## Table of Contents

### Chapter 1  Peace Enforcement in the Balkans

A. Overview .......................................................... 2  
B. Operation Deliberate Force .................................. 3  
C. Dayton Accords ................................................. 7  
D. Operation Allied Force ......................................... 9  
E. Operation Able Sentry ........................................ 18  

### Chapter 2  Enforcing U.N. Sanctions in the Persian Gulf

A. Chronology of Activity ......................................... 26  
B. Maritime Interdiction Operations .............................. 28  
C. No Fly Zones ..................................................... 28  
D. Iraq and UNSCOM ................................................. 29  
E. Operation DESERT FOX ......................................... 31  
F. Forward Presence and Pre-positioning ........................ 31  
G. Cooperation with GCC Allies .................................. 32  

### Chapter 3  Confronting Global Terrorism

A. Khobar Towers and Force Protection Initiatives ............. 36  
B. Bin Laden Attacks and U.S. Response ........................ 42  

### Chapter 4  Asia and Pacific Operations

A. Tension in the Taiwan Straits .................................. 43  
B. Deterring Aggression in Korea .................................. 43  
C. East Timor ....................................................... 44  

### Chapter 5  Caribbean Operations

A. Restoring Democracy in Haiti ................................... 46  
B. Hurricane Mitch and Central American Relief ............... 56  

### Chapter 6  African Military Operations

A. Somalia ............................................................ 57  
B. Rwanda Relief Operations ...................................... 59  
C. The President's Visit to Africa ................................ 60  
D. Relief Operations in Mozambique .............................. 61  
E. Peacekeeping Operations in Sierra Leone .................... 61  

### Chapter 7  Y2K Preparations .................................... 64  

### Chapter 8  Counter-Drug Operations ............................ 85
CHAPTER 1: PEACE ENFORCEMENT IN THE BALKANS

REGIONAL BACKGROUND/OVERVIEW

In the aftermath of World War II, Yugoslavia emerged as a Communist state united under the leadership of Josip Tito. The new Communist government developed an independent line from Moscow, and never became a member of the Soviet bloc. Tito addressed the challenge of rising nationalism by arranging a federal system of ethnically based republics that divided the largest group, the Serbs, to prevent them from dominating the country. In the 1974 Yugoslav constitution, the final version of this plan was outlined. There were to be six republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia) and two autonomous provinces within Serbia (Vojvodina and Kosovo). The autonomous provinces had nearly as much self-governing authority as the republics did, and all eight had a vote on the Federal Presidential Council.

With the death of Tito in 1980, nationalistic forces previously suppressed stirred passions within the various ethnic factions. A political stalemate at the federal level and rising financial difficulties (the national debt in 1989 was $18 billion with 2500% inflation) were the primary catalysts for the eventual destruction of the former Yugoslavia. In his quest for a “greater Serbia,” Slobodan Milosevic emerged as one of the leaders of post-Tito Yugoslavia. His speech in June 1989 at the battlefield site of Gazimestan (outside of the Kosovar capital, Pristina), given at a celebration of the six-hundredth anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, served to illustrate his position as a Serb nationalist bent on bringing all Serbs into one state. Since his rise to power in 1987, Milosevic had succeeded in orchestrating the ouster of party leaderships in Kosovo and Vojvodina, the two autonomous provinces (the ousted leaders were replaced with loyal Milosevic supporters). As a result, Milosevic was able to strip Kosovo of its autonomy as established in the 1974 constitution. A similar coup was carried out in Montenegro in the beginning of 1989, giving Serbia control of 4 of the 8 votes on the Yugoslav Federal Presidential Council.

Fearing domination, the Slovenes were the first to declare their independence (June 1991). In an almost bloodless revolt, commonly referred to as the “10 day war,” the Slovenes gained their independence with little opposition from Milosevic and the Serbs (there were virtually no Serbs living in Slovenia). Croatia followed suit, declaring its independence later that month. The Yugoslav Army was much more successful in Croatia, due to the support of the sizeable Serb minority living there. In September 1991, Macedonia also declared their independence. While the war continued in Croatia, the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, fearful of a Yugoslav government controlled by Serbia (without Croatia and Slovenia), opted for a referendum on the issue of succession. Boycotted by the Bosnian Serb minority, the referendum was overwhelmingly passed in February 1992. On 3 March 1992, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence, and was recognized by the West in April of that year. From this point on until late 1995, Bosnia would be ravaged by war.

As the conflict developed, it quickly became apparent to the international community that extensive political and diplomatic efforts would not end it. In the face of a growing humanitarian crisis, it became evident that diplomacy would not be effective unless it was backed by the credible threat of force and the political will to use that force. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and United States (US) involvement in Bosnia during the conflict developed in piecemeal fashion, starting in 1992 with maritime and then air operations (Operation Deliberate Force), and culminating in December 1995 with the deployment of the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR). All NATO deployments during the conflict were in support of resolutions from the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Over time, the role of NATO shifted from that of a 'subcontractor' to the UN to a more active participant in shaping its own missions and mandates.

OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE

Background

Although initiated in response to the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) shelling of the Sarajevo market place on 28 Aug 95, Operation DELIBERATE FORCE was the culmination of events and related planning over a long period. The warring factions' disregard for UN mandates regarding safe areas and heavy weapons exclusion zones (EZs), targeting of NATO and UN aircraft and ground forces, and increased factional fighting during the fall and winter of 1994, dictated prudent military contingency planning. Key events during this period:

- Ministers of Defense met informally in Seville to discuss proposals for more timely and effective use of NATO airpower (Sep 94);
- Several meetings of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and meetings between NATO and UN representatives took place resulting in agreement on revised standards for the application of NATO airpower (Oct 94);
- NATO airstrike on Udbina airfield in Krajina Serb-held Croatia in response to attacks by fighters from that airfield on the Bihac Safe Area (Nov 94);
- NATO airstrikes on surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites in northwest Bosnia-Herzegovina (B-H) in response to attacks from those sites on NATO aircraft (Nov 94); and,
- NAC decisions expanding authorization to respond to the air defense threat to NATO aircraft (Nov-Dec 94).

As a result of these events, two plans were formulated: Operation Dead Eye and Operation Deliberate Force:
• "DEAD EYE" - an air protection plan to disrupt the integrated air defense system (IADS) in Bosnia and thus reduce the risk to NATO aircraft flying over B-H. DEAD EYE targets included:
  - Key air defense communications nodes;
  - Air defense command and control facilities;
  - Early warning radar sites;
  - Known surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites; and,
  - SAM support facilities.

• "DELIBERATE FORCE" - an air attack plan to reduce military capability to threaten or attack safe areas and UN forces. "DELIBERATE FORCE" targets included:
  - Fielded forces/heavy weapons;
  - Command and control facilities;
  - Direct and essential military support facilities; and,
  - Supporting infrastructure/lines of communication.

Detailed planning and refinement continued as events escalated through the spring and summer of 1995 following the expiration of the Carter cease-fire (Dec 94-Mar 95).

Key events:

• "Dual-key" NATO airstrikes on Pale ammunition storage depot, 25-26 May 95, in response to:
  - BSA artillery fire into Sarajevo from UN-monitored weapons collection points near Sarajevo; and,
  - BSA removal of weapons from weapons collection points and continued shelling of the safe area.
• BSA take UN hostages as a response to NATO airstrikes;
• BSA shoot-down a NATO F-16, 2 Jun 95;
• BSA overrun the Srebrenica Safe Area, 11 Jul 95; and,
• BSA lay siege to the Zepa Safe Area in mid-July (Zepa falls 26 Jul 95).

At the London Conference on 21 July 95, ministers agreed that "an attack on Gorazde will be met by substantial and decisive airpower." NAC decisions of 25 July and 1 Aug 95 specified that further Bosnian Serb offensive action must be met with a firm and rapid response with the "aim of deterring attacks on safe areas and responding, if necessary, through the timely and effective use of airpower...until attacks on or threats to the safe areas have ceased."

A graduated NATO air operation would be triggered by: "Any concentration of forces and/or heavy weapons, and the conduct of other military preparations which, in the common judgement of the NATO and UN military commanders, presents a direct threat to the safe areas," or "Direct attacks (e.g. ground, shelling, or aircraft) on the safe areas."
Operation DELIBERATE FORCE was briefed by Admiral Smith and Lt Gen Ryan to the Honorable Willie Claes, NATO Secretary General, and General Joulwan, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), on 3 Aug 95. A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed by Admiral Smith and Lt Gen Janvier, Force Commander UN Protection Force (FC UNPF), which contained the joint UN-NATO arrangements for implementing the actions specified in the NAC and UN Security Council decisions (10 Aug 95).

Consistent with the MOU, and following coordination with Lt Gen Smith, Commander, UN Protection Force (COMD UNPROFOR), Lt Gen Ryan, Commander, Air Forces South (COMAIRSOUTH), briefed the concept of operations for Operation DELIBERATE FORCE and obtained agreement in principle from Commander in Chief South (CINCOUTH) and FC UNPF for both the operation and associated targets (14 Aug 95). Additionally, in accordance with the MOU, an Air-Land Coordination Document was developed by COMAIRSOUTH, the NATO air component commander, COMD UNPROFOR in Sarajevo, and Maj Gen David Pennyfather at the Rapid Reaction Force Operational Staff Headquarters in Kiseljak, specifying the necessary operational details of joint/combined operations.

Execution (all times Central European Time)

COMAIRSOUTH directed the Commander of the Fifth Air Task Force (COMFIVETAF), Lt Gen Fornasiero, to launch NATO forces with an execution time planned for not earlier than 0200 on 30 Aug 95. On 30 Aug 95, the initial strike package cleared "feet dry" into Bosnia-Herzegovina from the Adriatic at 0140 by the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) Director, Maj Gen Homburg. The first bomb impacted at 0212. Strike packages attacked IADS targets in southeast B-H followed by 5 waves of strikes on targets in the vicinity of Sarajevo. Around the clock coverage was provided by combat air patrol (CAP), air refueling (AAR), NATO airborne early warning (NAEW), airborne battlefield command, control and communications (ABCCC), and electronic intelligence/surveillance (ELINT/ESM) aircraft.

At 1716, EBRO 33, a French Mirage 2000K was shot down by a man-portable surface-to-air missile, 20 nautical miles southeast of Pale; two good chutes were observed; efforts to locate and rescue the downed aircrew continued around the clock, supported by a wide variety of NATO and national assets, for the duration of DELIBERATE FORCE.

On 31 Aug 95, three strike packages attacked targets in the Sarajevo area. The majority of targets were IADS nodes, ammo depots and equipment storage and maintenance facilities. A 24-hour suspension of air strikes beginning at 0400, 1 Sep 95 was requested by COMD UNPROFOR in support of negotiation efforts.

On 1 Sep 95, the request for a 24-hour suspension of air strikes was honored and planned strike packages were placed on ground alert status. On 2 Sep 95, the 24-hour
suspension was extended for an undetermined period while diplomatic solutions were pursued. The suspension of airstrikes was then extended to 2300, 4 Sep 95 by FC UNPF. Negotiations were unsuccessful and at 1000 on 5 Sep 95, in coordination with the UN, NATO airstrikes resumed. The air strike plan continued with the introduction of re-strike targets identified through the battle damage assessment process as requiring additional attacks to achieve the desired level of destruction.

On 6 Sep 95, continuing efforts to locate and rescue the downed French aircrew resulted in acquisition of ground indications (imagery) which justified the launch of a pre-planned reconnaissance mission. A NATO helo-borne search and rescue reconnaissance mission was launched in early morning hours, but was turned back by poor weather. On 7 Sep 95, a second helo-borne reconnaissance mission to locate and rescue the French aircrew was launched and an extensive search conducted, but dense ground fog impeded efforts. Finally on 8 Sep 95, a third helo-borne reconnaissance mission to locate and rescue the French aircrew was executed and weather was good but a thorough search of the area was performed without result. The mission came under attack from small arms fire; escorting gunship and fighter aircraft provided suppressing fire.

Efforts to locate and rescue the downed French aircrew continued until 28 Sep 95 when French authorities informed CINCSOUTH of their conviction that the French aircrew had been “recovered alive and taken into custody by the Bosnian Serbs.” CINCSOUTH indicated “while search and rescue efforts have been suspended for the present, he is prepared to resume search missions or initiate recovery efforts at any time they are deemed necessary.”

On 9 Sep 95, reports of possible BSA vehicles moving out of Sarajevo late at night resulted in a temporary suspension of airstrikes against targets in the immediate vicinity of Sarajevo. On 10 Sep 95, COMD UNPROFOR requested suspension of strikes on targets in the immediate vicinity of Sarajevo to assess BSA intentions to remove heavy weapons - strike packages were re-planned for targets outside the Sarajevo area. At 1425, UN requested CAS support following BSA shelling of UN positions near the Tuzla airport; three flights of fighters supported the CAS request; two command bunkers and an artillery position were identified, targeted and successfully engaged.

On 14 Sep 95, at 0930, all missions except AEW and AAR were put on three hour alert due to continued poor weather. Offensive operations were suspended at 2200 in response to an FC UNPF letter to CINCSOUTH; representatives of the warring factions had agreed to the conditions set out in the UN-brokered Framework Agreement:

- Cease all offensive operations within the Sarajevo exclusion zone;
- Remove heavy weapons from the exclusion zone within 144 hours;
- Unimpeded road access to Sarajevo;
- Sarajevo Airport opened for unrestricted use; and,
- Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and BSA commanders meet to formalize a cessation of hostilities agreement.
The initial suspension would last 72 hours (until 17 Sep 95). Compliance with initial conditions would result in an additional 72-hour suspension after which UN/NATO would review progress toward full compliance with the Framework Agreement (20 Sep 95). On 20 Sep 95, UN/NATO agreed that DELIBERATE FORCE objectives were met, the mission was accomplished and end states were achieved (safe areas no longer threatened or under attack). Adm Smith and Gen Janvier therefore agreed that "the resumption of air strikes is currently not necessary."

DAYTON PEACE ACCORD AND IFOR/SFOR

The Bosnian war was finally brought to an end with the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in November 1995. The Accords included a number of compliance requirements (both civilian and military). These requirements would form the framework for the subsequent deployment of NATO military troops and the overall engagement of the international community. The NATO Implementation Force (IFOR - Operation Joint Endeavor) was deployed in December 1995. Dayton partitioned the country into two entities: the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska and the Bosniak (Muslim)/Croat-populated Federation. A 4 kilometer-wide Zone of Separation (ZOS) separated the entities. In line with the requirements outlined in the Dayton Accords, IFOR successfully achieved the following:

- Cessation of hostilities;
- Withdrawal of entity forces from the zone of separation (ZOS);
- Withdrawal of forces/heavy weapons to cantonment areas;
- General demobilization of forces - diminished threat of military confrontation;
- Guarantee IFOR's Freedom of Movement;
- Withdrawal of foreign forces; and
- Establishment of Joint Military Commissions.

US involvement in the Balkans peaked with the employment of 20,000 deployed military personnel in 1996 in support of IFOR. In December 1996, IFOR's mandate expired and, under the direction of UN Security Council Resolution 1088, the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR - Operation Joint Guard) replaced it. In a slight transition from the mission of the Implementation Force, SFOR's role became one of sustaining peace and stability through the deterrence of hostilities, as well as assisting in selected areas of civil implementation. SFOR was also responsible for continuing to enforce compliance with military aspects of the Dayton Peace Accords. The force carried out this aspect of the mission by patrolling the ZOS, monitoring the military of the former warring factions through oversight of their movement and training, and enforcement of the Bosnian no-fly zone. SFOR was -- and remains -- explicitly prohibited from engaging in training of civil police units, guaranteeing the movement of individuals or minority returns, enforcing arms control agreements, and proactively seeking the apprehension of
persons indicted for war crimes (although criminals could be detained if SFOR encountered them during the course of normal operations). SFOR’s mandate would have expired after 18 months on 20 June 1998.

With the 15 June 1998 approval of UN Security Council Resolution 1174, SFOR’s mandate was extended. Although the name of the operation changed from Operation Joint Guard to Operation Joint Forge, the mission of the follow-on force (still known as SFOR) remained the same—to sustain peace and stability. Perhaps the greatest change, at least for the US, was a reduction in deployed troop strength. Whereas the original SFOR had on the order of 8,500 deployed US military personnel, SFOR II dropped to below a force cap of 6,900. This change was made possible through mission efficiencies realized because of two and one-half years of experience. Mission accomplishment, environment, and force protection were the key variables considered in the decision to draw down. In August 1998, the Multinational Specialized Unit was first employed. This force, under the overall command of SFOR, is trained and equipped to deal with crowd control and civil disturbance. They expertly bridge the gap that has existed between the capabilities of the unarmed International Police Task Force and the military strengths of SFOR. Their expertise was first called to action at the beginning of October 1998 in the small town of Capljina, with results lauded by the SFOR commander.

In December 1998, NATO Allied nations endorsed the implementation of reductions in the force structure of the NATO-led Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The efficiency reductions, completed by spring 1999, resulted from an analysis of the current SFOR mission, its key military and supporting tasks, and six months experience of operating under Operation Joint Forge. They did not, however, signal a change in the SFOR mission; nor have they affected SFOR’s ability to support implementation of the Dayton Accords. Overall SFOR reductions totaled approximately 10.9 percent of the total force structure. In line with this, the Department of Defense reduced US forces operating in Bosnia from 6,900 to approximately 6,200. As noted above, the SFOR II troop level of 6,900 represented a 20 percent reduction from the 8,500 US troops deployed in June 1998 and was 66 percent less than the peak US deployment of 20,000 troops in 1996. This change in US force structure was realized through reductions in personnel at the headquarters level, reductions in the manning of the operational reserve, and reductions in the force manning required at Multi-National Division North (Task Force Eagle). In addition to these short-term reductions, NATO approved a plan for more robust SFOR restructuring in October 1999, based on the concept of operational flexibility while still maintaining the lead-nation concept in each sector. This further reduction in force size (total SFOR manning is in the range of 19,000 personnel, with a US component cap of 4,600) was accomplished through normal troop rotations in April 2000.

After nearly five years of a NATO-led military presence in Bosnia, the overall focus of the mission of SFOR has evolved. While the military mission has achieved great success, the civil implementation aspects of Dayton must receive focused attention and
energy from the international community. The continuing role of SFOR is to deter the renewed outbreak of hostility and civil unrest, and to reinforce the tenets of the Dayton Agreement toward creating the environment enabling NATO forces and the international community to work toward the desired "end state" – a self-sustaining peace not requiring the presence of a NATO-led multinational force.

OPERATION ALLIED FORCE (KOSOVO AIR OPERATION) AND KFOR

The situation in Kosovo began to deteriorate sharply in early March 1998 when Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) security forces launched a series of strikes to crackdown on the growing Kosovar insurgent movement known as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). During the crackdown, FRY Interior Ministry security units (MUP Special Police) used excessive force, destroying homes and villages and terrorizing the civilian population. Belgrade's crackdown caused the ranks of the KLA to swell from roughly 200 to over 2,000 core fighters. Moreover, thousands more Kosovars joined local militias. By mid-summer, the KLA controlled 30-40 percent of Kosovo. Belgrade responded by launching a major summer offensive that involved not only Ministry of Interior Special Police (MUP) but also the FRY Army (VJ).

Due to the potential for spillover of the Kosovo fighting into Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and the surrounding region, the conflict began receiving considerable international attention in the spring of 1998. On 31 March, the United Nations adopted Security Council Resolution 1160, condemning the excessive use of force by Serbian security forces against civilians in Kosovo, and also established an embargo of arms and material against the FRY. The US dispatched Ambassadors Richard Holbrooke and Robert Gelbard to Belgrade and Pristina on several occasions to press for ceasefire and peace settlement negotiations. In May 1998, Ambassador Holbrooke was able to arrange the first meeting between FRY President Milosevic and Dr. Rugova, the leader of the shadow government in Kosovo. Milosevic and Rugova met once in May to lay the groundwork for peace talks. Although Milosevic did appoint a negotiating team that participated in preliminary talks in Pristina, the dialogue process quickly broke down following a deliberate Serb offensive in Decani where several dozen Kosovar Albanians were killed. Later that month, Ambassador Gelbard met with KLA representatives in Geneva, Switzerland, and Ambassador Chris Hill, the US Ambassador to Macedonia, was designated as the US Special Envoy to Kosovo. Ambassador Hill began shuttle diplomacy between Belgrade and Pristina in an attempt to negotiate a peaceful, political settlement to the crisis. In late May, the European Union named the Austrian Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Wolfgang Petritsch, as its envoy to Kosovo.

Meanwhile, US Ambassador to the FYROM, Chris Hill, worked behind the scenes with both parties in order to get agreement on talks. The lack of unity among the Kosovars significantly hampered his efforts, which continued throughout the summer. For the most part, diplomatic interventions bore little fruit during the spring and summer with one significant exception. On 16 June, Milosevic, in talks with Russian President Yeltsin, agreed to grant access to diplomatic observers – the Kosovo Diplomatic
Observer Mission (KDOM). From its establishment in early July, KDOM proved to be an invaluable tool for the international community in assessing events on the ground. In late June, Ambassador Holbrooke continued his diplomatic efforts, meeting again with Milosevic in Belgrade and with KLA commanders in the Kosovo village of Junik.

A VJ offensive, which began in July and continued through early October 1998, reopened major lines of communication and dislodged the KLA from its strongholds. In the process, thousands more homes and buildings were destroyed and whole villages fled to the surrounding countryside. At its peak in late 1998, the conflict resulted in nearly 500,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Kosovo and Montenegro, nearly 100,000 of who were believed to be without shelter. Additionally, over 17,000 Kosovars crossed into Northern Albanian. Smaller numbers moved into the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Bosnia. As the FRY’s brutal offensive continued through September and refugee numbers continued to grow, the international community began to fear the potential for a humanitarian catastrophe brought on by winter. On 2 September, during a Clinton-Yeltsin summit meeting, Secretary of State Albright and Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov issued a joint statement on Kosovo calling on Belgrade to end the offensive and for the Kosovar Albanians to engage with Belgrade in negotiations. On 23 September, the United Nations Security Council (with China abstaining) passed Resolution 1199 which called for, among other things, a cease fire, the withdrawal of all FRY security forces, access for non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and humanitarian organizations, and the return home of refugees and the internally displaced.

On 28 September, Milosevic declared victory over the Kosovo insurgency and announced the end of the FRY offensive. However, intelligence reporting indicated continued fighting in several areas and no significant changes to FRY security force deployments. On 1 October, the NAC issued an Activation Request (ACTREQ) for two air options. Four days later, UN Secretary General Koffi Annan released a highly critical UNSC report on FRY compliance with the provisions of UNSCR 1199. In the wake of this report, the US pushed NATO to issue Activation Orders (ACTORD) for both air options.

While NATO worked toward an ACTORD decision, the US dispatched Ambassador Holbrooke to Belgrade on 5 October to press for FRY full compliance with UNSCR 1199. Holbrooke spent the next seven days in talks with both Milosevic and the Kosovar Albanians. On 12 October, he reported to NATO that Milosevic was prepared to accept a 2,000 man OSCE ground verification presence and a NATO air surveillance mission to monitor FRY compliance with UNSCR 1199. A unilateral statement issued by Serb President Milutinovic on 13 October included a number of key principles that could form the framework of a peace settlement, including substantial autonomy, elections, and a local Kosovar police force.

A 16 October signed agreement between Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Chairman-in-Office Geremek and Yugoslav Foreign Minister Jovanovic paved the way for the creation of the OSCE Kosovo Verification
Mission (KYM). The OSCE Mission was endorsed by the UN Security Council on 24 October (UNSCR 1203) and was established under OSCE Permanent Council decision No. 263 on 25 October 1998. The primary mission of the KVM was to ensure FRY compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions 1160 and 1199. Tasks for this force of approximately 2,000 were to include verifying maintenance of the cease-fire, monitoring movement of forces, providing assistance in the return of refugees and displaced persons, supervising elections, helping in the formation of elected bodies of self-administration and police forces, and the promotion of human rights and democracy building. Regional centers were opened in Gnjilane, Mitrovica, Pec, Pristina, and Prizren. The OSCE KVM was under the leadership of Head of Mission US Ambassador William Walker.

On 21 March, the international community initiated one last diplomatic effort. Ambassador Holbrooke was dispatched to Belgrade to deliver a “final warning” to Milosevic. On 22 March, in response to Belgrade’s continued intransigence and repression, and in view of the evolution of the situation on the ground in Kosovo, the NAC authorized Secretary General Solana to decide, subject to further consultations, on a broader range of air operations if necessary. Ambassador Holbrooke departed Belgrade on 23 March, having received no concessions of any kind from Milosevic. Subsequently, Secretary General Solana directed General Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) to initiate air operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

On 24 March 1999, at approximately 8 p.m., Operation Allied Force began. It was carried out with a broad participation by key allied nations. The strikes were conducted against carefully chosen military targets focused on the air defense network of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Initial reports indicated that these first strikes were successful, and all NATO aircraft returned safely to their bases. The second wave of strikes, on 26 March 99, was canceled due to weather. In the first days of the conflict, two Serbian MIG-29s (carrying air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons) were downed in Bosnia. In Kosovo, FRY repressive operations continued to escalate, with continuing reports of ongoing atrocities directed towards the Kosovar civilian population. The Germans expressed an appeal not to consider further targeting in Montenegro—they stressed the strength of the pro-Western relationship. Spain and Italy supported the Germans, while the Greeks expressed that caution must be exercised and that we must be wary of Montenegro.

On 25 March, the Yugoslav government broke off diplomatic relations with the United States, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. On the ground, 26 March saw an escalation of fighting in Kosovo as Belgrade pressed its effort to destroy the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). There was particularly heavy fighting in the Podujevo, Mitrovica and Prizren/Orahovac areas, and the KLA general staff headquarters was bombed by Yugoslav warplanes. The KLA appeared to be losing ground in those zones, though it claimed it had taken few casualties. Belgrade massed large forces in the Podujevo, Prizren, Mitrovica and Lapusnik areas in preparation for further robust action in the next few days. Unconfirmed reports were received indicating summary executions.
by Serbian security forces in the cities of Pristina, Suva Reka, Srbica, Podujevo and
Djakovica. The fighting produced many more Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) who
were concentrated in the Pagarusa Valley, the Cicavica and Shala Mountains, and near
Orahovac and Prizren. The IDP situation was critical – food supplies were reported to be
very low, and Kosovars were appealing for emergency humanitarian airdrops. Several
ethnic Albanian residential neighborhoods in Pristina were reportedly looted and burned
and many downtown shops owned by ethnic Albanians were looted.

US Soldiers Captured in FYROM

On 31 March, FRY forces captured three US soldiers on patrol in northern Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). A Serb television broadcast carried by
CNN showed all three, one with heavy face bruises. The Department of Defense issued a
press release, identifying the three servicemen as Staff Sgt. Andrew Ramirez, Staff Sgt.
Christopher Stone, and Spec. Steven Gonzales. All three soldiers were assigned to B
Troop, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry of the 1st Infantry Division, stationed in Schweinfurt,
Germany.

The State News Agency Tanjug later reported that the three U.S. soldiers captured
by Yugoslav forces would face military court proceedings. The Tanjug report quoted a
judicial officer in Pristina, the Kosovo capital, as saying that an authorized military court
would conduct the proceedings, which were believed to be the equivalent of a grand jury
hearing that seeks evidence to determine what charges, if any, should be filed. It was
unclear if the proceedings meant a full trial would begin immediately or simply that
military court proceedings would start. These facts were also reported on Serbian radio
B92.

Reports of Serb war crimes in Kosovo – including forced expulsion of the
majority of the ethnic Albanian civilian population, the detention and summary execution
of military-aged men, rapes, and the destruction of civilian housing – continued to
escalate. Serb forces, including Yugoslav Army (VJ) and Serbian Interior Ministry
(MUP) units augmented by armed civilians and para-militaries, engaged in a systematic
effort to deport the Kosovar population from the larger towns and cities. In the provincial
capital of Pristina, where the population was swollen by ethnic Albanians who had fled
the destruction of their homes in the countryside during Serbian attacks over the past
year, the Serbs began to use railroad boxcars to more efficiently transport their victims
out of the cities. Many of these refugees had reported that Serb authorities forced them to
surrender all of their money and sign over title to their property in the guise of
"purchasing" their transportation out of the province. At least 560,000 Kosovar
Albanians – over a quarter of the province's pre-conflict population – had left the
province since the Serb security crackdown that began in March 1998. Over half of these
refugees had been forcibly expelled into neighboring countries in those last two weeks.

There was incontrovertible evidence of widespread burning in residential areas of
most of the larger towns and cities as well as in numerous villages, and it was confirmed
that thousands of dwellings and cultural symbols such as mosques had been torched. The
world had now seen videotape corroboration of at least one of the many massacres reported to have been perpetrated by Serb security forces since 24 March. According to a survivor who later filmed the scene, the ethnic Albanian residents of the village of Velika Krusa were removed from their homes at gunpoint, the men separated from their families, and the approximately one hundred adult males summarily executed at point-blank range. Because the Serbs had expelled international observers and most of the NGOs and journalists from the province, it was difficult to obtain independent corroboration of many of the specific allegations of violations of international humanitarian law reported in Kosovo. Nonetheless, the overwhelmingly consistent nature of the thousands of reports from official observers across the border in Albania and Macedonia, from journalists and NGOs still in contact with their local staff in Kosovo, and from Kosovar Albanians themselves (both refugees and the KLA) painted an unambiguous picture of a continuing campaign of brutal ethnic cleansing by Serbian forces.

International Efforts at Mediation

On 3 April, NATO missiles struck central Belgrade for the first time and destroyed the Yugoslav and Serbian interior ministries. On 6 April, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia declared a unilateral cease-fire to commence at 1200 eastern daylight time (EDT) and last until 1800 EDT 11 April 99. Belgrade claimed that all FRY army and police actions in Kosovo would end and that the government was ready to negotiate with Rugova. NATO rejected the offer, with French President Chirac calling the proposed cease-fire indefensible without a political agreement and security package. At the same time, the North Atlantic Council approved the Concept of Operations and the Operations Plan for Allied Harbor, the NATO humanitarian effort in Albania. On 7 April, acting President of Cyprus Spyros Kyprianou indicated he was going to Belgrade at the invitation of the FRY government to accept custody of the three American servicemen. Kyprianou said that the local FRY Ambassador, accompanied by the resident Russian Ambassador, had visited him at midnight on 6 April to make this offer. Kyprianou had told the FRY and Russian Ambassadors that he would go to Belgrade for "purely humanitarian reasons" and without preconditions in order to bring the three Americans back to Cyprus to convey them to US government custody. Kyprianou had asked the Government of Greece for transportation in and out of Belgrade, and the Greek Charge in Nicosia confirmed a plane would be available to fly the Cypriot acting president in and out of Belgrade the evening of 7 April. Kyprianou asked for US assistance in ensuring safe passage for the aircraft into and out of Serbian airspace. The plan was to spend approximately three hours on the ground on Belgrade, then to depart for Larne. The Greeks were increasingly skeptical that the FRY would let Kyprianou in because of NATO air strikes overnight.

It was also reported that day that FRY military or militia units forced refugees back from the Macedonia border deeper into Kosovo, possibly to use them as human shields from NATO bombing or to try to add credence to Milosevic's call for a cease-fire. The FRY reportedly had closed all three official FRY-Macedonia border posts. NATO Secretary General Solana issued a statement saying that the unilateral cease-fire proposed
by the FRY was "clearly insufficient." Solana said Milosevic must meet the demands of
the international community before a cease-fire could be considered. Norwegian Foreign
Minister and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Chairman-in-
Office Knut Vollebaek, during his visit to Albania on 6 April, had "no faith" in Milosevic
giving in, according to Embassy Tirana. Vollebaek dismissed Milosevic's cease-fire
proposal and said it would be impossible to accept any proposal that did not include the
presence of international troops in Kosovo to guarantee the safe return of refugees.

Acting Cyprus President Kyprianou finally arrived in Belgrade on the evening of
8 April, and was scheduled to meet with President Milosevic the next day. BBC World
reported, however, that FRY Deputy Prime Minister Seselj announced that the three
American prisoners of war would "under no circumstances" be released. Fighting
continued in Kosovo throughout the day on 8 April.

On 10 April, in discussions with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov said that a NATO-led Kosovo
implementation force was "unrealistic" and called for greater UN involvement. Several
days later, Germany unveiled a plan for a 24-hour halt to the airstrikes to give the FRY a
chance to start pulling out of Kosovo. Russian President Yeltsin named former Prime
Minister Chernomyrdin as FRY peace envoy. On 16 April, the NAC approved the
Activation Order for Operation Allied Harbor. In the next week, VJ and Serbian police
broke through KLA lines in the Podujevo area and drove IDPs out of the hills southeast
of Podujevo. KLA sources estimated the number of IDPs to be between 130 and 150
thousand.

On 21 April, it was reported that all EU countries agreed to back a proposed plan
to stop oil product deliveries by or through member states to the FRY. NATO missiles in
Belgrade hit the headquarters of Milosevic's Serbian Socialist Party and his private
residence. On 22 April, at the NATO Summit, alliance nations reaffirmed the conditions
that would bring an end to the air campaign. They also announced an intensification of
the air campaign. The following day, NATO destroyed the Serbian state television
building in central Belgrade, killing at least 10 people. The FRY agreed to conditionally
accept an international military presence in Kosovo after Chernomyrdin-Milosevic talks
in Belgrade. Reports of ethnic cleansing continued to come in.

As the NATO air campaign continued, it was reported that NATO struck an army
barracks in the southern Serbian town of Surdulica on 27 April. Local officials claimed
that 16 missiles were launched, some into a civilian area. Western journalists reported at
least 16 fatalities, including 11 children. According to reporting, NATO admitted that a
2,000-pound bomb had fallen off target. It was reported in Serbian state television that
over 300 homes were destroyed in the raid. They also claim that over 400 civilians have
been killed and 4,000 injured since the strikes began. NATO stated only three of 4,000
bombs had caused civilian casualties. On 30 April, the Reverend Jesse Jackson arrived in
Belgrade and met with the US servicemen that had been held captive by Serb forces for
the past month. Russian envoy Chernomyrdin reported "progress" after 6 hours of talks
with Milosevic in Belgrade. On 1 May, President Clinton extended US sanctions to ban oil sales and freeze Belgrade’s assets in the US Reverend Jackson secured the release of the captured servicemen following a 3-hour meeting with Milosevic. At approximately 2200 local time on 2 May, NATO bombs hit a Serbian power transmission facility at Obrenovac (west of Belgrade). Most Serbian cities, including Belgrade, were without power as a result. Despite China’s protests, NATO’s 13-14 May operations marked a return to more intense bombing of Serbia proper. Planes hit power stations, cutting electricity to Belgrade, Novi Sad, and Nis. FRY President Milosevic’s hometown of Pozarevac was also hit. On 6 May, at the Group of Eight (G-8) meeting in Bonn, the West and Russia announced agreement over the basic strategy to resolve the conflict.

Bombing of the Chinese Embassy

On 7 May, NATO planes accidentally hit the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, killing 3 and wounding 20. The following day, the UN Security Council (UNSC) convened an emergency session to debate the bombing of the Chinese Embassy. China implicitly accused the US and NATO of a deliberate attack while the alliance apologized for a “terrible mistake.” Thousands demonstrated in front of US diplomatic posts in China, and Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov canceled his trip to London in the wake of the attack. On 9 May, President Clinton wrote to Chinese President Jiang Zemin to offer regrets for the bombing, while Chinese demonstrations continued. In the days that followed, Chinese demonstrations continued and China suspended contacts with the US regarding arms control and human rights. At the same time, the Serbs announced a partial withdrawal from Kosovo. The FRY accused NATO of genocide and demanded that the World Court order an immediate end to NATO air strikes. On 11 May, Russian envoy Chernomyrdin met with President Jiang Zemin in Beijing and labeled the Chinese embassy bombing an act of aggression. China hinted that it might hold up Western attempts to achieve a peace deal at the UN unless the bombing stops. NATO disputed FRY claims of a troop withdrawal from Kosovo, countering that FRY military and police had actually stepped up their actions against the KLA.

On 16 May, Italian Prime Minister D’Alema proposed a NATO cease-fire on condition that Russia and China support a UNSC resolution imposing the G-8 terms on Milosevic. The following day, the European Union (EU) announced that Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari would serve as the EU’s new senior Kosovo envoy. The Greeks called for a temporary cease-fire “to give diplomacy a chance.” In the next week, NATO began a bombing campaign of the Yugoslav electricity grid, creating a major disruption of power and water supplies. On 27 May, President Milosevic and four other Serbian leaders were indicted by the UN War Crimes Tribunal (ICTY) for crimes against humanity. The London Times cited unidentified NATO sources as saying the President was considering ground operations in Kosovo with up to 90,000 US combat troops if no peace deal was reached within those next three weeks. The Times said the change followed a briefing from SACEUR General Clark – according to the reporting, a decision was needed by mid-June to ensure refugee returns to Kosovo before winter.
Reaching an Agreement

NATO bombed Serb positions a few dozen meters from the Kosovo-Albanian border on 31 May. Albanian border guards withdrew to avoid being hit by shells. In the middle of the strikes, however, some 30 refugees crossed the border. Milosevic had not yet issued a public statement on the G-8 Kosovo peace plan, but EU envoy Ahtisaari told the press that Milosevic did agree to the plan. Russian envoy Chernomyrdin expressed optimism that peace was at hand. Many Western leaders expressed cautious optimism but said they wanted to see FRY statements put into action. On 1 June, the FRY told Germany that it had accepted the Group of Eight principles for peace and demanded an end to NATO bombing. Several days later, the FRY accepted terms brought to Belgrade by EU envoy Ahtisaari and Russian envoy Chernomyrdin. On 7 June, NATO and Yugoslav commanders failed to agree to terms of pullout from Kosovo and suspended talks. Given the lack of progress, NATO intensified the bombing campaign. At the same time, G-8 Foreign Ministers in Bonn attempted to finalize a draft UN resolution. The FRY insisted that a UN Security Council resolution must be in place before any foreign troops could enter Kosovo.

On 8 June, the West and Russia reached a landmark agreement on a draft UN resolution at the G-8 talks in Cologne. NATO and Serb military delegations resumed Military Technical Agreement (MTA) discussions at the Kumanovo airbase in Macedonia. Three key Serb participants departed after two hours of talks to consult with Belgrade by phone, returning after an hour. Talks continued late into the evening. Pentagon spokesperson Kenneth Bacon said there were signs Serb forces were preparing to withdraw, but troops were not yet moving or assembling for a pullout. Nevertheless, NATO air strikes continued 8 June in Serbia and Kosovo. It was confirmed that B-52 airstrikes in Kosovo near the Albanian border destroyed armor, artillery and vehicles, but press reports of substantial FRY military casualties could not be confirmed. On 9 June, military talks continued with senior NATO and FRY officers. Late in the day, a Military Technical Agreement was signed between the two parties.

On 10 June, after receiving definite evidence that Serb forces were withdrawing from northern Kosovo, Secretary General Solana called for a suspension of NATO airstrikes. In Cologne, G-8 ministers drafted a plan to anchor the Balkans to Western Europe and rebuild Kosovo. That same day, the UN Security Council approved UNSCR 1244. All members of the Security Council approved the resolution except the Chinese, who abstained. On 13 June, UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) relief missions began. On 20 June, in accordance with the 9 June Military Technical Agreement, Serb forces completed their withdrawal from Kosovo, leading NATO Secretary General Javier Solana to officially end NATO's bombing campaign in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Building a Peace in Kosovo
Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council also decided that the political solution to the crisis would be based on the general principles adopted on 6 May by the Foreign Ministers of the G-8 and the principles contained in the paper presented in Belgrade by Ahtisaari and Chernomyrdin (accepted by Belgrade on 3 June). Both documents were included as annexes to the Resolution. The principles included, among others, an immediate and verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo; the withdrawal of the military, police and paramilitary forces of the FRY; deployment of effective international and security presence, with substantial NATO participation in the security presence and unified command and control; establishment of an interim administration; the safe and free return of all refugees; a political process providing for substantial self-government, as well as the demilitarization of the KLA; and a comprehensive approach to the economic development of the crisis region.

**KFOR**

The Security Council authorized member states and relevant international organizations to establish the international security presence, and decided that its responsibilities would include deterring renewed hostilities, demilitarizing the KLA and establishing a secure environment for the return of refugees and in which the international civil presence could operate. The Security Council also authorized the UN Secretary General to establish the international civil presence and requested him to appoint a Special Representative to control its implementation. Following the adoption of UNSCR 1244, Lieutenant General Sir Mike Jackson of the United Kingdom, acting on the instructions of NATO’s North Atlantic Council, made immediate preparations for the rapid deployment of the security force (KFOR – Operation Joint Guardian), mandated by the United Nations Security Council. The first elements of KFOR entered Kosovo on 12 June. As agreed to in the Military Technical Agreement, the deployment of the security force (KFOR) was synchronized with the departure of Serb security forces from Kosovo. By 20 June, the Serb withdrawal was complete and KFOR was well established in Kosovo.

At its full strength, KFOR comprised some 50,000 personnel. It is a multinational force under unified command and control with substantial NATO participation. NATO forces were at the forefront of the humanitarian efforts to relieve the suffering of the many thousands of refugees forced to flee Kosovo by the Serbian ethnic cleansing campaign. In the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, NATO troops built refugee camps, refugee reception centers and emergency feeding stations, and moved many hundreds of tons of humanitarian aid to those in need. In Albania, NATO deployed substantial forces to provide similar forms of assistance. NATO assisted the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) with co-ordination of humanitarian aid flights, and supplemented these flights by using aircraft from member countries. The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC), established at NATO in May 1998, also played an important role in the coordination of support to UNHCR relief operations.
OPERATION ABLE SENTRY

Task Force Able Sentry

Task Force Able Sentry (TFAS), a US Army force attached to the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP), was established 12 July 1993 to monitor and report activity along the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)/Serbia border area which could undermine confidence and stability or threaten the territory of FYROM. UNPREDEP was established as a peacekeeping operation under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, and UNPREDEP operations in FYROM are conducted under UN auspices. The headquarters of the US task force, Camp Able Sentry, is located near the FYROM capital of Skopje. There are 27 countries participating in UNPREDEP with the majority of troops coming from the United States, Finland, Indonesia, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden.

The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was the largest, most expensive and most complex peace operation in the history of the United Nations. The Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia is the most southern of the six former republics of Yugoslavia. It shares borders with Albania, Kosovo, Greece, the Former Republic of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The FYROM declared its independence in late 1991. When ethnic armed conflict broke out in the other five former Yugoslav states, FYROM President Gligorov and the United Nations became concerned that spillover fighting from warring factions to the north would move into the FYROM. On 11 November 1992, the President of Macedonia conveyed to the Secretary-General a request for the deployment of United Nations observers in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in view of his concern about the possible impact on it of fighting elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia.

On 9 December, the Secretary General submitted to the Council a report in which he recommended an expansion of the mandate and strength of UNPROFOR to establish a United Nations presence on Macedonia's borders with Albania and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). He indicated that the force's mandate would be essentially preventive, to monitor and report any developments in the border areas which could undermine confidence and stability in Macedonia and threaten its territory. The Secretary General recommended that the enlargement of UNPROFOR comprise an estimated battalion of up to 700 all ranks, 35 military observers, 26 civilian police monitors, 10 civil affairs staff, 45 administrative staff and local interpreters. This contingent would operate under UNPROFOR's "Macedonia Command" with headquarters in Skopje, the capital of Macedonia. The Security Council, by its resolution 795 (1992) of 11 December, approved the Secretary General's report and authorized the establishment of UNPROFOR's presence in Macedonia.

In February 1993, the UN deployed a Nordic Battalion, consisting of Finnish, Swedish and Norwegian troops. In March 1993, the UN Preventive Deployment Command became operation with a force of approximately 700 soldiers on the FYROM's
northern and northwestern border stretching from Bulgaria to Albania. In May 1993, the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the US articulated support for the UNPREDEP by considering the deployment of US military forces to the FYROM.

On 31 March 1995, the Security Council decided to restructure UNPROFOR, replacing it with three separate but inter-linked peacekeeping operations. Security Council Resolution 983 of 31 March 1995 changed the name of UNPROFOR within the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP).

UNPREDEP is divided into two sectors, the Nordic Battalion, primarily bordering Albania and Kosovo, and the US Battalion, primarily bordering the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. United States Reserve, National Guard and active-duty service members as well as Department of Defense civilians have participated in this United Nations peackeeping effort.

Initial TFAS operations began 16 July 1993. A 30-day orientation and training period began that taught TFAS soldiers UN Peacekeeping Operation procedures. In August 1993 TFAS moved forward and occupied Observation Points (OPs) 55 and 56 on the FRY-FYROM border and began patrolling on 21 August 1993. During the second rotation of soldiers to the TFAS mission, the US Secretary of Defense approved the deployment of an additional tailored reinforced company with necessary command elements (approximately 200 personnel) to assume sector responsibilities for departing Nordic Units.

In January 1997, Task Force 2-37 Armor received a very short notice alert to deploy to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in support of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force. Since assuming the mission in March of 1997, the soldiers of the Iron Duke Task Force conducted operations in response to the implosion in Albania and tense confrontations with Serb patrols in March 1997, including an increasing number of patrols in July, culminating in the the mission to their replacements in late August and September 1997.

TFAS is a battalion with a headquarters and headquarters company, up to four line companies, scouts, mortars, engineers, aviators and appropriate support elements. Battalions are deployed to the FYROM for 179-day rotations. The battalion's mission is to monitor and report activity on the FYROM/FRY border. To accomplish this, there are forward operations in the vicinity of the border. Each observation post is manned around the clock. Mounted, dismounted and/or community patrols are conducted daily from each OP. TFAS has also established company command posts which allow for forward command and control of operations. The main base camp itself, Camp Able Sentry, is located adjacent to the airport near Petrovec.
Perhaps the most publicly visible aspect of Able Sentry has been the legal and political controversy surrounding Specialist Michael New, who refused to don the insignia of the United Nations when he was ordered to deploy as part of the operation. The Army court martialed the volunteer-soldier for disobeying an order, and the case is on appeal.

UN Preventative Deployment Force

Established on 31 March 1995 to replace the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The mandate of UN Preventative Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) remained essentially the same: to monitor and report any developments in the border areas which could undermine confidence and stability in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and threaten its territory. Effective 1 February 1996, following the termination of the mandates of UNPROFOR, UNPREDEP became an independent mission, reporting directly to United Nations Headquarters in New York. Despite its new status, the operation maintained basically the same mandate, strength and composition of troops. In conjunction with its major tasks of monitoring and reporting on the situation along the borders with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Albania, the military component of UNPREDEP cooperated with civilian agencies and offered ad hoc community services and humanitarian assistance to the local population. By the end of 1995, UNPREDEP operated 24 permanent observation posts along a 420-kilometer stretch on the Macedonian side of the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Albania. It also operated 33 temporary observation posts. Close to 40 border and community patrols were conducted daily, and United Nations military observers (UNMO’s) complemented the work of the battalions.


By adopting resolution 1186/1998 on 21 July 1998, the Security Council reaffirmed its commitment to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and decided to authorize an increase in the troop strength of UNPREDEP up to 1,050 and to extend the mandate of UNPREDEP for a period of six months until 28 February 1999, to continue deterring threats and preventing clashes, to monitor the border areas, and to report to the Secretary General any developments which could pose a threat to the host country. The force was also charged
with monitoring and reporting on illicit arms flows and other activities that were prohibited under the Council's 4 December 1997 resolution 1160(1998).

UNPREDEP maintained close cooperation with the OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje and the European Commission Monitoring Mission in FYROM. It also established a working relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Kosovo Verification Coordination Centre and the NATO Extraction Force deployed in the host country (S/1999/161). The functions of the Force came to an end on 28 February 1999, when the Security Council, on 25 February 1999 (Press Release SC/6648), did not adopt draft resolution S/1999/201 [S/PV.3982], thereby not renewing the mandate of UNPREDEP due to the veto of China, a permanent Member of the Council.

APPENDIX 1: OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE
SUMMARY DATA

Total sorties flown: 3515
   Penetrating sorties (CAS, BAI, SEAD, RECCE, SAR/CSAR): 2470
   Support sorties (NAEW, ABCCC, ELINT/ESM, AAR): 1045
Total bombs dropped: 1026
   Precision munitions: 708
   Non-precision munitions: 318
Airstrikes were conducted on eleven days during the period 29 Aug - 14 Sep 95
   48 target complexes
   338 individual targets within target complexes

Aircraft Assigned To NATO For Operation “Deliberate Force”:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mirage F-1 CT</td>
<td>Istrana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mirage F-1 CR</td>
<td>Istrana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Jaguar</td>
<td>Istrana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Mirage 2000C</td>
<td>Cervia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Mirage 2000D</td>
<td>Cervia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mirage 2000K</td>
<td>Cervia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Super Entendard</td>
<td>Foch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>E-3F</td>
<td>Avord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>C-135FR</td>
<td>Istres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Puma</td>
<td>Brindisi/Split</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>ECR Tornado</td>
<td>Piacenza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Tornado</td>
<td>Piacenza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Tornado</td>
<td>Ghedi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>AMX</td>
<td>Istrana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Boeing 707</td>
<td>Pisa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation</td>
<td>Aircraft Type</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Tanker</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>C-130</td>
<td>Pisa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>G-222</td>
<td>Pisa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>E-3A</td>
<td>Geilenkirchen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>E-3A</td>
<td>Trapani/Prevesa</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>F-16A</td>
<td>Villafranca</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>EF-18A</td>
<td>Aviano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>KC-130</td>
<td>Aviano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CASA 212</td>
<td>Vicenza</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>F-16C</td>
<td>Ghedi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>GR-7</td>
<td>Gioia del Colle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>FMK-3</td>
<td>Gioia del Colle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>L-1011</td>
<td>Palermo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>FA-2</td>
<td>Invincible</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>E-3D</td>
<td>Aviano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>F-16C</td>
<td>Ghedi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>O/A-10A</td>
<td>Aviano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>F-15E</td>
<td>Aviano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>F/A-18D</td>
<td>Aviano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>F-16C</td>
<td>Aviano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>EA-6B</td>
<td>Aviano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>F-16C(HTS)</td>
<td>Aviano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>EC-130H</td>
<td>Aviano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>EC-130E</td>
<td>Aviano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>AC-130H</td>
<td>Brindisi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>KC-135</td>
<td>Pisa/Istres</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>KC-10</td>
<td>Genova</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>MH-53J</td>
<td>Brindisi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>MD/HC-130P</td>
<td>Brindisi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>F-18C</td>
<td>USS T. Roosevelt/America</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>EF-111A</td>
<td>Aviano</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional Non-NATO Forces Supporting Operation "Deliberate Force":

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Mirage IV</td>
<td>Mont de Marsan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>U-2R</td>
<td>RAF Fairford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F-14</td>
<td>USS T. Roosevelt/America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P-3C</td>
<td>NAS Sigonella</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RC-135</td>
<td>RAF Mildenhall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>E-2</td>
<td>USS T. Roosevelt/America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S-3</td>
<td>USS T. Roosevelt/America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role</td>
<td>Total Sorties</td>
<td>Percentage of Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEAD</td>
<td>785</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS/BAI</td>
<td>1372</td>
<td>39.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECCE</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPPORT</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>3515</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Precision Munitions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type Munition</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LGB/GBU 10</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGB/GBU 12</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGB/GBU 16</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGB/GBU 24</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGB/GBU AS30L</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGB/GBU TOTAL</td>
<td>653</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EO/IR SLAM GUIDED MISSILE  10
EO/IR GBU-15 GUIDED MISSILE  9
EO/IR MAVRICK GUIDED MISSILE  23
EO/IR TOTAL  42

TLAM  13

GRAND TOTAL  708

Non-Precision Munitions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE MUNITION</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MK 82</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK 83</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MK 84</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBU-87</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAND TOTAL</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other Munitions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE MUNITION</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GUN/CANNON (20MM)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUN/CANNON (30MM)</td>
<td>10086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUN/CANNON (40MM)</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUN/CANNON (105MM)</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAND TOTAL GUN/CANNON</td>
<td>10486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.75 ROCKETS</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGM-88 HARM</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Weapon Descriptions:

GBU-10: 2000 lb laser guided bomb
GBU-12: 500 lb laser guided bomb
GBU-16: 1000 lb laser guided bomb
GBU-24: 2000lb laser guided bomb
AS30L: Laser guided air-to-surface missile
SLAM: Electro-optical Standoff Land Attack Missile
GBU-15: 2000 lb TV / Infrared guided bomb
Maverick: Electro-optical / infrared guided air-to-surface missile
MK82: 500 lb general purpose bomb
MK83: 1000 lb general purpose bomb
MK84: 2000 lb general purpose bomb
CBU-87: Combined Effects Munition
AGM88: High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile
TLAM: Tomahawk Land Attack Missile

Cannon:
20MM: 20 millimeter air-to-air or air-to-surface projectile
30MM: 30 millimeter air-to-surface projectile
40MM: 40 millimeter air-to-surface projectile
105MM: 105 millimeter air-to-surface projectile

For additional information, contact:
Public Information Office
AFSOUTH
Viale della Liberazione - 80124 ITALY

Telephone: (+39) (081) 721 2437/2235
Fax: (+39) (081) 721 2973
EMAIL: pio@afsouth.nato.int
CHAPTER 2
ENFORCING UN RESOLUTIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF

In the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War and throughout the Clinton-Gore administration, Iraq consistently refused to abide by international norms and was the subject of numerous United Nations Security Council (USNC) Resolutions. The Department of Defense played a major role in enforcing those resolutions to include participation in Maritime Interception Operations (MIO), enforcement of the No-Fly-Zones, and support to the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) and its follow-on organization the United Nations Monitoring and Verification Commission (UNMOVIC).


1993
In January, the United States accuses Saddam Hussein of moving missiles into southern Iraq. Iraq refuses to remove the missiles. Allied planes and ships attack the anti-aircraft missile sites and a nuclear facility near Baghdad. In June, following the discovery of a plot to assassinate former President George Bush, U.S. ships fire cruise missiles at the Iraqi intelligence headquarters in Baghdad.

1994
Saddam Hussein moves Iraqi troops to the Kuwaiti border. He threatens to cease cooperation with UNSCOM. The forces withdraw after the United States deploys a carrier group, warplanes and 54,000 troops to the Persian Gulf region. UN approves Resolution 949 and demands withdrawal of Iraqi troops deployed to border area. United States establishes a no reinforcement zone below 32°N in southern Iraq. Iraq subsequently formally recognized Kuwait and UN border demarcation in compliance with Resolution 833.

1995
Saddam’s two son-in-laws defect to Jordan. One of the defectors, Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel Hassan, was responsible for Iraq’s arms industry including biological and chemical weapons programs. His revelations prompted Iraq to admit that its biological weapons program was more extensive than previously acknowledged and included the production of the nerve agent VX. UNSC adopts Resolution 986 offering Iraq another opportunity to export petroleum products and to use proceeds to meet humanitarian needs.

1996
In August, Saddam Hussein sends forces into northern Iraq and captures the city of Irbil, a key city inside the Kurdish haven established above the 36th parallel in 1991. The following month, U.S. ships and airplanes attack military targets in Iraq in response to the Iraqi military moves and President Clinton extends the southern NFZ to just south
of Baghdad. On 31 December, Operation PROVIDE COMFORT II—US and allied NFZ enforcement over northern Iraq and Kurdish relief operations from Turkey since 1991—officially ends. The Military Coordination Center, which monitors and reports on relief efforts in the region, ceases its operations and departs northern Iraq.

1997

On 1 January, Ankara approves a continuing air operation from Turkey, and Operation NORTHERN WATCH commences. In October, a protracted confrontation with Saddam Hussein begins after Iraq accuses U.S. members of the UN inspection teams of being spies and expels the majority of U.S. participants. The UN Security Council threatens renewed economic sanctions. The confrontation continued into November as Iraq expelled the remaining six U.S. inspectors. The United Nations also withdrew other inspectors in protest. Inspectors are readmitted after the United States and Great Britain again began a military build-up in the Gulf. However, later in November, Iraq announces it will not allow inspectors access to sites designated as “palaces and official residences.” UN officials protest, having long suspected that such sites were being used to conceal possible weapons of mass destruction.

1998

The tensions that began in October 1997 continue. In February, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan works out an agreement with Iraq that resumes weapons inspections. In turn, Iraq receives promises the United Nations will consider removing its economic sanctions. Inspections continue into August, when Iraq cuts ties with weapons inspectors, claiming it has seen no UN move toward lifting sanctions.

The Road to Operation DESERT FOX

October 31 — Iraq cuts off all work by UN monitors. The United States and Great Britain warn of possible military strikes to force compliance. A renewed military build-up in the Persian Gulf begins.
November 5 — The UN Security Council condemns Iraq for violating agreements signed after the end of the 1991 Persian Gulf War.
November 11 — The United Nations withdraws most of its staff from Iraq.
November 14 — With B-52 bombers in the air and within about 20 minutes of attack, Saddam Hussein agrees to allow UN monitors back in. The bombers are recalled before an attack occurs. Weapons inspectors return to Iraq a few days later.
December 8 — Chief UN weapons inspector Richard Butler reports that Iraq is still impeding inspections. UN teams begin departing Iraq.
December 15 — A formal UN report accuses Iraq of a repeated pattern of obstructing weapons inspections by not allowing access to records and inspections sites, and by moving equipment records and equipment from one to site another.
December 16 — The United States and Great Britain begin a massive air campaign (operation DESERT FOX) against key military targets in Iraq.
1999

The year following DESERT FOX was marked by continued Iraqi defiance and open hostility towards compliance with UN Resolutions as Saddam ordered his forces to shoot at U.S. and Coalition aircraft patrolling the NFZs. During this same timeframe Baghdad advised the UN that it would not renew visas for U.S. and U.K. oil-for-food monitors because it could not guarantee their safety. Consequently, United Nations Secretary General ordered all U.S. and U.K. oil-for-food monitors out of Iraq. Despite these setbacks, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1284 specifying conditions under which sanctions would be suspended and establishing the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to continue UNSCOM's mandate. However, Iraq has yet to accept Resolution 1284.

2000

While the United Nations Security Council sought diplomatic solutions on Iraq, Iraqi anti-aircraft sites continued to fire at US and Coalition aircraft patrolling the northern and southern no-fly-zones. The UNSC adopted Resolution 1302 in an effort to improve the flow of humanitarian aid to the Iraqi people.

B. Maritime Interdiction Operations

Throughout the Clinton-Gore administration, the US Navy has deployed warships to the Persian Gulf to participate in Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIOs). These operations were conducted under the command of USNAVCENT and included broad coalition participation from Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Kuwait, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Allied warships patrolled the Persian Gulf to ensure Iraq complied with Security Council Resolutions which permit Iraq to export crude oil in exchange for food, medicine, educational and other humanitarian supplies destined for the Iraq's civilian population. US-led Coalition forces conducted maritime interdiction operations, which included boarding every merchant vessel entering or leaving Iraq, verifying the contents of merchants' cargo against their U.N. authorization letters. Since 1996, the MIO conducted over 7,000 queries, 3,000 boardings, and 200 diversions. Maritime Interception Operations played a significant role in denying Iraq the hard currency it wanted by inhibiting the number of ships and amount of money Saddam Hussein could make smuggling gasoil. As a result, MIO inhibited the development of Iraqi WMD and played a major role facilitating the Oil-for-food program.

C. No Fly Zones

Throughout the Clinton-Gore administration, Operations Northern and Southern Watch continued their enforcement of the no-fly-zones (NFZs). The NFZs were established to monitor Baghdad's compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 678, 687, 688, and 949.
The northern NFZ was established in 1991 following the adoption of UNSCR 688 to monitor Iraqi compliance and deter further Iraqi repression of its Kurdish population. It encompasses Iraqi territory north of 36° N. The original southern NFZ, encompassing all of southern Iraq south of 32° N, was established in 1992 to prevent Iraqi attacks against Shiite Muslims in and around the marshes of southern Iraq in contravention of UNSCR 688 demands. In response to Iraqi aggression against Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq, President Clinton in 1996 expanded the NFZs to 33° N, just south of Baghdad. The expanded zone, combined with OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT in northern Iraq, covered most of the airspace over Iraq.

Since Operation DESERT FOX in December 1998, there have been over 700 incidents of Iraqi surface-to-air missile firings, anti-aircraft-artillery firings and Iraqi aircraft violations of the Southern and Northern NFZs. Consequently, aircrews enforcing the United Nations mandates have been authorized to respond as necessary to protect the safety of their aircraft.

D. Iraq and UNSCOM

On 19 April 1991, the Security Council set up United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), charged with verifying Iraq's compliance with Resolution 687 in respect of its non-conventional weapon programs. UNSCOM has two basic functions: to inspect and oversee the destruction or elimination of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missile capabilities and their production and storage facilities; and to monitor Iraq over the longer term to ensure continued compliance. The task of inspecting, destroying and removing all Iraq's nuclear weapon capabilities was assigned to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, included in UNSCOM's mandate was the obligation to assist and cooperate with the IAEA in its work in Iraq. Such assistance comprised transport and communication services and logistic support.

Following the establishment of UNSCOM, the United States developed an organizational infrastructure in support of the fledgling organization. On May 17, 1991, the U.S. Secretary of State approved UNSCOM support and established the Special Commission Support Office (SCSO) through which several federal departments, including DOD, provided assistance. On June 11, 1991, Secretary of Defense Cheney formally designated the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (USD [A]) as the executive agent for DOD support to UNSCOM. The following month, USD (A) passed the executive agent mission to the On Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) with a charter formally spelling out OSIA's roles and responsibilities.

On September 4, 1998, Secretary of Defense Cohen designated the newly formed Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) to assume executive agent duties from OSIA on October 1, 1998. Among its other duties, DTRA managed DOD's responses to UNSCOM requests for inspection team personnel, technical experts, monitoring equipment, supplies and other support. DTRA authority came from the UN Participation Act, Executive Order 10206 and applicable DOD directives, to direct components to
provide personnel, services, facilities, supplies, equipment, and other assistance from DOD stores.

UNSCOM requests flowed through the State Department's SCSO to DOD. Once there, the requests were coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and validated by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy before being forwarded to DTRA for implementation. The UNSCOM Support Branch within DTRA's On-Site Inspection Directorate ultimately received and responded to each request. During UNSCOM's tenure, DTRA responded to an average of 70 personnel support requests per year, providing numerous personnel to serve temporary tours of duty in Iraq ranging from 12-90 days.

DOD personnel, both military and civilian, provided a wide range of expertise to support UNSCOM inspection and monitoring missions as well as planning, preparation, and support operations. DOD provided camera monitoring systems (1994 - 1998), mobile chemical analysis laboratories (1994 - 1997), BW laboratory equipment air monitoring samplers (1994 - 1998), the airlift of Chilean helicopters in support of UNSCOM activities inside Iraq, and aerial surveillance operations by U-2 aircraft from August 1991 through December 1998 (439 total missions).

UNSCOM's initial mission was to carry out on-site inspections of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction infrastructure to verify the accuracy of Iraq's declarations. UNSCOM commenced inspection activities in Iraq in May 1991, and unlike some arms control agreements, these inspections did not have a pre-determined end-date. Information and documents provided by Iraq after the defection of several high-ranking Iraqi officials in 1995 raised serious questions about Baghdad's compliance with Resolution 687. This led to the crisis in 1998 when Iraq expelled UNSCOM inspectors in November, which led to Operation DESERT FOX. Since then, the UN has not conducted WMD inspections in Iraq.

In December 1999, the UNSC passed Resolution 1284, which: (1) created a new disarmament commission (UNMOVIC) to resume inspections, (2) permitted Iraq to sell more oil under the UN-administered Oil-for-food program, and (3) allowed for sanctions to be lifted if Iraq completes "key remaining disarmament tasks." Hans Blix (UNMOVIC Executive Chairman) reported to the UNSC in August 2000 that he was ready to work and not interested in negotiating for access to Iraq. At the close of the Clinton-Gore administration, Iraq rejected the resolution and refused to admit UNMOVIC inspectors. DOD support for UNMOVIC was based upon the same system that was utilized for UNSCOM. During initial stages in 2000, DOD assisted UNMOVIC through coordination of training, personnel and equipment.
E. Operation DESERT FOX

In October 1997, UNSCOM reported to the UN Security Council that Iraq was blocking inspections and refusing to disclose details to build chemical and biological weapons. Iraq responded by ordering American inspectors to leave the country. The UN replied by refusing to let Iraq choose the international composition of the inspection teams. In January 1998, Iraq blocked an UNSCOM inspection team headed by an American, provoking a confrontation with the Security Council. The U.S. and many other nations responded by building up forces in the Gulf. Faced with the threat of military strikes, Iraq reached an agreement with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan after the Iraq government made a commitment to allow UNSCOM inspectors to return and conduct unfettered inspections. In August 1998, Iraq announced it was stopping inspections, but would allow passive monitoring of weapons sites to continue. In October, it halted the monitoring and the U.S. and Great Britain prepared for military action. On November 14, 1998, just minutes before a planned strike, Iraq said it was prepared to cooperate unconditionally with UNSCOM and the strikes were called off. Throughout the seven and one-half year history of UNSCOM, the story was one of deception, deceit, and an almost unprecedented lack of cooperation by Iraq.

Iraq repeatedly blocked UNSCOM from inspecting suspect sites, restricted UNSCOM’s ability to obtain necessary evidence, hindered teams from conducting interviews, and failed to turn over virtually all the documents requested by inspectors. As UNSCOM Chairman Richard Butler wrote in his December 16, 1998 report, “Iraq did not provide the full cooperation it promised on 14 November 1998, and initiated new forms of restrictions upon the commission’s work.” As a result, President Clinton decided that military options were necessary to demonstrate to Saddam international resolve and to maintain the credibility of U.S. power as check against Iraq. Operation DESERT FOX began approximately 5:00 PM (EST) on December 17, 1998, and included American and British forces that carried out military strikes against Iraqi WMD, military, and infrastructure targets. The initial operation included deployed U.S. Navy aircraft from the USS Enterprise, U.S. Air Force and Royal Air Force aircraft operating from land bases in the region and Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from U.S. Navy ships at sea and U.S. Air Force B-52s. Additional assets included F-117 Stealth aircraft, the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson and associated ships of the carrier battle group as well as a division-ready brigade that reinforced troops already on the ground in Kuwait as part of Exercise “Intrinsic Action.”

F. Forward Presence and Prepositioning

Prior to the Gulf War, there were virtually no United States forces routinely in the Persian Gulf except for the Navy’s Middle East Force of four to six ships, which had been continuously on patrol in the Gulf since 1947. Additionally, Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) located at Diego Garcia were in place and available with prepositioned equipment.
After the Gulf War, most of the United States forces in the Gulf have been assigned on a rotational basis and not considered permanent. Nonetheless, the U.S. has substantially improved its capability to project U.S. military forces rapidly into the Persian Gulf region and has them ready to fight soon after arrival. The United States' rapid response was the result of several specific steps taken since the end of Operation Desert Storm:

- Prepositioning a heavy brigade set of equipment in Kuwait;
- Prepositioning a second heavy brigade set afloat on ships in the Indian and Pacific Oceans;
- Deployment of land-based aircraft in the Gulf region for Operation Southern Watch; and,
- An expanded series of combined exercises conducted with the militaries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and other coalition partners.

After the 1994 crisis, additional measures were put in place. The Army began the prepositioning of support for a second heavy brigade and a division base in Qatar (including a tank battalion set of equipment) in 1996. This brigade set was complete in mid-2000 and is one of the largest pre-positioned sets of equipment in the world. Additionally, Air Force equipment was pre-positioned in Oman.

Since 1992 the United States Navy has contributed with nearly continuous carrier battle group (CVBG) presence in the Gulf and frequent deployments of an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) with embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) often when the CVBG was unavailable. Tomahawk-capable surface ships deployed with the CVBG or independently as part of the Maritime Interdiction Operations force, and greatly increased firepower in the region. Bahrain, as host to Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT), has been an integral part of the Navy’s forward presence in the Gulf, especially since moving ashore in 1993. In 1999, the Commander of NAVCENT added four mine countermeasure ships into its inventory to be homeported from Bahrain. This move eliminated the time consuming transits from U.S. homeports.

G. Cooperation with GCC Allies

U.S. GCC partners provided instrumental support in coalition efforts to enforce UNSC resolutions and maintain the trade embargo on Iraq. These countries provided the U.S. with access to facilities for forward-deployed assets and assistance-in-kind to help defray the expenses associated with these deployments. Some of the highlights of this presence:
Kuwait:

Kuwait has hosted a continuous U.S. presence since the Gulf War. Its Coast Guard and Navy have been actively involved in enforcing the trade embargo, seizing an estimated 70 smuggling vessels in cooperation with the Maritime Interception Operation in the Persian Gulf. The U.S. presence has usually consisted of the following major elements:

- **ARCENT:**
  - Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters comprised of 40-50 personnel designed to quickly transition to the forward ground command in a crisis.
  - ARCENT-K: 400-soldier headquarters that administered the brigade prepositioning site at Camp Doha.
- **Ground Combat Units Normally in Kuwait,**
  - 1 Mechanized infantry or armor battalion.
  - 1 Special Forces Company.
  - 2 Patriot Batteries. Air defense units were currently deployed at Al Salem and Al Jaber Air Bases.
  - 1 Aviation Task Force. 8 AH-64s and UH-60s were in Kuwait at least six months a year.
- **CENTAF**
  - 332nd Air Expeditionary Group was based at Al Jaber conducting missions for TF-SWA. Its squadrons rotated every six weeks from CONUS bases. The group normally had 22 aircraft at Al Jaber, ranging in type from the F-15E to the A-10 and F-16s. Three HH-60G helicopters were stationed there for SAR missions.
  - 9th Air Expeditionary Group was based at Al Salem. It consisted of 2 HC-130 rescue aircraft, 2 C-130 transports, a radar air control squadron and medevac capability for military personnel.

Kuwait has provided extensive material support to forward-deployed US forces. Kuwait spent on average of $200 million annually on maintenance, support and exercise costs associated with ARCENT-Kuwait, the 332nd Air Expeditionary Group (based at Al Jaber conducting missions for Commander, Joint Task Force, Southwest Asia), the 9th Air Expeditionary Group (based at Al Salem) and the Office of Military Cooperation-Kuwait. Some of the major elements of this assistance were: $95 million for supplies, food, medical supplies and base operations throughout Kuwait; $64 million for combat service support at Camp Doha; and, $8.5 million for renting the portion of Camp Doha owned by a private company. As a result of this support, US operating costs in Kuwait were relatively modest—the salaries of uniformed forces being the most significant. The US military did not pay rent for any facility in Kuwait, nor did it pay airport or port fees. Kuwait maintained all operational and residential facilities, and the Kuwaitis provided all food for ARCENT-Kuwait and our deployed forces. Kuwait also allowed the US to use the Udairi range free of charge, which is one of the most significant training areas for US forces outside of the United States.
Saudi Arabia:

Saudi Arabia has hosted US forces continuously since the end of the Gulf War. These forces have primarily been involved in enforcing the southern no-fly zone over Iraq. Deployed operational forces in Saudi Arabia associated with Operation SOUTHERN WATCH under CJTF SWA have totaled on average of approximately 4,800 personnel and between 50-60 aircraft. The U.S. Army at Riyadh Air Base manned one PATRIOT air defense battery, and there were two batteries in reduced readiness status at Prince Sultan Air Base (PSAB) at Al Kharj. The major US military elements were as identified below.

- Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia (JTF-SWA): provided tactical command and control of coalition air assets that are performing Operation Southern Watch missions out of Prince Sultan Air Base;
- ARCENT-SA: US Army Central Command provided support for three Patriot missile batteries. One operational battery was located at Riyadh Air Base; two batteries were in reduced readiness storage at PSAB; and,
- USAF 363rd Air Expeditionary Wing was located at PSAB and provided USAF combat and combat support aircraft for OSW implementation.

Saudi Arabia supported US operations to enforce UN Security Council Resolutions on Iraq, the most important aspect of which was the use of Prince Sultan Air Base for Operation Southern Watch missions over Iraq. The Commander, Joint Task Force, Southwest Asia was also headquartered in Saudi Arabia, commanding missions out of Eskan Village. Saudi Arabia provided substantial support to forward-deployed US forces in the form of fuel, housing, food, water, utilities and transportation. AMEMB Riyadh estimated that CY 99 AIK totaled $80 million. In 1998, the Saudis incurred one-time expenses totaling $121 million for housing and force protection measures at Eskan Village, which housed personnel from Joint Task Force Southwest Asia, US Military Training Mission, Office of the Program Manager—Saudi Arabian National Guard (OPM-SANG), US Army Central Command (ARCENT-SA), the USAF 363rd Air Expeditionary Wing and the USAF 320th Air Expeditionary Group. Saudi Arabia provided the housing, utilities and food at Eskan Village gratis. It provided all the fuel and electricity at PSAB and approximately 60 percent of the food at the Friendly Forces Housing Complex on the base.

United Arab Emirates

The UAE has allowed the continuous stationing of four USAF KC-10s at Al Dhafra Air Base, which conduct refueling operations in support of naval aviation in Operation SOUTHERN WATCH. Dubai’s Jebel Ali port served as a key liberty port for the U.S. Navy in the Gulf, the most frequented of any outside the U.S. In 1998, for example, the USN made 274 ship visits (1,179 days in port) to Dubai (18 carrier visits).
The UAE routinely granted USN vessels blanket diplomatic clearances in and out of Dubai for shuttling supplies to Navy forward combatants.

Bahrain

The U.S. defense relationship with Bahrain has been in place since 1948 and remains one of the strongest in the Gulf. After Bahrain gained independence from the British in 1971, the U.S. Navy leased part of the old British naval base and expanded U.S. operations in country (highlighted with the establishment of NAVCENT Headquarters ashore in 1993). The US military presence in Bahrain has been intimately involved in enforcing UN Security Council Sanctions on Iraq. The Fifth Fleet throughout the post-Gulf War period has coordinated the Maritime Interception Operations, which enforces the seaborne trade embargo. The U.S. has also been able to depend upon Bahrain for critical access not only for naval forces, but also military aircraft as witnessed by the presence of an AEW during several contingency actions.

Oman

The U.S.-Oman military relationship was one of the strongest in the region during the 1990s. In exchange for U.S. economic and military assistance, Oman formally signed an Access Agreement in 1980 to provide logistical support and access for American naval vessels and aircraft. The agreement was renewed in 1990, despite criticism from other Arab governments—including several Gulf monarchies (in the pre-Desert Storm era). As a stable, progressive state with the potential for influencing Arab action, Oman has played an important role in Gulf regional policy. Strategically, access to Oman is key to keeping the Strait of Hormuz open for shipping in the Gulf. Oman's location on the southeast coast of the Arabian Peninsula has reduced the vulnerability of U.S. prepositioned assets there, yet generally does not hinder their employment in crisis situations. U.S. naval aircraft based in Oman have also played a useful role in assisting the Maritime Interception Operations enforcing the UN trade embargo on Iraq.

Qatar

United States-Qatar relations grew steadily during the 1990s, particularly with the signing of the Defense Cooperation Agreement in 1992. During the Persian Gulf War, the Qatar military contributed a tank battalion and fighter aircraft to the coalition effort. In 1992 the U.S.-Qatar Defense Cooperation Agreement was signed, which established the basis a growing military-to-military relationship. Qatar hosted the beddown of U.S. Air Force aircraft and crews at Doha International Airport during several contingency actions. They also allowed periodic deployments of Navy P-3s to Doha to assist in maritime patrol missions in the Persian Gulf. The Qataris have also permitted the prepositioning of combat stocks to support an armored brigade and an Air Force fighter squadron.
CHAPTER 3. CONFRONTING GLOBAL TERRORISM

A. KHOBAR TOWERS AND FORCE PROTECTION INITIATIVES

On June 25, 1996, a terrorist truck bomb containing an estimated equivalent of 20,000 pounds of TNT exploded approximately 35 yards outside the northern perimeter of the Khobar Towers compound, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. This compound housed nearly 3,000 U.S. military personnel of the 4404th Air Wing (Provisional) supporting the coalition air operation over Iraq, Operation SOUTHERN WATCH. The blast, which sheared off the northern face of Building 131 and damaged another building 100 yards away, killed 19 American servicemen and wounded over 500 personnel.

This attack marked the second terrorist strike at U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia within eight months. On November 13, 1995, a 220-pound car bomb exploded in a parking lot adjacent to an office building that housed the Office of the Program Manager, Saudi Arabian National Guard (OPM-SANG) in Riyadh, causing five U.S. and two Indian fatalities. A Department of State Accountability Review Board investigated this attack and made recommendations to improve U.S. security in the region. The Department of Defense (DoD) also conducted a Department-wide review of antiterrorism readiness following the November 1995 bombing. The DoD Antiterrorism Task Force report made recommendations concerning enhancements to the security posture of deployed forces, education and training, intelligence sharing, and interagency coordination. The Department of State recommendations and the DoD actions were addressed and being implemented at the time of the second bombing.

The massive power and proficiency of the Khobar Towers attack came as a profound shock. The bomb was almost 100 times more powerful than the 1995 OPM-SANG terrorist attack. The terrorists were able to secretly amass and employ enormous quantities of explosive material. While they developed sophisticated intelligence, they maintained tight operational security. They also managed to operate with relative impunity inside Saudi Arabia, despite the Kingdom’s extensive domestic security apparatus. Although unable to penetrate the perimeter at Al Khobar, the terrorists increased the size of the bomb to overcome the force protection measures the United States had undertaken in the wake of the previous attack at Riyadh.

Taken together, these developments revealed that a dark new day in the age of terrorism had broken. It was immediately clear that this attack was more than just another terrorist bombing. Rather, Khobar Towers was a watershed event for the U.S. Armed Forces and America’s security strategy, demanding an extraordinary response and a radically new approach to protecting the forces from terrorism. The Department of Defense launched what became a comprehensive and aggressive chain of actions to determine and resolve what happened at Khobar Towers. More importantly, this chain of action led to dramatic changes at the Department -- from top to bottom -- in the way U.S.
forces are protected from terrorist attack as they continue to protect and defend American interests around the world. This narrative provides an update of these actions and changes.

Response in the Aftermath: Setting a New Course

Less than 24 hours after the Khobar Towers attack, Secretary of Defense William Perry traveled to Saudi Arabia to witness the scene. He was joined by the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of U.S. Central Command, General Binford Peay, to review the events leading up to and following the blast, observe the damage, assess the situation, and consult with Saudi leaders to determine options for action.

One option -- and presumably a goal of the terrorist attack -- was immediately ruled out: The United States would not withdraw its forces from Saudi Arabia or abandon its commitment to protect U.S. national security interests in Southwest Asia. Instead, the United States firmly resolved to maintain its force presence in Saudi Arabia and its security commitments in the region and to dramatically improve force protection against terrorist attack.

Upon returning to the United States, the Secretary of Defense issued a charter on June 28, 1996 for an assessment of the facts and circumstances surrounding the attack on Khobar Towers as well as the security of U.S. forces in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the remainder of Southwest Asia. He appointed General Wayne Downing, the retired Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Special Operations Command, to conduct the assessment. General Downing was directed to assemble a Task Force to assess the extent to which the casualties and damage sustained were the result of inadequate security policies, infrastructures, or systems, and to recommend measures to minimize casualties and damage from future attacks.

General Downing’s charter granted the Task Force access to all information pertinent to the assessment and charged the team to visit such places as deemed necessary to accomplish its objectives. General Downing assembled a joint service Task Force composed of diverse disciplines to include active and retired military persons, DoD civilians, and representatives from multiple U.S. Government agencies (such as the State Department, Department of Energy, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation). The team included experts in intelligence, terrorism, force protection and antiterrorism, physical security, operations security, explosives, programming and budgeting, command relationships, training and education, medical matters, and the Southwest Asia region. Overall, the Task Force interviewed over 400 servicemen and women, assessed 36 sites, visited every major headquarters involved, talked to the entire chain of command from the Commander-in-Chief to the sentry on the roof, and analyzed thousands of documents.

While Downing’s Task Force organized, the Department of Defense undertook a fundamental reevaluation and realignment of the U.S. force posture in the Arabian Gulf region following discussions with the Saudi leadership. This realignment -- known as
Operation DESERT FOCUS -- was undertaken to better protect U.S. forces in the region. These actions fell along two fronts: first, to relocate forces to safer and more defensible areas (such as relocating the 4404th Air Wing from Dhahran to Prince Sultan Air Base near Al Khafj); and second, to withdraw most of the family members from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for their safety.

The Khobar Towers blast reverberated well beyond the region and raised questions about the adequacy of U.S. force protection worldwide. To address these questions, the Secretary of Defense directed all regional CINCs to review force protection in their areas of responsibility and report back on how best to deal with the escalated terrorist threat to U.S. forces. By August 1, every CINC responded personally with detailed suggestions of additional force protection improvements that could be undertaken without compromising mission effectiveness. In essence, the CINCs recommended changing training to include force protection, providing better and more focused intelligence to units in the field, and improving the interchange with host nations on intelligence and security matters.

On August 30, General Downing issued the final report of his task force (see 2.3.1.02). The report's 26 findings and 81 recommendations validated the Department’s view that it needed to more effectively protect U.S. service personnel around the world, that a fundamental new mindset was needed, and that the greater terrorist threat demanded radical changes rather than incremental fixes in force protection. By and large, General Downing also validated a number of Department actions that were already underway and identified additional changes. As he stated in a preface to his report:

The terrorist threat to U.S. military forces is real. Opponents of U.S. policy cannot engage the United States directly, but can employ terrorism to conduct strategic attacks against U.S. servicemen and women deployed in foreign countries. This threat can only be countered through concerted efforts at all levels to plan, prepare, and enforce force protection measures. Our vulnerabilities can be overcome. It will take energy, command attention, and resources.

Force Protection Initiatives

Equipped with the recommendations from the CINCs, the Downing Task Force, and other information and analyses, the Secretary of Defense appointed a special Anti-Terrorism Action Team chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to begin reviewing and implementing longer-range initiatives to better protect U.S. forces in Southwest Asia and around the world. On September 15, the Secretary of Defense issued a report to the President and Congress that announced major and comprehensive changes in the Department’s approach to force protection. The Department moved quickly to fully implement the recommendations of the Downing Report and institutionalize a broad range of new force protection policies and initiatives. Key initiatives and actions are highlighted below and described in greater detail in the “Response to Downing Task Force Report Recommendations”.

38
The Secretary of Defense designated the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the Secretary's principal advisor and DoD's focal point for all matters related to force protection. The Chairman also established an office within the Joint Staff, the Deputy Directorate for Operations (Combating Terrorism) (J-34), dedicated to force protection. To support its work, the Department aggregated the major budgets relating to force protection to provide better decision making, program additional funding where needed, and access existing technology in order to develop new technology to enhance force protection capabilities.

The Secretary of Defense issued a new statement of Department-wide force protection standards on September 15, 1996 through a revision of DoD Directive 2000.12, "DoD Combating Terrorism Program". This directive established new baseline policies and responsibilities for combating terrorism from the Secretary of Defense to the CINCs and the Services. It also incorporated force protection into the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment process under the Joint Requirement Oversight Council (JROC). In addition, DoD Directive 2000.12 established DoD Handbook O-2000.12-H ("For Official Use Only – Protection of DoD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulence") as the standard throughout DoD for force protection. The Handbook was revised in October 1997 to incorporate terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. DoD Directive 2000.12 was also revised in April 1999 and renamed "DoD Antiterrorism / Force Protection (AT/FP) Program".

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD (SO/LIC)) was designated as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense regarding antiterrorism and force protection policy. Specific responsibilities are delineated in DoD Directive 2000.12.

The Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State agreed in September 1996 that force protection for the major noncombatant forces deployed to Southwest Asia, previously under the responsibility of the Department of State, would now fall under the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief of Central Command (CINCCENT).

A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Between the Department of State and the Department of Defense on Security on the Arabian Peninsula was signed on September 15, 1996 to clarify force protection responsibility for DoD personnel. The MOU defined the authority and responsibility for the security of those DoD elements and personnel on the Arabian peninsula (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen) that did not fall under the command of CINCCENT. On December 16, 1997, a World Wide Universal MOU was signed between the State and Defense Departments that provided a mechanism to delineate security responsibility between the Chiefs of Mission and CINCs of Unified Commands in their respective countries. This is executed through a country-specific Memorandum of Agreement (MOA).
To meet unforeseen emergency antiterrorism and force protection requirements, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (via J-34) established a special Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund in December 1996. This fund provides flexibility to cover unprogrammed shortfalls which may develop as a result of a change in threat, or the discovery of a significant vulnerability during an assessment for which no funds had been allocated.

The Commander-in-Chief of Central Command created the Joint Rear Area Coordinator (JRAC) in January 1997 to clarify force protection responsibility and authority within the command structure. Prior to the Khobar Towers attack, Central Command’s service component commanders exercised operational control—including force protection—of deployed forces from their headquarters. But tactical control of forces in the theater was the responsibility of the Commander, Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia. Thus, force protection and tactical control were not the responsibility of a single commander. By establishing the JRAC in Southwest Asia, there is now a single focal point to ensure force protection is adequately addressed by every U.S. military element in the region. JRAC (now the Joint Security Directorate) has representatives both at Central Command’s Headquarters in Tampa, Florida and with forward-deployed forces on the Arabian Peninsula.

The Department of Defense extended numerous tours of duty in Southwest Asia for force protection purposes. Prior to the Khobar Towers attack, almost all operational personnel in Saudi Arabia were on 90-179 day rotational tours. General Downing found that such a rotation policy was detrimental to good security practices and close interaction with host nation security forces. In response, the Department assigned one-year tours to many of the key command, staff, intelligence, counterintelligence, and security personnel. This change provided key staff elements charged with the execution of force protection measures more time to fully understand the nature of problems confronted and to develop meaningful relationships with their host nation counterparts.

The Department of Defense published DoD Instruction 0-2000.16 (“For Official Use Only - DoD Combating Terrorism Program Standards”) in July 1997 to provide “mission-oriented” standards for the Department. A revised version is under final coordination (October 2000) and will clearly delineate responsibilities for antiterrorism and force protection throughout the chain of command down to the unit level.

On July 31, 1997, the Secretary of Defense released a report entitled “Personal Accountability for Force Protection at Khobar Towers”. This report provided his assessment regarding the accountability of those individuals responsible for protecting Khobar Towers.
The Department of Defense developed a comprehensive, standardized, and mandatory program to educate and train forces regarding theater-specific threat awareness and personnel protection. Previously, the U.S. military had no standardized training concepts for teaching forces and commanders how to combat terrorism. The new antiterrorism education and training program established by DoD Instruction 0-2000.16 (For Official Use Only) provides instruction at four levels: Individual Antiterrorism Awareness Training (area-specific) for military personnel and families traveling overseas; Antiterrorism Officer Training for those individuals who are antiterrorism/force protection advisors to the commander; Pre-Command Course Training for O-5 and O-6 level officers selected for command; and Executive Seminar Training for senior civilians and general officers in command.

The Department of the Air Force created the 82d Security Forces Group at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas to provide a rapid reaction ground force focused on all aspects of force protection. The Force Protection Battlclab was also established at Lackland Air Force Base to research cutting edge technology in the antiterrorism and force protection realms.

To improve intelligence collection and analysis, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) through the Defense HUMINT (Human Intelligence) Service initiated programs to increase its ability to recruit agents inside terrorist organizations. The Joint Staff also created a Threat Warning Cell in DIA/J-2 (TWC-2).

The Antiterrorism Coordination Committee (ATCC) and ATCC-Senior Steering Group (SSG), co-chaired by the ASD (SO/LIC) and the Director for Operations of the Joint Staff (J-3), was revitalized to reduce vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks in accordance with Presidential Decision Directive 39, "U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism" (classified).

The Department of Defense instituted a new system, based on DoD Directive 2000.12 guidance, to assess the force protection needs and terrorist vulnerability of military facilities around the world and recommend improvements. The J-34 office conducts Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessments (JSIVA) on behalf of the Joint Staff, while the Defense Threat Reduction Agency acts as the executive agent. The Services, CINCs, and Defense Agencies also field their own assessment teams to identify vulnerabilities and close gaps in defenses overseas and at home. The Department considers this a continuous process, not a one-time activity. Therefore, leaders and managers are allocating resources for the future to ensure that assessments are accomplished in a uniform and complementary fashion and are adaptable to the changing terrorist threat.

The Department of Defense redirected and revitalized two key organizations with research, development, testing, and evaluation responsibilities to make better use of commercially available technologies in the force protection arena. In particular, the
Counterterrorism Technical Support Program and the Physical Security Equipment Action Group (PSEAG) both received substantial funding increases. The Counterterrorism Technical Support Program rapidly develops equipment to meet the requirements of the Technical Support Working Group, an interagency group co-chaired by DoD. The PSEAG selects, designs, evaluates and acquires physical security equipment for defense organizations. One of this group's key contributions is the vetting of commercial off-the-shelf technologies for use by the Department. Its focus was adjusted to address all technologies offering countermeasures to terrorist attacks.

- The ASD (SO/LIC) released a new terrorism threat methodology in October 2000 that assessed the terrorist threat to the Department of Defense in terms of terrorist operational capability, intentions, activity, and operating environment. These revised factors enable DoD to more accurately assess the terrorist threat in a given country.

**Conclusion**

As a result of the Khobar Towers attack on June 25, 1996, the Department of Defense institutionalized a broad range of new force protection policies and initiatives in Southwest Asia and around the world. DoD's approach to combating terrorism will continue to evolve as it adapts to the ever-changing world environment. The policies and initiatives described above represent only a summary of actions taken since 1996. Please reference the attached documents for greater detail.

**B. BIN LADEN ATTACKS ON U.S. EMBASSIES AND THE U.S. RESPONSE**

As noted by President Clinton in his radio address to the nation on August 8, 1998 (2.3.2.01), within hours of the reports of the bombings of our embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, DoD mounted a massive military airlift operation to support a multi-Agency effort to locate, treat and assist the survivors of the blasts. In the first 36 hours the operation, called RESOLUTE RESPONSE, delivered almost 400 medical, security and government personnel and over 140 tons of badly needed supplies to the two locations. Seriously injured personnel were immediately medevac'd to military hospitals in Germany and the CONUS.

In the days and weeks that followed, DoD continued to provide airlift of critical supplies and personnel to ensure our embassies in the two countries were able to resume their most critical functions.
CHAPTER 4. ASIA AND PACIFIC OPERATIONS

A. TENSION IN THE TAIWAN STRAITS

In July 1995, the People's Republic of China began a series of missile launches, exercises and live fire drills directed at Taiwan. The PRC made clear that they took these actions in response to Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui's visit in May to Cornell University, his alma mater, to attend a class reunion. The visit was the first of its kind for a Taiwan leader, who in the past have been prevented from obtaining a visa to travel to the U.S. in keeping with an understanding between the PRC and the U.S. concerning implementation of our "One China" policy.

The PRC's aggressive response to this break with tradition sought to intimidate Taiwan and its president to desist from actions it viewed as increasingly directed toward asserting the island's independence internationally. Added to the PRC's ire was Lee Teng-hui's apparent concurrent avoidance of any serious discussions on unification. Eight months of such PRC intimidation reached a crescendo in March 1996 as Taiwan prepared to conduct a presidential election in which Lee Teng-hui was a candidate. In the weeks leading up to the election, the PRC announced and conducted ballistic missile firings off the southeastern coast of Taiwan, near international shipping lanes and Taiwan harbors. The U.S. viewed the potential effect of these launches on international trade and shipping in the Taiwan Strait, as well as the danger of escalation into full-scale war between the PRC and Taiwan should a missile land on Taiwan, as threatening to regional interests of peace and stability. In response, the United States deployed two aircraft carriers, the Independence and the Nimitz, near Taiwan to demonstrate U.S. resolve to counter PRC intimidation and encourage restraint on both sides. The PRC soon ceased its missile tests, having launched fewer than half the missiles it had planned to fire, and the crisis soon ended. [In late March, Lee Teng-hui won re-election as Taiwan's president.]

U.S. deliberations during this crisis were held at the senior-most levels of the USG, including the Pentagon. As a result, we have found no supporting documentation at the working level to include in this package.

B. DETERRING AGGRESSION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND FREEZING THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Deterring Aggression on the Korean Peninsula

Primary Issue Areas:
- Four Party Talks: State lead;
- Remains Recovery: DPMO lead;
- Humanitarian Aid (Food): State Department lead;
- Missile Negotiations: State Department lead; DoD POC is S&TR/NPP (unclass info available through press but does not have direct connection back to OSD); and,
C. EAST TIMOR

On May 27, 1999, the State Department (State) notified Congress of the U.S. intention to support the establishment of the UN Assistance Mission, East Timor (UNAMET) to manage a popular consultation by direct vote by the East Timorese people to accept or reject a special autonomy arrangement for the territory within the unitary Republic of Indonesia. The Security Council established UNAMET on June 11 in Resolution 1257 (1999). This step was taken pursuant to the so-called Tripartite Agreement and two supplementary agreements signed May 5 by Indonesia, Portugal (as the former colonial power), and the Secretary General on behalf of the United Nations.

The May 5 Agreements stipulated that in the event the East Timorese rejected autonomy, the government of Indonesia would take the necessary constitutional steps to terminate its links with East Timor, and the United Nations would initiate a process of transition towards independence. Thus, the UN presence in East Timor would involve three phases: the consultation; the post-consultation period until ratification of the ballot result by the Indonesian Parliament; and the UN-administered transition to independence.

On August 30, 1999 the East Timorese people defied months of intimidation by the military-backed pro-integration militias and voted in a UNAMET-organized popular consultation. More than 98 percent of the 450,000 registered voters cast ballots and over 78 percent rejected autonomy within Indonesia in favor of independence for East Timor. Although the balloting took place without incident, pro-integration militias that had fomented violence in the run-up to the vote reacted violently immediately thereafter. The violence intensified after the September 3 announcement of the results, with militia groups targeting all foreigners—including UNAMET, international relief workers, and journalists. The militias were largely successful in intimidating potential witnesses to their crimes into leaving. They also systematically forced hundreds of thousands of East Timorese to abandon their homes with many relocating against their will to West Timor. UNAMET evacuated to Darwin, Australia leaving behind only a dozen staff members.
The campaign of violence, looting, and arson carried out by the militias and Indonesian security forces devastated much of East Timor and especially Dili, the capital of the territory. In addition to the destruction of property throughout East Timor, unknown numbers of East Timorese were killed, four local employees of UNAMET lost their lives, and the fate of many more East Timorese remains uncertain. The humanitarian crisis was severe. An estimated 350,000 East Timorese were displaced from their homes due to the violence, including as many as 200,000 who fled or were forced to relocate to West Timor.

Under intense international pressure, in particular from the United States, the Government of Indonesia acknowledged its inability to control the violence and agreed on September 12, 1999 to accept the offer of assistance from the Secretary General and the international community to restore peace and security in East Timor. On September 15, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, adopted resolution 1264 authorizing the establishment of a multinational force (MNF) "to restore peace and security in East Timor, protect and support UNAMET in carrying out its tasks, and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations."

The Australian-led International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) began deployment on September 20 in cooperation with the Indonesian military, which had agreed to withdraw all but a token number of troops from East Timor. INTERFET originally consisted of 14 countries, including the United States. During INTERFET's operations, DoD provided critical support in the areas of communications teams, logistics support, strategic lift, humanitarian support, intelligence, and planning support.

On October 25, 1999, the UN Security Council (UNSC) created the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and charged UNTAET with tasks that include providing security and maintaining law and order throughout East Timor, coordinating humanitarian assistance, and establishing an effective administration while also developing East Timor's capacity for self-government. With UNTAET now responsible for East Timor's security, DoD currently provides the U.S. Support Group East Timor (USGET), consisting of a small staff and support personnel located in East Timor and Australia, to facilitate and coordinate rotational presence operations conducted by U.S. Pacific Command. USGET and the rotational presence operations are not part of UNTAET. The rotational presence operations, which have included the deployment of engineering teams to help rebuild schools, medical and dental teams that provide acute care and public health education, and periodic ship visits that provide humanitarian and civic assistance, are designed to support East Timor's transition to independence. DoD has agreed to continue USGET and the rotational operations through at least December 2000.
CHAPTER 5. Caribbean Operations

A. Role in Restoring Democracy to Haiti

Background:

Radical cleric and populist Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected president of Haiti on 16 December 1990, winning an estimated 67% of popular vote, and inaugurated 7 February 1991. Although voting was in some areas chaotic and poorly administered, making it impossible to produce a precise final accounting of the ballots, exit polling and quick counts by independent international observers confirmed Aristide’s victory in what was generally regarded as the first free and fair election in Haiti’s 200-year history.

Following clashes between Aristide partisans and right-wing opponents of the government, which included elements of the military, monied elites, and remnants of the Duvalier-era political apparatus, President Aristide was overthrown by military coup on 30 September 1991 and fled with a small band of supporters initially to Venezuela. The Haitian military, or FAd’H, installed Gen. Raoul Cedras as de facto leader, although the military never formally took power. Instead, the Haitian Senate and Chamber of Deputies ratified the establishment of a new provisional puppet government (11 Oct 91), headed by Supreme Court Justice Joseph Narette and human rights activist Jean-Jacques Honorat.

The U.S. acted promptly in response to events in Haiti, as President Bush signed Executive Order #12775 (4 October 1991) declaring a national emergency regarding Haiti, suspending foreign assistance, prohibiting payments by US companies to the regime, and freezing the Haitian Government’s US assets.

The overthrow of President Aristide also represent the first test of the Santiago Declaration, in which member countries of the Organization of American States (OAS) had agreed to consult and take action as appropriate upon the extra-constitutional removal of a democratically-elected government in this hemisphere. Consequently, the Organization of American States imposed a voluntary trade embargo against Haiti on 8 October 1991.

When initial U.S. and other international efforts to pressure the Haitian military to abandon power failed, the U.S., the OAS, and eventually the United Nations took steps progressively to isolate and sanction the de facto military regime. President Bush signs executive order #12779 (28 Oct 91) tightening sanctions by prohibiting exports of goods, technology and services & imports of Haitian goods. Humanitarian assistance was excepted.

In November 1991, the first boatloads of Haitian migrants interdicted en route to the U.S., signaling a surge in illegal migration. On 1 Feb 92 the Bush Administration
begins forcibly repatriating Haitian boat people not eligible for political asylum. On Feb 23, 1992, exiled President Aristide and members of Haitian Parliament sign OAS-brokered Washington Protocol laying down conditions and timetable for restoration of democracy and reinstatement of Aristide. The OAS sought to pressure Haiti to implement its terms by approving a resolution (1 Apr 92) to “tighten and broaden” economic sanctions after Haiti’s Supreme Court declared the 23 Feb Washington Protocol null and void. On May 20, 1992, the Haitian parliament gave its consent to an agreement setting up a government of national reconciliation and hindering Aristide’s return.

With illegal migration surging, May 24, 1992, President Bush ordered the US Coast Guard to intercept Haitians leaving the island and return them without hearing claims for asylum (May 24, 1992). Thereafter, the flood of refugees slowed to a trickle.

Given the failure of OAS voluntary sanctions to pressure Haiti’s military regime to yield power, on Nov 24, 1992, the UN General Assembly voted to reinforce its own embargo and asked Secretary General Boutros Ghali to play a role in the resolution of the crisis.

**The Clinton Administration’s Role:**

In January 1993, newly inaugurated President Clinton imposed a naval blockade of Haiti to stem illegal migration to the U.S. and put pressure on the Haitian military. At the same time, the U.S. relied on UN/OAS Special Haiti Envoy Dante Caputo to broker a deal with Haiti’s military to relinquish power. In April 1993, however, Haitian military leaders rejected Caputo’s proposals under which key military figures would step down and a “consensus government” would be formed to prepare the way for Aristide’s return and reinstatement.

On June 4, 1993, President Clinton announced targeted economic sanctions against Haitian military leaders and their associates, including the freezing of their U.S. assets, due to continued intransigence in negotiations with Caputo. On June 16, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 841 imposing an oil and arms embargo against Haiti and directing member-states to freeze Haitian government assets.

Due to continued international pressure on the military regime, on July 3, 1993 the UN and OAS-sponsored Governor’s Island Accord was signed by Aristide and de facto military dictator LTG Raoul Cedras. The agreement established a 10-point process for the transition to democracy including Cedras stepping down by Oct. 15 and Aristide returning on Oct. 30 1993. Aristide, then resident in Washington, resisted point 4 in which parties agreed to suspend sanctions once a new Prime Minister was confirmed but before Aristide returned to Haiti. Aristide did not want to lift sanctions until the coup leaders formally and finally relinquished power.

On July 12, 1993, the UN Secretary General issued a report on Haiti progress toward restoration of elected government. As part of that process, the Haitian military
requested that the UN provide assistance in modernization of its armed forces and the establishment of a new police force with the presence of UN personnel.

In August 1993, President Aristide, acting in absentia, named Robert Malval as interim prime minister, charged with smoothing the way for Aristide's return. On Aug 25, 1993, the UN Secretary General issued a report recommending creation of UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) to assist in modernization of Haiti's armed forces and creation of new Haitian police force.

On Aug 27, 1993, in accordance with the Governor's Island Accord and in light of the ratification by the Haitian legislature of the installation of Prime Minister Malval and his cabinet, the UN Security Council passes resolution 861 suspending petroleum, arms, and financial sanctions imposed under UNSC resolution 841. Shortly thereafter (Aug 31, 1993), the OAS embargo and US sanctions were suspended to implement UNSC resolution 861.

On that same date, UN Security Council Resolution 862 approved the dispatch of an advance team of 30 personnel to assess requirements and prepare for possible dispatch of civil police and military assistance components of proposed UNMIH. This was followed on Sept 23, 1993 by UN Security Council Resolution 867, which established UNMIH and authorized its dispatch to Haiti to carry out a cooperative training and professionalization program with the Haitian Armed Forces.

To implement the UN action, the Clinton Administration dispatched the USS Harlan County (Oct 6, 1993) carrying the first contingent of the UNMIH forces--200 US engineers and Canadian police--on a mission to train and professionalize the army and police of Haiti. By agreement with the Haitian government, this small military mission would operate under “permissive” conditions with support from the FAd'H. However, the Haitian military's paramilitary arm, FRAPH, launched pro-Cedras demonstrations at the port and U.S. officials decided not to land the Harlan county due to force protection concerns (Oct 11, 1993).

Disturbed by the obstruction of the arrival of UNMIH and the failure of the Haitian military to carry out its responsibilities in the Governor's Island Accord, the UN Security Council passed resolution 873 re-imposing sanctions (Oct 13, 1993). The following day, pro-military gunmen fatally shoot transition Prime Minister Robert Malval's justice minister, Guy Malary, outside his office in Port-au-Prince. The rest of the Malval cabinet went into hiding.

On Oct 15, 1993, the Haitian military ignored the deadline for Cedras's resignation set forth at Governors Island. The UN Security Council, prodded by the U.S., passed Resolution 875 calling on member-states to ensure strict enforcement of sanctions including maritime inspections. On Oct 18, 1993, the United States re-imposed and strengthened its sanctions. President Clinton ordered the deployment of 6 Navy vessels off Haiti to secure compliance with the ban. On Oct 19, 1993, the U.S. deployment was
authorized by the UN as the Multinational Maritime Interdiction Force (MMIF),
established with elements of the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard and promised support from
several other nations.

On Oct 28, 1993, Aristide addressed the UN General Assembly, calling for strong
action to restore his government. Notwithstanding his call, the date set for Aristide's
scheduled return under Governor's Island Accord (Oct 31, 1993) passed without the
military yielding power. Prime Minister Malval resigned (December 1993) and the
political situation evolved to a stalemate.

On Feb 4, 1994, Clinton Administration National Security Advisor Sandy Berger
met with Aristide, urging him to support an initiative proposed by Haitian
parliamentarians—the so-call "Washington Package"—to resolve the impasse. Aristide
decided, On Mar 25, 1994, Vice President Gore met with Aristide and urged the support
of the "Washington Package." Again, Aristide declined.

At a meeting of Clinton Administration National Security Council principals (Apr
20, 1994), it was agreed to fashion a new strategy for dislodging the de facto regime. On
April 28, the State Department proposed a "New Diplomatic and Political Strategy." The
Strategy proposed fundamental shift of the UNMIH mission from professionalization to
peace enforcement. The UNMIH would be charged with securing environment in which
political change would proceed but its deployment would be permissive (i.e., "this is not
an invasion"). The strategy included more aggressive enforcement of existing sanctions
and imposition of comprehensive trade embargo.

On May 6, 1994, UN Security Council Resolution 917 enacted a comprehensive
trade embargo, a ban on scheduled air service and global targeted sanctions against Haiti.
The resolution noted that sanctions will not be lifted without the creation of a proper
environment for the deployment of UNMIH and the retirement of the Gen. Cedras and
the remaining coup principals of the FaD'H—Gen. Biamby and Police Chief LTC
Michael Francois. On May 7, 1994, President Clinton signed Executive Order #12914
implementing UN sanctions.

At a May 8, 1994, meeting of the NSC Principles Committee, the decision was
made to apply tougher sanctions and conduct migrant processing on board ships. In
response, the Haitian military sought to "legitimize" its rule by prevailing upon
Parliament to install Emile Jonassaint as provisional president.

On May 21, 1994, President Clinton signed Executive Order #12917 applying
additional sanctions. The DoD dispatched personnel to Santo Domingo, Dominican
Republic, to negotiate establishment of a multilateral observer force to monitor UN
sanctions enforcement along the Haiti-DR border. Also, on June 1, 1994, the CJCS
issued a planning order calling for possible military operations in Haiti. Two scenarios
were requested to be addressed, one in which entry to Haiti would be peaceful and one
involving use of force as necessary (i.e., vanguard and no vanguard).
On June 10, 1994, President Clinton signed Executive Order #12920 prohibiting additional financial transactions with Haiti, as recommended by the interagency Haiti EXCOMM and endorsed by DoD, State, Treasury, and NSC staff.

On June 17, 1994, USACOM briefed the initial CONPLAN for Haiti operations the Haiti EXCOMM. On June 29, 1994, CJCS approved CINCUSACOM CONPLAN 2380-95 and requested ACOM provide an OPORD for potential military operations in Haiti.

On June 30, 1994, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 933 requesting member states to plan for action to bring the Haiti situation to an end and restore the democratically elected authorities to Haiti - the resolution implied deployment of international force. Also in June, a letter from President Clinton to UNSYG called for an expanded mandate for UNMIH.

Overwhelmed by thousands of boat people, U.S. changes refugee policy (July 5, 1994) to bar Haitians from the United States. Fifteen thousand Haitians were later detained at Guantanamo or diverted to safe havens in other Caribbean countries.

At a meeting on July 6, 1994, U.S. Special Haiti Envoy Gray met with UNSYG Butros. At that meeting, LTG Wesley Clark briefed USG UNMIH proposal. The SYG expressed reservations about an expanded UNMIH. The SYG strongly recommends USG lead coalition force in the UNITAF model—essentially meaning that the UN would sanction but not formally charter a multilateral force for Haiti. The U.S. decided to send 2,000 Marines to waters off Haiti to intimidate the Cedras regime, indicating that U.S forces have been practicing for invasion.

On July 8, 1994, the Cedras government formally expelled international human rights monitors from Haiti. On July 15, 1994, the UN Secretary General issued a report formally recommending creation of expanded force to conduct operations in hostile conditions in Haiti. In the report SYG outlined three options (1) expand UNMIH (2) creation of chapter 7 force (3) combination of options (1) and (2). SYG recommended a two phased operation. Phase I would consist of a coalition force securing a permissive environment for restoring democratically elected leaders and in Phase II turning the mission over to UNMIH for modernization of Haitian armed forces and professionalization of police forces.

On July 26, 1994, in a meeting between Gray and Aristide, the U.S. consulted the Haitian president on prospective military operations. Thereafter, on July 29, 1994, an Oval Office meeting discussed the upcoming UN resolution for use of force.

The UN Security Council passes Resolution 940 (31 July 1994), authorizing member states to form a multinational force (MNF) to use "all necessary means" to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership, the prompt return of the
legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment that will permit the implementation of the Governors Island Agreement. The resolution also approved the creation of a 60-person UNMIH Advance Team and defined the conditions that must be met in order for the MNF to transition to UNMIH.

On Aug 30, 1994, representatives of CARICOM and the USG meet in Kingston and announced the formation of a multinational coalition to restore legitimate authorities in Haiti. On Sep 7, 1994, CJCS briefed President Clinton and his top advisors on a three phased operational plan for Haiti. DepSecDef ordered activation of first ROROs (roll on, roll off support ships to position materiel for intervention, principally at Guantanamo). Also in August, by agreement between President Aristide and the U.S., the DoD led a bi-national delegation of U.S. and Haitian representatives to Guantanamo to begin the process of selecting and training a transitional police authority from among migrants housed at Guantanamo.

On Sep 8, 1994, the CJCS issued an Alert Order to CINCUSACOM to begin execution planning for Operation Uphold Democracy. On Sep 10, 1994, the Joint Staff Response Cell was activated in NMCC. SecDef signed an Execute Order for Uphold Democracy. By Sep 11, 1994, the 10th Mountain Division departed Ft. Drum, New York, by rail for Bayonne and Norfolk to constitute the initial intervention force. Senior government officials joined senior joint staff officers from Pentagon and USACOM for a "walk through" of day by day scenarios of detailed actions to be taken during the invasion and the aftermath. A dress rehearsal was held at NDU.

On Sep 12, 1994, the USS America unloaded organic aircraft to make room for Army troops and Army helicopters. Two days later, the USS Eisenhower also unloaded aircraft to make room for 10th Mtn Division troops and helos. The USS Mt. Whitney, command ship for the MNF commanded by LTG Hugh Shelton sailed from Norfolk. Leaflets were dropped in Les Cayes and Cap Haitien informing Haitians of how to receive the MNF, advising that ordinary citizens would not be harmed.

The Haitian military responded (Sept 15-16) with shows of force, renewed training of civilian militia and efforts to block airport ramps and runway. In a speech to the American people from the Oval Office (Sept 15, 1994), President Clinton provided the rationale for US military intervention to restore democracy in Haiti and issues a final ultimatum to Haiti's military leaders: "Your time is up. Leave now, or we will force you from power."

On Sept 16, the FAd'H began moving weapons to tactically significant locations. The following day, the Carter-Nunn-Powell delegation arrived in Haiti in a final attempt to negotiate a peaceful intervention and return to power of Aristide. On Sept 18, 1994, President Clinton signed the Execute order for Uphold Democracy.
On the even of intervention, the Carter-Nunn-Powell delegation concluded an agreement with Gen. Cedras and Biamby. Key elements were: (1.) Certain military officers (Cedras, Biamby and Francois) agreed to "early and honorable retirement" when a general amnesty is voted into law by the Haitian parliament or by Oct. 15, whichever is earlier; (2.) Military activities of US forces will be coordinated with Haitian military and vice versa; (3.) Economic embargo and economic sanctions would be lifted without delay in accordance with relevant UN resolutions; (4.) Forthcoming legislative elections will be held in a free and democratic manner.

Pursuant to that agreement, CJCS sent a message to assault forces canceling original the D-day/H-hour of one min. after midnight on Sept 19. On Sept 19, 1994, CJCS dispatched an Execute order authorizing unopposed landing of 10th Mtn Division and other elements of the MNF.

Lead elements of the Multinational Force (CJTF 180) arrive in Haiti at the Port au Prince International Airport (PIA), with a battalion Task Force of the 10th Mountain Division, from the USS Eisenhower. After the airport was secured, a second battalion of the infantry secured the PAP port facility. Approximately 3,000 personnel were in country by the end of the day. MNF establishes JTF HQ ashore and began coordination with Haitian military leadership. CINCUSACOM issued supplemental rules of engagement (ROE), including ROE for dealing with persons committing serious criminal acts.

On Sept 20, 1994, the MNF continued meetings with Haitian military leadership to set conditions for the mission. The MNF continued deployment of additional forces, with US Marines establishing control in Cap Haitien. On Sept 21, 1994, the Joint Staff sent ROE authorizing senior US Commanders in Haiti to intervene to prevent Haitian military or police from committing acts that threaten innocent lives. Also on Sept 20, the MNF completed deployment of the 1st Brigade combat team of the 10th Mountain Division. Initial MP patrol route was established.

The FAd'H Heavy Weapons Company at Camp d'Application was secured and all weapons placed under MNF control. By day's end, MNF had control of 14 critical areas within PAP and some 10,000 personnel in country. President Aristide visited the Pentagon to receive a briefing on the progress of MNF operations.

On Sept 23, the MNF sent troops out of PAP to conduct operations in Jacmel, Gonaives and Cap Haitien. MNF forces also directed to secure Bowen Airfield, Port Nationale, and Killick Naval Base. Forces in PAP and Cap Haitien continue to expand security, and maritime interdiction operations continue at sea. MNF forces then totaled approximately 12,000.

In the only unit confrontation of the intervention, on Sept 24, US Marines and a group of Haitian police exchange fire outside a Cap Haitien police station, resulting in the death of 10 Haitians and the wounding of one Marine. Four Haitian police were also
detained. 10,000 protesters surround Haitian military HQ at Gonaive. US Army troops disarmed, detained, or evacuated individuals. Within the first week of MNF operations, the MNF initiated a weapons buy-back program in an effort to rid the streets of as many illegal weapons as possible.

On Sept 24, 1994, the MNF established a CMOC to begin supporting humanitarian efforts. MNF also established procedures for the swift introduction of humanitarian aid flights into PAP and initiated several civil-military operations to improve Haitian people's quality of life, providing basic services such as water purification, improved sanitation and basic medical care. President Aristide called for a special session of the Haitian Parliament for Sept 28. His decree covered six of the nine laws proposed by the Governors Island Accord as well as an additional law designed to pass amnesty, organize a civilian police force and establish a police academy, abolish paramilitary forces (FRAPH), create an office of citizen protection, create a conciliation mission and pass laws over territorial groups.

On Sept 26, 1994 the US formally lifted economic sanctions against Haiti but kept sanction in place against the nation's military leaders and their supporters. President Clinton addressed the UN General Assembly, announcing U.S. intention to lift all U.S. sanctions except those affecting the military leaders.

On the ground in Haiti, CINCUSACOM called up two light armored companies from the 82nd ABN Division for a show of force in Port-au-Prince during a large pro-Aristide demonstration planned for Sept 30.

On Sept 27, 1994, at a breakfast meeting at Pentagon, senior DoD officials briefed congressional leaders on the progress of operations in Haiti. The following day, the Haitian parliament met for the first time to begin discussing an amnesty law. Although the House Foreign Affairs Committee approved a resolution authorizing the presence of US forces in Haiti only until March 1, 1995, no further action was taken by the U.S. Congress.

Although conditions in Haiti were generally peaceful, on Sept 29, 1994, two grenades explode in a crowd with approximately 15 killed and 59 wounded. Paramilitary "attaches" appeared to be the culprits. US forces pursued and detained 11 people including suspected thrower of grenades. Looting in buildings opened and searched by US forces while in pursuit followed the incident. US forces make some small attempts to stop the looting, but quickly give up.

Also, on Sept 29, UN Security Council Resolution 944 directed that all UN sanctions on Haiti be terminated the day after Aristide returns to Haiti and the first UN authorized International Police Monitors (IPM) landed in PAP.

On Oct 2, 1994, MNF troop strength in Haiti peaked at 20,931. CINCUSACOM was informed that the number must not exceed 21,000. The first elements of the
CARICOM battalion arrived in Haiti. CARICOM forces began to arrive in strength on Oct. 4, eventually reaching close to 600. Most of the troops in the CARICOM forces came from neighboring islands.

On Oct 3, 1994, a major US raid on FRAPH headquarters in PAP and quarters in Cap-Haitien produced a large cache of weapons seized and people detained. The U.S. secured the so-called "FRAPH documents," later to become a source of contention between the USG and the GOB.

The agreement between the US government and the GOB, which allows for the interdiction of Haitian migrants on the high seas, expired on October 7, 1994. Although Aristide refused to extend this agreement, US forces continued to interdict with little change in their actions.

By the third week of MNF presence, Haitian police were virtually non-existent anywhere US forces were present. Following the departure of LTC Francois to the Dominican Republic on Oct 4, Lt. Gen. Cedras and Brig Gen. Biamby resigned on October 10. Maj. Gen. Duperval was named CINC of the FAD'H. On October 11, Haiti's 13 de facto ministers vacated their posts and de facto President Emile Jonassaint departed the presidential palace. US troops occupied the National Palace and all ministry buildings without incident—preparing the way for Aristide administration officials. Prime Minister Malval returned.

On October 13, the remaining de facto leaders, Lt. Gen. Cedras and Brig Gen. Biamby and their families left Haiti. Cedras and Biamby arrived in Panama on a plane chartered by US government. On Oct 14, 1994, President Clinton terminated the national emergency, revoked all executive orders regarding sanctions, and terminated all remaining sanctions against Haiti.

On Oct 15, President Aristide returned to Haiti and reassumed leadership. No major violence or disruptions occurred. By Oct 20, 1994, there were approximately 16,750 MNF troops in country, down from 21,000 at the operation's peak. There were also 602 police monitors from 11 countries in Haiti. The Police monitors were engaged in joint patrolling operations with the MNF military police and the FAD'H police.

In January 1995, the U.S. initiated the first six-month ICITAP Police Academy course to train a new, civilian Haitian National Police (HNP). On Jan 17, in cooperation with GOH Justice Ministry, the U.S. Administration of Justice project was initiated to resurrect the Haitian judicial system.

On Jan 20, 1995, the Commander of the MNF report to the UN SYG that the environment in Haiti was secure and stable and ready for transition to UNMIH. Acting on that information, on Jan 30, 1995, the UNSC passed resolution 975 renewing UNMIH's mandate and starting the process to transition from MNF. At a ceremony on
Mar 31, 1995 attended by President Clinton, the transition from the US-led MNF to the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) was completed.

Originally planned for December 1994, parliamentary and municipal elections were held in June 1995, marking the formal transition to a freely elected parliament. Presidential elections followed in November 1994, paving the way for Haiti's first-ever peaceful, democratic transfer of power upon the inauguration of President Rene Preval on February 7, 1996.
B. HURRICANE MITCH AND CENTRAL AMERICAN RELIEF

Hurricane Mitch, which struck in October 1998, was the worst natural disaster in the recorded history of Central America. The winds and precipitation associated with the hurricane killed over 9,000 people, and left a similar number missing and presumed dead. Estimates of damage ranged from $5-7 billion.

In response, US forces provided search and rescue, damage assessments, airfield management, food delivery, immunizations against epidemic diseases, veterinary care, bridge and road reconstruction, water purification, liaison, and planning. The overall operation consisted of three phases. The emergency relief phase began when the hurricane struck and continued through mid-December, focusing on search and rescue and food distribution. During the rehabilitation phase (mid-December through the end of February), engineering and medical units were deployed into the region to restore essential transportation routes and medical services. The reconstruction phase, which ran from early March 1999 and continued into September of that year, employed units already scheduled for overseas training to assist with reconstruction projects. The scope of the US military disaster relief mission in Central America ultimately included a maximum deployment of more than 5,000 military personnel and 63 aircraft at a cost of $155 million.
Chapter 6 -- African Military Operations

A. Operations in Somalia

Following the overthrow of dictator Siad Barre in January, 1991, fighting between the rebel "warlords" for power, in combination with Somalia's periodic droughts, created chaos. Somalia was forced to rely on foreign assistance to feed its people. Food became a weapon; the resulting famine led to over 300,000 deaths. Relief agencies attempting to provide food and other assistance were subjected to extortion and looting. As many as 500,000 additional Somalis were at risk in the early months of 1993 unless the situation was corrected.

On 28 August, 1992, the United States launched Operation PROVIDE RELIEF, a food airlift to Somalia. An emergency measure, it was incapable of meeting Somalia's needs and the drought and the interference of the warlords continued. The UN Security Council (UNSC), in order to improve the security situation, established the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I). Although the UNSC authorized a military force of 3,500 personnel, only Pakistan contributed a force of 500.

In September, this force came under fire from heavy caliber weapons. Having undertaken a traditional peacekeeping mission (Chapter VI of the UN Charter; self-defense only) and faced with superior numbers and firepower from the warlords controlling Mogadishu, the UNOSOM commander (a Pakistani) decided to remain at the airport and avoid confrontation with the warlords. As relief activity increased, so did looting and vehicle hijackings.

Following consultations with the UN, the Bush Administration volunteered to lead an international coalition to ensure delivery of relief supplies. On December 9, 1992, acting under the authority of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 794, over 20,000 American troops were sent to Somalia as part of Operation RESTORE HOPE. The Unified Task Force (UNITAF), which eventually included 20 other countries and rose to nearly 28,000 troops, quickly secured Mogadishu's port and airfield and occupied other key distribution points and lines of communication throughout Somalia.

As the security situation improved, the Security Council passed UNSCR 814 (26 March 1993), which established UNOSOM II, placing the date of the transfer of control of the operations in Somalia from the U.S. to the UN as 4 May 1993. UNSCR 814 established Operation CONTINUE HOPE as the first-ever Chapter VII peace enforcement operation.

Approximately 4,000 U.S. forces remained in Somalia after 4 May 1993 as either part of or in support of UNOSOM II. These forces provided logistics, communications and intelligence support, and a Quick Reaction Force to respond to emergency situations. From May 1993 onwards, the U.S. Logistics Support Command provided logistics support to other UNOSOM military contingents, functioning under U.S. command but
under the operational control of Turkish LTG Cevik Bir, Commander, UNOSOM II Force Command. United States MG Thomas Montgomery, served as the Commander, U.S. Forces in Somalia (USFORSOM), while simultaneously serving as LTG Bir's Deputy UNOSOM II Commander. MG Montgomery reported to General Hoar, USCENTCOM. The U.S. Quick Reaction Force (QRF) consisted of a light infantry battalion with attack and transport helicopter support. Its mission was to reinforce UNOSOM's combat capabilities in emergencies as needed.

As the UN attempted to implement the disarmament plan reached among the factions as part of the Addis II Accords (15 March 1993), the levels of violence increased. Aideed decided he was being marginalized from the political process (his rival, Ali Mahdi, was actively cooperating with the UN). On 5 June, Pakistani peacekeepers, having just conducted an authorized search of one of Aideed's weapons cantonment areas, were ambushed, resulting in the death of 24 soldiers.

This resulted in the unanimous passage of UNSCR 837 (6 June 1993), which authorized all necessary measures to be taken against the attackers. The UN distributed "wanted" posters for Aideed and the Secretary-General's Special Representative (SGSR), Admiral Jonathan Howe USN (Ret), branded Aideed a "criminal." At UN request, U.S. aircraft destroyed heavy weapons that Aideed had assembled in violation of the Addis Accord. In June and July, QRF forces attacked houses in which Aideed lieutenants were believed to be planning operations against UNOSOM II.

Aideed's forces escalated their anti-UN campaign using command-detonated mines, sniper fire, and mortar attacks. Aideed also began targeting U.S. forces specifically. On 8 August, 4 U.S. soldiers were killed when their vehicle encountered a command-detonated mine, an attack allegedly ordered by Aideed.

During the summer, DoD had turned down various proposals to send a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) to Somalia with the specific mission of apprehending Aideed. However, in late August, Secretary Aspin relented and ordered the deployment of the JSOTF, including Rangers and other Special Operations Forces, to Mogadishu to apprehend those responsible for the 5 June and subsequent attacks. The Rangers conducted 7 missions, netting arms caches and several of Aideed's lieutenants. It was the last of these operations on 3 October in which 18 U.S. soldiers were killed, 74 wounded, and one captured (subsequently released). Aideed, whose SNA forces were hurt badly, immediately declared a unilateral cease-fire.

The 3 October losses set off a storm of criticism of the U.S. role in Somalia and the management of the U.S. (and UN) effort there. In order to improve the security situation, President Clinton announced on 7 October 1993 that he had ordered additional forces deployed to Somalia, including two Amphibious Ready Groups, an Army infantry battalion with 104 armored vehicles, and an aircraft carrier. He also announced he would withdraw most U.S. forces by 31 March 1994. In a 7 October 1993 speech and the 13 October 1993 Report to Congress he made clear the mission of our forces:
1) to "...protect our troops and our bases."

2) to "...keep open and secure the roads, the port and the lines of communication that are essential for the United Nations and the relief workers to keep the flow of food and supplies moving freely throughout the country so that starvation and anarchy do not return."

3) to "...keep the pressure on those who cut off relief supplies and attacked our people."

4) to "...make it possible for the Somali people, working with others, to reach agreements among themselves so that they can solve their problems and survive when we leave."

The withdrawal was successfully conducted in stages. Many of the first forces withdrawn were logistics support personnel. Their mission had been assumed by a private U.S. contractor, Brown & Root. In mid-December 1993, the infantry portion of the U.S. QRF began to withdraw and its mission was transferred to Malaysian forces. In the weeks ahead, the air and armor portions of the QRF were also transferred to other countries' forces. By mid-March, U.S. forces on the ground were down to about 1,500, and all were withdrawn by 31 March. U.S. Navy and Marine forces stationed off-shore will provided a covering force throughout the redeployment.

As a means of ensuring a stable security situation after 31 March, the U.S. actively recruited replacement forces. Pakistanis (1 brigade; 4,995 troops), Indians (1 brigade; 4,935 troops), Egyptians (1 brigade; 1,696 troops) along with Malaysia, Morocco, and Zimbabwe constituted the bulk of post-31 March forces. These countries' decisions to stay, however, was dependent upon the political and security situation that existed over the following months.

In March of 1995, the USG acceded to a UN request for assistance in withdrawing the peacekeepers from Somalia. An amphibious withdrawal operation was flawlessly executed with some minor skirmishing conducted by the warlords. Several armed Somalis were killed in the process by U.S. forces. (See attached supporting documentation)

B. Rwanda Relief Operations

The US military response to the April/May 1994 massacre of 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu by radical Hutu in Rwanda was entitled Operation SUPPORT HOPE. When the massacre ended in early May with the invasion of exiled Tutsi led by current President Paul Kagame, a large population displacement occurred as hundreds of thousands Hutu and other Rwandans fled into refugee camps west in Zaire (now DROC) and south in Burundi over a period of weeks. Conditions in the overcrowded camps there had deteriorated badly, and the President authorized US European Command to execute the humanitarian response operation on 22 July 1994.
Ultimately, 2,100 U.S. military personnel were deployed to the region, setting up a Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters at Entebbe, Uganda, with logistical operations in Goma and Bukavu, Zaire, Nairobi and Mombassa, Kenya, and Kigali. A 24-hour expanded air-logistics site was implemented at Kigali International Airport, which served as focal point for UNHCR/NGO coordination/activity and the hub for all relief flights in support of humanitarian relief operations. In support of the operation, a Civil-Military Operation Center (CMOC), a U.S. Air Force Tanker/Airlift Control Element (TALCE), other staff and logistical personnel, and a Military Police detachment for force protection of U.S. military personnel were deployed. SUPPORT HOPE entailed around 700 sorties of C-141, C-135s, and C-5s hauling 11,000 passengers and 23,000 tons of cargo (including UN relief supplies, UNAMIR operational forces and equipment, and US required cargo supporting water purification and air operations) between July and September 1994. A total of six TALCEs were deployed to the region to support the air operation. Full details may be found in the Operation SUPPORT HOPE After Action Report and other sources.

The spiraling death rates in the camps were quickly brought down, due to clean water and delivery of food and medical aid made possible by Operation SUPPORT HOPE. The operation redeployed on or about 28 September, and operation of the remaining camps was turned over to the UN and non-government organizations. Key successes included the demonstration of the US ability to conduct extensive and sustained complex humanitarian air operations, in a combined military operational environment with non-government organization support role.

Operation GUARDIAN ASSISTANCE was conducted in November and December 1996, echoing Operation SUPPORT HOPE in location and purpose. The Joint Task Force (JTF) was sent to assist in diffusing an expected refugee crisis in the Kivu region of eastern Zaire (DRC) and Rwanda, caused in part by the continuing low level warfare between Rwandan and Zairian Hutu and former Hutu soldiers and the government-backed Rwandan and Zairian Tutsi. Recent actions by both Zairian and Rwandan governments had exacerbated the situation, which to the West, appeared to threaten a replay of events in 1994. The US operation resulted in about 325 US servicemen and women sent into the region on 14 November 1996, with the main JTF headquarters in Entebbe, Uganda, and a small JTF-forward in Kigali, Rwanda.

In this humanitarian response, the U.S. military deployment was swift and efficient, but in fact the expected refugee flows did not materialize in large numbers. The mission was redeployed by 27 December 1996. Operation GUARDIAN ASSISTANCE indicated the readiness to respond quickly and efficiently to threats of genocide in the region.

C. President’s Visit to Africa: 1998

Operation EAGLE VISTA was conducted to oversee U.S. military support for the President’s visit to six African nations, 23 March to 2 April 1998. An 800-person task
force supported air operations in Ghana, Uganda, Rwanda, South Africa, Botswana, and Senegal, from twelve operational support locations across four time zones. Operation EAGLE VISTA was a major logistics challenge, with 93 strategic lift, 39 theater lift and 105 air refueling operational missions completed, and 2,346 passengers and 2,948 tons of cargo moved. The JTF tracked the intercontinental movements C-141, C-5 and C-17 sorties. EAGLE VISTA reflected an unusually extensive multinational coordination effort for the United States, with much less time to prepare than normally available for similar bilateral exercises in the region.

D. Relief Operations in Mozambique

Operation ATLAS RESPONSE commenced in response to torrential rains and flooding in southern Mozambique and South Africa with the deployment of a EUCOM Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST) to Mozambique and South Africa on February 18, 2000. ATLAS RESPONSE was chartered on 3 March to support humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in Southern Africa, to include Mozambique and neighboring states as required. South Africa agreed to provide Hoedspruit military airfield as an intermediate staging base for the humanitarian relief operation. A C-5 carrying part of a Tanker/Airlift Control Element (TALCE) arrived in Hoedspruit, South Africa, on March 5. That same day the first two C-130 aircraft arrived with Keen Sage imagery capability. After flying 216 missions, and transporting 860 passengers and delivering 754 tons of relief supplies, ATLAS RESPONSE concluded at the end of March.

The U.S. Government support to flood victims in Mozambique was well received and clearly demonstrated the U.S. policy of support and responsiveness on the continent of Africa.

E. Peacekeeping Operations in Sierra Leone

The Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) signed the Lome Peace Accord on July 7, 1999, ending, for a time, the state of open hostilities that had existed in Sierra Leone since 1991. This pact followed several months of repeated outbreaks of rebel violence, including a coup by former members of the Sierra Leone Army (the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council or AFRC) who deposed the elected government in May of 1997. The AFRC subsequently invited the RUF into the government.

In February 1998, ECOMOG, the Military Observer Group of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), reentered Sierra Leone and ousted the AFRC/RUF from Freetown and restored President Kabbah to power. ECOMOG then remained and provided significant military support to the GOSL, the vast majority of which was borne by Nigeria. The RUF then retreated to the countryside and reorganized and re-equipped. In the winter of 1998, the RUF commenced an offensive against
ECOMOG. This culminated in a January 1999 attack on the capital of Freetown, from which they were eventually repulsed by ECOMOG. The Nigerians, however, suffered significant casualties and requested U.S. assistance with medical equipment and supplies. The Department of State provided $1 million in ESF funding to provide the necessary assistance, which was delivered directly to Nigerian military hospitals by a team from the European Command (EUCOM). (See supporting documentation)

Following the repulse of the RUF from Freetown, ECOMOG continued operations in the field against the RUF. These forces from the nations of Nigeria, Ghana, Mali, and Guinea were desperately in need of equipment, and therefore in August 1999 President Clinton authorized the drawdown of DOD goods and services in the amount of $3 million. This drawdown authorized the transfer of uniforms, boots, personal equipment, and tentage to the deployed ECOMOG forces. (See supporting documentation)

UNSC Resolution 1270 (20 October 1999) authorized the establishment of UNAMSIL with a very limited Chapter VII mandate. Through subsequent resolutions, the force is now authorized 13,000 troops and has additional Chapter VII tasks. Most, if not all, progress made between the signing of the Lome Accord and 1 May 2000 was erased by the return to hostilities by the RUF. Nearly coincidental with the withdrawal of Nigerian ECOMOG troops on 30 April 2000, a series of incidents between the Nigerians, the RUF, and members of the ex-SLA created instability within the capital of Freetown. This culminated in a large UK deployment to execute a non-combatant evacuation operation. The operation was highly successful and UK military advice to the SLA eventually helped push the RUF away from Freetown.

Today, the Freetown area and Lungi peninsula (where the international airport is located) are generally secure and quiet. Most UN forces have retrograded to positions in a ring running 40 or so miles out from Freetown proper. Some UK forces remain in country, providing basic infantry training to SLA recruits. Consultations on the future of UNAMSIL are underway in the UN Security Council, with much debate over the size and mandate of the mission. The U.S. view is that the first priority is to improve the mission's capabilities and effectiveness, including perhaps getting non-performing units out of the mission. Then, the Council needs to decide on policy and objectives before troop levels are determined. While the U.S. has no direct role in the mission, we are presently conducting a program to equip and train seven West African battalions (5 Nigerian, 1 Ghanaian, and 1 Senegalese). (See supporting documentation)

These West African battalions will seek to extend UN authority into the diamond regions, depriving the RUF of this source of support and returning control of these strategic resources to the Government of Sierra Leone. President Clinton announced this program during his August 2000 visit to Nigeria. Additionally, SECDEF has approved the provision of three U.S. officers to support the UK-led International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT) that will re-build the Sierra Leonean military establishment.
CHAPTER 7
Y2K Preparations Under the Clinton-Gore Administration

Introduction

The Department of Defense (DoD) treated the Year 2000 (Y2K) as a cyber attack directed at the very core of its military capabilities - the ability to obtain, process and control information that allows American forces to dominate the battlefield. The DoD military and civilian leadership dealt with Y2K as a readiness issue and attacked the problem accordingly.

Securing DoD information systems for Y2K afforded numerous lessons that will translate well in efforts to secure critical information infrastructures in the future. Our efforts led to the best ever accounting of DoD systems and their status. An information management structure now in place meets the requirements of the Clinger-Cohen Act. Senior leaders are more aware and appreciate information technology, including the need for government to keep pace with industry. In many ways, we can look back on Y2K as a blessing that forced America to face realities of a rapidly changing information-based world.

Thanks to the tireless efforts of people throughout DoD, there were no major problems on January 1, 2000. Over the 18 months leading up to the century rollover, however, several important things happened. Getting ready for the Year 2000 (Y2K) had many positive impacts throughout the Department of Defense (DoD), including:

- Improved integrated working relationships between DoD Chief Information Officers, warfighters, and senior leaders;
- Thousands of people worked to make systems compliant and ensure Y2K readiness;
- The Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) of the unified commands, the military departments, and the defense agencies and activities have a much better understanding of their information technology systems and interdependencies;
- DoD shifted from a system focus on information technology to a core mission and function approach;
- DoD greatly reduced Y2K risk through a series of risk mitigation measures including: 123 major end-to-end evaluations, screening of computer software code using automated tools, and special configuration management policies and procedures;
- DoD greatly upgraded and improved contingency plans for individual system failure and for ensuring continuity of operation;
• DoD established on-going discussions for greater assurance on host nation support; AND,

• DoD better understands the dependencies on critical infrastructures outside its control that are necessary to accomplish core missions.

DoD Y2K Program

Scope, Magnitude and Complexity

The scope and complexity of the Y2K problem for the DoD is unparalleled in the federal government. The DoD has over 3 million people – active, Guard, Reserve, and civilian – spread all over the world. To administer this community takes over 1.5 million individual computers at hundreds of locations around the globe. For the Y2K problem, DoD tracked 9,634 systems, of which 25 percent (2,367) were considered mission critical systems. The Department also operates 637 military installations around the world and in the United States, which are like small towns, and rely on supporting infrastructure systems also vulnerable to Y2K problems. In addition, the Department had 15 centralized mainframe computer sites comprising 351 computer domains in operation on January 1, 2000. Over one-third of the government's mission critical systems are in the DoD.

Senior Leadership Involvement

The DoD made enormous efforts to ensure Y2K readiness. In August 1998, Secretary Cohen directed DoD's leadership to treat the Y2K issue as a major threat to military readiness. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was directed to include Y2K testing in joint warfighting and operational readiness exercises. The Military Departments and Defense Agencies were instructed to fix their systems, certify interfaces, and ensure vendors were held responsible for Y2K compliance of products. Finally, officials on the Secretary's staff were told to ensure functioning of specific business processes, such as medical and health activities, finances and payments, personnel, logistics, communications, and intelligence.

Major Phases of DoD Y2K Program

The DoD Y2K program evolved throughout the Y2K preparation period. In all, the program had three major components: Achieving Systems Y2K Compliance, Large Scale Integration Testing, and Risk Reduction Efforts.

Achieve Y2K System Compliance

The three major parts of achieving system compliance were: the five phase Office of Management and Budget management process; reliance on centralized guidance with decentralized execution; and a centralized inventory of information technology systems.

Five Phase OMB Management Process

The DoD adopted the Office of Management and Budget five-phase management process and institutionalized it in the DoD Y2K Management Plan. Extensive auditing throughout the DoD helped ensure that compliance with the five-phase system compliance process was relatively uniform and reported results were accurate.
Centralized Guidance, Decentralized Execution

The DoD established the DoD Y2K Management Plan as the central vehicle for conveying guidance on Y2K preparations throughout the department. The use of one document, available on-line, helped ensure all parts of DoD were working towards the same goal using the same approved procedures and tools.

Establish a Centralized Inventory of Information Technology Systems

To ensure a uniform baseline of systems and to implement common performance measurement standards to gauge progress, DoD established a centralized inventory of information technology systems. This DoD Y2K database was an essential management tool combining user level input with data quality assurance measures and managerial reviews. By using an on-line methodology, the DoD was able to continually shorten the reporting cycle as the Y2K program evolved to ensure an accurate and timely representation of DoD Y2K readiness.

Large Scale Integration Testing

The DoD executed a complex and multi-faceted approach to evaluation focused on improving confidence in the Department’s ability to execute the National Military Strategy. The DoD concentrated on complex, real-world end-to-end testing of “business functions” and Warfighter missions necessary to carrying out the national military strategy.

The DoD evaluation efforts were extremely complex and many events occurred nearly simultaneously. The Services conducted integration testing of functional or mission threads. The functional staff proponent on the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) staff organized and conducted end-to-end evaluations of core functional capabilities. Finally, the Commanders in Chief (CINCs) of combatant commands selected unique missions to devise real-world operational evaluations assessing the ability to execute warfighting tasks in a Y2K environment.

The number of activities, finite amount of resources (particularly testing experts and time), and demands of real world day-to-day operations forced an iterative and highly centralized synchronization of the entire evaluation plan. Evaluation efforts were managed in sessions co-chaired by members of the OSD staff and the Joint Staff. The DoD Inspector General provided oversight and another review to search for holes in the evaluation program. Finally, the General Accounting Office also provided external audit.

The key events in the DoD evaluation plan were CINC Operational Evaluations, functional end-to-end evaluations, and Military Department end-to-end and integration testing. The DoD conducted 36 operational evaluations, 31 major end-to-end tests, and 56 large-scale system integration tests, a total of 123 major Y2K evaluations. These evaluations involved thousands of people and systems worldwide, including Navy Battle Groups, Army Divisions, Air Force Wings, Marine Expeditionary Units, and Defense Agencies and Activities.
CINC Operational Evaluations

The DoD assessed operational readiness by validating the warfighting process, from “sensor-to-headquarters” using the significant dates specified by the General Accounting Office Testing Guide. Results confirmed that this kind of evaluation was essential to providing the additional assurance that systems would remain operational over the Y2K transition.

The CINC's of the combatant commands conducted 36 operational evaluations of a representative sample of warfighting systems. Because live fire evaluation of weapons systems was not feasible during CINC operational evaluations, critical weapons and other warfighting systems were evaluated by the military departments during integration testing.

Functional End-to-End Testing

The principal staff assistants of the OSD staff coordinated end-to-end tests of business function processes such as logistics, medical, personnel, communications, intelligence and finance. The Department used its business process managers to evaluate the capability to continue core support functions despite Y2K.

In some functional areas, particularly logistics, the Military Departments conducted end-to-end evaluations of their internal functional systems before DoD-wide functional evaluations. These tests were in addition to the CINC operational evaluations and included, in many cases, organizations and systems outside of DoD.

Military Department End-to-End Testing

Integration testing by the Military Departments ensured continued functioning of key processes such as organizing, training, and equipping forces. This testing was over and above the five-phase Office of Management and Budget process each individual system completed to achieve certification as Y2K compliant.

The Military Department integration testing was a critical factor in ensuring the ability of Service Components to carry out their parts of the CINC warfighting plans and provided a useful foundation prior to more complex, real-world CINC operational evaluations. The successful testing of several weapons systems (Kiowa, Apache, Hellfire, and Multiple Launch Rocket System) at White Sands, New Mexico, for example, provided an excellent basis for future CINC operational evaluations.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Contingency Assessments

The CJCS conducted Exercise POSITIVE RESPONSE Year 2000 (PRY2K), a series of four command post exercises scheduled from February to September 1999. These were the first national level exercises conducted under conditions of multiple Y2K mission critical system failures. The PRY2K assessed the ability of DoD to respond with timely decisions in a Y2K degraded environment and focused on the strategic national tasks of mobilization, deployment, employment, intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance, and sustainment. This series of exercises was designed to achieve senior participation in and awareness of the operational impact of Y2K mission critical systems failure during mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment processes. The concept was to remove mission critical systems and capabilities from play during the conduct of a robust warfighting scenario and then assess DoD ability to respond with timely decisions. In addition, the exercises assessed the ability of the Services to execute operational contingency plans and to mitigate problems associated with Y2K. Finally, senior members of the warfighting community shared lessons learned and other vital information via secure videoteleconference. The Secretary of Defense, CJCS, Service Chiefs, and CINCs participated in the videoteleconference following each exercise with a goal of recommending a strategy to the National Command Authorities to mitigate the impact of mission critical systems failure.

Business Continuity and Contingency Planning (BCCP)

As with other aspects of the Y2K effort, the DoD approach to BCCP was to provide centralized policy guidance with DoD components developing plans based on that guidance and executing them appropriately. While some planning assumptions changed for individual plans, the overall DoD BCCP guidance remained valid. A brief summary of BCCP follows.

Business Impact Analysis
Impact analysis was performed using operational risk analysis procedures standard for all DoD planning processes. Extremely long and complex information chains characterize most DoD missions. To ensure that these chains were thoroughly examined, the Joint Staff, each of the CINCs, the Services, and most DoD Agencies used a technique called Thin Line of Systems Analysis. This technique determined critical paths by which information flowed during the execution of primary missions. Identifying the thin lines served to ensure that all mission-critical systems were identified for each DoD mission/function. Systems comprising these thin lines were all involved in end-to-end testing to ensure that all elements were fully Y2K compliant.

Core Functions

The Department of Defense is a very complex organization. Under its present organization, there are three primary allocations of responsibility. These are:

**Warfighting**, which is the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs and the Unified Commands;

**Organize, Train and Equip**, which are the Title 10 responsibilities of the Military Departments; and

**Support Functions** (Logistics, Personnel, Health/Medical, Communications, Intelligence, and Finance) which are the responsibilities of designated Principal Staff Assistants on the OSD staff.

The DoD commands receive missions from various higher authorities. These missions can be analyzed and linked to elements from the applicable Service or Joint Mission Essential Task List (METL). The missions and METL of each DoD command correspond to the core functions of that command.

Planning Assumptions

There are two major categories of planning assumptions: general assumptions applicable across DoD, and site specific assumptions applicable to a unique location.

General Planning Assumptions

Operations in DoD occur worldwide and thus the general planning assumptions were separated into Continental United States (CONUS) and outside CONUS (OCONUS) locations.

**CONUS**

To prepare BCCP, DoD components assumed that electric power, natural gas, water service, waste treatment, financial services, transportation, the Internet, public voice and data communications, mail service, and the mass media would be available domestically with possible localized disruptions. Each command prepared operational,
contingency plans determining the degree to which the general assumption applied to their sites(s).

OCONUS

In non-U.S. locations, DoD followed the general planning assumptions of the State Department, which, in cooperation with other agencies, gathered Y2K information on a country-specific basis. The State Department designated the Head of Mission in each country as the U.S. lead on Y2K issues there. Agencies with interests overseas worked with the State Department to understand the risks to their operations and to develop appropriate assumptions.

Site-Specific Planning Assumptions

The commander or director responsible for each DoD site or facility was responsible for determining the appropriate site-specific planning assumptions for that location. This entailed due diligence in seeking out the Y2K status of local suppliers of critical services and supplies to that site in support of its core functions.

Other Risks to DoD Operations

The principal external risks to DoD operations were separated into three categories: Domestic Infrastructure Disruptions, Host Nation Infrastructure Support Disruptions, U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)/Allied Systems Interoperability Disruptions.

Domestic Infrastructure Disruptions

Domestic infrastructure disruptions were addressed during the normal contingency planning process. DoD planners made full use of the extensive information available through the Internet and the large number of DoD Y2K-related web sites.

Host Nation Infrastructure Support Disruptions

Regional discussions with host nations for OCONUS installations were used to ensure that Y2K planning assumptions are valid, as discussed previously. In addition, the DoD Y2K Office had representatives working directly with NATO to facilitate the process of information exchange among NATO planners. Since the most critical status updates were those in the final months before the century rollover, this process grew in emphasis during 1999.

NATO/Allied Systems interoperability Disruptions

Interoperability testing was planned and conducted to ensure systems interoperability with Allied and NATO systems. The operational contingency plans developed by Joint and Allied Commands addressed procedures to be followed in case of unforeseen disruptions.
In summary, DoD BCCP efforts were designed to ensure the continued ability to operate regardless of Y2K-related disruptions. As shown during the century rollover, for the isolated instances when system problems occurred, the contingency plan was successfully executed to ensure continued operations with minimal disruption.

**Risk Reduction**

The three major components of DoD's risk reduction efforts were leadership preparations, global outreach, and a group of risk mitigation policies.

**Leadership Preparations**

*Table Top Exercises*

In addition to the CJCS Contingency Assessments, DoD announced its plan for preparing senior leadership for the impact of Y2K on national security in a December 8, 1998, memorandum titled, "Participation in Department of Defense and National Level Y2K Table Top Exercises." This memorandum outlined exercise activities conducted at the defense and national level. The exercises exposed participants to a reasonably worst case scenario induced by potential Y2K failures. These activities enhanced participants' understanding of potential Y2K impacts on national security; assisted in developing policy recommendations; provided continuing impetus to accelerate progress on fixing Y2K systems problems; and facilitated effective contingency planning. The four-part program is in the figure below.

- A set of three functionally oriented one-day policy seminars held in November and December 1998 that identified some 70-80 policy-level issues that formed the foundation for further Table Top Exercise activities.
- A daylong Table Top Exercise policy workshop held on January 30, 1999. Participants represented the key decision-makers of DoD, including the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the State Department, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the President's Y2K Coordinator, and congressional staffers.
- A DoD Defense/National Security game conducted on September 8, 1999, and completed before the national level exercise. The DoD game focused on policy and crisis management in response to a national security emergency. The DoD senior leadership fully participated, including the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Under Secretaries, the DoD Chief Information Officer, selected Principal Staff Assistants and the Directors of specified Defense Agencies. The State Department and FEMA also participated in the exercise.
• This activity led to a National-level Y2K Table Top Exercise on September 18, 1999. This White House inter-agency exercise was supported jointly by DoD and FEMA.

---

### Table Top Exercises

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sep 6, 1999</td>
<td>Defense TTE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 10, 1999</td>
<td>National TTE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 1, 2000</td>
<td>Completed Y2K Game Scenario</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Secretary of Defense Y2K Posture Message**

To ensure uniform preparedness for the Y2K rollover period, the Secretary of Defense issued a Y2K Posture message that specified the level of readiness required for all DoD components in preparing for Y2K rollover events. These posture levels provided planning and action assumptions for DoD components and a means to synchronize actions in anticipation of or response to any disruptions occurring during the date transition.

**Reporting and Tracking Y2K Rollover Problems**

The DoD designated the period September 1, 1999, through March 31, 2000, as the “Y2K Date Transition Period.” This period encompassed possible events occurring from the 9/9/99 date and February 29, 2000, leap year date. To prepare for the unprecedented nature of Y2K, DoD developed procedures to identify, report, and respond effectively to global Y2K events.

In January 1999, DoD formed a Year 2000 Consequence Management Integrated Process Team consisting of representatives from all elements of the Department. The team reviewed guidance, processes, and procedures for providing domestic Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) and Foreign Disaster Assistance. The team also reviewed the organizational structure, processes, and procedures necessary to maintain operational readiness while responding to global requests for assistance. Based on recommendations made by the team, DoD:

- Acted to maintain the department's operational readiness and preeminence its national security responsibilities with consequence management requirements.
- Developed a decision support strategy to ensure DoD resources were applied in the most effective and efficient manner possible.
• Developed the Y2K Decision Support Activity (DSA) to monitor critical defense infrastructures, global public broadcasts, FEMA broadcasts, and the Internet. The DSA provided early warning, infrastructure performance, and resulting decision-support information to the Executive Secretariat, the DoD senior leadership, and the President's Council on Y2K Information Coordination Center.

• Developed specific Y2K training materials to ensure everyone involved in MSCA knew the specific methods for dealing with Y2K-related requests.

• Established an information flow to receive, track, and respond to requests for MSCA from FEMA and Foreign Disaster Assistance requests from Department of State.

Global Outreach

Russia

The U.S. and Russia worked on mutual Y2K-related national security concerns in five areas. The areas included Y2K Technology Management, Missile Warning, Nuclear Command and Control, Nuclear Stockpile Security, and Special Communications Links. Each effort had a lead agency in charge with overall coordination conducted by the OSD Y2K Outreach Office.

Y2K Management

The OSD Y2K Outreach Office was lead agency responsible for the Y2K technology management effort. The purpose of the initiative was to exchange Y2K management program information, general status, and management experiences to provide mutual assistance in managing the problem, as well as understand each other's management plans and progress. Several meetings in Moscow permitted the two countries to exchange ideas on how best to manage the transition period. Russia decided to take an approach similar to the U.S. to meet its Y2K challenges.

Missile Warning

OSD Policy and the Joint Staff were lead agencies for the missile warning initiative. The purpose of the effort was to reduce the risk of misunderstandings from missile early warning systems. Other participants included OSD Staff (C31), U.S. Space Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command, and the Air Force. The Center for Year 2000 Strategic Stability (CY2KSS) was established in Colorado Springs, CO, and operated over the transition period. The CY2KSS was manned by U.S. and Russian participants who jointly monitored missile early warning status and ensured there were no misunderstandings by either country.
Nuclear Command and Control

U.S. Strategic Command was lead for Nuclear Forces Command and Control initiative, which had two purposes. The first was to exchange nuclear specific Y2K management program information, general status, and management experience to assist each other in managing the problem, as well as understand each other's management plans and progress. The second was to discuss plans for managing Y2K when it arrived to prevent misunderstandings during the Y2K transition. Other participants included OSD Staff (Policy, C3I, Public Affairs, and functional experts), Joint Staff, U.S. Space Command and the North American Aerospace Defense Command, and Service Components. The participants worked with Russian Strategic Rocket Forces representatives to address mutual concerns and remedies.

Nuclear Stockpile Security

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) was lead agency for the nuclear stockpile security initiative. The purpose was to ensure control, security, and accountability of Russian nuclear materials, including stockpiles, weapons labs, and associated technology during the Y2K transition. Other participants included OSD Staff (Policy, C3I, and functional experts), Joint Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, and Service Components. The participants worked with Russian Ministry of Defense counterparts on specific action areas. Russia identified the location of 50 monitoring centers to meet security requirements and DTRA worked with the Russian Ministry of Defense to establish and equip the centers for Y2K transition period operations.

Special Communication Links

The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) was lead agency for the Special Communications Links initiative. The purpose was to ensure reliable communications between U.S. and Russian national political and military leaders during the Y2K transition. Other participants included OSD Staff (Policy, C3I, Public Affairs, and functional experts), Joint Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, and Service Components. Extensive work was conducted during the final months to assess existing communications links, upgrade various segments to ensure full Y2K compliance, and install additional redundancy and capability for the transition period.

Host Nation Support

The OSD Y2K Outreach program supplemented the extensive work of the Joint Staff, Service components, and defense organizations to address Y2K issues and ensure DoD could continue operations during the Y2K transition period. In many cases the emphasis for these prior efforts was placed on determining the installation's internal ability to manage Y2K challenges and did not necessarily address the capabilities of the host nations to provide continued support to overseas operating locations and missions.

The Y2K Outreach office expanded the overall DoD focus to "look beyond the fence" thus determining if and to what extent host nations could continue important
support services during the Y2K transition period. The ultimate goal of the expanded efforts was to provide the CINCs and Service components the information they needed to determine vulnerabilities and conduct effective planning for continuity of operations and contingencies. Host nation sectors of primary concern included energy, telecommunications, water, wastewater, transportation, air traffic control services, medical services, and safety and security.

OSD Y2K Outreach worked closely with the Joint Staff, the Services, and CINC Y2K offices to determine which installations and support sectors required additional investigation to support planning efforts. The main geographic areas of interest for these efforts were Europe, South West Asia, and the Pacific/Asia. Specific locations were selected for assessment and teams were formed to visit the locations and meet with U.S. and host nation representatives. Each of the visits required extensive coordination with the State Department, embassies, CINC Y2K offices, DoD commands and components, and other U.S. Government (USG) organizations to schedule meetings and visits within the host nations. Each team was tailored to meet specific tasks and information requirements.

Information developed during the visits, continued research, coordination of information associated with other USG agency efforts, and additional details provided by operating locations in host countries provided a much better account of what to expect during the transition. In addition, the extensive level of coordination led to additional sources of information and increased the awareness of various issues among all participants. The combined contributions of all USG agencies provided a much better assessment of what DoD and other USG agencies could expect during the transition in overseas operating locations. Specific attention was paid to NATO, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). OSD Y2K Outreach established working relationships with the SHAPE Y2K Program Management Office and provided appropriate technical expertise as SHAPE developed its Y2K management plans.

Risk Mitigation Policies

Consequence Management

The Department of Defense worked with other Federal agencies on consequence management and continuity of operations planning and recognized the potential for multiple competing demands for DoD resources throughout the Y2K date transition period. Because of this, in January 1999, the Department conducted a high level review of its “consequence management” policies, procedures, and organizations. Actions taken after the review ensured DoD was prepared to support a potentially increased number of requests for both domestic and international assistance.

First priority was to ensure DoD’s ability to conduct ongoing or imminent support to the National Command Authorities, warfighting, peacekeeping, intelligence, nuclear command and control, or critical infrastructure protection operations. Consequently,
approval by the Secretary of Defense, or his designated representative, was required before committing organizations and assets engaged in Priority 1 activities to support Y2K-related requests for assistance.

Likewise, the approval of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or his designated representative, was required before committing assets or organizations engaged in Priority 2 activities to support Y2K-related requests for assistance.

Other units could provide support to civil authorities with first priority to maintenance of public health and safety and second priority to maintenance of the economy and the nation's quality of life.

Throughout 1999, DoD actively collaborated with federal agencies and organizations to further the Department's (and the Nation's) ability to develop and exercise the information flow and procedures necessary to respond effectively to Y2K-related events.

Configuration Management

The DoD issued a policy, "Limitation on Configuration Changes to Y2K-Compliant Systems," on August 20, 1999, to prevent jeopardizing system compliance by further modifications. This policy gave final decision-making authority to CINC's and ensured decisions on fielding or modifying systems included assessment of risks to current and future operations.

The importance of configuration management, including centralized visibility, was one of the important lessons of Y2K. In addition, preparation for Y2K also highlighted difficulty in maintaining positive control of configuration management activities.

Internet Connectivity

As part of its Y2K preparations, DoD issued a policy, "Increasing the Security Posture of the Unclassified but Sensitive Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet)," on August 22, 1999, to ensure all DoD component systems connected to the internet met minimum security requirements. This policy required all connections to the Internet be through NIPRNet gateways managed by the Defense Information Systems Agency.

As DoD organizations worked to secure Internet connections, a collective appreciation for DoD's reliance on the Internet and on its vulnerabilities was gained. One of the challenges in achieving information assurance will be to mitigate DoD vulnerability to Internet weaknesses.

Community Conversations
During the summer months of 1999, parallel to and in support of the President’s Council on Year 2000 Conversion, DoD launched a program of Community Conversations to promote awareness of local issues and encourage proactive contingency planning. The DoD implemented this concept across all Military Departments with a continuing effort through the end of 1999 to raise community awareness for day one planning and personal preparedness.

Major installations hosted many events engaging civic leaders and the general populace in open dialogue. The materials and centralized guidance provided by the OSD staff promulgated a common and consistent message to coincide with that of the President’s Council. Materials for Community Conversations and other Y2K Business Continuity and Contingency Planning items of interest were made available at the DoD Y2K Contingency Planning web site. Over 200 DoD installations engaged in “Community Conversations” with their surrounding civilian communities to share information regarding Y2K efforts.

**Code Screening**

The Department purchased tools to aid in Y2K renovation and testing that proved to be not only cost effective, but also a critical part of the DoD risk mitigation effort. These tools were industrial-strength quality assurance and test support software useful in Y2K compliance testing, code analysis, regression testing, and code quality assessment. As a risk reduction measure, the military departments, intelligence community, and defense agencies screened large amounts of computer code with multiple tools.

Code screening turned out to be a very effective final screening effort when coupled with an effective configuration management process. This effort had many positive benefits for future information assurance and information technology management initiatives.

**External Auditing**

External auditing was a major factor in DoD’s Y2K success and Y2K was the most audited non-financial event in federal government history. Every aspect of the DoD Y2K program involved external auditing. For systems Y2K compliance, the DoD Y2K Management Plan provided guidance on independent verification and validation of system Y2K compliance. A mix of independent contractors, Inspectors General, other internal audit agencies, and the Government Accounting Office conducted independent verification and validation efforts. Large scale integration testing was audited by military department inspectors general, the DoD Inspector General, and the General Accounting Office. Finally, several risk mitigation efforts involved external auditing, such as configuration management and code screening.
The DoDIIG and Military Inspectors General

The Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Auditing, DoD, in accordance with an informal partnership with the DoD Chief Information Officer, provided substantial support to effective oversight of the DoD Y2K program. Since its initial Y2K audit efforts in 1997, the DoD Inspector General conducted 181 Y2K audits, devoting over 180 staff years, or more than 30 percent of its audit staff, to Y2K audits during FY 1999. Staff costs for Y2K audits during Fiscal Years 1998 and 1999 exceeded $16 million.

The Military Department Inspectors General provided independent assessments of DoD Y2K compliance management and implementation by making Y2K a special inspection item.

The General Accounting Office (GAO)

GAO auditors played a similar function in advising the senior leadership. The DoD followed GAO’s guides and templates for each phase of remediation as well as GAO guides for contingency planning and Day One planning.

Summary of DoD Y2K program

The complex and wide-ranging DoD Y2K program resulted in an extraordinary level of success for the century rollover. In addition, there were many benefits gained that will pay dividends in future information technology management and information assurance efforts.

DoD Y2K Lessons Learned

There were many lessons learned from the Y2K experience at every echelon of DoD. The most important of these have been distilled and grouped in three categories: Enterprise-Wide lessons applying to DoD and other federal agencies, Chief Information Officer lessons that apply to DoD efforts to achieve compliance with the provisions of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, and Warfighting lessons learned from the Joint Staff and CINCs.

Enterprise-Wide Lessons Learned

Hard work paid off - everything worked

Across DoD, thousands of systems continued to function across the century rollover. In cases where there were problems, contingency plans worked and assets were available to quickly respond to problems. This success is a testament to the rigor of system compliance efforts, contingency and continuity of operations planning, and superb execution throughout the DoD.

Government worked

The success achieved on Y2K is a testament to hard work by government employees and contractors across the federal government. Interagency efforts coordinated by the President’s Council on Y2K, including the federal sectors and high impact programs, produced the Y2K success. The cooperation between government and industry worked, as did an unprecedented level of cooperation between governments. Despite a high level of ongoing military operations, the job got done right.
Warfighting/Readiness Issue

In the summer of 1998, senior leaders recognized that Y2K was a Chief Executive Officer problem - not just a Chief Information Officer problem. To energize DoD, the Secretary of Defense directed the DoD leadership to treat Y2K as a readiness issue in August of 1998. This turning point ensured all members of DoD understood the necessity of cooperation to achieve success in preparing for Y2K and galvanized preparedness efforts.

Horizontal Problems versus Vertical Organizations

The DoD and government are organized along vertical lines, however, many problems of the 21st century are horizontal in nature, such as encryption and Y2K. Management for success requires a team oriented approach and close Chief Executive Officer focus to ensure successful resolution of key organizational problems where responsibility does not lie solely with one major organizational component. The Y2K problem showed the utility of standardized guidance and performance measurement tools to focus efforts across the organization coupled with proactive external auditing and effective management response.

Increased Dependence on Information Technology Systems

Business process improvements have increased dependence on information technology systems -- a potential vulnerability. One example is “Just in time” logistics. The DoD achieved success by teamwork with our business partners. The DoD required confidence in its vendor partners, which resulted from close teamwork and other measures, such as surveying thousands of U.S. companies to check Y2K readiness.

Importance of Computer Professionals

In preparing for Y2K, one important outcome was that warriors realized they needed the computer professional. DoD culture emphasizes warfighters; not computer professionals. After the Y2K effort, all now recognize that DoD needs to adapt to recognize the significance and contributions of information technology professionals.

Chief Information Officer Lessons Learned

Importance of Effective Chief Information Officers

DoD CIO’s must have a close working relationship with warfighters and senior leaders to make best use of Information Technology. Since a high level of information technology supports every part of the DoD, effective participation by the Chief Information Officer in business decisions was clearly recognized by all. These efforts span the DoD business processes of warfighting, support operations, and organizing, training, and equipping.

Collaborative Partnerships

The efforts of DoD in working with industry and allies had a large payoff in many ways, not just for Y2K. The increased appreciation for the level of interdependence and linkages of IT systems had major benefits for daily operations and planning.

One previous program, the Enterprise Software Initiative, proved extremely successful in making industrial-strength quality assurance and test support software useful in Y2K compliance testing, code analysis, regression testing, and code quality assessment widely available throughout DoD. Other collaborative partnerships involving prime vendors and electronic business have great potential for further benefits.
Centralized Guidance/Decentralized Execution

The use of one capstone document, the DoD Y2K Management Plan, to provide centralized policies, procedures, and performance measurement tools was a key element of DoD's success in Y2K. The scope, magnitude, and complexity of the Y2K problem for DoD made decentralized execution a necessity. Making centralized guidance widely available on-line, fostered teamwork and helped ensure all organizational elements focused on the same goals.

Accurate Inventory of Information Technology

Centralized visibility of assets is fundamental to information technology management (e.g., acquisition, configuration management, and information assurance). Timely and accurate performance measurement is essential to quality management oversight. The DoD Y2K database was used to ensure visibility and standardized reporting of progress.

By making the database available on-line to all DoD components, including the Intelligence Community, the reporting process was compressed. This allowed the DoD Y2K database to be used as an accurate and comprehensive measure of DoD progress in many areas of Y2K. The DoD Y2K database will be used as the basis for compliance with the provisions of Public Law 106-79, DoD Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2000, concerning registration and certification of information technology systems by the Chief Information Officer.

Teamwork with External Oversight and Audit Organizations

One of the major success factors for DoD on Y2K was the transparency resulting from including Congress, GAO, Office of Management and Budget, and the DoD Inspector General in all aspects of the DoD Y2K effort. Representatives attended monthly Y2K Steering Committee meetings chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and remained fully apprised of DoD status on all aspects of Y2K.

Warfighting Lessons Learned

The Joint Staff hosted a conference for CINC, OSD, and Defense Agency representatives on February 1-2, 2000, to address Y2K lessons learned.

Overview

Dealing with Y2K required parallel execution of many parts of a complex process. Success was enabled by leadership; unprecedented close relationships between DoD, the Joint Staff, and the CINCs, Services, and Defense Agencies and Activities; and a willingness and ability to re-focus workforces as the collective understanding of the Y2K problem changed.

Success on Y2K had many side-benefits, including improved knowledge of systems, system architectures, and interdependencies; mission versus purely system focus; continuity of operations plans and contingency plans that worked.

Joint Staff and CINC Lessons Learned

Joint Staff and CINC specific lessons learned included rollover organizations, use of reserve forces, and the role of Joint Staff and CINC Chief Information Officers.
Rollover Organizations

One of the lessons learned from Y2K rollover preparations and operations was that well-staffed organizations paid off. A clear focus on Y2K failures, millennium groups and terrorist attacks, and computer network attacks was maintained and served well. During rollover reporting, however, it became clear that current report formats work well for operational issues but are not well structured for capturing the impacts of information technology problems on warfighting operations. The Joint Staff and CINC staffs are actively working to restructure the report within the next six months.

Use of Reserve Forces

Reserves and contractor support were essential to the Y2K effort. Many individuals were called to active duty to support various aspects of the Y2K effort. In some cases, the lead times and processes to obtain reserve forces varied among the reserve components. Once called up, however, these individuals provided essential support to enable successful execution of Y2K efforts in the combatant commands and their components.

Joint Staff and CINC Chief Information Officers

Based on work during Y2K, it became clear that Chief Information Officer roles, responsibilities, and implementations were inconsistent across the combatant commands and the Joint Staff. The importance of Chief Information Officers was clearly recognized and DoD is developing a plan of action to establish them on the Joint Staff and CINC staffs.

DoD-Wide Recommendations

The DoD-wide lessons learned identified during the Joint Staff Y2K conference include data reuse, management processes, configuration management, and testing.

Data Reuse

Many types of information and data were centrally collected for Y2K, including OSD, Joint Staff, CINC, Military Department, and Defense Agency databases of Y2K-related information on specific systems across the information technology spectrum. The Y2K “thin-lines” and mission architectures provided a view of the critical processes and interrelationships of selected critical warfighting missions and tasks. Contingency plans and continuity of operations plans were developed, which proved to be a valuable training tool.

This data has many potential reuses, including information assurance; critical infrastructure protection; joint operational architectures; and refinement of deliberate and contingency planning. The data is also potentially useful for incorporating information assurance, critical infrastructure protection, interoperability, and configuration management into military exercises; and for enhancing DoD information technology management.
As an example, DoD will convert the DoD Y2K database for use in registering and certifying DoD information technology systems under section 8121 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2000.

Management Processes

The integration of Chief Information Officers and Warfighters was key to Y2K success. For example, the construction of thin line architectures provided invaluable insights into warfighting tasks and the reliance on information technology systems. Coupled with the operational evaluations that tested system interoperability, a collective appreciation was realized for the necessity to carefully manage information technology systems supporting warfighting operations. Based on this lesson learned, the Joint Staff and CINCs will develop joint operational architectures for all warfighting mission areas.

Configuration Management

The CINCs require insight into their system configurations to allow analysis of the benefits and risks of fielding information technology systems or configuration changes. To provide this insight, the DoD Y2K configuration management limitation policy will be allowed to expire on March 15, 2000. The Joint Staff and CINCs will work to develop a proposed framework for sustaining CINC insight into system configurations.

Another factor in DoD’s success on Y2K was the use of software tools to support configuration management and technical problem isolation. The tools continue to be used on a daily basis and are required for future operations. Consequently, DoD will renew licenses for independent verification and validation tools for further use in configuration management.

Another lesson learned by warfighting functional proponents was information technology management programs are not well defined, adequately resourced, nor are program requirements fully defined. The CINCs and Joint Staff will continue working to ensure information technology managers fully define program requirements and that resources are provided once requirements are defined.

Testing

The warfighting context provided by CINC operational evaluations was critical to DoD Y2K success. The operational evaluations validated information technology testing and evaluation, including examination of contingency plans. In the future, the department will incorporate information assurance, critical infrastructure protection, interoperability, and configuration management issues into routine CJCS, CINC, and Military Department exercise and training programs.
Another benefit of the Y2K effort was the appreciation of how battle labs added an invaluable dimension to CINC operational evaluations. These centralized testing facilities contained the necessary resources and expertise to enable successful information technology testing of operational architectures.

**Summary of Actions**

Based on lessons learned from the Y2K effort, the Joint Staff will take the following actions in coordination with the CINCs and other DoD components:

- Review suitability of Operational Reports for global information technology reporting;
- Streamline and standardize Reserve call-up procedures;
- Develop a resource strategy for large-scale CINC information technology operations;
- Develop a plan to establish Chief Information Officers on the Joint and CINC staffs;
- Institutionalize integration of Chief Information Officers and Warfighters;
- Consider databases, thin lines, and leftover documentation for reuse in information assurance, critical infrastructure protection, joint operational architectures, standing contingency plans, exercises, and information technology management;
- Develop prototype Joint Operational Architectures;
- Propose framework for sustaining CINC insight into system configurations;
- Renew licenses for existing independent verification and validation tools;
- Define information technology program requirements and resource accordingly; and,
- Incorporate information assurance, critical infrastructure protection, interoperability and configuration management into routine exercises and training.

**Effective Implementation of Lessons Learned – The Bottom Line**

Four aspects of the Y2K process are vital to implementing Y2K lessons learned:

- Senior leadership must remain engaged in information technology management;
- Every level of management and operations must understand the warfighting processes supported by information technology systems;
- Information technology management requirements must be defined and understood at all levels; and,
- Information technology management functions must receive enough resources to meet the requirements.
The combination of these three groups of DoD lessons learned from Y2K (Enterprise-Wide, Chief Information Officer, and Warfighting), provide a roadmap for improving information technology management. The DoD Chief Information Officer will use the DoD Chief Information Officer Executive Board to monitor implementation of Y2K lessons learned on the OSD staff, Joint Staff, Military Departments, and Defense Agencies. Implementing and institutionalizing these lessons learned will better position DoD to address similar “horizontal” problems, such as information assurance.

Conclusion

The DoD efforts to address the Y2K problem resulted in major improvements to information technology management throughout the department. Increased appreciation at all levels for DoD’s reliance on information technology and the role of the Chief Information Officer, the shift in focus from systems to core missions and functions, greatly improved contingency and continuity of operations plans, and improved risk mitigation measures are all positive outcomes of the Y2K experience.

The lessons learned from Y2K provide a clear roadmap for improving information technology management within DoD and for expediting compliance with all provisions of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996. The DoD Y2K effort has laid a firm foundation for longer term improvements in managing and protecting information technology systems and critical infrastructure.
Chapter 8 – Counter-Drug Operations

Since 1989, the Department of Defense has been the designated lead federal agency for the detection and monitoring of illegal drug trafficking from the source zone to the United States. From 1993-2001, the Office of the Department of Defense Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support (DEP&S) provided policy guidance, creative initiatives, and operational support to the Department’s counterdrug efforts. During this period, the Drug Enforcement Policy and Support office, comprised of 25 civilian and military personnel, spearheaded several new counterdrug initiatives that capitalized on the Department’s strengths, maximizing the Department’s impact on the nation’s fight against illegal drug trafficking. The tremendous breadth of counterdrug programs, the complexity of the counterdrug mission within the constraints of U.S. law and international law, and the constantly changing landscape of illegal drug trafficking, highlights the extraordinary efforts of the dedicated men and women in the Drug Enforcement Policy and Support office in meeting this challenge.

The Drug Enforcement Policy and Support office is unique within the Department of Defense, in that it is the only office that provides policy guidance, while planning, programming, budgeting, and executing the resources necessary to accomplish the mission at hand. The Office, on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, develops the Department’s counterdrug policies and programs in concert with and to complement the President’s National Drug Control Strategy, the numerous interagency counterdrug programs, and the domestic or host nation counterdrug programs and policies. The Office is constantly coordinating and monitoring the actions of the U.S. Army, the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Marine Corps, the combatant commands, and over twelve Defense Agencies and organizations in their execution of over 120 different counterdrug programs valued at over $4.5 billion dollars.

Over the past eight years (1993-01), the Office has been instrumental in instituting and developing a number of unique initiatives designed to have the utmost effect on reducing the flow of illegal drugs into the United States:

1) Developed and implemented the successful Peru air bridge denial program, designed to deny illegal drug traffickers use of the sky as they flew precursor chemicals and raw materials from Peru to Colombia used to make cocaine;

2) Launched the essential Ground Based End Game Operation (GBEGO) program, which vastly increased the effectiveness of U.S. and host nation military forces in detecting, tracking, and intercepting drug traffickers before they have a chance to deliver their illegal cargo. During the tenures of Defense Secretaries Aspen, Perry, and Cohen, the Office of the Department of Defense Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support developed and managed the Ground-Based End Game Operations (GBEGO) project, designed to improve the overall effectiveness of drug law enforcement agencies in South America to conduct arrests, drug seizures and execute extremely dangerous laboratory takedowns. In developing the GBEGO, valued at nearly $20 million over three years, the Office demonstrated
impressive attention to detail and worked closely with the Joint Staff, the U.S. Joint Forces Command and the CINC USSOUTHCOM to ensure funds were expended in strict accordance with congressional authority and Department of Defense counterdrug policies and priorities. The direct result of the hard work by the Office is reflected in the fact that the GBEGO project operates very smoothly and has become one of the most highly visible and sought after counterdrug support programs in South America;

(3) Played a key leadership role in the interagency formulation and implementation of a $1.3 billion FY2000 Colombia Emergency Supplemental (Plan Colombia), critical to the survival of Colombia as a democratic nation;

(4) Overhauled the Department’s urinalysis testing program and policies - vital for U.S. military force readiness - by instituting an automated, standardized, military and civilian drug testing program, conducting over 3 million tests annually. The Office ensures that critical drug tests are conducted by all services under the most stringent quality control standards, thereby maintaining a high degree of program integrity, which directly supports effective combat readiness of all military service members. Several dimensions of this activity include:

- The Office saved DoD $3.4 million dollars by successfully defending the program to continue use of military facilities for both recruit entrance and Army National Guard testing in lieu of transferring the program to private contractor facilities;
- The Office also was the lead agency in the development, execution, and follow-up of the first ever collaboration with the Russian Armed Forces for a military drug-testing program. This bold new initiative has provided invaluable assistance to the Russian military on drug testing techniques;
- The Office of the Department of Defense Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support was also instrumental in the ongoing demand reduction programs for military personnel in each of the Services and, in addition, has drastically improved the Department’s demand reduction programs for civilian personnel. The Department’s demand reduction program: provides early intervention with training and education; establishes strong deterrents to drug abuse by drug screening; takes swift and appropriate administrative action when drug abuse is identified; and, shares the knowledge that is gained with other organizations and communities. The results have been extraordinary and a source of pride to the entire Department of Defense. Demonstrating the government’s commitment to reducing the level of drug use within the military, data from the services show a continued decrease in prior 30-day self-admitted illicit drug use among Department of Defense Active Duty military personnel by 20 percent in the period from 1994 to 1998 (the Navy alone.
experienced a 55 percent reduction in drug use in 1998 as compared to 1994). Unequivocally, this shows that the Department, since 1993, has been moving in the "right direction".

(5) Unveiled an unprecedented counterdrug cooperative effort with the Mexican military targeted at increasing the effectiveness of the Mexican's ability to interdict illegal drugs before they arrive in the U.S.;

(6) Developed a continuum of effective counterdrug Program Objective Memoranda, Budget Estimate Submissions, Congressional Justification Books and other counterdrug resource documents too numerous to mention;

(7) Built "from scratch" a ground-breaking counterdrug training and equipment program supporting the governments of Peru and Colombia in the extremely difficult task of interdicting narcotraffickers and their shipments on the rivers. Valued at over $89 million dollars, this 5-year program had extraordinary visibility in Congress, Department of State (DoS), Department of Defense, the U.S. counterdrug community and the governments of Peru and Columbia; and,

(8) Coordinated the National Guard's counterdrug activities (totaling more than $180 million dollars annually) with the 54 states/territories governors, Attorney General's, counterdrug coordinators, and the National Guard Bureau. This includes funding, rules of engagement, legal authorities, and numerous policy implications in order to ensure the effective and appropriate implementation of the highly visible domestic part of the counterdrug program. All fifty-four states and territories have aggressive National Guard supported counterdrug programs that provide extensive support to law enforcement agencies at the Federal, state and local levels. This support includes: surface and aerial reconnaissance and surveillance; transportation and engineering support; and cargo container inspections. The cargo container inspection support is particularly significant and has resulted in an 80 percent increase in cargo container searches and current annual support of over one million man/days in this vital area.

In response to the departure of U.S. forces from Panama, DEP&S orchestrated in coordination with Commander in Chief (CINC) U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) plans and resources for a significant major reorganization in the USSOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility or "AOR". Major elements of this restructure include:

(1) The merger of Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) East and South at Key West;

(2) The consolidation and transfer of administrative functions from the merged JIATF to USSOUTHCOM Headquarters;

(3) The Merger of Caribbean Regional Operations Center (CARIBROC) and Southern Regional Operations Center (SOUTHROC) at Key West; and,

(4) The development of Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) in Aruba/Curacao, Ecuador and El Salvador to offset the closing of Howard Air Force Base. The FOLs, in the post-Howard era, are the new "launching pads" for U.S.
counterdrug Detection & Monitoring flights into the source zone of South America. Additionally, all restructuring was completed while maintaining 24-hour surveillance and support operations to several Federal agencies including U.S. Customs Service, Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Department of Justice.