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Folder Title:
Fall '95-For. Pol. [Foreign Policy] Plan

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OA/Box Number: 10132

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Fall '95 - For. Pol. [Foreign Policy] Plan

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**RESTRICTION CODES**

- **Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**
  - P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
  - P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
  - P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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  - P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
  - P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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- **PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).**

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- **Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**
  - b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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Dear Mr. Baer:

The accompanying essay addresses how President Clinton has been ill-served by those who have been attempting to graft upon his Administration a weak American posture towards the Balkans and towards Caucasian and Central Asia.

In the case of Caucasian and Central Asia, some senior military officers and Department of Defense executives have engaged in a campaign to have the U.S. cede its interests in the region to the dictates of the Russian Federation for its aggressive projects.

Likewise, in the case of the Balkans, some have urged a deferring to the U.S. partners in Europe (Germany, France, England, and Italy).

The effect of carrying this through on both U.S. commercial and security outcomes could potentially be damaging. For one item, by letting the Russian Federation set the pace and course of events in Caucasian and Central Asia, the U.S. will let the Russian Federation control the transport and sale of petroleum and natural gas from Central Asia and the Caspian basin.

The logical outcome of the U.S. laissez-faire attitude in Europe is an increasing destabilization and polarization of Europe.

Please consider the enclosed essay and recommendations. If you have any questions please feel free to call or write. Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

Kendall P. Brown

P.S. Please permit me to express my sympathies in the loss of Commerce Secretary Ken Brown and his colleagues in the course of his duty. Ken Brown
GUIDING U.S. ACTIONS IN THE BALKANS AND CENTRAL ASIA
USING RATIONAL LONG-TERM AMERICAN GOALS

Over the last eighteen months, President Clinton has been ill-served by those who have been trying to weaken American strategy towards the Balkans and towards Caucasian and Central Asia.

Who are these advocates of withdrawal? They are, in part, within the Pentagon and the Department of Defense, and have been influencing America to move towards weakness in Bosnia and toward marginal responses in the Balkans. These exponents are adamantly opposed to American leadership in security for Europe.

For instance, the U.S. has failed to enforce crucial portions of the Dayton Peace Accords. The U.S. Armed Forces have not stopped ethnic cleansing, nor stopped terrorism against civilians, nor has it ensured the free transit of civilians within Bosnia.

Perhaps it is true that some of the provisions of the Dayton Peace Accord are impractical or difficult to enforce. However, these deficiencies in enforcement have not been due to impracticality or difficulty of enforcement. The difficult operation to close down a training center that included Iranian paramilitaries and terror-type anti-civilian methods of warfare was completed quickly and successfully. This rapid response added to the credibility, the reputation, and the visibility of the U.S. Armed Forces in Bosnia.

On the other hand, the U.S. Command in NATO and the U.S. Armed Forces in Bosnia made a deliberate decision not to interfere with the ethnic cleansing of the suburbs of Sarajevo by paramilitary parts of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and its auxiliaries, despite their use of standard weapons of terror-type anti-civilian methods, including timed incendiaries, bombing and booby-trapping of civilian targets, and direct violence against civilians, emergency response, and fire emergency personnel.

Then, at the penultimate point of the ethnic cleansing of the Sarajevo suburbs, the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) took limited steps (after nation-wide and world-wide horror at its passivity), by first catching and then releasing terrorists to the Serbian police. IFOR has put minimal efforts into preventing ethnic cleansing.

Most notoriously, IFOR has had a hand in preventing the Federation police from halting ethnic cleansing. IFOR restricted the numbers of Federation policemen that could enter Ilidza immediately following the removal of the Serb occupation forces. On March 29, IFOR turned reality on its head by its claims that attempts by the Federation police to halt arson and looting in
the Sarajevo suburbs constituted a violation of the Dayton Accords.

IFOR and NATO have given the astonishing appearance that they are encouraging the ethnic cleansing of the Sarajevo suburbs, by issuing statements "telling the Serbs that they "have the right to burn their own houses.'"

At the same time, no visible efforts have yet been made to ensure the free and safe passage of civilians across lines of separation of armed forces within Bosnia, with some limited exceptions in Mostar and a single late-stage initiative beginning at the end of March.

Given that the Dayton Agreement is to be adhered to, flaws and all, then it should not be selectively enforced, especially in not in such a way as to increase or maintain ethnic cleansing.

In these matters, the approach of the U.S. Armed Forces and the NATO Command, especially that of the senior U.S. command in NATO, has been to defer to the wishes of Germany, France, Italy, and England in how the Dayton Peace Accords are enforced.

However, the European powers have been complicit in the ethnic cleansing of Bosnia and attempts at annexation by Croatia and Serbia. A prime example of this is the overturning by the Rome Conference in March, 1996, of the Koschnick Settlement for peace in Mostar, replacing the Koschnick Settlement with a plan for the final partitioning and ethnic cleansing of Mostar, and by implication, Bosnia.

There are those within the U.S. NATO Command and within the Department of Defense that wish to cede the decision-making on enforcement of the Dayton Accords to the European powers (who were never happy with the potential positive outcomes of these accords to begin with, not least because of the U.S. leadership role).

In the case of Caucasian and Central Asia, these same advocates of passivity have engaged in a campaign to have the U.S. cede its interests in the region to the dictates and the whims of an aggressive and dangerous push by the Russian Federation.

The outcomes of war in the Caucasus will have real significance for the United States. This significance does not just originate in the changes in U.S. influence over the transport of transport and sale of Central Asian petroleum and natural gas through the Caucasus.

We only have to look at the impact of the Russian war against the Caucasus on Russian domestic politics to realize the serious global impact of how American decisions are made and what decisions are made in response to the crisis in the Caucasus.
There was an explicit decision made, again following the influence of some groups within the Department of Defense and parts of the U.S. Armed Forces command structure, to comply with the Russian Federation decision to send the Russian Army and Interior Ministry troops into a war against Chechnya, and now Ingushetia.

The origin and explanation for such an agenda is not plainly visible. However, its outcome is apparent. As a consequence of refusing to halt the war, the U.S. has drastically weakened Yeltsin's political position, and with it the political position of the liberals and reformers within the Russian Federation.

The United States has had a major hand in creating a situation in the Russian Federation where Boris Yeltsin will be in the same position that Prime Minister Alexander Kerensky was in July of 1917. Kerensky and his cabinet made the decision to defer to the Russian General Staff and to carry through on the Romanov war plans for a June offensive in 1917. Within one month, there had not only been a victorious German counteroffensive, but the Kronstadt sailors and the Vyborg district workers had almost carried through a seizure of Petrograd, even without the encouragement of Lenin and the Bolsheviks.

Yeltsin and the reformers and liberals (even if they oppose him on the war) are now tainted with being the war party. The Communists and their political allies (even if they are imperialistic or jingoists) will get the popular political credit for at least not having started the war.

Of course, many Russians to this day believe that it was the machinations of the English, the French, and the U.S., that led to Alexander Kerensky not reaching a separate peace with Germany in 1917. And the Communist Party, with Lenin at its head, got the popular credit for being the party of peace; it was this popular credit for being the party of peace that drove the political revolution into a status where the Communists could seize power.

Although it is extremely unlikely that the Communists, if in power once more, would withdraw the Army and the Interior Ministry troops from Chechnya and Ingushetia, they will benefit prior the election from the public anti-war sentiment.

By inserting deficiencies into American actions affecting the Caucasus and Central Asia, this network within the Joint Chiefs and the Department of Defense has hindered our strategic tasks in Russia, North Asia, Central Asia, and Europe.

Likewise, in the case of the Balkans, parts of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and some civilian executives within the Department of Defense have urged that we defer to the principal powers in Europe (Germany, France, England, and Italy).
In particular, the U.S. has allowed Germany to influence our activities in the Balkans. The State Department, when it reflects these views, asserts that "the German government and public are deeply averse to all forms of militarism". Such an assurance has no basis in reality; the Bundestag is now considering a law to criminalize further any public statements against the German military, putting it even farther beyond either public scrutiny or criticism.

In similar assurances, the Department of State has said that "over the past forty-five years, the Federal Republic of Germany has proved itself to be a reliable ally which shares many of our interests and values." As for the present reliability and extent of shared interests with Germany, please consider the following:

1. German industrial interests have played a key role in supplying equipment to construct chemical weapons factories in Libya, which may soon become operational.

2. Germany has unconditionally provided diplomatic recognition to rump Jugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), despite the strong objections of the European Union, warnings from the majority of the other member nations of the EU, and the protests of the Social Democratic opposition in Germany. This recognition was extended simultaneously with the escalation of attacks by the Milosevic regime on the independent media and escalating violations of human rights in Kosovo.

3. German industries supplied weapons and arms technology to Iraq.

4. Germany is a primary financier of Iran, allowing it sufficient cash to finance terrorism, revolution, and weapons of mass destruction. Germany has refused to assist with the embargo on Iran.

5. Germany has directed a tremendous flow of weaponry to the Croatian Armed Forces, both in violation of the arms embargo and with damaging consequences for European peace.

Germany has been attempting to reinsert military and economic influence back into Croatia, Bosnia, Slovenia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and Poland, using money and arms where these will work (in Slovakia and Croatia), and political intimidation, based on its position at the political fulcrum of the European Union, where arms and money will not work (such as towards the Czech Republic). It has also exhibited an interest in extending similar influences into Moldova and Bulgaria.

In this effort, Germany will have to come into some medium term agreement with the Russian Federation. Again, the State Department has reassurances. " The Germans have no desire
to repeat these policies, which ended in disaster for their
country." It is useful to point out that past German agreements
with Russia on spheres of influence in Europe have not been based
on rational long-term interests, but on short-term political
criteria. At the present, as in the 1920s, Germany is near the
edge of an economic and political crisis, with resurgent
militaristic habits. However, in this case, a stale nationalist
government is attempting to fend off an even worse economic
crisis and the potential political consequences. In such a
context, any faith in continuity and rationality of the German
role in Europe is poorly placed.

The model for such an agreement with Russia can be seen in
the negotiations between West Germany and the U.S.S.R. on the
merger with East Germany. Clearly, the West Germans, under
Kohl, were able to get what they wanted. What did the U.S.S.R.
get in return? The Russians have stated publicly that the quid
pro quo was to be a secret German effort for waiver of restraints
on Russian military activity in Eastern Europe and Central Asia
(such as the Conventional Weapons in Europe treaty or the arms
embargo on Serbia).

In the same way, Germany has been able to place its armed
forces back into the Balkans without any visible protests by the
Russian Federation. What else has the Russian Federation
obtained in return?

There are strong indications that what the Russian
Federation received in return was a free hand, with no complaint
from the Europe Union (or Germany, France, England, or Italy
individually) to reconsolidate a military and economic hegemony
in the Caucasus and in Central Asia.

For instance, in visits by German Foreign Minister Klaus
Kinkel and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl to the Russian
Federation, there have been no criticisms of the war in the
Caucasus, which has generally been at its most gruesome and
hellish during these placid congratulatory visits by high German
officials. In the follow-up to the heavy lobbying by the
European Union for the new $12 billion loan by the IMF to the
Russian Federation, Germany followed this with a new $4.5 billion
loan (on top of the tens of billions of dollars that the Russian
Federation already owes Germany).

Even more ominous are the military and diplomatic tentacles
that Germany has put into the Balkans. For instance, Germany
now has a plan afoot to train the Croatian Army on German
territory, this September (agreed to by German Defense Minister
Volker Ruhe and his Croatian counterpart Gojko Susak in January,
1996).

In the normal course of geopolitics in Europe, one would
expect the Russian Federation to oppose the military, economic,
and diplomatic entrance of Germany into the Balkans, particularly
into Bosnia and Croatia. Nevertheless, and most curiously, the Russian Federation has been silent during this reentry.

It is not possible to conclude other than that Germany and Russia have come to an understanding. If Russia permits Germany to place troops and military bases in Croatia and Croatian-occupied Bosnia, then Germany will turn a blind eye to the Russian actions in Central Asia, the Caucasus, Serbian-occupied Bosnia, and Serbia.

Consistent with this close political relationship between the governments of Boris Yeltsin and Dr. Helmut Kohl, there has been not a word of dismay from Germany in response to the open plans by Yeltsin to continue arming the JNA, and by extension, its paramilitary auxiliaries in occupied Bosnia.

What has been the American response? We can be no less than astonished at the level of American complicity in the arming and training of the Croatian Army. Rather than providing a swift veto to both the German and Russian actions, the U.S. has stood aside and let arms and training flow to the two occupying armies. It is impossible to assume other than U.S. compliance when these arms were transferred from countries very sensitive to U.S. viewpoints, such as Germany, Ukraine, Hungary, and Austria.

The Department of State has accepted these German actions, even defending them, and has posited absurdities such as, in May of 1995, saying that "Chancellor Kohl has said that the tragic history of the German occupation of Yugoslavia precludes deployment of ground troops there." Of course, his government never intended to do so, and chose to ignore this commitment within a matter of months, sending one installation of ground troops to Croatia in June of 1995 and another in December of 1995.

The consequences of the U.S. laissez faire approach will be that these two occupying armies will be strengthened, and American interests in Central Europe and Eastern Europe will be damaged. The outcome for Europe is increasing destabilization and regional polarization. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe will find that they are forced to choose military and economic alignment with either Germany or Russia, a sure recipe for undermining the broad western alliance led by the United States.

In much the same way, in the case of Caucasian and Central Asia, there have been powerful advocates within the U.S. government who wish to have America cede its interests in the region to Russian designs.

The outcome will have real significance for the United States; both the commercial and the military results are potentially damaging. On at least one account, by letting the Russian Federation set the pace and course of events in Caucasian
and Central Asia, the U.S. will let the Russian Federation control the transport and sale of petroleum and natural gas from Central Asia and the Caspian basin.

In the context of the issue of oil in the Caspian basin, it is useful to consider how American decision-making on Central Asia has been driven. The rational way forward is to consider America's broad commercial and security interests, develop a plan to enhance them, and then let individual companies make their own way within those outlines. But rather than this approach, we have been swayed by company particulars.

For instance, specific companies have influenced U.S. traffic with Iran. Rather than maintaining a stable regime over the volume and particulars of commercial and financial transactions, we have oscillated between permissiveness and rigor.

The rational approach to the Iranian government is to openly assert that we recognize their intentions to sponsor terrorism, violent revolution, and weapons proliferation. Then, having done so, American diplomats or intermediaries (such as retired U.S. diplomats and politicians) can sit down with the government in Teheran and establish a working channel for communication that will not give the Iranian regime the benefits of public friendliness by America.

Iranian actions in the Middle East and Central Asia have not been substantially more hostile than those of Russia, Syria, China, or Pakistan. Fortunately, the American strategy of containment has at least been clearly put forth, but because of the loose cannons of private industry and the foolishness of the Republican Congress, there have been difficulties in implementation.

One aspect of this difficulty in implementation has been what to do about the transshipment of oil and natural gas from the Caspian basin to Europe and East Asia. Private U.S. companies have different interests in different routes, but American interests lie in giving neither Turkey nor Iran nor Russia a lock on transshipment. If possible, the countries of origin (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and the Caucasian Republics) should have as much autonomy as possible to choose routes without susceptibility to military or economic pressure.

For this reason, the route through Iran must be left open, and although it is in our interest to do so, we should be getting something from the Iranians in return. This could include, for instance, restraint in nuclear weapons development, perhaps coupled with Iranian willingness to provide diplomatic support for a test ban treaty and a nuclear-free zone in Central and South Asia. In return, Iran would have U.S. technology and financing for a small oil pipeline from a Caspian Sea port to the Gulf. This would be a small price for the U.S. to pay for
something that is in our natural interests (i.e., a viable alternative to a pipeline route through Russia or Armenia). For face-saving reasons, the U.S. could nominate commercial proxies in Pakistan, Azerbaijan, or Kazakhstan to carry out the transactions.

By these means, if we have the political resilience to resist specific commercial lobbies, we would keep Iran on our active communication list, while enhancing our clout in Iraq, Turkey, the Russian Federation, and all of Central Asia.

Again, this strategy will not be pursued if we simply follow the lead of Russia and Turkey in their separate pursuits of self-interest and agendas in the region. Those who have advocated abdicating our directive role have made assurances similar to those made about Germany. And they suggest that "exercises with the Russian military improve our understanding of this key institution in Russian society and lays the foundation for effective cooperation with Moscow on important security issues of common interest like Bosnia."

This brand of neglect could be characterized as willful naivety. It certainly will neither produce positive outcomes or enhance our diplomatic and military reputation.

Perhaps the type of cooperation that can be expected from the Russian Federation in Central Asia can be extrapolated based on the following:

(1) The senior Russian military officer sent to oversee American officers in Bosnia at Bjeljina and to share U.S. intelligence windfalls in Bosnia was a senior Russian officer in the battle to capture Grozny in 1995 (Colonel Alexander Lentzov). This fact alone is a damming indictment of the current American approach to military cooperation with the Russian Federation. The primary fact of the war against Chechnya is that more than 40,000 civilians have been intentionally slaughtered, while the Russian General Command and Ministry of the Interior has succeeded in brutalizing an entire generation of young Russian men.

One would think that after experiences in Vietnam, Haiti, and El Salvador, that the U.S. Armed Forces commanders would be shy of close and supportive association with such war criminals and sociopaths. However, the U.S. senior commanders appear to be as indifferent as ever to the contamination of American fighting men and women, in this case by close cooperation with the Russian and Serbian armed forces. It seems to remain the Pentagon's unwritten rule to enforce passivity on American soldiers in the face of war crimes and attacks on civilians.

(2) The Russian Federation has adamantly proceeded with sales of nuclear technology to Iran. It continues with arms sales, including advanced fighters, to China and to India.
(3) It remains to be seen what the Russian role has been and continues to be in the development of Indian ballistic missiles.

Boris Yeltsin has been habitually deceptive in his public statements on the Russian war against Chechnya. For example, he has repeatedly stated that the assault on the Caucasus will cease, while in fact, these attacks continue unabated.

The Russian President has made it clear that it is his intention that neither Chechnya nor any other part of his dominion will be allowed to determine its own future. This dictum has been accompanied by a final solution that includes the razing of villages and towns, the subjection of surrounded towns and villages and their populations to sustained air and ground artillery attacks, and the use of concentration camps, as well as an enlargement of the war to Ingushetia. The Russian war plan is to use massive retaliation against the civilian population in return for any armed resistance; these acts will inevitably lead to greater political decay in Central Asia and Russia.

To see where the Kremlin's war in the Caucasus and expansion in Central Asia is aimed, one need only consider that Russia, under new Foreign Minister Yevgeni Primakov's direction, by arming Iran and encouraging Iraq, will now directly oppose U.S. dual containment strategy.

Again, the U.S. cannot encourage this behavior. Just as we blundered by permitting the rearming and training of Croatia, prior to the expulsion of the Krajina Serbs, we have too long acquiesced to German and Russian intentions.

It is not hard to find where the sources of this error are. There are those, both in the private parties used in such mistaken actions (such as Military Professional Resources Inc.) and in the portions of senior officer staff linked to them (such as those in the DIA), who are intentionally undermining our influence over the European powers. We cannot continue to do so and retain our national safety.

We must place American strategic needs ahead of any private or institutional players. This means recognizing that we cannot continue to sponsor the Russian Federation's plans for empire and its wars in Asia. And we cannot let Germany create satellites in Central Europe, in either Croatia or elsewhere.
Don --

A draft of the speech for Thursday in New York.

Please call me with your comments at 6-9179.
I'm delighted to have this chance to speak with you today. I am especially pleased to have an opportunity to talk to you about our nation's role abroad. As our world grows closer with each passing year...as the global village becomes more of a reality...more and more Americans are finding themselves working on behalf of American interests with other nations. More people in your generation will have this kind of experience -- through involvement in business or government -- than in any previous generation. And all of you already have an important say in the role America plays in the world.

Our nation needs to hear your voices and your thoughts in this time of great change. The new realities of the post-Cold War world...the revolutionary advances of the Information Age...the rise of interdependence all mean that we must think anew about our goals today and what we want our nation to achieve in the years ahead -- when the torch passes from my generation to yours.

It is fitting that we are discussing these issues here and now. Tomorrow, I will leave to visit our troops in Bosnia -- where they are deployed in a mission as new and different as the age we inhabit. Like all Americans, I am deeply proud of the job they are doing. They are demonstrating again the supreme professionalism and dedication that make our armed forces the greatest on
earth. In difficult, often dangerous circumstances, they are performing the work of heroes. In bitter cold...amid snow and fog...in towns reduced to rubble...in fields and roads strewn with mines...they are giving a people ravaged by war a chance for peace -- and to find their way back to a decent, human existence.

Today, because of their efforts, men, women and children who lived through unspeakable horrors are beginning to trust that the guns are silent and the slaughter is over for good. The combatants are withdrawing to the positions agreed upon in the Dayton treaty. And our troops are helping create a secure environment, taking down the barricades and roadblocks, putting up bridges and opening the way for refugees to return to their homes. For the people of Bosnia, an enduring peace -- and a better life for their children -- is no longer a cruel mirage but a reality that is within grasp.

The American troops in Bosnia are also doing vital work by putting out a fire that threatened stability in the heart of Europe. Now, because our young men and women are making peace in Bosnia, they and hundreds of thousands more won’t be called to fight another major war on a continent where Americans have sacrificed so much in this century for freedom. These troops are giving new life to one of the most hopeful developments of our age -- the global turn to peace and security...to freedom, democracy and free markets...which is making a real difference in the lives of people on virtually every continent.
We see the benefits of peace in the Middle East, where Arabs and Israelis have turned the page on a past of bloody conflict -- and where Palestinians now control their towns and villages and are writing their own destiny... where Israeli mothers and fathers need fear no more that their sons must face the dangers of patrolling angry streets. [Poss. Syria track sent.] We heard it so powerfully in Northern Ireland last month in the cheering crowds of Protestants and Catholics who know that decades of bloodshed are giving way to a future of reconciliation.

We see the embrace of democracy in Haiti. The recent elections there have paved the way toward the first peaceful, democratic handover of power in the 192-year history of that nation next month. The Haitian people now have a real chance to break the cycle of poverty and repression in their country -- instead of being forced to flee by the tens of thousands for our shores.

The American people feel the benefit of this global change in a new sense of security. Now, when we turn out the lights at night -- for the first time in a generation -- there are no nuclear missiles pointed at our children.

Our nation feel the benefits as well because we are building the foundation of a prosperity that will last far into the coming century. Through far-reaching efforts to expand free trade -- through GATT, NAFTA and our initiatives in the Americas and the Asia-Pacific region -- we are opening the markets of tomorrow. Already, this work is paying off: in the last three years, these agreements have helped create more than 2 million export-related jobs. (ck) These are high-skill,
high-paying jobs -- the kind our economy must generate if we want to overcome the income stagnation that is perhaps our greatest problem today.

All these events ought to hearten all who seek a better, more peaceful and prosperous future. Even more, this is a record all Americans should be proud of -- because every one of these developments became possible because of one essential ingredient: American leadership.

In the Old World and the New...in the Northern Hemisphere and the Southern...America is making the difference. Without our constant, vigorous leadership, old hatreds would persist unchecked, the carnage would continue -- and hope would be denied. We have come so far because we have steered by our values. We have stood up around the world because we know that by strengthening others in their search for freedom and democracy...security and prosperity...we strengthen ourselves. American leadership is making the difference for the American people. It is providing tangible improvements in security and prosperity that will determine the kinds of lives we live today, tomorrow and for decades to come.

Ironically, at this hopeful moment, some are sounding the call to retreat. They say the Cold War is over, communism has been defeated and we can withdraw behind our borders. They say that there are no threats so great that America must confront them.

But those who counsel retreat are deaf to history and blind to the dangers of the present. They forget one of the great lessons of this century: that America must be engaged before an ideology
of destruction takes hold abroad -- so we are not forced to send our troops into battle against an imminent peril to our homes and freedom. We made that mistake after one World War -- and we were compelled to fight a second.

We must not make that mistake again -- and we must not underestimate the threats of today just because we see no strutting dictator or aggressive empire. Nations still compete and battle one another -- and we must remain vigilant to prevent old threats from taking on dangerous dimensions. New dangers -- many of which know no boundaries -- confront us as well. Nuclear smuggling, international terrorism, the drug trade and international crime -- these require America involvement. Without American leadership, they will not be defeated. We have seen already the destruction caused by a vial of sarin gas in Tokyo or the bombs in Riyadh, Paris, Karachi and Oklahoma City. We dare not be complacent. We must go out to meet these new threats.

We can defeat them -- because today we enjoy an unparalleled opportunity for advancing our interests and promoting our values. In the wake of the Cold War, the United States stands as the sole remaining superpower on earth. Never, in more than 500 years since the emergence of the nation-state has there been a strategic moment like this one. Never has one nation occupied such an unchallenged position of leadership.

Ultimately, what makes this moment so promising is not our unrivaled might. Instead, it is the fact that around the world, nations want us involved...look to us for help...share our values and
aspirations. Wherever I have traveled...whether I was speaking with prime ministers or
passersby...with parliamentarians or plain citizens...the message was always the same: America
must be involved. America must make the difference.

These nations look to us because -- through good times and bad -- America has stood by its
values. They know our commitment to liberty and democracy. They know that more than
military strength and economic power, our ideals are the heart of our arsenal. Which is why
America -- like no other country -- can swing the balance between strife and
reconciliation...between prosperity and poverty...between the forces of civilization and chaos.

Now, the task before our nation -- and the task that will face your generation as you take the reins
in the years to come -- is to decide how we can best use this extraordinary moment. Because the
chasm of ideology has closed...and because so much of the world shares our values...for the first
time, the limits on our action are the ones we set. No longer must we feel compelled to act
reflexively someplace in the name of containment because we have been challenged there by a
powerful rival, as we did at times in the Cold War. We are the ones who determine where we will
go -- and we will do that by deliberating about our interests...our aims...the resources we want to
devote to our goals.

But we must choose carefully. There is an abundance of conflict and tragedy in the world -- far
more than our nation could ever remedy. America cannot be the world’s policeman. We must
match our actions with our interests and our capacities. That is my job as President. But in the
pivotal events of our time...in those places where our values and interests are truly at stake...America must stand strong and ready to act. America must do what only a superpower can: keep the tide of freedom and security running our way.

So let us be clear: Our first priority must be upholding the tradition of American leadership...guided by our values and interests...which we have inherited from the generations that fought World War II and the long twilight struggle of the Cold War. Without this leadership, we would not have seen the incredible events of the last few months in Bosnia, the Middle East, Northern Ireland and Haiti. If we do not maintain it, we cannot expect to go forward.

To redeem the possibilities of this moment, we also must not hobble ourselves with self-defeating limits...by demanding that we call all the shots...or insisting that we act alone.

Of course, when our vital interests are at stake, America will act alone when it must. But we must also have the wisdom to join with others -- to spread the risks and responsibility of action. Time and again, the United States has benefited from coalitions -- as President Bush did in Desert Storm, and as we have done in Bosnia and Haiti. [For all its problems, the United Nations has served American interests well over five decades -- and we must not abandon it now.] Today, with so many nations sharing our values -- and eager to help us further those values -- it makes no sense to turn away. If we insist on unilateral action, we will act only when our deepest interests are at stake...we will slip into isolation...we will lose the mantle of leadership.
We can build a safer, more prosperous future -- but it will take resolve. We must be united -- just as we were through the historic fight against fascism and the struggle against communism. Throughout the decades of bipartisan consensus in foreign policy, Democrats and Republicans debated issues with a vigor that honors our liberty. But at the end of the day, they stood together for the good of the nation. If we allow ourselves to be divided...if we squabble over every step to advance freedom and prosperity and do not join together in common cause...we risk squandering a chance that will only come once. I urge both parties to maintain the bipartisan tradition that is one of our great inheritances. We must not let posterity ask, “Who lost the 21st century.”

So much is within reach: We can close the circle of peace in the Middle East and further lessen the chance that our troops would ever be called to fight again in this region where our nation has so many vital interests. CHRISTOPHER STORY TK. But only if America leads.

We can continue supporting the young democracies of Central and Eastern Europe as they overcome the legacy of communism and consolidate their freedom. As this work goes forward, we are helping create a stable, undivided and free Europe for the first time ever. This has long been a goal of our nation. And it is something we must achieve for America to have a partner who will face the challenges of the coming century. But it will only happen if America leads.

We can increase our security and push farther into the distance the cloud of nuclear danger. This year, ratification of the START II treaty can set in motion deep cuts that will reduce weapons levels to a third of their Cold War levels. We can achieve a Comprehensive Test Ban -- which has
been an American goal for more than 30 years -- and help ensure that no nuclear weapons are ever again detonated on earth. And we can make further strides toward preventing nuclear material from the former Soviet Union from falling into the wrong hands. But only if America leads.

We can continue opening new markets and expanding trade, which we must do to create export-related jobs...increase our prosperity...and keep the American dream alive. But we can only do that if America leads.

In the years ahead, America must uphold its leadership for the sake of our security and prosperity. But America must also continue to lead because our ideals of freedom and democracy demand it of us...because they are universal and the core of our nation’s mission. If we do not stand up for our values around the world, we risk losing our way home. We cannot champion liberty for ourselves and watch in complacence as others are denied. Yes, our decision regarding where, when and how America acts must be determined by our interests and our abilities. But an America that ceases striving for freedom and democracy for others is an America that courts the danger of losing its soul at home.

Generations of Americans have understood why we needed to be engaged in the world. They heard the call of our ideals. They recognized the responsibility these values carry. They accepted the burden of leadership for our values -- and they rose to carry out their duty...when the costs were highest and the outlook was dark. They never faltered. They never wanted it any other way.
Today, I challenge the coming generation to prepare itself for this burden of leadership in the world...to accept the responsibility that our values carry...to rise to this unprecedented moment, when America can make the difference. I challenge you to ready yourselves...to pick up where those who have gone before leave off. And I challenge you to start taking your place in the great chain of generations that have upheld American leadership...and turned history to our advantage.

What many call the American Century is coming to a close. I believe that the one ahead can be an even greater American Century, when our nation’s leadership, more than ever, makes the vital difference between peace and war...between freedom and repression...between security and fear...between prosperity and poverty. Let us join together to seize this extraordinary moment. And let us unite in common purpose behind the ideals that have carried us so far -- and can carry us so much farther.

God bless you. God bless America.

###
September 20, 1995

To: Don Baer
    George Stephanopoulos
    Mike McCurry

From: Antony Blinken

I attach a memo I did for Tony Lake on themes for this fall’s foreign policy speeches. Please let me know your thoughts.
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**COLLECTION:**
- Clinton Presidential Records
- Communications
- Don Baer
- OA/Box Number: 10132

**FOLDER TITLE:**
- Fall '95 - For. Pol. [Foreign Policy] Plan

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December 20, 1995

Mr. Donald Baer
OEOB Room 197
Office of Speechwriting
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Don:

Enclosed is an article from the new *Foreign Policy* that I thought might interest you. In it, I offer some thoughts on the political trends that are driving U.S. foreign policy away from internationalism, and on what kind of politics must be practiced if we hope to move U.S. policy back in the other direction.

Best regards,

Jeremy Rosner
Senior Associate

Enclosure
Clinton Presidential Records
Digital Records Marker

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America's campaign season has now begun in earnest. The races for the White House and Congress will revolve around domestic affairs, just as they did in 1992 and 1994. Once again, however, America's foreign programs will play a key supporting role. Most often, the role will be that of prodigal, fool, or foil, as candidates attack the cost, wisdom, and effectiveness of United Nations peacekeeping, foreign aid, and other international efforts. For those who wish to preserve America's leadership and presence abroad, it is a troubling spectacle. It is thus worth examining why foreign-affairs bashing on the hustings and in Congress has become so popular and what can be done about it.

It should not be any mystery why anti-internationalism now makes for good politics. Foreign aid, never popular, is even less so in the face of lingering federal deficits, economic anxiety, and diminished threats from abroad. The U.N., long suspect, is even more so after vivid failures in Somalia and Bosnia. The Republican majority in Congress, looking for sharp contrasts with a Democratic White House, finds a target-rich environment in the latter's mixed record of internationalism. Add new strains of nativism and protectionism, and attacks on all things foreign become irresistible.

The attacks have grown increasingly strident, especially on the

Jeremy D. Rosner, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment, was counselor and senior director for legislative affairs on the staff of the National Security Council from 1993 to 1994. He is author of The New Tug-of-War: Congress, the Executive Branch, and National Security (Carnegie, 1995).