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Documents from this Mandatory Declassification Review were released in full.
MEMORANDUM

TO: Communications group
FROM: Bob Boorstin
RE: 1995 Communications Initiatives
DATE: February 17, 1995

Following up on our previous conversation, this memo roughly summarizes the rationale and plans for Presidential national security initiatives over the course of 1995-96.

Initiatives and Rationale

Given the ongoing criticism of our foreign policy as reactive -- the lack of a Clinton doctrine -- it is vital to the President's stature as Commander in Chief and our national security agenda that we launch initiatives. Initiatives will provide us with positive actions that we can claim as our own.

Due to limited news space and interest from the public and the media, however, we must severely limit the number of initiatives that we put forth. Although the President will obviously spend time on any number of key issues -- as outlined in the "Action Agenda" -- his public time must be focused.

With that in mind, I believe that the President should launch initiatives on nonproliferation and anti-terrorism. These initiatives should carry us through 1995 and 1996.

My rationale for choosing these areas:
(1) The time is right. This year is critical for nonproliferation efforts: NPT, North Korea, Start II, CTB, etc. Terrorism is always in the news, of course, but the World Trade Center trial brings a special focus.
(2) People care. These are foreign policy issues which directly affect Americans here at home. Polls demonstrate consistent public interest in both areas (especially focus groups from this year's State of the Union.) We must continue to push our other best choice of initiative -- creating jobs through trade -- but it has worn out its welcome with the media.
(3) These are vital subjects in the post-Cold War era. The elites care. No subjects better illustrate the challenges -- and the potential for transnational cooperation. Introducing new initiatives (even new packages) will stimulate elites and start academic discussion.
(4) The risks of open partisan conflict are relatively small. With the exception of North Korea, we have an even or upper hand on these issues. (Compare, for example, with peacekeeping.) North Korea will continue to cause controversy. But arguments
against the NPT or START II, for example, will not resonate with the public, and no one opposes anti-terrorist activities.

(5) These subjects lend themselves to concrete demonstrations and television. You can dismantle warheads and produce graphics showing the numbers of missiles reduced. The arrest of terrorists and subsequent trials draw tremendous attention.

(6) The two initiatives intersect. Smuggling of nuclear materials, for example, offers a prime opportunity for attack. Missions like “Operation Sapphire,” presented correctly, will draw intense media interest.

The Message

As with any message, the key is simplicity and repetition. We might want to attach simple labels to each initiative. The message could be summarized as:

President Clinton is making Americans safer.
Americans sleep better at night because President Clinton has kept his promise to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons. He is leading the world in efforts to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction.
Americans are more secure because President Clinton has kept his pledge to hunt down and prosecute terrorists, at home and abroad. Now he has launched a new, aggressive effort to stop terrorism.

The Plan

The initiatives would be introduced in major Presidential speeches and/or events. The events would be preceded by small group and full White House corps backgrounders.

To maintain momentum, the initiatives would be the focus of the President’s major foreign policy addresses (i.e. UN Fiftieth Anniversary). Cabinet and sub-Cabinet officials would include in their regular remarks reference to one or both initiatives. The campaign would include regular op-ed pieces and articles in scholarly journals.

The campaign would begin immediately and build throughout the year, continuing through 1996. A suggested calendar -- including confirmed speeches and ideas for events -- follows. It envisions starting the nonproliferation initiative almost immediately (the calendar and our agenda are clear), while delaying the launch of the terrorism initiative until late June (time to reach closure with domestic agencies and gain support of allies.)

- March 1 -- Possible POTUS address. Introduction of nonproliferation initiative, with stress on NPT.
• March 14 -- Perry address to Council on Foreign Affairs. Relationship of nonproliferation and conventional defense or focus on rogue states.

• April -- Christopher address. Nonproliferation and relationship with Russia/former Soviet states.

• April 18 -- Perry address to Naval Academy. Nonproliferation subtopic.

• May 12-13 -- Perry commencement addresses.

• May 31 -- POTUS USAF Academy Commencement Address. Nonproliferation, highlighting SALT II and further warhead reductions.

• May/June -- POTUS Russia visit. Event/speech at site where warheads are dismantled.

• June 26 -- POTUS at UN 50th Anniversary. Launch of new worldwide anti-terrorist campaign. (Alternate time might be G-7 meeting in Halifax, if economic news is scarce.)

• July -- POTUS event. Announces new US task force on terrorism with Reno, Freeh, Christopher, etc.

• September -- Congressional session. Introduction of new anti-terrorism legislation.

• September 2-3 -- POTUS at VJ Day Commemoration. Prevention of conflict through nonproliferation efforts. Update on initiative.

• October 22 -- POTUS at UN General Assembly. Fighting the terrorist threat, particularly in regional conflicts. Initiative to fight nuclear smuggling.

• November 18 -- Japan state visit. Nonproliferation argument folded into visit to A-bomb memorials.

As I indicated, these are obviously rough ideas. Congressional hearings, a potential trip to Europe and other events offer further possibilities.
MEMORANDUM

TO: Communications group
FROM: Bob Boorstin
RE: Nonproliferation speech/calendar
DATE: February 19, 1995

As you know, the President is scheduled to deliver a major foreign policy address on March 1/2. The speech will focus on nonproliferation and illustrate the benefits of engagement.

The message is simple:
President Clinton is making Americans safer.
We sleep better at night because President Clinton has kept his promise to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons. He is leading the world in efforts to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

We will announce the initiative (i.e. Operation Secure Future) in the President’s speech, putting it in the context of our belief in engagement and our accomplishments to date. We would then lay out an agenda for the year, hitting each major area without getting bogged down in the detail.

In the days, weeks and months to follow, the President, Vice President, Cabinet secretaries and other officials would include agreed upon language on the nonproliferation initiative in their public and private appearances. Subtopics -- the NPT, START II, North Korea, Iran/Iraq, CTB, chemical weapons, landmines -- would be addressed and short reports would be delivered to the President. The President would have at least one public event per month to advance the initiative. Major speeches -- Air Force Academy, UN Anniversary -- would focus on this topic.

A proposed calendar and strategy for the first month might include:

- February 20-25: Planning
- February 26: Holum oped Times/Post
- February 27: Select journalist/columnist briefings
- February 28: White House press corps briefing
  State Department press corps briefing
  USIA foreign press corps briefing
- March 1/2: POTUS speech
- March 2/3: POTUS CNN interview
  Christopher/Perry Reuter interview
- March 6-10: START II press conference/event
  Follow-up opeds
- March 14: Perry speech on rogue states
- March 13-17: POTUS event (meet with NPT delegation?)
- March 27-31: Christopher address on Russia/former Soviet states
We'd like to kick off our nonproliferation effort. The President is scheduled to deliver a speech on March 1/2, on nonproliferation and illustrate the benefits of engagement.

The message is simple:

President Clinton is making Americans safer. We sleep better at night because President Clinton has kept his promise to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons. He is leading the world in efforts to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

We will announce the initiative (i.e. Operation Secure Future) in the President's speech, putting it in the context of our belief in engagement and our accomplishments to date. We would then lay out an agenda for the year, hitting each major area without getting bogged down in the detail.

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NPT and allied issues should be flagged in all visits here by heads of state/government. In addition, a proposed calendar and strategy for the first month might include:

- February 26: TL oped Times/Post
- February 27: Select journalist/columnist briefings
- February 28: White House press corps briefing
  - State Department press corps briefing
  - USIA foreign press corps briefing
  - Christopher speech on Engagement/Resources
- March 1/2: POTUS speech
- March 2/3: POTUS CNN interview
- March 6/7: Christopher/Perry Reuter interview
- March 14: Christopher on Nonproliferation
- March 18: Perry speech on nonproliferation and security
  - Lake meeting with interest groups
- March 18: Perry to Middle East
• March 18-24: Gore to Middle East

• March 20: Christopher address on Russia/former Soviet states

• March 25: Joint meeting of National Academy of Science and Center for Foreign Relations (Gore, Perry, Holum)

• Late March: START II press conference/event following Senate ratification
  Follow-up opeds

• April 16-17: POTUS event (meet with NPT delegation)

• April 17: NPT extension Conference. Vice President to attend to deliver speech
From: Fried, Daniel
To: @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor
CC: /R, Record at A1; Burns, Nicholas R.; Vershbow, Alexander R.
Subject: State of Union Language [CONFIDENTIAL]
Date: Tuesday, January 24, 1995 02:53 PM

For Tony Lake

From the Troika (Vershbow, Burns, Fried)

We recommending adding to the State of the Union text two sentences on NATO expansion, CEE and Russia.

The Administration' NATO/PFP initiatives show Presidential leadership and balance; they preempt Republican criticism (the previous Administration did nothing on NATO expansion when it had the chance). Our sentences are forward looking, rather than a catalogue of past activities.

Bob Boorstin would not take the language, stating that the speech was too long and the President had cut the foreign policy sections by two pages already.

The sentences would go on page 18, the final paragraph (the paragraph beginning "The United States has proudly supported free elections...")

"By launching the Partnership for Peace and initiating the process of NATO's expansion, we are building the foundations for an expanded TransAtlantic community of secure, free market democracies. NATO will build close and strong ties with a democratic Russia, in parallel with expansion."
PLEASE PASS TO TONY LAKE AND SANDY BERGER:

I have not seen the State of the Union, but would like to make a pitch -- just in case it's not there -- for a phrase like "call this year for the INDEFINITE AND UNCONDITIONAL EXTENSION OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, so that our children and their children may be protected from the specter of nuclear war." The key words are in caps (the President was criticized for omitting "indefinite" at the UNGA, giving rise to comment that the US was softening its support for that aim).

I know we don't want a laundry list in the speech, but omitting reference to NPT at this critical juncture in the run-up to the Extension Conference will be noted in foreign capitals, and criticized in arms control circles as showing a lack of Presidential vision and leadership on a critical challenge for the 1995 national security agenda.

Dan
Hall, Wilma G.

From: Poneman, Daniel B.
To: @NSA - Nat'l Security Advisor
Cc: /R, Record at A1; Andreasen, Steven P.; Bell, Robert G.; Benjamin, Daniel; Darby, M. Brooke; Ross, Thomas B.; @NONPRO - Export Controls
Subject: Revised TL speech outline (CONFIDENTIAL)
Date: Wednesday, January 25, 1995 10:13AM

<<File Attachment: LAKE.DOC>>
1995 marks a point of accomplishment and transformation of the nonproliferation and arms control agenda.

-- Key elements of the global regime have recently been completed

START I entry into force
Ukraine/Kazakhstan/Belarus NPT adherence

-- and we are moving expeditiously to put others in place

NPT indefinite extension
CTB (Announce new policy on 10-year withdrawal right)
START II ratification
CWC ratification
Fissile material convention
BWC implementation

Increasingly, a more cooperative U.S.-Russia relationship and the increasing importance of proliferation as a preeminent national security concern mean that the arms control and nonproliferation agendas are converging.

-- For example, we are undertaking a comprehensive effort to control fissile materials that addresses both arms control and nonproliferation objectives. Thousands of Russian scientists working in International Science Centers. Five hundred tons of Russian HEU to be blended
down to harmless reactor fuel. Operation Saphire. DOE labs working with Russian counterparts. {Announce that U.S. is putting substantial stock of fissile material from weapons under IAEA safeguards. (Check with DOE)}

We continue to need to deal with the imminent danger arising from backlash states who seek weapons of mass destruction, e.g. North Korea and Iran. Since many these countries typically pursue more than one route to nonconventional arms, our nuclear nonproliferation agenda must increasingly be interlinked with CBW and missile nonproliferation.

And that nonproliferation policy must be woven into the broader context of our national security and foreign policy interests. Expanding democracies -- South Africa's decision to give up its nuclear arsenal. Expanding trade as an engine of growth -- we seek closer economic cooperation and high tech trade with those who fulfill international nonproliferation norms. Strong defense -- US security commitments to Europe, South Korea and Japan have been critical to preventing proliferation in the past 25 years.

Looking to the future, we have the opportunity and the responsibility to build on the accomplishments, but also to move beyond the issues that defined nonproliferation during the Cold War.

--- Starting from the January and September Summits, we've undertaken a new agenda for transparency and irreversibility of weapons dismantlement.

--- We're taking significant steps towards unilateral openness on nuclear stockpiles.
-- Detargeting and unilateral reductions in alert status and new weapons development add to mutual confidence and stability without complex negotiations

-- We’re seeking to use the momentum from global fissile material initiatives to stimulate new thinking about the most intractable regional proliferation problems: South Asia and the Middle East.

-- Need to move from 70s to 90s approach to arms control and nonproliferation. Each of these initiatives should be pursued independently. Some unilateral, others bilateral, others multilateral. Need to move beyond linkage; each initiative too important to hold hostage to the others.

-- This has been and will remain an issue of American leadership. {Announce Presidential, Vice Presidential, Christopher speeches; VP opening of NPT Extension Conference}
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Your Trip to the 49th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)

OVERVIEW

The dominant theme during your second trip to the UN General Assembly will be the mission of the multinational coalition in Haiti -- an issue that dovetails neatly with the other themes you will stress in your speech to the General Assembly, in your bilateral meetings and in the social events that you will host or attend. These themes include: continued U.S. leadership in world affairs; the strong U.S. commitment to the United Nations; the need to strengthen and reform the UN's peacekeeping capabilities and management practices; and, the importance of UN initiatives in the realm of sustainable development and human rights.

Your visit comes at a relative high-point in U.S. leadership at the UN, where this Administration is generally regarded favorably, especially in comparison to its predecessors. The New York Times reported on Sunday, September 18, "As the General Assembly approaches, a variety of diplomats say they like what they have seen of the Clinton Administration." U.S. leadership in the Haiti crisis will likely enhance this perception. Moreover, having recently won approval from Congress for $1.2 billion to pay past and anticipated peacekeeping expenses -- funds that will avert a once-imminent UN cash flow crisis -- the Administration has proved its willingness to fight to strengthen and sustain the UN.

Nevertheless, there remains an under-current of resentment towards the U.S. at the United Nations, where some perceive us as bullying the membership into accepting U.S. dictates. In part, this perception is unavoidable, given our status as the world's only superpower. However, the strong pressure we applied to obtain Resolution 940, our resistance to impractical and costly peace operations, and Congress's regular withholdings on payments to the UN are cited by some as evidence of strong-arm tactics.

The centerpiece of your visit will be your speech to the General Assembly in which you will.....

SUMMARY OF EVENTS/OBJECTIVES

You will spend September 25 and 26 at the UN. On Sunday, September 25, you will participate in four UN-related events:
-- Bilateral meeting with UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in which you should strive for an open discussion on the UN’s current challenges and its future as well as developments in Haiti, Bosnia, and Somalia. You should urge appointment of a U.S. force commander for UNMIH, stress our commitment to UN reform, and reiterate your personal support for the candidacy of Dr. William Foege for UNICEF Executive Director.

-- Drop-by Trilateral Meeting with Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres of Israel, hosted by Secretary Christopher.

-- Bilateral Meeting with President Izetbegovic of Bosnia, in which you should draw him out on the notion of a six month delay in lifting the arms embargo, ask for his help during this period in which we are intensifying pressure on the Bosnian Serbs, and stress the importance of the Federation to any workable, long-term settlement.

-- Reception for selected African Heads of State and Delegation whose countries have made significant progress towards democracy and economic reform. At present, two African heads of state/government have committed to attend: President Bedie of Cote d’Ivoire and Prime Minister Veiga of Cape Verde along with Foreign Ministers and senior representatives from over twenty other African countries, Members of Congress, and representatives from the U.S. business and non-profit communities. The reception affords an opportunity to reiterate the U.S. commitment to Africa and highlight the constructive contributions made during your Administration. You will give brief remarks, and President Bedie of Cote d’Ivoire will reply.

Monday, September 26, will be devoted entirely to UN-related activities:

-- Jog with President Menem of Argentina (Tentative). The Argentinians have provided crucial support for U.S. policies at the United Nations, most recently and importantly on Haiti. Our goals are to thank the Argentinians for their support at the UN and with the Summit of the Americas and smooth over any remaining ruffled feathers they may have about being surprised by the Carter mission.

-- Photo-Opportunity with the Incoming UNGA President, Foreign Minister Amara Essy of Cote d’Ivoire, purely for protocol purposes.

-- Speech to the 49th UN General Assembly, highlighting ____.

-- Bilateral Meeting with President Franjo Tudjman of Croatia, in which you should reinforce Tudjman’s commitment to responsible international behavior, especially cooperation with UNPROFOR. You should also encourage full implementation of the Washington Agreement and warn him against any attack on the UN Protected Areas.

-- Visit to the UN Situation Center, the UN’s fledgling 24-hour crisis management cell. Until last year, the UN had no capability to monitor its field operations continuously. For instance, in 1989, UN Special Representative Marti Ahtisaari placed a weekend call to UNHQ from Namibia to report his UN forces were caught in a deadly firefight on the first day of the ceasefire. His call went unanswered. Today, the Situation Center, established with significant
U.S. assistance, represents a substantial step forward. Your visit underscores the U.S. commitment to improving UN capabilities pursuant to our peacekeeping policy.

-- Visit to U.S. Mission to the United Nations (Tentative). A brief visit and remarks by you would be greatly appreciated by USUN staff who are among the most hard-working and poorly compensated of U.S. embassy staff anywhere.

-- Luncheon Hosted by Boutros-Ghali. The Secretary General customarily hosts a luncheon for visiting heads of state on the opening day of the UNGA. This is an opportunity to talk with heads of state with whom you will not have bilateral meetings. The Secretary General will offer a toast, and you will respond with brief remarks.

-- Bilateral Meeting with President Aliyev of Azerbaijan, in which you should congratulate him on this week’s agreement to develop the large Caspian petroleum reserves with a Western consortium, encourage Azerbaijan’s cooperation in a CSCE-sponsored peace process for Nagorno-Karabakh, and urge progress on political/economic reforms and human rights.

-- Bilateral Meeting with President Iliescu of Romania, in which you should encourage his country’s economic reforms, acknowledge Bucharest’s strengthening democracy, thank him for his steadfast support of UN sanctions against Serbia/Montenegro, and praise Romania’s enthusiastic embrace of the Partnership for Peace.

-- Bilateral Meeting with President Salinas of Mexico, the object of which is to compliment him on completion of his enormously successful presidency, thank him for his hard work in improving bilateral ties -- especially NAFTA -- and acknowledge Mexico’s political and economic progress. Salinas will likely tout his candidacy for director of the World Trade Organization (WTO), established under GATT, and has requested a brief, one-on-one session with you during the meeting.

-- Press Availability (one half hour)

-- Reception for Heads of State and Delegation at the Metropolitan Museum of Art. You will offer brief remarks to Heads of State, Foreign Ministers, UN officials, and Permanent Representatives from almost every country in the world. This event has become something of an American tradition and a symbol of our leadership. Most invitees will have no other opportunity to meet you.

CONTEXT

The Year in Review: The UN’s record over the past year has been mixed at best. The 48th General Assembly ended with some significant successes, including the establishment of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and an independent office of inspector general -- top U.S. priorities. The UNGA also adopted favorable modifications to the customary Middle East resolutions. In addition, the UN Population Conference, just concluded in Cairo, succeeded in reaching broad consensus on a strategy to bolster educational opportunities for women and ensure access to family planning, maternal and child health services. Most nations should pursue implementation aggressively.
Nearly 2,000 UN electoral observers were the backbone of the international monitoring effort during the **South African elections**. After much wrangling, the UN deployed observers to **Georgia** to assist in refugee repatriation and monitor the Russian peacekeeping force. Most notably, the passage of UNSC Resolution 940, authorizing the use of "all necessary means" in **Haiti**, constituted a triumph of U.S. leadership and diplomacy.

Against the backdrop of these notable successes, however, several serious setbacks have occurred. **Bosnia**, where fighting is intensifying, remains an open wound for the UN. The UN has proved recalcitrant to enforce the exclusion zones and has turned the other cheek to repeated violations of other UN resolutions. In **Somalia**, the factions have made no measurable progress toward political reconciliation, and the UN is increasingly a target for attack.

Arguably, the worst stain on the UN's record this year is **Rwanda**. The UN, and particularly the U.S., have been blamed for abandoning Rwanda when the killings began and responding slowly to the resultant genocide. In fact, the UN's response reveals more about the gap between international expectations and the UN's capabilities than about the will of member states. It is improbable that a large peacekeeping force, even if well-trained and equipped, could have prevented the genocide in Rwanda. In any event, a large UN force could not have been assembled in time. Troop contributors are over-extended and hard to recruit. Many poor countries have not been reimbursed for months -- sometimes years -- due to the large debt owed the UN. Moreover, the bulk of UN troops come from developing countries, and many are poorly trained or equipped.

Lacking a **rapid reaction force** or an emergency humanitarian response capability, the UN is hamstrung in such situations. While the Administration's peacekeeping policy rules out any standing UN army "at this time", it does call for further consideration of a UN rapid reaction force, once the UN implements fundamental peacekeeping reforms. In the meantime, the NSC plans to initiate a policy review on means of strengthening international humanitarian response capabilities so that the world is not entirely dependent on the U.S. military in extremis. President Menem's "White Helmets" proposal will serve as a spring-board for the review. (For details, see background paper).

Another milestone this year was the release of the Administration's long-awaited **Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, PDD-25**, which you signed May 3. This was the first comprehensive review of its sort. Among its most prominent features are the tough questions the U.S. will ask before voting for new peace operations or committing U.S. forces. Some analysts on the left cite these questions as proof we seek to curtail UN peacekeeping. Others on the right argue the PDD reveals our readiness to subcontract our foreign policy to Boutros-Ghali.

Both interpretations are groundless. The purpose of the PDD is to offer a concrete proposals to strengthen UN peacekeeping as an effective tool of U.S. interests and an efficient method of burden-sharing. The PDD acknowledges peacekeeping is not a panacea but an instrument applicable in certain contexts, particularly when conditions are ripe for a political settlement. In short, our aim is to ensure we use peacekeeping selectively and more effectively.
While PDD-25 was misconstrued in some quarters, most in Congress, in the UN and foreign capitals view it as pragmatic. The release of the PDD, preceded by extensive consultations, served to dampen Congressional criticism of our policy on such emotional issues as command and control of U.S. forces. Since then, our political opponents have had little success in using the UN against us. Moreover, the UN has begun to implement several reforms we proposed, and the Security Council adopted a Presidential statement in May embracing many of our tough questions as those it will weigh before authorizing new missions.

**The Year to Come:** 1995 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations (UN 50). There are many UN commemorative events and conferences scheduled throughout next year. You have or will be invited to several. While no scheduling decisions have been made, you should be aware of the following events planned for 1995:

- **UN Security Council Summit, New York, January 31.** Argentina’s President Menem will chair this summit attended by Prime Minister Major, President Mitterand and President Yeltsin, among others. No formal agenda has been set, but the meeting, which will review the work of the Council since the last summit in 1992 and deliberate tasks for the future, fulfills a goal set by you and President Yeltsin at the Moscow Summit.

- **World Summit on Social Development, Copenhagen, March 6-12.** The “Social Summit” will address issues of poverty, employment and social integration, building on the Population Conference and 1992 Earth Summit. Boutros-Ghali may again urge you to attend.

- **50th Anniversary of the UN Charter, San Francisco, June 26.** A non-profit UN50 committee will host 184 Permanent Representatives to the UN for two days of commemorative activities in San Francisco, including re-enactment of the Charter signing and a reading by Maya Angelou of a poem written for the occasion. This event is of particular interest to several in the California congressional delegation.

- **Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, September 4-15,** which will adopt a platform of action for accelerating women’s economic and social progress. The USG and women’s groups throughout the U.S. are actively planning for this event, which it is hoped the First Lady will attend.

- **UN General Assembly Summit, New York, October 22-24,** will supplant the opening of the UNGA in September as the event for which Heads of State will travel to New York.

**KEY ISSUES**

**Haiti (Placeholder):** There will be wide interest at the UN in your views on Haiti, especially U.S. plans for standing up the police force and the risks inherent in the interim period before the de facto leaders resign. You should emphasize that the UN gave the U.S. authority to use “all necessary means”, and we did not abuse it, choosing to seek at peaceful settlement up until the last minute.
Initial UN Security Council and Secretariat reaction to the Carter Mission and U.S. deployment was cautious, though relatively optimistic. A subsequent briefing by a senior interagency team has done much to assuage pique among UN officials and Security Council representatives that they were not consulted on the Carter Mission. Nevertheless, most capitals have warmly praised the U.S. success in avoiding an invasion. A few UNSC members -- notably Brazil and China -- remain cool even to the permissive U.S. presence in Haiti.

There is wide consensus in the Security Council that most multilateral sanctions should not be lifted until after Aristide is restored, in accordance with UNSC Res. 917. At present, countries are poised to participate in the coalition, and the UN expects to deploy the first contingent of 16 UN military observers to Haiti by September 25. The U.S. continues to press the UN to accelerate dispatch of the UN-OAS human rights observers (ICM).

The U.S. confronts several challenges at the UN with respect to Haiti. The first is to ensure continuous, close coordination on the ground and in New York. Dante Caputo’s resignation is a reminder that we cannot coordinate enough with the UN. The second is to persuade skeptics that our objectives in Haiti are not altered by permissive entry. In the short-term, we may face more ambiguity and complexity that had we entered forcefully. These short term costs are easily outweighed by the improved long-term prospects for a peaceful transition to stability and democracy in Haiti.

Third, we must continue to insist on a U.S. force commander for UNMIH to maximize continuity with the coalition and security during Phase II and to minimize difficulties with command and control of U.S. forces. Boutros-Ghali has resisted a U.S. commander, arguing that this mission -- as with any other UN undertaking -- will lose its international credibility if perceived as U.S-dominated.

Finally, we are likely to have difficulty gaining UN agreement to a timely transition to UNMIH. This is a sensitive issue at the UN, where there is still a broad perception that the U.S. left the UN holding the bag in Somalia. We must continue reassuring the UN of our long-term commitment to Haiti. The best way around Boutros-Ghali’s delaying tactics will be to establish quickly a secure and stable environment and provide every assistance to the UN in recruiting, equipping and deploying non-U.S. troops to Haiti -- a top priority of the Haiti ExComm.

**Bosnia:** The increased fighting in Bosnia, repeated violations of the Sarajevo exclusion zone, and the UN’s continued reluctance to resort to NATO air power have taken a considerable toll on the UN’s credibility there. At NATO’s urging, UNPROFOR has begun planning for an orderly withdrawal. It is in this context that the Security Council will consider UNPROFOR’s mandate when it comes up for renewal on September 30. The Croatian Government, still frustrated by the UN’s failure to roll-back the Serbs from UN Protected Areas, may be reluctant to extend UNPROFOR’s tenure in Croatia beyond three months. Other UNSC members are skeptical about UNPROFOR’s future but will likely accede to a six month mandate without modifications to avoid signaling any uncertainty about continued UN involvement. You should stress to Boutros-Ghali our commitment to a regular, six-month mandate extension.

The UN and some key troop contributors remain apprehensive about strict enforcement of the exclusion zones. However, the British who have been among the most apprehensive, have
spoken more positively in recent days about strict enforcement. Progress on resolutions lifting sanctions on the Belgrade Serbs and tightening sanctions on the Bosnian Serbs has been slow, but Contact Group unity has held up reasonably well. The recently agreed border monitoring regime has begun successfully. Passage of the sanctions resolutions, coupled with continuing confirmation that the border remains closed and strict enforcement of the exclusion zones, may help alleviate pressure on the Administration to lift the arms embargo.

**Somalia:** UNOSOM’s mandate comes up for renewal on September 30, and the Council will decide whether to extend the mission until 1995, as originally planned, or end it early (e.g. December 31) and begin immediate troop withdrawal. The Secretary General has recommended a one-month extension and a delay in any decision about UNOSOM’s future. Meanwhile, violence is increasing in Somalia: ten UN peacekeepers have been killed in the past month. The parties have made no progress towards national reconciliation. Apart from providing limited security to relief efforts, UNOSOM is mainly engaged in force protection, while consuming approximately $80 mill/month (U.S. share is $25 mill/month). Increasingly, the UN and troop contributors concede that the mission is not succeeding, as evidenced by the recent UNSC decision to reduce UNOSOM by 3,000 troops to 15,000.

The U.S. position is that withdrawal should begin immediately with the aim of terminating UNOSOM by year’s end. Withdrawal will be risky, as Somalis try to seize UN assets (many of which are USG property) and possibly test the UN on its way out. Keenly aware of their vulnerability, the UN and numerous troop contributors -- including Pakistan, India, Egypt and Australia -- have asked for U.S. assistance in withdrawal. They are quick to remind us the U.S. persuaded many of them to go to Somalia. If abandoned in a pinch, allies are unlikely to forgive us. The implications for UN and other coalition missions, including Haiti, could be grave.

We have given no formal response to the UN and will soon ask you to decide whether we are prepared, in principle, to provide support for a UNOSOM exit. The Joint Staff, which favors U.S. assistance to UNOSOM, has begun evaluating potential U.S. force requirements. Its preliminary judgment is we would need to place an Amphibious Task Force offshore to deter attacks on UN forces and possibly to go ashore to cover the withdrawal’s last stages. We would need to consult closely with Congress about any such effort. Anxious for a U.S. response, Boutros-Ghali may ask you about U.S. support. We recommend you respond in general but favorable terms.

**Rwanda:** U.S. forces will complete withdrawal from the Rwanda Crisis Area by September 28, having fulfilled the four agreed UNHCR service packages. U.S. military responsibilities are being transferred to civilian organizations (i.e. UNHCR and NGOs) with equal or better capabilities. Our forces accelerated the flow of critical humanitarian assistance to the region and were instrumental in producing and distributing adequate water supplies in Goma. While the immediate crisis appears to have subsided, there remain tremendous long-term challenges such as the welfare and security of 800,000 refugees in Goma, the presence in the camps of armed Rwandan Army personnel poised to resume the civil war, and delays in prosecuting war criminals. The situation in Burundi also remains highly unstable. The U.S. will continue to provide substantial humanitarian, political and other assistance to the region.
The UN is taking several steps to assist in Rwanda. UNAMIR, the 5,500-person peacekeeping force, is finally nearing full strength, following many months in which troops were short and resources limited. The U.S. has provided considerable logistics support and equipment to UNAMIR. The UN is gradually deploying human rights monitors to Rwanda to investigate and deter additional acts of genocide. In the meantime, we are receiving credible reports that the RPF, and possibly the Government itself, is responsible for killing up to 10,000 Rwandan civilians per month. Though the agony in Rwanda is far from over, it is unclear what more, if anything, the international community can do to help.

**U.S. Debt to the UN:** As of early August, member states owed the UN over $2.1 billion for the peacekeeping and regular budgets. The U.S. was by far the biggest debtor, with arrears amounting to $883 million in the peacekeeping budget and $531 million in the regular budget. The large U.S. debt resulted from the establishment in 1993 of huge missions in Somalia and Bosnia, each costing over $1 billion per year and Congress’s refusal to appropriate adequate FY 94 funds for peacekeeping or the regular budget.

This year, the Administration had remarkable success in gaining Congressional approval for payments to the UN. With strong Democratic support (but virtually none from the GOP), we obtained $1.2 billion for peacekeeping expenses, including a $670 million FY 94 supplemental for past arrears. The Administration managed to preserve its entire FY 95 request in the State Department budget, except $30 million, which was to be our FY 95 down payment for Reagan-era regular budget arrears.

Congress also failed to appropriate $300 million in FY 95 peacekeeping funds requested in the DOD budget as part of the Administration’s new “shared responsibility” policy. Conferrees agreed to revisit this issue next year. The resultant shortfall, combined with the establishment of a large UNMIH -- unanticipated at the time of our budget submission -- ensures additional arrears in FY 95. Their size, however, could vary substantially depending on whether missions in Somalia and Yugoslavia continue long into next fiscal year.

**U.S. Debt to the United Nations**

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<td>U.S. Debt as of August 1</td>
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|----------------|--------------------------------|----------------|-----------------
| Peacekeeping Budget | 883 | 670 | 533¹ | ? |
| Regular Budget | 531 | 0 | 335 | 58² |
| Total | 1,414 | 670 | 868 | ? |

¹ The U.S. will make an immediate payment of at least $213 mill. at the start of the fiscal year, clearing all outstanding current peacekeeping arrears.
² The UN carries on its books $138 mill. in U.S. arrears that we do not acknowledge and will never pay due to congressionally-mandated “policy holds” for such things as previous UN activities in support of the PLO and SWAPO.
UN Inspector General and Other UN Reforms: The U.S. recently won a hard-fought battle to establish, by consensus resolution, an independent UN office of inspector general, known as the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS). Its establishment, in accordance with Congressionally-mandated requirements, is a major victory for the Administration. It also averted the loss of half the $670 mill. FY 94 peacekeeping supplemental and 20% of our FY 95 regular budget dues. On Friday, September 23, the Secretary of State will certify to Congress that the UN has in place an independent office of inspector general, and we will release the bulk of the sequestered funds.

The U.S. continues to press for various UN reforms, including cost containment, procurement and personnel reform, reduction of waste and fraud, and openness in UN budget processes. However, our top reform priority is reduction of our peacekeeping assessment from the current 30.4% to 25% by FY 96. While the reduction is consonant with Administration policy, it is also now law: Congress has prohibited payments exceeding 25% after October 1, 1995. We have tried to work constructively within the UN system to get other OECD countries to assume a greater share of the burden. Our success has been minimal thus far, despite some help from Boutros-Ghali, who recognizes the dangers of over-dependence on a single large donor. We will continue to urge a UN-managed reduction but expect, ultimately, it will be imposed unilaterally by Congress. This will leave us technically in perpetual arrears to the UN.

U.S. Priorities During the 49th UNGA: During this UNGA session, the U.S. will continue pursuing concrete peacekeeping and management reforms. We will also seek broad support for the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995 and swift conclusion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The U.S. will aim to cut-off fissile material production and establish a regime limiting exports of anti-personnel land mines.

Limits on UNGA resolutions addressing the Middle East, and further improvements in the texts of those that remain, is a major U.S. goal. Resolutions should reflect progress in the Peace Process and should be rid of unbalanced language. The U.S. will again press for Israel’s inclusion in one of the five UN regional groupings and encourage support for economic development in the region.

The U.S. will lobby for priority attention to women’s rights as well as increased funding for the UN’s Human Rights Center and newly established High Commissioner for Human Rights. We will also pursue adequate resources for the Yugoslavian and Rwandan War Crimes Tribunals and swift prosecution of suspected war criminals.

In addition, the U.S. will continue its support for an array of initiatives aimed at promoting sustainable development, while seeking substantive follow-up to the UN Conference on Environment and Development.

Finally, the U.S. will support Security Council reform efforts. There has been little progress in the open-ended UNGA working group established for this purpose last year. Its work will continue through the upcoming UNGA session, with the aim of placing a resolution before the GA in late 1995. However, the near-term prospects for reform are dim, and the U.S. must soon decide how hard it wants to push for change. Other permanent members have made
conciliatory sounds but privately prefer no reform in order to preserve their own privileged positions. The U.S. joins many other nations in supporting a modest expansion to 20-21 seats (up from 15) to create a more representative Council but opposes any expansion that would render the Council unwieldy and ineffective. We continue to support permanent seats for Germany and Japan but have taken no formal position on extending to them the veto.