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**COLLECTION:**
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The Importance of the "High Representative"
to the Clinton Administration's War Crimes Policy

Executive Summary

Going into Dayton, the job that became "High Representative" began as a largely ceremonial job overseeing aid and reconstruction. What emerged after UNSC Res. 1022 on November 22 makes the High Representative the most powerful civilian in Bosnia. Under UNSC Res. 1022, paragraph 3, the High Representative can, by himself, pull the trigger on restoring economic sanctions. This gives the High Representative the power to decide if the FRY and the Bosnian Serbs are complying with their obligations to the War Crimes Tribunal.

The High Representative is the only person who can use the threat of re-imposing sanctions to help the Tribunal apprehend indicted war criminals. Realistically, the IFOR Commander, being American, is never going to re-impose sanctions except in response to an attack on IFOR forces. Being European, the High Representative has the credibility to use the threat of sanctions for broader purposes.

The Administration has been focusing on the approach of having an American as the High Representative's deputy. Where the issue is implementation, this approach works. Where the issue is policy, this approach fails. The High Representative must share the vision that justice is the key to breaking the cycle of violence in the former Yugoslavia.

The United States should insist upon an alternative to Carl Bildt from among a number of excellent European candidates with both human rights stature and practical experience. Foremost among them is Max van der Stoel, a former Dutch Foreign Minister and U.N. human rights rapporteur for Iraq. Other good choices include José María Mendiluce, who ran the UNHCR aid program for Bosnia and is now a member of the European Parliament, and former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. The right choice for High Representative is the best opportunity the United States will have to ensure the Tribunal's success.

* * * * *

1. Why the Choice of High Representative Is So Important to the Clinton Administration and the War Crimes Tribunal

The High Representative Has the Power to Re-Impose Sanctions. Under Article IX of the Framework Agreement, all Parties, including the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Republika Srpska (RS), agreed to "cooperate fully" with the War Crimes Tribunal. The RS further agreed in Article II(8) of the Constitution to comply "with orders issued pursuant to Article
29 of the Statute of the Tribunal." Article 29 is what requires indicted war criminals to be turned over to The Hague for trial.

The real power of the High Representative comes not from the Dayton Peace Agreement but from U.N. Security Council Resolution 1022 (Nov. 22, 1995), paragraph 3:

3. [I]f at any time, with regard to a matter within the scope of their respective mandates and after joint consultation if appropriate, either the High Representative described in the Peace Agreement, or the commander of the international force to be deployed in accordance with the Peace Agreement, on the basis of a report transmitted through the appropriate political authorities, informs the Council via the Secretary-General that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or the Bosnian Serb authorities are failing significantly to meet their obligations under the Peace Agreement, the suspension [of sanctions] referred to in paragraph 1 above shall terminate on the fifth day following the Council's receipt of such a report, unless the Council decides otherwise taking into consideration the nature of the non-compliance;

What this means is that if the High Representative decides that the FRY or the RS are failing to "cooperate fully" with regard to the Tribunal, the High Representative has the power to decide, on his or her own, that the FRY, RS or both are "failing significantly to meet their obligations under the Peace Agreement." The High Representative then reports this to the Security Council. Sanctions are re-imposed unless the Security Council votes otherwise—which gives the United States a veto.

Thus, the High Representative has the power to "pull the trigger" on economic sanctions against the FRY or the RS. With the support of the United States, the High Representative has the power to force compliance with the Tribunal's indictments. This is why the position is so important to the success of the Tribunal and United States policy of using justice to bring peace.

The High Representative Has the Power to Enforce Compliance with the International Police Task Force (IPTF). The IPTF's police powers vis-à-vis the RS can be summed up as "My wish is your command."

Under the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) Annex II, Article III, paragraph 1, the IPTF has the authority for "monitoring, observing and inspecting law enforcement activities," "advising law enforcement personnel and forces," and "assisting by accompanying the Parties' law enforcement personnel as they carry out their responsibilities, as the IPTF deems appropriate." Under Annex II, Article IV, the RS "shall allow IPTF personnel immediate and complete access to any site, person, activity, proceeding, record, or other item or event ... as requested by the IPTF." Under Annex II, Article V, paragraph 1, "Any obstruction of or interference with IPTF activities, failure or refusal to comply with an IPTF request, or other failure to meet the Parties' responsibilities or other obligations in this Agreement, shall constitute a failure to cooperate with the IPTF" (emphasis added). Thus, any failure by the RS to carry out IPTF "requests" to arrest indicted war criminals constitutes a failure to cooperate with the IPTF.

Under Annex II, Article V, paragraph 2, "[T]he IPTF Commissioner will notify the High Representative and inform the IFOR Commander of failures to cooperate with the IPTF. The IPTF Commissioner may request that the High Representative take appropriate steps upon receiving such notifications, including calling such failures to the attention of the Parties, convening the Joint Civilian Commission, and consulting with the United Nations, relevant states, and international organizations on further responses" (emphasis added).
Thus, if the IPTF requires "access" to indicted war criminals and the RS police refuse to cooperate, it is up to the High Commissioner to decide what to do, if anything, about the failure to arrest indicted war criminals. The High Commissioner has the authority to do anything, including re-imposing sanctions, for failure of the RS police to arrest indicted war criminals.

Political realities mean that indicted war criminals will be sought out only by the IPTF. Because of the experience of Mogadishu, IFOR will not try to hunt down indicted war criminals, although it is expected to arrest any it encounters. Leaving aside the possibility of arranging "encounters" through intelligence, the only remaining authority with any hope of compelling the surrender of indicted suspects is the IPTF. Without power backing up the IPTF, its ability to compel anyone's surrender is nil.

The High Representative Has General Supervision over All Compliance with Human Rights and War Crimes Provisions of the DPA. DPA Annex 10, Article II, paragraph 1 gives the High Representative broad powers to "[m]onitor the implementation of the peace settlement," promote "full compliance with all civilian aspects of the peace settlement" and "a high level of cooperation" between the Parties "and the organizations and agencies participating" in the peace settlement—which includes the War Crimes Tribunal. The High Representative is also required to "[p]rovide guidance to, and received reports from, the Commissioner of the International Police Task Force."

Going into the Dayton negotiations, the position of High Representative was different from what emerged. During the negotiations, it took a long time for even the title "High Representative" to emerge—candidate titles changed frequently. In light of what happened at Dayton and afterwards, the United States should re-think the going-in assumption that the job would go to Carl Bildt.

2. Carl Bildt Is Likely to Frustrate U.S. Policy on War Crimes

The British and French, and, to a lesser extent, the Germans, are backing Carl Bildt for the job of High Representative. As of late last week, smaller European countries were not—particularly The Netherlands, Austria and Sweden (Bildt being the leader of the opposition party). The United States should work to see that another European candidate emerges who is better suited for the job as it presently exists.

In fairness to Bildt, the job of mediator is not the same as the job of High Representative as it emerged after Dayton and UNSC Res. 1022. The qualities required are not the same. Foremost among the qualities the High Representative needs is a vision for what has to be done in Bosnia so that war does not resume after IFOR leaves. The High Representative also has to go into with naiveté as to whom he or she will be dealing with.

An analysis of Bildt’s performance as EU mediator indicates that he is a "trimmer," working to level out the moral ground by raising some and knocking down others so that all parties can negotiate together. With respect to the way Bildt would deal with war crimes, there is reason to believe Bildt will not pursue war criminals aggressively. This will frustrate United States policy on the vigorous prosecution of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.

According to Roy Gutman, in early July, Bildt gave instructions that caused there to be no NATO airstrikes during the fall of Srebrenica. After the capture of 6,000+ Muslim men, Bildt said that the moral duty was to negotiate. "Military operations . . . can start and they can end, but politics goes on." On July 16, Bildt, on the basis of a promise without performance, prematurely announced a deal with the Bosnian Serbs that the ICRC could have access to the prisoners. Of
course, by that time, the prisoners were already dead. On July 16, after 6,000 prisoners had been killed by the Bosnian Serbs, Reuters reported: "I don't think there is a military solution to this conflict. You may seek a military solution but it's not there," Bildt commented after talks with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade. In Italy Pope John Paul condemned the Serb offensive against the U.N. 'safe areas' as crimes against humanity. 'What is being carried out under the world's gaze is a defeat for civilisation,' he said...

Even after it became clear what had happened at Srebrenica, Bildt made no significant public condemnation of Srebrenica. His first widely reported public condemnation of Srebrenica ("outrageous") occurred on October 29, 1995, in response to stories in the New York Times and Washington Post.

In contrast to Bildt's attitude towards Srebrenica, Bildt was quick to condemn Tudjman after the attack on the Krajina. This received widespread coverage in the media, particularly Reuters. During August, the Croats and the Bosnians at times refused to deal with him.

Bildt's one major peace initiative was his effort to agree to lift sanctions in exchange for Milosevic agreeing in writing to recognize Bosnia's international boundaries. This was dismissed by the United States and Germany. The New York Times reported on August 4 that the Clinton Administration opposed Bildt because his plan was "far too generous to Serbia."

The problem with just having an American deputy. The United States' approach to the choice of the High Representative has been to focus on getting an American deputy. This is a time-honored American tradition of working behind the scenes when an American should not or cannot hold the top job. One example where this has worked well has been the United Nations Compensation Commission in Geneva, which handles claims against Iraq.

Where the issue is implementation, this approach works. Where the issue is policy, this approach fails. The selection of Chief Prosecutor is an example: In August 1993, the United States offered to support Cherif Bassiouni as deputy to John Duncan Lowe, the British candidate. This would not have worked, because, despite Bassiouni's commitment and drive, Lowe would have had decision-making power whether to bring indictments against Karadzic and Mladic. Lowe would not have indicted Karadzic and Mladic in July 1995, if at all. A Richard Goldstone would, and did. The choice of High Representative is as important to the success of the War Crimes Tribunal as was the right choice for Chief Prosecutor.

3. Other European Candidates for High Representative Can Make the Administration's War Crimes Policy a Success Before IFOR Leaves

The United States should insist upon an alternative to Carl Bildt from among a number of excellent European candidates with both human rights stature and practical experience. Foremost among them is Max van der Stoel, a Dutch Foreign Minister and U.N. human rights rapporteur for Iraq. Not to be overlooked is that it would be politically advantageous for the United States to support a Dutch candidate for High Representative after having rejected former Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers as Secretary-General for NATO.

Other good choices include José María Mendiluce, who ran the UNHCR aid program for Bosnia and is now a member of the European Parliament, and former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. The right choice for High Representative is the best opportunity the United States will have to ensure the Tribunal's success.
Bildt Talking Points

1. Bildt blocked airstrikes that could have prevented the massacre of 6,000 men at Srebrenica: Around July 6, Bildt appears to have told the U.N. not to launch airstrikes while he was in Belgrade talking to Milosevic. On July 7, the Dutch, under attack from the Bosnian Serbs at Srebrenica, requested NATO airstrikes. This was rejected by U.N. officers, who said “they did not want to undermine the peacemaking efforts of Carl Bildt.” (New York Times, October 29, 1995.)

2. Massacres start and they can end, but politics goes on forever: After Bosnian Serb seizure of Srebrenica, Bildt said on July 12, “Military operations ... can start and they can end, but politics goes on. ... At the end of the day there will have to be a negotiated political settlement and I would hope that all of the parties to the conflict recognise that and that they are prepared to sit down and start talking about that as soon as possible.” (Reuters).

3. On July 14-16, Bildt met with Milosevic and Mladic in Belgrade. (Reuters; Roy Gutman, Newsday.) Bildt announced on July 16 that he had an agreement with Mladic to allow the ICRC into Srebrenica. “They can go in and have full freedom of movement to register people.” (Reuters.) This never happened, because by that time, most of the 6,000 Muslim victims were dead.

4. What’s brutal here: Speaking from Belgrade on July 16, after the massacre of 6,000 men at Srebrenica, “The brutal fact is that since a couple of months there has been a process of military escalation from both sides,” Bildt said (Reuters), referring “to the Bosnian Moslem-led government in Sarajevo and separatist Bosnian Serb forces” (Reuters.)

5. The difference between Carl Bildt and Pope John Paul II: Reuters, July 16, “I don’t think there is a military solution to this conflict. You may seek a military solution but it’s not there,” Bildt commented after talks with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade. ... In Italy Pope John Paul condemned the Serb offensive against the U.N. ‘safe areas’ as crimes against humanity. ‘What is being carried out under the world’s gaze is a defeat for civilisation,’ he said ...

6. Of course, subsequent NATO airstrikes had nothing to do with helping drive the Bosnian Serbs to make peace: On July 17, Agence France-Press reported “Bildt warned late Sunday [July 16] that tougher western measures against the Bosnian Serbs could lead to a Balkan war lasting several years. ... Asked his opinion on the consequences of taking a stronger stand against the Bosnian Serbs, Bildt replied, ‘Such measures would mean that we were heading for war in the Balkans.’”

7. Bildt’s perception of the leveraging power of economic sanctions against the FRY: On July 22, Bildt announced he had negotiated a deal with Milosevic in Belgrade
under which economic sanctions against the FRY would be lifted in exchange for a signed agreement to respect Bosnia within its international boundaries. (Reuters.)

8. **The balance of Bildt's negotiated solution:** The New York Times reported on August 4 that the Clinton Administration had rejected Bildt's plan to lift economic sanctions in exchange for a written agreement to respect Bosnia's international borders as "far too generous to Serbia."

9. **Tudjman, in contrast to others, is singled out by name a war criminal:** On August 4, Bildt implied Tudjman should be indicted as a war criminal for having tried to re-take the Krajina and for shelling Knin. Comparing Tudjman to Croatian Serb leader Milan Martic, who had been indicted for indiscriminate rocket attacks against Zagreb in May of 1995, Bildt said, "It is difficult to see any difference between these actions and the shelling of Knin, which President Tudjman must now be held responsible for." (Washington Post; Reuters.)

10. **Both the Croatians and the Bosnians, at various times, refused to meet with Bildt:** On August 7, Croatia said that Bildt "has lost the credibility needed for the role of a peace mediator," and that Croatia would cease meeting with Bildt because of his statements regarding Tudjman. (Reuters.) On August 17, top Bosnian officials refused to meet with Bildt, saying that he was the mediator of a "process that is dead." (Reuters.)

11. **Bildt on values:** After Croatia criticized Bildt for its one-sided criticism of Tudjman and the attack on the Krajina, Bildt replied, "I am not only a mediator. I am also here to uphold certain values... There are moral and European standards to be upheld and they apply to Serbs, they apply to Croats and they apply to everyone who has the ambition to be respected in the outside world and it is my duty to make that abundantly clear to everyone." (Reuters, August 7.)

12. **On August 28, Bildt issued his first widely reported criticism against an act by the Bosnian Serbs, a shelling of Sarajevo in which 37 people were killed.** (Reuters.) It was not until October 29 that Bildt called the atrocities committed at Srebrenica "outrageous." (UPI)

13. **The difference between Carl Bildt and Richard Holbrooke:** According to the New York Times, November 26, "To see Carl Bildt, a former Swedish Prime Minister who this year became the European Union's envoy to Bosnia, beside Richard C. Holbrooke, America's chief Balkan mediator, was to perceive the gulf between good intentions and power. Bildt, a lonely figure, paced the streets of Sarajevo with his briefcase and complained that he needed 'a phone card' to contact a West European capital. Holbrooke was flanked by generals, whose titles he would readily extol to impress his Balkan interlocutors, and supported by all the high-tech paraphernalia of U.S. intelligence and military might."
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<td>03/31/1993</td>
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National Security Council
Mary DeRosa (Legal Adviser)
OA/Box Number: 3312

FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - War Crimes, 1993

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2) objection

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George

Jameson

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so many others wanted to see. I must be careful.
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<td>The Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of Human Rights to Eric Schwartz; re: No Immunity for Slobodan Milosevic (partial) (1 page)</td>
<td>10/06/2000</td>
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<td>002. cable</td>
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<td>003. cable</td>
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<td>10/19/2000</td>
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<td>005. notes</td>
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<td>10/6/2000</td>
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<td>006. notes</td>
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<td>007. notes</td>
<td>re: Handwritten Notes - ICC [International Criminal Court] (2 pages)</td>
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<td>010. draft</td>
<td>re: USUN Reporting Cable Following June PrepCom (3 pages)</td>
<td>10/12/2000</td>
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<td>011. email</td>
<td>Dorothy Shea to Eric Schwartz; re: ICC Meeting (1 page)</td>
<td>10/11/2000</td>
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<td>012. letter</td>
<td>Minister Lekota to Secretary Cohen; re: UN/ICC Relationship Agreement (partial) (1 page)</td>
<td>09/29/2000</td>
<td>b(2)</td>
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</tbody>
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**COLLECTION:**
- Clinton Presidential Records
- National Security Council
- Dorothy Shea (Multilateral & Humanitarian Affairs)
- OA/Box Number: 3348

**FOLDER TITLE:**
ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia] - FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]

**RESTRICION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(5) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(5) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
Phone call did happen
Helms was not in good shape
Kinda disoriented
call could've get into everything she needed to get in

Dr. A UNESCO met with Helms a couple weeks ago. (Marsha)
Said Helms was fine.

Sec'y testimony on Tuesday
ID pre-brief of Helms
get this item on the agenda for 15min beforehand
Sandwich will talk to Garrett Grissom

distinct & inst. independent
need understanding
what form should it take?

Oct 2: legal expert 9-5 will circulate agenda.
Funding for 2 people from SE to come