Case Number: 2006-0471-F

FOIA MARKER

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Folder Title:
Germany - Berlin Airlift [May 14, 1998] [3]

Staff Office-Individual:
Speechwriting-Widmer, Edward

Original OA/ID Number:
2189

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**COLLECTION:**
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Ted Widmer (Speechwriting)
OA/Box Number: 2189

**FOLDER TITLE:**
Germany - Berlin Airlift May 14, 1998 [3]

**RESTRrCTION CODES**

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**
- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
maintaining the essential industries, and the minimum needs of all kinds of essential consumer goods.

It was agreed by the Commandants that a minimum stockpile of not less than 21 days' supply had to be maintained in each of the essential commodities, mainly food and fuel, which represented about 80% of the total Air Lift tonnage.

Central Coordination Set

In order to avoid conflicting orders from the various units engaged in supplying the needs of both German civilians and occupational personnel in Berlin, the Military Governors requested the Western Sector Commandants to establish a central agency for ordering all required commodities and materials.

For these purposes, an Air Lift Coordinating Committee was established in the Kommandatura. Each month the committee received from the Air Task Force an estimate of its forecast of daily average tonnages for the ensuing month. Based upon needs and the stocks on hand, the committee apportioned these tonnages among the various claimants according to commodities.

Counterpart committees were formed in the Western Zones to accept delivery directives from the Kommandatura group and to apportion each commodity to the appropriate zonal airfield. The Zone Coordinating Committee was also responsible that both the military authorities and the West Zone Germans would deliver the required commodities in the correct amounts to the proper airfields on schedule.

The work of the committees was outstanding. Despite the unpredictability of the weather, the performance of the aircraft—and not least, the constant interference by Soviet fighter planes in the Lift corridors—there was not a single day when there was insufficient supplies of the goods reaching the city over each aerial artery, nor ever any undue tie-up of either road or rail facilities because of excessive deliveries.

Midwinter Crisis

In general, from the beginnings of the Air Lift through December, 1948, deliveries to Berlin did not reach forecasted estimates, and it was only by the most stringent conservation and control of consumption that West Berlin was maintained through the winter.

The foggy weather in November and December was in part responsible for the situation. This did not alter the fact, however, that, when in early January coal stocks had dwindled to only a 19-day supply, drastic steps became necessary.

Utilities cannot operate effectively with less than a 14-day supply on hand, and on the basis of receipts, it appeared that that point would be reached within a week or ten days. Food stocks, however, approximated a 31-day supply.

In the hope of a break in the weather and a consequent better flow of deliveries, it was determined to have coal
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PRM. Personal record misfiled defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Embassy of the United States of America
Office of the Financial Attaché
Berlin Section
Neustädtische Kirchstr. 4-5
10117 Germany, Berlin

May 12, 1998

TO: NSC - Nicole Elkon
FROM: Robert Downes

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO BERLIN - TEMPLEHOF EVENT
BRIEF INFORMATION ON AIRLIFT PARTICIPANTS

Howard Steers indicated you needed some additional information regarding some of the known airlift veterans who will be at the Templehof event in Berlin on May 14th. Attached please find some preliminary information. We will continue to try to develop additional information and have anything substantive awaiting you on arrival.

Note that among those listed are almost a dozen veterans of the Airlift who served in the British military services. Hope this is helpful. Contact me directly for further information.

Rgds,
Robert Richard Downes
030-8305-2329
Fax 202-4569370

Attachments:
As stated.
Supplementary Information on Berlin Airlift (Luftbrücke)
for President Clinton's Visit to Berlin, May 13-14, 1998

The Berlin Airlift began on June 25, 1948 and ended on May 12, 1949. There were a total of about 280,000 flights. On April 16, 1949, 1,398 flights landed in a single day (one every 62 seconds). Two thirds of the cargo carried consisted of sacks of coal. It would, according to one veteran, take only just over 20 minutes for the workers to unload 10 tons of coal. During the Airlift 31 Americans, 39 RAF and British Army personnel and about a dozen German civilians lost their lives. (Note the USAF was founded in September 1947 from the Army Air Corps).

1st Lt. (later Col.) Gail S. Halvorsen, (pilot) the first “Candy Bomber” — known in Germany as the “Rosinen Bomber” (raisin bomber). Halvorsen began working on the Airlift on July 11, 1948 and flew 126 missions out of Rheinmain and Wiesbaden airfields. He began the practice of dropping handkerchief parachutes filled with candy for West Berlin children from his C-54 “Skymaster” cargo plane. Other American pilots took up the practice. Halvorsen, who comes from Provo, Utah retired after 31 years in the USAF and then spent 10 years as Dean of Student Life at Provo, Utah. He and the next three gentlemen flew over in the “Spirit of Freedom”.

1st Lt. (later Captain) Gerald Munn (pilot) was born in 1924 in Sayer, Penn. He grew up in lower New York state and started flying at the age of 17. He volunteered for the Army Air Corps after Pearl Harbor and began flying B-24s after finishing flying school in August 1943. He flew his first 50 missions over Italy before turning 20 years old. Later he flew B-24s over Germany from January-June 1944, one time returning from a mission and landing with all four engines out of commission. He left the service in October 1945 but flew with the reserves. In October 1948 the USAF sent out a call for 400 volunteers experienced in flying four engine aircraft. Mr. Munn finished C-54 school in January 1949 and flew in the Airlift out of Wiesbaden. He flew 121 roundtrips and notes that Wiesbaden and Rheinmain were the furthest AF bases taking part in the Airlift, requiring them to fly over two hours each way, vice less than an hour for other bases. Mr. Munn also flew in Korea during that War and left the service on August 12, 1952. He then spent 32 years flying for USAIR as a pilot. Having flown 31,560 hours during his military and civilian career, Munn continues to actively fly with the Spirit of Freedom during its visits throughout the east coast. Mr. Munn notes that the Airlift was one of the high points of the USAF. “Everyone pulled together and it worked.”

Bill Morrissy (tower operator) was born in Tyrone, Penn. He joined the USAF in April 1948 and arrived in Celle, in the British zone in November 1948 where he worked (as he did throughout his USAF career) as a tower operator. He spent 20 years in the air force, including a tour in Viet Nam before retiring in 1968. While not in Berlin during the Airlift (he controlled Airlift flights originating in Celle) he was posted in Berlin from November 1949 to February 1950 and had an opportunity to see the results of his work.

Fred “Joel” Hall (flight engineer) is from Karney, Maryland (near Baltimore). He served four years with the air force, five months of which was in Germany. He was trained as an airplane mechanic (during the airlift there was a shortage of mechanics
trained for C-54s and started as a maintenance supervisor with a mixed German and American maintenance crew in Rheinmain. During the latter stages of his work in Germany he flew 21 trips as a flight engineer into Berlin. On one occasion a young German boy remarked about his cowboy boots (when he was off-duty). He told the kids and his friends that he knew hop-a-long Cassidy and spread the tale (supplemented with chocolate) over a period of weeks to a growing group of German youngsters. On flying into Berlin he said it was "one of the most moving experiences in my life to once again see Berlin from the air." He said he has always been proud of his opportunity to work on the airlift and help his country.

Captain (later Col.) Kenneth Herman (pilot) President of the Berlin Airlift Association. Herman, who joined the U.S. military on March 28, 1942, was based in Frankfurt and flew 190 missions during six months with C-54s into Berlin.

Sgt. Jerry Boser (technical engineer) who worked out of Wiesbaden, but traveled to Berlin during the Airlift may also attend. We are working to confirm his status and participation.

The ceremony will also be attended by Mrs. Elaine Howard and Mrs. Eyvonne Hagen (and her son), both widows of US military personnel who served in the Airlift.

Also attending is Tim Chopp (about 55 years of age and a jet contract pilot), who while not serving in the Airlift is the President and founder of the Berlin Airlift Historical Foundation (based in Tom's River, New Jersey). This group supports the "Spirit of Freedom" and flies it around to show school children to "keep the memory of the Berlin Airlift alive." The plane flew 22 hours to come to Berlin stopping in an airshow in North Weld (near London) enroute.

I also understand that Jack O. Bennett (84) who indicates he was a civil contract pilot for American Overseas Airways during the lift may attend the ceremony. He claims to have flown the first Berlin Airlift mission and the most Airlift missions. Professional historians have been unable to confirm his claims, and have expressed some skepticism on certain points, although not the fact that Mr. Bennett flew in the Airlift.

In addition to the Americans (both military and civilian) attending the May 14th ceremony, we also expected the following veterans of the British military who reside in Berlin and participated in the Airlift:

James Armitage
Ralph Blair
Harold Flower
Allan Legget
Leonard Lowk
George Newman
Gwyn Phillips
William Sheckleston
Michael Tidnam
**Withdrawal/Redaction Marker**

**Clinton Library**

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
From: Widmer, Edward L.
Sent: Saturday, May 09, 1998 5:08 PM
To: @NSA - Natl Security Advisor
Cc: @PLANNING - Strat Plan & Comm; @EUROPE - European Affairs; @DEFENSE - Defense Policy
Subject: Airlift speech [UNCLASSIFIED]

Berlin airlift.doc

Comments to Ted W., 6-9375.

For SRB/JC review. Input from Downey, Brown.

You sure can write, boy! Wonderful speech. See comments.
PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON
REMARKS AT 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF BERLIN AIRLIFT
TEMPELHOF AIRPORT
BERLIN, GERMANY
MAY 14, 1998

[Acknowledgments: (TK) Chancellor Kohl; President Herzog; veterans of the Luftbrucke [lufť-brewka; German for airlift (literally “air bridge”); people of Germany]

Fifty years ago this airstrip was a pivotal battlefield in a war that had not been named yet. It would soon be called the Cold War; but in 1948 the word “war” was unspeakable, because the very idea was unspeakable. World War II had left Europe devastated and divided. The brightest century known to mankind was not even half-over, and our world was shrouded in darkness ... afraid of the past ... afraid of the future.

Nowhere was the crisis more acute than Berlin. People were hungry and homeless. The future of Germany was in jeopardy. A hundred years earlier, a German, Karl Marx, had declared “a specter hangs over Europe” ... the specter of Communism. In 1948, the specter’s shadow fell across half a continent. The edge of that shadow was the runway here at Tempelhof airport.

1948 was a year of decision around the world. In Asia and Africa, nations longed for independence. In my country, there were bitter struggles over how to define the American dream: And in Europe, people emerged from tyranny only to find a new kind of tyranny looming on the horizon. An Iron Curtain was drawn across the continent. And Berlin was divided – east from west ... the free from the enslaved. But in this place, the flickering light of
freedom refused to be extinguished. The last European battlefield of World War Two was the first battlefield of the Cold War.

On June 24, 1948, Stalin threw down a gauntlet, refusing to allow supplies sent to Berlin through the territory under their jurisdiction. It was war by starvation – with more than 2 million lives hanging in the balance. The blockade stymied the British, French and American allies. Some saw no solution, and reluctantly advised evacuation. But they underestimated the determination of the citizens of this city to remain free.

Then a few visionaries looked to the sky. The fate of free Germany hung by a thread—the thread of air support. There was no script to follow—just the simple rules of conscience that determine all our best actions. Harry Truman said, “There is no discussion on that point. We have to stay in Berlin — period.” From that moment, the western allies became protectors instead of occupiers. The people of Berlin would be fortified – not with arms, but with food, medicine, and supplies. The largest airlift in history began ... known fondly in America as Operation Vittles.

There are too many stories from that proud period to tell them all here. We will never forget the leadership of Generals Lucius D. Clay and William Tunner. Or the casualties, 31 from the U.S., 39 from Britain, from Germany. Or the countless stories of individual kindness, like Lt. Gail Halvorsen, the famous Rosinenbomber [rose-ee-nen-bomber] (whom some of you may remember as Uncle Wiggly-Wings). Allied deeds, small and large, convinced our friends in Germany that we were here to help. If the Communists could fight with fear, we could fight back with faith.
I'd like to salute all the American veterans who came back to celebrate with you today. For fifty years, your example has lifted spirits on both sides of the Atlantic.

Americans learned a great deal from the people of Berlin. We learned about pride, about sacrifice and courage (Lt. Halvorsen began to drop candy because he had never seen children who refused to beg). Thousands of Berliners, from doctors to housewives, rolled up their sleeves... help Americans expand this airfield... building Tegel [tay-gul] from scratch... unloading and maintaining the planes. Your fearless mayor, Ernst Reuter [roy-ter], inspired Americans and Germans alike when he stood before a rally and said, “we cannot be bartered, we cannot be negotiated, we cannot be sold.”

It has been estimated that 75,000 people around Europe helped the airlift in some capacity. People from Britain, France, Scandinavia, the Baltics... from all across Europe and beyond, working as a single team. The Airlift was an achievement of continental grandeur. Its triumph was a triumph for people everywhere who love freedom.

Between June 1948 and May 1949, over a quarter million sorties were flown, around the clock, every 90 seconds at its height [height col.]. The flight patterns were hard. The weather was often terrible. Bob Hope visited, looked at the fog, and said, “soup I can take — but this stuff has noodles in it.” Some two million tons of supplies were flown into Berlin — coal... medical supplies... and a whole lot of powdered milk, pulverized eggs and dehydrated potatoes. The recipe was simple: add a little water, add a little determination... and you can survive anything.
But the most precious cargo of all did not come in a CARE package like the one here today. It was the simple hope created by the constant roar of planes overhead. Berliners called it a "symphony of freedom" ... a symphony in which we all played together, in concert. For almost a year, the drone of airplane engines reminded you that Berlin was not alone.

Memories of the airlift are still fresh for some of you. But much time has elapsed since then. A new generation must relearn the lessons of the Airlift as we face new challenges ... challenges that are more diffuse more no less dangerous than those of half a century ago.

Yes, the Cold War is now history. As a result, we have a chance to build a new Europe - undivided, democratic and at peace. Around the world, more people than ever before choose their own leaders ... more markets are open to trade, generating growth and jobs. But the bit the information age is chipping away at barriers - economic, social, and political - that once kept people locked in and ideas locked out. Never in the course of human history have we had a greater opportunity to make our people healthier and wiser through advances in medicine and education ... to protect our planet from decay ... to make progress everyone's partner.

But today's possibilities are not tomorrow's guarantees. Too many people still fear change because they have not felt its benefits. They remain susceptible to the poisoned appeal of extreme nationalism ... to ethnic, racial and religious hatreds. And we are all vulnerable to the reckless acts of rogue states ... to terrorists, drug traffickers and international criminals. These
21st century predators feed on technological progress and the free flow of information, people and money. For all the promise of our time, we are not free from peril.

That is why I hope Americans will also remember the lesson of what happened here fifty years ago. That America cannot relinquish the responsibilities of leadership. That the struggle for freedom never ends. That the world can never be made completely safe for democracy. And that generosity creates its own rewards. In the heat of the crisis, General Clay wrote, "I believe the future of democracy requires us to stay." (The Airlift was expensive. But it cost far less than it would have cost to do nothing.)

The investment we made in Germany's future is one of the best investments we ever made. It would be difficult to imagine a more dynamic society or a better friend and ally. On this and all my previous visits as President, I have seen the power of people taking command of their destinies. And when the modern equivalent of CARE packages are sent to Bosnia, Rwanda and other places ravaged by war, the people of Germany are among the first to send them.

The bridge between our two countries has never been stronger. Countless educational programs link our children as they learn together. The Fulbright Program between Germany and the United States is the largest in the world. This fall, the American Academy in Berlin will open, bringing my country's leading cultural figures here to teach and learn from you. And I am pleased to announce that we will be requesting additional funding to support the Congress-Bundestag Youth Exchange, which has given more than 10,000 German and American students the chance to visit each other's countries. The next century of German-
American cooperation has already begun in our classrooms. Let us keep building these bridges in the hearts and minds of our young people.

In closing, let me read from Goethe’s “Song of the Spirits Over the Waters”:

Goethe wrote:

Man’s soul is like the water:
From heaven it descends,
To heaven it rises,
And down again
To earth it returns,
Ever repeating.

To me, these lines express the eternal heroism of the Airlift, and the lasting friendship we forged. It’s a story that began here at Tempelhof Airport. A story that tells people around the world never to lose faith in the future. That adversity can be conquered ... prayers are answered ... hopes are heard and realized. That cooperation between nations is no illusion. Today, a hundred years from today, and long after that, all friends of freedom will take pride in this story of flight and rebirth ... and the knowledge that now and forever, Berlin is still Berlin – Berlin bleibt doch Berlin [bear-lean bly-pt dawk bear-lean].

# # #
Berlin Gum Drop

The candy he dropped, says Flury, was a "symbol of hope."

"I was born in Berlin in 1914, and I always remember that candy," said Flury.

"It was a symbol of hope, but there was also a sense of danger. They knew the candy was coming, but they didn't know if they would get it."

"And it was a symbol of beauty, too. The candy was so colorful and shiny."
BERLIN AIRLIFT QUICK FACTS

Origins of the Blockade Video Clip

Britain, France, the United States, and the Soviet Union occupied Germany at the end of the Second World War. Each country controlled a zone. They also occupied Berlin, which was surrounded by the Soviet zone, and divided the city into four sectors.

Cooperation broke down in 1947 and early 1948. The three Western powers decided to create a separate West German government in their zones. The Soviets tried to dissuade them by gradually escalating harassment of Western traffic to and from the city, which culminated in the Berlin blockade, imposed 24 June 1948.

Berlin Airlift Chronology

- 18 Jun 48
  - As a first step toward a West German government, the Western powers announced a currency reform, effective 20 June. To keep the old currency from entering their zone, where it was still valid, the Soviets banned all travel to and from the eastern zone.

- 22 Jun 48
  - European Command (EUCOM) directed U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) to airlift supplies to Berlin for use by the U.S. garrison there. USAFE delivered 156 tons in 64 sorties.

- 24 Jun 48
  - The Soviets suspended all ground travel in and out of Berlin.
Video Clip

- 25 Jun 48
  - Royal Air Force (RAF) Dakotas (C-47 equivalents) deployed from the UK to Germany and flew their first missions into Berlin (6.5 tons for UK garrison).

- 28 Jun 48
  - USAF ordered C-54s from Alaska, Hawaii, and the Caribbean to Germany to reinforce the airlift. First U.S. and British cargoes for Berliners.

- 7 Jul 48
  - First coal shipments arrived on C-54s.

- 8 Jul 48
  - First fatal U.S. crash: C-47 went down near Wiesbaden, killing all three aboard.

- 19 Sep 48
  - First fatal RAF crash: York crashed near Wunstorf; five killed.

- 15 Oct 48
  - U.S. and British efforts merged, with Combined Airlift Task Force (CALTF) created at Wiesbaden.

- 5 Nov 48
  - First operational sortie into newly constructed Tegel Airfield in Berlin.

Video Clip

- 9 Nov 48
  - Two U.S. Navy R-5D (C-54 equivalent) squadrons joined airlift.

- 10 Jan 49
  - U.S. airlift reached peak strength of 225 C-54s.

- 16 Apr 49
  - CALTF mounts a maximum effort known as the "Easter Parade": 1,398 sorties (one landing in Berlin every minute), 12,940 short tons.
• 12 May 49
  • Soviets lift blockade.

• 30 Sep 49
  • Berlin Airlift ends.

Video Clip

**Berlin Airlift Statistics**

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<td>87,841</td>
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A comparison with the recent multinational airlift into Sarajevo suggests how intense an effort the Berlin Airlift was. From July 1992 to January 1996, 179,910 tons of cargo was airlifted into Sarajevo. The Berlin Airlift delivered more than that in March 1949 alone, and did it again in each of the four months that followed.

**Berlin Airlift Casualties**

- USA: 31 (28 U.S. Air Force, 1 US Navy, 1 US Army, 1 Army civilian)
- UK: 39 (17 Royal Air Force, 1 British Army, 21 civilians)
- Germany: Disputed. Most sources say 9 civilians; some list 12 civilians.

**Types of Aircraft Participating**

- USA: C-47s, C-54s. Five C-82s, 1 C-74, 1 C-97 (flew temporarily)
- UK: Dakotas, Yorks, and later Hastings. RAF chartered commercial carriers to supplement its own efforts, and charter companies flew a wide variety of aircraft. Australian, New Zealand, and South African air forces sent crews to fly with British Royal Air Force but no aircraft.

**Airfields**

U.S. began at Rhein-Main and Wiesbaden; later expanded to Fassberg and Celle in the British zone. The British began at Wunstorf; later operated from Fassberg, Finkenwerder, Fuhlsbüttel, Lübeck, and Schleswigland. At first, the allies used two bases in Berlin: Tempelhof (US) and Gatow (British). During the blockade, the allies built a third airfield, Tegel, in the French sector of Berlin. It’s now the main airport.

**Nicknames**
There was no official nickname for the overall operation. Americans called their airlift "Operation Vittles," while the British called theirs "Plain Fare."

Soviet Harassment

The Soviets made no determined effort to disrupt the airlift. There are two likely reasons for this. First, the Soviets saw no need to interfere with the airlift at first, because they believed it would fail. Second, disruption ran serious risks of triggering a war.
Wunsdorf, near Hanover, and Berlin-Gatow, carrying ad of sixty tons. That service, he assured his visitors, continued for a few days, by which time, road and rail s would be normal. It was this belief alone that had his government’s resolution to stay put.

“Never work long-term,” he concluded, “you could d two and a half million people by air. But it’s well ing. We must see this one through. Even if it fails you know, it will give us all time to negotiate.”

After the meeting Wedemeyer was seated beneath the chandeliers of the blue-and-silver restaurant in a hotel. Worried by what he termed Clay’s “cocky attitude,” he had called in his old friend, Lord Marshal of the RAF, for advice. Although Portal d from the post three years back, the two men had time comrades since the days of the Quebec and conferences.

Wedemeyer launched into the subject of the airlift. It had noted that Berlin could exist on a survival level of y tons, but Wedemeyer thought a scarcity of transc ldictate a maximum ceiling of 3,000 tons—a quarter’s preblockade needs. What part, he asked Portal, RAF play?

Hazarded that in any such operation the RAF would all in the Dakotas of the British Overseas Airways on. Between them they might muster a daily delivery ns. That left 2,250 tons to be made good by the s.

Wedemeyer still thought the answer was to withdraw Ameri and their dependents from Berlin at an appreciably z. This would cut down consumption of food. But hared him that air access for three clearly defined air to Berlin—from Hamburg, Frankfurt, and Bücke twenty miles wide—not only existed but had been in writing by the Russians as far back as October maximum permitted height-in these corridors was t.

At more reassured, Wedemeyer sipped his coffee. a chilling thought crossed his mind. “Supposing,” he n the Russians see this building up they won’t let us use the airfields?” There was a dead silence. Portal could find no answer at all.

Even as Ernest Bevin was bidding farewell to his guests in London, the thirty-third President of the United States, at his desk in the Executive Office of the White House, was pondering the fate of 2,500,000 Berliners.

Grouped around him this morning were three of his top advisers: Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall, and Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett. Without comment, Harry Truman listened as Lovett recited the details of a meeting hastily convened at Royall’s Pentagon office at 4:00 p.m. on the Sunday just past. There they had discussed three major alternatives to the problem of Berlin: to remain under the stress of weekly crises, to supply the city by air and risk war, or to quit Berlin.

Truman cut in abruptly: “There is no discussion on that point. We stay in Berlin—period.”

At once the burly Royall expostulated: “Mr. President, have you thought this through?” He elaborated: It was unthinkable that the United States should be committed to a position under which “we might have to fight our way into Berlin,” unless the possibility was clearly recognized and the consequences accepted.

Truman did not yield an inch. “We will have to deal with the situation as it develops, but the essential position is that we are in Berlin by terms of an agreement and that the Russians have no right to get us out by either direct or indirect pressures.”

The decision was now made irrevocably—a logical extension of the President’s will to contain Communism in Europe.

Another radical decision followed. As from today the President wanted Clay’s improvised airlift placed on a full-scale organized basis. Somehow Berlin would be fed until the diplomatic deadlock was broken—“even if it takes every Piper Cub in the United States.”

Two points only remained to be settled: the feasibility of dispatching two B-29 squadrons from Goose Bay, Labrador, to Germany and of basing two B-29 squadrons in England (the latter having been agreed to by the British).

Truman approved both projects wholeheartedly. The posi-
BERLIN IN CRISIS

position, and whether it would be advisable to base two B-29 groups in England as well.

Among the conclusions reached at the meeting were the following: (1) Forrestal, Royall, and Lovett should meet with the President the next morning and present the major issues involved for his decision, and the departments of Army and State should prepare short statements of the possible alternative courses of action and the arguments for and against each; (2) General Clay's reaction should be obtained on the question of sending two additional B-29 squadrons to Germany; (3) U.S. Ambassador Douglas in England should be asked to explore the possibility of basing two B-29 groups in Great Britain. 47

The Berlin crisis had been building up for several months and had been acute for about a week. Yet, as far as one can determine the meeting in Secretary Royall's office was the first time Washington had faced squarely the question of counteraction to the Soviet blockade attempt. Even then, relatively little attention was given the airlift, whose potentialities were still not appreciated. But this was not surprising, in view of the skepticism that still prevailed even in U.S. Air Force headquarters in Europe about the degree to which the airlift could be expanded.

JUNE 28 (MONDAY)—PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S DECISION

U.S. policy toward Berlin was clarified as soon as the matter was presented to President Truman. At a White House meeting, Under Secretary of State Lovett recapitulated the details of Sunday's discussion at the Pentagon. When he came to the specific question of whether the United States was to stay in Berlin or not, the President interrupted. There was no discussion on that point, he said. We were going to stay. Period. Secretary Royall expressed "some concern" as to whether the problem had been thought through. He did not think the Americans should be committed to a position under which they might have to fight their way into Berlin, unless this possibility was clearly recognized in advance. The President rejoined that we would have to deal with the situation as it developed, but that "we were in Berlin by terms of an agreement and that the Russians had no right to get us out by either direct or indirect pressure." 48

At the same meeting President Truman approved sending the B-29 bombers to Germany, a decision in which General Clay concurred in a communication from Berlin. The editor of The Forrestal Diaries remarks that at the time, there was Clay could be reinforced.

Dispatches from London were likewise prepared by the New York Times, and that the British confidence that the Ru

Berlin situation appeared ..." and that the British the designs of the Sov against them so strongly pursue its blockade pol to impress the Germans faces starvation, it is t..." time, however, it was a... time struck the average England: "Over the we people were gathered.'

In Berlin the Comm population and the c... was not to accept on the authority of sponed by telling th should be disregarded offset its increasingly i Soviet Military Gove...plied to sick persons at

At a meeting of the illustrated the close...noncommunist cou...ing whether to pres...of the Magistrat offer...go to the telepho...that the Soviets wou... before the United N;
Revolutionary Program and Strategy

develop, more than half the land owned in common by the peasants. Now the question is: Can the Russian obshchina, though greatly undermined, yet a form of the primeval common ownership of land, pass directly to the higher form of communist common ownership? Or, on the contrary, must it first pass through the same process of dissolution as constitutes the historical evolution of the West?

The only answer to that possible today is this: If the Russian Revolution becomes the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West, so that both complement each other, the present Russian common ownership of land may serve as the starting-point for a communist development.

London, January 21, 1882 Karl Marx Friedrich Engels

Preface to the German Edition of 1883

The preface to the present edition I must, alas, sign alone. Marx, the man to whom the whole working class of Europe and America owes more than to anyone else, rests at Highgate Cemetery and over his grave the first grass is already growing. Since his death, there can be even less thought of revising or supplementing the Manifesto. All the more do I consider it necessary again to state here the following expressly:

The basic thought running through the Manifesto—that economic production and the structure of society of every historical epoch necessarily arising therefrom constitute the foundation for the political and intellectual history of that epoch; that consequently (ever since the dissolution of the primeval communal ownership of land) all history has been a history of class struggles, of struggles between exploited and exploiting, between dominated and dominating classes at various stages of social development; that this struggle, however, has now reached a stage where the exploited and oppressed class (the proletariat) can no longer emancipate itself from the class which exploits and oppresses it (the bourgeoisie), without at the same time forever freeing the whole of society from exploitation, oppression and class struggles—this basic thought belongs solely and exclusively to Marx.

I have already stated this many times, but precisely now it is necessary that it also stand in front of the Manifesto itself.

London, June 28, 1883 Friedrich Engels

4. Village community.

Manifesto of the Communist Party

MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

A spectre is haunting Europe—the spectre of Communism. All the Powers of old Europe have entered into a holy alliance to exorcise this spectre: Pope and Czar, Metternich and Guizot, French Radicals and German police-spies.

Where is the party in opposition that has not been decried as Communist by its opponents in power? Where the Opposition that has not hurled back the branding reproach of Communism, against the more advanced opposition parties, as well as against its reactionary adversaries?

Two things result from this fact.

I. Communism is already acknowledged by all European Powers to be itself a Power.

II. It is high time that Communists should openly, in the face of the whole world, publish their views, their aims, their tendencies, and meet this nursery tale of the Spectre of Communism with a Manifesto of the party itself.

To this end, Communists of various nationalities have assembled in London, and sketched the following Manifesto, to be published in the English, French, German, Italian, Flemish and Danish languages.

I. Bourgeois and Proletarians§

The history of all hitherto existing society§ is the history of class struggles.

Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, the means of social production and employers of wage-labour. By proletariat, the class of modern wage-labourers who, having no means of production of their own, are reduced to selling their labour-power in order to live. [Engels, English edition of 1888]

§, That is, all written history. In 1847, the pre-history of society, the social organisation existing previous to recorded history, was all but unknown. Since then, Haxthausen discovered common ownership of land in Russia, Mauer proved it to be the social foundation from which all Teutonic races started in history, and by and by village communities were found to be, or to have been the primitive form of society everywhere from India to Ireland. The inner organisation of this primitive Communist society was laid bare, in its typical form, by Morgan's crowning discovery of the true nature of the gens and its relation to the tribe. With the dissolution of these primaeval communities society begins to be differentiated into separate and finally antagonistic classes. I have attempted to retrace this process of dissolution in: "Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privat-eigenthums und des Staates" [The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State], 2nd edition, Stuttgart 1884. [Engels, English edition of 1888]
dissatisfied with government work; shortly after the end of World War I he returned to journalism, and in 1931 he started his regular political column "Today and Tomorrow" for the New York Herald Tribune. The column was eventually syndicated in 250 American newspapers and 25 newspapers overseas and won two Pulitzer prizes.

Lippmann argued that the United States should base its foreign policy on realpolitik considerations rather than on moral postures of abstract right and wrong. He felt that the United States should not attempt to challenge Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. He also criticized the Truman administration's plans to rebuild postwar Germany as an unnecessary challenge to the Soviet Union.

Lippmann supported aid to Greece and Turkey because he believed it was in America's vital interests to protect the oil routes from the Middle East. But he opposed the Truman Doctrine's offer of aid to any country fighting communism on the grounds that it went beyond protecting the national interest and was in fact a moral crusade. Lippmann also opposed George F. Kennan's containment policy because he believed it would lead to "unending intervention" and enable the Soviets to maintain the initiative. Lippmann, in a series of articles on East-West relations, claimed that Kennan was waging a "cold war" and that the United States should instead pursue a "policy of settlement." The series of articles later became the basis of a book entitled The Cold War, published in November 1947.

During the Eisenhower administration, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles became a favorite target for Lippmann. He criticized Dulles for failing to define clearly the administration's "New Look" policy—the nuclear policy of "massive retaliation." During the Quemoy and Matsu crises Lippmann warned against a close alliance with Nationalist Chinese leader Chiang Kai-shek. He also proposed that Germany be gradually neutralized and demilitarized in order to achieve unification. Lippmann argued that the best way to prevent the spread of communism was to encourage the growth of democratic institutions in neutral Third World countries.

In the 1960 presidential election campaign, Lippmann endorsed John F. Kennedy as the first candidate since Roosevelt who could stir and unite the American people. But the liberal journalist quickly became disillusioned with Kennedy's economic and foreign policies. He became a particularly vehement critic of the Kennedy and Johnson policies in Vietnam, and continued to attack U.S. involvement there until his retirement in 1968.

For Further Information:

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Lisbon Agreement (1952) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Lisbon Agreement of 1952 established many of the basic structures of NATO, laid foundation stones for the formation of a European army and the European Defense Community (EDC), which would include West Germany, and set ambitious goals for alliance defense forces. The Korean War and successive crises in Berlin had convinced the European members of NATO that there was a greater danger that America's new worldwide commitments would leave it dangerously overstretched and leave Europe exposed to a military attack from the Soviet Union. The Europeans concluded therefore that they had to take on a greater share of the burden for their own defense and integrate their forces in a European army. At the same time, since Western Europe was still not fully recovered from World War II, it was necessary to strengthen America's defense and political ties to Western Europe through an expanded NATO organization.

These plans crystallized at a meeting of NATO foreign and defense ministers in Lisbon on February 20-25, 1952. The main points agreed upon by ministers at this meeting were:

1. Approval of plans for a European army to include West Germany.
2. A goal to have 50 NATO divisions active in Europe by the end of 1952 and produce 4,000 aircraft.
3. The inclusion of Greek and Turkish forces under the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.
4. The reorganization of NATO's bureaucracy to create a secretariat general, to increase the powers of the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe and establish a permanent council of ambassadors to NATO to take over from meetings of deputy ministers.
5. A declaration of aims that emphasized the defensive nature of the alliance.

The organizational changes went ahead and a NATO headquarters was installed later that year outside Paris. Lord Ismay, the British Commonwealth secretary, was named NATO's first secretary general. But a slight easing of tensions in Korea led the Europeans to reconsider their commitments to heavy defense expenditures. At his end-of-the-year report in December, Lord Ismay said that the alliance had fallen significantly short of its force goals. Plans for the European army under the EDC went ahead, and an agreement was signed in May 1952, but the pact collapsed after it was rejected by the French National Assembly in April 1955. This led to full West German membership in NATO and the Western European Union.

The main achievement of the Lisbon Agreement was that it demonstrated that if the threat was great enough, the
Core Objective:
The Congress-Bundestag Youth Exchange (CBYX) represents the German-American partnership. One of the best ways to cement this partnership and to highlight the President’s trip to Germany in May would be for the President and Chancellor Kohl to mark the fifteenth anniversary of CBYX by announcing some changes which will strengthen the program. In addition, the President should announce that he will request that Congress increase funding in FY-2000 so as to reach the optimal level of 400 participants on each side, and that he will couple this request with the recommendation that U.S. Government support for the program remain constant in later years. This will appeal to the program’s supporters in both countries and stop the annual reductions which have so irritated the Germans.

Background:
By virtue of its economic strength, geostrategic position and history, Germany is a uniquely important ally. It is vital to the U.S. national interest to maintain close ties and the best understanding possible with both the current leadership and the successor generation.

The interests of German political leaders, from Chancellor Kohl on down, dovetail with our own in regard to personal contacts and educational exchanges. In a speech entitled “Security in Tomorrow’s World,” given at the Wehrkunde Conference in Munich on February 7 of this year, the Chancellor again stressed the importance of youth exchange: “We intend to develop and intensify the partnership with the USA -- also in the economic, academic, and cultural fields. Personal contacts -- even in the age of electronic communication -- are more important than ever for this purpose. ... That is why exchanges between Americans and Europeans, especially between the younger generations, continue to be of such importance.”

German political leaders repeatedly single out the Congress-Bundestag Youth Exchange (CBYX) as the most important and effective exchange program between our two countries. CBYX is a unique program that has enabled more than 10,000 German and American young people to live and study in each other’s country since its founding by the two national legislatures 15 years ago. Alumni of the year-long exchange program have gone on to careers in government, international relations, and business, and all are enthusiastic about their experiences with CBYX. Every year to
date, up to 800 German and American high schoolers and young professionals have taken part in CBYX. The President of the Bundestag calls CBYX "one of the best ways to reinforce and expand our vital transatlantic ties."

From the U.S. perspective, CBYX is as vital to German-American understanding as the Fulbright program. The Fulbright program benefits mature scholars and graduate students. CBYX focuses exclusively on the crucial successor generation -- which we cannot afford to take for granted in Germany. By providing exchange opportunities to both high schoolers and young professionals, CBYX actually reaches a broader spectrum than the academically-focused Fulbright program.

We recommend that members of Congress (particularly the Congressional Study Group on Germany), as well as current American exchangees and German alumni of the CBYX Program, be invited to attend the President's Berlin speech in May. One of the Germans could be asked to share, in fluent English, some reflections on the impact which the exchange program has had on his/her life.

Talking Points:

✦ The President and the Congress hold the CBYX Program in the same high esteem that Chancellor Kohl and the Bundestag do: it is a symbol of our commitment to the bilateral relationship and a bridge for interaction between our two national legislatures.

✦ The traditional high school (ages 16-18) exchanges have been very valuable for those who have participated, although it has sometimes been difficult to find sufficient numbers of qualified American students.

✦ While we want to maintain the number of high school participants, we would also like to reflect the importance which both the President and the German government place on school-to-work programs and the education and training of youth as we approach the year 2000. To this end, the U.S. and German sides are in the midst of discussions regarding an increase in the number of young professional and vocational participants (ages 18-22).

✦ In order to increase the involvement and support of the Congress for CBYX, both sides are discussing proposals to increase the number of exchanges available to Congressional staffers and to arrange working experiences for exchange participants in legislators' Washington and district offices. In addition, the President has invited members of
Congress, particularly the Congressional Study Group on Germany, to attend his speech in Berlin.

We appreciate the constancy of German support for CBYX, at the annual level of $3.6 million. For FY-2000, the President will ask Congress for an increase in funding to $2.8 million, which should be maintained in later years. This U.S. level of funding will permit the program to reach the optimal level of 400 participants on each side.

Together with the Fulbright Program, the CBYX Program contributes significantly to the education and training of youth in both our countries and will ensure that the successor generations remain just as committed to the friendship and strategic partnership between our two countries as the current leaders are.
As we approach the new Millennium, I cannot think of anything more effective than exchange programs to cement the good relations between our two countries and to prepare our youth for the challenges they will face. From my own experience as an exchange student, I know how important and valuable it is to gain a broader perspective and to establish life-long relationships.

For the past 50 years, Germans and Americans have drawn closer together and increased their mutual understanding through the Fulbright Program. As many of you know, the world-wide Fulbright Program was created by my mentor, Senator William Fulbright from Arkansas. The Fulbright Program between Germany and the United States is the largest in the world. It has enabled mature scholars and graduate students to broaden their horizons and to share the fruits of their academic labor with their counterparts in both countries. In recent years, government funding for this program has been supplemented by private sector support -- from firms such as Siemens, Mercedes Benz, Ford, Opel and General Motors -- resulting in an increased number of scholarships.

This year marks the fifteenth anniversary of the Congress-Bundestag Youth Exchange, a unique program created by our two national legislatures. This program complements the academically-focused Fulbright Program. The Congress-Bundestag Youth Exchange, as the name suggests, is directed at the youth of our two countries: every year to date, up to 800 German and American high schoolers and young professionals have taken part in this program. The high school students become aware of the wider world and establish ties which they will treasure for the rest of their lives. Thanks to a combination of classroom education and on-the-job training during their year abroad, young professionals are able to bring valuable experience into their working life: Americans can take advantage of Germany’s unique “dual system” of education and practical training, while German youth can benefit from American strengths in areas such as telecommunications, environmental technology and the service sector. In both cases, the young people of our two countries gain knowledge and experience which will serve them well later in life.
In order to strengthen the Congress-Bundestag Youth Exchange Program and to tie it in even more closely with the need for school-to-career preparation for the new Millenium, we have agreed to increase the proportion of young professionals and vocational school graduates. So that our youth can better understand the connections between politics, work, and their daily lives, we have also agreed to arrange working experiences for participants in the offices of legislators in both countries. Because this Program is so important, I am going to ask the Congress to increase funding for the Congress-Bundestag Youth Exchange at the start of the new Millenium, in FY-2000, and I will ask the Members of Congress to keep this increased funding on a stable footing in the years thereafter. This increased level of funding will enable the program to function at the optimal number of 400 participants on each side.

As we look forward to strengthening this exchange program, I am delighted to be able to recognize some of its staunchest supporters, members of the Congressional Study Group on Germany and of the Bundestag, as well as young German and American alumni who will be leaders in our respective countries in the new Millenium. [The President invites a German alumnus/a of the Congress-Bundestag Youth Exchange onto the podium to share, in fluent English, some reflections on the impact which the exchange program has had on his/her life.]

Together, the Fulbright and the Congress-Bundestag Youth Exchange Programs can ensure that our successor generations will have a sound basis for life-long learning in the new Millenium and will remain just as committed to the friendship and strategic partnership between our two countries as the current leaders are.