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<td>001. memo</td>
<td>Sandy Berger to George Stephanopoulos &amp; Bruce Reed; re: Draft of New York Foreign Policy Speech (1 page)</td>
<td>03/24/1992</td>
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<td>Lee Galtman to Governor William Clinton; re: Emphasis of Clinton Campaign (9 pages)</td>
<td>04/03/1992</td>
<td>Personal Misfile</td>
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<td>03/23/1992</td>
<td>Personal Misfile</td>
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**COLLECTION:**
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- National Security Council
- Robert Boorstin (Speechwriting)

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**RESTRICTION CODES**

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Beware the Superpower Syndrome

By Ronald Steel

Los Angeles

Having tried to appease the interventionists while not getting sucked into a war in
Bosnia, President Clinton选择了 narrow dangerously, NATO’s insufferable
stance over the weekend reveals resiliency but in it did not advance a
long-term solution. Even if the Serbs withdraw from Gorazde, it’s a long way
in the negotiating table.

We are learning the hard way that there can be no “peacekeeping” until
there is a peace to keep. Having managed to survive the cold war without
ever exchanging a shot with the Sovi-
est, we now find ourselves on the verge of war with Serbia, a country
with a population about equal to that of
the Los Angeles basin. This happened
because the cold war rules are
obsolete and we have not worked out any new ones. From this mess some
cautious lessons emerge.

1. Don’t make promises you can’t
deliver. In the heat of his Presidential campaign Bill Clinton chastised
George Bush for not coming to the aid
of the Bosnians. Mr. Clinton
vowed to be more forceful. Now, hoist-
ed with the petard of his own oratory, he finds the situation in Bosnia — as in
Haiti — far more complicated.

2. Don’t use the United Nations for
cover. Either the U.S. has a capable
interest in aiding the Bosnian Muslims or it doesn’t. The problem can’t be avoided by bobbing it off on
the U.N., and then complaining when
things go wrong, as we did in the
Somalia fiasco, that the U.N. made us do it. The U.N. can do only what
its members authorize. To ignore this
simple fact is to weaken and discredit the
organization.

3. Don’t let the media set the agen-
da. Wherever TV cameras go, foreign
policy seems to come lapping obediently behind. Images of hunger get us into a mess in Somalia we never un-
derstood. Images of war may yet get
us into a Baltic conflict we understand even less.

The President’s job is to decide where our interests lie — not to win the
applause of pundits who urge him to let

Ronald Steel is professor of interna-
tional relations at the University of
Southern California.

Note to Readers

The Op-Ed page welcomes
unsolicited manuscripts. Be-
cause of the volume of submis-
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we cannot acknowledge receipt of
or return if it is accom-
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tamped envelope. If manu-
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within two weeks.

the bombs fly. If he does set, and the
policy fails, the very same pundits will
surely turn against him the way they
turned against Lyndon Johnson when
the war in Vietnam got ugly.

4. Don’t become a victim of ob-
stractions. Interventionists argue that
the U.S. must now “leadership” — by
which they mean taking the Bosnian side. If our European allies don’t like it, they
must be pushed into line. But other
nations will follow us only if
persuaded that we know the right
course. If the leader marches heroical-
lv off a cliff to demonstrate who runs
the alliance, they will stay behind and
watch.

5. Don’t use NATO as an excuse.
Unless NATO can show its muscle
against the Serbs, the Administra-
tion’s critics argue, the alliance will lose its “credibility.” Yet presumably the
purpose of NATO is to protect
its members from wars, not to get them
involved in the first place.

Interventionists should argue the merits of their cause, not maintain
that they need to find a job for NATO
after the cold war.

6. Show some respect for history.
Our historical memory is measured in
centuries. Gravestones there are older than our own nation. In the mixed
salad of Yugoslavia every group has
fought every other one, committed
gross injustices, signed truces, intermarried and fought again. This feud didn’t
begin when we became aware of it.

7. Beware the wisdom of historians.
This is the world, Mr. Clinton, after
the cold war. No evil empires, no easy
formulas, no knee jerk public support. Tread cautiously, because you are on
shifting ground.

because it believed that U.S. security
was threatened. But with Communists
now gone, the Government can no longer
assume a standard of world support
for military interventions.

8. Avoid interfering in other peo-
ple’s business. Ronald Reagan
and George Bush, who broke away from the
Yugoslav federation only two years
after Yugoslavia stepped into loot in
Serbs, who make up more than a third of
Bosnia’s population — may
well have the right to an independent
state, but no claim on the world to defend it
for them. We should be wary of
becoming the midwife of breakaway states.

9. Resist exaggerated rhetoric.
What in particular reprehensible
about this war, as about previous wars in
this area, is that people are evicted from their homes and even
killed — now mostly by Serbs, but also
by Croats — because they are of the “wrong” ethnic group. Understand-
ingly, this evokes accusations of genocidal
images of the Holocaust.

But this war is primarily about
territory and the fear of one ethnic
group of living under the control of
another. This has caused a war of
horrible brutality. But to speak of it in
Nazi terms conceals the roots of
the conflict and cheapens the Holocaust.

11. Be careful of selective morality.
If there is a case for intervening in
Bosnia, there is an equally compelling
one for intervening in Rwanda, where
more than 100,000 people have died in
the last month. Last week, the U.S.
supported a Security Council resolu-
tion to cut back its peacekeeping force
in Rwanda from 1,700 to 270 troops. On
what moral grounds do we decide that
one war is tolerable while another
may be ignored?

12. Anticipate the consequences of
your actions. We used the U.N. and
NATO as cover for minimal inter-
vention without thinking through
what would happen if the Serbs did
not comply. As a result we face disar-
ray in both organizations. Now the
Administration is told that it must live
the embargo and arm the Bosnians.
Every person should have the right to
defend themselves. But if we do this,
we must first set the terms of our
involvement. We must recognize that
it is their war, not ours, theirs to lose
as well as to win. But once engaged,
would we be willing to stand aside if
“our side” was being defeated? Or
would we only be pulled in deeper?

This is the world, Mr. Clinton, after
the cold war. No evil empires, no easy
formulas, no knee jerk public support. Tread cautiously, because you are on
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New York speech: New Dimensions for American Security

I. Introduction

I am literally a child of the Cold War, born as it was just beginning. My parents' generation wanted little more than to return from a world war and resume the blessedly ordinary joys of home and family and work. Yet it was no ordinary moment, and history would not let them rest. Overnight, an expansionist Soviet Union summoned them into a new struggle. Fortunately, America had farsighted and courageous leaders like Harry Truman and George Marshall, who recognized the gravity of the moment and roused our battle-weary nation to the challenge. Under their leadership, we rebuilt Europe and Japan, organized a great military coalition of free nations, and defended our democratic principles against yet another totalitarian threat.

America's unhesitating, unstinting response speaks to us as we stand at the gateway to a new century. It reminds us how much blood and treasure individual Americans have sacrificed to our nation's cause of freedom. It reminds us, too, of our duty to prevent the tragedies of the 20th Century -- cataclysmic wars and the dread of nuclear annihilation -- from recurring in the 21st Century.

Above all, perhaps, it tells us this: History is discontinuous. Some moments matter more than others. At a few points -- perhaps only two or three in any century -- we stand at the hinge of history, when the future is uniquely malleable, when almost everything is possible.

Those months following World War II were one such moment. In this century, the other was after World War I, when the world decided, with tragic consequence, how to shape a post-war order. And now we have arrived at another such moment, which future generations will record as the 20th century's third hinge of history.

Some say foreign policy will not be an issue in this year's election -- that we will hear little except a thankful chorus in unison for having prevailed in the Cold War. Quite to the contrary, I believe this is the most important and exciting moment of choice for America's foreign policy in my lifetime. I intend to make this election in part a debate over that choice. For the bipolar order of the old era is gone. The contour of a new era, while undetermined, is ours to help shape.

The opportunity of this moment is immense. We can make our future more prosperous and secure. America's global influence and moral prestige have never been greater. Yet our current leaders have failed to make creative use of our moment and our assets. At a time of revolutionary change, they are preoccupied with trying to shore up a status quo that, in fact, no longer exists.

In 1992, we must look forward, not backward. I am running to be, not the last President for the 20th Century, but the first President for the 21st Century.
Last December at Georgetown University, I called for a New Covenant for American Security based on three broad aims: revamping our Cold War military forces to meet our nation's changing security needs; working with our allies to encourage the spread and consolidation of democracy abroad; and reestablishing America's economic leadership at home and abroad.

My vision for U.S. foreign policy is based on a simple premise: America must lead the world we have done so much to make. Given our power and influence, the imperative of American leadership will touch on virtually every global challenge we face -- from how to defend our vital interests, to how to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction; from the opportunity of more open trade, to the threat of global warming. Over the coming months, I plan to speak on each of these areas, and the need for American leadership in all of them.

Today I want to discuss two of the challenges before us -- two challenges that demonstrate the need for American leadership, and illustrate the stakes and opportunities that confront us at this moment of choice.

The first challenge is the need for the United States to lead a global alliance for democracy where we once led the global alliance against communism. The key is a stable and democratic Russia, without which "the new world order" will be nothing but an empty slogan. If Russia's grand experiment fails, we will have lost a potent ally for stability in two regions of the world vital to U.S. security: Europe and the Pacific Basin. And we run the risk of seeing a revival of the old political and nuclear threats.

The second imperative is to pursue America's interests more vigorously through the institutions of collective security. As events are proving, in this new era our nation will be able to do more through these organizations now that they are not immolated in a bipolar crossfire. And while our own unilateral power and purpose will always be our ultimate defense, in the emerging era these institutions can shoulder greater responsibility for keeping the peace and coping with problems that otherwise might fall to us by default.

I believe U.S. leadership must be the catalyst for constructing a new framework for international security. If we don't take the lead, no one else will, because no one else can. But as we proceed, it's essential that we keep three realities in mind:

First, the end of the Cold War does not mean the end of a dangerous world. Our goal, even as we restructure our defenses, must be to prepare for new threats. Many are unforeseeable. Some, such as nuclear proliferation, are already certain and truly terrifying. When Americans elect a President, they select a Commander in Chief. They want someone they can trust to act when our country's interests and values are threatened. The invasion of Kuwait was such a case, and I supported the decision to expel Iraq by force. As President, I pledge to maintain military forces strong enough to deter and when necessary to defeat
any threat to our essential interests.

At Georgetown, I laid out a defense blueprint for replacing our Cold War military structure with a more flexible mix of forces better suited to the dangers we will face in the new era. We can and must substantially reduce forces originally designed to counter a Soviet threat that is now vanishing. But we must first set the level of defense spending based on protecting our enduring interests and preserving our comparative advantage in training, mobility and advanced military technology.

Second, we also need to be realistic about America's ability to determine outcomes. Democratic movements are stirring in nearly every corner of the globe. It is neither possible nor advisable for us to manage or guarantee their struggles. Moreover, the defining images of the past decade suggest there is no need to. Lech Walesa scaling the fence at the Lenin Shipyard; Vaclav Havel sounding the call for freedom at Wenceslas Square; Nelson Mandela walking out of prison a free man; Boris Yeltsin standing defiantly atop a tank in the face of the coup: these pictures speak of people willing to fight for their own destiny, rather than waiting for others to do the job for them.

The fate of freedom in Russia and elsewhere ultimately depends on what people in those nations do or fail to do. But we can make a difference. Our challenge in this era is not to bear the burden, but to tip the balance. The new task of promoting democracy won't require anything like the level of resources and effort we devoted to containing communism. Now, other nations are more interested in our help -- and ready to help us. During the Cold War, we spent trillions to protect freedom where it was threatened; in this post Cold War era, we can spend a fraction of that amount to nurture democracy where it has not existed for decades, if ever. This era will undoubtedly call on this generation of Americans for unique sacrifices. But we will have greater leverage. We will be able to accomplish more for less.

Third, and most important, none of this will be possible unless we restore America's economic strength. An anemic, debt-ridden economy, the developed world's highest crime and poverty rates, an archaic education and training system, and a decaying stock of public capital -- all of these are gradually eroding America's capacity to exercise world leadership and inspire others by our example.

In the post Cold War world, our economic strength will be the underlying premise of our national security policy. We must organize to compete and win in the global economy. We need a commitment from American business and labor to work together to make world-class products. We need vigorous action to promote open world trading and penalize those who abuse the system. And because the job of restoring America's competitive edge truly begins at home, I have offered a program to build the best-educated and best-trained workforce in the world and put our national budget to work on programs that make America richer, not more indebted.
The failure to make our economy strong is a failure of foreign as well as domestic policy. In today's world, foreign and domestic policy are inseparable. If we're not strong at home we can't lead the world we've done so much to make. And if we withdraw from the world, it will hurt us economically at home. We can't allow a false choice between domestic policy and foreign policy to hurt our country and our economy.

II. The Bush Record

Anyone running for President right now -- Republican or Democrat -- is going to have to provide a vision for security in this new era. But George Bush lately has been cowed into silence on foreign policy by the recession and by Pat Buchanan. This reticence started to become a national liability with the president's ill-starred trip to Japan, which was first postponed and then repackaged as a quest for jobs, jobs, jobs. Of course our trade problems with Japan are important, but they are more properly and effectively discussed within the larger context of our long-standing strategic relationship with Japan. I was frankly embarrassed by the spectacle of the President of the United States presiding over store openings and escorting U.S. auto executives through Tokyo; and I was angered when the Japanese Prime Minister expressed his sympathy for us in return.

This episode could be dismissed as an example of how domestic politics often distorts foreign policy, except that it illustrates the basic pattern -- reactive, rudderless, and erratic -- of U.S. diplomacy under this Administration.

During the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy had a clear, overriding purpose: containing Soviet power. Today we urgently need to define new organizing principles for our defense and foreign policies.

This Mr. Bush has singularly failed to do. No one doubts his long experience in diplomatic affairs. His handling of the international coalition against Iraq was a deaf display of crisis management. But for all his experience, skill and cautious professionalism, President Bush has failed to articulate clear goals for American foreign policy.

One goal -- which I believe unites America's strategic interests and our moral convictions -- is to advance democracy and human rights. Yet President Bush has consistently sided with autocratic stability over democratic change. Thus, he aligned the U.S. with Mikhail Gorbachev's efforts to prop up the stagnant and despised Soviet center, long after it was apparent that hopes for democratic reform had shifted to Boris Yeltsin and the republics. Similarly, he poured cold water on Baltic and Ukrainian aspirations for independence and belatedly recognized Croatia and Slovenia under prodding from Germany.

Even today, the president continues to coddle China, despite its continuing crackdown on democratic reforms, its brutal subjugation of Tibet, its irresponsible
exports of nuclear and missile technology, its support for the genocidal Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, and its abusive trade practices. Such forbearance on our part might have been justified during the Cold War as a strategic necessity, when China was a counterweight to Soviet power. But it makes no sense to play the China card now, when our opponents have thrown in their hand.

In the Middle East, President Bush and Secretary of State Baker deserve credit for getting negotiations started. But they have chosen to browbeat Israel, the region’s sole democracy, while forging warmer U.S. ties to Syria’s despotic regime. By its gratuitous public attacks on Israel, this Administration has damaged its ability to act as an honest broker and has encouraged the Arabs to harden their positions in the mistaken belief that Washington can or should deliver Israeli concessions without Arab concessions in return. In doing so, the Administration has undercut our strategic relationship with Israel and undermined the peace process itself.

In the Persian Gulf, the President failed to follow through on America’s smashing victory over Iraq. We quit the field too soon, leaving Saddam Hussein with enough military force to retain his hold on power and savagely suppress uprisings by Shiites and the Kurds. The same lack of staying power has been evident in Panama, which the administration has virtually ignored since ousting Manuel Noriega.

But what is perhaps more troubling than this Administration’s record of action in foreign policy has been its record of inaction. It has exhibited activism without vision, prudence without purpose, and tactics without strategy. Though capable of deft improvisations, it lacks the foresight to avert crises and fails to move America steadily toward clear goals. Enamored of the stability and certainties of the old order in which they were schooled, the president and his men have all but ignored a revolutionary new world, filled with opportunities, and have fought instead on behalf of a status quo that no longer exists.

Until World War II, we were a nation that preferred isolation to engagement. Since then, the American public has shown it is prepared to shoulder the responsibilities of global leadership. Today that willingness is under a double attack. On one side are the voices of outright isolationism. On the other side is an Administration that has neither a plan for prosperity at home nor a sense of purpose abroad; and without both, internationalism cannot survive.

Today, in an age of rapid change and instability, we cannot afford to let either of those threats succeed. America needs leadership of vision, values and conviction. We need to seize the opportunity to build our economic strength and security; to spread and consolidate democracy and market economies; and to reinvent the institution of collective security.
III. Engagement for Russian Democracy

At Georgetown last December, I called for a more forceful U.S. response to one of the greatest security challenges of our time, to help the people of the former Soviet empire demilitarize their societies and build free political and economic institutions. After campaigning across this country, I know it is hard to call for foreign assistance of any kind. It's harder when Americans are hurting, as millions are today. But I believe it is deeply irresponsible to forgo this short term investment in our long term security. Just as we insist that our leaders keep America militarily strong, we should consider it no less negligent if they fail to make modest investments in economic aid today that are likely to save us billions in future defense costs.

Yet the Bush administration for months saw the issue of aid to Russia as mainly a political problem to be managed by the usual gestures. Apart from relatively small amounts of farm credit and aid, the President had no coherent plan of action for organizing a global response to this challenge. He did not lead the charge in Congress. And his Administration has even been slow in spending the funds that were appropriated. Now that the problem has been forcefully brought to its attention by Richard Nixon, there are reports the Administration is preparing some response. Yet as we await its details, we must wonder how much interest and commitment the Administration brings to this effort.

Meanwhile, Boris Yeltsin has embarked on a radical course of economic reform, freeing prices, selling off state properties and cutting wasteful public subsidies. Price controls are being lifted on virtually everything in the Russian economy except baby food, medicine, and housing. Hopes for a democratic Russia ride on these efforts, which must begin to produce positive results before economic deprivation wears down the peoples' patience.

I believe America needs to organize and lead a long-term western strategy of engagement for Russian democracy. Together with our allies, we need to offer Russia a substantial package of assistance designed to ease the wrenching transition from state socialism to a market economy. The stakes are enormous. Chaos threatens to engulf Russia. Its old economy lies in ruins, staples remain scarce and lawless behavior is spreading. While few want to go back to a command economy, there is a danger people will turn to undemocratic and anti-Western demagogues.

Russia faces two economic challenges. The short-term challenge is to stabilize the economy and stem hyperinflation, so that Russia doesn't go the way of Weimar Germany. The long-term challenge is to build a market system from the ground up -- to create a labor market, establish property rights, and modernize its antiquated capital stock, which, outside of the defense sector, lags behind world standards.
Yet Russia is intrinsically a rich country. What it needs is not charity but trade and investment on a massive scale. It needs to import modern machinery and production equipment and acquire the technical and managerial know-how to renovate its industries. The problem is, its economy is imploding because its currency is shaky, its reserves of hard currency are dwindling, and foreign credit is drying up. And if Russia's economy collapses, its government will be imperiled. We could then see its nuclear weapons come under the control of a new dictator, or be sold off to third world governments or nuclear terrorists.

What we can do -- what the major financial powers can do together -- is to help the Russians build the financial and economic infrastructure they need to attract large infusions of investment capital. If we do, Russia's future holds the possibility of a stronger democracy rather than a resurgent dictatorship, and a new American market rather than a new American nightmare.

We should look at this assistance not as a bail out, but a bridge loan, much as a family gets from the bank when it buys a new house before selling their old house. I propose that the U.S. take the lead in putting together a bridge loan to help Russia make the transition from its old system to its new economy. It cannot guarantee Russia's prosperity, but it can give President Yeltsin's reforms and Russian democracy a fighting chance. In addition to continued food and technical assistance, it should have three components: a currency stabilization fund, balance of payment aid, and debt relief or rescheduling.

To create a sound monetary system, Russia badly needs a fund to stabilize its currency and create a sound money supply. Just as Franklin Roosevelt helped America conquer fear itself by restoring confidence in our currency, Russia's first challenge is to build the confidence of consumers and investors in the ruble. The West should establish a $6 billion fund, of which America should contribute about $1 billion. In return, Russian leaders have to agree to stop printing money and to rein in public spending. Responsibility for monitoring compliance with these conditions should rest with the International Monetary Fund, which has wide expertise in designing macroeconomic reform packages.

A fund of this kind is like a net for acrobats. By building confidence, it reduces the chance it will ever be used. A similar fund helped build confidence in the Zloty as Poland underwent economic shock therapy in 1990, and as a result it was never necessary to draw upon the fund -- it cost the American taxpayer virtually nothing.

In addition, Russia should receive loans so that it can import food, medicine and the crucial machinery needed to keep the economy functioning. Some experts believe the shortage of foreign exchange is the most acute threat to Yeltsin's reforms. It is leading to a sharp drop in output, which the IMF estimates will fall a dangerous 20 percent of gross domestic production this year.
A third crucial step is to declare a moratorium on Russia's external debts, which total $34 billion. By depleting foreign exchange reserves, debt service payments are contributing to human distress in Russia, which is having trouble importing food and medicine.

According to the IMF, Russia needs a minimum of $12 billion in financial assistance in 1992, which can consist of food aid, loans and postponement of debt repayments. Adding in the stabilization fund, the total bridge loan comes to $18 billion. The money should come from the western democracies and Japan, and perhaps also from other countries like Saudi Arabia and South Korea. The U.S. share is estimated at $2-3 billion this year and for each of the next several years -- or about one percent of our annual defense budget. This is not an exorbitant price to pay for a chance to create new American markets and anchor a revitalized Russia firmly in the democratic camp. It is certainly not too much to pay to help prevent a major nuclear power from plunging into chaos.

Moreover, the package for Russia consists of loans, not grants. Of course, there's always a chance that the money will not be paid back. But Russia has virtually every resource it needs to flourish. If Boris Yeltsin and his economic advisers stay the course, the chances are good that Russia will be in a position to pay us back in full by the latter part of the decade.

It is crucial not to forget the other former Soviet republics, especially Ukraine, as well as the other nations of Eastern Europe which are already leading the way. As they make the transition to markets, the international community should also provide appropriate assistance, including keeping our markets open to their products.

The U.S. should also continue to offer Russia farm credits and technical assistance, which includes efforts to help privatize key industries, convert military production to civilian uses, and employ people with expertise in designing, building and operating nuclear weapons in the effort to dismantle nuclear warheads and clean up contaminated areas. And it should be a condition of our assistance that reductions in nuclear arsenals proceed according to agreement.

If markets are poorly understood in Russia, so is constitutional democracy, which has never taken root there. The popular movement for Russian democracy has been held together more by anti-communism than by a clear or common understanding of how to build a democratic society. Democracy remains an abstract and theoretical notion; there is an enormous deficit of knowledge in the former Soviet Union about the texture and dynamics of a free society.

I think Americans are uniquely capable of filling this gap. Here are three ways we can build person-to-person links and private sector bridges:

* First, I support Rep. David McCurdy's proposal for a Democracy Corps that would send small teams of Americans to Russia and other members of the
Commonwealth of Independent States. Working out of "Democracy Houses," these small teams would assist local reformers in developing the institutions, skills and values of a free society. They would consist of professionals from business, law, local government, non-profit organizations and schools who agree to serve two-year tours of duty in the republics.

* The second idea comes from James H. Billington, the Librarian of Congress and a distinguished scholar of Russia. In addition to sending Americans abroad, he proposes a crash program for bringing large numbers of Russians -- as many as 50,000 -- to live and work here for four to six weeks. The idea is to expose them to key institutions so that they can take back knowledge and insights about the task of building indigenous democratic structures at home. Billington also suggests a nationwide effort to establish direct links between community and private organizations in America and Russia. Our engagement for Russian democracy should be a popular exercise, not just a matter for governments.

* Finally, we should actively support groups like the National Endowment for Democracy, which work to promote democratic pluralism and free markets in Russia and elsewhere. In Russia, the Endowment is focusing on the nuts and bolts of democratic governance and working closely with parliamentarians and local government officials.

Without the creation of democratic institutions and values, economic reforms will not succeed. Our nation's greatest resource is ultimately not our dollars or our technical expertise, but our values of pluralism and enterprise and freedom -- and our centuries of experience in making those values work. In an era of fledgling democracies, those values can be our proudest export and our most effective tool of foreign policy.

IV. Reinventing Collective Security

A second challenge in this new era is reinventing collective security. Thankfully, as we end this bloody century, we no longer need to establish the case for collective action. Two world wars taught us the deadly folly of isolationism and the imperative of common effort against freedom's foes. NATO and our other alliances proved collective defenses could serve our security not only in the heat of battle but through a Cold War as well.

Now our challenge is to update our alliances and international institutions to make them equal to new threats and ready for new opportunities. The importance of the IMF in coordinating our assistance to the former Soviet bloc is one example. Another, as I suggested at Georgetown, is the imperative of maintaining our ties to NATO.

Today, I want to discuss our approach to one institution in particular, the United Nations. Frankly, the U.N. has been a disappointment and worse for most of its lifetime. At times it helped to keep the peace or ease human suffering.
But more often the U.N. fell short of its founders’ lofty goals. Instead of a portal to world peace it became a mirror of the Cold War’s standoff. Most Americans saw that black skyscraper as a modern Tower of Babel -- a costly debating club where Soviet client-states and international have-nots engaged in anti-American damage-gueyry and outrageously equated Zionism with racism.

Now the picture has changed. Marxism is dead. Democracy is expanding. Developing nations are eager to befriend us, not insult us. All this allows us to turn a page in the U.N.’s history. For years the political right nursed a visceral hatred of the U.N., while the left too often harbored a naive faith that the U.N. could substitute for our defenses. Now we must move beyond both views and recognize the U.N. can serve specific American interests in this new era.

Nothing illustrates that better than the Gulf War. From the moment Iraq invaded Kuwait, President Bush wisely organized the global coalition around the U.N.’s authority. In this new environment, old adversaries cooperated or assented. The U.N. helped mobilize world opinion against Iraq’s aggression. It provided a legal basis for Operation Desert Storm. And it continues to ferret out Baghdad’s clandestine nuclear weapons program.

Now that the U.N. is no longer a forum for ideological warfare, it is proving its ability to play new and constructive roles. Some 14,000 U.N. troops will soon be in Yugoslavia, helping to staunch the bloodshed between Serbs and Croats. In Cambodia, the U.N. has launched an unprecedented effort to transform the killing fields into a fertile place for civilian life and electoral freedom. Last week the U.N. proved its value in the war against terrorism as it clamped an embargo on the Libyan dictator who sponsored the killers of Pan Am Flight 103. And in this new era the U.N. has new potential to address other problems that do not obey borders, from global warming to drug trafficking to AIDS.

It is never in America’s interest to support international institutions with an open checkbook and closed eyes. But these peacekeeping and lifesaving efforts are proving their worth -- to us, and to the world -- and it is distinctly in our interest to support them. They advance our ideals. They showcase our leadership. They reduce our expense. They enlarge our authority.

Unfortunately, it has become fashionable to shortchange the U.N.’s new activism. Only a year after waging a war to enforce the U.N.’s principles, President Bush and Congress have refused to fight for its budget. The U.S. now stands some $500 million in arrears to the U.N. This sum equals only eight hours of the cost of Operation Desert Storm. Yet it goes unpaid largely because the President has declined to press for the funds. It is as if he is determined to internationalize his inaugural slogan of “more will than wallet.”

I do not believe America is the kind of nation that walks away from its international commitments. And to hobble peacekeeping initiatives from their first day -- well, that’s worse than shortsighted; it’s wasteful.
new possibilities in collective action. But we will never abridge our prerogative
to act alone when our interests are at stake. Our motto in this era will be:
Multilateral where possible; unilateral where necessary. The point I want to make
today is that it is a failure of vision not to recognize that collective action can
accomplish more than just a few years ago -- and it is a failure of leadership not
to try.

* * *

Today I have addressed just two of the many challenges that confront us
at this unique moment -- this hinge of history. I will address others in the
months ahead.
Many of them will call for sacrifices. All of them will test our vision. Most of this era's challenges, I believe, hold more opportunity than danger for America. But there is one quality that none of them possess -- and that is patience.

It might be convenient to delay a debate over the contours and demands of the new era until we were past this political season. But history does not grind to a halt during American presidential elections. And history right now is calling upon our nation to decide anew whether we will lead or defer; whether we will engage or abstain; whether we will shape a new era or instead be shaped by it.

I believe the choices at this moment in history are of the greatest importance and I will continue to stress them in my campaign. That does not mean, however, that I see them as partisan choices. I believe the best, boldest, and most successful moments of America's foreign policy have come when we stood together as a nation, joined not in separate parties but in common purpose.

As a Democrat, I believe the proposals I have outlined today stand in the best tradition of my party. But I believe they should and will be supported by internationalist Republicans as well.

In particular, I look forward to hearing the details of the Russian assistance proposals the Administration is reportedly developing. If they fall short of the measure of leadership our nation needs to be exerting at this moment, I will certainly say so. But on this count, I would rather be deprived of an issue than see America deprived of an opportunity. And if the Administration calls for an assistance package that matches the scope of the moment, I will be a vigorous advocate for its adoption. I will help take the case to the country and argue that at this moment, as at others in our history, we can best serve our own interests by looking outside our own borders.

I am running for President, and I am running hard. Yet at this unique moment, just as important as our choice of national leaders is our affirmation of international leadership. That is what is at stake in 1992. After World War II, in similar circumstances, our nation proclaimed its character with an historic pledge to defend, to build, and to lead. I am confident the American people stand ready to affirm that pledge again today. Thank you.
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"A New Covenant for American Security"
Governor Bill Clinton
Georgetown University
December 12, 1991

CONTACT: George Stephanopoulos
(501) 372-1992

I was born nearly half a century ago at the dawn of the Cold War, a time of great change, enormous opportunity, and uncertain peril. At a time when Americans wanted nothing more than to come home and resume lives of peace and quiet, our country had to summon the will for a new kind of war -- containing an expansionist and hostile Soviet Union which vowed to bury us. We had to find ways to rebuild the economies of Europe and Asia, encourage a worldwide movement toward independence, and vindicate our nation's principles in the world against yet another totalitarian challenge to liberal democracy.

Thanks to the unstinting courage and sacrifice of the American people, we were able to win that Cold War. Now we've entered a new era, and we need a new vision and the strength to meet a new set of opportunities and threats. We face the same challenge today that we faced in 1946 -- to build a world of security, freedom, democracy, free markets and growth at a time of great change.

Anyone running for President right now -- Republican or Democrat -- is going to have to provide a vision for security in this new era. That is what I hope to do today.

Given the problems we face at home, we do have to take care of our own people and their needs first. We need to remember the central lesson of the collapse of communism and the Soviet Union. We never defeated them on the field of battle. The Soviet Union collapsed from the inside out -- from economic, political, and spiritual failure.

Make no mistake: foreign and domestic policy are inseparable in today's world. If we're not strong at home, we can't lead the world we've done so much to make. And if we withdraw from the world, it will hurt us economically at home.

We can't allow this false choice between domestic policy and foreign policy to hurt our country and our economy. Our President has devoted his time and energy to foreign concerns and ignored dire problems here at home. As a result, we're drifting in the longest economic slump since World War II, and, in reaction to
that, elements in both parties now want America to respond to the collapse of communism and a crippling recession at home by retreating from the world.

I have agreed with President Bush on a number of foreign policy questions. I supported his efforts to kick Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. I think he did a masterful job in pulling together the victorious multilateral coalition. I support his desire to pursue peace talks in the Middle East. I agree with the President that we can't turn our back on NATO. And I supported giving the administration fast track authority to negotiate a sound and fair free trade agreement with Mexico.

But because the President seems to favor political stability and his personal relations with foreign leaders over a coherent policy of promoting freedom, democracy and economic growth, he often does things I disagree with. For example, his close personal ties with foreign leaders helped forge the coalition against Saddam Hussein, but also led him to side with China's communist rulers after the democratic uprising of students. The President forced Iraq out of Kuwait, but as soon as the war was over, he seemed so concerned with the stability of the area that he was willing to leave the Kurds to an awful fate. He is rightfully seeking peace in the Middle East, but his urge to personally broker a deal has led him to take public positions which may undermine the ability of the Israelis and the Arabs to agree on an enduring peace.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, we need a President who recognizes that in a dynamic new era, our goal is not to resist change, but to shape it. The President must articulate a vision of where we're going. The President and his administration have yet to meet that test -- to define the requirements of U.S. national security after the Cold War.

Retreating from the world or discounting its dangers is wrong for the country and sets back everything else we hope to accomplish as Democrats. The defense of freedom and the promotion of democracy around the world aren't merely a reflection of our deepest values; they are vital to our national interests. Global democracy means nations at peace with one another, open to one another's ideas and one another's commerce.

The stakes are high. The collapse of communism is not an isolated event; it's part of a worldwide march toward democracy whose outcome will shape the next century. If individual liberty, political pluralism and free enterprise take root in Latin America, Eastern and Central Europe, Africa, Asia, and the former Soviet Union, we can look forward to a grand new era of reduced conflict, mutual understanding, and economic growth. For ourselves and for millions of people who seek to live in freedom and prosperity, this revolution must not fail.
And yet, even as the American Dream is inspiring people around the world, America is on the sidelines, a military giant crippled by economic weakness and an uncertain vision.

We face two great foreign policy challenges today. First, we must define a new national security policy that builds on freedom's victory in the Cold War. The communist idea has lost its power, but the fate of the peoples who lived under it and the fate of the world will be in doubt until stable democracies rise from the debris of the Soviet empire.

And second, we must forge a new economic policy to serve ordinary Americans by launching a new era of global growth. We must tear down the wall in our thinking between domestic and foreign policy.

We need a coherent strategy that enables us to lead the world we have done so much to make, and that supports our urgent efforts to take care of our own here at home. We cannot do one without the other.

We need a New Covenant for American Security after the Cold War, a set of rights and responsibilities that will challenge the American people, American leaders, and America's allies to work together to build a safer, more prosperous, more democratic world.

The strategy of American engagement I propose is based on four key assumptions about the requirements of our security in this new era:

* First, the collapse of communism does not mean the end of danger. A new set of threats in an even less stable world will force us, even as we restructure our defenses, to keep our guard up.

* Second, America must regain its economic strength to maintain our position of global leadership. While military power will continue to be vital to our national security, its utility is declining relative to economic power. We cannot afford to go on spending too much on firepower and too little on brainpower.

* Third, the irresistible power of ideas rules in the Information Age. Television, cassette tapes, and the fax machine helped ideas to pierce the Berlin Wall and bring it down.

* Finally, our definition of security must include common threats to all people. On the environment and other global issues, our very survival depends upon the United States taking the lead.

Guided by these assumptions, we must pursue three clear objectives: First, we must restructure our military forces for a
new era. Second, we must work with our allies to encourage the spread and consolidation of democracy abroad. And third, we must reestablish America's economic leadership at home and in the world.

RESTRUCTURING OUR MILITARY FORCES

When Americans elect a President, they select a Commander in Chief. They want someone they can trust to act when our country's interests are threatened. To protect our interests and our values, sometimes we have to stand and fight. That is why, as President, I pledge to maintain military forces strong enough to deter and when necessary to defeat any threat to our essential interests.

Today's defense debate centers too narrowly on the size of the military budget. But the real questions are, what threats do we face, what forces do we need to counter them, and how must we change?

We can and must substantially reduce our military forces and spending, because the Soviet threat is decreasing and our allies are able to and should shoulder more of the defense burden. But we still must set the level of our defense spending based on what we need to protect our interests. First let's provide for a strong defense. Then we can talk about defense savings.

At the outset of this discussion, I want to make one thing clear: the world is still rapidly changing. The world we look out on today is not the same world we will see tomorrow. We need to be ready to adjust our defense projections to meet threats that could be either heightened or reduced down the road.

Our defense needs were clearer during the Cold War, when it was widely accepted that we needed enough forces to deter a Soviet nuclear attack, to defend against a Soviet-led conventional offensive in Europe and to protect other American interests, especially in Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf. The collapse of the Soviet Union shattered that consensus, leaving us without a clear benchmark for determining the size or mix of our armed forces.

However, a new consensus is emerging on the nature of post-Cold War security. It assumes that the gravest threats we are most likely to face in the years ahead include:

* First, the spread of deprivation and disorder in the former Soviet Union, which could lead to armed conflict among the republics or the rise of a fervently nationalistic and aggressive regime in Russia still in possession of long-range nuclear weapons.
* Second, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, as well as the means for delivering them.
* Third, enduring tensions in various regions, especially the Korean peninsula and the Middle East and the attendant risks of terrorist attacks on Americans traveling or working overseas.

* And finally, the growing intensity of ethnic rivalry and separatist violence within national borders, such as we have seen in Yugoslavia, India and elsewhere, that could spill beyond those borders.

To deal with these new threats, we need to replace our Cold War military structure with a smaller, more flexible mix of capabilities, including:

* **Nuclear deterrence.** We can dramatically reduce our nuclear arsenals through negotiations and other reciprocal actions. But as an irreducible minimum, we must retain a survivable nuclear force to deter any conceivable threat.

* **Rapid deployment.** We need a force capable of projecting power quickly when and where it's needed. This means the Army must develop a more mobile mix of mechanized and armored forces. The Air Force should emphasize tactical air power and airlift, and the Navy and Marine Corps must maintain sufficient carrier and amphibious forces, as well as more sealift. We also need strong special operations forces to deal with terrorist threats.

* **Technology.** The Gulf War proved that the superior training of our soldiers, tactical air power, advanced communications, space-based surveillance, and smart weaponry produced a shorter war with fewer American casualties. We must maintain our technological edge.

* **Better intelligence.** In an era of unpredictable threats, our intelligence agencies must shift from military bean-counting to a more sophisticated understanding of political, economic and cultural conditions that can spark conflicts.

To achieve these capabilities, I would restructure our forces in the following ways:

First, now that the nuclear arms race finally has reversed course, it's time for a prudent slowdown in strategic modernization. We should stop production of the B-2 bomber. That alone could save $20 billion by 1997.

Since Ronald Reagan unveiled his "Star Wars" proposal in 1983, America has spent $26 billion in futile pursuit of a fool-proof defense against nuclear attack. Democrats in Congress have recommended a much more realistic and attainable goal: defending against very limited or accidental launches of ballistic missiles. This allows us to proceed with R&D on missile defense within the framework of the ABM treaty -- a prudent step as more and more countries acquire missile technology.
At the same time, we must do more to stop the threat of weapons of mass destruction from spreading. We need to clamp down on countries and companies that sell these technologies, punish violators, and work urgently with all countries for tough, enforceable, international non-proliferation agreements.

Although the President's plan does reduce our conventional force structure, I believe we can go farther without undermining our core capabilities. We can meet our responsibilities in Europe with less than the 150,000 troops now proposed by the President, especially as the Soviet republics withdraw their forces from the Red Army. We can defend the sea lanes and project force with 10 carriers rather than 12. We should continue to keep some U.S. forces in Northeast Asia as long as North Korea presents a threat to our South Korean ally.

To upgrade our conventional forces, we need to develop greater air and sea lift capacity, including production of the C-17 transport aircraft. But we should end or reduce programs intended to meet the Soviet threat. Our conventional programs, like the new Air Force fighter and the Army's new armored systems, should be redesigned to meet regional threats.

The administration has called for a 21 percent cut in military spending through 1995, based on the assumption, now obsolete, that the Soviet Union would remain intact. With the dwindling Soviet threat, we can cut defense spending by over a third by 1997.

Based on calculations by the Congressional Budget Office, my plan would bring cumulative savings of about $100 billion beyond the current Bush plan. If favorable political and military trends continue, and we make progress on arms control, we may be able to scale down defense spending still more by the end of the decade. However, we should not commit ourselves now to specific deeper cuts ten years from now. The world is changing quickly, and we must retain our ability to react to potential threats.

Also, we must not forget about the real people whose lives will be turned upside down when defense is cut deeply. The government should look out for its defense workers and the communities they live in. We should insist on advanced notification and help communities plan for a transition from a defense to a domestic economy. 31% of our graduate engineers work for the defense industry. They and other highly skilled workers and technicians are a vital national resource at a time when our technological edge in a world economy must be sharper than ever before. I have called for a new advanced research agency -- a civilian DARPA -- that could help capture for commercial work the brilliance of scientists and engineers who have accomplished wonders on the battlefield.
Likewise, those who have served the nation in uniform cannot be dumped on the job market. We've got to enlist them to help meet our many needs at home. By shifting people from active duty to the National Guard and reserves, offering early retirement options, limiting re-enlistment and slowing the pace of recruitment, we can build down our forces in a gradual way that doesn't abandon people of proven commitment and competence.

Our people in uniform are among the most highly skilled in the areas we need most. We need to transfer those human resources into our workforce and even into our schools, perhaps in part by using reserve centers and closed bases for community-based education and training programs.

The defense policy I have outlined keeps America strong and still yields substantial savings. The American people have earned this peace dividend through forty years of unrelenting vigilance and sacrifice and an investment of trillions of dollars. And they are entitled to have the dividend reinvested in their future.

Finally, America needs to reach a new agreement with our allies for sharing the costs and risks of maintaining peace. While Desert Storm set a useful precedent for cost-sharing, our forces still did most of the fighting and dying. We need to shift that burden to a wider coalition of nations of which America will be a part. In the Persian Gulf, in Namibia, in Cambodia and elsewhere in recent years, the United Nations has begun to play the role that Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman envisioned for it. We must take the lead now in making their vision real -- by expanding the Security Council and making Germany and Japan permanent members; by continuing to press for greater efficiency in U.N. administration; and by exploring ways to institutionalize the U.N.'s success in mobilizing international participation in Desert Storm.

One proposal worth exploring calls for a U.N. Rapid Deployment Force that could be used for purposes beyond traditional peacekeeping, such as standing guard at the borders of countries threatened by aggression; preventing attacks on civilians; providing humanitarian relief; and combating terrorism and drug trafficking.

In Europe, new security arrangements will evolve over the next decade. While insisting on a fairer sharing of the common defense burden, we must not turn our back on NATO. Until a more effective security system emerges, we must give our allies no reason to doubt our constancy.

PROMOTING DEMOCRACY AROUND THE WORLD
As we restructure our military forces, we must reinforce the powerful global movement toward democracy.

U.S. foreign policy cannot be divorced from the moral principles most Americans share. We cannot disregard how other governments treat their own people, whether their domestic institutions are democratic or repressive, whether they help encourage or check illegal conduct beyond their borders. This does not mean we should deal only with democracies, or that we should try to remake the world in our image. But recent experience from Panama to Iran to Iraq shows the dangers of forging strategic relationships with despotic regimes.

It should matter to us how others govern themselves. Democracies don't go to war with each other. The French and British have nuclear weapons, but we don't fear annihilation at their hands. Democracies don't sponsor terrorist acts against each other. They are more likely to be reliable trading partners, protect the global environment, and abide by international law.

Over time, democracy is a stabilizing force. It provides non-violent means for resolving disputes. Democracies do a better job of protecting ethnic, religious and other minorities. And elections can help resolve fratricidal civil wars.

Yet President Bush too often has hesitated when democratic forces needed our support in challenging the status quo. I believe the President erred when he secretly rushed envoys to resume cordial relations with China barely a month after the massacre in Tiananmen Square; when he spurned Yeltsin before the Moscow coup; when he poured cold water on Baltic and Ukrainian aspirations for self-determination and independence; and when he initially refused to help the Kurds.

The administration continues to coddle China, despite its continuing crackdown on democratic reforms, its brutal subjugation of Tibet, its irresponsible exports of nuclear and missile technology, its support for the homicidal Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, and its abusive trade practices. Such forbearance on our part might have made sense during the Cold War, when China was a counterweight to Soviet power. But it makes no sense to play the China card now, when our opponents have thrown in their hand.

In the Middle East, the administration deserves credit for bringing Israel and its Arab antagonists to the negotiating table. Yet I believe the President is wrong to use public pressure tactics against Israel. In the process, he has raised Arab expectations that he'll deliver Israeli concessions and fed Israeli fears that its interests will be sacrificed to an American-imposed solution.

We must remember that even if the Arab-Israeli dispute were resolved tomorrow, there would still be ample causes of conflict
in the Middle East: ancient tribal, ethnic and religious hatreds; control of oil and water; the bitterness of the have-nots toward those who have; the lack of democratic institutions to hold leaders accountable to their people and restrain their actions abroad; and the territorial ambitions of Iraq and Syria. We have paid a terrible price for the administration's earlier policies of deference to Saddam Hussein. Today, we must deal with Hafez Assad in Syria but we must not overlook his tyrannical rule and domination of Lebanon.

We need a broader policy toward the Middle East that seeks to limit the flow of arms into the region, as well as the materials needed to develop and deliver weapons of mass destruction; promotes democracy and human rights; and preserves our strategic relationship with the one democracy in the region: Israel.

And in Africa as well, we must align America with the rising tide of democracy. The administration has claimed credit for the historic opening to democracy now being negotiated in South Africa, when in fact it resisted the sanctions policy that helped make this hopeful moment possible.

Today, we should concentrate our attention on doing what we can to help end the violence that has ravaged the South African townships, by supporting with our aid the local structures that seek to mediate these disputes and by insisting that the South African government show the same zeal in prosecuting the perpetrators of the violence as it did in the past when pursing the leaders of the anti-apartheid movement. The administration and our states and cities should only relax our remaining sanctions as it becomes clearer that the day of democracy and guaranteed individual rights is at hand. And when that day does dawn, we must be prepared to extend our assistance to make sure that democracy, once gained, is not lost there.

An American foreign policy of engagement for democracy will unite our interests and our values. Here's what we should do:

* First, we need to respond more forcefully to one of the greatest security challenges of our time, to help the people of the former Soviet empire demilitarize their societies and build free political and economic institutions. Congress has passed $500 million to help the Soviets destroy nuclear weapons, and for humanitarian aid. We can do better. As Sen. Sam Nunn and Rep. Les Aspin have argued, we should shift money from marginal military programs to this key investment in our future security. We can radically reduce the threat of nuclear destruction that has dogged us for decades by investing a fraction what would otherwise have to be spent to counter that threat. And, together with our G-7 partners, we can supply the Soviet republics with the food and medical aid they need to survive their first winter of freedom in 74 years. We should do all that we can to coordinate aid efforts
with our allies, and to provide the best technical assistance we can to distribute that food and aid.

No national security issue is more urgent than the question of who will control the nuclear weapons and technology of the former Soviet empire. Those weapons pose a threat to the security of every American, to our allies, and to the republics themselves.

I know it may be bad politics to be for any aid program. But we owe it to the people who defeated communism, the people who defeated the coup. And we owe it to ourselves. A small amount spent stabilizing the emerging democracies in the former Soviet empire today will reduce by much more the money we may have to commit to our defense in the future. And it will lead to the creation of lucrative new markets which mean new American jobs. Having won the Cold War, we must not now lose the peace.

* We should recognize Ukraine's independence, as well as that of other republics who make that decision democratically. But we should link U.S. and western non-humanitarian aid to agreements by the republics to abide by all arms agreements negotiated by Soviet authorities, demonstrate responsibility with regard to nuclear weapons, demilitarize their economies, respect minority rights, and proceed with market and political reforms.

* We should use our diplomatic and economic leverage to increase the material incentives to democratize and raise the costs for those who won't. We have every right to condition our foreign aid and debt relief policies on demonstrable progress toward democracy and market reforms. In extreme cases, such as that of China, we should condition favorable trade terms on political liberalization and responsible international conduct.

* We need to support evolving institutional structures favorable to countries struggling with the transition to democracy and markets, such as the new European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, whose mission is to rebuild the societies of Central and Eastern Europe. We are right to encourage the European Community to open its doors to those societies, perhaps by creating an affiliate status that carries some but not all of the privileges of membership.

* We should encourage private American investment in the former Soviet empire. The Soviet republics, after all, are rich in human and natural resources. One day, they and Eastern Europe could be lucrative markets for us.

* We should regard increased funding for democratic assistance as a legitimate part of our national security budget. We should support groups like the National Endowment for Democracy, which work openly rather than covertly to promote democratic pluralism and free markets abroad. I would encourage both the Agency for
International Development and the U.S. Information Agency to channel more of their resources to promoting democracy. And just as Radio Free Europe and the Voice of America helped bring the truth to the people of those societies, we should create a Radio Free Asia to carry news and hope to China and elsewhere.

* Finally, just as President Kennedy launched the Peace Corps 30 years ago, we should create a Democracy Corps today that will send thousands of talented American volunteers to countries that need their legal, financial, political expertise.

RESTORING AMERICA'S ECONOMIC LEADERSHIP

Our second major strategic challenge is to help lead the world into a new era of global growth. Any governor who's tried to create jobs over the last decade knows that experience in international economics is essential and that success in the global economy must be at the core of national security in the 1990s.

Without growth abroad, our own economy cannot thrive. U.S. exports of goods and services will be over a half-trillion dollars in 1991 -- about 10% of our economy. Without global growth, healthy international competition turns all too readily to economic warfare. Without growth and economic progress, there can be no true economic justice among or within nations.

I believe the negotiations on an open trading system in the GATT are of extraordinary importance. And I support the negotiation of a North American Free Trade Agreement, so long as it's fair to American farmers and workers, protects the environment, and observes decent labor standards.

Freer trade abroad means more jobs at home. Every $1 billion in U.S. exports generates 20-30,000 more jobs. We must find ways to help developing nations finally overcome their debt crisis, which has lessened their capacity to buy American goods and probably cost us 1.5 million American jobs.

We must be strong at home to lead and maintain global growth. Our weakness at home has caused even our economic competitors to worry about our stubborn refusal to establish a national economic strategy that will regain our economic leadership and restore opportunity for the middle class.

How can we lead when we have gone from being the world's largest creditor country to the world's largest debtor nation -- now owing the world $405 billion? When we depend on foreigners for $100 billion a year of financing, we're not the masters of our own destiny.
I spoke in my last lecture about how we must rebuild our nation's economic greatness, for the job of restoring America's competitive edge truly begins at home. I have offered a program to build the most well-educated and well-trained workforce in the world, and put our national budget to work on programs that make America richer, not more indebted.

Our economic strength must become a central defining element of our national security policy. We must organize to compete and win in the global economy. We need a commitment from American business and labor to work together to make world-class products. We must be prepared to exchange some short-term benefits -- whether in the quarterly profit statement or in archaic work rules -- for long-term success.

The private sector must maintain the initiative, but government has an indispensable role. A recent Department of Commerce report is a wake-up call that we are falling behind our major competitors in Europe and Japan on emerging technologies that will define the high-paying jobs of the future -- like advanced materials, biotechnology, superconductors, and computer-integrated manufacturing.

I have mentioned a civilian advanced research projects agency to work closely with the private sector, so that its priorities are not set by government alone. We have hundreds of national laboratories with extraordinary talent that have put the United States at the forefront of military technology. We need to reorient their mission, working with private companies and universities, to advance technologies that will make our lives better and create tomorrow's jobs.

Not enough of our companies engage in export -- just 15 percent of our companies account for 85 percent of our exports. We have to meet our competitors' efforts to help smaller and medium-sized businesses identify and gain foreign markets.

And most important, government must assure that international competition is fair by insisting to our European, Japanese and other trading partners that if they won't play by the rules of an open trading system, then we will play by theirs.

We have no more important bilateral relationships than our alliance with Japan, a relationship that has matured from one of dependency in the 1950s to one of partnership today. Our relationship is based on ties of democracy, but as we cooperate, we also compete. And the maturity of our relationship allows American Presidents, as I will, to insist on fair play. As we put our own economic house in order, Japan must open the doors of its economic house, or our partnership will be imperiled with consequences for all the world.
Now we must understand, as never have before, that our national security is largely economic. The success of our engagement in the world depends not on the headlines it brings to Washington politicians, but on the benefits it brings to hard-working middle-class Americans. Our "foreign" policies are not really foreign at all.

When greenhouse gas emissions from developed nations warm the atmosphere and CFCs eat away at the ozone layer, our beaches and farmlands and people are threatened. When drugs flood into our country from South America and Asia, our cities suffer and our children are put at risk. When a Libyan terrorist can go to an airport in Europe and check a bomb in a suitcase that kills hundreds of people, our freedom is diminished and our people live in fear.

So let us no longer define national security in the narrow military terms of the Cold War. We can no longer afford to have foreign and domestic policies. We must devise and pursue national policies that serve the needs of our people by uniting us at home and restoring America's greatness in the world. To lead abroad, a President of the United States must first lead at home.

Half a century ago, this country emerged victorious from an all-consuming war into a new era of great challenge. It was a time of change, a time for new thinking, a time for working together to build a free and prosperous world, a time for putting that war behind us. In the aftermath of that war, President Harry Truman and his successors forged a bipartisan consensus in America that brought security and prosperity for 20 years.

Today we need a President, a public and a policy that are not caught up in the wars of the past -- not World War II, not Vietnam, not the Cold War. What we need to elect in 1992 is not the last President of the 20th century, but the first President of the 21st century.

This spring, when the troops came home from the Persian Gulf, we had over 100,000 people at a welcome home parade in Little Rock. Veterans came from all across the state -- not just those who had just returned from the Gulf, but men and women who had served in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. I'll never forget how moved I was as I watched them march down the street to our cheers, and saw the Vietnam veterans finally being given the honor they deserved all along. The divisions we have lived with for the last two decades seemed to fade away amid the common outburst of triumph and gratitude.

That is the spirit we need as we move into this new era. As President Lincoln told Congress in another time of new challenge, in 1862:
"The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew, and act anew. We must disenthral all ourselves, and then we shall save our country. Fellow citizens, we cannot escape history."

Thank you very much.

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Memo to the Democrats

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From: Sidney Blumenthal and James Ch

George Bush's alpha and omega, the public opinion polls are now signaling the most potentially important opening of the 1997 campaign: the foreign policy President is vulnerable on foreign policy. By late January, shortly after he limped back from Japan, polls showed that less than half of Americans approved of the way he was handling foreign policy -- the first time his approval rating had dropped below 50 percent in that vital category, the essence of his Presidential persona.

And yet the Democrats still don't seem to understand the political salience of confronting Bush on foreign issues. They either defer to this looming image as confronting Bush on foreign issues. They either defer to his looming image as foreign policy wise man or render easy moral judgments about, say, his China policy. Both approaches play into the game plan of the Republicans, who will inevitably try to cast the Democratic nominee as weak and soft -- a "carping little liberal," as Bush has said -- incapable of a sustained and vigorous defense of the national interest.

The Democrats' opportunity to take the offensive on foreign policy is unparalleled since 1984. But for the Democratic candidate to defeat Bush and govern successfully, he must compellingly draw the connections between the Republican foreign policy and the insolvency that is sapping the country's strength. Suddenly, it is possible to depict George Bush as weak, an apostle of decline, while the Democratic nominee can present himself as the tribune of American strength and renewal. The Democrats, at last, have available to them potent themes -- progress versus paralysis, strength versus weakness -- that their full political force can be brought to bear only by making the foreign policy case.

THE THEMES

The Democratic candidates must demonstrate and claim the theory of change. They must applaud the abundance that is the product of confidence and readiness. There is no better test of a candidate than willingness to be tested.

The Democrats, to begin with, have rejected their own integrity, attacked America's leadership and readiness and failed to deliver the domestic agenda. Many of the candidates falsely assume that the country has no commitments, neither to resources and its responsibilities. As if everything depends on the President's ability to deliver a political and philosophical agenda. During the cold war era, our means expanded to meet our sense of purpose.

PHOTOCOPY PRESERVATION
Memo to the Democrats:
The Foreign Policy Argument to the Republicans and You Cede Them the Election.

Sidney Blumenthal and James Chace

George Bush's alpha and omega, the public opinion polls, are now signaling the most potentially important opening of the 1992 campaign. President Bush is vulnerable on foreign policy. By late January, shortly after he limped back from Japan, polls showed that less than half of Americans approved of the way he was handling foreign policy. The first time his approval rating had dropped below 50 percent in a category, the essence of his Presidential persona.

The Democrats still don't seem to understand the political weight of confronting Bush's foreign issues. They either defer to his image as foreign policy wise man or render easy moral judgments, say, his China policy. Both approaches play into the game the Republicans, who will inevitably try to cast the Democratic foreign policy as weak and soft, a "carping little liberal," as Bush has said of sustained and vigorous defense of the national interest. Democrats' opportunity to take the offensive on foreign policy is real since 1984. But for the Democratic candidate to defeat Bush, he must compellingly draw the connections the Republican foreign policy and the insolvency that is sapping the strength of the country. Suddenly, it is possible to depict George Bush as the apostle of decline, while the Democratic nominee can present as the tribune of American strength and renew a defense. The Democrats have available to them potent themes — progress versus paralysis, versus weakness. But their full political force can be brought to bear by making the foreign policy case.

The Democratic challenge must do, more than simply blame the Bush administration for the collapse of American influence, for the erosion of American power, for the collapse of American leadership, for the collapse of American prestige, for the collapse of American foreign policy, for the collapse of American foreign policy. The Democratic challenge must do, more than simply blame the Bush administration for the collapse of American influence, for the erosion of American power, for the collapse of American leadership, for the collapse of American prestige, for the collapse of American foreign policy, for the collapse of American foreign policy. The Democratic challenge must do, more than simply blame the Bush administration for the collapse of American influence, for the erosion of American power, for the collapse of American leadership, for the collapse of American prestige, for the collapse of American foreign policy, for the collapse of American foreign policy. The Democratic challenge must do, more than simply blame the Bush administration for the collapse of American influence, for the erosion of American power, for the collapse of American leadership, for the collapse of American prestige, for the collapse of American foreign policy, for the collapse of American foreign policy. The Democratic challenge must do, more than simply blame the Bush administration for the collapse of American influence, for the erosion of American power, for the collapse of American leadership, for the collapse of American prestige, for the collapse of American foreign policy, for the collapse of American foreign policy. The Democratic challenge must do, more than simply blame the Bush administration for the collapse of American influence, for the erosion of American power, for the collapse of American leadership, for the collapse of American prestige, for the collapse of American foreign policy, for the collapse of American foreign policy.
I'm the one he brags about...

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PRESERVATION

BLOOD, SAND AND OIL

File photo shows a Syrian soldier standing guard at a border post near Damascus. (AP Photo/Herbert Knosowski)

By Michael Riede

The administration's belated response to the Syrian regime's brutal crackdown on protesters has failed to impress. President Obama's call for a European arms embargo on Syria has been met with a tepid response in Brussels, while the administration's efforts to provide support to the Syrian opposition have been hampered by the lack of a clear strategy.

The administration has also been criticized for its handling of the situation in Yemen, where the government has been fighting a war with Houthi rebels for the past year. The administration's approach has been seen as too accommodating to the Houthis, who have been backed by Iran.

The administration's struggle to contain Iran's regional expansion has been further compounded by the Trump administration's decision to pull out of the Iran nuclear deal. The move has been criticized by European allies, who see it as a setback to their efforts to counter Iran's influence in the region.

The administration's focus on countering Islamic extremism has also been criticized, with some critics accusing it of being too narrow in its focus on terrorism and not addressing the underlying issues that contribute to extremism.

The administration's response to the crisis in Venezuela has also been criticized, with some arguing that it has not done enough to support the opposition and that it has failed to impose meaningful sanctions on the government of President Nicolas Maduro.

The administration's approach to the situation in the Middle East has also been criticized, with some arguing that it has not done enough to address the root causes of conflict and instability in the region.

The administration's handling of the situation in Afghanistan has also been criticized, with some arguing that it has not done enough to prepare for the withdrawal of American troops and that it has failed to address the underlying issues that contribute to the country's instability.

The administration's response to the COVID-19 pandemic has also been criticized, with some arguing that it has not done enough to prepare for the crisis and that it has been slow to respond.

The administration's approach to trade policy has also been criticized, with some arguing that it has been too Protectionist and that it has failed to address the economic challenges facing the United States.

The administration's handling of the situation in the United States has also been criticized, with some arguing that it has failed to address the social and economic challenges facing the country.

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