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Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee:

First of all, I want to commend you for holding these hearings. They are timely and they are important. Hopefully, they will contribute to a clearer definition of our strategic objectives regarding the former Soviet Union and a Europe that is no longer divided but whose architecture is still unfinished.

In my view, over the last year or so there has been some significant improvement in U.S. policy toward the former Soviet Union. There is now greater recognition of the required balance between our efforts to aid Russia and the simultaneously needed efforts to help stabilize, consolidate, and positively transform the newly independent states. I note with gratification that American policy toward Russia and toward Ukraine has become more evenhanded.

A Russia that is no longer an imperial state is a Russia that has the possibility of becoming a more normal, democratic, national state. Conversely, a Russia that is an empire cannot be a Russia that is a democracy. That is why I applaud the statement by Mr. Christopher, the Secretary of State, to the effect that "Russia must avoid any attempt to reconstitute the U.S.S.R."

In addition, the Administration has taken some preliminary steps to address more realistically the issue of NATO expansion. After a period of evasion and equivocation, the Administration has stated more explicitly that NATO will be expanded. I welcome this.

Nonetheless, I have to register some serious disagreement and criticism regarding some aspects of the Administration's ongoing policy. Its approach to Russia is too heavily influenced by romanticism about Russia's past and future, and also by the absence of sharply defined geopolitical content. Its expectations regarding the postcommunist transformation and political democratization are naive. In brief, the Administration's view is clouded by historical amnesia and strategic myopia.

I am especially troubled by: (1) the excessive personalization of our relationship with Russia; (2) the Administration's Pollyannish view of Russia as an emerging democratic state; (3) the Administration's inclination to describe the current American-
Russian relationship as a mature "strategic partnership"; and (4) the Administration's delinquency in responding to the political and moral challenge posed by Russian military brutality in Chechnya.

Let me elaborate on each of the foregoing:

1. The excessive personalization of our relationship with Russia. This personalization is reminiscent of our earlier and excessively lengthy preoccupation with Gorbachev. It is even reminiscent of our idealization of Joseph Stalin as the benign "Uncle Joe" some fifty years ago. We are told by the Administration, over and over again, that we must support Yeltsin because "he is the democratically elected head of Russia." But that assertion overlooks the fact that to be a democratic president one has to govern democratically. (After all, even Hitler was elected democratically! -- though obviously I draw no further analogy between Yeltsin and Hitler.) Yet there are some serious concerns to be registered in this regard: the role of the former KGB in shaping Russian policy; the increasing political visibility of the Army, particularly in recent times; the mysterious and non-constitutionally grounded role of the so-called Security Council (the new "Politburo"); the weakness of the judiciary; the disregard for the Parliament; the absence of political parties.

2. The Administration's Pollyannish view of Russia as an emerging democratic state. To be sure, there are some hopeful signs: there is a relatively free press and a partially open television -- though both are increasingly under assault and political pressures are rising. Relatively free elections have been held. The important point, however, is that we are dealing here not with a functioning and institutionalized democracy but with an unstable combination of authoritarianism, pluralism and anarchy. It is very unclear which of these will prevail. Ongoing political debates in Russia clearly indicate that many Russians would favor the restoration of some form of authoritarian rule. There are, fortunately, many who oppose that -- but the key point to register is that in Russia the issue of democracy's future is far from resolved.

Perhaps symbolic of the ambiguous state of Russia's incipient democracy is the continued presence of the Lenin Mausoleum in the very heart of Moscow. That monument honors the founder of the Gulag, one of this century's four worst mass killers. Would we feel very reassured about the viability of German democracy if the most visible monument in Berlin today was a mausoleum dedicated to the embalmed corpse of Adolf Hitler?

3. The Administration's inclination to describe the current American-Russian relationship as a mature "strategic partnership." To me a strategic partnership implies the sharing of common and centrally important geopolitical and strategic objectives. I do not believe that that is an accurate description of the current
degree of congruence between American and Russian strategic objectives. I do not see that congruence regarding the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, where Russia clearly supports Serbia. I do not see that congruence regarding the future of the recently emancipated Central Europe, where Russia apparently wants to preserve its sphere of influence by denying the Central European states the right to become associated with the Euro-Atlantic security system. I do not see that congruence regarding Iran, where Russian policy seems to favor Iranian nuclear aspirations.

I do not wish to imply by the foregoing that a strategic collision between America and Russia is inevitable. Far from it. On many other issues, we do cooperate. But I do believe that it is simply inaccurate and misleading to create the impression that as of today we are dealing with an institutionalized democracy that shares with America the same basic global objectives.

4. The Administration's delinquency in responding to the political and moral challenge posed by Russian military brutality in Chechnya. The Administration in fact did nothing to discourage the Russian attack even though it was apparent for a number of weeks that it was coming. When it occurred, the President promptly labelled it as Russia's "internal affair," while a senior State Department briefer (described by the Washington Post a policymaker) went out of his way to legitimate the Russian action and to malign the Chechen leadership as "blackmailing, brutal, and authoritarian." The Washington Post account (12/25/94) of the briefing given by the senior State Department official concluded that, and I quote, "The Clinton administration's decision to take a hands-off approach to the increasingly brutal Russian assault on the breakaway Chechnya republic stems largely from Washington's shared desire to see the republic's quest for independence crushed, U.S. officials said."

Subsequently, the Administration, largely under the pressure of public opinion, somewhat sharpened its comments about the Russian conduct, but its position is still markedly weaker than that of our European allies. As recently as January 18, the Secretary of State was cited by wire services as being "satisfied by Moscow's attempts to resolve the five-week-long war," and there has been no comparable condemnation of the Russian action to that, for example, unanimously issued by the German Bundestag.

I am struck by the fact that even former President Gorbachev has recently stated that in his view "The best approach would be to halt all military action, withdraw to previous position, and begin political negotiations... Negotiations must be held with the real forces in Chechnya. That's Dudayev, who is backed by a substantial portion of Chechnya." The U.S. has not been willing to say that much!
I linger on this issue, because I believe it is symptomatic of the Administration's confusion regarding the promotion of democracy in Russia. To promote democracy in Russia, it is not enough merely to say that Yeltsin was democratically elected and that therefore we support him. To promote democracy means supporting democratic conduct and explicitly condemning undemocratic behavior. The support of democracy means support for the democratic forces in Russia and not for authoritarian leaders. The fact of the matter is that a very large percentage of the Russian public and almost all prominent Russian democrats have condemned the action in Chechnya. For the United States not to join in that condemnation is to fail the democratic forces in Russia. I note with embarrassment that Russia's press has made that last point very explicitly.

I draw the following policy conclusions from the foregoing:

1. U.S. policy should be more focused on the support and encouragement of democratic political parties and democratic political leaders in Russia. We should not personalize our commitment; the U.S. should be willing to criticize Yeltsin's policies explicitly; we should praise and endorse the Russian democrats who stand up for human rights and who deplore their abuse.

2. A strong condemnation of the Russian action in Chechnya is needed. That condemnation should be clearcut and forceful. It should include the branding of the Russian Defense Minister, General Grachev, as a war criminal. To give substance as well as symbolism to that condemnation, some portion of the funds allocated for the construction of housing for Russian officers -- say, 50% -- should be diverted for relief for Chechnya, whose lives as well as housing Russian officers are currently destroying.

3. Notwithstanding the above, economic aid to Russia should generally be continued, especially for initiatives which are strategically beneficial both to America and to Russia (such as the Nunn-Lugar funds) and in cases where it is tangibly focused on specific projects, preferably of a local nature.

At the same time, the U.S. Congress should not hesitate to pull the plug on those projects which are either indirectly financing acts of organized violence, such as those underway in Chechnya, or in cases where the Russian government is failing to meet minimum standards of responsible conduct regarding financial accountability.

4. It is essential to promote geopolitical pluralism in the space of the former Soviet Union. That means that aid for Ukraine particularly and for the other newly independent states should be in all cases no less than that for Russia itself.
That will help to prevent the reemergence of a Russian empire. Moreover, Russia itself, as a state, probably would develop far more effectively if it became a looser confederation. One of the main causes for the existence of the stifling Russian bureaucracy is the effort to keep a territorially huge society under central control. A highly decentralized Russia would be far more likely to unleash local creativity and contribute both to economic and to political pluralism and also make the restoration of dictatorship more difficult. Our aid should, therefore, be channeled as much as possible directly to local recipients.

5. Last but not least, the United States should move energetically to expand the scope of Euro-Atlantic security cooperation, in keeping with the process of European expansion. Fifty years after the end of the war we face a historic opportunity to build a more stable Europe. We should not fail to seize that opportunity. A cooperative Russia should not object to that process because a larger and more secure Europe would be in a better position to engage Russia in a fraternal and friendly relationship. It would be dangerous to delay the construction of a larger Europe until the day when either Russia gives its approval or, in a belated response, to undertake it in the face of a renewed military Russian threat.

The need is to set in motion and to support firmly a process that simultaneously expands Europe and the Euro-Atlantic security system while offering Russia the option of some immediate links to that process -- such as a NATO-Russian federation treaty, enhanced OSCE consultations, expansion of Europe-wide transportation links, collaboration in making the Kaliningrad region a free trade area, etc. All of that would benefit Russia while helping to expand and consolidate the kind of Europe that is needed for the sake of wider global stability. Instead of equivocating, the Administration should bite the bullet on this issue and announce clearly its position regarding the criteria for NATO membership and its view of the desirable timing of NATO expansion.

A larger, more cooperative Europe is in fact the best hope for Russia. A Russia that still harbors imperial aspirations vis a vis its neighbors in the near abroad or in Central Europe is likely to be a Russia condemned to poverty and dictatorship. I think it behooves us to say directly to the Russian people that they have to learn -- just like the Germans or the Japanese learned involuntarily -- that on the eve of the 21st century the definition of a great power is not the scope of imperial control but also the quality of life within one's own society, measured by the vitality of democratic freedoms and by the degree to which the benefits of modernity are shared by all. It is a delusion to seek the status of a great power on the basis of primitive social conditions and brutal political behavior. We owe the long-suffering Russian people the obligation of frankness -- and we owe it to ourselves as well.
A Different Dance
—from Tango to Minuet

Leon Aron

IN THE GLORIOUS autumn of 1991 the Soviet kingdom of ideological imperatives fell, and the foreign and security policies of Russia began to be shaped by what might be called the "normal" factors: domestic politics and the economy, history and geography. Suddenly, Russia's course became open to variations—and meaningful speculations.

Those in this country who speculated out loud almost instantly split into two camps. Each ranged across party affiliations and spanned the conservative-liberal divide, and each quickly acquired allies in the mass media and among policymakers. One school of thought (let us call it the "Historical") contended, in oversimplified essence, that a nation's history is its destiny. Historic genes would see to it that, sooner or later and mutatis mutandis, Russia would revert to its age-long authoritarian and imperialist ways.

The best known exponents of this view have been Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski.

The opposing camp (call it the "Romantic") had its main advocates in Jeane Kirkpatrick and, until last spring, Richard Nixon. The Romantics argued that nations do change, and that democracy—even one as tentative, fledgling, incompetent, and chaotic as Russia's—cures historic ills, as in our time it has done already in the cases of Germany and Japan.

It is clear today that both the Historicals and the Romantics were partially right—and also that both have erred, although the Romantics, so far, have been closer to the mark. The internal condition of Russia has changed immensely for the better, and is continuing to change, though progress has not occurred as fast or as decisively as the Romantics had hoped. As far as foreign policy and security are concerned, the process of change has turned out to resemble not a highway, but a muddy and pitted country road that zigzags, undulates and detours a great deal.

The justifiable concern caused in the West by the twists and turns of the Russian course has been endowed with additional weight and darker hues by a powerful mindset which requires a serious effort to resist. That mindset arises and gains credibility from an undeniable fact: for the last four centuries and until a few years ago Russia has been at the heart of two relentlessly expansionist empires: first that of the tsars and then that of the communists. Seen in this light, the dips and loops in the road—from the alleged Russian involvement in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict (whether authorized by the Kremlin or not), to the continuing presence of the Fourteenth Army in Moldova, to the defense of the brutal

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The ideological dream has been interrupted—Russia, too, faced the same cursed dilemma of Russian history: Russia great (that is, Russia imperial) versus Russia free. He became the first Russian leader ever to choose Russia free. Consider the magnitude of what Yeltsin did. In December 1991, when he hammered the last nail in the coffin of the Soviet Union in Belovezhskaya Pusha, he not only gave up all of the imperial conquests of Peter, Catherine, and both Alexanders but reversed the four hundred year old tradition in which the very national idea of Russia was derived from that of the imperial state. He "uncoupled" Russian identity and Russian statehood from the Russian empire. Until then, the two had never been separate: the emergence of the modern Russian state under Ivan the Terrible coincided—after the conquest of the Kazan and Astrakhan Khanates—with the birth of the Russian empire. The result of this revolution may be summarized quite simply: not since the middle of the sixteenth century when the Russian expansion began, has there been a Russia less aggressive, less belligerent, less threatening to neighbors.

As the great Russian historian Nikolai Karamzin succinctly put it in a memorandum to Alexander I in 1818, "The first duty of the sovereign is to preserve the internal and external unity of the state. Solicitude for the welfare of social classes and individuals must come second." Throughout Russian history, an overwhelming preoccupation with the integrity of the empire was a critical brake on domestic liberalization. As Adam Ulam has said:

As decisive moments it was not only the government but also Russian society which found itself unable to opt clearly for freedom if its price seemed to involve the threat to the country's unity and greatness. (In 1990, it was precisely such a threat that moved Gorbachev, belatedly and unsuccessfully, to attempt to slow down the reforms.)

When Russian foreign policy was reborn, Yeltsin, too, faced the same cursed dilemma of Russian history: Russia great (that is, Russia imperial) versus Russia free.
and the world than the Russia we see today.

**Liberal Disenchantment with America**

It is quite clear today, however, that despite the justified euphoria that attended the early stages of this revolution, it has not, in the end, produced a Russian foreign policy that is uniformly and unerringly solicitous of the United States, or even automatically accommodating of its interests.

Nor, in retrospect, could it have. Just as in Russian domestic politics anti-communism is no longer viewed in Russia as synonymous with democracy, but only as a necessary and in itself insufficient condition for progress, so, while the radical break withforeign policy objectives of the past creates a vital precondition for Russia’s re-integration in what Moscow used to call “the civilized world,” it does not in itself ensure a cloudless relationship with the United States and its allies.

Between the August Revolution of 1991 and today, there has occurred a major change in the ways in which the Russian political class views Russia’s proper role in its neighborhood and the world. In particular, there has been a change in perceptions of Russia’s relations with the United States, whose motives and objectives have been intensely—and less than objectively—re-examined in Moscow. The most remarkable feature of this metamorphosis is the political provenance of those affected by it. Until it occurred, there had been a very stable correlation between domestic ideological positions and perceptions of the outside world: the rejection of the West almost perfectly coincided with reactionary—that is, in the Russian context, leftist, statist and nationalist—domestic positions. But starting in the second half of 1992, suspicion of the United States and calls for a tougher foreign policy line in pursuit of Russian national interests began to emanate from different and most unusual ideological quarters.

Several months ago in Moscow, for example, a top official on the National Security Council, having just enthusiastically described to me a criminal justice reform that would provide additional and weighty guarantees for the individual against the state, proceeded to portray the U.S. policy toward Russia as based on raw force, narrow egotistical interests, and condescension—all, in his opinion, designed to deny Russia its great power status. One of the earliest converts to this line among prominent, cardholding democrats was Vladimir Lukin, ex-ambassador to the United States and now the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Duma. Today, he is in very large and distinguished company.

Consider, as another striking example, a statement made last spring by a leading Russian anti-communist and engineer of the Soviet Union’s demise, Gennady Burbulis. As Yeltsin’s top aide and state secretary, Burbulis was the second most powerful man in Russia during the critical first year of the revolution, between September 1991 and October 1992. Speaking in the House of the Cinema, the home of the most radical democratic opposition to Gorbachev during perestroika, in April, 1994 he responded to a question about the former Yugoslavia and Russia’s dispute with Ukraine over the Black Sea Fleet in these terms:

The lyrical phase of Russia’s partnership with the world community and, first and foremost, the United States, is over. We are moving toward tough pragmatism, which they have pursued all along...The world has been divided. Someone needs a Russia weak, dispossessed, humiliated and endlessly dependent on everybody; others are not ready to accept us as full partners in the world community, complete with a distinct foreign policy and convincing arguments in its defense.

Whence such a sharp departure from what used to be, only two years earlier, an utter and near-universal enchantment with the United States by Russian democrats? One reason is almost certainly the initial...
existence of inflated and unfulfillable expectations. When Russian foreign policy was reborn in early 1992, the so-called "liberal-internationalists"—at the time unchallenged as the charters of Russia's new course—brimmed with as much enthusiasm for the "new world order" as did the Bush White House. Fresh from the burial of Soviet totalitarianism, they were infused with a vision of the world in which the old and tired notions of traditional power diplomacy—all those "spheres of influence" and "zones of vital interests"—were about to be made irrelevant by a kind of multinational police force, led by the United States. In that dream, the "civilized world" would swiftly and decisively intercede for peace, democracy, and human rights and would check violence everywhere, including, of course, in the territory of the former Soviet Union.

Then came a conflagration of bloody ethnic and political fighting in Georgia, Tajikistan, Moldova, and the escalation of the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, all of which coincided with the siege of Sarajevo by the Bosnian Serbs. The sight of the international community's impotence, its inability to enforce the "new world order," or to contain, let alone settle, a savage ethnic conflict very much like ones that were sweeping the Russian southern periphery at the time, led the Russian "internationalists" to re-examine the hopes they had for the ability of the United States and its allies to restore a just peace anywhere. Assessing the Soviet-sponsored Cuban military intervention in Ethiopia in 1977-78, Zbigniew Brzezinski declared that "SALT I lay buried in the sands of Ogaden." As far as the Russian "internationalists" were concerned, the "new world order" was buried in the hills around Sarajevo.

But perhaps the weightiest reason behind the hardening of the Russian foreign and national security postures was provided by that "iron law" of post-revolutionary consolidation: when the dust settles down, there is at least partial return to traditional national agendas and traditional ways of articulating and implementing them. In Russia this process resulted in a broad national consensus on key foreign policy objectives, a consensus which emerged and solidified in 1992 and was codified in 1993.

**The New Consensus**

This consensus revolves around three strategic goals: Russia as regional superpower; Russia as world nuclear superpower; and Russia as a great—though not "super"—world power. The support for and maintenance of each of these objectives will inform Russian behavior for decades to come. Each goal will ramify through Russia's relations with the United States. Ironically, it is the nuclear superpower dimension, the thorniest of the bilateral issues in Soviet times, that so far has proved to be the easiest to deal with. This despite Russia's far greater reliance on the nuclear deterrent today when her conventional capability is greatly reduced, and despite the near-ob sesive zeal with which Moscow went after the Ukrainian and Kazakh weapons. It is in this area that the most unambiguous and important achievement of the U.S. engagement in Russia's post-Soviet strategic space has occurred: the de-nuclearization of Ukraine, which opened the way to the implementation of START I and ratification of START II. Some of this success undoubtedly is due to the well-developed and still well-oiled machinery of arms control negotiations, but most of the credit should go to a far more relaxed posture on Russia's part, once it bowed out of the competition for global superpower primacy.

Things get considerably more complicated as we approach the geostategic space in which Russia seeks to pursue the other two goals of its core foreign policy agenda. Frictions with the United States that spring from this pursuit are likely to be of a systemic and recurrent nature, never to be completely "solved" and disposed of, only more
or less successfully managed.

In response to U.S. actions outside Europe, we should expect Moscow to assume, at least initially, positions distinct from ours, sometimes suddenly so. Yet, ultimately, the posture is not going to be antagonistic or even hostile. Reflecting a slow and very painful adjustment to the fall from superpowership, this stance is not unlike the foreign policy of de Gaulle's France: another great power, that, having seen its relative importance vis-à-vis the United States diminish precipitously, compensated by using every opportunity to make up in rhetoric what had been lost in substance.

Russia's engagement of the United States and its allies in Eastern and Central Europe—a "gray zone" between the abandoned global stance and the intense, non-negotiable regional superpowership—is certain to be more stubborn and sustained than anywhere else in the world. It will include a resistance by all diplomatic means available, and a heated, at times blistering, rhetoric. In extreme cases, the West will face a choice between diluting and slowing down—or even abandoning—its policies, and a serious deterioration, indeed a possible breakdown, in relations with Moscow.

East-Central Europe will remain a source of strain because of the built-in tension between two geopolitical tendencies, clearly evident today. On the one hand, and reflecting an organizational credo that appears to equate expansion with vitality, NATO will keep trying to "anchor," police, protect, and eventually incorporate, the post-communist nations of Europe. On the other, Moscow will continue to resist Western expansion into the Slavic areas adjacent to Russian borders, reflecting an historic anxiety which is at least as old as West European fear of Russian imperialism, and which conjures up the nightmarish images of a cordon sanitaire around Russia.

The resulting confrontation will be further sharpened by the understandably relentless pressure of the Central European nations themselves for membership in NATO. To them it is both the ultimate symbolic imprimatur of their European lineage, interrupted by nearly five decades of war and Soviet domination, and a Trojan horse with which to penetrate the barriers of "fortress Europe"—a case of traveling to Luxembourg and Strasbourg via Brussels. Both of these prizes are far more real and urgent than any fear of the menace from the East. In this regard, the contretemps caused by NATO's decision eventually to accept the Visegrad nations as members, while excluding Russia, appears characteristic. Having failed spectacularly to deal with a real threat to the European "new order" in Bosnia, NATO has proceeded to make up for the defeat by advancing toward a commitment against a threat that does not exist.

The Budapest Decision.

FOR THE UNITED States, the endorsement of NATO's expansion, after almost two years of resistance, could be a watershed. During the previous three and a half years, under two administrations, Russia's rapidly evolving domestic and foreign policies lent themselves to three basic interpretations: the glass half-full, half-empty, and not-clear-but-let's-wait-and-see. Until the December 5, 1994 CSCE summit in Budapest, the U.S. appeared to be guided by the first and the third estimates. The "Partnership for Peace," ingeniously devised to postpone the crucial decision and buy time until only informed judgment becomes possible, epitomized this highly prudent and responsible attitude. In Budapest, for the first time, the glass was found half-empty.

The full impact of this fateful verdict on U.S.-Russian relations may not be immediately apparent but is likely very real and extensive. In international politics, symbols are just as real a currency as treaties and troop deployments. NATO's decision undermines the tentative but hopeful paradigm of U.S.-Russian relations that emerged at the

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Washington summit in September 1994. There, for the first time, instances of divergent national interests were discussed frankly. Some were resolved, others registered as disagreements to be worked out later. Yet all were clearly demarcated and localized, thus preventing them from poisoning the overall relation. That this foundation for a mature relationship became possible was due to the cumulative effect of those intangible but indispensable catalysts of all genuine and lasting diplomatic rapprochements: good will and trust. It is precisely these vital antidotes to strategic breakdowns that have been seriously sapped by the U.S. endorsement of the NATO expansion.

To the Russians, the implied exclusion from the “civilized world” represents a judgment on the country’s ability to complete its march toward democracy. It is this pronouncement on the fate of the Russian experiment, issued by the country still by far the most admired by Russians, that accounts for the resentment across the political spectrum and for the brusqueness of President Yeltsin’s remarks in Budapest. Yeltsin stated, “Europe, not having freed itself from the heritage of the Cold War, is in danger of plunging into a cold peace. Why sow the seeds of mistrust?”

Two weeks before Budapest, Vladimir Lukin, the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Duma and a leading contender for the post of the minister of foreign affairs in the post-Yeltsin government, commented in Moscow News on the Republican victory on November 8th and its significance for Russia:

The struggle [in the United States] between the two views on the “Russian problem” is intensifying sharply. The first view holds Russia a great nation which, on the whole, is proceeding in the right direction and the progress of which will determine success or failure of the “democratic wave” of the 1980s–1990s. In the other view, Russia is a semi-prostrate communist giant, immanently imperial and aggressive, ruined by incompetent leader-

ship and soon to be ready to tread the same road [as in the past] that would lead, eventually, to confrontation with the West. Until now, the first view has largely prevailed. Yet the changes in the political climate in Washington could push Clinton toward the other position.

An old and experienced American hand, Lukin was correct both in his description of the Washington Weltanschauung and in the impact of U.S. policies on the White House’s change of policy.

The damage done by the NATO decision has been further deepened by the context in which it was made and by its timing. Having, in effect, declared Russia less fit than, say, Slovakia to participate in the dominant security structure of Europe, the U.S. and their NATO allies made little attempt to tie Moscow to the new world order by other means: either by special arrangements between Brussels and Moscow which would parallel those between NATO and the Visegrad nations, or by greater Russian

1Expressing what appears to be a view popular with the supporters of NATO’s action, Charles Krauthammer, in a recent column, pronounced Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia deserving to be “brought into NATO within three years time.” At the same time he declared Russia unfit for the membership because, among other bad things, “half of the Russian people voted for fascist or communist parties” in the December 1993 elections (Washington Post, December 16, 1994). He omitted to mention that, while 20 percent of Russians voted for the communists or their allies and 23 percent voted for Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, 36 percent of Poles voted for the communists in the most recent elections, as did 33 percent of Hungarians. The anti-Russian bias among some American conservatives must indeed be quite strong if one of their best and brightest insists on the rapid admission into NATO of countries ruled by communists or left nationalist populists—so long as Russia opposes it.
cooperation with, and perhaps a promise of eventual participation in, the G-7.

The timing of the NATO decision compounded the harm, as it coincided with the twilight of the Yeltsin phase of the Russian revolution. The decision to draw a line separating Russia from the rest of Europe presents the Russian political elite with a new geopolitical reality which will undoubtedly shape their choices in the next two years—precisely at the time when they will lay a blueprint for a post-Yeltsin foreign policy.

The Near Abroad: Influence or Imperialism?

IN NO OTHER area will this blueprint be more complicated and pointed than in Russia's pursuit of regional superpowership. We would do well to understand the place of the near abroad in Russian national security.

Defense Minister Pavel Grachev voiced an assessment widely shared in Russia when he stated that the most probable danger to his country was not a direct armed invasion but her gradual entanglement in conflicts in neighboring nations and regions. Given the complex interrelation and interdependence of the various [newly independent] states and peoples, any armed conflict may evolve into a large-scale war.

But Russian concerns in the near abroad go far beyond purely military affairs. Much like the United States, which with the end of the Cold War has revised and expanded its definition of national security to include, for instance, free trade, the new Russia has redefined its own national security posture by placing a very strong, perhaps paramount, emphasis on progress toward economic prosperity and democracy. The centrality of the near abroad to Russia stems precisely from the view in Moscow that neither objective will be achieved without first securing a measure of stability in the newly independent states and then effecting economic re-integration with them.

Tied to Russia—in some cases for centuries, and in all cases for many decades—by a myriad of economic, political, social, military, and human cords, the new states are seen by the Russians—and it is here that the national consensus is the widest and the strongest—as the keystone to Russian national security in a most immediate sense. The key guiding document in the area of foreign policy, a kind of National Security Directive Number One, signed by Yeltsin in April 1993, states this quite unambiguously:

The vitally important interests of the Russian Federation are connected, first of all, with the development of her relations with the states of the near abroad. Russia cannot develop normally other than on the basis of new economic and transportation ties, cooperation in the area of defense, and in the settlement of conflicts.

In addition, Russian tentative political stability is perennially threatened by the prospect of an explosive exodus of ethnic Russians from the countries of the near abroad, especially the 9.7 million from Central Asia. In private conversations, both Russian officials and politicians of very different political hues insist that they had no choice but to defend the Afghan-Tajik border and support the puppet communist regime in Tajikistan, about which they have no illusions. They claimed that a victory of Muslim fundamentalists there would result in the destabilization of the whole of Central Asia and in the falling “dominos” of a massive Russian exodus from Uzbekistan (1.6 million), and Kazakhstan (6.2 million)—an exodus with which Russia would not be able to cope economically, socially and politically. Already an estimated two million have emigrated to Russia since 1989, and at least six million more are considered likely to move in the near future.

If the French experience in the 1960s is a guide, the Russian pied noir—impoverished,
homeless, unemployed, and bitter—are also likely to be profoundly reactionary. It took France (a far richer and stable society in the 1960s than Russia is today, or will be any time soon) two decades to digest and partially defuse a far smaller number of French exiles from Algeria. Whether or not Russian refugees from near abroad would organize themselves into an equivalent of the Organisation Armée Secrète (an organization that, if formed, thousands would join, and hundreds of thousands vote for), it seems more than likely that the extreme leftist parties would respond very quickly by advocating the restoration of the Soviet Union by force.

To note the deep domestic political, economic, and social roots of the Russian policy in the near abroad is not, of course, to imply that Russian behavior there should not be watched extremely carefully for the clues that will help answer the all-important question: Is Russia engaged in a purposeful, sustained, and coherent rebuilding of the empire—or is it merely fashioning a security belt, a "sphere of influence" of the kind that for centuries has existed around most great land powers?

The question, and the distinction, are critical because the answer goes to the heart of our paramount concern: Russia's progress toward a democratic state at peace with its own people, its neighbors, and the world. For, unlike, say, French and British counterparts, the Russian empire historically has never been compatible with Russian liberalization. Because of the geography of the near abroad, a determined effort at recapturing and consolidating the empire is almost certain to be accompanied by a slide toward authoritarianism and militant nationalism at home. On the other hand, the establishment of an old-fashioned "sphere of influence" along Russia's southern border, attended though it is certain to be by the usual quota of nasty tricks, is likely to be non-lethal to the Russian progress.

We need to establish, and inform Moscow of, a series of markers on the perimeter where the "zone of influence" ends and open-ended imperialism begins. Together such markers would constitute a kind of conceptual tripwire around Russia and set off alarms and Western opposition if crossed. These markers are not difficult to agree on, and three are quite obvious. The largest of them involves Russian behavior in relation to Ukraine, i.e., any and all Russian attempts to pressure, Finlandize, or threaten Ukraine's territorial integrity, be that in the Russian-majority enclaves of Crimea or in the Northeast. The second segment of the tripwire should be placed on the Russian border with the Baltic states and activated, for instance, by Moscow's insistence on basing rights for the Russian fleet, submarines and early warning systems; military build-up in Kaliningrad and special "rights of access" to this Russian enclave within Lithuania; or long-term "Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation." The third manifestation of the imperial designs would be an attempt to forcibly detach from Kazakhstan its six northern provinces by inciting and abetting Russian irredentism there.

This distinction should form the basis for our reaction to Moscow's actions in the near abroad. The rebuilding of the empire would be an act of political will and should be resisted, expeditiously and vigorously. The construction and management of a "sphere of influence" is an inevitable geostrategic reality. While its harsher manifestations may properly be criticized and an effort made to persuade Russia to exert its influence by more civilized methods, the reality should be acknowledged and the larger strategic stakes in our relationship always be kept well in mind.

The Russian invasion of Chechnya is a case in point. At once repugnantly brutal and inept, it should raise questions about the nature of the present Russian regime and President Yeltsin's dramatic physical and political decline. Yet the issue here is not imperialism but separatism. Chechnya is not

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the Sudetenland of 1938, the eastern Poland of 1939, or the Afghanistan of 1979. Rather, it is like the Tamil regions of Sri Lanka, Turkish Kurdistan, or Indian Kashmir of today: an area where a determined ethnic or religious minority seeks independence from a larger nation of which it has been a part for many decades. (And if Moscow does not make major concessions to the Chechens, the situation there will unfold along the same lines: an endless “dirty” war, fought with increasing brutality by both sides, complete with terrorism inside Russia itself.)

To criticize Russian behavior in this war is not to criticize Russian imperialism but, rather, the inability of the quasi-democratic polity to resist the age-long tradition in which a “small victorious war”—to quote Viacheslav Plehve, minister of the interior under the last Russian tsar, Nicholas II—is seen as the shortest and most reliable way of proving the effectiveness and ensuring popularity of an unstable regime.

As far as Russian imperialism is concerned, the only point conclusively proven by the wretched Chechnya affair is that even an imperfect democracy erodes, if not cures, the imperial urge. Although tardy in bestowing on Russia many of its other boons, Russian democracy has matured enough to make lengthy military expeditions very dangerous for the regime. The longer Russia persists on the non-authoritarian path, the harder its leaders will find it to undertake even relatively minor “inside jobs,” much less to enact grander imperial designs.

**The Honest Broker**

Yet there is today a glaring disjunction between the attention being given to the near abroad by the West in the form of close monitoring of Russian actions and the West’s inability and disinclination to intervene effectively in the region itself. Given the obvious lack of interest, funds, political will and, most importantly, public support for expending money, much less lives, in these exotic faraway lands, remote indeed is the likelihood of any direct Western intervention. To be sure, so obvious is the Western desire to stay away from the near abroad that, in response to Western protestations of concern for it, Yeltsin could well borrow from General de Gaulle and call the West’s bluff. Asked at a press conference at the Elysée in April, 1961 if he was concerned that France’s withdrawal from Algeria would produce an opening there for the Soviet Union or the United States, he responded, “À toutes deuz je souhaite d’avance bien du plaisir.” (Loosely translated: “Both are most welcome to have a lot of fun there.”)

As things stand today, the most we could hope for by way of constructive U.S. involvement is a mediation effort patterned on what might be called the Ukraine-Estonia model: the brokering of agreements with Russia which led to the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine and the withdrawal of former Soviet troops from Estonia. In both cases the United States provided Russia and her neighbors with a forum and a framework that allowed both sides to make concessions they themselves had come to recognize as inevitable, but for which they needed a domestic political cover in the form of the alleged, and publicly decried, U.S. “pressure.”

Meanwhile, as in the case of Russian domestic politics, the fluidity of conditions relating to the near abroad presents U.S. policymakers with the familiar problem of having to make judgment calls on the basis of inadequate information. Still, here too, the glass appears to be half-full rather than half-empty.

So far Russia has proved, at best, a reluctant integrationist. It took, for instance, months of debate in the parliament to approve the treaty with Georgia that led to the deployment of several hundred Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia. As late as last June, the upper chamber of the Russian par-

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The Nimitz briefing and yielded inescapable embrace, pressed against dancers' eyes were fixed and the air brimmed with tension, danger, excitement and the anticipation of some proximate resolution, dramatic and final.

When communism fell, we continued to dance the tango with the Soviet Union's successor, Russia. We invested ourselves deeply and engaged very closely—mostly out of the desire to help bring permanent change quickly, to remake Russia into a prosperous democracy, but also because this was the rhythm and the choreography we were used to. Under pressure from the inevitable divergence in national interests this dance of near-obsessive closeness and quick and final results had to be abandoned. It now has been. But what is to replace it still has to be decided.

Will we replace the artificially imposed closeness, which masked real differences, with frosty hostility or a turning away? Will the U.S. and Russia, having abandoned the outdated tango, limit themselves to exchanging angry glances across the dance floor and stepping on each other's toes while dancing with other partners?

That outcome is not inevitable. There is available an alternative, a balancing act between the inherently unsustainable closeness of the past few years and the "cold peace" of the past few months. This new strategy would involve an unflinching airing of differences but also a painstaking building on the common ground that exists and a conscious effort to give each other some benefit of the doubt—all to buy time for the Russian democratic experiment and to increase its chances of success by removing the traditional impediments to Russian liberalization: the perception of external hostility and of national humiliation. It is time for America and Russia to learn a new dance, one that would allow, at once, for both safe distancing and periodic contact at critical points. How about the minuet for a model: elaborate, graceful, slow, sloof, and cerebral? The part-

Choreography for Change

Perhaps metaphor can help. During the forty-five years of the Cold War, relations between the two superpowers could be likened to the tango. The dancers were intertwined, locked in a seemingly inescapable embrace, pressed against each other like two wrestlers. The movements were sharp and sudden, and every move instantly produced a counter move. Every inch of the dance floor was contested and yielded only after a struggle. The partners' eyes were fixed on each other, to an almost total exclusion of other dancers on the floor. Their preoccupation, even obsession, with each other was nearly complete. The rhythm was taut and wakeful, and the air brimmed with tension, danger, excitement and the anticipation of some proximate resolution, dramatic and final.

When communism fell, we continued to dance the tango with the Soviet Union's successor, Russia. We invested ourselves deeply and engaged very closely—mostly out of the desire to help bring permanent change quickly, to remake Russia into a prosperous democracy, but also because this was the rhythm and the choreography we were used to. Under pressure from the inevitable divergence in national interests this dance of near-obsessive closeness and quick and final results had to be abandoned. It now has been. But what is to replace it still has to be decided.

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ners spend a great deal of time away from each other, yet get together at regular intervals, give right hands to each other, and, upon turning a full circle, part again until the next occasion.

This combination of distance and regular engagement is crucial for a correct American posture, because of the duality of Russian policy. In the coming years, Russian foreign policy will involve, both in form and in substance, an unprecedented blend: on the one hand, the dramatic and benign change brought about by Yeltsin’s departure from the traditional Russian foreign policy paradigm; on the other hand, the continuity dictated by both the powerful historic tradition and geostrategic imperatives of a huge post-colonial continental power.

It is from this duality that the greatest challenge to the U.S. policymakers is likely to result. For at different times and in different places, one or the other element—novelty or continuity—is likely to be stronger. To be effective, United States policy must recognize and accept the reality of both formative influences and learn to distinguish between the two. The nuanced response that such an approach could produce would be likely to keep U.S.-Russian relations on an even and constructive course.

While not precluding forceful and honest discussion of disagreements, the U.S.-Russian minuet would keep the partners regularly engaged in a cooler, calculated, yet still friendly and regularly revisited arrangement. This would seem the best means available to prevent disillusion, recriminations, and distrust from rising to threaten what is still the firmest guarantee of world peace: Russia’s and America’s good will and openness toward each other.

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**Alternative Medicine**

Before the UN is trashed, it behooves its critics to come up with something better.

—Richard Cohen  
*The Washington Post*  
November 29, 1994

There is a well-known story about a man who, during the Lisbon earthquake of 1775, went about hawking anti-earthquake pills; but one incident is forgotten—when someone pointed out that the pills could not possibly be of use, the hawker replied: ‘But what would you put in their place?’

—L.B. Namier  
*In the Margin of History*
The Cold Peace

COPENHAGEN

Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev of Russia delivered a remarkable speech here the other day on Russian foreign policy—a speech that was at the same time illuminating, troubling and pathetic.

What was illuminating about Mr. Kozyrev's address to a U.S.-Japanese audience was that it clarified exactly where the Russian Government stands on the question of NATO expansion.

For the past eight months, Secretary of State Warren Christopher had been quietly nurturing a deal with Mr. Kozyrev in which the Russians would agree not to aggressively oppose NATO expansion into Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, in return for an expanded relationship between Russia and NATO that would address Moscow's security concerns.

In December Mr. Kozyrev, on orders from Boris Yeltsin, slowed down the NATO discussion, but it resumed again in January. Then in March, according to Russian officials, the Kremlin opponents of NATO expansion turned Mr. Yeltsin completely against the idea, and he in turn savaged Mr. Kozyrev for going too far with Mr. Christopher.

Three weeks ago, when Mr. Kozyrev and Mr. Christopher met in Geneva, Mr. Kozyrev bluntly withdrew all his previous concessions. This was a blow to the Clinton Administration, which for months had been operating on the assumption that while the Russians were putting up a public fuss over NATO, they were signaling privately a willingness to swallow expansion. Mr. Kozyrev laid that notion to rest in his speech here, warning that NATO's enlargement now would lead "to a nightmare of renewed confrontation."

What was pathetic about the Kozyrev speech was that time and again he departed from his prepared text to engage in rambling, maudlin appeals to the audience to oppose

NATO expansion because it would trigger a rise in Russian nationalism that could devour him and result in his writing his memoirs from "the gulag." "The nationalists are using the enlargement of NATO to demonstrate the failure of our Government, including myself," said Mr. Kozyrev. Pointing to his own head, he added: "the stones are already falling right on here."

It was troubling to see the Foreign Minister of a great power desperately trying to use his own weakness as bargaining leverage. Mr. Kozyrev has always been a man associated with a Russian foreign policy that sought cooperation with the West. He was the guardian of the moderate ground, and what he seemed to be telling his Western audience was that he no longer had any ground to stand on back home.

In the years just after the fall of the Berlin wall, Russian foreign policy appeared to be softening to the point where it was possible to speak of a partnership with the West. But it is now clear that this Russian cooperation was an aberration. It arose from the momentary weakness of Russia and the disorientation of Russia's leadership after the collapse of the Soviet Union. As the Russian state has found its bearings again it has reverted to a traditional Russian foreign policy, dictated by its history and geography, which is one of a assertive control over its neighbors and competing with the world's other superpower for influence and resources.

For too long the Bush and Clinton Administrations treated this gradual reassertion of traditional Russian foreign policy as a transitory way station on Russia's inevitable march to becoming a benign democracy with which we could enjoy a "strategic partnership."

But Secretary Christopher and President Clinton apparently have decided now to recast the U.S.-Russia relationship—to effectively de-romanticize it and begin to stress its limits as much as its possibilities. Mr. Clinton is expected to lay this out in a speech about Russia on Sunday, as well as during his upcoming summit meeting in Moscow, which, I suspect, will be the first one since the cold war that will be remembered more for its disagreements than agreements.

That's all right. It is time to recognize that the U.S.-Russia relationship is not going to be a strategic partnership, but it is not going to be a full-scale confrontation either. It is going to be what we have right now—non-containment, with selective cooperation and selective confrontations—an era that our children will remember as the Cold Peace, as surely as we remember the last 40 years as the Cold War.

Post-Soviet Russia: neither enemy nor friend.
In America
BOB HERBERT

The Longest Wait

OKLAHOMA CITY

Everyone's eyes, except those of the very small children, are melancholy. The very small children think it is all a game, like cowboys and Indians, and soon the dead will get up, brush themselves off and have a good hearty laugh at all the excitement they caused.

Everyone else is locked into the terrible, searing reality that one woman described as a "nightmare far beyond hell." Even the weather has been pernicious. Until yesterday it was depressingly cold and dank, with periods of lightning, dangerously high winds, rain and sleet.

"It's like the Lord Himself had it in for us," said Wendell Liston, a gasoline station attendant who stood bareheaded in the wind and rain and tried to give directions to a stranger.

"It's not like you see on television," said Shawn Creesey, a young Airman 1st Class who went into the Federal building in the early stages of the rescue effort. "It's so much worse. I was the team leader. We started busting some rocks. And then we found a foot sticking up out of the rubble. It took me a few minutes before I realized, you know, that was somebody's mom."

Events beyond the city limits are moving much faster than here. White news articles are focused on manhunts and militias, the sad and sometimes disoriented relatives of victims who have not been identified, or who are still trapped in the building, continue to meet daily in a common room at the First Christian Church, about two miles from the site of the blast.

"They have all of these emotions and feelings and they don't know what to do with them," said Earl Groliman, a crisis intervention expert who has counseled relatives. "People are talking about healing, but that's premature. The healing cannot begin until these bodies are found. The grief process can only start when people can say goodbye."

So the families wait and cope as best they can. One couple whose baby is missing continues to set a place for him at the dinner table each night. A man whose wife is missing has placed her photo on the pillow on her side of the bed.

When a victim is identified, the relatives waiting in the church are asked gently to come upstairs. They are given the news in private and can receive counseling if they wish. When they are ready to leave, they are escorted through an exit that enables them to bypass the common room and the media.

They are considered the lucky ones.

Not knowing is "a hurt you can't imagine," said Tina Tomlin, who was notified on Sunday evening that the body of her husband, Ricky L. Tomlin, had been identified. Mr. Tomlin, 48, was a special agent for the U.S. Department of Transportation. The Tomlins, who had been married on Valentine's Day in 1970, were talking to each other on the phone last Wednesday morning when the bomb exploded.

For many reasons, some obvious, some not so obvious, Oklahoma City has become probably the politest place on earth. A rare smile and a kind word are easy to come by. Most drivers keep their headlights on all day. You will seldom hear a horn blow, no matter what the provocation.

No healing yet in Oklahoma City.

At the same time, there are many things that are not talked about. The bodies still in the Federal building are disintegrating and the odor has become overpowering. Investigators attempting to identify the decomposing bodies of children are in some cases lifting fingerprints off toys. Many funerals will be held with only a small portion of a body.

"One of the problems is simply the verbalization of the bad news," said Mark Goodwin, an executive for a group of funeral homes. "How do you tell someone? Funeral directors are trying to help out in that area."

Many people are breaking down. There are episodes of hysterical screaming. There are children who blame themselves for the loss of their siblings. People are not yet ready to move on.

Each day the curious make their way toward the blast site. They are quiet and respectful, as if part of a pilgrimage. They cannot get closer than a few blocks from the building, so they stand on any high ground they can find. Some look through binoculars. There is very little conversation. Just ordinary people, silent and staring, mesmerized by the unspeakable.
U.S.-Russian Intersection: The Romance Is Gone

BY STEVEN GREENHOUSE

WASHINGTON, March 26 — After three months of squabbling over the war in Chechnya, the expansion of NATO and the plans by Moscow to build nuclear reactors in Iran, Russia's Foreign Minister Andrei V. Kozyrev and Secretary of State Warren Christopher suggested that relations between the two countries should evolve into something new and utterly unromantic.

After two days of talks in Geneva, the two diplomats said on Thursday that Russia and the United States should strive for a pragmatic partnership that aims to manage — and resolve — the many problems that constantly develop between the world's two most powerful nations.

In Mr. Christopher's words, the relationship should be one "that allows us to cooperate together on issues of great importance, a relationship which allows us to deal with our differences, even sharp ones, and managing them without threatening to blow up the world."

But with the Geneva talks having produced no breakthroughs, many students of Russian-American relations questioned how well Washington was managing its problems with Moscow.

Mr. Christopher, they noted, had little progress to report on Washington's three bruising disputes with Moscow: Russia's widely criticized offensive in the breakaway region of Chechnya, its plan to sell nuclear reactors to Iran and its opposition to expanding NATO eastward.

"This is going to be a difficult, frustrating, annoying, sometimes very productive relationship," said Michael Mandelbaum, a professor of foreign policy at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. "The good news is the Soviet Union is gone. The bad news is what's in its place is not Switzerland, but Russia."

Mr. Kozyrev demonstrated that the Russians do not intend to be diplomatic pushovers. Last Monday, the very day Mr. Clinton announced that he would visit Moscow to mark the 50th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany, Mr. Kozyrev renewed his attacks on the President's push to extend NATO eastward.

A day earlier, Mr. Clinton had sought to assure Mr. Yeltsin in a letter that the new NATO was in no way anti-Russian.

Then, the day after Mr. Clinton announced he would visit Moscow, Russia's military opened a new offensive in Chechnya, ignoring the Clinton Administration's repeated pleas for Moscow to end the war through negotiations.

Though stung by the timing of Moscow's moves, Mr. Christopher said, "The embarrassment of the timing is not nearly as important to me as the substance of their positions."

Mr. Christopher's aides had hoped that Mr. Kozyrev would make some significant concessions in return for Mr. Clinton's decision to visit Moscow, since the President would take considerable heat from lawmakers who urged him to reject the invitation because of the force used in Chechnya. Instead, Mr. Christopher had no Russian concessions to report.

"The failure of the Geneva meeting shows that the Russians are treating the Administration with contempt," said Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser under President Carter.

When Mr. Clinton decided to visit Moscow after all, Mr. Brzezinski said, the Russians saw that they could push Washington's top diplomat around. In February, Mr. Christopher had said, "Certainly, he wouldn't be going there unless Chechnya is resolved."

Defending his approach toward Moscow, Mr. Christopher insists that the practice of managing problems is paying dividends. Thanks to Russian-American cooperation, he said, Moscow withdrew its troops from the Baltic countries, is dismantling its nuclear warheads and helped persuade Ukraine to give up its nuclear arms.

Geneva was not a total failure, his senior aides say. The biggest development was an agreement to set up a joint working group that will prepare a report on global arms proliferation before the Clinton-Yeltsin summit meeting in May. Administration officials say the working group will seek to show Russian officials that Iran has a crash program to develop nuclear weapons, a program they contend will threaten Russia more than the United States.

The Administration's hope is that this report will persuade the Russians not to build reactors in Iran because it would quench Teheran's efforts to build the bomb.

But experts on Russia like Mr. Mandelbaum say that when push comes to shove, Mr. Kozyrev and other Russian officials will fight NATO expansion because they fear that the alliance could ultimately walk their country off from the West.

A senior aide to Mr. Christopher said the Secretary of State had read the riot act to Mr. Kozyrev about the way Russia seems to kick the Administration in the shins whenever it is holding out a friendly hand.

During his visit to Geneva, Mr. Christopher also had a message for Americans who say the Administration should stop meeting with Mr. Yeltsin and other Russians because of the war in Chechnya and other disputes.

"It's very easy to list the places where we have differences," Mr. Christopher said. "We could make that list and walk away, but it's certainly a luxury that I don't have. I have the responsibility to try and manage the differences."
Hillary Rodham Clinton and her daughter, Chelsea, wore traditional Islamic scarves yesterday during their visit to Faisal Mosque in Islamabad, Pakistan, after meeting with Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.

A Clinton and a Bhutto Share a Joke in Pakistan

By Todd S. Purdum

ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, March 26 — Hillary Rodham Clinton, admired and attacked as a strong woman in her own country, came to Pakistan today to admire and consult with another one: Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, who greeted the First Lady at a luncheon for prominent women with a sisterly joke on the perils of power.

"The First Lady does not know it, but according to newspapers in Pakistan, Mr. Asif Zardari is de facto prime minister of the country," Ms. Bhutto said, referring to her husband, who is often painted as a sinister threat behind the throne and who had met Mrs. Clinton's plane on her arrival in a driving rain 12 hours earlier. "He says, 'Only the First Lady can appreciate it's not true."

In fact, Mrs. Clinton's first stop on her 12-day, five-nation official visit to South Asia was a study in the subtle role of spouse without portfolio. In her biggest solo venture since the collapse of her health care plan last year, she is re-introducing herself as a First Lady not only of the land but also of the world, wading into a region thick with the geopolitical goo of nuclear proliferation, financial aid and human rights abuses.

Mrs. Clinton's aides said most of those issues had come up, at least elliptically, in a 25-minute private talk with Ms. Bhutto, but Mrs. Clinton did not raise them. And the First Lady's staff made it clear that such an agenda is the stuff of Ms. Bhutto's scheduled meeting with Mr. Clinton in Washington next month. The Prime Minister is likely to try once again to assure Washington that her country is not trying to develop nuclear weapons, the possibility of which has been the main irritant in American-Pakistani relations and has led to a Congressional ban on any new aid since 1990.

On this trip to Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, Mrs. Clinton is determined to emphasize what she calls "the human issues" of health, education and social progress, especially for women and children in a place of dreadful poverty. Those causes are no less complex if slightly less controversial than some others she has taken on, and consistent with her interests over the last 25 years.

After praising the uphill efforts of Ms. Bhutto (Radcliffe, '73) to improve the lot of women and encourage family planning in a country where the average woman bears six children and is restricted to the role of wife and mother, Mrs. Clinton (Wellesley, '69) added "a particular word of thanks for your emphasis on children."

"It is an emphasis that is the most important in my personal opinion, because by investing in the education and health of children, we are saying that the future is worthwhile, that every child will be given an opportunity to live up to his or her God-given potential," Mrs. Clinton told the group of about 60 women in the Prime Minister's official residence in the shadow of the Margalla Hills above the city.

Minutes later, as if to make that point, Mrs. Clinton strolled the grounds with her daughter, Chelsea, Ms. Bhutto and two of her children. Then the Clintons paid their respects to Islam by visiting the cavernous Faisal Mosque, financed by the Saudi royal family beginning in the 1970's, where Secret Service agents in stocking feet kept a respectful distance and Chelsea, who is on spring vacation from school where she has been studying Islam in 10th grade history class, asked well-informed questions.

For her part, Ms. Bhutto said: "I and the rest of the people of Pakistan have been utterly fascinated by the First Lady's heroic efforts to substantially restructure the responsibilities of the office of First Lady, and to provide caring and sensitive leadership on the key social issues of the modern era. Women who take on tough issues and stake out new territory are often on the receiving end of ignorance."
Russian Minister Opposing U.S. Missle Plan

But Overall, Foreign Chief Sees Big Gains From New Relationship

By BARBARA CROSSETTE

UNITED NATIONS, April 24 —

Two weeks before a summit meeting in Moscow between Presidents Clinton and Boris N. Yeltsin, Russia's Foreign Minister today cautioned the Administration and Congress against pursuing plans for a new short-range missile defense system.

He said moving ahead with such plans could slow progress on disarmament agreements and undermine a fragile new Russian-American partnership.

The missile defense system has been the subject of several recent meetings between the two sides in which American officials have tried to meet some Russian concerns before the summit meeting takes place.

In New York to speak at a conference on reviewing and extending the arms control treaty to halt the spread of nuclear weapons, Foreign Minister Andrei V. Kozyrev said in an interview surveying Russian-American relations that the progress made on arms control during the last few years between the United States and Russia had been impressive.

"For the first time ever, I flew from Moscow to New York feeling free from being targeted by my own missiles," he said, a tribute to the first strategic arms reduction treaty, START I, which went into effect in December. "And going back, I am sure also that I am not targeted by American missiles."

In his speech, Mr. Kozyrev also praised the nonproliferation treaty, the future of which is being decided here, and gave strong support to its indefinite and unconditional extension.

In the interview earlier, in a formal parlor at the Russian mission to the United Nations on East 67th Street, Mr. Kozyrev welcomed President Clinton's decision to go to Moscow on May 8 for ceremonies marking the end of the war in Europe and for a meeting with President Yeltsin.

"It is very important to recognize that it was absolutely the right decision to go to Moscow," Mr. Kozyrev said, speaking in English. "That recognizes the historical value of the victory we achieved together. We were allies. This is very important for the future."

He said the Moscow commemoration would give both leaders the chance to look back and honor war dead while also looking ahead to a burgeoning partnership.

In this context, he added, the visit is "doomed to succeed."

But Mr. Kozyrev returned several times in the interview to a preoccupation with moves in Congress and the Administration to continue at least the research if not the development of enhanced antimissile systems capable of destroying incoming short-range weapons.

The problem is that as these systems are upgraded or new generations are planned — better Patriot missiles, for example, or a new heat-seeking interceptor known as a Thaad — they move closer to being capable of attacking longer-range missiles.

Arms control experts say any such developments would weaken the 1972 anti-ballistic missile treaty and alarm Russians, including members of Parliament who must now ratify the second strategic, or long-range, arms reduction treaty, START II. That treaty is also nearing a vote in the United States Senate, where it is expected to have an easier time.

"My assessment is that both Congress and the Russian Parliament will ratify it in the end," he said. "It is in the best possible interest of both countries."

Then, he added, Russia and the United States can move on to serious discussion of a third strategic arms treaty, START III.

But he added that Russians have to be sure that there will be no new arms race in weapons of a new class and that the 1972 treaty will not be undermined by development of a defense system against short- to medium-range missiles, which Russia also wants, though it is well behind in the necessary technology.

Mr. Kozyrev said recent talks with American officials helped to create better understanding. American officials say those talks are stalled over the permitted speed of the new missiles as well as the range and speed of incoming targets they would attack, definitions that try to draw a line through the gray area between short-range and long-range missiles.

The treaty does not define these limitations for the sake of it.

The Administration says it wants only to do research on a better defense system against American or allied forces in regional conflicts. There are no such missiles threatening the United States directly.

The Foreign Minister chided Washington indirectly for indulging in what he called moralistic posturing rather than practical diplomacy in dealing with some of the world's most difficult issues. Defending his efforts to get better deals from the United Nations for President Saddam Hussein of Iraq and President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia, Mr. Kozyrev said: "Never demonize people in politics. In politics there are no demons."

Speaking more broadly on Russian-American relations, Mr. Kozyrev said that he no longer felt that the United States treated Russia as a "junior partner" but he was concerned that a working partnership between the two countries, defined on paper, had not been put into practice.

He was also critical of a "reflexive rejection" of Russia when there were disagreements, and what he called a simplistic tendency in the American Congress, among other places — to see a slide into Russian imperialism when there are disagreements, such as those over supplying nuclear power equipment to Iran or opposing an expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance to take in former Soviet-bloc countries.

"In Russia you also see a wave of demonizing the United States," he said. He called both reactions a "legacy of confrontation" and wondered why divisions were inflated and cast in apocalyptic terms, unlike similar disagreements between countries like the United States and France or Japan.

"Now it is a more mature relationship between us, but there is still a temptation on both sides, especially in public opinion, to say if they do O.K. by our standards, then it's O.K.," he said. "If they do wrong by our standards, then they are bad guys, or the bad guys are getting the upper hand in Moscow."

Mr. Kozyrev warned that such thinking gives "arguments to the opposition." He added: "It is not that we are overworried about this opposition."

"It is not that Zhirinovsky or the communists are coming to power," he said, referring to Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the Russian nationalist. "It is just that we are concerned not to strengthen their positions."
Britain Says It Is Willing to Upgrade Talks With I.R.A.

By JOHN DARNTON

LONDON, April 24 — The Government announced today that it was willing to upgrade talks with Sinn Fein, the political wing of the Irish Republican Army, to the ministerial level.

Until now the British Government has been represented at the lower level of civil servants during the half-dozen sessions it has held with Sinn Fein. It is careful to characterize the talks on how to achieve peace in Northern Ireland as "exploratory."

The Republic of Ireland, the United States and Sinn Fein have all brought pressure on Prime Minister John Major to elevate the talks a notch. The move is largely symbolic — the civil servants are obviously empowered to take notes and make statements on behalf of their Government — but the symbolism is important. For London it represents one more step in the long process by which it is coming to recognize publicly the legitimacy of an organization it used to shun as terrorist.

For 25 years, during the sectarian violence between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, the I.R.A. has waged a bitter campaign to oust the British and join the territory to the republic to the south.

A symbolic step toward London's recognition of its foe in Northern Ireland.

Up to now, Britain has insisted that it would not send a minister to negotiate in Stormont Castle in Belfast until Sinn Fein gives a clear commitment beforehand that the I.R.A. is willing to give up its weapons. For its part, Sinn Fein has insisted upon talking about "demilitarization" — a term that it uses to describe withdrawal of the 18,000 British military personnel.

In making today's announcement, the Government said that "a sufficient basis now exists" for ministers to enter into the dialogue, a phrasing that suggested that Sinn Fein had given some ground on London's demand for a commitment to talk about mothballing its stockpile of weapons.

The statement went on to say, "The Government has made clear that once ministers join the dialogue, there will first need to be a substantive discussion, as a separate issue, on decommissioning of arms, including an exploration of the specific ways this can best be achieved."

But it also said that "no subject is excluded from the dialogue" and that Sinn Fein "made clear their wish to raise a number of issues, including those arising from the need for them to term 'demilitarization.'"

A spokesman for the Prime Minister's office said the question of "decommissioning" I.R.A. weapons would be dealt with separately from the question of "demilitarizing" the province and sought to portray this as a significant shift in the Government's favor.

Gerry Adams, the Sinn Fein president, welcomed the statement. Though Sinn Fein did not immediately grab at the invitation in public, it is generally assumed that talks at the ministerial level will get under way within a week or so. Sinn Fein has a list of other issues — including release of I.R.A. prisoners — that it would like to discuss.

The real peace negotiations — meaning full-bodied talks with all interested parties sitting around the same table — are still somewhere in the future. They cannot begin until an actual process for decommissioning the weapons is under way, the Government insists.

On March 22 Britain began ministerial-level talks with the other side, the so-called loyalist paramilitaries who answer to the most militant elements among Protestants. But even on the lower level, the "exploratory" talks with Sinn Fein have been at an impasse for weeks.

The Government is moving slowly for fear of upsetting the Protestant Unionists, who insist that the province remain part of Britain, and of alienating back-benchers in the Conservative Party who uphold the cause of Ulster. Sinn Fein leaders cannot be seen as too ready to compromise lest they be viewed as soft by more militant I.R.A. members who might want to replace them.

Furthermore, the Government was upset over President Clinton's decision to meet with Mr. Adams on St. Patrick's Day and dug in its heels.

The statement today was welcomed by Dick Spring, the Irish Foreign Minister, as a step that would add momentum to the peace effort. Mainstream unionists were noncommittal but more radical unionists condemned it. The Rev. Ian Paisley, head of the Democratic Unionist Party, attacked the move as "another surrender."
Russian and American Publics Rate Countries Along Ally-Enemy Spectrum

Russians View U.S. As Friendly Power

Recent surveys in Russia and the United States asked each public to rate foreign countries on an identical five-point scale from "close ally" through "neutral" to "enemy" of their country. Both the U.S. and Russian publics were asked to rate the other power and more than 15 other countries around the world, including seven countries which were listed on both surveys.

**KEY FINDINGS**

- **Russia-U.S.** -- On the whole, Russians have a rosier view of U.S. conduct toward Russia (friendly) than Americans have of Russia's actions toward the U.S. (between friendly and neutral).

- **Russians Distinguish Friends From Other Countries** -- Three-fourths of the Russian public give a positive rating to Belarus (25% rate it a close ally and 50% as friendly toward Russia). About half or more give positive ratings to Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Germany, India, the U.S. and Bulgaria. On the negative side, fully two-thirds give a negative rating to Estonia (20% rate it an enemy and 47% as unfriendly toward Russia). A plurality rate both Armenia and Azerbaijan negatively, either as an enemy (about 10%) or as unfriendly toward Russia (about 30%).

- **Americans Make Even Sharper Distinctions Among Countries** -- About three-fourths of Americans view Canada and Great Britain positively, including about two-fifths who rate them as close allies of the U.S. At the other extreme, four-fifths view Iran and Iraq negatively, including half or more who rate them as enemies of the U.S.

- **Americans rate China, Iran, and Iraq much more negatively than does the Russian public; but Americans rate Japan and Poland more positively. Two countries are rated similarly by the two publics: Germany (friendly) and Turkey (neutral).**

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The Russian survey findings contained in this report come from a USIA-commissioned nationwide poll conducted between October 22 and November 14, 1994, by the Institute for Comparative Social Research in Moscow. (The sample comprised 1841 adults, yielding a potential sampling error of plus or minus 3 percentage points.) The U.S. findings come from a Roper nationwide poll taken in July 1993. Previous Roper surveys have shown that the American public's ratings of most countries do not change appreciably from year to year. Americans' mid-1993 ratings for Russia, specifically, were similar to those recorded in late 1991 for the Soviet Union. No polls have been available over the past few weeks to test whether American views of Russia have been affected by the fighting in Chechnya.
Russians Rate U.S. As Friendly; Americans Less Positive About Russia

Half of the Russian public perceive the U.S. positively -- either as a close ally of Russia (6%) or as a friendly country (44%). One-fifth believe the U.S. has been more or less neutral toward Russia (21%), and one-fifth rate U.S. conduct negatively (16% unfriendly and 4% as an enemy of Russia).¹ (See Table 1)

A third of the American public has a positive view of Russia -- either as a close ally of the U.S. (5%) or as a friendly country (28%). They are matched by about one-third (35%) who view Russia’s actions toward the U.S. as neutral. One-fifth rate Russia’s conduct negatively (16% unfriendly and 5% enemy).² (Table 2)

Russians Distinguish Among Countries in Each Region

CIS -- Seventy-five percent of Russians rate Belarus positively (25% see it acting as a close ally and 50% as friendly toward Russia), the highest rating on this survey. Belarus has been actively seeking to forge closer ties with Russia, and has proposed a monetary union between the two countries. A lesser majority give positive ratings to Kazakhstan (59%) and Ukraine (58%). However, positive views of both Armenia and Azerbaijan easily are outweighed by negative ones (about 20% positive vs. 40% negative in each case).

Europe -- Germany and Bulgaria are rated predominantly positive (about 50%), like the U.S., while Poland, Serbia and Turkey are widely seen as being neutral toward Russia. Estonia receives the lowest marks on this survey (7% positive vs. 67% negative), probably reflecting Russians’ perception that ethnic Russians in Estonia are being denied their rights.

Asia/Near East -- Positive ratings outweigh negative ones for India and, to a lesser extent, China. The reverse is true for Iraq and Iran. Positive and negative views are nearly balanced in the case of Japan. Russian-Japanese relations continue to be clouded by Japan’s demand that Russia return the Kurile Islands seized at the end of World War II. (See Table 1 for complete results of the Russian survey)

Americans Make Sharp Distinctions in Each Region

Western Hemisphere -- Americans as a whole have a predominantly positive impression of how their two large neighbors, Canada and Mexico, have acted toward the U.S. (Canada - 81% positive, Mexico - 47% positive). By contrast, Cuba is perceived by Americans about as negatively (72%) as Russians view Estonia.

¹This mainly positive rating of the U.S. probably stems partly from the widespread perception among Russians that the U.S. has been providing assistance to Russia. Fifty-one percent of the Russian public named the U.S. as providing aid to their country; 43 percent named Germany. No other country comes close to this level of recognition as an aid donor. See “Russians’ Confidence in Yeltsin Ebbs,” USIA Opinion Analysis Memorandum (M-251-94), December 7, 1994.

²Americans’ positive ratings of Russia/Soviet Union have levelled off during the past few years, after a sharp rise between 1984 and 1990. A decade ago, 89 percent of the American public viewed the Soviet Union as hostile to the U.S. (40% unfriendly and 49% enemy); only 3 percent had a positive view. (Roper poll, 5-6/84)
Europe -- The American public differentiates among countries in this region it mainly views as close allies (Great Britain), friendly to the U.S. (France, Germany, Italy), in the friendly-to-neutral range (Greece, Poland, Russia), and neutral toward the U.S. (Turkey).

Asia/Near East -- Americans give Japan (38% positive) a more positive rating than China (14% positive) -- the reverse of how these two countries rank among Russians. Positive ratings outweigh negative ones for Israel and, to a lesser extent, Egypt. But strongly negative views prevail about both Iraq (70% perceive it as an enemy) and Iran (50% enemy), which receive much less negative ratings than this from the Russian public (between neutral and unfriendly). (See Table 2 for full U.S. results.)

Russian Ambivalence Toward the U.S. Persists

While the U.S. and Russian surveys show substantial public support in both countries for cooperative relations, the Russian public continues to feel somewhat ambivalent toward the U.S. Thus, in the latest survey, most Russians (78%) affirm that it is in Russia's interest to work closely with the U.S., and half (52%) express approval for joint maneuvers by Russian and U.S. military forces like those conducted in Russia last September. At the same time, however, nearly half (46%) believe that the U.S. generally expects to get its own way in matters that concern both countries, and fully four-fifths (82%) feel that Russia should strive to keep its military strength on a par with the U.S. These contradictory sentiments appear to reflect in part Russians' sense of vulnerability and wounded national pride resulting from their country's loss of superpower status and its economic weakness.
Table 1. Russian Public Rates Countries on Ally-Enemy Scale
(Institute for Comparative Social Research, 10-11/94, 1841 respondents)

"I'd like to ask your opinion about the posture that certain countries have had toward Russia in recent years. As I read a list of countries, please use this card [RESPONDENT SHOWN CARD WITH RESPONSE CATEGORIES] to tell me how each country has behaved toward Russia in recent years. Has the country acted as a close ally of Russia, has it been friendly toward Russia but not a close ally, has it been more or less neutral toward Russia, has it been unfriendly toward Russia but not an enemy, or has it acted as an enemy of Russia?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Close Ally</th>
<th>Friendly</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Unfriendly</th>
<th>Enemy</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>25% (75)</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>6% (6)</td>
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<td>5%</td>
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<td>43</td>
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<td>47 (67)</td>
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Table 2. American Public Rates Countries on Ally-Enemy Scale
(Roper Poll, 7/93, 2006 Respondents)

"I'd like to have your impressions about the overall position that some countries have taken toward the U.S. [RESPONDENT SHOWN CARD LISTING COUNTRIES] Would you read down that list and for each country, tell me if you believe that country has acted as a close ally of the U.S., has acted as a friend but not a close ally, has been more or less neutral toward the U.S., has been mainly unfriendly toward the U.S. but not an enemy, or has acted as an enemy of the U.S.?

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Close Ally</th>
<th>Friendly</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Mainly Unfriendly</th>
<th>Enemy</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
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<td>46% (81)</td>
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<td>7%</td>
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</table>
Clinton's Yeltsin, Yeltsin's Russia

STEPHEN F. COHEN

Boris Yeltsin, Russia's first popularly elected president but unabashed admirer of Czar Peter the Great, comes to Washington on September 27 to visit his own most exalted enthusiast. If their previous summit meetings are any indication, President Bill Clinton will again embrace "my friend Boris" and endorse his claim to be the indispensable father of a "new, democratic and civilized Russia."

Not many influential Russians see Yeltsin that way any longer, nor are future historians likely to do so. The "irreconcilable opposition"—as ultranationalists and defiant Communists are called—still, of course, considers him a criminal agent of Western powers who first plotted the breakup of the Soviet Union and now are plundering Russia's economy by turning it into a deindustrialized exporter of raw materials and dumping ground for excess goods. But more significant for Americans, fewer and fewer Russian democrats, once Yeltsin's hopeful supporters, see him as one of their own. Most have come to regard him as an instinctively authoritarian leader—product of his own long history as a Communist Party boss and of Russia's older traditions—who has enabled the former Soviet ruling class, or nomenklatura, to preserve its position in post-Communist Russia, indeed to enrich and legalize itself under the cover of "privatization."

Nor is Yeltsin's standing with ordinary Russians what it once was. In last December's elections for a new parliament, the State Duma, various antigovernment parties took about 85 percent of the vote, even though Yeltsin wrote the rules, controlled the television and lavished money on his own surrogate party. And in recent presidential polls, he is preferred by only 14 to 20 percent of those surveyed. Not surprisingly, Russian newspapers have begun speculating about the "death agony of the Yeltsin regime."

It may be too early to write Yeltsin's political obituary, but not to understand the exceedingly dangerous consequences of his policies, particularly those in which the United States has been deeply involved. My own view—it is widespread in Russia but nearly absent in the U.S. media—is that Yeltsin's legacy will not be the promised transition to a democratic, free-market system, or even a popular consensus for moving in that direction, but a bitterly divided nation.

Three policies, each traumatic in its impact, have character-

Millions of citizens loathe what has happened, and the ruling elite has begun to fear its own people.

The political fallout from those excessive policies, all of them enthusiastically supported by the U.S. government but protested by many Russian reformers, was predictable. In response to Yeltsin's own brand of extremism, various "irreconcilable" views—including anti-Americanism and the opinion that post-Communist Russia is ruled by a "criminal state"—have crept across the spectrum. A majority of Russians no longer believe in democratic, free-market or other Western-sponsored solutions; now look back on the breakup of the Soviet Union as a tragic mistake or a conspiracy; and want some kind of regrouping of former Soviet republics. Russians may have lived through hard times before, but never, as a pro-democracy newspaper observed recently, in the midst of such ostentatious official corruption, mafia extortion and dubiously gained private wealth—or, it might have added, so many Western advisers. Even if these economic and political realities are overstated, "Boris Yeltsin's Russia," as he calls it in his new memoirs, has become a dangerously polarized nation.

Indeed, polarization is generating a still worse specter. Fear and loathing are spreading like a plague in this long-tormented, ethnically diverse and nuclear-laden country, where the question "What is to be done?" has too often been answered with another, "Who is guilty?" Millions of ordinary citizens loathe what has happened to their nation, at home and abroad, and ask who "betrayed" them. Understandably and no less traditionally, the ruling elite has begun to fear its own people. You don't have to spend several months a year in Russia, as I do, to sense the escalating anxiety. It is evident from ized Yeltsin's use of power and shaped Russia today. In December 1991, his sudden and surreptitious abolition of the Soviet Union shattered an exceptionally integrated economy while depriving 150 million Russians of the only nationhood they had known. In 1992, his attempt to impose a Western-style market economy on Russia by "shock therapy," in the spirit of his favorite czar, took away the life savings of most of them. Largely as a result, while perhaps 5 to 8 percent of Russians have profited fabulously, industrial production has plummeted by 40 to 50 percent, at least half the country now lives in poverty or on the brink of it, and general health and life expectancy have declined so severely that even a pro-Yeltsin newspaper describes the situation as an "unfolding catastrophe...as in wartime." His third decision, the unlawful and tank-backed overthrow of an elected parliament and entire constitutional order in 1993, then dealt a heavy blow to the popular expectations for democracy that had been raised by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s and by Yeltsin himself in the early 1990s.

Stephen F. Cohen is professor of politics and Russian studies at Princeton University. His books include Rethinking the Soviet Experience and Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution (both Oxford).
impressed, it seems, the general has continued to make clear his contempt for Yeltsin and to grow in public esteem. Immediately retreated in a humiliated fashion, praising Lebed's leadership in Russia, dismissing Yeltsin as a pretender. The President's few remaining military loyalists tried to remove a restored monarchy.

Second, credible reports suggest Yeltsin is suppressing evidence that the new authoritarian Constitution he put to the country last December—the Clinton Administration called it a "great democratic breakthrough"—did not actually get the required 50 percent of eligible votes. If true, everything Yeltsin has done as President in 1994 also has been unlawful.

The third development would similarly be a major scandal in a truly democratic country. An exceptionally popular young general, Aleksandr Lebed, recently called for a new political leadership in Russia, dismissing Yeltsin as a "minus." When the President's few remaining military loyalists tried to remove Lebed from his command, the general hinted he might inspire a mutiny or launch a personal bid for the leadership. Yeltsin immediately retreated in a humiliated fashion, praising Lebed's "great role" in keeping things "under control." Unimpressed, it seems, the general has continued to make clear his contempt for Yeltsin and to grow in public esteem.

All three episodes, and there are others, reflect a growing dread of powerlessness and retribution in the Yeltsin camp. No Russian or Soviet leader has ever left office voluntarily. Given the traumas he has inflicted on the country, it is easy to understand why Yeltsin may not want to be the first. Having ruled mostly by decree (issuing some 2,300 in 1993 alone, with about as many likely this year), often without benefit or in open defiance of parliaments, constitutions and laws; having set the precedent of a political trial against the Communist Party in 1992 and then used tanks to arrest his own former allies last year; and having tolerated financial scams that victimized millions of small investors while embracing high-level associates widely suspected of corruption, a powerless Yeltsin would risk becoming the target of any vengeful politics that ensued.

He would not be alone. Similarly endangered are his many appointees and other servitors, from politicians and bureaucrats to intellectuals and journalists, along with some of the "new Russians" who have profited so grandly from his largesse with state property. (Yeltsin's deposed Vice President is already promised to shoot or jail several ministers.) Desperate to keep Yeltsin in office, his men insist to foreigners that the Russian people are understanding, long-suffering or apathetic. But how to reconcile those assurances with the Yeltsin team's attempts to cancel elections, conceal voting data on the constitutional referendum, mimic the rhetoric of the "irreconcilables" and placate General Lebed—or with their occasional panic-driven warnings about the possibility of a "social explosion"?

Alarmed and itself divided, Yeltsin's inner circle is giving him conflicting advice. One faction is urging an early presidential election before the economic crisis gets even worse—a real possibility given the danger of much greater industrial unemployment and an agricultural collapse—and before the opposition finds a candidate who can at least equal Yeltsin's lowly ratings in the polls. The other group wants him to shed all such remnants of democratic "romanticism" and become a fully authoritarian leader—a "Russian Pinochet," as Lebed but also many pro-Yeltsin "democrats" are calling for.

Some Russian analysts doubt that anyone involved in the decisions to abolish the Soviet Union, launch shock therapy or assault the parliament could be re-elected. (Yeltsin's two partners in dissolving the union, Ukraine's Leonid Kravchuk and Belarus's Stanislav Shushkevich, have already been rejected by their own voters.) If that analysis is correct, truly democratic elections would oust most Yeltsinites from power. But their hard-line rivals are also unpopular and unconfident, partly because their wrathful language still worries many voters and because several of them, like Rutskoi, initially supported Yeltsin's breakup of the union. Moreover, many oppositionists who won seats in the State Duma have shown little interest in investigating the suspect voting results, and may go along with Yeltsin's offer to cancel both scheduled elections. They too fear the country's anti-establishment mood.

The Pinochet solution that so clearly tempts Yeltsin may be even riskier. Unlike in Chile, where that general ruled for seventeen years, Russia's emerging capitalist class is still too small to support such a regime and few army officers could
be counted on to do Yeltsin's bidding; the military would more likely turn to its own pretenders. Either way, Russia's historic experiment with democracy would be over.

Will anyone—President Clinton or a journalist—ask Yeltsin about these retrograde machinations when he visits Washington? More fundamentally, will the Clinton Administration change its policy toward Russia before it is too late? That policy, a "strategic partnership and friendship" based on an ill-advised U.S. crusade to transform post-Communist Russia along American lines, has failed, becoming little more than boosterism for a leader whose polarizing legacy may far outweigh any good he has done. Like the Clinton Administration, Yeltsin's American apologists in the media and in academic life continue to insist that he is our only hope and that, anyway, the worst is over. But without a far more restrained and ecumenical approach, the United States will have few friends, partners or democrats in post-Yeltsin Russia. Or does it too fear the future and prefer a Russian Pinochet?
Articles.

U.S. Policy Debacle

America's Failed Crusade in Russia

Stephen F. Cohen

The worst and most predictable U.S. foreign policy failure of the late twentieth century has been unfolding in post-Communist Russia ever since the Soviet breakup in 1991. All the desirable outcomes in a country that remains so essential to American security—democracy, a prospering economy, a political establishment friendly to the West, major reductions in and safeguarding of nuclear missiles and other weapons of mass destruction—have been undermined by the U.S. government's own policy.

Confronted with recent mind-opening events, American politicians and pundits are belatedly awakening to that failure, but not to its full magnitude or the real reason behind it. Pointing the "who lost Russia" finger at one another, zealous promoters of a profoundly unwise policy, initiated by the Bush Administration and greatly expanded by the Clinton team, insist that this policy failed because the West did not give sufficient or timely financial aid to Russian reformers. Their self-serving excuses ignore the lessons that must urgently be learned if the American debacle in Russia is not to become a full-scale disaster.

At fault, as I have argued repeatedly in The Nation, is the basic premise that has guided American policy since 1991: that the United States can and should intervene deeply in Russia's internal affairs to transform that nation into an American-style system at home and a compliant junior partner abroad. A preposterously missionary idea, it is in almost total conflict with Russia's historical traditions, present-day realities and actual possibilities, and thus is dangerously counterproductive.

Essentially, the United States said to the new Russian leadership: If you follow our "free market" prescriptions for economic reform—a leap-to-capitalism "shock therapy"—and our lead on international issues, we will give you ample financial aid, on-site adviser-therapists and a place by our side (or in our shadow) in world affairs. For his own complex reasons, Russian President Boris Yeltsin accepted or pretended to accept the offer, which both sides immediately anointed as a "strategic partnership and friendship." And on that romantic assumption, the Clinton Administration, with more ideological gusto and less restraint than its predecessor, has stuck to Yeltsin like Krazy Glue.

Consider how badly this missionary American policy has failed:

§ Prospects for peaceful development toward stable mar-
ketts and democracy in Russia are worse today than they were two years ago, and much worse than they were when President Clinton took office only a year ago. The economy is in free fall, ravaged by an extraordinary multiple collapse of production, capital investment, consumption, legal transaction and the ruble. Moreover, since Yeltsin destroyed the constitutional order by force last fall, Russia has had no real political system at all, only his current efforts to create a personal regime of power. As a result, antidemocratic, military and other security forces now play a much larger role in domestic and foreign politics than they did a year ago.

§ Nor has Russia's foreign policy conformed to U.S. prescriptions. Its opposition to expanding NATO eastward and to Western action against Serbia are just the latest evidence that Russian policies can be made and sustained only in Moscow, not in Washington. Meanwhile, almost nothing concrete has been done to reduce the various nuclear threats on former Soviet territory, which are greater today than they were under the Soviet regime. Not all of the much ballyhooed weapons reduction treaties, for example, have been fully ratified.

Clinton and his aides have become Yeltsin's cheerleader, accomplice and spin doctor.

§ As for the U.S. wager on Yeltsin as the popular instrument of the American crusade, 85 percent of Russian participants in the December elections voted against his policies and party. Still worse, a significant part of that anti-Yeltsin vote was a backlash against America's intrusive role there.

§ More recently, the Administration's apparent remoteness from Russian realities allowed President Clinton to be embarrassed by a Potemkin-village summit meeting with Yeltsin in Moscow. Promises made by Yeltsin about the composition and direction of his government were immediately violated. The "breakthrough" on persuading Ukraine to give up its nuclear weapons looks even more dubious as Ukrainian-Russian relations worsen in the aftermath of the election of a Crimean President who campaigned for returning the combustible Black Sea region to Russia. And in Belarus, where Clinton visited after Moscow, the pro-Western President was removed just after his departure.

§ Finally, here in the United States, the Clinton Administration has created so many illusions and false expectations that current developments are generating an anti-Russian backlash in our own country—certainly against more aid for reform. Inveterate cold warriors are already rebuilding their barricades. "We gave bear stroking a try," Charles Krauthammer declares in Time. "It did not work." A new U.S.-Russian cold war may not yet be on the horizon, but a chilly peace is now more likely than the vaunted "era of partnership and friendship." (And imagine the U.S. reaction if some new

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Russia-centered union emerges among several former Soviet republics, as is also likely.)

But there is worse news. Not even those of us who warned about the dangers inherent in U.S. policy foresaw how deeply the Clinton Administration would intervene in the caldron of Russian politics. It is said that the United States must support Yeltsin because he is Russia's elected President. But Clinton and his top aides have gone far beyond that norm of international relations, becoming his cheerleader, accomplice and spin doctor, and thus implicating America in some of his most ill-advised and even wicked deeds.

To understand that complicity, we must see Yeltsin's leadership through the eyes of a great many Russian citizens. For them, he has been an extremist leader imposing from above—an old Russian tradition—exceedingly radical policies for which they never voted. Yeltsin's most extreme measures came as three traumatic shocks to society. In 1991 he suddenly abolished the Soviet Union, the only country most Russians had ever known. (American opinion of that state isn't relevant to a serious analysis.) In 1992 his economic "shock therapy" took away the life savings and living standards of most Russian families. And in 1993, his tanks overthrew the elected Parliament and constitutional system previously presented to citizens as the legitimate post-Communist order.

Not surprisingly, Yeltsin's shock leadership utterly polarized Russian society, devastating all varieties of moderation and centrist in political life. Extremism always begets extremism. Yeltsin's policies led to the victory of the extreme nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky in the December elections, and to the sea changes under way in Russian politics today.

Recall now the American role in those events, even leaving aside any covert involvement. The U.S. government wildly ap-

pled Yeltsin's precipitate abolition of the Soviet Union without real concern for its psychological or bloody impact on ordinary citizens, including its potential for unleashing several civil wars in a land full of nuclear stockpiles and reactors. When his shock therapy then impoverished tens of millions of Russians (including prospective middle-class investors in economic privatization), our government urged him to do more of the same, scorning other pro-market but anti-Yeltsin economists for not being "real" reformers. When parliamentary opposition to Yeltsin grew in 1992 and 1993, the U.S. Administration echoed his charge that it was a "citadel of Red-Brown reaction," thus helping to undermine what Russian democratization needs most—an established Parliament and accepted opposition. The Clinton Administration then supported Yeltsin's first attempt to shut down the elected Parliament last March, shunned Russian moderates who tried to prevent a more fateful confrontation and cheered even more loudly when Yeltsin finally resorted to a tank-backed coup, thereby endorsing Russia's long antidemocratic tradition of unfettered executive power. And now that Yeltsin has contrived a new "constitution" without an authentic separation of powers, the Administration heralds it as a "democratic breakthrough"—evidently unaware that Russia has had many constitutions but never any sustained constitutionalism.

Given this dismal record, can there be any doubt that the intrusively missionary U.S. policy—supported no less enthusiastically by Congress, the media and many academic specialists—has both undermined our purposes in Russia and compromised our best values? The crusade to macromanage Russia's present and future (along with new suggestions by the Administration that it might try the same folly in Ukraine) must end, but what kind of policy should be adopted? The answer must be found this time in Russia, not in Washington, international banks or American universities.

Deeply wounded, polarized and angry, Russia desperately needs moderate, consensual, gradual reforms. Any more shocks will almost certainly send some rough beast slouching toward the Kremlin. A broad coalition of Russian moderates—"centrists" who see themselves trapped between Yeltsin and Zhirinovsky—is struggling to emerge as a political force capable of reshaping the reform process, with or without Yeltsin. To do so, its leaders will have to overcome their own past conflicts and future ambitions. Though Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's recent pledge to blend market economies with "the special characteristics of our state, people and Russian traditions" embraces their philosophy, for example, other important moderates, notably Valery Zorkin, the ousted chief justice of the Constitutional Court, have not forgiven his crucial role in Yeltsin's assault on the Parliament.

Nonetheless, some such moderate bloc is Russia's best hope, and possibly last chance, for democratic and market reform, even if it does not conform to U.S. dogmas about what that must mean. If so, it is also America's only hope for a Russia engaged in progressive change at home rather than a pursuit of lost power abroad.

But how will the Clinton Administration, which despite its devotion to centrism at home has been an opponent of moderation in Russian politics, react to any centrist opposition to Yeltsin's policies? If the Administration heeds the lessons of
its missionary failures in Russia, it will adopt a new and moderate principle of its own: The United States does not have the wisdom, right or power to intervene in Russia’s internal affairs; all attempts to do so will backfire perilously. On that principle, the United States will withdraw its excessive presence in Russia, cease its dogmatic sermons and dollar-laden ultimatums and encourage Russia to find its destiny, as it must, within its own circumstances and possibilities.

And when—or for pessimists, if—Russia finds its own way toward political and economic reform, even if it is not ours, the Clinton Administration will be able to give generous financial assistance, as it must, that is both productive and honorable.
A COLD PEACE WITH RUSSIA?
The Election’s Missing Issue

STEPHEN F. COHEN

For the first time in at least fifty years, in 1992 Russia was not an issue in an American presidential campaign—indeed, it was rarely even mentioned.

Given the corrupting influences of cold war politics over the years, the omission should be good news. Unfortunately, it was based on a misconceived and potentially dangerous assumption: that with the end of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia and the United States left behind all their decades-long conflicts and entered, as Presidents Boris Yeltsin and George Bush proclaimed at their summit meeting in June, “a new era of friendship and partnership.”

In reality, no such “era” is under way, and its proclamation at the highest political levels and in the media may well turn out to be another of the ideological myths that have prevented stable relations between the two nuclear-laden giants for so many years. Serious conflicts in U.S.-Russian relations are already on the political horizon, with important implications for domestic policy. None of the presidential candidates, including President-elect Clinton, even hinted how they might react, or noted the impact such tensions would have on their campaign promises.

The current image of post-Communist Russia as America’s new best friend and like-minded partner rests on many misconceptions, if not a general myopia, about post-Soviet developments. In most accounts, the image assumes Russian policies at home and abroad that are inspired and endorsed by the United States, or at least faithfully pro-American. It assumes, above all, that Russia is embracing Western-style democracy and capitalism, eschewing imperial behavior toward the other former Soviet republics and entering a de facto alliance with the United States in world affairs, including in the realm of nuclear weapons. All these areas of Russian decision-making today are characterized by complexities, contradictions and uncertain outcomes, but in none of them do recent trends fit prevailing American notions of what Russian policy is or ought to be. Consider the following:

The process of Russian democratization begun under former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev has progressed very little, if at all, since the collapse of the Communist Party and abolition of the Soviet Union last year. It may have even regressed, due in no small part to President Yeltsin’s expansive practice of ruling by decree and his campaign to re-create “strong executive power” at the expense of parliamentary and local government. Meanwhile, elites with little interest in further democratization have gained new power in the post-Communist political system and around Yeltsin himself, notably directors of monopolistic state economic enterprises and military-security officials.

At best, it might be said that democratization has been frozen for almost a year—not a good omen in a country with only fragmentary and fragile aspects of a real democratic process. Even leaving aside persistent authoritarian strains in elite and popular attitudes, Russia still lacks an authentic constitution, consensual separation of powers (or even tolerance) between the executive and legislative branches, an independent judiciary, regularly scheduled elections, a multiparty system, habits of civil political discourse and a free press capable of operating without state subsidies. Contrary to the views of American enthusiasts, few of Russia’s committed democrats any longer call the post-Communist order democratic. And even some of Yeltsin’s Russian supporters now deny that the democratic movement ever came to power under the Russian President.

The nuclear danger is greater today than it was under the Soviet regime.

In Russian economic life, the process of marketization is moving forward, however fitfully and painfully, but it hardly seems headed toward the “free-market capitalism” endorsed by Western cheerleaders. The leap-to-capitalism shock therapy inflicted on Russian society early this year by Yeltsin and his chief minister, Yegor Gaidar, at the urging of Western governments and banks and spearheaded by the International Monetary Fund has predictably failed to fulfill any of its reassuring promises. Instead, it has brought skyrocketing consumer prices, a further collapse of the ruble, impoverishment of most Russian families, plummeting industrial production and a continuing decline in popular support for liberal economic and political reform and for Yeltsin himself, the nation’s first and only popularly elected leader. (Several opinion polls give him barely 30 percent positive ratings, below those of his Vice President, Gen. Alexander Rutskoi, who has opposed shock-therapy policies from the start.)

Indeed, while Yeltsin continues to speak in a pro-capitalist idiom to his Western boosters, at home he is moving steadily away from Gaidarism and toward the very different program of its most formidable opponents, a coalition of state industrial and agricultural managers, nationalist military officers, former Communist Party reformers and lapsed radicals who have formed a political organization known as Civic Union. That program calls for a specifically Russian “mixed economy” and “regulated market,” looks admirably upon the

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"Chinese model" of gradual, state-guided economic reform and speaks contemptuously of the I.M.F. and the West's other would-be architects of Russia's future. With more than 90 percent of the economy still in state hands, Civic Union's policies would be progress in Russia, but not the kind insisted upon and expected in the United States.

Russia's relations with the other former Soviet republics, inside or outside the successor way-station known as the Commonwealth of Independent States, are not likely to resemble U.S.-Canadian relations any time soon, if ever. Despite raucous political disunion since 1991, powerful factors still bind many of the fourteen other former republics to Russia—particularly, irreplaceable economic ties, inescapable military realities and inalienable human bonds in the form of large ethnic diasporas and intermarriages. Not surprisingly, opinion polls show growing Russian nostalgia for the old union, while leaders of some of the non-Russian republics increasingly call for a new one. If these trends continue, the not unreasonable charge by opponents of the breakup that the Soviet Union did not in fact "collapse" in December 1991 but was conspiratorially abolished by Yeltsin and his allies in Ukraine and Belarus is likely to become a compelling issue in Russian politics.

No less important is the combustible combination of 25 million Russians living in former Soviet republics outside Russia and a Russian Army still encamped throughout those territories. In one way or another, that army has already been involved in at least four civil wars outside Russia—in Moldova, Georgia, Tajikistan and the Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. If the number and intensity of civil wars in the former republics grow, as seems likely, so will the imperial role of the Russian Army and thus the potential for renewed Russian hegemony. (Inexplicably, former Soviet Foreign Minister and current Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze's charge in October, "A war between Russia and Georgia in essence... is already under way," was scarcely reported in the U.S. media.) Elsewhere, elements of the Russian military in Estonia and Latvia, where large Russian minorities have been disfranchised, are itching for a fight; and on October 29 Yeltsin ordered a suspension of Russian troop withdrawals from the Baltics. Meanwhile, none of the potentially explosive conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, the second largest former republic, have yet been resolved or even defused.

American pundits and policy-makers attribute these examples of Soviet-like behavior to Russian "hard-liners," but such policies are supported in various ways by Russian leaders with some democratic credentials who are associated with Yeltsin. Vice President Rutskoi may be the government's most vocal defender of the army's role outside Russia, but even the head of Parliament's foreign affairs committee, Yevgeny Ambartsumov, a radical democrat who earlier broke with Gorbachev in favor of Yeltsin, now calls for a "Monroe Doctrine" that will give Russia hegemony over the entire former Soviet territory. That aspiration is growing among many leading Russians we call democrats, but will the United States accept its own historical relationship with Latin America as the model for post-Communist Russia's relations with its neighbors?

Finally, there is the preposterous notion that post-Communist Russia will now follow an Americanized policy in world affairs, as though only Marxist-Leninists could think up conflicts with the United States. In fact, Yeltsin's policies under Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev have been angrily criticized in many political quarters in Russia precisely because until recently they gave the appearance of being made-in-America. Again, U.S. commentators point to ex-Communists—who in power in Russia today is not one—and other "hard-liners," but the most telling critics have been leaders we identify as democrats, including Ambartsumov, the radical anti-Communist parliamentarian Oleg Rumyantsev, Yeltsin's high-level aide Sergei Stankevitch and even his impeccably democratic Ambassador to Washington, Vladimir Lukin, who recently protested the "infantile pro-Americanism" in Russian foreign policy.

As in domestic affairs, a struggle is under way over Russian foreign policy, but it is hard to imagine specific or general outcomes like those expected by American politicians and commentators. Despite President Bush's campaign boasts, none of the nuclear weapons problems once associated with the "Soviet threat" have actually been eliminated; they've only been papered over. The START II agreements, which if signed promise substantial reductions but require three former republics with strategic nuclear weapons to hand them over to Russia, will face a struggle for ratification in the Russian Parliament, and they are already the subject of profound second thoughts by the leadership of Ukraine, the most powerful of those republics. If the likelihood of ill-attended reactors and fugitive tactical weapons on former Soviet territories is added to this de facto proliferation, the nuclear danger is greater today than it was under the Soviet regime.

Is an anti-Communist government in Moscow enough to assuage American fears about that threat, once it becomes
known? The U.S. media amply reported and disapproved of Russia’s recent sale of strategic technology and weapons to China, Iran and India, but missed a more startling revelation, in September, by Russian Marshal Yevgeny Shaposhnikov. It turns out that Russia’s intercontinental missiles, which Yeltsin said he ordered retrofitted away from the United States early this year, have not been retrofitted, partly because, Shaposhnikov explained, the United States has not reciprocated. That position might be understandable, but it is not the reaction of a “friend and partner.” Nor was the warning in October by Yeltsin’s Defense Minister, Gen. Pavel Grachev, that Russia might resume nuclear testing in mid-1993 unless the United States adopts its own permanent test ban.

As for the larger international rivalry that divided the United States and the Soviet Union for so long, Russia will continue to pursue good relations with the Western powers, but will that be enough to satisfy American ideological expectations? As post-cold war divisions emerge between the United States and its NATO allies in Western Europe, Russia will have significant diplomatic and economic opportunities. It might find closer friends and better partners on its own continent. Nor should the symbolism of another recent development be overlooked. Yeltsin abruptly canceled his much-touted trip to Western Japan in September, but he will visit the last great Communist power, neighboring China, in December.

None of these “un-American” trends in Russian policy at home and abroad portend a renewal of the cold war, which was the product of historical factors that have largely passed. They do mean, however, that a U.S.-Russian relationship based on “friendship and partnership,” on the same national values and interests, is an exceedingly unlikely prospect. What is the alternative? Much depends, as before, on our own perceptions and reactions, and therein also lies a grave danger.

Most American thinking about Russia today, across the political spectrum, is based on a missionary premise that the United States can and should help convert that historically very different society into a replica of America. Of all Russia’s future possibilities, Americanization is not one of them. Recent developments there are not primarily the result of nefarious political intentions, poor understanding of markets and democracy or baneful hard-line influences but of deeply rooted traditions and intractable circumstances. One of those traditions, belief in the nation’s special destiny, is already inspiring a predictable political backlash against the West’s sponsorship of Yeltsin’s traumatic economic policies and the legions of American and other foreign “advisers” now swarming across Russia.

But what will be the reaction of our own opinion shapers and policy-makers when Russian realities explode the prevailing myths about America’s post-Communist friend and partner, as they soon will? If missionary dogmas persist, the American backlash is easy to foresee—at best, cynicism and indifference to Russia’s plight; at worst, a sense of betrayal and a revival of reflexive cold war attitudes. In either case, the first victim will be prospects for substantial reductions in U.S, defense spending, the “peace dividend” on which all three presidential candidates, especially President-elect Clinton, significantly based their economic promises.

The necessary alternative is the kind of common sense and plain talk that was so lacking in the presidential campaign. A reforming, stable Russia at peace with its neighbors is a crucial American interest, but such a Russia can find its way only within the limits of its own traditions and possibilities, not ours. Such a reformation does not need our political tutelage, but it is equally worthy of our financial support. If the United States cannot accept this first principle of post-Communism everywhere, the sequel to the cold war is likely to be a very cold peace.

**Nuclear Power for Women**

**Atom and Eve—A Love Story**

**Peter Grinspoon**

You've probably seen it on TV: an attractive, personable, intelligent woman identified as an engineer explaining her concerns about the environment and her maturing political views: “I want my kids to grow up in a healthy environment. ... When I was in college, I was against nuclear energy. But I’ve reached a different conclusion. [Nuclear energy] means cleaner air for the planet.”

The image then moves from her friendly, reassuring visage to the faces of her two young children, gleefully bounding through a green field toward a body of clear blue water.

Another thirty-second spot: a glistening pond, a lush grove of green trees and three shining, dome-shaped nuclear reactors. A father-and-son pair peacefully float by in their boat, fishing in solitude. Printed below this scene of bucolic bliss is the soothing slogan: “Nuclear Energy Means Cleaner Air.”

These pieces sound like public-service announcements. But, as the last frame in both ads shows, they are sponsored by the U.S. Council for Energy Awareness (U.S.C.E.A.), which, despite its official-sounding name, is a $21 million-plus public relations outfit financed by the nuclear power industry. These ads are part of a carefully crafted new strategy to resell nuclear power to the American public at a time when support for this technology is at an all-time low (surveys show 65 percent of those questioned oppose building more nuclear plants). According to internal U.S.C.E.A. documents recently leaked to Greenpeace, the industry is promoting nuclear energy as a clean “solution” to global warming, and, in this much-touted “Year of the Woman,” they are doing so by specifically targeting women.

“A good place to start could be at home,” concludes a December 1991 industry survey titled “The Gender Gap: Men, Women and Nuclear Energy,” conducted by Cambridge Reports/Research International for the U.S.C.E.A. According to this study, “Public opinion polls show that American women are less well-informed about nuclear energy than men...

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