

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. cable	re: France More Worried About Cote D'Ivoire (2 pages)	12/22/1999	P1/b(1) KBH
002. cable	re: Initial French Views on Cote d'Ivoire (2 pages)	12/27/1999	P1/b(1) KBH
003. cable	re: Additional French Read-Out on Cote d'Ivoire (3 pages)	12/28/1999	P1/b(1) KBH
004. cable	re: Cote d'Ivoire: France Weights Measures to Take (4 pages)	01/10/2000	P1/b(1) KBH
005. cable	re: Obasanjo Visit (3 pages)	02/12/2000	P1/b(1) KBH

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Cables
 Jan 1999-Dec 2000 ([Paris and Cote d'Ivoire])
 OA/Box Number: 530000

FOLDER TITLE:

[12/22/1999 - 02/12/2000]

2017-0241-M

kh2042

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Cable

PREC: ROUTINE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: RAACZYUW RUEHFRA8486 3561047-CCCC--RHEHNSC.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: R 221047Z DEC 99
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
OSRI: RUEHFR
DTG:
ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6946
INFO: RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN 0406
 RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 4049
 RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 0207
 RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 1941
 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2745
 RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 1492
 RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0374
 RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
 RUGNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
SUBJ: FRANCE MORE WORRIED ABOUT COTE D'IVOIRE
TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 018486

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
 2017-0241-M (1.01)
 KBH 7/9/2019

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2005
 TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PREF, XA, IV, KE, SU, FR
 SUBJECT: FRANCE MORE WORRIED ABOUT COTE D'IVOIRE

REF: A. (A) PARIS 18430
 B. (B) PARIS 18170

(U) CLASSIFIED BY DEPUTY POLCOUNS J. SHERWOOD MCGINNIS FOR REASONS 1.5 B/D.

1. ~~(S)~~ DURING THE COURSE OF A DECEMBER 16 MEETING ON VARIOUS SUBJECTS (REF A), JEAN-CHRISTOPHE DEBERRE, FRENCH ADVISER TO MFA/COOPERATION JUNIOR MINISTER FOR AFRICA CHARLES JOSSELIN, TOLD US THAT THE GOF WAS INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE APPARENT POLITICAL IMPASSE IN COTE D'IVOIRE AND COULD SEE NO CLEAR WAY TO OVERCOME IT. FRENCH GOVERNMENT ANALYSTS BELIEVE THAT IVOIRIEN PRESIDENT BEDIE HAS PAINTED HIMSELF INTO A CORNER IN HIS PERSONALIZED FEUD WITH PRESIDENTIAL HOPEFUL ALASSANE OUATTARA. DEBERRE SAID THAT JOSPIN IS ALARMED AT BEDIE'S HEAVY-HANDED USE OF "GOVERNMENT APPARATUS" TO THWART OUATTARA'S CAMPAIGN. HE DESCRIBED BEDIE AS "TOO INVESTED" IN THE PROBLEM TO EXTRACT HIMSELF.

2. ~~(S)~~ FOR THE GOF, BEDIE'S MANIPULATION OF DEMOCRATIC STRUCTURES OF GOVERNMENT WAS "SHOCKING." LIKE OTHER GOF INTERLOCUTORS, DEBERRE WOULD NOT CRITICIZE THE "ANTI-RIOT" LAW USED AS THE JUSTIFICATION FOR ARRESTING RDR LEADERSHIP IN

COTE D'IVOIRE, EMPHASIZING THAT IT WAS A LAW MUTUALLY AGREED UPON BY BOTH BEDIE AND OUATTARA AT ITS INCEPTION. HE REBUKED HOWEVER BEDIE'S BAN ON PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS, SAYING THAT THE SITUATION IN COTE D'IVOIRE WAS STEADILY DETERIORATING.

3. (C) ASKED WHAT FRANCE WAS PREPARED TO DO TO STEM THE DETERIORATION, DEBERRE DEMURRED. HE REGRETTED THAT BEDIE HAD USED ETHNIC RHETORIC TO INCITE HOSTILITY TOWARD OUATTARA BECAUSE THE ANTI-OUATTARA THEME HAD EXPANDED TO ENCOMPASS ALL FOREIGNERS. HE CREDITED FORMER PRESIDENT HOUPHOUET BOIGNY WITH HAVING "MADE COTE D'IVOIRE WITHOUT IVOIRIENS" (RELYING ON BURKINABE, LIBERIAN, AND GHANAIAN LABOR AS WELL AS DONOR FINANCES) WHILE BEDIE SEEMED HELL-BENT ON DESTROYING THE COUNTRY FOR THE PURPORTED BENEFIT OF IVOIRIENS, ALONE. ASKED WHETHER FRANCE WAS PREPARED TO WATCH COTE D'IVOIRE BE "DESTROYED" OR WHETHER IN THIS CASE THE GOF WOULD BE ABLE TO DEFEND A FRENCH-LED INTERVENTION SHOULD CIVIL DISTURBANCES GET OUT OF CONTROL, DEBERRE SAID THAT "NORMALLY, FRENCH POLICY WOULD BE NOT TO INTERVENE." HE CONTINUED, HOWEVER, THAT COTE D'IVOIRE'S POSITION IN THE REGION MADE THAT POLICY PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT TO SUPPORT. HE SAID THE GOF HAD NOT DISCUSSED ITS READINESS TO INTERVENE DIRECTLY IN COTE D'IVOIRE TO RESTORE A SENSE OF CALM. AT THIS POINT, THE GOF'S BEST EFFORTS WERE BEING MADE THROUGH EMISSARIES BEARING TOUGH MESSAGES OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL HARDSHIP SHOULD THE STALEMATE CONTINUE.

SPIRO

TOR: 12/22/99 06:19:48

DIST: SIT: BABBITT Blinken BYRNE NSC DEMPSEY FRAZER SMITHG Yee

Cable

PREC: PRIORITY
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: PAACZYUW RUEHFRA8629 3611629-CCCC--RHEHNSC.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: P 271629Z DEC 99
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
 OSRI: RUEHFR
 DTG:
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7042
 INFO: RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
 RUCNANC/FRANCOPHONE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
 RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 2310
 RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 4062
 RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON PRIORITY 1943
 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2754
 RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY 0981
 RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN PRIORITY 0411
 RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
 SUBJ: INITIAL FRENCH VIEWS ON COTE D'IVOIRE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2017-0241-M (1.02)
KBH 7/9/2019

(U) CLASSIFIED BY DEPUTY POLCOUNS SHERWOOD MCGINNIS FOR
 TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 018629

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2005
 TAGS: PREL, PHUM.PGOV, IV, FR, XA
 SUBJECT: INITIAL FRENCH VIEWS ON COTE D'IVOIRE

(U) CLASSIFIED BY DEPUTY POLCOUNS SHERWOOD MCGINNIS FOR
 REASONS 1.5 B/D

1. ~~(S)~~ FOLLOWING CLEAR -- AND PRACTICED -- GUIDELINES WITH REGARD TO RELATIONS WITH AFRICAN STATES WHICH EXPERIENCE UNDEMOCRATIC CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT, THE GOF ANTICIPATES SUSPENDING EU ASSISTANCE AND BILATERAL ASSISTANCE TO COTE D'IVOIRE UNTIL CLEAR SIGNS OF GENERAL GUEI'S COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY ARE EVIDENT. ALTHOUGH ADMITTEDLY RELIEVED THAT GUEI'S COUP OVER BEDIE DID NOT RESULT IN BLOODSHED, GOF INTERLOCUTORS CONTINUE TO VOICE PROFOUND SURPRISE AT THE QUICK TURN OF EVENTS IN ABIDJAN.

2. ~~(S)~~ ELYSEE ECONOMIC ADVISER ON AFRICA BERNARD DIGUET TOLD US DECEMBER 27 THAT EVEN THOUGH THE FRENCH RESPONSE IN COTE D'IVOIRE WILL MIRROR ITS RESPONSE TO THE BLOODY COUP IN NIGER EARLIER THIS YEAR, FRENCH OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT GOF

ENGAGEMENT IN COTE D'IVOIRE MIGHT RESUME MORE QUICKLY (THAN IN NIGER) PARTICULARLY IF GUEI SENDS THE RIGHT SIGNALS ABOUT QUICKLY TRANSITIONING TO DEMOCRATIC RULE.

3. ~~(C)~~ NOTING THAT DURING HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY'S TIME, GUEI WAS CALLED UPON AT LEAST TWICE TO QUELL SIGNIFICANT DOMESTIC DISTURBANCES AND DID SO, DIGUET DESCRIBED GUEI AS A "DETERMINED MILITARY LEADER" WHO MIGHT HAVE DEVELOPED AN INFLATED SENSE OF PERSONAL POWER DURING HIS AFFILIATION WITH FORMER IVOIRIAN PRESIDENT HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY. HE EMPHASIZED THAT GUEI WAS A "LEADER" WHO WAS SURE OF HIMSELF AND MORE THAN ABLE TO COMMAND HIS TROOPS. DIGUET DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT GUEI INTENDED TO SEIZE POWER WHEN THE MUTINY STARTED. ASKED IF HE WOULD LIKEN GUEI TO NIGERIA'S GENERAL ABOUBACAR WHO HELPED SMOOTH NIGERIA'S DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION THROUGH TO THE ELECTIONS WHICH PLACED PRESIDENT OBASANJO IN THE PRESIDENCY, DIGUET REFLECTED A MOMENT THEN AFFIRMED THAT PERHAPS ABOUBACAR AND GUEI COULD BE SEEN AS CARRYING OUT SIMILAR ROLES.

HUDSON
ROHATYN

TOR: 12/27/99 11:37:32

DIST: SIT: BABBITT BLINKEN BUSBY BYRNE NSC CRAWFORD DAVIDSON DEMPSEY FELDMAN
FRAZER GUARNIERI KASS MCLEAN MUNTER NAPLAN NORLAND SCHWARTZ SMITHG
STROMSETH VACCARO VONLIPSEY YEE

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHFRA8680 3621903-CCCC--RHEHNSC.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 281903Z DEC 99
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
OSRI: RUEHFR
DTG:
ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7054
INFO: RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNANC/FRANCOPHONE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE 0412
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 2311
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 4063
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 1944
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 2755
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 0982
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUFGNOA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
SUBJ: ADDITIONAL FRENCH READ-OUT ON COTE D'IVOIRE
TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 018680

**DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526**

2017-0241-M (1.03)
KBH 7/9/2019

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2005
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, IV, XA, FR
SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL FRENCH READ-OUT ON COTE D'IVOIRE

REF: (A) PARIS 18629 (B) ABIDJAN 9820

(U) CLASSIFIED BY POL MINCOUNS MICHAEL PARMLY FOR REASONS 1.5 B/D.

1. ~~(C)~~ SUMMARY: THE FRENCH MFA CONFIRMED TODAY 12/28 ITS SUPPORT FOR A CONCERTED EU RESPONSE TO THE SITUATION IN COTE D'IVOIRE FOLLOWING THE AGREED PRINCIPLES OF THE LOME AGREEMENT AS STATED IN ARTICLE 366BIS, BASED ON RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF RULE OF LAW, RETURN TO DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES, AND THE HOLDING OF TRANSPARENT ELECTIONS AS SOON AS FEASIBLE. FRANCE WILL MEET WITH EU PARTNERS WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION TO DETERMINE WHETHER AND HOW TO SUSPEND AID TO THE GOCI. MFA ADVISER TO VEDRINE ON AFRICA, GEORGES SERRE ASSERTED THAT THE GOF RESPONSE TO EVENTS IN COTE D'IVOIRE WERE PROOF BEYOND DOUBT OF THE CONSISTENCY OF THE GOF'S "NEW" POLICY OF NON-INTERVENTION IN AFRICA, AS IT WOULD HANDLE COTE D'IVOIRE EXACTLY AS IT RESPONDED TO SIMILAR SITUATIONS IN NIGER, GUINEA-BISSAU, TOGO AND COMOROS. END SUMMARY.

2. ~~(C)~~ WE MET WITH FRENCH MFA ADVISER TO FM VEDRINE GEORGES

SERRE (12/28) AT SERRE'S REQUEST TO REVIEW FRENCH THINKING ON COTE D'IVOIRE. SERRE ASSERTED THAT THE GOF REACTION IN ABIDJAN WAS YET ANOTHER CLEAR EXAMPLE OF THE FACT THAT THE GOF'S POLICY IN AFRICA WAS TRULY ONE BASED ON "PRINCIPLES" RATHER THAN "PERSONS." FRENCH REFUSAL TO ENTER THE FRAY WAS CONSISTENT WITH PRESIDENT CHIRAC'S NON-INTERVENTION IN AFRICA ASSERTIONS DATING BACK TO MARCH 1997. HAD THEY BEEN DEPLOYED, FRENCH SOLDIERS WOULD HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED SOLELY TO PROTECT THE FRENCH COMMUNITY AND PROPERTY, NOT TO INTERVENE ON BEDIE'S BEHALF.

3. (C) SERRE CONTINUED THAT FRANCE INTENDS TO USE THE SAME MECHANISM APPLIED IN THE CASES OF TOGO, COMOROS, GUINEA-BISSAU AND NIGER TO ENGAGE WITH AUTHORITIES IN ABIDJAN. SPECIFICALLY, A TROIKA FROM THE EU, ALONG WITH A TROIKA FROM LOME CONVENTION PARTIES (ACP COUNTRIES-AFRICA, CARIBBEAN AND PACIFIC STATES), COTE D'IVOIRE AND TWO LOME CONVENTION COUNTRIES OF COTE D'IVOIRE'S CHOOSING WILL CONSULT OVER A 30 DAY PERIOD, AFTER WHICH THE EU WILL DECIDE WHETHER SANCTIONS SHOULD BE IMPOSED ON COTE D'IVOIRE. THE AIM OF THE CONSULTATIONS IS TO ENCOURAGE A QUICK RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER IN COTE D'IVOIRE, AGREE UPON BENCHMARKS AND A POSSIBLE CALENDAR FOR ELECTIONS. SERRE ALSO NOTED THAT WITHIN THAT CONTEXT, SUSPENSION OF BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL (EUROPEAN COMMISSION) COOPERATION WILL ALSO BE DISCUSSED. HE STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT WHILE IT IS PROBABLE THAT THE GOF WILL SUSPEND ITS BILATERAL COOPERATION WITH COTE D'IVOIRE, NO INSTRUCTIONS TO DO SO HAVE BEEN ISSUED AS YET. SERRE STRESSED THAT THE GOF INTENDS TO DEAL WITH GUEI'S GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE AS IT DEFINES ITSELF.

4. (C) SERRE FELT THAT WE SHOULD URGE GENERAL GUEI TO MOVE TO ELECTIONS "AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE," BUT RECOGNIZED THAT THE OAU-INSPIRED SIX-MONTH CALENDAR ENDING JULY 2000, MAY BE DIFFICULT TO MEET, IF GUEI IS GOING TO REFORM THE CONSTITUTION, REASSEMBLE GOVERNMENT AND MAKE OTHER CHANGES AS OUTLINED IN HIS MEETING WITH THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS IN ABIDJAN 12/27 (REF B). AT THE SAME TIME, HE CHUCKLED THAT THE IVOIRIAN PEOPLE WERE EXTREMELY CAPABLE AND COULD PROBABLY MEET THE DEADLINE IF THEY PUT THEIR MINDS TO IT. HE ENCOURAGED CLOSE GOF/USG COORDINATION IN PARIS AS WE CONTINUED TO MONITOR DEVELOPMENTS IN ABIDJAN.

5. (C) WHEN WE RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF ETHNIC REPRISALS IN COTE D'IVOIRE SERRE SAID THAT THE ISSUE "BORE WATCHING" HOWEVER, HE COULD NOT DISCERN ANY REASON FOR ALARM. THERE WERE NO REPORTS OF ILL-TREATMENT OF ANY OF THE FORMER MINISTERS PRESENTLY UNDER DETENTION BY GUEI'S MEN AND HE DID NOT CONSIDER IT LIKELY THAT GUEI WOULD ENCOURAGE A VENGEFUL SPIRIT AMONG HIS FOLLOWERS. SERRE EMPHASIZED THAT GUEI'S NATIONAL SALVATION COMMISSION WAS COMPOSED OF A BROAD SPECTRUM OF ACTORS AND APPEARED "WELL-BALANCED." MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE COMMISSION OF NATIONAL SALVATION AND THE OPERATIVE GOVERNMENT APPARATUS. TIME WOULD TELL.

6. (C) IN RESPONSE TO OUR QUERY, SERRE SAID THAT IF IT BECAME APPARENT THAT GROSS MISDEEDS HAD OCCURRED WITHIN THE

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT OF GOCI AFFAIRS AND REQUESTS WERE MADE OF THE GOF TO ASSIST WITH THE RECUPERATION OF GOCI FUNDS AND/OR ASSETS IN FRANCE, THE GOF WOULD HAVE "NO PROBLEM" IN ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 018680

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2005
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, IV, XA, FR
SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL FRENCH READ-OUT ON COTE D'IVOIRE

PROVIDING SUCH ASSISTANCE. (NOTE: AT LUNCH TODAY WITH JOSSELIN'S ADVISER JEAN-CHRISTOPHE DEBERRE, DEBERRE HAD BEEN MORE CIRCUMSPECT, NOTING THAT THE QUESTION HAD ALREADY BEEN RAISED, BUT THAT JOSSELIN DID NOT HAVE THE ANSWER AS YET. FOR THE MOMENT, JOSSELIN'S OFFICE PREFERRED TO NOTE THAT IT WAS "UNLIKELY" THAT BEDIE OR OTHERS KEPT GOCI FUNDS IN FRENCH ACCOUNTS. IN THE SAME VEIN, DEBERRE REMAINED MYSTIFIED AS TO WHY PRIME MINISTER DUNCAN INSISTED ON LEAVING COTE D'IVOIRE WITH BEDIE. DEBERRE AND JOSSELIN CONSIDERED DUNCAN A BRILLIANT, CAPABLE, RESPONSIBLE PLAYER AND WOULD BE VERY DISAPPOINTED IF IT TURNED OUT THAT HE CHOSE TO FLEE IN ORDER TO HIDE CORRUPT PRACTICES. END NOTE)

7. (S) ACCORDING TO SERRE WHO SPOKE BY TELEPHONE TO ALASSANE OUATTARA 12/27, OUATTARA PLANS TO RETURN TO ABIDJAN WEDNESDAY, 12/29.
HUDSON

TOR: 12/28/99 14:45:41

DIST: SIT: BABBITT Blinken BYRNE NSC Davidson DEMPSEY SMITHG Yee

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHFRA0289 0101720-CCCC--RHEHNSC.
LINE2: ZNY CCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 101720Z JAN 00
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
OSRI: RUEHFR
DTG:
ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7281
INFO: RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
 RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN IMMEDIATE 0417
 RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 4100
 RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 1955
 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 2790
 RUEHLU/AMEMBASSY LUANDA IMMEDIATE 0605
 RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
SUBJ: COTE D'IVOIRE: FRANCE WEIGHS MEASURES TO TAKE
TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000289

**DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526**
 2017-0241-M (1.04)
 KBH 7/9/2019

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2010
 TAGS: EAID, PREL, PGOV, FR, IV, XA
 SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: FRANCE WEIGHS MEASURES TO TAKE

REF: A. (A) 99 PARIS 18629
 B. (B) 99 PARIS 18680

(U) CLASSIFIED BY POL MINCOUNS MICHAEL PARMLY FOR REASONS 1.5
 B/D.

1. ~~(C)~~ SUMMARY: FRENCH POLICYMAKERS CONTINUE TO WEIGH CAREFULLY HOW DEEPLY TO CUT GOF ASSISTANCE TO COTE D'IVOIRE IN THE WAKE OF THE CHRISTMAS EVE COUP. NO/NO DECISION ON SUSPENSION OF BILATERAL ASSISTANCE -- CIVILIAN OR MILITARY -- HAS BEEN MADE AS YET. REPORTEDLY, ALL GOF OFFICIALS ADVOCATE CONTINUING TO SEND A STRONG MESSAGE TO GENERAL GUEI REJECTING THE MILITARY TAKEOVER. NONETHELESS, SOME FRENCH PRINCIPALS CAUTION THAT THE SAFETY OF THE 20,000 FRENCH CITIZENS IN COUNTRY ALONG WITH THE STABILITY OF WEST AFRICA GENERALLY, REQUIRE FRANCE TO TEMPER A PRINCIPLED RESPONSE WITH AN AMPLE DOSE OF PRAGMATISM. THEY EMPHASIZE THAT COTE D'IVOIRE'S ECONOMIC CRISIS IS A DIRECT CONSEQUENCE OF BEDIE'S POOR GOVERNANCE, NOT GUEI'S COUP, AND THAT APPLYING STRINGENT ECONOMIC SANCTIONS WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO PRESCRIBING A FATAL DOSE OF MEDICINE TO AN ALREADY CHRONICALLY ILL PATIENT. END SUMMARY.

2. ~~(C)~~ IN THE COURSE OF MEETINGS AND TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS

OVER THE PAST WEEK, GOF PRINCIPALS INCLUDING FM VEDRINE'S ADVISOR ON AFRICA GEORGES SERRE, MFA DIRECTOR FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS JEAN-DIDIER ROISIN, CHIEF OF STAFF TO COOPERATION MINISTER JOSSELIN, JEAN-CHRISTOPHE DEBERRE, MFA/MILITARY COOPERATION DIRECTOR JEAN-PHILIPPE ROUX, AND DEVELOPMENT AGENCY (AFD) AFRICA DIRECTOR JEAN PARPAIS TOLD US THAT THE GOF IS WEIGHING VERY CAREFULLY HOW TO SUSPEND ITS ASSISTANCE TO COTE D'IVOIRE WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING FURTHER THE COUNTRY'S AND THE REGION'S FRAGILE STABILITY. THE GOF WANTS TO DEMONSTRATE ITS REJECTION OF THE MILITARY OVERTHROW OF A DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT. AT THE SAME TIME, SOME FRENCH OFFICIALS ARE CONCERNED THAT TOO STRINGENT MEASURES TAKEN AGAINST COTE D'IVOIRE MAY EXACERBATE AN ALREADY TENSE SITUATION.

FIRST STEPS

3. (P) IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE COUP D'ETAT, FRANCE LED THE CALL WITHIN THE EUROPEAN UNION TO INITIATE PROCEDURES RELATING TO ARTICLE 366 BIS OF THE LOME CONVENTION REQUIRING CONSULTATION AMONG THE EU, COTE D'IVOIRE (OFFENDING STATE) AND ACP REPRESENTATIVES (SEE 99 PARIS 18680). EU AFRICA EXPERTS ARE SCHEDULED TO MEET JANUARY 11-12 IN BRUSSELS TO DISCUSS WHAT COOPERATION ASSISTANCE TO SUSPEND. SUBSEQUENT TO THE EXPERTS MEETING (O/A JANUARY 24), EU FOREIGN MINISTERS WILL MEET TO ADOPT THE EXPERTS' RECOMMENDATIONS. WHEN WE SPOKE WITH FRENCH OFFICIALS, THE GOF POSITION WAS STILL BEING DEVELOPED FOR THE EU EXPERTS' MEETING. MOST LIKELY GOF SUSPENSION OF AID WILL BE PARTIAL AND FRANCE WILL ARGUE FORCEFULLY WITHIN THE EU TO ALLOW SOME PROGRAMS TO CONTINUE. THE RECOMMENDATIONS BELOW REPORTEDLY MADE THE FINAL CUT OF A MEMO SENT TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE LATE LAST WEEK AND WILL FORM THE CORE OF THE FRENCH POSITION IN BRUSSELS. CONTACTS IN THE ELYSEE NOTED THAT NOT ALL OF THE EU FAVORS A TEMPERED APPROACH TO COTE D'IVOIRE. THE ELYSEE EMPHASIZED WITH US THAT THE GOF WANTS TO SEND A CLEAR AND CORRECT MESSAGE TO GENERAL GUEI AND HIS FOLLOWERS. FRANCE WILL NOT CONDONE A "COUP BY FORCE" AND WILL NOT RESUME NORMAL RELATIONS UNTIL COTE D'IVOIRE DEMONSTRATES ITS COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY. REGARDING AID SUSPENSION, THE FRENCH ARE THINKING ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

WORLD BANK, IMF LOANS

4. (P) ELYSEE AND MFA/COOPERATION OFFICIALS WERE ADAMANT THROUGHOUT LAST WEEK THAT THE GOF WOULD NOT SUPPORT "NEW" LOANS TO COTE D'IVOIRE POST THE COUP. THE MFA AND ELYSEE NOTED THAT THE GOF WANTS WESTERN PARTNERS TO HAVE A CONSISTENT APPROACH WITH THE IFIS TO REINFORCE THE MESSAGE THAT COUPS CANNOT GUARANTEE DEMOCRATIC CHANGE. ALONG THAT LINE, ALL OUR GOF CONTACTS COMMENTED THAT THEY FOUND GUEI'S DECISION TO NOT PAY IMF LOANS VERY UNHELPFUL.

5. (P) NONETHELESS, MFA/COOPERATION REPRESENTATIVES EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE USG MIGHT SEEK TO SUSPEND IFI ASSISTANCE TO ONGOING PROJECTS. STRESSING THAT USING ECONOMIC MEASURES TO REINFORCE A POLITICAL MESSAGE MIGHT CREATE GREATER HARDSHIP FOR THE MOST VULNERABLE SEGMENTS OF

SOCIETY, OUR GOF CONTACTS SAID THAT THE FRANCE WOULD NOT WANT TO SUSPEND GOF SUPPORT TO EXISTING WORLD BANK AND IMF PROGRAMS. MFA DIRECTOR FOR AFRICA JEAN-DIDIER ROISIN POINTED ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 000289

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2010

TAGS: EAID, PREL, PGOV, FR, IV, XA

SUBJECT: COTE D'IVOIRE: FRANCE WEIGHS MEASURES TO TAKE

OUT THAT THE CONDITIONS PRECIPITATING COTE D'IVOIRE'S COUP WERE BROUGHT ON BY PRESIDENT BEDIE -- NOT BY GENERAL GUEI. HE SUGGESTED THAT A SUSPENSION OF IFI ASSISTANCE TO ONGOING PROGRAMS WOULD ONLY EXACERBATE AN ALREADY DIRE ECONOMIC SITUATION AND COULD HAVE SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS THROUGHOUT THE REGION. CHIEF OF STAFF TO COOPERATION MINISTER JOSSELIN, JEAN-CHRISTOPHE DEBERRE, SECONDED ROISIN'S VIEWS ADDING THAT APPLYING TOO STRINGENT ECONOMIC MEASURES TO COTE D'IVOIRE, WHEN AT ISSUE WAS THE NEED FOR AN UNEQUIVOCAL POLITICAL MESSAGE, WOULD BE TANTAMOUNT TO PRESCRIBING A FATAL DOSE OF MEDICINE TO AN ALREADY CHRONICALLY ILL PATIENT. WE TAKE THEIR FOREBODING TO MEAN THAT FRANCE WILL ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE ITS EU PARTNERS TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT IMF AND WORLD BANK PROGRAMS IN COTE D'IVOIRE WHICH SUPPORT BASIC NEEDS.

6. ~~(S)~~ ALONG THAT LINE, ROISIN ASKED WHETHER THE USG WOULD MAINTAIN ITS SUSPENSION OF AID UNTIL COTE D'IVOIRE HOLDS ELECTIONS OR WHETHER WE COULD CONSIDER EASING SANCTIONS ONCE GUEI'S GOVERNMENT HAS INDICATED ITS TIMELINE, AND INTENTIONS. WE REPLIED THAT OUR PARAMETERS WERE DEFINED BY CONGRESS AND WE WOULD BE BOUND TO WITHHOLD ASSISTANCE UNTIL DEMOCRACY HAD RESUMED IN COUNTRY, I.E., UNTIL AFTER ELECTIONS, NOT JUST UNTIL THE DATE FOR ELECTIONS HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED.

COOPERATION AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE

7. ~~(S)~~ ROISIN CONFIRMED THAT LIKE THE USG, THE GOF PLANS TO CONTINUE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO THE PEOPLE OF COTE D'IVOIRE. ALTHOUGH MILITARY AND CIVILIAN COOPERANTS ASSIGNED TO WORK DIRECTLY WITH SENIOR MINISTERS WILL BE SUSPENDED, THE MFA HAS RECOMMENDED THAT FRENCH COOPERANTS CONTINUE TO FUNCTION AT THE "WORKING LEVEL" IN CIVILIAN MINISTRIES. THE MFA HAS ALSO RECOMMENDED THAT SCHOLARSHIPS, INTERNSHIPS AND OTHER TEMPORARY STUDY PROGRAMS CONTINUE, ARGUING THAT INDIVIDUALS SHOULD NOT BE PENALIZED OR PREVENTED FROM EXPOSURE TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND TEACHING BECAUSE OF THE COUP.

8. ~~(S)~~ THE MFA HAS ALSO PROPOSED THAT FRENCH SUPPORT FOR THE REGIONAL MILITARY TRAINING FACILITIES (ZAMBAKRO, ET AL) CONTINUE. ROISIN EMPHASIZED THAT THOSE FACILITIES (A) TEACH DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND (B) SERVICE AFRICANS FROM OTHER STATES (WE UNDERSTAND THERE ARE FOUR SUCH REGIONAL TRAINING FACILITIES). LIKewise, THE MFA ADVOCATES CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR MULTILATERAL EXERCISES AND SIMILAR ACTIVITIES IN WHICH COTE D'IVOIRE PARTICIPATES, E.G., THE MULTI-NATION JOINT MILITARY EXERCISES KNOWN AS "GABON 2000."

9. ~~(S)~~ ADDITIONALLY, MFA/MILITARY COOPERATION DIRECTOR

JEAN-PHILIPPE ROUX TOLD US SEPARATELY THAT HE SUCCESSFULLY ARGUED THAT THE GOF PRESERVE FRENCH MILITARY COOPERANTS WITHIN THE IVOIRIEN GENDARMERIE AS A PALLIATIVE TO THE 20,000 FRENCH CITIZENS RESIDENT IN COTE D'IVOIRE.

10. (S) FRANCE HAS LIMITED ITS OFFICIAL CONTACT WITH GENERAL GUEI'S REGIME. ROISIN AND SERRE TOLD US THAT THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN ABIDJAN IS AUTHORIZED TO DISCUSS ONLY LOGISTICAL AND SECURITY (FRENCH PERSONNEL AND CITIZENS) ISSUES WITH GUEI. THE EMBASSY IS TO HAVE NO OTHER HIGH LEVEL CONTACT OF SUBSTANCE. THE GOF WILL NOT MEET BILATERALLY WITH GUEI UNTIL GUEI CLARIFIES (A) HOW LONG HE PLANS TO STAY IN OFFICE (B) WHETHER HE PLANS TO RUN FOR PRESIDENT, AND (C) WHEN ELECTIONS WILL BE HELD.

ROHATYN

TOR: 01/10/00 12:45:59

DIST: SIT: BABBITT Blinken BYRNE NSC Davidson DEMPSEY SMITH Yee

Cable

PREC: PRIORITY
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: PAACZYUW RUEHFRA1597 0431504-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: P 121504Z FEB 00
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
 OSRI: RUEHFR
 DTG:
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8266
 INFO: RUEHOS/AMEMBASSY LAGOS PRIORITY 0631
 RUEATRS/DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
 RUEHUJA/USLO ABUJA PRIORITY 0116
 RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 4190
 RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 1978
 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2897
 RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 1026
 SUBJ: MFA COMMENTS ON OBASANJO VISIT
 TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001597

**DECLASSIFIED
 PER E.O. 13526**

2017-0241-m (1.05)
 KBH 7/9/2019

TREASURY FOR GEITHNER, TRUMAN, SCHUERCH, LOWERY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2005
 TAGS: EFIN, PREL, NI, XA, FR
 SUBJECT: MFA COMMENTS ON OBASANJO VISIT

REF: PARIS 1231

(U) CLASSIFIED BY DEPUTY POLITICAL COUNSELOR SHERWOOD
 MCGINNIS FOR REASONS 1.5 B/D.

1. ~~(S)~~ SUMMARY: DURING THE COURSE OF AF DEPUTY S/E YELLIN'S
 FEBRUARY 8 MEETING WITH GOF MFA AFRICAN AFFAIRS DIRECTOR
 JEAN-DIDIER ROISIN (REPORTED SEPTTEL), ROISIN SAID THAT THE
 GOF WAS PLEASED WITH PRESIDENT OBASANJO'S VISIT DURING WHICH
 OBASANJO SHARED HIS VIEWS ABOUT AFRICAN POLITICAL HOTSPOTS,
 AND THAT AT LEAST SOME IN THE GOF ARE NOW INCLINED TO
 CONSIDER DEBT RELIEF MORE FAVORABLY THAN ORIGINALLY
 ANTICIPATED. END SUMMARY.

NIGERIA'S REGIONAL ROLE

2. ~~(S)~~ ROISIN REPORTED THAT THE VISIT WITH NIGERIAN PRESIDENT
 OBASANJO (2/6-8) HAD GONE WELL. INSTINCTIVELY LEERY OF SIGNS
 OF "HEGEMONY" IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, THE GOF HAS, IN THE
 PAST, PRAISED NIGERIAN LEADERSHIP IN ECOMOG BUT WOULD PREFER
 THAT NIGERIA MAKE GREATER EFFORTS TO FORM MILITARY
 PARTNERSHIPS WITH FRANCOPHONE STATES IN THE REGION,
 ESPECIALLY WITH SENEGAL AND MALI. LIKE THE USG, THE GOF
 WOULD LIKE OBASANJO TO WORK WITH MALIAN PRESIDENT KONARE IN
 ECOWAS TO DEVELOP A STRONG WEST AFRICAN REGIONAL

ORGANIZATION. THE GOF BELIEVES THAT A STRONGER ECOWAS COULD PROVIDE BALANCE TO THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY INFLUENCE OF SADC AND THAT AN ECONOMICALLY SOUND NIGERIA WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT COUNTERWEIGHT TO SOUTH AFRICA'S ECONOMIC CLOUT.

3. (X) ROISIN NOTED THAT REGIONAL ISSUES WERE BRIEFLY TOUCHED UPON DURING OBASANJO'S VISIT AND IN A QUICK SUMMARY SAID THAT OBASANJO WAS:

- SATISFIED WITH DEVELOPMENTS IN NIGER;
- CONFIDENT, APPROACHING OPTIMISTIC, ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR SIERRA LEONE;
- SERIOUSLY WORRIED ABOUT COTE D'IVOIRE, IN PART BECAUSE OF HIS IMPRESSION THAT GENERAL GUEI HAD NO INTENTION OF RELINQUISHING POWER;
- WORRIED ABOUT SENEGAL THOUGH NOT AS MUCH AS WITH COTE D'IVOIRE;
- HOPELESS ON SOMALIA;
- POSITIVE ABOUT THE POLITICAL EVOLUTION IN SUDAN, PARTICULARLY ABOUT SUDAN'S RE-INTEGRATION INTO THE REGION; AND
- DUBIOUS ABOUT THE SINCERITY OF ALL OF COUNTRIES INVOLVED IN THE RDC CONFLICT BUT COMMITTED TO SUPPORTING LUSAKA.

ACCORDING TO ROISIN, OBASANJO DID NOT COMMENT ON THE CONFLICT IN ETHIOPIA/ERITREA.

4. (X) WHEN PREPARING FOR THE OBASANJO VISIT, THE MFA INFORMED US THAT CONTRARY TO PERSISTENT RUMORS, THE GOF WAS NOT CONSTRUCTING A MILITARY BASE IN BAKASSA, NIGERIA. THE GOF DOES HAVE PLANS TO ASSIST CAMEROON WITH THE CONSTRUCTION OF A REGIONAL MILITARY TRAINING FACILITY FOR AIRPLANE AND HELICOPTER PILOTS ALONG THE NORTHERN BORDER AT GAROUA. DESPITE CURRENT POLITICAL PROGRESS IN NIGERIA, THE GOF REMAINS CONCERNED THAT THE NIGERIAN MILITARY CONTINUES TO POSE A SERIOUS CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRACY THERE. ALTHOUGH THE GOF IS INTERESTED IN EVENTUALLY WORKING WITH GON MILITARY OFFICERS IN TRAINING PROGRAMS, MILITARY COOPERATION DID NOT FEATURE HEAVILY IN THE OBASANJO VISIT.

DEBT RELIEF AND AID

5. (X) PARIS 1231 REPORTED THAT THE GOF WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO SUPPORT VERY GENEROUS PARIS CLUB TREATMENT FOR NIGERIA BECAUSE OF THE EXTENT OF FRENCH EXPOSURE. BOTH USG AND HMG DEMARCHES IN SUPPORT OF SPECIAL CONSIDERATION FOR NIGERIA PLUS OBASANJO'S SUCCESSFUL INTERACTION WITH THE GOF DURING THE WEEK COMBINED EFFECTIVELY TO SWAY THE MFA IN FAVOR OF RETHINKING THAT POSITION. AT THE 2/10 NOON PRESS BRIEFING ON THE OBASANJO VISIT, THE MFA SPOKESPERSON ANNOUNCED THAT THE GOF WOULD PRESS FOR A FAVORABLE EXAMINATION OF NIGERIA'S CASE AT THE PARIS CLUB AND IMF. LOCAL PRESS REPORTED (2/10) THAT PRESIDENT CHIRAC AND PRIME MINISTER JOSPIN "ASSURED" OBASANJO OF THEIR SUPPORT FOR A PARIS CLUB TREATMENT OF NIGERIA'S PUBLIC DEBT (PAYMENTS) AND THAT THE GOF WOULD SEEK "MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE" SOLUTIONS TO HELP STEER NIGERIA BACK TO A PATH OF SUSTAINABLE GROWTH.

6. (X) SUCH PRONOUNCEMENTS ARE HOWEVER, STANDARD IN THE

RUN-UP TO PARIS CLUB NEGOTIATIONS AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REFLECT THE DETAILS OF POSITIONS. A FRENCH FINANCE MINISTRY OFFICIAL RESPONSIBLE FOR NIGERIA, HOWEVER, SAID THERE HAD NOT ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 001597

TREASURY FOR GEITHNER, TRUMAN, SCHUERCH, LOWERY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2005

TAGS: EFIN, PREL, NI, XA, FR

SUBJECT: MFA COMMENTS ON OBASANJO VISIT

BEEN A CHANGE IN FRANCE'S MORE RESTRICTIVE POSITION ON THE TERMS OF PARIS CLUB TREATMENT AS A RESULT OF OBASANJO'S VISIT. THE FINANCE MINISTRY CONTINUED TO STICK WITH PARIS CLUB "CONSENSUS" THAT NIGERIA SHOULD MAKE AT LEAST DOLS 2 BILLION IN DEBT PAYMENTS IN 2000 AND IS ANNOYED THAT OTHER MEMBERS (I.E., THE U.S. AND UK) ARE PRESSING FOR LESS. THIS OFFICIAL DID NOT EXPECT AN IMF PROGRAM TO GO TO THE EXECUTIVE BOARD BEFORE THE END OF MARCH.

7. (c) A CONSISTENT GOAL OF GOF POLICY IN WEST AFRICA HAS BEEN THE CLOSER INTEGRATION OF ANGLOPHONE AND FRANCOPHONE COUNTRIES. DURING OBASANJO'S VISIT, THE GOF DOUBLED ITS ASSISTANCE TO NIGERIA TO 36 MILLION FRANCS, EARMARKING HALF FOR FRENCH LANGUAGE TRAINING. COMMERCIALY, THE GOF ENCOURAGES FRENCH BUSINESSES TO SEEK OPPORTUNITIES IN NIGERIA. THE LAST DAY OF OBASANJO'S VISIT WAS DEVOTED TO TOURING MAJOR AEROSPACE COMPANIES IN TOULOUSE, SOUTHERN FRANCE.
PEARSON

TOR: 02/12/00 10:08:59

DIST: SIT: BABBITT Blinken NSC DEMPSEY ODOHUE SMITH Yee
SIT: BABBITT Blinken NSC DEMPSEY ODOHUE SMITH Yee