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### COLLECTION:
- Clinton Presidential Records
- National Security Council
- Robert Boorstin (Speechwriting)

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### FOLDER TITLE:

### RESTRICTION CODES

- **Presidential Records Act** - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
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  - P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
  - P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
  - P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
  - P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
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  - b(6) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
  - b(7) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
  - b(8) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
Address by W. Anthony Lake
National Security Advisor

The Council on Foreign Relations
September 12, 1994

"THE STRUCTURES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY"

I. Introduction: The Purpose of Engagement

Ladies and Gentlemen, I'm delighted to be here. And Mort, thank you for that generous introduction. It's always a pleasure to hear words of praise from the Fourth Estate. I still vividly remember the last time that happened to me, during the Carter Administration...

I want to talk to you tonight about President Clinton's foreign policy and his efforts to build structures that will enhance our security, promote prosperity, and spread the benefits of democracy to an ever larger circle of nations.

All of us here would agree that we're now at a break point, similar to the ones we confronted after the two World Wars. Orienting ourselves in a radically new foreign policy environment can be frustrating. But then, charting a new course has never been easy. While the policy of containment looks obvious to us in retrospect, we should remember that it took the likes of Harry Truman and Dean Acheson several years to find their way and build a policy consensus. And they had the advantage of an ideologically and geographically defined adversary with whom to contend.

The easy divisions of the Cold War have given way to a complex of problems. "Traditional" aggression by malicious nation states. Emerging transnational threats like environmental decay, over-population and refugees. A global economic and information free-for-all that increases wealth and opportunity, but also produces fear and uncertainty. And terrible ethnic and religious fragmentation.

Dealing with these and other problems is not enough -- even when we facilitate success, as in Northern Ireland or the Middle East. American foreign policy also must
seize opportunities to enhance our security and increase our wealth. After World War II, a remarkable generation of Americans helped create the institutions -- like NATO, the Marshall Plan, GATT, the IMF and the World Bank -- that ensured half a century of security and prosperity in America, Europe and Japan. Now, we must strive to match those achievements for the next fifty years, and beyond.

As we go about these new tasks, the Clinton Administration is guided by three timeless truths. First, isolationism is simply not an option. The problems of the world will find us, no matter how hard we might try to avoid them. Second, power still matters. The United States must be -- and is -- prepared to defend our interests wherever they are threatened, by any means necessary. This requires maintaining and modernizing the finest military in the world so we can deter aggression -- and counter it when the need arises. Finally, principles still matter. We know from our own bitter experience that power unhinged from principle will leave us rudderless and adrift. The American people will not -- and should not -- support policies divorced from our values.

In short, the issue is not whether to engage, but rather how to engage. Put another way, we need to ask ourselves: what is the purpose of American engagement?

The purpose of American engagement goes beyond meeting threats to our security. It goes beyond creating new opportunities for wealth. In President Clinton's view, America's engagement in the world must work above all to build structures that bolster existing democracies and create the conditions for new ones to emerge.

This is no simple matter. Far from reaching the end of history, we are at the dawn of a new struggle that pits nations guided by the institutions and ideals of democracy against those animated instead by arbitrariness, repression, and ethnic strife. We must take up this challenge. It is a fundamental American interest to ensure that the countries that have only just escaped the shackles of totalitarianism remain free, and to encourage more nations to move toward democracy.

We are not starry eyed about the prospects for spreading democracy -- it will not take hold everywhere. But we know that the larger the pool of democracies, the better off
we will be. Democracies are less likely to wage war on one another and they make for more reliable trading partners. Our own experience tells us that democracy is the most enlightened form of governance yet devised. As Americans, we have long enjoyed the freedom and prosperity that democracy helps secure, and the political and civil rights it guarantees. We want others to share in its benefits. So we must do all that we can to expand the community of free and open societies.

Democracy is at once the foundation and the end product of the foreign policy structures we are striving to build. It is the foundation, because the culture and language of democracy are what make structures vital. As my predecessor Zbig Brzezinski has put it, "If one builds... only with bricks and mortar we will find that something profound is missing, and the structure may not prove enduring, because societies as viable entities exist on the basis of conviction, of commitment, of certain shared values that give [them] cohesion." Foremost among those shared values, whether in NATO or NAFTA, is democracy.

Democracy also is the final product of our foreign policy. As the structures we build make us more secure and more prosperous, they set a bedrock within which to better root emerging democracies, and upon which to construct new ones. In short, democracy both infuses the new structures of foreign policy, and gains strength from their solidity.

That's the big picture, which I will endeavor to fill in. Policy makers are partial to big pictures. It takes the focus away from day-to-day conflicts that may blot the work in progress. But we cannot paint over these crises. Bosnia and Haiti, for example, are not transitory tragedies. Rather, they are part of something bigger and more menacing that threatens to undermine the foreign policy structures we are working so hard to build. That's why any productive debate on how we engage must grapple with our short term responses to crises. And that's why the structures President Clinton is helping design must not only withstand challenges to their integrity, but also make it less likely, in the long term, that such challenges will arise in the first place.
II. Building Foreign Policy Structures

Before starting a project, any good architect sits down with the client and asks a few basic questions: What's the building for? What are your needs? How much time do you spend in each room? What direction do the high winds and storm fronts come from? As the newly designated architects for foreign policy, such are the questions we asked ourselves two years ago.

The theoretical answers were not hard to come by. The structures to be built should enhance our security and promote our prosperity, and that of those who build them with us. These structures should be open to all who would be willing to live by the rules of the house. Finally, they should be designed with the flexibility to withstand shifting threats to their stability, much like skyscrapers in Los Angeles or Mexico City are built with enough give to weather an earthquake.

Working with our allies, President Clinton has moved from the drawing board to the construction site. By creating new security arrangements, or revitalizing old ones, and by devising pro-trade economic institutions, or modernizing existing ones, our Administration is helping to build sturdy, integrated foreign policy structures for the future.

Security

The end of the Cold War has not changed human nature. So this administration's first responsibility remains the physical security of our country and our people. But the varied and evolving nature of the threats to our well-being compel us to revisit the institutions designed to protect us. Let me address two areas of primary concern: Europe and Asia.

In Europe, we are deeply engaged in transforming existing structures to fulfill President Clinton's vision for an integrated continent. NATO must remain the foundation of security and stability for the trans-Atlantic community. While its traditional defensive mission remains paramount, NATO increasingly is being called upon to undertake new
tasks and to cooperate with non-NATO partners. If Europeans and Americans are to stake their future security on the Alliance, it must adapt to changing times so as to keep the peace — and, if necessary, make the peace.

That's why President Clinton has taken the lead in outlining a new strategy and new missions for NATO, including the establishment of the Combined Joint Task Forces for peacekeeping and crisis management, and the "Partnership for Peace," to begin the practical process of expanding security in Europe eastward.

Above all else, the Partnership is a concrete answer to an extraordinary strategic challenge: the need to draw a new, unified map of Europe, a continent no longer divided into two adversarial blocs. For the new European democracies, the Partnership for Peace is the lighthouse at the entrance to NATO's harbor, offering real, practical military and defense cooperation with NATO. For Russia, the Partnership gives a boost to reformers. And it commits Moscow to promote transparency in defense planning and budgeting and to maintain democratic control of its defense forces. Should reform experience a reversal of fortune in Russia, NATO can re-evaluate its needs and those of the Central and Eastern Europeans. While keeping us prepared — just in case — for the worst, the Partnership allows us to work toward the best possible outcome for Europe — an undivided community of democratic and stable nations.

In Asia, this Administration also seeks to create integrated security structures, but with different building blocks. Because there is no equivalent to NATO, we must develop a series of arrangements that will function, as President Clinton has put it, "like overlapping plates of armor, individually providing protection and together covering the whole body of our common security concerns."

These plates may include bilateral arrangements with regional democracies, such as our treaty commitments to Japan, Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand, and the deployment of our forces to help stabilize the region. The plates might also consist of multilateral efforts, such as our partnership with South Korea, Japan and others to defuse the North Korean nuclear threat and reduce tension on the Korean Peninsula. Or they
may involve increased regional security dialogs. Last year, for the first time ever, the ASEAN countries -- including the United States, Russia, and Vietnam -- gathered around a table to discuss security issues. These types of structured dialogs can help prevent the outbreak of dangerous rivalries and promote regional integration.

**Prosperity**

From the outset of his Administration, President Clinton recognized that a strong foreign policy must begin with a sound economic foundation. But he also knows that prosperity at home requires that we maintain focus abroad. Now, more than ever before, our economic well-being is tied to that of other nations.

In the new global economy, governments no longer exert the control they once did over their nations’ commerce. While the possibilities for growth and creativity are endless, the loss of sovereignty can breed confusion, especially among people left behind. Those opposed to our engagement in the world, be it military or economic, feed on people's fears and uncertainties to promote their misguided cause. In this environment, protectionism becomes a temptation.

There is a powerful lesson here for those of us concerned with sustaining our country's prosperity in the decades to come. That is the need to design structures -- either bilateral or multilateral in form -- with the every day, real interests of Americans in mind, rooted in their lives, and able to produce tangible benefits.

One striking example is NAFTA, whose passage President Clinton went to the mat to secure. For all it promises to achieve in its own right, NAFTA is just the starting point for the structural integration of our hemisphere. Other regional compacts modeled after NAFTA will follow. And we will pursue integration at the Summit of the Americas, convened by the President in Miami next December.

Last year, we sent $120 billion in goods and services to Asia, which translates into almost 2.5 million American jobs. That's just a snapshot. If you could project that image
into the future, it would show that Asia, above any other region, is where we must find our growth in the years ahead.

With that fact in mind, President Clinton hosted the first ever gathering of the Organization for Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders in Seattle last November. The 15 members of APEC account for nearly half of the world's output and most of the fastest-growing economies. By setting pro-growth policies, toppling trade barriers, and cutting regulatory red tape within the Asian-Pacific, we can take tangible steps to improve our peoples' lives. Our engagement with APEC, which the President will pursue in Indonesia in November, is clear evidence of his vision for an integrated Asian-Pacific community, a community of shared prosperity, shared growth, and shared strength.

After a lot of heavy lifting, we successfully completed the GATT Uruguay Round, begun eight years ago. By lowering barriers to trade and bringing more nations into an open trading system, this accord promises to lift substantially American wages and living standards, and to do the same for other nations around the world. GATT's successor, the World Trade Organization, makes the overdue transition from a treaty to a new trade structure. It will help us resolve commercial disputes more efficiently, and ensure that our workers and businesses compete on an even international playing field.

III. Contending with Structural Threats

I suggested earlier that one essential question an architect asks her client before inking a design is "what direction do the high winds and storm fronts come from?" As we strive to raise new foreign policy institutions, we need to be concerned not so much with winds and storms, but with more fundamental threats to the structural integrity of our efforts. You might call these threats tremors within states and quakes across borders.
Tremors Within States

Bosnia, Haiti. Crises in these tragic lands, and elsewhere, dominate the news. This should not surprise us. It is, after all, more dramatic to watch a wrecking ball knock down a house that it is to witness the tedious, slow rise of a new building.

In saying this, my aim is not simply to lament our tendency to fixate on the crisis du jour at the expense of longer term policy efforts -- although a little lamenting on this score does the soul of a policy maker good from time to time. The fact is, these crises matter a great deal, on two distinct levels.

First, people are suffering and dying. To look the other way would be to abandon our compassion.

At the same time, such crises are evidence of a dangerous phenomenon that transcends their particulars. In a more complex, interdependent world, it is increasingly difficult for governments to govern. Interest groups clamor to be heard. Ethnic minorities vie for attention. Even within stable democracies, political margins have become razor thin. All too easily -- particularly in wobbly or dysfunctional systems -- this maelstrom of competing needs and demands can spiral out of control.

The resulting chaos and humanitarian disasters sorely test existing institutions, and threaten to undermine support for the new ones we're creating. Tremendous pressure -- filtered through the electronic media's all-seeing lens -- builds on us to intervene, even when our core interests are not a stake. This contradiction breeds confusion, and even a perverse nostalgia for the more predictable days of the Cold War.

While our finite means do not allow us to take responsibility for every crisis, our interests dictate that we assume the burden of some. This especially will be the case where old structures prove unable to cope with the problem, and new ones are not yet in place to do the job.

Ultimately, the only test for intervention is pragmatism, a pragmatism that marries interest and idealism. Compassion should animate, but not dictate, our policies. If we intervene and fail, we're not doing good, no matter how principled our motives or how
right the cause. But when our interests demand it, we cannot back down from the good fight. Our challenge is to be both pure of heart and focused of mind.

That said, let me briefly touch upon Bosnia and Haiti. Our very different interests in these countries color the injustice common to both, and so cause us to adopt different policies.

This Administration believes that while the tragedy in Bosnia does not pose an immediate threat to our security, important U.S. interests are nonetheless at stake. Our response has been strong but measured. Rather than go it alone, we have worked closely with the United Nations, NATO and individual allies to maintain one of the most thorough sanctions regimes in history; broker a Federation agreement between the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Croat minority; protect relief workers with air power; establish a Contact Group to negotiate a territorial settlement; and organize and fund a war crimes tribunal. We have provided more humanitarian assistance to the region than any other country. And if the Bosnian Serbs refuse to accept the settlement offer now on the table, we will lift the arms embargo -- which unfairly handicaps the Muslims -- even if that means acting unilaterally.

The restoration of democracy in Haiti is a clear and compelling U.S. interest. To allow General Cedras to continue to flout the will of the Haitian people would undermine the remarkable democratic advances made throughout the Americas. The devastating humanitarian consequences of Haiti's military rule also demand our attention. The Cedras regime has engaged in widespread human rights abuses, killing and maiming its own people -- women and children, even priests. And it has led Haiti to the brink of economic ruin, both by its failed policies and by a pattern of conduct that has made necessary the imposition of tough economic sanctions. Finally, our interest in restoring democracy is magnified by the refugee crisis provoked by the deteriorating human rights and economic situations.

Working with the U.N. and the Organization of American States, the United States initially sought to mediate, and then to compel, a solution to the Haitian crisis. U.S.
leadership has produced two important U.N. Security Council Resolutions, one barring all trade with Haiti except for humanitarian supplies, the other authorizing member states to form an international military corps to restore democracy by force if necessary. Because the international community -- starting with the democracies in our Hemisphere -- share our goal of restoring democracy to Haiti, we will continue to work cooperatively to meet that objective. But make no mistake: the military thugs responsible for usurping Haiti's democracy will go, even if that means unilateral U.S. intervention.

In Bosnia, and to a lesser extent Haiti, while existing structures have proved to be important forums for progress, they have not been up to the immensely complex task of resolving the crises. That's why we reserve the option of unilateral action. More important, the shortcomings we've identified in these structures inform our efforts to build new ones. The result, in the long term, should be institutions better equipped to cope with the crises that do arise, or to prevent their occurrence in the first place.

Quakes Across Borders

Mass migrations and refugees. The population explosion. An endangered environment. A nefarious nexus of crime, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. These are the so-called transnational threats that our institutions must be built to withstand, and ultimately to vanquish. I'd like to touch briefly on two of them: refugees and the crime, terrorism and nuclear weapons troika.

There are an estimated 19 million refugees worldwide, fleeing war, repression, poverty and famine. We cannot ignore their plight. Yet, prosperous countries can only absorb so many newcomers before an intolerable strain overextends social services. In times of economic distress, illegal aliens and legal immigrants alike become grist for the extremist mill -- witness the dangerous appeals to racism and xenophobia of a Le Pen in France or the Skinheads in Germany.

Humanitarian assistance, and intervention, aim in part to avert refugee catastrophes. But while we must remain willing to say yes to calls for help, we must also
be prepared to say no. This means getting over the reflex to take full responsibility for a
crisis whenever and wherever it arises. Often, the best we will be able to do is help
provide a breathing space for others to sort out their own problems.

Working with allies, through multilateral organizations like the UNHCR, and
alongside Non-Governmental Organizations, we have done our best to contain, and if
possible to reverse, the tragedies in places like Somalia and Rwanda. In so doing, we
fulfill our duty to meet the crisis of the moment. But as Secretary of State Christopher has
said, "The challenge of diplomacy is to anticipate, and to prevent, the crises of the future."
And that is precisely the function of many of the structures we are building, like the
Combined Joint Task Forces.

The growing nexus between organized crime, terrorism, and weapons of mass
destruction has horrific potential. Four times in the last month, police seized weapons-
quality plutonium smuggled into Germany from Russia. We should be thankful that
superior police work and cooperation among various intelligence services -- including our
own -- intercepted this deadly cargo. But we also should be concerned. Imagine, for
example, what would have happened if the World Trade Center terrorists had detonated a
nuclear, not a conventional device.

This nexus demands a coordinated, international response. Mere vigilance will not
suffice. The amount of plutonium needed to make a bomb is no bigger than a can of
Coke. Intensified cooperation among various criminal justice systems is one of the most
potent weapons in our arsenal. Over the past few years, we have greatly enhanced our
intelligence sharing with allies and through Interpol, increased regular consultations, and
engaged in joint anti-terrorist training. Most recently, in July, FBI director Louis Freeh
visited several Eastern European countries and Russia, where he stressed the risks of
nuclear proliferation through the efforts of organized crime and proposed new cooperative
initiatives in response. Ultimately, this informal network of concerned nations will likely
evolve into a new structure to counter what must rank as one of the greatest long term
threats to our security.
IV. Conclusion: Building for the Future

Moving from the theoretical to the practical is fraught with difficulty, all the more so in a period of change when we haven't defined the questions, much less answered them. For any given crisis, or on any larger issue, people of good will genuinely will disagree. Constructive criticism is essential. It produces better policy. Reflexive or partisan diatribes which fail to offer real alternatives do not. As citizens deeply involved in the formulation of American foreign policy, our opportunity and our obligation is to lead a national debate on defining the questions and finding the answers — a debate that thus far has been lacking. Only through a reasoned dialogue will we set a steady new course for our nation.

Choice, not chance, determines destiny. The Clinton Administration has chosen. Rather than throw up our hands in despair at the complexities of the post-Cold War era, we have thrown ourselves with determination into the task of creating new institutions for a rapidly changing world. We have chosen to engage, not retreat.

I believe that the security and economic structures we are building will enhance the strength and promote the spread of democracy. A larger community of democracies and the structures that go hand in hand with them will help defuse ethnic violence, and avert refugee crises. They will be better placed to show vigilance in the fight against terrorism and organized crime, and to prevent the sale of weapons and nuclear technology to pariah states. They will be less likely to fall prey to the rhetoric of hate mongers and demagogues. And they promise to prevent many of the crises that now challenge us from arising in the first place.

When Americans see a problem, our natural inclination is to try to fix it. This is a laudable quality, but one that needs to be held in check when it comes to foreign policy. You don't "fix" two hundred years of ethnic tension, or five centuries of national rivalry. You make it better or worse. You don't "fix" a hot war or a refugee crisis. You make it better or worse.
Through painstaking diplomacy in places like the Middle East and Northern Ireland, the United States has helped to make things better, to turn tragedy into hope. Through our on-going efforts in the former Soviet Union, we have made things better by helping to win agreements to withdraw all Russian troops from the Baltics, rid the Ukraine of nuclear weapons, and, eventually, close the Chernobyl nuclear facility. And, in the long term, by building new foreign policy structures and spreading democracy, we can make the world a safer, more prosperous place.

Foreign policy, in short, is not for those seeking instant gratification. It is for those who are engaged in the problems of our world, who are prepared to build patiently and pragmatically, day in and day out, and who aren't afraid to make mistakes. As President Roosevelt once said, it's better to err occasionally in the cause of activism than to be frozen in the ice of indifference.

In the end, this Administration believes that Americans must do even more than remain engaged in the world beyond our borders. We must lead. And we are. In NATO and APEC, with NAFTA and the NPT, through bilateral cooperation and unilateral initiative, the United States is helping to create a new foreign policy landscape. We don't pretend to have all the answers. No one does. And we need help from this important group, and the individuals who animate it. But the Clinton Administration is moving forward, building structures for the future. In so doing, we rely on decidedly American attributes: optimism and a pioneering spirit that rises to new challenges.
IV. Conclusion: Building for the Future

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Choice, not chance, determines destiny. After World War I, we chose withdrawal, leaving a vacuum that was filled by the forces of hatred and tyranny. After World War II, we chose engagement, creating the institutions that guaranteed 50 years of freedom and prosperity.

Today, at this century's third major turning point, the Clinton Administration has chosen. Rather than throw up our hands in despair at the complexities of the post-Cold War era, we have thrown ourselves with determination into the task of building new structures that will enhance the strength and promote the spread of democracy.

Democracies and the structures that go hand in hand with them are more likely to keep the peace. Democracies are better placed to defuse ethnic violence, and produce proud citizens, not terrorized refugees. Democracies are more vigilant in the fight against terrorism and organized crime, and the prevention of the sale of weapons and nuclear technology to pariah states. Democracies are less likely to fall prey to the rhetoric of hate mongers and demagogues. Democracies are more dependable trading partners. Enlarging the community of free and open societies by building structures infused with and giving strength to democracy must be the purpose of American engagement in the world.

Building democracy is not for those seeking instant gratification. You do not "fix" two hundred years of ethnic tension, or five centuries of national rivalry. You make
it better or worse. You do not "fix" a hot war or a refugee crisis. You make it better or worse. Building democracy, in short, is for those who are engaged in the problems of our world, who are prepared to toil patiently and pragmatically, day in and day out, and who aren't afraid to make mistakes. As President Roosevelt once said, it's better to err occasionally in the cause of activism than to be frozen in the ice of indifference.

In the end, this Administration believes that Americans must do even more than remain engaged in the world beyond our borders. We must lead. And we are. With the new structures we are building, through bilateral cooperation and unilateral initiative, the United States is helping to create a new foreign policy landscape. We don't pretend to have all the answers. No one does. And we need help from this important group, and the individuals who animate it. But the Clinton Administration is moving forward, building structures for the future. In so doing, we rely on decidedly American attributes: optimism and a pioneering spirit that rises to new challenges.
Address by W. Anthony Lake  
National Security Advisor  
The Council on Foreign Relations  
September 12, 1994  

"THE STRUCTURES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY"  
ARCHITECTURE OF DEMOCRACY  

I. Introduction: The Need for Engagement  

Ladies and Gentlemen, I'm delighted to be here. And Mort, thank you for that generous introduction. It's always a pleasure to hear words of praise from the Fourth Estate. I still vividly remember the last time that happened to me, during the Carter Administration... I want to talk to you today about... those who say...  

Not so long ago, I was listening with one ear to National Public Radio. The correspondent was talking about a "council", which he described as "a stodgy group of foreign policy wonks." I assumed he was referring to the National Security Council. Turns out he was talking about the Council on Foreign Relations. That's what happens when you've been around longer than the Rolling Stones.  

In fact, the Council has been influencing policy since 1921, from Coolidge to Clinton. Based on the conversations I've had with many of you in this room, and recent articles in Foreign Affairs, the word "stodgy" is not what comes to mind when I think about this institution. Let me suggest a few more accurate adjectives. Dynamic. Thoughtful. Provocative. As we enter a radically new foreign policy environment, these are much needed qualities.  

Entering any new world is disorienting. It forces us to leave behind a trusted frame of reference, and graph new maps by which to move forward. All of us here tonight would agree that we're now at a break point similar to the ones we confronted after the two World Wars. Sometimes it seems that we agree on little else. But then, charting a new course has never been simple. While the policy of containment may look
obvious to us in retrospect, we should remember that it took the likes of Harry Truman and Dean Acheson a good five years to find their way and build a policy consensus. And they had the advantage of an ideologically and geographically defined adversary with whom to contend.

The dangers we face today are less immediately threatening. But understanding their nature and agreeing upon the proper response is more complicated than ever.

It's a jumble out there. "Traditional" aggression by malicious nation states mixes with emerging transnational threats like environmental decay, over-population and famine. Information, ideas, money and people zig-zag around the world in blissful disregard of national borders. This new global free-for-all means increased wealth and opportunity, but it also produces fear and uncertainty. And we are witnessing a terrible fragmentation in places like Bosnia and Nagorno Karabakh, ethnic passions and national aspirations once held in check by communism or by the Cold War stand-off now run amok.

In setting our nation's foreign policy, the Clinton Administration has one core working assumption: The United States cannot sit idly on the sidelines, hoping to remain unscathed, while conflicts elsewhere proliferate or intensify. We are engaged beyond our borders -- economically, politically, militarily -- whether we like it or not. Isolationism is simply not an option, because the problems of the world will find us, no matter how hard we might try to avoid them.

Besides, as the sole remaining superpower -- and as Americans -- we have an obligation, born of both interest and idealism, to do what is within our means to deter aggression, defuse altercations, defend the victims of violence, and devise solutions to common concerns.

Parrying threats is not enough. American foreign policy must also seize opportunities to increase our wealth and enhance our security. After World War II, a remarkable generation of Americans helped create the institutions -- like NATO, the Marshall Plan, GATT, the IMF and the World Bank -- that guaranteed for us and our
allies half a century of peace and prosperity. Matching those achievements for the next fifty years and beyond demands our involvement, and our leadership.

In short, if we are to ward off threats to our interests, if we are to continue to prosper, if we are to remain secure, the issue is not whether to engage, but rather how to engage. As citizens deeply involved in the formulation of American foreign policy, our opportunity and our obligation is to lead a national debate on that question -- a debate that so far has been lacking -- and, over time, set a steady new course for the nation.

Let me join the debate by sketching for you how the Clinton Administration has shaped American engagement in the world. First and foremost, we have sought to build new structures that will guarantee the safety and freedom of our people and promote our economic vitality. You might call these forward looking initiatives our "big picture" foreign policy. I hope you will like what you see.

Of course, policy makers are partial to big pictures. It takes the focus away from day-to-day details that may blot the work in progress. To me, the crisis, or crises, of the moment cannot be painted over. Bosnia and Haiti, for example, are not simply transitory, if tragic, dilemmas. Rather, they are part of something bigger and more menacing that threatens to undermine the foreign policy structures we are working so hard to build. That's why any productive debate on how we engage must grapple with our short term responses to crises like Bosnia and Haiti. And that's why the structures I'll describe are being designed both to withstand challenges to their integrity, and to make it less likely, in the long term, that such challenges will arise in the first place.

In a letter to Eleanor Roosevelt in 1945, President Truman noted the pressure he felt to devise a new, post-War foreign policy and concluded: [Patience is the best virtue. TK TK exact quote]. This remains good advice. The structures we are creating or revitalizing today will determine, as President Clinton has said, "what we want the world to look like 20 years from now." As we strive to resolve the problems of the present, we must not be distracted from our engagement to build for the future.
II. Building Foreign Policy Structures

Before starting a project, any good architect sits down with the client and asks a few basic questions: what's the building for; what are your needs; how much time do you spend in each room; what direction do the high winds and storm fronts come from? As the newly designated architects for foreign policy, such are the questions we asked ourselves eighteen months ago.

The theoretical answers were not hard to come by. The structures to be built should enhance our security and promote our prosperity. Further, they should do the same for those who would build them with us, and they should be open to all those who would be willing to live by the rules of the house. Finally, they should be designed with the flexibility to withstand shifting threats to their stability, much like skyscrapers in Los Angeles or Mexico City are built with enough give to weather an earthquake.

The Clinton Administration has made a good start at moving from the drawing board to the construction site. As I hope to show, by creating new security arrangements, or revitalizing old ones, and by devising pro-trade economic institutions, or modernizing existing ones, we are building sturdy foreign policy structures for the future.

Security

The end of the Cold War has not changed human nature. So this administration's first responsibility remains the physical security of our country and our people. But the varied and evolving nature of the threats to our well-being compel us to revisit the institutions designed to protect us. Let me address two areas of primary concern: Europe and Asia.

In Europe, we are deeply engaged in transforming existing structures to fulfill President Clinton's vision for an integrated continent. NATO must remain the foundation of security and stability for the trans-Atlantic community. Only NATO has the military forces, the multilateral staff, and the habits of political and military cooperation to enable us to respond flexibly and forcefully to the post-Cold War threats.
But NATO was conceived to conduct large, multi-division operations in defense of Alliance territory. While this traditional mission remains paramount, NATO increasingly is being called upon to undertake new tasks, to operate "out of area," and to do so in cooperation with non-NATO partners. If Europeans and Americans are to stake their future security on NATO, it must adapt to changing times so as to keep the peace -- and, if necessary, make the peace.

That's why President Clinton has taken the lead in outlining a new strategy and new missions for NATO, which the alliance endorsed at last January's Summit.

First, NATO agreed to establish Combined Joint Task Forces. The CJTFs will be our principle tool for peacekeeping and crisis management, charged with planning, training and exercising for these non-traditional missions. Focused preparations should produce more timely, effective responses to crises and unprecedented flexibility for military operations. [For example, non-Alliance states might be asked to train and operate with NATO members, and European Alliance members will be able to call upon a Task Force to conduct operations involving neither U.S. interests nor U.S. forces.]

Second, NATO created the "Partnership for Peace" so as to begin the practical process of expanding security in Europe eastward. The Partnership lies at the heart of our answer to an extraordinary strategic challenge: the need to show the central and eastern Europeans that their future is with the West, and not trapped in some gray zone between two adversarial blocs.

Both by what it stands for, and what it does, the Partnership is a powerful vehicle for European integration. President Clinton has made clear to the CEE countries that the relevant questions for NATO expansion are not "whether" and "if" but rather "when" and "how." And the President has held out membership in the Partnership as the way to answer those questions. The new European democracies know that the Partnership for Peace is the lighthouse at the entrance to NATO's harbor. Through very real, very practical military and defense cooperation with NATO and with each other, many partner
nations soon will develop the capacity to assume the responsibilities of full NATO membership.

At the same time, by reaching out and making Russia a part of the process, the Partnership gives a boost to reformers in that country. And it commits Russia to promote transparency in defense planning and budgeting and to maintain democratic control of its defense forces. All of these are key Western security objectives. Should reform experience a reversal of fortune in Russia, NATO can re-evaluate its needs and those of the Central and Eastern Europeans, who, in any event, will have enhanced their military readiness through Partnership activities. While keeping us prepared -- just in case -- for the worst, the Partnership allows us to work toward the best possible outcome for Europe -- an undivided community of democratic and stable nations.

In Asia, this Administration also seeks to create integrated security structures, but with different building blocks.

Like Europe, Asia represents a tremendous investment of our blood and toil -- we fought three wars there in this century. Unlike Europe, Asia has no single security institution to revitalize. So our task has been to develop a series of arrangements that will function, as President Clinton has put it, "like overlapping plates of armor, individually providing protection and together covering the whole body of our common security concerns."

These plates may include bilateral arrangements, such as our treaty commitments to Japan, Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand. We know that our forces play a vital stabilizing role in the region. That is why President Clinton decided to freeze U.S. troop levels in Asia, and not reduce them as we are doing elsewhere.

Or the plates might consist of multilateral efforts, such as our partnership with South Korea, Japan and others to excise the North Korean nuclear threat and defuse tension on the Korean Peninsula.
And, finally, the plates may involve increased regional security dialogs. Last year, for the first time ever, the ASEAN countries -- including the United States, Russia, and Vietnam -- gathered around a table to discuss security issues. These types of dialogs can help prevent the outbreak of dangerous rivalries and promote regional integration.

**Prosperity**

From the outset of this Administration, President Clinton recognized that a strong foreign policy must begin with a sound economic foundation. But he also knows that prosperity at home requires that we maintain focus abroad. Put another way, the line between our foreign and domestic economic policies has increasingly blurred -- where it has not disappeared. Now, more than ever before, our economic well-being is tied to that of other nations.

In the new global economy, governments no longer exert the control they once did over their nations' commerce. While the possibilities for growth and creativity are endless, the loss of sovereignty can breed confusion, especially among people left behind. Those opposed to our engagement in the world, be it military or economic, feed on people's fears and uncertainties to promote their misguided cause. In such an environment, protectionism takes on a facile allure.

There is a powerful lesson here for those of us concerned with sustaining our country's prosperity in the decades to come. That is the need to design structures with the every day, real interests of Americans in mind, rooted in their lives, and able to produce tangible benefits.

After a lot of heavy lifting, we successfully completed the GATT Uruguay Round, begun eight years ago. By lowering barriers to trade and bringing more nations into an open trading system, this accord promises to lift substantially American wages and living standards, and to do the same for other nations around the world. GATT's successor, the World Trade Organization, will help us resolve trade disputes more efficiently, and ensure that our workers and businesses compete on an even international playing field.
Neither GATT nor the WTO diminish the need to enforce national fair trade legislation, or the importance of bilateral and regional compact. For example, last year we sent $120 billion in goods and services to Asia, which translates into almost 2.5 million American jobs. That's just a snapshot. If you could project that image into the future, it would show that Asia, above any other region, is where we must find our growth in the years ahead.

With that fact in mind, President Clinton hosted the first ever gathering of the Organization for Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders in Seattle last November. The 15 members of APEC account for nearly half of the world's output and most of the fastest-growing economies. By setting pro-growth policies, toppling trade barriers, and cutting regulatory red tape within the Asian-Pacific, we can take tangible steps to improve our peoples' lives. Our engagement with APEC is clear evidence of President Clinton's vision for an integrated Asian-Pacific community, a community of shared prosperity, shared growth, and shared strength.

Still closer to home, President Clinton went to the mat to secure passage for NAFTA. For all it promises to achieve in its own right, NAFTA is just the starting point for hemispheric integration that we will pursue at the Summit of the Americas, convened by the President in Miami next December. [There, our region's democracies will gather to discuss job creation through trade and sustainable development. And they will celebrate and look to accelerate progress toward democratic reform in the region.]

It's a remarkable fact that of the 36 countries in the Americas, only two -- Haiti and Cuba -- do not have freely elected leaders at their helm. This rising tide of democracy -- not just in the Americas, but around the world -- is a powerful force that can wash over contrary trends like fragmentation and closed trading systems.

Our own experience tells us that democracy is the most enlightened form of governance yet devised. As Americans, we have long enjoyed the freedom and prosperity that democracy helps secure. We want others to share in its benefits. And we know that
if they do, it will be to our advantage, too, because democracies make for reliable trading partners and they are not likely to wage war on one another. We are not starry eyed about democracy -- it will not take hold everywhere. But we will do all that we can to expand the community of free and open societies.

Democracy is at once the foundation and the end product of our foreign policy. It is the foundation, because the culture and language of democracy are what make the structures we're building vital. As my predecessor Zbig Brzezinski has put it, "If one builds...only with bricks and mortar we will find that something profound is missing, and the structure may not prove enduring, because societies as viable entities exist on the basis of conviction, of commitment, of certain shared values that give societies cohesion." Foremost among those shared values, whether in NATO or APEC or NAFTA, is democracy.

Democracy also is the final product of our foreign policy. As the structures we build make us more secure and more prosperous, they set a bedrock within which to better root emerging democracies, and upon which to construct new ones. In short, democracy both infuses the new structures of foreign policy, and gains strength from their solidity.

III. Contending with Structural Threats

I suggested earlier that one essential question an architect asks her client before inking a design is "what direction do the high winds and storm fronts come from?" As we strive to raise new foreign policy institutions, we need to be concerned not so much with winds and storms, but with more fundamental threats to the structural integrity of our efforts. You might call these threats tremors within states and quakes across borders.

Tremors Within States

Bosnia. Haiti. Crises in these tragic lands, and elsewhere, dominate the news. This should not surprise us. It is, after all, inherently more dramatic to watch a wrecking ball knock down a house that it is to witness the tedious, slow rise of a new building.
In saying this, my aim is not simply to lament our tendency to fixate on the crisis du jour at the expense of longer term policy efforts — although a little lamenting on this score does the soul of a policy maker good from time to time. The fact is, these crises matter a great deal, on two distinct levels.

First, people are suffering and dying. To look the other way would be to abandon our compassion.

At the same time, such crises are evidence of a dangerous phenomenon that transcends their particulars. In a more complex, interdependent world, it is increasingly difficult for governments to govern. Interest groups clamor to be heard. Ethnic minorities vie for attention. Even within stable democracies, political margins have become razor thin. All too easily — particularly in wobbly or dysfunctional systems — this maelstrom of competing needs and demands can spiral out of control.

The resulting chaos and humanitarian disasters sorely test existing institutions, and threaten to undermine support for the new structures we're constructing. Tremendous pressure builds on us to intervene, even when our core interests are not a stake. This contradiction breeds confusion, and even a perverse nostalgia for the more predictable days of the Cold War.

Much as we might like it, there is no bright line test for intervention. While our finite means do not allow us to take responsibility for every crisis, our interests dictate that we assume the burden of some. The trick is to make distinctions, to get away from sterile all-or-nothing debates.

As we weigh our response to a given crisis, we must ask ourselves some hard questions. What interests are at stake? What are our objectives? Is there a viable exit strategy? What are the costs involved? Answers to these queries will dictate the sum and substance of our response. If our core interests are at stake, we must be prepared to act, and to do so alone, if necessary. Where we share an interest with other countries, or with the international community writ large, intervention may come through the United
Nations, with regional security institutions like NATO, or in partnership with concerned allies.

Ultimately, the only test for intervention is pragmatism, a pragmatism that marries interest and idealism. Compassion should animate, but not dictate, our policies. If we intervene and fail, we're not doing good, no matter how principled our motives or how right the cause. But when our interests demand it, we cannot back down from the good fight. Our challenge is to be both pure of heart and focused of mind.

With this thought in mind, let me briefly touch upon Bosnia and Haiti.

This Administration believes that while the tragedy in Bosnia does not pose an immediate threat to our security, important U.S. interests are nonetheless at stake. Our response has been strong, but measured. We have pressed the U.N. Security Council to maintain one of the most thorough sanctions regimes in history. We brokered a Federation agreement between two of the three parties to the conflict -- the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Croat minority. We established a Contact Group to negotiate a territorial settlement. We helped organize and fund a war crimes tribunal. We have provided more humanitarian assistance to the region than any other country. And if the Bosnian Serbs refuse to accept the settlement offer now on the table, we will lift the arms embargo -- which unfairly handicaps the Muslims -- even if that means acting unilaterally.

The restoration of democracy in Haiti is a clear and compelling U.S. interest. To allow General Cedras and his cohorts to flout the will of the Haitian people would undermine the remarkable democratic advances made throughout the Americas. The devastating humanitarian consequences of Haiti's military rule also demand our attention. The Cedras regime has engaged in widespread human rights abuses, killing and maiming its own people -- women and children, even priests. And it has led Haiti to the brink of economic ruin, both by its failed policies and by a pattern of conduct that has made necessary the imposition of tough economic sanctions. Finally, our interest in restoring
democracy is magnified by the refugee crisis provoked by the deteriorating human rights and economic situations.

Last year, working with the U.N. and the Organization of American States, we negotiated a solution to the Haitian crisis, but the military coup leaders failed to cede power, as they had agreed. Since then, U.S. leadership has produced two important U.N. Security Council Resolutions, one barring all trade with Haiti except for humanitarian supplies, the other authorizing member states to form an international military corps to restore democracy by force if necessary. Make no mistake: the military thugs responsible for usurping Haiti's democracy will go.

It hardly bears noting that our policies in both Bosnia and Haiti have had their share of critics. Moving from the theoretical to the practical is fraught with difficulty, all the more so in a period of change when we haven't finished defining all the questions, never mind finding the right answers. For any given crisis, people of good will genuinely will disagree. Constructive criticism is essential. It produces better policy. Reflexive or partisan diatribes which fail to offer real alternatives do not. Those of us who make, report on or criticize policy would do well to bear those facts in mind. We owe that much to the American people.

Quakes Across Borders

In a recent talk, the historian Paul Kennedy neatly encapsulated how the world has changed in a few short years. "The navies of Spain, France and Italy, which in the good old days of the Cold War had the task of detecting Soviet submarines coming through the Mediterranean, are now on day and night patrol attempting, if you like, to erect a maritime cordon sanitaire against the large numbers of people who would like to move into Europe." Mass migrations and refugees. The population explosion. An endangered environment. A nefarious nexus of crime, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. These are the so-called transnational threats that our institutions must be built to
withstand, and ultimately to vanquish. I'd like to touch briefly on two of them: refugees and the crime, terrorism and nuclear weapons troika.

There are an estimated 19 million refugees worldwide, fleeing war, repression, poverty and famine. We cannot ignore their plight. At the same time, refugee assistance is expensive. Prosperous countries can only absorb so many newcomers before an intolerable strain overextends social services. In times of economic distress, illegal aliens and legal immigrants alike become grist for the extremist mill -- witness the dangerous appeals to racism and xenophobia of a Le Pen in France or the Skinheads in Germany.

Humanitarian assistance, and intervention, aim in part to avert refugee catastrophes. But while we must remain willing to say yes to calls for help, we must also be prepared to say no. This means getting over the reflex to take responsibility for a crisis whenever and wherever it arises. Often, the best we will be able to do is help provide a breathing space for others to sort out their own problems. In so doing, we fulfill our duty to meet the crisis of the moment. But as Secretary of State Christopher has said, "The challenge of diplomacy is to anticipate, and to prevent, the crises of the future." And that is precisely the function of many of the structures we are building, like the Combined Joint Task Forces.

The growing nexus between organized crime, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction has horrific potential. Four times in the last month, police seized weapons-quality plutonium smuggled into Germany from Russia. We should be thankful that superior police work and cooperation among various intelligence services -- including our own -- intercepted this deadly cargo. But we also should be concerned. Imagine, for example, what would have happened if the World Trade Center terrorists had detonated a nuclear, not a conventional device.

This nexus demands a coordinated, international response. Mere vigilance will not suffice. The amount of plutonium needed to make a bomb is no bigger than a can of Coke. Intensified cooperation among various criminal justice systems is one of the most
potent weapons in our arsenal. Over the past few years, we have greatly enhanced our intelligence sharing with allies, increased regular consultations, and engaged in joint anti-terrorist training. Most recently, in July, FBI director Louis Freeh visited several Eastern European countries and Russia, where he stressed the risks of nuclear proliferation through the efforts of organized crime. Ultimately, this informal network of concerned nations will likely evolve into a new structure to counter what must rank as one of the greatest long term threats to our security.

IV. Conclusion: Building for the Future

Choice, not chance, determines destiny. The Clinton Administration has chosen. Rather than throw up our hands in despair at the complexities of the post-Cold War era, we have thrown ourselves with determination into the task of creating new institutions for a rapidly changing world. We have chosen to engage, not retreat.

I believe that the security and economic structures we are building will enable us to better manage threats to our well-being. And they promise to prevent many of the crises that now challenge us from arising in the first place. A more secure and prosperous world will help defuse ethnic violence, and avert refugee crises. A more secure and prosperous world will be better placed to show vigilance in the fight against terrorism and organized crime, and to refrain from selling weapons and nuclear technology to pariah states. A more secure and prosperous world will be less likely to fall prey to the rhetoric of hate mongers and demagogues. And a more secure and prosperous world will enhance the strength and promote the spread of democracy.

As we go about the task of creating new structures, we build on a foundation of timeless truths. First and foremost, power still matters. Street toughs continue to disrupt peaceful neighborhoods. The United States must be -- and is -- prepared to defend our interests wherever they are threatened, by any means necessary. This requires maintaining and modernizing the finest military in the world so we can deter aggression -- and counter it when the need arises. Second, principles still matter. We know from our own bitter
experience that power unhinged from principle will leave us rudderless and adrift. The American people will not -- and should not -- support policies divorced from our values.

Americans are animated by a "can do" attitude. When we see a problem, we want to fix it. This is a laudable quality, but one that needs to be held in check when it comes to foreign policy. You don't "fix" two hundred years of ethnic tension, or five centuries of national rivalry. You make them better or worse. You don't "fix" a hot war or a refugee crisis. You make them better or worse. Through painstaking diplomacy in places like the Middle East and Northern Ireland, the United States has helped to make things better, to turn tragedy into hope. Through our on-going efforts in the former Soviet Union, we have made things better by helping to win agreements to withdraw all Russian troops from the Baltics, rid the Ukraine of nuclear weapons, and, eventually, close the Chernobyl nuclear facility. Over time, by building new foreign policy structures, we can make the world a safer, more prosperous place.

Foreign policy, in short, is not for those seeking instant gratification. It is for those who are engaged in the problems of our world, who are prepared to slog along, day in and day out, and work pragmatically toward solutions, and who aren't afraid to make mistakes. As President Roosevelt once said, it's better to err occasionally in the cause of activism than to be frozen in the ice of indifference.

This Administration may have made a few mistakes, but we cannot be accused of indifference. We know that Americans must do even more than remain engaged in the world beyond our borders. We must lead. And we are. In NATO and APEC, with NAFTA and the NPT, through bilateral cooperation and unilateral initiative, the United States is showing the way in an era of change and uncertainty. We don't pretend to have all the answers. No one does. And we need help from this important group, and the individuals who animate it. But the Clinton Administration is moving forward, building structures for the future. In so doing, we rely on decidedly American attributes: optimism and a pioneering spirit that rises to new challenges.
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Unclassified Memorandum

To: Mr. Lake  
Date: 9/2/94

From: Antony Blinken (NSC/Speech writing)

Subject: CFR Speech - Draft #2

Following Thursday's conference call, I attach a revised draft of the CFR speech. You'll note that it has come out one page shorter -- but it is still 15 pages. I've bracketed two small chunks (on CJTF and on the Summit of the Americas) that could be deleted for length.

I've tried to incorporate most of the comments made by you, Tara and Bob. I think the piece holds together structurally, and strikes a reasonable balance between the conceptual and the practical. That said, there are a few points (see below) I've had trouble working in that you may wish to play with.

As it stands, the speech moves as follows:

1. Introduction: The Need for Engagement
   * CFR scene setter
   * Snapshot of chaotic world whose problems will find us even if we try to avoid them
   * Reacting to problems only half the story: obligation to seize opportunities to build peace and prosperity
   * In short, our choice is not whether to engage, but how to engage.
   * We need to start debate on that question
   * To engage the debate, here's how the Clinton Administration sees our engagement in the world:
     -- Building structures
     -- Grappling with threats to the structures
2. Building Foreign Policy Structures

* Parallel to architect
* Security structures
  -- Europe
  -- Asia
* Economic Structures
  -- GATT
  -- APEC
  -- NAFTA/Summit of Americas
* Democracy as both the foundation and end product of our foreign policy.

3. Contending with Structural Threats

* Tremors within States
  -- Why they matter
  -- How we deal with them: pragmatism is test
  -- E.G.s of Bosnia and Haiti
  -- Call for reasoned debate

* Quakes across Borders
  -- Transnational threats
  -- Refugees
  -- Crime/Terrorism/Nukes

4. Conclusion: Building for the Future

* Choice determines destiny. We've chosen engagement and building for the future.

* Structures we're building will make us more secure and prosperous and prevent many problems now plaguing us from arising in first place.

* We're building on foundation of timeless truths: power and values.

* Diplomacy is slow process. Goal is not to fix things, but to make them better. And we are (e.g. N. Ireland - Middle East).
Better to err than to be indifferent. We may have erred, but we're not indifferent. We're engaged. More than that, we're leading by building new structures for the future.

The concepts of "building" and "structure" are now peppered throughout the speech and should give listeners a recognizable refrain.

A few things I had trouble working in:

* China and the notion that what a country does internally matters beyond its borders.

* Impassioned rhetoric: I think the tone is good -- there are some strong lines and decent rhetoric. I'll keep working on some podium pounders.

* Finally, I've been playing around with the notion that we're "building our structures at the intersection of idealism and interest" but I haven't been able to work this is. Does this work for you?

Please call anytime over the week-end if you wish to discuss. I will be at... Sunday, returning to D.C. Monday evening.

cc: Tara Sonenshine
Bob Boorstin
Address by W. Anthony Lake
National Security Advisor
The Council on Foreign Relations
September 12, 1994

"THE STRUCTURES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY"

I. Introduction: The Need for Engagement

Ladies and Gentlemen, I'm delighted to be here. And Mort, thank you for that
generous introduction. It's always a pleasure to hear words of praise from the Fourth
Estate. I still vividly remember the last time that happened to me, during the Carter
Administration...

Not so long ago, I was listening with one ear to National Public Radio. The
correspondent was talking about a "council", which he described as "a stodgy group of
foreign policy wonks." I assumed he was referring to the National Security Council.
Turns out he was talking about the Council on Foreign Relations. That's what happens
when you've been around longer than the Rolling Stones.

In fact, the Council has been influencing policy since 1921, from Coolidge to
Clinton. Based on the conversations I've had with many of you in this room, and recent
articles in Foreign Affairs, the word "stodgy" is not what comes to mind when I think
about this institution. Let me suggest a few more accurate adjectives. Dynamic.
Thoughtful. Provocative. As we enter a radically new foreign policy environment, these
are much needed qualities.

Entering any new world is disorienting. It forces us to leave behind a trusted
frame of reference, and graph new maps by which to move forward. All of us here
tonight would agree that we're now at a break point similar to the ones we confronted
after the two World Wars. Sometimes it seems that we agree on little else. But then, charting a new course has never been simple. While the policy of containment may look obvious to us in retrospect, we should remember that it took the likes of Harry Truman and Dean Acheson a good five years to find their way and build a policy consensus. And they had the advantage of an ideologically and geographically defined adversary with whom to contend.

The dangers we face today are less immediately threatening. But understanding their nature and agreeing upon the proper response is more complicated than ever.

It's a jumble out there. "Traditional" aggression by malicious nation states mixes with emerging transnational threats like environmental decay, over-population and famine. Information, ideas, money and people zig zag around the world in blissful disregard of national borders. This new global free-for-all means increased wealth and opportunity, but it also produces fear and uncertainty. And we are witness to a terrible fragmentation. In places like Bosnia and Nagorno Karabakh, ethnic passions and national aspirations once held in check by communism or by the Cold War stand-off now run amok.

In setting our nation's foreign policy, the Clinton Administration has one core working assumption: The United States cannot sit idly on the sidelines, hoping to remain unscathed, while conflicts elsewhere proliferate or intensify. We are engaged beyond our borders -- economically, politically, militarily -- whether we like it or not. Isolationism is simply not an option, because the problems of the world will find us, no matter how hard we might try to avoid them.

Besides, as the sole remaining superpower -- and as Americans -- we have an obligation, born of both interest and idealism, to do what is within our means to deter aggression, defuse altercations, defend the victims of violence, and devise solutions to common concerns.

Parrying threats is not enough. American foreign policy must also seize opportunities to increase our wealth and enhance our security. After World War II, a
remarkable generation of Americans helped create the institutions -- like NATO, the Marshall Plan, GATT, the IMF and the World Bank -- that guaranteed for us and our allies half a century of peace and prosperity. Matching those achievements for the next fifty years and beyond demands our involvement, and our leadership.

In short, if we are to ward off threats to our interests, if we are to continue to prosper, if we are to remain secure, the issue is not whether to engage, but rather how to engage. As citizens deeply involved in the formulation of American foreign policy, our opportunity and our obligation is to lead a national debate on that question -- a debate that so far has been lacking -- and, over time, set a steady new course for the nation.

Let me join the debate by sketching for you how the Clinton Administration has shaped American engagement in the world. First and foremost, we have sought to build new structures that will guarantee the safety and freedom of our people and promote our economic vitality. You might call these forward looking initiatives our "big picture" foreign policy. I hope you will like what you see.

Of course, policy makers are partial to big pictures. It takes the focus away from day-to-day details that may blot the work in progress. To me, the crisis, or crises, of the moment cannot be painted over. Bosnia and Haiti, for example, are not simply transitory, if tragic, dilemmas. Rather, they are part of something bigger and more menacing that threatens to undermine the foreign policy structures we are working so hard to build. That's why any productive debate on how we engage must grapple with our short term responses to crises like Bosnia and Haiti. And that's why the structures I'll describe are being designed both to withstand challenges to their integrity, and to make it less likely, in the long term, that such challenges will arise in the first place.
II. Building Foreign Policy Structures

Before starting a project, any good architect sits down with the client and asks a few basic questions: what's the building for; what are your needs; how much time do you spend in each room; what direction do the high winds and storm fronts come from? As the newly designated architects for foreign policy, such are the questions we asked ourselves eighteen months ago.

The theoretical answers were not hard to come by. The structures to be built should enhance our security and promote our prosperity. Further, they should do the same for those who would build them with us, and they should be open to all those who would be willing to live by the rules of the house. Finally, they should be designed with the flexibility to withstand shifting threats to their stability, much like skyscrapers in Los Angeles or Mexico City are built with enough give to weather an earthquake.

The Clinton Administration has made a good start at moving from the drawing board to the construction site. As I hope to show, by creating new security arrangements, or revitalizing old ones, and by devising pro-trade economic institutions, or modernizing existing ones, we are building sturdy foreign policy structures for the future.

Security

The end of the Cold War has not changed human nature. So this administration's first responsibility remains the physical security of our country and our people. But the varied and evolving nature of the threats to our well-being compel us to revisit the institutions designed to protect us. Let me address two areas of primary concern: Europe and Asia.

In Europe, we are deeply engaged in transforming existing structures to fulfill President Clinton's vision for an integrated continent. NATO must remain the foundation of security and stability for the trans-Atlantic community. Only NATO has the military forces, the multilateral staff, and the habits of political and military cooperation to enable us to respond flexibly and forcefully to the post-Cold War threats.
But NATO was conceived to conduct large, multi-division operations in defense of Alliance territory. While this traditional mission remains paramount, NATO increasingly is being called upon to undertake new tasks, to operate "out of area", and to do so in cooperation with non-NATO partners. If Europeans and Americans are to stake their future security on NATO, it must adapt to changing times so as to keep the peace -- and, if necessary, make the peace.

That's why President Clinton has taken the lead in outlining a new strategy and new missions for NATO, which the alliance endorsed at last January's Summit.

First, NATO agreed to establish Combined Joint Task Forces. The CJTFs will be our principle tool for peacekeeping and crisis management, charged with planning, training and exercising for these non-traditional missions. Focused preparations should produce more timely, effective responses to crises and unprecedented flexibility for military operations. [For example, non-Alliance states might be asked to train and operate with NATO members, and European Alliance members will be able to call upon a Task Force to conduct operations involving neither U.S. interests nor U.S. forces.]

Second, NATO created the "Partnership for Peace" so as to begin the practical process of expanding security in Europe eastward. The Partnership lies at the heart of our answer to an extraordinary strategic challenge: the need to show the central and eastern Europeans that their future is with the West, and not trapped in some gray zone between two adversarial blocs.

Both by what it stands for, and what it does, the Partnership is a powerful vehicle for European integration. President Clinton has made clear to the CEE countries that the relevant questions for NATO expansion are not "whether" and "if" but rather "when" and "how." And the President has held out membership in the Partnership as the way to answer those questions. The new European democracies know that the Partnership for Peace is the lighthouse at the entrance to NATO's harbor. Through very real, very practical military and defense cooperation with NATO and with each other, many partner
nations soon will develop the capacity to assume the responsibilities of full NATO membership.

At the same time, by reaching out and making Russia a part of the process, the Partnership gives a boost to reformers in that country. And it commits Russia to promote transparency in defense planning and budgeting and to maintain democratic control of its defense forces. All of these are key Western security objectives. Should reform experience a reversal of fortune in Russia, NATO can re-evaluate its needs and those of the Central and Eastern Europeans, who, in any event, will have enhanced their military readiness through Partnership activities. While keeping us prepared -- just in case -- for the worst, the Partnership allows us to work toward the best possible outcome for Europe -- an undivided community of democratic and stable nations.

In Asia, this Administration also seeks to create integrated security structures, but with different building blocks.

Like Europe, Asia represents a tremendous investment of our blood and toil -- we fought three wars there in this century. Unlike Europe, Asia has no single security institution to revitalize. So our task has been to develop a series of arrangements that will function, as President Clinton has put it, "like overlapping plates of armor, individually providing protection and together covering the whole body of our common security concerns."

These plates may include bilateral arrangements, such as our treaty commitments to Japan, Korea, Australia, the Philippines and Thailand. We know that our forces play a vital stabilizing role in the region. That is why President Clinton decided to freeze U.S. troop levels in Asia, and not reduce them as we are doing elsewhere.

Or the plates might consist of multilateral efforts, such as our partnership with South Korea, Japan and others to excise the North Korean nuclear threat and defuse tension on the Korean Peninsula.
And, finally, the plates may involve increased regional security dialogs. Last year, for the first time ever, the ASEAN countries -- including the United States, Russia, and Vietnam -- gathered around a table to discuss security issues. These types of dialogs can help prevent the outbreak of dangerous rivalries and promote regional integration.

Prosperity

From the outset of this Administration, President Clinton recognized that a strong foreign policy must begin with a sound economic foundation. But he also knows that prosperity at home requires that we maintain focus abroad. Put another way, the line between our foreign and domestic economic policies has increasingly blurred -- where it has not disappeared. Now, more than ever before, our economic well-being is tied to that of other nations.

In the new global economy, governments no longer exert the control they once did over their nations' commerce. While the possibilities for growth and creativity are endless, the loss of sovereignty can breed confusion, especially among people left behind. Those opposed to our engagement in the world, be it military or economic, feed on people's fears and uncertainties to promote their misguided cause. In such an environment, protectionism takes on a facile allure.

There is a powerful lesson here for those of us concerned with sustaining our country's prosperity in the decades to come. That is the need to design structures with the every day, real interests of Americans in mind, rooted in their lives, and able to produce tangible benefits.

After a lot of heavy lifting, we successfully completed the GATT Uruguay Round, begun eight years ago. By lowering barriers to trade and bringing more nations into an open trading system, this accord promises to lift substantially American wages and living standards, and to do the same for other nations around the world. GATT's successor, the
World Trade Organization, will help us resolve trade disputes more efficiently, and ensure that our workers and businesses compete on an even international playing field.

Neither GATT nor the WTO diminish the need to enforce national fair trade legislation, or the importance of bilateral and regional compact. For example, last year we sent $120 billion in goods and services to Asia, which translates into almost 2.5 million American jobs. That's just a snapshot. If you could project that image into the future, it would show that Asia, above any other region, is where we must find our growth in the years ahead.

With that fact in mind, President Clinton hosted the first ever gathering of the Organization for Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders in Seattle last November. The 15 members of APEC account for nearly half of the world's output and most of the fastest-growing economies. By setting pro-growth policies, toppling trade barriers, and cutting regulatory red tape within the Asian-Pacific, we can take tangible steps to improve our peoples' lives. Our engagement with APEC is clear evidence of President Clinton's vision for an integrated Asian-Pacific community, a community of shared prosperity, shared growth, and shared strength.

Still closer to home, President Clinton went to the mat to secure passage for NAFTA. For all it promises to achieve in its own right, NAFTA is just the starting point for hemispheric integration that we will pursue at the Summit of the Americas, convened by the President in Miami next December. [ There, our region's democracies will gather to discuss job creation through trade and sustainable development. And they will celebrate and look to accelerate progress toward democratic reform in the region. ]

It's a remarkable fact that of the 36 countries in the Americas, only two -- Haiti and Cuba -- do not have freely elected leaders at their helm. This rising tide of democracy -- not just in the Americas, but around the world -- is a powerful force that can wash over contrary trends like fragmentation and closed trading systems.
Our own experience tells us that democracy is the most enlightened form of governance yet devised. As Americans, we have long enjoyed the freedom and prosperity that democracy helps secure. We want others to share in its benefits. And we know that if they do, it will be to our advantage, too, because democracies make for reliable trading partners and they are not likely to wage war on one another. We are not starry-eyed about democracy -- it will not take hold everywhere. But we will do all that we can to expand the community of free and open societies.

Democracy is at once the foundation and the end product of our foreign policy. It is the foundation, because the culture and language of democracy are what make the structures we're building vital. As my predecessor Zbig Brzezinski has put it, "If one builds...only with bricks and mortar we will find that something profound is missing, and the structure may not prove enduring, because societies as viable entities exist on the basis of conviction, of commitment, of certain shared values that give societies cohesion." Foremost among those shared values, whether in NATO or APEC or NAFTA, is democracy.

Democracy also is the final product of our foreign policy. As the structures we build make us more secure and more prosperous, they set a bedrock within which to better root emerging democracies, and upon which to construct new ones. In short, democracy both infuses the new structures of foreign policy, and gains strength from their solidity.

III. Contending with Structural Threats

I suggested earlier that one essential question an architect asks her client before inking a design is "what direction do the high winds and storm fronts come from?" As we strive to raise new foreign policy institutions, we need to be concerned not so much with winds and storms, but with more fundamental threats to the structural integrity of our efforts. You might call these threats tremors within states and quakes across borders.
Tremors Within States

Bosnia, Haiti. Crises in these tragic lands, and elsewhere, dominate the news. This should not surprise us. It is, after all, inherently more dramatic to watch a wrecking ball knock down a house that it is to witness the tedious, slow rise of a new building.

In saying this, my aim is not simply to lament our tendency to fixate on the crisis du jour at the expense of longer term policy efforts -- although a little lamenting on this score does the soul of a policy maker good from time to time. The fact is, these crises matter a great deal, on two distinct levels.

First, people are suffering and dying. To look the other way would be to abandon our compassion.

At the same time, such crises are evidence of a dangerous phenomenon that transcends their particulars. In a more complex, interdependent world, it is increasingly difficult for governments to govern. Interest groups clamor to be heard. Ethnic minorities vie for attention. Even within stable democracies, political margins have become razor thin. All too easily -- particularly in wobbly or dysfunctional systems -- this maelstrom of competing needs and demands can spiral out of control.

The resulting chaos and humanitarian disasters sorely test existing institutions, and threaten to undermine support for the new structures we're constructing. Tremendous pressure builds on us to intervene, even when our core interests are not at stake. This contradiction breeds confusion, and even a perverse nostalgia for the more predictable days of the Cold War.

Much as we might like it, there is no bright line test for intervention. While our finite means do not allow us to take responsibility for every crisis, our interests dictate that we assume the burden of some. The trick is to make distinctions, to get away from sterile all-or-nothing debates.

As we weigh our response to a given crisis, we must ask ourselves some hard questions. What interests are at stake? What are our objectives? Is there a viable exit
strategy? What are the costs involved? Answers to these queries will dictate the sum and
substance of our response. If our core interests are at stake, we must be prepared to act,
and to do so alone, if necessary. Where we share an interest with other countries, or with
the international community writ large, intervention may come through the United
Nations, with regional security institutions like NATO, or in partnership with concerned
allies.

Ultimately, the only test for intervention is pragmatism. If we intervene and fail,
we're not doing good, no matter how principled our motives or how right the cause. A
pure heart must be married to a focused mind.

With this thought in mind, let me briefly touch upon our policies in Bosnia and
Haiti.

This Administration believes that while the tragedy in Bosnia does not pose an
immediate threat to our security, important U.S. interests are nonetheless at stake. Our
response has been strong but measured. We have pressed the U.N. Security Council to
maintain one of the most thorough sanctions regimes in history. We brokered a
Federation agreement between two of the three parties to the conflict -- the Bosnian
government and the Bosnian Croat minority. We established a Contact Group to
negotiate a territorial settlement. We helped organize and fund a war crimes tribunal. We
have provided more humanitarian assistance to the region than any other country. And if
the Bosnian Serbs refuse to accept the settlement offer now on the table, we will lift the
arms embargo -- which unfairly handicaps the Muslims -- even if that means acting
unilaterally.

The restoration of democracy in Haiti is a clear and compelling U.S. interest. To
allow General Cédras and his cohorts to flout the will of the Haitian people would
undermine the remarkable democratic advances made throughout the Americas. The
devastating humanitarian consequences of Haiti's military rule also demand our attention.
The Cédras regime has engaged in widespread human rights abuses, killing and maiming
its own people — even Priests, women and children. And it has led Haiti to the brink of economic ruin; both by its failed policies and by a pattern of conduct that has made necessary the imposition of tough economic sanctions. Finally, our interest in restoring democracy is magnified by the refugee crisis provoked by the deteriorating human rights and economic situations.

Last year, working with the U.N. and the Organization of American States, we negotiated a solution to the Haitian crisis, but the military coup leaders failed to cede power, as they had agreed. Since then, U.S. leadership has produced two important U.N. Security Council Resolutions, one barring all trade with Haiti except for humanitarian supplies, the other authorizing member states to form an international military corps to restore democracy by force if necessary. Make no mistake: the military thugs responsible for usurping Haiti’s democracy will go.

It hardly bears noting that our policies in both Bosnia and Haiti have had their share of critics. Moving from the theoretical to the practical is fraught with difficulty, all the more so in a period of change when we haven't finished defining all the questions, never mind finding the right answers. For any given crisis, people of good will genuinely will disagree. Constructive criticism is essential. It produces better policy. Reflexive or partisan diatribes which fail to offer real alternatives do not. Those of us who make, report on or criticize policy would do well to bear those facts in mind. We owe that much to the American people.

Quakes Across Borders

In a recent talk, the historian Paul Kennedy neatly encapsulated how the world has changed in a few short years. "The navies of Spain, France and Italy, which in the good old days of the Cold War had the task of detecting Soviet submarines coming through the Mediterranean, are now on day and night patrol attempting, if you like, to erect a maritime cordon sanitaire against the large numbers of people who would like to move into Europe." Mass migrations and refugees. The population explosion. An endangered
environment. A nefarious nexus of crime, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. These are the so-called transnational threats that our institutions must be built to withstand, and ultimately to vanquish. I'd like to touch briefly on two of them: refugees and the crime, terrorism and nuclear weapons troika.

There are an estimated 19 million refugees worldwide, fleeing war, repression, poverty and famine. We cannot ignore their plight. At the same time, refugee assistance is expensive. Prosperous countries can only absorb so many newcomers before an intolerable strain overextends social services. In times of economic distress, illegal aliens and legal immigrants alike become grist for the extremist mill — witness the dangerous appeals to racism and xenophobia of a Le Pen in France or the Skinheads in Germany.

Humanitarian assistance, and intervention, aim in part to avert refugee catastrophes. But while we must remain willing to say yes to calls for help, we must also be prepared to say no. This means getting over the reflex to take responsibility for a crisis whenever and wherever it arises. Often, the best we will be able to do is help provide a breathing space for others to sort out their own problems. In so doing, we fulfill our duty to meet the crisis of the moment. But as Secretary of State Christopher has said, "The challenge of diplomacy is to anticipate, and to prevent, the crises of the future." And that is precisely the function of many of the structures we are building, like the Combined Joint Task Forces.

The growing nexus between organized crime, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction has horrific potential. Four times in the last month, police seized weapons-quality plutonium smuggled into Germany from Russia. We should be thankful that superior police work and cooperation among various intelligence services — including our own — intercepted this deadly cargo. But we also should be concerned. Imagine, for example, what would have happened if the World Trade Center terrorists had detonated a nuclear, not a conventional device.
This nexus demands a coordinated, international response. Mere vigilance will not suffice. The amount of plutonium needed to make a bomb is no bigger than a can of Coke. Intensified cooperation among various criminal justice systems is one of the most potent weapons in our arsenal. Over the past few years, we have greatly enhanced our intelligence sharing with allies, increased regular consultations, and engaged in joint anti-terrorist training. Most recently, in July, FBI director Louis Freeh visited several Eastern European countries and Russia, where he stressed the risks of nuclear proliferation through the efforts of organized crime. Ultimately, this informal network of concerned nations will likely evolve into a new structure to counter what must rank as one of the greatest long term threats to our security.

IV. Conclusion: Building for the Future

Choice, not chance, determines destiny. The Clinton Administration has chosen. Rather than throw up our hands in despair at the complexities of the post-Cold War era, we have thrown ourselves with determination into the task of creating new institutions for a rapidly changing world. We have chosen to engage, not retreat.

I believe that the security and economic structures we are building will enable us to better manage threats to our well-being. And they promise to prevent many of the crises that now challenge us from arising in the first place. A more secure and prosperous world will help defuse ethnic violence, and avert refugee crises. A more secure and prosperous world will be better placed to show vigilance in the fight against terrorism and organized crime, and to refrain from selling weapons and nuclear technology to pariah states. A more secure and prosperous world will be less likely to fall prey to the rhetoric of hate mongers and demagogues. And a more secure and prosperous world will enhance the strength and promote the spread of democracy.

As we go about the task of creating new structures, we build on a foundation of timeless truths. First and foremost, power still matters. Street toughs continue to disrupt peaceful neighborhoods. The United States must be -- and is -- prepared to defend our
interests wherever they are threatened, by any means necessary. This requires maintaining
and modernizing the finest military in the world so we can deter aggression — and counter
it when the need arises. Second, principles still matter. We know from our own bitter
experience that power unhinged from principle will leave us rudderless and adrift. The
American people will not — and should not — support policies divorced from democratic
values.

Americans are animated by a "can do" attitude. When we see a problem, we want
to fix it. This is a laudable quality, but one that needs to be held in check when it comes to
foreign policy. You don't "fix" two hundred years of ethnic tension, or five centuries of
national rivalry. You make them better or worse. You don't "fix" a hot war or a refugee
crisis. You make them better or worse. Through painstaking diplomacy in places like the
Middle East and Northern Ireland, the United States has helped to make things better, to
turn tragedy into hope.

Foreign policy, in short, is not for those seeking instant gratification. It is for
those who are engaged in the problems of our world, who are prepared to slog along, day
in and day out, and work pragmatically toward solutions, and who aren't afraid to make
mistakes. As President Roosevelt once said, it's better to err occasionally in the cause of
activism than to be frozen in the ice of indifference.

This Administration may have made a few mistakes, but we cannot be accused of
indifference. We know that Americans must do even more than remain engaged in the
world beyond our borders. We must lead. And we are. In NATO and APEC, with
NAFTA and the NPT, through bilateral cooperation and unilateral initiative, the United
States is showing the way in an era of change and uncertainty. We don't pretend to have
all the answers. No one does. And we need help from this important group, and the
individuals who animate it. But the Clinton Administration is moving forward, building
structures for the future. In so doing, we rely on decidedly American attributes: optimism
and a pioneering spirit that rises to new challenges.
Prosperity
Naples, Halifax.
Intro: confluence of dom for policies
1) loss of sway under global ec - govt
   no longer able to manage dom ec's
2) Sandel - Global Ass
   2) as awareness of govt inability rises,
   instinct to react w/ barriers - force out (offers opportunity)
   to the know-nothings (take democracy speech) & same sentiment that resists any
   cost
3) new ec structures that rooted in practical
gains -
GATT - fast track
NAFTA -
APEC -
the summit of geis
Democracy -
democracy as the foundation for all this;
culture (of democracy, language - the
ways of democracy, underlying both within nations
and among them -
strategic stake, no matter where - must
focus on those, where it matters most to us -

Intra part II
look w/ confidence on -
centrifugal vs. centripetal, chaos +
coherence -
major trends - tremors/quakes - that
can defeat us
global, Rwanda, long term -
manifestation hitting all states - hard
for govt to govern -
political margins -
sovereignty
most difficult in 3rd world -
a) any of these, setting case law -
   immediately because of drama, CNN -
human grounds -
   all these cases - great pressure for us to
do we intervene? esp. in case
we are often only people who can do something impervious - lost major conceptual reason + political imperative - during CW every nation provided oppor for 4 in 3 - can't think through - US/UN - (press briefing on PPP) - can't take responsibility. For 4 all, but can't say none of them. - 4 questions in PPP - have to get over sense that any time anything goes wrong, it's our fault - US/UN can't hold ourselves.

In long run, deal w/ them proactively. [ POTUS taxonomy of interests; Atlanta]

One & in Env. trip to Horn of Africa;
Canuto conference

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**COLLECTION:**
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Robert Boorstin (Speechwriting)
OA/Box Number: 420

**FOLDER TITLE:**

**RESTRICTION CODES**

- Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
  - P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
  - P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
  - P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
  - P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
  - P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
  - P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
  - b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
  - b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
  - b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
  - b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
  - b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
  - b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
  - b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
  - b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
I. Introduction

- Take stock of new world:
  - end of Cold War
  - global economy
  - instant communications

- Need for new FP vocabulary to match these changes. We're using outdated lexicon. Old debates irrelevant.
  - "isolationism" versus "intervention". US is engaged whether we like it or not. Trick is sorting out how we intervene, not whether we do so.
  - "Multilateral" versus "unilateral". It's not a question of one versus the other, but rather which approach -- or combination of approaches -- to apply in a given situation.

- More broadly, we're at third major turning point of century:
  - Post WWI (we looked inward)
  - Post WWII (we built outward-looking institutions)
  - Today: we're at the same kind of major crossroads.

Clinton Administration vision: promote and sustain free and open societies. In our own experience, democracy best form of government (best to live under; better trading partners; less likely to make war on each other). Full fledged democracy may not be practical everywhere. But objective is to move toward increasingly freer and more open societies around the world.

The building blocks for free and open societies are: (i) security and (ii) economic prosperity. Clinton Administration's FP: build the structures that promote security and prosperity and counter emerging threats to those structures.

II. Building New Structures

Security and economic prosperity demand regional and global structures to knit together, integrate states. This involves revitalizing old structures or building new ones. And it requires structures that are flexible, that have give to withstand the tremors of uncertain times (image of Mexico City skyscrapers?) Clinton Administration already has accomplished much. A few non-exhaustive e.g.'s:

1. Security
   - P4P (e.g. of new structure.) Preparing for the worst, working toward best possible outcome for Europe.
   - NPR (e.g. of revitalizing old structure.)

2. Prosperity

* GATT (revitalizing old structure). WTO as child of GATT.

[3. Democracy Initiatives ]?

End result is climate in which free and open societies are most likely to flourish.

III. Countering Threats

Cold War served as curtain, facade which hid other problems. These are just now coming into clear view. US, as sole remaining superpower, must decide not whether to deal with them, but how to deal with. (E.g. Rwanda). Principle threats to new structures we're building are:

1. Fragile Institutions

   * OAS/OAU. Major overhaul needed.
   * ASEAN. Fragile institution taking great strides to meet new challenges (controlling N. Korea.)
   * Self-critique: US also bulking up or reworking its own outmoded institutions (e.g.: AID; State Global Affairs portfolio.)

2. Conflict w/i States

Limit to what is possible (there will always be conflict). But new structures we are helping to build should make such conflicts less likely to break out in the first place (prevention) or easier to contain if they nonetheless do (reaction).

   * Bosnia
      -- US interests
      -- New structures were not yet in place
      -- We have done a lot (assistance; bringing allies around to our point of view)
      -- New structures will help prevent future Bosnias

   * Haiti
      -- US interests
      -- effective use of multilateral tools
      -- You don't just invade: graduated response
      -- New structures will help prevent future Haitis

3. Transnational Threats

   * Environment
      -- What's at stake
      -- Biodiversity Conference
      -- Rio Conference

   * Organized Crime
      -- What's at stake
      -- FBI in EE, FSU. Connecting institutions. Spawning new models.
III. Conclusion: The Challenge

• Reminder we are at turning point

• Challenge is to build the structures that will promote prosperity and guaranty security and thereby allow free and open societies to flourish.

• New structures will help us to deal with crises (prevention and reaction).

• Strategy is visionary, long term. We're building network of integrated structures. Trade and security spheres. Regional, then increasingly global. Gradually, new structures will become part of accepted vocabulary. We'll talk about APEC the way we talk about NATO.

• Challenge audience to help change vocabulary, outline and fill in new structures in uncertain times.
Lake Meeting  8/11/93  RS, NS, TG

Atlanta - times we act unilaterally - multilateral -
Annapolis -
phenomenon of states falling apart
centrifugal vs. centripetal forces -
harder for nodal states to be governed - all rest of architecture could be lost -
modes beyond the lexicon -
false debate between whether we're going to act
order and disorder -
the dots connect -
we have a plan -
structure
threats to that structure - profit, terror, crime,
environmentality of states to govern -
challenge people to think anew
on who will be in US involvement because of
could be lost - didn't matter what
now we should be going through the debate -
ot omniscience, but omnipresence -
still grappling for concepts that determine
What's good for the citizens, the crisis of faith, self-confidence, and the centrifugal forces under challenge, all have to show our societies why cohesion is better than chaos — why we are engaged —