

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS, re: Telephone Call with French President Chirac (1 page)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1) vL 3/3/2020
001b. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with French President Jacques Chirac (2 pages)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1) vL 3/3/2020
002. cable	US Mission, USNATO to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C.; re: July 21 Ministers Meeting on Bosnia - A View from NATO [NATO] (3 pages)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1)
003. paper	re: The Bosnian Serbs & the Enclaves (5 pages)	07/12/1995	P1/b(1)
004. paper	re: Gorazde (2 pages)	07/12/1995	P1/b(1)
005. memo	Sir Robin Renwick, British Ambassador to The Secretary et al; re: British Cabinet's Decisions on Bosnia (1 page)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1)
006. memo	Sir Robin Renwick, British Ambassador to The Secretary et al; re: British Cabinet's Decisions on Bosnia (1 page)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1)
007. paper	re: Military Options in Bosnia [partial] (2 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1) vL 3/3/2020
008a. memo	Mary Ann Peters to Anthony Lake; re: Your Meeting with British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind [partial] (3 pages)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1), P5 vL 3/3/2020
008b. talking points	re: Talking Points for Meeting with British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind [partial] (4 pages)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1) vL 3/3/2020
009a. letter	Jacques Chirac to John Major; re: Gorazde (2 pages)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Alexander Vershbow (European)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995 [Mid-July] [3]

2006-0647-F

jp2104

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009b. letter	Jacques Chirac to John Major; re: Gorazde [in French] (2 pages)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1)
010. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with British Prime Minister John Major (2 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1) VL 3/3/2020
011. paper	re: Talking Paper - July 16, 1995 Chiefs of Defense Meeting in London Concerning Bosnia (6 pages)	07/15/1995	P1/b(1)
012. note	Jim Pardew to Mr. Slocombe et al; re: Gorazde (1 page)	07/17/1995	P1/b(1), P5 KDE 5/26/16
013a. memo	Nelson Drew to Anthony Lake; re: Response to Fall of Srebrenica (1 page)	07/12/1995	P1/b(1) RDS 6/6/2013
013b. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS; re: Response to Fall of Srebrenica (2 pages)	07/12/1995	P1/b(1), P5
014a. memo	Andrew Sens to Kenneth Brill; re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (1 page)	07/15/1995	P1/b(1) VL 11/5/2019
014b. telcon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between POTUS & Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany; re; Bosnia (3 pages)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1) JSCAR 7/3/2019
014c. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with Chancellor Helmut Kohl [partial] (1 page)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1) RDS 6/6/2013
015a. memo	Andrew Sens to Kenneth Brill; re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between POTUS & French President Jacques Chirac (1 page)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1) VL 11/5/2019
015b. telcon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between POTUS & French President Jacques Chirac; re: Bosnia [partial] (5 pages)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1) RDS 6/6/2013

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Alexander Vershbow (European)
 OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995 [Mid-July] [3]

2006-0647-F
 jp2104

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
--------------------------	---------------	------	-------------

015. paper	re: Bosnia Strategy [partial] (4 pages)	07/12/1995	P1/b(1), P5
------------	---	------------	-------------

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Alexander Vershbow (European)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995 (Mid-July) [4]

2006-0647-F
jp2105

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONINFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Principals' July 14 Conclusions on Bosnia

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
CIA Historical Collections Division
ML 70-14 1 OCT 2013
[2012-0800-m, 1.08]

Response to Fall of Srebrenica: Principals agreed that we should not be seen as saying "no" to the French on efforts to make UNPROFOR more robust or their specific proposal to reinforce Gorazde. But we must find ways to turn the discussion to options that are militarily feasible without falling into the trap of either having to put forces in on the ground or be blamed for the failure of UNPROFOR. The immediate decision is to send General Shali to London to meet on Sunday with his French and British counterparts for the purpose of reviewing the military options being considered in the aftermath of Srebrenica. Shali will raise a series of issues about the French Gorazde option designed to focus the discussion on what is realistic from a military standpoint:

- the need to ensure that the mission makes sense and that the Bosnian government will mount an active defense where UNPROFOR makes its stand;
- the need for preemptive suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) to support an UNPROFOR stand either at Gorazde or Sarajevo;
- the need to eliminate the dual key in enforcing the heavy weapons exclusion zone around Gorazde (and Sarajevo), to bolster the more robust posture on the ground;
- the need for UNPROFOR to act as though under Chapter VII provisions throughout Bosnia, to reduce the likelihood of additional hostages being taken in response to tough UNPROFOR action in Gorazde;
- the fact that it will take 10-14 days for a U.S. helicopter lift package to be in place and ready to assist with French redeployments;
- the need for UNPROFOR troops assisting in the defense of Gorazde to be effectively integrated with and supported by Bosnian government forces who would bear the primary responsibility for active defense of the enclave;

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on:

in: OADR

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

- ensuring that a clear line of NATO command and control exists for any U.S. lift and/or logistical support;
- a commitment from the French that if we assist in redeployment of their forces to provide a more robust UNPROFOR posture, they will not turn around and withdraw from UNPROFOR anyway; and
- a clear signal that any U.S. assistance is a one-time deal that implies neither any commitment of U.S. ground forces nor willingness to engage in a similar operation again.

Principals agreed that if there was to be a decision for UNPROFOR to make a stand at Gorazde, it would be a decision for Sarajevo, London, Paris and Kiev to make. We would not seek to drive such a choice if they are not willing to implement it. We will, however, signal to allies at the meeting in London this weekend that we believe such a decision would require robust use of air power, and that we stand ready to provide it in conjunction with a NATO effort to restore air supremacy over Bosnia.

It was agreed that, in the end, Sarajevo is more important to a successful UNPROFOR strategy than Gorazde. Principals agreed that we should not only support using the RRF to open a secure land route, but measures to enable UNPROFOR to counter Serb artillery attacks on the city. The JCS will develop a list of equipment deemed essential to the protection of Sarajevo, such as advanced counter-battery artillery systems, that could be provided as part of our planned \$50 million in drawdown contributions to the RRF.

Principals determined that the risk of Serbian attempts to take hostages would dramatically increase if UNPROFOR adopted a more robust policy of actively defending the remaining enclaves, and that therefore it would be necessary for the UNMO missions to be withdrawn from Serb-controlled territory.

Dole Resolution on Lift: All of us agreed that, as a strategy for opposing the unilateral lift bill being put forward by Bob Dole, we should encourage efforts to amend the language in order to remove the most onerous provisions of the legislation, but serve notice that even with amendments, a requirement that the U.S. would unilaterally violate binding UNSC resolutions would be subject to your veto. Secretary Perry will take the lead in approaching Senator Nunn to seek his assistance in getting amendments to:

- extend the time allowed before lift would take effect from 12 weeks to the 22 weeks necessary to implement OPLAN 40104;
- link any requirement for lifting the arms embargo to its likely consequences by including Congressional authorization for U.S. participation in a NATO-led withdrawal operation;

- ensure that the trigger for implementation of lift is not just a request from the Bosnian government, but rather a decision by the UN Security Council; and
- change unilateral lift to multilateral lift.

Secretary Perry will make clear to Nunn that, even if he succeeds on the first three points, the bill will be subject to your veto as long as it still required unilateral lift. However, in the event that a veto is overridden, his assistance in gaining the amendments we are seeking could be instrumental in saving the lives of UNPROFOR troops and the NATO soldiers, including U.S., helping to extract them should the lift bill trigger withdrawal -- as the French have assured us it will.

Negotiations with Milosevic: Finally, we received word of a new agreement that EU mediator Carl Bildt is close to concluding with Milosevic to obtain a mutual recognition package between Bosnia and Serbia. The deal would go too far in restricting our ability to reimpose sanctions if Milosevic did not live up to his commitment to seal the border. (It would require a majority among either the five Contact Group members or the five UNSC Permanent members to reimpose sanctions after 9 months, thus giving the Russians, British and French the ability to block.) Ambassador Frasure will meet with Bildt next week to explain our reservations.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Nelson Drew to Anthony Lake; re: Your Meeting with Bosnian Foreign Minister Sacirbey (1 page)	07/17/1995	P1/b(1), P5 VL 3/3/2020
001b. talking points	re: Talking Points for Use with Bosnian Foreign Minister Sacirbey (1 page)	07/17/1995	P1/b(1) VL 3/3/2020
002. cable	Letter from Prime Minister John Major to POTUS; re: Gorazde, UNPROFOR, & Bosnia (3 pages)	07/17/1995	P1/b(1)
003. talking points	re: Talking Points to be Used in Response to Deliberations by British Cabinet Over Bosnia (2 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1) VL 3/3/2020
004. memo	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense; re: CHODs Meeting in London [partial]. (3 pages)	07/16/1995	P1/b(1), P5 VL 3/3/2020
005. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS; re: Principals' July 14 Conclusions on Bosnia (3 pages)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1) RDE 10/1/2013 Bosnia Conference
006. paper	re: Gorazde (3 pages)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1)
007. report	re: Srebrenica (3 pages)	07/13/1995	P1/b(1)
008a. memo	Nelson Drew to Anthony Lake; re: July 14 Principals Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1), P5
008b. agenda	re: NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1) VL 11/5/2019
008c. paper	re: Discussion Paper - Elements of a Post-UNPROFOR Strategy - Support the Federation; Contain the Conflict (9 pages)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1) RDE 10/1/2013 Bosnia Conference

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Alexander Vershbow (European)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995 (Mid-July) [4]

2006-0647-F

jp2105

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009a. memo	Nelson Drew to Anthony Lake; re: July 14 Principals Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1), P5
009b. agenda	re: NSC Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1) VL 11/5/2019
009c. paper	re: Discussion Paper - Elements of a Post-UNPROFOR Strategy - Support the Federation; Contain the Conflict (9 pages)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1) RDE 10/1/2013 Bosnia Conference
010. cable	US Mission, USUN New York to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C.; re: July 12 - Resolution Adopted on Srebrenica (4 pages)	07/13/1995	P1/b(1)
011a. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS, re: Telephone Call with Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok (1 page)	07/13/1995	P1/b(1) VL
011b. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with Dutch Prime Minister Wim Kok (1 page)	07/13/1995	P1/b(1) VL
012. email	Alexander Vershbow to Nancy Soderberg et al; re: Thoughts on Strategy for Opposing Dole (1 page)	07/12/1995	P1/b(1) VL
013a. email	Alexander Vershbow to Anthony Lake; re: Bosnia Strategy Paper (1 page)	07/13/1995	P1/b(1), P5 VL 3/3/2020
013b. paper	re: Bosnia Strategy [partial] (4 pages)	07/12/1995	P1/b(1), P5 RDE 10/1/2013
014. paper	re: Bosnia Endgame Strategy [partial] (4 pages)	07/17/1995	P1/b(1), P5 RDE 10/1/2013
015. paper	re: Bosnia Strategy [partial] (4 pages)	07/12/1995	P1/b(1), P5 RDE 10/1/2013
016. paper	re: Bosnia Endgame Strategy [partial] (4 pages)	07/17/1995	P1/b(1), P5 RDE 10/1/2013

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Alexander Vershbow (European)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995 (Mid-July) [4]

2006-0647-F

jp2105

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
017. agenda	re: Checklist for Deputies' Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	07/12/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Alexander Vershbow (European)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995 (Mid-July) [4]

2006-0647-F
jp2105

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

SECRET

Discussion Paper

Elements of a Post-UNPROFOR Strategy:
Support the Federation; Contain the Conflict

Overview

At the May 23 Principals Committee meeting there was a general consensus that U.S. policy following UNPROFOR withdrawal would be to seek multilateral lift of the arms embargo, limited support for arming and training the Bosnian Army, but no commitment to air strikes. Principals also agreed that U.S. security assistance should be largely limited to the provision of financing for Bosnian arms purchases from other suppliers and that training should be conducted by a third party, if possible. There was also agreement that such policies would have to be accompanied by enhanced efforts to contain the fighting within current bounds, including maintaining, and possibly reinforcing, peacekeepers in Macedonia.

Principals agreed that all these elements of a possible post-UNPROFOR strategy need further analysis, as do several other questions including: What relief and other military operations could or should remain in place? How would we work with Allies and friends to contain the fighting? What are Russia's likely responses to our efforts to lift the arms embargo and bolster the security of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

Political/Military Goals

Our principal goals following UNPROFOR's partial or complete withdrawal would be to:

- Preserve the sovereignty of the GOBH over as much of its territory as possible;
 - We could continue to recognize the borders of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as of 1992 and not accept the territorial status quo created by Serb military operations and ethnic cleansing, just as we did with Soviet conquest of the Baltics in the 1940s.
- Maintain the Bosniac-Croat Federation and good relations between Zagreb and Sarajevo;
 - Whether these alliances of convenience can endure remains to be seen. The Federation offers the best prospect for developing a counterweight to extreme nationalism and Serbian regional hegemony. Maintaining some common sense of purpose between Zagreb and Sarajevo is the best way to safeguard the GOBH from a Serb-Croat grand bargain that could leave Bosnia a Balkan Palestine in the middle of Greater Serbia and Greater Croatia.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOGRAPHY

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

PER E.O. 13526

RDS 12/3/2013 (0.17)

2012-0800-11

- Croatian support would be essential to success of efforts to arm and train the Bosnian Army, if only to ensure transit of equipment. But Zagreb would surely want some similar security assistance and closer ties to NATO (through PFP) and the EU.
- Prevent a widening of the conflict and bolster regional stability;
 - This remains our abiding strategic interest. We must prevent the conflict from widening into a general Balkan War that could engage two NATO allies (with very different agenda), threaten the stability of fragile new democracies in the region, and increase the risks of deeper U.S. engagement.
- Deter further aggression by Belgrade, while keeping a line open to Milosevic and his successors.
 - Threats to Kosovo, Macedonia, and other neighbors would have to be deterred, but moderation of Serb policies is the long-term goal.

General Elements of the Strategy

Security Assistance

We would seek support of all NATO allies, PFP Partners, and moderate Islamic states for a security assistance package for the GOBH. But we should be prepared to proceed with a coalition of the willing.

Allies would balk at supporting lift for fear that it would prolong the war and exacerbate the risks of its widening. We would need to convince them that we only want to give the GOBH a chance to survive and be able to negotiate a viable settlement. A convincing containment strategy would also be essential to enlisting their support.

Security assistance to Bosnian government would be designed to give it sufficient military capacity to defend the territory still under its control and enhance its ability to regain, by force or at the negotiating table, territory now controlled by the BSA. The magnitude of assistance could range from what would be required to defend the status quo, to a more robust package that would allow it to make strategic gains, to an extensive reequipping that would allow it to reestablish its control over territory allotted it under the Contact Group Plan. Clearly cost will be a major factor here, and past estimates of the robust package have exceeded \$1 billion.

We and the GOBH would have to balance various goals with the risks of triggering engagement of superior Yugoslav Army (VJ) and Krajina Serb Army (KSA) forces in the fighting in ways that could only be countered by direct U.S. and/or Allied

military support. All but the first option risk bringing other Serb forces to Pale's defense.

Bosnian/Croat Harmony

Sarajevo has few alternatives other than alliance with Zagreb. Zagreb, on the other hand, may need additional incentives stay with the program. We and other Allies might offer Zagreb certain rewards for cooperation with Sarajevo such as additional technical and military assistance, deeper bilateral economic and political ties, and membership in PFP.

Dealing With Serbia

Deterring further Serb aggression would likely require reinforcing the "Christmas warning" to Milosevic about responding to Serb-triggered violence in Kosovo, and adding threats to take unspecified military actions against Serbia if it escalates its support to the Bosnian Serbs or intimidates Macedonia or other neighbors.

Forging anti-Milosevic coalition could cause divisions within the Alliance and the EU and reinforce Serb nationalism unless we make it clear our efforts are not directed against Serbia proper but at the aggressive nationalism sponsored by the current government. At the same time, we could take steps to support opposition political groups in Serbia who favor more moderate regional policies. We could continue to hold out to Milosevic the promise of further integration if he really breaks with Pale and respects international norms.

Regional Containment

Our regional containment efforts might include:

- Retain some residual UNPROFOR or other peacekeeping presence in the Federation territory to maintain Bosniac-Croat harmony.
- Retain a robust UNCRO to prevent a resumption of the Serb-Croat war and limit KSA support the BSA.
 - KSA support was instrumental in the BSA's ability to beat back the Bosnian V Corps offensive in Bihac during the fall of 1994.
 - There is intelligence suggesting that if the KSA were driven out of UN Sectors North and South by the Croatian Army, they would move into the Posavina corridor and support BSA operations against the Gorazde pocket.
- Maintain and possibly augment UNPREDEP in Macedonia to help stabilize that country and deter a Serb crackdown in Kosovo. In the context of arming the Bosnians, we would

have to be careful not to give Kosovar Albanians the sense that U.S. or Allied forces would come to the aid of an armed uprising against Serb authorities.

- Deploy some other border monitoring forces like UNPREDEP in Hungary and Albania. This and other actions to prevent spillover could be organized by NATO through PFP.
- Reinforce stability along the periphery by redirecting resources currently used for peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance to promote economic development and cooperation among the front-line Balkan states.

Efforts Prior to Withdrawal

To be effective, elements of this strategy would need to be in place well before extraction of UNPROFOR actually begins. The military imbalance is such that the BSA could readily put pressure on the enclaves and Sarajevo before and during UNPROFOR withdrawal. Also, as the SNIE 95-7 notes, the Bosnian government would be likely to strongly resist a partial or complete withdrawal of UNPROFOR unless the U.S. or NATO commits to military support. This commitment would just as surely trigger BSA actions to preclude complete withdrawal.

- We would need to build consensus among the Allies and other potential partners and secure at least Russian acquiescence for the main goals of this approach.
- To give the GOBH forces a chance, we would need to explore ways to help the Bosnians "creep out" of the restrictions of the arms embargo. This might include:
 - Providing some intelligence support to GOBH to enhance their ability to organize defenses against BSA actions. For example, we might start providing the GOBH with data from the Predator UAV flights and other sources.
 - Programs that Gen. Sewell has broached with the Federation for rear area operations, NCO training, etc.
 - Developing military-to-military contacts between the GOBH and third countries (Croatia, Turkey, or non-front-line CE states such as Poland or the Czech Republic), that would enable rapid launching of the envisioned training programs.
 - Reconsider the option of allowing UNPROFOR units, on a national basis, to turn their equipment over to the GOBH upon withdrawal. In this way the Bosnian Army could also provide some protection to the evacuation force. Our assumption has been that this would trigger hostile Serb action against these forces, but if the extraction environment is hostile in any event this may not be so decisive in the Serb calculus.

Lifting Options

Multilateral

We would call for an end of the arms embargo because its continuation in the absence of a peacekeeping force or other UNSC action to preserve the peace would deny Bosnia-Herzegovina its right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. It would seem difficult for Russia or other states to justify continuation of the arms embargo in this context. Indeed, Russian Rep Churkin proposed lifting the arms embargo last year as part of the Contact Group's package of incentives and disincentives if Bosnia accepted the CG plan and the Serbs did not. Still, one could expect Russia and even some NATO allies to argue that lifting the embargo would only escalate the violence without altering the outcome fundamentally and run the risk of widening of the conflict. Allies would also be wary of lift because of the inevitable pressures to provide military assistance to the Bosnian government.

NATO/Coalition

If Russia or some another UNSC member (China) appeared to be the principal obstacle to multilateral lift, we might press for a NATO/coalition action to achieve the desired goal. Our argument would hinge on rights to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. However, absent a UNSC action to remove the embargo, we would still be vulnerable to the criticisms we have leveled at proponents of unilateral lift and risk losing support for compliance with other UN-mandated sanctions regimes.

Lift Only

"Lift and pray" would seem to be a completely indefensible strategy both at home and abroad. Even the most isolationist Republicans are not advocating this approach. While this would end the stigma of supporting UNPROFOR, it would create the impression that we had decided to leave the Bosnian government to fend for itself on the black market or rely on Islamic states.

The GOBH might well resist withdrawal in this context. Indeed, the only advantage of this approach would seem to be that it would decrease the BSA's incentive to complicate or resist withdrawal. However, the BSA would know that the GOBH would receive arms from Islamic and other countries, even if the U.S. and Europe had made no commitments. This outcome would put pressure on the Federation and would risk the ensuing conflict from becoming a clash between Muslims and Christians.

Arming and Training

On the face of it, arming and training by "third countries" has a number of benefits. It would limit the extent of U.S. engagement, making it easier to avoid the "Americanization" of

the post-withdrawal conflict. In turn, this could help prevent the struggle from becoming a surrogate conflict between Russian-backed Serbs and the U.S.-backed GOBH.

Identifying likely "third countries" is more problematic. As for arming, many West European governments might be reluctant to fuel the conflict due to fears of widening. Some front line Central European governments might have similar fears, and enlisting them in such an enterprise would run contrary to our efforts to continue the demilitarization of these societies. This leaves Turkey, Iran, and/or other Islamic countries, all of whom have lots of capacity and high motivation. But if these states get involved, modulating the flow will become more complicated, not to mention the polarizing impact of making this a clash between Islam and Christianity.

As for training, if the Bosniac/Croat Federation holds, Croatia would offers proximity, high motivation, and an eagerness to cooperate with NATO. The downside risks are that enlisting Croatia so frontally in the conflict against the Bosnian Serbs would risk reopening the Serb-Croat conflict in a bigger way. Clearly, Croatia's cooperation would be essential to any arming and training package for Bosnia. However, its use as a transit and staging area are different than its use as the training ground and launch pad for offensive operations against Serbs.

Robust Lift and Strike

Here the assessment is in many ways unchanged from the early days of the war in 1992. Lifting the arms embargo and beginning some arming and training of the GOBH forces will take time. During that time they would be very vulnerable to BSA military actions. The most effective way to mitigate this would be to conduct supporting air strikes against BSA heavy weapons, military facilities, and operations. If liaison with the Bosnian Army was established, it might be possible to use Bosnian forces as forward air controllers and target designators. At a minimum, we could argue that NATO's August 1993 decisions to undertake airstrikes to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo and other safe areas remain valid.

An even more robust option, would be designed to limit VJ involvement by threatening to target VJ military installations in the FRY and the Drina River Bridges and other transit points between the FRY and Bosnia if military support continues.

This would give the GOBH the best chance for survival, but it has several significant risks. Such strong action against the Serbs might trigger more direct Russian support. It could also spark an uprising in Kosovo or Vojvodina provinces that could trigger the wider war we seek to avoid.

Strike, No Lift

This option, also considered in late 1992, is gaining supporters outside government once again for different reasons. This approach would seek to "level the playing field" by targeting BSA heavy weapons and other military targets. Once UNPROFOR was out, it could be accomplished without fear of hostage taking. Forward air controllers would be required, but it might be possible to train Bosnian government forces to perform that function for NATO forces. Most military assessments have concluded that air strikes alone would be insufficient to save the enclaves and break a siege of Sarajevo. However, air strikes might be successful in achieving other, less demanding goals at the negotiating table.

Humanitarian Relief: Over to the Bosnians

PRM's paper explains in great detail how the withdrawal of UNPROFOR would disrupt relief efforts by international organizations. However, we need to explore the feasibility of turning over management and delivery of relief efforts to the Bosnian government. Our provision of security assistance might free resources and personnel for such efforts and the Bosnians could operate without current restrictions on UN and international agencies. Also, if we can hold the Federation together, these regions and Croatia could remain secure supply bases.

Assessing/Managing the Russian Reaction

In Moscow's fractious political environment, an expanded U.S.-NATO role in Bosnia would appear at first glance to be a tempting target either for Yeltsin's opponents or for Yeltsin himself and others eager to posture in defense of Russian national interests in the run up to parliamentary and presidential elections. While some support to the Serbs and pointed criticism of U.S. moves would be inevitable, the overall impact on elite and popular sentiment may be more manageable and less explosive than generally predicted.

How Strong is Pan-Slavism?

U.S. and Russian polling data routinely highlight the absence of any significant popular Russian support for Serbia or its agenda in the Balkans. Despite constant Russian (and Western) assertions to the contrary, the Russian view of Serbia corresponds roughly with attitudes toward Poland or Turkey (i.e., these states are seen as mildly friendly to Russia at best). Like most foreign policy issues, events in a post-UNPROFOR Bosnia would resonate faintly with a Russian electorate preoccupied with day-to-day socioeconomic concerns. Politicians from across the political spectrum would find it difficult to rouse average Russians out of their indifference or to stir up serious opposition to the Yeltsin government for its reactions to U.S.-NATO policy.

Moscow has been actively working to retain and expand its political influence in the Balkans (including with Greece) and clearly does not want to be marginalized by Western decisions on Bosnia. But a confrontation with the West over efforts to save the rump Bosnia would not necessarily advance those interests. Moreover, such a stance would also be perceived as anti-Muslim and therefore do damage to Moscow's warming relations with Iran and other Islamic states.

Russia's strategic interests in the Balkans, despite Zhirinovskiy's rhetoric, are far from evident to the average Russian. Given the lingering outrage over the war in Chechnya -- much closer to home -- Moscow would have a hard time justifying direct military involvement in Serbia, even advisors/trainers, to the Russian public.

The Duma has gone on record as favoring military support to the Serbs if the arms embargo on Bosnia is lifted. But Russian arms sales now generally operate on a cash basis. It is not clear that Russia has either the resources or the political motivation to provide significant amounts of military assistance on credit to a bankrupt Serbia. The possibility of non-official Russian support to the Serbs, in the form of volunteers and arms, is a real possibility, but the magnitude of such support seems unlikely to be decisive.

Managing Russian Elite Perceptions

To be sure, the Moscow-based elite is likely to bristle at a more muscular U.S.-NATO posture in Bosnia. Although most foreign policy circles have embraced great power rhetoric and bluster on many high-profile issues, there is little fire in the belly left for the Balkans. The elite's Bosnia anxieties reached their high-water mark more than a year ago and were sparked largely by the April 1994 airstrikes around Sarajevo. This growing Bosnia fatigue has also been fed by the actions of the Bosnian Serbs on the ground and by Moscow's high-profile diplomatic forays -- and failures -- in the region, the Contact Group, and the UNSC. Churkin's unproductive visit and gloomy assessment are another example of this frustration.

The steady downgrading of Russian efforts in the Balkans also is linked implicitly to the Russian elite's growing preoccupation with NATO expansion. While Yeltsin and Kozyrev would still be the key players in how the Russian internal debate on post-UNPROFOR Bosnia develops, they will need a clear understanding of the potential costs of opposing international consensus on this issue. Given the Russian leadership's overriding stake in trying to hold the line on NATO expansion and repairing the damage caused by Chechnya, we can expect that Moscow will be far less inclined to fan a new round of crisis in relations with the U.S. and its Allies over Bosnia.

Still, it will be particularly important for the U.S. to engage directly with Russian officials early and try to

~~SECRET~~

-9-

influence elite opinion as our overall direction becomes clearer. In addition to giving Russian officials a sense of engagement in the development of policy, we should also look at face-savers that would make it easier for Moscow to abstain from a UNSC vote on lifting the arms embargo. For example, we could advance a UNSC resolution that would lift the arms embargo on all the Yugoslav successor states. This would have little practical impact on Serbia's military potential.

Shifting Alignments

In the post-UNPROFOR environment, we would likely have to deal with shifting alignments among Contact Group members. While Germany and the UK would probably be supportive of efforts to isolate Serbia, one can imagine Russo-French resistance to this tack and even collusion to cut deals with Belgrade and Pale. The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy would offer countervailing pressures that might limit the depth of such fissures. But maintaining even the limited degree of Western unity we have today would be difficult as old biases and differing geopolitical interests became more pronounced.

Drafted: S/P: SFlanagan
6/14/95, Revised 7/7/95, SPEUR 5169

CLINTON LIBRARY ~~SECRET~~ PHOTOCOPY

Cicio, Kristen K.

From: Vershbow, Alexander R.
To: @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor
Cc: /R, Record at A1
Subject: Bosnia Strategy Paper ~~(SECRET)~~
Date: Thursday, July 13, 1995 8:17AM

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VC NARA, Date 11/5/2019
2013-0656-m (278)
[2012-0800-m, 1.18]

Please pass to TL and SRB:

Here it is. Draft is too long, but I wasn't sure whether you wanted to include the material at the bottom of page 1/top of page 2 on ways to recreate military leverage (most of which may be unrealistic while UNPROFOR is still there) and the regional containment strategy on page 4. After your comments, I will work heroically to shorten it.
<<File Attachment: JUL12BS.DOC>>

reassert its mission soon, it will be faced to leave (by Europeans, Bosnians and/or Congress). We should seek to get some leverage from this inevitability.

(A)

7/11

TL/SV:

→ Good cut. See comments.
→ I would add explicit warning to both parties that UNPROFOR will leave if it is not allowed to reassert its mission in central Bosnia. Despite all rhetoric, Sacerby still only says they may not seek renewal of in Nov -- strongly suggest they are not ready for UNPROFOR to leave. May go ~~down~~ less from left than they hope and a horrific humanitarian problem. Serbs, despite being up now, could easily get left if UNPROFOR leaves. In fact if UNPROFOR cannot/does not

BOSNIA ENDGAME STRATEGY



→ Sandy V

Summary: With the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa, we need to make an all-out effort in the coming weeks to restabilize the situation on the ground, restore UNPROFOR's credibility in Sarajevo, Central Bosnia and [possibly] Gorazde, and press for a realistic diplomatic settlement this year. If this effort fails, we should move quickly to withdraw UNPROFOR this year and help the Bosnians obtain the military capabilities needed to level the playing field. This would be underpinned during a one-year transition period by air strikes to protect Sarajevo and the other safe areas, reinforced if possible by an UNPROFOR successor force based on a coalition of the willing. Following the transition, the Bosnians would be on their own.

Restabilization post-Srebrenica and Zepa: We have only a few weeks to devise and implement steps to strengthen UNPROFOR and halt the pattern of increasingly aggressive Serb behavior. If we do not change the status quo, the Serbs will move on Gorazde and renew the strangulation of Sarajevo, and the French will likely decide to withdraw -- leading to UNPROFOR's collapse and a protracted NATO withdrawal operation in circumstances that will represent a defeat for the UN and the Alliance. It will also guarantee passage of unilateral lift by the Congress in a manner that will damage relations with our allies, and create an ~~unstable~~ unstable veto override right.

less
ambivalent
on G.

Our priority is to shore up UNPROFOR in Sarajevo and Central Bosnia by reducing its vulnerability, using the RRF to open secure routes to Sarajevo, and making more aggressive use of NATO air power (under a single key) to halt Serb artillery attacks on the exclusion zones. We should also support reinforcing Gorazde if a feasible approach can be found, recognizing that a U.S. contribution to this effort may be needed to prevent a French decision to pull out. In order for this strategy to succeed, we need to persuade the Bosnian Government that it is in its interest to keep UNPROFOR even if this means writing off Srebrenica and Zepa and concentrating UNPROFOR's efforts in Sarajevo and Central Bosnia. We would also need to be sure, before embarking on steps to reinforce Gorazde, that Bosnian forces will defend the enclave, since even a reinforced UNPROFOR presence is not capable of doing this on its own.

Pressing for a political settlement this year: The best way of avoiding an UNPROFOR withdrawal and the new challenges of a post-withdrawal strategy would be to make an all-out effort at obtaining a political settlement this year. The strengthened UNPROFOR and more aggressive use of NATO air power described above will restore some of the leverage we have lost over the past year vis-à-vis the Bosnian Serbs. But we will also need to offer some new inducements to break the logjam surrounding "acceptance" of the Contact Group plan. The loss of Srebrenica and Zepa may open the way to more realistic territorial solutions, and we will need to have a heart-to-heart discussion with the Bosnians to urge greater flexibility on the map, constitutional arrangements, and possibly the Bosnian Serbs' right to secede from the Union after an initial period. We will also need to sweeten our offers to Milosevic in order to encourage him to put real pressure on the Bosnian Serbs. At Annex I is a more detailed gameplan for an early diplomatic breakthrough.

really a
negotiation
w/ Bosnians
hard
headed
trade off

Supporting Bosnia's Survival post-UNPROFOR: If the last-ditch effort to obtain a settlement fails and/or we fail to restabilize the situation on the ground, we will need to face up to the issue of UNPROFOR withdrawal and implementing a post-withdrawal strategy. Indeed, it would be preferable to face these issues this year rather than having to implement a messy and protracted

imple
w/draw
need to
assume
Cong supp
debate

NATO withdrawal operation in the middle of the election campaign, when the parties will have an even greater incentive to embarrass us or try to draw us into the conflict. **We should begin consulting with our key Allies now on our post-withdrawal strategy** in order to bolster their resolve to strengthen UNPROFOR in the short term, and to force them to face up to their responsibility to help support Bosnia's survival if withdrawal must occur.

Leveling the playing field: Our post-withdrawal strategy should have as its goal providing the Bosnians with sufficient military capability to survive the immediate Serb onslaught, consolidate their authority over Sarajevo and Central Bosnia and, within a short period of time, to begin to regain territory allotted to them under the Contact Group proposal. This would make the ultimate resolution of the conflict the result of a balance of power on the ground rather than dependent on the actions of the international community.

- **Our preferred approach would be to lift the arms embargo multilaterally through passage of a UNSC resolution, perhaps part of the same resolution terminating UNPROFOR's mandate and authorizing withdrawal. Our allies have indicated they will go along with lift after UNPROFOR withdrawal. To secure a Russian abstention, we may need to make the lift applicable to all republics of the former Yugoslavia (including Serbia-Montenegro) and/or agree to substantial sanctions relief for Belgrade.**

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(c), 1.4(d)

Additional Support during the Transition: Although the Bosnians are stronger now than when we first pushed lift-and-strike in 1993, until they acquire and assimilate new arms, they will still need additional support to survive the Serbs' preemptive offensives. At a minimum, we will need to help the Bosnians ensure the survival of Sarajevo as the linchpin of a future Bosnian state. Therefore, for a one-year transition period, we would:

- Press our NATO Allies to continue enforcing the no-fly zone, to deprive the Serbs of air superiority (this would, of course, require preemptive SEAD);
- **Conduct aggressive air strikes against a broad range of Bosnian Serb military targets to protect Sarajevo (and possibly the other remaining safe areas) against Serb artillery attacks.** This would preferably be done through NATO or, if our allies refused to renew the NATO mandate post-UNPROFOR, through a U.S.-led coalition of the willing. The air strikes would be based on new UNSC authority (since existing authority under 836 and 844 is tied to UNPROFOR) or, as a fallback, on a Bosnian Government request for collective self-defense. Forward air controllers would be provided by the Bosnians or by members of the UNPROFOR successor force, if available (see below). We would limit the commitment to Sarajevo and possibly the other safe areas to avoid becoming full-scale combatants; in any case, Bosnian ground forces, with HVO cooperation, can hold their own in Central Bosnia.

- **Support the deployment of a successor force to UNPROFOR** to reinforce the Bosnians' hold on Sarajevo and the other safe areas, and to continue to promote stability in Federation-controlled areas of Central Bosnia. Such a force would be a coalition of the willing composed of those UNPROFOR contributors willing to remain plus new forces from Islamic countries. If possible, the force would be deployed under a Chapter VII UN mandate with the explicit mission of supporting Bosnia against Serb aggression. Otherwise, the force would deploy at the request of the Bosnian Government. (The humiliating prospect of Islamic countries taking the place of European countries in solving a European problem could prompt some of our Allies to stay and participate in the successor force.)

What is logic of one year? Does it make that sense?

We would set a time limit of one year (the end of 1996) on the NFZ and air strike commitments and on the mandate of the successor force, making clear to the Bosnians that once the playing field is leveled, they are on their own. In addition to providing arms and training to reinforce their ground force capabilities, we would ensure they obtained effective air defenses to counter Bosnian Serb air capabilities when the NFZ lapsed.

(b)(1), E.O. 12958 1.4(b), 1.4(c), 1.4(d)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(c), 1.4(d)

Keeping Belgrade Out: Leveling the playing field becomes a much more formidable challenge if Belgrade intervenes on a large scale in support the Bosnian Serbs. We would offer substantial sanctions relief to induce Milosevic to stay out, seal the border and accept a much larger international monitoring force. We would at the same time warn Milosevic that, if we detect Serbian military support, we will use air power against Serbian forces operating inside Bosnia and against the Drina bridges and other supply routes, and that we do not rule out strikes against military targets inside Serbia.

Shorter period all stated by milo need

Regional containment strategy: As we moved to arm the Bosnians, we would need to take a range of steps to prevent a widening of the conflict to other parts of the region, to include:

What is rationale for UNPREDEP? We already have trip wire. Rajar presence is significant would be substantial

- **Reinforcing UNPREDEP in Macedonia** to deter Serbian border encroachments and a new crackdown in Kosovo, together with a reaffirmation of our warnings to Milosevic regarding air strikes against Serbia in the event he provokes armed conflict in Kosovo;
- **Strengthening UNCRO** and providing increased economic assistance to Croatia to discourage Tudjman from launching a full-scale war in Krajina in the near term (while at the same time encouraging continued low-level attrition operations that could help limit Krajina Serb support to the Bosnian Serbs); and
- **Possibly deploying preventive peacekeeping forces** along Hungary's and Albania's borders with the FRY.

We would, at the same time, intensify our efforts to sustain the Federation and Bosnian-Croat military cooperation. And we would make clear that we stand ready to broker a political settlement and assist in its implementation, although at this stage we would jettison the Contact Group approach and devise a new basis for the negotiations.

Annex I: Gameplan for a Diplomatic Breakthrough in 1995

To achieve an agreement this year that reflects the changing strategic realities, we will need to adapt elements of the Contact Group plan while preserving its essential core as the starting point.

- We would begin with a heart-to-heart talk with the Bosnians, stressing that, in light of the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa and renewed Western readiness for tougher action, they need think more realistically about the shape of a settlement. They also need to bend in their demand that the Serbs "accept" the Contact Group plan as the "starting point" and agree to at least exploratory Contact Group contacts or proximity talks with Pale.
- In talks with Pale, we would float possible modifications to the Contact Group map. At the outset, these would preserve the 51:49 ratio, but provide for a more compact and cohesive territory for the Federation (e.g. trading Srebrenica, Zepa and a widening of the Posavina corridor for full Federation control over Sarajevo and additional territory in central Bosnia). Consistent with a recent Silajdzic proposal to Juppé, we could state that up to 10 percent of the Contact Group map was subject to renegotiation.
- Ultimately, we should be prepared to press the Bosnians to accept less than 51% if they can obtain higher-quality territory and more defensible frontiers for the Federation in Central Bosnia.
- We would, similarly, develop the Contact Group's proposed constitutional principles to show the Serbs the amount of autonomy their republic would have within the Union and the scope of the "parallel special relationship" with Serbia.
- If necessary, we would press the Bosnians to agree that the Serbs can conduct a referendum on secession after 2-3 years, as had been agreed in the 1993 *Invincible* package. We would argue that, if the Bosnians cannot persuade the Serb population that their best future lies in reintegration, there is no point in blocking the peaceful separation of the Union along the lines of the Czechoslovak model.
- We would propose to the Allies and Russians mutual participation in funding a post-settlement "mini-Marshall Plan" for the Balkans designed to foster regional economic recovery and integration and thereby give all parties a stake in peace.

Shouldn't we deal w/ this upfront w/ Bosnians

In tandem with these steps, we and our Contact Group partners should tell Milosevic the time has come for him to put up or shut up, i.e. that:

- We will terminate the current sanctions relief in September if he has not recognized Bosnia and taken visible action to terminate military support for Pale (and Knin);
- Moreover, if sanctions relief is terminated and the ICFY mission departs, any resumption of large-scale support for Pale will be met not only by a tightening of economic sanctions against the FRY, but by U.S. or NATO air strikes against the Drina bridges and key supply routes.
- At the same time, in conjunction with the threat of terminating sanctions relief for non-compliance, we would increase the rewards offered to Milosevic for initial positive steps, such as lifting vice suspending phase-one sanctions if he recognizes Bosnia.

better alternative: ~~deep~~ more extensive suspension in return for border;

BOSNIA STRATEGY

Summary: With the fall of Srebrenica, we need to make an all-out effort to restabilize the situation on the ground, restore UNPROFOR's credibility, and press for a realistic diplomatic settlement this year. If that effort fails and UNPROFOR must withdraw, we should move quickly to help the Bosnians obtain the military capabilities needed to level the playing field while minimizing U.S. involvement, so that an ultimate solution is not dependent on our support or the actions of the international community.

Restabilization post-Srebrenica: The Bosnian Serb attack on Srebrenica is simply the most dramatic development in a pattern of increasingly aggressive Serb actions over the past few months. If we and our Allies fail to reverse this pattern, it will only encourage Serb attacks on the other enclaves and renewed strangulation of Sarajevo, precipitating UNPROFOR's collapse and a protracted NATO withdrawal operation in circumstances that will be perceived as a defeat for the UN and the Alliance. It will also guarantee passage of unilateral lift legislation by the Congress in a manner that will damage relations with our allies.

In the short term, we should give political support to French-led efforts to restore the Srebrenica safe area as a demilitarized enclave, while recognizing that there is no sensible military option for saving Srebrenica or Zepa. **The more important task is to devise a strategy to reestablish UNPROFOR's credibility where it counts:** using the lead elements of the RRF immediately to establish secure humanitarian access routes to Sarajevo; and using the full RRF, once deployed, to protect Gorazde, the strategically most important of the eastern enclaves and the one where NATO is most directly engaged (through the exclusion zone). If UNPROFOR and the RRF can prove their effectiveness in this way, we may be able to deter further Serb provocations, restabilize the situation on the ground, and avert an early UNPROFOR withdrawal.

In order for this strategy to succeed, we need to **persuade the Bosnian Government that it is in its interest to keep UNPROFOR** even if this means writing off Srebrenica and Zepa and concentrating UNPROFOR's efforts in Sarajevo and Central Bosnia. We would also need to be sure, before employing the RRF to help protect Gorazde, that Bosnian Government forces there will defend the enclave, since the RRF is not designed to do this on its own.

Pressing for a political settlement this year: We are not going to obtain a settlement this year unless we recreate some real leverage vis-à-vis the Bosnian Serbs, and unless we are prepared to offer inducements to break the logjam surrounding "acceptance" of the Contact Group plan.

Sticks: The more assertive UNPROFOR/RRF actions suggested above will not, in themselves, provide much negotiating leverage. We should use the specter of defeat that UNPROFOR withdrawal would represent to convince Allies of the need to raise the stakes in other ways, such as:

- **restoring the credibility of Operation Deny Flight** by broadening the ROE to permit attacks on all elements of the Serb integrated air defense system displaying hostile intent and retaliatory attacks on airfields used to launch no-fly zone violations;

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

Declassified in Part

Per E.O. 13526

RDS 10/01/2013 (AR 70-14)

[2012-0800-M, 1.20]

- issuing new NATO ultimatums regarding air strikes to enforce the exclusion zones;

-

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(d)

- in order to deprive the Bosnian Serbs of Krajina Serb support, quietly encouraging Tudjman to maintain the threat of increased Croatian attrition operations against Sectors North and South (but not to launch a full-scale assault).

In tandem with these steps, we and our Contact Group partners should tell Milosevic the time has come for him to put up or shut up, i.e. that:

- we will terminate the current sanctions relief in September if he has not recognized Bosnia and taken visible action to terminate military support for Pale (and Knin);
- moreover, if sanctions relief is terminated and the ICFY mission departs, any resumption of large-scale support for Pale will be met not only by a tightening of economic sanctions against the FRY, but by U.S. or NATO air strikes against key supply routes and military targets, including those inside Serbia.

Carrots: To bring the Allies along, convince the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate, and manage the Russians, we will need to adapt elements of the Contact Group plan while preserving its essential core (one state, 51:49). This will entail:

- having a heart-to-heart talk with the Bosnians, stressing that, in light of the fall of Srebrenica, renewed Western readiness for tougher action (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4(d) (b)(1) they need think more realistically about the shape of a settlement, and agree to at least exploratory Contact Group contacts or proximity talks with Pale;
- in the talks with Pale, advancing possible modifications to the Contact Group map consistent with the 51:49 ratio but providing for a more compact and cohesive territory for the Federation (e.g. trading Srebrenica, Zepa and a widening of the Posavina corridor for full Federation control over Sarajevo and additional territory in central Bosnia); consistent with a recent Silajdzic proposal to Juppé, we could state that up to 10 percent of the Contact Group map was subject to renegotiation;
- similarly, developing the Contact Group's proposed constitutional principles to show the Serbs the amount of autonomy their republic would have within the Union and the scope of the "parallel special relationship" with Serbia;
- if necessary, pressing the Bosnians to agree that the Serbs can conduct a referendum on secession after 2-3 years, as had been agreed in the 1993 *Invincible* package;
- proposing to the Allies and Russians mutual participation in funding a post-settlement "mini-Marshall Plan" for the Balkans designed to foster regional economic recovery and integration and thereby give all parties a stake in peace.

At the same time, in conjunction with the threat of terminating sanctions relief for non-compliance, we may want to **increase the rewards offered to Milosevic** for initial positive steps, such as lifting vice suspending phase-one sanctions if he recognizes Bosnia. This could be especially helpful in keeping Moscow on board.

If UNPROFOR withdrawal must occur: If the last-ditch effort to obtain a settlement fails and the RRF fails to restabilize the situation on the ground, we will need to face up to the issue of UNPROFOR withdrawal and implementing a post-withdrawal strategy. (Indeed, it may be preferable to face the issue this year rather than having to implement a messy and protracted NATO withdrawal operation in the middle of the election campaign, when the parties will have every incentive to try to draw us into the conflict.)'

Leveling the playing field: Our post-withdrawal strategy should have as its goal providing the Bosnians with sufficient military capability to survive the immediate Serb onslaught and, within a short period of time, to begin to regain territory allotted to them under the Contact Group proposal. This would make the ultimate resolution of the conflict the result of a balance of power on the ground rather than dependent on the actions of the international community.

- **Our preferred approach would be to lift the arms embargo multilaterally through passage of a UNSC resolution.** This could be made part of the resolution terminating UNPROFOR's mandate and authorizing withdrawal. Our allies have indicated they will go along with lift after UNPROFOR withdrawal. To secure a Russian abstention, we may need to make the lift applicable to all republics of the former Yugoslavia (including Serbia-Montenegro) and/or agree to substantial sanctions relief for Belgrade.

- (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(c), 1.4(d)

While the Bosnians' survival in the short term may require U.S. or NATO air strikes, we would want to set a time limit to any air strike commitment and then restrict our involvement to the provision of arms and training, making clear to the Bosnians that once the playing field is leveled, they are on their own. (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(c), 1.4(d)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(c), 1.4(d)

We would continue to use a mixture of sanctions relief and threats to keep the Serbian border closed and to deter full-scale intervention by Belgrade; but we would tell the Bosnians bluntly that if their offensives went beyond retaking territory on the Contact Group map and provoked Serbian intervention, they should not expect us or NATO to come to their rescue.

Regional containment strategy: As we moved to arm the Bosnians, we would need to take a range of steps to prevent a widening of the conflict to other parts of the region, to include:

- a strong warning of retaliation against Serbia in the event of direct intervention in Bosnia, coupled with sanctions relief to encourage a sealing of the border;
- reinforcing UNPREDEP in Macedonia to prevent Serbian border encroachments and to deter a new crackdown in Kosovo;
- strengthening UNCRO and providing other carrots to Tudjman to prevent a resumption of full-scale war in Krajina (while at the same time encouraging continued low-level attrition operations that could help limit Krajina Serb support to the Bosnian Serbs);
- and possibly deploying preventive peacekeeping forces along Hungary's and Albania's borders with the FRY.

We would, at the same time, intensify our efforts to **sustain the Federation and Bosnian-Croat military cooperation**. And we would make clear that we stand ready to **broker a political settlement and assist in its implementation**, although at this stage we would probably want to set aside the Contact Group approach and devise a basis for a "fresh start" to the negotiations.

SECRET

July 17, 1995

Sam

BOSNIA ENDGAME STRATEGY

Summary: With the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa, we need to make an all-out effort in the coming weeks to restabilize the situation on the ground, restore UNPROFOR's credibility in Sarajevo, Central Bosnia and possibly Gorazde, and press for a realistic diplomatic settlement this year. If this effort fails, we should move quickly to withdraw UNPROFOR this year and help the Bosnians obtain the military capabilities needed to level the playing field. This would be underpinned during a one-year transition period by air strikes to protect Sarajevo and the other safe areas, reinforced if possible by an UNPROFOR successor force based on a coalition of the willing. Following the transition, the Bosnians would be on their own.

Restabilization post-Srebrenica and Zepa: We have only a few weeks to devise and implement steps to strengthen UNPROFOR and halt the pattern of increasingly aggressive Serb behavior. If we do not change the status quo, the Serbs will move on Gorazde and renew the strangulation of Sarajevo, and the French will likely decide to withdraw -- leading to UNPROFOR's collapse and a protracted NATO withdrawal operation in circumstances that will represent a defeat for the UN and the Alliance. It will also guarantee passage of unilateral lift by the Congress in a manner that will damage relations with our allies.

Our priority is to shore up UNPROFOR in Sarajevo and Central Bosnia by reducing its vulnerability, using the RRF to open secure routes to Sarajevo, and making more aggressive use of NATO air power (under a single key) to halt Serb artillery attacks on the exclusion zones. We should also support reinforcing Gorazde if a feasible approach can be found, recognizing that a U.S. contribution to this effort may be needed to prevent a French decision to pull out. In order for this strategy to succeed, we need to persuade the Bosnian Government that it is in its interest to keep UNPROFOR even if this means writing off Srebrenica and Zepa and concentrating UNPROFOR's efforts in Sarajevo and Central Bosnia. We would also need to be sure, before embarking on steps to reinforce Gorazde, that Bosnian forces will defend the enclave, since even a reinforced UNPROFOR presence is not capable of doing this on its own.

Pressing for a political settlement this year: The best way of avoiding an UNPROFOR withdrawal and the new challenges of a post-withdrawal strategy would be to make an all-out effort at obtaining a political settlement this year. The strengthened UNPROFOR and more aggressive use of NATO air power described above will restore some of the leverage we have lost over the past year vis-à-vis the Bosnian Serbs. But we will also need to offer some new inducements to break the logjam surrounding "acceptance" of the Contact Group plan. The loss of Srebrenica and Zepa may open the way to more realistic territorial solutions, and we will need to have a heart-to-heart discussion with the Bosnians to urge greater flexibility on the map, constitutional arrangements, and possibly the Bosnian Serbs' right to secede from the Union after an initial period. We will also need to sweeten our offers to Milosevic in order to encourage him to put real pressure on the Bosnian Serbs. At Annex I is a more detailed gameplan for an early diplomatic breakthrough.

? patrol
did not
non

Supporting Bosnia's Survival post-UNPROFOR: If the last-ditch effort to obtain a settlement fails and/or we fail to restabilize the situation on the ground, we will need to face up to the issue of UNPROFOR withdrawal and implementing a post-withdrawal strategy. Indeed, it would be preferable to face these issues this year rather than having to implement a messy and protracted

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

Approved for Release
CIA Historical Collections
Division AR 70-14 1 OCT 2013
[2012-0800-M, 1.21]

NATO withdrawal operation in the middle of the election campaign, when the parties will have an even greater incentive to embarrass us or try to draw us into the conflict. **We should begin consulting with our key Allies now on our post-withdrawal strategy** in order to bolster their resolve to strengthen UNPROFOR in the short term, and to force them to face up to their responsibility to help support Bosnia's survival if withdrawal must occur.

Leveling the playing field: Our post-withdrawal strategy should have as its goal providing the Bosnians with sufficient military capability to survive the immediate Serb onslaught, consolidate their authority over Sarajevo and Central Bosnia and, within a short period of time, to begin to regain territory allotted to them under the Contact Group proposal. This would make the ultimate resolution of the conflict the result of a balance of power on the ground rather than dependent on the actions of the international community.

- **Our preferred approach would be to lift the arms embargo multilaterally through passage of a UNSC resolution**, perhaps part of the same resolution terminating UNPROFOR's mandate and authorizing withdrawal. Our allies have indicated they will go along with lift after UNPROFOR withdrawal. To secure a Russian abstention, we may need to make the lift applicable to all republics of the former Yugoslavia (including Serbia-Montenegro) and/or agree to substantial sanctions relief for Belgrade. *we must*

- (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(c), 1.4(d)

Additional Support during the Transition: Although the Bosnians are stronger now than when we first pushed lift-and-strike in 1993, until they acquire and assimilate new arms, they will still need additional support to survive the Serbs' preemptive offensives. At a minimum, we will need to help the Bosnians ensure the survival of Sarajevo as the linchpin of a future Bosnian state. Therefore, for a one-year transition period, we would:

- Press our NATO Allies to **continue enforcing the no-fly zone**, to deprive the Serbs of air superiority (this would, of course, require preemptive SEAD);
- **Conduct aggressive air strikes against a broad range of Bosnian Serb military targets to protect Sarajevo (and possibly the other remaining safe areas) against Serb artillery attacks.** This would preferably be done through NATO or, if our allies refused to renew the NATO mandate post-UNPROFOR, through a U.S.-led coalition of the willing. The air strikes would be based on new UNSC authority (since existing authority under 836 and 844 is tied to UNPROFOR) or, as a fallback, on a Bosnian Government request for collective self-defense. **Forward air controllers** would be provided by the Bosnians or by members of the UNPROFOR successor force, if available (see below). We would limit the commitment to Sarajevo and possibly the other safe areas to avoid becoming full-scale combatants; in any case, Bosnian ground forces, with HVO cooperation, can hold their own in Central Bosnia. *?*

- **Support the deployment of a successor force to UNPROFOR** to reinforce the Bosnians' hold on Sarajevo and the other safe areas, and to continue to promote stability in Federation-controlled areas of Central Bosnia. Such a force would be a coalition of the willing composed of those UNPROFOR contributors willing to remain plus new forces from Islamic countries. If possible, the force would be deployed under a Chapter VII UN mandate with the explicit mission of supporting Bosnia against Serb aggression. Otherwise, the force would deploy at the request of the Bosnian Government. (The humiliating prospect of Islamic countries taking the place of European countries in solving a European problem could prompt some of our Allies to stay and participate in the successor force.)

We would set a time limit of one year (the end of 1996) on the NFZ and air strike commitments and on the mandate of the successor force, making clear to the Bosnians that once the playing field is leveled, they are on their own. In addition to providing arms and training to reinforce their ground force capabilities, we would ensure they obtained effective air defenses to counter Bosnian Serb air capabilities when the NFZ lapsed.

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(c), 1.4(d)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(c), 1.4(d)

Keeping Belgrade Out: Leveling the playing field becomes a much more formidable challenge if Belgrade intervenes on a large scale in support the Bosnian Serbs. We would offer **substantial sanctions relief to induce Milosevic to stay out, seal the border and accept a much larger international monitoring force.** We would at the same time warn Milosevic that, if we detect Serbian military support, we will use air power against Serbian forces operating inside Bosnia and against the Drina bridges and other supply routes, and that we do not rule out strikes against military targets inside Serbia.

*WLOP
w.c.*

Regional containment strategy: As we moved to arm the Bosnians, we would need to take a range of steps to prevent a widening of the conflict to other parts of the region, to include:

- Reinforcing UNPREDEP in Macedonia to deter Serbian border encroachments and a new crackdown in Kosovo, together with a reaffirmation of our warnings to Milosevic regarding air strikes against Serbia in the event he provokes armed conflict in Kosovo;
- Strengthening UNCRO and providing increased economic assistance to Croatia to discourage Tudjman from launching a full-scale war in Krajina in the near term (while at the same time encouraging continued low-level attrition operations that could help limit Krajina Serb support to the Bosnian Serbs); and
- Possibly deploying preventive peacekeeping forces along Hungary's and Albania's borders with the FRY.

*CROATIA
Ser*

We would, at the same time, intensify our efforts to sustain the Federation and Bosnian-Croat military cooperation. And we would make clear that we stand ready to broker a political settlement and assist in its implementation, although at this stage we would jettison the Contact Group approach and devise a new basis for the negotiations.

Annex I: Gameplan for a Diplomatic Breakthrough in 1995

To achieve an agreement this year that reflects the changing strategic realities, we will need to adapt elements of the Contact Group plan while preserving its essential core as the starting point.

- We would begin with a **heart-to-heart talk with the Bosnians**, stressing that, in light of the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa and renewed Western readiness for tougher action, they need think more realistically about the shape of a settlement. They also need to bend in their demand that the Serbs "accept" the Contact Group plan as the "starting point" and agree to at least exploratory Contact Group contacts or proximity talks with Pale.
- In talks with Pale, we would float **possible modifications to the Contact Group map**. At the outset, these would preserve the 51:49 ratio, but provide for a more compact and cohesive territory for the Federation (e.g. trading Srebrenica, Zepa and a widening of the Posavina corridor for full Federation control over Sarajevo and additional territory in central Bosnia). Consistent with a recent Silajdzic proposal to Juppé, we could state that up to 10 percent of the Contact Group map was subject to renegotiation.
- Ultimately, **we should be prepared to press the Bosnians to accept less than 51%** if they can obtain higher-quality territory and more defensible frontiers for the Federation in Central Bosnia.
- We would, similarly, **develop the Contact Group's proposed constitutional principles** to show the Serbs the amount of autonomy their republic would have within the Union and the scope of the "parallel special relationship" with Serbia.
- If necessary, we would press the Bosnians to agree that the Serbs can conduct a **referendum on secession after 2-3 years**, as had been agreed in the 1993 *Invincible* package. We would argue that, if the Bosnians cannot persuade the Serb population that their best future lies in reintegration, there is no point in blocking the *peaceful* separation of the Union along the lines of the Czechoslovak model.
- We would propose to the Allies and Russians mutual participation in funding a **post-settlement "mini-Marshall Plan" for the Balkans** designed to foster regional economic recovery and integration and thereby give all parties a stake in peace.

In tandem with these steps, we and our Contact Group partners should tell Milosevic the time has come for him to put up or shut up, i.e. that:

- We will terminate the current sanctions relief in September if he has not recognized Bosnia and taken visible action to terminate military support for Pale (and Knin);
- Moreover, if sanctions relief is terminated and the ICFY mission departs, any resumption of large-scale support for Pale will be met not only by a tightening of economic sanctions against the FRY, but by U.S. or NATO air strikes against the Drina bridges and key supply routes.
- At the same time, in conjunction with the threat of terminating sanctions relief for non-compliance, we would **increase the rewards offered to Milosevic for initial positive steps**, such as lifting vice suspending phase-one sanctions if he recognizes Bosnia.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS, re: Telephone Call with French President Chirac (2 pages)	07/13/1995	P1/b(1), P5 v2 3/3/2020
001b. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with French President Jacques Chirac (1 page)	07/13/1995	P1/b(1) v2 3/3/2020
002. draft	re: Bosnia Endgame Strategy [partial] (5 pages)	07/10/1995	P1/b(1), P5 v2 3/3/2020
003. report	re: Srebrenica Civilian Evacuation Options (3 pages)	07/12/1995	P1/b(1)
004. report	re: The Bosnian Serbs & the Enclaves (5 pages)	07/12/1995	P1/b(1)
005. paper	re: Options for UNPROFOR Extraction from Eastern Enclaves (4 pages)	07/11/1995	P1/b(1) v2 3/3/2020
006. paper	re: Srebrenica & a UN Firebreak (2 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1) v2 3/3/2020
007. notes	re: Handwritten Notes - Conversation with Mike Durkee (5 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1)
008. letter	Alija Izetbegovic to POTUS, re: Srebrenica Crisis [two copies] (2 pages)	07/09/1995	P1/b(1) v2 3/3/2020
009. memo	Nelson Drew to Sandy Berger; re: July 11 Deputies' Meeting on Bosnia (4 pages)	07/11/1995	P1/b(1), P5
010. agenda	re: NSC Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (1 page)	07/11/1995	P1/b(1)
011. notes	re: Handwritten Notes - Bosnia Options (2 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Alexander Vershbow (European)
 OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995 (Early July) [1]

2006-0647-F
 jp2099

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002. draft	re: Bosnia Endgame Strategy [partial] (5 pages)	07/10/1995	P1/b(1), P5

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Alexander Vershbow (European)
OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995 (Early July) [1]

2006-0647-F

jp2099

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

BOSNIA ENDGAME STRATEGY

The Context: Our current strategy on Bosnia will, at best, delay UNPROFOR withdrawal, and has virtually no chance of producing a political settlement. The Rapid Reaction Force will soon be in place and put to the test; while it may succeed in restoring convoy access to Sarajevo, it is not likely to be of much use in staving off the collapse of the eastern enclaves. Allies are no longer willing to use NATO air power to enforce the exclusion zones and the Bosnian Serbs' integrated air defense system has effectively "denied flight" to NATO planes, thereby eliminating the stick from our negotiating leverage. Milosevic continues to demand more than we can give on sanctions relief, while backing away from a readiness to genuinely recognize Bosnia or cut off support for the Bosnian Serbs; even if Carl Bildt comes to acceptable terms with Milosevic, it is not clear that this will lead to any change in the Bosnian Serbs' rejection of the Contact Group plan as the starting point for negotiations. The Bosnian Government, increasingly skeptical of the value of keeping UNPROFOR in place, may soon decide to withdraw its consent to UNPROFOR's presence and push for a lifting of the arms embargo and a solution on the battlefield. Meanwhile, Tudjman seems poised for a military assault on Sectors North and South by fall.

The Perils of Drift: There is a high probability that our Allies will decide this summer that UNPROFOR withdrawal can no longer be avoided. Even if we muddle through and gain another winter's respite, the situation next spring is likely to be even more difficult to control. In the midst of the U.S. presidential election campaign, our Allies could force the decision to implement OPLAN 40104 upon us, while the Bosnian government will have every incentive to try and draw us into the conflict -- through our protracted presence during the NATO withdrawal operation or, subsequently, through an open-ended lift, arm and strike policy. The flexibility needed to make critical decisions would be severely constrained by the glare of the campaign, which argues for bringing the Bosnia issue to a head this year. To this end, we should:

- make an all-out, high-risk effort to obtain a political settlement this fall, before a decision is taken to withdraw UNPROFOR; and
- *if that effort fails*, force the issue of UNPROFOR withdrawal and lifting the arms embargo *this year*, rather than having to confront those issues during the election year.

The Path to an Early Settlement: We are not going to obtain a settlement this year unless we recreate some real leverage vis-à-vis the Bosnian Serbs, in terms of both sticks and carrots:

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

Document released in Part

CIA Historical Collections Division


CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

AB 7A-14 1 OCT 2018
[2012-0800 m, 1.22]

Sticks: The arrival of the RRF and the specter of defeat that UNPROFOR withdrawal would signify should be used to convince the Allies of the need for tougher action against the Serbs on the ground and from the air. This could include:

- using the RRF to protect convoys using a ground corridor to Sarajevo and to reestablish UNPROFOR control over Sarajevo airport, permitting the humanitarian air lift (grounded since April) to resume;
- restoring the credibility of Operation Deny Flight by broadening the ROE to permit attacks on all elements of the Serb integrated air defense system displaying hostile intent and retaliatory attacks on airfields used to launch no-fly zone violations;
- issuing new NATO ultimatums regarding air strikes to enforce the heavy-weapons exclusion zones;

--



- working with Dole and other key Congressional leaders to ensure that language in any unilateral lift resolution provides leverage in negotiations before being triggered;
- in order to deprive the Bosnian Serbs of Krajina Serb support, quietly encouraging Tudjman to maintain the threat of increased Croatian attrition operations against Sectors North and South;
- if necessary to gain Allied agreement to the above measures, agreeing to assist in the reconfiguration of UNPROFOR, possibly including emergency extraction from the eastern enclaves, with Allied equipment left in the hands of Bosnian Government forces.

In tandem with these steps, we and our Contact Group partners should tell Milosevic the time has come for him to put up or shut up, i.e. that:

- we will terminate the current limited sanctions relief in September if he has not recognized Bosnia and taken visible action to terminate military and economic support for Pale (and Knin);

- moreover, if sanctions relief is terminated and the ICFY mission departs, any resumption of large-scale support for Pale will be met not only by a tightening of economic sanctions against the FRY, but by U.S. or NATO air strikes against key supply routes and military targets, including those inside Serbia (similar to our Kosovo warning).

Carrots: To bring the Allies along, convince the Bosnian Serbs to seek a political settlement, and manage the Russians, we will need to be prepared to break the logjam surrounding "acceptance" of the Contact Group plan. This will entail:

- having a heart-to-heart talk with the Bosnians, stressing that, in light of renewed Western readiness for tougher action [redacted (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)] they need to agree to at least exploratory contacts by the Contact Group or proximity talks with Pale;
- in the talks with Pale, advancing possible modifications to the Contact Group map consistent with the 51:49 ratio but providing for a more compact and cohesive territory for the Federation (e.g. trading Srebrenica, Zepa and a widening of the Posavina corridor for full Federation control over Sarajevo and additional territory in central Bosnia); consistent with a recent Silajdzic proposal to Juppé, we could state that up to 10 percent of the Contact Group map was subject to renegotiation;
- similarly, developing the Contact Group's proposed constitutional principles to show the Serbs the amount of autonomy their republic would have within the Union and the scope of the "parallel special relationship" with Serbia;
- if necessary, pressing the Bosnians to agree that the Serbs can conduct a referendum on secession after 2-3 years, as had been agreed in the 1993 *Invincible* package;
- proposing to the Allies and Russians mutual participation in funding a post-settlement "mini-Marshall Plan" for the Balkans designed to foster regional economic recovery and integration and thereby to give all parties a stake in good-faith implementation of a peace settlement.

At the same time, in conjunction with the threat of terminating sanctions relief for non-compliance, we should increase the rewards to Milosevic for initial positive steps, such as lifting vice suspending phase-one sanctions if he recognizes Bosnia. This could be especially helpful in keeping Moscow on board.

If UNPROFOR withdrawal must occur: As noted above, if the last-ditch effort to obtain a settlement fails, or if the RRF fails to improve the situation on the ground, we should force the issue of UNPROFOR withdrawal this year rather than having to deal with it in the middle of the election campaign. We should also seek to maximize Congressional co-responsibility in our withdrawal and post-withdrawal strategy.

40104 Lite? If we hope to avoid being drawn into the conflict, we need to use the withdrawal period, to the extent possible, to lay the groundwork for effective implementation of a post-withdrawal strategy of lift, arm and train. This argues for minimizing the time involved in extracting forces from areas where NATO forces are most likely to encounter Serb resistance, as well as Government maneuvers designed to prolong NATO's stay.

-- Specifically, this would require shifting the emphasis to reliance on the RRF and rapid airborne extraction of UNPROFOR troops in the eastern enclaves (if necessary, destroying some equipment or handing it over to the Bosnian Government).

-- The bulk of the remaining UNPROFOR troops would be in or near Federation-controlled territory, where a lighter NATO force may be sufficient to cover the withdrawal. (In this regard, we may want to make the case to our Allies for maintaining a rump UNPROFOR presence in central Bosnia to continue to assist in implementing the Federation agreements and dampening Muslim-Croat tensions.)

Transition to Lift: As soon as most UNPROFOR troops are out of harm's way, we should accelerate the transition to a pro-Bosnian lift, arm and train strategy:

--

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.3(b)(5), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

-- In the UNSC, we would prepare for passage of a resolution to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia following UNPROFOR's departure:

- To secure a Russian abstention, we may need to make the resolution applicable to all republics of the former

Yugoslavia (including Serbia-Montenegro) and/or agree to substantial sanctions relief for Belgrade.

- If the Russians threatened to veto the UNSCR, we would seek a joint Allied agreement that, with UNPROFOR's departure, the UNSC was no longer "seized of the matter," that Article 51 rights of collective self-defense were now preeminent, and that we were therefore no longer bound by the arms embargo.
- As we moved in the UNSC, we would begin to mobilize a multinational effort to arm and train the Bosnians, with a view toward spreading the burden and thereby reducing the overall U.S. role and responsibility.

Implementing the post-withdrawal strategy: Following UNPROFOR's departure and passage of the UNSCR lifting the arms embargo, we would enter the implementation phase of our lift, arm and train strategy. Our objective would be to facilitate the provision to the Bosnian Government of military capabilities sufficient to recover territory allotted to the Federation under the Contact Group proposal.

- We have recently backed away from a commitment to air strikes in tandem with lift on the grounds that an air campaign could draw us too deeply into the conflict. We would, however, need to reexamine the "no strike" decision to the extent that Bosnian Government forces needed help in repelling Serbian offensives before they obtained arms and training sufficient to level the playing field.
- We would also need to implement a regional containment strategy, to include: a strong warning to Serbia to refrain from direct intervention; reinforcing UNPREDEP in Macedonia to prevent Serbian border encroachments and deter a new crackdown in Kosovo; strengthening UNCRO to prevent a resumption of full-scale war in Krajina and limit Krajina Serb support to the Bosnian Serbs; and possibly deploying preventive peacekeeping forces along Hungary's and Albania's borders with the FRY.
- We would, at the same time, intensify efforts to sustain the Federation and Bosnian-Croat military cooperation.
- We would make clear that we stand ready to broker a political settlement and assist in its implementation, although at this stage we would probably want to set aside the Contact Group approach and devise a basis for a "fresh start" to the negotiations.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. email	James E. Baker to Nancy E. Soderberg, re: Information for Bosnia PC (1 page)	07/14/1995	P5 v2 1/21/2013
001b. email	James E. Baker to Nancy E. Soderberg et al; re: Legal Availability of 614 Waiver (1 page)	07/14/1995	P5 v2 1/21/2013
002a. email	Alexander Vershbow to Anthony Lake; re: Bosnia Strategy Paper (1 page)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1) v2 11/5/2016
002b. paper	re: Bosnia Strategy [partial] (2 pages)	07/12/1995	P1/b(1) v2 10/1/2013

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Nancy Soderberg (Staff Director)
OA/Box Number: 1402

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia, July 1995 [1]

2006-0647-F
jp2106

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. paper	re: Bosnia Strategy [partial] (2 pages)	07/12/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Nancy Soderberg (Staff Director)
OA/Box Number: 1402

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia, July 1995 [1]

2006-0647-F
jp2106

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

BOSNIA STRATEGY

Summary: With the fall of Srebrenica, we need to make an all-out effort to restabilize the situation on the ground, restore UNPROFOR's credibility, and press for a realistic diplomatic settlement this year. If that effort fails and UNPROFOR must withdraw, we should move quickly to help the Bosnians obtain the military capabilities needed to level the playing field while minimizing U.S. involvement, so that an ultimate solution is not dependent on our support or the actions of the international community.

Restabilization post-Srebrenica: The Bosnian Serb attack on Srebrenica is simply the most dramatic development in a pattern of increasingly aggressive Serb actions over the past few months. If we and our Allies fail to reverse this pattern, it will only encourage Serb attacks on the other enclaves and renewed strangulation of Sarajevo, precipitating UNPROFOR's collapse and a protracted NATO withdrawal operation in circumstances that will be perceived as a defeat for the UN and the Alliance. It will also guarantee passage of unilateral lift legislation by the Congress in a manner that will damage relations with our allies.

In the short term, we should give political support to French-led efforts to restore the Srebrenica safe area as a demilitarized enclave, while recognizing that there is no sensible military option for saving Srebrenica or Zepa. **The more important task is to devise a strategy to reestablish UNPROFOR's credibility where it counts:** using the lead elements of the RRF immediately to establish secure humanitarian access routes to Sarajevo; and using the full RRF, once deployed, to protect Gorazde, the strategically most important of the eastern enclaves and the one where NATO is most directly engaged (through the exclusion zone). If UNPROFOR and the RRF can prove their effectiveness in this way, we may be able to deter further Serb provocations, restabilize the situation on the ground, and avert an early UNPROFOR withdrawal.

In order for this strategy to succeed, we need to **persuade the Bosnian Government that it is in its interest to keep UNPROFOR** even if this means writing off Srebrenica and Zepa and concentrating UNPROFOR's efforts in Sarajevo and Central Bosnia. We would also need to be sure, before employing the RRF to help protect Gorazde, that Bosnian Government forces there will defend the enclave, since the RRF is not designed to do this on its own.

Pressing for a political settlement this year: We are not going to obtain a settlement this year unless we recreate some real leverage vis-à-vis the Bosnian Serbs, and unless we are prepared to offer inducements to break the logjam surrounding "acceptance" of the Contact Group plan.

Sticks: The more assertive UNPROFOR/RRF actions suggested above will not, in themselves, provide much negotiating leverage. We should use the specter of defeat that UNPROFOR withdrawal would represent to convince Allies of the need to raise the stakes in other ways, such as:

- **restoring the credibility of Operation Deny Flight** by broadening the ROE to permit attacks on all elements of the Serb integrated air defense system displaying hostile intent and retaliatory attacks on airfields used to launch no-fly zone violations;

- issuing new NATO ultimatums regarding air strikes to enforce the exclusion zones;

•

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(c), 1.4(d)

- in order to deprive the Bosnian Serbs of Krajina Serb support, quietly encouraging Tudjman to maintain the threat of increased Croatian attrition operations against Sectors North and South (but not to launch a full-scale assault).

In tandem with these steps, we and our Contact Group partners should tell Milosevic the time has come for him to put up or shut up, i.e. that:

- we will terminate the current sanctions relief in September if he has not recognized Bosnia and taken visible action to terminate military support for Pale (and Knin);
- moreover, if sanctions relief is terminated and the ICFY mission departs, any resumption of large-scale support for Pale will be met not only by a tightening of economic sanctions against the FRY, but by U.S. or NATO air strikes against key supply routes and military targets, including those inside Serbia.

Carrots: To bring the Allies along, convince the Bosnian Serbs to negotiate, and manage the Russians, we will need to adapt elements of the Contact Group plan while preserving its essential core (one state, 51:49). This will entail:

- having a heart-to-heart talk with the Bosnians, stressing that, in light of the fall of Srebrenica, renewed Western readiness for tougher action and (b)(1), 1.4(b), 1.4(d) 1.4(d) they need think more realistically about the shape of a settlement, and agree to at least exploratory Contact Group contacts or proximity talks with Pale;
- in the talks with Pale, advancing possible modifications to the Contact Group map consistent with the 51:49 ratio but providing for a more compact and cohesive territory for the Federation (e.g. trading Srebrenica, Zepa and a widening of the Posavina corridor for full Federation control over Sarajevo and additional territory in central Bosnia); consistent with a recent Silajdzic proposal to Juppé, we could state that up to 10 percent of the Contact Group map was subject to renegotiation;
- similarly, developing the Contact Group's proposed constitutional principles to show the Serbs the amount of autonomy their republic would have within the Union and the scope of the "parallel special relationship" with Serbia;
- if necessary, pressing the Bosnians to agree that the Serbs can conduct a referendum on secession after 2-3 years, as had been agreed in the 1993 *Invincible* package;
- proposing to the Allies and Russians mutual participation in funding a post-settlement "mini-Marshall Plan" for the Balkans designed to foster regional economic recovery and integration and thereby give all parties a stake in peace.

At the same time, in conjunction with the threat of terminating sanctions relief for non-compliance, we may want to **increase the rewards offered to Milosevic** for initial positive steps, such as lifting vice suspending phase-one sanctions if he recognizes Bosnia. This could be especially helpful in keeping Moscow on board.

If UNPROFOR withdrawal must occur: If the last-ditch effort to obtain a settlement fails and the RRF fails to restabilize the situation on the ground, we will need to face up to the issue of UNPROFOR withdrawal and implementing a post-withdrawal strategy. (Indeed, it may be preferable to face the issue this year rather than having to implement a messy and protracted NATO withdrawal operation in the middle of the election campaign, when the parties will have every incentive to try to draw us into the conflict.)

Leveling the playing field: Our post-withdrawal strategy should have as its goal providing the Bosnians with sufficient military capability to survive the immediate Serb onslaught and, within a short period of time, to begin to regain territory allotted to them under the Contact Group proposal. This would make the ultimate resolution of the conflict the result of a balance of power on the ground rather than dependent on the actions of the international community.

- **Our preferred approach would be to lift the arms embargo multilaterally through passage of a UNSC resolution.** This could be made part of the resolution terminating UNPROFOR's mandate and authorizing withdrawal. Our allies have indicated they will go along with lift after UNPROFOR withdrawal. To secure a Russian abstention, we may need to make the lift applicable to all republics of the former Yugoslavia (including Serbia-Montenegro) and/or agree to substantial sanctions relief for Belgrade.

- (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(c), 1.4(d)

While the Bosnians' survival in the short term may require U.S. or NATO air strikes, we would want to set a time limit to any air strike commitment and then restrict our involvement to the provision of arms and training, making clear to the Bosnians that once the playing field is leveled, they are on their own.

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, 1.4(c), 1.4(d)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b, EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 1.4d

We would continue to use a mixture of sanctions relief and threats to keep the Serbian border closed and to deter full-scale intervention by Belgrade; but we would tell the Bosnians bluntly that if their offensives went beyond retaking territory on the Contact Group map and provoked Serbian intervention, they should not expect us or NATO to come to their rescue.

Regional containment strategy: As we moved to arm the Bosnians, we would need to take a range of steps to prevent a widening of the conflict to other parts of the region, to include:

- a strong warning of retaliation against Serbia in the event of direct intervention in Bosnia, coupled with sanctions relief to encourage a sealing of the border;
- reinforcing UNPREDEP in Macedonia to prevent Serbian border encroachments and to deter a new crackdown in Kosovo;
- strengthening UNCRO and providing other carrots to Tudjman to prevent a resumption of full-scale war in Krajina (while at the same time encouraging continued low-level attrition operations that could help limit Krajina Serb support to the Bosnian Serbs);
- and possibly deploying preventive peacekeeping forces along Hungary's and Albania's borders with the FRY.

We would, at the same time, intensify our efforts to **sustain the Federation and Bosnian-Croat military cooperation**. And we would make clear that we stand ready to **broker a political settlement and assist in its implementation**, although at this stage we would probably want to set aside the Contact Group approach and devise a basis for a "fresh start" to the negotiations.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Rob Malley to Anthony Lake; re: Human Rights Atrocities in Bosnia- (2 pages)	08/04/1995	P1/b(1) v 3/3/2020

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Srebrenica or War Crimes or ICTY or Atrocities or Genocide])
 OA/Box Number: 599

FOLDER TITLE:

9506054

2006-0647-F

jp2136

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

8/7
Nancy S 6054

August 4, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: MORTON HALPERIN *RM to*

FROM: ROB MALLEY *RM*

SUBJECT: Human Rights Atrocities in Bosnia

There is increasingly solid evidence of atrocities committed by the Bosnian Serb army during its attack on Srebrenica and Zepa. During a mission to central and northeastern Bosnia, A/S Shattuck was able to confirm through interviews with refugees, reports and intelligence we have been receiving. Approximately 12,000 persons from the two former enclaves are still missing and unaccounted for. Hundreds, perhaps up to a thousand, persons (principally men and boys) appear to have been killed in mass executions. Others are either in detention or seeking to flee the area. Reports of other brutalities, including rape, sexual abuse and mutilations abound. There also are some indications that chemical weapons might have been used.

State is undertaking a series of steps to pressure the Bosnian Serbs to grant access to and permit free passage for those still at large or in detention:

1. Demarche to Belgrade to communicate the requirement that an international mission be permitted to enter the former safe areas and extract all former residents.
2. Demarche to Russia and Greece to exercise pressure on Belgrade and Pale.
3. Efforts at the UNSC for the issuance of a statement on the need for accounting, access to and safe passage for those remaining in enclaves.

White House action will be needed to support this effort which, given the unknown fate of thousands of persons, is of the utmost urgency. A first step would be a presidential statement that condemns the atrocities, calls for access to and safe passage for those remaining in the enclaves, and reminds perpetrators of these actions that they will be held accountable. (A draft statement is attached at Tab A). The statement would be released in conjunction with a fact sheet detailing known incidents of

CONFIDENTIAL

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOGRAPHY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By: [redacted] NARA Date: 11/5/2019
[7013-0656-m (4,45)]
2012-0800-m (1.36) 6/6/2013

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Alexander Vershbow to Samuel Drew re: FW: Bosnia Human Rights Issues (4 pages)	08/06/1995	P1/b(1) RDS 6/6/2013
002. email	Robert Malley to Eric Schwartz and Vershbow re: Bosnia (2 pages)	08/07/1995	P1/b(1) RDS 6/6/2013
003. email	[Duplicate of 002] (2 pages)	08/07/1995	P1/b(1) RDS 6/6/2013
004. email	Drew to Drew et al. re: Krajina Refugee Lines for Shattuck Points (2 pages)	08/07/1995	P1/b(1) RD 6/6/2013
005. email	Malley to Drew and Schwartz re: Bosnia Statement (2 pages)	08/07/1995	P1/b(1) RDS 6/6/2013
006. email	[Duplicate of 005] (2 pages)	08/08/1995	P1/b(1) RDS 6/6/2013
007. email	Drew to Jane Baker et al. re: Bosnia Statement (3 pages)	08/09/1995	P1/b(1)
008. email	Sitroom to Steven Andreasen et al. re: 15 August 95 WHSR AM Summary (4 pages)	08/15/1995	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Emails
 MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Srebrenica and Ethnic Cleans...])
 OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[08/06/1995-08/15/1995]

2006-0647-F

rs504

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 07 August 95 09:01
 FROM Malley, Robert
 CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 SUBJECT Bosnia [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
 TO Schwartz, Eric P.
 Vershbow, Alexander R.
 CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
 TEXT_BODY

Attached is a proposed rewrite of the statement.

[[BOSNIA3.DOC : 2304 in BOSNIA3.DOC]]

ATTACHMENT
 FILE DATE 7 August 95 9:0
 ATTACHMENT
 FILE NAME BOSNIA3.DOC

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
 White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
 By W NARA, Date 11/5/2019
 2012-0860-m (1.32)

Over the past month, violence has escalated throughout the former Yugoslavia. The United States has urged and will continue to urge all parties to show restraint and, most importantly, to respect human rights and international humanitarian law.

The conduct of Bosnian armed forces during their attack on Srebrenica and Zepa is of particular concern. Evidence of unspeakable atrocities is mounting every day. There are reports of mass executions, beatings, rape, sexual abuse and other flagrant violations of human rights. Thousands of civilians from Srebrenica and Zepa are missing and unaccounted for. As I have made clear before, the United States condemns these outrageous actions in the strongest terms.

Our first obligation is to the men, women and children held by the Bosnian Serbs or still alive in the hills and woods in and around the former enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa. The Bosnian Serbs must provide international humanitarian organizations access to those persons still being detained. They must provide a full accounting of people from the two areas whose fate remains unknown. They must not harm persons who have survived the Bosnian Serb onslaught and are in need of immediate assistance. And they must grant the men, women and children from Srebrenica and Zepa safe passage to areas where they will be protected. I have directed my Administration to make our concerns known to all relevant parties and to work with the

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY
 CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

international community to see to it that these basic requirements are met.

Public condemnation of the atrocities alone is insufficient. There also must be justice, and those who have committed these acts must be held accountable. To that end, I also have directed my Administration to intensify efforts to collect information on what happened in Srebrenica and Zepa. Evidence will be turned over to the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and serve to prosecute those culpable of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. I urge States to fulfill their international obligation to arrest those already indicted by the Tribunal if they enter their territory and surrender them to the Tribunal.

Bosnian Serbs need to be on notice that such criminal actions constitute serious impediments to a political solution. They must not and will not remain unpunished.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Eric Schwartz to Peter Bass et al. re: Bosnia: Humanitarian Update (2 pages)	07/12/1995	P1/b(1) v2 3/3/2020
002. email	Anthony Gardner to Samuel Drew and Alexander Vershbow re: Chirac Telcon [partial] (6 pages)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1) v2 6/6/2013
003. email	Ralph Sigler to Gary Bresnahan re: Major Telcon [partial] (9 pages)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1) v2 5/26/2016
004. email	Drew to Jane Baker et al. re: Lake Meeting with Sacirbey Monday (5 pages)	07/15/1995	P1/b(1), P5 v2 3/3/2020
005. email	Sitroom to Steven Andreasen et al. re: WHSR PM Summary 14 July 1995 (5 pages)	07/15/1995	P1/b(1)
006. email	Vershbow to Bass et al. re: Massacres at Srebrenica [partial] (3 pages)	07/25/1995	P1/b(1) ; b(6) 6/6/2013
007. email	Robert Malley to Eric Schwartz and Vershbow re: Bosnia (3 pages)	08/04/1995	P1/b(1) v2 6/6/2013

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Emails
 MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Srebrenica and Ethnic Cleans...])
 OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[07/12/1995-08/04/1995]

2006-0647-F

rs503

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 14 July 95 18:47
FROM Gardner, Anthony
CLASSIFICATION ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SUBJECT chirac telcon [~~CONFIDENTIAL~~]
TO Drew, Samuel N.
 Vershbow, Alexander R.
CARBON_COPY Maxfield, Nancy H.
TEXT_BODY
 [[5425TEL.DOC : 4659 in 5425TEL.DOC]][[5425BRL.DOC : 4660 in
 5425BRL.DOC]][[5425AS.DOC : 4661 in 5425AS.DOC]]
**ATTACHMENT
 FILE DATE** 14 July 95 18:45
**ATTACHMENT
 FILE NAME** 5425TEL.DOC
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 5425
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with French President Jacques Chirac

PARTICIPANTS: The President
 President Jacques Chirac
 Present: Alexander Vershbow
 Notetaker: Anthony Gardner

DATE, TIME AND PLACE:
 July 13, 1995, 3:22-3:58 p.m.,
 Oval Office

The President: Hello, Jacques?

Declassified in Part
 Per E.O. 13526
 RDS 06/06/2013 (1.34)
 2012-0800-M

President Chirac: Hello, Bill. How are you? I will speak in French. First of all, my congratulations on the strong statement you issued that if we cannot restore the UN mission, then the days of UNPROFOR are numbered and that that causes you concern. Our analysis is the same. The fall of Srebrenica and the probable fall of Zepa tomorrow and the real threat to Gorazde is a major failure of UN, NATO and all democracies. You see what we see on TV, how the Serbs are separating men from women, sending women to be raped and killing men who are old enough to bear arms. In my opinion, we can no longer just stand by and watch this. (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4b

(b)(1), 1.4(b) That means restoring the situation in the Eastern enclaves. Therefore, firm and limited military action is called for.

France is ready to put all of its forces behind the mission. I don't yet know what the British want to do. They are directly concerned since they are in Gorazde. I wonder whether or not their intention is to pick up and leave Gorazde just as the Dutch left Srebrenica. I don't want France to be an accomplice in such a situation. Either we agree to a joint military intervention to protect the enclaves, recapture Srebrenica and guarantee Gorazde and Zepa which account for 100,000 Muslims -- today 20,000 to 40,000 Muslims are fleeing Srebrenica -- and we use military intervention to impose the will of the UN, which can only come from the U.S., France, the UK and Germany -- France is prepared to throw all of its forces into the effort to restore the situation in Srebrenica -- or we do nothing. But if the option is to do nothing, just as we did in 1939, then France will withdraw -- of course, in accordance with our British friends and the rest of UNPROFOR. So the issue is whether the U.S. is prepared to cooperate in combatting ethnic cleansing or do we sit back and let these people fight each other and we go home. We cannot allow ourselves to be accomplices!

The President: We appreciate the strong stance you have adopted. Obviously, we have been thinking about this a lot. I will take up

your specific proposals with my military commanders, but I wanted to speak with you first. I would like you to think about a few things. Gorazde is much more important psychologically than Zepa and Srebrenica due to its size. The Bosnian Government has 9,000 troops in Gorazde ready to fight. In Srebrenica there were about 3,000 Bosnian troops but, as you know, they left under pressure of shelling. They left although they could have stayed and fought. The British have 300 troops in Gorazde, so I think they will be more inclined to take a stand there. We all know that if something happens to Gorazde, the Bosnian Serb army will feel to move on Sarajevo. Our military advisers say there are significant hazards

in attempting to land a force with helicopters in Srebrenica and that UNPROFOR might be better off securing Gorazde first and then move back eastward due to the inherent difficulty of defending the area there. The other issue I would like to raise with you -- which we discussed in Halifax and here during your visit and has become more pressing -- is the necessity of knowing the rules of engagement in Bosnia. You cannot be in a position to fight in Zepa and then ask for NATO support without clear rules of engagement. If there is going to be fighting, it has to be different than in the past. Before we provide air power, we have to know that it would be effective. Before we get into a military campaign, we must have a clear sense of what the next move is and what the acceptable military options are under UNPROFOR and NATO. Now that you have told me what you want to do, I will talk to our military advisers, but they are very skeptical. We must first ensure that Gorazde can be held and then Sarajevo. I will have conversations with them and get back in touch with you.

I would like to make two more points. First, I think your stated intentions to reopen Mount Igman road is a critical point. Second, we need General Shalikashvili to speak with Admiral Lanxade or have Secretary Christopher speak with your foreign minister to talk in detail about what you have in mind for the enclaves. We need to consider whether the Muslims will return to the enclaves, how we will protect them if they come back, and whether it would be under old UN rules of engagement. Will the Bosnian Serb Army just end their advances? Therefore, I believe we should focus on Gorazde and press for ministerial and military talks. You have given me many things to work on. I would like to have a follow up between the generals or foreign ministers on the details.

President Chirac:


(b)(1) EO 13526-1:4b

(b)(1) EO 13526-1:4b

leave the situation like this. If we are not prepared to defend democracy, we should leave, let them fight, withdraw UNPROFOR and implement Oplan 40104. We cannot day after day be smacked in the face while ethnic cleansing is going on.

The President: We cannot defend democracies in the abstract. My military advisers tell me the Muslims could have defended Srebrenica more fiercely, but that they would not do it. We cannot fight just because the UN says they are "safe areas". We cannot commit ourselves to stay forever if they won't defend themselves. That's the problem with the strategy you suggest. Yesterday we saw the imbalance in their arms. Have you any thoughts about lifting the arms embargo?

President Chirac:



The President: If we intercede to regain the enclaves on their behalf and they won't fight, then UNPROFOR's mission is completely changed. I agree the Serbs have made a mockery of the UN. They took Srebrenica and got it for free. We didn't even bomb them. I have argued that we should allow NATO to take tougher action, but that was not to be. If we enter a war to defend the Bosnians, they have to be ready to defend themselves. That's what worries me.

President Chirac: When does the Congress vote on lifting the embargo?

The President: Next week. I agree with you: I am vehemently opposed to unilateral lift and am prepared to veto it.

President Chirac: Can Congress override the veto?

The President: Yes, with a two thirds vote, but I don't think there's a chance. I am not worried about it. I would like to confer with my military advisers and get back in touch on this

matter.

President Chirac: OK, I quite agree. I will ask Admiral Lanxade to contact General Shalikashvili as soon as possible. Thank you very much.

The President: OK. Good-bye.

-- End of Conversation --

ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE

14 July 95 17:4

ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME

5425BRL.DOC
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
5425
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KENNETH C. BRILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
Between the President and French President Jacques
Chirac (U)

The attached Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the President and French President Jacques Chirac is provided for the information of the Secretary of State. It must be distributed via NODIS channels and not below the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) level. It may also be sent to our Embassy in Paris for the Ambassador and/or Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) only. (E)

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE

14 July 95 17:4

ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME

5425AS.DOC

5425

July 13, 1995

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW

FROM: ANTHONY GARDNER

SUBJECT: Telcon with French President Jacques
Chirac

Attached at Tab A is the Memorandum of Telephone Conversation
between the President and French President Jacques Chirac on July
13, 1995.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I transmitting the Memorandum of
Telephone Conversation to the Department of State.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to State
Tab A Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS; re: Telephone Call with French President Chirac (2 pages)	07/20/1995	P1/b(1), P5 VL 9/2/2020
001b. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with French President Jacques Chirac (2 pages)	07/20/1995	P1/b(1) VL
002a. memo	Andrew Sens to Kenneth Brill; re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between POTUS & French President Chirac (1 page)	07/19/1995	P1/b(1) VL 11/5/2019
002b. telcon	Telephone Conversation Between POTUS & French President Chirac; re: Bosnia Question (6 pages)	07/19/1995	P1/b(1) JSCAD 7/3/2019
003a. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS; re: Telephone Call with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl (1 page)	07/19/1995	P1/b(1) VL
003b. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with German Chancellor Kohl (2 pages)	07/19/1995	P1/b(1) VL
004. paper	re: Gorazde (1 page)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1)
005. paper	re: Croatia (2 pages)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1)
006. report	re: Bosnian Army [partial] (4 pages)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1) CIA Bosnia Conference 10/1/2013
007. memo	Leon Fuertth to Tony Lake; re: Safety of ICFY Monitors (1 page)	07/19/1995	P1/b(1), P5 VL
008a. memo	Richard Holbrooke to The Secretary; re: Srebrenica - Implications for the Federation (1 page)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1)
008b. paper	re: What Should be Done if the Enclaves Fall? (3 pages)	07/18/1995	P1/b(1), P5

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Alexander Vershbow (European)
 OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995 (Mid-July) [2]

2006-0647-F

jp2103

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
009a. memo	Andrew Sens to Kenneth Brill; re: Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between POTUS & British Prime Minister Major (1 page)	07/17/1995	P1/b(1) VL 11/5/2019
009b. telcon	Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between POTUS & Prime Minister Major; re: Bosnia Problem [partial] (7 pages)	07/14/1995	P1/b(1) XDE S/26/2016
010. cable	American Embassy, Belgrade to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C. & American Embassy, London; re: Bildt Close to Agreement with Milosevic on Bosnian Recognition (1 page)	07/19/1995	P1/b(1)
011a. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS; re: Telephone Call with Canadian Prime Minister Chretien (1 page)	07/19/1995	P1/b(1) VL
011b. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with Canadian Prime Minister Chretien (2 pages)	07/19/1995	P1/b(1) VL
012a. memo	Nelson Drew to Anthony Lake; re: Telephone Call with Dutch Prime Minister Kok (1 page)	07/19/1995	P1/b(1) VL
012b. talking points	re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with Netherlands Prime Minister Kok (2 pages)	07/19/1995	P1/b(1) VL
013. paper	re: Summary of Conclusions for Deputies Committee Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)	07/25/1995	P1/b(1) CIA Bosnia Conference 10/1/2013
014. paper	re: Summary of Conclusions for Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia (3 pages)	07/25/1995	P1/b(1) CIA Bosnia Conference 10/1/2013

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Alexander Vershbow (European)
 OA/Box Number: 897

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - July 1995 (Mid-July) [2]

2006-0647-F
 jp2103

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Deputies Committee

DATE: July 11-12, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room/SVTS
TIME: 11:00 - 11:30 a.m.
12:30 p.m. - 1:30 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Deputies Committee Meetings
on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

CHAIR
Sandy Berger Rick Inderfurth (7/12 only)
David Scheffer

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders (7/12 only) OMB
Gordon Adams (7/12 only)
Keith Bickel (7/12 only)

STATE
Peter Tarnoff
John Kornblum
Christopher Hill (7/11 only) CIA
George Tenet (7/12 only)
Dennis Blair (7/11 only)
Norman Schindler

DEFENSE
John White (7/11 only)
Walter Slocombe
Joe Kruzel (7/12 only) JCS
William Owens
Wesley Clark
Howell Estes (7/11 only)

USUN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright
(7/11 only -- via secure
video) NSC
Alexander Vershbow
Nelson Drew

Summary of Conclusions

- 1. Deputies met on July 11 and 12 to consider appropriate responses to the Bosnian Serb assault and occupation of the UN Safe Area at Srebrenica. (U)

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

CIA Historical Collections Division

SECRET

Declassify on: OADR

CLINTON LIBRARY ~~PHOTOCOPY~~
[2012-0800-M, 1.42]

2. Deputies agreed on the need to reassert UNPROFOR's ability to carry out its humanitarian and protection missions in Bosnia, and to halt the pattern of successful Bosnian Serb military aggressiveness that has marked the past month. They also agreed that failure to reverse this pattern will result in attacks on the other enclaves and renewed strangulation of Sarajevo, precipitating the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission and initiation of a withdrawal under circumstances that will be perceived as defeat for the UN, NATO and our allies. They also expressed concern that it would accelerate passage of unilateral lift legislation by the Congress in a manner that would damage relations with our allies. ~~(S)~~

3. Deputies agreed on the following immediate actions (U):

- To support the UNSCR introduced by the French calling for the use of all available resources to restore the Srebrenica Safe Area, although acknowledging privately that UNPROFOR does not now possess the military capability to reverse the Bosnian Serb occupation of Srebrenica (nor, in all likelihood, to prevent the fall of Zepa). (Action: State/USUN) ~~(S)~~
- To weigh in with Milosevic (and, through the UN, with Karadzic and Mladic) to obtain support for UNHCR efforts to assist in the movement, care and supply of the refugees and the Dutch UNPROFOR troops in Srebrenica; at the same time, to work with the Bosnian government to obtain their consent for the evacuation of the refugees to Tuzla rather than forcing them to remain unsupported behind Serb lines. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~
- To use public statements and consultations with allies to send a clear signal of continuing U.S. resolve to support the retention of UNPROFOR as the best available option for resolving the crisis short of a major Balkan war. (Action: All) ~~(S)~~
- To review the viability of U.S. and NATO quick/emergency withdrawal options as a matter of highest priority, in light of the speed with which Srebrenica was overrun. (Action: OSD/JCS) ~~(S)~~

4. Beyond these immediate actions, Deputies also agreed on the need to work with allies on the development of a follow-on strategy to deter further Serb provocations and prevent the collapse of the UNPROFOR mission (Action: NSC/State/OSD): ~~(S)~~

- At a minimum, this strategy must preserve Bosnian government presence in and access to Sarajevo, and it must sustain

UNPROFOR deployments in Federation territory so as to continue maintaining peace where it exists. ~~(S)~~

- To this end, we will support robust use of the existing elements of the RRF to secure overland access to Sarajevo using the Mt. Igman route, and possibly to restore control over Sarajevo airport. ~~(S)~~
 - Given the political imperative not to be seen as abandoning all of the eastern enclaves, and the fact that NATO credibility (through commitment to enforcing the weapons exclusion zone) is engaged in Gorazde, the strategy should include a commitment to protect this safe area, even if protection of Zepa proves unfeasible. ~~(S)~~
5. Finally, Deputies agreed that efforts to stabilize the situation will be critical to our efforts to avoid Congressional action on unilateral lift. ~~(C)~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Summary of Conclusions for Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: July 14, 1995

LOCATION: White House Situation Room/SVTS

TIME: 3:00 - 4:00 p.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia ~~(S)~~

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair
Anthony Lake

OMB
Alice Rivlin

OVP
Leon Fuerth
Rick Saunders

Chief of Staff
Leon Panetta

State
Secretary Christopher
Peter Tarnoff
Richard Holbrooke

CIA
John Deutch
Dennis Blair

DOD
Secretary Perry
Jan Lodal

JCS
General Shalikashvili
Wesley Clark
Howell Estes

USUN
Ambassador Madeleine Albright
(via secure video)
Rick Inderfurth (via secure video)

White House
Sandy Berger
Nancy Soderberg

NSC
Alexander Vershbow
Nelson Drew

Summary of Conclusions

- 1. Principals met on July 14 to consider appropriate responses to the Bosnian Serb assault and occupation of the UN Safe Area at Srebrenica. (U)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 1 NARA, Date
CIA Historical Collections Division
[2012-0200-m, 1.43]

SECRET
Declassify on: OADR

CLINTON LIBRARY

Response to French Proposal to Reinforce Gorazde:

2. Principals agreed that we should not ~~be~~ say "no" to the French on efforts to make UNPROFOR more robust or their specific proposal to reinforce Gorazde. But we must find ways to turn the discussion to options that are militarily feasible. The immediate decision is to send General Shalikashvili to London to meet on Sunday, July 16, with his French and British counterparts for the purpose of reviewing the military options being considered in the aftermath of Srebrenica. He will raise a series of issues about the French Gorazde option (including U.S. helicopter lift for French reinforcements) designed to focus the discussion on what is realistic from a military standpoint. He will return with answers before a decision is made on whether or not to provide U.S. helicopter lift. (Action: JCS) ~~(S)~~

3. Principals agreed that if there was to be a decision for UNPROFOR to make a stand at Gorazde, it would be a decision for Sarajevo, London, Paris and Kiev to make. We will not seek to drive such a choice if they are not willing to implement it. We will, however, signal to allies at the meeting in London that we believe such a decision would require robust use of air power, and that we stand ready to provide it in conjunction with a NATO effort to restore air supremacy over Bosnia. (Action: JCS/OSD) ~~(S)~~

4. It was agreed that, in the end, Sarajevo is more important to a successful UNPROFOR strategy than Gorazde. Principals agreed that we should not only support using the RRF to open a secure land route, but measures to enable UNPROFOR to counter Serb artillery attacks on the city. The JCS will develop a list of equipment deemed essential to the protection of Sarajevo, such as advanced counter-battery artillery systems, that could be provided as part of our planned \$50 million in drawdown contributions to the RRF. (Action: JCS) ~~(S)~~

5. Principals determined that the risk of Serbian attempts to take hostages would dramatically increase if UNPROFOR adopted a more robust policy of actively defending the remaining enclaves, and that therefore it would be necessary for the UNMO missions to be withdrawn from Serb-controlled territory. (Action: State/USUN) ~~(S)~~

Dole Resolution on Lift:

6. Principals agreed that, as a strategy for opposing the unilateral lift bill being put forward by Senator Dole, the administration should encourage efforts to amend the language in order to remove the most onerous provisions of the legislation, but serve notice that even with amendments, a requirement that

the U.S. unilaterally violate binding UNSC resolutions would be subject to Presidential veto. Secretary Perry will take the lead in approaching Senator Nunn to seek his assistance in getting amendments to:

- extend the time allowed before lift would take effect from 12 weeks to the 22 weeks necessary to implement OPLAN 40104;
- link any requirement for lifting the arms embargo to its likely consequences by including Congressional authorization for U.S. participation in a NATO-led withdrawal operation;
- ensure that the trigger for implementation of lift is not just a request from the Bosnian government, but rather a decision by the UN Security Council; and
- change unilateral lift to multilateral lift.

Secretary Perry will make clear to Nunn that, even if he succeeds on the first three points, the bill will be subject to veto as long as it still requires unilateral lift. (Action: NSC/OSD)

~~(S)~~

Negotiations with Milosevic:

7. Principals received word of a new agreement that EU mediator Carl Bildt was close to concluding with Milosevic to obtain a mutual recognition package between Bosnia and Serbia. They agreed that the deal would go too far in restricting U.S. ability to reimpose sanctions if Milosevic did not live up to his commitment to seal the border. (It would require a majority among either the five Contact Group members or the five UNSC Permanent members to reimpose sanctions after 9 months.) Ambassador Frasure will meet with Bildt next week to explain our reservations. (Action: State) ~~(S)~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	William Studeman to Director, Defense Intelligence Agency et al; re: Support to War Crimes Prosecutor (2 pages)	03/16/1995	P1/b(1)
002a. report	Alexander Vershbow & Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake; re: CIA Paper [Action Data Summary Report] (2 pages)	01/04/1995	P1/b(1) VL 3/3/2020
002b. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake; re: CIA Paper [partial] (1 page)	01/04/1995	P1/b(1) VL 2/27/2011
002c. report	re: Bosnia [partial] (31 pages)	12/1994	P1/b(1) DS 10/1/2013 CIA Historical C.
003. fax cover sheet	Jim O'Brien to Rob Malley; re: Budget for War Crimes Tribunal (partial) (1 page)	02/27/1995	b(2)
004. fax cover sheet	Jim O'Brien to Rob Malley; re: Passed for Comments (partial) (1 page)	02/27/1995	b(2)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Rob Malley (Democracy/Human Rights)
 OA/Box Number: 794

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - War Crimes Tribunal [1]

2006-0647-F

jp2125

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. memo	Don Kerrick to Anthony Lake; re: CIA Paper [partial] (1 page)	01/04/1995	P1/b(1) <i>Rev 10/1/2013</i> <i>CIA Bosnia Contour</i>

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Rob Malley (Democracy/Human Rights)
OA/Box Number: 794

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - War Crimes Tribunal [1]

2006-0647-F
jp2125

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D C 20506

January 4, 1995

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ALEXANDER VERSHBOW *AV*
FROM: DON KERRICK *(K)*
SUBJECT: CIA Paper on Serb Ethnic Cleansing

Attached CIA paper prepared by the Task Force on Serb ethnic cleansing is based on the 1.4c, 3.5c briefing you received last month. Flagging it for your attention as a heads-up as it will go to the Hill where it could fuel sentiment in favor of tougher action against the Serbs.

Attachment

Tab A. CIA Paper - Bosnia: Serb Ethnic Cleansing

cc: Bill Danvers
Alan Kreczko
Rick Saunders

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

~~TOP SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

2012-0800-M (1.44)
2/27/2017 KBH

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002c..report	re: Bosnia [partial] (31 pages)	12/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Rob Malley (Democracy/Human Rights)
OA/Box Number: 794

FOLDER TITLE:

Bosnia - War Crimes Tribunal [1]

2006-0647-F
jp2125

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY



Intelligence Report

DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force

Bosnia: Serb Ethnic Cleansing

3.5c

A Research Paper

EO 13526 3.5c

Approved for Release
CIA Historical Collections
04/05/2011
AR 70-14
[7011-0200-11, 1.46]

EO 13526 3.5c

Reverse Blank

~~Top Secret~~
~~EUR 94 10008C~~
~~SC 00396794~~
~~December 1994~~

**Bosnia: Serb Ethnic
Cleansing** 3.5c

**A Definition of
Ethnic Cleansing**

The US Department of State, in its 1993 Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Bosnia-Herzegovina, stated that *"techniques that the [Bosnian Serb Army itself] referred to as ethnic cleansing included: laying siege to cities and indiscriminately shelling civilian inhabitants; "strangling" cities (i.e., withholding food deliveries and utilities so as to starve and freeze residents); executing non-combatants; establishing concentration camps where thousands of prisoners were summarily executed and tens of thousands were subjected to torture and inhumane treatment; using prisoners as human shields; employing rape as a tool of war to terrorize and uproot populations; forcing large numbers of civilians to flee to other regions; razing villages to prevent the return of displaced persons; and interfering with international relief efforts, including attacks on relief personnel."* 3.5c

EO 13526 3.5c


iii

~~Top Secret~~
EUR 94-10008C
SC 00396/94
December 1994

3

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

Areas of Control in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mid-December 1994



Unclassified

734314 (R00389) 12-94

4

**Bosnia: Serb Ethnic
Cleansing** 3.5c

Summary

Evidence- (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c
(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c
(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c -indicates
that ethnic Serb forces have carried out at least 90 percent of the destruc-
tion, displacement, and loss of life associated with ethnic cleansing.

- *Croats and Muslims in Bosnia have also committed atrocities and forced other ethnic groups to flee—the Croat destruction of Mostar is one example—but the ethnic cleansing actions of the Bosnian Serbs are unrivaled in scale, intensity, and ferocity. We have no evidence that Croats or Muslims have planned or carried out calculated, large-scale ethnic cleansing.* 3.5c

Sustained campaigns of ethnic cleansing by Bosnian Serbs since 1992 have resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of non-Serbs, the displacement of hundreds of thousands more, and the radical recasting of Bosnia's demographic makeup.

- Ninety percent of non-Serbs who lived in the 70 percent of Bosnia now under Serb control have been forced to flee or have been killed. A majority of the 1,300,000 displaced persons within Bosnia are Muslims, most of them expelled from their homes as a result of ethnic cleansing. 3.5c

The Bosnian Serb Army, paramilitary groups, Bosnian Serb political leaders, and police have played pivotal coordinating roles in ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.

- *Consistent patterns of political-military collusion and coordination are apparent in Serb seizures of Bosnian towns; many non-Serb refugees from throughout Bosnia have described such takeovers in strikingly similar terms.*
- The bloodiest rounds of ethnic cleansing took place earlier in the Bosnian conflict in 1992 and 1993, but Serb efforts to expel non-Serbs are continuing, with more than 12,000 evicted since last summer. 3.5c


We lack conclusive evidence that the most senior Bosnian Serb or Serbian leaders directed or planned large-scale ethnic cleansing; but the systematic, widespread nature of Serb actions strongly suggests that Pale—and perhaps Belgrade—have exercised a carefully veiled role in the purposeful destruction and dispersal of Bosnia's non-Serb population. 3.5c

EO 13526 3.5c

Reverse Blank

Contents

	<i>Page</i>
A Definition of Ethnic Cleansing	iii
Summary	v
Introduction	1
The Key Players in Ethnic Cleansing	1
The Serbian Democratic Party and Internal Security	2
The Bosnian Serb Military	5
Paramilitary Forces	12
The Serbian Connection	12
The Toll of Serb Ethnic Cleansing	13
Conclusion	20
Appendixes	
A. Agreements and Treaties of International Law Applicable to the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia	23
B. Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia: An Abbreviated Chronology of Significant Events	25



(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

⑤

Bosnia: Serb Ethnic Cleansing 3.5c

Introduction

Ethnic cleansing has been carried out in Bosnia since at least early 1992, primarily by Bosnian Serb political and military forces opposed to the Bosnian Government's declaration of independence following a republicwide referendum in early March 1992. The Bosnian Serbs boycotted the vote.

- (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c
(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c Bosnian Serbs were planning takeovers of some towns, such as Brcko, before the referendum and were seeking assistance from the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and paramilitary units formed in Serbia. 3.5c

In many cases, ethnic Serbs did not constitute majorities or significant pluralities in key multiethnic towns they subjected to ethnic cleansing.

- Official census data show, for example, that—in early 1992—Muslims constituted a majority of 56 percent in the northeastern city of Brcko. They also comprised a plurality (38 percent) of the population in the northwestern town of Prijedor that nearly equaled the size of the Serb community (40 percent). Both areas have since been virtually depopulated of non-Serb residents. 3.5c

Well over a million of those displaced mainly by Serb ethnic cleansing since early 1992 remain in Bosnia. A majority are Muslims forced into overcrowded enclaves and towns in Bosnian Government-held areas.

- Ethnic cleansing by Bosnian Serbs continues today, although the most brutal and widespread incidents took place in 1992 and 1993, when some of the most notorious detention camps were forced to close following extensive international publicity. More than 12,000 non-Serbs have been expelled from Serb-controlled areas since July 1994, according to press and UN reports, with 4,500 forced out in one week last September alone. 3.5c

3.5c

The Demographic Impact of Bosnian Serb Ethnic Cleansing

The number of non-Serbs living in territory now held by the Bosnian Serbs:

Before the war (early 1992): 1,730,000
November 1994: Approximately 165,700

Source: United Nations High Commission for Refugees

3.5c

Croats and Muslims have also committed atrocities during the Bosnian conflict, but their actions have consisted overwhelmingly of random, discrete—though sometimes ferocious—episodes that lack the sustained intensity, orchestration, and scale of the Bosnian Serbs' efforts (see inset).

- The vast majority of refugee accounts—corroborated by information from the UN, international relief organizations, (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c indicate that ethnic Serbs are probably responsible for at least 90 percent of the destruction, displacement, and loss of life associated with ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. 3.5c

The Key Players in Ethnic Cleansing

A substantial body of evidence (b)(1), 1.4(c)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c indicates that political, security, military, and paramilitary elements all played central, coordinated roles in carrying out ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.



Croat and Muslim Atrocities in Bosnia

The vast majority of deaths and expulsions because of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia have been the work of ethnic Serbs, [redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c [redacted] 1.4(c) but Bosnian Muslims and Croats have also been responsible for atrocities against each other and ethnic Serbs. Both groups have detained, abused, expelled, and been responsible for the deaths of civilians—particularly in central Bosnia.

- Some notorious detention sites, such as the Tarcin Silos run by the Bosnian Government Army, are still operating. [redacted] (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c and may hold some civilians along with Bosnian Serb Army POWs.

Reports also persist of localized brutality and harassment of minorities.

- Many detention sites, such as those run by Muslim forces in Bugojno in central Bosnia, reportedly have been closed. Refugee reports, however, indicate that harassment and expulsions of Serb civilians continued as late as last spring.

- Press reports note that Bosnian Croats have been trying since last spring to evict Muslims from western Mostar, which the Croats control.

Despite this record of offenses, there is no information—nor is there a pattern of events—suggesting that either Bosnian Muslim or Bosnian Croat leaders have encouraged large-scale ethnic cleansing efforts in conjunction with their military forces to gain and hold territory. Non-Serb forces in Bosnia have not pursued sustained campaigns of ethnic cleansing as have the Bosnian Serbs, but most often have committed atrocities or forced expulsions in response to such acts perpetrated against their own ethnic group [redacted] 3.5c

- Estimates by the UNHCR and ICRC of the number of deaths and displaced persons in Bosnia suggest, when compared with 1991 census data for Bosnia, that far fewer ethnic Serbs than Muslims and Croats have been killed or expelled from their homes.

EO 13526 3.5c

- The statements of refugees from ethnically cleansed towns as distant from each other as Prijedor, Brcko, and Foca recount a strikingly similar pattern. They describe how non-Serbs were disarmed and Serb political, security, and military forces took control of their towns, setting up new civic structures with identical names or functions, and systematically rounding up, interrogating, torturing, and imprisoning or expelling members of non-Serb elites—usually Muslims. The almost simultaneous timing of the takeovers of many towns in the spring of 1992 also suggests collusion among Bosnian Serb authorities.

The balance among these political and military elements appears to have shifted over the past two years—the military, for example, has expanded its


role in ethnic cleansing—but all remain involved, according to recent information from a range of sources. [redacted] 3.5c

The Serbian Democratic Party and Internal Security

Local and regional members of Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic's Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) appear to have been responsible for many tactical decisions involving the ethnic cleansing of non-Serbs.


- Numerous refugee accounts name the SDS as having orchestrated Serb takeovers of previously multi-ethnic towns, where they put in place new regimes, set up interrogation centers, established mock "courts," and moved thousands of non-Serb civilian prisoners to detention camps [redacted] 1.4(c), 3.5c





(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

10



(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

(11)

~~TOP SECRET~~
UMBRA

• The SDS mayor of Prijedor, who took office following the takeover of the town in April 1992, stated to a US news organization in a fall 1992 interview that the three principal detention sites in the area—Keraterm, Trnopolje, and Omarska, where thousands reportedly were tortured and died—were “formed on decisions of the Prijedor civil authorities” [redacted]

[redacted] 3.5c

• Many ethnic Serbs identified as local SDS activists have also been affiliated with local paramilitary or irregular units reported to have terrorized the non-Serb populace. [redacted] 3.5c

Local SDS officials also work closely with internal security elements.

• Interior Ministry officials traditionally control the local police, and their authority for dealing with civil disorder gives them access to municipal records. Many refugees have reported that, in town takeovers, prominent local non-Serbs have been quickly rounded up by police using organized lists.

• Bosnian Serb internal affairs officials also have commanded interrogation sites and detention camps for civilians, such as Omarska, according to several refugees [redacted] 3.5c

Karadzic has consistently denied that Serbs have engaged in ethnic cleansing or that his self-appointed regime is responsible for any atrocities, but he and his associates have operated some of the most notorious Bosnian Serb detention camps.

[redacted]
(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

• Journalists told [redacted] (b)(1), 1.4(c) of having to arrange visits to detention camps in 1992 through Karadzic’s office, and a US official toured one camp accompanied by SDS “escorts.” [redacted] EO 13526 1.4c [redacted] 1.4(c)

This information and the consistent patterns evident in the takeovers of towns throughout Bosnia strongly suggest that top SDS leaders, including Karadzic, knew about ethnic cleansing plans from the outset—and that they probably initiated them in coordination with internal security organs and the military. [redacted] 3.5c

The Bosnian Serb Military

The Bosnian Serb Army (BSA), which was formed from the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) in mid-May 1992, has been a central participant in ethnic cleansing campaigns against Muslims and Croats.


• BSA units have conducted systematic ethnic cleansing operations, controlled detention camps, and methodically destroyed Muslim villages, in particular. BSA forces have often operated in conjunction with Serb paramilitary units identified (by many refugees who claim eyewitness status) as the perpetrators of some of the worst atrocities of the Balkan conflict. [redacted] 3.5c

From April through September 1992, the BSA and the JNA before it, carried out operations aimed at removing by force much of the substantial Muslim and smaller Croat populations from the northwestern Bosnian towns of Prijedor and Sanski Most and their surrounding areas.

• A broad range of sources reveals that this was probably the most well-organized and comprehensive ethnic cleansing effort conducted in Bosnia since the onset of hostilities. Information from refugee debriefings indicates that these actions were carried out jointly by the Bosnian Serb internal affairs “ministry” under the direction of the Serbian Democratic Party (see figure 5).


12

~~Top Secret~~
SC 00390/94



(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

Figure 5
Ethnic Cleansing by the 5th Kozarska and 6th Krajiska
Brigades in Bosnia, April - September 1992



EO 13526 3.5c

734292 UO1096 12-94

14

- Extensive 1.4(c) reporting has identified two Bosnian Serb military brigades that were formerly part of the Territorial Defense Force, the 5th Kozarska and 6th Krajiska, as having had major roles in rounding up Muslim citizens in these areas for transport to detention camps or killing Muslims and destroying their towns.

- These two units operated initially under the control of the JNA and then the BSA. 1.4(c)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

The BSA has operated many of the detention camps that have held primarily Muslim and Croat civilians—rather than POWs (b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 1.4c BSA-run camps, notorious for their reported brutality and high death tolls, include facilities at Manjaca and Batkovic, 1.4(c)

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

- A significant part of the Serb detention camp and prison system in Bosnia was an integrated entity organized within the corps structure of the BSA.

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

- The BSA's security service reportedly exercised command and control of the camp system using military police as guards. (b)(1), 1.4(c)


(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, 3.5c

As the BSA, under the command of General Ratko Mladic, has intensified its military operations, its role in ethnic cleansing has grown. The BSA has incorporated

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

into its campaigns the systematic destruction of villages—primarily Muslim—to ensure that the inhabitants will not return to the area EO 13526 3.5c

- BSA forces in both the January-April 1993 Srebrenica offensive and the April 1994 Gorazde attack razed Muslim villages well after Bosnian Serb troops had seized control of the areas surrounding the villages EO 13526 3.5c




(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

During its 1994 offensive to capture the Bosnian-Muslim-controlled town of Gorazde, the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) destroyed the only remaining Muslim villages in the area—driving out the population to claim the land for ethnic Serbs EO 13526 3.5c


necessity but was aimed at preventing a return of their Muslim inhabitants.

- *There are no reports that paramilitary groups of the type associated with destruction, looting, and atrocities elsewhere in Bosnia in the wake of BSA assaults were present during the offensive, suggesting that BSA troops burned the villages.*



(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c


The small size of the villages, the absence of significant local Muslim resistance, and the flight of most residents in the face of the BSA's advance suggest that the destruction of the towns was not a military



(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c

EO 13526 3.5c

16



(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

Paramilitary Forces

Numerous Bosnian refugees have provided information to US Government debriefers indicating that both Bosnian Serb and Serbian paramilitary units initially operated in conjunction with the JNA and later the BSA, as well as local police forces, to seize control of territory and ethnically cleanse these areas in 1992.

- A range of reporting provides at least circumstantial evidence that the JNA/BSA and the Serbian Interior Ministry armed Bosnian Serb and Serbian paramilitaries in 1992.
- In many cases, the JNA/BSA secured the area around a town and fired artillery or tank rounds into the area to terrorize the population, according to a variety of reports. Paramilitary units appeared to operate in close coordination with the Army, if not under its command, typically following up on the Army's encirclement of the town by entering it to ethnically cleanse it through murder, terror tactics, and expulsion.
- The BSA appears to have disbanded most paramilitary units or incorporated them into the Army in late 1992 largely because of concerns that paramilitary commanders were unreliable and could serve as a rival armed force. Volunteer paramilitary units that have operated since that time appear to have functioned under BSA command or as part of a BSA unit. 3.5c

The Serbian Connection

The most tangible link between Serb authorities in Belgrade and actions against non-Serbs in Bosnia has been through the presence in Bosnia of paramilitary units formed partly in Serbia. Serbian nationals have led these units, which are implicated in ethnic cleansing by numerous military, refugee, and press reports.

- (b)(1), 1.4(c) reporting (b)(1), 1.4(c) indicates that, at least early on in the Bosnian conflict, Belgrade knew of ethnic cleansing activity, allowing Serbian forces to intervene on behalf of Bosnian Serbs. In one case, Serbian troops even restrained overzealous Serb paramilitary forces whose brutal actions in the northeastern Bosnian city of Brcko apparently risked attracting unwelcome attention. 3.5c


Mihajlo Kertes and Radmilo Bogdanovic, intimates of Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic who have helped him to establish control over Serbia's intelligence and security services, are likely central figures in any planning or directing role that Serbia may have played in ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.

- (b)(1), 1.4(c) press reporting indicates that both have been involved in the oversight of Serbian paramilitaries since early 1992. 3.5c

Such officials generally have been careful, however, to avoid overt signs that they have sanctioned or directed the ethnic cleansing of non-Serbs in Bosnia.

- The "irregular" status of Serb paramilitary units, for example, affords Serbian leaders plausible deniability when confronted with reports of especially brutal action by those forces. 3.5c

19



(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

Information has not emerged that conclusively links top Serbian officials to the planning or direction of ethnic cleansing.


- Documents that have surfaced in the West purporting to be evidence of Belgrade's direction of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia have proved spurious and virtually impossible to authenticate. The individuals offering such "evidence" often appear to have dubious or self-serving motives and unsavory backgrounds. In addition, the possibility exists that Serbia's rivals in the region—or Serbs trying to spoil the chain of evidence for potential war crimes trials—have fabricated this "evidence." [3.5c]

The Toll of Serb Ethnic Cleansing

There is no reliable estimate of how many Bosnians have died as a result of Serb ethnic cleansing, but [] (b)(1), 1.4(c), 3.5c reports suggest that they number in the tens of thousands.

- Extensive US Government refugee debriefings alone have yielded information on more than 200 mass graves in Bosnia that are said to contain a total of more than 40,000 bodies. Although this information is mostly anecdotal and not the result of formal





(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

21

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

investigations or exhumation, the refugees reporting it claim in most cases to have witnessed the atrocities involved. [3.5c]


Approximately 2,000,000 people from states of the former Yugoslavia have been displaced but remain elsewhere in the former Balkan country.

- About 1,300,000 of those displaced persons are in Bosnia, a majority of them Muslims forced to leave Serb-controlled areas. [3.5c]

Nearly 1,000,000 refugees from the former Yugoslavia have fled abroad, according to UNHCR, most of them to Europe.

- Neither UNHCR nor host governments can provide firm estimates of the breakdown of Balkan refugee populations by ethnic group, either within the former Yugoslavia or abroad. Most agree, however, that a clear, though unspecified, majority are Bosnian Muslims (see figure 17). [3.5c]

59




(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

23

(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

24


~~SECRET~~



(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

~~Top Secret~~
SC 0039877


25



(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

26

Figure 15
Decline in the Non-Serb Population
of Bosnia, 1992-94



Unclassified

347001A1 12-94

Conclusion


Widespread, sustained Serb ethnic cleansing campaigns in Bosnia over three years have radically altered the formerly multiethnic state. Restoring its pre-war demographic balance and ethnic distribution now appears virtually impossible. The actions of ethnic Serb political and military forces have created a Bosnian—mainly Muslim—diaspora. At the same time, ethnic Serbs have succeeded in securing their hold over large parts of Bosnian territory and made significant strides toward their apparent objective of establishing, or expanding, an ethnically pure Serb state.

3.5c

~~Top Secret~~
SC 0039694

27

~~Top Secret~~
~~UMBRA~~



(b)(1), EO 13526 1.4c, EO 13526 3.5c

28

~~Top Secret~~
~~SC 0039874~~

Appendix A

Agreements and Treaties of International Law Applicable to the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia

Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949 (Geneva Convention Number III).

Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949 (Geneva Convention Number IV, especially Article 47, "women shall be especially protected against rape.")

Convention on the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide, December 8, 1949.

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Armed Conflicts (Protocol I). Opened for signature December 12, 1977. (This may make blocking humanitarian aid convoys a war crime.)

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II). Opened for signature December 12, 1977. (This may make blocking humanitarian aid convoys a war crime.)

Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions (December 12, 1949) bestows the protections of Geneva Convention Number IV to civilian persons in armed conflicts not of an international nature.

Grave breaches of one or more of the Geneva Conventions relevant to the situation in Bosnia include:

- Willful killing.
- Torture or inhuman treatment.
- Willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health.
- Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity, and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.
- Compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the armed forces of foreign power.
- Willfully depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial.
- Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian.
- Taking civilians as hostages.

This appendix is EO 13526 3.5c

Appendix B

Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia: An Abbreviated Chronology of Significant Events

1991

25 June

War breaks out in the Balkans almost immediately after Slovenia and Croatia declare independence. Although Slovenia and Croatia conclude cease-fire agreements with Belgrade by fall 1991, the status of Bosnia-Herzegovina remains uncertain.

3 October

Serbia and Montenegro seize control of Yugoslavia's Federal Presidency.

23 December

Germany recognizes Slovenia and Croatia as independent states.

1992

15 January

EC member states and 14 other countries recognize Croatia and Slovenia as independent states.

February

Bosnian Serbs organize paramilitary units in northeastern city of Brcko.

27 February-1 March

Bosnia holds a referendum on independence from Yugoslavia. Bosnian Serbs react violently to the vote in favor of independence. President Izetbegovic tries to make concessions to the Serbs by including them in his government.

7 March

Advance team of UN peacekeepers arrives in Yugoslavia.

Early April

Bosnia-Herzegovina declares independence.

6 April

The EC recognizes Bosnia-Herzegovina.

7 April

The United States recognizes Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serbs move almost immediately to partition the republic. The JNA stages assaults on Muslim towns, and ethnic cleansing campaigns begin throughout Bosnia.

April-May

Bosnian Serbs nationalists, working with JNA and Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) forces, stage civic takeovers of Prijedor, Sanski Most, and neighboring towns in northwestern Bosnia and begin ethnic cleansing of the Muslim population that continues into the fall.

1992

1 May

Fighting breaks out in Brcko, signaling the start of Serb ethnic cleansing there.

19 May

The JNA formally disassociates itself from ethnic Serb forces in Bosnia. The newly formed BSA under General Ratko Mladic continues the ethnic cleansing of non-Serbs.

1993

January-April

BSA conducts Srebrenica offensive, carrying out extensive ethnic cleansing of Muslim settlements in eastern Bosnia.

22 February

The UN Security Council authorizes establishment of an international tribunal to prosecute war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia since 1991.

1994

1 March

Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims sign agreement to establish a federation in Bosnia.

30 March-April

Bosnian Serbs launch offensive against Bosnian Government-held enclave of Gorazde, ethnically cleansing seized villages along the way.

Mid-July

Anticipating Bosnian Government approval of the Contact Group's "51-49" peace plan, Bosnian Serb forces show defiance by launching a new ethnic cleansing campaign in northern Bosnia to drive out remaining non-Serb residents.

18 July

The Bosnian Assembly approves the Contact Group peace plan.

3 August

The Bosnian Serb "parliament" votes unanimously to hold a referendum on the Contact Group plan.

27-28 August

Bosnian Serb referendum overwhelmingly rejects the Contact Group plan.

September

Concerned about the potential impact of the lifting of the UN arms embargo on Bosnia, Bosnian Serbs step up their ethnic cleansing campaign in northern Bosnia. Since the onset of fighting in Bosnia, some 90 percent of non-Serbs have been driven from the territory now controlled by Bosnian Serb forces.

This appendix is EO 13526 3.5c