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Bosnia-IFOR

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The mission of the IFOR is to monitor and enforce compliance in an evenhanded manner with the military aspects of the Dayton peace agreement. While the Parties have primary responsibility for implementing the agreement, the Parties have made clear that a strong international military presence is needed to give them mutual confidence that commitments will be met and to provide them with a breathing space to begin to rebuild their country. In the past, absence of such an implementing force has contributed to repeated failures of other agreements in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In short, IFOR's purpose is to improve the chances of this agreement leading to lasting peace.

Specifically, IFOR's primary tasks are to:
- establish the military infrastructure -- logistics, communications, command and control -- required to support a large, robust force. This requires the early deployment of about 3000 NATO personnel under NATO command and control and NATO rules of engagement throughout the theater, of which approximately one-third would be US.
- deploy IFOR rapidly once the agreement is signed, quickly establishing a strong, visible presence to deter violations.
- assume command and control of the theater from UNPROFOR and withdraw UN forces that are not becoming part of IFOR.
- ensure IFOR's self-defense and freedom of movement throughout B-H.
- monitor and enforce compliance with specific military provisions of the Dayton agreement, including:
  -- from the outset, continued compliance with the cease-fire.
  -- within 30 days, withdrawal of forces behind a zone of separation approximately 2km on either side of the agreed cease-fire line.
  -- within 45 days, redeployment of forces from areas to be transferred from one entity to the other.
  -- for an additional 45 days, no introduction of forces into transferred areas.
  -- the selective marking of the agreed cease-fire line, the inter-entity boundary line and their zones of separation.
  -- the establishment of liaison with local military and civilian authorities.
  -- the creation of Joint Military Commissions to resolve disputes between the Parties.

In addition, IFOR will be prepared to provide assistance -- within its capabilities and on request -- to others responsible for implementing other provisions of the agreement. Most essential is IFOR's role in
Creating secure conditions for the conduct by others of their implementation tasks, including elections. IFOR will coordinate with and be prepared to assist the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other international organizations in their humanitarian missions. IFOR will assist in monitoring the clearing of minefields and obstacles. IFOR will assist in observing and preventing interference with the movement of civilian populations, refugees and displaced persons.

Equally important is understanding what IFOR will not do. IFOR is not responsible for election security, conducting humanitarian missions, or clearing mines. Its mission is not disarmament; it will not attempt to collect and control weapons. IFOR is not responsible for movement of civilians. IFOR is not a police force or a nation-building force.

Now that the specific provisions of the agreement are established, we believe that approximately 12 months will be adequate to accomplish IFOR's tasks and allow the peace to become self-sustaining. The international effort to implement the civilian aspects of the Dayton agreement -- especially economic reconstruction -- will require a longer term, but 12 months should be sufficient to set up the civilian structures that will oversee this effort. In the initial 12-month period, IFOR can lay the foundation for a lasting peace by establishing a pattern of compliance by the Parties with the military provisions of the agreement, thereby decreasing tensions and building confidence. This period of stability is vital so the Parties can build the framework for a stable military balance, to the extent possible through arms control negotiations.

Approved by CJCS, 1400, 25 Nov 95
Zones of Separation
(No military forces, weapons or explosives except IFOR)

Agreed Cease Fire Line

Inter-Entity Boundary Line

Complete withdrawal within 30 Days after TOA
Complete withdrawal within 45 Days after TOA

Withdraw Heavy Weapons within 120 Days
Withdraw Forces within 120 Days

Cantonment Area/Barracks

Sarajevo
- Vacate selected positions along cease-fire line within 7 days
- Complete withdrawal behind Zone of Separation within 30 days after TOA.
- Zone of Separation = 2km
  Can be narrowed or widened to 4 km. (No weapons or explosives within ZOS.)
Q-and-A's on Administration Balkan Policy

I. Bosnia: Broad Issues

Why send U.S. troops to Bosnia? Is Bosnia worth a single American life?

• Iron Logic: The security of Europe is of vital interest to the United States.
  -- Twice this century, we have paid a heavy price for turning our backs to conflict in Europe and delaying our involvement until it was too late.
  -- Bosnia is the most dangerous threat to Europe since WWII. The current conflict could spread and involve us and our allies. Without peace, we face an increased risk of a much broader war in Europe.
  -- US has vital interests in security and prosperity of Europe because of our immense trade relationship, historic ties, and lasting partnership in pursuing our shared values of democracy and market economies throughout the globe.

• U.S. leadership and participation is critical to peace.
  -- The participants in the agreement have stated that U.S. participation is required.
  -- Leadership in the past two months has brought us to the brink of peace
    -- U.S. military resolve to use airpower to stop Serb aggression
    -- Shuttle diplomacy leading to successful cease-fire and basic principles
    -- Leadership in Proximity Talks.

• Peace in Bosnia would help end the suffering and atrocities in the Balkans and help us realize our goal of a stable, secure and democratic Europe that benefits our own security and prosperity.
II. US/IFOR Mission

What is the IFOR mission?

- There are two complementary aspects to the peace implementation mission -- civil and military.
  - Civil aspect includes rebuilding the infrastructure, economic development, elections, refugee resettling.
  - Military aspect -- task of IFOR -- is to create a secure environment for the civil aspects to proceed.

- We will have the IFOR deployed long enough to give the civil aspects an opportunity to take hold and to start making an impact on the lives of the people in the country.

- We expect to create a secure environment shortly after IFOR deployment.
  - Agreement obliges the parties to complete withdrawal of all their forces behind the agreed cease-fire line within 30 days. And it establishes zones of separation (about 2 km wide) on both sides of cease-fire line.
  - Agreement obliges parties to withdraw all heavy weapons and forces to barracks areas within 120 days.
  - Obligates parties to furnish information on mines and other unexploded ordnance.
  - Establishes a Joint Military Commission (headed by IFOR commander) with representatives of the forces of the parties to resolve military complaints, questions and problems.

- We expect that the IFOR will need to be present for about a year. In this time we will monitor and enforce compliance with these military aspects. The civil aspects will continue for many years.

Are our troops ready for this type of task?

The troops to be assigned have been in intensive training for months to insure their readiness.
How does this mission impact on readiness in other areas?

Readiness is my number one priority and one that requires constant monitoring. We will shift some units and personnel into the European theater to help in the effort, but I believe that we have the flexibility to do that and still be ready to fulfill our other commitments. We're watching this.
III. IFOR Duration/Cost

How long will the U.S. forces stay? What will it cost?

- Our objective is for NATO to complete its job in about 12 months.

- NATO will deploy about 60,000 troops on the ground in Bosnia; 20,000 U.S.
  -- Will not go in until after the peace agreement is signed in Paris
  -- We will join at least 10,000 NATO nation troops (currently UNPROFOR) already there
  -- Air, naval, logistics forces to support IFOR, including c.10,000 US personnel (outside Bosnia)

- Initial 'ballpark' estimate of U.S. cost: $1.5 billion.

- Prepositioning (Enabling Force) may occur before the peace agreement is signed to allow rapid deployment.

- Basic concept: send a heavy force; withdraw as soon as possible.

How will you pay for this?

- We will work closely with Congress on funding US participation in IFOR.
  - Until appropriations have been finalized for FY 1996, we will not be in a position to determine how best to fund this operation.
IV. Equip and Train

What have we promised the Muslims in terms of military support and training for their army? Did the Serbs and Croats agree with this? Are the British, French and Germans in agreement?

- Our strong preference is that military stabilization be achieved by limitations and reductions, not by the introduction of new arms in the region. But we also believe that it is important that Federation armed forces be capable of providing for their own defense.

- Peace agreement obligates parties to start negotiations within seven days, under OSCE, to agree on a series of confidence-building measures. (restrictions on military deployments and exercises, notification of military activities, etc.)

- Peace agreement also establishes an arms control mechanism for setting numerical limits (within 180 days) on holdings of tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, combat aircraft and attack helicopters. Negotiations begin within 30 days under the auspices of OSCE.

- On November 22, the UN passed a Security Council resolution which provides for the phased lifting of the current arms embargo against all states of the former Yugoslavia, when the peace agreement is signed by all three parties.
  -- Lifting of the arms embargo has three phases -- designed to minimize risks to the safety of military personnel participating in the IFOR:
  -- For the first 90 days after the agreement is signed, all provisions of the embargo remain in place.
  -- During the second 90 days, heavy weapons (defined in Dayton agreement) and their ammunition, mines, military aircraft and helicopters would be prohibited until the arms control annex to the Dayton agreement has taken effect.
  -- 180 days after signature and after a SecGen report that arms control annex has taken effect, all provisions of the embargo terminate, unless the council decides otherwise.

- The U.S. will coordinate with other interested countries to ensure that Federation armed forces receive the necessary equipment and training needed to establish an effective self defense capability.
• Support of this effort is contingent upon BH compliance with the peace settlement and on BH terminating any military support and cooperative arrangement with Iran.

Just a few months ago US and NATO air forces were striking against the Bosnian Serbs. Why should they now trust us as impartial peacekeepers?

• We struck in response to attacks on civilians and UNPROFOR perpetrated by the Bosnian Serb forces.
• Because the Peace Agreement provides the foundation for a just and lasting peace. The Serbian signature on the agreement indicates their willingness to comply.

How does the US stay neutral while carrying out 'Equip and Train'?

• IFOR will maintain impartiality between the two sides during the implementation of the peace settlement.
• Any Equip and Train effort will be separate from IFOR. This effort intends to improve the defensive capability of the Bosnian Federation forces.
V. More on IFOR

What will IFOR's mission be if fighting breaks out again?

- In the event of sporadic violations of the peace agreement, IFOR will act against those responsible for the violation, in such a way that the offender won't want to try it again.

- If there is a significant change in the willingness of the signers of the peace agreement to maintain the peace, NATO will have to reassess the IFOR mission.

Will IFOR patrol Bosnia's external borders?

- According to the peace settlement, IFOR is not responsible for this task.

- The supervision of Bosnia's external borders will be carried out by other organizations, most likely the International Commission (ICFY) which currently performs that function.

Will IFOR do policing?

- IFOR will not act as a police force. That function will be the responsibility of the civilian side of the peace implementation operation.

- Peacekeepers will have the authority to detain any persons indicted for war crimes or who interfere with the IFOR mission, but they will not try to track them down.

Who exercises political control over IFOR?

- The North Atlantic Council (NAC) will exercise political control over IFOR.

How will we respond to military aid from Serbia?

- Movements of military equipment would constitute a violation of the peace settlement and would be met with appropriate action, possibly including military action.
VI. Non-US IFOR

Will the US be assessed costs for IFOR troops participating from other countries?

- Each country pays its own way.

How many other countries will contribute troops to IFOR? Could you please give a breakdown of how many troops will participate?

- Of a total of 60,000 IFOR ground troops in Bosnia, we anticipate 30,000+ from 14 of our 16 NATO allies (the exceptions are Iceland and Luxembourg), including about 12,000 from the UK and about 10,000 from France.
- From non-NATO countries, we expect about 10,000 -- from Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Pakistan, Egypt, and others.

Will non-NATO countries participate in the peace force?
- Will they be integrated into a NATO command structure?
- What are the criteria for allowing other countries to participate in this force?

- Non-NATO nations will participate in IFOR, as long as they can provide troops and equipment that can perform a function for IFOR and meet minimum criteria for military effectiveness, and pay their own way.
- Yes. All IFOR forces will be under NATO command and control.

Why not use European troops only? It's a European problem.

- Bosnia is not just a European problem. The US has a vital interest in a stable, secure Europe.
- This is a question of U.S. leadership on a global scale. We cannot exercise such leadership by 'leading bravely from the rear'. Experience tells us that such a course significantly decreases the chances for success. And recent diplomatic experience tells us the consequences of our nonparticipation would be broader than the risks, in terms of NATO, European security, and our vital interests in a militarily, politically, and economically stable Europe.
VII. Congressional Authorization

Does U.S. participation need congressional authorization?

- President Clinton has said that he will seek Congressional support

- I believe it is important and desirable that Congress support American leadership in bringing peace to the Balkans and stability to Europe
  --We are working closely with Congress.
  --This is an historic opportunity for peace in the area.

- The Constitution gives the President the authority to use military force.

At what point in the peace process will consultations take place with Congress on the US troop commitment?

- We have been in touch with many Congressmen already. Further meetings are scheduled. We welcome the support of Congress.
VIII. Russia

Why is Russian participation necessary?

- Russia has played a key role in the peace process.
  -- Contact group
  -- Russian rep at Proximity talks
  -- Russian rep at SHAPE

- NATO/Russian cooperation will be an important step toward European stability.

- In their meeting at Hyde Park, NY, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin instructed Minister Grachev and me to work out the details of Russian participation in operations to sustain peace in Bosnia.

- Meeting earlier this month in Brussels, Russian Defense Minister Grachev and I reached agreement on Russian participation in IFOR
  -- One Russian brigade is to be in the area of responsibility of an American Division.
  -- Operational control will be exercised by GEN Joulwan, through a Russian deputy. Tactical control will be exercised by the US division commander.
  -- Russian elements intended for the unit agreed in October could be merged into this brigade.

- We will continue discussions on remaining unresolved issues, including political oversight.

- I go to Brussels on Tuesday to meet again with Grachev on this.
IX. War Crimes

Why isn't the U.S. doing more to stop them?

- War criminals must be held accountable at War Crimes Tribunal.

- We have condemned ethnic cleansing by all parties.
  -- Have raised issue repeatedly with officials.
  -- Will supply all possible information to Tribunal to aid prosecution of guilty parties
  -- Will make particular effort to make sensitive information available both in a timely manner and in a way that will avoid compromising the sources of such information.

- The peace agreement explicitly excludes war criminals from holding any official positions in the new government

Is the US going after Mladic and Karadzic?

If IFOR encounters them, they will be detained and turned over to the Tribunal.
X. Implications of Peace Agreement

Doesn’t a settlement giving the Bosnian Serbs nearly half of Bosnia reward aggression? What sort of message does this send?

• This is a settlement that all sides have agreed to. We believe it is the best framework for establishing a durable peace in Bosnia.

It’s obvious that this peace agreement has been won only through pressure on the parties. That’s not real peace -- why are we helping to implement it?

• The parties want an end to the war. Our assistance and our participation in the IFOR are to help them achieve their goal. A continuation of the war threatens our interests.

What are the plans for returning refugees? Will US troops have a role?

• The peace settlement includes a provision that refugees may return to their homes. Within the implementation structure, the responsibility for returning refugees will go to civilian agencies. Mechanisms are being developed to coordinate the activities of those agencies with IFOR. IFOR will create the environment, in accordance with the agreement, that allows refugees and displaced people to move freely.

How much is the US committed to provide for reconstruction? Where will the funds come from?

• We have not yet established definite aid figures. We expect to discuss this subject at an international conference in London shortly before the formal signing of the Peace Settlement.
XI. Peace Settlement and the Future of Bosnia

We let the Serbs, Croats and Muslims break up their country in the first place -- why would we try to put them all back together again? (Aren’t we reversing our position and just seeking a rationale that doesn’t make sense?)

- The policy of leaving a Bosnian solution to the Europeans did not succeed.
- US leadership was vital for the peace settlement reached 21 November. US participation is now necessary to carry out the settlement to which the parties have agreed. We believe that the settlement terms are achievable, and the signatures of the parties on the agreement signify their commitments to work toward that end.
XII. Related Congressional/Budget Questions

President Clinton has still not signed the Fiscal Year 1996 defense appropriations bill sent to him about a week ago. If he vetoes it, as some have indicated he might, the Congress has said it would be very difficult to fund military operations in Bosnia. What advice have you given the President and does he really understand the problems this creates for you, Mr. Secretary, in carrying out the Administration’s peacekeeping plans?

- Of course, I’d like to have a final spending bill for the Department of Defense. By not having the bill, we were subject to the recent shutdown of the Government and the disruptions that went with it.
- Let’s remember, however, that the President has a responsibility to look at each bill sent to him by the Congress within the context of the Administration’s overall spending priorities. It is difficult to defend a Defense bill that adds $7 billion to the President’s request when other Administration priorities are being unreasonably cut back.
- The way to carry out the peacekeeping plan is to work with the Congress to achieve its goals. Congress has a vital role in allowing the United States to carry out its end of this hard-fought peace agreement. I will work to convince members of the need for funding an effort that seizes this opportunity for peace.
XIII. Admiral Macke

Q: Why didn’t you relieve Admiral Macke as the CINC immediately? Why does he continue to serve as the CINC?

- We felt that Admiral Macke would face significant obstacles in working effectively with the government and people of Japan in the future.

- However, we also felt that the requirement for an orderly transition made it absolutely necessary that he remain in place until a successor is confirmed.

Q: Has Admiral Macke formally requested retirement?

- Admiral Macke has formally requested retirement and it is working its way through the process.

- The exact date of retirement has not been determined.

Q: How long does it take to select a new CINC?

- Impossible to generalize. Process involves the services, the JCS, the SecDef, the President and the Senate.

Q: At what grade will Admiral retire; 2- or 4-star?

- That is ultimately determined by the Senate after a recommendation by the President.

- The President normally bases his recommendation on the advice of the SecDef and appropriate service secretary.

- It would be premature to speculate about the grade at which he will retire at.
XIV. AIR FORCE RESERVE C-141 BASKETBALL TRIP

Q. What do you intend to do about the Air Force Reservists' use of a C-141 aircraft to travel across country to watch basketball games?

A. I am always concerned anytime there are allegations of misuse of government aircraft.

    -- I don't want to prejudge or influence the ongoing investigation launched by the chief of the Air Force Reserves immediately after learning of the alleged incident.

    -- In general however, I believe that all members of the Department of Defense have a duty to spend the taxpayers money wisely.

    -- It is essential that managers and commanders at all levels prevent not only the misuse of transportation resources but the perception of misuse as well.

    -- Earlier this year the Department issued new guidelines to all DOD employees on the procedures to be followed for the use of military aircraft for travel of government employees.

    -- I expect those rules to be followed and if violations of the rules occur, I expect managers and commanders at all levels to hold individuals accountable for their actions.
FAX COVER SHEET

Date: November 2, 1995

To: Jill Schuker

From: X Margie Sullivan (703-693-0566)
      — Sharon Curcio (703-693-0566)
      — Laura Marcus (703-693-4272)

# Pages: 20 (including cover)

SUBJECT: Press Guidance

Attached: 2 Nov 95 Draft Proposed Public Affairs Guidance, and 27 Oct 95 Public Affairs Guidance for Training in Germany
MEMORANDUM FOR NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (ATTN: MAJ SEATON)
STATE DEPARTMENT, BUREAU FOR EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS (ATTN: MR. SCHWAN)
STATE DEPARTMENT, BUREAU FOR POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS (ATTN: MR. EVANS)
UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY (ATTN: MR. EVANS) RM 858
DIRECTOR, BOSNIA TASK FORCE, ISA (ATTN: LTC KEAGLE)
ASD LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS (ATTN: MR. GERTSMA) RM 3D932
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, PUBLIC AFFAIRS (ATTN: LTC KROPF) RM 2D246
OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, PUBLIC AFFAIRS (ATTN: CDR DOOLEY)
DIRECTOR FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION (ATTN: CDR FRANKLIN)

SUBJECT: Proposed Public Affairs Guidance – Bosnia IFOR Planning and Training

Attached for your review is the proposed public affairs guidance prepared for use by commanders and PAO’s in the field. Request your clearance or comments not later than 1630 hrs, Friday, 3 November 1995. Your concurrence will be assumed if no response is received by the suspense date.

Point of contact for responses is LTC Arne Owens, USA, Plans Officer, COMM (703) 697-6163 or 695-9528, COMM FAX (703) 693-6853.

Mark A. Brzozowski
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director for Plans

Attachment:
As stated
SUBJ: PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE – IFOR PLANNING AND TRAINING

1. AS PEACE NEGOTIATIONS PROCEED IN DAYTON, MEDIA INTEREST IS GROWING REGARDING U.S. MILITARY PREPARATIONS FOR POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT TO THE BALKANS AS PART OF A PEACE IMPLEMENTATION FORCE. MEDIA INTERVIEWS ARE PERMITTED WHICH DEMONSTRATE PLANNING, TRAINING, PREPOSITIONING OF ASSETS, FORMATION OF SURVEY TEAMS AND OTHER PRUDENT ACTIONS WHICH ENSURE THAT THE U.S. MILITARY WILL BE ADEQUATELY PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN A NATO-LED IMPLEMENTATION FORCE, IF DIRECTED TO DEPLOY BY THE NCA, AND SUCCESSFULLY ACCOMPLISH A WIDE RANGE OF MISSIONS WHICH MIGHT STEM FROM A PEACE AGREEMENT, IF AND WHEN SIGNED.

2. THE FOCUS OF SUCH MEDIA ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE PRUDENT U.S. MILITARY TRAINING AND PREPARATIONS FOR A WIDE RANGE OF CONTINGENCIES. COMMANDERS, PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS AND OTHER UNIT SPOKESPERSONS OR PERSONNEL WHO MIGHT COME IN CONTACT WITH THE MEDIA SHOULD REFRAIN FROM ANY SPECULATION REGARDING A PEACE AGREEMENT OR MISSIONS THE U.S. MILITARY MIGHT RECEIVE AS PART OF THE NATO-LED IMPLEMENTATION FORCE. IN INTERVIEWS, WE NEED TO ENSURE THAT THE MEDIA UNDERSTAND THE CONTEXT FOR MILITARY TRAINING, PARTICULARLY ANY TRAINING GEARED TOWARD A PEACE IMPLEMENTATION FORCE. SPOKESPERSONS ARE ENCOURAGED TO DRAW FROM THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS, AS APPROPRIATE:

A. THERE IS NO PEACE AGREEMENT AT THIS POINT.

B. THERE WILL BE NO DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. FORCES UNTIL THERE IS A PEACE AGREEMENT.

C. WHILE PLANNING CONTINUES BOTH AT NATO AND WITHIN THE U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, THIS PLANNING WILL NOT BE FINALIZED UNTIL THERE IS AN ACTUAL PEACE AGREEMENT.

D. READINESS IS OUR TOP PRIORITY. AS A RESULT, MILITARY PERSONNEL PLAN AND TRAIN ON AN ON-GOING BASIS FOR A WIDE RANGE OF MISSIONS AND CONTINGENCIES THAT THEY MIGHT BE CALLED UPON TO PERFORM.

E. MANY OF THE SITUATIONS CONSTRUCTED FOR IMPLEMENTATION FORCE TRAINING ARE BASED ON PAST PEACEKEEPING EXPERIENCE. THIS TRAINING
MAY OR MAY NOT REFLECT ACTUAL MISSIONS OR SITUATIONS U.S. FORCES WILL CONFRONT IF DEPLOYED AS PART OF A PEACE IMPLEMENTATION FORCE.

3. IN ADDITION, THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS MAY BE HELPFUL FOR USE IN RESPONSE TO QUERY. THEY WILL BE UPDATED AND EXPANDED AS REQUIRED.

Q1. WHAT COMMITMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE BY THE UNITED STATES TO ITS NATO ALLIES?

A1. THE PRESIDENT IS PREPARED, AFTER CONSULTING WITH CONGRESS AND IF ASKED BY THE PARTIES, TO USE U.S. TROOPS AS PART OF A NATO FORCE TO ASSIST IN IMPLEMENTING A PEACE SETTLEMENT THAT THE PARTIES ARE CARRYING OUT IN GOOD FAITH. U.S. PARTICIPATION ON THE GROUND WOULD BE SUBSTANTIAL BUT NO MORE THAN ONE-HALF OF THE OVERALL FORCE. THIS PRINCIPAL WILL SERVE AS A BASIS FOR OUR RESPONSES TO NATO FORCE REQUESTS.

Q2. WHAT COMMITMENTS REGARDING U.S. TROOP PARTICIPATION HAVE BEEN MADE TO THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT?

A2. NO COMMITMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT REGARDING U.S. FORCES. WE HAVE REAFFIRMED TO THEM OUR PUBLIC COMMITMENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A NATO-LED PEACE IMPLEMENTATION THAT WE HAVE MAINTAINED SINCE 1993.

Q3. WHAT IS THE RANGE OF TOTAL NATO GROUND FORCE LEVELS, RELATED TO ENFORCEMENT OF A BOSNIAN PEACE SETTLEMENT, BEING CONSIDERED? WHAT WOULD THE U.S. CONTRIBUTION OF FORCES BE?

A3. THE NECESSARY RANGE OF NATO GROUND FORCE LEVELS WILL BE DETERMINED BY NATO MILITARY PLANNERS AND WILL NOT BE FINALIZED UNTIL THE PEACE SETTLEMENT AND OPLAN ARE FINALIZED. OUR CURRENT ESTIMATE IS THAT THE TOTAL NATO GROUND FORCE FOR BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA WILL NUMBER ABOUT 60,000, WITH THE U.S. CONTRIBUTING ABOUT 20,000.

Q4. WHAT IS THE ESTIMATE OF THE NUMBER OF RESERVISTS THAT WOULD NEED TO BE CALLED UP?
A4. The precise number of U.S. reservists that might be required for
the peace implementation operation has not yet been determined.
Based on the force list for OPLAN 40104, which is still under
development, the number of reservists will likely be about 2,000-3,000
personnel.

Q5. Would this be a NATO-only operation or would other troops,
from Islamic countries for example, also be a part of that total
implementation force?

A5. We expect non-NATO forces will participate in the operation. Non-
NATO forces that may participate include former UNPROFOR units
which remain to become part of the peace implementation force, and
possible partnership-for-peace nations as well.

Q6. What about Russian participation?

A6. We view a constructive Russian role as particularly important
not only to sustain a comprehensive peace but also given our
broader efforts to promote NATO-Russian cooperation. The
preliminary agreement reached between Secretary Perry and
Minister Grachev paves the way for a combined U.S.-Russian “special
operations unit” that will perform functional tasks in support of
implementation. This unit will be under the overall command of
General Joulan in his role as USCINCBUR.

Q7. Would NATO be in complete command of all forces involved in an
enforcement operation? Will there be a “dual key” arrangement
with the UN?

A7. The NATO theater commander will have command and control of
all forces participating in IFOR. Specific arrangements have not yet
been determined, but the NATO force will not be under UN command
or control, nor will they operate under any “dual key” command
structure. We envision a NATO-led force capable of implementing
the terms of the peace agreement under NATO rules of engagement
(ROE).

Q8. What is the command arrangement for Russian forces?
A8. THE U.S.-RUSSIAN “SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIT” IS NOT PART OF THE IFOR, BUT WILL CONDUCT DISTINCT FUNCTIONS IN SUPPORT OF IMPLEMENTATION. IT WILL BE UNDER THE OVERALL COMMAND OF GENERAL JOULWAN, IN HIS ROLE AS A U.S. COMMANDER.

Q9. WHEN WOULD NATO FORCES BE DEPLOYED? WHAT IS THE FIGHTING DOES NOT STOP AFTER AN AGREEMENT IS SIGNED?

A9. WE AND OUR ALLIES EXPECT SOME LEVEL OF COMPLIANCE WITH A PEACE AGREEMENT BY THE WARRING PARTIES. WE ALSO PLAN TO MOVE QUICKLY AND DECISIVELY FOLLOWING A PEACE AGREEMENT TO PRECLUDE DETERIORATION INTO RENEWED CONFLICT. IN THE EVENT OF A MAJOR BREAKDOWN IN COMPLIANCE, THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL WOULD ASSESS THE SITUATION IN CONSULTATION WITH NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES AND AUTHORIZE ANY NECESSARY CHANGES IN ROE. ALLIES ALSO AGREE THAT THE NATO FORCE SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN IN THE EVENT OF A TOTAL BREAKDOWN IN COMPLIANCE.

Q10. IS THERE A TIME TABLE FOR UNPROFOR WITHDRAWAL? WOULD SOME OF THESE UN UNITS REMAIN AS PART OF THE NEW FORCE?


Q11. WHEN WOULD THE “DUAL KEY” BE ELIMINATED? WOULD THERE BE ANY OTHER UN INPUT INTO THE COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS?

A11. A MINIMUM CONDITION FOR U.S. PARTICIPATION IN A NATO IMPLEMENTATION FORCE IS THAT THE OPERATION BE CONDUCTED UNDER NATO COMMAND AND CONTROL WITH NO UNITED NATIONS “DUAL KEY.” WE HAVE THEREFORE INSISTED TO ALLIES THAT ALL UN FORCES IN THEATER WOULD IMMEDIATELY COME UNDER NATO COMMAND AND CONTROL UPON INITIATION OF DEPLOYMENT, INCLUDING BOTH THOSE FORCES THAT WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO THE NATO OPERATION AND UNPF UNITS WITHDRAWING FROM THE THEATER. THIS REQUIREMENT WILL ENSURE THAT THERE IS NO “DUAL KEY” ON GROUND FORCES AT ANY TIME DURING THE TRANSITION FROM UN TO
NATO OPERATIONS. UN COORDINATION ON NATO AIR OPERATIONS WILL CEASE UPON TRANSFER OF THEATER OPERATIONAL CONTROL (OPCON) TO NATO.

Q12. WHAT WOULD THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR NATO FORCES BE?

A12. NATO RULES OF ENGAGEMENT HAVE NOT YET BEEN FORMALLY ESTABLISHED. THEY ARE EXPECTED TO BE BASED ON THOSE DEVELOPED FOR OPLAN 40104. THESE ROE ARE ROBUST AND WERE DESIGNED TO ENSURE THAT NATO FORCES WILL HAVE AN INHERENT RIGHT TO SELF DEFENSE. THERE WILL BE NO "DUAL-KY." 

Q13. WHERE WOULD NATO TROOPS BE DEPLOYED? IN BOSNIAN SERB CONTROLLED TERRITORY?

A13. THE DEPLOYMENT CONCEPT FOR NATO FORCES IS STILL UNDER DEVELOPMENT. THE IFOR IS EXPECTED TO OPERATE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ZONE OF SEPARATION. HOWEVER, IT IS ENVISIONED THAT MOST IFOR FORCES WILL INITIALLY BE DEPLOYED IN AND OPERATE PRINCIPALLY FROM FEDERATION TERRITORY.

Q14. WOULD BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT FORCES BE SUPPLIED WITH ADDITIONAL ARMS DURING THIS ENFORCEMENT PERIOD SO THAT BOSNIA CAN BETTER DEFEND ITSELF AFTER NATO FORCES LEAVE?

A14. THE MISSION OF THE IMPLEMENTATION FORCE WILL NOT INCLUDE ARMING THE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT FORCES. THE IFOR MISSION WILL BE THAT OF A NEUTRAL FORCE IMPLEMENTING THE CEASE-FIRE AND SEPARATION OF FORCES AGREED TO IN THE PEACE SETTLEMENT. THERE WILL BE NO IFOR MISSION CREEP INTO NATION-BUILDING, OR OTHER AREAS.

THE CREATION OF LASTING PEACE IN BOSNIA REQUIRES A STABLE MILITARY BALANCE. THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO SUPPORT AN INTERNATIONAL MILITARY STABILIZATION EFFORT, INCLUDING BOTH ARMS CONTROL PROVISIONS AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE FEDERATION, SEPARATE FROM AND UNRELATED TO IFOR. THE ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVE WILL BE LIMITATIONS OR REDUCTIONS IN BOSNIAN SERB HEAVY WEAPONS SO AS TO BALANCE THE BSA ADVANTAGE IN THOSE AREAS. WE ALSO ENVISION THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE ASPECT TO INCLUDE EQUIPMENT AND CONTRACTOR TRAINING. THE DETAILED LIST OF TYPES OF WEAPONS AND TRAINING THE BOSNIAN-CROAT FEDERATION FORCES NEED WILL REQUIRE A DETAILED
ASSESSMENT. THESE MEASURES WILL HELP THE FEDERATION DEVELOP A MORE Viable SELF DEFENSE AND A MORE STABLE MILITARY BALANCE IN THE REGION WHEN NATO FORCES WITHDRAW.

Q15. HOW LONG WILL NATO TROOPS BE DEPLOYED? WHAT IS THE EXIT STRATEGY?

A15. PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT AMONG NATO MEMBERS IS THAT THE IFOR MISSION WILL BE COMPLETE WHEN THE PEACE AGREEMENT HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED BY THE IFOR, BUT NO LATER THAN 12 MONTHS FROM ITS INITIAL DEPLOYMENT. AS NATO POLITICAL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES CONTINUE TO DEVELOP THE TERMS AND CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION, WE WILL ADDRESS IN MORE DETAIL THE CRITERIA AND CONDITIONS OF MISSION COMPLETION AND THE PARAMETERS OF OUR 12 MONTH DEADLINE. IT IS THE U.S. POSITION THAT THE MISSION BE DEFINED IN LIMITED AND MEASURABLE TERMS IN ORDER TO ENSURE THE SOONEST POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL AND TO AVOID MISSION CREEP.

Q16. WHAT IS THE ESTIMATED COST OF DEPLOYING U.S. FORCES?

A16. OUR BEST ESTIMATE AT THIS TIME IS THAT IT WILL COST APPROXIMATELY $1.5 BILLION TO DEPLOY A U.S. DIVISION FOR ONE YEAR. THE ADMINISTRATION WILL SHARE INFORMATION WITH THE CONGRESS ON THE TERMS, DEVELOPMENTS AND SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS AFFECTING THE U.S. COMMITMENT.

4. OATS(PA) POINT OF CONTACT FOR PLANS IS LTC ARNE OWENS, USA, DSN 227-6163/COMM 703-697-6163; FOR MEDIA QUERIES, CDR CHUCK FRANKLIN, USN, DSN 227-5131/COMM 703-697-5131.
UNCLASSIFIED

PTSMJH AUEC/46 020106-00066--AUEC/95

IN A UUUU
D 2715213 OCT 95

SECRETARY WASHINGTON D/C/ATSP/PA/DPL/
BUCA/USCINCEUR VAIHENGE GE/EC/E
INFO RUEC/SESTATE WASHINGTON D/C/SEUR-PA/
RUEHOL/AMBASSAD BOON/USIS/DAO/
RUEJCS/JSTAFF WASHINGTON D/C/9A/
RUSEADW/HQDA WASHINGTON D/C/HPA/
RUFDAAS/CINCUSEUR MELDEBER GE/AAPA/
RUFDAVE/CDRCORPS MELDEBER GE/PAO/
RUFHEA/CDR USETAF VIEGNA IT/PAO/
RUFMEM/CDR3DCOSEC WISBROEN GE/PAO/
RUSMF/CDR1STARMODIV BAD KREUHAK GE/PAO/
RUFNDB/CDR3DINFDIV WURZBURG GE/PAO/
RUFKCO/CDR21STTAACOM NAESCHLATOR GE/PAO/
RUFDCFR/CDR SEVENTH ARMY THE COMD GRAPENPOHLER GE/PAO/
RUFHQUI/CDR TRAINING AREA HOMENFEL GE/

BT

UNCLASSIFIED

SUBJ: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE — EXERCISE MOUNTAIN EAGLE 95

A. USCINCEUR 2019152 OCT 95

PAGE 02 RUEJCS9546 UNCLASSIFIED

B. CINCUSEUR 2016342 OCT 95

C. PHONECON, ECPA AND OATSD(PA)—DPL, 24 OCT 95

REFERENCE A PROPOSED PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE FOR EXERCISE MOUNTAIN

LF 95. REF B WAS USECUEU PROPOSAL TO CHANGE PA POSTURE FROM
PASSIVE TO ACTIVE. REF C WAS TELEPHONIC CONCURRENCE BY ECPA WITH
REFERENCE B.

2. PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE IS APPROVED WITH AN ACTIVE PA POSTURE.

3. OATSD(PA) POINT OF CONTACT FOR PLANS IS LTC ARNE OWENS, USA, DSN
227-6163/COMM 703-697-6163; FOR MEDIA QUERIES, CDR CHUCK FRANKLIN,
USN, DSN 227-5131/COMM 703-697-5131.

BT

JOIN STAF V1

ACTION

SUFS-C(*) WHC:CW(*) J3(*) CMAS(*)
J4(*) J5(*) QUAL CONTROL(*) JANS(*) J7:JETD(*)

SECRETARY V2

ACTION ATSD:PA-AARAK(1)

INFO SECCOE-(*UserController(*) USDP:DSBA(*)
USDP:NADEP(*) ATSD:PA:USB(1)

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 1

9546
TIMESTAMP: 9510201300  SUBJECT: PROPOSED GUIDANCE (PPAG): EXERCISE MOUNTAIN EAGLE '95

RFI: RUEKJCS 8361
PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED  SPECAT HANDLING:
DTG: 201315Z OCT 95
FROM: USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECPA//
TO: RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OATSD-PA//
RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//AEACC-EX/AEAPA/USAFL//
RÜFPAVU/CDR V CORPS HEIDELBERG GE//PAO//
RÜFDNEU/CDR USSETAF VICENZA IT//PAO/G3//
RÜFDWBU/CDR 3COSCOM WIESBADEN GE//PAO//
RÜFDFSU/CDR 1AD BAD KREUZNACH GE//PAO//
RÜFDWDU/CDR 3ID WUERZBURG GE//PAO//
RÜFDCOU/CDR 21 TAACOM KAISERSLAUTERN GE//PAO//
RÜFDGRI/CG 7ATC GRAFENWOEHR GE//PAO//
RÜFDGRI/COG 7ATC CMTC HOHENFELS GE//PAO//
INFO: RUEADWD/HQDA WASHINGTON DC//SAPA//
RUEHOUAMEMBASSY BONN GEI/DAO/USIS/PRESS ATTACHE//
RUSECNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECLA/ECJ1/ECJ3/ECJ5//

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UNCLAS //N05720//
SECTION 001 OF 003
SUBJ: PROPOSED GUIDANCE (PPAG): EXERCISE MOUNTAIN EAGLE '95
PAGE 02 RUSNDNB0090 UNCLAS //N05720//
REFERENCES
A. SECDEF PRINCIPLES OF INFORMATION
B. GUIDANCE SUBJECT: GUIDANCE (PPAG): USAREUR ACTIONS/PREPARATIONS FOR DEPLOYMENT TO B-H AS PART OF A NATO-SUPPORTED PEACE PLAN (U); HQ USAREUR OCPA (AEAPA-PP), TRANSMITTED VIA E-MAIL, 041700Z OCT 95.
C. CROUCH SENDS, SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR COMMANDERS TO READ TO TROOPS AND ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE (U); HQ USAFR (AEAPA-PP) MESSAGE 0520377 OCT 95.
D. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

GUIDANCE, SUBJECT: Guidance for U.S. Army Preparations to Participate in NATO Peace Implementation Plan (U), HQ EUCOM ECPA Message, 130955Z OCT 95.

E. USAREUR Proposed Guidance: Mountain Eagle 95, HQ USAREUR Message Text, Telefax 200CT95.

1. Reference A is the basic principle which guides PA operations and procedures. Ref B was issued to establish baseline PG and information concerning possible USAREUR involvement in a NATO-sponsored peace implementation plan. Ref C was issued by CINCUSAREUR as additional information to inform troops and to dispel rumors. Ref D was issued to establish theater-wide PG for media queries regarding any possible deployments.

2. This PPAG has been theater coordinated with USAREUR elements, and has been coordinated by EUCOM ECPA. Approved PG is required for use as soon as possible (NLT 200001Z OCT 95). Contingency statement (Paragraph 6A, below) to be used until this PG is approved.

3. Request passive posture. Do not request OATSD/PA announcement in Washington, DC. Request any addressee using this PG notify HQ USAREUR OCPA, Media Relations Branch POC.

4. The following statement is for response to query (text follows): Quote:

4A. Approximately 10,000 U.S. Army V (Fifth) Corps personnel are conducting training at the 7th US Army Training Center and the Combat Maneuver Training Center in Germany as part of a scheduled training program. (Para)

4B. Soldiers from the 1st Armored Division and the U.S. Army V (Fifth) Corps are participating in tank gunnery training and Page 04 RUSNDNBO090 UNCLAS //N05720//

Military Stability Training under an exercise named Mountain Eagle. This training began on 12 October 1995, and will end on or about 15 November 1995. Mountain Eagle will be conducted at the 7th U.S. Army Training Center, Grafenwoehr, Germany and the Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels, Germany. This training exercise is a multi-faceted operation involving actual and simulated environments which allow participating troops to effectively train in planning, coordinating and executing operations as the nucleus of a U.S. joint task force. The OPFOR, or opposing forces, and civilian role-players for the field training exercise portion of Mountain Eagle will be provided by the 7th Army Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels, Germany, augmented by personnel from the 1st Armor Division, Bad Kreuznach, Germany. The main focus of the exercise is developing, streamlining and improving interoperability techniques, methods and procedures for future exercises, training events or contingency operations. Mountain Eagle does not involve any other national forces.
4C. Media days are scheduled for the 23rd and 24th of October 1995. For more information please contact the media operations center at the 7th Army Training Center, DSN 475-8470 or commercial 08641-83-8470. Unquote.

5. The following questions and answers are for response to query.

Q1. Omitted

Q2. What are the major units participating in this exercise?
A2. Elements of the U.S. V Corps, and the 1st Armored Division.

Q3. What is the exact number of personnel participating?
A3. Approximately 10,000 U.S. Army personnel.

Q4. What is the estimated cost of this training?
A4. TBD.

Q5. Where are the funds coming from to pay for this exercise?
A5. Normal operations funds.

Q6. What roles will the U.S. V Corps elements play?
A6. V Corps elements are the training facilitators for 1ST ARMORED DIVISION DURING THIS TRAINING. V CORPS IS CONDUCTING LEADER TRAINING AND SUPPORTING THE 1ST ARMORED DIVISION’S GOALS FOR THIS SCHEDULED TRAINING EVENT.

Q7. Are there going to be any live fire exercises or range events?
A7. Yes, there will be a variety of live fire exercises which are scheduled throughout this training exercise at the Grafenwoehr Training Center. (See Answer 22)

Q8. Is this exercise a preparatory step for U.S. troops being committed into the Balkan region?
A8. No, this exercise is a normally scheduled unit training rotation and exercise which will train U.S. forces on the goals as stated.

Q9. How long has this exercise been scheduled?
A9. This training period has been scheduled for almost one year. Gunnery and CMTC density training are scheduled during the development of the division’s annual training plan, which is drafted about one year in advance.

Q10. Is this training exercise in response to a NATO or UN request?
A10. No, it is a scheduled training event.

Q11. What are the goals of this exercise?
A11. The goals of this training are to: one, provide gunnery and CMTC density training for elements of the 1st Armored Division. Two, conduct military stability operations training for 1 AD Forces.

Section 002 of 003
Tactical training for elements of the 1st Armored Division. Two, conduct military stability operations training for 1 AD Forces. Three, exercise the command, control and logistics functions of the division on a fairly large scale. Four, continue to maintain a ready, trained, professional and relevant force in Central Europe.
Q12. IS THIS TRAINING EXERCISE LINKED TO CURRENT EVENTS IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA?
A12. THIS TRAINING IS NOT SPECIFICALLY LINKED TO EVENTS IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA. HOWEVER, COMMANDERS MUST TRAIN THEIR FORCE FOR MANY POSSIBLE MISSIONS OR CONTINGENCIES. SOME OF THE ASPECTS OF THIS TRAINING HAVE APPLICATION NOT ONLY TO BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, BUT OTHER SITUATIONS IN THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN REGION.

Q13. IS THERE A SCENARIO WHICH IS DRIVING THE TRAINING? WHAT IS THE SPECIFIC SCENARIO?
A13. THERE IS NO SPECIFIC SCENARIO FOR THE OVERALL TRAINING EXERCISE. 1ST ARMORED DIVISION ELEMENTS WILL CONDUCT GUNNERY TRAINING AND PARTICIPATE IN SITUATIONAL TRAINING EXERCISES (STX) LANES AT THE GRAFENWOEHR TRAINING AREA. THE STX LANES WILL PREPARE SOLDIERS AND SMALL UNIT LEADERS TO REACT TO A MYRIAD OF SITUATIONS CONCERNING MILITARY STABILITY OPERATIONS. FOLLOWING THE TRAINING AT GRAFENWOEHR, THE DIVISION WILL CONDUCT A TACTICAL ROAD MARCH TO COMBAT MANEUVER TRAINING CENTER (CMTC) IN HOHENFELS, GERMANY. AT CMTC, THE 1 AD ELEMENTS WILL CONDUCT MILITARY STABILITY OPERATIONS USING CMTC PERSONNEL AS ROLE-PLAYERS AND THE OPPOSING FORCES. THIS TRAINING AT CMTC IS NOT UNIQUE NOR DIFFERENT FROM PREVIOUS TRAINING SCENARIOS AND IS VERY SIMILAR TO HOW TRAINING WHICH IS ROUTINELY CONDUCTED AT THE CMTC.

Q14. WHAT, IF ANY, SIMULATION PROGRAMS OR SYSTEMS ARE BEING USED TO SUPPORT THE TRAINING?
A14. AT LEAST THREE DIFFERENT COMPUTER MODELS WILL SUPPORT THE TRAINING EXERCISE. THE SIMULATION PROGRAMS ARE BRIGADE-BATTALION SIMULATION (BBS), CORPS BATTLE SIMULATION (CBS) AND URBAN COMBAT COMPUTER ASSISTED TRAINING SIMULATION (UCCATS).

Q15. WHAT IS THE DESIRED OUTCOME OR RESULT OF THIS TRAINING EXERCISE?
A15. THIS TRAINING WILL HELP LEADERS AT ALL LEVELS TO ASSESS THE READINESS AND CAPABILITIES OF THEIR SOLDIERS AND UNITS. THIS TRAINING WILL PROVIDE VALUABLE INFORMATION AND FEEDBACK TO THE COMMANDERS.

Q16. HOW WILL THIS EXERCISE EFFECT TRAINING?
A16. THIS EXERCISE WILL ENHANCE TRAINING FOR A LARGE NUMBER OF TROOPS AND UNITS. THIS TRAINING INCORPORATES A PLANNED ROTATION THROUGH THE COMBAT MANEUVER TRAINING CENTER, WITH V CORPS HEADQUARTERS TRAINING ON COMMAND, CONTROL AND COORDINATION ISSUES.

Q17. WILL THERE BE MORE EXERCISES IN THE MOUNTAIN EAGLE SERIES?
A17. TBD

Q18. WILL TROOPS FROM SETAF PARTICIPATE IN MOUNTAIN EAGLE?
A18. NO. (SETAF PAO ANSWER). (IF MEDIA SPECIFICALLY NOTE SETAF ELEMENTS BEING PRESENT AT GTA/CMTC THEN THE FOLLOWING IS AUTHORIZED: NO TROOPS FROM SETAF ARE PARTICIPATING IN MOUNTAIN EAGLE; HOWEVER, THERE ARE A LIMITED NUMBER OF SETAF ELEMENTS PRESENT TO OBSERVE THE TRAINING AND TO SERVE AS LIAISONS WITH DIVISION AND CORPS STAFFS. THIS IS ROUTINE FOR TRAINING OF THIS
Q19. WHAT FLIGHT OPERATIONS ARE PLANNED? WILL THERE BE WEEKEND/NIGHT FLYING?
A19. FLIGHT OPERATIONS ARE PLANNED FOR BOTH DAY AND NIGHT, WITH LIMITED FLIGHTS ON WEEKENDS.
Q20. DOES THIS TRAINING INVOLVE PEACEKEEPER TRAINING?
A20. MOUNTAIN EAGLE TRAINING INCORPORATES MILITARY STABILITY OPERATIONS, WHICH INCLUDES PEACEKEEPING SITUATIONS.
Q21. ARE OBSERVERS OR PARTICIPANTS FROM OTHER NATIONAL FORCES ATTENDING MOUNTAIN EAGLE?
A21. NO.
Q22. WHAT IS THE LIVE FIRE SCHEDULE? (FOR MEDIA DAY)
A22. 23 OCT 95
BFV TABLE VIII 1-1 CAVALRY SQUADRON RANGE 204
BFV TABLE XII 3-5 CAVALRY SQUADRON RANGE 211
TANK TABLE VIII 1-1 CAVALRY SQUADRON RANGE 117
CAVALRY CALFEX 1-1 CAVALRY SQUADRON RANGE 301
AH-1 LIVE FIRE 1-1 CAVALRY SQUADRON RANGE 301
MK-19 GRENADE 18 MILITARY POLICE BDE RANGES 121/305
9MM M-9 PISTOL 16 ENGINEER BRIGADE RANGE 202
24 OCT 95
BFV TABLE VIII 1-1 CAVALRY SQUADRON RANGE 204
BFV TABLE XII 3-5 CAVALRY SQUADRON RANGE 211
TANK TABLE VIII 1-1 CAVALRY SQUADRON RANGE 117
CAVALRY CALFEX 1-1 CAVALRY SQUADRON RANGE 301
MK-19 GRENADE 18 MILITARY POLICE BDE RANGES 121/305
PAGE 06 RUSNDNB1266 UNCLAS //N05720//
Q23. HOW ARE UNITS GOING TO MOVE FROM GRAFENWOEHR TO THE CMTC?
A23. UNITS WILL CONDUCT A TACTICAL ROAD MARCH WHILE MOVING FROM GRAFENWOEHR TO THE COMBAT MANEUVER TRAINING CENTER.
Q24. DOES THE LIVE FIRE SCHEDULE INCLUDE ANY NIGHT AND WEEKEND FIRING?
A24. YES. HOWEVER, WEEKEND FIRING WILL BE LIMITED.
Q25. WHAT ARE MILITARY STABILITY OPERATIONS?
A25. MILITARY STABILITY OPERATIONS INCLUDE A VARIETY OF TASKS WHICH INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS. ADDITIONALLY, HUMANITARIAN AID ASPECTS ARE ALSO INCLUDED.
6. CONTINGENCY STATEMENT AND COMMUNICATIONS THEMES.
6A. CONTINGENCY STATEMENT. REQUEST IMMEDIATE APPROVAL OF THE FOLLOWING CONTINGENCY STATEMENT IN ORDER TO RESPOND TO ANY MEDIA QUERIES REGARDING PREPARATION ACTIVITIES FOR EXERCISE MOUNTAIN EAGLE. QUOTE: PREPARATIONS ARE UNDERWAY FOR EXERCISE MOUNTAIN EAGLE, WHICH IS SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE IN GERMANY DURING THE MONTH OF OCTOBER, 1995. THE U.S. ARMED DIVISION IS CONDUCTING A PLANNED, ROUTINE TRAINING UNCLAS //N05720//
FINAL SECTION OF 003 EXERCISE WHICH IS PART OF USAREUR’S TASK FORCE TRAINING PROGRAM. SOLDIERS, VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT FROM 1ST ARMORED DIVISION WILL PAGE 06 RUSNDNB1267 UNCLAS //N05720//

JOIN WITH TROOPS FROM THE U.S. V CORPS. SOME 10,000 PERSONNEL WILL PARTICIPATE IN THIS TRAINING EVENT. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, CONTACT THE V CORPS PAO AT 475-8470 OR COMMERCIAL 049-(0)9641-63-8470. END QUOTE.

6B. COMMUNICATIONS THEMES. THE FOLLOWING COPY POINTS SHOULD BE PROVIDED TO LEADERS AND SOLDIERS IN COMMAND INFORMATION PRODUCTS FOR USE WHEN MEETING WITH THE MEDIA.

6B1. THERE ARE NO ORDERS FOR DEPLOYMENT TO B-H, NOR HAVE ANY UNITS BEEN ALERTED FOR DEPLOYMENT TO B-H.

6B2. USAREUR, V CORPS AND 1ST AD ARE ALL EXPERIENCED AT INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS - WE HAVE DONE PEACEKEEPER TRAINING AND THE PFP TRAINING.

6B3. WE WILL TRAIN AND TAKE CARE OF SOLDIERS AND THEIR FAMILIES.

6B4. BEING TRAINED AND READY IS SOMETHING WE DO EVERY DAY.

6B5. WE WILL BE TRAINING SOLDIERS IN HOW TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN DIFFICULT SITUATIONS WITHOUT OVERREACTING.

6B6. THIS TRAINING IS NOT NEW TO US.

7. MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION.

7A. THIS TRAINING EXERCISE IS UNDER THE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF HQ, USAREUR AND 7TH ARMY, HEIDELBERG, GE. HQ U.S. EUCOM AND HQ PAGE 03 RUSNDNB1287 UNCLAS //N05720// AFSOUTH (NATO) INVOLVEMENT IS FOR STAFF INFORMATION ONLY.

7B. MEDIA OPERATIONS CENTERS:

7B1. V CORPS PAO WILL ESTABLISH A MEDIA OPERATIONS CENTER (MOC) AT BUILDING 675, GRAFENWOEHR TRAINING AREA (GTA), GRAFENWOEHR, GERMANY, BUILDING NUMBER 675. PHONE NUMBER, DSN 475-8470. COMMERCIAL 049-(0)9641-63-8470. TIME/DATE OPERATIONAL 200800Z OCT 95. POC, V CORPS PAO.

7B2. V CORPS PAO WILL ESTABLISH A MEDIA OPERATIONS CENTER (MOC) AT (LOCATION TBD), COMBAT MANEUVER TRAINING CENTER (CMTC), HOHENFELS, GERMANY. BUILDING NUMBER AND PHONE NUMBER, TBD. TIME/DATE OPERATIONAL, 20 OCT 95. POC, V CORPS PAO.

7B3. V CORPS PAO WILL ASSIST WITH MEDIA TRAINING FOR SELECT PERSONNEL AND CONDUCT COMMAND INFORMATION MEDIA EFFORTS DURING THE EXERCISE, WITHIN CAPABILITY.

7B4. HQ, USAREUR AND 7TH ARMY OCPA IS READY TO RESPOND TO QUERIES AS REQUIRED. POC IS MEDIA RELATIONS BRANCH, USAREUR OCPA, COMMERCIAL, 049-6221-57-8847/8934, FAX 049-6221-57-8986.

7D. MEDIA COVERAGE IS WELCOMED. V CORPS PAO WILL PROVIDE MEDIA TRANSPORTATION WITHIN CMTC AND GTA DURING THE EXERCISE. MEDIA PAGE 04 RUSNDNB1287 UNCLAS //N05720// SHOULD COME PREPARED FOR ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS AND MUDDY TRAINING AREAS. MEDIA FACILITIES AT BOTH TRAINING AREAS WILL BE SPARTAN. FOR MORE INFORMATION CONTACT THE V CORPS PAO.

7E. ACTIVATION AND DEPLOYMENT OF THE DOD MEDIA POOL IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THIS EXERCISE. ALL MEDIA ARE WELCOME AND MAY VISIT THE TRAINING UPON REQUEST BETWEEN 20-27 OCT 95, WITH MEDIA DAYS SCHEDULED ON 23 AND 24 OCT 95.

7F. INTERNAL INFORMATION AND AUDIO-VISUAL COVERAGE. COMMAND INFORMATION PUBLICATION ALSO DEPLROYS TO COVER THE EXERCISE. THESE PERSONNEL WILL CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN UNIFORM AND DO NOT
These personnel will conduct operations in uniform and do not require escort at GTA or CMTC during Mountain Eagle.

7G. Media coverage. Open coverage with escort is the desired method of coverage. Media days are scheduled for both CMTC and GTA exercise sites on 23 and 24 Oct 95, location and times TBD. Media will not be allowed unescorted access to training sites. Internal and external media are not allowed in simulation or command and control facilities.

7H. Media travel via military aircraft. Request OATSD-PA coordination for approval for media to fly on a space available basis during exercise Mountain Eagle. The exercise will take place in and around the Grafenwoehr training area and the combat maneuver training area, Germany, 20-27 Oct 95.

8. HQ V Corps PAO POC is LTC Ron Williams, DSN 475-8470, commercial 049-9641-83-8470. HQ USAREUR OCPA POC for this page is Maj Ryan Yantis, DSN 370-6753, FAX 8986; commercial 049-6221-57-6753, FAX 8986.

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TIMESTAMP: 9510201214 SUBJECT: CHANGE TO PROPOSED GUIDANCE - EXERCISE MOUNTAIN SHIELD

RFI: RUEKJCS8188
PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED SPECAT HANDLING:
DTG: 201634Z OCT 95
FROM: CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//AEA
TO: RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECPA-PP//
RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG
/GE//AEAGC-EX/AEAPA/USAFLQ/AEAGC//
RUFDAVU/CDR V CORPS HEIDELBERG GE//PAO//
RUFDBJU/CDR USSETAF VICENZA IT//PAO/G3//
RUFDBWN/CDR 3COSCOM WIESBADEN GE//PAO//
RUFDFEU/CDR 1AD BAD KREUZNACH GE//PAO//
RUFDFDU/CDR 3ID WUERZBURG GE//PAO//
RUFDCOU/CDR 21 TAACOM KAIERSLAUTERN GE//PAO//
RUFGRU/C/7ATC GROFENWOEHR GE//PAO//
RUFHOG/COG 7ATC CMTC HOHENFELS GE//PAO//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OATSD-PA//
INFO: RUEADWD/HQDA WASHINGTON DC//SAPA//
RUEHOUAM/EASSWY BONN GE//DAO/USIS/PRESS ATTACHE//

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UNCLAS
PAGE 02 RUFDDIN0065 UNCLAS
SUBJECT: CHANGE TO PROPOSED GUIDANCE - EXERCISE MOUNTAIN SHIELD
REFERENCES
A. MESSAGE, PROPOSED GUIDANCE, USCINCEUR ECPA,
   DTG 201315Z OCT 95
B. GUIDANCE FROM COL SULLIVAN, CPA, HQ USAREUR OCPA, REGARDING
   PA POSTURE (SEE PARA 1, BELOW).
B. PHONCON BETWEEN CPT SATTLER, EUROM ECPA AND MAJ RYAN YANTIS, USAREUR OCPA, 201800Z OCT 95 SUBJECT: CHANGE IN PA POSTURE.
1. REQUEST IMMEDIATE APPROVAL FOR CHANGE TO PROPOSED GUIDANCE IN RFF A. THE PROPOSED CHANGE REPLACES PARA 3
OF THAT MESSAGE WITH THE FOLLOWING.

QUOTE: THE OPEN DISCUSSION OF THESE PREPARATIONS IN TESTIMONY THIS WEEK BY SECDEF AND SECSTATE AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS HAS EFFECTIVELY COOPTED THE PASSIVE POSTURE PREVIOUSLY IN PLACE. NO DOD ANNOUNCEMENT NEEDED. OPEN ACCESS TO TRAINING IS ONGOING.

REQUEST EUCOM ECPA PROVIDE THIS PAG (WHEN APPROVED) TO USIS, AMEMBASSY BONN, GERMANY FOR INFORMATION PURPOSES. REQUEST ANY ADDRESSEE USING THIS PAG NOTIFY HQ USAREUR OCPA, MEDIA RELATIONS BRANCH POC. ENDQUOTE.

PAGE 03 RUFDI0065 UNCLASS

2. POC THIS REQUEST IS MAJ RYAN YANTIS, USAREUR OCPA, PLANS AND POLICY; DSN 370-8763, FAX 370-8986.

BT

#8188

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<^SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01
<^SSN>8188
<^TOR>951020121407 M0879287
## Department of Defense
Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
1400 Defense Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1400

### FAX COVER SHEET

**DATE:** 25Oct 95  
**FROM:** LTC Owens  
CASD/PA/DFL, Rm 2D757  
PENTAGON

**PHONE:** (703) 697-1254  
**FAX:** (703) 693-6853

**SUBJECT:** PPAG - Exercise Mountain Eagle 95

Number of pages including cover sheet: 5

If all pages are not received or are illegible, please call (703) 697-1254 or DSN 227-1284

**REMARKS:**

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MEMORANDUM FOR NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (ATTN: MAJ SEATON)
STATE DEPARTMENT, BUREAU FOR EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN
AFFAIRS (ATTN: MR. SCHWAN)
STATE DEPARTMENT, BUREAU FOR POLITICAL-MILITARY
AFFAIRS (ATTN: MR. EVANS)
UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
(ATTN: LTC JOHNSON) RM 858
DIRECTOR, EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, ISA (ATTN: LTC KEAGLE)
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, PUBLIC AFFAIRS
(ATTN: LTC KROFF) RM 2D246
OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF, PUBLIC AFFAIRS (ATTN: CDR DOOLEY)
CHIEF OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
OF THE ARMY (ATTN: LTC WHITEHEAD)
DIRECTOR FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION (ATTN: CDR FRANKLIN)

SUBJECT: Proposed Public Affairs Guidance – Exercise MOUNTAIN EAGLE 95

Attached for your review is the proposed public affairs guidance, provided by EUCOM Public Affairs, for Exercise MOUNTAIN EAGLE 95. This PPAG is being provided late, with the exercise already underway. If you have comments, request your response not later than 1630 hrs, Thursday, 26 October 1995. Your concurrence will be assumed if no response is received by the suspense date.

Point of contact for responses is LTC Arne Owens, USA, Plans Officer, COMM (703) 697-6163, COMM FAX (703) 693-6853.

Mark A. Brzozowski
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director for Plans

Attachment:
As stated
EXERCISE MOUNTAIN EAGLE

- **Summary.** Approximately 10,000 U.S. Army V (Fifth) Corps and 1st Armored Division soldiers are conducting a month-long training exercise that began October 12 at the 7th U.S. Army Training Center, Grafenwoehr, Germany, and the Combat Maneuver Training Center, Hohenfels, Germany, through November 15, 1995, under an exercise named Mountain Eagle.

- **The goals of the exercise are:**

  - to provide **gunnery and tactical training** for elements of the 1st Armored Division,
  
  - conduct **military stability operations** training for 1st Armored Division forces,
  
  - exercise **command, control and logistics** functions of the division on a fairly large scale,
  
  - and, **overall,** to continue to maintain a ready, trained, professional and relevant force in central Europe.

- **Military stability operations** include a variety of tasks which include peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations and humanitarian aid aspects. The specific tasks included in military stability training are:

  - patrolling zones of separation
  
  - reacting to mines
  
  - manning checkpoints
  
  - meeting with civilians and civilian officials
  
  - reacting to zone of separation violations
  
  - assisting non-governmental organizations (NGOs)

- 1st Armored Division elements will conduct gunnery training and participate in situational training exercises (STXs) at the Grafenwoehr training area. The STXs will prepare soldiers and small unit leaders to react to a myriad of situations concerning military stability operations.
• Following the training at Grafenwoehr, the division will conduct a tactical road march to the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) in Hohenfels, Germany. Here division elements will conduct military stability operations using training center personnel as role players and the opposing forces.

• At least three different computer models will support the exercise. The simulation programs are brigade-battalion simulation (BBS), corps battle simulation (CBS), and urban combat computer assisted training simulation (UCCATS).

• Unlike the previous exercises in June and September, no troops from the Southern European Task Force (SETAF) are participating in Mountain Eagle. However, there are a limited number of SETAF elements present to observe the training and to serve as liaison with division and corps staffs -- routine for this type of training.

• Flight operations and live fire training are planned for both day and night, but will be limited on weekends.