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**COLLECTION:**
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Ted Widmer (Speechwriting)
OA/Box Number: 2190

**FOLDER TITLE:**
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit, 4/99

**RESTRICITON CODES**

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5/16 5/20
Welcome to one of the most important events of the Washington Summit. We’ve talked about NATO and its evolving mission for two days now. Today, it’s time to turn to a subject that is at the heart of Europe’s future: NATO’s partnership with other states and institutions. This session will address the way these relationships continue to evolve.

We know that NATO is not a static organization. The world has changed in fundamental ways since 1949, and NATO has changed with it – not only by taking in new members, but by constantly adapting its mission to new challenges. No decade has seen more change or challenge than this one. We have met these challenges well, and there is no doubt our partnerships have been beneficial to all parties.

The Partnership for Peace was created in 1994, and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997. Each has provided an essential forum for consultation with partners and for joint initiatives to make Europe more peaceful and better integrated. The proudest monument to our success is the fact that we have all grown so much this decade, NATO and Partner nations alike. All of Europe is moving forward. In the Baltics, in central and eastern Europe, in the Caucasus, and in most of the Balkans, we have seen profoundly significant progress. But this progress is far from finished. The next decade can be just as historic as the past one.

The end of the Cold War made this a safer world for all nations. But just because one source of conflict ended did not mean that new ones would never arise. The creation of the Partnership for Peace and the EAPC provided a framework to address future tensions and increase cooperation on matters of importance to all of us, both political and military.

In a few short years, we have seen how vital these institutions are. The creation of IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia brought that nation from the abyss, and Bosnia’s relative stability through the Kosovo crisis have shown what our combined troops are doing protecting the peace.

Kosovo has awakened some old tensions, but it has also brought home how important cooperation will be in the Europe of the new century. The support of most partner nations for NATO’s action in Kosovo has greatly facilitated our work restoring stability. I believe it has also helped to persuade Russia and other concerned nations that we are not acting as aggressors, but to prevent ethnic cleansing and to build the conditions for a lasting peace. We recognize that there will be honest disagreements whenever military action takes place. Organizations like this are the best way to work out those disagreements.
I hope this morning that we also go beyond Kosovo to think about long-term stability for all of Southeastern Europe. Long-term stability means far more than military stability. It means opening trade and building prosperity. It means political dialogue, both within nations and between them. The United States and NATO strongly support the continued integration of the region with the rest of Europe. The PFP and the EAPC can play a large role in this integration.

As we approach the new century, it would be naïve to expect that there will not be other crises in Europe. Very likely, they will resemble the threats we have seen this decade: regional tensions that explode suddenly, threatening to draw in reluctant neighbors. That gives all the more urgency to our task of finding common ground and extending this partnership. We must not let our occasional disagreements overshadow our larger need to create the institutions for lasting peace in Europe.

NATO will continue to evolve, just as its partner institutions will. I believe we should keep the door open to new members, but that we should maintain high standards for the responsibilities of membership. I also believe we should help nations that aspire to meet these standards. The question remains not if NATO will expand, but when and how? I look forward to discussing NATO’s future with the Partner nations, and talking with you about the best way we can oversee its future in a way that addresses all of our needs.

The century will bring new opportunity, and new complications. When you consider the types of new threats we are facing in the world, it becomes clear that they are too big for any single nation to solve alone. Environmental issues that affect large regions, not just individual nations. Weapons of mass destruction. Terrorism. Unregulated patterns of investment that disrupt regional economies. To position ourselves intelligently before the problems of the new century, we must create the framework to talk about them – without rancor and without delay.

This has been a historic weekend. You represent the largest gathering of foreign leaders ever assembled in Washington. I thank you for your commitment to this partnership, and I look forward to our meeting.

###
Welcome to the EAPC Plenary session. In my welcoming remarks, I called on NATO and Partner nations to continue their work together, building military and political cooperation we prepare for the new challenges of the 21st century. Let me suggest a few ways to extend this cooperation.

First, strengthening the institutional relationship between NATO, the PFC and the EAPC is a key goal of this Summit. We have already accomplished much in this decade, particularly in Bosnia, where our forces have stood shoulder to shoulder for peace. Within two years of the creation of the PFC, no fewer than 15 Partner nations were working with NATO to implement the Dayton Peace Accords. We need to continue thinking and acting together, increasing the degree to which our military and political structures are interrelated. This will build confidence and effectiveness for future challenges. The new “Political Military Framework” will enhance the roles of Partners in NATO’s political and military decisions. We must also maintain NATO’s strong working relationship with other institutions like the OSCE and the EU.

Second, we need to deepen our cooperation in the Balkans, particularly in Kosovo, where ethnic cleansing again threatens the fragile balance of the region. We cannot let our good work in Bosnia fall apart because we fail to stand up to new intimidation. While recognizing the traditional friendships of the Serb people with other peoples who share their faith, we cannot stand aside and let innocent people succumb to brutality. The EAPC has been a valuable source of ideas about resolving the conflict. Now we need to find unity and build a lasting peace in Kosovo.

Third, we need to develop a long-term vision for Southeastern Europe, one that respects the history of the region but which places that history in its proper perspective. We particularly need to conceive a better future for the nations emerging from the former Yugoslavia and their neighbors. This future depends not only on enhanced understanding between ethnic groups, but on economic stimulus, democratic progress and increased integration with the rest of Europe.

Fourth, we need to discuss the future eligibility of Partner nations for membership in NATO. The Partner nations must recognize that NATO places high demands on its members, and therefore must maintain high standards. But NATO nations must keep open the possibility that new nations will join the Alliance, and we must actively work with nations seeking to meet those standards.
Fifth, we need to improve NATO’s relationship with the largest nation in the Partnership for Peace, Russia. All of our initiatives for peace and prosperity in Europe must be embraced by Russia, and they must embrace Russia. We seek nothing less than the full integration of Russia into the Euro-Atlantic community. We also will continue our important partnership with Ukraine, since the Alliance believes and independent and democratic Ukraine is essential to our community. Yesterday’s Summit of the NATO-Ukraine Commission exemplifies our ability to bridge the differences of history and build a common future.

Sixth, we must continue to address the new transnational challenges that threaten all nations. The 1990s brought new opportunities, and the end of the Cold War was welcomed across Europe. But we have also seen new threats. Increasingly, political and military problems are tied up with a wide range of other issues, from economic prosperity to the environment. Security threats come less from the contest between nations, and more from incidents of ethnic violence, or unpredictable acts of terrorism. Together, we can tackle these threats far more effectively than any of us can on our own.

Finally, I want to recognize a number of specific areas where we have had productive conversations, from landmine removal to education activities to specific initiatives like the Exercise Simulation Network, the Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, and nationally-sponsored partnership Training Centers.

Thank you again for making this Summit what it has been – an unprecedented opportunity to reshape our world for peace and prosperity.

###
Welcome to Washington, and welcome to the White House. I am delighted to officially begin our smallest and least formal plenary session of the next few days.

I'd like to say a few words about the larger purpose of this summit and the alliance among our nations. Fifty years ago this month, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington. For my country, it was a radical departure from our history. Our founding fathers wanted nothing to do with foreign entanglements – that is, as soon as we were done asking the French to help us win independence from the British.

Many Americans didn't want the United States to sign that treaty. The Second World War was over. The staggering carnage of that war was an argument both for and against involvement with Europe. The tempting solution was to celebrate the end of the war, and wash our hands of further responsibility. The hard solution – the right solution – was to do everything in our power to alter history, including our own. To win World War Three by making sure it never began. To accept what we now see as a basic lesson of our century: peace is not something you hope for, it's something you work for, and sometimes you fight for.
We owe a profound debt of gratitude to our parents and grandparents for choosing the right course. They were thinking of their children—us—when they took on that responsibility. Tonight, we are thinking of them as we renew our commitment to each other... and to our children.

I don’t have to go into the history of NATO for you. All of you know how much this alliance has accomplished. That we have never been directly challenged by an adversary, that Europe’s divisions are fading, that so many new democracies want to join us... that says it all. But it does not mean we do not face constant challenges. I think the situation in Kosovo has crystallized what it is that draws us together and keeps us together.

NATO is an alliance not merely of arms but of values. We believe in the right to pursue happiness with freedom and dignity. We also believe that God-given rights must be actively sought and secured by human beings. We know our history too well to believe that the conditions for happiness and friendship exist naturally. They must be defined, and they must be defended.

Over fifty years, a new Europe has emerged. Each decade has seen progress—none more than the 1990s. Today’s map of the continent reveals what NATO’s founders could only dream of—a Europe that is increasingly united—free—and with one exception, at peace. Amidst all the trappings of a state dinner, it is difficult to conjure up the suffering of the Kosovar people. But we must remember them, and find resolve in our reflection.
As we meet, hundreds of thousands of innocent people in Kosovo are without a home. They have been driven from their country, many are trapped inside it, afraid to go back to their villages, yet unable to escape. Many have seen unspeakable cruelty; many are facing hunger and cold, not because of anything they have done, but because of who they are. But for all they have been through, they know this. The most powerful democratic alliance ever assembled is on their side. They are not abandoned. They are not forgotten. Mr. Milosevic will not succeed in erasing their names from the pages of history. They will return and reclaim their lives.

Let's not forget that as we turn to our working agenda this weekend. Let's not forget that the issues we are discussing are not abstractions, whether it’s the need to revise NATO’s strategic concept, or to strengthen our defense capability, or to build new ties with non-NATO states. All our discussions serve the overarching purpose of NATO – giving people the chance to live the lives they want to, free of fear.

All of you have contributed to that purpose by contributing to our efforts in Kosovo. Fourteen allies have contributed forces. Italy is providing critical airbases near the front lines. Greece is trying to get desperately needed humanitarian aid inside Kosovo. Our three new allies are bolstering the alliance in Central Europe. Our partners across Europe are standing together. All nations represented here, and many nations not represented, are helping to fight against fear in Southeastern Europe. Thank you for your solidarity.

Our situation remains ever new. But we draw strength from those who labored before us so that nations might co-exist, and find lasting peace in common purpose. I will close with a line from

Gaius Julius Caesar, The Gallic Wars: 1.18.2: ‘Do the Greeks want to be singled out...’
Aeschylus: "Great spirits meet calamity greatly." I will add to that the principle that has
animated NATO from the moment of its creation: from the calamity of war, a gentler world can
be built, and shielded from harm. Let us renew that commitment – to honor NATO’s founders,
and protect their legacy into a new half-century and a new century. Please join me in a toast to
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

###

and pass their
legacy onto
our children
into the new
century.
in the United States, far short of the material prosperity of many of his colleagues. On the other hand, he has been reported as a "best seller" in Western Europe in the recent post-war years.

I FEEL that this award was not made to me as a man, but to my work—a life's work in the agony and sweat of the human spirit, not for glory and least of all for profit, but to create out of the materials of the human spirit something which did not exist before. So this award is only mine in trust.

It will not be difficult to find a dedication for the money part of it commensurate with the purpose and significance of its origin. But I would like to do the same with the acclaim, too, by using this moment as a pinnacle from which I might be listened to by the young men and women already dedicated to the same anguish and travail, among whom is already that one who will some day be. I refuse to accept the end of my writing.

Our tragedy today is a general and universal physical fear so long sustained by now that we can even bear it. There are no longer problems of the spirit. There is only the question: When will I be blown up? Because of this, the young man or woman writing today has forgotten the problems of the human heart in conflict with itself which alone can make good writing because only that is worth writing about, worth the agony and the sweat.

He must learn them again. He must teach himself that the basest of all things is to be afraid: and, teaching himself that, forget it forever, leaving no room in his workshop for anything but the old verities and truths of the heart, the universal truths lacking which any story is ephemeral and doomed—love and honor and pity and pride and compassion and sacrifice. Until he does, he labors under a curse. He writes not of love but of lust, of defeats in which nobody loses anything of value, of victories without hope and, worst of all, without pity or compassion. His griefs grieve on no universal bones, leaving no scars. He writes of the heart but of the glands.

Until he learns these things, he will write, as though he stood among and watched the end of man. I decline to accept the end of man. It is easy enough to say that man is immortal simply because he will endure; that when the last ding-dong of doom has clanged and faded from the last worthless rock hanging tideless in the last red and dying evening, that even then there will still be one more sound; that of his puny inexhaustible voice, still talking. I refuse to accept this.

I believe that man will not merely endure; he will prevail. He is immortal, not because he alone among creatures has an inexhaustible voice, but because he has a soul, a spirit capable of compassion and sacrifice and endurance. The poet's, the writer's, duty is to write about these things. It is his privilege to help man endure by lifting his heart, by reminding him of the courage and honor and hope and pride and compassion and pity and sacrifice which have been the glory of his past. The poet's voice need not merely be the record of man, it can be one of the props, the pillars to help him endure and prevail.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR

"Old soldiers never die; they just fade away."

WASHINGTON, D. C., April 19, 1951—General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, most picturesque of the commanders in World War II and virtual proconsul of the Western powers in the Pacific until stripped of his command in recent weeks by President Harry S. Truman, delivered his farewell to half a century of military life in an unprecedented setting, as the honored guest of a Joint Session of the Senate and House.

Never at a loss for eloquent expression, General MacArthur gracefully accepted his dismissal, but in this eulogy of his own career backed down not an inch from the stand which brought it about. He placed himself among the ageless line of old soldiers who "just fade away," but in his passing from the picture he cautioned that the halfway measures prescribed for the current war in Korea—confined action against the Communists to the small land mass of North Korea—would only encourage and perpetuate the determination of the Communists to continue their world-wide onslaught
day when all the people of Europe, including the Serbs now suffering under Mr. Milosevic’s tyranny, will be free to choose their own destiny.

To the leaders and the people of Russia, let me say: we recognize Russia’s unique importance in building a more united and secure Europe’s future. We are determined to support Russia’s unprecedented transition toward the freemarket and democracy and to deepen the NATO-Russia partnership. Whatever our differences today on Kosovo, we also have considerable common ground and need to build on. It should have achieved let us continue to find common ground whenever and wherever we can. We are reducing our Cold War-era arsenals, promoting new trade and economic ties, and promoting a safer world. We want the same things for our children, and the world benefits when we work together, as we have by reducing our nuclear arms, limiting conventional forces, helping restore the people of peace in Bosnia along the path of peace and democracy. We worked hard together for a peaceful solution for Kosovo, and it is important that we join forces to end the conflict in Kosovo when we end Serbia’s violence, I believe Russia can be our partner in restoring stability.

Let me conclude by noting that in the last couple of years we have celebrated the 50th anniversaries of some of the wisest decisions ever made by an American leader: the abolition in our armed forces of the racial segregation that made a mockery of our commitment to equal rights; the recognition of the proud Israeli state that rose from the ashes of Europe’s Holocaust; the successful effort to protect the free people of West Berlin with a heroic airlift; and, 50 years ago this month, America’s decision to join with Canada and European partners to defend freedom and democracy through NATO. As we go forward with our mission in the Balkans, I hope we can all gain some inspiration from the principled and tenacious leader who guided us back then, President Harry Truman. He worked to defend this nation so, as he put it on the day we signed the North Atlantic Treaty, people could “get on with the real business of government and society, the business of achieving a fuller and happier life for our citizens.”

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Thank you Mr. Secretary-General, fellow leaders: As I suggested in my welcoming remarks, the goals that ought to guide us today are simple and clear: to prevail in this conflict, and to be ready to win the peace once the conflict is over. Let me say a few words about the specific steps we should take as we work towards those goals.

First, we have to reaffirm our conditions for bringing this conflict to an end. Serbian military, police and paramilitary forces must leave Kosovo. All refugees and displaced people must be able to return, with security and self government. And an international force must deploy to protect them. Before we suspend the bombing, Mr. Milosevic must unequivocally accept our conditions and begin to withdraw his forces from Kosovo.

In other words, we are waiting for verifiable actions, not empty gestures or phony promises. Mr. Milosevic can take those actions, or watch as NATO grinds down his war machine, as his supporters face growing hardship, as he loses his grip on Kosovo.

Our conditions represent the minimum necessary solution to this crisis. They are also reasonable and just. The international force we envision, for example, will have NATO at its core, but it will include many other nations. We hope Russia will play an important role in it. We would want the force to have a UN mandate. It will demilitarize Kosovo, including the KLA. It will protect the rights of all of Kosovo's people, including its Serbian minority. This is an offer that no Serbian leader with the interests of his people at heart would refuse.

Second, we must increase our political and economic pressure against Belgrade so that its capacity to hold out is diminished and so we can meet our goals sooner. This should include countering Belgrade’s propaganda by increasing broadcasting from transmitters in the front-line states. It should include increased support for the War Crimes Tribunal.

But most of all, it should include denying Mr. Milosevic the resources he needs to maintain his control and keep his war machine moving. I strongly support the United Kingdom’s proposals to
tighten economic sanctions against Serbia and the European Union’s initiative to impose an oil embargo. But if we agree to deny fuel to Serbia in principle, we should also deny it in practice by sending NATO ships to interdict it before it reaches port. It makes no sense to allow oil to get through to Belgrade if we are asking our pilots to risk their lives to destroy it once it arrives. We have the ability to stop this flow, the right to stop it, and most important, an obligation to stop it.

Our third task today should be to send a tangible message of support to the front line states that have stood with us in this crisis, but which are threatened by Belgrade’s actions. We have done that by helping the refugees and sending economic aid. We should also make it clear today that if Serbia launches an attack any of its neighbors because of their support for our efforts, NATO will respond. In other words, we should state plainly in advance what we would wish to do anyway if any of these countries were attacked. In this way, we will be more likely to deter such a threat in the first place, and give our partners the confidence they need to persevere.

Finally, even as we fight this conflict, we need to look beyond it to what southeastern Europe should look like a decade and a generation from now. In our own interest, we need to support its economic and democratic development and its integration into our community. I want to work with our allies, with the EU, and with the International Financial Institutions to mobilize more support for these countries. And I want to make sure we condition our help, just as we did during the reconstruction of Europe 50 years ago, on deeper reform and closer cooperation among the beneficiaries. In that way, we can start the process of de-Balkanizing the Balkans.

What we do not need is a strategy of more meetings and rhetorical commitments. What we do need is constant, steady engagement, backed by resources. This will demand keeping our institutions open to nations that make the right choices. It will take money, in the form of aid and investment. It will oblige us to increase and coordinate our security assistance to our partners through the Partnership for Peace. It will require a willingness to provide moral and material support to people across the region who are standing up for multiethnic democracy, and for a democratic transition in Serbia.
Let me just conclude by saying that from the very beginning we have wanted the Summit to make a clear statement of NATO’s values and vision of Europe. I cannot imagine a more powerful statement of what we believe than our actions in Kosovo today, and our commitment that this confrontation should end with a new push toward integration. I cannot imagine a more powerful demonstration of NATO’s unity and resolve in the face of new challenges. That does not make the situation in Kosovo any less tragic or difficult. But it does offer hope that NATO will continue to do what it has done so well for the last 50 years: to uphold our interests and our values by making it clear that America and Europe will do what it takes to defend them.
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<td>re: Plenary Meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (3 pages)</td>
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- Clinton Presidential Records
- National Security Council
- Ted Widmer (Speechwriting)
- OA/Box Number: 2190

**FOLDER TITLE:**
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit, 4/99

**RESTRICTION CODES**

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Thank you Mr. Secretary-General, fellow foreign ministers, distinguished colleagues.

We meet today to take a further step toward deeper ties between NATO and its Partner countries. We are concluding the work of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and inaugurating the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

I want to say a few words about how we arrived at this point, and about where I believe we should go from here.

Six years ago, when the NACC was formed, the rubble of the Berlin Wall was still fresh; free institutions were just starting to take hold to our east. Everyone agreed that something had to be done to bring an undivided Europe together. Not everyone agreed about precisely what that something should be.

Some believed that in the post-Cold War world all the institutions we had grown used to would be swept aside. NATO would go the way of the Warsaw Pact and the do-do bird, and we would walk hand in hand into a common European home-- a community that included everyone, but imposed true obligations on no one.

Others assumed that our challenge in central and eastern Europe consisted simply of sending assistance and advice. They were in no hurry to open our institutions to nations and peoples that seemed foreign, distant, unpronounceable.

More than anything else, the war in the former Yugoslavia taught us that we could afford neither vagueness nor indifference in our approach to Europe's new democracies.

Building a peaceful, integrated Europe was an urgent goal in need of a practical blueprint and a proven approach. That is why we decided to adapt and extend the institutions that have served us so well for so long, beginning with NATO and the EU.

The NACC, proposed by two of our distinguished predecessors -- James Baker and Hans-Dietrich Genscher -- was the first bridge NATO built across Europe's divide. It was a good start. Among other things, it helped us achieve the first adaptation of the CFE treaty after the collapse of the Soviet Union. But now we have done so much more.

NATO ended the war in Bosnia -- and our Partners are there with us now sharing the same risks and achievements.

The Partnership for Peace has made cooperation among our armed forces so smooth, continuous, and successful that it now seems a matter of course. And yesterday, NATO ministers approved new measures that will allow our Partners to participate in the planning and execution of virtually every mission we undertake.

NATO and Russia have signed the Founding Act of their new relationship. And yesterday, NATO and Ukraine initialed a Charter to take their distinctive partnership to
In 40 days, we will invite a first group of Partners to join the Alliance. And yesterday before the North Atlantic Council, I urged NATO to make a clear and credible commitment that the first new members will not be the last.

In other words, we have moved far beyond mere dialogue and cooperation. Today, we are aiming at nothing less than the true integration of Europe and the transatlantic community. We are turning a Europe of shared ideals into a Europe of shared responsibilities.

That is the goal the EAPC must embody.

This is a new structure that we are forging together. It will give the Partnership for Peace a political dimension. It will be the place where Partners can help shape the missions, such as IFOR and SFOR, that we undertake together. It will harmonize our defense planning. It is where we will consult together on arms control and proliferation, terrorism, civil emergency and disaster relief, and the full range of peace support operations. It will help ensure that NATO's Partners are at the table when we plan our joint efforts -- and on the ground when we implement them.

It will be a place not just for those who aspire to membership in NATO but for those who choose not to. And it will complement our common efforts in the OSCE.

The EAPC is part of a larger structure we are building to prevent future conflicts in Europe. It reflects our judgment that we must do more than just respond to crises -- that if we wait for a threat to arise, we will invite a threat to arise.

At the same time, it would be irresponsible to spend all our time on a grand design for the future if we ignored the very real threats to human life and freedom that Europe faces in the present. Today, many of these challenges must be confronted in southeastern Europe. Our goal must be to build stability in this region as we advance our overall effort to adapt NATO and shape an undivided Europe. This goal should be high on NATO's agenda and on the EAPC's agenda as well.

Above all, it is our common effort in Bosnia which reminds us that our new partnership is not an end in itself, but a means to action.

The SFOR mission will remain in Bosnia for another year. We will not be biding our time. We are determined to improve the status quo, not just to maintain it. We are not going to be satisfied by anything less than full implementation of Dayton.

We have a responsibility to ensure that when our troops leave, they can do so without the fear that violence threatening our interests will resume. That is why the United States has called for a reinvigoration of the civilian aspects of Dayton. The risks of avoiding that responsibility are far greater than the risks of accepting it.

Albania is another example of the kind of crisis we are likely to face in Europe and beyond in the years ahead, and of the need for NATO and the EAPC, together with the OSCE, to focus our efforts on preventing conflict. The composition of the multinational force in Albania also reminds us that from now on, most peace operations in Europe will be conducted by Allies and Partners working together.

I applaud Italy, France, Romania, and the other members of the MNF, for taking the lead in responding to this crisis. I believe NATO should now send a SHAPE assessment team to Albania in the very near future to determine how the Alliance can help restore a
functioning, democratically controlled military in the country. The results of such a mission should be discussed in the EAPC so that we can all work together effectively to restore stability to that troubled nation.

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has been another potential flash-point for conflict in southeastern Europe. The UN Preventive Deployment Force has been deployed since 1992, and we welcome the renewal of its mandate yesterday. When we do decide to draw down the U.N. force, the EAPC will be a proper place to consider how we can stay constructively involved.

For all these reasons, I am convinced that the EAPC would serve our interests whether or not NATO had decided to welcome new members. For it is through this Council and with its members that we will shape our common response to the most likely contingencies that we now face in Europe. I am gratified that we are ready to begin today.

(###)
"critical" airbases near the "frontlines" of the fighting

how about "Italy is providing airbases close to the fighting." I'd rather not list everybody.

very glad you did this but one issue: it says "Italy is providing the airbases." What about spain, portugal, germany etc...?
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THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release February 10, 1998

FACT SHEET

Southeast Europe Action Plan

President Clinton, in a meeting with President Petar Stoyanov of Bulgaria today, announced a new Action Plan for Southeast Europe. The Action Plan will give further dynamism to U.S. cooperation with the stable democracies of Southeast Europe. It will help states in the region consolidate reforms, develop regional cooperation, and advance their integration into the European and transatlantic communities. It will also reinforce Balkan peace by promoting stability around Dayton Accord countries.

The U.S. Action Plan for Southeast Europe will be implemented along three tracks:

- First, the United States will expand bilateral political, economic, military and civil cooperation with the states of Southeastern Europe.

- Second, the United States will work to promote greater regional cooperation.

- Third, the United States will work bilaterally and multilaterally, particularly through closer cooperation with members of the European Union, to embed the countries of the region into the evolving architecture of European and transatlantic institutions.

The Action Plan is an evolving framework for the achievement of U.S. goals in the region. Intergovernmental Working Groups in several Southeast European capitals (presently Bulgaria, FYR Macedonia, Romania, and Slovenia) are developing country-specific work programs. These work programs will be supported by Washington agencies. Additionally, we will intensify our dialogue with Allies and partners about this region and look for areas for enhanced cooperation.

Using the format followed by the U.S. Department of Defense in the conduct of the existing Bilateral Working Groups on Defense Matters, the U.S. will establish Bilateral Working Groups on Economic Matters. These Economic Groups will be headed on the U.S. side by a senior State Department official, and include officials from the Departments of Treasury, Commerce, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and other agencies. Like their defense counterparts, the economic working groups will meet once a year to conduct assessments of progress towards agreed goals in the areas of economic development, trade, investment and related fields, and explore opportunities for further cooperation.

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005. talking points re: POTUS Toast at the EAPC Dinner (4 pages) 04/21/1999 P1/b(1)