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**COLLECTION:**
- Clinton Presidential Records
- National Security Council
- Ted Widmer (Speechwriting)
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- Kerrick [General Donald L.] [2]

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  - P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
  - P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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  - P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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  - b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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Good morning. I’d like to begin by wishing you all a happy day after Veteran’s Day. Despite all the military has done to defend America, this holiday just never seems to fall on a Monday.

It’s good to see so many of you here this morning. I’m very happy to talk to you about the National Security Council because I think it is important Americans know what we do and how we do it. I especially think it’s important for all of you here at the War College to know, because there are so many complicated decisions that have to be made every time we see the threat of foreign hostilities on the horizon.

Before any weapon is fired, thousands, if not millions of pieces of information are filtered through the highest levels of government to determine the best course of action. The NSC is the filter closest to the President, giving him up-to-the-minute information received from the military and other sections of the government. If we do our jobs right, we make sure that American troops are protected by the most current knowledge of their adversaries. Or even better, we help to avoid hostilities altogether. The NSC has been involved in every decision to deploy force over the last half-century, but it has also helped to secure peace through negotiation and
dialogue. From the Korean War to Desert Storm, from the Cuban Missile Crisis to Camp David and the Dayton Accords, the National Security Council has been at the heart of debate, decision, and action.

1997 has been a big year for the NSC. It is our fiftieth anniversary. And though the NSC has been a low-profile organization for most of those fifty years, we are suddenly getting a lot of attention for our work. Of course, not all this attention is exactly good. How many of you have seen *The Peacemaker*? Well, I’d like to offer a couple of small corrections. First of all, I’m sorry to inform you the average NSC staffer does not look like Nicole Kidman. Not even close. And second, the average NSC staffer does not enjoy the right to singlehandedly order troops into combat behind the Russian border. The NSC I work for is a little more complicated.

Other recent movies are not much better, usually showing the National Security Advisor as some kind of insecure zealot, bent on making everyone listen to his terrible advice. In *Air Force One*, the NSA is an arrogant egghead who brags about his ability to get the best basketball tickets in town. In *Contact*, he’s a shameless self-promoter. And in *Murder at 1600*, the NSA is sensitively portrayed as a deranged maniac who tries to force the President to resign.

On second thought, maybe our obscurity wasn’t such a bad thing.

When Jim Reed called and gave me my marching orders with this speech, he specifically wanted me to discuss how today’s NSC fits into the interagency decision-making process. I would like to take questions from you afterwards, but let me begin by laying out for you what exactly the
real National Security Council is. Many Americans have heard of it, but have no sense of its size, function, or even its physical location.

- NSC Overview

Compared to the Department of Defense, the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council is tiny. It has 155 staffers, many of whom are on detail from other departments and agencies. The payroll of the NSC has only 42 people. It is a subsection of the executive branch of the government, and its offices are in the White House and the Old Executive Office Building. The NSC was created in 1947 as part of President Truman’s National Security Act, which also created the Department of Defense, the Air Force and the Central Intelligence Agency. In the early years, it included the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense, and one of its primary goals was to unify the service branches and the foreign service, all of whom had grown rather independent in the wake of America’s victory in World War Two. Over time, NSC meetings expanded to include the Vice-President, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the CIA director, and of course the National Security Advisor.

Since 1947 the NSC has evolved significantly, but it remains true to its original goal of advising and assisting the President with quick, accurate information relating to foreign affairs and the implementation of American policy. This advice can range anywhere from tracking El Nino to choosing the right words in a toast to the Chinese president to giving up-to-the-minute information on military action in hot spots like Bosnia and Korea. In layman’s language, the NSC is part presidential brain trust, part inter-agency referee, and part bureaucratic traffic cop.
The Situation Room, where the President and the NSC monitor late-breaking foreign developments, is about twenty feet from my office. When a crisis erupts, the President uses the Situation Room and the NSC for prompt information as he formulates the proper national response. And right here, I want to spell out – the NSC is not in the business of operations. We leave that to you folks. We are an instrument the President can use for assistance with policy and coordination between agencies. But everything we do follows a clear procedure and a clear line of command. There are no Nicole Kidmans in the NSC I know.

Since 1947, each president has used the NSC differently. President Truman's NSC was dominated by personnel from the State Department. President Eisenhower was more comfortable with military advisers. President Kennedy preferred small ad hoc groups of experts from different backgrounds, and he created the new job of National Security Advisor. This office grew even more important under President Nixon, especially as Henry Kissinger developed a large role in the administration’s foreign policy. President Carter was dubious of the power Kissinger had amassed, and he restructured the NSC to become more of an informal forum for ideas and planning than a place where decisions were made unilaterally. But it was still a crucial source of foreign policy, especially as the President leaned more and more on Zbigniew Brzezinski with help relating to Iran and Afghanistan.

In the 1980s, the NSC was again restructured after the Iran-Contra affair, and the perception the NSC had grown too active in planning cover policy in Central America and the Middle East. In 1986, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. One very good
result of that act was that we now issue an annual National Security Strategy Report, where we explain to the world our overarching foreign policy. By explaining our global strategy in comprehensible language, we increase understanding at home and abroad. We also help to insure that our foreign policy is well-coordinated between the different parts of the government, including the military. I can’t stress enough to you how important it is to have a set of clearly-articulated goals when we’re dealing with decisions that affect the lives of our men and women in uniform.

• President Clinton and the NSC

That brings us to the current President. The day President Clinton was inaugurated, January 20, 1993, he instituted sweeping change in the NSC. That day he signed two documents. The first, was called PDD-1. This created two new kinds of presidential orders—the Presidential Decision Directive, or PDD, and the Presidential Review Directive, or PRD. PDDs would express Presidential decisions on national security matters, and PRDs would direct agencies and departments to conduct specific reviews of important matters.

The second document he signed that day was called PDD-2. It significantly expanded the NSC, allowing new voices, including the U.N. Ambassador, the President’s Chief of Staff, and his economic adviser, and occasionally the Attorney General. By doing so, PDD-2 increased cooperation between these different constituencies, who formerly had a hard time getting themselves heard when the national security was planned. Five days later, the President also created the National Economic Council, with the expectation that the NSC and the NEC would
harmonize our foreign and domestic economic policy. Once again, the NSC was acting as the bridge between different groups close to the President.

PDD-2 also created a network of four different levels of decision-making. Besides the top level of the NSC, it maintained two important committees from the Bush administration, a Principals Committee and a Deputies Committee. Finally, it provided for a network of Interagency Working Groups. The full-dress NSC has met only once, on March 2, 1993, to review global conditions. Most of the NSC’s work is done in more flexible working groups, under the coordination of the National Security Advisor.

The Principals Committee is a forum for Cabinet-level officials to resolve issues together, and hash out broad issues of foreign policy, such as our China and Russia policy, and key decisions such as whether to tighten sanctions against Serbia. If issues are unresolved, they go the President with a split recommendation. And even with agreement, decisions are often sent to the President because of their importance, such as any decision to deploy American troops in a peacekeeping force. The Principals Committee meets about 2 or three times a month, but more often in a crisis.

The Deputies Committee is chaired by the Deputy National Security Advisor. It closely follows the interagency process to make sure the President’s policies are carried out efficiently. The committee contains members at the Undersecretary level, and it meets more frequently than the Principals Committee, roughly twice a week. It supervises our specific policy, making sure that Bosnia sanctions are enforced, or airdrops are reaching their targets. It also is responsible for
crisis management and overseeing the lower-level Interagency Working Groups created by PDD-2.

This is the basic architecture of the NSC under President Clinton. Besides these committees, the everyday work of the NSC is divided into 19 directorates and several administrative offices, with experts on different parts of the world, economic conditions, the environment, intelligence and other areas affecting our foreign policy. Since assuming office, President Clinton has signed 59 PDDs and 54 PRDs. As a result, the NSC is functioning more smoothly, and integrating more points of view than ever before.

- Day-to-Day Work of the NSC

The everyday work of the NSC can be divided into several functions, all of which dovetail with the work of the Committees I just mentioned.

--As I said at the outset, we are process managers, coordinating information between agencies and departments trying to get the President's ear. We do this at all levels of the government, not just the upper echelons. At the staff level, we harmonize the interests of all these different constituencies by meeting with their staff, sending letters and faxes, making phone calls, all to ensure that American foreign policy sends a united message, with everyone on the same team.

--Once the message has been formulated, the NSC also helps to deliver it. We do this in every way conceivable, from the NSSRs to the PDDS to the President's speeches themselves, which are prepared with background material furnished by the NSC. And any directive issued by
another department that affects US foreign policy must be cleared through the NSC. By constantly staying in touch with all of the major interest groups (State, Defense, CIA), we ensure that the public face of our foreign policy is consistent.

--In the event of a problem, one of the NSC’s most important roles is crisis management. I mentioned earlier the Situation Room. Here we receive the information from military and intelligence sources that allows us to make quick decisions. [TK explain the workings of the Sit Room?—most students would be fascinated]
[TK more on how we support operations?]}

So that is how the NSC functions. As the world continues to change, I’m sure the NSC will change with it, but the current system under PDD-2 has produced excellent results. I’d like to briefly talk about the end result of all this work I’ve been discussing—the foreign policy of the United States.

• Where Are We Today?—50 years later, and into the 21st century

Today, I think most of us would agree the world is in relatively good shape. Free markets are ascendant, barriers are coming down, and military tensions are relatively low compared to most of the last fifty years. But we still need to be careful. I will quickly summarize some of the major foreign policy issues we have wrestled with over the last few years.
In a sense the current world situation resembles that of 1947. Then there was a great deal of tension because one world order had collapsed and a new one was forming, one in which we were pitted against a great adversary whom we were struggling to understand.

Fifty years later, we are again witnessing the birth of a new world, quite different from 1947. The Cold War has ended, and with it our need to match wits against a single rival. Russia and America are partners, NATO is expanding, we are making progress with the Chinese, and there are no large-scale wars on the immediate horizon.

But the challenges are still out there. In the new world, there is greater partnership, but every day brings new threats. The former Soviet Union has become an extremely complicated place, where new forces of ethnic nationalism and rapid economic development complicate our picture. China is also a hodgepodge of different types of people, some more modern than others, whom we need to understand better than we do. And throughout the third world, we are dealing with constant problems, familiar and unfamiliar, from food shortages and environmental disasters to tribal violence and refugee crises. As we have seen in places from Africa to Asia to the Middle East, it doesn't take long for something like a refugee crisis to become a military problem, and that's why we need to understand all the components of the challenges facing us.

In the past few years, the scale of hostilities has been reduced, but they are still a constant source of concern. More and more, the warfare we see around the world is intra-national, not international. In places like the former Yugoslavia and the Congo, we see terrible infighting that is difficult to understand from traditional perspectives. Unlike the Cold War, the new situation
holds fewer direct threats to the sovereignty of the United States. But it is still a highly volatile world, filled with new and old pressures that require our vigilance. The end of the Cold War was an exciting event, but it also increased America's responsibility to lead the rest of the world, both by example and, when necessary, by the prudent display of force.

That is where the NSC comes into the picture. Many of the NSC's staffers, like myself, have military experience, and can offer advice whenever the use of American armed forces is considered by the President. But the NSC also can draw on the expertise of different kind of experts, from regional specialists to economists to environmentalists to intelligence liaisons. This flexibility is our strongest ally in a rapidly changing world picture. Many of the most pressing new issues on the President's desk do not fall clearly under the jurisdiction of one agency or department: the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Chemical Weapons, land mines, global warming, Gulf War Illness. As we did fifty years ago, we are acting as honest brokers between the different people who need to get their views to the President.

The system isn't perfect. But it's working pretty well. For every crisis, large or small, we have a concerted response for the President. As the big wars come less frequently, we will need more flexible responses to specific situations. Here the rapid support of the NSC can have its greatest effect. Not just fighting these smaller wars, but preventing them.

What are the current goals of American foreign policy? How do we envision the 21st century? I'll outline this for you quickly. President Clinton's 1994 NSSR explained the broad goals of engagement and enlargement. We have been pursuing these goals around the world, expanding
NATO and trade alliances like NAFTA, promoting democracy in Russia and China, and enhancing American prosperity through greater investment abroad. We are helping to build a new architecture of foreign relations, where countries deal openly with each other, join international organizations, and freely communicate their disagreements. The states that do not choose to join this new world, like Iran, Libya and Cuba, will become increasingly isolated rogue nations. For the United States, the choice is clear: we are choosing integration over isolation.

President Clinton’s last State of the Union address went into more detail about this policy, listing six specific aims. At the NSC, we call them the Six Pillars.

1 -- We must help foster a peaceful, undivided, democratic Europe. [NATO expansion, Partnership for Peace; Helsinki]

2 -- America must promote a stable, prosperous Asia Pacific community. [China, APEC, Japan alliance, North Korea]

3 -- America must prosper in the global economy. [NAFTA, fast-track, overcoming other trade barriers; goal of free trade throughout Americas by 2005, through Asia by 2020]

4 -- We must continue America’s leadership as the most important force for peace. [Bosnia, Middle East, Northern Ireland, Haiti]

5 -- We must counter growing dangers to our security: weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, international crime, drugs, illegal arms trafficking, and environmental damage.

Many of these threats are transnational. [The Russian mob is now infiltrating Colombian drug cartels. And Iran is behind much of the terrorism in the Middle East, which is why we don’t
want the Chinese to sell them nuclear material.] To fight transnational threats to our security, we need a cooperative approach between nations.

6 -- We must have the diplomatic and military tools to meet all these challenges. [more funding for foreign affairs; UN]

These are the broad goals of the NSC in late 1997, as we near an exciting new century. I'd be glad to go into them further if you'd like to ask questions about our long-term strategy.

I'd like to end by briefly mentioning our first president, a great soldier and a great statesman. When George Washington gave his farewell address, he warned against American involvement in what he called “foreign entanglements.” He worried it would drag us into ancient quarrels, and slow down our growth as a nation. At the time, he was right. But since World War Two, Americans have agreed we have a strong national interest in supporting peace and prosperity abroad.

We cannot sit back and hope the rest of the world will avoid conflict. We need to use our strength for stability. And in order to best use our strength abroad, in the thousands of situations that arise every year, we need a flexible plan of action that is coordinated down to the tiniest detail. We need smooth cooperation between the men and women who conduct our foreign policy and our military operations. In short, we need a smooth-running NSC. We will never see the complete disappearance of “foreign entanglements.” But we can do our best to untangle the entanglements through alert observation; quick, decisive response plans; and seamless interagency communication.
Fifty years after the NSC was founded, there are no large-scale wars, and worldwide hostilities are generally limited to small regional conflicts. We don’t often realize how much better things are today than they were then. There are many reasons for this improvement, and one of them is that the NSC has fulfilled the mandate President Truman gave it in 1947. When the President needs information to make a quick decision, he gets it. The system works. I am confident that fifty years from now, Americans will enjoy continued security as a result of the NSC’s efforts. I hope some of you men and women will be a part of it.

Thank you.

###
Delighted to have this chance to speak with you this evening. Especially glad to meet with a group that so clearly lives up to its billing. Obviously, anyone smart enough to get invited out of the city to this lovely setting in August deserves to be an “intelligence fellow.”

Want to talk with you about President Clinton’s foreign policy priorities and their implications for the intelligence community. Sure your questions will lead to a discussion that will be at least as illuminating as my overview, so I’ll leave plenty of time at the end.

As everyone here recognizes, we live in a time of radical change. If we were meeting only ten years ago, we would still be discussing a world map still largely divided into blocs of red and blue. Now, with the barriers of a half-century gone, President Clinton has challenged the American people to be as farsighted as the generation of Truman and Marshall was after World War II — and to create the institutions and understandings that will bring America another fifty years of security and prosperity.

To accomplish that task, the President believes that our efforts must fit the realities of our time. In this regard, nothing is more important than harnessing the forces of integration that affect so many aspects of our lives. You know these phenomena as well as I do. Economic integration — reinforced by revolutions in communications and technology — mean that ideas, information and capital speed around the planet in nano-seconds. Nations are more closely linked than ever — and more profoundly affected by events far beyond their borders.

These forces create unprecedented opportunities for progress. Indeed, President Clinton is convinced that by harnessing the forces of integration we can not only improve our nation’s economic wellbeing but shape the most fundamental character of the world we inhabit. These forces spread values, including the ideas that define America — democracy, liberty, free enterprise — which are now more widely embraced than at any time in history.

The economic, technological and political trends that are bringing people together are creating a new, central division in the world — between nations that observe the international rules of the road and opt into the community of nations — and those that remain outliers.

These norms — alliances of like-minded countries... adherence to the rule of law... open and competitive trade rules... regimes to control dangerous weapons — are forming a structure for security and prosperity for all who choose to live within them, and they define the terms of isolation of those that stay outside. As the world grows closer, the cost of exclusion grows.

Turning this trend to our advantage is essential for meeting the challenges that these very forces of integration create. As all who have watched the evolution of the intelligence world over the last decade know, the trend toward integration also helps fuel new threats to our security, peace and prosperity. Because as borders become more porous, nations become
more vulnerable -- and we need a new level of coordination and common effort to deal with new threats.

- Consider a few examples of economic and security threats bred, at least in part, by the forces of integration: The Peso crisis threatened not only Mexico's economy, but jobs in America and the stability of developing economies around the world. Terrorists, organized criminals, drug traffickers also benefit from technological change and the free flow of goods and information. And they often are supported by rogue states like Iran, Iraq, Libya and Sudan which remain outside the community of nations -- and seek to destabilize it.

- The challenge this President has undertaken is to encourage the positive forces of integration -- while preventing the forces of disintegration from dominating the future.

- The President's vision is driven by six key strategic objectives: working for an undivided, democratic peaceful Europe for the first time in history... forging a strong, stable Asia Pacific community...embracing our role as a decisive force for peace in the world... building the bulwarks against transnational security challenges...creating jobs and growth through a more open and competitive trading system...and maintaining a strong military and fully funded diplomacy to get these jobs done. These objectives provide America's road map in the world. Let me describe each briefly.

- **The first strategic goal is working for an undivided, peaceful, democratic Europe.** After two world wars that began in Europe, we can create a durable European peace by replacing the divisions of the past with ties of partnership for a common future.

- In the last few months, we have seen progress in this effort that only a few years ago would have been unimaginable. As someone who served two tours in Germany, I can tell you it's been a privilege to be part of this historic achievement -- a feeling shared throughout the Administration.

- In Madrid, working with our allies, we bridged one of this century's deepest chasms -- and invited three Central European nations to join NATO. The addition of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary will make the alliance stronger. We're adapting NATO to meet the new security challenges of our era. We're giving more responsibility to the Europeans for European contingencies.

- By leaving NATO's door open for more new members, we are ensuring that no new divisions replace the ones. We're supporting the powerful trend in Central Europe's new democracies toward deepening reform and settling old quarrels. We're reaching out and strengthening our ties to new partners through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, working with those who are outside the Alliance to strengthen peace and security.

- We're also building a new partnership with a democratic Russia. Russia must be a part of the new security structure in Europe. As the Founding Act in Paris demonstrated, we can build that cooperation as we enlarge NATO -- without undercutting reform in Russia.
• **Our second strategic objective is building a strong, stable, integrated Asia-Pacific community.** The old conventional wisdom saw Asia, North America and Europe emerging as rival, competing blocs. President Clinton had a different vision, based on America’s enduring place as a Pacific power. Soon after taking office, he convened the first-ever Asia Pacific summit meeting, where the leaders agreed to define our futures not just in Asian or American terms, but increasingly in Asian-Pacific terms.

• This is an evolutionary process involving more open trade and a continuing American security engagement in the region. In an environment where regional rivalries are still dangerous, America provides a essential balance wheel for stability.

• Requires that we meet three immediate challenges. First, we must deepen our partnership with Japan...militarily, diplomatically and through market opening initiatives. Second, we must continue to work closely with South Korea -- remaining vigilant against the unpredictability of a North Korea in distress...still pursuing the four-party peace talks...ensuring dismantlement of North Korea’s frozen nuclear program. Third, we must deepen our strategic dialogue with China.

• With the approach of President Jiang’s visit to Washington in October, this last goal is front and center on our agenda. A China that evolves as a power that is stable, more open politically and economically and non-aggressive militarily – a China moving toward, not away, from a secure international order -- is profoundly in our interest.

• Our engagement with China is not a reward for good behavior. It’s a vehicle for expanding areas where we can cooperate to advance our strategic interests – such as on the CTBT and stability on the Korean Peninsula -- and where we can deal directly with our differences -- such as human rights, market access and some of China’s weapons sales.

• No guarantee that engagement will prevent China from taking a more nationalistic, self-absorbed course. But seeking to isolate China...or to isolate us from China...will push China in the wrong direction, undercutting stability for the entire Asia Pacific.

• **Our third strategic goal is act as befits the reality that America can be a decisive force for peace.** We have a unique ability to stand with others around the world who seek to bridge their divides -- and build a stronger foundation for peace, security and cooperation.

• Demands that we balance interest and risk, achievability and cost, clarity of mission and support from others. Can’t be everywhere and we shouldn’t do everything. But we must be prepared to engage when key interests and values are at stake and we can make a difference.

• Often, this engagement is diplomatic, as in the Middle East, Northern Ireland, Central Africa. Sometimes diplomacy must be backed with force: In Bosnia, our use of air power through NATO -- with determined diplomacy -- stopped a war that threatened Europe’s stability. Now, our presence through SFOR is giving a fragile peace a chance to take hold.

• There are other places where our engagement is more important than ever. Let me cite just three. South Asia remains a flashpoint and an enormous opportunity for cooperation. The
enormous resources and strategic location of the Caucasus and Central Asia give us a strong stake in strengthening their stability and building up our ties to the region. And it is profoundly in our interest to help Turkey remain anchored in the West, committed to democracy and working to resolve its differences peacefully with Greece.

- **Our fourth strategic goal is to deal with the new transnational security threats mentioned earlier -- terrorists, international criminals, drug traffickers -- and stand against the continued danger posed by rogue regimes.**

- Sometimes we must and will act alone. But these threats often cut across national lines and compel us to seek collective action. So whether it is the threat of terrorism or the scourge of drugs, we must be able to launch collective defense to thwart them.

- That’s why we are building coalitions to take on these new challenges. The Administration worked hard to win ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention, we’re stepping up international law enforcement cooperation against drug traffickers and criminal cartels, intelligence sharing to root out corruption, and a more concerted strategy against terror.

- We know that these threats have moved to the top of the concerns of the American people. Just look at the movie screen: the biggest release of the summer is Air Force One, the ultimate terrorist story -- and we’re all waiting for Peacemaker, a loose nukes film that promises to be one of the fall’s hottest movies. Not only does this mean that America’s collective imagination has turned to these crucial threats. It also means that we can look to Hollywood for help -- in fact, the Secret Service is thinking about putting an escape pod into the President’s plane. Unfortunately, they’re also looking for an NSC staffer to test it out.

- **America’s fifth strategic goal is to build a new, open trading system for the 21st century.** Our nation’s economic well-being is tied to the rest of the world. Eleven million Americans depend on exports for their jobs. We can compete with anyone -- so long as the contest is open, the field competitive and the rules fair and enforced.

- Historians will look back on this period as bringing most far-reaching changes in the global trading system since the days of Harry Truman. We completed the most sweeping round of the GATT; forged a comprehensive trade agreement with our two neighbors; tore down barriers in high-tech sectors where America leads the world; and launched a process for more open and competitive trade in our hemisphere and the Asia Pacific.

- These efforts have paid off. The global economy is not a zero sum game -- we are creating good jobs at home by nurturing new markets abroad. The President is determined to pursue this course, navigating the false choice between protectionism and unbridled free trade.

- To sustain our strong momentum, we need to conclude smart, new market-opening trade agreements. In Latin America alone, our exports in 1995 were greater than our sales to Japan and Germany combined. That’s why the President will be fighting this fall for fast track authority -- because we must complete the job we have begun.
• Finally, we cannot harness the forces of integration without the strength and resources to get the job done -- and without sharing the burdens with other like-minded nations.

• We have the finest military in the world. This President is determined that we be able to dominate any battlefield of the future -- an indispensable investment in peace and security.

• We also must fully fund America’s diplomacy. Our foreign affairs budget for the current fiscal year is 50% lower than it was a decade ago. This trend is too dangerous to continue. The President is determined to make the investments necessary to advance America’s interests. The new budget reverses the dangerous downward spiral, strengthening our ability to promote peace, fight drugs, track down terrorists, combat nuclear proliferation, boost exports and meet our obligations to the community of nations.

• These are the six strategic objectives that the President has set forth. They’re ambitious -- but achievable. They have important implications for the work of the Intelligence Community -- like to turn briefly to them.

• We’ve heard a lot about the role of intelligence in the post-Cold War World -- a lot of it highly skeptical. As the President has said, these views are “profoundly wrong.” I’m here to tell you that this Administration believes that high-quality, analytic intelligence is as important today -- in a world of often bewildering complexity -- as it was in the days of the nuclear standoff of the East-West conflict. In many ways, it’s more important.

• That’s reflected in the continued reliance of policymakers on the community’s products. The President begins his day, every day, with an intelligence report. The National Security Advisor begins and ends his day, every day, with an intelligence report. I have seen how every foreign policy decision the President makes is informed by intelligence reporting. And I take it as one vote of support for the community that this Deputy National Security Advisor got his job after serving as Director for Operations of DIA and setting up that agency’s Human Intelligence Service.

• Today, national security means foreign, defense and economic policy built on a foundation of solid intelligence. Keeping that foundation solid is one of the most difficult tasks we face simply because there are so many issues and such an extraordinary multitude of sources. There may be a vast number of topics to cover, but as the new DCI George Tenet has said, the approach must be “systematic, comprehensive and strategic…rather than one piece at a time.”

• That’s why President has been determined to set priorities for the intelligence community to meet our national security needs. And that is what he has done in Presidential Decision Directive on intelligence.

• In broad terms, they are as follows: First comes the intelligence needs of our military during an operation. We need to have all the tools at our disposal to so our commanders can make the best decisions and we can maximize the safety of our troops.
• Second: Political, economic and military intelligence about countries hostile to the U.S. We have to be up to speed on potentially hostile major powers with weapons of mass destruction.

• Third: Intelligence about specific trans-national threats, such as weapons proliferation, terrorism, drug-trafficking, organized crime and environmental issues of compelling significance.

• We know that as we go forward, we need to keep a few principles in mind. We must continue to move the frontiers of technology forward because the capacity of our satellites, signals operations, imagery and the like is vital to our national security. But we will always rely on the human intelligence to tell us what an adversary has in mind. As the President has said, “There is no zero sum choice to be made between the technological and human dimensions of intelligence. We need both and we will have both.”

• This is a good place to stop. Very much want to hear what you have to say, so let’s begin with some questions.

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<tr>
<td>001. note</td>
<td>Ted Widmer to General Kerrick and Marc Hurwitz; re: Origins of NSC Speech (partial) (1 page)</td>
<td>10/31/1997</td>
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COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Ted Widmer (Speechwriting)
OA/Box Number: 2190

FOLDER TITLE:
Kerrick [General Donald L.] [2]

RESTRICITION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
To: General Kerrick and Marc Hurwitz  
From: Ted Widmer  
October 31, 1997  

Dear General Kerrick and Marc:

Here is a second outline of the November 12 speech. I go into a fair amount of detail on the origins of the NSC, then sketch out a number of directions to go in. There may not be time to pursue all of these talking points in a half-hour lecture, but I wanted to list them for consideration. I'd be happy to try next for a completed speech, but if you would prefer that I use talking points for the second half of the speech, I can do that instead.

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Best, 

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Best,
Ted -

Don thought you might find this useful.

(It's PDD-2)

Marc

59  PDD
55  PRD

Brian Merchant
January 20, 1993

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE/NSC-2

TO:

The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Transportation
The Secretary of Energy
Representative of the United States to the United Nations
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
United States Trade Representative
The Chief of Staff to the President
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The Assistant to the President for Economic Policy
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Administrator, Agency for International Development
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency
The Director, United States Information Agency

SUBJECT: Organization of the National Security Council (NSC)

To assist me in carrying out my responsibilities in the area of national security, I hereby direct that the National Security Council system be organized as follows.
A. The National Security Council (NSC)

The National Security Council (NSC) shall be the principal forum for consideration of national security policy issues requiring Presidential determination. The functions, membership and responsibilities of the NSC shall be as set forth in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and this Presidential Decision Directive. The NSC shall advise and assist me in integrating all aspects of national security policy as it affects the United States -- domestic, foreign, military, intelligence and economic (in conjunction with the National Economic Council). Along with its subordinate committees, the NSC shall be my principal means for coordinating Executive departments and agencies in the development and implementation of national security policy. (U)

The NSC shall have as its members the President, Vice President, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, as prescribed by statute. The Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, as statutory advisers to the NSC shall attend NSC meetings. In addition, the new membership of the NSC shall include the Secretary of the Treasury, the U.S. Representative to the United Nations, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and the Chief of Staff to the President. The Attorney General shall be invited to attend meetings pertaining to his jurisdiction, including covert actions. The heads of other Executive departments and agencies, the special statutory advisers to the NSC, and other senior officials shall be invited to attend meetings of the NSC where appropriate. (U)

The NSC shall meet as required. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, at my direction and in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense and, when appropriate, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, shall be responsible for determining the agenda and ensuring that the necessary papers are prepared. Other members of the NSC may propose items for inclusion on the agenda. The Assistant to the President shall be assisted by a National Security Council staff, as provided by law. (U)

B. The NSC Principals Committee (NSC/PC)

An NSC Principals Committee (NSC/PC) is established as the senior interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security. The NSC/PC shall review, coordinate, and monitor the development and implementation of national security
policy. The NSC/PC should be a flexible instrument -- a forum available for Cabinet-level officials to meet to discuss and resolve issues not requiring the President’s participation. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall serve as Chair. The Assistant to the President for Economic Policy shall be informed of meetings and be invited to attend all those with international economic considerations.

The NSC/PC shall have as its members the Secretary of State (if unavailable, the Deputy Secretary of State or the designee of the Secretary of State); the Secretary of Defense (if unavailable, the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the designee of the Secretary of Defense); the U.S. Representative to the United Nations; the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Chair); the Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, as appropriate. The Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General or other heads of departments or agencies shall be invited as needed.

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall be responsible -- in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense, and, when appropriate, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy -- for calling meetings of the NSC/PC, for determining the agenda, and for ensuring that the necessary papers are prepared.

C. The NSC Deputies Committee (NSC/DC)

An NSC Deputies Committee (NSC/DC) shall serve as the senior sub-Cabinet interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security. The NSC/DC shall review and monitor the work of the NSC interagency process (including Interagency Working Groups established pursuant to Section D below). The Deputies Committee also shall focus significant attention on policy implementation. Periodic reviews of the Administration’s major foreign policy initiatives shall be scheduled to ensure that they are being implemented in a timely and effective manner. Also, these reviews should periodically consider whether existing policy directives should be revamped or rescinded.

The NSC/DC shall have as its members the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (who shall serve as the Chairman); the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence; and the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff;
the Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs; and the Deputy Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, as needed. The Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in consultation with the representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, may invite representatives of other Executive departments and agencies, and other senior officials, to attend meetings of the NSC/DC where appropriate in light of the issues to be discussed. When meeting on sensitive intelligence activities, including covert actions, the attendees shall include the appropriate senior representative of the Attorney General.

The Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall be responsible -- in consultation with the representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NEC, as appropriate -- for calling meetings of the NSC/DC, for determining the agenda, and for ensuring that the necessary papers are prepared. The NSC/DC shall ensure that all papers to be discussed by the NSC or the NSC/PC fully analyze the issues, fairly and adequately set out the facts, consider a full range of views and options, and satisfactorily assess the prospects, risks, and implications of each. The NSC/DC may task the interagency groups established pursuant to Section D of this Presidential Decision Directive.

The NSC Deputies Committee shall also be responsible for day-to-day crisis management, reporting to the National Security Council. In this capacity, the group shall be designated the Deputies Committee/CM, for Crisis Management. Any NSC principal or deputy, as well as the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, may request a meeting of the Deputies Committee in its crisis management capacity. The Committee also shall focus on crisis prevention -- including contingency planning for major areas of concern. While meeting as the Deputies Committee/CM, the group shall be assisted by a small support staff -- to provide institutional memory, develop agendas and record decisions.

D. Interagency Working Groups (NSC/IWGs)

A system of Interagency Working Groups -- some permanent, others ad hoc -- is hereby authorized. The NSC/IWGs shall be established at the direction of the Deputies Committee, which shall also determine the chair of the NSC/IWG -- either departmental or NSC or NEC. In general, foreign policy and defense issues should be chaired at the Assistant-Secretary level by the Departments of State and Defense, respectively; international economic issues by
the Department of the Treasury or the NEC, as appropriate; and intelligence, nonproliferation, arms control and crisis management by the NSC. The IWGs shall convene on a regular basis -- to be determined by the Deputies Committee -- to review and coordinate the implementation of Presidential decisions in their policy areas. Strict guidelines shall be established governing the operation of the Interagency Working Groups, including participants, decision-making path and time frame. The number of these working groups shall be kept to the minimum needed to promote an effective NSC system.

William J. Clinton
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

10/4

Ted Widmer:

More background for lecture or TV roles. Let's get together soon.
Overview of the NSC

- Established by the National Security Act of 1947

- Roles:
  - Advise and assist the President
  - Derived from that fundamental purpose:
    - Interagency coordination
    - Crisis management (situation room and our activities)

- Council membership:
  - Statutory Members: President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense.
  - Statutory advisors: Chairman Joint Chiefs Staff, Director Central Intelligence.
  - Invited to all meetings: Sec. Treasury, UN Ambassador, National Security Advisor, Economic Policy Advisor, and President’s Chief of Staff.
  - Others as required.

- Staff: 70% of policy staff detailed from other departments or agencies.

- How strategy and policy are articulated:
  - National Security Strategy
  - Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs)
  - Presidential Directives, Determinations, etc.
  - Presidential speeches, letters, memoranda
  - Directives, orders, instructions issued by the Departments and Agencies -- If they affect national policy, they are cleared through NSC

- How interagency coordination is conducted:
  - The Cabinet
  - The National Security Council
  - Principals Committee
  - Deputies Committee
  - Interagency Working Groups
  - Staff level: meetings, phone, fax, memos, etc.

- What the NSC does not do: command forces, lead operations or conduct any similar activity that would make us an operating agency -- such actions contradict NSC's legal status.
Background on the National Security Strategy

- Prior to 1987: No statutory requirement to have a strategy or to report on it to Congress.
  - Strategy documents published on an ad hoc basis.
  - Varied in scope and focus.

- Requirement for NSSR a result of two independent forces:
  - Strategic imperative to broaden conception of national security - economic and diplomatic as well as military.
  - Defense reform movement - improve strategic planning.

  - Centralized the planning process
  - Established requirement for an annual national security strategy report
    - Presidential articulation of U.S. interests, goals and objectives.
    - Submitted with budget
    - Classified and unclassified version

- Reagan Administration
  - 1987 Report. Short timeframe: current strategic thought with focus on military power vis a vis communist bloc
  - 1988 Report. Broader context: strategy identified many elements of our national power, with regional strategies for integrating these elements in different areas of the world

- Bush Administration
  - 1990 Report. Revolutionary events in Eastern Europe rendered many underlying policies of previous NSSRs obsolete. Emphasis upon specific policy initiatives.
  - 1993 Report. Documented successful conclusion to, and transition out of, Cold War.

- Clinton Administration
  - 1994 Report. Set out the tenets of a national security strategy of engagement and enlargement
    - Remaining engaged in the world through US leadership to ensure balance and stability in regions of greatest importance to U.S.
- Enlarging the community of free-market democracies to promote peace and prosperity
- Three core objectives:
  - enhance security
  - economic revitalization
  - promote democracy

  - Refined strategy:
    - Defined categories of national interests.
    - Refined criteria on when & how to use military force
      - Addressed "CNN effect."
    - Emphasized dangers and opportunities that transcend national borders.
      - Distinction between foreign and domestic policies eroding.
    - Established an "exceptional" right of intervention in the sovereign affairs of another nation.

- Guidance for 1997 report
  - Recast the strategy -- succinctly
  - Cull list of accomplishments: use selectively to illustrate strategy’s principles
  - Submit to Congress in May in order to allow for inclusion of final results from Quadrennial Defense Review.

- Developments considered in formulating the strategy report:
  - Changes and uncertainty in International Politics.
  - Changes in domestic policies and politics: Distinction between domestic and foreign policy has blurred.
  - Different expectations of five major audiences: Congress, foreign capitals, executive agencies, media, and foreign policy community.
The 1997 National Security Strategy Report

- The 1997 NSSR's **three core objectives** remain unchanged from the previous three Clinton Administration NSSRs:
  - To enhance our security.
  - To bolster America’s economic prosperity.
  - To promote democracy abroad.

- The NSSR is built upon the six **strategic priorities** that the President laid out in his 1997 State of the Union Address:
  - First, we must help **foster a peaceful, undivided, democratic Europe**.
  - Second, promoting a **stable, prosperous Asia Pacific community**.
  - Third, America must prosper in the global economy. Tear down trade barriers abroad, especially in Asia and Latin America.
  - Fourth, America must continue to be an **unrelenting force for peace**. Exercise leadership.
  - Fifth, we must continue to move strongly to **counter growing dangers to our security**: weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, international crime, drugs, illegal arms trafficking, and environmental damage.
  - Sixth, we must have the **diplomatic and military tools to meet all these challenges**.

- The **imperative of engagement** drives our overall strategic approach: influencing the actions of other states and non-state actors, exerting global leadership, and remaining the preferred security partner.

- **Enhancing Security**, a three-pronged strategy:
  - Shaping the **international environment** to prevent or deter threats.
  - Maintaining an **ability to respond across the full spectrum of potential crises** -- from transnational threats, to smaller-scale contingencies and major theater warfare.
  - **Preparing now** to meet the challenges of an uncertain future.
• **Promoting Prosperity.** The **second core objective** of our national security strategy is to promote America’s prosperity.

  • Enhancing American Competitiveness. Enhancing access to foreign markets and an export strategy and advocacy program.
  • Strengthening Macroeconomic Coordination. Improve our capacity to prevent and mitigate international financial crises.
  • Providing for Energy Security.
  • Promoting Sustainable Development Abroad.

• **Promoting Democracy.** The **third core objective** of our national security strategy is to promote democracy and human rights.

  • Emerging Democracies. Strengthen democratic and free market institutions and norms.
  • Adherence to Universal Human Rights and Democratic Principles.
  • Humanitarian Assistance. Alleviate human suffering, help establish democratic regimes that respect human rights, and to pursue appropriate strategies for economic development.

• **Conclusion:**

  • **Continuity:**
    • Our core objectives of enhancing security, bolstering economic prosperity and promoting democracy
    • The emphasis on engagement.

  • **Changes:**
    • Enlargement subsumed under engagement.
      • Subtitle no longer “engagement and enlargement.”
      • Enlargement deleted at request of State:
        • Confusion with NATO enlargement.
        • Avoid criticism that administration appeared not to recognize that the process of democratization can generate conflict.
        • **No lessening of the commitment to promoting democracy.**
    • The addition of preparing for an uncertain future to the strategy for enhancing our security. Recognizes the need to strike a balance between near-term requirements and preparing now for future challenges.

• I would be more than happy to take any questions you may have.
Current Hot Issues

- General:
  - UN Reform and US arrears
  - State Department restructuring
  - Global threats: Terrorism, WMD proliferation, narcotics

- Arms control:
  - Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ratification
  - Negotiating a ban on Anti-personnel landmines (APL)
  - ABM-TMD demarcation
  - Gaining Russian Duma ratification of START II
  - Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty adaptation

- Economic policy:
  - Fast track legislation
  - Export controls (supercomputers, etc.)

- Europe
  - Bosnia
  - NATO enlargement
  - Greece-Turkey: Aegean, Cyprus

- Middle East
  - Middle East Peace Process
  - Dual containment of Iraq and Iran
  - Caspian Sea region

- Asia
  - Korean Peninsula
  - Engagement with China
  - US-Japan defense relationship
  - South Asian proliferation concerns

- Latin America
  - Arms sales policy
  - Ecuador-Peru relations
  - Caribbean issues: Haiti, Cuba and regional development

- Africa
  - Continuing instability and threats to democracy
  - Humanitarian concerns
REMARKS BY MAJOR GENERAL DONALD L. KERRICK
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
WASHINGTON, DC
NOVEMBER 12, 1997

Outline 2:

1] Salutation

[Acknowledgments—RADM Marfiak, new commandant; Colonel David Tretler (acting commandant who extended invitation); Colonel Jim Reed (coordinating event); Dr. Charles Stevenson (course director); others?]

Good morning. I’d like to begin by wishing you all a happy day after Veteran’s Day. Despite all the military has done to defend America, this holiday just never seems to fall on a Monday.

It’s good to see so many of you here.

2] Main Theme — quick summary

I was invited here to explain the National Security Council and how it works. I would like to take questions from you afterwards, but I’ll begin by laying out for you what exactly the NSC is and how it fits into the President’s policy process. Many Americans have vaguely heard of it, but have no sense of its size or function, or even its physical location.

3] Background and History

The National Security Council is tiny compared to other branches of the government. It has 155 staffers, many of whom are on detail from other departments and agencies. The payroll of the NSC has only 42 people. It is a subsection of the executive branch of the government, and its offices are in the White House and the Old Executive Office Building. The NSC was created in 1947 as part of President Truman’s National Security Act. Since then it has evolved significantly, but it remains true to its original goal of giving the President quick, accurate advice relating to foreign affairs and the implementation of American policy. This advice can range anywhere from tracking El Nino to choosing the right words in a toast to the Chinese president to giving up-to-the-minute information on military action in hot spots like Bosnia and Korea.

The Situation Room, where the President and the NSC monitor foreign developments, is about twenty feet from my office. [describe?] When a crisis erupts, the President uses the Situation Room and the NSC for prompt information as he formulates the proper national response. And
right here, I want to spell out – the NSC is not in the business of operations. We leave that to you folks. We are an instrument the President can use for assistance with policy and coordination between agencies. But everything we do follows a clear procedure and a clear line of command.

I say this because I think the American public is sometimes a little suspicious of the NSC. A bunch of Hollywood movies released recently have seriously distorted what we do. The Peacemaker stars Nicole Kidman as an NSC staffer who single-handedly orders troops into combat positions inside Russia. Air Force One has a National Security Adviser who claims to be running everything in Washington down to who gets the best basketball tickets. In the current Vanity Fair, Gore Vidal attacks what he calls “the National Security State,” citing the NSC as an organization created without the approval of the American people. Earlier this year, Dick Morris, that paragon of virtue, wrote a book complaining the NSC was unresponsive to his requests for information when he was advising the reelection campaign. In his words, “Whenever I came too close to NSC issues, the foreign policy staff honked like geese on a pond, warning each other of an approaching dog.”

Why would Americans feel this way about the NSC? I have a few theories. Part of the reason is we’re not as familiar to most people as the Pentagon or the State Department. We’re tiny compared to them, though in many ways we serve as an important bridge between the two. Another reason is that Americans don’t like agencies that do several things at once. Because we perform a variety of different functions, we are sometimes seen as mysterious, when the truth is we’re just plain overworked.

The NSC’s image problems developed in the 60s and 70s, for a variety of reasons. The Vietnam War was unpopular, and it was often seen as the brainchild of policy experts close to the President from Kennedy onward. Under Presidents Johnson and Nixon, there was widespread suspicion of the executive branch, culminating in the Watergate crisis. It didn’t help that so many of the National Security Advisers seemed to be professors from Harvard University (Bundy, Kissinger) or immigrants who spoke in strong accents (Kissinger, Brzezinski). Now that I think of it, Henry Kissinger had both these problems.

The image problems flared up again in the 1980s, when the Iran-Contra scandal seemed to suggest that Ronald Reagan’s aides were running a personal war in Latin America, disdainful of Congressional authority and public opinion. Despite all the drama, the North hearings and the Tower Commission did not cast the NSC in a very positive light.

Finally, the NSC may be unfamiliar simply because it is relatively new. It is very much a product of the post-war order that came about in the wake of World War Two. The National Security Act of 1947 revolutionized the way the United States conducts its foreign policy.

For most of our history, Americans were isolationists. George Washington urged us to “avoid foreign entanglements” in his farewell address, and for a century we did just that. But as we became a world power, we had to take on world responsibilities. Few people today remember how frightened the world was in 1947. Yes, we had won a great victory in 1945, but there was no indication that more war would not follow. In fact, most indications supported the opposite
conclusion. The Red Army was massed in offensive positions throughout eastern Europe, outnumbering American, English and French troops combined. In China, the Communists were about to topple the government. Turkey and Greece were perilously close to falling behind the Iron Curtain. Austria and Italy were not doing much better. Throughout South America, Africa and Asia, voices were being raised, calling for new systems of government. Despite our happiness the war had ended, the late forties were not a stable time for democracy.

Given these grim events, the leaders of the United States decided to reorganize the way we responded to foreign events, through both diplomacy and the military. The National Security Act created National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Air Force, and the Department of Defense. This reorganization was intended to give the President greater flexibility than the more compartmentalized approach of the Second World War, when each service branch was dominated by an independent hierarchy, sometimes difficult for the President to control. At the top of this new structure, the NSC would harmonize the different interests competing for the President’s attention, from the new DOD and CIA to the State Department and the other branches.

Since 1947, each president has used the NSC differently. President Eisenhower was comfortable with military advisers, and populated the NSC with them. President Kennedy preferred small groups of freewheeling advisers. The role of the APNSA began to grow under President Nixon, especially as Henry Kissinger developed a large role in the administration’s foreign policy, and became a prominent public figure. [Most APNSA’s have preferred to shun the limelight.]

80s reorganization:
NSSRs begin in 1987: coordinated, articulated US policy [I can go into more detail here, describing each NSSR, but it may become repetitive]

President Clinton and the NSC

[I have mostly summarized this section, which might lend itself to a more conversational approach, with talking points—but I’d be happy to write it out if that’s better]

That brings us to the current President. The day President Clinton was inaugurated, January 20, 1993, he instituted sweeping change in the NSC.

PDD1 and PDD2

NSC’s current role can be divided into these functions:

1] We are process managers, coordinating information between agencies.
2] We package information for the President
3] We articulate the President’s policy
4] Crisis management
5] Support negotiation
Where Are We Today—50 years later?

In a sense the current world situation resembles that of 1947. Then there was a great deal of tension because one world order had collapsed and a new one was forming, one in which we were pitted against a great adversary whom we were struggling to understand.

Fifty years later, we are again witnessing the birth of a new world, quite different from 1947. The Cold War has ended, and with it our need to match wits against a single rival. Russia and America are partners, NATO is expanding, we are making progress with the Chinese, and there are no large-scale wars on the immediate horizon.

But the challenges are still out there. In the new world, there is greater partnership, but every day brings new threats. The former Soviet Union has become an extremely complicated place, where new forces of ethnic nationalism and rapid economic development complicate our picture. China is also a hodgepodge of different types of people, some more modern than others, whom we need to understand better than we do. And throughout the third world, we are dealing with constant problems, familiar and unfamiliar, from food shortages and environmental problems to tribal violence and refugee crises.

More and more, the warfare we see around the world is not international, but intranational. In places like the former Yugoslavia and the Congo, we see terrible infighting, difficult to understand from yesterday’s perspectives. Unlike the Cold War, the new situation holds fewer direct threats to the sovereignty of the United States. But it is still a highly volatile world, filled with new and old pressures that require our constant vigilance. The end of the Cold War was a wonderful event, but it also increased America’s responsibility to lead the rest of the world, both by example and, when needed, by force.

That is where the NSC comes into the picture. Many of the NSC’s staffers, like myself, have military experience, and can offer advice whenever the use of American armed forces is considered by the President. But the NSC can also draw on the expertise of different kind of experts, from regional specialists to environmentalists to intelligence liaisons.

The system isn’t perfect. But it’s been working pretty well. For every crisis, large or small, we have a concerted response for the President.

Now I’d like to go over some specific examples of crises and how we handle them.
What Are Current Problems?

Transnational: Drugs, Terrorism. Russian mob now infiltrating Colombian drug cartels. The sale of peaceful nuclear material to China is related to their sale of nuclear material to Iran, which worries us because of their support for terrorism in the Middle East. The world is a complicated place. To solve these problems, we need a cooperative approach between nations.

Specific hot spots: new problems (Bosnia, Africa) and old (Korea, Cuba)

Hard new issues, defying simple solution by one agency or another: Land mines, CTBT, GWI

The NSC fills in the cracks, giving the President as well rounded a picture as it can before he acts.

Summary
Joe/Bob:

Attached is some information about a speech that General Kerrick will be giving at the NWC on November 12th. Ted Widmer of Strategic Planning is working on a generic “Role of the NSC” speech.

Do you have any recommendations as to any specific issues that DLK should bring up in his speech? Any help would be greatly appreciated.

Thanks,

Marc
6-9479

cc: Ted Widmer
October 8, 1997

Ted:

Thought this might be helpful to you!

Marc
October 28, 1997

Ted:

Not sure if you saw Vinca’s speech for Sandy on Friday. Understand it’s not a finished product yet, but Don wanted to make sure you had it.

Marc
REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

Office of the Commandant

Major General Donald L. Kerrick, USA
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
National Security Council Staff
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear General Kerrick:

We are very pleased that you have accepted our invitation to speak to the students and faculty of the National War College on Wednesday, November 12, 1997, from 8:30 to 10:00 a.m.

It will be enormously valuable to have someone of your background and expertise explain the operation of the National Security Council and its staff, and how the NSC fits into the broader interagency policy process.

Enclosed is an information sheet about the National War College that you may find useful. I understand that Colonel Jim Reed has been in touch with you regarding the details of your appearance. If you have any additional questions, please have your staff call Colonel Reed at (202) 685-3704 or Dr. Charles Stevenson, the course director, at (202) 685-3661.

We look forward to your presentation on November 12. If your schedule permits, please plan to arrive at 8:15 a.m. for coffee with RADM Marfiak, our new commandant.

Sincerely,

David A. Tretler
Colonel, USAF
Acting Commandant

Enclosure
QUESTIONS FREQUENTLY ASKED BY GUEST LECTURERS

Whom will I be addressing?

The audience will consist of approximately 190 students: Army, Air Force, Sea Services (Navy, Marines, Coast Guard) and Federal Agencies (State, DOD, CIA, FBI, Justice, etc.). In addition, there will be NWC faculty members and 14 International Fellows from Australia, Brazil, Egypt, France, Germany, Korea, Kuwait, Mexico, Malaysia, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Turkey, and Ukraine.

What are their demographics?

They are Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels (and Navy equivalents) who have commanded ships, aviation squadrons or battalions, Foreign Service Officers, and GS-14's and 15's who have been senior level officials in the Executive Branch. Almost all hold Master's Degrees and a few hold doctorates. The average age of the class is 43 years.

What will be the format of my address?

Our customary format begins with the speaker's prepared presentation of approximately 30-40 minutes, followed by a 10-minute break and then a 20-30 minute question and answer period.

What protection will I enjoy for my remarks?

The National War College observes a policy of holding all remarks by our guests in strictest confidence; thus, we hope you will feel free to speak candidly.

When should I arrive?

I would invite you to arrive 15-20 minutes early for refreshments in my office prior to the lecture.

How do I get to where I am going to speak?

The National War College is located on Fort McNair, 4th and "P" Streets, SW., in Roosevelt Hall, Building 61. The Military Police at the entrance to the Post can direct you to the College. You may park in front of the building in spaces 521-523 or be dropped off at the front steps, and enter through the main door where a member of the faculty will meet you.

What audio/visual support do you provide?

We have full audio/visual capability, from viewgraphs to television. Just let your faculty sponsor know your desires.
1. Ploidy
   NCSC (but 6/78 did)
   What is NCSC? Many for US ideas, abroad?
   Crucial body, small # in phone
   Still evolving
   Let's walk through history

2. 50 years old, relatively young
   1947: European coordination do foreign
   [role of UK negative]
   Tough situation, no time to retain global leadership
   In absence of US, UK asked to go to Greece

3. Need defense and US
   Small at 1st
   Intelligence coordination
3) evolution [5-10]

JFK - still hot
Cuba
JFK - still hot, but still important

Me: Bundy X 2 high profile after APNSA
HK: highest profile
Gas relay - force comm
1986 law requiring reports
Colin Powell
army guy usually there

4) what is NCS today [20 min, 2]

- who gain is yelling at
- members of the exec group to coordinate NCS policy
- process changes, in terms of PBOZ
- need package info for P
- crisis management
- act and write P
- support negotiation
- support operation (and more)
- unprec events - go through P
- flexible fact

- Brooks
- Deputy Com
- Secretary
5. *Questions*

- What is the SBIR Review? Why?
- How are decisions made?
- How is the SBIR Process Assessed?

Begin (How do we improve SBIR?)
(See one very first graph.)
10/21/5 pm

MAJOR GENERAL DONALD KERRICK
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
REMARKS BEFORE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
NOVEMBER 12, 1997

Draft Outline:

1 -- Introduction [2 minutes]

--Peacekeeper--how it distorts facts
--What is the NSC? Many Americans have no idea; yet it is a vital arm of the executive branch, organized “to advise and assist the President” with foreign policy
--tiny size compared to other government agencies, but crucial to American security
--still evolving, used differently by different Presidents

2 -- Brief History of the NSC [5 minutes]

--1997 the 50th anniversary of the NSC
--explain conditions in 1947, European situation, need to integrate foreign policy, military policy, and domestic policy
--US forced to assert global leadership
--details of 1947 act, creation of CIA, DOD, Air Force
--need for interagency coordination as US rose to meet Soviet threat at beginning of Cold War

3 -- Evolution of the NSC [5-10 minutes]

--NSC grew during Korean conflict
--different styles of Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy
--Cuban Missile Crisis (new book by Ernest May reveals taped conversations in Situation Room)
--emergence of high-profile advisers and APNSA (Bundy, Kissinger, et al.)
--redefinition of the 1980s, requirement for NSSRs

4 -- What is the NSC today? [20 minutes]

--define 1993 changes, new format
--different functions:
  process managers
  package information for President
  articulate President’s foreign policy
  support negotiations
  support operations (distinct from making operations)
  crisis management (Situation Room)
--define current roles for APNSA, DAPNSA
--explain Principals Committee, Deputies Committee
--explain how important the smooth operation of the NSC is at this transitional moment of world history, following the Cold War, building a new world, anticipating new kinds of situations
--discuss current hot spots
--summarize: today we have an unprecedented opportunity for peaceful cooperation between nations, thanks to our military superiority and the respect we command as a fair arbiter between nations; the smooth running of the NSC can make this international cooperation a reality

Possible Questions:
--What does it take to be a successful DAPNSA?
--How are top-level NSC decisions made? How does the NSC resolve conflicts between different agencies, departments, interests and personalities?
--Does the NSC function differently during times of military engagement?
--What is the Sit Room like? How does information get from the field to the White House?

what are P's priorities? what are our mission?
what are our authorized? we do have a process, = priorities

very clear

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"Peacekeeper" Wrong

One of the most interesting parts of the meeting was the discussion about the situation in the Middle East. The president was very concerned about the ongoing conflict and the need for a resolution. He mentioned the importance of diplomacy and the role of the United Nations in helping to resolve these issues.

1947 5:00


7 1967

1. JFK (book), LBJ, etc. Advisers:
   - L. B. J., etc.
2. SSG, RGG
   - Foreign Affairs
   - 1967 Reorganization
3. What is NSC today?

Q: What

NGC vs State

9/6/1  9/6/5
imperative for America to lead by example. We have contributed more than our share of CO2 to the atmosphere. Now we need to contribute to a genuine solution, one that will impress the other countries that are trying to imitate our economic success. Nor can we say to developing countries, “you need to stop development this second.” A fair solution will allow sustainable growth alongside new protections to save our earth and its fragile atmosphere.

These are scientific and environmental issues, but they are also ethical issues, and they relate directly to our everyday lives. No parent needs the burden of worrying about whether to let our children play outdoors, or stay in the sun too long. Children’s Health Day should remind us how important it is to set an example of responsibility. We have an obligation to future generations to leave the Earth in as good shape as we found it. I think we should accept this responsibility, and your presence here today gives me great faith that we will.

Thank you.
1st mtg
11/12
Northwest College
recent NSC policy making
Danial Soderberg piece
20-30 min lecture 29/1
on priority
then Q&A

3 activities: intragency
- process managing
- we package info for P
- aim management
- articulate P's policy
- support registration
- support operations (with more operations)

Ring of Power
2nd mtg
Air Force head?
Marines

- interesting
- role of NSC in decision-making
- where power
- walk through
- priorities
- Pres's priorities
- votes
- process managing
- help some pretty adrift

2 week's straight chat
"The Peacemaker" -
start talk w/ scene
N. Kidman character
without