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Russia, 5/95 - Press Statement

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## Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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**COLLECTION:**
- Clinton Presidential Records
- National Security Council
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2:40 P.M. (L)

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, journalists. This is the seventh meeting of the presidents of the U.S. and Russia. This visit by Bill Clinton to Russia is of particular importance. The participation of such a high guest in the 9th of May celebration is seen by us as a tribute to the people killed in our common struggle against fascism.

Before each Russian-U.S. summit, there is no shortage of all kinds of speculations about Russian and U.S. contradictions. Sometimes they even refer to crises in our relations. The results of the Moscow talks have yet again denied these speculations.

Of course, even after the summit, differences to a number of issues have not disappeared. The important thing is that we seek to address these problems while maintaining a balance of interest and without prejudice to each other's interests, but on the contrary, in assisting each other.

The agenda of this meeting was very busy and comprehensive. We addressed the key issues of international life, issues which are of top priority for both countries. I'm referring, above all, to the evolution of the European security structures -- the START Treaty and the ABM Treaty, strengthening the nonproliferation regime, economic cooperation and terrorism.

It is of fundamental importance that the discussion, which we had about the model for European security, proceed at taking into account the new role of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Today, this organization is beginning to play a central role in maintaining stability on the European continent.

We exchanged views on NATO issues. Today we better understand the interests and concerns of each other, and yet we still don't have answers to a number of questions -- our positions even remain unchanged.

I hope that our joint statement on matters related to strengthening European security will provide a starting point for further efforts because it provides for cooperation in the establishment of a single indivisible Europe looking into the future.
A serious document has been agreed on the problem of the ABM. We adopted a joint statement on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. I believe that that agreement will mark a major contribution to the adoption at the New York conference of a decision on an indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT Treaty. The conference will probably end tomorrow.

At the negotiations, the question was raised about future Russian supplies of equipment to Iran. That is, of course, not a simple question, and, of course, you are going to ask that question, and both Presidents will answer that question.

We discussed in detail the implementation of the economic charter we signed last year. As a result, we adopted a statement on the question of economic reform, trade and investment. The U.S. President expressed his support for our reforms. We agreed to speed up the process of Russia's entry to the system of international economic institutions, above all, the COCOM.

Of course, we discussed the Chechen issue. This is an internal matter for Russia, but I also believe it does have an international aspect. Russia has accepted the presence at Grozny of the OSCE assistance group. Terrorism knows no borders. Unfortunately, U.S. citizens recently were confronted with that barbarous phenomenon. I believe that everybody would agree that we should fight this evil jointly, and we have agreed upon that.

During the talks, we had a fruitful exchange of views on the meeting of the political eight in Halifax, and not of the political, but also of the economic eight. We also discussed a number of other international issues.

Now I am ready to answer your questions. I give the floor to the President of the United States of America, Mr. William Clinton.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: First of all, I'd like to thank President Yeltsin and the Russian people for making me and the rest of our American delegation and the others who came here for the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II feel so welcome.

I was honored to play a part in that, and I think it was a very important day for our country and for our relationship.

Today we focused on the future. And if you ask me to summarize in a word or two what happened today, I would say that we advanced the security interests of the people of the United States and the people of Russia. We increased the safety of the future of our peoples, and we proved once again that this regular, disciplined, working relationship that we have established, rooted in Russia's commitment to democracy and in a mature and balanced dialogue and a commitment to continue to work on the differences between us in the areas of common opportunity, we proved that this is a good relationship, and that it is worth the investment, and that we are approaching it in the proper way.

I characterize this as a success from a security point of view for several reasons. First of all, with regard to European security, while there was not an agreement between us on the details on the question of the expansion of NATO, Russia did agree to enter into the Partnership for Peace. And I committed myself in return at the meeting at the end of this month to encourage the beginning of the NATO-Russia dialogue, which I think is very important. There must be a special relationship between NATO and Russia.
We agreed to continue to discuss this at Halifax, and again at the end of the year when we see each other. And I made it clear that I thought that anything done with NATO had to meet two criteria: Number one, it must advance the interests of all the partners for peace, the security interests of all of them, including Russia; and, number two, it must advance the long-term goal of the United States, which I have articulated from the beginning of my presidency, of an integrated Europe, which I believe is very important. And I think Russia shares both of those objectives.

Secondly, with regard to the nuclear sales to Iran, as you know, the United States opposes the sale of the reactor and the centrifuge. I want to say that I was deeply impressed that President Yeltsin told me that he had decided, in the interest of nonproliferation, not to supply the centrifuge and related equipment to Iran. I shared with him some of the intelligence from the United States on the question of whether Iran is trying to become a nuclear power. And we agreed in light of the questions of facts that need to be determined here and Russia's strong support for nonproliferation, to refer the question of the reactor itself to the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission for further work on resolution.

I was very pleased today that we were able to make progress on the outstanding issues relating to weapon sales which will permit Russia to be a founding member of the post-COCOM regime, something, again, which will make the world a safer place.

Fourthly, we agreed that both of us would work as hard as we could to get START II ratified this year, and then to go beyond that to talk about what we could do further to support the denuclearization of the world and of our two arsenals.

Fifthly, we agreed that we should step up our efforts in combatting terrorism and organized crime, a problem that affects not only our two nations, but also many others in the world, as we have sadly seen. And we discussed some fairly specific things that we might do together to intensify our efforts.

As President Yeltsin said, we reaffirmed today in specific actions our support for the Nonproliferation Treaty, and we look forward to its permanent extension. And we hope that the indefinite -- excuse me, the indefinite extension will be adopted soon.

And finally, we were able to reach agreement on the ABM theatre missile defenses issue, which is a very important one, and many of the Americans here know, important for our attempts to go forward on START II and other things back home.

We talked about our economic cooperation. We talked about the progress Russia is making. I expressed again the strong concern of the United States that the violence in Chechnya should be brought to an end. I urged the permanent extension of the cease-fire. I was encouraged that President Yeltsin, I believe, understands the gravity of this matter and also wants it concluded as quickly as possible.

So we are, I think, in a better position in our two countries today and our people will be safer as a result of this meeting. It was an advance for security. There was significant progress made. And we still have work to do.

MR. MEDVEDEV: Dear colleagues, you have an opportunity to ask questions. I wish to remind you that we will give you the floor in sequence with my colleague, the Press Secretary of the U.S. President, Mr. McCurry.
Russian Public Television. Boris Nikolayevich, before the negotiations began, both sides were quite categoric on questions at issue. Are any concessions possible today on the NATO problem? Are there any linkages possible? I know that President Clinton insists on flank restrictions in the south of Russia. Well, if both sides not concede, what will President Clinton bring back to the United States?

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, I must tell you that we didn't have such a trading system in our talks. On the contrary, on the question of flank restrictions, Bill was the first to bring this matter up. And he said that he will surely support us on this difficult issue because it is true we are sort of in a trap with that issue.

Now about NATO. We should look at this question in broader terms. What about general European security and NATO? I cannot say that after protracted discussions today on this subject, and by the way, we even had to change the schedule, we in fact had a never-ending meeting, and we were not able to dot the i's and cross all the t's. And we decided, first, if it is so difficult, let us not hurry, and then let us continue our consultations when we meet in Canada in Halifax.

We also believe that it may be we won't be able to agree in Halifax either. And we may need another meeting in November when the United Nations marks its 50th anniversary. We will meet in New York once again, and maybe at that time we may come to some final agreement.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: I think this meeting was a win-win meeting. That is, I do not -- I believe that both our countries advanced our interests and the interests of our people.

With regard to European security, the important thing for me was -- not that Russia and the United States would agree today on the details of NATO expansion -- indeed, it's important for all of you to understand, NATO has not agreed on that. NATO has not agreed on that.

This whole year, 1995, was to be devoted for the rationale for expanding NATO and then determining how it might be done, with no consideration whatever of who would be in the included membership and when that would be done. That was the plan. So not only has there -- have we not agreed on that, as far as I know, there may be significant differences among the NATO partners themselves.

The important thing for me was that the President and I would agree that European unity, integration, is still our goal. We don't want a differently divided Europe. And that our NATO expansion plans should enhance the interests, the security interests of all of our partners, including Russia. Now, for my part, I haven't changed my position from the beginning on how this should be done.

The second thing I want to say is, the most important thing to me is that Russia has now agreed to proceed with participation in the Partnership for Peace, which is becoming very, very important in its own right, and a significant force in increasing a sense of trust and understanding and working together in security within Europe.

With regard to the flank issue you mentioned, we have not worked out all the details of that. We've agreed to continue working on it. The problem is, of course, that the treaty becomes effective at a certain date. It's terms were negotiated in a previous time. Then there is a lag time for modifications of the treaty.
We believe some modifications are in order. We are supporting the Russian position there. What we want to do is to figure out a way for us to preserve the integrity of the treaty and compliance with it, but, in the end respond to the legitimate security interests of Russia. And I believe we can get there.

Q  Mr. President, you made clear in advance on the Iran nuclear deal that you wouldn't be satisfied with anything short of an outright cancellation of that sale. Today you said that it's going to be referred to a lower level, that you weren't able to solve this question. I want to know, are there any repercussions? Are you disappointed that you weren't able to get this sale closed? And will you resist Republican threats to cut off foreign aid to Russia?

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Well, first of all, this sale was in the pipeline, announced, and is legal under international law. I believe it is unwise. I think it should not go forward. We actually got more done today than I thought we would do, and we are ahead of where I thought we would be.

As I said, President Yeltsin made it clear to me that even though it would be some financial sacrifice to Russia, he did not believe they should proceed with the centrifuge and the related portions of the sale that could have a much more direct and immediate impact on weapons production. I gave him some of our intelligence and made the best arguments I could about why I thought the whole sale should not go forward. And we agreed that since some of this involves an evaluation of technical matters, it would be appropriate to refer to the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission where we have gotten a lot of useful work done between our two countries. So we are actually further down the road on that issue than I thought we would be.

Now, with response to the particular arguments about the cut off of aid, I think what we should do is to look at the progress we have made today, look at the progress we have made in the last two years, ask ourselves whether the United States is safer and more secure as a result of these efforts. I think the answer is yes. We should keep working. We should treat this like a business relationship that is furthering the security of both countries, and we should do whatever is in our interest. And I believe that the programs that we presently have underway are clearly in our interest.

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: I would like to add to what President Bill Clinton just said. The point is that the contract was concluded legitimately and in accordance with international law, and no international treaties were violated in the process. But it is true that the contract do contain components of peaceful and military nuclear energy. Now we have agreed to separate those two.

Inasmuch as they relate to the military component and the possibility, the potential for creating weapons-grade fuel and other matters -- the centrifuge, the construction of silos. And so one -- we have decided to exclude those aspects from the contract, so the military component falls away, and what remains is just a peaceful nuclear power station on light water reactors, which is designed to provide heat and energy.

Any more questions?

Please, colleagues, it's our--

Q  Boris Nikolayevich, could you clarify, if possible, the mechanism for decision-making regarding the Iranian contract? According to President Clinton, the materials
will be referred to the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, who will then decide? Will they report to the heads of state, or will some other mechanism be worked out?

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: After this question has been comprehensively considered by the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, we, the two Presidents, will receive all the material and we will make the final decision.

Q -- seem ironical to you that you have just celebrated the end of World War II, and the killing goes on in Chechnya? And it really has appalled the world, the killing of civilians. So what are you going to do about it, and how can you stop it?

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, first, there are no hostilities underway in Chechnya right now. Therefore, that is -- there is no irony to there. Furthermore, the armed forces are not involved there. Today, the Ministry of the Interior simply seizes the weapons, which are still in possession of some small, armed criminal gangs. But most importantly, we are doing some creative work there. We are rehabilitating buildings, utilities, we ensure the necessary financing.

The Chechen government has been set up and it is headed by a Chechen, and it operates in accordance with the Russian Constitution. The dates for parliamentary elections are now being discussed. Therefore, creative work is being done, and I believe that soon we will have a normal situation there, and a situation of a democratic republic, with all the ensuing rights for the citizens living in Chechnya.

Q -- radio station. I have the following question: The people are very impressed with incidents of brutal terrorism. Boris Nikolayevich, you said that you discussed this and you agreed on some common actions. Could you elaborate on that? And I would be grateful if both Presidents could at least briefly address this question.

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: Well, first we convinced each other that without joint efforts, we will not be able to cope with this evil in the world. What we really need is joint efforts -- joint efforts, not talk, not conferences, not meetings, but actions. And as regards actions, of course we did not discuss the matter specifically, but we have instructed our governments to work out those actions and to proceed without delay to taking those actions.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: He asked for an answer, I'd like -- we talked -- we did not agree on a number of specific actions, but we discussed some. And I think it might be helpful.

First of all, President Yeltsin and I, and the leaders of many other countries in the world, are quite concerned that the great security threat of the 21st century might not be all those we had been discussing, either explicitly or by implication here in the last few moments. They instead might be coming from often nongovernmental sources in terms of terrorism and organized crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, getting into the hands of terrorists and organized criminals. So we discussed how we could cooperate more with law enforcement and intelligence. I think you know that the Federal Bureau of Investigation is opening an office here in Moscow, and we have been working with Russia for sometime now.

We discussed how we could make sure we each were as technologically advanced as possible, because many of the adversaries we face are very advanced. And we discussed how we might work together to try to limit the destructive capacity of terrorists and organized criminals and limit their ability to proliferate the weapons, particularly in the biological and chemical area. It's a great concern to me, and both Russia and the United States probably have some resources there that we can bring to bear.
And I think in light of what happened in Japan, all advanced countries should be very, very concerned about the prospect of -- the merger of terrorism with weapons of mass destruction -- biological, chemical and small-scale nuclear weapons.

Q President Clinton, you've just heard President Yeltsin describe the situation in Chechnya in a way that may be at odds with news dispatches coming from that part of the country describing a massacre. And I wondered if -- what your reaction is to his description, whether you accept it, if not why not, and what impact these reports of terrible things there may be having on the countries eager to join NATO, and what you would have to say to him about that?

PRESIDENT CLINTON: Well, I will say to you what I said to him personally already, and I think what he knows and Chancellor Kohl and other friends of Russia have said: The civilian casualties and the prolongation of the fighting have troubled the rest of the world greatly and have had an impact in Europe on the attitudes of many countries about what is going on here and about future relationships. I don't think anyone is unaware of that.

What I have urged President Yeltsin to do is to try to make a permanent cease-fire, to try to move rapidly with the cooperation of the OSCE to get a democratic government there and to bring this to a speedy resolution, because I do believe it is something that is very troubling to the world, particularly in the dimensions of civilian casualties.

And I'm sure all the American journalists here know that we have a missing relief worker there ourselves. And I asked the President to help me find whatever could be found about Mr. Cuny, and he said that he would direct the Russian authorities there to try to help us. But this is a troubling thing for the world, and it's been a difficult thing for them as well.

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: -- looking at my watch. Shall we agree -- Mr. McCurry, just one question on each side?

Q Boris Nikolayevich, we will have a meeting at Halifax with the eight. Do you intend to improve on the results of the similar meeting in Naples? Did you discuss anything like that this time with Bill Clinton? Did you agree that Bill Clinton will help you somewhere in some of Russia's aspirations?

And the question for the U.S. President -- this is also a question from Ukraine -- what are you bringing to Ukraine?

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: -- I met during these celebrations days, of course, with everybody we discussed Halifax. I and Russia, of course, concerned about our role in the G-7 or in the G-8. That is why this morning, at 9:00 a.m., I had a meeting with the Prime Minister of Canada, Mr. Chretien, who will act as cochairman. We discussed the U.N. views -- we discussed his views on the problem. I discussed this with Bill Clinton, with Helmut Kohl, with Francois Mitterrand.

Well, generally speaking, everybody is optimistic on this subject, and they wish to support Russia. To give you an example, Mr. Chretien this morning said that Russia, in Halifax will have three times more opportunities than last year in Naples. Well, that's not bad. The minimum we count on is as follows: The political aid, we believe, has now asserted itself; it is a fact of life -- we are part of the political eight.
Now about economic matters. At Halifax, first they will address the economic matters of the G-7 and then they will address international matters pertinent to the whole world. As regards their internal business, well, we have no claims to that. They discuss specific issues and important issues related to trade and other economic matters. But as regards global strategic matters of importance to the entire world, Russia should participate in such discussions fully. So I think we can call this seven and a half.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: -- specific questions. The United States, since I have been President, has supported two major aid packages to Russia to support the conversion to a market economy and to try to assist in developing all of the institutions necessary to make that successful, as well as to support our denuclearization efforts under the so-called Nunn-Lugar funds.

We were also very strongly supportive of the recent $6.8 billion standby loan that the International Monetary Fund granted to Russia as a result of the economic reforms initiated under President Yeltsin. So I think that your country has a great deal to be proud of in the economic progress that has been made.

I know you still are dealing with a lot of economic difficulties -- all market economies do. And the markets don't solve all problems. So you have to work on trying to deal with those. But I believe that our partnership has been a good investment for the United States because we have a stronger, more democratic, more open, more free Russia, and we will continue to support that direction.

With Ukraine, I must say, they've made a remarkable amount of progress in the last year or so, and I think President Yeltsin feels the same way. I am encouraged by the balance and discipline coming out of the government in Ukraine, and I will continue to support the process of reform there.

Q President Yeltsin, several U.S. officials, including the Secretary of State, have suggested that if you go along with the sale of the nuclear reactors to Iran, this would endanger Russia's becoming a full member of the G-7 and other international institutions. And several Republican leaders in the U.S. Congress have warned that if you go ahead with this sale, it would endanger continued U.S. assistance to Russia. Are these kinds of threats persuasive, or was the intelligence information that President Clinton showed you today of Iran's nuclear ambitions, was that the convincing element to you? Or are you still basically at a disagreement with the United States over Iran's nuclear ambitions?

PRESIDENT YELTSIN: We're not afraid of threats. We never react to threats. But as for your question, we have already told you with the President, that technically we need to sort the question out. We need to sort out what relates to peaceful and to military purposes. And this has been entrusted to the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. Once we get to signatures -- once we get a document signed by two, we the Presidents will make the final decision.

PRESIDENT CLINTON: This may be a fitting question to close this press conference.

I think it is important that the people of the United States and the people of Russia understand that from time to time, as with any sort of relationship, there will be differences of opinion. Occasionally, there will even be occasions where our interests are different. What we have been working on for over two years now are areas where our interests are not different, working through areas where our opinions might be.
Now in the case of this Iranian matter, just to take a -- one example. If the United States is right and Iran is attempting to develop the capacity to build nuclear weapons, that would be more of an immediate security threat to Russia than to the United States, because you are closer to the country.

So we don't really have different interests here. Both our countries are committed to the fight against terrorism. Both our countries are committed to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and its indefinite extension. Both our countries are dismantling our own nuclear arsenals at a more rapid rate than our treaties require.

Now, in playing this relationship out, there will come times when there will be differences. If we ultimately differ on something, I think that we all know there may be consequences to having different positions and different actions. But I think we should be quite careful in using the language of threats in a relationship that in the last two years has made the world a much safer place. We have seen Russia's democracy strengthened. We have seen Russia's transition toward a private economy go more rapidly than all experts predicted. We have seen discipline asserted in this economy to a greater degree than most experts predicted. And we have seen more progress on thorny difficulties, complex matters, than most experts predicted.

As a result, the people of the United States, the people of Russia, and the people of the world are safer today than they were two years ago and than they were before this last meeting between us occurred. That is the fundamental story. We will have differences. They will have consequences. But we should stay away from big words like threats when we're managing matters which can be managed in a relationship that is quite good for the world and that has made us all safer.

Thank you.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

3:20 P.M. (L)
We have had two full and very productive days here in Moscow. As you know, yesterday we honored the people of Russia and the former Soviet Union for their enormous sacrifices in the war that ended in the defeat of Nazism in Europe.

Today, we focused on the future. Our discussions covered a range of subjects, including security, regional, and economic topics. I reaffirmed to President Yeltsin the importance we attach to Russian integration into the family of free market democracies. I welcome his assurance that parliamentary and presidential elections will take place, as scheduled, in December of this year and in June 1996.

I expressed to President Yeltsin our deep concern over the situation in Chechnya. I renewed our call to all parties to put an end to this bloodshed. The temporary cease-fire should be made permanent and genuine political reconciliation begin. I urged President Yeltsin to cooperate fully with the OSCE assistance group now operating in Chechnya and to help in the delivery of humanitarian relief in the region.
We discussed European security at great length, and we are issuing a joint statement on this subject. Together, we are determined to promote a stable, secure, integrated and undivided Europe, and we have agreed on specific steps to advance that goal. [Variant one—good outcome: I welcome President Yeltsin’s commitment to implement Russia’s two NATO partnership documents. I believe that at their upcoming meeting, NATO ministers should agree to begin talks on a new NATO-Russia relationship. I also reiterated to President Yeltsin that the admission of new members to NATO will be gradual and fully transparent.] [variant two—less good: As President Yeltsin indicated, our discussions today did not dispel all of Russia’s concerns over the evolution of Europe’s security structures. I reiterated to President Yeltsin that the admission of new members to NATO will be gradual and fully transparent. For the future stability of Europe, Russia must be a vital part of the new security structures that are emerging. This process cannot develop normally unless Russia is involved. So the door remains open, and we will continue our discussions.]

On Iran, I explained to President Yeltsin my strong opposition to the proposed Russian nuclear reactor sale and shared with him information about the true nature of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. President Yeltsin assured me that Russia has no intention of providing Iran with nuclear fuel enrichment technology or training. I welcome that assurance. We agreed that Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin should continue our dialogue on this important issue.

We reviewed the U.S.-Russia security agenda and made progress on a number of issues [including resolution of a question concerning the the treatment of space launch vehicles under START.] We issued a statement of principles regarding theater missile defense systems and
their relationship to the ABM Treaty, as well as a statement on our mutual non-proliferation efforts and on the Transparency and Irreversibility of the Process of Reducing Nuclear Weapons.

We also discussed specific European issues, such as the situation in the former Yugoslavia. We agreed on the continued need for cooperation in the Contact Group and at the UN. We reviewed the status of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, and I urged President Yeltsin to ensure full Russian compliance with that agreement when its limits take effect this November.

In our discussions of economic issues, we noted the remarkable progress of Russian reform over the past two years. The recent agreement by the International Monetary Fund to grant Russia a $6.8 billion standby loan is a well-deserved vote of confidence in Russia's economic future. I assured President Yeltsin that I intend to continue American support for his program of market reforms. U.S. assistance has had a direct, positive impact on Russia's privatization efforts and on small business development.

President Yeltsin and I have always attached great importance to scientific and technological collaboration. Today, I have issued a statement announcing the establishment of a civilian research and development foundation, to be funded initially by the United States and by a generous gift from George Soros. The foundation will support joint research projects among scientists from the United States, Russia, and the other New Independent States.

Before I leave for Kiev tomorrow, I'm looking forward to spending time in Moscow, visiting and talking with Russians from many different walks of life. In a few hours, I will visit Moscow
State University for a speech that I hope will be heard throughout this vast country. Tomorrow, I will meet with Russian leaders from across the political spectrum as well as from some of Russia's different regions. Finally, I will visit a Coca-Cola bottling plant and meet with young management trainees who are benefiting from direct American investment in Russia.

The United States has a vital interest in staying engaged and supporting Russia during this difficult period of transition. Since the start of my administration, I have made it a priority to support reform and reformers in Russia because this is the way to improve the lives and security of Americans, to create an important partner for trade and investment, and to speed progress on important regional and international issues.

Over the past two years, we have achieved notable successes in each of these areas. President Yeltsin and I don’t expect to find agreement on every issue. But I know he shares my view that, taken as a whole, this important bilateral relationship is strong and moving forward -- and benefiting the Russian and American peoples. I want to thank President Yeltsin for his warm hospitality over these past two days. I thank him and I thank all the Russian people once again for inviting me to join in this historic and inspiring commemoration of our common victory 50 years ago.
Foreign Policy Talking Points

May 10, 1995

Russia

Key Points
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Cuba

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Key Points

-- Wanted to give you a sense of how I see the importance of the trip I am making to Russia and Ukraine next week.

-- United States has a vital stake in staying engaged and helping Russia, Ukraine, all ex-Soviet states become more open and democratic, integrated with the West, at peace with their own people and with their neighbors.

-- Since start of my administration, have made it a priority to support reform and reformers in the region:

  -- improves lives and security of U.S. citizens;

  -- creates stable democratic partner for trade/investment; and

  -- allows cooperation on regional, international issues

-- This is a long-term strategy. Process of transformation underway will not be completed in a few years. Need to keep our eye on the strategic, long-range benefits for us of staying with this policy.

-- Need to be honest: ultimate outcome of this transition is not foreordained. Still a struggle going on between those who support reforms and those who oppose or fear change.

-- That struggle leads to setbacks: Chechnya, Iran reactor sales, resistance to idea of NATO expansion. These are all real problem areas. We need to work through, and are doing so.

-- But those problems do not define the whole our policy toward Russia, Ukraine or the other states. And the setbacks on the road to reform do not mark a reversal of course.
The overall direction is still good. Look at the enormous dividends our engagement has paid:

- Russian nuclear warheads no longer aimed at US cities; Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan destroying 1000s of weapons
- Russian economy -- over 50% of GDP now comes from private sector
- No Russian troops in Baltics or Central Europe
- Russian, Ukrainian support for indefinite NPT extension; Russia helping us bring peace to Middle East

A year ago we were all wondering whether the Duma could hold together, whether the Russian economy would collapse under inflation, whether the Ukrainians would honor their commitment to give up their nuclear arsenal, whether the Russians would pull out of Latvia and Estonia

I would argue that the engagement of the West -- led by the United States -- played an important role in influencing the positive outcome of all these problems.

And I am even more convinced that our continued engagement is necessary to resolve the tough issues that face us now.

You build a relationship with a country on many levels. Meetings of Presidents are important, but Presidents come and go. The real basis of good relations is at the level of people.

That is why I thought it was so important to go to Moscow on May 9 -- to honor the enormous sacrifice of the Russian people, who were our allies and helped us defeat fascism in the War.

But as we remember the past, we must also look to the future. And I have a full agenda for my meetings with President Yeltsin and Kuchma that is very forward-looking.

History has given us a gift. The end of communism has opened up possibilities we wouldn’t have dreamed of four years ago.
It’s my responsibility to the American people to make the most of these opportunities in our own national self-interest. And that’s the rationale for this trip.

**Russia: Meaning of May 9**

-- Here to remember that sacrifice and to recall our wartime alliance.

-- We joined together to defeat a common evil. Now have opportunity to work together to promote the common good.

**Chechnya**

-- I have emphasized to President Yeltsin my strong view that Russia should end its military operation in Chechnya, allow humanitarian relief to reach war’s victims, and negotiate a permanent political settlement.

-- Chechnya is part of Russia, but Russia must act in accord with international standards.

-- Conflict can only be resolved through political process that results in a lasting settlement.

-- Have urged Russia to take full advantage of, work closely with the OSCE Assistance Group in Chechnya.

**If asked about Fred Cuny:**

-- I believe Russians are doing all they can to help us establish his whereabouts; working very hard on this.

**Russia-Iran Nuclear Cooperation**

-- We are profoundly disturbed by evidence that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons technology.

-- That’s why I’ve banned all American trade with Iran.

-- We strongly oppose Russia’s proposed sale of nuclear reactors to Iran, which could improve Iran’s nuclear expertise.
Have shared information with Russian officials that leaves no doubt as to Iran's nuclear ambitions.

We have made our views known to the Russian's and will continue to do so.

(If asked about reports that Russia will not sell gas centrifuge enrichment technology to Iran as part of the proposed reactor sale)

It is a positive step if the Russian government has decided not to provide enrichment technology to Iran, but that misses the main point.

There should be no nuclear cooperation with Iran, in view of that country's ambition to acquire nuclear weapons.

Iran's nuclear program is at an initial stage. Providing Iran a light-water nuclear reactor will raise the country's nuclear expertise. It will also put in place a procurement network that Iran could exploit to support its nuclear weapons program.

We thus continue to oppose any nuclear cooperation with Iran. This was one of the main issues on my agenda with President Yeltsin.

(If asked about reports that Iran is prepared to return spent fuel to Russia)

That misses the point.

There should be no nuclear cooperation with Iran, in view of that country's ambition to acquire nuclear weapons.

Russia/NATO Enlargement

NATO is a defensive alliance and always has been. Since the end of the Cold War, it has taken on new missions and established cooperation with Russia and other states of the former Warsaw Pact.

NATO's new strategy is not directed against a threat from Russia or from any other state, but against such common threats as local conflict and nuclear proliferation.
As NATO admits new members, it will do so gradually and transparently and as part of a broader effort to forge a community of democratic states throughout Europe.

Extending the zone of stability and democracy to Central Europe serves the interests of all countries in Europe (and North America), including Russia.

NATO also serves to establish a lasting partnership with a democratic Russia, which should be a key player in building a new European security system.

Believe Russia should be part of a new security architecture of integrated, democratic Europe.

**Bilateral Assistance/Impact of Iran & Chechnya**

Our assistance is aimed at advancing U.S. interests, i.e., supporting reform and reformers in their efforts to make democracy and a market economy succeed.

Over two thirds of U.S. assistance to Russia goes to the private sector, non-governmental organizations and municipal governments in regional areas outside of Moscow.

Russians have made important progress in democratic institutions and a market economy. U.S. has a vital interest in seeing this process continue and our assistance is vital to that effort.

We have differences in important areas. But we address those through the kind of discussions I’ve just had with President Yeltsin, not by cutting off assistance to reformers.

Isn’t aid wasted/ineffective?

Much of our assistance is aimed at the grass roots of Russian society and isn’t broadly visible.

Our assistance seeks to create the building blocks of a market economy that will make reforms irreversible. This is a long-term effort.
Believe Russia would not be as far along as it is in its privatization effort without U.S. support.

IMF lending Russia $6.8 billion during war in Chechnya?

- Have made clear our views on the tragedy in Chechnya.
- We back the loan and other IFI support because it helps advance economic reform.
- Can't be sure economic reform will make Russia more stable and peaceful; but can be certain Russia will become less stable if reforms fail.

Democracy and Media Freedoms/Impact of Chechnya

- Russia has made great strides in developing democratic institutions and in laying the foundation for a democratic state. A free press is essential to this process -- and the press in Russia has never been freer.
- Tragic use of violence in Chechnya underscores the fragility of reform in Russia. At the same time, the often critical coverage of Chechnya has demonstrated the degree to which mass media are free and express a wide range of views.

Russia reasserting influence on Near Abroad/same as Communists and Tsarists?

- U.S., Europe, Russia all have interest in seeing democracy and economic reform take root in New Independent States. Stability of region in everyone’s interest.
- We have been clear in our support of the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of all the New Independent States. We expect the Russian government to be equally supportive of these conditions in its relations with other NIS countries.

Bosnia/Russia distancing from contact group?

- President Yeltsin and I agree that we need a unified position in the contact group if we are to bring a negotiated end to the conflict in Bosnia.
-- We have asked Secretary Christopher and Foreign Minister Kozyrev to intensify their efforts to this end.

Russian push for lifting sanctions

-- I made clear our position that we can’t agree to lift sanctions until the Bosnian Serbs accept the contact group plan as a starting point for negotiations.

Does TMD undermine ABM?

-- We consider the ABM Treaty a cornerstone of strategic stability, and critical to progress toward further reductions in strategic offensive arms.

-- We and the Russians in full agreement on the treaty’s continuing importance in reducing the nuclear threat.

-- We and the Russians agree that the ABM Treaty permits TMD systems. We will ensure that development and deployment of TMD systems are and will be consistent with the ABM Treaty.

Why are you extending the provisions of the ABM Treaty to cover these TMD systems, which should not be limited?

-- Not extending any limits to cover TMD systems.

-- ABM Treaty limits apply to defenses against strategic ballistic missiles, such as ICBMs and SLBMs.

-- Have made our position clear on this issue. Will continue to abide by ABM Treaty as we develop effective theater defense capabilities.

Russia/Biological Weapons Violations

-- Yeltsin confirmed in 1992 that former Soviet biological weapons program had continued in violation of BWC and formally ordered program’s termination.

-- Believe that Yeltsin and his senior officials are committed to comply with Convention.
Yeltsin and I agree on importance of full implementation of
1992 trilateral statement on biological weapons in building
confidence that all offensive BW programs have been
terminated. U.S., UK and Russia working to ensure that
former Soviet BW program has been terminated.

Russia/Chemical Weapons

-- U.S. and Russia support earliest ratification and entry into
force of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

-- We have also exchanged information on CW stockpiles and
facilities and conducted inspections of declared CW sites
under a 1989 bilateral agreement. Seeking further
elaboration on Russian information.

-- We have also begun to work together to assist the Russian CW
destruction program.

Russia/CW Program Concealed?

-- U.S. concerned about reports regarding chemical weapons
program Russia inherited from former Soviet Union.

-- Since September 1994 Summit, we have engaged in senior-level
political talks on these issues.

-- All our efforts are directed toward resolving these questions
and building confidence between our governments in chemical
weapons area.

Russia/Ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention

-- Yeltsin and I agree on importance of securing early
ratification and entry into force of Chemical Weapons
Convention.

(If Asked Whether The U.S. Should Ratify Without Russia:)

-- Believe Yeltsin is committed to securing Duma’s approval of
CWC, just as I’m committed to securing our Senate’s advice
and consent to ratification.
Russia/CFE Treaty Flank limit compliance

-- We and our NATO Allies have made clear that Russia should comply fully with CFE when its limits take effect in November 1995.

-- We have been working with Russia and other Treaty parties to resolve flank issue consistent with Treaty.

-- Believe that the CFE Review Conference in 1996 is place to seek long-term solution to Russia's concerns.

Russia: START Implementation
(Entered into force on December 5, 1994)

-- START implementation activity, including inspections, is under way and going smoothly.

-- Both sides well ahead of schedule in meeting Treaty's reduction deadlines.

-- All nuclear warheads have now been removed from Kazakhstan, and the process of removing nuclear warheads from Belarus and Ukraine also well under way.

Russia: START II Ratification

-- Yeltsin and I reaffirmed our commitment to ratification of START II Treaty.

-- Confident that U.S. Senate will give its advice and consent to ratification of Treaty, probably late this month.

When will Duma ratify?

-- Yeltsin has assured me ratification of Treaty remains high priority for his government.
Q: Can you confirm reports that the United States has agreed to cease continuous monitoring of missile production in Ukraine (as provided for under Start)?

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The United States and Ukraine have discussed the issue of continuous monitoring activities at the Pavlograd missile facility.

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An interim policy has been worked out between our two governments whereby U.S. would voluntarily end monitoring activities and Ukraine would allow three additional short-notice inspections of the Pavlograd facility.

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We have notified Congress of this approach, and we expect shortly to finalize this arrangement.
CUBA

-- Our policy represents a humanitarian solution to the situation in Guantanamo where
20,000 migrants live in difficult conditions, at a cost of $1 million a day, and with
security risks for U.S. personnel.

-- It will strengthen Florida by preventing another uncontrolled migrant outflow from Cuba.
This policy will mean less, not more migration to Florida.

-- It preserves the broad legal migration program for Cubans in Cuba and provides added
protection to Cubans who apply for refugee status in Havana.

(If asked whether this is a reversal of policy)

-- The decision represents another step in our continued efforts to regularize migration
relations with Cuba. The basic thrust of U.S. policy was and remains the establishment of
safe, legal, and orderly migration.

-- This had to be done in steps. Our first objective was to put an end to the uncontrolled
outflow last summer, which our safehaven approach successfully accomplished.

-- We are now in a position to take this new step without risking a mass exodus from Cuba.

(If asked how you can justify returning Cubans to Cuba)

-- We will provide every opportunity for Cubans who need protection to apply for refugee
status at our Interests Section in Havana. Cuba is one of three countries in which we
provide for such in-country processing.

-- Cuban migrants rescued at sea with genuine refugee claims will be screened prior to
being taken to Cuba.

-- We know the Cuban regime is repressive, yet we cannot admit every Cuban to this
country. The only real path to freedom for Cubans is in Cuba.

-- That is why we will continue to pursue our central goal: To promote a peaceful transition
to democracy in Cuba. We will do that by enforcing the economic embargo, expanded
contacts with the Cuban people, and being ready to respond in carefully calibrated ways
to significant, irreversible reform in Cuba.
BALKANS

Croatia

- We remain deeply concerned about renewed fighting in Croatia, and particularly distressed at rocket attacks last week on Zagreb's innocent civilians.

- We have been working hard to defuse the situation. We are pleased that no new rocket attacks have occurred and that the overall level of fighting has decreased.

- Vice President Gore met with President Tudjman in London urging restraint and welcoming the Croatian Government's decision not to retaliate for the Serb rocket attacks on Zagreb.

- I urge all parties to halt military operations, abide by the UN ceasefire, and ensure the safety of civilians, prisoners of war, and UN and American personnel in Croatia.

- It is important that the situation not escalate into wider war. Our diplomatic efforts will continue to focus on ending the fighting, restoring UN authority, and restarting political negotiations as the only viable course to lasting peace in Croatia.

Bosnia

- We are very concerned about increasing Bosnian Serb shelling of Sarajevo and continuing closure of the Sarajevo airport to humanitarian aid and official flights.

- I call upon the Bosnian Serbs to end the senseless attacks on the innocent citizens of Sarajevo and to immediately reopen Sarajevo's airport.

- I urge the UN to deal firmly with Serb provocations, either on the ground in Sarajevo or through the use of NATO air power. We stand by our commitment to use NATO air power to help enforce all UN and NATO mandates in Bosnia.
NORTH KOREA

-- We have reached agreement in principle with North Korea to hold political-level talks to try to resolve issues that could not be settled in our recent discussions in Berlin related to the supply of the light water reactor project.

-- No agreement has been yet reached on the time and place for such talks.

-- North Korea continues to observe the freeze on its nuclear program.

-- As we have consistently made clear, if North Korea breaks the freeze, we will return this issue to the UN Security Council.

-- Our position remains that the only feasible basis for the light water reactor project is for the South Koreans to build the reactors.

(If raised)

-- Ambassador Gallucci is traveling to South Korea and Japan this week. This is part of our ongoing process of consultation with our regional allies.
that is true statesmanship. And that is what the Prime Minister has done. (Applause.)

I would like to ask your leave for a moment to discuss one other issue before I return to the Middle East. This weekend I have been working on two major areas of foreign policy -- first of all, preparing for the very good meeting I just finished with the Prime Minister; and secondly, getting ready for the upcoming trip I will take to Moscow and Kiev. Tomorrow marks the 50th anniversary of the victory of the Allied forces in World War II in Europe. We will mark that day here in a very moving and wonderful ceremony. Then I will get on the plane and travel to Moscow, and then to Kiev, to honor the sacrifices in that war of the peoples of Russia and the newly-independent states.

Five decades ago, the people of the United States and the then Soviet Union joined together to oppose an evil unmatched in our history. In that conflict 27 million Russians lost their lives -- or members of the Soviet republic. They were soldiers and citizens; there were untold tens of thousands of women and children; they were Russians and Belarussians, Uzbeks and Jews; Ukrainians, Armenians, and more. Death touched every family. The siege of one city took a million lives in 900 days. This week we will honor that almost unimaginable sacrifice.

But the trip also gives us a chance to look forward. Just as we fought five decades ago for our common security against the common evil, today we can fight for our common security by striving for common good. Fundamentally, this trip is about making the American people more secure and giving them a better future.

We've also based our policies from the beginning of our administration on a sober assessment of the challenges faced by these nations and a conviction that cooperation was in our best interests. We supported the forces of openness, democracy, and reform in Russia for one reason above all -- it is good for the American people and good for the rest of the world.

In the last two years that policy has made every American safer. It's helped Russia become a partner for trade, investment and cooperation, and to assume its rightful place among the nations of the world. We've got some concrete benefits to shoe for it. Some of you may not know this, but because of the agreement made last year between the United States and Russia, for the first time since the dawn of the nuclear age, there are no Russian missiles pointed at the citizens of the United States. (Applause.)

We're destroying thousands of nuclear weapons at a faster rate than our treaties require. We have removed nuclear weapons from Kazakhstan, and Ukraine and Belarus soon will follow. We're
cooperating with the Russians to prevent nuclear weapons and bomb-making materials from falling into the hands of terrorists and smugglers. We're working together to expand indefinitely a nuclear nonproliferation treaty. For the first time in half a century there are no Russian troops in Central Europe or the Baltics. Almost 60 percent of the Russian economy is now in private hands, and the elements of a free society -- elections, open debate, and a strong, independent media, whether the politicians like it or not -- are beginning to take root.

Compared with only a few years ago, when severe disagreements with Moscow paralyzed our relations and threatened nuclear confrontation, we live in safer, more hopeful times because of this extraordinary opening to new freedom in Russia.

Of course, ultimately, the fate of this country, like every other, lies in the hands of its own people. And there is still struggle between the proponents of reform and the forces of reaction. Peaceful, democratic change is not inevitable and the forces of reform will suffer setbacks. But after all, that's no different from what happens in any democracy. The forces of hope and fear are not always in the proper balance.

Nonetheless, in the struggle for freedom, the engagement and support of the West, and especially the United States can make an important difference, so more than ever, we have to engage and not withdraw. We will have our differences with Russia, but even our differences today occur in a different context. The movement of the relationship is plainly toward increasing democracy and increasing security. The interests of our people are clearly best supported by supporting that transition in Russia to a more free and open society. When we have similar goals, we'll cooperate. When we disagree -- as we do and we will -- we must manage those differences openly, constructively, and resolutely.

The war in Chechnya, where continued fighting can only spill more blood and further erode international support for Russian reform is a case in point. And Russia's cooperation with Iran is another.

All of you know that Iran, a country with more than enough oil to meet its energy needs, wants to buy reactors and other nuclear technology from Russia. This fact, together with other evidence about Iran's nuclear program, supports only one conclusion -- Iran is bent on building nuclear weapons.

I believe Russia has a powerful interest in preventing a neighbor, especially one with Iran's track record, from possessing these weapons. Therefore, if this sale does go forward, Russian national security can only be weakened in the long-term. The specter of an Iran armed with weapons of mass
destruction and the missiles to deliver them haunts not only Israel, but the entire Middle East, and ultimately, all the rest of us as well.

The United States, and I believe all the Western nations, have an overriding interest in containing the threat posed by Iran. Today Iran is the principal sponsor of global terrorism, as the Prime Minister has said. It seeks to undermine the West and its values by supporting the murderous attacks of the Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, and other terrorist groups. It aims to destroy the Middle East peace process.

You know the need for firm action here as well as I do. And I thank you for your long history of calling attention to Iran's campaign of terror. I thank you for urging a decisive response, and I thank you for supporting the action we have taken. We have worked to counter Iran's sponsorship of terrorism, its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. We led our G-7 allies to ban weapons sales, tightening restrictions on dual-use technology and in preventing Iran from obtaining credit from international financial institutions. But more has to be done. That's why I ordered an end to all U.S. trade and investment with Iran. (Applause.)

I understand this will mean some sacrifice for American companies and our workers. But the United States has to lead the way. Only by leading can we convince other nations to join us. I hope you will help us convince other nations to join us. (Applause.)

Let me mention two other nations. We have also taken a strong stand against Libya. We remain determined to bring those responsible for the bombing of Pan Am 103 to trial. (Applause.) And make no mistake about it, though U.N. sanctions have weakened Saddam Hussein, he remains an aggressive, dangerous force. He showed that last October, menacing Kuwait until our armed forces' swift and skillful deployment forced him to back down. As long as he refuses to account for Iraqi weapons programs, past and present, as long as he refuses to comply with all relevant Security Council resolutions, we cannot agree, and we will not agree, to lift the sanctions against Iraq. (Applause.)

We will not compromise on this issue, and we value the support we have received from the Prime Minister and the state of Israel.

Our measures to contain these rogue nations are part of a larger effort to combat all those who oppose peace, because even as we achieve great strides in resolving the age-old conflict between Arabs and Israelis, there remains a struggle between those searching for peace and those determined to deny it;
**DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE** | **SUBJECT/TITLE** | **DATE** | **RESTRICTION**
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001. talking points re: One-on-One Meeting with Yeltsin - Points to Make (3 pages) | n.d. | P1/b(1)

**COLLECTION:**
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Robert Boorstin (Speechwriting)
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**FOLDER TITLE:**
Russia, 5/95 - Press Statement

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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- b4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
...Russians, Americans, British, French, Poles and others in the Grand Alliance defeated Hitler; they fought for a united Europe, free of dictatorship and the hatred that is dictatorship's lifeblood. But this dream was not yet to be.

Before the fires of war had cooled, another system of fear and repression -- Stalinism, let us speak the truth -- again sundered the continent, cut short the hopes of millions and scarred the lives of two generations: Russians, Americans, West and Central Europeans. Some believed that the Cold War was fate; that Europe would remain divided forever. But the people of Russia and Central Europe decided otherwise. From roundtable negotiations in Warsaw, through the streets of Prague to the heroic defense of the White House in 1991, free peoples stood firm and reclaimed life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness which are the God-given birthright of all men and women.

These heroes gave us the opportunity -- and responsibility -- to complete the work so cruelly blocked fifty years ago. We have a second chance and there may not be a third. We must not yield to fears and threats -- to the failed policies of great power spheres of influence or hegemony. We are not enemies but friends. The West must open its minds, hearts and institutions to all nations which share our fundamental values. And Russia must recall that it, too, is a part of a common heritage -- a larger, shared community of values. And so Russia should join in building a united Europe based on democracy, an expanding community of freedom.

While this new community will have many aspects, one -- the security aspect -- has given rise to misperceptions and I wish to address it now and address it frankly.

Russia and the West need to build their security together, not apart. Democratic Russia deserves an unimpeded chance to join its fellow democracies. That is why the United States seeks to link Russia and the West's premier security organization -- NATO -- in close partnership. Whatever voices of the past may say, NATO is not an instrument of cold war aggression. It never was.

NATO carried out two historic missions during the cold war years. First, it prevented war by collective defense. Second, it stabilized Western Europe during the post-War reconstruction, bringing former enemies -- Germany and Italy -- back into the common fold of democratic civilization where they belonged. And when the Spanish people by their own efforts returned to democracy, NATO opened its doors to them.

While NATO's original purpose of collective defense remains, its form and specific mission are changing. With no militant, Stalinist enemy in Russia, NATO in the last five years has evolved to meet new challenges. A democratic Russia can be NATO's friend and partner. NATO forces in Europe are greatly reduced, as they should be, and those that remain are longer poised for full­fledged defensive battle in Central Europe. NATO is changing to meet the new forms of
aggression -- including local conflict -- that may threaten European security in the future. NATO stands as the sturdy counterpart to other institutions, such as the OSCE, which aim to prevent conflict or resolve it through political means.

NATO is already working to integrate Europe's new democracies into an undivided European security family. The Partnership for Peace will give all the states of Europe -- including Russia and other states of the former Soviet Union -- broad, permanent links with NATO. And through PFP, NATO can go farther.

As I have said many times, NATO will bring in new members. And by doing so carefully and deliberately, NATO can stabilize Central Europe just as it stabilized Western Europe forty-five years ago, allowing democracy to consolidate itself. NATO insists that any new member give up territorial claims, adhere to democracy and reform, and fully respect minority and other human rights. Therefore, the growth of an evolving NATO will help block the poison of nationalist insecurity and competing ambition in and around Central Europe that contributed to two world wars. No nation suffered more than Russia from the terrible consequences of these wars, so NATO's mission in Central Europe is also in Russia's interest.

Security in Europe can rest on these strong, pillars: NATO and democratic Russia together, an evolved NATO with new missions and new members, a strengthened OSCE, a strong and active G-7 with a growing partnership with Russia leading perhaps to a G-8, and more. Russia and America can make it happen -- not through secret deals over the heads of any other nation, but through open and honest cooperation.

Many Russians are worried about the prospect of NATO's expansion. I tell you that NATO is not and will never be a threat to Russian security. Just the opposite: by stabilizing Central Europe, NATO will build predictability and reduce tension, paving the way for Russian security and cooperation with its natural Western partners.

Russia is a great nation; so is the United States. We can and we will disagree from time to time. But as long as we both adhere to the basic principles of democracy, respect for the sovereignty of other nations and peoples and seek out areas of cooperation, we can, even amid disagreements, fulfill our responsibility to ourselves and our children.
Bob -- this is as far as I’ve gotten thru numerous interruptions, etc. I’ll try to give you more -- esp. on Yeltsincentrism -- tomorrow.

But we will also be firm when Russia’s policies or actions run counter to our interests. Russia’s decision to sell nuclear reactor technology to Iran is one such case. We have not hesitated to make clear our view that this deal, as currently envisioned, should not go forward. Iran’s ambition to develop a nuclear weapons capability is not a matter of conjecture. It is a fact, and we have shown Russian officials the evidence to prove it. We will continue our efforts to convince Moscow that this deal is a terrible mistake.

Likewise, we have made clear that we deplore the needless death and suffering from the conflict in Chechnya. We are encouraged that Russia appears finally to be prepared to put an end to military action. We urge all sides to make this a permanent end to hostilities that will allow the search for a political solution to move forward. Although Chechnya is part of Russia, the world expects Russia to respect international standards in dealing with this tragedy.

We continue to consult closely with Moscow on the crucial issues related to European security and the future of NATO. We appreciate the sensitivity with which the Russian people view this question; for over 40 years, they were taught to view regard this defense alliance as a hostile threat to their security. Now, as NATO adapts to the changed circumstances of the post Cold-war Europe and begins to consider taking in new members, Russians view the process with apprehension. Our position is clear (take from Cleveland speech).

Bob
PRESIDENT CLINTON'S TRIP TO RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

President Clinton will travel to Russia and Ukraine to honor the great sacrifices of their people who helped win the victory over Fascism during World War II. In meetings with President Yeltsin and others, President Clinton will continue his push for free markets and democracy in Russia, make progress on issues of common interest, and spell out our differences on certain issues. In Ukraine, he will encourage the political and economic reforms that are already underway.

American Interests in Russia. The United States has a vital stake in helping Russia become a more open and democratic society, at peace with its own people, its neighbors, and the world. From the beginning of his Administration, President Clinton's policy toward Russia has been designed to:

- Improve the lives and security of American citizens;
- Create a democratic, prosperous and stable partner for trade and investment; and
- Continue cooperation on important regional and international issues.

Progress In U.S.-Russia Relations. Our Russia policy has already paid enormous dividends:

- Russian nuclear warheads are no longer aimed at American cities and towns, and Russia is destroying thousands of nuclear weapons;
- Russia has made important strides toward a market economy with the private sector now accounting for more than 50 percent of its economy;
- For the first time in half a century, there are no Russian troops in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states;
- Russia is helping us extend indefinitely the Non-Proliferation Treaty and bring peace to the Mideast; and
- Russia's new agreement with the IMF commits it to tighter budgets, fewer state price controls and a renewed fight against inflation.

A Pragmatic Strategy. President Clinton's policy toward Russia is firmly grounded in the interests of the American people. It is based on a hard-nosed assessment of the opportunities and challenges ahead. We know that the ultimate success of peaceful, democratic reforms in Russia is not foreordained. It is in our interest to do all we can to help the proponents of reform in their struggle against the forces of regression. That principle will guide the President's discussion with President Yeltsin and others in Russia:

- We will cooperate with Russia where our interests coincide, and manage our differences candidly and constructively where they do not.
- A decade ago, severe disagreements with Moscow threatened nuclear confrontation. Today, we do not always agree, but every difference is not a crisis. We address our problems constructively and work out solutions.
- Because of the stakes, we cannot and will not hold our relationship hostage to one issue. Our differences over the sale of reactors to Iran, for instance, are serious, but that does not mean we can simply walk away from our engagement with Russia.
The Chechen Conflict. Russia's conduct in Chechnya has been tragically wrong. The United States has consistently urged Russia to:

• End its military operation in Chechnya;
• Allow humanitarian relief to reach the war's victims; and
• Negotiate a permanent political settlement that addresses the legitimate concerns of all the people of Chechnya.

Chechnya is part of Russia, but Russia must abide by international norms there. The Russian government should work with the OSCE to end the bloodshed, reach a ceasefire that permanently ends the war, and find a lasting political solution. More fighting in Chechnya will only corrode Russia's democratic progress and weaken international support for reform.

Nuclear Cooperation with Iran. The U.S. is firmly opposed to any Russian action that advances Iran's plans to build nuclear weapons, threatening both our interests and Russian security. Reports of additional elements in the deal, e.g., a uranium enrichment facility, only heighten our concerns. President Clinton will continue to press Russia for an outcome that does not facilitate Iran's nuclear ambitions.

European Security. President Clinton believes that Russia should be part of the new security architecture that will shape an integrated and democratic Europe. At the Moscow Summit, we hope to overcome Russia's misconceptions about the process of NATO expansion and give new impetus to building the NATO-Russia relationship. But decisions about the future of NATO will be taken by NATO's 16 members alone.

U.S. Relations with the Ukraine. The United States policy toward Ukraine has been designed to serve American interests and help stabilize one of the most important nations in Europe. Our policy supports an independent, democratic and prosperous Ukraine.

Progress in U.S.-Ukrainian Relations. Our Ukrainian policy to date has made real gains and proved the wisdom of our support for reforms in the Newly Independent States:

• In 1994, Ukraine signed the Trilateral Statement, ratified START, and acceded to the Non Proliferation Treaty. Nuclear weapons are now being dismantled at a rapid pace.
• We've done a lot to help Ukraine reform its economy, leading the G-7 last summer to pledge $4 billion for Ukraine and making sure that commitment becomes reality.

A Pragmatic Strategy. In Kiev, President Clinton has three goals. He will encourage the Ukrainian leaders and people to:

• Keep their economic reforms on track;
• Continue to nurture a free press and strengthen representative democracy;
• Move forward on an agenda for the future that strengthens the trade, investment and commercial ties between Ukraine and the United States.
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