Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee
DATE: August 18, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 4:30 - 6:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR
Sandy Berger

OMB
Phebe Vickers
Rodney Bent

OVP
Bill Wise
Rick Saunders

CIA
George Tenet
Dennis Blair

STATE
Strobe Talbott
John Kornblum

AID
Thomas Dine
Michael Mahdesian

DEFENSE
Jan Lodal
Ted Warner
James Pardew

JCS
BG John Walsh
Douglas Lute

USUN
Dave Scheffer
James O’Brien

WHITE HOUSE
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
BG Donald Kerrick
Richard Clarke
Sue Bremner

Summary of Conclusions

1. Deputies met August 18 to review the status of DoD’s post-settlement implementation planning effort and discuss arming and training the Federation forces. They agreed to reconvene on Tuesday, August 22 to accomplish two tasks:

- review more detailed discussion paper on peace settlement implementation based on Deputies discussion, to be prepared by
OSD with input from JCS and others as appropriate, that would be forwarded to Principals later in the week;

- review a paper on arm and train, in which JCS would attempt to frame questions and lay out a mechanism for decisionmaking. This paper would also be presented to Principals later in the week. (S)

IMPLEMENTATION

2. Deputies accepted as a working assumption (although this was disputed by some) that the force would largely be deployed to Federation territory. (S)

3. Deputies were in agreement that the mandate of the NATO-led Peace Implementation Force (PIF) should include all necessary use of force in self-defense, whether through air power or other means. (S)

4. With regard to the mandate of the force vis-a-vis protecting Federation territory from Serb attack, some participants advocated security guarantees akin to NATO Chapter V protection; anything short of this was described as making the PIF ineffectual. Other participants called for lesser guarantees in the form of air power alone, under the arrangements envisioned at the July 1995 London Conference but country-wide. Participants agreed the subject required further consideration. (S)

5. Deputies agreed that if the Bosnian government or Federation violated the terms of settlement by launching major offensives to gain strategic advantage, the PIF would leave. (S)

6. If the Serbs violated the terms of the agreement by launching major campaigns to gain strategic advantage, the PIF would undertake actions that moved up a pre-established ladder of escalation. (S)

7. All agreed that the PIF would take an even-handed approach, using force as necessary, to counter renegade or isolated military activities on the part of either side, so long as they did not constitute major offensives. (S)

8. With regard to the mission of the force, Deputies discussed four elements:

- Separation of forces: Separation of forces would be done voluntarily by the parties to the agreement, but the PIF would be authorized to effect the movement of forces that had not done so voluntarily. (S)
Disarmament: Some Deputies noted that this task would be subordinate to separation of forces, as troops would not have to be disarmed inside areas they were given at settlement. Other Deputies noted that we would need to guard against appearing to sanction an arms race in territory under the control of the parties. *5*

Heavy weapons: Deputies noted that build-down was an option that needed to be explored further. The task of controlling heavy weapons was also discussed in relation to separation of forces and demilitarization. *5*

Demilitarization: The Deputies agreed that there should be narrow DMZs along the borders. They agreed to examine analyses of weapons limitation zones to supplement the DMZs. Deputies further discussed zones of separation, including notions of two-tiered zones with inner zones of separation and outer buffer exclusion zones. *5*

9. Deputies agreed that the PIF should be under NATO command and control, with arrangements for non-NATO troops. Deputies noted that dissuading the Russians and Islamic-country forces from participating in post-settlement implementation might be politically difficult. *5*

10. Deputies agreed peacekeeping forces would continue to operate in Macedonia and Croatia under UN auspices and would not be incorporated into the PIF. The UN would also continue to operate civilian functions such as UNCIVPOL and UNHCR in the PIF area of responsibility. *5*

11. On the subject of phasing, Deputies agreed that initial deployment should occur quickly, once the UN made a request, through means of a NATO command and control headquarters being set up on the ground and the resubordination of the RRF. A Joint Commission would be established to coordinate political and military issues with local officials. NATO OPLAN 40104, containing planning for UNPROFOR withdrawal, might be used as a basis for planning out initial deployments, which would have to occur in conjunction with the removal of UNPROFOR units not a part of NATO and not willing to remain. *5*

12. As for the exit strategy, Deputies discussed DoD’s estimate that the force would remain in place for nine months. Some participants considered nine months sufficient for arm and train to be effective; others felt the establishment of buffers and CBMs, separation of forces, and other aspects of the mission would take more time. DoD noted that using OPLAN 40104 as the basis for planning is the correct approach.
basis for planning would facilitate drawdown of the PIF itself, when the time came. (S)

13. Deputies agreed that next steps for the USG, once Principals endorsed the DoD paper, would include a possible key allies meeting to refine plans and make arrangements for a NAC to bless an updated version of OPLAN 40104 encompassing settlement implementation as well as withdrawal. (S)

ARM AND TRAIN

14. Deputies agreed arming and training was a function parallel to implementation planning. Basic assumptions included:

- that we would equip the Federation (as opposed to other entities);
- that the U.S. would attempt to lead a multilateral effort;
- that our goal would be to build up the core defensive capabilities of the Bosnian army;
- that we would attempt to counterbalance the strengths of the BSA. (S)

15. Deputies noted that even if there were no peace plan implementation, there might still be a requirement to arm and train, so planning needed to get under way. (S)