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Memorandum of Conversation

Date: February 1, 1993
Time: 6:00 pm to 7:30 pm
Place: US Mission, New York

SUBJECT: Status of the Vance/Owen Plan for Bosnia

PARTICIPANTS: The Secretary
Former Secretary Cyrus Vance
Lord David Owen
Ambassador Herbert Okun
Ralph Johnson (notetaker)

Secretary Christopher opened the meeting by expressing his and President Clinton's appreciation for the tireless and courageous work being done by Vance and Owen, and asking Vance to bring him up to date on the negotiations.

Vance Summary

Summarizing the state of play, Vance explained that every part of the three part package had been examined in detail with each of the parties, "especially with the Muslims." All have signed the constitutional principles, and he described the Bosnian side as particularly enthusiastic because the approach rejects "confederation" and the concept of a "state within a state."

The military provisions, said Vance, had been accepted by all as well, until President Izetbegovic backed away last Saturday (1/30) for reasons that remain unclear.

In describing the provincial boundaries, Vance said that they are fair, and that most are not in dispute. There are some areas where the Bosnian muslims and Serbs have differences. These need to be negotiated seriously, in New York. Noting that leaders of all the parties have been invited to the UN, Vance commented that Izetbegovic says he cannot come because he has been too long away from Sarajevo. Owen interjected that this means the muslims "are not serious."

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Pointing out that the Serbs have done the largest amount of ethnic cleansing, Vance declared that these gains are not accepted in the map the negotiators have put forward.

As for the "interim government," Izetbegovic had asked Vance and Owen for a plan and they had come up with one, which they have now presented to the three sides, asking that they study it and provide some reactions.

Given the impasse on provincial boundaries, said Vance, he and Owen felt the need to consult with the Security Council. He outlined the following recommendations that they intended to make:

1. Lifting the arms embargo would be a serious mistake.
2. If the Security Council sees their plan as a viable basis for settlement, it should pass an appropriate resolution.
3. The Security Council should set up an international criminal court to try war criminals.
4. The Security Council should support the International Commission on Human Rights as proposed at the Geneva Conference.

Summarizing where he thinks the parties stand on outstanding issues, Vance said he believes Karadzic (Bosnian Serb) is prepared to talk further about the map, and that Izetbegovic has some flexibility on military measures.

When asked by the Secretary what type of resolution they contemplate, Vance and Owen did not elaborate.

In further discussions of the map, Vance tabled drawings showing, he said, a rollback in Serb-held territory "from 70% to 43%," which he described as 30% less than "pre-war." He reiterated a readiness to talk to all sides, saying, however, that changes to the map could only be made if all agree. In his view, more progress can be made in this area.

US View

Secretary Christopher explained that the US does not have a negative view of the plan, but we have questions. He asked whether Vance and Owen believe the parties would honor an

agreement. Vance replied that he thought they would, though sporadic violations should be expected. He added that there is no guarantee any agreement would last forever.

The Secretary drew attention to problems with the situation in the UNPA's in Croatia, and Vance acknowledged there are real problems there, suggesting he and Owen might try to bring the Croats and the Krajina Serbs together for talks in New York.

Implementation of the Plan

Vance and Owen were asked how their plan would be enforced if it is adopted.

Owen explained the arrangements laid out in the military measures portion of the plan, e.g., progressive demilitarization of Sarajevo, withdrawal of troops into their "strongholds," i.e., provinces in which their ethnic group was predominant. In his view, much depends on the strength of UNPROFOR. He expects a Canadian brigade to be dispatched in the near future to Sarajevo, and he thinks this will help. As for the number of troops required, he said the UK believes it will take more than the "three battalions" which General Nambiar (UNPROFOR Commander) has called for.

Owen sees NATO's role as critical. He thinks NATO forces should be "in blue berets" (i.e., deployed under UN colors), but says they are vital to make the force "convincing." The greatest danger of conflict in his view is friction between Croats and Muslims. He described the Bosnian Serb forces as "more disciplined," a characterization questioned by Secretary Christopher.

Elaborating on the composition of an implementation force, Owen listed Pakistan, India, Russia as acceptable troop contributors, pointing out the Ukrainians had been a disaster. He said a military plan had been developed by the "NATO Headquarters Unit" in Bosnia (NOTE: this is a reference to a UN HQ unit near Sarajevo. It is not a NATO unit, but has some NATO personnel.)

Bosnian Government problems with the map

Secretary Christopher asked for an explanation of the Bosnian Government's problems with the Vance/Owen map. Lord Owen, using maps that were subsequently given to the Secretary, outlined the differences between Muslims and Serbs over the

construction of provinces. In Bihac, he said, the Serbs are being "rolled back by 62%," but the Bosnian Government wants more territory, particularly to the Southeast, where the Serbs are "quite strong."

Bosnian Muslims would like to control Brcko, which the Vance/Owen plan puts in a Serb area. In this case, said Owen, the Serbs have been denied a northern corridor, but given an internationally supervised road. Brcko is strategically located with respect to the road, and the Serbs fear that in Bosnian control the town could be a base for cutting off access to the road.

The Muslims, said Owen, would also like control of an area along the border of B-H adjacent to the Sanjack, a region of Muslim population in Serbia. Further, they have asked for control of Trebinje, a mostly Serb area in the south of B-H where there has recently been some ethnic cleansing.

Vance declared that the plan does not divide Bosnia into 10 provinces. The war broke Bosnia apart. The plan restores Bosnia-Herzegovina in a decentralized manner. The ethnic approach was rejected from the outset, as is evident, he said, from the fact that more than one-third of the Bosnian Serbs would be living outside the provinces where they are a majority.

Congressional Concerns

Secretary Christopher said he had a question for Vance and Owen that he knew would be asked by Congress: Why should the US support a plan that punishes Bosnian Muslims, the victims in this war?

Ambassador Okun replied that the Serbs are not rewarded, since they lose land under the plan, adding that the combination of human rights guarantees and agreed military measures would assure the safety of the Muslim population. Vance added that if the parties can't be brought together under this plan, the fighting will be worse.

The Secretary persisted, saying there nevertheless was strong sentiment in Congress, e.g., the DeConcini Resolution calling for US intervention on behalf of Bosnia, that it would be unfair to impose this plan on the Bosnian Government. He questioned as well the viability of the enforcement mechanism, pointing out that the UNSYG will have problems finding support from troop contributors.

Vance and Owen Comment on the US Role

Vance said there would indeed be questions about enforcement, but that much will depend on the US role.

Saying that he had felt from the beginning force should have been used by the international community, Owen pointed to the salutary effect of the No Fly Zone pressed by President Bush, claiming that it had changed the negotiating dynamic for the better overnight. He would not recommend putting in troops, however, without a plan.

The reason the Muslim side won't cooperate, declared Owen, is that they hope the US will lift the arms embargo and they think the Administration doesn't like the map. Until the US position is clear on these points the fighting will go on. While there is still a window for negotiations, it's closing. The real danger, opined Owen, is partition, with the Croats pulling forces out of Bosnia to allow Serb advances. Then Bosnia will become a Lebanon.

Secretary Christopher said he had heard estimates of up to 50,000 troops for enforcing the plan. Owen was skeptical, saying he didn't think that many would be needed. Vance said he knew the planners had talked about large numbers, and without stating a number said "it will take a lot."

Humanitarian Aid

Expressing concern about the delivery of humanitarian aid, the Secretary asked for the negotiators' view of the situation. Both agreed this was a critical problem and that more must be done, noting we had been lucky to have a relatively mild winter in the region. Although they shared worries about the security situation facing UNHCR and other relief organizations, neither offered specific suggestions.

The Future of the Negotiations

Pointing out that there was still room for negotiation, Owen said that if he and Vance had their way the map could be changed, and that they would try to improve on it during the meetings in New York this week.

The Secretary said he understands the logic of Vance and Owen's view, i.e., that the Bosnian Muslims hope for more from the US. However, the Administration is only 10 days in office, it has inherited an impossible situation, and it is mid way through a policy review. We hope the negotiating process can be sustained, and we'll look for ways to help. He asked what pressure points might be used to encourage President Izetbegovic to come to New York.

Replying in unison, Vance and Owen asked that the US press Izetbegovic to come, suggesting that the Administration could "broker some help in his favor" since the map remains flexible.

In response to Secretary Christopher's query about action on sanctions, Owen said he thought the "isolation" package proposed by the EC was a good idea, but that it would require compensation for the states neighboring Serbia.

The Secretary asked whether all three parts of the plan must necessarily move forward together, to which Vance replied that this was not essential. What is essential is to stop the war.

Vance and Owen showed guarded optimism when the question of Serb acceptance of all three plan elements was raised. They described the Russians as "troubled," but gave high marks to their diplomacy, noting that arms sales to the Serbs seem to have stopped, that they are reluctant to break P-5 consensus, and that they (the Russians) feel they have moved the Serbs in a constructive direction.

Conclusion of the Meeting

Wrapping up, Secretary Christopher expressed his great appreciation for the chance to talk and said he had found the conversation extremely useful. The Administration's policy review would go forward, and perhaps could be accelerated, but it would be a mistake to force answers to some of the ultimate questions before the policy was in place to deal with them.

Lord Owen asked if it would be helpful for him to speak with the Congress. The Secretary said that might be a good idea at the right moment, but thought the first order of business would be for the Administration to talk to Congress about the policy that emerged from the review.

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Former Secretary Vance said he understood the Administration's situation and did not wish to complicate it. It is important, nevertheless, that discussions in the UN go forward, so that all parties have a chance to see that the process is fair.

In closing, the Secretary briefly outlined what he intended to say publicly about the meeting.

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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February 19, 1993

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER *mw*
FROM: BARRY F. LOWENKRON *BL*
SUBJECT: Your Meeting With General John Shalikashvili,
Monday, February 22, 1993, 2:00 - 2:30 p.m.

Background. General Shalikashvili ("Shali") is in town for consultations on Bosnia. In addition to meeting you he will be seeing Secretary Aspin, General Powell and Under Secretaries-designate Wisner at DOD, and Tarnoff and Davis at the State Department. Before becoming SACEUR, Shali was Assistant Chairman of the JCS and its representative to the senior inter-agency group tasked with developing policies toward a whole panoply of European security architecture issues (e.g., NATO-WEU relations, development of the NACC and CSCE). As SACEUR he negotiated the agreement this January with General Naumann and Admiral Lanxade that tied the Franco-German corps to NATO.

Bosnia. This should take up the bulk of the meeting. Shali will want to brief you on the status of work at SHAPE, and solicit your views on next steps.

Peacekeeping. Last December NAC Foreign Ministers mandated accelerated work in the alliance to prepare for peacekeeping (e.g., development of doctrine, training). Since then Shali has lead the effort to develop the military structure for peacekeeping, which can include participation by NACC members. This work has been pursued in tandem with planning at NATO aimed at accommodating French interest in participating in Alliance management of peacekeeping.

Russia. Having travelled to Russia in late January, Shali may want to spend a few minutes sharing with you his impressions of the Russian military, their interest in developing closer links to NATO, and their uneasiness (principally as a function of domestic politics in Russia) with our stepped-up campaign against the Serbs.

Concurrences by: Bob Bell, Jane Hall *RGB*

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THE UK AND AFRICA

The UK remains our most reliable partner on major African issues and crises. Although sub-Saharan Africa has slid down the UK agenda in recent years as other issues came to the fore, the British remain serious players in a dozen African countries, including virtually all the major countries (South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria, Ghana, Angola, and Mozambique) of most interest to us. British commercial interests in the first four dwarf ours (over one billion pounds of direct investment in Kenya and Nigeria and nearly four billion pounds in South Africa) and their political ties run deep.

Southern Africa

The U.S. and UK hold similar views and have coordinated closely on the three major southern Africa issues, Angola, Mozambique and South Africa.

Civil war resumed in Angola in late 1992 after UNITA rejected the September 29-30 election results. UNITA is pressing its military advantage; an immediate ceasefire is unlikely. The second round of direct talks between the government and UNITA has been delayed while both sides attempt to improve their bargaining position through success on the battlefield. The UK has told us it considers its evenhanded approach has been unproductive and now intends to be more openly supportive of the government. HMG would like us to recognize it.

In Mozambique, despite delays in the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces (ONUMOZ), the cease-fire is holding and food relief is getting to needy areas. The U.S. and UK participate in several UN-chaired commissions overseeing the peace accord. We are now considering a UN request for a U.S. engineer battalion for ONUMOZ. The British, with the French and Portuguese, will train the new, unified Mozambican military.

The South African Government (SAG) and the African National Congress (ANC) are making progress in bilateral talks on the process and timetable for negotiating South Africa's transition to nonracial democracy. However, large gaps remain over key issues such as powersharing and federalism. The SAG and ANC hope to resume multi-party negotiations in March and hold the country's first democratic election within a year. It is unclear whether Inkatha leader Buthelezi will join the negotiations. Political violence remains widespread, although the major South African parties agree that the UN and other international observers have been a very positive factor. Meanwhile, the economy continues to deteriorate, resulting in a nearly 50% unemployment rate among blacks.

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TALKING POINTS
G-7 ECONOMIC SUMMIT

- Revitalizing the U.S. economy is my top priority. Our recovery is underway, but we are concerned that weak economic growth in Europe and Japan may hamper a global recovery.
- We need to work together for higher world growth. The Tokyo Summit should provide the opportunity to encourage the adoption of growth-oriented global economic policies and continuation of economic reform efforts in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and the developing world.
- We agree with you that the Summit process should be reinvigorated to allow for frank and informal exchanges. We are prepared to work with you to achieve this, if not for this year, certainly for 1994.
- We also remain committed to using the Summit forum for close and regular political consultations.
- We are developing our ideas at this point on the political subjects to be discussed at the Tokyo Summit and will be discussing them in the regular process for preparing the Summit agenda and draft Political Declaration.

TO: LAKE

FROM: GROSSMAN, M

DOC DATE: 25 FEB 93
SOURCE REF: 9303655

KEYWORDS: NATO
GERMANY
YUGOSLAVIA

FRANCE
CSCE
BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

PERSONS: WOERNER, MANFRED

SUBJECT: BRIEFING MATERIALS FOR PRES MTG W/ NATO SEC GEN WOERNER 2 MAR

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 27 FEB 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ITOH

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

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CODES:

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COMMENTS: _____

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

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DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE

DISPATCH FOR ACTION

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001 930224 GROSSMAN, M



Washington, D.C. 20520

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February 25, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: The President's Meeting with Manfred Woerner, NATO Secretary General, Tuesday, March 2, 4:00-4:30 p.m.

Secretary General Woerner wants to establish a partnership with the President. He has direct access to all key European leaders, and works closely with us. Woerner is committed to a dynamic, evolving NATO that links the U.S. to Europe in a system of collective defense, provides a framework for developing a European security identity, and uses its active liaison program to foster the transition to democracy in the East. He sees U.S. leadership as critical, and is frustrated with Europe's inability to stand alone, or sometimes even to stand on principle.

We expect Woerner to focus on the parameters of NATO action in Yugoslavia and the U.S. commitment to Europe through NATO. He is critical of past U.S. failure to lead in the Balkans, and will want to know how far we are now willing to go. He may raise new possibilities for working with France. He will argue strongly for a militarily meaningful U.S. force level in Europe (he sees 100,000 as the absolute minimum), and will ask the Administration to seek restored funding for NATO infrastructure.

Woerner may explore an early Presidential visit to NATO, perhaps to brief after the April 4 Summit with Yeltsin. He will meanwhile seek to make our case in Europe, starting with his March 4 briefing of NATO Ambassadors on his Washington trip. We suggest four main themes, building on the Secretary's February 26 presentation to NATO: The economic growth program complements U.S. engagement abroad; the U.S. is committed to Europe and to NATO; the U.S. and its allies must step up to the challenge in Yugoslavia; and we have a strategic need to engage and support reform in Russia.

Woerner will be accompanied by Private Office Director Roland Wegener, Deputy Assistant SYG for Political Affairs John Kriendler, and Private Office Deputy Director Christine Shelly.


Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

Tab 1 - Talking Points and Background Papers

Tab 2 - Biographic Information

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NACC/NATO LIAISON

Established by the November 1991 Rome NATO Summit, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) is the institutional forum for NATO's new cooperative relationship with the countries of the former Warsaw Pact. Through dialogue and practical cooperation, the NACC aims to assist those countries' transition toward democratic societies with civilian control of the military. It also gives these "partner" states a common security anchor in Western structures and provides us an avenue for addressing some of their most immediate security concerns without extending a formal NATO or U.S. "security umbrella."

Defense-related cooperation with the former Warsaw Pact states is also carried out in NATO's ad hoc Group on Defense Matters (GDM), which does not include France. The GDM also serves as NATO's clearinghouse for defense cooperation requests from the partner states.

The NACC and GDM are useful instruments for achieving our larger strategic objective of integrating Russia and the other states of Central and Eastern Europe into a common security system. They also reinforce NATO's central role in ensuring European stability.

The NACC has made a positive start, holding four ministerials and many other meetings with partner state representatives, initiating a military-to-military contacts program, and sponsoring seminars on topics such as defense planning and budgeting, defense conversion, command and control, and military-related environmental issues. Further progress has been slowed by French objections to a more operational role for the NACC, but recent French pragmatism toward NATO as a whole is reason for hope that they will take a more positive line in the NACC.

The December NACC ministerial adopted a comprehensive workplan for 1993. It includes agreement to begin concrete cooperation on peacekeeping, including joint planning, training, and eventually joint exercises. An ad hoc group of experts is currently preparing a detailed program for peacekeeping cooperation, with the first elements of cooperation expected to be implemented this Spring. This marks a major step forward for the NACC. Through cooperation in crisis management and peacekeeping we can create a basis for joint action in addressing the real security challenges of post-Cold War Europe.

Most NACC states are interested in eventual NATO membership. We have made clear that NATO is not a permanently closed club, but stressed that expansion of NATO membership is not a current prospect and that NACC membership is not a halfway house to NATO membership.

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TALKING POINTS
NATO/NACC LIAISON

- Substantive cooperation with the partner states in peacekeeping would represent a breakthrough for the NACC and a chance to create a basis for joint action in addressing the real security challenges of post-Cold War Europe. We are committed to making it a success.
- Do you believe that France will allow a vigorous NACC program of peacekeeping cooperation to go forward? And how do you see the relationship between the NACC and the GDM developing?

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NATO PEACEKEEPING

Peacekeeping and crisis management in Europe are key new roles for NATO in the post-Cold-War world. NATO Ministers agreed in June 1992 that NATO would support peacekeeping activities under the aegis of the CSCE. In December Ministers broadened that authority to include peacekeeping actions requested by the UN.

NATO can support the UN or CSCE through a direct Alliance contribution, use of NATO common assets, or Alliance support of national contributions. NATO's multinational command and control structure, expertise in the planning and conduct of military operations, standardized procedures, extensive network of facilities and communications links, and readily available forces give it capabilities for peacekeeping and crisis management no other multinational institution can offer. But it has been clear for some time that NATO will not act without U.S. participation and leadership.

The ex-Yugoslav crisis has established NATO as a key instrument for European crisis management. NATO is monitoring and enforcing UN sanctions in the Adriatic, contributing a military command headquarters team to UNPROFOR II, and monitoring the Bosnian no-fly zone from the Adriatic and Hungarian airspace with NATO AWACS. NATO also has offered to enforce the Bosnian no-fly zone, and to respond to other UN Security Council requests. The UN is likely to turn to NATO to implement any agreed peace plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina, now that the U.S. has agreed to participate. There is some reluctance in the UN to draw on NATO capabilities, which we are working to overcome.

The way ahead on NATO peacekeeping faces several obstacles. A key issue is whether U.S. forces will be engaged, and if so, what kind. For NATO to fulfill its promise, the U.S. needs to participate. The cooperation of a reluctant France is imperative. We are making progress, working with France on a pragmatic basis on NATO peacekeeping issues, and France grudgingly has recognized the need to draw on NATO's unique capabilities. Germany needs to resolve its constitutional "out-of-area" problem in a way that permits full German participation in NATO peacekeeping missions. By using the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), we need to involve Russia and other NACC partners in NATO peacekeeping to address common security problems, thus developing East-West military-to-military ties and building patterns of cooperation.

Secretary General Woerner is a strong proponent of NATO playing the leading role in European peacekeeping and crisis management, and he will guide the development of NATO peacekeeping procedures and operations undertaken with UN or CSCE blessing.

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TALKING POINTS
NATO PEACEKEEPING

- The post-Cold-War world already is challenging us with threats to peace and stability more diverse than ever before.
- Our institutions of collective security -- such as NATO -- need to continue to evolve.
- In ex-Yugoslavia, NATO already has established a strong record of support for the UN, and we -- like you -- would like NATO to do more.
- The United States is committed to Europe's stability and to NATO, and will play an active and direct role in seeking a resolution of the Yugoslav crisis.
- We will continue to seek common ground with our Allies, and our former adversaries, as NATO tackles its new tasks. We want France involved as much as possible without undermining the NATO military structure.
- We need to reach out, through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), to involve Russia and other NACC partners in NATO peacekeeping. Finding creative ways to engage and support the Russians must be a high priority. In this way we can address common security problems and build patterns of cooperation.

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WEU-NATO RELATIONS

Inactive since the 1950's, the Western European Union (WEU) was resurrected in 1986-87 as the process of European integration quickened, to provide a framework for European cooperation on certain security matters, including the deployment of ships to the Persian Gulf. At Maastricht in 1991, WEU foreign and defense ministers issued a new dual mandate for the WEU as the defense component of the "European Union" (i.e., the EC) and a means to strengthen NATO's "European pillar." The ministers also agreed that WEU-NATO relations should develop on the basis of transparency and complementarity.

The U.S. has long supported European efforts to take more responsibility for their own security. At the November 1991 NATO Summit in Rome, the U.S. and its allies agreed that the development of a European security and defense identity and the strengthening of NATO should be complementary and mutually reinforcing processes. All the allies also confirmed that NATO remains the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of the allies under the Washington Treaty.

Driven mainly by France, the WEU sometimes seems primarily interested in creating a niche for itself at NATO's expense or simply making itself "visible." For example, WEU Secretary General van Eekelen has suggested a "division of labor" between NATO and the WEU that would give the latter a leading role in peacekeeping and relations with Eastern Europe that it simply does not have the ability to carry out.

The WEU has no dedicated forces, a small staff, and few resources. As has been the case in the maritime monitoring of Yugoslav sanctions in the Adriatic, it would have to rely on NATO assets to conduct any major operation. We are concerned, however, that WEU actions in crises such as Bosnia could -- if not coordinated in advance with NATO -- limit NATO's flexibility to act (or not act) and possibly draw us into the conflict.

The relationship between the WEU and NATO has too often appeared to be based on competition and opaqueness rather than complementarity and transparency. There are several hopeful signs, however: the recent move of WEU headquarters from London to Brussels, the opening of the WEU in November 1992 to include all European members of NATO, at least as associate members or observers, and a frequently more pragmatic French approach at NATO.

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TALKING POINTS
NATO-WEU RELATIONS

- The U.S. has long supported European efforts to take more responsibility for their own security.
- We have in the past been concerned that the WEU was not taking into adequate consideration the interests of allies who do not belong to it. The recent contacts between the NATO and WEU Secretariats are a good sign.
- The two organizations need to improve communication and avoid needless duplication. This is particularly true as regards the Balkan crisis.
- We do not favor a rigid "division of labor" between NATO and the WEU, as Secretary General van Eekelen has proposed. NATO should not smother the WEU, but NATO is and must remain the primary forum for discussion and decision by the Allies of matters affecting their security and their obligations under the Washington Treaty.
- We would value your candid views on how the WEU is developing over the coming months and years.

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FRANCO-GERMAN CORPS

France and Germany launched the Franco-German Corps as a bilateral initiative in October 1991, and formally announced its existence in May 1992. Bonn intended the proposal to provide for continuing a close military link with France as French troops were being withdrawn from Germany. Paris viewed the proposal as creating the basis for an eventual "Eurocorps," outside of NATO. The United States supported the development of the Franco-German Corps, but only in the context of the development of a European Security and Defense Identity that strengthens NATO.

The political-military problem to be solved was that the German half of the Corps consisted of troops committed to NATO, while the forces of France, which does not participate in NATO's military structure, were not. We and other Allies were concerned because the French seemed intent on developing the Corps outside of NATO and the Western European Union (WEU), and without the close links to NATO envisioned by separate Alliance and EC Ministerial agreements. Such a development would contain the seeds of a European-only army, and could have an adverse effect upon the ability of the United States to remain engaged in Europe and upon domestic U.S. support for a continued U.S. troop presence in Europe.

After intensive U.S. diplomatic efforts with France and Germany, and in close cooperation with the UK, NATO agreed to authorize negotiations between SACEUR and the French and German Chiefs of Defense Staff aimed at creating the proper links between the Corps and NATO's military structure. These negotiations were successful, and in December 1992 NATO approved an agreement associating the Corps to NATO. The agreement was signed in January 1993.

We regard the agreement as a significant achievement which enabled France to cross an important threshold, and created a precedent for further association of French forces to NATO. The special agreement achieves a number of key U.S. objectives: the Franco-German Corps has the same relationship to NATO as any other multinational unit; German forces in the Corps maintain the priority of their NATO assignments; the Corps is under NATO's operational command; SACEUR has planning responsibility for using the Corps in main defense and reaction force roles; and the Corps is available for missions like peacekeeping. The agreement also contains provisions for command and control, interoperability and standards, and training and exercises. SACEUR intends to move rapidly to conclude implementing agreements between NATO and the Corps on items such as training, exercises, standards, and planning.

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TALKING POINTS
FRANCO-GERMAN CORPS

- I appreciate your leading role in the effort to establish a relationship between NATO and the Franco-German Corps that strengthens NATO.
- Through your determined leadership, we have achieved key NATO objectives in the Corps-NATO agreement.
- I look forward to your continued guidance as other Allies consider possible participation in the Corps, and as we move forward on implementing the Corps-NATO agreement.
- It is vital that NATO Allies who may participate in the Corps maintain the priority of their NATO assignments.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE NATO INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM

During his February 6 meeting with Secretary Aspin at the Munich Wehrkunde Conference, SYG Woerner emphasized that he and our NATO Allies were very worried about the cutback in U.S. funding for NATO infrastructure. The last Congress cut the U.S. FY 93 contribution to the program from the requested \$221 million to \$60 million. Woerner stressed that without its integrated command and infrastructure, NATO would be lost. Secretary Aspin indicated he would do his best to get appropriate funding.

Established in 1950, the NATO Infrastructure Program is collectively funded and designed to support wartime requirements of NATO-assigned forces for permanent and mobile installations, facilities and capabilities. To date, the program has produced approximately \$15 billion in inventory. The U.S. contribution is set at 27.82%, although the US historically has received a greater share of program benefits, either through projects that directly support U.S. military requirements or contracts to U.S. firms.

NATO is making major changes in the Infrastructure Program to adapt the program to meet post-Cold-War needs and budget realities. Annual program size has been cut from about \$3 billion to \$1 billion; 40% of projects have been cancelled. The focus is shifting from "brick and mortar" projects to procurement of systems needed to support NATO's new strategic concept. Last Spring, NATO also agreed to use the program to fund operating costs of U.S. reinforcement facilities in Europe, which represents a major cost sharing breakthrough for the US. While overall requirements for the program have been cut, substantial needs in the areas of reinforcement, command, control, and communications remain.

Because of the FY 93 Congressional cut, NATO cannot approve new infrastructure projects (including US reinforcement costs), and there is concern that some essential projects which are already underway may not be completed. The Bush Administration recommended a U.S. contribution to the Infrastructure Program of \$250 million both for FY 94 and FY 95, the minimum required for a viable program. At this time, we anticipate DOD will include \$250 million for Infrastructure funding in its FY 94 DOD budget submission.

The level of U.S. support for the infrastructure program will have an impact on our influence and leverage in NATO and European regional security affairs, as well as on our ability to obtain increased burdensharing contributions from the allies. The FY 93 cut sent a shock throughout the Alliance and raised additional questions about future U.S. commitment to NATO. Strong Administration support in Congress for adequate Infrastructure funding will assuage anxious allies about U.S. intentions.

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TALKING POINTS
THE NATO INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM

-- I understand from Secretary Aspin how concerned you are about future U.S. funding support for the NATO Infrastructure Program.

-- I appreciate the importance of the Infrastructure Program to NATO and also the importance of the U.S. contribution.

-- Let me assure you that we will do our best to make a persuasive case before the new Congress on the importance of the NATO Infrastructure Program.

-- We will emphasize the need for adequate U.S. funding support.

UNCLASSIFIED

PUBLIC OPINION IN EUROPE ON NATO

Nationwide USIA-commissioned surveys in Europe over the past year indicate that:

West European publics (from two-thirds to three-quarters) express confidence in NATO as an institution and favor their countries' membership. Spain is an exception: roughly half both oppose NATO membership and lack confidence in the Alliance.

Attitudes toward the American military presence in Europe are less positive. Only the British believe U.S. military presence in Europe is necessary for their security (53%) and favor keeping U.S. troops in Europe at their current level (56%). Majorities in France (57%) and Spain (69%) think American troops in Europe are not necessary, while opinion in Italy and western Germany is evenly divided. Consistent with these views, publics either favor reduction or complete withdrawal of American troops (86% in western Germany and 94% in eastern Germany, and 76% in Spain) or divide between keeping present levels or cutting back (France and Italy).

Majorities (from 61% to 80%) would support a common European Defense Force as part of EC "deepening", but an exclusively west European alliance (instead of NATO or CSCE) is supported by at most ten percent. Public opinion welcomes a strong European pillar in the western alliance, along with a continued U.S. role.

In stark contrast to west Europeans, central and east European publics voice lower levels of confidence in NATO (only about half at the most). Central and east Europeans are not well-informed about NATO; they express higher levels of confidence in the EC and CSCE than in NATO.

European governments support a strong NATO and a continued U.S. military presence in Europe. Senior officials in Eastern and Central Europe publicly and privately express their interest in NATO membership and their belief that robust western security arrangements are critical to a stable balance of power on the continent.

Notwithstanding their interest in developing a European security and defense identity, western European governments have given no indication that they want the new Administration to make further changes in NATO, other than by further developing NATO peacekeeping capabilities to advance the adaptation process begun three years ago. In the December 1992 NAC Communiqué, all Allies agreed that "the substantial presence of U.S. armed forces in Europe and the continuing political and military commitment and active engagement in European security of both the United States and Canada will remain essential."

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NATO AND THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS

NATO's involvement in the crisis in ex-Yugoslavia grew out of decisions by NATO Foreign Ministers last year to authorize NATO support for peacekeeping mandated by the UN or CSCE.

As the evolving Yugoslav crisis made clear the limits of CSCE, WEU, EC, and UN capabilities, NATO took on increasingly important functions on behalf of the international community. Its multinational command-and-control structure, standardized procedures, network of facilities and communications, expertise in planning and conducting military operations, and readily-available forces are capabilities no other institution offers.

NATO's initial involvement was through monitoring in the Adriatic Sea of the UN sanctions on Serbia-Montenegro. This first step showed some awkward competition between NATO and the WEU, which wanted to profile its existence and capabilities, with the result that NATO and the WEU both have fleets in the Adriatic cooperating smoothly in their respective zones of action. In September, Allies detached national elements of a military headquarters team from a NATO regional headquarters and sent them to the UNPROFOR II operation to improve UNPROFOR's very limited command-and-control capabilities. In October, NATO AWACS began monitoring the Bosnian no-fly zone from the Adriatic and, with Hungary's approval, from Hungarian airspace. NATO has also provided military contingency planning to the UN at the latter's request. This unprecedented evolution for NATO took place without causing an "out-of-area" debate concerning NATO in any NATO member. (The "out-of-area" debate in Germany concerns the legality of German, not NATO, "out-of-area" action.) France has let NATO proceed (in part, to protect the French troops on the ground) and cooperated flexibly, while safeguarding its own political sensitivities.

In December, NATO crossed a significant threshold, agreeing to enforce the Bosnian no-fly zone if the UN Security Council so requested; offering to take "appropriate measures" if UNPROFOR or UNHCR personnel were threatened or harmed; and warning that violence in Kosovo would "require an appropriate response from the international community."

As the U.S. has taken a more active role in pursuit of a just, durable, and workable Bosnian settlement, we have said that NATO should play a leading role, under UN political authority, in implementation of any agreement that may be reached. It will be important in that regard to ensure active participation by France, as well as by non-NATO countries such as Russia, but we must avoid eroding the unity of command that will be critical to the success of such an operation.

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TALKING POINTS
NATO AND THE YUGOSLAV CRISIS

- The Yugoslav crisis, a humanitarian tragedy and a threat to European stability, has accelerated NATO's emergence as a useful tool for European peacekeeping and crisis-management.
- I want to express my high regard for the leadership you have shown in steering NATO in this direction, which builds on the transformation the Alliance has undergone since the 1990 London Summit.
- NATO, along with the international community generally, faces critical challenges in Bosnia, in Kosovo, and in Macedonia.
- We believe that NATO will have a central role to play in implementing a Bosnian settlement, if a just, durable, and workable agreement can be reached by the parties.
- We will need NATO to engage in ways that facilitate the participation not only of France, but also of Russia and other non-NATO states, but without eroding the unity of command that will be critical to the success of such an operation.
- Our experience in this crisis will set patterns for future actions and, we hope, favorably influence the acceptance of NATO by the international community as a strong but flexible force for crisis-management and the maintenance of stability and security.

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U.S. TROOP LEVELS IN EUROPE

The Bush Administration used its U.S. National Military Strategy and NATO's New Strategic Concept to justify maintaining 150,000 U.S. troops in Europe through 1995.

During his February 6 meeting with Secretary Aspin at the Munich Wehrkunde Conference, Secretary General Woerner stressed the importance of a U.S. troop level in Europe no lower than 100,000. He said anything lower would be seen as only a symbolic presence. He noted that for Europeans, East and West, the physical presence of American divisions is the proof of the U.S. commitment to European security. Woerner said he did not want to get into the numbers game, but anything below 100,000 was dangerous.

Media coverage of impending U.S. defense cuts deeply concern Woerner. Talk of possible U.S. troop reductions in Europe comes on the heels of public announcements that Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium intend to make significant cuts in the size of their military forces. Woerner has expressed concern that decisions to reduce national military contributions to NATO are being made without thorough consultation within the Alliance and with little regard either for NATO's primary mission -- collective defense and the prevention of war in Europe -- or for its assumption of new crisis management tasks.

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TALKING POINTS
U.S. TROOP LEVELS IN EUROPE

-- U.S. defense budget cuts and troop level reductions in Europe do not imply any weakening in U.S. resolve to stand by our commitments to NATO and our European Allies.

-- The U.S. will continue to emphasize a forward defense strategy and continue to maintain forces for power projection so the U.S. can make a difference in preserving peace and stability.

-- With the end of the cold war, the U.S. can and should responsibly trim force levels and defense spending.

-- U.S. and ultimately NATO security can only be sustained if the nations of the Alliance maintain healthy economies.

-- That said, our defense reductions in no way undercut our security commitments.

-- I have directed Secretary Aspin to budget for reductions in U.S. troop presence in Europe toward an end FY 96 level of approximately 100 thousand.

-- We believe these numbers are fully compatible with our firm commitment to NATO and European security, and are politically sustainable in the U.S.

-- As we draw down the size of our forces, we will work closely with our European Allies -- and fully consult using NATO's Defense Planning mechanisms -- to bring the best possible capabilities to bear on the security challenges facing our Alliance.

-- I must stress that my Administration is committed to an active foreign policy and to meeting our international responsibilities.

-- A smaller active duty U.S. military and fewer forces forward-deployed mean we must attach even more importance to such factors as close cooperation with our NATO allies, prepositioned equipment, interoperability, and commonality of doctrine and training.

-- I look forward to working with you to continue the adaptation of our Alliance to the post-Cold War World and to ensure the bonds of our trans-Atlantic link remain strong.

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EUROPEAN INTEREST IN A NATO SUMMIT

Allied leaders are eager to meet with you, but are more interested in bilateral opportunities than a multilateral summit. Moreover, they recognize the Administration has come to office with a strong mandate to increase the priority given to domestic affairs. Secretary Christopher's February 26 visit to NATO has already provided an initial authoritative statement of the Administration's views on NATO, Europe, and the world.

The leaders of all major Allies are weakened by internal political and economic problems. France is preoccupied with its March 21/28 parliamentary elections, which almost certainly will usher in a new center-right government that will need time to work out a modus vivendi with Mitterrand. There is also broad feeling that, before major political commitments can be weighed, the Maastricht Treaty's fate must be resolved -- which we do not expect to happen until the latter part of this year.

A convenient way to establish your commitment to the Alliance while limiting the demands on your time from Allied leaders would be to offer to meet them at NATO when returning to Washington after your April 4 summit meeting with Yeltsin. This would permit you to establish or deepen your personal contacts with them, while simultaneously giving a personal assessment of your discussions with Yeltsin, which they would strongly appreciate, and coordinating closely on Yugoslavia. The early timing of such a NATO summit would avoid unrealistic expectations of any major transatlantic initiatives.

An alternative possibility would be to defer a meeting with NATO leaders until important substantive issues are identified requiring decisions at the highest level.

Danish interest in an early US/EC summit in Copenhagen is also relevant to your scheduling decisions. Secretary Christopher told Danish Foreign Minister (and current EC Council President) Petersen February 16 that Europeans must understand the priority you give the domestic agenda and said he thought it unlikely you would be able to visit Copenhagen in the next few months.

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TALKING POINTS
EUROPEAN INTEREST IN A NATO SUMMIT

IF ASKED ONLY

- My Administration is committed to NATO as a forum for consultation and decision on key European security issues.
- Secretary Christopher's meeting with his NATO counterparts and with you in Brussels last week was an early confirmation of that commitment.
- You are aware of my need in coming months to ensure that our domestic program is well launched.
- I would value your views on how I can best help you maintain NATO as a dynamic instrument of Western policy.

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NATO AND FRANCE

France's relationship to NATO has shown signs in recent months of moving into a new phase. We do not expect a complete break from the past, since France continues to view NATO as an instrument dominated by the U.S., and the underlying French goal remains to be at the center of a "Europe" which is equal to the United States and, in the meantime, to minimize U.S. political influence, while retaining U.S. security engagement.

The Yugoslav crisis has led the French to recognize that no present substitute for NATO capabilities is available for dealing with problems that must be faced today. Thus, although there continue to be bumpy patches, France is showing much greater flexibility and pragmatism in working with NATO authorities to find modalities for NATO engagement in Yugoslavia.

Another sign of the evolution in France's position is the agreement reached in December between NATO, France, and Germany on the Franco-German Corps. This agreement brings French forces in the Corps into a closer relationship with NATO's integrated military structure than any since 1966 (when de Gaulle drew France out of the defense side of NATO), while preserving the principle that the German forces in the Corps retain their primary responsibility to NATO. In the wake of this agreement, and in light of the ongoing cooperation on Yugoslavia, France has decided that it will reclaim its seat on NATO's Military Committee when the Franco-German Corps or "peacekeeping" issues are under discussion. We will need to work within NATO, as we did when Spain joined, to ensure that France fits smoothly into existing bodies.

The French have made clear that they do not plan fully to rejoin the integrated military structure and remain concerned that no public impression arise to that effect. We welcome and encourage French participation in NATO defense matters, on condition that decisions in which France participates on forces in the integrated military structure will also apply to French forces made available for the common actions under discussion.

The French parliamentary elections on March 21/28 are virtually certain to result in a new center-right government which may well have a more pragmatic attitude toward NATO. The dynamics of the transatlantic trade dialogue will affect how hard they wish to pursue any new approach, and Mitterrand will retain the ability to block any more dramatic rapprochement between the new government and NATO.

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TALKING POINTS
NATO AND FRANCE

- We have taken considerable satisfaction in seeing the degree to which France has proven willing to cooperate pragmatically with NATO on modalities for engagement in Yugoslavia.
- We recognize, of course, that there are still clear limits as to what France will accept, and that we will need to continue to be flexible and inventive in dealing with the French, while protecting the integrated military structure.
- Our bottom line is that it would be a mistake to try to get France more involved on the defense side of NATO than it genuinely is willing to do on its own, without inducements.
- We do not expect any radical departures in French policy toward NATO after the March 21/28 elections, but we see no reason that French policy would lose the flexibility that it has recently shown.
- Our overall sense, then, is that we think it is very important to work with the French as much as possible to bring them into a more constructive relationship with the defense side of NATO.
- I would value your views on the prospects for continued improvement in France's attitude towards NATO and how we can best facilitate such an evolution.

UNCLASSIFIED

CSCE

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) is a multilateral forum with 53 Atlantic, European, and Eurasian members. ("Yugoslavia" is a member but is currently excluded). CSCE's concept of security includes protection of human rights, democratic-institution building, promotion of market economies, and arms control. Its broad mandate and flexibility make CSCE a unique resource for preventive diplomacy.

CSCE began with the 1975 Helsinki Final Act as a vehicle to promote dialogue and decrease tensions between East and West during the "detente" era. The Act, a politically binding declaration of principles governing relations among nations, mandated regular discussions on a broad range of concerns in what became known as the "Helsinki Process." During the Cold War, the U.S. and its allies used CSCE to advance human rights in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. CSCE also enhanced military security through confidence-building measures and the brokering of significant arms control agreements.

Following the popular revolutions of 1989, CSCE played a major role in the West's strategy of a "soft landing" for the collapsing Soviet empire, as embodied in the 1990 "Charter of Paris for a New Europe." The end of the Cold War signalled a further transformation. At the 1990 Paris and 1992 Helsinki Summits, the member states equipped the CSCE with a variety of new tools to give the CSCE "process" a more organizational character, increase administrative control, monitor human rights, and promote military security. This process is continuing.

Beginning with its 1992 Helsinki Summit, CSCE has moved, with U.S. urging, to the forefront of conflict resolution efforts. It continues to send fact-finding and monitor missions to the Balkans, including Macedonia and Kosovo, and to Georgia, Estonia, and Moldova. It has established the Minsk Conference to seek resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It is coordinating the international sanctions in the Balkans.

CSCE and NATO

As the Cold War ended, some thought CSCE might replace NATO as the main pillar of European security. Instead, NATO has retained a key position in the interlocking European security system; CSCE has become the standards-setter and political legitimizer. On peacekeeping, CSCE offers capabilities at the low end of the crisis-management scale, complementing those of NATO. It has established specific links with NATO to obtain peacekeeping support when necessary and is working to institutionalize overall CSCE-NATO ties.

TALKING POINTS
CSCE AND NATO

-- In dealing with current crises in Europe, NATO and CSCE should play complementary roles.

-- I see NATO as a key element in European security affairs, with CSCE providing the political and moral momentum for conflict prevention and crisis management.

-- CSCE is further developing tools to encourage and assess compliance with its high standards on human rights and fundamental freedoms.

-- These CSCE tools include long-term missions to tense areas and mechanisms for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

-- I am pleased that CSCE can now also call upon NATO's unique expertise for peacekeeping.

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THE COPENHAGEN-ROME-MAASTRICHT FORMULA

As the European Community (EC) has moved toward a political as well as economic union, many Europeans have concluded that the integration they seek would not be complete without a dimension embracing foreign policy, security, and eventually defense. This in turn raised questions about how such a development would relate to NATO as an institution and to non-EC members of the Alliance (not only the U.S. and Canada, but also Turkey, Norway, and Iceland).

The June 1991 Copenhagen meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers welcomed the efforts to strengthen the security dimension of European integration and agreed it was up to European Allies to decide what arrangements might be needed in that regard. The development of a European security identity and defense role would be reflected in the strengthening of NATO's European pillar and reinforce NATO's integrity and effectiveness. NATO would retain a number of agreed continuing, publicly-identified "core functions." Transparency and complementarity would be maintained between NATO and the European security and defense identity as it emerged in the EC and the WEU. Of particular importance was the agreement that Allies not participating in the development of a European identity should be "adequately involved in decisions that may affect their security."

The Rome NATO Summit in November 1991 reaffirmed the Copenhagen decisions, stressing that NATO's transformation and the development of a European security identity and defense role were mutually reinforcing processes that would enhance the transatlantic link and fully maintain the strategic unity and indivisibility of security of all Allies. NATO was recognized as the essential forum for consultation among its members and for agreement on policies bearing on NATO Treaty commitments.

At the EC and WEU meetings in Maastricht in December 1991, EC members pledged to develop a common foreign and security policy that would address the "eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defense." This would respect existing obligations under the NATO Treaty and be "compatible with the common security and defense policy established within that framework." The WEU agreed that it should serve the dual purpose of building up in stages as the defense component of an integrated Europe and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of NATO.

The WEU's recent move from London to Brussels is likely to improve transparency with NATO, which has not always been sufficient. Refinement of the Copenhagen-Rome-Maastricht framework depends in the first instance on ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, which could occur toward the end of 1993.

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TALKING POINTS
THE COPENHAGEN-ROME-MAASTRICHT FRAMEWORK

ONLY IF ASKED

- We expect Europeans to be preoccupied with the effort to ratify Maastricht until later this year and do not believe constructive discussions to refine or develop the Rome-Maastricht framework could be undertaken until Maastricht's fate is clarified.
- We understand that the WEU's move from London to Brussels is resulting in steps toward a greater exchange of information between it and NATO, which we welcome.
- I would be interested in your views on how the Yugoslav crisis may affect future developments in the relationship between NATO and the efforts to build a European security and defense identity.

NATO'S STRATEGIC CONCEPT/NEW COMMAND STRUCTURE

New Strategic Concept

Recognizing that the traditional threat was fading and that the raison d'etre of NATO and its defenses were being called into question, NATO heads of state and government mandated an overall strategy review at the 1990 Summit in London, as part of a program of transformation and renewal. NATO's new Strategic Concept was approved November 8, 1991 at the NATO Summit in Rome.

The new Strategic Concept emphasizes three reinforcing elements: dialogue, cooperation and the maintenance of collective defense capability. The Concept revamps NATO strategy by adopting a reduced forward presence, with greater reliance on mobilization of reserves, and reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. The Concept calls for flexibility and mobility of forces to compensate for a reduction in overall size, and for the development of multinational forces within NATO to ensure greater cooperation and to promote interoperability. In the nuclear area, the Concept provides for an adequate sub-strategic nuclear force, maintained via dual-capable aircraft, to preserve the continued role of nuclear forces in maintaining peace and preventing coercion.

New Command Structure

NATO's new command structure, also the result of the overall security review mandated by the 1990 London Summit, was approved by Defense ministers at the May 26, 1992 meeting of the Defense Planning Committee (DPC). The new command structure increases the proportion of European command positions.

Command structure was streamlined. The number of Major NATO Commands (MNCs) was reduced from three to two: ACE -- Allied Command Europe -- and ACLANT -- Allied Command Atlantic; the number of Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs) under ACE drops from four to three (AFNORTHWEST -- Allied Forces Northwest Europe; AFCENT -- Allied Forces Central Europe; and AFSOUTH -- Allied Forces Southern Europe).

The number of general/flag officer slots remains approximately the same under the new command structure. The U.S. retains command of ACE and ACLANT, but loses approximately 30 percent of its general officer billets. Germany gains the most. All German territory is to be consolidated in one subordinate command (AFCENT), commanded by a German four-star. The UK loses its Major NATO Commander with the elimination of Allied Command Channel (ACCHAN) but still retains three key posts: deputy SACEUR, command of the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Force, and 1992-1995 chairmanship of NATO's Military Committee.

The changes in command structure should be realized by 1995.

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TALKING POINTS
NATO'S STRATEGIC CONCEPT/NEW COMMAND STRUCTURE

- NATO's new Strategic Concept is an important adaptation of NATO's strategy to the dramatically changed strategic environment in Europe;
- The changes in the command structure should assure each participant in the integrated military structure of a role commensurate with its contribution to NATO's overall defense effort.
- We need to be certain that NATO's strategy and structure square with evolving realities. Europeans should play an increasing role.
- What are your thoughts on suggestions we sometimes hear that the U.S. should surrender the SACEUR slot to a European?

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NATO MEMBERSHIP EXPANSION

Former Secretary Eagleburger said in June 1992 at the Oslo NAC:

"The Alliance may need to expand, at the appropriate time, taking full account of our rigorous democratic standards and the need to preserve the strong fiber of our common defense."

He made clear that this issue was not part of the current agenda, but rather one that we would need to address at some point in the future.

Even without enlarging to the East, NATO is building greater stability and addressing some of the most immediate security problems in the East through the liaison program of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). This support has taken the form of statements affirming the importance NATO attaches to the security of the eastern states; cooperative programs and security consultations in the NACC; readiness to support CSCE- and UN-mandated peacekeeping and engage in joint planning and training of such missions with NACC states; and consultation and cooperation with NACC states in supporting UN efforts in ex-Yugoslavia.

Eventual membership of Central/East European states in NATO could enhance stability and encourage their democratic and economic development. Even consideration of any expansion that would not include Russia, however, would immediately trigger fears of exclusion in Moscow. If not addressed, this could lead to greater instability. In considering the time and pace of expansion, NATO would have to take into account the effect upon NATO's integrated military structure and the risk of more direct exposure to local and regional conflict.

Senior officials in Central/Eastern Europe and Russian President Yeltsin have publicly and privately expressed their interest in NATO membership as an eventual goal and their commitment to Western security arrangements. In December 1992, Albania became the first former communist country to apply formally for NATO membership (the application was quietly returned to the Albanians and they were urged to continue cooperation with NATO through the NACC). Current Polish Defense Minister Onyszkiewicz was quick to report NATO Secretary General Woerner had predicted that Poland would be a NATO member before the end of his tenure (June 1996).

The EC is already discussing possible extending membership to include EFTA "neutrals" Sweden, Austria, and Finland. This will also pose questions about NATO membership.

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TALKING POINTS
NATO MEMBERSHIP EXPANSION

ONLY IF ASKED

- At the June 1992 Oslo NAC Ministerial, former Secretary of State Eagleburger put the U.S. on record, saying that in time, and consistent with the Allies' commitment to democratic principles and common defense, we could envision an eventual expansion of NATO membership.
- He made clear that this is not part of the current agenda, but rather an issue that we will need to address at some point in the future.
- This seems like a sensible approach to me.
- What is your view of the effect on NATO of a possible eastern expansion in membership, and how do you think we might address Russian sensitivities concerning expansion?

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THE U.S. ROLE IN NATO

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO has pursued a US-led course of self-transformation to adapt itself to the security needs of post-Cold-War Europe.

NATO has reached out to its former adversaries by creating and developing the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), by supporting the further evolution of CSCE as an operational body capable of addressing tensions and low-intensity conflict, and by agreeing to participate itself in CSCE- or UN-mandated peacekeeping in European trouble-spots. It has enhanced military stability on the continent by revising its military strategy and force structure to meet the new security challenges, by helping ensure the ratification and entry into force of the CFE Treaty after the break-up of the Soviet Union, and by playing a coordinating role in CFE implementation and verification. It has supported the development of a European security and defense identity consistent with a continuing strong transatlantic link.

A constant in this process of transformation has been the role of the United States in the Alliance. Created at a time when only the U.S. was in a position to organize, lead, and lend real substance to European resistance to the power of the Soviet Union, NATO has always followed an American lead. U.S. leadership was accepted willingly by most Allies, and more reluctantly by France, which nonetheless recognized its necessity in the face of a Soviet threat disproportionate to European resources.

Although the end of the Soviet threat created a much less starkly defined security environment with greater potential room for European action, U.S. leadership remains essential to NATO and to Europe. As events in Yugoslavia confirm, Europeans have not been able to summon the political will to act decisively and in concert to address common security problems.

NATO remains the fundamental and most effective means by which the U.S. can engage in European security. But it does not operate automatically. Its effective use depends on political judgment and will on both sides of the Atlantic, and particularly on U.S. leadership that is not only rhetorical, but reflected in active involvement of U.S. forces in NATO activities, in maintenance of adequate although lower troop levels, and in continued support of a NATO infrastructure program that is adjusted to the new security environment.

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TALKING POINTS
THE US ROLE IN NATO

- The transformation that NATO has undertaken since 1990 has made it a valuable instrument in the new European security environment, but its effective use depends on political judgment and will on both sides of the Atlantic.
- The crisis in Yugoslavia shows that active U.S. political engagement through NATO remains essential to European stability and security.
- As Secretary Christopher made clear in Brussels last week, our commitment to Europe's security and to NATO remains undiminished.
- We will do our part and exert leadership when it is needed, but we look to our Allies to do their part as well.
- We will continue to coordinate our efforts closely with yours to ensure that NATO functions effectively to promote the common European and American interests.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

*Jane -
very good point
DZ*

1164

March 4, 1993


ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: JENONNE WALKER

FROM: JANE E. HOLL

SUBJECT: Keeping Our Eye on the Ball in Bosnia



Natl Sec Advisor
has seen

The real "ball" to keep our eye on in Bosnia is **an equitable and workable negotiated settlement**, both for what it achieves in Bosnia and for how it enhances prospects for preventing renewed violence in Croatia and an outbreak of violence in Kosovo

A negotiated settlement is perhaps the one realistic step toward ending the violence in Bosnia -- indeed, absent complete Serb domination or massive Western military intervention on behalf of the Bosnians, it is probably the only step in that direction. Thus, we should evaluate any contemplated actions -- to lift the siege of Sarajevo, bring humanitarian aid to Eastern Bosnia, tighten sanctions, stop (or limit) discrete incidences of violence, etc. -- for how they support the negotiations to reach a settlement. We should take these steps -- and manage the attendant risks -- if they are constructive in this way.

For example, to keep Izetbegovic at the table, we may need to respond to the violence in Eastern Bosnia or take steps to control Serb heavy weapons, by direct intervention, by opening Tuzla airport, or establishing safe havens to protect Muslim populations, perhaps. To keep Karadzic in line, we should tighten sanctions and explore ways to increase the diplomatic and economic pressure on the Serbs. Again, the goal is to take steps to encourage the parties to negotiate toward a comprehensive set of agreements. Steps to overcome Bosnian reservations will demonstrate that we are concerned that the deal they get is equitable as well as give them confidence that the deal they strike will be workable. **But by reiterating that our actions are designed to support (and are taken in the context of) reaching a negotiated settlement, we put clear limits on and purpose to what we are prepared to do (both for them and for ourselves).**

Similarly, after a settlement, our actions should support the maintenance of any agreement that is reached. Thus, lifting the siege of Sarajevo, to chose an illustration, can either be undertaken as a confidence building measure in advance of an agreement or as part of the implementation program following an agreement. Our focus is still on the agreement -- getting a good one and helping make it work -- a focus that will help guard against policy incrementalism or worse, drift.

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By: [initials] NARA, Date 8/20/2019

2015-0923-m (1.19)

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ISSUE PAPER

INTERIM OBJECTIVES FOR BOSNIA

This paper outlines the pros and cons of adopting as an interim objective for Bosnia the establishment of a UN-supervised cease-fire in place, with the features described below, based on the principles of the London Conference.

Context. The current US -- and UN and EC -- objective in Bosnia is to have the Serbs sign and comply with the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. A key feature of that plan is that it requires large scale Serbian withdrawals from territory they now control and from which the Muslim population has been forcibly expelled. (See attached map) In addition, it would establish a new Bosnian state of ten provinces, each (except nominally for Sarajevo) dominated by one ethnic group, but with a complex tripartite power sharing structure, and it would entitle those expelled and refugees to return to their former homes.

Despite vigorous negotiating efforts, there is little immediate prospect of Serbian agreement to sign, much less to fully implement, the VOPP. There is, to be sure, some level of US force with which we could occupy the entire country, and force acceptance of whatever peace terms we like. However, there is no significant support in the Administration, much less in the Congress or among our allies, for sending a direct intervention force of this scale. While various increased pressures -- ranging from tightened sanctions to limited air strikes -- are being considered, there are difficulties about all the pressure options, if only because of the need to secure UN, allied, and/or Russian authorization or participation. Moreover, there is also serious question whether even the strongest actions being considered -- such as strikes against Serbian artillery and other heavy weapons -- would suffice to induce the Serbs to surrender by agreement much of the territory they have won by military force, brutally but successfully applied, in what they regard as a national crusade.

The Proposal. The goal laid out by the Administration on February 10 was a "negotiated settlement...acceptable to all parties." An alternative to continuing, given the present context, to focus our principal effort on seeking Serbian agreement to the VOPP is to seek, as an interim step, the implementation of key features of the London Accords - a cease fire, limited withdrawals of forces, control of heavy weapons, free movement of relief, and release of prisoners. This more modest objective would be based on the urgent need to stop the fighting and civilian suffering, pending agreement on the future political structure of the country. It would also seek to broaden the scope of the discussion beyond Bosnia itself, to try to create stability in the Former Yugoslavia generally.

Declassified in Part

Per E.O. 13526

VZ 08/20/2019

2015-0923-M (1.22)

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The proposal has the following elements:

1. We would seek to have the parties agree to a cease-fire in place. In order to avoid the uncertainties of the multiple prior aborted cease fire agreements, it should be negotiated in advance, and would come into effect on a phased basis in different areas and as progress was made in implementation (see Annex A for a possible phasing system). As cease-fires were established across the country, opposing forces would separate by withdrawals to pre-agreed lines (creating a DMZ between forces) and heavy weapons would be turned over to UN control.

2. The cease fire would be followed by limited Serbian withdrawals from around Sarajevo, as well as other places, such as Tuzla and Mostar, where they can easily cut off relief supplies to Muslim-held areas. The Muslim enclaves in Eastern Bosnia, but not Bihac in the West, would be evacuated. Other geographic arrangements are possible.

3. Muslims who wished to leave Serb (or Croatian) controlled areas would be assisted to do so. Similar assistance would be offered other ethnic groups who found themselves on the "wrong" side of a line of de facto control. All prisoners would be released, with some system to deal with prisoners who are alleged war criminals, such as having them screened by an international tribunal.

4. UN and other relief efforts would have free movement throughout the country. Humanitarian programs would be stepped up, and expanded beyond subsistence food supply to include restoration of basic services (fuel, water, sewer, power) and construction of housing, both to replace damaged residences and to accommodate refugees.

5. The US would, through NATO, and with UNSC authority, participate with other nations in an expanded UN force to implement the interim agreement. Deployments would be phased to match progress on compliance by the parties. The force deployed would be sized and configured (as is the notional VOPP implementation force) to overwhelm local resistance, not merely to monitor voluntary implementation, and would have ROEs authorizing use of effective force for that mission. In particular, once a cease fire had been established in an area, violators would be counterattacked vigorously, as would those who interfered with relief convoys. In the event of a general breakdown of the cease fire, i.e., of a collapse of the basic political agreement to end the war essentially in place, the implementation force would either be re-enforced or withdrawn.

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6. There would be no effort to establish multi-ethnic civil authorities: De facto, Muslim controlled areas, including Sarajevo, would be run by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government, while Serbian and Croatian controlled areas would be run by the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat "governments" respectively. The exact control and relationship of Croatian areas is not certain.

EO 13526 1.4d, (b)(1)

8. US would lead international efforts focused on securing an effective cease fire, limited withdrawals, and expanded humanitarian programs of the interim agreement, not on an ultimate political solution, and we would not, in practice, resist the de facto extension of Belgrade and Zagreb authority to the Serbian and Croatian controlled areas.

9. Economic sanctions and the NFZ would continue, as additional sureties for Serbian compliance with the interim agreement, to be relaxed in a phased process in conjunction with implementation of the agreement.

10. Consistent with the idea of creating a viable Muslim enclave state, the arms embargo on the Sarajevo government would be lifted, possibly in phases as other sanctions were eased.

11. The US would repeat its warnings about Serbian and other factions' misconduct in Kosovo -- and extend them to actions in the Vojvodina and Sandzak.

Although nominally only an interim agreement, without prejudice to final political settlement along the lines of the VOPP, the cease-fire in place, limited withdrawals, and population transfers would, if it succeeded, create a de facto partition of Bosnia, establishing de facto a Muslim enclave state, essentially within territory now controlled by the Muslims (less the eastern enclaves, and plus some territory around Sarajevo and other cities, e.g., Tuzla and Mostar) along with de facto Serbian and Croatian "ministates" with very close connections to Serbia and Croatia.

Arguments for and against.

The case against shifting our focus to a cease-fire in place, limited withdrawals, and orderly population transfers includes the following points:

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-- The "solution" rewards ethnic cleansing and aggression, and indeed all but concedes the creation of a Greater Serbia, absorbing big chunks of Croatia and Bosnia. As such it is immoral, and likely to encourage further ethnic aggression in the Balkans and elsewhere.

-- It would be seen by many as a significant retrenchment by the USG. The outcry from the press and the international community could be significant.

-- The proposal will be strongly resisted by the Muslims, who believe they have - or should have - a commitment from the US to pressure the Serbs into signing up for Vance-Owen.

-- The Muslims may prefer to "go down fighting" rather than, in effect, surrender. Securing Croatian support will prove nearly as difficult as Muslim support.

-- The Serbs would be less likely to agree to the provisions of this proposal, notably the cease-fire, if the arms embargo against the Muslims were to be lifted.

-- In the event of a general breakdown of the cease-fire, a decision would be required to reinforce or withdraw the implementation force. Both alternatives represent an admission of failure with respect to the mission upon which we embarked.

-- Accepting so limited and unsatisfactory an outcome is wholly inconsistent with the Administration's past declarations that even Vance-Owen is unfair to the Muslims, and that partition is not an acceptable solution.

-- The success such an outcome would represent for Serbian nationalism would re-enforce all the worst forces in Serbia and encourage ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and the Vojvodina, and actually ratifies Serbian intransigence in the Krajina and the other UNPAs and pink zones in Croatia.

-- Croatia will gladly pocket ratification of its de facto annexation of the Croatian parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but it will not acquiesce in the loss of the UNPAs, or the creation of a secure Serbian Northern Corridor along the Sava. Even if the cease fire held in Bosnia, the Croats may resume military probes at the UNPAs.

-- The proposal is not even stable so far as the Muslims are concerned. Even if they accepted it now, on the ground that, having been abandoned by the West, they have no choice, they will never be reconciled to the result. We will have created what former French Defense Minister Joxe rightly called "a Gaza strip in the middle of Europe."

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-- Implementation of the agreement, assuming only limited local opposition, would probably require about the same force as envisioned for the Vance-Owen plan, and face similar difficulties.

-- The Muslim enclave state will not be viable politically, economically, or militarily. The international community (with heavy reliance on the U.S.) will be committed to protecting it militarily and supporting it economically for years to come.

The case for the proposal includes the following:

-- Granted that the VOPP, or some variant of it that denied the Serbs the fruits of their brutal ethnic cleansing, would be the ideal solution, there is simply no prospect of its being achieved short of massive -- corps plus scale -- US intervention. Only those who favor such intervention, or have some evidence lesser pressures will work to produce massive Serbian concessions, can credibly argue against an interim solution on the ground that VOPP is not only better (which everyone should concede) but that it is attainable.

-- If the US is not prepared to support substantially the large scale international military intervention needed to force the Serbs to accept and implement VOPP, the only possible outcomes are (1) indefinite war, (2) a Serbian victory, and (3) some negotiated cease-fire with much smaller Serbian withdrawals than VOPP requires. Among these three - the only real - possible outcomes, the third is clearly better.

-- It ends the fighting early, avoiding the very real prospect of a final Serb push this spring to eliminate the Muslim hold on the eastern enclaves, and perhaps even Sarajevo itself, with all that would entail in human suffering and frustration of US goals.

-- It provides a framework for a greatly enhanced humanitarian effort, which remains the aspect of the US (and UN and European) effort that has the greatest popular support.

-- Serbians (whether in Belgrade, Pale, or Knin) will now probably accept an outcome which requires a real cease fire, separation of forces, control of heavy weapons, free movement of relief, and even some locally significant withdrawals. There is no particular evidence they seek to eliminate Muslims throughout Bosnia, so long as they get control of the territory they believe should be Serbian. They have (except for the eastern enclaves) now secured the territory they regard as Serbian by right, and could well be prepared to make modest concessions to solidify that control. Further military successes -- which are well within their capability -- might well increase their minimum requirements for peace.

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-- While the Muslims would certainly prefer a more favorable solution, they recognize the desperation of their military position, and the unlikelihood of major military intervention. They will need to be convinced that they will do better to cut a deal now, before their situation deteriorates further.

-- A reasonably contiguous, internationally protected, Muslim state, while facing many problems, is more likely to be viable and stable than whatever would come out of another year or so of continued fighting.

-- Given the profound ethnic tensions in the area, and the effects of two years of ethnic war, an ethnic-based partition, however distasteful, is likely to be the only stable solution. (Even VOPP is an ethnic partition in all but name.) Better that it should be negotiated, and effected under international supervision, than result purely from military operations.

-- By frankly recognizing that large-scale population movements (mostly but by no means exclusively by Muslims) will accompany any settlement, the agreement can provide explicitly for those movements and for accommodating the people who move.

-- The financial costs of enforcing an agreement that has a better chance of actually being complied with by the parties, and of sustaining a Muslim state, while large, are likely to be small compared to the costs of the military effort that would be needed to force acceptance of the VOPP.

EO 13526 1.4d, (b)(1)

-- Reluctant international acceptance of a result that gives the Serbs much of what they feel entitled to, and resolution to enforce that result, will be the best basis on which to convince the Serbs that they will lose badly if they press their luck by making trouble in Kosovo or Vojvodina.

-- The proposal requires significant Serbian concessions, including some withdrawals and a willingness not to press their military advantage. The scale of pressures we are actually prepared to apply -- sanctions, lifting the arms embargo, NFZ enforcement -- are far more likely to be successful in achieving these limited but meaningful concessions than in forcing greater ones.

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-- Moving to a policy that would stress an interim arrangement along these lines is not inconsistent with our backing Vance-Owen up to this point. We have always made clear that we want a settlement the parties themselves agree on, not that we will impose our own notion of a good solution. The proposal seeks, in effect, to implement the key features of the London accords, which has long been US policy.

-- Moreover, there is a view that even if VO were signed, we would be doing very well if it produced, not full implementation, but merely Serbian action to meet the conditions proposed by DOD for commitment of a US force element, namely an effective cease fire, control of heavy weapons, separation of forces, free movement of relief, and release of prisoners. These elements of Vance-Owen would amount, in effect, to a cease fire in place, marginal local Serbian withdrawals, and the creation of a Muslim enclave under UN protection. In short, the practical difference between what it would be reasonable (some even argue too much) to expect of Vance-Owen, and the new proposal, may be rather slight. Moreover, seeking an interim agreement on these lines would not preclude continuing to treat the VOPP as a long term objective.

-- And it would allow for a negotiated settlement, albeit long term, to be conducted out from under the gun.

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PROPOSED PHASING OF IMPLEMENTATION

- **Phase I.** This phase would consist of a cease-fire in place. NATO lead peacekeeping forces, under a UN mandate, would be introduced once indications of seriousness have been demonstrated.
- **Phase II.** Once a stable cease-fire is in place, peacekeeping forces (including the US/NATO under UNSC authority) can oversee the separation of forces and take control of heavy weapons. This phase should include the release of detainees and freedom of movement for humanitarian aid.
- **Phase III.** During this phase limited Serbian withdrawals from areas such as Sarajevo, Tuzla and Mostar would take place. Proceeding to this phase requires solid agreement on and cooperation with the previous phases. Any decision to proceed from phase to phase needs to be based on actions, not time.
- **Phase IV.** This phase consists of refugee resettlement and reconstruction. Although, in theory, it would be beneficial to delay these tasks until after the previous three steps are complete, we must "face reality."
 - The moment there is some freedom of movement for beleaguered civilians, they will flow to areas of relative safety.
 - The purpose of the resettlement phase is not to return refugees to their homes, but, to deal with the flow of those who find themselves on the "wrong side of the line."
 - Infrastructure repairs must proceed to the greatest extent possible, if civilian suffering is to be minimized.
- **Phase V.** This would be the final phase of the interim program.
 - Following resettlement and reconstruction of basic services, civil government would need to be reestablished on all sides of the cease-fire lines.
 - These civil authorities would engage in a continuing dialogue (no doubt of a long-term nature) to determine the future political and physical structure of the country.
 - This phase would, for at least the near-term (perhaps decades), result in a de facto partition of Bosnia. The current Bosnian government would control Muslim areas; The SRBH Serbians areas. The exact control and relationship of Croatian areas is not certain.
 - Sanctions, including the arms embargo, would eventually be fully lifted as to all parties.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By VL NARA, Date 8/23/09

15-0123 M (123)

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Annex A

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INFORMATION

WASHINGTON

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By h NARA, Date 8/20/2019

2015-0923-m (1.25)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Changing the U.S. Policy Course on Bosnia

~~For your April 20 meeting with Principals, we have prepared two options papers (Tab A) which present what Principals agree are the two best choices we now face, given continued Serb aggression on the battlefield and persistent intransigence at the negotiating table. 1) Undertake a significant military deployment to help enforce a cease-fire in place, or 2) Devote the full weight of U.S. diplomatic and political energies to convince allies and others to lift the arms embargo.~~

Both options assume no near-term prospects for a negotiated settlement (although we would not abandon Vance/Owen publicly) and that, undeterred, the Serbs will likely continue their aggression until the Bosnians capitulate or are so weakened that the Serbs (and even perhaps Croats) simply assert control over the regions they occupy. ^{capitulate throughout eastern Bosnia and perhaps beyond.} The attached papers outline both options, presenting the advantages and disadvantages of each. Principals will elaborate on the arguments when we meet. We should evaluate whether or not these options can be used wholly or in part -- in tandem. This memo details the critical analytic questions we should resolve before you make a final determination as to how we proceed.

Enforcing a Cease-Fire in Place. Under this option, a multinational force, centered on NATO and mandated by the UN, would be inserted in Bosnia to fix a cease-fire in place along current battle lines; a key responsibility of the force would be to control and destroy heavy weapons. The operation would aim to stop further Serb aggression and establish a pause in which negotiations might resume. We would commit to deploying U.S. ground forces (initially 15-20,000 troops) as part of a large international force, but make clear that our involvement would not be open-ended. Some questions to ask:

- How would the parties react? Would the Bosnians oppose this de facto partition or expect us to do more? Would the Serbs challenge us? How would the Bosnian Croats respond?
- How should we answer the charge that we would be enforcing the results of ethnic cleansing?
- Should the multinational force operate only to stabilize the status quo? If so, should we make proposals (i.e., land swaps to give the Serbs key towns in Eastern Bosnia in exchange for territory elsewhere) to help preserve a more viable Bosnia? Alternatively, should we try to "level the playing field," using our presence to keep the Serbs at bay while we do so?

-- How would we accomplish the latter? Should we work actively (with training and arms) to prepare Bosnian forces to assume

-- What forces would be required? From whom? For what?

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Declassify on: OADR

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Vice President
Chief of Staff

-- Might we not end up enforcing this more against the Muslims than the Serbs?

at least

e.s. by lifting arms embarg.

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After our departure,

do we offer to back up the Bosnians with stand-off air power, other military means, or a 'Kosovo-like' warning to Belgrade? How long will our offer stand? What if the Bosnians are unable to hold their own?

-- How do we get out? Setting a clear time limit to our deployment at the outset may undermine Serb incentives to cooperate -- either in negotiations or with the terms of the cease-fire -- by sending the signal that our departure is only a matter of time. What alternatives exist for shaping the duration of our involvement?

-- Should we really lift sanctions (in whole or part) on the Serbs for compliance with this interim arrangement or should we keep up some pressure for a comprehensive settlement?

-- How would this move affect the Serb-Croat situation *in Croatia?*

-- What strategies do our choices imply for dealing with allies, the Russians, and others to implement this option?

Lifting the Arms Embargo. With this approach, we would undertake a major diplomatic offensive to win passage of a Security Council Resolution to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia. At the same time, we would reiterate our Kosovo warning and extend it to cover Macedonia to underscore our commitment to prevent the war in Bosnia from spreading. Again, we would not publicly abandon Vance/Owen, but would stress that we take this step to induce the Serbs to cooperate in the negotiations. Some questions to ask:

-- *How long would it take to get the weapons in and necessary training completed?*

-- If we are successful in getting the arms embargo lifted, will the Serbs immediately overrun the Bosnians or ^{could} will the Muslims hold their own? ~~Either way, do we have any further responsibilities to Sarajevo? If yes, do any scenarios envisage U.S. troops on the ground? How do we limit our involvement?~~

Who would supply the weapons and training?
(e.g. at Gora and Rep)

Should we carry out air strikes to protect them/in the interim?

~~-- If sieges continue and the relief effort ends as a result of this move, or, if the Bosnians begin to suffer clear losses, what should our response be?~~

-- *Are the Bosnians capable of ^{managing} the relief effort, with Croatian ^{cooperation}?*

-- If our allies, the Russians, and/or others successfully oppose our efforts to lift the arms embargo -- how do we help the Bosnians?

Muslims and Croats?

-- Is it realistic to think we can restrict arms embargo relief to the Bosnians? How ^{do} we manage Croatia ^(or others') demands?

-- *What would be the Russian ^{world} response?*

~~-- What strategies do our choices imply for dealing with allies, the Russians, and others to implement this option?~~

Finally, we should begin planning the public information strategy we will pursue to bring the public and Congress along with us. ~~regardless of the option we undertake. Similarly, we will require your intervention with key world leaders to ensure that we do not move down our chosen path alone.~~

Attachment
Tab A ~~Options Papers~~

How would we avoid ~~not~~ having such long-term commitment? Would such strike be only against attacking Serb forces/artillery?

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INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By JK NARA, Date 8/20/12
2015-0913-W (1.26)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Changing the U.S. Policy Course on Bosnia

The two options papers present what Principals agree are the two best choices we now face. Both options assume no near-term prospects for a negotiated settlement (although we would not abandon Vance/Owen ^{as a goal} ~~publicly~~) and that, undeterred, the Serbs will likely continue their aggression at least until the Bosnians capitulate throughout eastern Bosnia and perhaps beyond. The papers outline the advantages and disadvantages of each option. Principals will elaborate on the arguments when we meet. This memo details the critical analytic questions to be resolved before you make a final determination ^{or some other negotiated settlement} ~~as to how we proceed~~.

Enforcing a Cease-Fire in Place. Under this option, a multinational force, centered on NATO and mandated by the UN, would be inserted in Bosnia to fix a cease-fire in place along current battle lines; a key responsibility of the force would be to control and destroy heavy weapons. The operation would aim to stop further Serb aggression and establish a pause in which negotiations might resume. We would commit to deploying U.S. ground forces (initially 15-20,000 troops) as part of a large international force, but make clear that our involvement would not be open-ended. Some questions to ask:

-- How would the parties react? Would the Bosnians oppose this de facto partition or welcome us and expect us to do more? Would the Serbs challenge us? How would the Bosnian Croats respond?

-- Might we not end up enforcing this cease-fire more against the Muslims than against the Serbs?

-- How would we answer the charge that we would be enforcing the results of ethnic cleansing?

-- Should the multinational force operate only to stabilize the status quo? ^{Or are you proposing adjustments?} ~~If so, should we make proposals (i.e., land swaps to give the Serbs key towns in Eastern Bosnia in exchange for territory elsewhere) to help preserve a more viable Bosnia? Alternatively, should we try to "level the playing field," e.g., by lifting the arms embargo, and using our presence to keep the Serbs at bay while we do so?~~ ^{during this period? Would that be the case?}

-- What forces would be required? From us? From others?

-- How do we get out? ^{How would we explain our departure, if not on the grounds that the playing field had been levelled?} ~~Setting a clear time limit to our deployment at the outset may undermine Serb incentives to~~

cooperate -- either in negotiations or with the terms of the cease-fire -- by sending the signal that our departure is only a matter of time? What alternatives exist for shaping the duration of our involvement? After our departure, ~~do~~ we offer to back up the Bosnians with stand-off air power, other ^{would} military means, or a 'Kosovo-like' warning to Belgrade? How long ~~will~~ our offer stand? What if the Bosnians ~~are~~ ^{are} unable to hold their own?

-- Should we really lift sanctions (in whole or part) on the Serbs for compliance with this interim arrangement or should we keep up some pressure for a comprehensive settlement?

-- How would this move affect the situation in Croatia?

-- What strategies do our choices imply for dealing with allies, the Russians, and others to implement this option?

Lifting the Arms Embargo. With this approach, we would undertake a major diplomatic offensive to win passage of a Security Council Resolution to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia. At the same time, we would reiterate our Kosovo warning and extend it to cover Macedonia to underscore our commitment to prevent the war in Bosnia from spreading. Again, we would not publicly abandon Vance/Owen, but would stress that we take this step to induce the Serbs to cooperate in the negotiations. Some questions to ask:

-- How long would it take to get the weapons in and necessary training completed? Who would supply the weapons and training? In-country or outside it?

-- If we ~~are~~ ^{were} successful in getting the arms embargo lifted, ^{before the weapons arrived} ~~will~~ the Serbs immediately ^{try to} overrun the Bosnians, or could the Muslims hold their own? Should we carry out air strikes to protect them (e.g., at Gorazde and Zepa) in the interim? How would we avoid having such strikes become a long-term commitment to Bosnia's defense? Would such strikes be only against attacking Bosnian Serb forces/artillery, or could we threaten/strike other Bosnian Serb targets, such as supply lines in Bosnia? What if Serbia itself openly joined the war?

-- If our allies, the Russians, and/or others successfully oppose our efforts to lift the arms embargo -- how do we help the Bosnians?

-- Is it realistic to think we can restrict arms embargo relief to the Bosnian Muslims and ^{Bosnian} Croats? How do we manage Croatia's demands?

-- What would be the Russian response?

~~Finally, we should begin planning the public information strategy we will pursue to bring the public and Congress along with us regardless of the option we undertake,~~