF A DEMOCRATIC RUSSIA."


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BALTIC CHARTER
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13. ULMANIS OUTLINED HIS HOPES FOR THE BALTIC CHARTER:
-- IT SHOULD ENSHRINE HELSINKI PRINCIPLES;
-- IT SHOULD EMBODY A "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" WITH THE U.S.;
-- IT SHOULD BE IDENTICAL FOR ALL THREE COUNTRIES;
-- THE DRAFT SHOULD BE DISCUSSED BEFORE MADRID;
-- IT SHOULD BE SIGNED AT THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE LEVEL AFTER MADRID.

DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT AGREED WITH ULMANIS'S POINTS, AND DAS ASMUS STATED THE DRAFT COULD BE READY IN AS SOON AS THREE WEEKS.

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GERMAN BALTIC POLICY/ SKRUNDA
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14. ULMANIS AND MERI ENCOURAGED THE U.S TRY TO PERSUADE GERMANY TO PAY MORE ATTENTION TO THE BALTICS. ULMANIS CLAIMED KOHL HAD AGREED WITH THE RUSSIANS THAT HE WOULD NOT TRAVEL TO THE REGION. MERI DREW THE ANALOGY WITH "RAPOLLO" AND STRONGLY URGED THE U.S. TO TELL GERMANY IT HAS A RESPONSIBILITY IN EUROPE AND TO "SEND KOHL TO THE BALTICS." THE DEPUTY SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT HIS FIRST PRIORITY WOULD BE RESTORING BALTIC TRUST IN THE U.S.

15. ULMANIS WARNED THAT THE RUSSIANS DID NOT INTEND TO COMPLY WITH OR EXTEND THE AGREEMENT ON SKRUNDA. TALBOTT ASSURED HIM THAT THE U.S. IS AWARE OF AND WORKING ON THE SKRUNDA ISSUE.

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01
SSN: 0550
TOR: 970612105835 M2801788

DIST:
  SIT: FRIED SCHMIDT
  SIT: NSC
FOR AMBASSADORS AND PAOS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/31/97
TAGS: NATO, PREL
SUBJECT: NATO ENLARGEMENT -- U.S. DECISION ON NEW MEMBERS

1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY THE DEPUTY SECRETARY, REASONS 1.5 (B) AND (D).

2. (G) LATE ON JUNE 11, PRESIDENT CLINTON DECIDED THAT THE U.S. WOULD SUPPORT INVITING THREE STATES -- POLAND, THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND HUNGARY -- TO JOIN NATO AT THE MADRID SUMMIT. THE PRESIDENT MADE HIS DECISION ON THE BASIS OF RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE PRINCIPALS' COMMITTEE AND AFTER LENGTHY CONSULTATIONS WITH THE CONGRESS. ON JUNE 12, SECDEF COHEN BRIEFED NATO SYG SOLANA ON THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION AND INFORMED ALLIED COUNTERPARTS DURING THE NACID MINISTERIAL. ALSO ON JUNE 12, DEPUTY SECRETARY TALBOTT BRIEFED NATO AMBASSADORS. HE SUBSEQUENTLY REVIEWED THE DECISION IN CONVERSATIONS WITH AMBASSADORS FROM THE THREE WOULD-BE INVITEES; THE BALTIC STATES; ROMANIA; AND SLOVENIA. EUR A/S KORNBLUM LATER BRIEFED AMBASSADORS FROM SLOVAKIA, BULGARIA AND THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA.

3. (G) TO HELP ENSURE THAT ALLIES, PARTNERS AND OTHER FRIENDS FULLY UNDERSTAND THE PRESIDENT'S DECISIONS AND THE RATIONALE BEHIND IT, WE ARE PROVIDING THIS COMPREHENSIVE PACKAGE. A DETAILED READOUT OF THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S
DISCUSSION IS INCLUDED AT PARAS 4 - 15 FOR ALL ADDRESSEES' INFORMATION. ACTION ADDRESSEES MAY DRAW ON THE POINTS IN PARAS 16-17 AS NEEDED TO EXPLAIN OR FURTHER REINFORCE THE U.S. POSITION WITH APPROPRIATE HOST GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. MOSCOW FOR POST'S INFO ONLY. SEPARATE GUIDANCE WILL BE SENT SEPTEL. PRESS GUIDANCE IS CONTAINED IN EUR'S DAILY GUIDANCE CABLE, WHICH WILL ALSO BE TRANSMITTED TO THOSE ADDRESSEES WHO DO NOT NORMALLY RECEIVE IT.

DEPUTY SECRETARY'S BRIEFING FOR NATO AMBASSADORS

4. IN DESCRIBING THE U.S. DECISION, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE THE PRESIDENT PLACED NOT ONLY ON EXTENDING THESE INVITATIONS AT MADRID BUT ON KEEPING THE DOOR TO MEMBERSHIP OPEN AFTERWARDS. HE NOTED THE PRESIDENT HAD FOLLOWED THE PROCESS VERY CLOSELY, HAD RECEIVED DETAILED BRIEFINGS FROM SECRETARY ALBRIGHT ON HER MEETINGS IN SINTRA, PORTUGAL, AND HAD CAREFULLY CONSIDERED THE VIEWPOINTS OF HIS PRINCIPAL ADVISORS, FELLOW ALLIED LEADERS, CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES, AND MEMBERS OF CONGRESS BEFORE MAKING HIS DECISION.

5. FOLLOWING "AN INTENSE ENCOUNTER" LATE JUNE 11 WITH MEMBERS OF THE SENATE NATO OBSERVER GROUP, THE PRESIDENT HAD DECIDED TO SUPPORT THE THREE COUNTRIES. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY EXPLAINED THAT SOME MEMBERS OF THE SENATE GROUP WERE SKEPTICAL ABOUT ANY NATO ENLARGEMENT AT ALL WHILE OTHERS SUPPORTED AS MANY AS FIVE FOR THE FIRST ROUND.

6. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY NOTED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION WAS BASED ON A DECISIVE BUT STRAIGHTFORWARD CRITERION: ON AN ISSUE AS MOMENTOUS AS THIS FOR THE ALLIANCE, THERE SHOULD BE THE STRONGEST AND MOST SOLEMN CONSENSUS. NATO WORKED BY CONSENSUS AND THERE WAS CONSENSUS IN THE ALLIANCE FOR THREE; THERE WAS NO CONSENSUS FOR FOUR, FIVE, OR MORE.


8. THERE WERE OTHER ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF A MORE LIMITED GROUP, INCLUDING THE FACT THAT A SMALLER GROUP OF THE STRONGEST AMONG SEVERAL PROMISING CANDIDATES INCREASED THE CREDIBILITY OF NATO'S PROMISE THAT THERE WOULD BE SUBSEQUENT ACCESSIONS. THIS INITIATIVE WOULD NOT SUCCEED
UNLESS THE PROCESS OF ENLARGEMENT CONTINUED. THE PRESIDENT FELT VERY STRONGLY THAT A STRONG OPEN DOOR POLICY WAS CRITICALLY IMPORTANT.

9. CCP NSC SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS VERSHBOW ADDED THAT SINCE ADMISSION TO NATO WAS "AN IRREVERSIBLE STEP," THE COUNTRIES INVITED HAD TO MEET THE HIGHEST STANDARDS. AFTER WEIGHING ALLIED VIEWS AND EXTENSIVE DELIBERATIONS WITH HIS SENIOR ADVISORS AND THE CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT CONCLUDED THAT THE ALLIANCE'S INTERESTS WOULD BE BEST SERVED BY BEGINNING WITH THE STRONGEST CANDIDATES, WHILE KEEPING THE DOOR OPEN TO OTHERS NOT QUITE AS READY.

10. CCP IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM THE DUTCH AMBASSADOR AS TO WHETHER THE MEETING WITH THE SNOG HAD LED THE PRESIDENT TO BELIEVE THAT RATIFICATION WOULD BE DOUBTFUL IF FIVE WERE INVITED, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY REPLIED THAT HE BELIEVED RATIFICATION WOULD BE "MORE DIFFICULT, BUT NOT DOUBTFUL." WHILE SOME SENATORS HAD EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR FOUR OR FIVE, NONE WOULD OPPOSE RATIFICATION IF IT WERE ONLY THREE. OTHER SENATORS WERE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES FOR "DILUTION" OF THE ALLIANCE AND ABOUT COSTS, ESPECIALLY AS THE SIZE OF THE FIRST GROUP INCREASED. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY WAS CONFIDENT THE SENATE WOULD RATIFY ENLARGEMENT, BUT HE EMPHASIZED THAT, WHILE THE PRESIDENT HAD CAREFULLY LISTENED TO SENATE LEADERS AND CONSIDERED THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN RECENT WEEKS BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, HIS DECISION HAD NOT BEEN DRIVEN BY CONGRESSIONAL OPINION.

11. CCP THE DEPUTY SECRETARY ADDED THAT CONCERN ABOUT COSTS WOULD BE A MAJOR QUESTION. HE COULD NOT STRESS STRONGLY ENOUGH HOW IMPORTANT THIS ISSUE WAS TO THE U.S., ESPECIALLY WHAT THE PRECISE COSTS TO THE U.S. WOULD BE, THE EXTENT TO WHICH ALLIES WOULD SHARE THE BURDEN OF ENLARGEMENT'S COSTS, AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH NEW MEMBERS WOULD MEET COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH NATO'S COMMON DEFENSE.

12. CCP THE LUXEMBOURG AMBASSADOR ASKED WHETHER THE ADMINISTRATION HAD CONSIDERED FOUR COUNTRIES FOR THE FIRST ROUND. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY REPLIED THAT WE HAD, BUT THE SENSE WAS THAT FOUR WAS NOT A VERY VIABLE NUMBER; IT WAS REALLY EITHER THREE OR FIVE. HE DID NOT WANT TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION REFLECTED AN ADVERSE CRITICISM OF ROMANIA OR SLOVENIA. WE WERE ALL VERY IMPRESSED BY HOW FAR THEY HAD COME, BUT THE PRESIDENT BELIEVED THAT THEY WERE NOT AS FAR ALONG AS POLAND, HUNGARY AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO ENSURE THAT ROMANIA AND SLOVENIA, AND THE OTHER ASPIRANTS, HAD THE INCENTIVE TO CONTINUE THEIR PROGRESS.

13. CCP THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR ASKED WHETHER THE U.S. HAD CONSIDERED WHETHER TO FIX A DATE FOR A REVIEW OF THE NEXT ROUND. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY REPLIED THAT WE HAD CONSIDERED IT. WE NEEDED TO FIND THE RIGHT WORDS AT MADRID TO SAY CLEARLY AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY THAT THE PROCESS
WOULD GO FORWARD AND IN A MEANINGFUL TIMEFRAME, BUT WE
NEEDED TO CONSIDER CAREFULLY WHETHER ATTACHING A DATE FOR
THE NEXT REVIEW WAS THE APPROPRIATE MEANS TO DO THIS.
HOWEVER, WE SHOULD NOTE THAT WE HAD KEPT OUR COMMITMENTS
AND THE TIMETABLE WE HAD PROMISED DURING THE PAST THREE
YEARS AND CANDIDATES HAD NO REASON TO DOUBT OUR WORD ABOUT
THE OPEN DOOR.

14. THE DUTCH AMBASSADOR ASKED WHETHER THE PRESIDENT
HAD CONSIDERED THE IMPACT ON THE RUSSIANS AND WHETHER FIVE
MIGHT NOT BE BETTER FROM THEIR VANTAGE POINT AS IT MIGHT
LEAD TO A PAUSE THAT WOULD GIVE THEM TIME TO GET USED TO
IT. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY REPLIED THAT HE HAD HEARD THIS
ARGUMENT, BUT OUR PRIORITY WAS TO ENSURE THAT THE PROCES
OF ENLARGEMENT CONTINUED AND THAT WE FIRMLY ESTABLISHED
THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR OPEN DOOR POLICY. THE KEY POINT
WAS TO KEEP WORKING WITH RUSSIA, AND TO MOVE FORWARD ON
THE NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP.

15. IN CLOSING, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY EMPHASIZED THAT
THE PROCESS WAS NOT OVER WITH THE PRESIDENT’S DECISION.
WE WOULD NEED TO WORK CLOSELY WITH ALLIED LEADERS IN THE
COMING WEEKS TO REACH A CONSENSUS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.
BUT, HE STRESSED, THE PRESIDENT’S DECISION WAS FIRM.

16. (U) BEGIN POINTS FOR USE WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS:

-- PRESIDENT CLINTON HAS DECIDED THAT THE UNITED STATES
WILL SUPPORT ISSUING INVITATIONS AT NATO’S MADRID SUMMIT
TO JOIN NATO TO THREE STATES -- POLAND, HUNGARY AND THE
CZECH REPUBLIC.

-- AT THE SAME TIME, HE HAS REAFFIRMED THE U.S. COMMITMENT
TO NATO’S "OPEN DOOR." NATO ENLARGEMENT IS A PROCESS, NOT
A ONE-TIME EVENT.

-- THE DOOR TO NATO MEMBERSHIP WILL REMAIN OPEN. THOSE
STATES SELECTED AT MADRID WILL BECOME, IF THE U.S. SENATE
AND ITS NATO COUNTERPARTS AGREE, THE FIRST NEW MEMBERS
FROM CENTRAL EUROPE. THEY WILL NOT BE THE LAST.

-- THE U.S. HAS PURSUED NATO ENLARGEMENT AS ONE ELEMENT OF
A BROADER STRATEGY AIMED AT CREATING AN UNDIVIDED,
DEMOCRATIC AND INTEGRATED EUROPE, FREE OF DIVIDING LINES,
WITH ENHANCED SECURITY FOR ALL. IT IS A STRATEGY THAT
WILL PRODUCE CURRENT WINNERS AND FUTURE WINNERS -- NOT
WINNERS AND LOSERS.

-- ENLARGEMENT IS ALSO ONE ELEMENT OF THE NEW NATO, WHICH
ALSO INCLUDES BUILDING A DEEPER, MORE COOPERATIVE
RELATIONSHIP WITH RUSSIA (AS EMBODIED IN THE FOUNDING
ACT), ITS INTERNAL ADAPTATION AND ASSUMPTION OF NEW
MISSIONS, AND ITS EFFORTS TO BUILD THROUGH THE EAPC AND
OTHER OUTREACH ACTIVITIES A DEEPER RELATIONSHIP WITH ALL
EUROPEAN STATES.

-- WHILE NATO HAS A FUNDAMENTAL ROLE IN BUILDING THIS NEW
EUROPEAN SECURITY STRUCTURE, AND IS THE PRIMARY VEHICLE
FOR AMERICAN ENGAGEMENT IN EUROPE, INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE OSCE ALSO PLAY A VITAL ROLE IN BUILDING THIS NEW EUROPE. MEMBERSHIP IN THESE INSTITUTIONS IS ALSO CRUCIAL.

-- THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION WAS BASED ON EXTENSIVE CONSIDERATION OF THE MERITS OF EACH OF THE COUNTRIES WHICH HAD EXPRESSED INTEREST IN JOINING THE ALLIANCE. HE CONCLUDED THAT THE FIRST GROUP INVITED TO BEGIN ACCESSION TALKS SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THE STRONGEST CANDIDATES. THIS WOULD ENSURE THAT WE MAINTAIN THE CREDIBILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ALLIANCE AS IT ENLARGES.

-- IN HIS VIEW, POLAND, THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND HUNGARY WERE CLEARLY THE STRONGEST CANDIDATES.

-- PRESIDENT CLINTON MADE THIS DECISION ON THE BASIS OF SEVERAL BASIC PRINCIPLES:

0 EACH COUNTRY SELECTED MUST HAVE AN ESTABLISHED TRACK RECORD OF REFORM. NATO MEMBERSHIP IS IRREVERSIBLE. NEW MEMBERS MUST DEMONSTRATE THAT THEY ARE COMMITTED TO THE VALUES THE ALLIANCE REPRESENTS AND IS PLEDGED TO DEFEND. THIS INCLUDES A COMMITMENT TO AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRATIC, MARKET AND ECONOMIC REFORMS.

0 NATO MUST ALSO AVOID THE PERCEPTION THAT IT COULD DILUTE ITSELF BY PURSuing A HASTY AND OVERLY AMBITIOUS ENLARGEMENT, ONE THAT APPEARS TO PUT POLITICAL GOALS AHEAD OF HARD-NOSED SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS. WE DO NOT WANT TO UNDERCUT THE VITALITY OF THE ALLIANCE WE ARE NOW ENLARGING.

0 NOR CAN WE LOSE SIGHT OF THE OVERARCHING CRITERION REFLECTED IN THE WASHINGTON TREATY -- THAT PROSPECTIVE MEMBERS MUST BE IN A POSITION TO SHOULDER THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF MEMBERSHIP AND MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO THE COMMON SECURITY OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC AREA. NEW MEMBERS MUST BE SECURITY PRODUCERS, NOT JUST SECURITY CONSUMERS.

0 THE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS MUST CONTINUE TO PROVIDE ALL COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE WITH INCENTIVES TO STAY ON THE PATH OF INTEGRATION, REFORM AND RECONCILIATION.

0 THE FINAL BENCHMARK IS CLEAR: NATO ALLIES MUST ALL BE PREPARED TO ASSUME THE SOLEMN RESPONSIBILITY THAT AN ARTICLE V COMMITMENT ENTAILS.

-- THE U.S. IS NOT SAYING "NO" TO OTHER COUNTRIES INTERESTED IN NATO MEMBERSHIP, INCLUDING ROMANIA, SLOVENIA AND THE BALTIC STATES.

-- RATHER, WE ARE SAYING "NOT YET," REFLECTING THE EXPECTATION THAT THESE COUNTRIES WILL CONTINUE TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM PROCESSES AND TO DEVELOP FURTHER THEIR CAPABILITIES TO MEET THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF MEMBERSHIP.
17. **FOR NATO POSTS ONLY:**

-- WE KNOW SOME ASPIRANTS WILL BE DISAPPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION, BUT WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THEY WILL ALSO NOW WISH TO WORK EVEN MORE CLOSELY WITH US TO ENSURE THEIR EVENTUAL MEMBERSHIP.

-- IT IS THEREFORE CRITICALLY IMPORTANT THAT WE PUT IN PLACE IN MADRID A STRONG PACKAGE ON THE OPEN DOOR TO INCLUDE ROBUST LANGUAGE IN THE COUNCIL, STRENGTHENED CONSULTATION AND PRACTICAL COOPERATION IN THE EAPC AND ENHANCED PFP, AND CONTINUATION OF INTENSIFIED DIALOGUES AFTER MADRID WITH THOSE COUNTRIES STILL ASPIRING TO MEMBERSHIP.

-- WE PROPOSE THESE POST-MADRID DIALOGUES BE GIVEN HIGHER POLITICAL VISIBILITY AND BE RENAMED "ATLANTIC DIALOGUES," AND THAT WE STRENGTHEN THEIR NATURE AND CONTENT TO ENSURE THAT THEY ARE AS EFFECTIVE AND HELPFUL TO NE APPLICANTS AS POSSIBLE.

(FOLLOWING POINTS FOR USE ON IF-ASKED BASIS)

-- BOTH ROMANIA AND SLOVENIA ARE STRONG CANDIDATES FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP. WE ARE ALL IMPRESSED BY HOW FAR THEY HAVE COME IN SUCH A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME.

-- LET US NOT DEFINE THEIR PARTIAL SUCCESS AS FAILURE. BOTH COUNTRIES ARE MUCH CLOSER TODAY TO REACHING THEIR GOALS THAN THEY WERE WHEN WE STARTED.

-- OUR STANDARDS FOR ADMISSION WERE SET VERY HIGH. WHILE BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE MADE REMARKABLE PROGRESS, WE BELIEVE THEY WERE NOT QUITE AS STRONG CANDIDATES AS THE OTHER THREE.

-- WE DO NOT THINK A PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF THE "INADEQUACIES" OF EITHER COUNTRY IS PRODUCTIVE. THE KEY IS TO CONTINUE TO WORK TOGETHER TO REACH THE GOAL OF EVENTUAL MEMBERSHIP THAT WE SHARE WITH THEM. THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO ROMANIA AND SLOVENIA WAS NOT "NO" BUT "NOT YET."

-- HOW BOTH COUNTRIES HANDLE OUR DECISION WILL BE SEEN BY US AS A MEASURE OF THEIR MATURITY AND RESPONSIBILITY.

18. **(U) FOR PARTNER AND OTHER POSTS ONLY:**

-- WE KNOW SOME WILL BE DISAPPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT'S DECISION, BUT WE BELIEVE WE HAVE MADE THE DECISION THAT WE BEST ENSURE THAT AN ENLARGED NATO ENHANCES THE SECURITY OF ALL EUROPEAN STATES.

-- AS THE PRESIDENT STRESSED, NATO ENLARGEMENT IS A PROCESS, NOT AN EVENT. WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO ENSURING THAT NATO'S DOOR REMAINS OPEN TO ALL EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES
WHO DEMONSTRATE THEY ARE WILLING AND ABLE TO MEET THE
EXTENSIVE RESPONSIBILITIES ENTAILED FOR MEMBERSHIP.

-- WE WILL ALSO LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU IN THE
COMING MONTHS TO BUILD TOGETHER THE EURO-ATLANTIC
PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL IN WHICH WE CAN ALL WORK TOGETHER TO
ADDRESS COMMON SECURITY CONCERNS.

ALBRIGHT

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01
SSN: 1475
TOR: 970613004928 M2802943
DIST:
SIT: BELL DOWLING EGGERT FEELEY FORT FRIED HAMEL JOHNSON LUZZATTO MATERA
PASCUAL PASSDOWN PIFER RUBIN SCHMIDT SUM2 VERSHBOW WITKOWSKY
SIT: NSC
PRT: SIT{C2}
23:15 - 071 - H (1.36)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By [Redacted], Date 5/21/2014

1. [Redacted] after returning from his brief visit to Bonn early this morning, President Constantinescu met with the ambassador before departing for trilateral meetings in Ismail with Ukraine and Moldova. Constantinescu stated that he had told Kohl that he did not want Romania to become an issue of disension between the United States and its NATO allies and that Romania accepts the U.S. decision on three countries at Madrid. However, without a specific reference to Romania in the Madrid Communiqué, in his words, "I will have achieved nothing. Romania will be in the same position as Bulgaria, and I will have failed as a leader.

2. [Redacted] in replying to the ambassador's paraphrasing of the five points in Ref A, Constantinescu characterized a strong open door declaration as "meaningless, without specific reference to
ROMANIA". AS FOR THE 1999 REVIEW DATE, HE TREATED IT AS A POINT TAKEN FOR GRANTED AND WAS EQUALLY DISMISSIVE OF PROPOSED COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE ON THE IMPORTANCE OF SOUTHEAST EUROPE. WHEN ASKED SPECIFICALLY WHETHER KOHL TOLD HIM THAT HE WOULD SUPPORT A SPECIFIC REFERENCE IN THE MADRID COMMUNIQUE TO ROMANIA, HE FIRST CONVEYED BY WORDS AND GESTURE THAT NO SUCH COMMITMENT HAD BEEN GIVEN, THEN HESITATED, SAYING "THIS IS PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL".

3. KOHL TOLD CONSTANTINESCU THAT HE HAD DECIDED TO SUPPORT ROMANIA ONLY AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE UKRAINE-ROMANIA TREATY AND THE INTERVENTION ON ROMANIA'S BEHALF BY UKRAINIAN FOREIGN MINISTER UDOWENKO. CONSTANTINESCU STATED THAT HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO COUPLING SLOVENIA WITH ROMANIA IN THE MADRID COMMUNIQUE BUT ADDED THAT "KOHL TOLD ME HE DOES NOT CARE ABOUT SLOVENIA; GERMANY INTERVENED ONCE IN YUGOSLAVIA AND IS SORRY. IF SLOVENIA JOINS NATO, KOHL THINKS IT WILL CAUSE PROBLEMS WITH CROATIA".

4. COMMENT: I DO NOT DOUBT CONSTANTINESCU'S SINCERITY IN NOT WANTING ROMANIA TO BE A POINT OF DISPUTE BETWEEN THE USG AND ITS EUROPEAN ALLIES. AT THE SAME TIME, AS I SEE IT, ROMANIA IS NOT GOING TO BACK OFF FROM ITS EFFORTS FOR A SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO ROMANIA IN THE MADRID COMMUNIQUE. FROM MY READING, KOHL DID NOT PROMISE HIS SUPPORT FOR THIS BUT LEFT THE DOOR OPEN. THIS IS SUPPORTED BY THE OFFICIAL GERMAN COMMUNIQUE WHICH STATES: "THE TWO SIDES TALKED ABOUT PREPARATIONS FOR THE MADRID SUMMIT ON JULY 8 AND 9. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE CHANCELLOR UNDERSCORED THAT HE PERSONALLY, AND THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED THE ROMANIAN WISH FOR EARLY NATO MEMBERSHIP. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THIS DECISION WOULD BE REACHED AS A RESULT OF A CONSENSUS OF THE 16 NATO PARTNERS." THE ROMANIAN COMMUNIQUE, GIVEN TO ME BY CONSTANTINESCU, READS "CHANCELLOR KOHL ASSURED PRESIDENT CONSTANTINESCU OF HIS PERSONAL SUPPORT AND THAT THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT IN FINDING A SOLUTION WITH REGARD TO ROMANIA'S INTEGRATION INTO NATO THAT WOULD BE MOST FAVORABLE AND THAT WOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE CONSENSUS OF THE 16 ALLIANCE MEMBERS PARTICIPATING AT THE MADRID SUMMIT..."

5. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE ROMANIANS ARE PUTTING THE MAXIMUM POSITIVE SPIN ON THE KOHL MEETING BY REFERRING TO A SOLUTION THAT WOULD BE "MOST FAVORABLE". WHEN I ASKED CONSTANTINESCU WHETHER HE HAD TALKED TO CHIRAC HE SAID THAT HE WAS WAITING FOR CHIRAC TO RETURN HIS CALL. IMMEDIATELY BEFORE MEETING WITH ME, CONSTANTINESCU MET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENT COALITION. I WILL TRY TO GET A READ-OUT OF THE KOHL MEETING FROM SEVERIN -- WHO MAY FIND SOMETHING TO CRITICIZE (REF
B). ROMANIA, A COUNTRY THAT WAS ON NO ONE'S NATO
RADAR SCREEN ONLY A YEAR AGO, NOW FINDS ITSELF AT
THE CENTER OF THE NATO STORM, AND IS LOVING EVERY
MINUTE OF IT, A LA BRETEIANU AT VERSAILLES. MOSES

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01
SSN: 4204
TOR: 970703081323 M2833010
DIST:
SIT: BELL BRADEN DOWLING EGGERT FEELEY FORT FRIED HAMEL MATERA MEYLER
PASCUAL PASSDOWN PIPER SCHMIDT SUM2 VERSHBOW WITKOWSKY
PRT: BERGER COSGRIFF DAVIES FUERTH HELWEG KERRICK MALLEY RICEE SIT{C2}
SODERBERG STEINBERG
SIT: NODIS