

Case Number: 2014-0558-M

MIR MARKER

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| Original OA/ID Number: 2718 | | | | |
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| Row: 46 | Section: 4 | Shelf: 2 | Position: 1 | Stack: V |

Case Number: 2014-0558-M

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| Original OA/ID Number: 2719 | | | | |
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| Row: 46 | Section: 4 | Shelf: 2 | Position: 2 | Stack: V |

Case Number: 2014-0558-M

MR MARKER

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| Original OA/ID Number: 2720 | | | | |
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| Row: 46 | Section: 4 | Shelf: 2 | Position: 3 | Stack: V |

MIR MARKER

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| Original OA/ID Number: 2720 | | | | |
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| Document ID: 9902317 | | | | |
| Row: 46 | Section: 4 | Shelf: 2 | Position: 3 | Stack: V |

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------|---|-----------------------|----------------------------------|
| 001a. telcon | re: Telecon with French President Chirac (4 pages) | 03/21/1999 | P1/b(1) KBH 12/5/2019 |
| 001b. telcon | re: Telecon with German Chancellor Schroeder (2 pages) | 03/21/1999 | P1/b(1) KBH 12/5/2019 |
| 001c. telcon | [Duplicate of 001b] [incomplete copy] (1 page) | 03/21/1999 | P1/b(1) KBH 12/5/2019 |
| 001d. telcon | [Duplicate of 001a] [incomplete copy] (2 pages) | 03/21/1999 | P1/b(1) KBH 12/5/2019 |
| 001e. telcon | [Duplicate of 001b] [incomplete copy] (1 page) | 03/21/1999 | P1/b(1) KBH 12/5/2019 |
| 001f. telcon | [Duplicate of 001a] [incomplete copy] (2 pages) | 03/21/1999 | P1/b(1) KBH 12/5/2019 |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 NSC Records Management
 ([Kosovo and Chirac])
 OA/Box Number: 2720

FOLDER TITLE:

9902317

2014-0558-M

rs1046

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: BERGER

FROM: BUTLER

DOC DATE: 30 MAR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO

TELCON

PERSONS: CHIRAC, JACQUES

SCHROEDER, GERHARD

SUBJECT: TELCONS W/ EUROPEAN LEADERS ON 21 MAR 99

ACTION: KERRICK APPROVED RECOM

DUE DATE: 02 APR 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BUTLER

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BUTLER
FICKLIN
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSNHM CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER
001

Z 99033108 FOR DECISION
X 99040709 KERRICK APPROVED RECOM

**National Security Council
The White House**

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2317
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TC A/O _____

| | SEQUENCE TO | INITIAL/DATE | DISPOSITION |
|----------------------|-------------|-----------------|-----------------------|
| <i>d</i> Cosgriff | | | |
| Rice | <u>1</u> | <u>(D) 3/31</u> | <u>OK [Signature]</u> |
| Davies | | | |
| Kerrick | <u>2</u> | <u>(D) 3/31</u> | |
| Steinberg | | | |
| Berger | | | |
| Situation Room | | | |
| West Wing Desk | <u>3</u> | <u>3/31 DMC</u> | <u>D</u> |
| Records Mgt. | <u>4</u> | | <u>N/R</u> |

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

98 MAR 31 AM 8:26

COMMENTS: *Memo of Selcons with European Leaders on Kosovo*

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 2317
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS
 BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TC A/O _____

| | SEQUENCE TO | INITIAL/DATE | DISPOSITION |
|----------------|-------------|-----------------|-----------------------|
| Cosgriff | | | |
| Rice | <u>1</u> | <u>(C) 3/31</u> | <u>at [signature]</u> |
| Davies | <u>7</u> | <u>(V) 3/31</u> | |
| Steinberg | | | |
| Berger | | | |
| Situation Room | | | |
| West Wing Desk | <u>3</u> | <u>3/31 DMK</u> | <u>D</u> |
| Records Mgt. | <u>4</u> | | <u>N/R</u> |

copy ✓
cc ✓

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cc:

COMMENTS: Memo of Jelco's with European Leaders on Kosovo

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

March 30, 1999

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBI/NARA, Date 7/31/2019
2014-0538-m

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER *(D) R*

THROUGH: ANTONY BLINKEN *(ADG)*

FROM: LAWRENCE BUTLER *(D)*

SUBJECT: Memoranda of Telephone Conversations with
European Leaders re Kosovo

Attached at Tabs A and B are the President's telephone
conversations with President Chirac and Chancellor Schroeder
which took place during on March 21, 1999.

RECOMMENDATION

That the attached Memoranda of Telephone Conversations be filed
for the record.

Approve *(D)* Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab A Telcon with President Chirac on 3/27

Tab B Telcon with Chancellor Schroeder on 3/27

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0558-M (1.01)
KBM 7/31/2019

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with French President Chirac (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
President Chirac

Interpreter: Marcel Bouquet
Notetakers: Doug Bayley, Frank Jaraosinski,
Miles Murphy and Joel Schrader

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: March 21, 1999, 1:18-1:33 p.m. EST
Residence

President Chirac: Bill how are you? It's a great pleasure to hear your voice. (U)

The President: Fine. Thank you. I just got off the phone with Hillary and Chelsea in Egypt and they are on their way to the museum. (U)

President Chirac: It is wonderful, excursions into antiquity. How long will they stay there? (U)

The President: About three to four days. They are going to see a lot of the country and sites and also go to Tunisia and Morocco. (U)

President Chirac: What a wonderful treat. Tunisia is a beautiful country and Morocco is beautiful also. They have already been in Morocco before? (U)

The President: Yes, once before. (U)

President Chirac: Do you mind if we speak through the interpreter because my English is short? (U)

The President: Certainly. I called to check in with you on Kosovo. Milosevic has agreed to meet with Holbrooke one more time and I am sending him out there tomorrow. There is one

village evacuated with 13,000 people completely evacuated this morning. (S)

I think we are in a difficult situation but I wanted to call because I believe it is important that NATO be prepared to carry out the first phase of the attacks on short notice and make sure they have the green light tomorrow. And then of course, if he launches an all out offensive against the people or us we have to be prepared to do more. It seems to me if he believes that we are quite firm and resolute about the terms of the peace agreement, we will still have the chance to avoid this. (S)

My main concern outside of Kosovo is the difficulty that it poses to the Russians. We all have to be prepared to work with Yeltsin and Primakov to limit the damage to them, but we can't afford to delay and have to be ready to go. (S)

President Chirac: Bill, first of all, I think that Milosevic has placed himself in a situation where there is no possibility for him to avoid air strikes. Therefore, we will stand-by to be active. In the second case, I understand through the message that I received that Holbrooke would leave tomorrow and give a firm message to Milosevic. I think it's a good initiative and Mrs. Albright also mentioned a trip to Belgrade on Wednesday to Milosevic of Mr. Cook and Mr. Verdine if nothing will happen before then. (S)

Thirdly, I fully understand the technical organization of strikes must be very good and carried out rapidly. That is why I suggested that the first stage, destroying air-to-air defenses, and the second stage, which aims at specific points, be merged and this was what was requested by Headquarters NATO and this must be done with urgency. I'm absolutely in favor of this. (S)

This being said, I consider that I cannot give a general order to take a strike decision to launch without having had a political decision and this is why I don't agree to the fact of entrusting absolute powers to General Clark given it is impossible to know what Holbrooke will say and what will occur in the field. Although we have very rapid contact between ourselves, and at the minimum will be ready to relay to General Clark the strike decision but we cannot abandon the political authority to a General. (S)

This is a problem of conditions and I have much fear that neither Holbrooke nor Cook or Vedrine will get very much if they

go. It will very much depend on Holbrooke. It is important that we are in contact with the three of them if something does happen. Then we need to have intervention immediately and a political decision can be taken in an hour. So I agree with the overall proposal conveyed by Mrs. Albright that subject to the political decision taken between the concerned, the four powers also be in agreement before being implemented by the CINC of NATO. (S)

The President: I am concerned with the evacuation of villages yesterday and that we're going to get into a time bind. If you want to talk again, it is absolutely imperative that we need to be available at anytime in the next forty-eight hours on minimum notice to have necessary conversations so we can talk about this matter. (S)

President Chirac: Bill, it is very easy -- the second problem that we will have the time to call each other. It is an unacceptable initiative being taken by the Serbs, like a strike on a village. Then even if we are not immediately available, there are staff that can take the decision in a quarter of an hour. But as a matter of principle we cannot retreat from political power and cannot withdraw decision power from them. I have great esteem for General Clark, but we want to be able to check what he wants to do to see if he's in the same frame of mind. All the others, not talking about the Russians, understood the military position was not tenable and that they are in no position to have any effective opposition to this. We won't have any problems with the Russians. (S)

The President: Well that is encouraging about the Russians and we will have to work with them. I imagine we will be talking in the next day or two. (S)

President Chirac: Well, I think the latest pressure will yield something. It all depends on Holbrooke. He will do his utmost but I am not optimistic given Milosevic or his army taking the initiative, in which case in one hour we will have a response because we all agree, the Americans, the British and the French, to ensure that we agree together. (S)

The President: Okay, I will be back in touch. (U)

President Chirac: Very well and my love to Hillary and Chelsea and I hope they have the best in Egypt then Tunisia and Morocco. (U)

The President: Thank you. Bye. (U)

President Chirac: Bye bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0558-m (1.02)
KBH 7/31/2019

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with German Chancellor Schroeder (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Chancellor Schroeder

Interpreter: Brigitta Richman
Notetakers: Sean Tarver, Robin Rickard,
Bonnie Glick, Miles Murphy and Joel
Schrader

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: March 21, 1999, 5:51 - 6:01 p.m. EST
Camp David, Maryland

The President: Hello. Thank you for taking the call. (U)

Chancellor Schroeder: I did it gladly, because I think it is important. (U)

The President: Well, I think you probably know this, but Dick Holbrooke is going to see Milosevic one final time tomorrow.

(U)

Chancellor Schroeder: Well, I think that is correct and hope Milosevic will change his course. But I am pessimistic. (U)

The President: Yes, I am too. And if he doesn't, I think NATO must be prepared to act. (U)

Chancellor Schroeder: Yes, this is also my assessment, and our analysis here. Therefore, I agree. But I have one request. I have a political request that during the entire phase of the operations we stay in close consultation because I have to justify my actions to the Cabinet and to the other political parties. I mean, an informal consultation, not a formal consultation. (U)

The President: I agree. I think it's important we talk together a lot since this may not be easy and free from

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(a,b,d)
Declassify On: 3/30/09

controversy. We have to demonstrate that we are working together closely. (S)

Chancellor Schroeder: Yes, and other than that, I fully agree with your assessment. Well, I want to make one more comment that it is important for the public in Europe and I think also there in the United States, to know that we are acting for humanitarian reasons to avoid further humanitarian disasters and not to punish Milosevic or to force him to come to the negotiating table. The center of the argument is that we have to protect people there. We cannot have another 10,000 refugees when there are already 250,000 there. (S)

The President: Yesterday, Milosevic's forces occupied Srbica and created 13,000 refugees and we can't have that again. When Tony Blair and I were talking today, we agreed we have to get all of our people together to make it so that over there we will be avoiding a humanitarian disaster. Milosevic did not put 40,000 troops there for nothing. I think we can all make the same argument. (S)

Chancellor Schroeder: I agree with you and my staff person, Mr. Steiner, is available to coordinate our comments to the public and I would imagine that Sandy Berger is going to call him. (S)

The President: Yes, we'll be in close contact. (S)

Chancellor Schroeder: Thank you and goodbye. (U)

The President: Bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

Bartlett, L. June

From: Butler, Lawrence E.
Sent: Wednesday, March 31, 1999 11:30 AM
To: Bartlett, L. June
Subject: FW: Pckg 2317 -- MEMCON - Pres Chirac ~~[TOP SECRET]~~

that was an ugly sentence. Think I untangled its meaning.

-----Original Message-----

From: Bartlett, L. June
Sent: Wednesday, March 31, 1999 11:23 AM
To: Butler, Lawrence E.
Cc: @EUROPE - European Affairs; @CROSS - Cross Hatches; Rice, Edward A.
Subject: Pckg 2317 -- MEMCON - Pres Chirac ~~[TOP SECRET]~~

Larry,

Can you take a look at sentence in red at top of page 3. We don't follow the sentence.

Please let us know.

Thanks.

June



2317 chirac 321
telcon.doc

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBM/NARA, Date 7/31/2019
2014-0558-m

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0558-M (1.03)
KBH 7/31/2019

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Chancellor Schroeder: I did it gladly, because I think it is important. (U)

The President: Well, I think you probably know this, but Dick Holbrooke is going to see Milosevic one final time tomorrow. (C)

Chancellor Schroeder: Well, I think that is correct and hope Milosevic will change his course. But I am pessimistic. (C)

The President: Yes, I am too. And if he doesn't, I think NATO must be prepared to act. (C)

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My main concern outside of Kosovo is the difficulty that it poses to the Russians. We all have to be prepared to work with Yeltsin and Primakov to limit the damage to them, but we can't afford to delay and have to be ready to go. (S)

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Doesn't make sense. Check w/ Britten

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KSH NARA, Date 7/31/2019
2014-0528-m

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0558-M (1.05)
KBH 7/31/2019

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The President: I am concerned with the evacuation of villages yesterday and that we're going to get into a time bind. If you want to talk again, it is absolutely imperative that we need to be available at anytime in the next forty-eight hours on minimum notice to have necessary conversations so we can talk about this matter. (S)

President Chirac: Bill, it is very easy -- the second problem that we will have the time to call each other. It is an unacceptable initiative being taken by the Serbs, like a strike on a village. Then even if we are not immediately available, there are staff that can take the decision in a quarter of an hour. But as a matter of principle we cannot retreat from political power and cannot withdraw decision power from them. I have great esteem for General Clark, but we want to be able to check what he wants to do to see if he's in the same frame of mind. All the others, not talking about the Russians, understood the military position was not tenable and that they are in no position to have any effective opposition to this. We won't have any problems with the Russians. (S)

The President: Well that is encouraging about the Russians and we will have to work with them. I imagine we will be talking in the next day or two. (S)

President Chirac: Well, I think the latest pressure will yield something. It all depends on Holbrooke. He will do his utmost but I am not optimistic given Milosevic or his army taking the initiative, in which case in one hour we will have a response because we all agree, the Americans, the British and the French, to ensure that we agree together. (S)

The President: Okay, I will be back in touch. (U)

President Chirac: Very well and my love to Hillary and Chelsea and I hope they have the best in Egypt then Tunisia and Morocco. (U)

See 2009-1290-M

Case Number: 2014-0558-M

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See 2013-0472-M

Case Number: 2014-0558-M

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|--------------------------------|---|--------------------|----------------------------------|
| 001. talking points | re: Points to be Made for Telephone Conversation with President Chirac and Chancellor Schroeder (1 page) | 03/1999 | P1/b(1) KBM 12/5/2019 |

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Kosovo and Chirac])
OA/Box Number: 2725

FOLDER TITLE:

9903100

2014-0558-M

rs1047

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9903100
RECEIVED: 23 APR 99 14

TO: BERGER

FROM: SUTPHEN

DOC DATE: 27 MAR 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOSOVO

TELCALL

PERSONS: CHIRAC, JACQUES

SCHROEDER, GERHARD

SUBJECT: POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELCALL W/ PRES CHIRAC & CHANCELLOR SCHROEDER

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 29 APR 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BLINKEN

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

BLINKEN
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 7/31/2019
2014-0558-m

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSEMK CLOSED BY: NSEMK DOC 1 OF 1

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RECORD ID: 9903100

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

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DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2014-0558-M (1.07)
KBH 7/31/2019

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH
PRESIDENT CHIRAC AND CHANCELLOR SCHROEDER

[**Purpose:** to confirm Chirac and Schroeder are prepared to have Solana authorize Phase II, to ask for their support in convincing D'Alema, and to advocate giving Solana authority for Phase III as soon as possible. FYI, Solana will probably have spoken to both Chirac and Schroeder by the time you call them.]

- Rather than backing down in the face of NATO air strikes, Milosevic is stepping up attacks on the Kosovar Albanians. 10-18,000 forces are involved in widening range of operations.
- Disturbing reports of Serb forces and armed civilians rounding up ethnic Albanians, expelling them from their homes, and committing summary executions.
- Milosevic seems ready to widen conflict. Repeated shelling into Albania, as well as incursions today and yesterday into Bosnian airspace.
- In light of this situation, agree with Javier Solana's intention to authorize Phase II air strikes against military forces including forces in the field.
- Understand you also agree with moving to Phase II. May need your help with Massimo [D'Alema], who has some domestic political problems. We need to convince Massimo that any new diplomatic moves now, or a "pause" in our operation would signal a lack of resolve that Milosevic would fully exploit.
- We also need to be ready to give Javier the authority to transition to Phase III as soon as tomorrow. We need to show Milosevic that we are serious, and that he will pay a price for the actions of his forces.
- Finally, some will accuse NATO of having sparked the violence. But Milosevic has been planning an all-out offensive in Kosovo for months.

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Antony Blinken
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 10 years

3100 FRP

Millison, Cathy L.

From: Sutphen, Mona K.
Sent: Saturday, March 27, 1999 12:44 PM
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor; @KOSOVO; @EXECSEC - Executive Secretary
Subject: schroeder/chirac points as handed to SRB [SECRET]



chirac-schroeder.doc

2055
2282

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBL NARA, Date 7/31/2009
2014-0558-M

Case Number: 2014-0558-M

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