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sequence of Manjana, the Endless Song (Pupils of the Skin) was the turning point of his career as a major work of contemporary Turkish literature. Manjana, the man-eating tiger, is recognized as a major work of postmodernism, expressing the breakdown of traditional family structures and the rise of individualism.

He is the author of several famous works, including "The Last Poet" and "The Japanese Poet." His poetry is impressionistic and often figures in Western heroes in his texts. In "Pilgrimage to the City," the six volumes of "Media Montages," and the trilogy "Gud & Gokke" (1992; God & Gokke), T.'s writing is a mosaic of fragmentary, flowing text with prose and poetry. The novel "Gud & Gokke" is a comedy about a middle-class urban life, with poems published in the first Turkish novel, "The Awakening," (1876), and wrote Huguesque tragedies with patriotic themes. Both Sinasi and Kemal took the position that the primary function of literature was the service to society, and what they preached in their essays, they practiced as poets as well. Reaction against utilitarianism in literature gained momentum in the 1880s when an art-for-art's sake movement arose. Sentimental lyricism replaced social concerns in the poetry of Rezai Sokmen (1847-1914) and of Abdihakim Huseyin (1852-1937). Both were committed Westernists, and Tarhan also wrote plays in imitation of Shakespearean and French neoclassical tragedies. The same period also witnessed a resurgence of traditionalism, while devoting polemics to new innovators and defenders of classical verse dominated the literary scene.

Such polemics continued throughout the 1890s; Westernists who gathered around the influential periodical "Arts-Flam" initiated a literary movement that took over poeinemes in French literature. Influenced by the Parnassians and SYMBOLISTS, the poets of this group experimented with new verse forms, including the prose poem. Fiction of the period, on the other hand, was dominated by a search for realism. The Turkish novel in the last quarter of the 19th c. reflected and documented the circumstances of rapid cultural and social change. Ahmet Mithat (1884-1912), who popularized the novel, employed the genre as a means of instructing the public. He defended the moral virtures of Turkish society but aimed to show the means of achieving material progress through imitating the European work ethic. Other novelists of the period shared similar concerns; they ridiculed the effete foppery of certain elite groups for whom Westernization simply meant fashionable dress, and they reflected on the breakdown of the traditional family structure as a result of modernization. The novel gained more depth and subtlety in the 1990s. The principles of naturalism and Zola's theories were first introduced in 1885, and novelists of the period shared similar concerns, they, too, were interested in the psychological dimension of characters and to the influence of environment on the personality. The search for realism culminated in Hali-Ziya Ufuk's "The Awakening" (1866-1945), which vividly depicts life in an upper-class Turkish mansion and tensions among the members of the family. By the turn of the century, Western genres had been adopted in Turkish literature, and the principal currents of literary modernism had begun taking shape. The development of Turkish poetry, fiction, and drama in the 20th c. has been closely connected with ideological movements.

Poetry

Nationalism as an ideology preceded the establishment of the Turkish Republic as a nation-state in 1923. In the face of the rapid disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and especially during the interwar period between 1910 and 1922, poetry was called upon to inculcate a sense of patriotism and national solidarity. National consciousness replaced Ottomanism, which had been a patriotic movement that called for the protection of the Ottoman Empire as a multilingual, multireligious, cosmopolitan entity. As a result, poets began turning to Turkish folklore as a source of inspiration. The quantitative meter borrowed from the Arabic was forsaken in favor of a poetic idiom appropriate to convey ideas.
of the simple syllabic meter of the minstrels. Nationalism also meant popanism, and poets began using pure conversational Turkish rather than the formal literary language called Ottoman, cultivated by the elite over several centuries, which relied heavily on Arabic and Persian vocabulary.

Two leaders of the nationalist vein were Mehmet Emin Yurdakul (1869-1944) and Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924). Yurdakul wrote verse in imitation of folk poetry laden with references to the accomplishments of the Turkish nation. Gökalp, who was also the father of Turkish sociology, aimed to convey the principles of nationalism through simple, didactic poems. Riza Tefik Balıkköghi (1849-1949), who defined literature as a manifestation of national conscience, was far more successful in capturing the essence of folkloric poetry, its themes as well as melodies; he was the first urban poet to use the syllabic meter of the minstrels with ease, and his poems contained vivid pictures of rural Anatolia.

The rising interest in folklore as the basis of the new poetry culminated in the work of Orhan Seyfi Orhun (1890-1972), Enis Behş Koydürük (1881-1949), Halit Fahri Orhan (1891-1971), Yusuf Ziya Onaş (1895-1967), and Farka Nazih Çamhâvel (1898-1973). All five began their careers under the influence of nationalism and were encouraged by nationalist leaders. Although their success as poets varied, they collectively confirmed that poetry could be written in a simple language and address itself to the popular taste. The combined influence of folklore and nationalism thus set a major trend that continued through the 1940s. The poems of Kemalettin Kamu (1901-1948), Ahmet Kutsi Tecer (1901-1967), Ömer Bedrettin Üsâk (1904-1946), and Behçet Kemal Çağlar (1908-1969) are inspired by a romantic sense of attachment to the land and to the people.

The trend of employing folkloric themes in literature was encouraged by the government. The state aimed at fostering a strong sense of national identity, and as a part of its nation-building program, People's Houses were established. In 1921, as the cultural arm of the ruling Republican People's Party, the People's Houses replaced the Turkish Hearths, founded earlier to disseminate nonliterary, semiofficial Turkish. The People's Houses served as social and cultural centers, and provided financial assistance to the artistic community. In 1932 the semiofficial Turkish Language Society was established, it helped accelerate the language reform movement and encouraged poets in their search for a national idiom through the use of nonliterary, spoken Turkish.

The result, however, was not a domination of poetry by ideological trends. For many of the young poets who began publishing in the first two decades of the Republic, the language reform and the rejection of classical verse forms provided a means for experimentation and new departures. The questions of love, death, and time, and of deep psychological urges versus material aspects of human existence were explored in the poems of Ahmet Hamdi Tanpinar (1901-1962), Necip Fazıl Kısakağlı (b. 1905), Cahit Sökti Tarancı (1910-1956), and Ziya Osman Saha (1910-1957).

Meanwhile, the burden of the past was not to be ignored. Three of the young poets who began publishing during the War of Independence (1920-22) were adopted as the Turkish national anthem in 1921. But ironically, because of disagreement with the secular principles of the Republic, the Turkey in 1924 and lived in Egypt until a few months before his death. His most interesting poems are those that depict lower-middle-class urban life, and he was the last craftsman who could make common people speak through the intricate metrics and rhyme scheme of classical verse. Ahmet Hâşir (1884-1955) continued the trend of symbolism begun in the 1890s; he made a major contribution to this movement through his effective word choice, his eros, and his use of food imagery. Yâhya Kemal Beyatli (1884-1958), a neoclassicist, imitated the masters of the Ottoman and Persian classical tradition in a significant portion of his work, but his best-known poems are those that capture various scenes of İstanbul. His nationalism manifested itself not only in his preference for classical diction but also in his nostalgic references to the glories of the Ottoman Empire. The works of these poets constituted the only strong link between tradition and modernity in Turkish literature.

Nâzım Hikmet was a true revolutionary in several senses of the word. He embraced communism as a student in Moscow in the early 1920s and began writing poems celebrating the struggle of the workers, peasants, and colonial peoples against imperialism. He spent several years in prisons in Turkey, was deported to the Soviet Union, where he died in exile. Hikmet, under the influence of Vladimir Mayakovsky, revolutionized Turkish poetry, introducing free verse, thereby paving the way for a poetic idiom free from formal constraints. He was, however, a master craftsman, who employed to advantage all the possibilities that the language could accommodate. Hikmet was above all a lyricist and a humanist; he wrote a number of intimate love poems, and his revolutionary poems reflect his love for the people.

The appearance of Garip (1941; strange), a small anthology consisting of poems by Orhan Veli Kasap (1914-1950), Osmana Rıfat (b. 1914), and Melih Çevdet Anadat (1910-1947) was a prelude to a free verse movement. The volume reflected the revulsion of many of the young poets who began publishing in the 1920s against the formal constraints imposed by the classical teachers of the 19th century. The works of these poets constituted the only strong link between tradition and modernity in Turkish literature.

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The individual was not neglected in the work of several poets who rejected social realism in favor of probing the individual's response to life. In Bəḥəq NASİC'TƏƏ's work, the feelings of hope and despair in the face of life's vicissitudes are explored. At different stages of their careers, Cemal Şahısır and Turgut Uyar (b. 1927) have explored psychological states, sexual urges, and attitudes toward the social and natural environment; Uyar has also experimented with traditional forms while eschewing antiquated vocabulary and classic meters. The influence of surrealism also remained and can be discerned in the technique and imagery employed by Ece Ayağın (b. 1931) and Ülku Taner (b. 1937). The publicized development of Turkish poetry thus continues, while younger poets explore different approaches and achieve new syntheses.

With the rise of nationalism in the first decades of the 20th c., just as poets turned to folkloric themes and forms, novelist and short story writers also began shifting the focus of fiction away from the upper-class life of the capital to the rural hinterland. A populist-nationalist movement began in 1911 with the initial publication in Salonica of a literary magazine, *Görün*, whose editors defended the use of the vernacular in literature and rejected a literary language separate from the spoken Turkish of the people. The leading writer of this group, Ömer Seyfettin (1884-1920), wrote anecdotal stories in which he captured the lifestyle and mentality of people in urban neighborhoods and rural areas. In this respect, his work complemented the trend of concrete realism as earlier by Hikmet Rıza Gürpinar (1864-1944) and Ahmet Rasim (1864-1932), who portrayed humorous aspects of Istanbul life by caricaturing representative types. Both in his humorous vignettes and stories with nationalistic themes, however, Seyfettin aimed to present and defend the true values and virtues of Turkish society.

The transformation from empire to nation state and the attendant changes in society captured the imagination of novelists in the early decades of the Republic. Halide Edib ADinski wrote about traditionalist communities as well as the emerging modern society; she also wrote sagas of the War of Independence. Yakup Kadri KARADONMUĞLU's novels as a whole portray and document the transformation of Turkish society in the first half of the 20th c. His broad, panoramic view encompasses such themes as the breakdown of the traditional family, the changing political life, and the distance between urban and rural culture. The pathological aspects of the clash between conservative, traditionalist groups and ultra-modernist elements were examined by Peyami Safa (1889-1961). The title of his novel *Fatih Harbiyesi* (1931; *Fatih-Haribey*), which concerns the syndrome of incompatibility between socially and culturally opposed segments of society, is the old part of Istanbul—lower-middle-class and traditional; Harbiye is a newer section—upper-middle-class, posh, Westernized.

No single current or trend has dominated Turkish poetry since the 1960s, while experiments and departures in different directions have resulted in its enrichment. Regardless of fashionable currents and countercurrents, social engagement continued to be a strong trend. One of the leading contemporary poets, Fazıl HıSAR's (b. 1926) notable work has been his depiction of the existence of poverty and injustice, of the maltreatment of the disenfranchised, and even of the American involvement in Vietnam. In his *Popular Çikayı* (1922; *The Autobiography of a Turkish Girl*, 1949), Reşat Nuri Güntekin (1889-1956).sym to several of his generation. His stories were critical of the capitalist developments in Turkey but also focused on the plight of the poor. His condemnation of the capitalist development and the theme of private property to be taken over by an influential person. The individual's alienation, the isolation of the poor, and the struggle for existence are depicted. Social reality was taken up by a new generation of writers, among whom were younger people with rural backgrounds who had been educated in the Village Insitutes—teacher-training schools established as a part of the educational mobilization program. They knew only too well the unpleasant realities of village life—the undertakings of the landlord and the sharecropper, the social and political life in villages and small towns: *Menteket Hijayeleri* (stories from the country). Others approached Anatolian culture in a more modernist, more 'free verse,' thereby paving the way for a new poetic idiom shorn of all artifice. In general, realism as a narrative mode and modernism in Turkish literature.

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In the same period, interest in Anatolia increased, and many urban novelists attempted to discover the rural heartland of the nation. Prior to World War I, only two authors had written about the village. In 1919 Reşit Hikmet Kamy (1888-1965), who had spent time in Anatolia as a political exile, published his first collection of realistic stories depicting life in villages and small towns: *Menteket Hijayeleri* (stories from the country). Others approached Anatolian culture in a more modernist, more 'free verse,' thereby paving the way for a new poetic idiom shorn of all artifice. In his *Popular Çikayı* (1922; *The Autobiography of a Turkish Girl*, 1949), Reşat Nuri Güntekin (1889-1956) focused on the plight of the poor. His condemnation of the capitalist development and the theme of private property to be taken over by an influential person. The individual's alienation, the isolation of the poor, and the struggle for existence are depicted. Social reality was taken up by a new generation of writers, among whom were younger people with rural backgrounds who had been educated in the Village Insitutes—teacher-training schools established as a part of the educational mobilization program. They knew only too well the unpleasant realities of village life—the undertakings of the landlord and the sharecropper, the social and political life in villages and small towns: *Menteket Hijayeleri* (stories from the country). Others approached Anatolian culture in a more modernist, more 'free verse,' thereby paving the way for a new poetic idiom shorn of all artifice. In general, realism as a narrative mode and modernism in Turkish literature.

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and humor absurd situations and eccentric types encountered in the cosmopolitan milieu. Turkish humor found its spokesmen in Arif MEHIN, the prolific satirist of international fame who continues to poke fun at ludicrous aspects of everyday life and to assault the absurdities of officialdom.

Realists began to explore new possibilities and techniques in the 1960s and 1970s. Kemal Fahal (1910-1973), who started out as a village novelist, gradually turned to the historical novel as a means to explain the background of present social conditions. Several of his works dwell on the formation of social classes and groups in the recent past, but in his controversial Dervet Ane (1967, mother state) he attempted to present a panoramic view of the emergence of the Ottoman state in the 13th c. Asta JAHAN began his career as a poet who successfully combined social realism with an epicmatic outlook. Since the 1960s, however, he has written fiction in which the social and political climate of early-20th-c. Turkey are compellingly and vividly portrayed.

Two women novelists have made significant contributions to the realistic novel. Sevgi SOYAL (1935-1976) treated the differences between social classes through representative types; Asalet AGOGLU has depicted social and political currents as reflected in the experience of the individual. Another woman writer, Furzan [Selcuk] (b. 1935), has achieved fully developed character analysis within the framework of the short story. The regionism of the village novel has been continued in the work of Bekir YILDIR (b. 1933), who depicted the harsh and ruthless conditions of the rural southeast. However, he has also dealt with the cultural alienation, loneliness, and discrimination experienced by Turkish guest workers in West Germany, a topic that is increasingly coming into vogue among young Turkish writers, some of whom live in West Germany.

Realism has been the mainstream of modern Turkish fiction, although there have been some notable attempts at abstract explorations of the states of mind through the use of the stream-of-consciousness technique.

Drama

Modern Turkish dramas owe much to municipal and state support of theatrical activity. Most of the repertoire of European-style playhouses established in the 19th c. consisted of translations, while Turkish authors attempted to grasp the techniques of playwriting and insisted on a broad variety of Western dramatic genres. In 1914 the Istanbul Municipal Theater was established. Since the 1930s there has been governmental encouragement and support of playwriting and production through the People's House and State Theaters. The 1950s saw an upsurge of theatrical activity, in numerous private companies were formed. Since then, however, economic conditions and competition from the television and film industries have increased the dependence of repertory theaters on public support.

Playwriting in Turkey has yet to catch up with poetry and fiction on the one hand, and with the number, and quality of theater companies that remain dependent on translations on the other. The majority of plays written before the 1960s consisted of war and melodrama, although a few distinguished authors experimented with psychological drama, avant-garde plots, and folkloric themes. The scope of dramatic writing has broadened over the last two decades as playwrights have begun treating a variety of themes explored by novelists. Paralleling the novel, plays by Necati CUMALI and Cahit ATAY (b. 1925) constitute dramatic versions of protest literature. Social criticism has also been presented in comedies and satires, notably in the works of Cevat FEHİM (1908-1971) and Aziz NISAN. Vahan ASI (b. 1922), Orhan GÖRLU (b. 1925), and Gündüz DİLMEN have successfully used plays based on Osmanian history, folklore, and myth. Haldun TANR's Keşan Ali destan (1964: The Ballad of A Keshan, 1976), a musical in the vein of BRECHT's Threepenny Opera, was an outstanding achievement of the early 1960s. Contemporary playwrights continue their explorations in several directions while they supply the stage with plays ranging from musical comedies to bitter-exposés of the human condition.

See also under Cypriot Literature and Yugoslav Literature for non-Turkish writing in Turkey, see Armenian Literature, Assyrian Literature.


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Turkish Literature since 1980

The 1980s were an eventful decade in Turkey: ideological and economic turmoil, repressive military regime, multiparty parliamentary system dominated by a single party, transition to open market economy, restoration of democratic freedoms. Literature experienced, within ten years, the worst repression and the worst freedom. While academic freedom remained curtailed to some extent in the 1990s, literature enjoyed a virtually unprecedented ability to deal with any themes and ideas, including those that have sometimes brought indictments to literary figures in the past. Consequently, in the 1980s, drama draws to a close. Turkish literature enjoys ideological and erotic openness and brave innovations in substance, structure, and style. Its diversity seems wider and broader than ever.

Poetry

Many of the prominent modern poets, including Fazıl HAMDIOGÜL, DADRACCA, Mith Erdal ANDAY, Necati CUMALI, Ulaş BERK, and others, continue to be prolific and to explore new creative dimensions. DADRACCA, often referred to as "Turkey's leading living poet," published in the 1980s hundreds of lyric and philosophical poems remarkable for their luminosity. Anday pursued his writing in Near Eastern mythology as well as modern mythopoesis, while Cumali achieved ever stronger synthesis of social concerns and...
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private sensibilities. Berk, a foremost experimenter since the 1950s, produced several volumes, each one of which represents a striking innovation of poetic technique.

Several poets, highly promising in the previous two decades, published their potential. Of these, perhaps the most productive was Odemir Ince (b. 1936), who published several volumes of his new powerful poems and translations of Akhmatova, Lautekasten, Char, and others. In 1981, Ince became a member of the Malatya Academy, and organized the First Istanbul International Poetry Festival (1991). Ince’s poems, full of fresh evocations, metaphors, and compelling human drama, exhibit an admirable virtuosity. One of his major accomplishments is a four-volume anthology of modern world poetry, which he edited together with Atas Usatoglu (b. 1942), who also achieved premier status in the 1980s with extensively crafted poems of love, exile, and protest.

Ahmet Oktay (b. 1933) stands as one of contemporary Turkey’s greatest intellectual poets and masters of literary theory. His poetry draws on the features of the best work of Wallace Stevens and T.S. Eliot. Himi Yavuz (b. 1936) enjoys considerable esteem for his stimulating blend of traditional Turkish aesthetic values and many of the values of European poetry. Perhaps the most original of the young Turkish poets is Ece Ayhan, who is recognized for his imaginative distortions of syntax, for calculated dissonance, and uncanny alignments. Sabahattin Kudret Akad (b. 1920-1993), by contrast, is a poet of lucidity even when he deals with elusive themes. Between 1965 and 1996, several prominent poets died: Edip Ceneri (1914-1998), Turgut Uyar (1927-1985), Ismail Elek (1927-1985), Turgut Sayar (1930-1989), Cemal Sayin (1931-1990), and Sabahattin Kudret Akad, all of whom had introduced Turkey to new dimensions of poetic experience. In the early 1990s, ideologies and social protest became less of a factor among Turkish poets compared with their dominance from 1960 to 1980. Nonetheless, political commitment continues to motivate many socialists, including Gulten Akin (b. 1933), Turkey’s leading woman poet.

Neorealism, which was in vogue as an antidote to the social realism of the pres-1980 period, seems to have lost much of its appeal. Essentially, Turkish poetry has entered an era when no specific school or movement prevails. Also, there is a growing group of poets, including many young ones, who are creating original poems inspired by some of the basic values and aesthetic norms of classical Ottoman verse. Neoclassicism, which attempts to keep alive the aesthetic forms and the poetry of that tradition, is still going strong.

Fiction

A restless quest for fresh techniques and textures has characterized Turkish novels and short stories since the early 1980s. As the so-called “village novels” of the earlier decades steadily lost ground, writers began to respond more readily to the modern fiction of Europe, the U.S., and Latin America. Translation activity, mainly from English and French, has gained momentum—as well as producing impact through the translation of translated works. Yavuz KEMAL, still Turkey’s strongest Nobel candidate, has continued to write the saga of his southwestern Anatolian region in ten volumes of Ince Memed (slim Memed), the first volume of which was translated into English as Memed, My Hawk (1963), and translated into Istanbul (1974); The Lords of Akchasaz: Murder at the Inquisition Market (1979). Much of Kemal’s fiction since the late 1970s has dealt with fishing communities and urban life. His books are being translated into numerous languages at an impressive rate. Most recent English translations, all by Talda Kemal, include AtCreats Seyyid Selim as Sazgi (1981), Denis Kevii (1978) as The Sea-Crusted Fisherman (1984), Krupa de Gun (1978) as The Birds Have Also Gone (1987), and Yolanda Olds (1976) as To Crush the Serpent (1991).

The legendary satirist Aziz NASIR died in 1985, leaving behind over ninety books of short stories, essays, poems, and novels. Saim continues to fire the imagination of the Turkish public. Sales of humorous books (many of them with illustrations and cartoons) enjoy more substantial sales than virtually all other genres—and a whole new generation of humorists and satirists has emerged in recent years.

A remarkable development in fiction is the ascendancy of a large group of woman writers. This group, which includes Adalat AGAOGU, Toros Uyar (b. 1941), Fuar Kili (b. 1943), Naz Eser (b. 1945), Leyli Edlbi (b. 1941), Seren Denk (1943-1993), Furukan, Gulten Dayoglu (b. 1935), Ayla Kutuk (b. 1938), and others, has brought vitality to novelistic techniques. Ayseg Ulukan (b. 1942) has produced stories drawn from the experiences of the Turkish guest workers in Germany; one of her books is available in English translation: The Prizing Over (1988, trans. by Cela Kerlek). A first novel, Sergiis arsos (slim; 1983; dear, shameless death) by Latic Tekin (b. 1951), burst on the literary scene with a gripping narrative and a brave new language steeped in quaint provincial expressions and an unconventional urban lingo. Haunted by many critics as nothing short of a small masterpiece, the Tekin novel documents the trials and tribulations of a rural family struggling to survive in the big city.

The 1980s also witnessed the meteoric rise of Orhan Pamuk (b. 1952). His first novel, Ceyda Bey ve Ajgunlar (1982; Ceyda Bey and his sons), a family saga reminiscent of Thomas MANN’s Buddenbrooks, is a sprawling conventional narrative. Suvici ev (1983; the silent house) is a powerful Faulknerian novel and winner of the 1984 Madoz Award. Pamuk’s Boyz's Tale (1995) has been a major success not only in Turkey but also in the English-speaking world where it came out in 1991 as The White Castle, translated by Victoria Holbook, winning extensive praise from American critics (the New York Times, Joan Updike in the New Yorker, and many others). It is perhaps the most successful postmodernist Turkish novel. So in Istanbul in the 17th c., it depicts the confrontation and merger of East and West in the persons of a young Italian and a Turkish intellectual who cooperate and sometimes compete to find solutions for the Ottoman state. Pamuk’s huge novel of 1996, entitled Ken Kip (black book), which went through a dozen printings in one year, has established him as one of Turkey’s great novelists. It is a masterful intellectual exercise in postmodernist fiction with vivid and exotic characters and an omnivorous plot.

Mobat Corporation’s prestigious Pegasus Prize, however, for the best novel published in Turkey between 1980 and 1990, went to Bilge Karasu (1933-1995) for his intriguing novel Gece (1985; night). Karasu, a master of the力AM-OF-CONSCIOUSNESS technique and a connoisseur of modern myths, shares with Fethi Edigu (b. 1916), Selm Ufek (b. 1949), Murathan Mungan (b. 1955), and others a sublime aesthetics of narration and character portrayal.

The Turkish novel is currently enjoying a period of quest for refiguration based on an awareness of the best of world literature and the private and social crises of Turks at home and abroad.
**Drama**

Theater is vibrant in Turkish cities—with hundreds of plays, native and foreign, produced by the state, city, and independent theaters. Regional theatrical activity has also gained momentum. Turkish playwrights have fervently written about historical, mythological, and contemporary subjects in a wide variety of dramatic forms. A. Turan Olfaçoğlu and Orhan Asena are among the leading figures of historical drama. Olfaçoğlu has concentrated on Ottoman sultans in plays that have a Shakespearean structure and tone. Şenol Ülmen is a foremost playwright who has dealt with ancient myths and many phases of Turkish and non-Turkish history.

A major figure to emerge in the 1980s is Mehmet Baydar (b. 1953), whose ingenious plots, whimsical characters, and rich and sometimes lyrical dialogue have made his plays popular in Turkey and, some, in translation, in France. Güneyli beyan (1984; southern lady) by the woman playwright Bilgesu Erenes (b. 1943) attracted considerable attention. It is a poignant play based on the life of the woman playwright Bilgesu Erenes (b. 1943) who was imprisoned for her political activities.

As the 20th c. draws to a close, Turkish literature shows both maturity and a restless energy to introduce new creative dimensions. It seems secure and confident about its authentic cultural identity, and eager to embrace influences from abroad and to generate new aesthetic values from within its own resources.


—TALAT SATT HALMAN

## TURKMEN LITERATURE

During the first two decades of the 20th c. oral poetry continued to dominate Turkmen literature, although written verse, by those educated mainly in Bukhara and Khiva, dates from at least the 18th c. A transitional figure, Muhammed Qilch (1885-1922), combined traditional themes with lament over the hard life and social injustice. His long poem *Bichare* (before 1917; the passion) describes the unhappiness of a young woman in marriage for a large bride price. That plight of women in Central Asian society occurred often in literature of the early part of the century, as can be seen in Agathan Dadji's (1904-1967) stories "Birgit pejesinde bir gül" (1927; a beauty in the eagle's talons) and "Bagdada gül Bagdada" (1928; lucky girl in Baghdad).

The new medium of prose was quickly adopted by the poets Boffi, Karababa-oglu (Russian: Karababa) (1904-1974) and Ata Govahut (1903-1953), the former mainly for short stories and novels, the latter for dramas like *Gandi jenggel* (1925; bloody double wedding). Kerbaba, in the long story *Guruhkili* (1932; stories of central wedding) and other writings, also turned to the topic of the status of women.

Many Turkmen, including Kerbaba, the poet and composer, became acquainted with European forms of theater and poetry, and the leading figures of historical drama. His long poem *Bagdatda* (1926; flames of hope), soon performed in Stalin's palace, attracted numerous Turkmen writers who admired the German playwright's capacity for satire and for denouncing the cruelty, injustice, and oppression of the state's organization to the topic of the status of women.

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POLICY PLANNING STAFF (S/P)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Date:

TO: Ted Widmer

FROM: Justin Leites
Office of Speechwriting
202-647-9943

MESSAGE: Ton thought this might be useful to you for the Turkey speech - see page 6

Number of pages (incl. cover sheet): 10
REMARKS BY
SECRETARY OF STATE MADELEINE K. ALBRIGHT
TO THE INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION

New York, New York
October 14, 1999

Thanks, Allan. When Allan was Associate Dean of the Georgetown School of Foreign Service, in the early 1980’s, he helped recruit me to teach there. Over the years, he’s been a wonderful colleague and friend. So when he invites me to dinner, I show up.

But given this institution and this audience, it was an easy sell. Henry Kaufman, Garrick Utley, our distinguished co-chairs, honorees, guests and friends, I am delighted to be here.

I am a fan of the IIE for many job-related reasons, but I have a personal one, as well. When my family first came to America, my father, who had been a Czech diplomat, needed to find a new line of work. Ben Charrington -- a patron saint of IIE -- helped him obtain a teaching position at the University of Denver. There, my father thrived and so did our family. For us, IIE has always been a synonym for opportunity.

Of course, there are many other families around the world who have equally good cause to thank this institution. For eight decades, the IIE has been the world’s leader in promoting the exchange of people and the sharing of ideas.

Founded in the aftermath of war, to help prevent war, it is dedicated to the premise that people who understand and know each other better are less likely to hate and attack each other. That requires a certain faith in human
character; a faith without which no human progress could be achieved.

Speaking of faith, I just want to say to those who may have followed the recent, all too brief, debate on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that we will not give up. The Treaty is in our interests. As President Clinton said last night, "the fight is far from over." And as Winston Churchill said years ago, "Americans can always be counted upon to do the right thing--after all other possibilities have been exhausted." In the meantime, we will continue to refrain from nuclear explosive tests, and encourage others to do so, as well.

The nuclear treaty aside, tonight's dinner comes at an exciting time for me as Secretary of State. That is because at the beginning of this month, the Department merged with the United States Information Agency.

This was no mere bureaucratic re-shuffling. It reflects our understanding that, in today's world, public diplomacy must be an integral part of our foreign policy from the moment initiatives are conceived to the day they are fully executed. I am pleased that tonight we are joined by our newly-sworn-in Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Evelyn Lieberman.

I call your attention, as well, to the presence of Alice Ilchman, now Chairman of the Board of the Rockefeller Foundation, and formerly Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs.

As these leaders can attest, public diplomacy matters because, in this day and age, we cannot simply assume that America's policies and intentions will be understood. Public diplomacy helps us to tell our side of the story; to clarify intentions; provide explanations; and rebut lies.

It also enables us to spread more broadly the good news of democracy.

About the time the IIE was founded, British author H.G. Wells wrote that "history [is] a race between education and catastrophe." Helping people to value democratic principles of tolerance and openness is a good way to aid us all in winning that race.
That is why our international scholarship, exchange and visitor programs are such a vital component of our public diplomacy. And for decades, the IIE has successfully administered the best of these programs, including the Fulbright and Humphrey fellowships.

I have a deep commitment to these programs because I have seen them work. When I was at Georgetown, I participated in seminars that included future prime ministers and presidents from Europe, Asia and Latin America.

This year, Allan tells me that the IIE is training lawyers from Russia; economists from South Africa; public administrators from Eastern Europe; and environmental professionals from India. That is an impressive amount of history in the making.

While these initiatives focus on specific areas of expertise, they also improve the climate for respecting basic human rights.

In relatively closed societies, IIE programs provide a rare chance to establish outside contacts and explore wonderfully dangerous ideas—such as freedom.

In transitional countries, they provide a means of educating future leaders about the nuts and bolts of democratic institutions.

And in every nation they touch, they help open the door of opportunity to minorities and women.

The benefits to the United States are clear as well. These ventures improve our understanding of other cultures, and make friends for us worldwide.

In consequence, I am absolutely committed to preserving the integrity of these programs. They are by law and by right non-political. They are not pork; they are pure gold—and we must manage them as the precious assets to American interests and values they are.

The Institute for International Education is dedicated to the exchange of knowledge and the pursuit of truth. Tonight, I want to say a few words—in the context of American foreign policy—about the closely-related subjects of free press and free expression.
It is especially appropriate to do so here in New York, the free speech capital of the world; where, to paraphrase Shakespeare, some are born with opinions, some develop opinions, and all have opinions thrust upon them.

It is also appropriate because the IIE is a champion of free expression, training journalists in many key countries.

But even more important, freedom of speech and expression are fundamental to the principles and values that America promotes around the world.

The Universal Declaration on Human Rights provides that everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and to impart and receive ideas through the media. The very importance of this right is what causes dictators to want to suppress it. For to dictators, the truth is often inconvenient—and sometimes a mortal threat.

That is why so often they try to grab the truth and leash it like a dog, ration it like bread, or mold it like clay. Their goal is to create their own myths, conceal their own blunders, direct resentments elsewhere and instill in their people a dread of change.

Consider, for example, Serbia. For years, Slobodan Milosevic, now an indicted war criminal, has fed his people lies, while repressing and terrorizing those who sought the truth. Slavko Curuvija, a newspaper owner and critic of Milosevic, was murdered this spring—after being harassed repeatedly by Serb authorities. Other independent voices, such as the opposition newspaper Glas Javnosti, have also been fined or temporarily shut down.

In Cuba, it is hard for an honest person to get on a soapbox without having it yanked out from beneath. Numerous correspondents, including Raul Rivero and Manuel Gonzalez Castellanos, have been arrested or detained for directly or indirectly criticizing Fidel Castro.

In Belarus, the government closed down newspapers two weeks ago after one published a story about a cabinet minister's construction of a luxurious summer home.
In Syria, the government arrested human rights journalist Nizar Nayyouf back in 1992. He is now near death after years of solitary confinement, torture, and neglect.

Even in somewhat more open societies, criticizing the powers that be can be hazardous to your health and livelihood.

For instance, in Zimbabwe, two journalists, Mark Chavunduka and Ray Choto, were arrested, tortured and are now on trial for reporting on an alleged army plot to remove President Mugabe.

In Croatia, journalist Orlanda Obad is being prosecuted for writing about the financial holdings of President Tudjman’s family. More than 900 other Croatian journalists currently face civil or criminal charges.

In Peru, television station owner Baruch Ivcher was stripped of his citizenship and forced into exile for reporting on allegations of government abuses including illegal wiretapping and torture.

Governments that respond to hostile or investigative reporting with threats and prosecutions betray their own insecurity and misuse power. No society can advance very far unless its government is accountable; and governments are not accountable unless journalists are able to do their jobs.

It is true that reporters and independent broadcasters are capable of abusing their rights; of poisoning the airwaves by inciting hate, spreading fear and telling lies. We have seen that happen this decade in, among other places, Rwanda.

Press codes that establish standards of professionalism and accountability can be a vital safeguard. And authorities should have the right to rebut, correct, and argue with their critics. But they do not have the right simply to silence them.

This is a point we make to all countries, including friends and allies.

In Ukraine, for example, we are concerned by apparent efforts to hinder news coverage of opposition candidates in
the current Presidential campaign. Federal authorities have frozen the bank accounts of the television station STB, which has a reputation for unbiased reporting, thereby forcing the station to curtail political and other programming.

And earlier this year, in Turkey, a journalist named Nadire Mater published a book of interviews with soldiers that was banned for allegedly insulting the military. The author faces a possible six-year prison sentence.

It must be emphasized, however, that there has been noteworthy progress on human rights in Turkey since Prime Minister Ecevit, with whom I met recently in Washington, came to power. For example, in August, the Turkish parliament suspended the sentences of some journalists convicted for speech-related offenses. This is a step in the right direction, and we will continue to encourage further progress.

Around the world, Americans may be proud that our diplomats regularly stress the importance of free speech and a free press. Both publicly and privately, we urge that the rights of journalists and other reporters be respected.

One place where we have made a special effort is Kosovo. This is a region where past efforts to control and misuse information contributed to a terrible harvest in suffering and blood.

That is why creating a climate in which a free and independent media could operate was a priority for NATO and the UN in the aftermath of the conflict earlier this year.

Today, thanks in part to American assistance, Kosovo has six daily newspapers and more than 20 radio stations, reflecting a wide range of editorial viewpoints. One influential publisher--Veton Surroi--has been particularly courageous in championing the cause of better relations between ethnic Albanians and Serbs.

As we scan the horizon, we see the ongoing problems of intolerance in the Balkans, and the obstacles to a free press created by organized crime in Russia. We see the clashes in Iran and China between those who favor greater
openness and those who fear it, and the tendency in so many countries still to censor ideas, rather than debate them.

We are reminded daily that the quest for free expression must confront many hurdles and remains a long distance race. But with H.G. Wells’ aphorism in mind, we must, and will, continue to educate, advocate and insist that global norms be respected.

Before closing, I want to say just a word about resources.

Public diplomacy, international exchanges and support for human rights all cost money.

Unfortunately, over the past five years, the funds we annually invest in international affairs have declined by roughly twenty percent from the prior five year period.

And what has been a very bad situation is now at risk of becoming much worse.

Last week, Congress voted to slash President Clinton’s Fiscal Year 2000 budget request for foreign affairs by $2 billion. This does not include another $2.6 billion in emergency needs that we have identified since the President’s budget was prepared. The result is a clear and present danger to American interests and a potential shortfall so large that it could become nearly impossible for me to do my job.

The message we are sending back to Congress is that this is simply not acceptable. The President has vowed to veto the inadequate appropriations bill. And we will insist that our international affairs programs, including public diplomacy, be treated fairly in the final budget negotiations this fall.

Many Americans are surprised when I tell them that the amount we allocate for foreign affairs is equal only to about one penny of every dollar the Federal government spends. But in many situations, diplomacy is our first line of defense in preventing war, defusing crises, and building peace.
And foreign policy is one of our government's most basic responsibilities. So I hope we will have your support in assuring that America has the resources required to lead.

Finally, let me emphasize how strongly I feel about the issues I have discussed tonight. When I was in graduate school, I wrote my thesis on the role of the media in Czechoslovakia before and during what came to be called Prague Spring.

In the 1980's, as a professor, I watched the freedoms promised by the Helsinki Accords inspire writers such as Andrei Sakharov and Vaclav Havel and help erode the foundations of Communism in Central Europe and the Soviet Union.

And as UN Ambassador and Secretary of State, I have come into contact with courageous men and women throughout the world who still strive at great cost and risk to report and broadcast the facts.

These heroes remind me of the old story about the wavering dissident in a repressive regime who tells his friend: "It is because I have children, I dare not speak out." To which his friend replies, "it is because I have children, I dare not remain silent."

I am proud that throughout this century, America has been the world's leading defender of every person's right, everywhere, to speak, write, publish and broadcast freely and without fear.

I am proud that America pioneered the notion that public diplomacy should be based not on self-serving fictions, but rather on openness and truth.

Finally, I am proud to count myself among the friends and admirers of the Institute for International Education. In the year you were founded, Woodrow Wilson was President, the reigning World Series champions were the Boston Red Sox, and the Secretary of State had a moustache.

Since then, over eight decades, the Institute for International Education has been a mighty instrument of information and an agent of understanding, fostering peace and reminding us all that what counts most are not the
distinctions of culture, nationality and language that divide us, but rather the common humanity that binds us.

For all you have done, I congratulate you.

For all you are doing and will do, I salute you.

And for your attention and welcome here tonight, I thank you all very much.
Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott  
Remarks to the U.S.-EU Conference  
"Bridging the Atlantic: People-to-People Links"  
Washington, D.C., May 6, 1997  
U.S. Department of State

Text As Delivered

The U.S., the EU, and Our Common Challenges

Thank you, Ambassador Ruperez, for that kind introduction. As President of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Spanish Parliament, as Spain's first Ambassador to NATO, as a negotiator who helped to craft the Helsinki Final Act, you are the personification of the European side of the transatlantic relationship that is the subject of my remarks to this distinguished audience.

The theme of this conference is building bridges across the Atlantic. I work for a President who is building one to the 21st century, so I applaud the metaphor. But it really is the right one. Many of you here are dealing with the nuts-and-bolts issues of strengthening the structures of transatlantic cooperation--student and employee exchange programs, sister-city relationships, economic partnerships, Internet link-ups, and the constant back-and-forth, give-and-take transactions across the Atlantic.

I would like to give special mention to one exchange program in particular because it has served as a model for several others represented here. Five decades ago, a statesman from Arkansas named William Fulbright had an inspired idea: a scholarship that would give Americans and others the opportunity to live and study in a different country. Since then, thousands have used their Fulbright experience to tie tighter the bonds between the United States and Europe.

I am particularly pleased to see Harriet Fulbright here today. I want to tell you, Harriet, that your late husband's friend, admirer, and one-time Senate aide, President Clinton, will do everything he can to strengthen and extend this remarkable program and others like it, such as the Ron Brown and Edmund Muskie Fellowships, which give students from Europe's young democracies a chance to study in America.

The U.S.-EU Agreement on Higher Education and Vocational Training has already helped launch dozens of educational consortiums. The Fellowship of Hope--proposed by former Secretary Christopher last September--is up and running, giving officials from the U.S., the EU, and its member states a chance to work in the foreign affairs agencies of our governments. I am also pleased to see that a Transatlantic Labor Dialogue has joined the Transatlantic Business Dialogue, and I know you are already working on a flurry of creative proposals--from a transatlantic AIDSNET to a "telecity" and a digital library projects, from new sister-city arrangements with communities in central and eastern Europe to corporate and workplace exchange programs.

All of us--governments, the private sector, universities, and NGO's--are working together in joint enterprise. Its purpose is not just to strengthen existing structures across the body of water that separates us, but also to build new structures embracing the values that bring us together in a single, transatlantic community.

I'd like to speak to you this morning about several ways in which our community is changing. It is changing basically for the better, but, nonetheless, in ways that present
challenges to all of us.

Both here, on this side of the pond in the Western Hemisphere, and on the far side in Europe, the watchword of our era is integration. Secretary of State Albright—who sends her greetings to all of you—is in Mexico. She is with President Clinton and several other members of his Cabinet, working to advance our Administration's vision of hemispheric integration. But the quest for integration is a transatlantic phenomenon as well, and it has been since the birth of our country.

In 1785, before Thomas Jefferson became Secretary of State, he was our Minister in France. That was a time of intense, often literally cut-throat competition in Europe. From his post in Paris, Mr. Jefferson drafted a proposal for freedom of trade between the Old and the New Worlds—and for a covenant on the universal rights for the citizens of all nations.

That same year, when Barbary pirates were menacing the sea lanes of the Mediterranean and Atlantic, Mr. Jefferson proposed that the United States organize a multinational naval force to combat the threat. If you will grant me a little license of creative hindsight, you could say one of our Founding Fathers was proposing a proto-NATO. However, he was shot down by his home office on the grounds, among other things, that we couldn't afford such a thing—a reminder that the occasional difficulty of persuading Congress to provide the resources for America's engagement abroad is nothing new.

One hundred and thirty years later, Americans went "over there"—to Europe—to fight the war that Woodrow Wilson said would end all wars and make the world safe for democracy. But, of course, all that carnage did nothing of the kind—in some measure because its aftermath included a sustained episode of American isolationism. It took another World War before America and Europe would finally build a lasting structure across the Atlantic.

This year, we are celebrating the 50th anniversary of the Marshall Plan, which, appropriately, came into being at about the same time as the Fulbright Exchange Program—and in furtherance of the same commitment to transatlantic bridge-building.

The enduring legacy of the Marshall Plan is visible today not only in the steel mills and railways and farmlands of Western Europe, it is visible in the institutions that have brought the two continents politically and economically closer together. The OECD and the Bretton Woods institutions—the World Bank and IMF—were catalysts not just for reconstruction of shattered economies, but for reconciliation and integration among former European adversaries. They helped ultimately to solidify the foundation of the European Union itself. Together, 50 years ago, we embarked on a period of unprecedented peace and prosperity, and together, we built the most dynamic trade and investment relationship in the world.

But there is another point that is crucial, both as an aspect of history and as a guide for the future: We—the U.S. and Europe—did not confine our cooperative efforts, or the benefits of those efforts, to ourselves alone. Rather, we reached out—we opened up—to other regions, to other markets. We saw the pattern in the tiles we were assembling as part of a larger mosaic. This was not an abstraction; it could not have been more practical, which is to say it could not have been more economical and commercial. The U.S. and the EU worked together to liberalize world trade. The Uruguay Round of the GATT was the culmination of that effort. In a word, to our credit, while acting regionally, we grew used to thinking, acting, and trading globally.

But being limited in our prophetic powers, we also grew used to the Cold War; we
came to think of it as a permanent part of the human condition and the Iron Curtain as a permanent fixture on the Continent of Europe. Our shortsightedness in this respect calls to mind a remark by an American baseball player, Dan Quisenberry, who used to be a relief pitcher for the Kansas City Royals: "I have seen the future," he once said, "and it is very much like the present--only longer."

Then, suddenly, eight years ago in 1989, the future arrived, and it looked very different. The walls came down, revealing a new landscape in which old thinking and old borders were no longer relevant. Today, the fastest-growing economies in Europe lie east of the Elbe. Soldiers from Russia and Ukraine, Estonia and Poland, Britain and France, America and Canada, and many other countries that were, only a decade ago, members of opposing blocs are today serving together in Bosnia. I spent last week in Moscow with Secretary Albright negotiating a cooperative relationship between Russia and NATO. All of which vindicates the wisdom of another famous philosopher-baseball player--the incomparable Yogi Berra: "The future," he said, "ain't what it used to be."

With the end of the Cold War, the energies that used to go into common defense have increasingly been able to go instead into the strengthening of our core institutions. One of those is the EU itself, about which I would like to say a few words.

But first let me put forward a general principle: Let me establish a context for American support of, and occasional concern about, the EU. We believe that regional integration in Europe and everywhere else should help those countries directly involved transcend traditional boundaries of habit and history, geography and culture. As a corollary, integration should look outward, rather than inward.

That is our best insurance policy against the possibility that the wrong kind of regional cohesion will spawn the worst kind of interregional conflict. That worry has been on the minds of some of our best, most farsighted thinkers for a long time. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, George Orwell wrote his futuristic nightmare 1984. In the story that the novel tells, the globe is divided into three warring super-regions--Eurasia, Eastasia, and Oceania. Well, we are now 13 years past 1984 and, let's hope, safely past the danger of which Orwell warned.

But we can't be complacent. We must continue to make sure that cooperation within regions reinforces cooperation among regions. That principle guides our own government in its approach to NAFTA, as President Clinton, Secretaries Albright, Rubin, and Daley are telling their hosts in Mexico today. It guides us in our approach to South America and the Far East--and the opportunities for bridge-building between the two. Who would have thought a decade ago that Chile would be one of the most vibrant members of an organization called APEC? The A and the P stand for Asia-Pacific. And this same emphasis on openness, on outwardness--on bridge-building--will guide us in our reaction to, and interaction with, the EU.

Let me borrow the terminology especially familiar to the Europeans here today: When our Administration says we support European integration, we mean both deepening and broadening; we mean both the consolidation of international institutions and the expansion, or enlargement, of those institutions. That means we encourage our friends and allies in Europe to embrace the broadest, most expansive, most outward-looking, most inclusive possible version of integration.

This is not a criticism of past or current EU policy. Quite the contrary, we credit the EU for the farsighted decisions it has already made, such as its assistance programs in central and eastern Europe, its commitment to expand, and its part in the New Transatlantic Agenda.
That said, we also understand that Europe today is embroiled in a debate over an issue that seems, at least to its participants, to be largely internal to Europe. I'm referring to the issue of EMU. A few words--carefully chosen, I might add--about our view on this important and sensitive subject. The record shows that over the past 50 years, the United States has supported every previous initiative to achieve greater political and economic unity among European nations. We have done so for reasons of our own self-interest. A politically united Europe will be a stronger partner to advance common goals. An economically united Europe creates a much more attractive environment for American investment.

As for the EMU, we have been careful not to plunge into the middle of a debate that already has plenty of just the right participants. It is not for us to say how this initiative should evolve or who should join. But we have no doubt--and no hesitancy in saying--that an EMU that cements an open single market and that sparks economic growth in Europe will be good for the American economy. If the EU emerges from this bold initiative able to play an even more active and constructive role on the world stage, that will be good for America, too.

Let me now turn to another subject that has also generated vigorous debate: the relationship between the EU and the lands to its east. Central and eastern Europe is the region where our century's two hot wars as well as the Cold War began. New dangers still lurk there, as is apparent from a sobering fact: From Bosnia, Croatia, and Albania in the Balkans, to Chechnya and Nagorno-Karabakh in the Caucasus, more Europeans have died violently in the last five years than in the previous 45. Instability there threatens the peace of Europe as a whole.

Vaclav Havel has reminded us that--and I quote--"Just as it is impossible for one-half of a room to be forever warm and the other half cold, it is equally unthinkable that two different Europe's could forever exist next to each other without detriment to both--and it is the stabler and more prosperous one that would pay the higher price." Havel is one of a number of brave leaders of brave peoples, who have, since 1989, broken the locks, thrown open the gates, torn down the walls. States that were, only a decade ago, captive nations, fortress societies, and command economies are now holding elections, instituting the rule of law, opening their economies, nurturing a free press, and knocking at the doors of the various international associations and institutions that make up our community.

We must respond by opening those doors. In debating whether--and how quickly and on what terms--to do so, we should remember that when George Marshall unveiled the plan that came to bear his name, Germany and France were ruined lands, worse off in many ways than the countries of central and eastern Europe today. Today, they and the rest of the EU represent the triumph of integration over what Marshall depicted in 1947 as the "hunger, poverty, despotism, and chaos" of Western Europe. That is why the enlargement of the structures that undergird the transatlantic community is not some risky new venture, but a logical extension of the strategy of Marshall, Adenauer, and Monnet.

It was with that idea in mind that the leaders of NATO three years ago decided to expand to central and eastern Europe. NATO had another choice. It could have confined itself to its Cold War membership, but that would have implied that Checkpoint Charlie marks the spot where our interests and aspirations end--or, as was once suggested not too long ago--where history itself ends. That would have been a strategic mistake of the most profound proportions and the most lasting consequences.

Let me speak for my own government's motives here. We, the United States, have a
variety of mutually reinforcing reasons for enlarging NATO. We believe it is the best way to ensure stability and consolidate democracy in central Europe.

But I will be quite frank: We have an ulterior motive as well. We hope that the enlargement of NATO, of which we are a member, will contribute to the conditions for the enlargement of the EU, of which we are not a member, but in which we have such a profound--I'd even say vital--interest.

This is not just a matter of NATO's setting an example. Rather, it's a matter of NATO's creating an environment which, because it is more stable and peaceful, will be conducive to the EU's expansion eastward. Many of Europe's new democracies are well on their way to meeting the economic conditions for EU membership. But EU governments and Western investors must also be confident about the long-term, deep-seated security of the region, and that's what NATO is all about.

Some have suggested that the opposite is true--that NATO enlargement gives the EU an excuse not to embrace new members. The facts argue otherwise. The clearer we have been about NATO's determination to take in new members, the clearer the EU has been about its own plans to expand. What's more, in all fairness to the EU, it is hard to imagine its process of expansion moving much faster. The EU rightly asks potential members to make many complex changes in their economic and regulatory policies. But as Secretary Albright has said, the security NATO provides should not have to wait until, as she put it, "tomato farmers in central Europe start using the right kinds of pesticides." From our vantage point, NATO enlargement and EU expansion are separate but parallel processes in support of the same overall cause, which is a broader, deeper transatlantic community.

Let me turn now to a third tough, important issue that the EU faces as it looks east and south. I'm referring to the challenge to Europe's sense of itself and its future posed by Turkey's aspiration to join the EU. Here, too, the U.S. doesn't have a vote, but it certainly has interests.

Turkey is undergoing the strains of modernization, including in the crucial area of democracy and human rights. These areas, along with Turkey's relationship with Greece, are all legitimate issues of concern to the EU. But these difficulties do not make Turkey any less European. In fact, many current EU members have overcome far greater traumas in this century, and that's putting it mildly. And let us not forget that at the beginning of this century, in the wake of World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman empire, Turkey--under the leadership of Kemal Ataturk--made a strategic choice about its nature and its orientation--the right choice, from our point of view and, we believe, from Turkey's own.

Then, in the wake of World War II, Turkey joined NATO. That was, of course, largely because Turkey shared a border with the Soviet Union and was thus literally on the front line of the Cold War. But it is today just as much on the front line of the multiple challenges that face us in the post-Cold War era. Turkey's continuing strategic importance derives from its frontiers with Iraq, Syria, and Iran, and from its proximity--as well as its linguistic affinity--to the Caucasus and central Asia.

Therefore, we have as much an interest as ever in Turkey's development as a strong, prosperous, secular, and democratic state, fully integrated with our community. Only with that kind of Turkey can we prevail together in the struggle that has replaced the Cold War: the struggle between security and insecurity; between prosperity and poverty; in short, between the forces of integration and disintegration.

We recognize how difficult and multi-dimensional the issue of Turkey is, not least for
Turkey itself, but also for others. We realize that Turkey's relationship to the EU is not just a foreign policy issue for several major EU states, but one of domestic politics as well, given the connection between EU membership and freedom of movement.

We in the U.S. have some familiarity with such connections, as anyone knows who has followed the debate over NAFTA, or who heard this morning's news reports on the demonstrations that greeted President Clinton upon his arrival in Mexico City. I'd even say that, among the many things that the U.S. and the EU have in common is a dilemma: how to reconcile, on the one hand, the imperatives and benefits of regional integration and open borders with our neighbors and, on the other, the imperatives of a sound and humane policy on migration. In their current visit to Mexico, President Clinton and his Cabinet are stressing that we want to encourage legal migration, which has enriched our culture and our economy and made the United States the fifth-largest Hispanic nation on earth. We want to encourage legal immigrants to become citizens, while at the same time, we want to discourage illegal migration, which only erodes the consensus for deeper ties.

We recognize that the EU and Turkey are working hard to strike their own balances on these complex issues and to stake out as much common ground as possible. The EU has had a Customs Union Agreement with Turkey for over a year, and last week, the EU stated that its door is open to Turkish membership according the same criteria applied to any other applicant. We also applaud the establishment last week of a group of "Wise Men" to look at the issues that have generated so much tension between Greece and Turkey.

Still, there are those who resist vehemently the idea that any nations to the east of what might be called "traditional Europe" can ever truly be part of a larger, 21st century Europe. We believe that view is quite wrong—and potentially quite dangerous. Over the centuries, Europe at its best—and its most peaceful and most prosperous—has defined itself not in terms of artificial barriers—a river here, a mountain range there, a concrete-and-barbed-wire wall somewhere else. Rather, Europe has become Europe by reaching over such boundaries; by assembling itself into a community of nations that share values, aspirations, and ways of life.

Turkey has been a part of the European system since the 16th century. Of course, it has cultural ties to Central Asia and the Middle East. But so does Russia, which must also be part of the building of an integrated post-Cold War Europe if there is to be such a thing. True, most of Turkey is separated from the rest of Europe by a bit of water, but then so is all of the United Kingdom.

Let me also say a word more about Islam. The current debate over Turkey resonates with references to "culture," or sometimes as "civilization." These words are often euphemisms for religion. There is a theory currently in vogue that the Cold War rivalry between communism and capitalism has been replaced by a global "clash of civilizations," including one between Western and Muslim countries.

That idea gives short shrift both to the great diversity within these supposed civilizations and to what they have in common. It underestimates the ethnic and religious diversity of the United States and, increasingly, of Western Europe as well. And it underestimates the dangers we may face in the future if we today raise artificial barriers against the aspirations of any European nation that is willing to accept the standards and responsibilities of our democratic community, or if we define the "European-ness" of a village on the basis of whether its landmarks are church spires or minarets.

As Warren Christopher put it early last year, our strategy of integration must, and I
quote, "not recognize any fundamental divide among the Catholic, Orthodox, and Islamic parts of Europe. That kind of thinking fueled the war in the former Yugoslavia and it must have no place in the Europe we are building." Secretary Albright strongly agrees, and she will use her own tenure here to urge that Europe define itself as inclusively, expansively, and comprehensively as possible.

So, to conclude, with respect to all three issues I have touched on this morning--the EMU, the relationship between the EU and the former communist lands to its east, and the EU's relationship with Turkey--the United States will continue to recommend as guiding principles for statesmanship and public policy precisely those goals and values that motivate all of you in the work that has brought you together for this conference. We will encourage the EU to do in the future what the individuals gathered and the organizations represented here are doing right now--and that is building bridges; deepening and broadening the network of connections and associations; and promoting exchanges within and among the local, national, and regional communities that make up the global community of which we are all a part. Thank you very much.

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The U.S. must stop playing favorites in Armenia and Chechnya.

goals will meet little effective resistance from the war-torn Chechen region.

Unconstrained, Russia tends to overreach, and that is why President Clinton should lead the way at the meeting this month.

Dick Morris was, after all, the former Soviet Union, and they have sought to emerge more strongly committed to their independence. In Georgia, for example, they are now looking to their borders and drugs.

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The United States has a big stake in the future development and political landscape of the South Caucasus, Europe, the Persian Gulf and Asia. The region's vast resources and unresolved territorial disputes make it both attractive and potentially a pawn of conflict for ambitious powers that have been weakened in this region, including Russia, Turkey, Iran, and the United States.

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About Black

"...now, the 'African-Americans' of the 9...

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Howard Berkowitz
Marcia and David Glazier
Edward M. Kennedy

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"...now, the 'African-Americans' of the 9..."
read some other books which had been written by wiser men. They said: "As the end, at all events, is nought, let us be joyous and happy while we live." So far as I am concerned, I am a man of that character who prefers the second conception of life, but only under the following restrictions: Unhappy is he who believes that his personality embodies the existence of the whole of mankind. It is evident that the individuality of such a man is bound to extinguish. To work not for one's self, but to work for those to come must be the aim of everyone that he may be content and happy in his life. And any reasonable man cannot act otherwise. Full pleasure and happiness in life can only be attained in working for the existence, honour and well-being of the coming generations.

In doing so one should not even worry: "Will those who come after me realise that I have worked in such a spirit?" The happiest people are those who are of a character to prefer their services to remain unknown to all generations.

Everyone has a pleasure of his own. Some men find pleasure in gardening and in cultivating beautiful flowers. There are some other men who like to cultivate men. Does the man who grows flowers expect anything from them? The man who cultivates men should act, with the mentality of the man who cultivates flowers. Only people who think and act in this way can be useful to their countries and nations and to the future of both. He who thinks of the happiness of his country and nation is a man of primary worth. But men who place on themselves the greatest value and believe that the existence of the country and the nation they belong to rests on their persons cannot be considered as having served the well-being of their nations. Only those who think of and work for the coming generations procure their nations opportunities to live and to progress. It is a great mistake to suppose that progress and action will cease after one passes away.

Points I have mentioned so far refer to different societies. But to-day all the nations in the world have become more or less each other's relatives or are about to become each other's relatives. Consequently, one should think just as much of the peace and prosperity of all the nations in the world as of the existence and well-being of his own nation, and should work for the happiness of all nations with the same zeal as he would work for his own. All wise men admit that nothing can be lost in working for this purpose, because working for the well-being of all the nations in the world is another way of trying to provide for one's own peace and well-being. If peace, harmony and good understanding do not reign in the world and among the nations, a nation cannot attain peace whatever she may do for her own sake. That is why I advise to people I love this:

Men who conduct and lead nations desire, above all, to be factors in the lives and well-being of their own nations. But they should also foster the same wishes for all nations. All events in the world prove to us this truth very plainly. We cannot know whether an incident which we believe to be remote, may not, some day, directly affect us. Therefore, mankind has to be considered as a body and the different nations as the members of this body. The pain in one tip of the body affects all its members.

We ought not to say: "What do I care if there exists uneasiness in this or that part of the world?" If such uneasiness does exist we must pay the same attention to it as if it were right in our midst. No matter how far away the event may take place, we should always hold to this principle. It is this way of looking at things that saves men, nations and governments from selfishness. Selfishness, whether personal or national, must always be considered as an evil thing. I will now from the above-said draw this conclusion: We shall, naturally enough, envisage our own interests and provide for them accordingly, and that done, we shall interest ourselves in the world in general.

Let me cite a small example: I am a soldier. During the Great War I was at the head of an army. There were other