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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memcon	re: Meeting with Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez (13 pages)	12/06/1993	P1/b(1) <del>KBH</del> 2/5/2020

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Memcon and Gonzalez...])  
OA/Box Number: 176

### FOLDER TITLE:

9309562

2015-0548-M

rs1228

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: ITOH

FROM: LEBOURGEOIS

DOC DATE: 06 DEC 93  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SPAIN

MEMCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES MTG W/ SPANISH PM GONZALEZ ON 6 DEC

ACTION: KENNEY APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 09 DEC 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: LEBOURGEOIS

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC  
FICKLIN  
LEBOURGEOIS  
WALKER

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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OPENED BY: NSWEA      CLOSED BY: NSJDA      DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 ITOH  
001

Z 94010510 FOR DECISION  
X 94010510 KENNEY APPROVED RECOM

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: JB LOG # 9562  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM: PR\$ NSC INT  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG: JB A/O \_\_\_\_\_

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West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>ASK 1/3</u>	<u>AJ</u> <u>N</u>
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A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:            VP                            McLarty                            Other \_\_\_\_\_

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

*Exec Sec's Office has desk* \_\_\_\_\_

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9562

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 27, 1993

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSH NARA, Date 9/9/2019  
2015-0548-M

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH

FROM: JENONNE WALKER *JW*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of President's Conversation with  
Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez December 6, 1993

Attached is the Memorandum of Conversation from the meeting  
between the President and Prime Minister Gonzalez of Spain on  
December 6, 1993.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the  
record.

Approve  *WALKER* Disapprove

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 3, 1994

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0548-M (1.01)  
KBH 9/9/2019

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
 Peter Tarnoff, Acting Secretary of State  
 Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
 Robert Rubin, Assistant to the President for Economic Policy  
 Richard Gardner, U.S. Ambassador to Spain  
 Alexander Vershbow, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State  
 Jenonne Walker, NSC Notetaker, Oval Office  
 Julien LeBourgeois, NSC Notetaker (lunch)

Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez  
 Jaime Ojeda, Spanish Ambassador to the U.S.  
 Miguel Angel Feito, Secretary of State for Commerce and Tourism  
 Francisco Villar, Secretary General for Foreign Policy  
 Miguel Gil, Spokesman, Ministry of the Presidency  
 Jose Rodriguez-Spiteri, Director General for North America and Asia  
 Jose Pons, Director, International Affairs Department, Ministry of the Presidency

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: December 6, 1993 11:30am-1:35pm  
Oval Office/Blair House

The President: When did you arrive? (U)

The Prime Minister: Last night about seven. I had dinner with the Prince, who as you know is studying at Georgetown. His Majesty the King asked me to give you his very best. He was very impressed when you said you would keep an eye on the Prince. The Prince is happy at Georgetown and getting an excellent education. (U)

The President: As you know I went to Georgetown. I told His Majesty I would keep an eye on the Prince but the Prince doesn't seem to like that because he hasn't been around. (U)

The Prime Minister: The Prince says that there is a democratic majority on campus and that political discussion there is animated and lively. (U)

I am happy to meet you. We have followed with an attention that probably would surprise you the implementation of major features of your Administration's policy. We are very interested in all you are doing about the development of infrastructure. I talked to Mrs. Clinton this morning about your proposals on health care. I also am very interested in what you are doing to reform education as a factor in economic development. For the last decade we have been doing all three things. So the country that you knew when you went to Spain has changed radically and you should go back. It would be easier to show you the changes than to explain them. Since I know that you will go at least four times to Europe next year, one of those times you should stop in Madrid. Otherwise I will try to influence Mrs. Clinton. (e)

But the government's priorities here have really struck us because they point to an historic change of direction. Our two countries' concerns are coming together in the middle. We are extremely concerned about adapting the educational system to the needs of development. We broke with the trade unions on an ambitious program of training and changing the hiring system of enterprises. We are doing all of this in the midst of a very deep cycle of change. Very important discussions are going on over unemployment. Our rate is three times greater than yours and our labor market is incredibly rigid. In my talks with the unions I say that this year we're going to lose 500,000 jobs and the increase in salaries is totally insensitive to this. The collective bargaining agreements are growing at 2% over inflation. (e)

One of the things that pleases us the most is the big infrastructure investment during the last 6-7 years in Spain. Spain has changed radically as a result. (e)

The President: All of our countries have big trouble creating jobs. In the U.S., the labor markets are more flexible and that helps create jobs, but wages of the lowest paid have not kept up with inflation over the past twenty years. So we need to maintain labor market flexibility but keep open the prospect for low earners to earn more. For many of the years since 1976 France had good growth and did better than we at raising minimum wages and narrowing the gap in wages, but lost jobs even when its economy was growing. So if fewer people produce more goods there will be more unemployment and lower wages for those who do work. We must find a way to increase jobs and wages. (e)

I am amazed that you have maintained as much support with your unemployment problems. It is a great tribute to you. I hope that a recovery in world economic growth can help. At the G-7 meeting last July the U.S. said that we would keep our commitment to bring our deficit down and keep our markets open. We have been pushing Japan to open its markets. I hope the change in leadership of Germany's Bundesbank will bring German interest rates down so Europe can have growth. (e)

The Prime Minister: That will be the debate this weekend. In Spain, entry into the European Community caused greater customs

disruption than in any other OECD country but in the same years GDP grew 30% in real terms and the salary range narrowed. During that period there was very high growth in employment. But since 1991 when we entered a period of less growth, there has been brutal job elimination. Much of what was done before has been undone from a jobs point of view. (e)

I just talked to Brussels. This weekend's debate will have two components. We will discuss Delors' White Paper and economic policy guidelines for 1994. We must keep pressing interest rates down and do a better job of controlling government spending. If the West Europeans could coordinate we could bring interest rates down. We came down 5% just this year but real interest rates still are very high. There still is a Bundesbank problem because of the German obsession. I talked to Chancellor Kohl last Friday at our bilateral Summit about the sensible Commission proposals to coordinate interest rates and budgets downward, using the European Investment Bank to make loans for construction in telecommunications and communications in general. So without affecting national budgets it would be possible to reactivate economies by further developing communications and telecommunications. The purpose is to start growth without disturbing the balance. The paradox is that Germany does not accept this so far and the UK is not happy despite British efforts to cut interest rates. But if interest rates do not go down in Germany, in the medium and long term they cannot in the UK either. (e)

Another important question is job creation prospects. All agree that we must break the excessive rigidity of the jobs market; we in Spain especially. We still have job classifications that look like the first industrial revolution. Mobility within the job market also is rigid. (e)

There is some confusion in how growth in productivity should be divided. A stupid debate about distribution of the work week. There has been a huge scandal in France over how a 32-hour work week would effect unemployment. The false and dangerous element is the idea that the amount of work available can be determined with precision without understanding that it depends on how competitive the companies are and on other activities that can absorb the remaining unemployed. For instance, environmental programs. How many workers can they absorb? Or home care for the elderly, instead of putting them in nursing homes? All kinds of new activities could absorb part of the unemployed. (e)

And the whole area of training. Will the new technological revolution have the same effect as the last one? In the last one, after initial labor savings, more jobs were created. (e)

But what is essential is that the G-7 coordinate better. No country can grow while others are in recession. We must convince Kohl to lower interest rates. (e)

The President: But can he? How independent is the Bundesbank?  
(e)

The Prime Minister: Just about as autonomous as the Federal Reserve. I followed with great interest and concern the NAFTA debate. But I have learned from many years in politics that when the executive branch makes a full commitment it is very difficult for another branch to resist -- whether the legislature or the federal reserve. (C)

NAFTA was of overriding importance for all of the Americas. I hope it will not do serious damage to the U.S. (C)

The President: I think the damage is beginning to go away. But you are right that the outcome was in doubt. Ten days before the vote leaders of the opposition proposed putting the vote off to avoid hurting the Presidency with a defeat. We were 100 votes behind two months before the vote. Congress knew it was the right thing to do, but was afraid of the consequences. In the end the vote was very important because it made a statement that we would reach out to the rest of the world, be confident as a people. (C)

I believe the Vice President discussed the Hemispheric Summit later this year. If we embrace the rest of the hemisphere it will be good for democracy and world growth (Latin America is now the second largest grower, after Asia) and I hope it will be good for Spain because of your strong role in Latin America. The U.S. has ignored its responsibilities in Latin America. Our banks got over extended and then called in their loans, and that hurt Latin American economies badly. My predecessor was concerned with Central America and the drug program and ignored the big overall potential of the region. I hope to have your help there. (C)

The Prime Minister: This is the best moment to have a continental summit. There is a process of democratization, modernization, economic opening throughout the continent. And politically never in my 25 years of intensive involvement have there been better possibilities. There is now substantial understanding with the U.S. and great opportunities for America to overcome the demons of the past. They have been waiting a long time for attention from the U.S. Cuba is the most obvious exception. (C)

(Other participants join the meeting at this point.)

The Prime Minister: This is an historic moment. Almost all the countries of Latin America have overcome nationalistic attitudes toward the U.S. (C)

We have special relations with Cuba. We know the American position. So in addition to saying what you expect to hear, there also is substantial agreement between us that there must be a process of democracy in Cuba. Our concern is whether change will have to be traumatic or will be peaceful. We are trying to force a dynamic of change as peaceful as possible. Presently events are evolving faster than before. The economic system is not sustainable. (C)

I had a relatively tough talk with Castro this summer. I said that the embargo cannot be blamed for Cuba's economic crisis. That does not mean that the embargo does not have influence. It makes the situation more acute. But the crisis is a result of Cuba's political system. (S)

They agreed to a thoroughgoing study of how the production system in Cuba needs to be changed toward an open market. Without being overly naive, we did have two excellent working meetings. The purpose is to conclude by January a plan to begin the transformation from a centralized to an open economy. (S)

For now Castro has accepted this, although there is an internal struggle. Some sectors agree that political change also will be necessary but others do not want anything to change. Castro is in the middle of this struggle. We will continue to try to force this dynamic in the right direction. (S)

The President: What do you think he wants to do? (S)

The Prime Minister: He doesn't know himself. In the first session when our team, headed by my former economics minister, presented conclusions to Castro, I think he defined his attitude. He said "I think that you are right that we must do the things you propose but I am not sure whether we will be able to." So he knows that he needs to change quickly. The argument that weighs most heavily on him is that Cuba is drifting ever further from the currents of democracy elsewhere in the hemisphere so he is getting isolated. This weighs on his thinking. I think he does want to make changes. (S)

I do not think Fidel Castro ever was a committed communist. That does not mean anything because he has been worse -- a kind of Christian anarchist or something. That is a Spanish specialty. He adopted the communist model to keep himself in power, and was successful. But he never was a communist like his brother Raoul. (S)

They are very dependent and react to any gesture from the U.S.; much more than you would imagine. But at the same time they have Spanish pride. If Cuba were not so close geographically to the U.S. the changes would already have happened. They are obsessed with the U.S. But I think that change will come in the next year. (S)

The President: We may be obsessed with each other. (S)

The Prime Minister: True. Quite an exaggerated obsession. Once when talking to Gromyko about Afghanistan I asked if the Russians hadn't figured out how the U.S. has put up with a communist country so close to its coast for so long, and he just laughed but did not deny it. But yes, it has been an obsession for the U.S. as well. (S)

Cuba is a wonderful country. A sensational island. It has perhaps the greatest potential in the Caribbean. (S)

The President: There is no question about it. The problem for us is reinforced by the enormous number of Cuban Americans, many exiles from Cuba. There is some division among them but most believe, and I agree, that the embargo is helping get Castro to at least think about his alternatives. It is a strange situation because the U.S. could be the best friend Cuba ever had. We need reconciliation. But most of our Cuban people believe that if we let up, he could use any economic relief to tighten his political grip. (e)

The Prime Minister: If that took place, and I do not think it would, but if there were a more open American attitude to Cuba it could make political change in Cuba unstoppable. If you had that maneuvering room. But I have talked to Cuban Americans. We have had very interesting discussions. They think a transition model like that of Spain would be acceptable. I said that would mean they would have to turn the page of history because in Spain we went from dictatorship to democracy without even any temptation for reprisals. (e)

I discussed this with Havel, and gave him one anecdote. The first time I took a plane from Madrid as Prime Minister was to the funeral of my father-in-law in Seville. I came down the stairs of the plane and the Chief of Police saluted me and I called him by name and he changed color. He paled. "Do you know me?" he said. "Yes, of course," I replied, "you arrested me in 1974". (e)

(Laughter as the participants departed for lunch.)

-- END OF CONVERSATION --

Gonzalez Working Lunch December 6, 1993

The President: We need one week to sell a GATT agreement to Japan and everybody else. But even today I took a call from Korea on an agricultural angle. We should be able to reach agreement with the Europeans today; if not today, tomorrow. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Spain's economic opening and integration over the past years have had a tremendous structural impact. In some fields, 73 percent of what we consume is of U.S. origin, seven percent from Spain, and 20 percent from the rest of the world. (S)

The President: I hope we can talk about that over lunch. It's an issue I never needed to consider before becoming President and one we are recognizing. (S)

As for the overall GATT agreement and Japan, we hosted a recent meeting of the APEC nations in Seattle -- where I had my second meeting with Prime Minister Hosokawa. He told me that if the U.S. and the Europeans reach an agreement, Japan would not stand in the way of an accord. There is the visible problem of rice -- changing from quotas to tariffs -- but markets can appear to be open and barriers still exist. We have had a series of bilateral negotiations to change such Japanese practices for everyone's benefit -- to end Japan's \$1 billion trade surplus, half of which is with the U.S. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: The Japanese have mechanisms to control their market, specifically the tight cooperation between MITI and Japanese industries. In Japan, they plant rice in a room this size! How can that be profitable? Unsustainable protectionism in Japan makes it possible for one melon to cost the same as a television set. We will have even more problems with the Chinese when they join GATT. They respect no rules and have amazing potential for growth. (S)

I want to say we have not done badly with our economic opening. Some sectors have been hurt, but overall the results have been good. Now, with the current crisis, the negatives are more obvious. So we are interested in the success of GATT. It is not too difficult to reach agreement by the 15th. Some of the Latin American countries are not paying enough attention to IPR issues, but that will come. (S)

The President: The Chinese problem is more interesting to me in a way than Japan's. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: China ignores trade rules. They make things confusing. We used to say: "It's all Greek to me." Now we have to say it's all Chinese. A Spanish company in China has been making powdered chocolate for four years. But 20 companies there have copied the formula! There is no oversight of any kind. (S)

The President: Perhaps we will get there. I had an interesting visit with President Jiang Zemin in Seattle and also have to stop saying it's all Greek. If I raised an issue he did not like, he would read a speech. He speaks English and had to listen to his own speeches twice. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: They refuse to talk politics -- only the economy. I asked the President about the downfall of the USSR, sure he could not get out of this one. He replied with a Chinese parable: How could a country (the USSR) work whose officials actually toss back all the mao tai when told that is the Chinese way. (S)

I tried to talk about human rights but they said: "We know what you are going to say. There is no need to go on. When you get home, you will find a surprise." A few days after my return, they freed a few of the Tiananmen leaders. The Chinese will determine what the 21st Century means to us. (S)

The President: It is hard to know how to deal with China. We all have a large stake in what kind of society it becomes. Therefore, the issues of human rights and non-proliferation are important. It is also hard to pass up economic opportunities. You never know with China if you are taking one step forward or two back. We have tried to bridge the post-Tiananmen gap without giving up our insistence on human rights. They say that we are being mean, but we take 30 percent of China's exports. That is a reasonable contribution to its welfare. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: We have to be pragmatic. We are used to thinking that there is a communist system there. Even politically, that has ceased to exist. They have a market economy within an entrenched totalitarian framework. It may take years before this structure loses its intensity, given the leaders' obsession with their huge populace speaking all sorts of languages. It is hard to fit China into how we think of a country. (S)

But there is a revolution of telecommunications -- and the fax. We want to see democratic participation. But China is now moving more toward disorder than toward greater participation. It is more totalitarian than communist. And they have an elephant's memory for any gesture. (S)

The President: They also believe time is on their side. They have great patience. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: And a different sense of history. On one visit I saw Deng, who at the end of his life talked in detail of what would happen in 50 years. If we said the same sort of thing to the television, people would laugh. (S)

The President: China dominated the world in 2500 BC. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: China is easier to understand in the arms field, where there is room to negotiate. They believe we

don't understand what democracy means for China. Russia never had a free market and doesn't understand. China does. (S)

The President: May we talk about GATT? I would like to explain our position on audio-visuals. I understand why this is important for countries such as France and Spain. We have put on the table a rule to allow current restrictions. But we don't want to limit new technologies or to have contracts negotiated in the U.S. not honored elsewhere. Our entertainment industry is concentrated in New York and California, two states with the highest rate of unemployment here. The audio-visual sector is very labor intensive. We have been negotiating mostly with the French and I know you are generally aligned with them. We are hoping for some accommodation. (S)

In the end, it is hard to restrict audio-visual products, given satellites and other technologies. With regard to cultural identity, cable and satellite give a country more opportunities to dedicate channels for local use and to still permit access for others. Every major city in the U.S. has a Spanish-language channel with a majority of imported programming. Washington, D.C. has an Asian channel. This industry is second best in exports for the U.S. and we need this to be taken into account. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Madrid is a major importer of films, and there have been sharp recent increases. I won't be overly nationalist; the situation is not reversible. But an example: If there is a popular super production, lots of people go, but they make a package deal to bring other movies that are not so much in demand. Only seven percent of films screened at the box office are Spanish. The problem won't change. Our only objective is to maintain our local production -- to see it maintain itself and become competitive. But to lose it would be a great problem for any political party. Spain will continue to be an excellent client and the market share of the U.S. won't change. We have to maintain a small amount of protection. (S)

The President: The U.S. has made clear its position to accept current restrictions. It is difficult to grasp all the nuances of packaging, but we should try to get legal protection for any agreement we negotiate. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: We are just about to change our regulations. It should not be interpreted as trying to further restrict U.S. products. The legislation we are preparing won't put new restrictions over and above what exist now. Please, do not worry. (S)

The President: Perhaps our people should discuss this. Some who have contacted us think the regulations would bring changes, reducing distribution and dubbing licenses. Those who know about this issue should discuss it. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: I agree. My people could explain our feeling. We don't want to turn the clock back. Twenty percent

of the box office take goes to European countries, mainly France. This is a natural evolution. France and we both have lobbying intellectuals and artists too. (C)

Between us, I don't like the cultural-based exception in GATT. It would be much better to study this issue. But this is not an opinion that can be expressed publicly. What flexibility does the U.S. have on this in GATT? (C)

The President: I was told this morning that we more or less have an agreement with the Europeans, but it was unclear whether this concerned agriculture or audio-visuals. A big issue domestically is whether what the U.S. gives up meets our laws on counter-vailing duties and anti-dumping. If we weaken our tools, Congress could vote the agreement down. There is not as much Congressional opposition to GATT as there was to NAFTA, since everyone sees the benefit of a wide reduction of tariffs. If the rules work well, there will be more integration of the global economy and respect for international organizations. (C)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: The European Union wants to create a multilateral oversight mechanism. One U.S./EU conflict is excess U.S. corn. Ninety percent went to Spain, which is continuing to absorb it. This doesn't affect the price index but does impact local production. Spain's bilateral trade deficit with the U.S. is structural -- and increasing. It can only be fixed by trading more. We still find some difficulties entering your open market. We keep the U.S. from being more in deficit. (C)

The President: We appreciate that. (C)

Concerning the NATO Summit in January, we are trying to work out ways to relate to the emerging democracies in Eastern Europe -- ways to cooperate that do not provoke a negative reaction from Russia. It is important that the U.S. reaffirm its commitment to Europe. I understand that Spain has given a positive reaction to our Summit proposals, but I wanted to ask you personally. (C)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: This is the most difficult question for the Alliance. France wants to be more integrated in trans-Atlantic decision-making -- except perhaps for Mitterrand, who because of his age does not want to make the change. The Minister of Defense wants more integration. The point is that no one doubts the trans-Atlantic link. This is not worth discussion. But there is a huge vacuum in the East, where countries have vague foreign policies while they grapple with the questions of security and economics. Russia does not want the East and Central European countries to join a military alliance on its borders. It is a delicate situation. Yeltsin does not have much room for maneuver with the Parliament, even less with the armed forces. (C)

The U.S. position is the only one possible. We will support it, but we know that most of the East Europeans do not see it as sufficient. And it will still worry Russia. (C)

I have been concerned for some time about Ukraine. A year ago I met with the President. He said clearly what he had hinted publicly, that he would not comply with nuclear arms agreements. We are asking for compliance he won't be able to give. He wants a U.S. nuclear umbrella. Therefore, this is a further problem for NATO. (S)

Another problem we must deal with before the Summit is Yugoslavia. (S)

The President: Are the chances good for reaching an agreement this weekend? (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Yes. There are possibilities for the current plan. If successful, implementation will be the next step. This will be important for NATO. (S)

Another Spanish soldier lost his life over the weekend. We never had anything to do with the Balkans. One half of UN troop casualties in Yugoslavia have been Spanish. (S)

If there is a real agreement, the figure of 50,000 troops is too big; 20-25,000 would be more appropriate. But to impose peace would require more than 250,000 troops. This could come up over the weekend. What is the U.S. position on participation in a peacekeeping force and on loosening the embargo on Serbia? (S)

The President: I want to thank you for Spain's involvement and regret the loss of your soldier. (S)

The U.S. would support a peace settlement if it is generally agreed by the parties and do its best to help implement it. Neither 50,000 nor 250,000 troops would be enough to enforce peace if the parties don't want it. The reality is more ragged than any agreement. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: It's asking a lot for them to be honest. (S)

The President: Yes. There has been lots of fighting for a long time, and it's hard to bring everyone on board. Our military people have used the estimate of 50,000 troops in the event of a settlement. I've taken that recommendation from the experts. There could be many local people who would continue fighting for more territory or who would try to take the law into their own hands. This is why our contingency plans involved 50,000 troops. If you believe otherwise, our military experts should talk. (S)

Whatever role the U.S. plays, the U.S. Congress will have to support it. In Somalia, I almost faced an immediate, forced withdrawal of our forces. There was a real sense of isolationism about any ground force involvement. But I would not predict that Congress would countermand my February statement on implementing a settlement. Congress does support the ongoing negotiations and the humanitarian airlift. The prevailing mood is, if we go in, it must be with plenty of troops. (S)

Mr. Lake: We are perhaps looking at different terms than before. Maybe we will only need to protect Muslim-held areas. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: To just close off Muslim areas? (S)

Mr. Lake: Not to demilitarize all areas. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Yes, though some Muslim areas are right on the border and would still need to be demilitarized. I was told today: "Don't be too surprised if there is an agreement over the weekend." (S)

The President: What about corridors for the isolated Muslim areas? (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: The main issue is access to the sea. Croatia recognizes it needs to offer something but is not yet ready. The Muslims may want to wait until spring and launch a new offensive. We should discourage them from doing this. (S)

Mr. Lake: It is more difficult with the Croats than with the Serbs. We have argued for many months against trying to force the Muslims into an agreement, since by definition it would not last. Especially since they are doing well militarily. Military commanders would reject an agreement as not in their interest. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: It's a mirage for the Muslims to think they can do better. We have reports from the Spanish forces who have dealt with constant Muslim incursions into Croat areas. It would be a shame for the senseless destruction to continue. International aid is being used to prolong the fighting. (S)

The President: If an agreement is concluded and we agree on the number and distribution of peacekeeping troops to enforce it, how much risk would there be for them? (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Honestly, with an agreement, relatively high. There are no real guarantees that one group or another won't shoot. (S)

The President: Well, are we ready to meet the press? We have held them off for three hours. (U)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: When can you come to Madrid? (U)

The President: I'd like to come back! (U)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: The King would be delighted and, of course, you would have to bring Mrs. Clinton. (U)

The President: Would you be able to open the Prado early? (U)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Even if it is a Monday, when it is normally closed. You will be flying over Spain two times out of

your four trips to Europe next year. You should reorganize your trip. (U)

Mr. Lake: All those wonderful paintings by Bosch. (U)

The President: The thing to do would be for you to force down the plane, and then I could defect. (U)

-- END OF CONVERSATION --

# MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 617				
Document ID: 9508718				
Row: 44	Section: 6	Shelf: 5	Position: 3	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memcon	re: U.S.-EU Summit (10 pages)	12/03/1995	P1/b(1) <b>KBH 2/5/2020</b>

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Memcon and Gonzalez...])  
OA/Box Number: 617

### FOLDER TITLE:

9508718

2015-0548-M

rs1229

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: SENS

FROM: FROMAN

DOC DATE: 05 DEC 95  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: EU  
MEMCON

SUMMIT

PERSONS: GONZALEZ, FELIPE

SANTER, JACQUES

SUBJECT: MEMCON FOR PRES PARTICIPATION AT US - EU SUMMIT ON 3 DEC

ACTION: DOHSE APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 08 DEC 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FROMAN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
EXECSEC  
FROMAN

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP      CLOSED BY: NSGP      DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 SENS  
001

Z 95120516 FOR SIGNATURE & DECISION  
X 95120614 DOHSE APPROVED RECOM

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 8718  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM (FRS) NSC INT  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG (RPA) A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<sup>K</sup> Harmon	_____	_____	_____
Dohse	1	D	_____
Sens	_____	_____	_____
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	2	(RPA) 12/6	D
Records Mgt.	3	_____	N
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A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

CC:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON  
December 5, 1995

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBI/NARA, Date 9/9/2019  
2015-0548-m

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

FROM: MICHAEL FROMAN *MF*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation for U.S.-EU Summit,  
December 3, 1995

At Tab A is the memcon from the U.S.-EU Summit, December 3, 1995,  
in Madrid, Spain.

Concurrence by: Mary Ann Peters, Anthony Gardner *MF*

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached Memorandum of Conversation for  
record purposes.

Approve *Dohe* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment  
Tab A Memcon of U.S.-EU Summit

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2015-0548-m (1.02)  
KBH 7/9/2019

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: U.S.-EU Summit

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State  
Ambassador Mickey Kantor, United States  
Trade Representative  
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Nancy Soderberg, Deputy Assistant to the  
President for National Security Affairs  
Ambassador Jeffrey Lang, Deputy United  
State Trade Representatiave  
Joan Spero, Under Secretary of State  
Daniel Tarullo, Assistant Secretary of State  
Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat, U.S. Ambassador  
to the EU  
Ambassador Richard N. Gardner, U.S.  
Ambassador to Spain  
John Kornblum, Principal Deputy Assistant  
Secretary of State

President Felipe Gonzalez  
Javier Solana, Foreign Minister  
Ambassador Carlos Westendorp, State  
Secretary for European Affairs  
Francisco Villar, Secretay General for  
Foreign Affairs  
Ambassador Jaime de Ojeda, Ambassador  
to the United States  
Javier Conde, Secretary General for the  
European Communities

President Jacques Santer  
Sir Leon Brittan, EU Commission Vice  
President  
Jurgen Trunpf, EU Council of Ministers  
Secretary General  
Horst Krentzler, Director General, DG-I  
Colin Budd, Cabinet of President Santer  
Ambassador Hugo Paeman, EU Ambassador to  
the United States

DATE, TIME AND PLACE:  
December 3, 1995, 9:45 - 11:30 local time  
Madrid, Spain

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(b), (d)  
Declassify on: X6

President Gonzalez: Welcome. I want to underscore the importance of the New Transatlantic Initiative. Jointly, we must face challenges of a new international reality. The 1990 Transatlantic Declaration was a beginning, but with the end of the Cold War, globalization and changes in the European Community, we need to make a qualitative leap to deal with new challenges.

Just six months ago, we began this initiative. Today we take a great step. I want to thank all of the members of the group who worked on this initiative and commend their spirit. Their efforts will culminate in an expression of a new will, a rapprochement to work together on a series of difficult issues, the most immediate of which are Bosnia and the Middle East.

President Santer: This is the most important step in our relationship since 1990. It is a quantum leap forward. It reflects our cooperation on economics, security and trade issues -- and on issues like crime, AIDS and drugs which have a real impact on people. We will make a difference by acting jointly, not just consulting.

This will help us focus our efforts and set our priorities. In the area of humanitarian assistance, where we face strict budget constraints, we need to make our efforts more effective and complementary.

We have a joint responsibility to make sure the WTO works well and to make sure the Singapore Ministerial is a success by spurring trade liberalization. Russia and China should enter the WTO as soon as possible. The Transatlantic Business Dialogue in Seville shows that our business communities have much they agree upon and that we can act on their recommendations. Finally, the education and information technology components of this initiative are vital to our people.

Today's actions will address what some critics have seen as a drift in the transatlantic relationship by deepening and revitalizing that relationship. It shows the world that the relationship is strong enough to carry us through our disputes.

The President: I want to thank Presidents Gonzalez and Santer for the remarkably pace with which they've worked to make this initiative a success over the past six months. This represents a move from consultation to joint action. It's very important that this have an impact on the lives of ordinary people by taking steps on disease, crime, humanitarian assistance and tariff cuts.

I understand you'll be voting on the compensation package for the EU's enlargement this week. I hope you'll approve it. That would show that we're working well together.

The Bosnian peace agreement has its military and non-military components. If we can work well together on this, we can do a lot of other things. The pledging conference in Brussels later this month is an important step. We look to Europe to lead.

The bottom line is that I frankly did not expect a document this visionary, detailed and specific. This is the beginning of something more important than most people will see today when we sign it.

President Gonzalez: On Bosnia, we are grateful for the U.S. effort in Dayton. It is the beginning of a peace process, but there is no guarantee that it will work. To be a success, U.S. troops must be on the ground. This will have two effects. First, it will provide cohesion to an international alliance in favor of peace. Second, it will have a psychological effect by installing confidence in NATO's role.

Creating peace in Bosnia is not going to be easy, as President Clinton has said many times before. There is great hatred among the communities there. Sarajevo is a divided, lacerated city. Our work there will have to be a labor of patience.

We need to work hard on reconstruction. The level of destruction is so high, it may take many years, but I'm hopeful. There will be special problems. The Serbian community in Sarajevo is in a difficult position. It is difficult in Eastern Slavonia too. We need to use maximum influence to show there can be no deviation from the peace plan.

President Santer: Congratulations on the breakthrough in Dayton, which is a crucial step toward peace. It is a result of your leadership and our close cooperation. The EU is giving and will continue to give about \$2 billion in humanitarian aid, including aid to refugees. We are planning to earmark more. We expect the major donors to follow-through at the pledging conference to be held as early as December. Fair burden sharing is important.

We need to be imaginative in our approach on trade, and that may require your political leadership. We want to lay the groundwork for good relations among former enemies, and we need to work harder with third country donors like the OIC.

President Gonzalez: Any comments?

The President: That sounds good to me. I have two observations. I hope the EU at the outset will not set a strict ceiling of one third on its total contribution because I don't know how much will be needed and when. It's highly unlikely that the U.S. will be able to make more than a 20% contribution over the next couple of years. Maybe things will change after a couple of years. Maybe things will change after elections next November. We've met with our Congressional leadership on the costs of IFOR. That went down pretty well, but I'm not too optimistic about additional requests.

I have a question, which is not intended to be critical, but just a question: Have you thought through the structure of how best to use the aid, to monitor it to make sure what needs to be done is being done?

President Gonzalez: I have a few comments. With regard to the contribution, we have a desire that there be a balanced contribution. I'm not sure whether it must be balanced at the start or at the ending point, but we do want it to be balanced. As time goes on the demands for further assistance will be overwhelming due to the savage destruction of the country.

We want a balance not just with the U.S. but also with Islamic and Arab countries. They have criticized the West, but now it's time for them to show some solidarity. It's hard to draw the line as to where there are direct interests involved, but I think Japan also should contribute. The whole world is interested in this conflict.

I am aware of the problems President Clinton faces now. I hope he won't have any problems in November next year and that he will still be here.

President Santer: There are several stages to the reconstruction effort. First, there is humanitarian assistance. As I said, the EU will continue to contribute \$2 billion there. And there will be the return of the refugees. There will also be the need for technical assistance on institutional reform. We will benefit greatly from the World Bank's experience on financial issues.

We in the EU have some experience with reconstruction in Central and Eastern Europe, and as in the case there, we need to ensure market access for products from the region.

We need to forge normal relations among parts of the former Yugoslavia. The first step in the implementation of the Dayton plan is elections. Here, the OSCE will have an important role to play.

Secretary Christopher: Remembering the experience we have had in Gaza and Jericho, we need to make money available as quickly as possible. The procedures of the international institutions are bureaucratic and not particularly conducive to quick action. Like Gaza and Jericho, we need to show quickly that peace makes a difference in peoples' lives. We cannot be complacent or rely too much on the IFI's. The London conference will be critical in that regard. We have been planning the IFOR effort for more than a year. We need a similar effort on reconstruction.

President Gonzalez: I agree. We have some experience with our Blue Helmets, who have been doing extraordinary things: setting up schools, establishing electricity. We need good coordination for EU assistance efforts based on our experience.

Now let's turn to Russia and Central and Eastern Europe. We signed an association agreement with Russia in July, and we had a good meeting on September 7 with Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin on the reform process and the transformation of Russia. We should actively coordinate our efforts on Russia and Central and Eastern Europe since we agree on the aims. The stability of Central and Eastern Europe depends on accession to the EU and NATO. With Russia, the economic relationship will progress, but how should we build a European security architecture? They cannot have a veto over NATO expansion. We have no interest in creating a new division in Europe. We need to show them confidence.

On December 16 we will have a meeting between the EU member states and 12 countries, including Cyprus, Malta and the Baltics. We will examine our future agenda and talk about a calendar for European security matters and EU accession.

Russia is a touchy subject, but provides us with a unique opportunity. We need a Europe united politically. We have shared goals, and we need to take on board issues regarding Russia and other countries.

President Santer: We are seeing our trade relations with Russia improving. The EU is Russia's largest trading partner, and trade is increasing 15% per year.

With regard to Central and Eastern Europe, we are improving our assistance efforts as part of a pre-accession strategy. Economic conditions in these countries are improving.

To enlarge the EU, we need to reform its institutions. Right now, it is operating with 15 members through institutions designed for 6. We need to put our own house in order through the Intergovernmental Conference in 1996. After that, we can

turn to enlargement. In the meantime, we are developing a pre-accession strategy at the political and economic level.

We will be providing \$10 billion in assistance to Central and Eastern Europe and \$7 billion to the Mediterranean between now and 1999. We have minister-level and expert-level meetings with these countries on accession-related issues.

It is important to remember that the 12 Central and East European countries and other candidates for membership together have the GDP of the Netherlands. They have a long way to go before they will be ready to be members of the EU, but in the meantime we need to strengthen relations. We will start negotiations following the IGC with case-by-case transition periods. They differ in size and the nature of their problems. It is a huge challenge we face. The Commission has issued studies on the impact of enlargement on various policies, such as the CAP, and we will continue to do so.

The President: We should be encouraged that relations with Russia have been positive, on balance. Developments in Central and Eastern Europe are encouraging for democracy and economic reform.

On the security front, we have in place the Partnership for Peace which will help manage the tensions arising from NATO expansion. Bosnia provides us with a great opportunity to demonstrate the harmony of our security interests with Russia and to demonstrate that we are not trying to contain Russia by unifying Europe.

As for EU enlargement, that is of course your business, but uniting the continent economically and in terms of security is our common agenda. Your IGC will set the stage. I have no particular views on who should be admitted when, but it is important to signal these economies that they will be joining the EU. They have a small GDP, but they have large potential growth and some examples of progress toward accession could be a positive incentive for reform. I encourage you to make the most of the IGC in this regard.

Political and economic integration in the EU could help take the sting out of the view that we're creating a unified Europe through NATO.

President Gonzalez: I'd be interested in your views about the status of the Middle East peace effort in the aftermath of Rabin's tragic assassination. Our recent conference in Barcelona was contaminated by Israel-Syria tensions. I am under the impression that Syria wants to be invited by the U.S. to the negotiation table.

The President: Peres is coming to see me in the next few days, so I'll have more personal knowledge then. A lot of work has been done since Rabin's death. I had some short meetings when I was in Israel for the funeral. I'll ask my Secretary of State to provide an update on this.

Secretary Christopher: It was interesting that Syria viewed Rabin's assassination as a moment to accelerate the peace process. We're trying to capitalize on this. Peres has shown a strong desire to pursue the Syria track. After January 1, I hope that this track will be reinvigorated.

We have seen no signal that Syria wants to have direct dealings with Israel, but they might soon at the Foreign Minister level. Maybe Peres' style will help move the process along, but he is still constrained by the same dynamics in the Keneset and in Israeli politics.

I am looking forward to the first quarter of 1996 as a possible time for progress. Peres is committed to following-up and moving ahead on the West Bank.

The President: We are working very, very hard on this issue. We're doing all that we can. If any of the EU member states have even remotely positive relations with Syria, they should encourage the Syrians to seize the moment. The style of negotiating cannot be haggling -- this should not be a Jesuitical exam. There is nothing wrong with discussing details -- Rabin and Arafat signed 26 maps with thousands of decisions -- but the Syrians need to be receptive. Peace involves taking chances. Your members could help in shaping Syria's attitude.

We need to make this agreement successful. We're trying to encourage investment by the Arab-American and Jewish-American business community. It's important to continue our support, particular as Arafat faces elections. The security situation complicates the economic situation, but if the EU could take steps to open markets to Palestinian goods before the election it would be helpful.

President Gonzalez: I want to clarify that I did not mean to suggest that Syria was ready to talk directly to Israel. The process is still in the United States' hands. I spent about four hours with Assad, who explained the entire history of the conflict from the time of the Canaanites to the present. I had the impression that Assad wants to be forced by the U.S. to the table.

For our part, we will send 300 people to monitor the elections. We have provided \$450 million in aid to date. We are cooperating to encourage investment and actively supporting U.S. efforts. I will ask President Santer for his views and then ask Minister Solana for a readout of the EU's Mediterranean Conference.

President Santer: I agree with the President that we need to actively support the Palestinians. The Commission is supporting the election-monitoring effort. On December 9, there will be the Paris Conference on aid to the Palestinians, where we will work on a joint action plan. The EU has provided 15 million ECUs in development assistance and will provide 52 million ECUs, part of which will go to support administrative costs and the budget deficit. We need to shift to more economical assistance. We're trying to negotiate an economic association agreement with the Palestinians. We have a strong commitment to the reconstruction of Gaza.

Foreign Minister Solana: The Euro-Mediterranean Conference brought the Mediterranean countries together with the 15 EU members -- representing a total of 500 million people. The political objective was to support regional stability vis-à-vis Europe. We discussed a code of conduct in the relationships among these countries, and identified human rights and the values of democracy as key. From the political standpoint, it was very important. It also dealt with economic and financial cooperation. Between now and 2000, we will provide \$6.5 billion in aid and \$6.5 billion in loans.

Our objective is build a free trade zone among Europe-Mediterranean countries. We also want to engage in a social and religious dialogue. We need to make an effort to go beyond confrontation among civilizations.

The Barcelona Conference was the beginning of a new chapter. We didn't solve our problems, but set up a process for dealing with them.

With regard to the Middle East, I would just add that at the conference Peres played a very positive role.

President Gonzalez: We all agree on the importance of the customs union with Turkey. In the past months we have done our utmost to assure a favorable vote. On December 13, the European Parliament will vote on the customs union. This is a long time in coming. I have asked Ciller not to make any comment that might upset the apple cart. This would go into effect January 1 and clear the air before elections there.

Right now, Turkish opinion is favorable toward the EU. Our relations with Turkey can help with Iran and other issues.

President Santer: I would just add that I too hope for a positive vote by the European parliament, which we hope would further the normalization of relations with Turkey, lessen tensions with Greece and help solve the Cyprus issue.

The President: If the vote goes through, it will improve the prospects for resolving the Cyprus dispute, which we have been working hard on. It gives us a chance to have a new relationship with the Muslim world, particularly if we have a good outcome in Bosnia. It is immensely important -- beyond the particular issue at hand.

President Gonzalez: I want to raise one issue on which we do not totally agree: Iran. The EU has called for a critical dialogue. We have a large economic relationship with Iran. The U.S. is concerned about this relationship. Perhaps we can work out compatible positions even if they are not the same.

The President: As you know, we stiffened our policy recently and did something I almost never do -- take unilateral action -- because dialogue seems to have no effect. Rabin said Iran is the real problem in the region. Iran continues to support terrorism while taking all the benefits of economic dialogue.

I took unilateral action even though I knew our allies did not support it and that it would therefore have only limited effect. At a minimum, I think there should be no new government credits or major investment until there is evidence that dialogue is not strengthening their ability to wreck havoc around the world. There is absolutely no evidence that reasonable treatment of Iran produces results.

Sir Leon Brittan: We share a common perception of the danger Iran poses, but disagree only in our perception of what is most likely to produce change. It would be extremely unfortunate if our differences on this issue fuel disagreement between us given all that we are accomplishing here today. I am concerned about the D'Amato legislation and hope that the Administration will oppose it and its secondary boycott, rather than reach a compromise. This could be a source of major conflict and discontent.

Mr. Lake: The Administration opposes the legislation and is working to amend it, but it has strong support in the Congress. Regardless of our position on the legislation, we still oppose awarding Iran with economic benefits.

The President: You need to decide if Iran is qualitatively different from other countries with which we have differences and which may even resort to force every once-in-a-while. I don't like the D'Amato bill and share your reservations, but you have to come to grips with whether there is a strategy that will get results. Leon, I know you've had a terrible terrorism burden in your country with the IRA. Iran has taken the genie out of the national bottle when it comes to terrorism. It can pop up anywhere. I don't support D'Amato, but you need to decide whether Iran is qualitatively different.

We need to have a stronger dialogue on Iran. It's always tagged on the bottom of the agenda as item number 10. We shouldn't let it cloud the rest of the agenda and what we have achieved here today, but we are kidding ourselves if you think we can leave this as item number 10 on the agenda. Even if you're right in your approach, we need to have a more intensive effort.

President Gonzalez: I agree that we can't allow any disagreement to cloud our overall good relationship. We need a dialogue on this. Terrorism will be an increasingly important issue on the agenda. Dealing with disagreements strengthens our relationship.

The President: Just a brief word in closing. I am extremely pleased with the U.S.-EU relationship and with the leadership of Presidents Santer and Gonzalez. But six months from now, people will look back to judge whether we have done anything. That's a more uncomfortable position to be in. We need to work hard to make sure we accomplish what we set out to do today.

-- End of Conversation --

# MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 3535				
Document ID: 9509253				
Row: 47	Section: 1	Shelf: 6	Position: 1	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re. Telcon with Prime Minister Gonzalez of Spain (2 pages)	12/29/1995	P1/b(1) <b>KBH 2/5/2020</b>

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Memcon and Gonzalez...])  
OA/Box Number: 3535

### FOLDER TITLE:

9509253

2015-0548-M  
rs1230

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: LINO, M

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 29 DEC 95  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: SPAIN

TELCON

PERSONS: GONZALEZ, FELIPE

SUBJECT: TELCON OF PRES 29 DEC TELCALL TO SPANISH PM GONZALEZ

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 02 JAN 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

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EXECSEC  
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COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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DISPATCHED BY DRS DATE 12-30-95 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSVJD CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9509253

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

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001	X 95123009 SENS APPROVED RECOM
002	X 95122909 SENS SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
002	951229	STATE	

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 9253  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM RBS NSC INT  
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Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>RA 12/29</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>3</u>	<u>RA 12/18/89</u>	<u>D</u>
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A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette WFO

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_

LOG # 9253

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_

SYSTEM NSC NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_

DOCLOG RA A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	_____	_____	_____
Dohse	_____	_____	_____
Sens	<u>1</u>	<u>ADS</u>	_____
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>RA 12/29</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>3</u>	<u>12/10/89</u>	<u>D</u>
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A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

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COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette 1/8

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

9253

December 29, 1995

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KRM/NARA, Date 9/9/2019  
2015-0548-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. MARISA R. LINO  
Acting Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with Spanish Prime Minister  
Gonzalez (U)

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation must be distributed via  
NODIS channels and should not be distributed below the Deputy  
Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. If the item is to be sent to an  
Embassy, it should be sent to the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief  
of Mission (DCM) only. (C)



Andrew D. Sens  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Andrew D. Sens  
Reason: 1.5(b)  
Declassify On: 12/29/05

TAB A

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2015-0518-M (1.03)  
KBH 7/9/2019

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Prime Minister Gonzalez of Spain  
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez  
Interpreter: Guillermo Baserva  
Notetakers: Alexander Vershbow, Tom Crispell,  
Katherine O'Loughlin, Celina Realuyo,  
Elaine Florio

DATE, TIME: December 29, 1995, 10:03-10:12 a.m. EST  
AND PLACE: The Oval Office

The President: Hello, Felipe? (U)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: Good afternoon, Mr. President. (U)

The President: Thank you for taking my call. (U)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: It is my pleasure. (U)

The President: I wanted to talk to you about the operations in Bosnia and Eastern Slavonia. I know that some of my people have been in touch with your government, but I wanted to talk to you personally about this. I think that things are going well in Bosnia right now, but I want to make sure the agreement between Serbia and Croatia on Eastern Slavonia holds up. For complete compliance, we will have to have a UN operation to supervise implementation. I understand Russia and Slovakia will likely contribute troops to the operation in Eastern Slavonia and that Belgium is willing to lead the mission, but the Belgians are hesitant without any other NATO partners participating. That is why I am calling: to see if you can contribute. (U)

I know that you have made a significant contribution to IFOR and that Spanish forces have compiled an excellent track record. However, I think that if you could make even a modest contribution to the peacekeeping force in Eastern Slavonia, it could encourage others to contribute, and it would help get Solana off to a good start as NATO Secretary General. I am

worried that Croatia will resort to the military option if we don't get a peacekeeping operation in there soon. If we do succeed, then I think things will work out fine. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: It would be a catastrophe if Croatia did that. I agree with you Mr. President. You know we are trying to send more troops to Mostar, but I will try to speak with our partners in the European Union to talk about the Eastern Slavonia problem and see what solution can be found. Do you have an approximate idea of how many troops we would need? (S)

The President: About 2000 more. If you could provide 800 or so, that would be good, depending on how many we could get from the others. But 800 to 1000 would be fine and would help convince others to contribute. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: You know the operation in Eastern Slavonia is a UN operation, not a NATO operation. I am trying to send one more battalion to Mostar to complete our brigade there. (S)

The President: I understand it is a UN operation. But the Belgians said they would like some NATO partners to participate in the Eastern Slavonia operation. We would be prepared to make the same commitment to have NATO help with a withdrawal of the force if it got into trouble. Of course, all of NATO will have to agree, but I think they will. (S)

Prime Minister Gonzalez: This afternoon I will talk to my partners in the European Union who are also members of NATO to see what we can do about the problem. Right now, I am preparing to send more troops to Mostar to have a full brigade there. But I will talk to my EU partners immediately about Eastern Slavonia to see what we can do. Thank you for calling and I wish you all the best for the New Year. (S)

The President: Good-bye and good luck to you too. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

December 29, 1995

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KRM/NARA, Date 9/9/2019  
2015-0548-m

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation Between the President and Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez

At Tab I is a memorandum to State Department transmitting the Memorandum of the President's telephone conversation with Spanish Prime Minister Gonzalez on December 29, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A.

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State  
Tab A Telcon.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9509253  
DATE 29 DEC 95

SUBJECT: TELCON OF PRES 29 DEC TELCALL TO SPANISH PM GONZALEZ  
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ROOM 7224 2201 C STREET, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20520	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
			COPY: <u>1 + DISK</u>

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS  
Initials: KBH Date: 9/9/2019  
2015-0548-m

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB  
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

# MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1081				
Document ID: 9600254				
Row: 44	Section: 6	Shelf: 7	Position: 2	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. telcon	re: Telcon with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana (2 pages)	01/12/1996	P1/b(1) KBM 2/5/2020

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Memcon and Gonzalez...])  
OA/Box Number: 1081

### FOLDER TITLE:

9600254

2015-0548-M

rs1231

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9600254  
RECEIVED: 18 JAN 96 08

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 19 JAN 96  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO

TELCON

PERSONS: SOLANA, JAVIER

SUBJECT: PRES TELCON W/ NATO SEC GEN SOLANA

ACTION: HARMON SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 22 JAN 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

EXECSEC  
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COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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DISPATCHED BY BU DATE 1/22 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: NSASK DOC 2 OF 2

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSM/NARA, Date 9/9/2019  
2015-0548-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 SENS  
002

Z 96011919 FOR SIGNATURE & DECISION  
X 96012208 HARMON SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 960119 BURNS, W

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9600254  
DATE 19 JAN 96

SUBJECT: PRES TELCON W/ NATO SEC GEN SOLANA  
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS DEPARTMENT OF STATE ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
			COPY: <u>ORIGINAL</u>

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS  
Initials: KRM Date: 9/9/2019  
2015-0548-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB  
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 0254  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG VP A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Dohse			
Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>VP</u> <u>1/19</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>3</u>		<u>D</u>

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

CC:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 0254  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT  
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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
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Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
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Records Mgt.	<u>3</u>		<u>D</u>
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A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

0254

January 19, 1996

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By ~~KS~~ NARA, Date 9/9/2019  
2015-0548-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between  
the President and NATO Secretary General Solana  
(U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and NATO Secretary General Solana is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may be transmitted to USNATO for the Ambassador or DCM EYES ONLY. (U)

  
Andrew D. Sens  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Andrew D. Sens  
Reason: 1.5 (b,d)  
Declassify On: 01/19/05

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0548-m (1.04)  
KBH 9/9/2019

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
NATO Secretary General Solana  
  
Notetaker: Alexander Vershbow

DATE, TIME: January 12, 1996, 1700 - 1705 EST  
AND PLACE: Air Force One en route from Nashville to Aviano

Secretary General Solana: I just returned from Sarajevo and a visit with Tudjman in Zagreb. I am sorry I cannot receive you in the theater as had been my wish, but I understand that logistics made that difficult. (U)

The President: I am very pleased with the work you have done and with your strong support and leadership. (U)

Secretary General Solana: When you arrive in Bosnia you will find a military operation that is going superbly. They are doing fantastic work. Admiral Smith and the others are in very good shape and doing a splendid job. (U)

The President: That's very good. I hope that we can also use this operation to bring NATO closer to Russia. (U)

Secretary General Solana: We are working on that too. I spoke with the Russians, and they have started their deployment today. They will sign their participation agreement in the coming days. Things are going well with the Russians as far as IFOR is concerned. The only problem with the operation is complications with the Serbs in Sarajevo. We need to talk to the Bosnians on how to ease this situation so that we can avoid an exodus by the Serbs. There is also the problem of Eastern Slavonia. You will have an opportunity to talk to Tudjman. We are trying to get more troops to go there. There is one piece of good news today: the Belgian government approved having Belgian forces stay in

Eastern Slavonia. We now have to see if we can find some other countries to contribute. (C)

The President: That is great news about the Belgians. (U)

Secretary General Solana: Let me just wish you all the best for your trip. As I said, you will find your troops in very high spirits. They are working superbly. (U)

The President: Thanks again for your leadership. I am looking forward to seeing you in Washington next month. (U)

Secretary General Solana: I am looking forward to that too. I am sorry I could not receive you in Bosnia. (U)

The President: See you soon. Good-bye. (U)

Secretary General Solana: All the best. Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504  
January 19, 1996

0254

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBM NARA, Date 9/9/2019  
2015-0548-17

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

SUBJECT: Telcon with NATO Secretary General Solana

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation which took place on January 12, 1996, between the President and NATO Secretary General Javier Solana.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation to the Department of State.

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Telcon with NATO Secretary General Solana

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(b,d)

Declassify On: 01/19/05

# MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1086				
Document ID: 9601110				
Row: 44	Section: 6	Shelf: 9	Position: 1	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001a. memcon</del>	<del>re: Meeting with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana (6 pages)</del>	<del>01/20/1996</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> KBH 2/5/2020
<del>001b. memcon</del>	<del>re: Meeting with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana (8 pages)</del>	<del>01/20/1996</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> KBH 2/5/2020

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Memcon and Gonzalez...])  
OA/Box Number: 1086

### FOLDER TITLE:

9601110

2015-0548-M  
rs1232

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 26 FEB 96  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO

MEMCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF MTG W / NATO SECRETARY GENERAL SOLANA 20 FEB 96

ACTION: SENS SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 24 FEB 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

FICKLIN  
NSC CHRON  
VERSHBOW ✓

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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DISPATCHED BY LA DATE 2/26/96 BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSASK CLOSED BY: NSLA DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 SENS

Z 96022317 FOR DECISION

001

X 96022616 SENS APPROVED RECOM

002

X 96022616 SENS SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 960226 BURNS, W

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 1110  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG \_\_\_\_\_ A/O \_\_\_\_\_

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<i>[Signature]</i> Harmon	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Dohse	<u>#</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Sens	<u>2</u>	<u>ADP</u>	_____
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>ADP 2/26</u>	<u>D with diskette</u>
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	<u>D</u>
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A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

2 ~~different~~ different memcons

Exec Sec Office has diskette [Signature]

February 26, 1996

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBH NARA, Date 9/9/2019  
2015-0548-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President  
and NATO Secretary General Javier Solana (U)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation between the President and NATO Secretary General Javier Solana is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. (S)



Andrew D. Sens  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0548-M (1.05)  
KBH 9/9/2019

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
The Vice President  
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State  
Leon Panetta, Chief of Staff  
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Ambassador Robert Hunter, U.S. Permanent  
Representative to NATO  
Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of  
State for European and Canadian Affairs  
Leon Fuerth, Special Assistant to the Vice  
President for National Security Affairs  
John Kornblum, Senior Deputy Assistant  
Secretary of State for European and  
Canadian Affairs  
Alexander Vershbow, Senior Director for  
European Affairs, NSC Staff, (Notetaker)

Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General  
Klaus Scharioth, Director, Secretary  
General's Private Office  
Jamie P. Shea, Deputy Director for Press  
and Information, Spokesman  
James B. Foley, Deputy Director, Private  
Office

DATE, TIME February 20, 1996 5:15 p.m. - 6:00 p.m.  
AND PLACE: Oval Office

Secretary General Solana: What you are doing in Bosnia is really impressive. This is not only my view but that of many sensible and intelligent people in Europe. I have been to Bosnia two times and met with Admiral Smith. It is very impressive to see how things are operating on the ground, and the way that all of the commanders are doing their jobs. I believe the mission will succeed. (C)

The President: I feel good about the situation. There are lots of rocks in the road, but the military operation is going well. We had a meeting today on the importance of pushing the civilian side. I will make a very big push with the Congress on providing funds for the police and other civilian activities. We don't want IFOR's time to run out before we have the infrastructure in place to preserve the peace. (S)

Secretary General Solana: If I might say, on the civilian issues, that Carl Bildt has a very difficult task in coordinating the different agencies. All of them want to be recognized. Bildt has the authority to coordinate but can't lead the effort. I had a dinner with him after my visit to Mostar and we agreed to cooperate on the civilian-military interface. We set an agreed agenda with priorities and NATO will try to help him as much as possible. He needs assistance in areas like transportation and communications, in particular. He is placing a lot of confidence in our help. (S)

Anthony Lake: The Secretary General will be meeting with Senator Cohen and a few other members of Congress and will make a strong pitch for assistance for civilian implementation, and in particular the \$200 million supplemental. (S)

Secretary General Solana: It is important that the IFOR troops should remain up until the elections in late August or September. There should not be a drawdown before the elections. I would also note that we may be forced by our public opinion to do more on things like war criminals, mass graves and the like -- especially in the spring when the weather improves. The media will be putting a lot of pressure on us. But from a military viewpoint, the operation is going well. (S)

Anthony Lake: We agreed in our earlier meeting that any debate over what will happen after IFOR would not be helpful at this stage, especially here in the U.S. (S)

The President: I agree with that. (U)

Secretary General Solana: If I may turn to NATO enlargement, may I ask how you see the calendar until the end of the year? We have started the dialogue that will proceed through the end of 1996. The next decision is in December. Our idea is that we should define clearly the way to proceed and maybe take the decision on new members in 1997, possibly at a NATO summit. (S)

The President: We should stay on the timetable that has been agreed, because it is designed to do the work that needs to be done, in a low-key, unthreatening and transparent way. We also need to walk a tightrope and not unnecessarily inflame things in

Russia or in Central and Eastern Europe. We should stay on the timetable and be almost boring, methodical, plodding, even bureaucratic. We need as much as possible to take away the emotional energy from the NATO enlargement issue in both Russia and Central and Eastern Europe, as well as among constituencies that support enlargement in the U.S. and Europe. In short, we should smile and plod ahead. (C)

Secretary General Solana: That is what we are trying to do. We are saying that the decision has been taken, and now let us look ahead. (C)

The President: We also need to make a success of IFOR as an example of the Partnership for Peace. We should highlight our long-term commitment to PFP. This idea has proven to be a bigger deal than we had expected -- with more countries, and more substantive cooperation. It has grown into something significant in its own right. We should also use IFOR to improve relations with the Russians. (C)

Secretary General Solana: Partnership for Peace will be necessary for the long term because not all members will become Alliance members. Therefore, I agree that we need to build up PFP as much as possible. Regarding Russia, there has been one interesting development. We have established a good channel to the Russian military because of IFOR and it will be important to keep that channel open. When General Joulwan was in Moscow, Yeltsin congratulated him through General Shevtsov and even wanted to decorate him with Russian awards. We may need to use this channel in the future; it may be a better means of sending messages than Ambassador Churkin in Brussels. (C)

Secretary Christopher: The Secretary General has been invited by Primakov to come to Moscow in March. I think it is a fine idea for the Secretary General to talk to the Russians about IFOR before the elections and try to neutralize the NATO issue in Russia. (C)

The President: Yes, that would be a great opportunity to work on the Russian military. One of the things that we keep hearing is that the ultra-nationalists in Russia are playing up the Cold War memory of NATO, especially among older voters in rural areas. In those parts, there are people who actually believe that NATO will bomb them the first chance it gets. You might want to consider when you are in Moscow giving a structured series of interviews in which you send a general message about NATO without appearing to interfere in their elections. This could help take the sting out of the rabid anti-NATO views in Russia. (C)

Secretary General Solana: I will be going to Moscow right after Secretary Christopher, so he will be in the hot spot on NATO. Looking to the North Atlantic Council meeting in Berlin, this will be a very important event in symbolic terms -- the first time NATO has met in Berlin. At the meeting, I would like to accomplish three things: evaluate IFOR; stress the importance of Partnership for Peace; and move forward on the internal reform of NATO, including a response to the French suggestions. How do you see the French initiative? I have not yet met with Chirac. (e)

The President: I think the French initiative is a positive thing. Chirac is very, well, French, but also a strong and imaginative leader who looks to the future. He wants France to have a more integrated relationship with NATO, and that is positive. I think he felt good about his state visit here. We have never objected to a European security pillar within NATO, although we don't want Alliance equities to be compromised. I believe Chirac's proposal can be a good thing. To make it work, France needs to be part of it. There are a lot of details and arrangements to work through, but I feel positive about Chirac's approach in general. (e)

Secretary General Solana: By the time of Berlin, I hope we can have some of the problem solved so that we can announce a package of decisions on NATO adaptation. (e)

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The President: Is there a way to focus on IFOR as well as the European issue? Should we be doing anything with respect to the Russians and IFOR? But I agree that if we can work on the French issue and IFOR, it will not give the Russian nationalists any new ammunition. (e)

Secretary General Solana: Yes, and the third topic, PFP, should be underlined as well.

Richard Holbrooke: By the time of Berlin, we will already be able to draw some of the lessons from IFOR, which will not be controversial with the Russians. (e)

The President: One of the things we need to keep in mind is what a good thing IFOR is vis-à-vis the Russians. It demonstrates to

Moscow that NATO is defining a new substantive mission that is different from its Cold War mission and not antithetical to Russian interests. The name NATO has a positive significance for freedom-loving people here and in Europe, but it carries a lot of baggage for the Russians. When we have NATO take new actions that are different from its Cold War missions, it helps to shed some of this baggage without undermining NATO's appeal in the West. So we should think of other ways to throw off some of the political baggage without weakening NATO's fundamental mission. (S)

Anthony Lake: There is one more issue we should discuss, the Aegean. (S)

The President: I thought we would expend all of NATO's forces over two rocks. (S)

Anthony Lake: The situation is not good. The Greeks are mad at us, and it is good that the Secretary General will be going to Athens and Ankara. (S)

Secretary General Solana: It is very difficult to resolve the Greek-Turkish problem from the European side. We can help, but we need your support. The Europeans are divided, with Greece in the EU and Turkey not. (S)

The President: We have to keep working on this problem. It is all very strange, with the Greeks mad at us right now. (S)

Secretary General Solana: You have good possibilities of working with the new Greek Prime Minister. He is a very good man. It is a pity that he came into power in a moment of turmoil, but we can do business with him. (S)

The President: I don't know what to make of the Turkish political situation. Right now we have no government, no one to deal with. (S)

Secretary General Solana: When I met with Foreign Minister Baykal, he spoke of weeks or even months before a new government would be in place. (S)

Anthony Lake: Next week we should get together and discuss a joint strategy, since the situation could explode. (S)

The President: In the world we are living, the passion of nations is in inverse proportion to the issues over which they are arguing. It is hard to believe that we almost had a war over the little rock, Imia. (S)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6

Secretary General Solana: Nationalism is a difficult thing to understand. (2)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2015-0548-M (1.06)  
KBH 9/9/2019

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
The Vice President  
Warren Christopher, Secretary of State  
Leon Panetta, Chief of Staff  
Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Ambassador Robert Hunter, U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO  
Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs  
Leon Fuerth, Special Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs  
John Kornblum, Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs  
Alexander Vershbow, Senior Director for European Affairs, NSC Staff, (Notetaker)

Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General  
Klaus Scharioth, Director, Secretary General's Private Office  
Jamie P. Shea, Deputy Director for Press and Information, Spokesman  
James B. Foley, Deputy Director, Private Office

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: February 20, 1996 5:15 p.m. - 6:00 p.m.  
Oval Office

Secretary General Solana: What you are doing in Bosnia is really impressive. This is not only my view but that of many sensible and intelligent people in Europe. I have been to Bosnia two times and met with Admiral Smith. It is very impressive to see how things are operating on the ground, and the way that all of the commanders are doing their jobs. I believe the mission will succeed. (C)

The President: I feel good about the situation. There are lots of rocks in the road, but the military operation is going well. We had a meeting today on the importance of pushing the civilian side. I will make a very big push with the Congress on providing funds for the police and other civilian activities. We don't want IFOR's time to run out before we have the infrastructure in place to preserve the peace. (S)

Secretary General Solana: If I might say, on the civilian issues, that Carl Bildt has a very difficult task in coordinating the different agencies. All of them want to be recognized. Bildt has the authority to coordinate but can't lead the effort. I had a dinner with him after my visit to Mostar and we agreed to cooperate on the civilian-military interface. We set an agreed agenda with priorities and NATO will try to help him as much as possible. He needs assistance in areas like transportation and communications, in particular. He is placing a lot of confidence in our help. (S)

Anthony Lake: The Secretary General will be meeting with Senator Cohen and a few other members of Congress and will make a strong pitch for assistance for civilian implementation, and in particular the \$200 million supplemental. (S)

Secretary General Solana: It is important that the IFOR troops should remain up until the elections in late August or September. There should not be a drawdown before the elections. I would also note that we may be forced by our public opinion to do more on things like war criminals, mass graves and the like -- especially in the spring when the weather improves. The media will be putting a lot of pressure on us. But from a military viewpoint, the operation is going well. (S)

Anthony Lake: We agreed in our earlier meeting that any debate over what will happen after IFOR would not be helpful at this stage, especially here in the U.S. (S)

The President: I agree with that. (U)

Secretary General Solana: If I may turn to NATO enlargement, may I ask how you see the calendar until the end of the year? We have started the dialogue that will proceed through the end of 1996. The next decision is in December. Our idea is that we should define clearly the way to proceed and maybe take the decision on new members in 1997, possibly at a NATO summit. (S)

The President: We should stay on the timetable that has been agreed, because it is designed to do the work that needs to be done, in a low-key, unthreatening and transparent way. We also need to walk a tightrope and not unnecessarily inflame things in

Russia or in Central and Eastern Europe. We should stay on the timetable and be almost boring, methodical, plodding, even bureaucratic. We need as much as possible to take away the emotional energy from the NATO enlargement issue in both Russia and Central and Eastern Europe, as well as among constituencies that support enlargement in the U.S. and Europe. In short, we should smile and plod ahead. (C)

Secretary General Solana: That is what we are trying to do. We are saying that the decision has been taken, and now let us look ahead. (C)

The President: We also need to make a success of IFOR as an example of the Partnership for Peace. We should highlight our long-term commitment to PFP. This idea has proven to be a bigger deal than we had expected -- with more countries, and more substantive cooperation. It has grown into something significant in its own right. We should also use IFOR to improve relations with the Russians. (C)

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Secretary General Solana: You have good possibilities of working with the new Greek Prime Minister. He is a very good man. It is a pity that he came into power in a moment of turmoil, but we can do business with him. (S)

The President: I don't know what to make of the Turkish political situation. Right now we have no government, no one to deal with. (S)

Secretary General Solana: When I met with Foreign Minister Baykal, he spoke of weeks or even months before a new government would be in place. (S)

Anthony Lake: Next week we should get together and discuss a joint strategy, since the situation could explode. (S)

The President: We could find IFOR having to occupy every piece of ground in the Aegean -- with the U.S. taking rock #14, Spain rock #50 and Germany rock #3. (S)

Anthony Lake: For a moment, we thought that we had spotted a Greek flag on one of the islands off the coast of China. (e)

The President: Perhaps we should encourage Greece and Turkey to form a joint force to deal with the islands in dispute between China and Taiwan. In the world we are living, the passion of nations is in inverse proportion to the issues over which they are arguing. It is hard to believe that we almost had a war over the little rock, Imia. (e)

Secretary General Solana: Nationalism is a difficult thing to understand. (e)

The President: It would be better to fight over 12 computers than 12 goats. (e)

Leon Panetta: We shouldn't give them any ideas. (e)

Secretary General Solana: I see that Tony Lake is looking at his watch. If I could ask you one question about the domestic scene. Since I have no doubt that you will be the next President, I would like to know how you plan to deal with Congress. (e)

The President: That all depends on how much I win by. If I win by 5 points, we could win the House back and hold even in the Senate or pick up one seat. It all depends on whether I wage a strong enough campaign. The truth is that no one knows what will happen. (e)

There are common currents flowing through all the democracies and this is why we have so many 50-50 elections or 3-way splits within parliaments. Look at the headlines in this week's news magazines: "Middle Class Workers Losing Jobs, Malfunctioning of Public Institutions; Republicans Don't Know What They Are For." These are problems common to the whole advanced world. In the U.S., we have done well in creating jobs, but 60% of the workforce is living on incomes that are the same or lower than 10 years ago after adjusting for inflation. We are not well situated to deal with the global economy; many workers lack the skills needed to rise. This is a common problem for all western societies. The information revolution has changed the nature of work, the workplace, the marketplace and the means of information transmission. (e)

Take France as an example. They now have a higher per capita income among industrial wage earners than the United States, but in trying to protect the workforce against the global economy, they are running high unemployment. In the U.S. we have stagnant wages but more jobs. Germany now has manufacturing wages that are 20% higher than in the United States. They have lots of

protection and a good social safety net, but higher unemployment as well. Every European state is trying to create a new social compact. There is no perfect answer in this period of transition and that is why we are seeing lots of close elections. (S)

Even the Republicans, despite their triumphant election in 1994, found in 1995 that the voters didn't really support the Republican agenda. What happened in 1994 was that many workers with modest incomes stayed home. They did not see any improvement in their situations and didn't vote. Now these people want to vote for me because I am fighting against the other guys. (S)

If I win the election, I think we will win back the House or will come very close -- close enough to fashion a moderate majority. We will also hold even in the Senate and, without the House pulling the Senate to the right, I think we will be able to function. If Dole were not running for President and the House were not pulling the Senate to the right, we could do business right now. The Senate was better than the House on Bosnia, although both houses were bad on providing money for foreign relations. The Republicans want a big military but don't want to do anything with it. If we just had another billion dollars for foreign relations, we could do a lot. Leaving aside NATO, if we had such money for South Asia, we could get India and Pakistan to throw all their nuclear weapons into the sea. The Republicans throw lots of money at the military, but give no money for our diplomacy. This is part of their inchoate America-alone world view. The Senate is better than the House, but went along with the House on the budget. (S)

Of course there are many wild cards. Ross Perot could join the campaign in August and spend twice as much money as me or the Republican nominee. He could not be elected, but he could help reelect me if he enters the race. We are living in strange times. On balance, I am optimistic, but you need to imagine how the world looks to the people who vote. (S)

I am not surprised how the Turks voted in their last election. Look at the fundamentalists: when they were elected mayor of the big cities, they cleaned up the streets, collected the garbage, and fixed many of the problems. In advanced countries, people are losing faith in their institutions as those institutions undergo transformations. Every European country, Japan and the United States are struggling with these problems and there is no perfect strategy. As I said, we are doing pretty well on jobs, but the times are disorienting for our people. I am trying to figure out how to convince people that they have more influence over their own destiny, in order to raise the confidence levels. If I can do this, then their better selves will vote in November.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

8

The Republicans are trying to win by scaring the hell out of people about what the Democrats will do. (e)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504  
February 22, 1996

1110

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSH NARA, Date 9/9/2019  
2015-0548-M

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation from the President's Meeting with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, February 20, 1996

Attached at Tab II is the full Memorandum of Conversation of the President's meeting with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana on February 20, 1996. At Tab A is an abridged version that omits the discussion of domestic politics.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the abridged Memorandum of Conversation to the Department of State.

That the full Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve ADS Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State  
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation (abridged)  
Tab II Memorandum of Conversation (full text)

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(b,d)  
Declassify On: 02/22/06

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9601110  
DATE 26 FEB 96

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF MTG W / NATO SECRETARY GENERAL SOLANA  
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: **SECRET**

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE  
2201 C STREET, N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

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COPY: ORIG+DISK

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OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS**  
Initials: KBY Date: 9/9/2019

2015-0548-m

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB  
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memcon	re: President's Meeting with NATO Secretary General Solana (6 pages)	05/19/1997	P1/b(1) <b>KSH 2/5/2020</b>

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Memcon and Gonzalez...])  
OA/Box Number: 1621

### FOLDER TITLE:

9703535

2015-0548-M

rs1233

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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RECORD ID: 9703535  
RECEIVED: 21 MAY 97 11

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 23 MAY 97  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO

MEMCON

PERSONS: SOLANA, JAVIER

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES 19 MAY MTG W/ NATO SEC GEN SOLANA

ACTION: DAVIES SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 27 MAY 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: VERSHBOW

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OPENED BY: NSVJD CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 2 OF 2

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSA NARA, Date 9/9/2019  
2015-0548-m

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9703535

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 DAVIES  
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Z 97052312 FOR DECISION  
X 97052317 DAVIES APPROVED RECOM  
X 97052317 DAVIES SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

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National Security Council  
The White House

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
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Davies	<u>1</u>	<u>g 5/23</u>	_____
Kerrick	_____	_____	_____
Steinberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>2</u>	<u>ED 5/23</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>3</u>	<u>AB 5/23</u>	<u>D</u>
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A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

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MAY 23 AM 9:25

National Security Council  
The White House

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Kerrick	_____	_____	_____
Steinberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
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Records Mgt.	<u>3</u>	<u>ED 5/23</u>	<u>D</u>
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cc:

COMMENTS:

MAY 23 AM 9:25

Exec Sec Office has diskette \_\_\_\_\_

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3535

May 23, 1997

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBM NARA, Date 9/9/2019  
2015-0548-m

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President  
and Secretary General Javier Solana (e)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of the meeting between the President and Secretary General Solana is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to U.S. Mission NATO for the Ambassador only. (e)

  
Glyn T. Davies  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies  
Reason: 1.5(d)  
Declassify On: 5/22/07

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0548-m (1.07)  
KBH 9/9/2019

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with NATO Secretary General Solana

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
The Vice President  
Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State  
Samuel Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Robert Hunter, U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO  
James Steinberg, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
John Kornblum, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs  
Alexander Vershbow, Senior Director for European Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General  
Hoyt Yee, Private Office Deputy Director  
Jamie Shea, NATO Press Secretary

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 19, 1997, 1:20 p.m.-1:45 p.m.  
Oval Office

The President: *(Commenting on the questions from the press during the pool spray)* That was very good. The American press has not been giving serious coverage to foreign policy. The fact that they asked six questions on foreign policy is a good sign, even if the questions were hostile. (U)

Secretary General Solana: That is one way to look at it. (U)

Samuel Berger: The President can find a silver lining in anything. (U)

The President: I was speaking with Brzezinski, and he said NATO expansion is as important for the long-term stability of Europe as the Marshall Plan was in its time. (U)

Strobe Talbott: Brzezinski was also very high on the NATO-Russia agreement. (U)

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Secretary General Solana: Let me say that everyone in this room on the American side who contributed to the NATO-Russia agreement has been fantastic. (U)

The President: You did a terrific job in negotiating the agreement. (U)

Secretary General Solana: Without your meeting in Helsinki, nothing would have happened. (U)

The President: I have one or two things I want to discuss with you today. We just had Ukrainian President Kuchma here. Not without reason, he was obsessed with getting his own agreement with NATO. He wants to come to Madrid to sign a NATO-Ukraine agreement in the immediate aftermath of the Summit. As a practical matter, this means that you and the Ukrainian Foreign Minister need to initial the agreement at Sintra. I hope that can be done. (U)

Secretary General Solana: I believe it can be done. I was in Kiev on May 8 just after the call from the Vice President about signing the CFE Flank Agreement. I gave a draft of the Ukraine-NATO agreement to Kuchma and I believe we can finalize it at Sintra. He wants it signed at the highest level, in your presence. (U)

The President: There has been some discussion about whether the new Partnership Council should be convened at Sintra or Madrid. My only concern is what is most practical. Will we be giving the Partners a better sense of a foothold if we hold the first meeting at Sintra? The second day of Madrid, we could meet with the Partners for an informal discussion. We would not need to put as much emphasis on the level of representation since the Partnership Council would already have met at Sintra. This is a serious issue because we do not know what the Russians will do. Strobe does not believe that Yeltsin or even Primakov will come to Madrid. (U)

Secretary General Solana: Yeltsin told me that he would be in Madrid, but that he could not say when. This was because King Juan Carlos had invited him to pay a State visit. (U)

The President: One reason why we think Sintra would be best is that it would take the sting out of the fact that the Russians would not be at Madrid at a high level. It might also reassure the Baltic states and others while rubbing less salt in the wounds of the Russians. (U)

Secretary General Solana: My only reservations are that this will be the last NACC meeting. We want to show that we are not

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just changing the name, and that the EAPC is more than a continuation of the NACC. There will also be a Bosnia ministerial meeting that afternoon. Naturally, ministers may want to talk about Bosnia, and this could diffuse attention from the EAPC. We need to consider this question seriously, and be sure that the new EAPC will be fully understood as an important event. (S)

The President: What are your current thoughts about Bosnia? (S)

Secretary General Solana: I know that you have been working on the problem. We need to revisit Bosnia. I have the impression that NATO ministers have been away from the problem for a while. Therefore, the ministerial meeting at Sintra is very important. My second great concern relates to war criminals. If we do not face up to this problem clearly, we will not find a solution in Bosnia. I want to be emphatic in bringing this to your attention because we need to do something. (S)

The President: Do you think that if we do not remove Karadzic, we won't solve Bosnia? (S)

Secretary General Solana: No. It is very difficult. We will need to deal with the Bosnian Serbs after dealing with war criminals, so we should act before the municipal elections. If we don't do it, there will be serious problems. I am sorry to be so blunt, but that is my view. (S)

The President: The thing that bothers me is that the military balance is shifting to the point that the Muslims may not support Dayton as much. Civilian assistance is not moving as quickly as possible. We have to get European leaders to focus on that. (S)

Secretary General Solana: The meetings in Paris and after will be important to refocus everyone's attention on Bosnia. If people get used to the situation, our generals and the NAC will forget what is going on. I must also share my concern about what will happen in the middle of 1998 when we have to take important decisions on the future of SFOR at the very same time we will be in the midst of ratification of NATO enlargement. Because these two things will be happening simultaneously, we need to plan intelligently so that there is no tension among the Allies at the same time that a complicated debate is underway on NATO enlargement. I am afraid that at the end of June 1998, there will be problems among allies in deciding whether or not we have to leave Bosnia. It could be a bad sign to be debating internally at the same time that we are expanding NATO. I spoke with Ambassador Gelbard this morning and I am enthusiastic about the way he is taking charge. He will have my support. I agree that it is important to refocus implementation efforts. (S)

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The President: I agree. We have got Bosnia out of the headlines, but there are still problems. I still hope that we can work out our differences with the French on internal adaptation. We are very flexible, and have offered a lot, but we cannot cave on AFSOUTH. We have too many forces involved. We have offered a lot of things and have tried to avoid putting you in the middle. (S)

Secretary General Solana: With Chirac hosting the Paris NATO-Russia meeting, the momentum for a solution could not be better. (S)

Samuel Berger: I do not think the French want to resolve the problem before the parliamentary elections. The Paris summit will take place between the two rounds of the French elections. Unless we totally capitulated, a solution is not likely until after the elections. (S)

The President: We just hope that the problem can be resolved before Madrid. (S)

Secretary General Solana: It would be a good thing if they do it, but reintegration is a difficult question for the French. There will be an important meeting in Bonn tomorrow between President Chirac and Chancellor Kohl. Kohl told me that he is going to confront this issue with Chirac. Kohl also wants to clarify the situation, but he is aware that nothing can be made public until after the French elections. (S)

Samuel Berger: We have to deal with the issue of a successor to Carl Bildt. What do you think of the Spanish candidate, Westendorp? (S)

Secretary General Solana: I know him very well, since he was my deputy and successor as foreign minister. (S)

The President: It's very interesting, he is a Spaniard with a Dutch name. (U)

Secretary General Solana: That is true. If you have decided on a high representative, and believe that the deputy should be American, you should consider somebody like Jacques Klein. You could be sure that he and Westendorp would work as a team. Klein has a personality like a tank. We would need to watch out that the couple (High Representative and deputy) works in the short time that we have left. (S)

Strobe Talbott: Do you think that that team would work? (S)

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Secretary General Solana: They need to know clearly what the deal is, and not waste any time. Some of the other candidates do not seem too impressive. (S)

Samuel Berger: What can you tell us about Westendorp's capabilities? (S)

Secretary General Solana: He was my collaborator, he knows everybody, and was in charge of European issues for many years. He is a fine diplomat. Unlike Jacques Klein, he is more of a diplomat. Westendorp will understand the game. You should ask Peter Tarnoff, since the two worked together on the U.S.-EU New Transatlantic Agenda. Another possibility would be to try and find a German for the top job, but the Germans do not have a candidate. (S)

John Kornblum: The Germans do not want to put forward a candidate. (S)

Secretary General Solana: The choice of a new High Representative is very important. (S)

Samuel Berger: And it needs to be made sooner rather than later. (S)

Strobe Talbott: So you think that of all the combinations, Westendorp and Klein would work? (S)

Secretary General Solana: I don't know the other candidates with the exception of Michael Portillo. I am not familiar with the Italian, Finnish or Portuguese candidates. (S)

The other thing that we need to do with Russia is put the meat on the bones of the NATO-Russia Joint Council. We cannot let the Russians drag their feet; we must work to get things done. I spoke with Primakov last Friday and he told me that he saw more domestic support than expected for the NATO-Russia agreement. He is never positive about things. (S)

Samuel Berger: That is where the question came up about states of the former Soviet Union being admissible to NATO. We need to be clear that this is not acceptable. (S)

Secretary General Solana: We are now translating the text of the NATO-Russia Founding Act from English into French and Russian. Some differences have surfaced. (S)

Strobe Talbott: Such as adding "not" in the document? (U)

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The President: I want to thank you again for your work. It has been a pleasure to work with you. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9703535  
DATE 23 MAY 97

SUBJECT: MEMCON OF PRES 19 MAY MTG W/ NATO SEC GEN SOLANA  
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Initials: KRM Date: 9/9/2019  
2015-0548-M

May 22, 1997

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KRM/NARA, Date 9/9/2019  
2015-0548-m

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *W*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of President's Meeting  
with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the  
President's meeting with NATO Secretary General Solana, May 19,  
1997.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of  
Conversation to the Department of State.

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation of the meeting be  
filed for the record.

Approve g 5/23 Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to State
- Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

# MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1631				
Document ID: 9704924				
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# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memcon	re. Meeting with NATO Secretary General Solana (6 pages)	07/07/1997	P1/b(1) <b>KRM 2/5/2020</b>

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
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2015-0548-M

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### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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RECORD ID: 9704924  
RECEIVED: 16 JUL 97 14

TO: BURNS, W

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 21 JUL 97  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO MEMCON  
RUSSIA SPAIN  
FRANCE GREAT BRITAIN

PERSONS: SOLANA, JAVIER

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW PRES & NATO SEC GENERAL JAVIER SOLANA *on 7 Jul*

ACTION: DAVIES SGD MEMO DUE DATE: 22 JUL 97 STATUS: C

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
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2015-0548-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 DAVIES  
002

Z 97071818 FOR DECISION  
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DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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National Security Council  
The White House

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4924

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

July 21, 1997

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KRM/NARA, Date 9/9/2019  
2015-0548-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM J. BURNS  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation Between the President  
and NATO Secretary General Javier Solana (S)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of the meeting between the President and Secretary General Solana is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to U.S. Mission NATO for the Ambassador only. (S)



Glyn T. Davies  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

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Classified by: Glyn T. Davies  
Reason: 1.5(d)  
Declassify On: 7/16/07

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0518-M(1.08)  
KBH 9/7/2019

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with NATO Secretary General Solana

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
 Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State  
 William Cohen, Secretary of Defense  
 Samuel Berger, Assistant to the President  
 for National Security Affairs  
 Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State  
 Jim Steinberg, Deputy Assistant to the  
 President for National Security Affairs  
 Robert Hunter, U.S. Ambassador to NATO  
 Walter Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense  
 for Policy  
 John Kornblum, Assistant Secretary of  
 State for European Affairs  
 Alexander Vershbow, Special Assistant to the  
 President and NSC Senior Director for  
 European Affairs, NSC (Notetaker)

Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General  
 Sergio Balanzino, Deputy Secretary General  
 Gebhardt von Moltke, Assistant Secretary  
 General for Political Affairs  
 Antony Cragg, Assistant Secretary General  
 for Defense Planning and Policy  
 Jorge Domecq, Director of Private Office  
 Hoyt Yee, Deputy Director of Private Office  
 Jaime Shea, NATO Spokesman

DATE, TIME July 7, 1997, 7:05-7:35 p.m.  
 AND PLACE: Palacio de Congressos, Madrid

The President: First, I want to thank you for the magnificent  
 job you have done in preparing for this Summit and handling all  
 NATO issues. We're glad to be here and anxious to get going.  
 (U)

Secretary General Solana: Thank you for all the help that you  
 and your team have given to me. I hope I can say the same thing  
 in two days. (S)

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The President: This is objectively a huge event. We have created an encouraging situation for all the parties involved. Everyone is ahead of where they were when they arrived in terms of the Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. We have established relationships with Russia and Ukraine, and there is the decision of Spanish government to rejoin the military command; I hope we can work out the details. The real question is how can we get out the right message and come to the right political decisions, ones that project an image of unity and strength. We don't want a message of division coming out of Madrid. (e)

Secretary General Solana: Let me tell you where we are now, although I think your team already has a lot of the information. A drafting committee is working now to resolve all the issues in the communique other than those relating to the open door. We hope tonight to have a clean text of the communique except for the open door. Tomorrow, we will have a short opening session and then a working session. I hope that it will be in restricted session from the beginning, but this will be difficult since France wants to begin at two-plus-nine. This risks having everyone fix their initial position and it could waste a lot of time. But I have so far been unable to convince the French to go straight into a restricted session, two-plus-two. I would like to have about an hour of discussion in restricted session and then give instructions to foreign ministers to put ideas on paper in a single paragraph. If they can get it right, we will be in good shape. My aim is to finish the whole process before lunch rather than have the question linger all day. At the same time, it is possible we will not finish by lunch and ministers will have to work over lunch. We will then have a second restricted session after lunch. This will mean a lot of time will have passed before we get to internal adaptation and other subjects.

I have spoken with all the Prime Ministers and Heads of State or their representatives. They all claim to be in a position to maneuver. I did not have such a good conversation with Prime Minister Chretien -- he was not very positive. I was unable to reach Chancellor Kohl, who has the flu, but spoke with Bitterlich. He said that Kohl is open to any solution; I urged Bitterlich to get to the point as quickly as possible. I also spoke with Levitte, who said he would work on language during the day and send it to me. However, I have not yet received any text from him. Chirac will only arrive at 9 o'clock and go straight to the dinner. He wants to speak to me there and perhaps we will have some other discussions on the margins of the dinner. (e)

Assuming the French are open to compromise, we then have to assure that our decision is communicated effectively to the world. The U.S. idea of having this done in a statement in the

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presence of all the Heads of State and Government has caused problems with some countries, but we will see if we can work it out. If we finish before lunch, we could do the statement at the family photo, without taking any questions. We would simply announce the decision on three and our philosophy of the open door. This is the dream scheme. If we cannot finish before lunch, we will have to see how to handle it in the afternoon.

(e)

As I told Madeleine Albright yesterday, it is important to talk to as many countries as possible so that the opening interventions are constructive. There is not much point in restating initial positions. Everyone needs to show a readiness to find a consensus. If we have a tour de table and then someone counts the votes, inappropriate conclusions could be drawn, calling for some kind of mathematical compromise. Therefore, it is important to begin with a constructive attitude from the beginning. We will continue to work at dinner and afterwards. That sums it up. The situation is not brilliant. (e)

The President: If it works, it will be brilliant. It would be great if we could finish by lunch. How long do you think it will take to complete the accession talks? (e)

Secretary General Solana: I think we can finish the talks by December, if we do it properly. If everyone takes a constructive attitude, there is not that much to discuss. (e)

The President: So this will mean that we will be able to ratify during 1998? (e)

Secretary General Solana: That is right. Ratification should begin in January or February, with the aim of having it completed in all 16 countries by 1999, so that we can have a Summit in Washington to celebrate the 50th anniversary of NATO and its opening to new members. (e)

The President: We need to get the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council up and running as well. We had a good start in our meeting in Paris. (e)

Secretary General Solana: I received a letter from Primakov suggesting three things. First, that there be a brief meeting of the Permanent Joint Council at the level of Ambassadors before the summer break. The most important issue for this meeting would be to resolve the procedures for the operation of the Council. Then Primakov wants a ministerial meeting by September, possibly in New York around the time of the UN General Assembly. This has both advantages and disadvantages. It would be very easy to do since all the Foreign Ministers would be in New York.

But holding the meeting on the margins of another event could cause the meeting to be seen as less important than it should. Nevertheless, we have said that we are prepared to have some meetings outside of Brussels, although we must make clear that this is not a precedent. Otherwise, we will be having NATO-Russia meetings at the OECD, OSCE and other venues. We should keep it separate and have real meetings that are focused just on the NATO-Russia relationship. We have not yet answered Primakov, but I suspect that allies will agree to his idea of a preparatory meeting in July and a ministerial in September. The issues Primakov mentioned for the agenda are reasonable: Bosnia, peacekeeping, etc. There are still procedural problems to resolve, in particular, how the three person-chair will operate. NATO's latest proposal is reasonable. There will be a co-chairmanship at ministerial level meetings. There are signs that this approach goes in the right direction. The Russians will probably accept the Secretary General chairing meetings at the ambassadorial level in practice, but he will not want that written down. (C)

The President: Where are we on Spain's integration into the military command? (C)

Secretary General Solana: Remember that I do not represent the government of Spain! I think you will hear something positive from the Prime Minister. He would like to make a statement at the summit, if there is enough substance to justify it. I believe he will make a statement that is not definitive, but says that if things go in the right direction, Spain is not going to change its mind on integration. It would be good if he could go farther, but the UK is not prepared to agree because of a small problem with respect to a little piece of rock in the Mediterranean. (C)

Regarding France's integration, the last time we met, we agreed it would be a good idea to put into the communique that the military structure should be finished by some specific date. We cannot let this process run on and on and permit Spain and France never to take decisions. It will become increasingly weird if we are inviting new members to join the Alliance but the military structure that they are joining is unknown. Therefore, we need to finish more or less at the same time that we finish the accession talks. (C)

Samuel Berger: Would that target date be in the communique? (C)

Secretary General Solana: I will try to do that -- or you should do so. It would be good if the United States pushed it. (C)

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Secretary Cohen: I have said publicly that we hope to resolve the command structure by end of the year. (U)

Samuel Berger: The French have indicated an interest in resuming negotiations on reintegration after Madrid. One of their reasons is a concern that all the hats will be passed out and their reintegration will not be a meaningful one if it happens after that. (S)

Ambassador Hunter: There is an end-of-year deadline in play and the French have not yet rejected it. (S)

Secretary General Solana: On other issues, we need to make the EAPC a real success. It is our responsibility to put enough meat on the bones. We have to make sure that it is different from the NACC, for example, through enhanced programs under PFP. The most important issue is the Ukraine relationship. We also have problem with respect to Bosnia. (S)

Secretary Albright: We are in favor of a stronger statement on Bosnia in the communique. (S)

Secretary General Solana: I am absolutely sure that allies will agree with your text, but do you want to make the whole statement about Mrs. Plavsic? I think that something more about overall implementation should be added. (S)

Secretary Albright: There is additional material in the regular communique that we can move into the statement on Bosnia.

Secretary General Solana: What we say on Plavsic should be broader. (S)

John Kornblum: The whole issue could be broken out of the communique... (S)

Alexander Vershbow: ...with the two texts put together. (S)

Secretary General Solana: That would be good, so it is not just about Plavsic. (S)

Secretary Albright: She is all we have at the moment! (S)

Secretary General Solana: That is my other concern. We have to have a tough private conversation about war criminals. If we cannot say we will isolate Karadzic, people will ask what more we will do. (S)

The President: The more we speak about this, the worse it is, no matter what happens. In this area, no news is good news. (S)

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Secretary General Solana: In 1998 we will have to work out a strategy for dealing with all these complicated issues, but we can see how things evolve. (e)

Samuel Berger: Did I understand you correctly that Levitte said he was working on a compromise text? (e)

Secretary General Solana: Yes. But it is possible that President Chirac said that it was not good enough, so he is reworking it. Bitterlich is a real opportunist. Levitte has been sounding more constructive. (e)

Samuel Berger: Levitte always sounds constructive. (e)

Secretary General Solana: I expect that the French language, if it is ever presented, will contain names and dates. (e)

The President: I think the Germans are the key. (e)

Secretary General Solana: I think so as well. It will be difficult if the Germans do not want to say anything. Kohl has stated that he prefers three but could live with four or five. This is not good. It would be better if he said he preferred three and urged that allies work on the open door. The British are at the other end of the train -- they do not want fixed dates. (e)

The President: The British really prefer three and no one else. (e)

Samuel Berger: They can support an open door, but without names or dates. (e)

The President: I think we will need more to help the French get out of the hole. I want a result in which Jacques Chirac can say that he won. We do not need it to look like a defeat. (e)

Secretary General Solana: It would be good if we could work on the basis of their language, assuming it is reasonable. (e)

The President: When do you think you will receive it? (e)

Samuel Berger: I will be seeing Levitte tonight. (e)

-- End of Conversation --

July 18, 1997

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KRM/NARA, Date 9/9/2019  
2015-0548-m

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR GLYN T. DAVIES

FROM: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *M*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of President's Meeting  
with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the  
President's meeting with NATO Secretary General Solana, July 7,  
1997.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of  
Conversation to the Department of State.

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation of the meeting be  
filed for the record.

Approve *G 7/21* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to State
- Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

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Original OA/ID Number: 2034				
Document ID: 9803170				
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RECEIVED: 04 MAY 98 09

TO: KENNEY, K

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 05 MAY 98  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO

TELCON

PERSONS: SOLANA, JAVIER

SUBJECT: TELCON BTW POTUS & NATO SEC GEN SOLANA 2 MAY

ACTION: DAVIES SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 09 MAY 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MCELDFOWNEY

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BANDLER  
EXECSEC  
FICKLIN  
MCELDFOWNEY  
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSTSM

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSH NARA, Date 9/9/2019  
2015-0548-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER  
001  
002

Z 98050513 FOR DECISION  
Z 98050517 KERRICK APPROVED RECOMS  
X 98050517 DAVIES SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 980505 KENNEY, K

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 3170  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG TS A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>Ⓟ 5/4</u>	<u>Edith [Signature]</u>
Davies	<u>3</u>	<u>8 5/5</u>	
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>Ⓟ 5/5</u>	
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>		
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>	<u>Ⓟ 5/5</u>	<u>D+Disk</u>

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:

98 MAY 10 4:03

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 3170

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG TS A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>R</i> Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>RS/4</u>	<u>Edith Joffe</u>
Davies	<u>3</u>	<u>RS/5</u>	_____
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>RS/5</u>	_____
Steinberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	_____	_____
Records Mgt.	<u>5</u>	<u>RS/5</u>	<u>D-Disk</u>

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:  
'98 MAY 4 am 4:08

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3170

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 5, 1998

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By KBH NARA, Date 9/9/2019

2015-0548-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with NATO  
Secretary General Solana on May 2, 1998 (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and NATO Secretary General Solana is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our U.S. Mission to NATO for the Permanent Representative and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (C)



Glyn T. Davies  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: 5/4/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KRM/NARA, Date 9/9/2019  
2015-0548-17

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with NATO Secretary General Solana  
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
NATO Secretary General Solana

Notetakers: Larry Wright, Bonnie Glick,  
Tom Crowell, Tony Campanella, David Higgins

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 2, 1998, 4:50 - 4:53 p.m. EDT  
Palo Alto, California

The President: Hello. How are you Javier? (U)

Secretary General Solana: Fine, thank you. (U)

The President: I called to thank you for everything you did for us here and in Brussels to get the NATO vote passed in the Senate. (U)

Secretary General Solana: Thank you, thank you very much. It is great news. I think we are going to have a fantastic summit in Washington. (U)

The President: I think it is going to help us a lot. I'm thrilled and I wanted to say that and to thank you and say I'll work with you however else I can. (U)

Secretary General Solana: Thank you very much. It's been a pleasure. We're working on preparation for the summit and will need to stay in touch. (U)

The President: Good. (U)

Secretary General Solana: Things are going well. I think we'll have a great summit there. (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies  
Reason: 1.5(d)  
Declassify on: 5/4/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

The President: Good. Take care. Bye. (U)

Secretary General Solana: Thank you very much for calling. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9803170  
DATE 05 MAY 98

SUBJECT: TELCON BTW POTUS & NATO SEC GEN SOLANA 2 MAY  
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE
MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE 2201 C STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 DEPARTMENT OF STATE	_____	_____	_____
		PRINT LAST NAME:	_____
		COPY: <u>ORIG +DISK</u>	

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS  
Initials: KBY Date: 9/9/2019  
2015-0548-M

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB  
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 4, 1998

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBM NARA, Date 9/9/2019  
2015-0548-m

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER   
THROUGH: DONALD K. BANDLER   
FROM: NANCY MCELLOWNEY   
SUBJECT: Telcon with NATO Secretary General Solana on  
May 2, 1998

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and NATO Secretary General Solana on May 2, 1998.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation (Tab A) to State (Tab I).

Approve  Disapprove

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve  Disapprove

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to State
- Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By: KR1NARA, Date: 9/9/2019  
2015-0548-M

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with NATO Secretary General Solana  
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
NATO Secretary General Solana

Notetakers: Larry Wright, Bonnie Glick,  
Tom Crowell, Tony Campanella, David Higgins

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: May 2, 1998, 4:50 - 4:53 p.m. EDT  
Palo Alto, California ✓

The President: Hello. How are you Javier? (U)

Secretary General Solana: Fine, thank you. (U)

The President: I called to thank you for everything you did for us here and in Brussels to get the NATO vote passed in the Senate. (U)

Secretary General Solana: Thank you, thank you very much. It is great news. I think we are going to have a fantastic summit in Washington. (U)

The President: I think it is going to help us a lot. I'm thrilled and I wanted to say that and to thank you and say I'll work with you however else I can. (U)

Secretary General Solana: Thank you very much. It's been a pleasure. We're working on preparation for the summit and will need to stay in touch. (U)

The President: Good. (U)

Secretary General Solana: Things are going well. I think we'll have a great summit there. (U)

# MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2051				
Document ID: 9805273				
Row: 45	Section: 5	Shelf: 7	Position: 1	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001a. memcon</del>	<del>re: Meeting with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana (3 pages)</del>	<del>07/16/1998</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> <b>KBH 2/5/2020</b>
<del>001b. memcon</del>	<del>re: Meeting with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana [incomplete copy] (2 pages)</del>	<del>07/16/1998</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> <b>KBH 2/5/2020</b>

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Memcon and Gonzalez...])  
 OA/Box Number: 2051

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9805273

2015-0548-M

rs1236

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9805273  
RECEIVED: 24 JUL 98 09

TO: KENNEY, K

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 27 JUL 98  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: BELGIUM

MEMCON

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW PRES & NATO SEC GEN SOLANA OF BRUSSELS ON 16 JUL 98

ACTION: RICE SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 30 JUL 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BANDLER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BANDLER  
EXECSEC  
FICKLIN  
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY SP

DATE 7/27

BY HAND

W/ATTC

OPENED BY: NSSWD

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By K31 NARA, Date 9/9/2019  
2015-0548-m

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9805273

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001  
002

X 98072710 KERRICK APPROVED RECOM  
X 98072710 RICE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 980727 KENNEY, K

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 5273  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG (A) A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>J</i> Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	<u>1/3</u>	<u>(0) 7/25</u>	<u>Done</u>
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>(0) 7/25</u>	<u>- Needs Fix</u>
Steinberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: *Memor - Pres. M. de  
with NATO Sec Gen - Solana  
July 16, 1998*

'98 JUL 24 07 6:17

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_

LOG # 5273

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_

SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_

DOCLOG (A) A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>J</i> Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	<u>1/3</u>	<u>(0)725</u>	<u>(R)me</u>
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>(0)765</u>	<u>- Needs FIX</u>
Steinberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: *Memor - Pres. M. by  
with NATO Sec Gen - Solana  
July 16, 1998*

'98 JUL 24 PM 6:17

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5273

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

July 27, 1998

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

KSH NARA, Date 9/9/2019

2015-0548-m

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation between the President  
and NATO Secretary General Javier Solana of  
Brussels (U)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of the meeting between  
the President and NATO Secretary General Javier Solana of  
Belgium is provided for the information of the Secretary of  
State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below  
the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. (U)

  
Glyn T. Davies

For: Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify On: 07/22/08

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0548-M (1.09)  
KBH 9/9/2019

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State  
Samuel R. Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
James Steinberg, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Donald K. Bandler, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European Affairs, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General  
Jorge Donneg, Director of Private Office of the Secretary General  
Hoyt Yee, Deputy Director of Private Office of the Secretary General

DATE, TIME July 16, 1998, 10:45 - 10:55 a.m.  
AND PLACE: Oval Office

Secretary General Solana: I am glad to have another chance to visit with you. The NATO summit is coming closer and I know it will be a great event. (U)

The President: Yes, I am very excited about the summit and looking forward to it. (U)

Secretary General Solana: Of course we have lots of work to do between now and then, especially on Kosovo and Bosnia. I think we can make real progress on both by the time of the April summit. This will show again that NATO is a real success. (U)

The President: We should also aim to resolve problems between Greece and Turkey by then. (U)

Secretary General Solana: That may be possible. (U)

The President: You're doing well working with them, for example on confidence building measures, and should keep it up. (S)

Secretary General Solana: We've made progress on some measures, but need more. (U)

The President: I know the mood is not easy. During the Cardiff EU negotiations to improve Turkey's accession prospects, I phoned Prime Minister Simitis. I got in 45 seconds, he responded for 45 minutes. We have a large Greek community here in the United States. Some of them are upset at my efforts to try to work things out through compromise, but I have to do it. (S)

Secretary General Solana: I agree. I just returned from Kiev, where I had a long talk with Kuchma. The situation in Ukraine is very bad, and he knows it. I know Al Gore is going to visit there soon. We may have to do something urgent about the declining situation in Ukraine. I am not sure it will hold together; the economic and political situation is dramatic. This is a country we cannot ignore, especially because of its relationship to Russia. (S)

The President: I am also very worried about this. A significant part of the problem is the government's lack of capacity to get help from others and use it effectively. If you have ideas you should let us and others know. I have supported Kuchma in the G-8 and in other ways. I like him and want him to make it. (S)

Secretary General Solana: You are going to Russia.

The President: I hope things are in better rather than worse shape when I get there. (S)

Secretary General Solana: We need to clarify the Kosovo problem with them. I hope you can do that. (S)

The President: Much depends on what they think our goals are. They don't want a successful pro-independence movement because of the precedent it would set for Chechnya. They are constantly concerned about the impulse for independence and the impact that could have on their neighborhood. (S)

Secretary General Solana: You're right. Well, I hope we can have the main building blocks for the NATO summit in place by the December Council meeting. (S)

The President: That would be excellent. Don't forget to let me know if you have any specifics on Ukraine or Greece-Turkey-Cyprus. And I look forward to seeing you again soon. (S)

-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

July 23, 1998

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KRM/NARA, Date 9/9/2019  
2015-0548-M

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD KERRICK

*(Handwritten initials and a circled 'P')*

FROM: DONALD BANDLER

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation of President's Meeting  
with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana of  
Brussels

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation of the  
President's meeting with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana of  
Brussels on July 16, 1998.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorized Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of  
Conversation at Tab A to State.

Approve  Disapprove

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation of the meeting be  
filed for the record.

Approve  Disapprove

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum of State
- Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

5273

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KGH NARA, Date 9/9/2019  
2015-0548-m

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation ✓ Between the President  
and NATO Secretary General Javier Solana of  
Brussels (U)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation of the meeting between  
the President and NATO Secretary General Javier Solana of  
Belgium is provided for the information of the Secretary of  
State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below  
the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. (U)

Glyn T. Davies  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies  
Reason: 1.5(d)  
Declassify On: 07/22/08

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2015-0548-M (1.10)  
KBH 9/7/2019

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State  
Samuel R. Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
James Steinberg, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Donald K. Bandler, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European Affairs (Notetaker)

Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General  
Jorge Donneg, Director of Private Office of the Secretary General  
Hoyt Yee, Deputy Director of Private Office of the Secretary General

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: July 16, 1998, 10:45 a.m. - <sup>10:55</sup>~~11:45~~ a.m.  
Oval Office

Secretary General Solana: I am glad to have another chance to visit with you. The NATO summit is coming closer and I know it will be a great event. (U)

The President: Yes, I am very excited about the summit and looking forward to it. (U)

Secretary General Solana: Of course we have lots of work to do between now and then, especially on Kosovo and Bosnia. I think we can make real progress on both by the time of the April summit. This will show again that NATO is a real success. (U)

The President: We should also aim to resolve problems between Greece and Turkey by then. (U)

5273

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Secretary General Solana: We've made progress on some measures, but need more. (U)

The President: I know the mood is not easy. During the Cardiff EU negotiations to improve Turkey's accession prospects, I phoned Prime Minister Simitis. I got in 45 seconds, he responded for 45 minutes. We have a large Greek community here in the U.S. Some of them are upset at my efforts to try to work things out through compromise, but I have to do it. (S)

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Secretary General Solana: We need to clarify the Kosovo problem with them. I hope you can do that. (S)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9805273  
DATE 27 JUL 98

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW PRES & NATO SEC GEN SOLANA OF BRUSSELS ON 16 JUL 98  
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY  
ROOM 7224, MAIN STATE  
2201 C STREET, N.W.  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

\_\_\_\_\_  
PRINT LAST NAME: \_\_\_\_\_

COPY: ORIGINAL + DISK

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS  
Initials: KRM Date: 9/9/2019  
2015-0548-m

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB  
PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES

# MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2706				
Document ID: 9900312				
Row: 46	Section: 3	Shelf: 9	Position: 1	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001a. telcon</del>	<del>re. Telephone Conversation with NATO Secretary General Solana (2 pages)</del>	<del>01/16/1999</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> KBH 2/5/2020
<del>001b. telcon</del>	<del>re. Telephone Conversation with NATO Secretary General Solana (2 pages)</del>	<del>01/16/1999</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> KBH 2/5/2020

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Memcon and Gonzalez...])  
 OA/Box Number: 2706

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9900312

2015-0548-M

rs1237

**RESTRICTION CODES**

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9900312  
RECEIVED: 19 JAN 99 14

TO: BERGER

FROM: SCHULTE

DOC DATE: 19 JAN 99  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO

TELCON

PERSONS: SOLANA, JAVIER

SUBJECT: TELCON BTW APNSA & SEC SOLANA ON 16 JAN

ACTION: KERRICK APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 25 JAN 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BERGER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
NSC CHRON  
SCHULTE

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
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DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSVJD

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBA NARA, Date 9/9/2019  
2015-0548-M

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER  
001

Z 99012013 FOR DECISION  
X 99012112 KERRICK APPROVED RECOM

**National Security Council  
The White House**

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 0312  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG TIC A/O \_\_\_\_\_

*TMA*

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	_____	_____	_____
Davies	<u>1</u>	<u>g 1/19</u>	_____
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>(D) 1/19</u>	_____
Steinberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	_____	_____	_____
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

CC:

99 JAN 19 11 7:30

COMMENTS: *SRB telcon w/ Secretary  
General Solana*

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

*Don (D) 1/19  
you should  
just file for  
record.  
g*

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 0312

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BY PASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG TIC A/O \_\_\_\_\_

TMA

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	_____	_____	_____
Davies	<u>1</u>	<u>G 1/19</u>	_____
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>(D) 1/19</u>	_____
Steinberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	_____	_____	_____
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____

Don (1/19)  
you should  
just file for  
record.

G

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    tion

cc: \_\_\_\_\_  
1989 JAN 19 10 17 AM

COMMENTS: SRB telcor  
General Solana

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

January 19, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GREG SCHULTE

SUBJECT: Telcon with Secretary General Solana

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KKH/NARA, Date 9/9/2019  
2015-0548-M

*Handwritten initials: a circled 'D' and 'R' with a signature below.*

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between you and Secretary General Solana on January 16, 1999.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve  Disapprove

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-05-18-M (1.11)  
KBH 9/9/2019

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telephone Conversation with NATO Secretary  
General Solana

PARTICIPANTS: Samuel Berger, Secretary General Solana

Notetakers: Anthony Campanella, Robin  
Rickard

DATE, TIME: January 16, 1999, 12:17 - 12:22 p.m., EST  
AND PLACE: Situation Room of the White House

Mr. Berger told the Secretary General that the events in Kosovo were "pretty ugly." He said he saw the Secretary General's statement and that it was very good. Mr. Berger said that the President would put out a statement in the similar vein. Mr. Berger told the Secretary General that Secretary Albright would be calling her NATO counterparts.

Secretary General Solana told Mr. Berger that he would call the Council into session tomorrow and will help him get out of the Council what he wanted. He said he does not want a divisive Council.

Mr. Berger said he thought the Council should give President Milosevic an ultimatum to turn over those responsible and get back into compliance or the Council should go back into the ACTORD mode.

Secretary Solana said there was a need to "massage some countries" because they are feeling "out of focus."

Mr. Berger reiterated that Secretary Albright would be calling her counterparts and then would call the Secretary General herself to brief him on her efforts.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Secretary General Solana concluded the call by thanking Mr. Berger and commenting that he thought calling the Council in on a weekend would give it some added importance.

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0548-M (1.12)  
KBH 9/9/2019

Stet  
g

MEMORANDUM OF ~~TELEPHONE~~ CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: ~~Telcon~~ Telephone Conversation with NATO Secretary General Solana

PARTICIPANTS: ~~Samuel Berger~~ Secretary General Solana

Notetakers: Anthony Campanella, Robin Rickard

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: January 16, 1999, 12:17 - 12:22 p.m., EST  
Situation Room of the White House

~~Mr. Berger spoke with NATO Secretary General Solana today from 12:17 - 12:22 p.m., EST.~~

Mr. Berger told the Secretary General that the events in Kosovo were "pretty ugly." He said he saw the Secretary General's statement and that it was very good. Mr. Berger said that the President would put out a statement in the similar vein. Mr. Berger told the Secretary General that Secretary Albright would be calling her NATO counterparts.

Secretary General Solana told Mr. Berger that he would call the Council into session tomorrow and will help him get out of the Council what he wanted. He said he does not want a divisive Council.

Mr. Berger said he thought the Council should give President Milosevic an ultimatum to turn over those responsible and get back into compliance or the Council should go back into the ACTORD mode.

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Mr. Berger reiterated that Secretary Albright would be calling her counterparts and then would call the Secretary General herself to brief him on her efforts.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

Secretary General Solana concluded the call by thanking Mr. Berger and commenting that he thought calling the Council in on a weekend would give it some added importance.

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2717				
Document ID: 9901835				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 1	Position: 3	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memcon	re. Meeting with Secretary General Javier Solana of NATO (7 pages)	03/15/1999	P1/b(1) KBM 2/5/2020

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Memcon and Gonzalez...])  
OA/Box Number: 2717

### FOLDER TITLE:

9901835

2015-0548-M  
rs1238

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9901835  
RECEIVED: 16 MAR 99 14

TO: BERGER

FROM: BANDLER

DOC DATE: 05 APR 99  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO  
          SPAIN

MEMCON

PERSONS: SOLANA, JAVIER

SUBJECT: MEMCON BETWEEN POTUS & SOLANA MAR 15

ACTION: KERRICK DISAPPROVED RECOM 1

DUE DATE: 22 MAR 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BANDLER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BANDLER  
FICKLIN  
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
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DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTTS      CLOSED BY: NSTSM      DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSM NARA, Date 7/9/2019  
2015 0548 - 07

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER  
001

Z 99040520 FOR DECISION  
X 99041914 KERRICK DISAPPROVED RECOM 1

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 1835  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG Duck A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>ASB</i> Cosgriff	<u>1</u>	<u>4/6</u>	<u><del>Done</del></u>
Rice	<u>1 1/2</u>	<u>4/6</u>	<u><del>Done</del></u>
Davies			
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>4/6</u>	
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>TC 4/6</u>	<u><del>R</del></u>
Records Mgt.	<u>4</u>	<u>3/21</u>	<u>N</u>

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: *Memo - SG Solana  
15 Mar 99*

1999 APR 5 AM 8:20

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

*JD* Do - Agree  
File Only. G  
 I in concern that  
 Kosovo discuss  
 2 weeks ago right  
 before - after the  
 help - should we  
 keep diskette but  
 @

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_

LOG # 1835

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SYSTEM: ERS NSC INT ARS

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	<u>1</u>	<u>4/6</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
Rice	<u>2</u>	<u>4/6</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
Davies			
Kerrick			
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>4/6</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>4</u>	<u>4/21</u>	<u>N</u>

A = Action

No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

*Do - Agree*  
*File Only. G*  
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*Kosovo discuss*  
*2 weeks ago next*  
*conference - after that*  
*held - should we*  
*keep desks but*  
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*Anal*

'99 APR 5 PM 8

Exec Sec Offic

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

April 5, 1999

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KGM NARA, Date 9/9/2019  
2015-0548-m

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER *DR*

FROM: DONALD BANDLER *B*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with Secretary General Solana of Spain on Monday, March 15, 1999

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Secretary General Solana of Spain on Monday, March 15, 1999.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of Conversation at Tab A to State.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove

*Don - State  
pls brief to know.  
we need to talk it  
LEGISLATION  
OUTDATED  
NOW.*

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve  Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to State
- Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with Secretary General  
Solana of Spain (U)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation between the President  
and Secretary General Solana of Spain is provided for the  
information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed  
via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary  
(DAS) level. (C)

Glyn T. Davies  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By ~~KBY~~ NARA, Date 9/9/2019  
2015-0578-m

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0548-M (1.13)  
KBH 7/9/2019

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Secretary General Javier Solana  
of NATO (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State  
William Cohen, Secretary of Defense  
Samuel Berger, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State  
Leon Fuerth, National Security Adviser for  
the Vice President  
James Steinberg, Deputy Assistant to the  
President for National Security Affairs  
Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, U.S.  
Permanent Representative to NATO  
Donald Bandler, Special Assistant to the  
President and Counselor to National  
Security Adviser for the NATO Summit  
(notetaker)

Javier Solana, Secretary General, NATO  
Jorge Domeq, Director of the Secretary  
General's Private Office  
Hoyt Yee, Deputy Director of the Secretary  
General's Private Office

DATE, TIME March 15, 10:30 - 11:30 a.m.  
AND PLACE: Oval Office

Oval Office/Restricted Session

The President: Thank you for the great job you are doing for  
the Alliance. (U)

Secretary General Solana: I greatly appreciate your support and  
American support for NATO. We still have lots of work to do  
before the Summit. (U)

The President: I agree. If the Serbs don't sign the draft agreement soon there will be even more to do. NATO needs to maintain a firm position. I talked to Tony Blair today and he is solid but some other allies have less resolve and need to be brought along to support the use of force if that should prove necessary. (S)

Secretary of Defense Cohen: I have a real concern that there is a difference of opinion among allies on the objectives for the possible use of force. If we take action we need to look hard at a phased air campaign that will bring Milosevic to the table with a desire to sign -- and thus prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. NATO has to be prepared for the possibility that Milosevic will not be persuaded by Phase I of the air campaign and will decide simply to hunker down. He might also decide to attack the UCK in the areas his forces have surrounded in Kosovo. He might also strike at NATO forces in FYROM and in Bosnia. The allies need to be aware of these dangers and we need to get an understanding with them that they'll be with us and prepared to respond vigorously if he reacts in those ways. (S)

National Security Adviser Berger: I agree. If Milosevic decides to hunker down the Alliance would have no deterrence against a FRY offensive against the Kosovar Albanians or Bosnians. Therefore, NATO needs a second bullet that would go beyond Phase I and provide us with a next step if necessary. Milosevic can create chaos and he needs to understand that we are ready and willing to go to the next step. (S)

Secretary General Solana: We needed today's good news and need to start talking in the coming days with the Allies so they'll be prepared to act in the way you've indicated. (S)

Secretary of Defense Cohen: The Alliance risks being blamed for a humanitarian disaster in Kosovo if we did not bomb. A second problem is the risk of being blamed for meek and ineffective bombing that does not produce a cooperative FRY attitude. (S)

Secretary General Solana: There is also a third scenario in which NATO might bomb and then be blamed for any subsequent FRY attacks on the Kosovars. (S)

Secretary of Defense Cohen: I agree. What NATO needs is the capacity to continue air strikes beyond Phase I if necessary. (S)

Secretary of State Albright: In the event NATO commences airstrikes, it will be essential to be able to continue the momentum beyond Phase I. (S)

Secretary General Solana: Yes, we need to consult with Allies soon and prepare the ground for a Council decision on Phase II. (S)

The President: We need to have a plan to activate once we get into Phase II. (S)

Secretary of State Albright: There is also a potential problem with talks going on too long, with the Serbs wanting to renegotiate and some allies dragging their feet. (S)

Secretary General Solana: If you agree, I'll start making phone calls that welcome the KLA signing but prepare the ground for a possible NAC decision on Phase II at a later date. You're right about the importance of dealing with the calendar factor. Primakov will be in Washington March 24 and Russia would certainly not react well to air strikes. If NATO needs to strike before his visit, the U.S. needs to be prepared to do damage control. You need to decide how to handle this visit and what happens after it. I would appreciate it if you keep me informed of U.S. thinking on this aspect. (S)

Secretary of Defense Cohen: I do not believe Primakov would come to Washington if NATO bombs the FRY before his visit. (S)

The President: Russia might have more leverage and more success with Serbia following the Kosovar's signature of the draft agreement. It's obvious they haven't felt pushed to do anything in the absence of that signature. (S)

Secretary of State Albright: The fact that Ivanov got no assurances from Milosevic during his meetings in Belgrade is not a good sign. (S)

Secretary of Defense Cohen: They won't sign if their intelligence tells them that France or Germany is not on board with the plan for a strong air campaign. (S)

Secretary General Solana: The most powerful signal to Milosevic that NATO was serious would be the withdrawal of the OSCE verifiers. (S)

National Security Adviser Berger: You spoke recently with President Chirac. What were his views on the use of force? (S)

Secretary General Solana: He was strongly committed to proceeding with air strikes if negotiations are exhausted. At this point, he and Blair envisage 48 hours of Phase I strikes followed by a pause to see what happens. (S)

Secretary of Defense Cohen: I am very concerned about a pause since the Chinese and Russians would intervene in the United Nations Security Council to try to stop any further actions. It is essential to keep the Allies on board with a realistic plan. The mission would be difficult. They have a robust air defense system and we're likely to have some pilots shot down. Some casualties would be inevitable. (S)

Secretary General Solana: It would be important that this not be a U.S.-only operation. All allies need to be involved in the air campaign from the very beginning. All would have to be on-board politically, share the responsibility and have a role. This would send a strong signal to Milosevic and others that NATO could not be divided. (S)

Secretary of Defense Cohen: It would be best if we could avoid having to go back to the NAC for approval of a second phase. Can you work this out with the NATO in advance? (S)

Secretary General Solana: We now have authorization for a limited Phase I operation, and would need to go back to the NAC for approval to go to Phase II and III, if needed. (S)

Ambassador Vershbow: We can see how far we can push the envelope of Phase I. (S)

The President: This conversation about Kosovo is a perfect illustration of why we can't agree to tie our hands with language in the Strategic Concept that creates a blanket requirement for a United Nations Security Council mandate. (S)

Secretary General Solana: You don't have to tell me; I agree on the importance of not putting the Alliance in a position where its actions and decisions could be vetoed by Russia or China. The recent veto by China of the extension of the UNPREDEP's mandate was a good example of what NATO has to avoid. We should use that example to convince Allies that decisions may be made on grounds that have nothing to do with the issue at hand. (S)

The President: I agree. We have to persuade any remaining Allies that haven't come to grips with that. In other respects summit preparations seems to me to be in pretty good shape. (S)

Secretary General Solana: I agree. The Strategic Concept is on track. Concerning the vision statement, the U.S. should handle that so the other leaders are personally engaged. We should work on it from the top down rather than bottom up so they feel it is their own document. The only potentially disruptive Strategic Concept issue is the mandate. We should try to get that agreed before the summit to avoid the kind of last minute problems we had in Madrid. Similarly, we should decide in advance of the summit on the general direction we want to go and on the constraints. (S)

The summit leaders will have a rare opportunity at the summit to discuss the future of the transatlantic relationship. Assuming that the outstanding issues in the Strategic Concept and ESDI can be resolved beforehand, allied leaders could have as much as five hours for an meaningful, forward-looking and open exchange of ideas on common principles and interests. If this focused on the countries' bonds of friendship and common values rather than drafting it would be a huge success. The dream of '99 is to create new dimensions in our relationship. This will be the first summit for a good number of the Prime Ministers, many of whom are young. We should use this meeting to underscore that the transatlantic relationship is not merely a military and security one but has economic and political dimensions. You can lead that discussion. (S)

The President: I agree completely and hope that events will permit allies to have that kind of discussion. (S)

Secretary General Solana: In addition to the NAC there will be a NATO-Ukraine summit -- which could be the event of the year for Kuchma -- and hopefully a NATO-Russia meeting. (S)

Secretary of Defense Cohen: At the Wehrkunde meeting in Munich this year the Russian delegate gave a hard speech with redlines and the Ukrainian delegate rebutted it strongly. (S)

Deputy Secretary of State Talbott: I understand the Russians are maintaining the option that either Prime Minister Primakov or Ivanov may attend provided that Russian concerns on the Strategic Concept, CFE and Kosovo are adequately addressed beforehand. If we have bombed Kosovo before the summit, they might send a third secretary. (S)

Secretary of State Albright: We have made significant progress in recent days on CFE adaptation. (S)

The President: Now is everyone clear on what needs to be done in coming days on the Kosovo problem? (S)

Secretary General Solana: I understand everyone's thinking but have doubts about the timing. (S)

National Security Adviser Berger: The key is how to configure the military options. We hope the threat of force works, or if not that Phase I would be convincing. But if not, we need to have the possibility of escalating to Phase II in a nearly automatic way without having to go back to jittery Allies, which could cause undue delay and weaken deterrence. (S)

Secretary of State Albright: I agree. As Javier and I discussed yesterday, FRY compliance on the ground and its cooperation in the negotiations should be treated as a package that allies would judge when weighing the need for action. We have the ACTORDs and need to retain a crisp yes/no decision process. (S)

Secretary of Defense Cohen: I also agree that NATO must avoid a situation in which it deployed Phase I, Milosevic doesn't move, then we go into a NATO debate rather than continuing with Phase II despite the lack of desired results. NATO must be prepared to go all the way; otherwise, this would be seen as a failure. (S)

The President: We will begin phoning Allies today on this matter. (S)

Secretary of Defense Cohen: I will talk about it with German Defense Minister Scharping, who is in Washington tomorrow. (S)

Secretary General Solana: He will be good on the issue. A potential problem is France wanting to ensure the success of Rambouillet and seeking more time. We'll have three NATO people at the Kleber Center negotiations. (S)

Secretary of State Albright: Yes, but they're being asked to stay in the basement. (S)

CONFIDENTIAL

7

Secretary General Solana: We will need to stay in close touch on developments in Paris. Please keep me informed of your thinking, particularly with regard to timing of any actions.

(c)

The President: You're doing a great job. We will have a great summit. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

CONFIDENTIAL

# MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2720				
Document ID: 9902340				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 2	Position: 3	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001a. telcon</del>	<del>re: Telecon with Secretary General Javier Solana (3 pages)</del>	<del>03/25/1999</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> <b>KBM 2/5/2020</b>
<del>001b. telcon</del>	<del>re: Telecon with Secretary General Javier Solana [incomplete copy] (1 page)</del>	<del>03/25/1999</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> <b>KBM 2/5/2020</b>

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Memcon and Gonzalez...])  
 OA/Box Number: 2720

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9902340

2015-0548-M  
rs1239

**RESTRICTION CODES**

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9902340  
RECEIVED: 31 MAR 99 10

TO: BERGER

FROM: SCHULTE

DOC DATE: 31 MAR 99  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO SCG

TELCON

PERSONS: SOLANA, JAVIER

SUBJECT: MEMCON W/ SEC GEN SOLANA *25 MAR*

ACTION: KERRICK APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 06 APR 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SCHULTE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

FICKLIN  
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP

CLOSED BY: NSTSM

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By *KBY* NARA, Date *9/9/2019*  
*2015-0548-17*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9902340

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 BERGER  
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99040111 FOR DECISION  
X 99060217 KERRICK APPROVED RECOM

National Security Council  
The White House

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 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS  
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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>d</i> Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>(R) 4/1</u>	_____
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>(C) 4/1</u>	_____
Steinberg	<u>copy</u> ✓	_____	_____
Berger	<u>copy</u> ✓	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>4/1 DMK</u>	<u>✓</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>4</u>	<u>(R) 6/2</u>	<u>N/R</u>

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

CC:

035 APR 1 1977

COMMENTS: *Memorandum of Telcom with SecGen Solano*

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 2340  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG TC A/O \_\_\_\_\_

*J*

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>(R) 4/1</u>	_____
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>(C) 4/1</u>	_____
Steinberg	<u>copy</u> ✓	_____	_____
Berger	<u>copy</u> ✓	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>4/1 DMK</u>	<u>✓</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>4</u>	<u>(D) 4/2</u>	<u>N/R</u>

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

CC:

COMMENTS: *Memorandum of Telcom with SecGen Solano*

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

March 31, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GREG SCHULTE

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with  
Secretary General Javier Solana

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KRM/NARA, Date 9/9/2019  
2015-0548-M

*MS* *WR*

Attached at Tab A is the President's telephone conversation with Secretary General Solana.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve   *o*   Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment  
Tab A      Telcon with Secretary Solana

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0548-M (1.14)  
KBH 9/9/2019

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Secretary General Javier Solana  
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Secretary General Javier Solana

Notetaker: Bonnie Glick, Jenny McGee,  
Miles Murphy, James Smith

DATE, TIME: March 25, 1999, 2:19 - 2:25 p.m.  
AND PLACE: Oval Office

Secretary General Solana: Hello? (U)

The President: Hello, Javier? (U)

Secretary General Solana: Mr. President, how are you? (U)

The President: How are you? (U)

Secretary General Solana: Fine. Thank you very much.  
Everything is holding up here very well. (U)

The President: Well, the first day went well. (S)

Secretary General Solana: All the information I have is very  
positive. You have received a briefing, I saw on television.  
Impacts and all that. (S)

The President: Yes. (U)

Secretary General Solana: I think the first day has been a  
success. I don't have anything confirmed, but some of the  
allies, Italy and Greece in particular, but I think we'll hold  
them together. (S)

The President: I think you have more influence on them than I  
do. I made the best case I could to the American people but my  
concern is that if there is a pause between Phase I and

Phase II, Milosevic will clearly doubt our will to continue. Even Chirac told me, and he has been ... on a pause, "I'm only for this pause for one night and two full days to work and only if Milosevic agrees to cease all offensive action." Which of course, he has not done. (S)

Secretary General Solana: Do you see he has broken diplomatic relations? There's that note. I think we have to continue to maintain the solidarity among the countries and go ahead. (S)

The President: Yes. What about our efforts to reassure front-line countries? (S)

Secretary General Solana: I'll take care of that. I have reassured them. I talk to them just about every day. I heard from the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Defense from Albania. This afternoon I talked to the Albanian Prime Minister and Gligorov this morning for 45 minutes, almost one hour on the phone. It will not be a problem. They are very nervous, but we try to keep them in good contact and good shape. We have to do it every day but it is worth it. (S)

The President: What about Russia? (S)

Secretary General Solana: Well, Russia is a tricky problem we have. My impression is that they don't want to get isolated. So the fact that in the Security Council they were isolated yesterday. My report is that Primakov is not happy with that situation, so they have to play it inside in a manner not to break the chance of communicating. From Brussels, they have withdrawn their military representative but the Ambassador is staying. I received him last night and he is going to stay. I keep talking to him. I tried to do my best to maintain the channels open. This suggestion by Yeltsin for a Contact Group meeting, I don't know how it will be taken. I saw that D'Alema said it would be a good idea and Minister Vedrine of France said that, too. I don't know if this is going to grow or not but we have to do our best to maintain channels with Russia. We have invested a lot, we have a good avenue, but it is true that we cannot consider this. (S)

The President: Yes, I agree. You've got the key on the second phase? (C)

Secretary General Solana: Yes, the second phase will be on consultations after General Clark thinks it is necessary. He has to convey to me that he needs it, then I take a brief

consultation mechanism, much as the first, and put it in at his disposal. (S)

The President: I think the key is if Milosevic hasn't stopped the military aggression, we have to push ahead. (S)

Secretary General Solana: Yes. (U)

The President: We are working with the Russians and may find a way to put this back on track. (S)

Secretary General Solana: That is very good. That will relax some of the Europeans too. Something we have to keep in mind is that next week is Holy Week for the Catholic countries and it may be a complication. The week before Easter for the Catholic countries, from next Wednesday is very complicated -- festivities. We have to keep that in mind to make our calendar. (S)

The President: Yes. I will talk to our people about that. I don't know if anyone has considered that. We need to keep that in mind in terms of challenging him. It's not the Orthodox -- (S)

Secretary General Solana: First is the Catholic, then the Orthodox. For the Greeks it will be difficult. I imagine the Pope will say something during Holy Week, so we have to take care to have much of the work done before -- (S)

The President: Got it. Well, thank you very much. (U)

Secretary General Solana: Mr. President, all the best and good luck. I saw you on television and it was a great success. Are you happy with it? (S)

The President: Yes. Now, this is not a happy thing. (S)

Secretary General Solana: Yes, yes. I mean happy with the reaction of the American people. (S)

The President: Oh, yes. They've been very good. (S)

Secretary General Solana: Well, thank you very much for calling and we'll keep in touch. Goodbye. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

Phase II, Milosevic will clearly doubt our will to continue. Even Chirac told me, and he has been ... on a pause, "I'm only for this pause for one night and two full days to work and only if Milosevic agrees to cease all offensive action." Which of course, he has not done. (S)

Secretary General Solana: Do you see he has broken diplomatic relations? There's that note. I think we have to continue to maintain the solidarity among the countries and go ahead. (S)

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Verdrine

The President: Yes, I agree. You've got the key on the second phase? (S)

Secretary General Solana: Yes, the second phase will be on consultations after General Clark thinks it is necessary. He has to convey to me that he needs it, then I take a brief

# MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2725				
Document ID: 9903170				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 4	Position: 2	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001a. memcon</del>	<del>re: Meeting with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana (7 pages)</del>	<del>04/22/1999</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 2/5/2020</del>
<del>001b. memcon</del>	<del>re: Meeting with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana (7 pages)</del>	<del>04/22/1999</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 2/5/2020</del>
<del>001c. memcon</del>	<del>re: Meeting with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana (7 pages)</del>	<del>04/22/1999</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 2/5/2020</del>
001d. memcon	re: Meeting with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana [incomplete copy] (1 page)	04/22/1999	P1/b(1) KBH 2/5/2020

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Memcon and Gonzalez...])  
 OA/Box Number: 2725

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9903170

2015-0548-M  
rs1240

**RESTRICTION CODES**

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: KENNEY, K

FROM: DAVIES

DOC DATE: 06 MAY 99  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO

MEMCON

PERSONS: SOLANA, JAVIER

SUBJECT: MEMCON W/ NATO SEC GEN SOLANA ON 22 APR 99

ACTION: RICE SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 03 MAY 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BANDLER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BANDLER  
EXECSEC  
FICKLIN  
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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DATE

*5/06*

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DOC 2 OF 2

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER  
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Z 99050517 FOR DECISION  
X 99050612 KERRICK APPROVED RECOM  
X 99050612 RICE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

002 990506 KENNEY, K

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
THE WHITE HOUSE**

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 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG DK A/O \_\_\_\_\_

<i>MH</i>	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
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RICE	<u>1/3</u>	<u>① 5/5/6</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
DAVIES	_____	_____	_____
KERRICK	<u>2</u>	<u>① 5/6 ED</u>	_____
STEINBERG	<u>copy</u> ✓	_____	_____
BERGER	<u>cert</u> ✓	_____	_____
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WEST WING DESK	<u>4</u>	<u>5/6 DWS</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>5</u>	_____	<u>D</u>
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A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:  
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COMMENTS:

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE Yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

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 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG DK A/O \_\_\_\_\_

<i>MH</i>	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	_____	_____	_____
RICE	<u>1/3</u>	<u>① 5/5/6</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
DAVIES	_____	_____	_____
KERRICK	<u>2</u>	<u>① 5/6</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
STEINBERG	<u>copy ✓</u>	_____	_____
BERGER	<u>copy ✓</u>	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>4</u>	<u>5/6</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>5</u>	_____	<u>D</u>
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A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:  
 20 MAY 5 04 5:00

COMMENTS:

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE Yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 6, 1999

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBM/NARA, Date 9/9/2019  
2015-0548-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with NATO Secretary  
General Solana (U)

The attached Memorandum of Conversation between the President and NATO Secretary General Solana is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. (C)

  
Glyn T. Davies  
for Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0548-M (1.16)  
KBH 9/9/2019

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Vice President  
Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State  
William Cohen, Secretary of Defense  
John Podesta, Chief of Staff  
Samuel Berger, Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State  
Leon Fuerth, National Security Adviser for  
the Vice President  
James Steinberg, Deputy Assistant to the  
President for National Security Affairs  
Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, U.S.  
Permanent Representative to NATO  
Joe Lockhart, Press Secretary  
Donald Bandler, Special Assistant to the  
President and Counselor to National  
Security Adviser for the NATO Summit  
(notetaker)

Javier Solana, Secretary General, NATO  
Jorge Domeq, Director of the Secretary  
General's Private Office  
Hoyt Yee, Deputy Director of the Secretary  
General's Private Office  
Jamie Shea, NATO Spokesman

DATE, TIME April 22, 1999, 3:00 p.m.-3:45 p.m.  
AND PLACE: Oval Office

Oval Office/Restricted Session

The President: I have much I want to talk about with you, but first let me hear what you have to tell me. (U)

Secretary General Solana: Well, this will be one of the most important meetings in NATO's history. Regarding Kosovo, we need to be well prepared in advance. We have set aside three hours, starting with a ten minute briefing by Generals Naumann and Clark. I will speak in general terms about what we want to achieve. Determination and unity will be most important; this has to be more than an exercise in studying the options. At the same time, it will be difficult to avoid some tricky subjects: how the military operation is going, possible solutions to current problems, what to do with Serb radio and television transmissions, and ground troops. ~~(S)~~

I don't think ground troops will be raised bluntly, but questions may arise about whether a ground force will face a permissive or non-permissive environment. I've been speaking on the phone with leaders on this. Tony Blair might bring it up, for example, but not in an aggressive way. Our goal should be to concentrate on the military aspects of Kosovo and unite the allies. We should get not only formal agreement but a real consensus. You may want to get together a small group of leaders to discuss this in advance because I don't know how openly people will speak in a larger setting. (U)

I don't expect major problems with anyone. Perhaps Simitis is in the most difficult spot but he doesn't want to show it. We have had a very positive experience with the Greeks in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) meetings -- as long as they don't have to take a separate national action they won't block the NAC. The Italians could pose difficulties. The problem is not so much D'Alema as Foreign Minister Dini. The French are, as you know, complicated. The British are on a very good line. ~~(S)~~

In sum, I see no insurmountable difficulties. The toughest issue is United Nations Security Council mandates; reaching a final arrangement could be complicated. There should be no problem finalizing our Kosovo strategy tonight. We only have a few issues such as the criteria for stopping the bombing and whether/when to go to the UN. But we have five solid conditions and a good Southeast Europe Initiative. The only other difficulty would be if someone presses for answers now on ground troops. ~~(S)~~

The President: The most important thing is unity and resolve. The press will be looking for a story about how the NATO effort is failing or division among us over ground troops. We have some real potential problems and need to deal with them successfully. I thought you made a good start by moving to an

updated assessment on ground troops. My view, and Tony Blair agrees, is that it's best for all of us to state that we support what you've said. (S)

The problem is with one small group, which has little involvement in the air action and also doesn't support ground troops. They're inclined to call on us to just make a deal. Another small group will say the air war isn't succeeding. In fact, the air action is going well but we need considerably more time before considering action on the ground. Weather complicated the air action, as did targeting and related issues. To succeed from the air we will need: an updated strategy; a more forthright position concerning economic pressure, which I recognize will present problems for Greece and Italy; removing obstacles to effective targeting; and moving to a 24 hour per day operational tempo - and we can't do that if we are haggling over target sets. So, we need to get the right message out from our Kosovo meeting, and should avoid a major discussion of ground troops. The reality is that we have done very well so far in Kosovo. We have lost only one plane. No one thought we could stop Milosevic in Kosovo with an air action of a few weeks. We have to broaden the targets, make the Serbs uncomfortable while minimizing civilian casualties, and stepping up economic pressures. That's what we should aim to decide, and then trumpet it. (S)

Secretary General Solana: Allied positions on targets are changing very rapidly. We need to say we are determined to go forward and win. We should get the heads of government to agree, "let's go, go all the way." General Clark has a letter from me saying "You take your responsibility and I'll take mine." He can do everything he needs to do. Last night's military action was very important. The evening before we did something that was impossible two weeks ago - an attack on Milosevic's party headquarters. We can turn the lights and heat off. (S)

Vice President: Will you discuss those issues in the NAC? (S)

Secretary General Solana: They are never discussed in the NAC. Sometimes, they're talked about bilaterally. (S)

Vice President: It seems the press is able to get information and it is then conveyed to Belgrade. Could we give it to the military commander and SACEUR only? (S)

Secretary General Solana: You should decide that. (S)

National Security Adviser Berger: We still have one thing to deal with. (U)

Secretary General Solana: Do you remember the article in the French newspaper "Liberation"? It spoke of targeting a national headquarters building and the headline said "Chirac Has a Veto." Then, we hit the building two days later and not one newspaper complained about our strike in the heart of Belgrade. (S)

Secretary of Defense Cohen: I spoke with French Defense Minister Richard and told him there would be lots of criticism in the United States about Heads of State reviewing targeting issues. He said it would be a big plus in France politically that President Chirac was micro-managing targeting. (S)

Secretary General Solana: But two days later the strike was done. (S)

Vice President: It would be much better if you give the decision authority to SACEUR without going through the political leaders. (S)

Secretary General Solana: That's been given. (S)

National Security Adviser Berger: Mr. President, that is something we need to take up bilaterally. (S)

Secretary General Solana: But the situation is a lot better today than one week or one month ago. (S)

The President: We're in a world of 24 hour news coverage and people want immediate results. We've spent a lot of effort so far. It would be a mistake for people to believe we cannot solve this problem by a vigorous air war, tougher economic pressures and good diplomacy. There is an excellent chance it will work if we pursue these three targets with energy. I don't want the summit to end with an impulse to give up the air war and move to a land war. As world leaders we will want to stick with our conditions and give our strategy a chance to work. (S)

Secretary General Solana: We have principles and values at stake, and the future of a new generation of European political leaders is at stake too. (S)

The President: They won't quit. (S)

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The President: We need unity and vigorous prosecution of our current strategy. (C)

Secretary General Solana: Only three people can speak effectively from the summit to world public opinion: you, Mr. President, Prime Minister Blair, and me -- but I am unimportant. We have to organize Schroeder and Chirac to speak beyond their home audiences, to show that it's a collective effort. Chirac needs to be heard, as do Havel and Schroeder. We have a generation of some young and determined leaders. They must be heard in Rome and Athens. Mr. President, you should seek out and address European audiences. Havel should speak to American audiences as part of the collective effort. When Tony Blair came to Brussels he had a tremendous impact around Europe, hit lots of news markets he is not normally heard in. In other words, we need to be a global NATO communications team building a coalition across borders. A collective approach like that would have great impact. That's what I want to see tomorrow. We have a press conference tomorrow after the Kosovo meeting. We'll have the 19 leaders; you and I will be there. (C)

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-- End of Conversation --

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 5, 1999

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBH NARA, Date 9/9/2019  
2015-0548-M

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

Handwritten initials: a circle containing 'D' with 'R' to its right, and another circle containing 'B' below it.

FROM: DONALD BANDLER

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation with NATO Secretary  
General Solana on Thursday, April 22, 1999

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation between the  
President and NATO Secretary General Solana on Thursday, April  
22, 1999.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of  
Conversation at Tab A to State.

Approve   D   Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be filed for the  
record.

Approve   D   Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to State

Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0548-m (1.17)  
KBH 9/9/2019

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Vice President  
Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State  
William Cohen, Secretary of Defense  
John Podesta, Chief of Staff  
Samuel Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State  
Leon Fuerth, National Security Adviser for the Vice President  
James Steinberg, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO  
Joe Lockhart, Press Secretary  
Donald Bandler, Special Assistant to the President and Counselor to National Security Adviser for the NATO Summit (notetaker)

Javier Solana, Secretary General, NATO  
Jorge Domeq, Director of the Secretary General's Private Office  
Hoyt Yee, Deputy Director of the Secretary General's Private Office  
Jamie Shea, NATO Spokesman

DATE, TIME April 22, 1999, 3:00 p.m.-3:45 p.m.  
AND PLACE: Oval Office

Oval Office/Restricted Session

The President: I have much I want to talk about with you, but first let me hear what you have to tell me. (U)

Secretary General Solana: Well, this will be one of the most important meetings in NATO's history. Regarding Kosovo, we need to be well prepared in advance. We have set aside three hours, starting with a ten minute briefing by Generals Naumann and Clark. I will speak in general terms about what we want to achieve. Determination and unity will be most important; this has to be more than an exercise in studying the options. At the same time, it will be difficult to avoid some tricky subjects: how the military operation is going, possible solutions to current problems, what to do with Serb radio and television transmissions, and ground troops. (C)

I don't think ground troops will be raised bluntly, but questions may arise about whether a ground force will face a permissive or non-permissive environment. I've been speaking on the phone with leaders on this. Tony Blair might bring it up, for example, but not in an aggressive way. Our goal should be to concentrate on the military aspects of Kosovo and unite the allies. We should get not only formal agreement but a real consensus. You may want to get together a small group of leaders to discuss this in advance because I don't know how openly people will speak in a larger setting. (U)

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In sum, I see no insurmountable difficulties. The toughest issue is United Nations Security Council mandates; reaching a final arrangement could be complicated. There should be no problem finalizing our Kosovo strategy tonight. We only have a few issues such as the criteria for stopping the bombing and whether/when to go to the UN. But we have five solid conditions and a good Southeast Europe Initiative. The only other difficulty would be if someone presses for answers now on ground troops. (C)

The President: The most important thing is unity and resolve. The press will be looking for a story about how the NATO effort is failing or division among us over ground troops. We have some real potential problems and need to deal with them successfully. I thought you made a good start by moving to an

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WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0548-M (1.18)  
KBH 9/9/2019

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

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Oval Office/Restricted Session

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relationship. All that is needed is in the preamble and Article 7 of the North Atlantic Treaty. (C)

Secretary General Solana: I can't do much more myself on this issue. I have exhausted my own authority on it. I don't know what Chirac will do but no one on the French side will act without his approval. On ESDI, we have had some very difficult discussions, especially with the Turks. The U.S. has been working toward agreement all along but the Turks are difficult. (C)

The President: Doesn't the language on the rights of non-EU allies help them? (C) ✓

Secretary General Solana: Not enough. (C)

Secretary of Defense Cohen: The problem is if this is not agreed here, France will take it right in to the EU meetings where we have no voice. (C)

Secretary General Solana: That's why we need to find a deal with the Turks. We need to keep telling them they can ensure their equities through the implementation process. (C)

The President: We'll talk with the Turks. (C)

Secretary General Solana: You should work on France and Turkey. (C) ✓

The President: And what about the Open Door? (U)

Secretary General Solana: It's possible the Italians might advocate letting Romania and Slovenia in now. (C)

The President: Will everyone agree if I proposed a summit review no later than 2002? (C)

Secretary General Solana: That would be good. (C)

The President: I'll support it strongly. (C)

Secretary General Solana: You'll have problems with Blair. (C)

The President: He agreed to it when we talked last night. (C)

Secretary General Solana: That's the first I've heard of that. (C)

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0548-M(1.18)  
K8H 9/9/2019

# MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2731				
Document ID: 9903996				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 6	Position: 2	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001a. memcon</del>	<del>re: Meeting with Secretary General Solana of NATO (7 pages)</del>	<del>05/05/1999</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 2/5/2020</del>
<del>001b. memcon</del>	<del>re: Meeting with Secretary General Solana of NATO (7 pages)</del>	<del>05/05/1999</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 2/5/2020</del>

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Memcon and Gonzalez...])  
 OA/Box Number: 2731

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9903966

2015-0548-M  
rs1241

**RESTRICTION CODES**

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: BERGER

FROM: BLINKEN

DOC DATE: 07 JUN 99  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO

MEMCON

PERSONS: SOLANA, JAVIER

SUBJECT: MEMCON BTW POTUS & SYG SOLANA ON 5 MAY

ACTION: KERRICK APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 29 MAY 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BLINKEN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BLINKEN  
FICKLIN  
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEMK

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 1 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9903996

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER  
001  
002  
002

Z 99060717 FOR DECISION  
X 99060907 KERRICK APPROVED RECOM  
X 99060914 NOTED BY PRESIDENT  
X 99061113 ORIGINAL MTG CARDS RETURNED

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
THE WHITE HOUSE**

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 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG RS A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>Car</i> JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	<u>1</u>	<u>EP 47</u>	_____
RICE	_____	_____	_____
DAVIES	_____	_____	_____
KERRICK	<u>2</u>	<u>(D) 6/8</u>	_____
STEINBERG	_____	_____	_____
BERGER	_____	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>3</u>	<u>(R) 9/0</u>	<u>N</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:  
 '99 JUN 7 10 49 AM

COMMENTS: *Solana memo on May 5.*

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE Yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

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BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG RS A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
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POWELL	<u>1</u>	<u>EP 47</u>	_____
RICE	_____	_____	_____
DAVIES	_____	_____	_____
KERRICK	<u>2</u>	<u>(C) 6/8</u>	_____
STEINBERG	_____	_____	_____
BERGER	_____	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>3</u>	<u>(R) 4/10</u>	<u>N</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>N</u>
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A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

93 JUN 7 10 44 AM

COMMENTS:

*Solana memcon  
May 5  
Yes*

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE Yes

June 7, 1999

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KRM/NARA, Date 9/9/2019  
2015-0548-m

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: ANTONY BLINKEN

SUBJECT: Meeting with Secretary General Solana

Handwritten initials: "W" in a circle, "R" to the right, and "ABG" in a circle below.

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Conversation between the President and Secretary General Solana on May 5, 1999.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memorandum of Conversation be file for the record.

\_\_\_\_\_ Approve  \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment  
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0548-m (1.20)  
KBH 9/9/2019

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Secretary General Solana of  
NATO

PARTICIPANTS: U.S. PARTICIPANTS

The President  
Ambassador Alexander Vershbow  
Secretary Madeleine Albright  
Secretary William Cohen  
Doug Sosnik  
Samuel Berger  
Brian Atwood  
General Hugh Shelton  
Antony Blinken (notetaker)

NATO PARTICIPANTS

Secretary General Javier Solana  
Deputy Secretary Balanrino  
Assistant Secretary General Klaiber  
Assistant Secretary General Cragg  
Director Domecq  
Deputy Director Yer  
Hoyt Lee (notetaker)

DATE, TIME May 5, 1999 -- 7:30 - 9:00 a.m.  
PLACE: NATO Headquarters, Belgium

Secretary General Solana: Mr. President, first let me thank you for this visit. It is very important and very timely. But let me first start by saying again thank you for your hospitality and your leadership at the NATO Summit. I think we can all be happy with the results. How do you want to organize this meeting? (U)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify on: June 7, 2009

The President: Let me first say I agree that the Summit went very, very well. You were great. We all appreciated your tremendous leadership. But let me turn to some of the issues about Kosovo. First, where are we on the maritime operation? (e)

Secretary General Solana: I think we are pretty close to finding a solution. The main problem is the so-called legal basis. The European Union took an important decision to implement an embargo. Many countries that are not in the EU have agreed to join. But of course, this is a consensual system. The military committee at NATO has been tasked to look at a broader search and visit system. I hope today that we can give a formal tasking to the military committee. But this legal basis problem remains. So what we have now is a consensual approach by the EU and NATO countries. For example, we cannot stop and search Russian ships given the problem of the legal basis. I hope we can find an appropriate solution, but it is taking time. Today is a crucial decision, I hope we can move things forward. (e)

The President: Would it help or would it hurt for me to say something in public?

Secretary General Solana: I don't think we need a new statement. But what we need to do is talk within NATO and explain to the other leaders. We could go to the United Nations Security Council. Meanwhile, we can continue to work on a consensual basis and go as far as we can in that manner. As you know lots of the oil goes through Slovenia to Croatia. We can't enter their borders. (e)

Secretary Albright: Croatia won't let you go in? (e)

Secretary General Solana: The problem is small boats that are moving right along the coastline. (e)

The President: Yes, the problem is we can't get big ships in there. (e)

Samuel Berger: Ironically, the problem is not really Russian ships even though that is the perception of the problem. (e)

Secretary General Solana: That is right. We need to work on Slovenia and Romania. They have all agreed to help. (e)

The other question is how do we handle updating KFOR and "B-"? On KFOR we had a discussion on Monday. Everyone agreed that there is a need to revisit because the situation today is different than it was when we first discussed KFOR. For example, we will need more engineers. Some countries do not want a formal tasking now. They just want to proceed and do it without comment. As for "B-" in other words an entry in force, we will get a report today from the military committee. (S)

On KFOR as such, some countries think that with diplomacy seeming to move forward, this is not the moment to say anything publicly. For example, that is France's position. I think what is important is that the work goes forward. And all agreed that work must be done. (S)

The President: How do you think the communications operation is working? We have now sent a number of good people from the United Kingdom, from the United States and other countries to help. (S)

Secretary General Solana: I think it is now working very well. I meet with them regularly. I think they are doing a very good job. We have French, German, British and Americans working on this. Other countries will also send people. So I think there are no difficulties, on the contrary. (S)

The President: I think we need to continue to work on this -- especially now, with some hope for diplomacy -- so that we keep getting out to the media of every country, new stories of atrocities. Most of the NATO countries are doing well. And of course, everyone has their own domestic problems to focus on too, as we do with that terrible situation in Denver. The difficulty is keeping the story line out in public. We need to do this to bolster our ability to stand strong. The press has an insatiable need to be fed. (S)

I don't know how much of a readout you got of our meetings with Chernomyrdin? We spent an hour and 45 minutes together. Sandy, Madeleine, the Vice President were also there. I think it will be very helpful in the long-term to get the conditions met, if we can do so with the Russians. Of course, it won't be helpful if it means watering down the conditions. We are determined to hold strong to the conditions. For example, compare the situation to early Bosnia. We were in a UN straight jacket with the dual key system. Now, there is no need to wait two or three years to do something. I think Chernomyrdin understands the importance, in terms of Russia's status, in terms of sustaining

reform, in terms of Russia's relationship with the West. But he still is focused more on what he can sell to Milosevic as opposed to our conditions. We are working hard to show that the conditions are not there for military victory, but are the minimal necessary conditions to make Kosovo work, to give people their lives back in a secure way. Meanwhile, we need to remain vigorous with the air campaign. But it is a net plus to work with the Russians. (C)

Secretary General Solana: This morning, I read about the visit of Chernomyrdin to New York and his meeting with Kofi Ana. It seems that it went well. He recognized that it is impossible to solve the problem without an international military force. (C)

Secretary Albright: That's right, but it is not clear what that means to him. (C)

Secretary General Solana: There still seems to be this idea of dividing sectors. (C)

The President: Yes, and it won't work, it would be a de facto partition. (C)

Samuel Berger: Can we come back for a moment to the maritime interdiction. I understand that we're a minority of one. Can we at least describe the voluntary system as "Phase I" so it is clear that this is not the final step, and that we are continuing to work on it. I hope we can move to a more comprehensive system that is more than "please stop." (C)

Secretary General Solana: The rules of engagement for a non-consensual system will be the same. So what we have to do is decide if countries are prepared to go beyond the consensual system. (C)

The President: Let me ask a practical question. If in fact a significant percentage of the oil is coming through Slovenia and then on to small boats that hug the Croatia coastline, why not put in small coast guard boats? There are less likely to cause a problem than larger ships. (C)

Secretary General Solana: Yes, we must push Croatia to be more helpful as well. (C)

Secretary Albright: They agreed to turn off the pipeline. (C)

The President: This is all well enough, but what I think we need is some small boats operating in shallow water. (S)

Secretary Cohen: Some of the countries that are against a non-consensual regime will refuse to put in boats. (S)

Secretary General Solana: Not every country needs to participate. (S)

The President: Let me ask you about the humanitarian operation. It is of great concern to me. We are watching Macedonia very closely. We cannot allow it to be destabilized. We should talk about moving more people to Turkey. (S)

Secretary General Solana: I think there are three things that we have to look at. First, new camps in Macedonia. Second, countries that have the capacity to take on more people must do so. Third, we need to move more refugees out to Albania. It is hard to find land there. So these are my three reactions. Now Blair tells me that the Macedonian Prime Minister is more reliable, but there are ups and downs. (S)

The President: He is also very young. (U)

Secretary General Solana: Yes, it is quite a combination -- their president is 81, and their Prime Minister is 31. Another thing I should mention is that Bulgaria and Romania are behaving very well. We had some questions on the use of civilian air space yesterday. It is a complicated question but we had a very good outcome. So on the whole I think the neighbors are behaving very well. On the humanitarian situation overall, we need to get more services. The problem is not so much capabilities but the difficulty of dealing with others. We at NATO are basically doing everything. When others see that we are responsible for all the humanitarian efforts they get upset, like the UNHCR. There is a stupid competition. We don't need the credit, we don't need more publicity. Anyway, it is getting better now that we have the summer, but then we have the cold winter ahead of us and so we need to act. (S)

Brian Atwood: We are exploring the Turkey option. One of the issues is that we need to get Bulgaria and Greece to allow over land transit. (S)

Secretary General Solana: I know that Turkey is taking quite a large number. And Bulgaria is also more open now. (S)

Brian Atwood: The numbers are overwhelming. If it continues, we will need a radical solution. Bulgaria and Romania can take in between 5,000 and 10,000, but that is it. (S)

Secretary General Solana: The best country to help is Romania. It is a complicated place. The pressure on the President is tough. But we will hate to have Iliescu again. That would be a big step backwards. We need to talk to them to help them out. Of all the neighboring states, it is the one with the most difficulty. (S)

Apart from that, you're going to Germany. Some of our countries have elections and of course party congresses. I hope these will not prove to be too difficult. In Germany there are the Greens on May 13. Then on June 13, we have the European elections. So in this campaign season, Kosovo will be an important issue. We need to maintain a high level of support. The NATO Summit showed the leadership at the top is very important. With all respect to Secretary Albright, Ministers can do a lot but it is on the margins. The effort at the top is key, it can break logjams. (S)

The President: Is there anything else we can do to help you?  
(U)

Secretary General Solana: No, I think we are doing well. We just have to keep the communications open. The atmosphere is good. (S)

I have two concerns about the media in the coming days. First, the idea that NATO makes mistakes everyday. We need to stop that and present things in a different manner. We somehow need to incorporate the collateral damage in our normal action. (S)

Secretary Cohen: We need to keep the focus on the refugees and on their suffering. (S)

Secretary General Solana: I agree but the media is sending lots of people to Belgrade. It is outrageous. (S)

Samuel Berger: I think we need to take them to the refugee camps in an organized, systematic way. Once they see that, they will see Belgrade in a very different way. (S)

The President: It was very interesting when Jesse Jackson returned. He and his group had clientitis. In Belgrade itself, the Serbs are in complete denial because the State controls the

media. They do not acknowledge Kosovo or Bosnia, they don't want to know about it. We need to hammer all of this home to the western press. (S)

Secretary General Solana: We need to use the people in the camps to be interviewed, to tell their personal story. This could have a real impact. The second thing I want to say is that we need to get leaders to communicate beyond the borders of their own countries. They need to talk to other countries. This will help show that it is not just one country acting here but a coalition of countries. (S)

The President: I totally agree. When I am in Germany, I will be doing a round table with a number of foreign journalists. Let me say too that in the run up to the European election, I think we need a good thirty-day plan. We need to communicate very clearly to our publics. And we need to take people to the camps to do tours and to see for themselves. We need a very aggressive effort. (S)

Secretary General Solana: We had fantastic press conference with some Kosovar Albanians here. It made a big impact on the press corps. (S)

Anyway, I think it is time now for the briefings that we have organized. There are two of them, one on the military situation and another on the humanitarian situation. (S)

The President: Okay, that sounds great. By the way, I know you are getting one of my very good people, Bob Bell. (S)

Secretary General Solana: Yes, I thank you very much. We are delighted that he will be joining us. (U)

Samuel Berger: I hope Javier, that you believe in reciprocity.

Secretary General Solana: We'll see.

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0518-M (1.21)  
KBH 9/9/2019

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

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NATO

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Director Domecq  
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Hoyt Lee (notetaker)

DATE, TIME May 5, 1999 -- 7:30 - 9:00 a.m.  
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Reason: 1.5 (d)  
Declassify on: June 7, 2009

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Secretary General Solana: I think there are three things that we have to look at. First, new camps in Macedonia. Second, countries that have the capacity to take on more people must do so. Third, we need to move more refugees out to Albania. It is hard to find land there. So these are my three reactions. Now Blair tells me that the Macedonian Prime Minister is more reliable, but there are ups and downs. (S)

The President: He is also very young. (U)

Secretary General Solana: Yes, it is quite a combination -- their president is 81, and their Prime Minister is 31. Another thing I should mention is that Bulgaria and Romania are behaving very well. We had some questions on the use of civilian air space yesterday. It is a complicated question but we had a very good outcome. So on the whole I think the neighbors are behaving very well. On the humanitarian situation overall, we need to get more services. The problem is not so much capabilities but the difficulty of dealing with others. We at NATO are basically doing everything. When others see that we are responsible for all the humanitarian efforts they get upset, like the UNHCR. There is a stupid competition. We don't need the credit, we don't need more publicity. Anyway, it is getting better now we have the summer, but then we have the cold winter *that* ahead of us and so we need to act. (S)

Brian Atwood: We are exploring the Turkey option. One of the issues is that we need to get Bulgaria and Greece to allow over land transit. (S)

Secretary General Solana: I know that Turkey is taking quite a large number. And Bulgaria is also more open now. (S)

Brian Atwood: The numbers are overwhelming. If it continues, we will need a radical solution. Bulgaria and Romania can take in between 5,000 and 10,000, but that is it. (S)

Secretary General Solana: The best country to help is Romania. It is a complicated place. The pressure on the President is tough. But we will hate to have Illescu again. That would be a big step backwards. We need to talk to them to help them out. Of all the neighboring states, it is the one with the most difficulty. (S)

Apart from that, you're going to Germany. Some of our countries have elections and of course party congresses. I hope these will not prove to be too difficult. In Germany there are the Greens on May 13. Then on June 13, we have the European elections. So in this campaign season, Kosovo will be an important issue. We need to maintain a high level of support. The NATO Summit showed the leadership at the top is very important. With all respect to Secretary Albright, Ministers can do a lot but it is on the margins. The effort at the top is key, it can break logjams. (S)

The President: Is there anything else we can do to help you?  
(U)

Secretary General Solana: No, I think we are doing well. We just have to keep the communications open. The atmosphere is good. (S)

I have two concerns about the media in the coming days. First, the idea that NATO makes mistakes everyday. We need to stop that and present things in a different manner. We somehow need to incorporate the collateral damage in our normal action. (S)

Secretary Cohen: We need to keep the focus on the refugees and on their suffering. (S)

Secretary General Solana: I agree but the media is sending lots of people to Belgrade. It is outrageous. (S)

Samuel Berger: I think we need to take them to the refugee camps in an organized, systematic way. Once they see that, they will see Belgrade in a very different way. (S)

The President: It was very interesting when Jesse Jackson returned. He and his group had clientitis. In Belgrade itself, the Serbs are in complete denial because the State controls the media. They do not acknowledge Kosovo or Bosnia, they don't want to know about it. We need to hammer all of this home to the western press. (S)

Secretary General Solana: We need to use the people in the camps to be interviewed, to tell their personal story. This could have a real impact. The second thing I want to say is that we need to get leaders to communicate beyond the borders of their own countries. They need to talk to other countries. This will help show that it is not just one country acting here but a coalition of countries. (S)

The President: I totally agree. When I am in Germany, I will be doing a round table with a number of foreign journalists. Let me say too that in the run up to the European election, I think we need a good thirty-day plan. We need to communicate very clearly to our publics. And we need to take people to the camps to do tours and to see for themselves. We need a very aggressive effort. (S)

Secretary General Solana: We had fantastic press conference with some Kosovar Albanians here. It made a big impact on the press corps. (S)

Anyway, I think it is time now for the briefings that we have organized. There are two of them, one on the military situation and another on the humanitarian situation. (S)

The President:  Okay, that sounds great. By the way, I know you are getting one of my very good people, Bob Bell. (S) 

Secretary General Solana: Yes, I thank you very much. We are delighted that he will be joining us. (U)

Samuel Berger: I hope Javier, that you believe in reciprocity.

Secretary General Solana: We'll see.

-- End of Conversation --

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9903996  
RECEIVED: 24 MAY 99 14

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BLINKEN

DOC DATE: 07 MAY 99  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO

MEMCON

PERSONS: SOLANA, JAVIER

SUBJECT: POINTS TO BE MADE - 5 MAY MTG W/ NATO SEC GENERAL SOLANA

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ACTION: ORIGINAL MTG CARDS RETURNED

DUE DATE: 29 MAY 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BLINKEN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

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DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BLINKEN  
FICKLIN  
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEMK

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KRM NARA, Date 9/9/2019  
2015-0548-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9903996

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER  
001  
002  
002

Z 99060717 FOR DECISION  
X 99060907 KERRICK APPROVED RECOM  
X 99060914 NOTED BY PRESIDENT  
X 99061113 ORIGINAL MTG CARDS RETURNED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Case Number: 2015-0548-M

# MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 2734				
Document ID: 9904474				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 7	Position: 2	Stack: v

# MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2738				
Document ID: 9905078				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 8	Position: 3	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001a. telecon</del>	<del>re: Telecon with NATO Secretary General Solana (4 pages)</del>	<del>04/26/1999</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> KBH 2/5/2020
<del>001b. telcon</del>	<del>re: Telcon with NATO Secretary General Solana [incomplete copy] (3 pages)</del>	<del>04/26/1999</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> KBH 2/5/2020

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Memcon and Gonzalez...])  
 OA/Box Number: 2738

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9905078

2015-0548-M  
rs1242

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: BERGER

FROM: GORDON  
BLINKEN

DOC DATE: 02 JUL 99  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO

TELCON

PERSONS: SOLANA, JAVIER

SUBJECT: POTUS TELCON WITH NATO SYG SOLANA ON 26 APR

ACTION: DAVIES APPROVED RECOM 2

DUE DATE: 06 JUL 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GORDON

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BLINKEN  
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GORDON  
NSC CHRON  
SARGEANT

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
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OPENED BY: NSNHM

CLOSED BY: NSDMK

DOC 1 OF 1

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KSH NARA, Date 9/9/2019  
2015-0548-m

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9905078

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 BERGER  
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 99070219 FOR DECISION  
X 99070614 DAVIES APPROVED RECOM 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
THE WHITE HOUSE**

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 5070  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG 2 A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	_____	_____	_____
SARGEANT	1	J 2 7/3	<del>W 2/3</del>
DAVIES	2	J 7/4	_____
KERRICK	_____	_____	_____
STEINBERG	_____	_____	_____
BERGER	_____	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	3	EMK 7/5	N
RECORDS MGMT.	4	DMK 7/6	N
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC: 59 JUL 20 081

COMMENTS: *Selcon with NATO 546  
Solana 4/26/99*

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE Yls

—

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 5070  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS INT ARS  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG 2 A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
JACOBSON	_____	_____	_____
POWELL	_____	_____	_____
SARGEANT	<u>1</u>	<u>82 7/3</u>	<u>W/Action</u>
DAVIES	<u>2</u>	<u>8 7/4</u>	_____
KERRICK	_____	_____	_____
STEINBERG	_____	_____	_____
BERGER	_____	_____	_____
SITUATION ROOM	_____	_____	_____
WEST WING DESK	<u>3</u>	<u>EWK 7/5</u>	<u>N</u>
RECORDS MGMT.	<u>4</u>	<u>DMK 7/6</u>	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC: 28 JUL 2 00 545

COMMENTS: Telcon with NATO 546  
 Solana 4/26/99

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE Yes

July 2, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER *G*  
THROUGH: ANTONY BLINKEN *AB*  
FROM: PHILIP GORDON *PG*  
SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with NATO Secretary General Solana

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By *KGM* NARA, Date *9/9/2019*  
*2015-0548-17*

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and NATO Secretary General Solana that took place on April 26, 1999.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Glyn Davies to transmit the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation at Tab A to State.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove *Gfa*

That the attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation be filed for the record.

Approve *Gfa* Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to State
- Tab A Telcon with Solana

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

5078

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBH NARA, Date 9/9/2019  
2015-D548-M

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with NATO  
Secretary General Solana (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and Secretary General Solana is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to the U.S. Mission to NATO in Brussels for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (C)

Glyn T. Davies  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Telcon with Secretary General Solana

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Glyn T. Davies  
Reason: 1.5(d)  
Declassify On: 7/2/09

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0548-M (1.22)  
KBM 9/9/2019

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with NATO Secretary General Solana  
(U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Secretary General Solana

Notetakers: Doug Bayley, Jenny McGee,  
Jim Smith and Roger Merletti

DATE, TIME April 26, 1999, 1:46 - 1:55 p.m. EDT  
AND PLACE: The Residence

The President: Javier? (U)

Secretary General Solana: How are you? (U)

The President: Hey, I just wanted to talk to you before you left. (U)

Secretary General Solana: Thank you very, very much. (U)

The President: I think you did a masterful job. These people like and trust you. It's so important and so obvious. I think we're leaving here in better shape. (U)

Secretary General Solana: There's no question about that. The most important thing to me personally is we are constructing a profound friendship. That will allow us to fight whatever battle is necessary. After all, this is a business for human beings. (U)

The President: I agree with that. Can you hold on a minute?  
(U)

Secretary General Solana: Yes. (U)

The President: Sorry. Let me ask you something. I want to take a day to think about all that happened here, and I would like to call you maybe tomorrow and just go over it. (S)

Secretary General Solana: Compare notes? (S)

The President: I need some time to absorb it. I have some ideas about what we should do now operationally, but also how to get out of this. I followed up as we discussed. Al Gore talked to Chernomyrdin today. (S)

Secretary General Solana: He did already? I talked to Strobe Talbott last night and had dinner with him. I think we will be in good shape. Let me say something very personal. I appreciate so much what you have done for the Summit, and before the Summit, and the friendship we built together. It's been something unforgettable for my wife and for me. I don't want to get sentimental on this point, but sometimes we have to tell each other the truth. We have a lot of things to do together, and we will do them. (S)

The President: And after I leave office, too. (S)

Secretary General Solana: Sure, sure. Life is very long. (S)

The President: I enjoyed being with you so much. (S)

(Power failure at 1351 EDT. Call reconvened at 1352 EDT.)

The President: Hello? We got cut off. I'm sorry. (U)

Secretary General Solana: Technology didn't work this time.  
(U)

The President: I wanted to say it also meant a lot to me. I feel much closer to you, and I think it's a good thing you're there now. One of the things I'd like you to think about: I want to have time to think about this and call you back with some specific thoughts I have. Do you have a copy of *The Washington Post*? (S)

Secretary General Solana: I have a copy, but I have not read it. (S)

The President: There's an article in there by a man named Nicholas Gage. He wrote a famous English book called *Eleni*. It's about a young girl caught in war. He's an interesting man

and knows a lot about the Balkans. The specifics of the article, I don't know if they're right. He says we ought to have settled this thing with the Russians and get together a conference with the Serbs and all the front-line states. The idea that intrigued me is he had this idea, instead of doing what we planned to do which is settle Kosovo, to put them together. (S)

Secretary General Solana: The whole region? (S)

The President: That might be something to get Milosevic to take the NATO force. That way, he could see it as part of a larger force. (S)

Secretary General Solana: For the Serbs it would be very good.

The President: It would be part of a larger thing. It also solves something for us. Otherwise, we couldn't have Milosevic at a conference on the region. (S)

Secretary General Solana: I had given some thought to that idea before. That may be a good way out. (S)

The President: Now, many people would dislike that because they think we should demonize him, but the important thing is a good long-term solution. (S)

Secretary General Solana: Addressing the region as a whole will quiet those people. We have a problem bigger than Milosevic. It's a regional problem. If we were able to solve it, that would compensate. (S)

The President: That's my theory. There's another problem with it, though. We're racing against time, because the war crimes tribunal may indict him, and that will complicate things. (S)

Secretary General Solana: We can handle it, I think. (S)

The President: Are you sure? (S)

Secretary General Solana: Sure, we can handle it. If we agree, you and I, we can handle it. (S)

The President: We don't need to say that to anyone else. We would be vilified, both of us, you and I, if anyone heard us say it. Well, read it, and we'll talk again in 48 hours. (S)

Secretary General Solana: We don't need to say anything to anyone else. (S)

Secretary General Solana: Thank you, and all the best for our friendship. You know how much I value human relations whatever the third way, fourth way, and fifth way, it comes down to human beings. (U)

The President: You got it. Thank you, friend. (U)

Secretary General Solana: Thank you, and goodbye to Hillary. (U)

The President: Goodbye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

The President: Sorry. Let me ask you something. I want to take a day to think about all that happened here, and I would like to call you maybe tomorrow and just go over it. (S)

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