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"CHARTING A TRANSATLANTIC AGENDA FOR THE 21st CENTURY"

ADDRESS BY SECRETARY OF STATE WARREN CHRISTOPHER

Casa de America
Madrid, Spain

June 2, 1995

Thank you, Director Remiro, for that kind introduction. Since its founding several years ago, CERI has already established itself as a leader in foreign policy research. I also want to thank Ambassador Garrigues and the Casa de América for co-hosting this event. I feel at home here -- not only because of the name and purpose of this respected institution, but because the Ambassador served as Spain's Consul General in my home city of Los Angeles.

There is no more appropriate place to discuss the transatlantic partnership than Spain -- a true Atlantic nation. As a member of both NATO and the European Union, you have placed your future in the vibrant mainstream of Europe and the transatlantic community of democracies. The spirit of renewal so evident here in Madrid is a tribute to King Juan Carlos, to Spain's democratic leadership, and to the determination of the Spanish people.

For half a century, the transatlantic partnership between the United States and Europe has been the leading force for peace and prosperity, not only in our countries, but around the globe. Together, the Old World and the New World have created a better world.

Together we helped transform former adversaries into allies, and dictatorships into democracies. We built the institutions that ensured our security and economic strength -- most important, NATO and the EU. We created the great institutions of global cooperation -- the UN, the IMF and the World Bank, the OECD, the GATT and now the WTO. By standing steadfast through the Cold War, we have brought a democratic, undivided Europe within reach.

These are truly epic achievements. But at the threshold of the new century, there is another new world to shape -- with challenges no less critical than those faced by our counterparts half a century ago. Terrorism, international crime, aggressive nationalism, and
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction threaten our security. Global problems like environmental degradation, unsustainable population growth, and mass movements of refugees undermine emerging democracies and the prosperity of all nations. The new global economy offers great prospects for growth, but also brings wrenching dislocation as our industries and workers seek to adapt.

Although the world remains a dangerous place, our opportunities are enormous. Open societies and open markets are on the march. We have the opportunity to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons, enhance our prosperity, and, for the first time in history, build an integrated, undivided, peaceful Europe.

Nevertheless, there are those who question whether Europe and the United States have the will to maintain our partnership to meet these new dangers and seize these opportunities. In the absence of a single unifying threat, and at a time of understandable focus on domestic concerns, some argue that the ties that bind us are fraying, and that America and Europe will inevitably drift apart.

I reject that view. From World War II to our strong support for German unification, the United States and Europe have shared a common destiny. But we must not take this relationship for granted. It cannot be sustained by nostalgia. Every generation must renew the partnership by adapting it to meet the challenges of its time. It is our responsibility to build the partnership that will ensure that, by working together, our next fifty years will be as great as the last. To achieve this goal, we must widen our horizons and lift our aspirations.

I believe this goal is shared on both sides of the Atlantic. In recent months, a number of European leaders have set forth their ideas on this very theme. President Clinton and Prime Minister Major discussed this issue when they met earlier this spring.

I have come to Madrid, on behalf of the President, to say that the United States welcomes this transatlantic dialogue. It is timely. It is constructive. And it should be intensified -- to reaffirm our common purpose, to advance a common vision, and to forge a common transatlantic agenda for the 21st century. Today I want to suggest goals for our common agenda and how we might strengthen our ability to achieve them together.

A Comprehensive Strategy for European Security

In this year in which we commemorate the 50th anniversary of V-E Day, we cannot forget that security comes first. It is the bedrock of our partnership and the guarantor of our freedom. That is why President Clinton is pursuing a comprehensive strategy for European security, based on America's continuing commitment to remain engaged on the continent.

That strategy has five key elements: adapting and enlarging NATO; strengthening the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; supporting Europe's integration and EU enlargement; enhancing a European security and defense identity complementary to NATO; and engaging Russia in Europe's security structures.
NATO remains the central security pillar for Europe, and the core institution for linking the security of North America to Europe. In the last five years, NATO has undertaken sweeping changes to match the sweep of Europe’s transformation.

I have just come from the NATO ministerial meeting in the Netherlands, where we took important steps to advance these goals. Russia’s decision at that meeting to cross the threshold into active engagement with NATO puts into place an important element of our comprehensive strategy. We also reviewed the great progress made in just a year and a half by the Partnership for Peace -- NATO’s mechanism to deepen cooperation with Europe’s new democracies. And we reaffirmed that the Alliance remains on a steady course toward enlargement.

These efforts are strengthening the security pillar of the transatlantic relationship to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War world. But for our partnership to thrive, it must be comprehensive. That means taking specific steps in the economic and political arenas that will complement and reinforce our security relationship.

The Economic Dimension

Deepening our economic relationship is central to this agenda; it undergirds not only our prosperity but also our security. Although our ties have expanded with the Asia-Pacific region and Latin America, it is important to recall that the United States and Europe enjoy the largest combined external trade and investment relationship in the world today.

American exports to EU countries and European investment in the United States support over 7 million American workers. All told, Europe accounts for almost half the foreign revenues of American firms. Our investment in Europe alone roughly equals that in the rest of the world put together. And since the Berlin Wall fell, the United States has become the top foreign investor in Central and Eastern Europe.

Together, the United States and Europe have led the world toward open markets and greater prosperity. Our cooperation made possible every global trade agreement from the Kennedy Round to the Uruguay Round. Through the G-7, we work to stimulate global growth. And at the OECD, we are developing strategies to overcome structural unemployment and adapt to demographic change.

A hallmark of the Clinton presidency is its focus on global economic growth and expanding trade. Indeed, President Clinton is advancing the most ambitious international economic agenda of any American President in half a century.

In addition to implementing the North American Free Trade Agreement, his efforts include leading the way to the Miami agreement to complete negotiations on a free trade area in the Americas by the year 2005. He also helped forge APEC’s decision to achieve free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region by 2020. None of these efforts will raise
barriers to non-participants or exclude any economic sector. And they will meet the requirements of the new World Trade Organization.

Our vision for the economic relationship between Europe and the United States must be no less ambitious. The long term objective is the integration of the economies of North America and Europe, consistent with the principles of the WTO.

We should undertake a transatlantic economic initiative to multiply trade, investment, and jobs on both sides of the ocean. It will make us an even more powerful engine of the global economy. It will align our efforts to promote transatlantic integration with the forces of integration around the world. And it will, like our other efforts, reinforce the open global trading system to the benefit of all nations.

Thoughtful observers from Europe, Canada, and the United States have proposed that we seek a Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement. EU Commissioner Leon Brittan has launched a study of this proposal, and we too intend to give it the serious study it deserves, with its considerable potential to form an element of our overall strategy. There are, of course, important issues that need to be addressed. For example, any free trade agreement must advance our overriding objective of global trade liberalization, be consistent with an effective WTO, and not disadvantage less developed countries.

Even as we undertake these studies, there are concrete measures that we can take in the near term to eliminate trade barriers progressively and deepen our integration, building on the momentum we achieved in the Uruguay round.

First, we can create a comprehensive investment regime. The vast region from Honolulu to Helsinki is essentially a common investment area without common ground rules. We should promptly negotiate a Multilateral Agreement on Investment as agreed by OED ministers last month.

Second, the United States and the EU need to develop more flexible rules to widen market access and spur innovation in information technology fields. At stake is open competition in one of the most dynamic sectors of the global economy.

Third, the United States and the EU should work to eliminate barriers to trade that result from differences in product standards and testing systems -- and do so without compromising health or safety. Incompatible standards inhibit billions of dollars in new trade.

Fourth, we should open our skies. The aviation agreements we will soon complete with nine European countries will make transatlantic travel easier and cheaper and will spur trade and investment.

The United States and the EU should also work together to complete the unfinished business of the Uruguay Round. We must move forward to reach agreements to liberalize financial services within the next twelve months and telecommunications within the next year. And
we must work to overcome our differences in key sectors such as audio-visual products and services.

Trade means competition — and vigorous competition is healthy for our relationship and for our economies as well. But that competition must be fair. American businesses operate under the appropriate constraints of legislation barring bribery of foreign officials. Our nations made a commitment to address this problem multilaterally through the OECD last year. We must make progress now.

The private sector is the driving force in our economic relationship, and its leaders should have a larger voice in shaping our agenda. The Pacific Business Forum has helped propel the APEC process; the Transatlantic Business Dialogue launched by Commerce Secretary Ron Brown and Commissioners Bangemann and Brittan can do the same for transatlantic economic integration. I know that this is a special interest of Foreign Minister Solana, with whom I discussed this issue last night.

Global Political Cooperation

The United States and Europe are partners not only for prosperity, but in promoting stability, human dignity and opportunity around the world. We share common interests and a common responsibility to lead. The political dimension of our proposed agenda will allow us to shape a world more conducive to our interests and consistent with our ideals.

First, we must intensify our efforts to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. The indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty last month would not have happened without the leadership of the United States and our European partners. The same leadership will be needed to achieve a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and a global ban on the production of fissile materials; to bring the Chemical Weapons Convention into force; and to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. We must also bolster our common support for dismantling nuclear weapons and safeguarding nuclear materials in the former Soviet states.

Second, we must strengthen our cooperation against international crime, terrorism, and narcotics trafficking. The United States and Europe have collaborated to combat money laundering through the Financial Action Task Force. Regular meetings of top American and European anti-narcotics officials could strengthen our arsenal in the fight against drugs. Those who traffic in weapons, narcotics, and human lives recognize no national borders. We must make sure they have nowhere to hide.

Third, we must coordinate our humanitarian and development assistance more effectively. Ninety percent of all global humanitarian assistance is provided by the United States, the European Commission, and the member states of the EU. We need to build on our successful joint experience providing food relief to the Caucasus and technical assistance to Central Europe to develop a common strategy and to coordinate priorities, especially at a time when we all face financial constraints. More generally, we need to broaden our cooperation
to address a range of emerging global problems. Our joint efforts in Cairo made the International Conference on Population and Development a success. And our annual high-level environmental dialogue has helped pave the way for multilateral initiatives like the Berlin Climate Conference and major agreements such as the Montreal Protocol. The joint program for cooperation between the United States and Japan -- "the Common Agenda" embracing issues ranging from population to health, the environment, science and technology -- provides a model of the concrete and high-impact opportunities for collaboration. Human rights, too, is an area where working together we can enhance our impact.

Fourth, we must bolster our cooperation in regions where the United States and Europe share common interests and historic ties -- for example, the Middle East. With EU support, the 1991 Madrid Conference launched the most promising opportunity for Arab-Israeli peace in two generations. Now is the time to make that promise real by more effectively coordinating our economic assistance and working together to bring into being the Middle East Development Bank proposed by Egypt, Jordan, Israel and the PLO. And at the Amman summit this October, together we can build on the start we made in Casablanca last year to generate the private investment that is so essential to lasting peace and prosperity in the region.

We should also expand our cooperation in the Mediterranean, an area of vital interest to the EU and the United States. Spain has played a key role in advancing the EU's initiative on this important region, and we look forward to cooperating with you as the Barcelona Conference approaches. We can also explore new ways to work together to sustain democracy in the Americas, an area where Spain is an especially valuable partner.

Cooperation in Europe

Of course, nowhere is our regional cooperation more important than meeting the new challenges and opportunities facing Europe itself. We in the United States know too well that our security is at risk when Europe's is imperiled. And we have a common interest in assuring that the historic transformations now underway in Central Europe and the former Soviet Union are consolidated -- and that these countries become integrated into our transatlantic community.

We have worked closely together to coordinate our assistance through the G-24, the World Bank, and the IMF. Our financial and technical assistance is helping countries like Russia, Ukraine and Poland to free prices, privatize industry, and ease the pain of dislocation. Our economic assistance efforts are complemented by our support for durable democratic institutions throughout Central and Eastern Europe and the New Independent States. Together, the European Union and the United States are a vital force for stability in the region.

We are also advancing European integration by extending our economic and security relations to the east. Our steady program for enlarging NATO is reinforced by the steps being taken by the EU. The prospects for stability in Europe's new democracies are unmistakably linked to their potential for prosperity -- and to our willingness to open our markets to their goods.
The EU does more than open its markets to the new economies of the region, however. It provides incentive and shelter for the development of civil societies that are the surest guarantee for stability and security. And it encourages the resolution of ancient enmities, today in Central Europe as after World War II between France and Germany.

As we look to the future, the United States and the EU should work together to develop new areas for common action aimed at assisting the new democracies of Central Europe. For example:

- We could help these states to cope better with the scourge of organized crime through efforts such as the International Law Enforcement Academy in Budapest;
- We could promote the development of citizens groups and NGOs that can help build democratic societies from the ground up; and
- We could refocus our technical assistance to ensure that the basic structures of a modern market economy are fully in place as the Central European countries make the transition from aid to trade.

The United States and the EU also have a special interest in supporting a democratic Turkey, integrated into the transatlantic community. Turkey is at the strategic crossroads of the Balkans, the Middle East, and the former Soviet states. We hope that the European Parliament will ratify the critically important customs union agreement between the EU and Turkey. At the same time, we strongly encourage Turkey to move ahead with democratic reform and strengthen the protection of human rights. We are also redoubling our efforts to achieve a political settlement in Cyprus prior to the start of EU accession talks.

The terrible conflict in Bosnia remains the single greatest threat to our vision of an integrated Europe at peace. The United States and Europe are working together, although it is clear to all that we have not achieved the results we seek. We have sought to contain the conflict, to alleviate suffering, and find a lasting peaceful settlement to the war. On behalf of the American people, I want to thank our European allies, Spain among them, who have put their troops and personnel in harm's way to help the people of the former Yugoslavia and to uphold the principles of the international community. We believe that a strengthened UNPROFOR is the best insurance against an even worse humanitarian disaster that would follow its withdrawal. That is why this week, the Contact Group and others have undertaken efforts to reinforce UNPROFOR's ability to carry out its mission safely and effectively. The United States will continue to coordinate closely, through NATO, the United Nations, and the Contact Group.

One of the few bright spots in the midst of the Bosnian tragedy has been the agreement of the Muslim and Croat communities to end their conflict and establish a bicommunal
Federation. The United States and the EU have joined forces to help support this enterprise through the Friends of the Federation -- helping to keep alive hopes for preserving a multi-ethnic society in Bosnia. This is a model for the joint initiatives that we should develop for the future.

The Way Ahead

To achieve the ambitious agenda I have set forth today, we must enhance our ability to work together more effectively. This will require commitment on three fronts.

First, the United States and Europe must remain engaged in the world, on our own and as partners. Our nations have the unique capacity to provide global leadership. We must resist the siren songs of isolation and withdrawal.

Second, the United States looks to Europe to be a strong partner for the United States and a capable actor on the world stage. Of course, the choice of mechanisms is for EU members themselves to decide. But the United States has a clear interest in Europe's continued integration and its enhanced ability in foreign and security policy. And the EU should move ahead with its historic process of enlargement.

Forty years ago today, six European foreign ministers gathered in a monastery in Messina to launch a process that ultimately led to the Treaty of Rome and the Establishment of the European Communities. Tomorrow, history will be made in Messina once again, as the EU under Spanish Chairmanship meets to plan the ambitious Intergovernmental Conference. The objective, as President Truman's Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett said in 1948, "should continue to be the progressively closer integration, both economic and political, of presently free Europe, and eventually of as much of Europe as becomes free."

Finally, we must strengthen the mechanisms of our cooperation. We must take advantage of immediate opportunities, such as the upcoming summit between President Clinton and Presidents Chirac and Santer, to define common goals and to advance them more systematically. In the next six months, the United States looks forward to working closely with the Spanish presidency of the European Union to develop more fully our common agenda. By the end of the year, we should have developed a broad-ranging transatlantic agenda for the new century -- an agenda for common economic and political action to expand democracy, prosperity, and stability. Between now and the end of the year, we are prepared to engage seriously with representatives of the EU to forge this agenda.

Closer government ties are essential, but in a time of generational change on both sides of the Atlantic, we need to deepen our interaction at every level. We should call on business leaders to tell us what must be done to tear down barriers to trade and investment in Central and Eastern Europe and between North America and Western Europe. We should encourage our elected representatives to intensify their contacts, from parliamentary exchanges to sister cities. We should broaden the academic and cultural exchanges to enrich our deepest ties of all -- those between our people.
We must act now. For as President Kennedy told a European audience in 1963, "time and the world do not stand still. Change is the law of life. And those who look only to the past are certain to miss the future." I know that the partnership that brought us to this hopeful point in history will continue to shape the future as boldly as it shaped the past.

Thank you very much.
Mr. Secretary General, distinguished colleagues and friends: I am honored to join you once again as President d’Honneur of the North Atlantic Council. I would like to welcome those ministers who have joined us since our last meeting in December. On behalf of all the members of the Council, let me extend to you the assurance of the close cooperation that is the strength of this Alliance.

Fifty years since the end of World War II, our ministerial meeting marks an important occasion for reflection. We have begun to put in place a comprehensive security architecture that will advance peace and stability across Europe.

NATO remains the central security pillar of Europe, and the core institution for linking the security of North America to Europe. In the last five years, NATO has undertaken sweeping changes to match the sweep of Europe’s transformation.

While maintaining NATO’s core defensive role, we are adapting its military forces to address the new demands of crisis management and peace-keeping. We are supporting a capable European Defense Identity and a broader role for the Western European Union. We are building enduring ties between NATO and the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. And tomorrow, the Alliance will take an important step to develop its dialogue with Russia.

Three weeks ago in Moscow, Russia agreed to proceed with its participation in the Partnership for Peace and to move ahead with a broader dialogue with NATO. We welcome that development. Russia’s decision to deepen its cooperation with Europe and North America enhances our ability to achieve our common goal of a truly integrated Europe.

Under the Partnership for Peace, Russia and the Allies will conduct military exchanges, hold joint military exercises, and train together for peacekeeping. Beyond the Partnership, we will pursue an extensive dialogue on vital security issues, including non-proliferation and nuclear security. At
tomorrow's 16 plus 1 meeting with Russia's Foreign Minister Kozyrev, and in the months ahead, we will launch this dialogue to define the framework for an expanded relationship with Russia.

The NATO-Russia relationship we are pursuing complements the other elements of our strategy: strengthening the Partnership for Peace, further strengthening the OSCE, and maintaining steady progress toward enlargement of both NATO and the European Union.

The Partnership for Peace gives form and substance to the new cooperative relationship between the Alliance and its former adversaries. The Partnership has made impressive progress since last December. In my intervention today, I will put forward several proposals to strengthen the Partnership for the future.

Since its creation, NATO has always been open to adding new members. The process of enlargement is moving forward along the same steady, transparent course the Allies set last year. We have begun to examine how enlargement will occur and its implications for European security. We will present our conclusions to interested partners this fall.

Each of these steps is an essential part of our effort to build a comprehensive security architecture for Europe. As we continue to adapt NATO, we must also continue our support for other institutions of security and economic cooperation. European integration, bolstered by the European Union, is helping to extend prosperity to all of Europe. And the strengthened Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe can and should play a central role in conflict prevention and crisis management.

This comprehensive strategy for European security will strengthen our ability in the future to prevent the kind of conflicts we are witnessing in the former Yugoslavia. Later today, we will have an opportunity to discuss in detail recent events in Bosnia. We look forward to discussing with all our NATO allies, including many valued troop contributors, the very important understandings we reached last night in the Contact Group. These include our conviction that UNPROFOR should remain in Bosnia, with the means to ensure it can carry out its mission safely and effectively. We also emphasized the need to sustain our vigorous diplomatic efforts. In the meantime, we unanimously agreed that the Bosnian Serbs must end their violations of UN resolutions and release all detained UN personnel immediately.

Our entire agenda today reminds us of the great importance of European integration -- a process that has been fundamentally linked to the broader transatlantic relationship since the Marshall Plan years. Over the last several months, several of my colleagues in this room have made important contributions to our dialogue on reinforcing the bonds between Europe and the United States. I intend to address this timely set of issues later this week in Madrid. I will emphasize America's willingness to bolster the transatlantic relationship by taking additional steps to strengthen our political consultations and economic ties.

I will also reaffirm the unshakable commitment of the United States to remain engaged in Europe -- through this Alliance and through our involvement in the other great institutions of security and economic cooperation. President Clinton is determined that America will continue to stand by its
commitments to its European allies and to its friends around the world.

Thank you.
Mr. Secretary General, distinguished colleagues: Eighteen months ago in Brussels, I said this Alliance had to make an historic choice: whether to embrace innovation or risk irrelevance. The choice that we made weeks later at the January 1994 Brussels Summit was clear, and today, so is the record.

At that Summit, the Alliance took a series of momentous decisions, building on the landmark London Summit of 1990. As 16 allies, united by common values and purpose, we reinforced NATO's strength in the west and extended a hand of cooperation to the east.

Today we continue our historic enterprise. We also broaden our endeavor, as Russia becomes a full participant in the Partnership for Peace, and we inaugurate a new NATO-Russia dialogue.

Earlier this morning, I outlined my views on the key areas of action for this North Atlantic Council ministerial:

- First, we will review the progress of the Partnership for Peace, and prepare a plan of action for the future.

- Second, we should reaffirm our agreed timetable for completing our study on enlargement, and for presenting its results to partners. Our goal should be to complete the presentations in time to permit thorough analysis of the results before our next ministerial in December.

- Third, we will launch tomorrow the beginning of a new era in NATO-Russia relations -- a critical component of Europe's evolving security architecture.

Let me begin by reviewing the progress of the Partnership for Peace. Two years ago, the Partnership was a vision -- in part, the vision of my late colleague, Les Aspin. Today, it is action. It is British soldiers exercising on Polish soil. It is Czechs and Belgians working side-by-side in Partnership offices. This summer it will be soldiers from the Baltics in the bayous of Louisiana.
With 26 members, the Partnership for Peace has become a vibrant and integral part of Europe's security structure.

At our last meeting in December, we called for establishment of a defense planning and review process by early 1995. We have met that goal; indeed, 14 partners are already participating. This process will promote greater openness in defense planning and budgeting among our nations. It will improve the ability of Partners to work with Allies in future joint missions. Moreover, it will provide aspiring NATO members with valuable experience in allied practices and procedures.

The Alliance also agreed in December on a substantial exercise program that will build toward more complex and varied training scenarios. Here too, we have made impressive progress. The rigorous agenda for 1995 includes 11 joint exercises and more than 100 other activities. Partners are working with NATO on many aspects of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, from delivery of assistance by air to search and rescue at sea. The United States will be hosting a major exercise at Fort Polk, Louisiana, this August, that will include a significant number of allies and partners. And even as we meet, American soldiers are in Ukraine, training with Ukrainian forces in the spirit of the Partnership.

We believe there are a number of promising areas in which we could intensify the political and military relationship between NATO and its partners:

- First, agreement on a set of principles for civilian and democratic control of the military could help guide our partners in their national reform efforts.

- Second, a joint defense planning and review process committee could help us explore the possibility of expanding the Partnership's focus to include all armed forces of the partners, not just those dedicated to peacekeeping and humanitarian tasks. The committee could also recommend measures for adapting partners' military doctrine and forces to NATO's.

- Third, we can find ways to enable partners to play a more active, substantive role in the planning of Partnership activities and exercises.

- Fourth, we can engage partners more routinely in the substantive activities of the NAC and NATO senior committees.

- Finally, the resources that NATO dedicates to the Partnership could be increased significantly.

In order to maintain the Partnership's momentum, NATO must provide sufficient resources. NATO has taken the important first step of adopting a comprehensive funding policy for this purpose. We need to do more.

We expect each partner to undertake the long- and short-term planning necessary to ensure its own participation in Partnership activities. Several Partners have already included the Partnership for Peace in their national budgets and made other adjustments reflecting their firm commitment to the
Partnership and to relations with NATO. Others should follow.

Even though Partners must bear the responsibility for their participation in the Partnership, we must recognize that some will need assistance getting started. If we want the Partnership to succeed -- a goal that serves all our interests -- each NATO member must be willing to do its part to help.

This fiscal year, the United States is providing $30 million in bilateral assistance directly related to the Partnership. As President Clinton pledged in Warsaw last July, his budget request for fiscal year 1996 designates $100 million to help our new partners work with us to advance the partnership's goals.

The Partnership for Peace is firmly established as a central feature of Europe's new security architecture. In less than two years, the Partnership is achieving its broad purposes. It is providing its members a permanent association with NATO, a vital link to virtually all that NATO is and does. And for those Partners that aspire to join the Alliance, it is helping to develop the common standards and practices that will enable a smooth transition to becoming an effective ally.

In January, 1994, at President Clinton's initiative, the Alliance launched a historic process that will lead to admission of new members from the democracies to the east. That process is now moving forward according to schedule. NATO's study on how enlargement will occur is making good progress and should be completed this summer. This will allow us to complete presentations on the study in Brussels and partner capitals in time to thoroughly assess the way forward at our December meeting.

NATO enlargement remains an essential part of our strategy to build a more integrated Europe of democracies at peace. It is essential that our efforts to integrate these states remain open and inclusive. Each prospective member should be considered individually, on a case by case basis. Above all, we must not let one set of arbitrary lines across Europe be replaced with another.

Clearly, it is in the interest of every NATO ally and partner that Russia participate constructively in building a more secure and integrated Europe. We welcome Russia's decision to proceed with its participation in the Partnership for Peace and to move ahead to fashion a broader relationship with the Alliance.

An enhanced NATO-Russia relationship is the next important element of our overall strategy for European security. This relationship can reinforce European security and contribute to NATO's fundamental goals.

The first component of this relationship will be the Partnership for Peace. As it does with our other Partners, the Partnership for Peace will help build our cooperation with the Russian military. Russia's Individual Partnership Program envisions continued exchanges in both directions. Russian and Allied troops will participate in multinational exercises and train together for real-world peacekeeping operations.

Outside the Partnership, we will hold political consultations with Russia on a number of
critical security issues where Russia has special interests or capabilities. These include nuclear non-proliferation, implementing the Chemical-Weapons Convention, building confidence in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, as well as nuclear safety and the prevention of nuclear smuggling.

We should be prepared to go beyond these initial elements and develop the NATO-Russia relationship further. To this end, we welcome tomorrow's 16 + 1 meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev. We urge an immediate start to the dialogue on the direction our relationship should take. I hope we can define a framework of goals and objectives for an expanded relationship by the time of our next Ministerial meeting in Brussels. This process should proceed in rough parallel with NATO's enlargement. As Russia progresses with democratic reform and demonstrates respect for international norms, we can deepen this relationship even further.

Ukraine is also critical. With its size and position, and its history of subjugation and upheaval, it is a linchpin of European security. NATO's strategy and evolution must take into account this country's strategic importance as well as its historic decision to give up nuclear weapons, to build democratic institutions and to pursue free market reform. The United States believes that the door to greater cooperation and integration with the West should be open to countries that take the bold and difficult steps that Ukraine has taken.

We must also sustain our important progress in another new area of focus for NATO -- fighting the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The diplomacy that members of this Alliance brought to bear made a decisive contribution to the indefinite extension of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty last month. We welcome the development of new channels for consultation on non-proliferation matters with Russia and other NACC partners.

NATO is at the core of our strategy for strengthening security in Europe -- but it is not the exclusive forum. Our comprehensive strategy envisions strong, interlocking institutions of security and economic cooperation, each with special and complementary strengths. That is why, last December, our Heads of State and Government took important steps to bolster the effectiveness of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

With its broad membership and extensive commitments on human rights, the OSCE is uniquely equipped to address the root causes of conflict in Europe. Its potential is especially evident in Chechnya -- where it represents the only official international presence. As our communiqué will emphasize, we are profoundly troubled by the continued war in Chechnya. This tragedy has killed thousands of innocent civilians, damaged reform, and hurt Russia's standing in the international community. We urge the Russian authorities to cooperate with the OSCE mission to permit the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian relief and to reach a genuine political solution to that conflict.

Let me also emphasize the continuing support of the United States for a more capable European defense identity -- one that will strengthen our flexibility, support European integration, and result in a more balanced sharing of burdens. The Alliance should continue to strengthen its relations with the Western European Union. The benefits of improved cooperation are already evident in the conduct of the joint NATO-WEU Operation Sharp Guard. Similarly, we should redouble our efforts to complete development of the Combined Joint Task Force concept. CJTF will enable NATO to
conduct the full range of its missions more efficiently, allow the WEU to make use of Alliance assets, and facilitate operations with non-members of the alliance.

As I said this morning, this comprehensive strategy for European security will strengthen our ability in the future to prevent the kind of tragic conflict we are witnessing in the former Yugoslavia. Let me say first that our allies with personnel on the ground have shown remarkable courage and leadership in standing firm in conditions of great threat and adversity. We all owe a debt of gratitude to our NATO allies and all the nations that have placed their troops and personnel in harm’s way to uphold the principles of the international community.

Later today, we will all have an opportunity to discuss the understandings that the Contact Group ministers reached last night in five key areas:

- First, we agreed that UNPROFOR should remain in Bosnia-Herzegovina to carry out its important mission.

- Second, we agreed that UNPROFOR should move rapidly to reduce the vulnerability of its forces, by regrouping units and avoiding activities that could unduly endanger their safety.

- Third, we should take steps to assure the freedom of movement and safety of UNPROFOR personnel. We intend to ask our military experts to examine promptly the specific proposals of France, the United Kingdom, and others with a view toward achieving that objective.

- Fourth, we agreed on the need to enhance the capability and strength of UNPROFOR to assure that it can carry out its mission safely and effectively -- and the United States intends to provide appropriate support to that end.

- Fifth, we agreed to continue to pursue our efforts to obtain recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Serbia and to achieve an effective closure of the border between Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The diplomatic efforts of the Contact Group remain the basis for achieving a political solution to this conflict. The United States will continue to lend its vigorous support to those efforts.

Speaking as the representative of President Clinton and the American people, let me assure you that America’s engagement in Europe and in NATO is as firm and unshakable as ever. The United States has enduring political, security, economic and cultural links to Europe that must and will be preserved. NATO will remain the anchor of American power and purpose in Europe. We will continue to maintain approximately 100,000 American troops on European soil. We will continue to help preserve peace and prosperity for the next 50 years and beyond -- this time for the entire continent.

Thank you very much.
Mr. Secretary General, distinguished colleagues, and friends. I am privileged to serve as your President d'Honneur at our first formal meeting since we selected Willy Claes to succeed the brilliant and dedicated Manfred Woerner.

Secretary General Claes has taken charge at a time of historic opportunity and challenge for the Alliance. As we build European security for the 21st century, we are fortunate to have this statesman of strength and experience at NATO's helm.

The two greatest struggles of the 20th century, the battles against fascism and communism, are over. The fallen Iron Curtain has revealed a window of opportunity for open societies and open markets to prevail across a continent at peace.

It is important to recall that NATO played an essential role in bringing us to this hopeful point. For more than four decades it kept the peace, preserved our freedom, kindled hope in oppressed peoples, and finally helped bring the Cold War to an end -- a victory for all who love freedom.

For half a century, NATO also provided the foundation on which our nations built the greatest community of peace and prosperity the world has ever seen. It cemented close relations among former adversaries in Western Europe. It formed the core of our transatlantic community -- forging links that can never be broken. The ideals embodied in the Treaty of Washington -- democracy, liberty, and the rule of law -- proved no less powerful than the arsenals of this Alliance. Dean Acheson said it best: "the importance of NATO in the long run goes far beyond the creation of military strength.... Future hope lies in the development of a community of free peoples...."
But NATO was not just about yesterday. It is about today and tomorrow -- about Dean Acheson's "future hope."

First let me be clear about my own nation's conviction. American power and purpose are here in Europe to stay. This Alliance will continue to be the anchor of American engagement in Europe, the linchpin of transatlantic security. Through over four decades, under Democratic and Republican administrations, we have maintained a bipartisan commitment to a free, stable, secure, and prosperous Europe. Today, we are committed to keep 100,000 American troops on European soil as part of our continuing engagement.

As we meet today to continue to adapt this great Alliance, we are keenly aware that the end of the Cold War has brought not only opportunities, but serious challenges. The terrible conflict in Bosnia continues to resist resolution. It has challenged NATO and all the institutions that have dealt with it. Frankly, when this conflict emerged from the ashes of the Cold War, the international community was insufficiently prepared. The world ultimately turned to the United Nations to shoulder the principal responsibility.

For its part, NATO has done whatever has been asked of it by the United Nations. It has established a no-fly zone and prevented the conflict from becoming an air war. It has maintained the sanctions pressure, and it has been instrumental in preventing the spread of the conflict. Contrary to some reports, NATO has not ruled out the use of air power. NATO stands ready to use air power, when requested, pursuant to United Nations resolutions.

Now, our task continues to be to seek a peaceful negotiated end to the conflict, one that will preserve Bosnia's territorial integrity. We should renew our efforts to seek an immediate ceasefire and general cessation of hostilities. We should pursue with the parties the terms for a settlement, building on the Contact Group plan.

Let me stress one important fact: The crisis in Bosnia is about Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia. It does not diminish NATO's enduring importance. The Allies remain committed to NATO's irreplaceable role as the key to European security. There is no disagreement among us on this point.

The tragedy of the war and bloodshed in Bosnia does not diminish our responsibility to build a comprehensive European security architecture that consolidates stability, addresses today's conflicts, and prevents others from happening in the future. On the contrary, the tragedy in the former Yugoslavia underscores the urgency of that task.
Central to building a comprehensive security architecture for Europe is a measured process of NATO expansion, along with continued European integration and a determination to strengthen the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Yesterday's NATO helped to reconcile old adversaries, to embed free countries in strong and solid institutions, and to create an enduring sense of shared purpose in one another's security. Today's NATO must do the same -- with new countries but with an enduring purpose. This Alliance must preserve its core defensive role and adapt its military forces to meet the new demands of crisis management and peacekeeping. It must also help new Partners learn Western standards of cooperation and draw them into NATO's practical work of providing stability in Europe.

Last January at the NATO Summit, the Alliance committed itself to deepen our ties with Europe's emerging democracies when it approved President Clinton's proposal for a Partnership for Peace. In less than a year, the Partnership has come to life. Twenty-three nations, including Russia, have joined. Belarus has just announced its intention to become our twenty-fourth Partner. Tonight, NATO and Russia will agree on broad possibilities for cooperation, including Russia's program for the Partnership for Peace. Troops that for half-a-century faced against each other in the Cold War are now coming together in joint military exercises.

Our leaders also declared last January that the Alliance is open to new members. Today, we take an important step in the process that will lead to NATO expansion. I urge that we agree to begin now our internal deliberations on expansion and, in 1995, to discuss with Partners the obligations and implications of membership.

This process will be steady, deliberate, and transparent. I want to stress that expansion must not and will not dilute NATO. But NATO must, over time, be ready to include nations which are willing and able to assume the necessary Alliance obligations and commitments, and whose membership advances the goals of the Alliance and of broader European security. Expansion, when it comes, will occur in a manner that increases stability for all of Europe -- for members and non-members alike.

As we pursue NATO expansion, we must also strengthen other structures of security cooperation. No single institution has the mandate or the capability to meet every challenge in Europe. Our NATO Alliance must be complemented by other institutions that can address the full range of challenges facing Europe's future. We recognize an important role for European integration, supported by the European Union. There is also an important institution with untapped potential: the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. We must build on its unique strengths as a structure for conflict resolution and prevention and as an institution that embodies the ideal of an undivided Europe.

Speaking as your President d'Honneur, I say with confidence that the Alliance is prepared to take up both the challenges of the moment and the future. And speaking as a representative of President Clinton and the American people, I say with equal confidence that as we do so, the commitment of the United States to participate actively in maintaining the security, prosperity, and freedom of Europe remains unshakeable.

Thank you very much.

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INTERVENTION BY
U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE WARREN CHRISTOPHER
AT THE MEETING OF THE
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
NATO HEADQUARTERS
BRUSSELS, BELGIUM

December 1, 1994

Mr. Secretary General, distinguished colleagues, and friends: I am pleased to join you at this very important meeting of the North Atlantic Council. Allow me also to salute once again our new Secretary General. He assumes his responsibilities at a defining moment in the history of NATO and of Europe.

These are times of great change in Europe. But America’s interests in Europe have not changed. Neither have the basic principles guiding our engagement -- principles that have long commanded bipartisan support.

The first principle is that NATO is and will remain the anchor of America’s engagement in Europe and the core of transatlantic security. The United States has enduring political, military, economic and cultural links to Europe that must and will be preserved.

A second core principle of American engagement remains our support for European integration and our partnership with the European Union. The United States has supported European integration from its inception. The EU remains a vital partner in trade, diplomacy, and increasingly in security, where we cooperate to combat proliferation and terrorism.

A capable European defense identity and effective cooperation between NATO and the Western European Union are critical elements of this relationship. Fortifying the European pillar of the Alliance contributes to European stability and to transatlantic burden-sharing. And it improves our collective capacity to act. I welcome the November 14 call by WEU ministers to accelerate work on the Combined Joint Task Force concept. CJTF offers a practical vehicle for making NATO assets and capabilities available to the WEU under certain circumstances.
A moment ago, I noted that America’s interests in Europe have not changed. What has changed in the last few years is that the sphere of political and economic freedom in Europe is wider than ever before. This leads me to the third core principle of our engagement: Breaking down the barriers that divide West from East will serve our collective interest in wider European stability. Our alliance of democracies can help consolidate democracy across an undivided Europe at peace. We can help design a comprehensive and inclusive architecture that enhances security and freedom for all.

Our strategy of integration offers tangible rewards. It will help promote stability in Europe’s eastern half, the region where two world wars and the Cold War began. It will strengthen the hand of forces committed to political, military, and economic reform. And it will help assure that no part of Europe will revert to a zone of great power competition or a sphere of influence and that no nation is left hanging in isolation.

The challenge we face today is not unlike the one we faced, and met, in Western Europe 50 years ago. After World War II, President Truman and Secretaries of State Marshall and Acheson understood that security and economic cooperation were essential to the defense of democracy. Within five years of D-Day, America and its Allies had launched the Marshall Plan, established NATO and the GATT, and laid the foundations for what became the EU and the OECD. These institutions helped us produce unparalleled peace and prosperity for half a century -- but only for half a continent.

Now five years have passed since the Berlin Wall fell. We must build a security community of all democratic nations in the Euro-Atlantic region -- one that endures where the Congress of Vienna, the Concert of Europe, and Versailles ultimately failed, and one that builds on the strength of our post-war success in Western Europe.

Developing the new European security architecture begins with reinforcing its foundation -- the Alliance that has preserved our liberty and prosperity for half a century. NATO has always been far more than a transitory response to a temporary threat. It has been a guarantor of European democracy and a force for European stability. The core values it champions -- democracy, liberty, and the rule of law -- are now ascendant around the world. For all these reasons, NATO’s benefits are clear to Europe’s new democracies.

Since the NATO Summit last January, we have taken remarkable strides to renew and invigorate the Alliance. We have achieved our historic goal of deepening ties with the new democracies to the east. In less than a year, the Partnership for Peace has evolved from a bare idea to a bold reality.
The United States considers the Partnership an integral and lasting part of the new European security architecture. That is why President Clinton indicated in July that he will ask Congress to designate $100 million in the coming fiscal year to advance the Partnership's goals. I am pleased to say that Congress has already authorized an additional $30 million to strengthen the Partnership's joint exercise program over the next year. I hope that other NATO members will soon announce comparable contributions and that we can coordinate our efforts to maximize the impact. But of course, it will fall mainly to Partners to ensure that the Partnership realizes its full potential.

The United States is seeking agreement on additional measures for next year. First, we urge putting exercise programs for 1995 and beyond on a 5-year planning cycle, and building toward progressively more complex and diverse training scenarios. Second, NATO must ensure sufficient funding for the Alliance's Partnership-related costs. Finally, we should strive to have a Partnership defense planning process established and operational by early 1995.

The Partnership is a critical tool in its own right. It is also the best path to membership for countries wishing to join the Alliance. As both President Clinton and Vice President Gore have emphasized, NATO must be open to expansion. An exclusionary policy would risk maintaining old lines of division across Europe -- or creating arbitrary new ones. The United States believes that Europe's institutional arrangements should be determined by the objective demands of the present, not by the tragedies of Europe's past.

The United States believes it is time to begin the process -- to begin deliberate consideration of the practical requirements for adding new members to the Alliance. It is imperative that we agree as an Alliance on our aims and our purpose in this historic evolution. The Washington Treaty is not a paper guarantee. New members will assume solemn obligations and responsibilities, just as we will extend our solemn commitments to them. This will require careful consideration and preparation.

We are deciding today that the Alliance begin its internal deliberations on expansion. A process has begun. It is also essential that we begin to present our views to interested Partners during 1995. I expect the next several months to be particularly intense, as we formulate a joint Allied presentation. We have already provided your governments with our initial thinking, and we would propose building on that to develop Allied consensus. I am personally committed to moving forward on this matter.
Our presentation to the Partners should explain the practical implications and obligations of NATO membership. Let us be clear: These initial exchanges are not intended to be the beginning of accession negotiations. Neither will they indicate that any Partner is necessarily a candidate for admission. But they will reflect our determination that the process for expansion be open and inclusive from the start.

The process of expansion should be steady, deliberate, and transparent. Each nation should be considered individually. No country outside of NATO will have a veto over any other. In our view, there are, however, certain fundamental requirements for membership that are reflected in the Washington Treaty. New members must be market democracies committed to responsible security policies and able to make a contribution to the Alliance.

As I noted earlier this morning, we cannot pursue NATO expansion in isolation. The new security architecture for Europe's future must be supported by other strong pillars. No single institution has the mandate or the capability to meet every challenge in Europe.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe -- the CSCE -- has proven experience and untapped potential as an organization that can help ease tensions and prevent future conflicts. With its comprehensive membership and unique experience in preventive diplomacy, human rights protection, and dispute resolution, the CSCE can complement NATO's essential role. To make it more effective, however, we need to refine its mission.

At the CSCE Summit in Budapest next week, the United States will work with our allies and partners to enhance the CSCE's capabilities. President Clinton will urge his colleagues to approve his proposal to strengthen the role and structure of the organization. We hope to clarify the CSCE's role in the European security architecture and improve its ability to prevent future Yugoslavias.

Our economic and security institutions are gradually breaking down the outdated frontiers of the Cold War. The security and prosperity of all of Europe is inextricably linked to the stable development of Europe's emerging democracies in the East.

Our goal is the successful transformation of post-communist Europe into a community of sovereign, democratic states. A key component is the development of a democratic, market-oriented Russia. No less vital is the emergence of a stable, democratic, non-nuclear Ukraine and the realization of the promise of greater security embodied in the START-1 and START-2 agreements. In Budapest we will take a significant step forward.
when President Clinton joins President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Major in receiving Ukraine's accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and signs security assurances for Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. This action will pave the way for START-1 to enter into force.

We welcome democratic Russia in assuming a full role in the common effort of building new structures. We welcome the agreement we will sign tonight on the NATO-Russia Individual Partnership Program. It sends an unmistakeable possible signal of our Alliance's desire to include Russia in a cooperative approach to security in Europe.

At the same time, we will continue to pursue avenues for cooperation between NATO and Russia outside the Partnership for Peace. The United States welcomed the first meeting between an Alliance working group and Russia on the question of nuclear weapons dismantlement. We also support intensifying Russia's cooperation with the G-7. And we are sponsoring Russia's membership in the GATT and its successor, the World Trade Organization.

Integration will enhance Russia's security in a wider Europe and expand Russia's access to markets and capital. But it also carries obligations that all Western nations share. GATT membership will make Russia's trade practices consistent with world standards. Expanded ties with NATO and the EU, along with strengthened CSCE principles, will strengthen Russian democracy and promote respect for the sovereignty of its neighbors.

Our support for Russian policies that adhere to these core principles will serve our vital interests and Europe's -- especially the nations that so recently broke free from communist rule. By the same token, expanding Western institutions to Central Europe will benefit Russia.

In taking the steps I have outlined today, we will advance our shared interest in building a democratic, prosperous, integrated Europe at peace. These steps reflect the core principles of our engagement in Europe -- our unwavering commitment to NATO, our continued support for European integration, and our determination to enhance security and stability in the East. The United States understands that our leadership remains indispensable if we are to achieve these goals. And we are determined to provide it.

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Mr. Secretary General: I am honored to be here in Athens to take part in this meeting of the North Atlantic Council. This is the first formal meeting of the NAC in ministerial session since President Clinton took office. I therefore want to elaborate upon the basic statement I made in February in Brussels on U.S. policy toward NATO and, more broadly, transatlantic security.

But first let me thank Manfred Woerner for his letter setting out the principal issues for our meeting today. I am impressed with the soundness of both his analysis and his conclusions.

In meeting with you today, I am following every U.S. Secretary of State of both political parties over four and a half decades. America's commitment to the security of Europe is not bound by party, and, like the Treaty of Washington itself, it is not bound by time.

Among us, we have built the most successful alliance in history. We should never lose sight of that stunning truth. The values and interests we share remain in force—and the challenges we face remain formidable.

Above all, safeguarding the security of our countries and maintaining stability throughout Europe remains the core responsibility of NATO. The United States will sustain its unparalleled military strength. We will continue to maintain substantial, effective forces in Europe—about 100,000 troops—to ensure our ability to meet our solemn security commitment.

Beyond Europe, we are revitalizing the American economy, forging a new partnership with Russian reform, working for peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors, creating a new framework for our relations with Japan, pressing for reform in China, finding new ways to protect the global environment, and promoting human rights and democracy worldwide.

The end of the Cold War is making American leadership even more important—and we accept the challenge.

Along these lines and as I indicated to the Secretary General this morning, President Clinton proposes that there be a summit meeting with his fellow NATO Heads of State and Government before the end of this year. He sees such a meeting as an important opportunity to assess with his colleagues how to continue to strengthen the alliance, and to adapt its agenda to the challenges of the post-Cold War world. We would be interested in hearing your views and discussing how we can obtain maximum use from such a meeting.

For the past few years, NATO has been setting its course for the future. But there has been an important continuity in our mission: to keep the peace; to promote the freedom and security of our member states and peoples; to reinforce unbreakable links across the Atlantic. And there is an important new mission: to help the emerging democracies to the East share in the benefits we have gained from this alliance.

The entire international community continues to search for effective means to end the killing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, bring about a lasting and equitable peace, and guarantee that this tragic conflict does not spread. In pursuit of these goals, the United States and other Security Council members agreed in Washington on May 22 on a Joint Action Program. It represents a step forward, seeking to increase pressure on those who have stood in the way of peace in Bosnia. We all recognize that these are interim steps, not a comprehensive solution to this tragic situation. A negotiated settlement—that is agreed by all three parties and implemented in good faith—remains our goal. And let me state again that new and tougher measures remain on the table, should they be needed to reach that goal.

NATO is already supporting the Joint Action Program through enforcement of the No-Fly Zone and sanctions.

Intervention at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, Athens, Greece, June 10, 1993.
enforcement in the Adriatic. NATO can and should make several decisions today to demonstrate unity and purpose on this issue—including further support of the Joint Action Program.

As you know, last Friday the U.N. Security Council enacted Resolution 836, creating “safe areas.” Resolution 836 authorizes UN member states to use air power to support UNPROFOR troops in implementing the safe areas. I believe NATO should join us in protecting UNPROFOR personnel with air power if they are attacked and request assistance. The United States is already committed to this, and we want to join our efforts with those of other allies in a NATO operation. Such an operation should be based on the structure already in place for No-Fly Zone enforcement.

As an additional contribution, the United States is prepared to provide airlift to nations contributing troops to UNPROFOR’s safe area operations if they need this assistance.

Further, as a means to increase pressure for a settlement, we should press our Eastern partners for enforcement of the UN sanctions against Serbia. We should strongly endorse all efforts to enforce sanctions in the region.

These sanctions must be unrelenting. Everyone should understand that the United States will insist on the isolation of Serbia and Montenegro from the community of nations until all UN requirements are met. Pariah status is the price that must be paid for the aggression that is taking place. Sanctions are also possible against Croatia if it supports aggression and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

We recall well the pledge trumpeted by the Belgrade authorities to close the frontier with Bosnia-Herzegovina. The world wants them to live by their word—and is watching with growing disappointment as they conduct business as usual.

Long-term pariah status must also be attached to those guilty of atrocities. We intend to pursue vigorously the indictment and prosecution of those who have committed war crimes in the former Yugoslavia. Those who have committed such atrocities must pay for their crimes.

This conflict must not be allowed to spill over. We must prevent a wider Balkan war, which would threaten NATO allies and several emerging democracies. It is essential that everyone in the region understand that aggression against the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia would have grave consequences. The United States will support an increase in the international presence in that Republic.

I am pleased to announce today that we have offered the UN a reinforced company team to augment the UN contingent already in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. These troops underscore the seriousness of our warning to Belgrade and the Bosnian Serbs. This offer of U.S. troops to the UN has both symbolic and tangible significance.

Neither can we permit a crackdown in Kosovo that could lead to an expansion in the conflict. The U.S. has made it clear to the Serb authorities that such a move will not be tolerated. NATO should also support an increase in the CSCE long duration missions in the former Yugoslavia, particularly in Kosovo. I plan to discuss this with the CSCE Chairman-in-Office and Secretary General when I visit Vienna next Monday. Together these steps underscore the seriousness of our warnings to Belgrade.

Today we must also reconfirm NATO’s readiness to assist the United Nations in implementing a negotiated peace settlement. Credible provisions for implementing such a peace settlement will be fundamental to its prospects for success. The United States reaffirms its commitment to participate with the UN and NATO in implementing and enforcing that agreement, including the possible use of ground forces.

Finally, I believe we all recognize that the West missed opportunities to head off this horrible problem. I hope we learn that we must work together earlier to help prevent conflicts before they erupt. We must develop mechanisms to deal more quickly and creatively with crises. Further, we must give high priority to the development of peacekeeping capabilities.

Mr. Secretary General, we have been preoccupied with Bosnia. But we must also create the basis for tomorrow’s security in the North Atlantic area and throughout Europe. This alliance can succeed only if we make our political and economic linkages as strong as our military ties. We must strengthen bonds between North America and the European Community. Indeed, European security today is a compound of political, economic, social, and military efforts. Preserving common security across the Atlantic requires us to focus not only on renewing NATO, but also on concluding the GATT Round. Transatlantic relations cannot be overly compartmentalized—either in substance or, increasingly, in institutions.

In this new era, we must show our parliaments and peoples that we share burdens as we share risks. The drastically diminished threat after the Cold War leads us to reduce our military spending. But if any of us cuts spending to the point of imperiling the common needs of the alliance—even worse, if there is a free-fall in defense spending—then the alliance faces not only a crisis of confidence but a corrosion of capability. The United States will maintain its military commitment and responsibilities in Europe. But President Clinton and I must be able to show the U.S. Congress that the allies are doing the same. Sharing must be a visible NATO principle: sharing of burdens; sharing of responsibilities; sharing of decisions.

Mr. Secretary General, I believe that between now and our next meeting, which I hope will be a Summit, we need to achieve progress in five important areas.

First, we must strengthen the unique qualities of NATO cooperation. Never before have so many nations joined together to confront common challenges. Never before have the
military forces of so many countries worked together so effectively, both in NATO's integrated command and in informal arrangements. Never before have the defense industries of so many countries adopted the same standards and made possible such a multiplication of military strength. These achievements must not be squandered. We must maintain our ability to act when our interests are challenged.

Despite the grave situation in the former Yugoslavia, there is no fundamental challenge to the political order in Europe that could produce a new Continent-wide war. Sustaining that achievement will depend in part on reinforcing our alliance, our practices of cooperation, our robust military defenses and command structures.

If the cooperative linkages among our defense industries are permitted to erode as defense budgets fall, each member nation and the whole alliance can lose the benefits of this special "force multiplier." That's why the Defense Trade Code of Conduct is so important. We must also continue updating NATO's common infrastructure program to ensure that we invest in assets essential to meeting new challenges.

Second, we must help to make and keep the peace in Central and Eastern Europe. For many countries, the "unfreezing of history" has vastly complicated the transition from Communism to democracy.

Peacemaking and peacekeeping are most effective when they are preceded or accompanied by timely political efforts to reduce tensions and settle disputes. NATO must be able to take political decisions for early, sustained, and credible engagement. Its military leaders must have confidence in the ability of this Council to provide timely and effective political direction.

Different member states will approach situations with different political sensitivities in mind, and with different peacekeeping structures that they might prefer. But we should also work to develop core NATO peacekeeping procedures that will balance political acceptability and military effectiveness. We don't need to "reinvent the wheel" each time NATO's peacekeeping capabilities are needed. These capabilities are especially important to help new democracies succeed — and to draw our NACC partners firmly to the West.

Third, we must work more effectively with other institutions with goals similar to NATO's. The U.S. commitment to European security will continue to be expressed first and foremost through NATO. We reaffirm that "the alliance is the essential forum for consultation among its members, and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of allies under the Washington Treaty."

But while NATO is central to our common purposes, it is not alone in pursuing goals consistent with the broadest definition of security. The UN, CSCE, EC, the NACC, the WEU and the Council of Europe have valuable roles to play—and each should be energized. Important progress has been made in developing complementary, interlocking institutions. But NATO needs to build more effective links for crisis prevention, management and communication among them to meet new challenges to European security.

With the United Nations, we should extend planning beyond ad hoc arrangements to a more systematic relationship. We must also seek to ensure that NATO states that are not members of the UN Security Council are nonetheless more engaged in reaching decisions that affect their interests. The United States supports the idea of establishing a contact group consisting of key contributors to peacekeeping activities.

The United States welcomes the development of a European security and defense identity. This will make our own commitment even more effective. Such an identity can also sustain and build popular support, in Europe, for meeting European commitments and responsibilities. We also welcome the opportunity to work more closely with France in alliance defense activities, and we look forward to expanding that cooperation.

NATO must develop closer ties with the WEU. But we should also recall our declared intention "to preserve the operational coherence we now have and on which our defense depends." And we must act on the premise that although the military capabilities of the two institutions are separable, they must not be seen as separate.

Fourth, we must create the basis for continent-wide security. In declarations of the North Atlantic Council since 1990, we have accepted the mandate for developing a system and practices of security that span the continent. All states need to implement reductions already placed on Cold War weaponry and further reduce any residual risks. And states left outside the security system could in time pose dangers to it. Outreach activities with NACC partners—and work with the CSCE—are vitally important. CSCE's innovative work on crisis management and conflict prevention is one of the most promising security experiments underway in Europe today.

Securing the full benefits of ending the Cold War depends on consolidating the place of the post-Communist states in the community of democratic nations. Western Europe has succeeded in replacing a thousand years of strife and turmoil in Europe with a new approach to security grounded in basic human values and the rule of law. Now the great test is whether it can be achieved in the East.

At an appropriate time, we may choose to enlarge NATO membership. But that is not now on the agenda.

Most important, we should intensify and expand the work program for the NACC and broaden its mandate. This institution has already proved its worth in involving post-Communist states with the West. It can and must become much more. For example, the NACC states should step up joint consultations, joint activities on peacekeeping, exchange of personnel, training in civil-military relations and joint exercises. We are once again prepared to contribute $500,000 to the NATO budget to support NACC activities, provided other allies contribute a proportionate share.
By our next meeting, we should agree upon an expanded NACC agenda, designed to draw post-Communist states more closely into the structure of security for the heart of Europe. At the same time, we should develop new ways for those European nations not in the NACC to participate in NATO work.

As Secretary of Defense Aspin reported to the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) two weeks ago, the United States is developing a strategic partnership with Russia, agreed upon by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin at Vancouver. We want to build similar relationships, based on commonly shared values and principles, with all the new post-Communist states. In building more partnerships, we will of course work closely with our NATO allies. We do not see these relationships as mutually exclusive or as a substitute for other bilateral or multilateral relationships.

President Clinton is also initiating a strategic partnership with Ukraine. Of course, it remains important that Ukraine fulfill its Lisbon Protocol commitments, ratify START I, and accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear state. Ukraine and other newly independent states of the former Soviet Union must also be integrated into European institutions—such as the NACC and CSCE—as the best assurance of their independence, security, and territorial integrity. I would be glad to report to you on Secretary Aspin’s and Ambassador Talbott’s recent trip to Ukraine in detail during the discussion period after lunch.

In recent years, the West has created a series of partially means-of-coordinating policy toward the post-Communist states in a number of areas, especially economic policy. But as yet, we have no shared strategic framework to link nations across the old East-West divide. We should strengthen the NAC—along with the NACC—as a central forum to discuss broad strategic policy. We need to ensure that we develop an approach that reaches out to Russia and all the new states of the region.

Fifth and finally, just as we recognize the importance of extending NATO’s role eastward on the continent, we must intensify cooperation on threats to allied interests arising from beyond Europe. We have learned that we must act against other threats to our common security from outside the North Atlantic area—whether or not the allies act together or through the institutions of the alliance.

We face no more urgent security threat than the potential spread of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them. NATO governments must work to achieve the unconditional and indefinite extension of the NPT at the 1995 Review Conference. But we must do even more. Proliferation is the emerging arms control agenda of the Nineties—and we must be prepared collectively to take stronger action. States seeking to threaten the peace by acquiring these weapons must know that we will oppose them.

Our proliferation agenda must also encompass new partners. Above all, we should cooperate with Russia and the NIS. All NATO governments have a direct interest in the rapid and safe dismantling of the former Soviet Union’s nuclear forces. This task is beyond the means of any one nation. And it will involve much greater costs if we do not combine our efforts to accelerate denuclearization now.

Mr. Secretary General, between now and our next meeting, let us work together to achieve concrete results in each of these five areas. Let us take specific steps to maintain NATO’s strength, improve peacemaking and peacekeeping, cooperate more closely with other institutions, extend security cooperation eastward, and respond to threats from beyond the Continent.

President Clinton has nominated a top-flight individual, Dr. Robert Hunter, to be the new U.S. Ambassador to NATO. We are eager to have him join the allies on the Council very soon. I have asked him to work closely with you in these key areas so that we can register progress at our next meeting.

Mr. Secretary General, I know that I have proposed an ambitious agenda for the North Atlantic Council during the next several months. But I believe it is an agenda appropriate to the challenges. We seek not to find new tasks to justify an old alliance, but to use this enduring alliance to face new threats. This agenda demonstrates that the North Atlantic Alliance is vital to us all.

Thank you.
Secretary Christopher

Transforming the NATO Alliance To Meet New Security Needs

Intervention before the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Istanbul, Turkey, June 9, 1994.

It is a pleasure to reconvene in the North Atlantic Council. I want to thank our Turkish hosts and express our appreciation for this spectacular meeting site on the banks of the Bosphorus. I also want to thank our distinguished Deputy Secretary General, Sergio Balanzino, who will lead our discussion.

Our thoughts today also are with Secretary General Woerner. President Clinton and I offer our best wishes for Manfred's full and rapid recovery. His strength, resilience, and courage inspire us all. His contribution to the renewal of this alliance has been remarkable.

Over the last week—in Italy, Britain, and France—President Clinton made clear once again that America's commitment to Europe is resolute. Before the French National Assembly on Tuesday, President Clinton set forth our shared strategic challenge in building a stronger and more integrated Europe based on security cooperation, market economies, and democratic institutions.

The President will reaffirm his vision of a broader Europe when he travels to Italy, Germany, and Poland next month. As the most hopeful chapter in European history is being written, the United States will continue to stand with the peoples of an undivided, democratic continent.

This past week, President Clinton reiterated the pledge he made at the Brussels summit to maintain roughly 100,000 American troops in Europe. He reaffirmed that our political engagement will continue to be reinforced by our military deployment. Our presence remains necessary to safeguard America's vital interests as well as Europe's.

The NATO alliance will remain the core of American engagement in Europe and the heart of European security. Since the Athens ministerial last June, we have renewed our efforts to reinforce the trans-Atlantic bond that NATO embodies. As we move ahead with the landmark decisions taken at the summit, we are transforming the alliance to meet the security needs of the post-Cold War world.

The threat now is not invasion from the East but instability in the East. In Central Europe, new market democracies are consolidating freedom and showing promising signs of economic growth. But democracy remains vulnerable in many countries that have emerged from the Soviet empire. Demagogues have played on ethnic divisions and economic dislocation to fuel aggression. Left unchecked, such tensions will frustrate the region's progress toward reform and ultimately threaten wider European security.

As President Clinton said last January in Brussels: "This period may decide whether the states of the former Soviet bloc are woven into the fabric of trans-Atlantic prosperity and security, or are simply left hanging in isolation." We must actively embrace the opportunity to help new democracies emerge as stable partners in security and trade.

At the Brussels summit, the alliance set two central, mutually reinforcing goals. The first was to design more flexible command structures and to address new security threats, such as weapons proliferation. The second and historic goal was to deepen our ties with the emerging democracies to the east. We invited them to participate in a broad range of political and military activities with alliance members, thereby paving the way for eventual expansion of the alliance.

We have made progress toward both these goals. Indeed, 1994 has been a year of immense significance for the alliance.

To achieve the first goal of increasing effectiveness, NATO has taken important decisions to support the efforts of allies to develop a more capable European Security and Defense Identity. That identity should maintain and build popular support in Europe for meeting European commitments and responsibilities and strengthen our collective capacity to respond to future security needs. It should also reinforce the trans-Atlantic relationship. We continue to look to our allies for a more balanced sharing of responsibilities.
Another important summit decision to achieve the first goal was to create Combined Joint Task Forces. We are making a promising start as we work to make this innovative concept a reality. Our objective remains to renew the alliance and to strengthen the Western European Union. We hope efforts in NATO and the WEU will enable us to take concrete decisions about CJTF at the December ministerial.

As part of advancing the same goal of improving alliance effectiveness, we are taking significant steps to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them. NATO must address this threat, both to complement other international efforts and to meet our solemn commitment to protect the security of alliance members.

I am pleased by the early work of the senior political-military and defense groups formed as a result of this initiative. We will affirm that progress today by approving an alliance policy framework on non-proliferation. This framework lays the political foundation for improving allied capabilities to protect against the threat, or use, of weapons of mass destruction. The defense group has agreed to examine threats, defense planning, military and doctrinal capabilities.

To achieve the second goal, the most significant decision reached at the NATO summit was the creation of the Partnership for Peace. The Partnership, proposed by President Clinton and adopted by the alliance, reaches out to the East in order to reassure new democracies and strengthen European security. In five short months, we can recognize a remarkable achievement. The Partnership has moved from a bare concept to become a working reality, a series of concrete relationships. Twenty countries have joined. I want to highlight two among the many steps we have taken thus far to make the Partnership operational.

First, Partner states are actively engaged at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, and will soon be present at the Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons working side by side with NATO military planners. The previously unimaginable is on the way to becoming routine.

Second, we will fulfill the summit’s call for Partnership peacekeeping exercises to begin in 1994. These exercises represent a remarkable transformation. Think of it: Troops that for half a century faced off against each other in the Cold War will come together in joint military exercises.

This fall, the Netherlands will host a field exercise, and Poland will host the first exercise on the soil of a partner country. SACLANT is organizing a Partnership maritime exercise, which will be held before the end of the year. In addition, the United States and other allies and partners will use already scheduled exercises to advance the Partnership’s goals. We expect at least 14 activities of this kind to occur before the end of the year. We are also developing a robust schedule of exercises for 1995.

These exercises of NATO units with their former adversaries will send a powerful message that the old East-West division of Europe is dead. These are real, concrete steps toward the integrated and strengthened Europe that President Clinton called for at the summit and again this past week.

We will also involve partners in many NATO committee and training activities. Together, alliance members and partners will develop practical means for addressing new threats to regional security. We will enable non-NATO countries to develop the habits of cooperation, such as defense planning, that are the lifeblood of the alliance.

We are committed to NATO’s expansion. Effective cooperation is a critical step in preparing partners for NATO membership. I want to underscore today what the President told East European leaders in Prague last January: “The Partnership changes the entire dialogue about enlarging NATO’s membership. Now the question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members, but when and how we will do so.”

Mr. Deputy Secretary General, as we consider NATO’s relationship with nations to the east, Russia will figure prominently in our deliberations. Russia is undertaking a difficult transformation that will have profound implications for the world. Whatever course its internal evolution may take, Russia is and will remain a vital actor in European security affairs. It is in our interest—and Russia’s—to develop broad, constructive interaction between NATO and Russia. The Partnership for Peace is central to that process.

We welcome Defense Minister Grachev’s recent statement that Russia will participate in the Partnership for Peace without preconditions. As NATO has said, each partner will sign the same framework document. But each partner will design its own presentation document and each will develop its unique independent Partnership program. Clearly, Russia has significant capabilities and inherent strengths upon which it can draw in developing a Partnership cooperation program that will serve the Partnership’s interests and enhance European security.

At the same time, Russia’s size, broad interests, resources, and military capabilities provide the basis for a productive relationship with NATO in addition to the Partnership for Peace. Properly designed and conducted, this relationship can serve the interests of all European countries. We recently welcomed Minister Grachev to NATO headquarters for an extremely valuable session. Where Russia can and is prepared to make a constructive contribution, periodic consultations and practical cooperation outside the Partnership would be natural and mutually beneficial.

For example, Russia’s nuclear capabilities establish an obvious basis for a dialogue on nuclear issues such as safe and secure weapons dismantle-ment. Cooperation between NATO and Russia to stem the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction would advance our shared interests.
Of course, other European states also may have interests or capabilities that would warrant "16-plus-one" consultations or cooperation with them outside the Partnership as appropriate. We should welcome those possibilities.

Bilateral relationships between Russia and individual allies complement Russia's relationship with NATO. The United States and other allies are developing bilateral political and military cooperation that will complement the work of the alliance.

Let me turn briefly to two important matters that have far-reaching implications for Russia's relations with NATO and for the overall course of European security. First, European stability depends on respecting the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of all the states that emerged from the Soviet empire. We recognize Russia's legitimate concerns in this region, but we have made it clear that no country has a right to assert a role that is inconsistent with international norms.

A second key feature of Europe's stability and security is the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. The United States is committed to maintaining the integrity of the treaty over the long term. We welcome discussion of any implementation questions among CFE signatories in the forum created by the treaty—the Vienna Joint Consultative Group.

An important area where Russia and members of the alliance have cooperated productively is in working to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia. This alliance—indeed, all nations concerned with the future of Europe and standards of human decency—remains deeply concerned about the continued fighting in Bosnia. That brutal and tragic conflict, the most savage fighting in Europe since 1945, cries out for resolution.

We remain convinced that this conflict can be resolved only through negotiations. We know that NATO cannot impose a solution. Since our last meeting, NATO has supported UN efforts to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia. Without question, our efforts have decreased the level of violence and destruction. NATO's February 9 ultimatum ended the shelling of Sarajevo. We enforced the no-fly zone over Bosnia. NATO's April 22 decision ended the brutal attacks on civilians in Gorazde. We all recognize the leadership of the Government of Italy in providing bases for allied operations in these vital endeavors.

These and previous NATO actions, including sanctions enforcement, demonstrate our ability to make difficult decisions as 16 allies. NATO's firm actions show, as President Clinton has said, that the alliance "can still be a credible force for peace in the post-Cold War era." Those actions continue to provide crucial support to the United Nations and to save innocent lives. NATO has demonstrated in Bosnia that it is the only international institution with that capability.

We are now at a critical point in our efforts to find a negotiated solution. Working together, the EU, the UN, Russia, and the United States have made good progress in putting together a territorial proposal that we believe could serve as a reasonable basis for a settlement. Our hope is that this proposal will be accepted by both sides, and that yesterday's cease-fire agreement is a step toward a nationwide cessation of hostilities. If these efforts succeed, we can turn our attention and resources to the task of implementing a peace agreement and helping reconstruct war-torn Bosnia. We must expect, however, that the compromises necessary for peace will not come easily. The alliance must stand ready as before to back up the diplomatic process. And NATO allies must remain engaged in this effort.

The international community, and NATO in particular, are powerful forces helping to resolve this conflict. We must stay at it until we get the job done. We can contain the conflict. We can facilitate talks. We can help shape solutions. We can volunteer the military forces essential for implementing a final agreement. And I want clearly to reaffirm the commitment of the United States to participate in this vital task.

The war in Bosnia remains a grave threat to our goal of an integrated Europe. It threatens to draw other fragile democracies into a wider war. And violent nationalism undermines the security of all European nations.

The United States is committed to greater integration among European democracies, East and West. We are determined to extend to the East the benefits—and obligations—of the same liberal trading and security order that have been pillars of strength for the West. That is the best way to secure the gains of democracy in the East. That is the best way to ensure that a wider war never engulfs Europe again.

Yesterday in Paris, many of us were present when the OECD decided to start membership negotiations with the Visegrad countries. We decided to intensify OECD activities in other Central and Eastern European countries. The OECD also signed a cooperation agreement with Russia.

We have sought to extend economic institutions to the East because we understand that the quest for security in Europe cannot rely on security institutions alone. It also must rely on the political and economic reconstruction of newly democratic nations. Our experience in Western Europe after the Second World War taught us that economic integration is essential to anchor stability among rebuilding nations. That is why we must lower the remaining trade barriers that limit the East's exports and its potential for lasting growth.

With the Cold War past, the doors of the West must be open to open societies and open markets to the East. By widening the reach of NATO and of organizations like the OECD, the EU, and the GATT, we will strengthen the prosperity of an undivided Europe and bolster the security that this alliance continues to preserve.
Secretary Christopher

Toward a More Integrated World


It is a pleasure to be the first American Secretary of State to attend an OECD Ministerial in more than a decade, and a pleasure to join Secretary Brown in today's proceedings. Let me take this opportunity to express my government's appreciation for Secretary General Paye's many contributions to the OECD over the past decade. He has earned our gratitude.

I am especially pleased to be here today as the OECD welcomes its first new member nation in more than 20 years. By doing so, it reaffirms its scope as a truly global organization. I want to congratulate my neighbor and friend, Foreign Minister Tello.

Mexico's commitment to economic reform and free trade have earned it the respect of the world. Now it can assume new responsibilities as a contributor to the OECD's important work.

Today, this organization is taking historic steps almost unimaginable five years ago. We have agreed to start membership negotiations with four of the new democracies to the East: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, and with South Korea as well. We hope that these five nations will attain full membership as soon as possible. And today we also will sign a cooperation agreement with the Russian Federation to extend the OECD's unique expertise to the great task of building a market economy in Russia.

With these actions, the OECD renews the purpose that inspired Jean Monnet, George Marshall, and other post-war leaders of long vision and strong will: to build a democratic and integrated Europe, and a more peaceful and prosperous world. Today, these goals are within sight.

We are gathered this morning at a historic site. It was here, after the Second World War, that the challenge of building peace and reconciliation was addressed. The United States and Western Europe understood, as George Marshall expressed it, that a "working economy" had to be revived "to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist."

The OECD evolved from that effort. Its predecessor, the Organization for European Economic Co-operation, helped coordinate post-war reconstruction under the Marshall Plan. As the first European institution dedicated to economic cooperation, the OEEC was a catalyst for economic recovery and integration on the western half of this continent. In the words of its first Secretary-General, Robert Marjolin, our predecessors were "convinced that the different European countries were indissolubly linked in their destinies."

That we can meet today in a vibrant city, in a prosperous Western Europe at peace, is a tribute to the success of their work. But to the east, the scourges that George Marshall described almost 50 years ago, "hunger, poverty, despotism, and chaos," still are vivid in the memory of nations that never had the chance to share our prosperity. These scourges are especially vivid in the former Yugoslavia. And they threaten the nations that emerged from the former Soviet Union.

Marshall's vision, and Monnet's, encompassed all of Europe, but the reality of their time could not. The Eastern European nations were invited to join the Marshall Plan, but Soviet leaders would not allow it. The benefits of Western European reconstruction and integration were denied by the absolute divisions of the Cold War.

With the end of the Cold War, we cannot allow new divisions to arise. Europe must not be split into zones of prosperity and poverty, stability and insecurity. We must now extend to the East the benefits—and obligations—of the same liberal trading and security order that have been pillars of strength for the West.

Tomorrow, many of us will meet in the North Atlantic Council in Istanbul to review our progress in renewing NATO, especially through the Partnership for Peace. In Istanbul, we will continue to develop the important network of relationships with our new partners to the East.

By widening the reach of NATO, and of organizations like the OECD, we will strengthen the security and prosperity of an undivided, democratic Europe.

I believe that the OECD, with its unique capabilities, can be a model and an instrument of wider integration in the post-Cold War world—just as its
predecessor was during the early Cold War years in Western Europe. The OECD can perform its core function as a forum for policy analysis and coordination at a time of accelerating economic change. And it can help complete the unfinished business of postwar reconstruction, in a new era and on a wider scale, by helping more countries throughout the world enter the community of advanced industrial nations.

Last January in Prague, President Clinton announced that the United States supported early entry into the OECD for the Visegrad countries, four nations that, in his words, have "confounded skeptics and surprised even the optimists." By undertaking the process leading to membership, they will push market reform further and ultimately lift economic growth and the living standards of their people.

The United States has strongly supported the OECD's Center for Economies in Transition and its efforts to forge closer links with other nations in Eastern Europe and the new Independent States. As we learned in the years after the Second World War, economic cooperation is the best way to promote stability.

Five years ago, the countries of Eastern Europe won their freedom and helped cement ours. If we no longer fear a Third World War, if we can envision a Europe no longer riven by repression or conflict, we owe it in part to the struggles of men and women in Gdansk and Vilnius and Prague and Sofia.

The Visegrad states have the potential to form one of the world's fastest-growing economic regions. Poland, for example, already has one of the highest growth rates in Europe, a budget deficit lower than the European average, and declining inflation.

But expectations in the East have outpaced living standards. Market reforms have caused short-term pain. It continues to be in the interest of the world's advanced industrial democracies to help ensure that dislocation does not lead to disillusionment with democratic institutions and free markets. That is why the United States has provided more than $8 billion to support reform efforts in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989.

But economic assistance is not enough. We all must urge these countries to build legal, tax, and regulatory structures that will attract additional private capital to the region. These steps will complement the difficult actions already taken to privatize factories, reduce subsidies, and lower tariffs.

If the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have the courage to take these painful but necessary steps, we must be prepared to do our part. As President Clinton has said, "it will make little sense for us to applaud their market reforms on the one hand while offering only selective access to our markets or the other." We must lower the remaining trade barriers that limit their nations' exports and potential for development. Market access is not just an economic issue. At stake are the prospects for democracy and stability across Europe.

There is no reason why our institutions or our aspirations should stop at old frontiers of the Cold War. I believe that encouraging Russia's integration with the West is the best investment we can make in our security, and in the security of all the peoples of Europe. Integration will bring benefits to Russia—not only expanded trade and investment, but participation in military arrangements with NATO and political discussions with the G-7 nations. Integration also will require Russia to accept the obligations we all share: to pursue sound economic policies; to uphold democracy; to respect the rights of other countries.

It is, of course, Russia's choice whether to take the path of integration. But we must do everything we can to encourage it to choose that path. Russia's recent agreement with the IMF is evidence that its government, under the leadership of President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, continues to make progress in stabilizing its economy. Substantial progress already has been made in privatization and decentralization—the twin reform objectives at the center of our assistance efforts. As a result, an increasing amount of Russian economic life is no longer controlled by the rigid hand of the state.

The agreement the OECD will conclude today with Russia is a welcome step. It will allow the OECD to provide expertise on structural reform and to carry out in-depth analyses of the Russian economy—just as it does each year, with such integrity and objectivity, for its members.

Our response to Russia's reforms, and to those of its neighbors, should be based on a simple proposition. The community of market democracies is not a closed club. It is open to open societies. It is open to open markets. It is open to freedom everywhere.

The OECD had its origins in Europe; its initial membership was transatlantic. But with Japan a member for three decades and Australia and New Zealand for more than two, and with Mexico joining this year, the time has come for the OECD to evolve further as a global organization. It must create new and flexible relationships with non-member nations of growing economic importance.

An open, creative, and dynamic OECD can help enlarge the community of free and prosperous nations throughout the world. The opportunity is there. South Africa has emerged as a source of healing and hope—and a potential catalyst for economic development in Southern Africa. In Asia, we have seen dramatic growth, ranging from India to China to South Korea. In Latin America, liberalization is opening markets, cutting tariffs, and creating jobs.

The United States welcomes the OECD's dialogue with dynamic economies in Asia and Latin America. We hope that South Korea will follow Mexico as a full member. The OECD can also assume a new importance in
the architecture of the global economy, as a bridge between Atlantic and Pacific industrial economies.

Just as European integration began with economic cooperation, so must the challenge of global integration. Implementation of the Uruguay Round is a critical task for us all. The world’s advanced industrial democracies share a responsibility to sustain and strengthen the liberal world trading system that has allowed our economies to grow and our peoples to prosper. Now we must meet that great responsibility.

Cordell Hull, a distinguished predecessor of mine who served Franklin D. Roosevelt as Secretary of State, did more than any statesman of his time to make America a champion of the liberal world trading system. He knew that open trade was good economics. He also knew, as he put it, that “when goods move, soldiers don’t.”

President Clinton is committed to passing legislation to implement the Uruguay Round in this calendar year. The legislation will be submitted to our Congress this summer, and I am confident that it will be approved. This agreement is in the overriding interest of America and the world. Each of our nations must approve the Uruguay Round this year to ensure that the most far-reaching trade agreement in history takes effect by January 1, 1995.

By approving the Round, we will open markets, boost confidence, spur growth, and create jobs. We will help new market democracies carry out difficult economic reform. We will help ensure that the post-Cold War world is not divided into new blocs: not North against South; not rich against poor; not North America against Europe or Asia.

We also must move ahead with a strong World Trade Organization to set the stage for a new century of prosperity. The WTO can strengthen the multilateral trading system through new rules and disciplines. The OECD can help it address the next generation of trade issues: the intersection of trade with investment, labor standards, and the environment.

New rules are also needed in other areas to make trade more efficient and equitable. Our nations will not have open competition unless we have clean competition. Our ability to advance economic development will be undermined as long as bribery distorts the allocation of resources, saps accountable government, and subverts the rule of law.

The United States has long sought to build an international consensus against the bribery of foreign officials in international business transactions. Last October, I proposed on my country’s behalf an initiative to advance this vital objective. Now OECD member nations have committed themselves to take “concrete and meaningful” steps to stop illicit payments by their firms. We must mount a sustained campaign against bribery. With endorsement of the agreement at this ministerial meeting today, we can move from the discussion phase to the action phase of this campaign.

The campaign against illicit payments is a prime example of the OECD’s new, more activist role. The agreements we have reached with the Visegrad states and with Russia show that the OECD is playing its part in integrating Europe. The accession of Mexico, and the likelihood that South Korea will join soon, demonstrate the OECD’s global reach.

The United States sees a broader role for the OECD but it also encourages its reform. The OECD must live within its means and streamline its operations and decision-making. It must focus its priorities on areas where it has a comparative advantage, such as structural analysis. A recent example is the seminal Growth and Employment Study that is helping our nations tackle the central task of job creation.

That the OECD is changing and growing is a mark of progress not only for the institution but for the world. It means that the sphere of advanced, industrial democracies is growing. It means that economic cooperation is enlarging the circle of prosperity.

As Jean Monnet once said, “Nothing is lasting without institutions.” The gains of freedom will endure only if we have the foresight to extend to new nations the institutions that have served us so well for so long.

Let us summon the confidence and the sense of common purpose that guided us through the last half century. Let us gain inspiration from the vision of Marshall and Monnet. Now that we can, let us strengthen our security by extending to others the blessings our predecessors secured for us.
NATO Plus

Throughout Central and Eastern Europe, including the states of the former Soviet Union, democracy and reform are developing but are not yet secure. They are being assaulted by extremists who feed on economic dislocation and fuel hypernationalism. Many of these nations fear the resurrection of centuries-old interstate rivalries and revanchist ambitions. Left unchecked, these tensions could frustrate progress toward reform and ultimately threaten the stability of Western Europe itself.

The states to the east of NATO—some with a proud democratic tradition, others with little or none—are yearning for a closer relationship with Western institutions, especially NATO. Forming such links in this crucial period of transition will give democracy and reform more than a fighting chance to succeed.

That is why President Clinton has proposed a Partnership for Peace to deepen NATO's engagement with the East and draw the new democracies into the West. The partnership will be open to all members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (the NACC, which includes the states of the former Warsaw Pact and the former Soviet Union) as well as other European countries.

The partnership will allow the forces of non-NATO states to develop a practical working relationship with NATO forces as they plan, train and exercise side by side. The partnership will have a planning group to organize joint training and exercises and to prepare for possible joint operations. That group will work directly with NATO military planners. We will build capabilities to address challenges to our common security.

Active partners will have representation at NATO headquarters and participate in the alliance's political and military bodies. Whenever there is an imminent threat to the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any partner state, it will have the explicit right to consult and engage in intense political dialogue with alliance members. Establishing such a right is an important step in assuaging the insecurity felt by—-and reinforcing political ties with—a number of states in Central and Eastern Europe.

The partnership will not alter NATO's core mission of defense of the alliance. Nor will it interfere with NATO's integrated command structure, decision-making mechanisms or mutual commitments for collective defense. In fact, it will help adapt NATO's capabilities in vital areas such as crisis management, humanitarian relief and peacekeeping.

The alliance is central to the task of transforming NATO to meet the tests of the post-Cold War era. It offers nations that seek to join NATO a means to prepare for the obligations of membership. Each state can determine its level of involvement in the partnership. Those that choose active engagement in the partnership will begin to develop the habits of cooperation and the routines of consultation that are the lifeblood of the alliance. And as Gen. John Shalikashvili has said, the Partnership for Peace will give NATO's members the joint procedures, the joint operating experience, the joint training experiences that are so absolutely vital to making an alliance like NATO work.

As a logical corollary to the Partnership for Peace proposal, the United States will seek a clear statement of principle at the summit that the door is open to expanding the alliance. We envision an evolutionary process of expansion from which neither Central and Eastern Europe, nor Russia, Ukraine and other states of the former Soviet Union would necessarily be excluded. We believe that a step-by-step approach to expansion will achieve the twin objectives of increasing the confidence of Central and Eastern European states while not inflaming the passions of extremist elements, particularly in Russia, that perceive an expanded NATO as a military threat.

NATO members will retain the exclusive right to decide when and how new members will be added. Participation in the partnership will build the qualifications necessary for membership, but participation alone will not guarantee membership. NATO's decisions on membership will be based on a realistic assessment of the needs of trans-Atlantic security and on each candidate's ability—as demonstrated through the Partnership for Peace—to take on the mutual defense responsibilities of member states. Most important, as outlined in the North Atlantic Treaty, a prospective new member will have to demonstrate that it adheres to the principles of democracy, individual liberty and respect for human rights, the rule of law, the peaceful settlement of disputes, the inviolability of national boundaries—in short, the values that NATO embodies and that have made the alliance the bulwark of freedom in the free world.

The partnership and the evolutionary approach to NATO expansion are an investment in the proposition that there need be no common enemies in the future. We want Russia to take its place in the new European security architecture. But Russia must assume its share of responsibility, both in how it defines its statehood and in its relationship with the states of the former Soviet Union. Russia must avoid any attempt to reconstitute the U.S.S.R. Its conduct toward other states must conform to international standards, avoiding the temptation to rely on the old Soviet practices of intimidation and domination.

Should Russia turn away from this new path, we can reevaluate our approach to trans-Atlantic security and NATO's strategic priorities.

The administration's proposals for Partnership for Peace and the principle of structured, gradual NATO expansion have gained substantial support in Europe, both among alliance members and the governments of Central and Eastern Europe. Yet the administration's approach has been criticized in some quarters. Some fear that our proposals go too far, potentially diluting the alliance's effectiveness. Others fear that the partnership is too little and may leave Central and Eastern Europe exposed to what some perceive as Russia's imperial ambitions. These fears are misplaced. The partnership we propose will in no way supplant the alliance. NATO's strength is rooted in its political and military cohesion and in the solid commitment of the United States to European security. The alliance will never add members at the expense of military readiness or effectiveness.

As Sen. Sam Nunn recently noted, NATO must weigh carefully the resource requirements and changes in strategy that would accompany any expansion. At the same time, we should attach no talismanic significance to the present number of NATO members. If the alliance fails to reach out to the East and ultimately embrace it, NATO may well sow the seeds of the very instability it seeks to prevent.

A NATO that does not adapt itself to the new security challenges facing Europe risks being pulled apart by the centrifugal forces of apathy and parsimony as budget-conscious governments in the West respond to an increasingly skeptical public.

But if there is long-term danger in keeping NATO as it is, there is immediate danger in changing it too rapidly. Swift expansion of NATO eastward could make a neo-imperialist Russia a self-fulfilling prophecy. It would risk redividing Europe by drawing new lines and unintentionally replicating a bit farther to the east, the line of confrontation that we persevered for four decades to overcome. In addition, premature expansion could lead to the inclusion of states that are not ready—politically or militarily—for the responsibilities of membership.

In adapting NATO to face the security challenges in post-Cold War Europe, we seek to maintain the alliance as the anchor of trans-Atlantic security. Yet NATO alone will not be enough to make reform in the East succeed. Trans-Atlantic security depends not only on political and military cooperation but also on sustaining the hard march of economic reform. Those European nations making the difficult transition to free market democracy must be able to deliver tangible benefits to their peoples. Western nations and institutions have a responsibility to assist that effort, especially by widening access to Western markets.

Through more inclusive patterns of trade, we will accelerate reform and advance prosperity. Beginning tomorrow in Brussels, when we extend NATO's cooperation with the East, we will lay a foundation of security on which a democratic and prosperous Europe can rest.

An alliance that does not adapt itself to the new security challenges facing Europe risks being pulled apart.
Secretary Christopher

Strengthening the Atlantic Alliance
Through a Partnership for Peace

Remarks at the intervention at the
North Atlantic Council Ministerial
Meeting, NATO Headquarters,

I am delighted to be with you for this
ever important meeting of the
North Atlantic Council. First let
me pay tribute to our Secretary
General. Manfred Woerner deserves
tremendous credit for his leadership,
determination and dedication. We are
all in his debt. Let me add that I have
valued the exchanges that I’ve had in
recent weeks with many of my col-
leagues here today as we have ap-
proached this ministerial.

Last June in Athens, on behalf of
President Clinton, I proposed a NATO
summit. Today, we must ensure that
the Brussels summit that is just six
weeks away is successful for our
Alliance and for each of our member
countries.

At the summit, President Clinton
will articulate his vision of transatlantic
security and prosperity—and the
strong and unbreakable link between
the United States and Europe. The
President recognizes that American
leadership remains indispensable. And
he is determined that the United
States will continue to provide that
leadership because it is profoundly in
the interest of both the United States
and Europe to do so.

The security of our Alliance
depends not only on our military
capability. Security also depends
fundamentally on our ability to consoli-
date democratic institutions, ensure
respect for human rights, and sustain
the hard march of economic reform to
eventual prosperity. Each of these
post-Cold War elements of security
must advance—or none of them will.

Western leaders in the late 1940s
created the institutions that enabled
Western Europe to rebuild and renew
itself after the Second World War.
Their foresight and fortitude and the
steadfastness of their successors
enabled our values to prevail in a long
and bitter Cold War. And millions of
people, for the first time in their lives,
have the chance to enjoy political
freedom and economic opportunity.

We must resolve to secure and
expand the blessings of peace that our
predecessors did so much to achieve.
We must address the insecurity and
instability that have come with the
demise of the Soviet empire. We must
build the structures and the patterns of
cooperation that will help to ensure the
success of democracy and free markets
in the East. We must move decisively
beyond the age of confrontation in
Europe when the balance of power was
a poor substitute for a concert of free
peoples. We must infuse this Alliance
with the new vision and vitality that
earned many of our distinguished
predecessors the mantle of statesman-
ship.

We have many issues to decide.
But the Alliance must also make an
historic choice. That choice is whether
to embrace innovation or risk irrele-
vanvce.

We must adapt this Alliance to the
new security challenges that confront
Europe today. At the same time, we
must strengthen the core political
coopération, security commitments and
military capabilities that have kept the
16 strong and free. We must act to
revitalize the Alliance's continued
central role in European security and
in the transatlantic partnership.

We all recognize that our most
important summit task is to decide how
the Atlantic Alliance will reach out to
the East. Two years ago, we created
the North Atlantic Cooperation
Council—the NACC. With the Part-
nership for Peace, we can now deepen
NATO's engagement with the East.
We must demonstrate that the West is
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democracies address some of their most
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We should extend an invitation to
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We envision defense cooperation
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The Partnership will be a military
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activities, it will have a strong political dimension. The Allies should provide all participants in the Partnership with a pledge of consultation in the event of threats to their security. And for partners once part of the communist world, this cooperation will help adapt defense structures to civilian control.

The Partnership will enhance regional stability. It will develop capabilities to meet contingencies, including crisis management, humanitarian missions and peace-keeping. It will develop useful habits of cooperation. It will enable us to develop common military standards and procedures. Peace partners will train side-by-side with NATO members and take part in joint exercises. To ensure operational effectiveness, the Partnership should have a planning group in Mons and should make full use of the political and military institutions of NATO here in Brussels. Active partners will have permanent representatives to take part in the work of these organizations when dealing with Partnership matters.

Our new partners should finance their own involvement, but some new NATO resources will be necessary. There will be costs, but of a manageable size. The United States stands ready to contribute its share, and it is essential that all Allies do the same.

Let me be clear with respect to a very important issue that the Partnership raises. The Partnership is an important step in its own right. But it can also be a key step toward NATO membership. While many factors will enter into decisions about expanding NATO membership, active participation in Partnership activities will help prepare countries to meet the obligations of membership.

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The most immediate task is to develop the overall policy framework to NATO efforts against proliferation. We envision a senior group at 16, with representatives of both foreign and defense ministers. NATO supports, but should not duplicate, non-proliferation efforts underway through other institutions and negotiations.

Our non-proliferation agenda should be consistent with our essential mission of protecting the security of our members. We must adapt Alliance military strategy and capabilities to deter the use of weapons of mass destruction and protect against their use. We must intensify our individual and collective efforts to isolate states that actively pose proliferation threats.

I also want to comment on Bosnia, particularly the humanitarian situation. While we welcome the resumption of the peace negotiations, the most pressing fact is that winter has descended. The United States has therefore announced an additional contribution of $150 million to increase the food, winterization supplies, refugee assistance and medical aid reaching the people of Bosnia. We are prepared as part of this effort to double the number of U.S. flights in the Sarajevo airlift, double the amount of relief provided by air drops, and begin airlifting supplies into Tuzla airport if it can be opened. We call upon other governments and regional organizations to increase their commitments to help the people of Bosnia survive this winter.

Let me raise one final issue that is not on our agenda today but that each of our nations must also address. Last June at our Athens ministerial, I made a statement in this forum with respect to the Uruguay Round. Let me repeat that advancing transatlantic security requires us to focus not only on renewing the NATO Alliance but also on successfully concluding the GATT negotiations.

Our publics and parliaments understand that transatlantic relations cannot be overly compartmentalized—either substantively or institutionally.

As great allies and great powers, Europe and the United States share great responsibilities. We are partners in a community of shared values and interests. Our values and interests converge in this Alliance—and they converge in a successful conclusion to the Uruguay Round. Through NATO and through GATT, we can reinforce transatlantic security and prosperity—and reaffirm the transatlantic partnership. We have the chance to construct the architecture of a better world.

Since the end of the Second World War, together we have created and sustained a successful liberal trading order. That system has allowed our economies to grow and our people to prosper. Now we have an historic opportunity to open markets further, to the benefit of our nations on both sides of the Atlantic.

These are momentous weeks for the West. By December 15, we have the responsibility to come together and lift the global economy. On January 10, we have the responsibility to come together and renew the most successful Alliance in history. The United States and Europe share these responsibilities—and we must meet them.
Secretary Christopher

The CSCE Vision: European Security Rooted in Shared Values

Since then, significant progress has been achieved. But our vision is far from being fully realized. Nations have been reborn and ethnic identities vigorously asserted. But aggressive and often myopic nationalism has emerged, and vicious ethnic conflicts have erupted. The foundations of democratic institutions are being laid, but their structures are not all built. A free press is a commonly embraced ideal but is not a common reality. The hard march toward economic reform has begun, but widespread economic hardship persists.

The CSCE is a creative and inclusive institution. We must harness its unique capabilities to help mold a new Europe secured by democratic institutions, respect for human rights and growing prosperity. That is the only basis for a future Europe at peace.

An abiding concern and respect for human dignity is a linchpin of American foreign policy. We recognize that in the United States, we have not yet formed a perfect union. But we are constantly striving to ensure that all individuals are accorded respect and protection.

This concern for human rights affects every one of America's relationships in the world. Although it is not the sole principle guiding us, an American foreign policy that lacked a commitment to international human rights would not be true to our nation's ideals or interests.

Every CSCE state is pledged to respect and protect the rights of all individuals. On both sides of the Atlantic, we share strong interest in building respect for diversity, in enfranchising minorities, and in offering every person a stake and a say in national life. As the fall of the Soviet empire demonstrates, no state can achieve long-term stability and prosperity without an open society and a fundamental commitment to human rights.

From its earliest days, the CSCE has helped legitimize international concern about how a country treats its citizens. Human rights must remain at the forefront of the CSCE agenda. The High Commissioner on National Minorities has contributed significantly to the protection of minorities, from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to Slovakia to Albania. The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights has effectively organized human rights missions and monitored elections.

Serious human rights abuses still occur in the former Yugoslavia, in Turkmenistan, in Tajikistan, in Uzbekistan and in other CSCE states. We must work to stop these violations.

Safeguarding human rights requires free and vigorous media. As a great Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, the late Benjamin Cardozo, once said, "Freedom of expression is the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom."

We must watch carefully to make sure that freedom of expression is not merely proclaimed but practiced in the fledgling democracies. As they adopt
new constitutions and laws, the CSCE should insist that freedom of the press
and broadcast media be fully protected
and free from state interference.
Progress has been made in securing
freedom for the print media, despite
persistent restrictions on distribution
and on the availability of newsprint.
An even greater obstacle to building
open societies is the lack of progress in
broadcast freedom. Television is
democracy's "biggest megaphone," and
it must not become the captive of any
one party.
Addressing human rights violations
and threats to fundamental freedoms is
only a part of the challenge we face.
We must also deal with the conse-
quences of a conflict that has defied
resolution, where the parties have so
far stubbornly refused to end the
bloodshed and killing.
This winter, the snows have come
early to Bosnia, and the humanitarian
crisis there has deepened. In these
tragic circumstances, the United States
will increase its humanitarian efforts to
help alleviate the suffering. We will
work closely with the UNHCR in
identifying the most effective uses of
that aid. As the largest single donor
country, we have already provided well
over $400 million in assistance to the
former Yugoslavia since the outbreak
Today I am announcing an addi-
tional American contribution of
$150 million, targeted to programs and
organizations providing the most
critical aspects of winter relief. Our
goal is to increase the food, winteriza-
tion supplies, refugee assistance and
medical aid reaching the people of
Bosnia, through the following steps:

First, we are prepared to double the
number of U.S. flights that are part of
the multi-nation Sarajevo airlift. This
effort, in which the United States now
flies roughly one-third of all missions,
has launched a total of 6,000 flights
during its 500-day history. This
airborne lifeline, the principal means of
supply for Sarajevo, has now exceeded
in duration the Berlin airlift of 1948.

Second, we are prepared to begin
airlifting needed supplies to the airport
at Tuzla upon its opening. We will also
provide the equipment needed to keep
it open. That airport could become a
crucial point of access for humanitarian
aid for all groups. Thus far, the Serbs
and Croats have made it impossible to
use the field for that purpose. We call
upon all warring parties to stop their
unconscionable conduct that blocks the
delivery of critically needed supplies
through this facility. We also call upon
the warring parties to live up to their
recently signed agreements to permit
secure land access for relief convoys.
The warring parties must see that this
is in their best interests. Full access
will serve the vital needs of all Bosnia's
factions.

Third, our new contribution will
intensify the air drop campaign. Over
the last eight months, the continuous
air drops of food and supplies for the
most isolated and endangered communi-
ties have meant the difference
between life and death for thousands of
Bosnians. Having flown almost 80% of
the missions, having dropped more
than 10 million meals, we know that
this program is critical. Our new funds
will permit doubling the amount of
relief we provide in this vital effort.
We will also include essential wint-
erization materials in the air drop
packages, helping those in the most
isolated locations to survive a harsh
winter.

Fourth, we have decided to use the
U.S. military medical facility in Zagreb
to provide medical services to severely
wounded Bosnian children.

We call upon other governments
and regional organizations, such as the
Organization of the Islamic Conference,
to increase their commitments to help
the innocent people of Bosnia survive
this winter. But whatever we do to
help, it will not be enough. So long as
the armed conflict continues, it is not
humanly possible to end the suffering
of the people of Bosnia. The only
answer is to bring the fighting to an
end, and the only means to that end is a
negotiated settlement. The United
States encourages and supports
diplomatic efforts to produce a peace
agreement for Bosnia.

Two specific CSCE activities
deserve our unqualified support: the
work of the sanctions assistance
monitors in the Balkans and the
Skopje-based mission to contain the
Yugoslav conflict. These activities are
not only vital to an eventual settle-
ment; they also demonstrate our
determination to prevent the spread,
and raise the cost, of aggression.

We condemn any interference with
CSCE monitoring efforts in the former
Yugoslavia. The United States regards
the Serbian expulsion of CSCE moni-
tors from Kosovo, Vojvodina and
Sandzak as totally unjustified. We
urge the CSCE to continue pressing
Serbian authorities to permit the
monitors to return, and to cease all
interference with CSCE efforts to
report on events in these regions.

As we try to ease the pain and end
the conflict in the Balkans, we must
uphold international humanitarian law
and insist on justice for the victims of
war crimes and other human rights
abuses. Those who commit atrocities
must be held accountable for their
actions. The United States fully
supports the War Crimes Tribunal,
which began its work on November 17.
The Tribunal has the authority neces-
sary to bring war criminals to justice,
whenever they may be and wherever
they may be found. No nation that
harbors individuals who are indicted
and called by the Tribunal—or that in
any other way interferes with its
work—can expect to be regarded as
members of the international commu-
nity in good standing. The work of the
Tribunal will help to deter those who
would settle ethnic and territorial
disputes through attacks on civilians.

We must also focus on preventing
and resolving conflicts elsewhere on
the continent. Today, in Rome, we
should reach decisions to strengthen
CSCE's ability to build a secure
Europe. In particular, we must act to
improve CSCE's capacity for early
warning and prevention of conflicts.

The CSCE is already on the cutting
edge of preventive diplomacy. In
Moldova, Estonia, Latvia, Georgia,
Tajikistan and Nagorno-Karabakh, as
well as in the former Yugoslavia,
CSCE missions are moving to prevent
conflict, stem its spread, and halt open
warfare. The members of those mis-
sions should feel proud of their perfor-
formance under difficult and dangerous conditions where ethnic strife and human rights violations tear the very fabric of states and cultures. While we have made a good beginning, it is only a beginning. We must do more, particularly in the new independent states where CSCE can provide vital assistance to reformers seeking to build independent, democratic societies.

In Georgia, we must redouble our efforts to assist the government in achieving peace and stability while ensuring respect for human rights and the country’s territorial integrity. In Moldova, a strengthened mandate for our mission can help all parties create a political framework for peace and assist in the early departure of remaining Russian forces. In Tajikistan, quickly establishing a small mission on the ground can aid international efforts to promote the political reconciliation needed to bring stability to that troubled region.

In Nagorno-Karabakh, the continued suffering of hundreds of thousands of refugees and the danger of renewed hostilities compel us to intensify efforts to end the conflict. With Italy’s leadership, the Minsk Group has made significant progress in finding common ground among the parties. Now it is time for all parties to accept the timetable so painstakingly crafted by the negotiators of that forum. We know that Sweden, the new chair of the Minsk Group, will vigorously pursue that objective.

CSCE’s involvement in these conflicts also highlights the challenge to reach a consensus on guidelines for CSCE oversight of regional peacekeeping. The United States believes the CSCE must be clear about the military activities our members consider appropriate. And it is time to develop the instruments to ensure that forces engaged in peacekeeping execute their responsibilities with strict neutrality and in good faith.

We must also make better use of the full range of CSCE conflict prevention tools, from the “Human Dimension” mechanism to the peaceful settlement-of-disputes mechanism agreed to at Stockholm. At this meeting, we will adopt an American proposal to develop a “rapid reaction roster.” I am pleased that this decision will allow us to draw more fully on diplomats and experts from the public and private sectors—individuals who are prepared to deploy quickly to reinforce or initiate a mission. The United States has assigned officers as full-time monitors to support CSCE missions and has contributed substantial funds. We are doing our part, and we urge every CSCE state to do the same.

The CSCE must also do its part by streamlining its decision-making process. CSCE’s value depends on its flexibility, its relative lack of bureaucracy, and its capacity for innovation. These advantages must be maintained.

The CSCE can also promote regional stability, especially through the untapped potential of its Forum on Security Cooperation. A safe Europe cannot permit the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The CSCE’s security principles commit us to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of other states. These principles form the basis of the security assurances we are prepared to provide the non-Russian new independent states where we seek to eliminate nuclear weapons. We applaud the action of Belarus in ratifying START and adhering to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty agreements. We welcome the move by Kazakhstan to ratify START and President Nazarbayev’s pledge to adhere to the NPT. And we call on Ukraine to ratify the START agreement, adhere to the NPT, and meet its obligations under the Lisbon Protocol at the earliest possible date.

As we strengthen the CSCE, we must also adapt other regional institutions. We can promote more durable European security through interlocking structures, each with complementary roles and strengths. NATO stands at the center of transatlantic security, and it will remain the central point of engagement for the United States in European security. We are working with our European allies to adapt NATO to the new challenges of an undivided Europe—and to turn former adversaries into new partners for peace.

We have proposed to our NATO allies a Partnership for Peace that will extend practical security cooperation to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council partners and other European nations. At the same time, we propose to open the door to an evolutionary expansion of NATO’s membership. The ministerial meetings of the North Atlantic Council and the NACC later this week in Brussels will discuss important initiatives to as we approach the NATO summit.

The CSCE vision compels us to recognize that democracy and security are sustained by prosperity. At the 1990 Paris summit, and again at its 1993 Economic Forum, the CSCE embraced free market economics as an essential part of its vision.

The nations in Central and Eastern Europe that are making the difficult transition to free market democracy must be able to deliver tangible benefits to their people. Their citizens must know that sacrifice will be rewarded by the trade policies of the leading industrial nations. Our commitment to the new democracies of Europe will be measured by the degree of market access we provide in the West.

Opening markets in key sectors—and successfully concluding the Uruguay Round by the final December 15 deadline—will point the Central and East European nations toward greater prosperity, security and democracy. Failure will divide Western nations and deepen hardships for new and old democracies alike.

Again, today we stand at a turning point for this continent. While the transformation of the East has lost some momentum, a Europe that is safer, freer, and better remains within reach. Let us redeem the promise of a democratic and undivided Europe, a promise embedded in the principles of this institution. Let us reinforce our commitment to CSCE as we build a European future of democracy and peace.

Thank you very much.
Secretary Christopher

Strengthening the Atlantic Alliance Through a Partnership for Peace


I am delighted to be with you for this very important meeting of the North Atlantic Council. First let me pay tribute to our Secretary General. Manfred Woerner deserves tremendous credit for his leadership, determination and dedication. We are all in his debt. Let me add that I have valued the exchanges that I've had in recent weeks with many of my colleagues here today as we have approached this ministerial.

Last June in Athens, on behalf of President Clinton, I proposed a NATO summit. Today, we must ensure that the Brussels summit that is just six weeks away is successful for our Alliance and for each of our member nations.

At the summit, President Clinton will articulate his vision of transatlantic security and prosperity—and the strong and unbreakable link between the United States and Europe. The President recognizes that American leadership remains indispensable. And he is determined that the United States will continue to provide that leadership because it is profoundly in the interest of both the United States and Europe to do so.

The security of our Alliance depends not only on our military capability. Security also depends fundamentally on our ability to consolidate democratic institutions, ensure respect for human rights, and sustain the hard march of economic reform to eventual prosperity. Each of these post-Cold War elements of security must advance—or none of them will.

Western leaders in the late 1940s created the institutions that enabled Western Europe to rebuild and renew itself after the Second World War. Their foresight and fortitude and the steadfastness of their successors enabled our values to prevail in a long and bitter Cold War. And millions of people, for the first time in their lives, have the chance to enjoy political freedom and economic opportunity.

We must resolve to secure and expand the blessings of peace that our predecessors did so much to achieve. We must address the insecurity and instability that have come with the demise of the Soviet empire. We must build the structures and the patterns of cooperation that will help to ensure the success of democracy and free markets in the East. We must move decisively beyond the age of confrontation in Europe when the balance of power was a poor substitute for a concert of free peoples. We must infuse this Alliance with the new vision and vitality that earned many of our distinguished predecessors the mantle of statesmanship.

We have many issues to decide. But the Alliance must also make an historic choice. That choice is whether to embrace innovation or risk irrelevance.

We must adapt this Alliance to the new security challenges that confront Europe today. At the same time, we must strengthen the core political cooperation, security commitments and military capabilities that have kept the 16 strong and free. We must act to revitalize the Alliance's continued central role in European security and in the transatlantic partnership.

We all recognize that our most important summit task is to decide how the Atlantic Alliance will reach out to the East. Two years ago, we created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council—the NACC. With the Partnership for Peace, we can now deepen NATO's engagement with the East. We must demonstrate that the West is committed to helping Europe's new democracies address some of their most immediate security problems. At the same time, we should signal that we envision an evolutionary expansion of the Alliance. We should make it clear that, as a matter of principles, NATO is open to the admission of new members.

We should extend an invitation to join the Partnership for Peace to all NACC states and other nations on whom we agree. Those who join will enter a much fuller relationship with NATO. The Partnership for Peace will provide a means for each state to develop a practical and personal relationship to NATO and determine what resources it wants to commit to that relationship. We envision defense cooperation developing in a broad range of fields. The Partnership will be a military relationship but, like all of NATO's...
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NATO is not an alliance of convenience, but an alliance of commitment. Expanded membership must strengthen, not weaken the ability of the Alliance to act.

The Partnership will maintain NATO's core purpose and capabilities. The current military and political processes of the Alliance will continue undiluted, but the Partnership will multiply the ability of the Alliance to meet security needs.

I am pleased that the Partnership for Peace has received the active support—and reflects the constructive suggestions—of every NATO ally. The Alliance must understand that this Partnership represents a decisive commitment to become more fully engaged in security to the East.

This is an historic commitment that our leaders should be prepared to make at the January summit. Today we should continue our work to make sure that next month NATO will take this decisive step to deepen our security cooperation with our new Partners. We want the Partnership to begin functioning next year. Turning former adversaries into partners is in the fundamental interest of every member of this Alliance. We must seize this extraordinary opportunity—the opportunity that this Alliance has worked so successfully to create.

A second summit objective I want to address is the need to strengthen the evolving relationship between NATO and the Western European Union. Previous American administrations were ambivalent about the development of a distinct European security capability. Today, the United States fully supports efforts to create a strong and effective European Security and Defense Identity. Such an identity is a natural element of European integration. It will make the European Union a more capable partner in the pursuit of our mutual interests.

The relationship between NATO and the WEU must be based on mutual trust and transparency. To work effectively and to avoid a costly duplication of defense resources, NATO should be prepared to offer the WEU the use of common NATO assets in the conduct of its operations. This would make WEU capabilities separable but not separate from the Atlantic Alliance. At the same time, as we have agreed, we would expect that the North Atlantic Council will consult on issues that affect the security of Allies. And NATO should have full opportunity in those consultations to consider the appropriate response.

These NATO deliberations would not contemplate an Alliance veto over WEU actions. But the use of NATO common assets to support a WEU operation would clearly require a decision by the NAC. This approach would safeguard collective Alliance capabilities while supporting the development of the European Union.

A third summit objective should be adapting Allied military capabilities. We have made important progress in enabling NATO to support the international community's efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement in Bosnia.

Building on this model, the United States has proposed the creation of Combined Joint Task Forces. We believe CJTF strikes the right balance. It would allow new flexibility for organizing peace-keeping and other tasks. It would enable NATO to take effective action in contingencies that do not evoke Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. It would also enable the WEU to take autonomous actions with NATO support, when appropriate. And it would do all this while preserving the unique capabilities of the integrated command for collective defense requirements under Article V. The task force would be tailored in size, force mix and nationality for both NATO and non-NATO missions.

The CJTF concept will strengthen existing command arrangements and make them more flexible. It will allow maximum use of limited resources. It will demonstrate that each of our countries is bearing its fair share of common responsibilities. And it will help ensure that NATO and WEU work as partners, not rivals, as their relationship evolves.

Finally, between now and the summit, we must also prepare the Alliance to meet other new challenges that have come in the wake of the Cold War. Most urgent is curbing the
spread of weapons of mass destruction and the means of delivering them. This threat constitutes the arms control agenda of the 1990s. At the summit, we must make a fundamental Alliance commitment to combat proliferation.

The most immediate task is to develop the overall policy framework to NATO efforts against proliferation. We envision a senior group at 16, with representatives of both foreign and defense ministers. NATO supports, but should not duplicate, non-proliferation efforts underway through other institutions and negotiations.

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