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2191

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## Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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**COLLECTION:**
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Ted Widmer (Speechwriting)
OA/Box Number: 2191

**FOLDER TITLE:**
Steinberg, James [3]

**RESTRCTION CODES**

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(5) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(5) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
THEME -- EURO-ATLANTIC COMMUNITY: THRIVING ENTERPRISE, BUT WITH LOTS OF AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT

Introduction

- Acknowledge Robin Cook’s morning speech (we’ll try to score a copy in advance) to European Institute. (Copies of his recent speeches on EU and U.S. are attached for background inspiration.) UK has double responsibility this year, holding presidency of the EU-15 and the G-8. UK epitomizes the virtues of the Euro-Atlantic Community -- membership and active participation in European security and beyond in the EU, NATO, G-8, OSCE, WEU and the UN Security Council, open economy, open society to culture and information.

- Acknowledge British presidency’s goal of being a bridge for the EU and the United States -- as Blair said “strong in Europe, strong with the United States... Stronger with one means stronger with the other.” (Speech in London, November 10, 1997) This is the mirror image of our view of the European Union, integrated and prosperous, key partner in world affairs with the United States.

THE EURO-ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

- George Washington’s oft-repeated quote upon leaving office that American should avoid entangling alliances with Europe, avoid being dragged into the Continent’s non-stop intrigues and wars.

- Our engagement in Europe following Second World War led to creation of a truly Euro-Atlantic community with structures which opened, irrevocably, our societies to the outside world. Rapid globalization of industry and trade and security alliances eliminated any possibility that any country, including the United States, could remain isolated from worldwide developments.

- Financial crises in Asia, war in Bosnia, aggression in the Middle East have immediate consequences in our security -- military and economic.

- The Euro-Atlantic alliance counts an overwhelming number of successes in security, economics, culture, and transnational arenas in the second half of the 20th Century: global trade liberalization under GATT; creation of the European Community/Union; reunification of Germany; democratization of Central and Eastern Europe; collapse of the Soviet empire;
return of sovereignty to the Baltic Nations (Baltic Charter will be signed here January 16, the next day); NATO, and Russia’s, first out-of-area peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, and a new framework for American cooperation with the EU, the New Transatlantic Agenda.

- In post-Cold War world, we have numerous shared strategic interests:
  - promoting and locking in gains of peace and freedom (spread of open societies/markets; info-tech explosion);
  - combating transnational threats (rogue states, terrorism, narcotics, crime, WMD, environmental degradation);
  - shaping fair, open global trading system that accommodate evolving forms of trade, such as posed by electronic commerce;

- None of us is can isolate ourselves from refugee flows, the spread of disease, or the reach of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

- Part of renewing transatlantic partnership means recognizing these strategic interests transcend the Euro-Atlantic arena an affect all of us.

Security Community

- This community is a reality, not a dream. NATO epitomizes the Euro-Atlantic community, forming the foundation for all the other structures. We were steady and determined during 40 years of cold war, have continued to do a good job on security since the fall of the Berlin wall. There were questions of how to sustain our security architecture in the absence of a single, unifying threat. NATO enlargement and the creation of virtual institutions, such as the OSCE have contributed to this development. This administration has demonstrated its commitment to a policy of engagement in Europe with investment in Bosnia, efforts to enlarge the alliance, support for key European institutions.

- But, there is no place for complacency -- we have concerns over declining European defense budgets, pose potential for atrophy of military capabilities. The consequence is already visible and is likely to become more so -- the EU tending to offer carrots of dialogue, trade and assistance, leaving the U.S. to carry the security burden. This is an unsustainable formula.

- This dichotomy is producing mirror image impacts on our publics -- the U.S. accused of behaving as an hegemon as it exercises leadership, Europe accused of shirking the burdens of global leadership. Difference is in tactics, not goals.

  -- We want to see the EU take a bigger role in global affairs. But this means stepping up to the challenge.

Economic Community

we got to get enlargement right

preclude both NATO & EU enlargement

mutually acceptable enlargement

we ad to figure out each serve same goal

(what?)
Measles Disease
• You know the numbers -- at a trillion dollars, the largest economic community in the world, with goods, services and finance flowing without significant barriers, creating jobs, growth in both our economies.

• The Community working together in the global arena concluded the Uruguay Trade Round in 1993, following up with successes in ITA and Financial Services. Within the Community, we went from the Transatlantic Declaration of 1990 to the New Transatlantic Agenda in 1996, Transatlantic Business dialogue, and moving towards the Transatlantic marketplace. Trade expansion and economic growth have followed from these actions. With no major trade initiatives currently underway, we ought to start thinking about the next, millennium, trade round.

• We are dealing with our budget deficits. Inflation is low and controlled, and interest rates are at low levels. Our economies are benefiting from this favorable macro environment.

• We have supported deeper European integration. We have the same interest with regard to the creation of a single currency that we have with respect to any major development in Europe. We are well served when Europe is economically vibrant, and working to open its markets and strengthen ties to the global economy. Europe will prosper from an economic and monetary union that supports these ends. When Europe prospers, so does the U.S.

• But, we have annoying concerns with the European Union. They are largely agriculture related. The CAP continues to consume a huge amount of EU resources -- it is unrealistic in 1998 and cannot be carried over to your new members when they join. We understand your food safety concerns, especially with BSE, but we cannot comprehend objections to biotechnology innovations where there is no evidence of a public health threat. We cannot wander into trade disputes fueled by luddite paranoia.

• We acknowledge that our choice of economic tools to deal with rogue states causes concern in the EU. We see a powerful incentive in denying access to our markets and capital for countries which flout international norms. We find this a preferable alternative to resorting to military action when diplomacy fails to elicit changed behavior. Causes problems for us when we perceive Europeans seeking commercial advantage with states which pose serious threats to regional and global security.

• Where we do have serious differences in the economic arena, such as Helms-Burton and ILSA, it’s not about economics, reflects a fundamental deficiency in foreign policy tool continuum -- there aren’t many options between diplomacy and war. Disagreements with the EU reflects choice of tactics, not goals. Shared desire for more democracy in Cuba has resulted in suspension of Title III. Iran/Libya different problem.

Cultural Community

• This community is also flourishing with an interconnectivity that has facilitated an explosion in information flow. Satellites, cell phones, computers, internet and the human dimension of visits across the Atlantic have made this vibrant, a reality.
• But, we have concerns over tendencies to protect European culture, most notably in the audio-visual sphere.

• Clashes in cultural perception manifest themselves in the hegemony/burden-sharing debate. Need to activate the human dimension more, to translate the immense economic interdependence into an openness and appreciation for each other’s culture.

Transnational Community

• United States has supported all EU efforts at deeper integration. But these so-called III pillar areas of law enforcement, environment, etc, have not developed the Euro-Atlantic links that we have in security, economics and culture.

• On law enforcement, with Schengen and single market, making the movement of people and goods easier, we have lagged in creating corresponding linkages.

• An example was tepid European support for U.S.-sponsored International Law enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Budapest, to work with emerging democracies police forces to combat transnational crime.

• Environment -- (not sure what to say about this -- maybe skip??)
SPEECH BY THE PRIME MINISTER, MR TONY BLAIR, AT THE LORD MAYOR'S BANQUET, GUILDHALL, LONDON, MONDAY, 10 NOVEMBER 1997

'THE PRINCIPLES OF A MODERN BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY'

Lord Mayor, Late Lord Mayor, Your Grace, Lord High Chancellor, Your Excellencies, Lords, Aldermen, Sheriffs, Ladies and Gentlemen.

It is a great pleasure for Cherie and me to be with you this evening. May I first of all congratulate you, Lord Mayor, on your taking up this great office. Serving the City of London is a great national cause, which I wholeheartedly support.

My own case to you tonight is simple. Britain is once again a great place to be. It has new optimism, confidence and self-assurance about its future. What it needs now is to turn that spirit into a clear definition of national purpose, not just what we want for Britain in itself, but the direction of the nation and how it deals with the outside world.

The key goals of national purpose under this Government are these.

To run a well-managed economy with low inflation and tough rules on public finances; where having got stability for the long-term in place we focus policy on using the creative talent of all our people to build a true enterprise economy for the 21st Century. We compete on brains, not brawn.

To make a quantum leap in education, with high quality schools and universities open to all.

To put our hospitals and welfare system on a sure footing for today's society, not the hand-to-mouth existence we live now.

To tackle crime and its underlying causes of a social underclass set apart from society's mainstream.

To reform our Constitution to end the era of big centralised government.

And to allow Britain's standing in the world to grow and prosper.

These objectives are clear, right and achievable. They define our national purpose. They mean a politics no longer scarred by the irrelevant ideological battles of much of the 20th century. Most of the old left/right tags today are nothing but obstacles to good thinking. We have to concentrate on the things that really matter - what I call the big picture - not the periphery.

The goal of our foreign policy - tonight's subject - is clear. We cannot in these post-Empire days be a super-power in a military sense. But we can make the British presence in the world felt. Without historic alliances, we can be pivotal. We can be powerful in our influence - a nation to whom others listen. Why? Because we run Britain well and are successful ourselves. Because we have the right strategic alliances the world over. And because we are engaged, open and intelligent in how we use them.

And we can do this by using the strengths of our history to build
our future. People sometimes misunderstand my emphasis on modernity. Of course I want Britain to be a modern forward-looking country. I also do believe we allow an old-fashioned image of Britain occasionally to obscure the new fashions of Britain to our detriment.

But I value and honour our history enormously. Who could stand at the Cenotaph yesterday and not feel both moved and proud?

I want us to make sense of our history. There is a lot of rubbish talked about the Empire. In my view, we should not either be apologising for it, or wringing our hands about it. It is a fact of our history. It was, in many ways, a most extraordinary achievement and it has left us with some very valuable connections - in the Commonwealth, in the English language. So let us use them and be thankful we have them.

There are other strengths. We have the institutions; strong armed forces, a world-respected Diplomatic Service, international companies, the City, the British Council, the World Service, our global charities and NGOs. We have the technology and inventiveness. Most important, we have the people: entrepreneurs, creative talent in every field, world-renowned scientists, a dynamic multi-cultural, multi-ethnic society.

We also enjoy a unique set of relationships through the Security Council, NATO, the G8, Europe and the Commonwealth, not to mention our close alliance with America. We hold the Presidency of the European Union and the G8 next year, and are hosting the second Asia-Europe Meeting.

By virtue of our geography, our history and the strengths of our people, Britain is a global player.

As an island nation, Britain looks outward naturally. The British are inveterate travellers. We are the second biggest investors, and the second biggest recipients of inward investment, behind the US in both cases.

Our task has to be to shape these strengths and give them definition within a foreign policy that is clear and stated.

Tonight I will do so. I will set out, briefly but plainly, the 'guiding light' principles of a modern British foreign policy.

First. Consistent with our national interest, we must end the isolation of the last 20 years and be a leading partner in Europe. Of course, if Europe embarks on a path that is wrong or repugnant to British interests, we would have to stay apart. But subject to that, there is no place for misguided little Englander sentiment. The world is moving closer together. The EU will continue to develop. Look at South America, with Mercosur and the Andean Pact countries. North Asia and ASEAN. Or the US and NAFTA.

Britain is part of Europe. It must play its full part in leading it. Not because there is no alternative. There is: we could go. But because it is in British national interests to stay. And as we are staying - let us do so with effect.
Then we can change Europe where it needs changing. Reform of the CAP. Enlargement. Driving through the single market. Greater flexibility in the EU economy. Making a single currency work. A successful single currency would be good for the EU. Our own position will be judged on a hard-headed assessment of the economic benefits. They must be clear and unambiguous. But it will affect us in or out. And influence, not impotence, must be our objective in shaping how it works.

Europe wants us there as a leading player. Britain may need to be part of Europe, but Europe needs Britain to be part of it. For four centuries, our destiny has been to help shape Europe. Let it be so again.

Second principle: Strong in Europe and strong with the US. There is no choice between the two. Stronger with one means stronger with the other.

Our aim should be to deepen our relationship with the US at all levels. We are the bridge between the US and Europe. Let us use it.

When Britain and America work together on the international scene, there is little we cannot achieve.

We must never forget the historic and continuing US role in defending the political and economic freedoms we take for granted. Leaving all sentiment aside, they are a force for good in the world. They can always be relied on when the chips are down. The same should always be true of Britain.

We face another critical test of international resolve today. Saddam Hussein is once more defying the clearly expressed will of the United Nations by refusing to allow UN inspectors to fulfil their task of ensuring Iraq has no remaining weapons of mass destruction. It is vital for all of us that they be allowed to complete their work with no suggestion of discrimination against our US allies. Only then can the question of relaxing sanctions arise.

This Government's determination to stand firm against a still dangerous dictator is unshakeable. We want to see a diplomatic solution and will work with others to achieve this in the next few days. But Saddam should not take as a sign of weakness the international community's desire to find a peaceful way forward if possible. He has made this fatal miscalculation before. For his sake, I hope he will not make it again.

Third principle: We need strong defence, not just to defend our country, but for British influence abroad. Today, whether in Bosnia or the UN peace-keeping forces, or in any of the negotiations on disarmament and the reduction of weapons of mass destruction, sound defence is sound foreign policy. It is an instrument of influence. We must, of course, always look for efficiency in money spent on defence. But we must not reduce our capability to exercise a role on the international stage.

Fourth principle: We use power and influence for a purpose: for the values and aims we believe in. Britain must be a key player on
major transnational issues; the environment, drugs, terrorism, crime, human rights and development. Human rights may sometimes seem an abstraction in the comfort of the West, but when they are ignored human misery and political instability all too easily follow. The same is true if we ignore the ethical dimension of the trade in arms.

Again, we are well placed to push forward international action through our position in all the major international groupings, not least the Commonwealth.

Environment and crime will be major themes of our EU presidency. Next year's Birmingham Summit will have international crime as one of the two or three critical issues on its agenda. Development was a preoccupation of the recent Commonwealth Summit.

Fifth, Britain must reinforce its position as a champion of free trade throughout the world. We are, above all, a trading nation, open to the world and ready to compete on a level playing field with all comers. We must also be champions of free investment, inward and outward. No-one gains in the end from protectionism.

Which brings me back to the starting point: national purpose. Foreign policy should not be seen as some self-contained part of government in a box marked 'abroad' or 'foreigners'. It should complement and reflect our domestic goals. It should be part of our mission of national renewal.

In the end I am, simply, a patriot. I believe in Britain. But it is an enlightened patriotism. Patriotism based not on narrow chauvinism but on the right values and principles. I believe in Britain because, at its best, it does stand for the right values and can give something to the world.

Tonight I have set out the guiding light principles of a modern British foreign policy. Properly followed, they do allow Britain to escape from the legacy of the past and shape an exciting future for ourselves.

A new confidence in Britain is not about style - though don't ignore the impact on the outside world of presenting a modern, professional face. It is, of course, about substance. It is about knowing where we are going. That is what gives us the confidence. We do. And with the right blend of intelligence and determination, we will get there.

ENDS
UK Presidency of the European Union

REMARKS BY THE PRIME MINISTER, MR TONY BLAIR,

ON THE LAUNCH OF BRITAIN'S EU PRESIDENCY IN THE US

Britain's Presidency of the European Union in 1998 is a tremendously important opportunity for Britain, and indeed for Europe.

The new British government has taken a constructive attitude to Europe. We've put behind us some of the more anti-European attitudes of the past because we believe that it is essential if Britain is to have influence in the world that it must be a key and leading player in Europe.

In the Presidency we aim to focus on launching Monetary Union successfully, making sure that it works, and works in the interests of countries whether they are in or out of it. We need to make sure that the process of enlargement, getting the countries from Eastern Europe into the European Union, is put under way, and put under way successfully. We will focus particularly on areas like crime and environment where those issues cross national boundaries, and are of direct interest to people in Europe. And of course the key question for the ordinary person in the street in Europe is jobs, and we have got to make sure that in Europe we are concentrating on how we make our work force more employable, on education, skills, technology in the new global market rather than on some of the old style European interventionism and state aids.

We also want a Europe that's open. Open to markets, open to competition, able to compete, not a fortress Europe that tries to shut itself off from the rest of the world.

I believe, too, that a Britain that is stronger in Europe is a Britain that is strong with the United States of America too. Britain enjoys a good, very strong relationship with the United States today. I believe in that. The United States is a key ally for Britain, always has been and always will be, but I think it is important that Britain acts as a bridge between Europe and the United States of America. We could bring the two closer together, and make sure that some of the common issues that we face are tackled in a more cohesive and concerted way.

So I hope very much that the European Union Presidency for Britain will be an opportunity for us not just to demonstrate new leadership in Europe, but also an opportunity for us to bring Europe and America closer together, with a closer and better understanding of the challenges we both face.
THE CHALLENGE FOR THE UK PRESIDENCY

BY THE BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY, MR ROBIN COOK, MP

When the new Labour government was elected, we promised to make Britain a leading player in Europe. We now go to Brussels united, committed to Europe, and determined to play our part in shaping the future of the Union. We have no pretensions to being the paramount leader or the crowned prince in Brussels. But we do want our voice to be a constructive and influential one.

The British Presidency offers us the chance to affirm the new reality. It will give us six months in which we can help to give new direction to Europe. It is an opportunity that we will make the most of. During the British Presidency the EU will be taking its first crucial steps in two of its most important projects - EMU and enlargement. We will give both the best start we can.

We have already said that Britain will not be joining Stage 3 of EMU in 1999, when many of our partners will be locking their currencies together. We believe that British membership of a single currency would in principle be good for Britain and good for Europe. But the timing is wrong for us. We will be in the chair when the decisions are made, though. I have given my assurance that we will discharge this responsibility fairly and objectively, and facilitate the historic decisions to be made. We want the single currency to be a success.

We are also determined to make enlargement a success. Bringing the Central and East Europeans into the EU will fulfil the challenge set when the Iron Curtain came down eight years ago - to create a Europe that is whole and free. An enlarged EU will mean a bigger single market, a strengthened European voice in the world, a prosperous and peaceful Europe in which war is unthinkable. It is a historic goal. But it is also a goal that requires a lot of work. The applicant countries have made impressive progress since the dead hand of communism was lifted. But they all have some way to go before they are ready to take on the commitments of EU membership, and before their enterprises are ready to stand confidently in the EU's single market. The process will take several years. But we will take the first steps during our Presidency.
Britain in the USA

The British Presidency - Giving Europe back to the people.
Speech by the British Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, in Dublin

Speech by the British Foreign Minister, Robin Cook, to the Institute for European affairs. 3 November 1997

When the new Labour Government was elected in May, we promised we would transform Britain's relations with Europe. We promised that Britain would be a key and committed player in Europe, not an uncooperative minority of one. We promised this because we believed in European co-operation. We believe that Europe needs to work together now more than ever before. We believe that the challenges that face us are not challenges that we can face alone.

Because the world is changing fast. The economy is becoming ever more global. Trade is growing at twice the speed of production. British Airways does its backroom work in Bombay, while a baker in South Yorkshire is taking on 50 new staff because his baguettes are selling so well in France. Yesterday's solutions will not work for tomorrow.

But political leaders must be careful that as we build supra-national structures, we do not lose contact with the people. We need to reconnect the peoples of Europe with the European Union which their governments are trying to create. They need to know that the EU is relevant to their lives. The EU seems to spend too much of its time discussing things that do not touch the people's lives, abstractions and institutions rather than a concrete agenda. The people need to believe that their agenda is also our agenda. Britain has a mission as President of the European Union - to give Europe back to the people.

Three issues are of paramount concern to the people of Europe. First is finding and keeping a job. Over 18 million people are unemployed in the EU. 5 million of them are under 25. That means one in ten of Europe's young people are jobless. And those in work often feel less secure than they used to be. Many of us started work at a time when jobs were for life. Now changing jobs and even careers is the norm. The modern economy is very exciting for those who are prepared for it, for those with the skills to flourish in the new market-place. But many feel threatened by it, and many are excluded from it. We must make sure that the modern economy is an inclusive one, that brings in all sectors of society.

The EU has a major role in that process. The forthcoming Jobs Summit will set an agenda for putting Europe back to work. We will use our Presidency to pursue that agenda with vigour. By helping governments find the best ways to help their people find and keep jobs. The EU should be a clearing-house for innovation. And by pursuing the four goals which the Commission has identified in its draft guidelines, which match well with the new Labour Government's policies.

First, promoting employability. Governments must make sure that our people have the skills they need to find work. We need to make sure that our society does not split into those with skills who can benefit from the modern economy, and those without who risk being permanently excluded from it. We need to give all our people the education and the skills they need so they can use their talents and embrace the new economic reality with confidence.

The new Labour Government has offered a New Deal for the unemployed - helping them learn new skills and find jobs. Because the only real job security in the modern world comes from employability. Of course, I am preaching to the converted in Dublin, where unemployment has come down and migration has been reversed. The miracle has been pulled off through keeping the Irish economy competitive and ensuring Irish school leavers emerge on to the jobs market armed with the skills that companies need.

The second goal is flexibility. Companies must be able to adapt to a fast-changing market. Otherwise,
they stop being competitive and cannot create jobs. This does not mean blind deregulation. All workers are entitled to decent minimum standards. But we must guarantee basic standards in the workplace without over-burdening business and destroying jobs. Red tape cannot protect jobs or promote growth. Skills and competitiveness can.

Third, entrepreneurship. We must be able to turn creativity and innovation, of which Europe has plenty, into jobs and growth. To do this, we must nurture small businesses, and encourage them to take on workers - by lightening their administrative burden, reducing the non-wage costs of taking on new people, and encouraging investment in new companies.

Finally, equal opportunities. All those who want to work must be given the chance, not just the young or able-bodied or those without family commitments. This means improving child-care provisions and encouraging flexible working arrangements. It means enforcing anti-discrimination legislation so that nobody is denied work because of their sex or the colour of their skin. It means looking at the particular needs of disabled people.

The Luxembourg Jobs Summit will not be the end of the process, but a new start. In Cardiff eight months later we will be looking at what progress we have achieved. We will not let up, so that young school-leavers can enter the jobs market with confidence, so that young entrepreneurs who are trying to create jobs should not have to complain of skills shortages, and so that people who have been unemployed for long periods of time should get another chance to re-equip themselves with skills and find jobs.

The other key to creating jobs is staying competitive. And a key part of staying competitive is making the Single Market work - an area where Ireland and the UK have led the way. But there is still some way to go before we can claim that the Single Market is complete. We will be working hard on the Single Market Action Plan we approved in Amsterdam, and together with the Luxembourg and Austrian Presidencies we aim to get it completed by the end of 1998. We need to implement the directive liberalising electricity markets, so competition between suppliers can lead to lower electricity prices for consumers and businesses. In Britain we have seen how freeing up the telecoms market leads to better service, more choice and lower prices; we will use our experience to ensure that telecoms liberalisation in Europe, due on 1 January 1998, is effective and on time. We also need to make sure that all businesses have a fair chance to compete for the 720 billion ECU that European governments spend on goods and services each year.

We need to tear down the remaining barriers to borderless trade, making sure that things like technical standards do not remain as a subtle form of protectionism. We need to simplify the Single Market rules and enforce them properly. We need to ensure that they are reflected properly in the laws of all the EU's members. Then we will have a genuine Single Market, free of the distortions of hidden barriers and unfair state aid. Then we will have a Europe that can work for the people, and put the people back to work.

Next to insecurity at work in importance as a concern to the people is insecurity in the home and on the street from fear of crime. The drugs trade is second only to the oil trade in turnover. In 1995 there were over 6,500 deaths in Europe directly relating to drugs. The drugs trade is one of the most integrated in Europe. Its agents are streets ahead of government in working together across borders. If we are to catch them, we need to match them, with teamwork and international co-operation of our own. And we must be prepared to stand up to them. Many people in Britain join the Irish people in saluting Veronica Guerin, who gave her life exposing those behind the drugs trade. The best tribute we can pay her is to show the same courage and determination in taking on the drug barons - helping young lives from being ruined by drugs, and families from being torn apart by addiction.

It was George Bernard Shaw who said that people have got so accustomed to a life seasoned with crime that they cannot contemplate a life without it. The people look to government to do everything within our power to fight crime. Working with other governments is a key part of that. We have built outstanding co-operation between the UK and Ireland. We want to use the British Presidency to see co-operation enhanced across the whole of Europe. We need to get Europol launched as soon as we can,
currency can get off to the best possible start.

Economic and Monetary Union is not the only momentous step the EU is about to take. During the British Presidency we will be starting negotiations with countries that want to join the European Union. One of our key objectives will be to make sure these are successful. Enlarging the EU is an historic opportunity, both for the EU and for its new members. It will fulfill the challenge set a decade ago when the Iron Curtain was brought down - to create a prosperous, peaceful Europe. And prosperity and peace are the two over-riding needs of the people.

The way forward is to launch negotiations as soon as possible with those countries best prepared for membership. Some are ready for the rigours of the Single Market and the far-reaching commitments which EU membership brings. Others are not. Opening talks with those who still are not yet ready would raise hopes unfairly. It would soon leave them disappointed and disillusioned. It would distract their attention from the pressing task of creating a functioning market economy. So the British Presidency will have two important objectives - to get negotiations under way as quickly as we can with those who are ready to join, and to help those who have further to travel, to make sure that they do not feel they are being rejected. The enlargement process must be like a pipeline - all the applicant countries are in it, moving at their own speeds but towards the same goal, all with the promise of eventual membership. And also all with the promise of support along the way - support to help them reform their economies, privatise their state-owned corporations, strengthen their public administrations.

To show that this is an inclusive process, we are proposing a European Conference, in which all the European applicants will take part. This will show that although EU membership itself may take time, we already regard the applicants as partners and members of the European family.

Enlargement is part of a wider project. Together with the Agenda 2000 reforms proposed by the Commission, they make up a vital package to modernise the EU. The EU has to change to meet the challenges posed by enlargement, and by the changing world.

The Common Agricultural Policy is one example. It made sense in the 1950s against a background of food shortages. But it needs modernisation now. The Commission has come up with proposals, and during our Presidency we will want to take forward the debate on those proposals. I know the strength of feeling on reform of the Common Agricultural Policy, and the divergence of views about how it is best done. There is much that we can agree on. A modernised agricultural policy must support our farmers, but at lower cost to the taxpayer and at lower cost to the consumer, and preserving rural communities and the rural environment.

We will use our Presidency to take a hard look at how the EU is financed, and how the money is spent. We all know this is difficult territory. As one of my predecessors as Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, said in another context, 'if you open that Pandora's box, you never know what Trojan horses will jump out'. But the people want to know that the burden is shared fairly, that the regional aid to help the poorest areas goes to the areas which need them most. They want hard action on fraud, to know that their money is not being wasted or siphoned off.

Finally, the British Presidency will have a duty to speak for Europe in the world. The EU can be a major player on the world stage, but only if we can co-ordinate EU foreign policy effectively.

We will make sure that the people of Europe know that the countries of Europe are speaking with one voice, and that working together we carry more clout than working individually. We will use our Presidency to develop an EU Code of Conduct on arms exports. We shall ensure that human rights remain a key factor in the EU's relations with the rest of the world. I know this is an area of great interest to Ireland, and we were delighted by the recent appointment of Mary Robinson as UN Commissioner for Human Rights. We will be working closely with her.

Ours is an ambitious agenda. We cannot and are not aiming to complete in six months. But we can make a start on some important new priorities, and in doing so help give a new direction to the EU. Making the EU relevant to the people's lives. Making the EU receptive to the people's concerns. Restoring the
people's faith in the European project. Giving Europe back to the people.

- Britain in Europe
- International and Domestic Issues

Footnote:

Britain in Europe
International and Domestic Issues
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE</th>
<th>SUBJECT/TITLE</th>
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<tr>
<td>001. memo</td>
<td>Donald Bandler to Samuel Berger; re: Long-Term Planning - European Directorate (4 pages)</td>
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**COLLECTION:**
- Clinton Presidential Records
- National Security Council
- Ted Widmer (Speechwriting)
- OA/Box Number: 2191

**FOLDER TITLE:**
- Steinberg, James [3]

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**RESTRICION CODES**

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**
- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor’s deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**
- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(5) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(5) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
Often said that when you get to government, too busy to really think – have to draw on stored capital.

Regrettably, a lot of truth to that. Fortunately, before coming to Washington, had a lot of time to build up some capital – working closely with so many of you here today.

When I began to think about the topic of your conference, realized that it was just four years ago that many of us in this room got together to think about the future of the transatlantic alliance, and to try to sketch out some common ideas about whether and how to sustain that relationship in the future.

So last night, I went to my bookcase to pull out the results of our efforts -- to ask whether we had got things right, and how, in light of subsequent events we ought to calibrate our policies for the future.

I think it's fair to say that our conclusions back in 1993 were realistic, but generally optimistic about US-European and US-French relations and the possibility of a new partnership (won't reopen my old discussion with Nicole about a new "bargain").

Yet, if you look at some of the headlines over the past couple of years, you might think that we had our heads in the clouds.

• Maybe real question we need to be asking not just, “Can U.S. & France, U.S. & Europe, sustain and strengthen global partnership in post-CW world?” but “Is it worth the trouble?”

• Answer: Definitive yes. But need to face hard challenges – squarely, strongly, creatively. In process, think we’ll find conceptual differences can in fact be bridged.

Want to look briefly at 4 areas of challenge: Europe, Asia, Middle East, Africa:

Europe (know that Bandler has discussed with you – which has been the focus of so much activity – largely been a success story of transatlantic cooperation. Despite continued issues remaining on NATO internal adaptation (particularly between US and France) the efforts over the past four years on NATO enlargement, outreach to non-members, NATO-Russia and Ukraine, and, not insignificantly, the rather remarkable cooperation in Bosnia, has largely put to the rest the core question of sustaining a transatlantic security link with respect to Europe. On the economic front, despite some continued differences on specific trade issues, fears that economic differences would dominate in a post-Cold War world have not proven true.

Of course challenges ahead – EMU, future involvement in Bosnia, NATO internal structures and burden-sharing in connection with enlargement – to name a few. But I think that it’s reasonable to feel a certain optimism about the future.
Let me then turn to several of the key challenges beyond Europe.

Middle East – areas where there has been both dramatic instances of cooperation (Desert Storm) and important friction.

- **Middle East:** Common interest in stability, access to resources, combating terrorism, spread of WMD. Yet different views on how to handle rogue states: Engagement and dialogue to sway them from bad behavior OR political isolation, economic sanctions to raise the cost? **Can opposing tactics be reconciled?**

Asia: perhaps most important question for next century is what kind of power China will become

- **China:** We share profound interest in China that is stable, open, non-aggressive, respects human rights, plays responsible role on world stage. At same time, acutely aware of China’s draw as major market for our export-driven economies. **How do we exert right kind of influence in China, when economic stakes are so alluring?**

Africa: Area where the US in the past has played a rather limited role, but with the changing internal politics and economic strategies of the post, post colonial generation, as well as conflicts with large scale humanitarian consequences has led to some greater US involvement and a rethinking of European, especially French role

- **Africa:** Both want to see continuing evolution of peaceful, democratic African states integrated into global economy. Yet different perspectives, priorities: France has focus on stability; U.S. looking for steady progress, faster pace of democratization. **How to achieve common goals in Africa without generating destructive friction between ourselves?**
CONCLUSION

• Challenge for all of us: To keep working on ways to manage partnership more effectively -- preventing competition from eroding cooperation... keeping tactical differences from obscuring strategic goals... ensuring inevitable disagreements don’t spiral into confrontations.

• Does this mean revamping institutions of cooperation, developing new “rapid response” mechs for consultation/message mgmt, compromising more, agreeing to disagree more often? Don’t have all the answers – but need to ensure we have the will.

• As we move forward, three key principles to guide our work:

  First, U.S. and Europe must remain engaged in world, on our own and together. Unique capacity to provide global leadership in age where challenges/opportunities increasingly transcend national borders. Need to resist isolation forces on both sides of Atlantic.

  Second, Europe needs to accept that U.S. has global interests and will act as must to defend them. At same time, needs to recognize we can’t be expected to bear burden alone. We in turn must be prepared to accept Europe as a strong partner. That’s why clear interest in Europe’s continued integration, enhanced ability in foreign and security policy, more effective US-EU cooperation. Appreciate European desire to translate aggregate economic power of 15 into collective political influence.

  Third, U.S., for its part, must be willing to share not only burdens of global leadership but prerogatives. Need to accept that others have stakes and will pursue them. Need to intensify consultation, but shouldn’t expect or demand consensus on every issue.
In the piece I wrote for the RAND/WEU Institute study, I concluded "The arguments against a new partnership between US and Europe) demonstrate [that] there are costs and risks associated with crafting a new relationship between the United States and Europe. But in the end, the case for a new partnership is more compelling, because in today’s increasingly interdependent world, individual states will find it difficult to achieve unilaterally their national interests and so will need strengthened forms of cooperation.

###
INTRODUCTION

- Tempting in US-Euro symposia to fall back on old softshoe routine: Gravely pose question, does our partnership have a future? Methodically review core values, common interests. Solemnly conclude that yes, it does. Shake hands, go home. Same time, next year.

- Truth is, we all know there are serious problems – differences, disputes, downright confrontations.


- Maybe real question we need to be asking not just, “Can U.S. & France, U.S. & Europe, sustain and strengthen global partnership in post-CW world?” but “Is it worth the trouble?”

- Answer is yes. But need to face hard challenges – squarely, strongly, creatively. In process, think we’ll find that conceptual divisions can in fact be bridged.

TROIS CONUNDRUM: Part I

- Want to consider three such challenges today: China, Africa, Middle East

- China: We share profound interest in China that is stable, open, non-aggressive, respects human rights, plays responsible role on world stage. At same time, acutely aware of China’s draw as major market for our export-driven economies. How do we exert right kind of influence in China, when economic stakes are so alluring?

- Africa: Both want to see continuing evolution of peaceful, democratic African states integrated into global economy. Yet different perspectives, priorities: France has focus on stability; U.S. looking for steady progress, faster pace of democratization. How to achieve common goals in Africa without generating destructive friction between ourselves?

- Middle East: Common interest in stability, access to resources, combating terrorism, spread of WMD. Yet different views on how to handle rogue states: Engagement and dialogue to sway them from bad behavior OR political isolation, economic sanctions to raise the cost? Can opposing tactics be reconciled?
TROIS CONUNDRAS: Part II

China

- U.S., Europe both recognize enormous stakes of China's evolution. Will be significant factor in whether 21st c. one of conflict or cooperation.

- While we may compete for markets, can't afford to view each other as rivals. Helping China make right choices isn't zero sum game.

- On up-side: Working together in OECD, UN to stop illicit payments, protect intellectual property rights. Support China's entry into WTO on appropriate terms. Advancing dialogue on non-proliferation, control of sensitive technologies. (But have ASIA check anything on security issues?)

- On down-side: Disagreed in Geneva on how to promote human rights. Case of shared aims, different tactics – but risks creating perception of gap b/n us that could possibly be exploited.

- Now France launched new approach with rule of law programs, exchanges; U.S. continues to raise cases as in past, doggedly pursuing human rights through frank strategic dialogue.

- Perhaps making our way to new paradigm: Moving from common approach to complementary approach. Beginning to recognize that situation is not zero-sum [What's the conclusion/prognosis? Needs a punchline]

Africa

- Been source of great tension between us in past years. Public spats, private disputes diverted energy from shared goals – peace, stability, better life for African people.

- Now, approach shifting; both sides working to change tone, tactics.

- Example: Africa Crisis Response Initiative. Since ACRF's inception, U.S. & France have debated its size, shape, structure. Tensions reached point that my predecessor had difficulty getting meeting in Paris to discuss.

- Both sides since realized that letting Africa become stage for U.S.-France tug-of-war didn't help anyone. Gradually narrowed differences, reached compromises. Now starting to work on ACRF's implementation. Debate was healthy, resulted in much closer cooperation on security issues between our two countries.

- Also seen benefits of cooperation in Denver, w/ Africa initiative.
• Bottom line: Problem in Africa not too many outside powers vying for influence. Problem is not enough countries interested, involved. U.S. & France both have leadership role to play; instead of tug-of-war, should pool strength. More we concert efforts, more progress we make.

Middle East

• U.S. view: Iran/Iraq hegemonic rogue states, chief threat to regional stability. Only way to deal with such bad actors is to make them pay heavy price. Dialogue doesn’t work; not prepared to force. Best option is strict political isolation, tough economic sanction.

• Euro view: Never cage an animal. Engagement through “critical dialogue” more likely to produce results.

• Despite high stakes and shared goals, working at cross-purposes: U.S. can’t isolate Iran/Iraq single-handedly; resorts to blunt tools like ILSA. Europe resentful; U.S. frustrated in turn by Europe seeming to turn blind eye to intolerable behavior. Find ourselves fighting each other instead of fighting common enemy.

• Have started to bridge gap. U.S., EU, Canada agreed to pursue consultations, with objective of identifying common assessments of Iranian activity in terrorism, human rights, WMD. Though perhaps not yet at level of “benchmarks,” still takes us one step closer to common goal of changing Iran’s behavior.

• But not there yet. Hard work, tough choices ahead. Need to find better way of working together. Only winners in a struggle between us will be Iran/Iraq.

SUCCESS STORIES

• If those are challenges where we’re still trying to find our way; many other areas where we’ve proved what we can do. Some examples:

  -- Open global trading system: GATT, ITA

  -- Europe: NATO enlargement + NATO-Russia at same time; Bosnia

  -- Global threats: Put global threats (drugs, crime, terrorism, env degradation, disease) in mainstream of international agenda at Lyon, Denver; forged new commitment and new tools to meet them together.

  -- ME Peace Process: Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group

CONCLUSION
Think all these examples reflect three basic points:

(1) Solid basis for U.S. & France, U.S. & Europe to sustain and strengthen long-term partnership. Firm core of shared values, trust, broad convergence of strategic interests. Don’t need common enemy; have solid common interests, sense of shared destiny.

(2) When we act together to advance common goals, whole is greater than sum of its parts: benefits accrue not only to us but to larger project at hand.

(2) In general, when we fail to act together, our differences over tactics, not goals.

Challenge for all of us: Commitment to keep working on ways to manage partnership more effectively -- preventing competition from eroding cooperation... keeping tactical differences from obscuring strategic goals... ensuring inevitable disagreements don’t spiral into confrontations.

[Does this mean revamping insts of cooperation, developing new “rapid response” mechs for consultation/message mgmt, agreeing to disagree more often? Don’t have all the answers – but need to ensure the will.] [TK]

As we move forward, three key principles to guide our work:

First, U.S. and Europe must remain engaged in world, on our own and together. Unique capacity to provide global leadership in age where challenges/opportunities increasingly transcend national borders. Need to resist isolation forces on both sides of Atlantic.

Second, Europe needs to accept that U.S. has global interests and will act as must to defend them. At same time, needs to recognize we can’t bear burden alone. We look to Europe to be strong partner, capable actor on world stage. That’s why clear interest in Europe’s continued integration, enhanced ability in foreign and security policy, more effective US-EU cooperation. Appreciate Europe desire to translate aggregate economic power of 15 into collective political influence.

Third, U.S., for its part, must be willing to share not only burdens of global leadership but prerogatives. Need to accept that others have stakes, and will pursue them. Need to intensify consultation, but at same time Can’t expect or demand consensus on every issue. [more...??]

Look forward to continuing to work with all of you as we tackle challenges ahead. Clear that our partnership is not “A Bout de Souffle” -- but I am, so I’ll conclude here. Happy to take your questions... 

###
March - Diplomacy

West of Berlin - Hudson
73. Helsinki: accord, border interests.

European: Realists on Force?

Dad's topic: Eastern Europe - Community: Dream or Reality?

is there one? (prob yes)

get its current agents, or managing problem

similar? They

game strategy gone, but differ on tactics

post-Cold: is there really an alliance?

the glue of a Community

can't vs same goal, they: big guys, are we always for tough guys: rescue their bacon

they put big pot of Russian

7. Windows: need to be contacting

let's look: what is solid? Security strategy

may be a line for our audience?

read off # 7 of this we didn't know: that was by: Egypt

both sides we had to avoid strain with
problems: honest

prescription: If the always do can't,
we stick, recipe for disaster

statement, more dealing

we want integration