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Draft Memo on Ethnic Conflict

You have asked us to consider what set of principles - or doctrine - arises from our response to ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. How should we deal with the vast array of ethnic troubles in the world, with demands of so many groups for independence and autonomy? Under what circumstances should we intervene to stop ethnic violence? How does the principle we are acting on in Kosovo apply to other cases, from Africa to Chechnya to Turkey’s Kurds? We have tried to answer those questions, drawing and building on your public statements.

Identifying the Problem

Ethnicity arguably has been the driving force in international affairs in this century. It has played a positive role in causing the breakup of oppressive empires and the creation of nations more representative of their people. It has played a destructive role, too. Senator Moynihan has written that there are just eight countries on earth that existed in 1914 which have not had their government changed by force since then -- and that ethnic conflict has been the most frequent factor in the turmoil the rest have experienced.

During the Cold War we often missed this. We treated conflicts in countries like Ethiopia as proxy wars between superpowers, overlooking their ethnic dimensions. Now the connections are widely recognized. Of the two dozen or so active conflicts around the world, almost all are fueled by ethnic divisions. We see it in the Balkans, in the Caucasus, in South Asia, in Africa from Congo to Sudan. We see the power of religious solidarity in the reaction of Orthodox nations to the bombing of Serbia; the power of nationalism in the resentment of many nations toward an assertive American role in the world. The manner in which ethnic differences are resolved will help decide whether Russia and China emerge as stable and prosperous societies, whether Africa overcomes its daunting troubles, whether the Middle East achieves peace, and countless other matters important to America and the world.

The problems that concern us are ethnic hatred, ethnic conflict, and ethnic cleansing. They are related but not the same.

What we are opposing in Kosovo, for example, certainly has its roots in “ancient ethnic hatreds” - in prejudices embedded in the human psyche and myths passed down from one generation to the next. The Serbian people supported the rise of Milosevic
because of, not despite, his nationalist platform. They took to the streets in 1996 not only to protest his dictatorship, but because they blamed him for losing Serb lands in Bosnia and Croatia. Nor can they claim total ignorance of Serbian atrocities. Many have fought in Milosevic's wars; many have witnessed ethnic cleansing; few have spoken against it. In this sense, we do have a quarrel with the Serbian people.

But ethnic hatred and nationalism is not itself the cause of the slaughter in the former Yugoslavia, nor is it the reason we have intervened. There have been tensions in the Balkans for centuries; they have often led to conflict, but rarely the massive assaults on entire peoples we have seen in last decade. As you have pointed out, if the nations of the Balkans had seen nothing but ethnic cleansing for the last 1,000 years, they would be ethnically homogenous today, not diverse.

Ethnic cleansing does not erupt spontaneously. Historically, it has been organized by leaders who exploit ethnic and religious divisions to dominate others and make war on their neighbors - by governments that remove all restraints against violence, and instead use the tools of power to encourage it. Ironically, the perpetrators often do not share the prejudices they exploit. Milosevic, for example, appears to be less of a hater than a manipulator of hatred.

The tools of this manipulation are familiar by now: Spreading hate through state media. Killing moderate community leaders. Destroying records. Arming and bankrolling paramilitaries, and ordering armed forces to support them in planned campaigns of expulsion. In these situations, victims and refugees are not a byproduct of fighting; the fighting is designed to create victims and refugees. That is what happened in Bosnia as well as in Rwanda - and what we are standing up to in Kosovo now.

All conflicts claim innocent lives. But we have a particular interest in ending conflicts that arise from the manipulation of ethnic and religious tensions. When people are capable of dehumanizing and killing their neighbors, and their governments encourage them to do it, the potential for destruction is limitless. What is more, such conflicts leave legacies of anger and instability that take generations to correct.

That is why we were right to pay special attention to Kosovo a year ago when the war was still in its early stages, and why we must be awake to the warning signs of such conflict elsewhere
(and remember that Milosevic will have opportunities for ethnic cleansing after Kosovo - in Vojvodina, Montenegro and Sadjak).

**Policy**

Just as we must understand the distinction between ethnic hatred and ethnic cleansing, we need to distinguish between the policies we pursue to address them. The first requires long term effort; the second, immediate action. To use a domestic analogy, it took time to defeat organized racism in America and we are still building a culture of tolerance in its place. But in the meantime, somebody had to stop the lynching.

There is no easy way to heal the ethnic and religious divisions that lead to violence. Bombing does not change hearts and minds. Broadcasting information is not enough in the short term, either. We have seen in the Kosovo crisis that vivid propaganda trumps uncensored news from the democratic world, or at least makes people so cynical that they believe nothing they hear.

Sometimes, the only realistic solution is to redraw maps and create ethnically homogenous states. That can be the case following the total collapse of an empire, such as the Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia; or when two peoples freely agree to an amicable divorce, as did the Czechs and Slovaks; or when bitterness between two groups runs deep and there is no larger political framework into which both can be integrated, as may prove true between Israelis and Palestinians, or Indonesians and Timorese. But total separation should be a last resort. We should oppose it when it is likely to lead to more violence - and when better alternatives exist.

The best long term alternative is a combination of democracy, economic development and integration. Democracy gives minorities a voice and people a chance to change their societies peacefully. Economic development allows for the emergence of common interests among different groups, and makes conflict over resources less likely. Integration makes borders less meaningful and encourages nations to see that their well-being depends on cooperation, not competition with their neighbors. That is the formula that ended nationalistic rivalries after centuries of balkanization in western Europe. It is what allowed central Europeans to resolve their ethnic and border disputes after the Cold War. It is the basis of our strategy for southeastern Europe, and it is working. All the region's governments support NATO, despite popular identification with
the Serbs, in part because we have given them a realistic chance of joining western institutions.

Of course, integration cannot be forced. For example, we cannot make the Serbs join a democratic, undivided Europe, unless we are willing to occupy and "de-Milosefy" their country. Hopefully, the shock of losing Kosovo to what will be in effect, if not in name, a protectorate, and the shock of finding themselves in a lesser Serbia with no economic prospects as their neighbors move closer to NATO and the EU will cause Serbs to rethink their choices and the dead-end ideology that led them to ruin. Until they do, we should make clear that southeastern Europe will come together with them or without them.

Outside Europe, the process of integration is far less advanced, but it is advancing - in Latin America with NAFTA, MERCOSUR, and the Summit process, in Asia with ASEAN and APEC, in Africa through groupings like ECOWAS and SADC, globally through the WTO - not to mention the phenomenon of globalization. Our interest in preventing ethnic conflict gives us another reason to promote these trends and to encourage as many nations as possible to take part. For example, weaving China into the "world wide web" of international institutions, regimes, communications networks and trade relationships remains the best way to avoid both the rise of an aggressive nationalistic China, and the demise of a China splintered by restive nationalities.

Once ethnic cleansing has begun, however, none of these long-term solutions apply. In Bosnia and in Kosovo, we have acted on the doctrine that we will not tolerate the systematic destruction, displacement or deportation of a people because of their ethnicity and faith -- and that we will use all necessary means up to and including force to combat such actions, even when they occur within the borders of a sovereign state. Kofi Annan has echoed this view, arguing that the perpetrators of such crimes can find no refuge in the UN Charter.

This is a clear and limited principle. It justifies our military action in Kosovo not as an effort to heal ethnic divisions, or to help an ethnic group achieve self-determination, or to establish democracy, justice or any particular way of life, but simply to protect the right of a people to exist on their land. Helping the Kosovars achieve some separation from Belgrade may be a means to that end, but it is not the end we are fighting for. In fact, we have opposed Kosovo's independence and sought to preserve, if possible, Serbia's sovereignty. That can be part of our answer to the
Russians and Chinese who worry we are setting a precedent in Kosovo today that we will apply to Chechnya or Tibet tomorrow.

**Applying the Doctrine**

We cannot afford to respond to ethnic violence everywhere; nor can we justify responding to it nowhere. No matter how clear our principles, we will not achieve perfect consistency, nor should we be paralyzed by overly rigid criteria. In most cases, we will do what we can, weighing the nature and magnitude of the violence and our capacity to make a difference.

The doctrine we suggest would require us to take appropriate action where there is a deliberate, systematic campaign to uproot or destroy a people because of who they are. It would clearly apply to Bosnia, to Kosovo and to Rwanda. It would arguably apply to Sudan as well, where the government preaches an ideology of exclusion and has applied it with enormously destructive consequences for the peoples and cultures of the central and southern parts of the country.

In a somewhat different category lie predatory movements such as the rebel forces in Sierra Leone and the Lord’s Resistance Army, a Sudanese proxy fighting in northern Uganda. Neither movement fights to exterminate people of a different ethnicity or faith, yet both aim to murder indiscriminately. The Cambodian genocide is another example of mass murder that had nothing to do with ethnicity, though hatred of Vietnamese was part of the Khmer Rouge ideology. Such catastrophes clearly merit a response, even if our doctrine does not fully apply.

The doctrine would clearly not apply to conflicts like the one in Chechnya. Russian forces used force indiscriminately there and killed thousands of innocent people. But their aim was not to rid Chechnya of the Chechens. What is more, Russia, for all its problems, is a functioning democracy with internal political arrangements that can restrain leaders from pursuing disastrous policies. Ultimately, public opposition ended the Chechnya war.

Turkey’s conflict with its Kurdish minority is similar. It is a counter-insurgency campaign in which civilians have been killed and human rights violated, but its intent and effect is not to eradicate the Kurds of Turkey. And many Kurds are fully integrated in Turkey’s political life.

Where our doctrine does require us to act, the manner in which we do so must be governed by practical considerations. In
Kosovo and Bosnia, we had military forces nearby, strong regional support, allies willing to act with us, and a conventional aggressor susceptible to military pressure. These conditions did not exist in Rwanda in 1994, nor do they exist today throughout Africa. Our forces are not there. Regional structures are weak. The conflicts are often waged by small units operating in isolated regions; overwhelming force is usually not an appropriate response. F-16’s don’t do well against teenage warriors with machetes.

But even where direct intervention is not realistic, we could do more in Africa if we are willing to apply the doctrine we are suggesting. We could make a more vigorous effort to isolate and contain forces responsible for ethnic violence. We could begin to take clear sides in such conflicts, instead of maintaining an aloof neutrality, providing material, logistical, and military support to those who are willing to fight the perpetrators of mass murder, or to protect civilian populations. In Central Africa, this could mean supporting Rwanda’s efforts to fight genocidaires across its borders - in other words, allowing the prevention of ethnic slaughter to take precedence over the principle of respect for sovereignty.

We could also take our support for the African Crisis Response Initiative to a new level. Right now, ACRI is turning out African units ready to keep the peace where conflicts have ended. We should consider using ACRI to train forces for Chapter VII peace enforcement missions, to deal with conflicts that have yet to be resolved. Conceivably, this could lead to the creation of a standing multinational force in Africa, which could deploy rapidly with our support to defuse crises. Of course, these initiatives will require more resources. Right now, we allocate only $4 million for voluntary peacekeeping for all of Africa, in addition to limited ESF and drawdown funds.

We end with Africa because that is where any such doctrine would meet its greatest test, and where the range of options to consider is the greatest. Needless to say, we need to think carefully about how it would be applied - and how it would be perceived - elsewhere. Once you are comfortable with a framework, its policy implications will need to be fleshed out. We look forward to discussing this with you further.
Chapter Twelve

New Security Paradigms

The end of the Long War has also brought an end to the strategic paradigm that structured so much of American policy during the more than four score years of U.S. involvement in the Long War and its aftermath, from the reversal of his own isolationist policies by President Woodrow Wilson in 1917, to the proclamation of a Wilsonian "New World Order" by President George Bush in 1990. That paradigm was formed by the cluster of understandings as to the American purpose in the world, the threats the U.S. faced in that world, and the strategies to be employed to achieve those purposes and respond to those threats. These understandings continue today to provide the partly conscious model by which Americans grasp world events. It has roots in our continental expansion westward, in the idealistic imperialism of Theodore Roosevelt and the haunting cadences of Abraham Lincoln. It only came to life, however, once we were brought face to face with an attack by a Great Power whose involvement with the dynamic of state changes in Europe, described in Part II, juxtaposed a competing paradigm that threatened and invigorated us. On March 12, 1917 Germany sank the U.S. merchantman Algonquin on the high seas; on March 18, she sank three more American merchant vessels; on April 1, the Aztec, another merchantman, went down. These attacks—and not the more famous sinking of the liner Lusitania two years earlier—propelled the U.S. into armed conflict, and we have been endeavoring to "make the world safe for democracy" ever since.

A paradigm such as this does more than provide a model for describing events: it offers an explanatory world view within which each new phenomenon can be fitted without altering the entire scheme. There will be zones of disagreement, of course, but the overall understanding is largely accepted by all parties to the domestic political debate. In the present chapter we shall study various new proposals for the American role in international affairs that describe themselves, or are described by others, as new "paradigms." I think it can be shown that each of these is actually more of an implementing policy—like "containment"—than a new world view; and also that each of the policies is really simply an application of the current paradigm, often being a repetition of a position within that paradigm that has appeared at an earlier period. Such policies are distinguished by their pursuit of a particular objective; the identification of a particular threat; and their proposal of a particular strategy. For example, the purpose of containment was to defeat international communism. The perceived threat was communist aggression in Central Europe and in Asia on the one hand, and threats of subversion in the formerly colonial states of the Third World on the other. The strategy employed was nuclear deterrence and conventional defense in the first world, and military assistance augmented by covert aid to surrogates in the third world. Alternative
policies, like the liberation of communist clients and the roll-back of the Soviet occupation of Central and Eastern Europe, or, at the other extreme, acquiescence and appeasement, were frequently proposed. These alternatives were not incompatible with the Wilsonian world view of America's purpose in the world, but after debates that look, in retrospect, less closely divided than they perhaps were, these alternative policies were decisively rejected by a series of administrations from both political parties. Large elements of both these parties actually preferred such alternatives to the policy of containment but they were never able to fundamentally alter the policy of containment over a period of four decades and nine administrations. There were occasional departures from the rough guide I have just sketched: it appeared to some at the time the nuclear threats made against Cuba during the missile crisis were a departure from previous policy; and it is obvious that we used conventional forces in both Korea and Viet Nam, as if we were fighting in a "First World/Second World" context. Even with these apparent departures, however, U.S. policy was remarkably consistent over this long period.

The noteworthy feature of the policies that bid to succeed containment is that they, like that policy, assume certain patterns for strategic conflict. Because the roles of history and law have been so well defined during the Long War—indeed they set its terms, since the establishment of legitimacy for state regimes after the collapse of the 19th century system was what the Long War sought, by strategic means, to determine—we have become accustomed to think within a paradigm of military challenge.

Why do we need a structuring paradigm at all? Why not simply make decisions on an ad hoc basis, recognizing that, in any case, these decisions will not be randomly made or irrational, but will be guided by our best judgments as to what appears to increase American power and opportunity? The answer lies in the relationship of strategy to law. Legitimacy, not merely power, was what the Long War was fought over. Until that question could be settled, conquest and defeat alone could not end the War. Legitimacy is the ground of law; it arises from consistent practices and tacit acceptance and gives law its political authority (and ultimately its power). A United States that cannot explain why it seeks the enlargement of democratic practices among all states but supports the suppression of the Algerian elections that would have brought Islamic fundamentalists to power will not be able to rally a worldwide consensus in favor of democratic enlargement. A United States that can offer no reason why Russia should be treated as a successor state for the purposes of the Security Council seat of the Soviet Union, but as a dissolved state for the purposes of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, will perhaps have its way in such matters for a time, but only so long as our power can compel assent. It is better, even from the perspective of our power—in the long run—to write the rules, though they may sometimes be applied against our wishes, than to abandon rule-following in favor of policies that have no more general appeal than that we want them followed, at least for the time being. We can extend our influence beyond our temporary hegemony if we take this moment to craft a system of rules that is compatible with our basic understanding of state responsibility. Yet without some general understanding of our strategy in the world, we cannot begin to even draft such rules.

What are some of the candidates for this new paradigm for the United
I will describe five general approaches and attempt to place various contributions from the recent literature on this subject within them. This is especially hard to do because, as I shall argue, these proposed paradigms are really nothing of the sort: rather, they are simply new policies in service of the old paradigm that guided our behavior during the Long War. As a result, there is much overlapping among writers as they stray from a particular position that is comprehensive and internally consistent because they recognize that, as a practical matter, something more fundamental is pulling them away from a doctrinaire consistency. I put them in these categories to ease the reader's understanding of what options are on the table for today's leadership, not because I am dealing with a series of clear-cut manifestos. On the other hand, it is also important to realize that the proposals that are offered to become a new American paradigm for our behavior in the world are so far short of this advertising that no leader, no matter how far-sighted, could really rely on them to master the challenges that have arisen in the backwash of the end of the Long War. This basic impracticality is sometimes hidden in the persuasive, reassuring prose of editorial writers and the aggressive debating of candidates who do not have the responsibility of day-to-day decisionmaking, but are confident that things would run more smoothly if they did.

One might typify these five approaches as: (1) the anarchic (the New Nationalism); (2) the collective (the New Internationalism); (3) the compensating (the New Realism); (4) the conversionary (the New Evangelism) and (5) the dominant (the New Leadership), or to use metaphor: (1) the cacophony, (2) the chorus, (3) the ensemble, (4) the choir and (5) the aria. Each of these general proposals has a distinct, paramount goal for U.S. policy; each suggests a particular strategic concept to achieve that goal; each reflects a perception of a crucial threat to U.S. interests to which the proposed paradigm is responsive.

(1)
The Anarchic Society And The New Nationalism

It has been _____ years since Hedley Bull's pathbreaking book entitled The Anarchic Society appeared. Almost at once it was recognized as describing something essential about the international world of national states, something that recalled Hobbes' description of mankind in a state of nature. Hobbes and Bull described a world whose fundamental feature was that it was without law. It was a world of all against all and each one against every other one. In such a world the primary goal must be to be fittest in a competition for survival, and so it is also with the proposed new paradigm that has recently found favor with a new generation of political leaders on the right.

This strategy for competitive survival of the United States focuses our resources on confronting only those threats that truly put the United States itself at risk. Based on such a focus, Alan Tonelson, in an influential article in Foreign Affairs, "Superpower without a Sword," recommends that American forces limit their mission to deterring nuclear attacks on the American homeland, defending the American land mass from conventional incursions, and maintaining the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf, "at least until a serious national energy plan is in place." This is the core of his strategic plan, augmented by "token handholding" forces in Europe
and East Asia, the maintenance of units capable of launching precision-strike weapons against rogue states to destroy weapons of mass destruction, and small special forces to handle evacuations, hostage rescues, and the like. It provides a well thought-out example of an increasingly influential position in American affairs.

A similar proposal became part of the Republican "Contract with America," the legislative agenda offered by candidates for the Congress in 1994. This proposal provides that—- During the debate in the House in February, 1995 one Republican representative was quoted as saying, "You call it isolationism. I say it's America first!" apparently unconscious of the resonance such a phrase must have for many, because the America First Committee was the 1940 vehicle for isolationism before Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, the Congressman was right, I think, in distinguishing this position from isolationism. A fuller canvass of this position will show that it does not in fact offer a new paradigm—and isolationism for the U.S. would certainly be that—-so much as a policy variant on the interventionist role for America that we have pursued since entering World War I.

The strategy pursued according to this approach would be more parsimonious about defining what constitute American "vital interests" because the new nationalist reflects the belief that many international conflicts and injustices do not concern our survival and thus can be safely, and should be prudently, ignored. The principal threat to the United States is thought to be economic and, perhaps because they are asserting a strategic view, proponents of this position tend to adopt an essentially mercantilist view of international economic competition. That is, whereas strategic affairs are commonly zero-sum, with the measurement of the victor's spoils never exceeding those of the defeated's losses, economic perspectives are typically thought to enable the creation of wealth for all trading partners. When a strategic perspective on economic trading is introduced, however, gains and losses are necessarily relative to the positions of the various competing states. It matters not so much that both the U.S. and Japan are wealthier after a decade of record U.S. trade deficits; what matters is that the relative position of the U.S. vis-à-vis Japan has declined. Treaty arrangements like NAFTA and GATT are anathema to the new nationalist because they sacrifice the pre-eminence of the American market in order to generate wealth, even when foreign markets remain to a large degree closed to U.S. products.

There is a populist flavor to this position that so disdains the establishment policies of intervention abroad and free markets at home. Thus Patrick Buchanan:

Put bluntly, it is blue-collar Americans whose jobs are lost when trade barriers fall, working-class kids who bleed and die in Mogadishu and along the DMZ when the shooting starts. But the best and the brightest tend to escape the worst consequences of the policies they promote from military service to unemployment. This [and not better information or understanding] may explain why national surveys show repeatedly that the best educated and wealthiest Americans are the staunchest internationalists on both security and economic issues.\(^\text{336}\)

\(^{336}\) It is noteworthy that during the Gulf War, not one son or daughter of a member of Congress went off to war. Need Buchanan cite.
Tonelson adds,

On the merits, the essence of the America First approach [urges that]—a focus on rebuilding and husbanding America's material wealth is our best foreign policy bet in the turbulent world we've entered, and the establishment knows it. [It is] a full-blown alternative [which] would break decisively with internationalism by abandoning the quest for worldwide security, prosperity and democracy as the best guarantors of American well-being. Instead, it would conclude that in a world likely to remain highly unstable, America's future is best assured by restoring and consolidating its own military and economic strength...337

Owing to this focus on domestic re-building, it is not surprising that it was the NAFTA debate, more than any traditional security crisis, that seems to have rallied the partisans of this approach. Precisely because NAFTA was advertised as a way of stemming immigration from Mexico, it tended to underscore nationalist hostility to the treaty. The proponents of the treaty were put in the position of asserting a kind of blackmail: either we assist the Mexican economy or our own security would suffer. But this argument plays into the hands of the proponents of the set of policies I have been describing as "new nationalist" because it implicitly acknowledges that the relative attractiveness of the U.S. must decline in order to keep Mexican immigrants at home.

In any case, proponents of this view argue, the U.S. really has no alternative. We may claim, as did the Bush Administration, that we are forging a new world order, but the stark reality is that assets of the scope required by such an undertaking no longer exist. The Pentagon continues to maintain that the American military is capable of fighting a Gulf War-size regional conflict at the same time it can come to the aid of allies in a similar size undertaking elsewhere (as in Korea) while being able to initiate small scale intervention of the sort launched against Panama or in relief of the Kurdish forces in Northern Iraq; this is the 2 1/2 war scenario. But, it is argued, the facts are otherwise. The U.S. budget for 1995 called for defense spending authorizations that were 35% below the 1985 levels in real terms. In fact, actual defense spending has been cut in every single year from 1986 to 1995.

The effects of these cuts can be seen when one considers the possibility of launching a response today on the scale of the Gulf War. U.S. forces in Europe, which fought the Gulf War, have decreased from almost 300,00 before the War to about 100,000 in 19... To re-fight the Gulf War today would take 66% of all U.S. Army divisions, Air Force fighter attack wings, and Marine air wings, as well as 50% of our aircraft carriers. If during such a conflict the North Koreans attacked across the 38th parallel, all of our reserves would have to be called up, and mobilization of the Selective Service pool would be required.

Moreover, this gap between means and ends is growing larger, owing to the end of the Long War. First, the collapse of the Soviet Union increased the number of independent actors on the world stage, some of whom had been restrained from

337 Cite Tonelson.
fomenting conflict by local Soviet hegemony. They, unlike the Soviet Union, have every reason to believe that American resolve to intervene in the conflicts they wish to engage in is far more modest than our rhetoric, and thus the testing of U.S. commitments is, ironically, likely to increase rather than decrease after our victory in the Long War. Second, our national will to send troops abroad appears to be inversely correlated with the habit of our leaders to support humanitarian interventions. Polls routinely show large majorities opposed to intervention in Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda, and elsewhere. The American public not unreasonably appears to be more intent on revitalizing the social and economic framework at home, a focus of attention that is to some degree self-fulfilling, because fewer and fewer resources allocated abroad—resources that have to be voted by the representatives of the public—make attention to other states' problems more and more difficult.

But perhaps the strongest argument for this proposed paradigm is rooted in constitutional law. By what right, Tonelson asks,

can the President or the Congress make the decision to send our troops to alleviate suffering in dangerous situations in which they—the politicians—readily admit that there are no strategic stakes involved? As citizens of a republic, we authorize our elected leaders to take all sorts of actions...But we grant this authority because it is an American good that is advanced or defended—because the majority of members of the political community to which we belong will supposedly benefit.338

This nation-state argument (one can scarcely imagine it from the lips of a Napoleon) exposes one of the deep, though subterranean fault lines within post-World War II American national security policy: much of the American security structure is "extended" to protect other states. There are complicated reasons for doing so that do, in fact, support the conclusion that such policies confer important benefits on the American people, but these have seldom been fully explained to the public. Instead, while foreign policy elites have used the forward presence of American forces to anchor powerful allies—Germany and Japan—whose ultimate intentions were uncertain, these policies have been sold to the American public as based on resistance to the Soviet Union. Thus, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, there has emerged onto the surface a hitherto unexposed crevasse between our deployments and the ostensible reason for those deployments. Before the Soviet collapse, as Benjamin Schwartz put it,

the apparent dictates of national defense against a superpower foe happened to correspond to the global pacification strategy that the U.S. foreign policy establishment believed was essential regardless of the Soviet threat. The American public...supported the maintenance of U.S. forces in Europe and the Far East based on its understanding that those forces were needed to counter the Soviet threat. National security experts, however, have long known that the U.S. presence in

338 Cite Tonelson.
those regions has been based on far more complex and esoteric rationales. 339

Now the public rightly asks: why do we need to spend so much money and run such risks if the foe is defeated?

In place of a "global pacification strategy," the anarchic paradigm of the new nationalist accepts the condition of chaos as an irremediable feature of the state system. As de Gaulle remarked (and Palmerston before him), states have no permanent friends, they have only permanent interests. Rather than try to remake the nature of states, or human nature for that matter, proponents of the new nationalism would operate within the natural, anarchic environment—preserving U.S. influence when a more ambitious agenda would dissipate it, strengthening our position by increasing our wealth rather than taking on ever-increasing expenses. Nor is this position confined to adherents from the Republican right wing. Paul Kennedy has eloquently presented a history of states whose power declined when strategic overreach impelled them to divert more and more of their resources into unproductive security investments as their global ambitions increased, and the need to protect peripheral assets became a policy imperative. 340 [Salisbury quote.]

The anarchic strategists go further and not only argue against strategic overcommitment but see opportunities in the very chaos of the international system that America's peculiar strengths would enable it to exploit. Unlike its potential competitors in Europe and Asia, the U.S. does not have powerful and threatening neighbors. That gives it less of a stake in the maintenance of a peaceful status quo, and it allows for a comparative advantage should that system break down. Abandoning the task of underwriting a benign global political environment frees the U.S. to enjoy assets that are independent of that environment: the world's largest single market and the world's most secure geopolitical position. With such vast resources we can intervene when our own interests really are served, and pursue objectives that really are achievable. As Walter Lippmann wrote,

A mature great power will make measured and limited use of its power....It will eschew the theory of global and universal duty which not only commits it to unending wars of intervention but intoxicates its thinking with the illusion that it is a crusader for righteousness, that each war is a war to end all war....I am in favor of learning to behave like a great power, of getting rid of the globalism which would not only entangle us everywhere but is based on the totally vain notion that if we do not set the world in order, no matter what the price, we cannot live in the world. We shall have to learn to live as a great power which defends itself and makes its way among the other Great Powers. 341

In what does such a defense consist? There are three principal elements. First, the defense of our economic strength and its growth. On this view, a national

339 Cite Schwartz.
340 Rise and Fall of Great Powers; quote to the effect that Britain would be asked to establish a colony on the moon "to protect the trade routes to India."
341 Cite Lippmann.
security establishment that, even in a period of record deficits and pronounced defense cutbacks still takes about 29% of the national budget must rank as more a threat to our long term security than any particular state poses. Trade policies that are more geared to stabilizing the international trading system than winning advantages for U.S. companies and workers would be rejected. Military investment that is a drain on investment in infrastructure and innovation would be redirected.

Second, the avoidance of needlessly adding to the risks we would otherwise face. This means abstention from involvement in conflicts that would add to our burdens but do not actually threaten us. The state system will never be "in balance" because it is dynamic and historical. The relative positions of "one sub-Saharan state vis-à-vis another, or of Hungary vis-à-vis Romania, or of Serbia vis-à-vis Bosnia" pose no real threat to us. Indeed the many bitter conflicts in the world are largely focused on such dueling pairs, who would not turn their hostility against the U.S. unless we seek to insert ourselves, as the American involvement in the Middle East has shown.

Third, an assertive defense of our territory and freedom of action. This implies the abandonment of alliances, such as NATO, that have served their purposes but have no specifically American reason for being. This element reinforces the demand for energy independence. It implies a reconfiguration of the force structure: anti-missile defenses ought to be developed that can shield the American homeland from the few, eccentric threats we might face as nuclear weapons proliferate to irresponsible but minor states like Iran or Libya. Without the obligation to defend Korea, Japan or Western Europe, we would re-shape our forces away from a large personnel base to fewer active-duty ground troops with greater readiness, fewer forward defense deployments, and greater sea-and airlift.

Such a proposed "paradigm" is far more tolerant about the proliferation of nuclear weapons to major states, because the major states of the world do not pose geopolitical threats to the U.S. (including the major state of Russia). At the same time, proponents of this view are more willing to hand over responsibility for regional security and regional trade to those states most closely affected. Far from feeling rebuffed by exclusion from a European Defense Community we should welcome it. If Ukraine wishes to retain nuclear weapons, we ought not to ignore the advantages to the U.S. in having Russia checked by a regional nuclear power with its own considerable incentives to moderate Russian expansionism.

The "New Nationalism" represents a popular near-term option to re-make American foreign policy. It is the culmination of decades of change in which our attitudes have gone from "thinking like lawyers"—which gave us the collective security paradigm I will next discuss—to "thinking like economists." It is present in many forms in contemporary Western life and shapes and reflects our values to some degree in all our public (and a good many of our private) endeavors.

(2) The Multicultural Society And The New Internationalism

"Fundamental shifts in the definition of security begin at the conceptual level and, through a process of interaction with historical circumstances and emerging political perceptions, gradually prompt realignments of practical policy." So write Janne
Nolan and John Steinbrunner in *Global Enlargement: Cooperation and Security for the 21st Century*, a report of the Brookings Institution and perhaps the most ambitious statement of the *new internationalism*, the second proposed new national security paradigm of the United States. This proposal, in all its variants, relies on a structure of collective security. It is therefore a pole away from the autarkic, nationalist strategy discussed in the previous section. For our purposes it is important that the proponents of this view conceive it as a paradigm shift—whatever the philosophical merits of Nolan and Steinbrunner’s description of the process of shifts in paradigms. In the Brookings report that puts forward this alternative, the authors contend that "the major powers must completely reconcile their vaunted security strategies in this more multi-centric and unstable post-Cold War environment." Whereas the survivalist agenda of the new nationalism focuses on the U.S. alone, the goal of the new internationalism is world peace. One might characterize the nationalist agenda as leading to an international society where it is "every man for himself," while the internationalist agenda is better described as "all for one and one for all." "In the former case, " a Carnegie Endowment for Peace Report says, "the enemy is another nation-state; in the latter, the enemy is war itself."

"Collective security" is an organizing strategic concept that seeks to marshal the resources of the group through institutionalized cooperation to achieve common goals. This perspective relies on the insight that the end of the Long War has globalized security needs in a way that only a global, collective response can cope with.

It is indisputable that the well-being of Americans is affected by the behavior of remote economic and political actors. Enthusiasts of collective security take this point to demonstrate that a nationalist agenda is therefore unrealistic and that the withdrawal of the United States from multilateral institutions is not really a viable alternative for policy. American lives are affected by upheaval elsewhere: how many American cities have substantial Vietnamese populations today, the internationalist asks, pointing to an obvious domestic consequence of foreign upheaval. It has been estimated that, at one point in the 1980s, more than 1/2 the population of El Salvador was living the United States. How, the multilateralists ask, can a sublime neglect of the troubles of others really protect the U.S.? That unfairly caricatures the nationalist approach, I think: its proponents are perfectly aware that the perceptions and policies of other states, and indeed non-state actors, must be taken into account by U.S. security policy and, moreover, that the security problems the U.S. faces are global in nature. Rather, the nationalist believes that the most successful manipulation of those perceptions and policies lies in the bilateral dialogue of the United States vis-à-vis other states and actors, and not through the multilateral institutions that, necessarily, curb our freedom of action and reflect interests that are not our own. In any case, the nationalist argues, we cannot resolve civil conflicts in Viet Nam, El Salvador, or anywhere else. If we had been more self-restrained in our policies to Southeast Asia, perhaps the Vietnamese would never have left in the first place. If refugee flows are the problem, then perhaps a stricter border regime is the answer. At least this lies within our control. And so on.

To this the multilateralist asserts two propositions: (1) that American

342 Cite Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and debate in Feyersbard, Lakatos, etc.
leadership of multilateral collective institutions can multiply the weight of our own policies, giving them a legitimation (and a cost-sharing) far beyond what the U.S. standing alone could deliver; (2) that, in any case, the well-being of others is and should be treated as a fundamental national goal for Americans. Of course this last point is the sort of pulpit rhetoric that drives the nationalist wild, but there is more to it than simply a vague egalitarian altruism. As James Rosenau has pointed out, modern media make Americans conscious of the identity and conditions of people around the world, and this awareness changes and enlarges the objectives we care about.343

Nor should this difference about goals be overstated: many of the objectives sought to be achieved by what is sometimes called "the New Internationalism" are much the same as those of the "New Nationalist": to deter attack on the U.S., her armed forces and citizens; to maintain U.S. prosperity; to reduce the vulnerability of the U.S. to nuclear attack. The means chosen to accomplish these objectives, however, are different. The internationalist believes that U.S. prosperity is best ensured by a general lowering of barriers to U.S. trade and that this can only be achieved through multilateral institutions like the GATT and NAFTA. The internationalist believes that regions important to our prosperity—East Asia, Europe, the Persian Gulf—must be kept out of the hands of hostile powers and that this can be done at an acceptable cost only by sharing the burden of forward defense (as in the case of the Gulf War that was fought largely by the U.S. but financed largely by others). The internationalist believes in stopping weapons proliferation much for the reasons his liberal counterpart believes in gun control on the domestic scene; the internationalist believes also in the necessity of economic development for all states, much for the reasons her liberal counterpart believes in jobs for the poor as a prophylactic for crime. The nationalist is more dubious about these means, but in any case, affirmatively does not concede that international organizations, like the NPT regime or the World Bank and the IMF, have been or could be successful at achieving the ends that would be required of them by both internationalists and nationalists.

Some objectives, however, belong to the multilateralist alone. Ensuring that the basic needs of all peoples are met (whether or not they could, conceivabley, pose a security threat to the U.S. even by migration); strengthening U.S. control over multinational corporations; maintaining equal terms of trade for all states; protecting the global environment; developing agreed-upon norms of international behavior in the resolution of conflict and the settlement of disputes. These ambitious goals are, however, if they are achievable at all, probably only achievable through multilateral institutions.

What are these institutions and how would they change? For some internationalists, NATO would be expanded both as to its mission and its membership. What have thus far been regarded as "out-of-area problems" beyond the scope of the North Atlantic Treaty that sets up NATO and commits its members to a collective defense of the European frontier, would henceforth be included within NATO's responsibilities. Effectively it was NATO forces that fought the Gulf War, though no one much said so at the time. Now NATO's mission would be expanded

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to include not only the protection of the Gulf states, but other responsibilities as well. Article 43 of the United Nations Charter might finally be activated in order to provide armed forces to the U.N. which would take up the role in the Korean peninsula, for example, filled by U.S. forces. The United Nations Security Council would be expanded to include Germany and Japan and quite probably the most influential states from the Southern tier, such as India, Brazil and possibly others, such as Indonesia or Nigeria. While NATO would be devoted to peacemaking, the U.N., with its own Article 43 forces, would be an active peacekeeper and intervenor to provide humanitarian relief. Multilateral institutions such as the G-7, which is now confined to coordinating macro-economic policy, would expand their missions to take on new roles, such as the coordination of technology transfers, environmental protection, non-proliferation, and counter-terrorism. The IMF and the World Bank would be invested with greater funds to accomplish the mission of environmentally sustainable development in the Third World and in the formerly Second World of ex-communist states. GATT would be strengthened and extended to the equity and capital markets.

New internationalists often hold, as James Chace does in his influential The Consequences of the Peace344, that economic stability is the precursor to international peace. Like the new nationalists, Chace concedes that the U.S.'s economic position does not enable it to either dominate the world economy nor act as the world's policeman. But because international peace is the goal he wishes the U.S. to pursue, these concessions commit him, not to a retrenched agenda of more or less autarkic objectives, but rather to reaching out to re-structure international organizations to take up the role the U.S. is no longer able to play. Chace argues for a supranational central bank—Mrs. Thatcher's worst nightmare—that could create and manage the money supply of a common global currency. He also envisions a parallel global organization vested with authority to manage international trade, pointing to the example of the E.U. which, unlike the GATT, has been able to lower tariffs among the member states while maintaining the diverse tax and regulatory structures of its member states.

Like other new internationalists, Chace supports an enlarged role for international security organizations, particularly the U.N. Like Eugene Rostow, he points to Article 51 of the Charter as providing a reserve clause by which the United States can retain the power to act if the Security Council is stymied.

It is interesting to observe that multilateralists, like their nationalist counterparts, are inclined to believe that the day of the superpower is over. The U.S.'s role as a debtor nation, its modest growth brings it ever nearer to a GDP on par with its more dynamic Asian trading partners; its comparatively low savings rates make it hostage to the indulgence of those very competitors; and its lack of spending self-control reflects and re-enforces the prospect of a diminished future—all are salient characteristics of our current situation for both the internationalist and the nationalist. Precisely because no nation is self-sufficient, as Richard Rosencrance argues345, and every economy is intertwined with others, either the U.S. must exploit the institutions that arise from this necessary inter-penetration or exploit the

344 Need cite.
345 Need cite.
comparative advantages that may be ours in the disarray that would follow the collapse of those institutions. Depending on which of these policies one chooses, one counts oneself as an internationalist or nationalist respectively. And that choice in turn seems to depend on whether global peace or comparative American success is the principal objective of the policy.

Or does it? The new internationalist argues that, on the contrary, "a stable environment that the U.S. has been able to shape according to its interests will be less expensive over the long run than a system drifting out of control."346 Moreover, the U.S. cannot shape a stable environment unilaterally, but it can use multilateral institutions to work its will and project its interests. Indeed it is hard to see how the U.S. could broker a deal wherein it offers its unique military assets as its contribution to international security, partly funded by others whose contribution is material but not military, without the structure of multilateral institutions. Without such a deal, however, U.S. forces become too expensive to use, possibly even to preserve. How can it make sense to liquidate those assets in the name of promoting the national interest? And how can it make sense to liquidate also the political capital of the West—the shared goals, values, habits of cooperation and institutions that have emerged from the struggle of the Long War? It is precisely because, as Zbigniew Brzezinski argues, America has neither the legitimacy to act as the world's policeman, nor the liquidity to act as the world's banker that the Northern tier states must act together to preclude the re-emergence of the coercive, utopian myth-states that would arise in the vacuum created by our absence from international leadership. Even the narrow goal of national survival is better served, he maintains, by collective security than by mercantile solitude.

America is condemned to the New Internationalism because it is not constitutionally suited to any of the other paradigmatic positions. Brzezinski goes on to argue that the American constitutional system has produced in the U.S. a policy of gridlock that prevents the institutions of government from dealing with our pervasive internal social problems. Moreover, our reliance on legal institutions has replaced the moral consensus of the community with the technical substitute of the law: not right and wrong but legal and illegal are the standards by which behavior is measured. As a result, the United States, despite its military, economic, political, and cultural power, cannot sustain a position as international role model (as required by the paradigm to be discussed as the New Evangelism) nor as the apotheosis of the New Nationalism (since the ethos of consumerism, not dour mercantilism, has replaced self-restraint with the "permissive cornucopia" of modern life), nor as arbiter of the balance of power, the New Realism, (because our security problems do not arise from a competition among the Great Powers, but rather out of the seething underclass, domestically and in the Third World, that has been seduced by the cult of the cornucopia at a time when the future dictated by its demographics moves ever farther from its expectations). By contrast, our constitutional structure and the dynamics of our political process make us "organically congenial" to multilateral, collective institutions.

America's openness to outside participation in its own affairs—through foreign sponsored lobbies, growing foreign ownership of its assets, and even some foreign

346 cite RAND
participation in the definition of its domestic agenda—makes America both the
exemplar and the harbinger of the increasingly porous definition of the nation-
state.347

Brzezinski believes that international society will sort itself into six power
centers—America, Europe, East Asia, South Asia, the Muslim crescent, and a
Eurasian black hole created by the breakup of the Soviet Union. Conflicts among
these clusters are likely to be economic in nature, with violent conflict occurring
within some of the unstable clusters. A trilateral alliance of Japan, Europe and the
U.S. is the collective security arrangement he prefers, operating within the larger
framework of a strengthened U.N., with a somewhat larger Security Council.

(3)
International Society In Balance: The New Realism

The nationalist and internationalist models provide different methods by which to
aggrandize and assert U.S. primacy. The former does this by relatively improving
the position of the U.S. vis-à-vis other states, exploiting the natural advantages we
enjoy in a chaotic environment; the latter does this by improving the U.S. position
absolutely (if not relatively), while improving the position of others also, so that U.S.
dominance can be extended through the multilateral institutions that provide security
and prosperity to all.

Proponents of the compensating system, or balance of power, have no such
illusions (as they regard them) about U.S. primacy. Their goal is less ambitious, or
perhaps I should say, less starry-eyed. They aim merely to prevent the primacy of
any other state. If the nationalist's fundamental objective is making the U.S. the
fittest for survival, and the internationalist's, world peace, then the principal goal of
the new realist theorist is world stability.

"Vital interests" are at core of all these strategies, but what is really vital
seems to vary with each perspective. The nationalist judges what is vital by its
relationship to U.S. freedom of action, for only when the U.S. possesses the freedom
of action, can it use its power to protect itself from threats to its survival. The
internationalist holds that the welfare of the other states of the world is vital, for only
then will the world present a benign environment within which the U.S. can ultimately
survive and prosper. Otherwise, the neglect of the welfare of other states will turn
the international environment into a cesspool of environmental and human rights
degradation, out of which will emerge predator states armed with weapons of mass
destruction from whom there is, on only one planet, no place to hide. For the new
realist, our vital interests are only threatened when a state, or coalition of states, is
powerful enough to successfully strike those interests. So these theorists tend to
define vital interests in terms of the stability of the system, and the prevention of the
rise of a hegemonical state powerful enough to threaten that system.

The differences among these varying definitions of the 'vital', however, are
largely apparent only. Such variances can be contributed to differing attitudes about
means, not ends. The balance of power theorist simply doesn't believe that calls for
peace and justice can unite the world community, or deter a predator (who perhaps

347 Brzezinski
has unfurled the banner, "No justice, No peace" and believes the \textit{status quo} to be fundamentally inequitable). Nor does the balance of power proponent believe the \textit{machismo} rhetoric of the nationalist: it strikes him as adolescent, unrealistic, exaggerated. To believe that one state—the U.S.—will be able to coerce all the others into participating in a system that perpetually keeps them at a disadvantage is to assume an inability to cooperate among our competitors that amounts to wishful thinking. The international system may be chaotic, or anarchic, but even criminals can conspire.

Rather the proponents of compensating balances believe that technique, rather than natural advantage or procedural perfection, will best insure vital U.S. interests. It is a philosophy for the Metternich in every statesman, and it requires an adroitness and coolness of calculation, to say nothing of a dispassion towards the problems of other states, that the American public has seldom exhibited. A history written by such a theorist is accordingly a history of great men, just as a history written by the Hobbesian chaoticist is a history of impersonal forces, and a history by the internationalist the account of treaties and resolutions and the acts of multilateral institutions.

How would one describe the paradigm that is based on a balance of power? What are the components of the New Realism? If we assume that the goal of ensuring world stability is sought in order to achieve the same objectives as the various other paradigms—protecting U.S. territory, armed forces, and citizens from attack or coercion, and providing for the continued growth and prosperity of the American market economy—how does this approach plan to achieve these objectives?

The New Realist intends to protect the political security of the American state by preventing any other state from becoming powerful enough to truly threaten us. Thus he takes a severe view of those threats that actually strike at our vital interests but is disinclined to see every atrocity as a threat to our security. Accordingly, a state (or alliance of states) would have to do more than simply kidnap an American citizen or massacre an African village in order to pose a mortal threat to the American state. The New Realist assumes that America's current position is both too weak to impose world peace and too strong to have to content itself with passively awaiting hostile forces outside our control to coalesce against us. To prevent a state from becoming powerful enough to truly threaten us, the New Realist takes as the first imperative the prevention of the emergence of any state (or alliance of states) that could dominate the Eurasian land mass. This plays itself out differently with respect to different potential adversaries.

With regard to China, the U.S. should seek to encourage her to develop as a trading state, since this development is both salutary—in that it will, over time, loosen the grip of the totalitarian party and armed forces that currently rule the country and have in the past been tempted to seek hegemony in the region—and possible, since the U.S. represents a rich market for Chinese goods, one capable of improving the standards of living for hundreds of millions persons.

With respect to the former states of the Soviet Union, the U.S. ought to encourage devolution and democratization, not so much because it is a good in itself, but because it is the best hedge against the re-emergence of a state with ambitions of world dominion. A broken-up Soviet Union is less likely to be able to
mount a challenge against the U.S.; a democratized Russian state is less likely to threaten the other former republics, and also less likely to be able to re-emerge as a militant superpower.

The states posing the greatest potential threat, however, are not the collapsing red dwarfs of Communism, the supernovas that are already imploding, but rather are Germany and Japan and the productive states that surround them in some anxiety. Whereas the New Internationalist seeks to extend the U.N.'s mission or NATO's to accomplish the agenda of a world order based on collective security, the New Realist wants to strengthen NATO to keep Germany anchored to the U.S. The differing approaches imply different policies for the widening of NATO membership and the deepening of its portfolio of missions. NATO enlargement, to include Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and perhaps others, is the preferred Realist proposal, not the expansion of NATO's mission out-of-area. While NATO remains the preferred institution for a German-American alliance, just as important is German membership in the E.U., which also ties German policy to its neighbors. Even a revived WEU would be preferable to a Germany looking eastward, with the potential to become a strategic superpower and the revived ambitions that would exploit that potential.

Japanese democracy is usually thought not to have achieved a very deep root structure in Japan, and thus to be even more at risk than the German democratic state. Moreover, Japan lies proximate to two unstable, highly armed states—China and North Korea—and depends at present on U.S. forward forces and the U.S. nuclear deterrent for her safety. As I have written elsewhere, American policy to de-nuclearize North Korea, or to induce human rights in the Chinese state, must paramountly consider whether our steps are likely to bring the Japanese closer to nuclear and military self-reliance. It would be a tragedy for the world if, in order to extirpate a North Korean nuclear force with which Japan has learned to live, we plunged the Korean peninsula into a war that led to the mobilization of Japan's energy and wealth on behalf of its armed forces. Already the Japanese, with less than 1 1/2% of GNP, field the world's third largest defense establishment, and there is no NATO-like institution that links this establishment with the forces of surrounding states. It is probably far more important that the U.S. maintain forces in Korea than any other forward basing because Japan must be persuaded that the threats she faces—now that the Soviet Union is no longer among them—both require an alliance with the U.S. and yet at the same time, will not erupt, owing to U.S. unilateral action.

The New Nationalist strategy of closing American markets to East Asian competitors in a trade confrontation is precisely the sort of maladroit move that the New Realist seeks to avoid. Economic competition is doubtless the one area of interaction with the U.S. that could detonate Asian antagonism and anti-Western unity, particularly if it is enhanced by heightened trade exclusion on the part of the E.U. By treating each of the states of East Asia as separate entrants into the U.S. market, the New Realist would balance one against another so that a coalition of East Asia states does not form, and no single state can dominate the others.

The same defensive posture dominates the New Realist calculus for American intervention: the U.S. should never intervene when our own vital interests are not at stake, and then only to prevent others from achieving a dominant position from which we can be threatened. Just as importantly, this principle should control our relationships with the internal forces at play within a foreign state. The Persian Gulf provides one example. The states of this region to whom the U.S. gave security
guarantees under the Carter Doctrine can be protected against local predator states; the Gulf War and the earlier re-flagging of Kuwaiti vessels showed as much. The economic vitality of the G-7 states is dependent on the flow of oil from the Gulf; any state that controlled that flow would be in a dominant position vis-à-vis the U.S., Japan, and Europe, who are, to varying degrees, dependent on that oil. Accordingly the independence of the Gulf states is of crucial importance and should be protected. It is far from clear, however, that these states are good bets for the long run. Modernization, democratization, and pan-Islamic movements stimulate internal threats that U.S. military intervention is powerless to deflect, and may even excite. Within such states the U.S. cannot afford to abandon the regimes on whose stability the economic life of the Northern tier, post-industrial states of the world depends. But neither can the U.S. be so closely identified with those regimes that it, as well as they, become the target of revolution, as happened in Iran. This observation counsels that U.S. policy, perhaps through diplomatic or even clandestine contacts, must maintain a flexible posture with respect to the internal dynamics at work in these states. Such a complex policy has strengths and weaknesses. It provides flexibility and avoids the rigid commitments of collective security that inevitably fail to reflect shifts in the politics and power relationships among and within states. It leverages American influence by linking it to coalitions of states that share America's interest in preventing a hegemonical threat from arising, rather than merely hoping to defeat such a threat once it becomes lethal. At the same time it is ineluctably linked to the status quo and thus makes the United States a locus of animosity among reformers whose values we may in fact share. Most importantly, it requires intimate knowledge of the political locale and a sure-footedness in dealing with subtle and sometimes surprising shifts. It is one thing to muster the ruthlessness to abandon the Kurds in order to strengthen the Shah for geopolitical reasons; it is quite another to predict his replacement by the Ayatollah Khomeini, as so few analysts did. Yet without such accurate but difficult forecasting, the mere willingness to take cold blooded decisions amounts to no more than a declarative pose.

Nationalists are inclined to downplay the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Most of these weapons, now that the Cold War has ended, are not trained on the U.S.—it is said—and, to the extent that they tie down our international competitors, relatively improve our position. So long as America is able to defend against the modest forces likely to be available to the current (and anticipated) generation of proliferatees, it is a matter of indifference whether, for example, Iraq uses poison gas against Iran.\textsuperscript{348} Internationalists, by contrast, seek a full court press against proliferation and even hope for some roll-backs of nuclear programs that, for example, have been pursued by some states that are now willing to abandon them.\textsuperscript{349} With some exceptions, notably Kenneth Walz\textsuperscript{350}, internationalists tend to view any proliferation as inimical to world peace.

The realist view is more nuanced and more pessimistic. It seeks non-proliferation mainly of nuclear delivery systems, which are easier to detect and to destroy than fissile material. But such a position is fatalistic and does not wish to

\textsuperscript{348} See John Mearsheimer
\textsuperscript{349} South Africa
\textsuperscript{350} K. Walz, "Nuclear Weapons: More May be Better"
waste diplomatic assets pursuing the fruitless goal of convincing Pakistan and India that nuclear weapons do not really enhance their security or that the threats each faces from the other are not mortal. Rather the realist accepts some proliferation as inevitable, and tries to mitigate its impact on the stability of the international system.

The balance of power approach with respect to achieving American goals in the international economy shows the same watermark of maneuver and irony, and the same disdain for impractical programs (whether they spring from romantic idealism or sullen paranoia). This approach accepts that America’s share of the world economic product has dramatically fallen since the end of the Second World War and is likely to fall still further as hitherto unproductive economies industrialize. Proponents of this view do not waste time lamenting this change or trying to recapture the past by withdrawing from these emerging states the markets they must have to thrive. But neither does the New Realism sacrifice American competitiveness to the overall good of the world’s wealth. Rather here, as with political competition, it seeks a certain relationship for the United States with other states that is relatively advantageous. Just as the New Realism seeks to prevent a situation whereby any state (or coalition) dominates the Eurasian land mass or the crucial sea lanes, so it seeks here to prevent the U.S. from slipping into an inferior position in the terms of trade with another state (or bloc of states) for much the same reason: in that case, as in the case of the hegemonical Eurasian actor, the continued wealth and power of the U.S. become hostage to the policies of another state. For the new internationalist, potato chip production is just as valuable as computer chip production: in a world market, the important thing is that every state produce that as to which it has a comparative advantage. This leads to the greatest efficiency and the maximization of international wealth. For the new realist, however, this phenomenon is exactly what is to be deplored: the potato chip manufacturer, whose products have easy substitutes and for whom there is an infinite number of potential series of competitors because the human capital and the technology required for farm production are so modest and so widely distributed, will always be at the mercy of value-added products like the computer chip that enable so many other kinds of productivity, and can themselves only be made more efficient by the most sophisticated technology and the most competitive states. Given a choice between a free market worldwide and a system that established favorable terms for trade for the U.S., the new realist would only smile: it is not a realistic choice. States will never permit a universal free market so long as they have the political power to engineer favorable terms for themselves through various anti-competitive tactics, including exploiting the free rider phenomenon, and as long as domestic political groups can protect themselves from foreign competition at the expense of the larger society, as farmers have so successfully done in Japan, France, and elsewhere. Nor is any system that attempts to enshrine favorable terms for trade for the U.S. likely to endure for long, not least because the U.S. consumer would not tolerate the rise in prices such an imperial system would require. Competitiveness must be won. But through the adept use of retaliatory threats, state-private sector collaboration, and regional groupings like NAFTA that, for historic and cultural reasons, appear to enshrine a favored U.S. position, it may be that the terms of trade can be successfully manipulated, at least to mitigate the effects of declining U.S. competitiveness.
The new realist is preoccupied with stability. His forebears are those European intellectuals who attempted to tutor an unsophisticated and idealistic American policy elite in order to prevent a repetition of the catastrophe of Nazism that seemed to them as much a product of the idealism for the League of Nations as of the isolationism that characterized pre-war U.S. policy. This group had little interest in the Third World; its successors do not either. There is nothing "vital" in American interests there, and the potential for costly diversion is almost limitless. Nor do the problems of transnationalism, the environment, refugee migration, epidemics, famine, and terrorism seem to concern the new realist. He accepts the primacy of the nation-state, and at the same time realizes its existence cannot be successfully separated from that of the society of nation-states with whom it is in competition. Transnational problems, however, and the non-governmental organizations that are increasingly the effective agents dealing with these problems, are difficult for the balance of power theorist to include within his frame of reference.

The Democratic Society: The New Evangelism

In September 1993 the Clinton Administration announced its policy of "democratic enlargement," a commitment to expand democracy by bringing as many nations as possible into the fold of practicing free-market economies and limited-government democracies. This represented something of a change from the policy of "democratic engagement," by which the Americans sought a dialogue with other states at varying stages of democratization to encourage them along that path. That subtle change turns on a key notion of democratic enlargement: the link between a nation's internal political order and its external orientation.

Observing that the state system was "built around the idea of sovereign equality and non-interference by foreign powers into a nation's internal affairs," the then-Director of Policy Planning for the State Department, James Steinberg, concluded, however, that "it seems clear that a rigid application of the concept of 'non-interference in internal affairs' is not enough. Neither balance of power nor collective security arrangements will be adequate...."

In Eastern Europe, as Secretary of State Warren Christopher said, "the successful transformation of the Soviet empire into a community of sovereign, democratic states is a matter of fundamental importance; [but also in Haiti] our objective is...the restoration of democracy." Whether by force (as in Haiti or Panama), or with economic aid (as in the former Soviet empire), or economic sanctions (as against South Africa), Americans have acted alone or in concert with NATO allies or pursuant to U.N. resolutions to establish democratic regimes. Establishing democratic regimes is a far more ambitious agenda than simply encouraging them. For one thing, the former goal requires a different notion of international legal norms because the nature of a state's political structure has usually been held to be an "internal" matter, for that state's determination alone. Steinberg writes that, "the international community has begun to exercise the right, recognized in the U.N. Charter, to intervene in internal disputes when they pose a threat to international peace and security. And in practice, the international community is stretching the concept of threat to internal peace and security to a
broad range of cases where the internal conflict is serious, the humanitarian costs are large, but the external dimension is limited, as in Somalia."

Now suppose that, in addition to this appreciation of the changing transparency of sovereignty we add the convictions that: (1) democracies do not go to war against one another and (2) a democracy crucially if in part consists in the security of basic human rights for its citizens and (3) that free markets and democracy are mutually supportive and may even been indispensable to the longevity of either. We then have the new evangelist position that sees the U.S. role as one that, using international institutions wherever possible but acting alone if necessary, the U.S. may intervene to buttress, restore, or even establish democratic regimes where these are threatened or non-existent, leading gradually to a world of like-minded communities sharing the universal values of liberty and freedom. But are such values truly universal? George Kennan once wrote,

I know of no evidence that ‘democracy’ or what we picture to ourselves under that word is the natural state of most of mankind. It seems rather to be a form of government (and a difficult one, with many drawbacks at that) which evolved in the 18th and 19th centuries in northwestern Europe...and which was then carried into other parts of the world, including North America, where peoples from that northwestern European area appeared as settlers...Democracy has, in other words, a relatively narrow base both in time and in space, and the evidence has yet to be produced that it is the natural form of rule for peoples outside those narrow perimeters.351

Or, as Tony Smith put it in the Washington Quarterly,

Some realists [ask]: Given the desperate condition of many African countries, how can the U.S. propose with confidence that if they follow its example they will find salvation? Can Americans realistically suppose that good relations with the Muslim world necessarily presuppose the conversion of these countries to liberal democratic government?352

While the realist is content to offer limited help to struggling democracies, stressing that it is difficult to know what the right political system is for non-Western cultures and a mistake to identify too closely with any friendly regime, the nationalist is actually hostile to making the promotion of democracy a key American goal. The realist doubts the premise that the security of human rights abroad is vital to American security. The nationalist, however, doubts the very underpinnings of the evangelical democrat that American security would be enhanced by a world of democracies because such states allegedly do not attack each other. France occupied the Ruhr in 1923 against the Weimar democracy, India attacked what was then East Pakistan when both states were thought to have generally democratic

351 Need cite.
352 Need cite.
institutions, and Ecuador and Chile have engaged in recent hostilities. These and other examples may cast doubt on the theory most eloquently argued in our day by the Princeton political scientist Michael Doyle that democracies do not make war on one another. Moreover, the nationalist sees the new evangelist as an impractical meddler, risking his own state’s resources in a vain effort to reform everyone else. As Alexander Hamilton wrote,

There are still to be found visionary, or designing, men who stand ready to advocate the paradox of perpetual peace between states. The genius of republic, they say is pacific; the spirit of commerce has a tendency to soften the manners of men and to extinguish those inflammable humors which has so soften kindled wars. [Democracies] will never be disposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions with each other. They will be governed by mutual interest, and will cultivate a spirit of mutual amity and concord.

We may ask these projectors in politics, whether it is not the true interest of all nations to cultivate the same benevolent and philosophic spirit? If this be their true interest, have they in fact pursued it? Has it not, on the contrary, invariably been found that momentary passions and immediate interests have a more active and imperious control over human conduct than general or remote considerations of policy, utility and justice? Have democracies in fact been less addicted to war than monarchies? Are not the former administered by men as much as the latter? Are there not aversions, predilections, rivalships, and desires of unjust acquisition that affect nations as well as kings? Are not popular assemblies frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice and other irregular and violent propensities?353

By contrast, the objection of the new internationalist to this proposed paradigm aims at a different fundamental target: he questions the new evangelist’s emphasis on the importance of the internal. The new internationalist strives for international agreements to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ecological devastation, and world recession from a macro-economic perspective; he is less concerned with internal structures of human rights and micro-economic practices. Both approaches stress the importance of international institutions, but on closer inspection, the preferred organizations of the new evangelist are choirs composed of the already converted—the G-7, for example, or NATO.

The new evangelist rejects the notion that states have no permanent friends, only interests. For the evangelist, the community of the faithful are permanent. Because they are chosen by the people, democratic governments regard each other’s government as legitimate and deserving of respect. Because, domestically,
civilized non-violent means are used to resolve disputes, democracies tend to prefer the same methods internationally. The Evangelist also downplays the fear of a hegemonic power or group of powers. Indeed the Clinton Administration has been more enthusiastic about European integration than many of the members of the E.U. So long as the power is exercised by a democratic state, even nuclear proliferation, e.g., to Israel, can be acceptable.

Like each of the other competing paradigms, this view is linked to a perception of a particular threat that it regards as uniquely salient. For the new evangelist, this threat arises from the resurgence of nationalism and violence in the hands of authoritarian states. To combat this threat to the U.S., the new evangelist proposes a kind of inoculation far more imaginative than anything from his competitors. Realists, nationalists, and internationalists all treat the world as relatively static. The Cold War has ended, but their prescriptions generally forecast more of the same. The new evangelist has two dynamic aspects to his position: history seems to be moving in his direction, at least in the short term, and he can mobilize increasing popular support on behalf of the cause of American values in a way that more cynical or more abstract theorists cannot. A global democratic revolution has been going on since Prague Spring in 1968, and with considerably more success each decade. In 1975 the Portuguese overthrew their communist government with the help of the European democracies. In the 1980s Latin American states replaced military regimes to an unprecedented degree on that continent. There are at present elected civilian governments in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, Panama, and Uruguay. The transition from a racist, oligarchic state to a multi-racial democracy in South Africa in the 1990s has stunned and even inspired the world community.

Unlike the other competing paradigms, the new evangelist can call on such inspiration for political support. Democratic ideology, Graham Fuller writes,\textsuperscript{354} not weaponry, won the Cold War. We cannot ignore the role of values in shaping our security and our fate, nor should we. Being true to human rights, pluralism, freedom of conscience, and democratic governance is the only way we will be able to mobilize support at home for our policies and, if the new evangelist is right, find a safer, more secure world. The end of the Cold War has freed us from having to support regimes that were hostile to our values. Now, as the sole remaining superpower, we can support those regimes with whom we have true affinity.

It must be said that much of the enthusiasm behind this position arises from our role as the sole superpower. The world is beset by enemies, many of them states that are the enemies of their own peoples. None really threatens us. If there was ever a time for the U.S. to assert its values, it must be now, for if not the U.S., then who will do it and if \textit{not} now, when would we be in a better position to do so? And if no one asserts these values, isn't it just a matter of time before the fragile movement toward democracies is overtaken by the retrograde forces of realists, nationalists, and relativist internationalists everywhere? In a period of relative American decline, doesn't our best insurance against the future lie in persuading other states to adopt a political system that is benign toward our state and congenial to our culture?

\textsuperscript{354} Graham Fuller footnote needed
Like all unipolar, or imperial, universal visions, however, the paradigm of the new evangelist seems remarkably insensitive to the will of others. When an Administration official proposed in an interview that "the U.S. must rebuild the Haitian economy and restructure its court system, its legislative system and its military system," a columnist replied, "What colonialist, racist nonsense. Haiti belongs to the Haitians to run as they see fit." But isn't that the beauty of the democratic vision: that it alone of all the ideologies of modern government can lay a claim to truly recognizing the people's will in having a state of their own choosing?

The only major states in which democratic transplantation has been tried are Japan and Germany. These examples can be cited either way. Skeptics point out that the principal reason behind the alliance system was not to contain the U.S.S.R. but to keep these new democracies from reverting to their old ways. This must reflect at least some nervousness about how deep the roots of democracy have grown in those societies, even under the most propitious circumstances. Advocates point to the unblemished success of those two societies in peacefully transferring power (finally, in Japan) and in their non-threatening international behavior. Both sides have good points to make. Perhaps the most salient point, however, is that it is no less important now to strengthen those democracies than it was before, and this, as before, is unlikely to happen in the absence of American commitment.

But what if a state is attacked that is not a fully functioning democracy, such as Kuwait? Or if a state threatens its neighbors even through it is a democracy, such as India? Or if the slow process of building democracies are too complicated and ponderous to treat emergencies, such as occurred in Bosnia and Rwanda? In all these instances, democratic enlargement seems to have little of immediate relevance to say.

(5)
The Sole Remaining Superpower: The New Leadership

Each of the preceding four proposed security paradigms shares an essential assumption about American power: that it is in relative decline and that the consequences of that decline will constrain the U.S. from playing the role of world leader to which it has been accustomed in the post-World War II period. One proposed paradigm, however, denies this assumption. This is the program I will call the "New Leadership." In the words of its most articulate spokesman, the true geopolitical structure of the post-Cold War world [is that of] a single pole of world power that consists of the United States at the apex of the industrial west...American pre-eminence is based on the fact that it is the only country with the military, diplomatic, political and economic assets to be a decisive player in any conflict in whatever part of the world it chooses to involve itself....One can debate whether America is in true economic decline. [One should note, however, that] its percentage of world GNP is roughly where it has been throughout the 20th century (between 22% and 26%) excepting the aberration of

355 Cite Krauthammer.
the immediate post-World War II era.\textsuperscript{355}

This point can be urged even more strongly: the U.S., while in relative economic decline \textit{vis-à-vis} the E.U. and Japan, whose percentages of world GNP are growing more rapidly, has actually increased the measure of its geopolitical position by the defeat of its global adversary, the Soviet Union. As a result, as William Odom has written, "the configuration of power today is such that only the United States can launch the construction of a new system." What sort of national security paradigm would fit the U.S. to play such a role?

Advocates of the \textit{new leadership} have something in common with each of the other competing schools: like the nationalists, they advocate a focus on U.S. vital interests and disdain charitable missions abroad, although they draw the line around such interests far more broadly than other nationalists because they believe American interests to be global in nature and emphasize that American prosperity depends upon a stable international market; like the multilateralists, they wish to strengthen NATO and various collective security schemes (such as the OSCE), but they conceive of these groups differently, believing them to be little more than a psychological fig leaf for the robust American assertion of power (and thus reserve a special contempt for the U.N.). As Charles Krauthammer has put it,

There is much pious talk about a new multilateral world and the promise of the U.N. as guarantor of a new post-Cold War order. But this is to mistake cause and effect, the U.S. and the U.N.. The U.N. is guarantor of nothing...Collective security? In the Gulf, without the U.S. leading and prodding, bribing and blackmailing, no one would have stirred. Nothing would have been done: no embargo, no Desert Shield, no threat of force. The world would have written off Kuwait the way the last body pledged to collective security, the League of Nations, wrote off Abyssinia.\textsuperscript{356}

Like the realists, advocates of American leadership place a strong emphasis on bilateral ties and the prevention of new hegemonies from arising, but in contrast with the realists, they focus more closely on internal issues within the great power states and less on a grand concert among them. Advocates of the new leadership point out that balance of power approaches are tone deaf, for example, to the importance of American values in U.S. foreign policy. Moreover, balance of power techniques are considered outmoded from this point of view. As Odom puts it, "the American concept for NATO at its creation was prevention of a return to the old \textit{Realpolitik} game in Western Europe, and although the alliance balanced Soviet power, it was created as much to solve Western Europe's problem with Germany as it was to prevent Soviet expansion." Indeed Odom stresses that Europe's security problems are "primarily ones of internal instability and civil war, problems a balance of power [with its purely external focus] approach will not solve."

One might say that, as opposed to the "democratic engagement" of the

\textsuperscript{355} Cite Krauthammer.
\textsuperscript{356} cite needed
current U.S. administration, the advocate of American leadership proposes instead "selective engagement." But whereas conservative groups, such as the Heritage Foundation who coined this phrase, are strongly anti-interventionist, the new leadership would deploy selective American engagement to achieve the global aims of American dominance. For example, this is the only paradigm that would, forthrightly, have counseled significant NATO force against Serbia, in part because the failure to do so amounted to an abdication of American leadership itself. If victory in the Gulf War may be thought of as symbolizing what might have been the beginning of a new American century under American leadership, then the collapse of western will in Yugoslavia demonstrated what happens when the Americans defer to the Europeans on such matters. If the unification of Germany represented a triumph of clear-sighted American diplomatic leadership in the face of European confusion and accordingly advanced American prestige, then the calamities in Bosnia give us some picture of what diplomacy accomplishes in the absence of such leadership: impotence draped in cynicism. In the end, the very Europeans who stalemated action in Yugoslavia will be the ones who point to Bosnia as evidence of the futility of American leadership.

Advocates of the new leadership are, however, less eager to intervene in Somalia or Haiti where the outcomes do not threaten American leadership one way or the other. Where they perceive future threats—such as those arising from the possession of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist states, such as Iran, Iraq, or North Korea—these advocates favor decisive action untempered by the effort to achieve consensus with our allies. President Carter's role in negotiating a peaceful solution with North Korea was attacked just as much by partisans of the new leadership, who favored a more robust response, as it was by the new nationalists, who really had little to offer as an alternative.

As every leader instinctively knows, one's adversaries may present immediate problems, but preventing one's friends and colleagues from becoming successful rivals is necessarily part of the agenda of dominance. For this reason, new leaders and new realists often appear to agree: both want to prevent the rise of a state, or collection of states, that would threaten the U.S. But whereas the latter wish to do so as a consequence of inevitable American relative decline, the former wish to preserve American hegemony at the top. Thus some realists would have demurred about intervention in the Gulf because Iraq is not a potential power of world-dominating ambitions, whereas for the new leader, it was essential that the U.S. demonstrate it could act on behalf of the northern tier states from whose number a rival leader might emerge. While realists such as Mrs. Kirkpatrick now suggest that "it is time to give up the dubious benefits of superpower status" so that we may aspire to be "a normal country in a normal time," the new leader recognizes that we are far from normal times.

Above all, is not the new leader the truly realistic one? For while others call for strengthening the democratic revolution, achieving a robust agenda of counter-proliferation, and preventing hostile combinations from forming against us, only the new leader actually plans to accomplish these goals by specific means within our control, as opposed to offering hortatory rhetoric and a sort of "You first" diplomacy. The real question for the proponent of this paradigm is: Can we afford it? Indeed there are some realists who claim that even attempting such an agenda is bound to weaken our geopolitical position, just as it did earlier superpowers who, having
vanquished their opponents, found themselves increasingly unable to provide the economic infrastructure that would sustain their gains because they had diverted so great a portion of their resources to military budgets.

To this the new leader retorts that whether or not our economic health can be restored through American hegemony, it certainly can't prosper without it. Moreover, the decline in American competitiveness is not, he argues, due to overspending on defense, but rather to those national characteristics that are the negative face of qualities whose positive side better suit us for world political leadership than for cut-throat trade wars in the game of geo-economics, a game that our rivals would be only too anxious to tempt us to play in lieu of the geo-politics where our overwhelming assets lie. Let me take up both these points, seriatim.

First, it is often assumed by many that the vast flow of international goods and information is a natural given and that any American resources spent to insure international stability through defense expenditures are resources wasted because they are diverted from our economic well-being. How often are we treated to lectures by economists who claim that money spent on tanks is unproductive, while the same money spent on tractors contributes to our national wealth. In fact it took British expenditures well in excess of our own (as a percentage of GDP) to maintain the sea lanes on which British prosperity depended, and to prevent the competing hegemonies of those who might threaten her trade and later her industrial supremacy. It is open to question whether her relative decline began when the costs of empire overstretched her ability to maintain domestic investment, or when other states—Germany, for example, whose military expenditures were far greater than Great Britain's—overtook her and was manifestly willing to threaten the very international security on which complicated contemporary economic life depends. As Krauthammer puts it,

It is a mistake to view America's exertions abroad as nothing but a drain on its economy. As can be seen in the Gulf, America's involvement abroad is in many ways an essential pillar of the American economy. The United States is, like Britain before it, a commercial, maritime, trading nation that needs an open, stable world environment in which to thrive. In a word of Saddams, if the U.S. were to shed its unique superpower role, its economy would be gravely wounded. Insecure sea lanes, impoverished trading partners, exorbitant oil prices...are only the more obvious risks of an American abdication...The cost of ensuring an open and safe world for American commerce—5.4% of GNP and falling—is hardly exorbitant.357

But, it is said, this is far more than, for example, the Japanese spend on defense (about 1.5% of GNP) and is a competitive drag on the U.S. economy. Surely Japan is as much in need of secure trade lanes as the U.S. and far more sensitive to oil prices. Wouldn't the U.S. be better off ceding some share of its responsibilities for international security to those states who, when they took up this burden, would thereby acquire a drag on their ascent and thus relatively improve our

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own competitive position? This is the second question suggested above, and it draws a distinct
line between the purported paradigm of leadership and all others. For here the partisan of this
approach denies the very comparison on which the argument depends: geopolitical
leadership, he argues, is not the same as geo-economic competition. "The notion
that economic power inevitably translates into geopolitical influence," Krauthammer
writes, "is a materialist illusion." Economic power is a necessary but not a sufficient
condition for great power status, which also comprehends not simply military power,
but the will to use it, and the legitimacy to do so without exciting countervailing
coalitions. Here the U.S., in part because of its benign history towards the defeated
states of World War II, is in a unique position. It may appear that it is the imprimatur
of the U.N. that conveys this legitimacy, but in fact this is only a reflection of the
American desire not to appear hegemoniacal and thus to seek U.N. endorsements
for its actions. A quick canvass of recent General Assembly resolutions would
disabuse anyone who was tempted to think that the U.N. could, acting as an
institution, convey legitimacy to any state act without the consent of the Great
Powers.

Indeed the constitutional framework of the U.S. and its multinational state
uniquely suit it to pursue the goals of world power without threatening the other Great
Powers, now that Russia is in apparent decline. The Long War was fought over
issues of legitimacy; the resolution of that war in favor of the democratic republics
has given us a post-war order over whose protection the United States is well placed
to preside. To abandon this role will not only threaten that victory, it will inevitably
invite the chaos that is most costly to a status quo power such as ourselves. We
have the most to lose by our own passivity and no other way to lose it.

Paradigms And Policies

We have seen five proposals for a new strategic paradigm for the United
States—the New Nationalism, the New Internationalism, Democratic Engagement,
the New Realism, the New Leadership. None has yet captured the consensus that
characterizes a paradigm, which is a comprehensive, consistent and coherent set of
beliefs and pre-conceptions shared by the members of a particular discipline or
community. This failure has prompted some to suggest that the world is simply too
complicated now for a single paradigm. "No doctrine," Richard Haass has written in
a wittily titled article, 'Paradigm Lost', "can hope to provide a lens through which to
view most events."

The first thing to be said about these proffered 'new paradigms' is that they
are not paradigms at all. In fact, the entire intellectual enterprise that has yielded
these proposals has been triggered by a profound misunderstanding as to what has
been lost and what can serve to replace it. The source of this misunderstanding
may perhaps be traced, ironically, to the following account: The world inherited by
the Bush and Clinton Administrations is "a more complex place than what came
before." Whereas Presidents from Truman to Reagan had the comforting stability of
the Cold War to provide a consistent and continuous context for foreign policy, the
aftermath of that War has not yet yielded such clarity. In the place of
containment—the old 'paradigm' through which all political events were
mediated—there is only confusion, because the antinomies on which containment
depended (the global competition of the West with that of the Soviet Union, the universal ambition of communist ideology versus the pluralistic vision of the West) have also collapsed. Perhaps until new threats against which the United States must contend are themselves clarified, its political class will be unable to decide what paradigm is to replace containment; or perhaps the threats are so diffuse that, as Haass suggests, no single paradigm will do.

What is wrong with this account? First, it confuses paradigms with policies. A paradigm is what members of the political community share; a policy is what some portion of them put into place in pursuit of the goals of that paradigm. Of course no single policy will do; indeed the history of the Cold War itself shows an enormous variation in policies, depending on the time, place, and manner of the conflict. But without a shared paradigm, its hard to know whether the proposed policy is even effective when implemented. Without a shared paradigm, the United States is condemned to adopt that most seductive of dogmas, the "case-by-case" approach. This approach is appealing to a powerful state because it obviates the need to make some crucial choices and comforts the decisionmaker that no precedent is created that will come back to embarrass him. The more powerful the state, the more appealing is this approach, because that state will always appear to prevail. It will always appear to get its way, if it is powerful enough to bring the other states into line. I say "appear to prevail" because it is not so clear what "way" the state, acting on a case-by-case basis, is actually getting when it gets its way. Any road seems like the right one if you don't know where you're going, because if you don't know where you're going, any road will take you there. So the U.S. may be said to have had its way when it persuaded the U.N. Security Council to adopt resolutions condemning the Serbs for war crimes; and to have gotten its way again when it led the Council in declining to prosecute those indicted; to have gotten its way when it initially led humanitarian forces into Somalia, and to have gotten its way again when it was the first to evacuate its own troops.

Second, the history of the account given above is saturated with presentism, the view that things have never been quite so much the way they are as they are right now. I doubt the world is, as is so often said, "more complicated, more complex," because the 'world' in that sentence is not the teeming globe whose problems increase as our appreciation of them increases, but instead is the set of values that, problematically, collide in the attempt to allocate our power wisely. Such a world is no more complex for President Clinton, with vastly more resources, than it was for, say, John Quincy Adams. Clinton had to decide whether to intervene in Bosnia to halt a campaign of genocide; Adams had to decide whether to give aid to the South American revolt against Spain. The decisions (as opposed to the means) are no less complex in either case.

Moreover, it is not the end of the Cold War that has transformed the world and left the United States without an objective. Our objective never was simply to defeat the Soviet Union. Georgiy Arbatov's cynical remark—"We have done our worst to you: we have deprived you of an enemy"—is far more reflective of Soviet culture than American. Rather it is the end of the Long War, which was fought over the legitimacy of the democratic system itself and that of its competitors, that has quite appropriately left us with the slight puzzlement one feels after accomplishing a long and difficult task.
Finally, it is not 'containment' that is the paradigm that has been lost. Containment, composed of that set of policies that sought to prevent the aggrandizement of the Soviet empire by defensive alliances and, where possible, the avoidance of armed conflict in order to enable the internal contradictions of the communist system to manifest themselves and to be contrasted with the marked success of the Western states, was not a paradigm at all. Containment did not provide us a way of understanding the conflict, but rather with a guiding set of tactics for winning it.

The paradigm by means of which Western statesmen and their publics have understood this century-long struggle is a picture of the State. That paradigm depicts the legitimate state as one that exists to better the welfare of its people. This paradigm distinguishes the nation-state from the state-nation that preceded it, the paradigm of which was a state that existed to mobilize the people as to whom it was the sovereign; the state-nation was the state of empires.

The 20th century paradigm is the State created by the self-determination of peoples. It has not been lost; indeed it is flourishing in many parts of the globe. But it fails to provide guidance for U.S. policy because the problems that the American state faces now are not problems of the Long War, whose inception marked the widespread transition to the modern nation-state. That paradigm continues to provide the requisite ability to see resemblances, to enable analogies, to structure consensus—if it didn't, then the fruits of the Long War would be incomprehensible to us. The strategic innovations that ultimately won that war—and which will compel other states to either copy the United States, or respond to it with innovations of their own—were the development of nuclear weapons, the invention of rapid computation, and the evolution of communications technology. Accordingly, the American state has changed and is changing to reflect the effects of these innovations. Part of that change, which is already well underway in the United States, will be a paradigm shift in our attitude about the State. If the Wilsonian paradigm was a state that existed to better the welfare of its people, the 21st century American state will be one that exists to reflect, implement, inform, and diversify individual choice. It is tempting to say that this is a change from a democratic, political matrix of ideas to an economic, market matrix. But this would confuse the way we deal with problems for the problems themselves: there will always be a political and a market mechanism working in tandem because the kinds of problems states must solve cannot be wholly assimilated into one or the other approach.

Briefly put, systems for allocation that use political means (like the Selective Service Act) call on different views of egalitarianism (one man, one vote, for example) than do market systems (like the All-Volunteer Force) with their distinctive views (to each according to his means and ability). One can never be wholly sacrificed to the other in a civilized society. Indeed one might go so far as to say that it is a distinguishing mark of a civilized society that it struggles to maintain many-valued forms of life despite the human condition of scarcity.

What the proffered nominees for the "New Paradigm" in fact offer are policies. Indeed they are the same policies we have more or less been recycling throughout the Cold War, and all sit quite comfortably within the Versailles paradigm for the

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358 For an elaboration of the argument for this conclusion, I refer the reader to the book, Tragic Choices.
nation-state. All five programs have been, at various times, the implementing techniques for the Cold War policy of containment. Each has risen to temporary ascendancy at the time of a particular Cold War crisis—the collapse of the Congo (internationalism), the Cuban missile crisis (nationalism), German unification (realism), the War in South Vietnam (democratic enlargement), the Arab-Israeli War in 1968 (leadership). The reason they are so very unhelpful—ask the President whether 'Democratic Engagement' has helped him decide whether to confront China over its human rights policies or whether to use force to disarm North Korea's nuclear weapons capability—is precisely because they are representative of a debate whose reason for being has ceased. If we are truly to imagine what a New Paradigm might look like, we have to look at the State and the strategic challenges it faces, and determine how it itself has changed. Each of the current elements in the policy portfolio was once a paradigm of statecraft. When the sort of state for which it was essential changed, the paradigm ceased to have the force of a consensus worldview. Paradigms decay into policies.

Thus the security paradigms—the "worldviews" of statecraft—of any particular era follow the constitutional makeup and outlook of the states of that era. We can see this in a review of the morphology of the modern State traced in Part II. As each form of the state underwent a transition from one constitutional order to another, it added an accompanying paradigmatic outlook. Thus we find in the political papers during the transition from the reign of feudal princes to that of the princely State, a refined and sophisticated development of the balance of power. Machiavelli speaks the idiom of realism. His city-state has his love, "more than his soul," he once wrote, not his ethnic group, which he seems to pity and even disdain. There is little, if anything, of nationalism in his papers, though he calls upon a "redeemer" for Italy. And there is nothing of praise for internationalist institutions—the church—nor, of course, for democratic enlargement. The transition to the kingly state retains the concept of the balance of power among its lexicon of policies, but its outlook is one that we would associate today with hegemony. One does not negotiate the compensating system of balances when one hopes to overpower all the competing states. The count-duke Olivares wrote Philip IV,

> You should not be content to be king of Portugal, of Aragon and of Valencia and Count of Barcelona, but you should direct all your work and thought...to reduce the realms to the same order and legal systems as Castile. If your majesty succeeds in this you will be the most powerful prince in the world.\(^{359}\)

Leadership and dominance are the language of Olivares and Richelieu, just as they are the animating ambitions of the Habsburg emperors, who shattered the princely states of Italy, and the French kings who, in turn, destroyed the hegemonical dreams of imperial Catholicism, and whose model inspired Olivares. It would have been idle of Charles V or Maximilian to think in nationalist terms; what nation—Spanish, Austrian, Italian, Burgundian—would it have been? Nor did the great alliance structures of the period presage a system of collective security,

\(^{359}\) Need cite.
precisely because they were not collective in nature, and spawned no congresses or conventions that outlived the conflicts that gave them birth. Even shared religious allegiances could not spawn an alliance structure that outlasted a particular conflict and placed the security of the whole as its highest responsibility. Catholic France proved Catholic Spain’s decisive enemy.

It was the transition from kingly states to territorial states that introduced the paradigm of nationalism, as German princes became tied to particular peoples, in the slow working out of the consequences of the principle of *cuius regio eius religio*. Of course there are the continuing policies of the balance of power and of ideological hegemonism: the Treaty of Utrecht specifically cites a balance of power as its goal and it was the ambitions of France to achieve hegemony that led to the treaty. But the ‘anarchic society’ is a term one associates with Hobbes, not with his predecessors. It is he who insists that no individual is strong enough to guarantee his own security unaided, and that governments are required to do so in order to settle disputes that are not amenable to direct compromise or agreement among the parties. Conflict among states is the natural environment.

When Rousseau argues that moral rule, in order to be moral, must be self-imposed and thus that the State must originate in self-government, he writes words that to us suggest popular sovereignty, but to his contemporaries would have suggested the transition to the state-nation. For he also writes that the good of each citizen must be distinguished from his temporary desires. The permanent aim of the citizen—the product of his rational, true, higher self—is distinguished from his passing impulses. Thus obedience to the State is an act of allegiance to the true self-will; by this means, in Rousseau’s word; "I am forced to be free." Since this higher good is the same for all rational citizens, their permanent selves are identical and can thus have a single will that is manifested in the State. There is nothing in this of democracy, as we understand it, but there is the possibility of international cooperation. Although it may shock us to think so, the utilitarian line that would organize the powers of Europe on precisely the same bases that individual government are constituted, leads directly to Hegel and the deified state. For if states, collectively, are the only means of assuring security and concert, then is not the State the only vehicle for a realization of the nation, its protection and order?

Because these phase-transitions occur in the nature of the State itself, it is hardly surprising that the security paradigms to which they give birth should reflect ideas about the constitutional make-up of the state.

Finally we come to the transition from state-nation to nation-state, which gave us the paradigm within which we currently strive, to add to the others we have inherited as policies. This may be stated as: The state is constituted to improve the material well being of the nation. Thus the nation-state bears within its legitimacy the problem of nationalities. Who can claim a state? What is a national people? Suppose the nation is itself divided—what means are permissible to coerce and legitimate unification? This is the program of the evangelist of democracy, and it is rightly associated with Lincoln and Wilson, but also with Bismarck and Adolf Hitler. Each of the three contending political philosophies that contested the Long War had a different answer to this issue, but for each it was the issue: whether submerging nationalism in the larger good owed to the international proletariat, or worshipping the nation as the authentic legatee of the *volk*, or placing at its disposal the
procedures of legal process and representation. The United States has lived within a Wilsonian paradigm because that is the American understanding of the basis for the nation-state, but all the Great Powers lived within variations of the nation-state paradigm, whether in Hitler's formulation or Lenin's. If, as I argued above, this paradigm has not withered away or been lost with the end of the Long War, why should we expect, much less search for, a new paradigm?

It could be that the vacillation of American foreign policy has no deeper cause than the poverty of its leadership; it may be that the prevailing paradigm is sturdy enough to provide a basis for choosing among competing policies in the various contexts that current affairs bring forth, if only leaders of a higher caliber were doing the choosing. I doubt this: the predecessor to the current U.S. administration, in which I also served, had no better answers to Haiti, North Korea, Somalia, Yugoslavia, or Ukraine, all of which it made modestly worse by not having a policy and bequeathing acute problems that became chronic to its successor. If, as I believe, President Bush and Secretary Baker will stand high in America's history for their work in unifying Germany and expelling Iraq from Kuwait, it can be seen already that the former was a problem in the endgame of the Long War, and that the latter did not even serve as a precedent for Great Power action a few months after Baghdad was surrounded when, for the second time in the history of the U.N., a member state invaded another member state and annexed its territory. Virtually all of President Clinton's important achievements in foreign security policy—in Haiti, North Korea, Ukraine, and Bosnia—are at a tentative stage. The best that can be said of them at the present is that they promise great success even without a shared vision of the American role; the worst, that having lived by the expedient and the impromptu, we will find all these problems so much more troublesome when the agreements that temporarily quieted them unravel.

I am inclined to believe, however, that it is not the absence of a structuring idea, a shared way of understanding the challenges we face, that pervades all the current proposals and disquieting performances, but rather the clinging to a paradigm that has lost its utility. The Wilsonian pledge—to make the world safe for democracy—and the Wilsonian understanding—that national democracies offered the best chance to benefit the people of the world—have not failed us; they have succeeded beyond what Wilson would have dared attempt in parts of the globe untouched by the Fourteen Points. They have succeeded in providing us political principles that could guide our strategic policies during the Long War in which those principles were contested and sorely tried. Now, with the Long War over, we are so sunk in the habits of strategic thinking that we ceaselessly bat about alternative security policies at a time when we are unable to make the simplest decision when to use force. We have lived as a state in war for so long that, paradoxically, we are unable to make appropriate security plans for peace.

In the final section of this part of Book I, I will offer some speculation as to what such a successor paradigm might look like, by looking at current contexts analogous to those that provided paradigms to states in the past: the contexts of strategic innovation and constitutional change. Then it may be possible to answer the question posed in the Introduction: how ought we to decide when to use force in the international arena?

Preliminarily, however, the first thing one ought to observe about a new
constitutional archetype is that it will not be something wholly new in form. For the United States, for example, there will be no new constitution. Americans will still be called 'Americans', though what image that word conjures up in their minds may not be the same as came to my father and his contemporaries. Indeed, perhaps the most serious impediment to creative thinking in this area has been our automatic impulse to assume that the next paradigm will involve something like a new kind of state, that is, a re-iteration of the European state on a different scale. Articles such as "After the nation-state what?" capture this reaction, for they invariably posit a 'super-state' or no state at all. It is not only intellectuals who make this error. The movement toward the WEU as a "European pillar" for the Atlantic defense system is, for many, merely a political station on the way to an integrated, European defense system, coordinated by the European Union. Precisely because such a defense arrangement requires a fundamental constitutional modification of the nation-states of Europe in the direction of a super-state it is already an out-moded objective. Moreover, because so many of the challenges facing the nation-state are supranational in character—environmental threats, mass migration, capital speculation, to name just three—and it is clear that supranational solutions will be required, this tempts many to assume that a delegation of sovereignties must and will occur. This is a profound misreading of how such integration as has occurred in Europe came about. It is American involvement in Europe, through NATO and the Marshall Plan, that has, paradoxically, provided Western Europe with such capacity as it currently possesses to act as a unified political entity. It is difficult to imagine Britain ever delegating such a role to the bureaucratic machinery of Brussels or to the one state capable of dominating that machinery by virtue of its military and economic strength, Germany. The unification of the German state has, for the foreseeable future, put an end to the unification of Western Europe by creating a power that is actually capable of dominating the E.U.

What critics writing in the security area have not contemplated is a change in the constitutional structures of the European (and other) states that does not surrender sovereignty to yet another state, but returns it even more radically to the people themselves. How collective defense arrangements would work among such states is the subject of Book II of The Shield of Achilles.
Dangers of the “Clinton Doctrine”

by Gerry Gendlin

From the very first, the international behavior of the United States under President Bill Clinton has been criticized for a multitude of sins. Critics have said that nothing in the international actions of the Clinton administration suggests a well-thought-out foreign policy. When making policy decisions, he has had unclear purposes and used ineffective means. The president has not done enough, gone far enough, or learned from the lessons of the past. Even as the United States coordinated the United Nations’ response to Iraqi intransigence, Bill Clinton merely did what previous policies dictated he must.

However, Clinton has enunciated a clear and pragmatic formulation of foreign policy. In the tradition of naming broad foreign policies after the presidents who enunciate them, it is justified to attribute recent U.S. foreign policies to the “Clinton Doctrine.” This doctrine can be summed up in Clinton’s own words: “We can’t do everything but we must do what we can.” On the surface, this seems to be a safe and wise manner in which to conceptualize the goals and actions of foreign policy. Yet, taking the very wisdom that creates restraint and balancing it with a realistic assessment of capabilities could end up causing as many problems as it resolves. The Clinton Doctrine may well lead the country in the wrong direction, and future U.S. leaders could find themselves constrained by the very pragmatism of which Clinton has been so proud.

THE CLINTON DOCTRINE

Since the fall of the Soviet empire, U.S. foreign policy has been without the comfortable and familiar purpose that directed it for more than 40 years. With the Soviet menace gone, the Cold War ended with a thankful whimper as political analysts immediately began a fundamental reassessment of international relations. The post-Cold War era, it is said, has been a time of confusion

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for U.S. foreign policy. Without an enemy, perhaps the United States would have to struggle to redefine itself. The Clinton Doctrine addresses this issue squarely: the emphasis here is not on what the United States can do, but rather on the idea that there are actions that must be taken, and these actions are tempered only by an evaluation of what is possible.

The United States is neither the cause of nor solution to world problems. However, it must do what it can to help deal with some of these difficulties. Understood another way, the United States, both at home and abroad, has purposes and goals that should dictate its actions within the bounds of the practical. As former Secretary of Defense William Perry stated:

-Wise decisions about the use of force or forces have a political and military and an ethical element. The political element involves a judgement as to the nature of interests at stake, and whether the use of the threat of use of military force is the most appropriate way to protect those interests. The military element involves a judgement as to the capability of U.S. military force to achieve our goals, and the probable losses entailed. The ethical element involves whether achieving our goals by using our military is in keeping with America's fundamental respect for human life—the lives of our men and women in uniform and the lives of people of other nations.

Such a restatement of U.S. policy is a dramatic shift from the doctrines pronounced by Cold War-era presidents in that their doctrines spelled out when and under what circumstances the United States would get involved internationally. The Truman and Reagan doctrines mandated U.S. intervention around the world, first in opposition to communism wherever it threatened, and then in support of anti-communist movements wherever they emerged. Between the 1940s and the 1980s, Dwight Eisenhower, Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Jimmy Carter all lent their names to doctrines that, no matter what region of the world they addressed, mandated U.S. involvement of one sort or another.

In the succession of doctrines, the practicality of the Clinton Doctrine most closely resembles that of the Nixon Doctrine, which limited U.S. involvement to money and equipment. Still, Nixon's policy operated under clear, anti-communist guidelines. In contrast with these earlier principles, the Clinton Doctrine has no conditions that would automatically guarantee U.S. intervention or involvement. Rather, the Clinton Doctrine makes any U.S. action contingent on means and results: the United States may act only where such action is practical. This is distinctly different from the Clinton Doctrine's predecessor, the Weinberger Doctrine. Named for Ronald Reagan's secretary of defense, Caspar Weinberger, it established a clear list of criteria to determine when force would be used:

-Is the situation in the vital national interest of the United States?
-Is it possible to commit enough resources to be successful?
-Will such a commitment be sustained?
-Are there clearly defined objectives?
-Will there be support from Congress and the people of the United States?
-Have all other options been used?

This doctrine was used successfully in the Gulf War, but the Clinton administration departed from it right from the start. The general impression was that the Weinberger Doctrine was too restrictive and that the military could, and should, be used in more situations. Clinton's national security advisor, Anthony Lake, elaborated on this subject in a speech at the National Defense University that listed seven situations in which force could be used to:

-Defend the United States, U.S. citizens, and allies;
-Counter acts of aggression;
-Defend economic interests;
-Defend democracy;
-Counter the spread of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, crime, and narcotics;
-Preserve the impression of reliability;
-Pursue humanitarian objectives.

While pointing out that the United States cannot solve every crisis around the world Lake further stated that "When millions of human lives are at risk, the world's most powerful nation cannot simply sit on the sidelines. The American people will not allow it—and that is to their credit." The Clinton Doctrine is a principle of pragmatism, yet it also continues the tradition that U.S. behavior imparts some sort of moral value. As Clinton's deputy secretary of state put it, "The American people want their country's foreign policy rooted in idealpolitik as well as realpolitik. The United States is uniquely and self-consciously founded on a set of ideas, and ideals, applicable to people everywhere."

If such ideals are to be applied around the world, there clearly are times when the United States must act. It might be argued that because Clinton's approach lacks the guidelines that specify when action is to be taken, it cannot be rightfully considered a doctrine. Such an argument in semantics ignores two points. First, the Clinton approach does stipulate that the United
States must do something, although the action to be taken is left open. Second, as the broad Truman Doctrine and the sweeping Reagan Doctrine show, explicitness is not a necessary feature of a doctrine. In any event, the concentration on the word “doctrine” obscures the important point: Clinton’s foreign policy is clearly defined, with both purpose and restraint.

**THE CLINTON DOCTRINE IN ACTION**

There are three prominent examples of this doctrine in action during the Clinton years. In Yugoslavia, Haiti, and Iraq, U.S. leaders perceived a need to do something, and the United States did what it could to live up to the collective vision of human rights outlined by the American value system.

**Yugoslavia**

It was the situation in the former Yugoslavia that brought about the first clear enunciation of the Clinton Doctrine. After the death of longtime leader Tito, Yugoslavia suffered a nationalist interregnum that eventually led to the disintegration of the country. The occasional ethnic skirmish was replaced quickly by real warfare among the several peoples scattered throughout the Balkans. The expression “ethnic cleansing” became part of the American vocabulary as it became clear that Bosnian Moslems were being slaughtered.

Initially, the United States did nothing to stop the ethnic cleansing. Former Secretary of Defense Perry rejected criticism of U.S. inaction:

Some say America has an ethical obligation to solve the Bosnian tragedy by entering the war on one side or the other. But America doesn’t have enough at stake to risk the massive American casualties, as well as casualties from other parties and civilians, that would occur if we participated in a wider war. That course is unacceptable.

Later, however, the United States acted in concert with NATO, the United Nations, and with other Western powers in an attempt to stop the Balkan war. Military pressure forced all sides to the negotiating table in Dayton, Ohio, where a shaky peace settlement was established.

The implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, however, required more than diplomacy. The United States led a NATO military force to effect the agreement. It was in his speech to Congress justifying U.S. participation that Clinton clearly stated the principle that will probably come to characterize his presidency: “My duty as President is to match the demands for American leadership to our strategic interests and to our ability to make a difference. . . . We can’t do everything, but we must do what we can.”

When the original mandate for a U.S. military presence expired in December 1996, the president authorized an 18 month extension to stabilize the situation since the terms of the Dayton Accords had been implemented. Unlike previous interventions, this one was tied specifically to accomplishments, to progress measured by stability. The limited involvement of the United States clearly resulted from the first part of the Clinton Doctrine: the United States cannot do everything.

To date, the Clinton Doctrine has been a success in the former Yugoslavia. The limited involvement of the United States has, along with America’s NATO allies, helped make and keep the peace there, at least for now. Supporters of the president say Bosnia is a case where America did only and exactly what it could to make a difference.

**Haiti**

The Clinton Doctrine required and justified a moderately favorable intervention in Haiti. After decades of despotism under the Duvaliers, the Caribbean country entered what was supposed to be a period of tenuous democracy. When the institutions of force reasserted themselves, the elected president was overthrown. After a period of diplomatic efforts, U.S. troops landed in Haiti, ostensibly to restore the president and allow democracy to grow.

With the benefit of hindsight, the U.S. action may not have accomplished its goals. However, the intervention’s goals are not as important as its importance—threatened important—but not vital—U.S. interests: namely, our interest in protecting democracy in this hemisphere; in preventing the flow of refugees; and in our deep concern in putting a halt to a cruel, systematic reign of terror over the Haitian people.

When it became clear that democracy in Haiti would not survive unless the United States acted, Clinton’s team was forced to match its behavior with its rhetoric. With the administration’s blessing, former President Jimmy Carter negotiated a tenuous settlement—by sending Carter, the United States was also doing what it could. However, it backed diplomacy with an obvious willingness to resort to force. While the long-term future remains in doubt, the short-term conflict was more or less resolved.

**Iraq**

When U.S. policy toward Iraq was little more than an inherited annoyance for the Clinton team, U.S. forces merely patrolled the no-fly zones and partic-
minated in UN inspection teams. After several years, however, the Iraqi leadership progressively prevented the inspection teams from completing their assigned jobs. Months of diplomatic efforts were unable to coax Iraq into abiding by the UN resolutions that had become the backbone of U.S. regional policy since the Gulf War. A military response was the next logical step.

The Clinton Doctrine explains how President Clinton acted in a limited, measured way with clearly defined goals and means to ensure that Saddam Hussein would allow UN weapons inspectors unfettered access to all sites. The situation did not call for a massive war effort, nor would Clinton have been likely to approve one. So with Iraqi disobedience embarrassing the West, and threatening to undo billions of dollars already spent in taming Iraqi intransigence, Clinton believed a military strike was the only alternative and therefore felt compelled to ready the American people for such a possibility:

Saddam Hussein's Iraq reminds us of what we learned in the twentieth century and warns us of what we must know about the twenty-first. In this century we learned through harsh experience that the only answer to aggression and illegal behavior is firmness, determination, and, when necessary, action.21

This clearly spells out the course of action the United States should take in dealing with countries that violate international norms. Yet Clinton was forced to keep his response measured because there was no emotionally charged issue to rally the people behind the cause. The Gulf War had the act of aggression in the takeover of Kuwait by Iraq. So unlike President George Bush, Clinton has not been able to cite clear transgressions in dealing with Saddam Hussein. Even so, President Clinton learned the lessons of the past and realized that only a show of force would provoke action from the Iraqi leader. He followed through by sending carrier battle groups to the Gulf and sending his advisors around the world to garner support from allies and key nations in the region. Taking the hard line proved effective for Clinton: the Iraqi leader informed UN Secretary General Kofi Annan that Iraq would adhere to UN resolutions. Only time will tell the true success of the agreement reached with Saddam Hussein, but Clinton used the resources he had to take the appropriate course of action as the situation warranted.

THE CONSTRAINTS ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IMPOSED BY THE CLINTON DOCTRINE

There can be no doubt that the 50,000 lives lost in the Vietnam conflict taught the United States a lesson.22 It was a lesson revisited several times since the 1970s, most notably by Ronald Reagan.23 Both Lake and Perry have pointed to their responsibility to prevent the loss of lives wherever possible; such is the American reverence for each individual life. Clearly, the wisdom of the Clinton Doctrine is its obvious attention to the limits of American efficacy: the United States cannot do everything.

The doctrine evinces, therefore, an inability to guide policy makers in deciding what actions the United States can take, how much it should try, and when to stop. If, as Perry and Lake both discuss, the deciding factor is the American sense of values, it may be difficult for leaders to assess the moral conscience of 250 million people. Even if we assume that leaders know what goals "the American people" will demand in a given situation, the values themselves may not speak to the means or timing.

So it was in Bosnia. While the idea of introducing troops to support peace is appealing, there seemed to be no clear vision on the efficacy of their deployment.24 As all three examples show, the Clinton Doctrine is not a prescription for the resolution of any problem; it is more a statement of conflict management. The Clinton Doctrine does not envision long-term settlements that provide for a lasting peace and a democratic future. In fact, the doctrine only speaks to causes of and restraints on action; it says nothing about what the action should be designed to accomplish, except that it should address some American value. The lack of clarity on the maxim's goals is part of the doctrine's appeal: by saying flatly that America cannot do everything, the doctrine imposes a pragmatic restraint. This restraint may cause the most problems.

On the one hand, a constraint of pragmatism is necessary because of the universal nature of American ideals, and the broad sense in which they could be applied around the world. As candidate Clinton said in 1992, "It should matter to us how others govern themselves. Democracy is our interest."25

If the promotion and preservation of democracy were an interest that required action, the United States would be constantly active around the world. Sadly, people are suffering on every continent. Democracy is more threatened or non-existent than it is flourishing. However, the Clinton Doctrine makes it clear that the United States has neither the resources nor the desire to project its force and influence wherever people are mistreated. U.S. action is mandated only when Washington can show, no clear the one project its force and influence wherever people are mistreated. U.S. action is mandated only when Washington can show, no clear the one project its force and influence wherever people are mistreated. U.S. action is mandated only when Washington can show, no clear the one project its force and influence wherever people are mistreated. U.S. action is mandated only when Washington can show, no clear

The pragmatic restraint on U.S. action is also necessary because Americans value human life.26 Just as the Clinton team would try to save lives around the world, so too, is it apparent that American lives would be among those saved. In other words, the United States has a fear of casualties, especially our own. The Clinton Doctrine's con-
strait of pragmatism gives voice to this fear: America values the lives of its young men and women in uniform as much as it does human rights and democracy.13

Consequently, many people, including then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, were afraid that the complex political objectives of a U.S. mission to Yugoslavia could result in failure.14 In other words, there might be an unacceptable number of deaths.

The pragmatism of the Clinton Doctrine, therefore, weighs the potential human cost of U.S. involvement against the necessity of action, and looks for a clearly defined political objective. William Perry quoted Biblical scripture to make this point.

There's a painting that hangs outside my office in the Pentagon. It depicts a poignant scene of a service­man with his family in church. Clearly he is praying before a deployment and long separation. Below the painting is a wonderful quote from Isaiah. God says, "Whom shall I send and who will go for us?" And Isaiah replies, "Here am I; send me." When we talk about using military force, we are talking about the lives of the people who say, "Here am I; send me;" And every decision we make to use force must bear them in mind.15

A danger may come should the American people judge too few objectives worthy of sacrificing American lives.

The fear of death is accompanied by a reluctance to spend money. Since the advent of the Reagan era, and especially since the 104th16 Congress began in 1994, issues of government expenditures, taxes, and public moneys have been paramount in the national political culture. For example, Congress has questioned U.S. involvement in international organizations, and spending on defense, issues once considered sacrosanct to Republicans.17 Even military analysts have pointed to the increasing tensions between domestic social needs and military spending.18 The strictest limitations imposed by the Clinton Doctrine respond to the fear of death and the reluctance to spend money.

Rwanda

Rwanda serves as an outstanding example of the kind of constraints on U.S. international behavior recognized by the Clinton Doctrine. Because U.S. interests in the region were difficult to define, the administration stayed away from the tragedy in south central Africa, even as a well-publicized genocide took the lives of about one million people.19

As tragedies go, Rwanda was as fierce and gruesome as the twentieth century has produced. The government of Rwanda was based on a framework inherited from the region's colonial past. Although not wholly without conflict, the two main ethnic groups, Hutu and Tutsi, had lived with each other well before the Europeans came and imported their conceptions of nation and nationalism.20 With independence, the antagonism lost any sort of historical basis and gained instead the use of modern means and weapons. State structures are precarious in much of the world, and a little push sent Rwanda into a period of anarchy in which gross massacres slaughtered hundreds of thousands of people in the African "Great Lakes" region.21 As innocents fled one way and then another, eastern Zaire became flooded with refugees; rebel groups opposed to the Zairean dictator Mobuto took advantage of the uncertainty and seized control first of the east and then of the whole country. Mobuto was a corrupt and evil dictator but his successor has not proved himself any more democratic.22

The killing in the area as a result of the Rwanda crisis far surpassed even the ferocity of Balkan "ethnic cleansing" campaigns. Yet the United States did not intervene.23 A full comparison between Bosnia and Rwanda is beyond the scope of this discussion. However, it is important to note the United States had no military forces permanently stationed in the region on which it could draw, no strategic interests that necessitate stability, and no economic interests that require peace. The only reason to intervene would have been regard for human life which is apparently not enough of a draw.24 Logistically, the projection of U.S. power into southern Africa would have been very difficult. For the United States to make any moves toward ameliorating the carnage in Rwanda, Bill Clinton would have had to commit large numbers of forces over a long period of time, in difficult terrain, where the United States had no military experience. More importantly, he would have had to prepare the American people for casualties.25

DANGERS OF THE CLINTON DOCTRINE

Human rights provide a powerful incentive to act but one not powerful enough to overcome practical obstacles. Americans are wary of fighting and dying for human rights alone. Although the Gulf War ended successfully, there was a very vocal discussion on whether the real reason for U.S. action was, in fact, to guarantee continued access to cheap oil, and whether this was a sufficient interest to risk American lives.

The Clinton Doctrine has publicly declared what was until now a bitter subtext for United States involvement: Americans do not want to die, nor to see their children die, for reasons of economics, or geography, or causes important only to others. Although President Clinton said that global democracy is a U.S. interest, it is clear that Americans are unwilling to die for it. For in suggesting that America will act
only when the costs are low and the results clearly attainable, the Clinton Doctrine may provide an open invitation for trouble around the world.

Taiwan
One of the clearest danger points is Taiwan. For almost 50 years, the United States has been the defender of Taiwan's independence, even though it no longer officially recognizes the government on the island. Should China invade Taiwan, the necessary commitment of resources and the potential of mass casualties might, under the Clinton Doctrine, prevent U.S. action. Since Americans were less than enthusiastic about waging war for their own cheap oil, and apathetic about saving lives in Africa, they may reject completely the idea of dying for rich Taiwanese who only recently have begun to move toward democracy. A successful Chinese action there could be just the first of many destabilizing moves Beijing might undertake, regionally or globally.

Kuwait
Iraq serves as another example. One reason for the importance of UN inspections, air strikes, no-fly zones, and like measures is simple: if Iraq were to invade Kuwait again, the United States might do nothing in response. The Clinton Doctrine would force the commander-in-chief to evaluate the realistic assessments of cost, casualties, and outcomes. In Iraq, as elsewhere, the chances for a permanent resolution may be slim, and Americans may not wish to die for Kuwaiti rights. Removing Saddam Hussein solves the problem only until the next "mad man" takes over there or elsewhere.

A PRECARIOUS FUTURE?
A successful challenge to American values and commitments by China or Iraq could stand as an example for other leaders, or even for terrorists. The president has said that "America cannot and must not be the world's policeman." However, knowing for sure that Washington has taken off its badge might provoke hostile action.

The Clinton Doctrine, therefore, has shifted the debate away from which issues are of concern to Americans, and onto what costs the country is willing to bear to resolve an international issue. As theorists and practitioners re-examine the international scene in the post-Cold War era, they would do well to keep in mind what appears to be a growing American reluctance to use force. We live in the epoch of individualism. After a century of war and fear, future presidents may take their cue from the Clinton Doctrine, and decide that even a few casualties are a few too many. Such a decision may seem more in line with democratic values in the short term, but it could have dangerous, un-democratic consequences in the future.

ENDNOTES
3. Of the most meaningful is Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Touchstone, 1997).
7. On the Nixon Doctrine, see Lawrence Kaplan, "NATO and the Nixon Doctrine Ten Years Later," Orbis Volume 24, No.1 (Spring 1980): 149-164. Dated as it is, this period piece is still worthwhile as an explanation of the rationale and consequences of the Nixon Doctrine.
10. Ibid.


27. Witness the words of William Perry: “military forces may be appropriate in certain, specific situations, such as when . . . the risk to American service members is minimal.” William J. Perry, Introduction to the Annual Report to Congress 4 March 1996.


34. Among the many studies of the genocide in Rwanda, see Glynne Evans, Responding to Crises in the African Great Lakes, Adelphi Paper No. 311 (New York: Oxford University Press for the Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997).


36. It should also be said that no other Western power intervened to any great extent.

37. Evans suggests that the United States did not intervene because “the nature of the killing was not apparent until late in the day,” Responding to Crises, 71. However, there may have been other, less appealing reasons that the United States refused to intervene in Rwanda. For a critical comparison of the news coverage of Bosnia and Rwanda, see Melissa A. Wall, “A Pernicious New Strain of the Old Nazi Virus and an ‘Orgy of Tribal Slaughter’: A Comparison of US News Magazine Coverage of the Crises in Bosnia and Rwanda. Wall shows how the two events were portrayed differently in the press. While her overall point has merit, Wall does not adequately deal with the complex relationship among public opinion, news reporting, and political action. It is, therefore, difficult to conclude based on her work where the fault lies in the differing perceptions, and how this might have influenced policy makers not to intervene in Rwanda.

