TO: The Deputy Secretary

FROM: EUR - John C. Kornblum, Acting

SUBJECT: A Multilateral Framework for Bosnian Peace Implementation

Many countries and agencies must be integrated into a structure for implementation of Bosnian peace accords. This includes complex civilian and military structures.

A number of models are imaginable. US interests include the following requirements:

-- Complete autonomy for NATO as the organizer of the IFOR.

-- An indirect link to the United Nations, without requirements for UN oversight of either the military or civilian components.

-- A means of integrating non-NATO participants, especially Russia, into the IFOR, on the basis of NATO command and control.

-- A credible central civilian implementation structure which does not become embroiled in the politics of the UN, the EU or other organization.

A UNIFYING STRUCTURE

There is a strong desire both among NATO allies and other possible participants in implementation, especially the Russians, to devise a unifying structure to manage the implementation. Three possibilities can be imagined:

-- Direct UN authorization and management, including a UN civilian administrator and a UN military commander.

REVIEW AUTHORITY: Robert Homme, Senior Reviewer
-- A totally self-supporting structure which emerges from the peace agreement. The parties would agree to the structure and would agree on its international management. A variant would be to have the Contact Group serve in a sponsorship role.

-- A coalition of forces on the Desert Storm model. A UN resolution would request "interested member states and appropriate regional organizations" to undertake implementation. A multilateral coalition could be formed, perhaps at the meeting in London. The coalition could be limited to the military implementation or could cover civilian aspects as well.

ANALYZING THE OPTIONS

The first option is unacceptable to the United States and to most NATO allies. The UN seems uninterested in assuming this burden.

The second option would be most practical and efficient from an American point of view. The disadvantage would be that the framework would not be broad enough to provide a sense of participation for all countries and agencies who believe they have a legitimate role in Bosnia. There would be resentment by some countries at a special role for the Contact Group.

The third option offers a chance to establish a credible international structure which is separate from the United Nations, but still manageable by the US. It could be especially useful in meeting the needs of Russia and others for a role in IFOR.

A MULTILATERAL COALITION FOR IFOR

An example of a useful international coalition is the IFOR and the role of non-NATO participants. The structure could be designed as follows:

-- The Bosnian Peace Agreement establishes an implementation structure which includes an implementation force mounted by NATO and a civilian coordinator. An annex establishing this force as an integral part of implementation is attached to the peace agreement.

-- The UNSC issues a short resolution which approves the peace agreement and grants authority to "interested member states, acting with appropriate regional organizations or arrangements," to support all aspects of implementation. NATO is not mentioned in the resolution, but a UNSYG report states that NATO has agreed to take on the IFOR task.
NATO would take the lead in organizing the IFOR coalition. It would conclude individual MOU's with interested states which would discuss mission, command and control and consultations. These MOU's would provide a process for determining each individual state's contributions. Details would be worked out with SHAPE.

The individual MOU's would include identical provisions for political and military coordination. These could include:

- Agreement that each participant would be able to approve the operational plan as a condition for contributions of forces to IFOR. NATO would promise to take account of views, but final judgment would be reserved to the NAC.

- Establishment of a Multilateral (or International) Coordinating Council: This would be a political body composed of NATO and senior officials from contributing countries. The NATO Secretary General would chair. This body would discuss overall policy and command and control issues arising from IFOR's operation.

- A Senior Military Council: This would be chaired by SACEUR and be composed of senior military representatives from NATO and contributing countries. It would be charged with reviewing military operations and consulting with contributing countries on issues which arise in the operation of IFOR. It would assume the duties of the current Ad Hoc Group.

- Command Liaison Arrangements: NATO would provide liaison arrangements with contributing countries at various staff levels. Details would be tailored to individual countries.

- Provision for a common funding mechanism could be added if desired.

Adding a Civilian Element

This structure could be expanded to cover the civilian implementation structure and the role of the Senior Implementation Coordinator (SICOR). Providing a "coalition" structure could help deal with the debate with the French and others over the need for a supervising structure for the SICOR.

Rather than being appointed by the UNSYG as the French wish, the SICOR could operate within the framework of the multilateral coalition. A coalition of countries could include OIC countries etc. who would sign a single MOU on overall implementation. The SICOR's authority could come from the coalition agreement.
Existence of this "coalition" would also provide a framework for non-combat Russian military operations, if the Russians chose this course. Their forces could attach directly to a "security division" of the SICOR.

MEETING RUSSIAN NEEDS

Such a structure would help meet Russian needs in a number of ways:

-- It would include express UN authorization.

-- It would set up an intermediary structure between Russian and NATO which Russia could claim was the "real" IFOR authorizing body.

-- It would provide for an individual Russian agreement with NATO, preserving Russia's desire to be an "equal" partner with NATO in the IFOR.

-- It would provide for a direct role for SACEUR in the Senior Military Council, thus preserving for Russia the sense that they were dealing with SACEUR as a coalition commander rather than a NATO commander.

-- It would provide both civilian and military consultative bodies to give Russia a chance to express its opinions on policy issues.

-- It would provide liaison opportunities in the NATO command structure.

-- If so desired, it could provide a common funding arrangement to help pay for the Russian contribution.

-- If so desired, it could have a direct link to the civilian structure to allow Russia to relate its civilian and military roles. Russia could for example be given a senior post (deputy SICOR?) in the civilian structure to balance NATO's role in IFOR. Or, if Russia chose option II, its non-combat forces would still be part of the same coalition as the IFOR.

-- As a final point for Russia, we could agree informally that major policy issues would continue to be consulted with Contact Group partners in an informal CG forum established either at NATO or meeting regularly in capitals.

Attachments:
1. Timeline thru Hyde Park
2. Hyde Park Wish List
3. IFOR Options (Perry-Grachev)
4. International Conferences
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BOSNIA WISHLIST FOR HYDE PARK

WISH #1: Announce agreement on Russian participation in IFOR.

FALLBACK: Announce support for NATO-led IFOR and our joint commitment to Russian participation in some form.

WISH #2: Specify and announce Moscow conference on implementation issues.

FALLBACK: Announce that an implementation conference of some kind will be held in Moscow.