FOIA MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:
Russia-U.S. Relations - Background

Staff Office-Individual:
Speechwriting-Boorstin

Original OA/ID Number:
415

Row: 48  Section: 6  Shelf: 3  Position: 1  Stack: v
Clinton in Moscow: Focusing on Differences

By STEVEN ERLANGER

MOSCOW, May 3 — Less than a week before President Clinton's arrival in Moscow to join the 50th anniversary celebrations of V-E Day, relations between the United States and Russia appear to have deteriorated.

Analysis Russian officials think Washington is overly concerned with less-than-pressing issues like an old contract to sell Russian nuclear reactors to Iran and pressure in Washington to build a new missile defense system. The Russians continue to express skepticism about American intentions to expand NATO, and think that Washington is taking advantage of Moscow's weakened position in the world.

With the legislatures of both countries dominated by conservative forces critical of the early Russian-American honeymoon, one of its prime achievements, the second strategic arms reduction treaty, or Start II, may be dead, the Russian Parliament unlikely to ratify it.

Signed by President Boris N. Yeltsin and former President Bush in January 1993, the arms treaty would cut strategic nuclear arsenals by almost three-quarters. It would eliminate multi-warhead, land-based nuclear missiles — the backbone of the Russian arsenal — and, with them, the threat of a first strike.

The treaty would also allow both countries to oversee the dismantling and destruction of nuclear warheads, important when American officials say their primary concern is what they call "loose nukes," or the smuggling of weapons-grade nuclear material out of Russia.

Instead of protecting a real achievement in nuclear safety, attention prior to Mr. Clinton's arrival for ceremonies marking the Allies' victory over Germany in World War II has been focused on an old Soviet contract to supply light-water nuclear reactors to Iran, which the United States insists is trying to build its own bomb. Russian officials think the emphasis on Iran stems from American domestic politics.

American military plans to develop a new interceptor missile to stop short-range missiles have also disturbed the Russians. The Americans say the missile defense is intended to stop terrorist weapons; the Russians say it is a step toward undermining the 1974 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty. More importantly, Russian officials say, it will push them into another technological arms race with the United States that they do not want and cannot afford, giving the Russian military and its industrial allies more arguments against further reductions.

"Again, like NATO, it feels destabilizing," the Russian official said. A Western diplomat acknowledged the Russian concerns, saying, "They wonder why the Americans can't leave well enough alone for a while."

Some Russians also do not see why the West is so reluctant to renegotiate the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe treaty, which limits the num-

Complaints Threaten Real Security Gains

ber of troops and armor Russia can keep in the troubled Caucasus region. Negotiated with the Soviet Union and designed to reduce the risk of a Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe, the treaty sets troop limits that may no longer make sense now that both the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union are gone.

The Russians also see Iran as an issue of commercial competition as much as one of nuclear proliferation. Even Yegor T. Gaidar, the former Prime Minister and a pro-Westdemocrat, said: "We have serious commercial interests here. So I want a very serious argument made before abolishing this deal, and I haven't heard one yet."

The Russian Atomic Energy Ministry has argued that the United States controls half the shrinking world market in nuclear technology and does not want a competitor. Russian arms sellers make the same argument, complaining that customers of the old Soviet Union like Iraq, Libya and the former Yugoslavia are all off-limits now because of United Nations sanctions.

Sergei M. Rogov, director of the USA-Canada Institute in Russia, says the idea of a "Russian-American honeymoon" was always a myth. "Both sides should get some excitement and profit from a honeymoon," he said, but Russia "didn't get much."

The problems will be toned down for Mr. Clinton's visit, he said, only to re-emerge later: the war in Chechnya won't have ended, the second strategic arms treaty won't be ratified, Russia won't fulfill its obligations under the conventional forces treaty. "We'll be considered, for the first time, a violator of a major international agreement," he said.

Then NATO will meet in December to decide conditions for new members while the Russian parliamentary elections are taking place. "The weaker we are becoming the louder we begin to cry and shout about parity with the United States," Mr. Rogov said.

Mark V. Urenov, director of Mr. Yeltsin's Analytical Department, appealed for American "long-term understanding and trust." Russia is in transition, he said, "We are potential friends and real partners."
Four months into Gov. George E. Pataki's administration, a majority of New Yorkers are concerned that he is moving too swiftly to shrink the state government and that his policies will damage their quality of life, according to a recent state telephone poll that finds Mr. Pataki's ratings are low over budget cuts.

Most of New Yorkers are concerned efforts to portray him as a weak leader, 48 percent of registered voters said Mr. Pataki has tax policy and leadership qualities, an increase of 14 percentage points from October.

And though only 27 percent of these people said they have a favorable opinion of Mr. Pataki, that is still a 9 percentage points higher than in the fall. The statewide telephone poll of 1,205 adults was conducted April 26 through April 30 and has a margin of error of plus or minus 3 percentage points.

How the Survey Was Conducted

The latest New York Times poll of New York State is based on telephone interviews conducted from April 26 to 30 with 1,205 adults throughout the state. Interviews were done in either English or Spanish.

The random sample of telephone numbers was provided by Survey Sampling Inc. of Fairfield, Conn.

Within each household one adult was designated by a random method to be the respondent. The results have been weighted to reflect the demographic characteristics of the state's population, as well as to adjust for variations relating to the age of the state, race, sex and education.

According to statistical theory, in 19 of 20 cases the results based on such samples will differ by no more than 3 percentage points in either direction from what would have been obtained by seeking out all adults in New York State.

The potential sampling error for smaller subgroups is larger. For example, for results based only on residents of New York City, it would be plus or minus 6 percentage points.

In addition to sampling error, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey of public opinion may introduce other sources of error into the poll. Differences in the wording and order of the questions, for example, can lead to somewhat varying results.

The poll was funded by contributions from readers of The New York Times. The New York Times assumes responsibility for the conduct of the poll and the publication of its findings.

The poll also showed that 24 percent of registered voters have favorable opinions of Senator Alfonse M. D'Amato, Mr. Pataki's chief political rival and sponsor of a major state budget proposal. The poll was conducted April 26 through April 30 and has a margin of error of plus or minus 5 percentage points.

The New York Times is a member of the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan, the National Election Pool, and other organizations that conduct surveys of public opinion.

The New York Times telephone polls are conducted by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. The telephone numbers are selected at random and are based on the telephone directory. The interviews are conducted by telephone operators who are trained to follow a standardized script.

The margin of error for the poll is plus or minus 3 percentage points.

The poll was conducted April 26 through April 30 and has a margin of error of plus or minus 3 percentage points. The results are based on a random sample of 1,205 adults throughout the state.

The poll was conducted April 26 through April 30 and has a margin of error of plus or minus 3 percentage points.
By Michael Dobbs
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Russian foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, describes his political situation as one of "benign nationalism." Last week, he came to Washington to deliver a simple message: Do business with me and my boss, President Boris Yeltsin, because the alternatives are likely to be a good deal worse.

Fashoined to coincide with the 50th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany in World War II—which will be marked in Moscow by a May 9-10 summit meeting between Yeltsin and President Clinton—the Kozyrev message has been loud and clear in Washington.

Over the last few months, the Clinton administration has worked hard to reshape its Russia policy from one of largely uncritical support for Yeltsin and his "reformers" to a policy of "pragmatic engagement" with a prickly, and frequently unpredictable, great power in the East.

Kozyrev first tried out his "good cop-bad cop" routine at a European security conference in Stockholm in December 1992, when he shocked his audience by delivering a simple message: Moscow and Washington were further strained by a Russian decision to sell nuclear reactors to Iran and by the attack on Chechnya.

Although it was widely seen as a major setback, Yeltsin's outburst did serve one useful purpose: It shattered the naive illusions of amity and concord that characterized U.S.-Russian relations during the immediate aftermath of the collapse of communism. Like a married couple putting the pieces back together after their first big row, U.S. and Russian diplomats have spent the last four months attempting to repair the damage and put their relationship on a more realistic basis.

There now seems to be a reasonable prospect that the Moscow-Berlin-Peking variant of "benign nationalism" could cause a "nightmare of renewed confrontation." At the same time, Kozyrev has polished his act to the extent that it is now very difficult to tell how much of it is personal conviction and how much is an "oratorical device" to grab the attention of his Western interlocutors. But the essence of the act is the same: He is posing as the "good guy," the "benign nationalist" who represents the reasonable alternative to malignant nationalists back home.

"There is a clear line between us and the ultranationalists," the foreign minister said in an interview here last week. "Russia, like other states, is engaged in a search for identity. The strengthening of Russian foreign policy need not be a negative for the U.S. You should recognize Russia as a player, recognize our desire to defend our national interests, and play an important role in the world."

The new Russian rhetoric of "benign nationalism" contrasts sharply with the "partnership" rhetoric that reached its apogee in June 1991, with the ecstatic reception given Yeltsin by a joint session of Congress. At that time, the Russian leader was still basking in his reputation as the slayer of the communist dragon. Senators and representatives responded to his appeal for a joint U.S.-Russian effort to make the world "safe for democracy" with nine standing ovations and enthusiastic chants of "Boris, Boris!"

Contrast that love-fest with the scene in Budapest last December, when Yeltsin warned of the Cold War being replaced by a "cold peace" if the United States went ahead with plans to expand NATO to include several former Soviet bloc countries, such as Poland and Hungary. U.S. officials acknowledge that they were stunned by Yeltsin's harangue and his related refusal to agree to Russian participation in the Partnership for Peace, a major cooperation program between NATO and its former Warsaw Pact adversaries. In January, relations between Moscow and Washington were further strained by a Russian decision to sell nuclear reactors to Iran and by the attack on Chechnya.

The Washington Post
SUNDAY, APRIL 30, 1995

Russia's Kozyrev Portrays Stance as Benign as Washington's...
U.N. Gives Evidence Of Serb Air Attack On Bosnian Enclave

Bombing Would Violate NATO 'No-Fly Zone'

By John Pomfret
Washington Post Foreign Service

SARAJEVO, Bosnia, April 29—U.N. officials said they suspect Serb warplanes based in Croatia bombed the Muslim-held Bihac pocket today, defying a NATO-enforced "no-fly zone" in Bosnia and crossing an international border to do so.

The alleged airstrike followed a ground attack by Serb infantry, artillery and tanks into the isolated northwestern enclave from Serb-held territory in Croatia. The U.N. mission here also said that Serb forces fired a phosphorous shell at a mission here, said the Geneva Convention's ban on the use of such weapons.

Serb assaults on the Bihac pocket, the northwestern corner of Bosnia that has been the scene of heavy fighting late last year, have escalated in recent days as a result of the Serb forces' decision to pull their men out of the pocket. If verified, the bombing of Bihac today, however, two weeks later. Today, however, no NATO planes were called into action over Bihac, U.N. officials said.

U.N. spokesman Alexander Ivanko said that U.N. military officials had yet to confirm the attack occurred. U.N. officials, Ivanko said, had put together the following details. Shortly after 3 p.m., Bangladeshi U.N. troops near the town of Klokot inside the Bihac pocket saw two jets fly over their observation post. Explosions were heard shortly thereafter near an area about one mile north of Bihac's U.N.-designated "safe area."

A few minutes later, Czech peacekeepers in Serb-controlled Croatia reported seeing two jets flying away from Croatia, leading U.N. military officials to assume they were the same aircraft, Ivanko said. "The detonations inside the Bihac pocket didn't seem like they were from shelling or mortar fire," Ivanko said. "So we think the jets discharged two bombs."

One U.N. military official said he believed that the Serbs attacked with cluster bombs and that their target was either front-line Muslim positions near the "safe area" or a water station that supplies it with drinking water.

In recent weeks following Bosnian Serb threats, U.N. officials have spoken frequently of their worries that Bosnian Serb forces soon would begin a major effort to force the Muslim-led Bosnian government to give up its goal of winning back some of the 70 percent of Bosnia that the Serbs now hold.

U.N. officials and military officers have pointed to Bihac as the most likely target of a Serb assault. The pocket is surrounded by Serbs to the north and west and Bosnian Serbs to the east and south. A band of rebel Muslims, fighting the Sarajevo government, also has aided the Serbs in their attacks.

Croatian Serb troops began crossing from Croatia into Bihac late Friday night about 10 miles northwest of Klokot, Ivanko said. Backed by tanks, mortars and artillery, the Serb forces were believed to have set at least 12 houses ablaze, U.N. officials said.

U.N. officials also expressed dismay at the Bosnian Serb use of white phosphorous shell on Friday. Ivanko said the shell hit the town of Maglaj, burning a house and one of its occupants.

"This attack proves just how much respect the Bosnian Serbs have for the laws of the international community from which they seek recognition and legitimacy," Ivanko said.

Burning white phosphorous released by such shells sticks to flesh and bones.

The Reuters news agency reported from Zagreb, Croatia:

Separatist Serbs killed three Croatian motorists and took five hostage on a highway crossing cease-fire lines in reprisal for the killing of a Serb by an embittered Croatian refugee, the United Nations said.

The rebels promised to free the five today in a swap for the body of the Serb under a deal engineered by U.N. peacekeepers scramble to prevent the violence from ruining efforts to reconcile Croatia and its Serb minority.

Serbs seized almost a third of Croatia in 1991 in a revolt against its secession from Yugoslavia. 
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

12-Dec-1994 12:52pm

TO: (See Below)

FROM: Margaret M. Suntum
Office of the Press Secretary

SUBJECT: 1994-12-12 Background Briefing on Gore-Chernomyrdin

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL

December 12, 1994

The Briefing Room

11:40 A.M. EST

MR. MITCHELL: Good morning. Briefing today on the Vice President's forthcoming trip on the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission will be Leon Fuerth, who is the National Security Advisor to the Vice President and the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; and Nick Burns, who is the Senior Director for Russian, Ukrainian and Eurasian Affairs. It will be senior administration officials, BACKGROUND ONLY briefing.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're going to leave for this in the afternoon, late in the afternoon of tomorrow. We will be working in Moscow from roughly 3:00 p.m. in the afternoon on the 14th through something like 4:00 p.m. in the afternoon their time on the 16th. And then we'll head back for Washington.

This is the fourth meeting of the commission, which you may know, alternates back and forth between Moscow and Washington.
The commission was established shortly after Vancouver, the first U.S.-Russia summit in the course of the Clinton administration. And the guiding idea was to try to make sure that areas of cooperation, specific areas of cooperation especially in fields of economics, science, technology and so on that were agreed to, would be executed, and that obstacles that arose to these would, to the extent necessary be handled by a high-powered commission headed by heavyweight officials of both governments -- in this case, the Vice President and the Prime Minister of Russia.

The structure of the commission has evolved over time. More committees have been set up by joint agreement when it was found that the system seemed to be working. And presently, it consists of
the Business Development Committee, which is headed by Ron Brown; the Energy Commission, which on our side is headed by Secretary O'Leary -- there is an equivalent Russian opposite number in each case -- the Defense Conversion Committee, which is headed by Secretary Perry; the Environment Committee, which is headed by Carol Browner from EPA; S&T Committee, which is headed by Gibbons, the Director of OSTP here in the White House; NASA -- or, rather a Space Committee, which is headed by Dan Goldin on our side. And we are starting up a new health committee, which was agreed to the last time there was this meeting -- a meeting of the GCC here in Washington, and it will be headed by Donna Shalala.

The committee, on the one hand, is deeply into nuts and bolts operations. And the longer the clock runs on it, the deeper it gets into the details that make or break business deals, that signal to American investors that the time has come to show a keen interest in Russian -- that either sustain or delay the schedules for joint research projects and so on. However, when you look at it in the aggregate, it is a very important force holding the U.S. partnership together.
Obviously, it's a force that depends on a track record of success. So far, I think we've got the track record, but it also depends up on a growing sense of intimacy and mutual understanding between large parts of the governments of both countries, which have become ever more aware of how they think, what their regulations are, what their laws are.

It's also clear that the Russian Parliament is a real player in this, and that, in many ways, they can determine the destiny of enterprises that are started up at the government-to-government level and pursued through this commission through the legislative process on their side.

I think I should stop there. That's giving you a pretty good thumbnail sketch. We will be releasing specific details of what's on the agenda and what's been accomplished on the other side of these meetings when we actually know what we have got nailed down. But let me try and answer your questions.

Q The obvious question is how the recent tensions that have arisen in foreign policy between the United States and Russia would affect these meetings.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: My colleague has already risen from his seat because we anticipated this, but the answer to that question I think I can take. And it is, we're not expecting that they will. The kinds of issues that we engage in in the commission are clearly in the mutual interest of both countries. And we think that there is probably a desire on the Russian side to proceed with these things. If there are disagreements, they're going to be disagreements that are specific to a given topic on the agenda rather than reflecting any particular bumps that there might be in the overall relationship.

Would you agree?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would just add briefly to what my colleague has said by telling you that we have a very strong relationship with Russia. Now, in the last couple of weeks people have focused on the fact that we do have differences, some on Bosnia, some on NATO expansion. The same day those differences were aired in Budapest on NATO expansion we were able to work with Russia to sign the START I treaty into force and to agree to a CSCE peacekeeping force for Nagorno-Karabakh -- a disagreement we had had for more than two years that President Clinton and President Yeltsin have been able to settle.

So I think that the backdrop of the Vice President's visit is we have a very strong relationship. The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission itself is the expression of that, the fact that we now have seven different bilateral working groups underway, working very practically day to day with not a lot of fanfare and press coverage, at the really important things in the relationship. So we go to Moscow with a great deal of confidence that the relationship is still on track, that American national interests are still engaged, and
that we have the right policy to secure them.

Q Well, wasn’t the President stunned by the lecture in Budapest that -- and surprised that they’re so anti-NATO at the moment?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There have been a lot of conversations preceding Budapest between Secretary Christopher and Minister Kozyrev. There have been an exchange of letters between the two Presidents. I think we were surprised, perhaps, by the tone of the address, but not by the substance. There are substantive

MORE
problems that need to be worked through, and we're confident that
we'll be able to do that.

Q Could you characterize the letters, what the
President's letter said to --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, we normally don't
do that. We rarely do that, and I'd prefer not to today.

Q What does it portend? What does it mean?

Q Just in the context of the strong relations that
you say we still have with the Russians, how do the letters lend
themselves to that statement, if at all?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm not going to
get into what was in the letters because they're private
communications between two leaders. I will say that our agenda on
NATO is focusing now on something very practical. Russia is a member
of the Partnership for Peace. Russia is deliberating now on whether
or not to sign the implementing documents that would create a work
plan for them in Partnership for Peace. And we are confident that,
after a series of discussions on this issue that will take place in
the next couple of weeks, in the next month or so, that they will
choose to sign those documents. And so we're confident that we can
ride through this current difficulty.

Q Will Gore be seeing Yeltsin on this, or anything
else?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's possible. But as
you know, it appears that President Yeltsin has had minor surgery,
and that this is supposed to keep him essentially sidelined, and
we've been told that that period will cover the time when the Vice
President is in Moscow. However, it's really up to him. And if he
feels well enough to have a meeting, then the Vice President would be
delighted and prepared for it.

Q Before the President's ailment, had there been a
meeting scheduled tentatively or permanently?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. There have been
discussions about this possibility, but nothing had been booked, and
so, consequently, nothing is being taken off the books. And we'll
just simply have to wait and see how he is feeling.

Q I realize your agenda is not out, you're going to
be putting it out, but can you give us a little more detailed idea of
what -- in the context of the commission, what Gore and Chernomyrdin
at these particular meetings will sit down and do? Is it like an
action list of problems they have to make decisions on?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, I can describe
that. Forgive me, my head is so saturated with the details after
spending days looking at the books, meaning the briefing books, that
it gets hard to prioritize. But I'll try and give you a sense of
what a typical meeting might cover and how it's structured.

The whole commission, consisting of the U.S. side plus their Russian opposite numbers, will be hooped around a long table with a backup staff behind them in Moscow with full translation. The agenda shows specific times set aside to discuss each committee. When the time for discussion on what has been going on in the committee comes, either the Vice President or Chernomyrdin will introduce the meeting and then the actual -- with some general remarks -- and then the actual committee heads will proceed to give a report on what they have been doing. And in essence, it is a joint report in which they have been working on together, delivered jointly.

MORE
to the Prime Minister of Russia and to the Vice President of the United States.

And these reports will indicate where on the agenda pending actions they have been successful and where there are hangups. And there will be some discussion as to how to get past the hangups either through ongoing discussions in side rooms or in the aftermath as we go on beyond this session.

Typically, there is an effort at these meetings to hand off issues that are completed or nearly completed into the cycle of presidential meetings between the President of the United States and the President of Russia so that the things tend to interact.

Typically, to give you an idea of what would be on the agenda of one of the committees, if you took, let's say, the Energy Committee on -- its agenda would be bifurcated -- they deal with nuclear and nonnuclear energy matters. Under nuclear, for example, they would be talking about the state agreed-to and ongoing efforts to improve the safety of older types of Russian nuclear reactors, power reactors. They would be talking about plans to retire from plutonium production several Russian nuclear reactors. They would be talking about efforts to improve nuclear accountability in a very detailed way.

On the non-nuclear side, they would be talking about specific energy legislation; they would be talking about the state of agreed bilateral programs to work on energy conservation, on analysis of the environmental consequences of certain forms of energy production and on certain kinds of joint research that relate to energy. That's a very fragmentary list.

Q All the Cabinet people will be there with --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All the people I named, yes -- well, some will arrive on the second day. Secretary Brown will be coming in on the second day from a meeting elsewhere in Europe. Secretary Perry will be coming in on the second day from a meeting elsewhere in Europe. But when their subject is discussed, they will be at the table.

Q When you're talking about these specific nuclear issues, is there a possibility with these specifics that something could come up like the North Korean scenario where the U.S. negotiators would offer something to replace some of these graphite-based plants that they have, some of the more dangerous plants, to build light water reactors? Is that a possibility? Are you talking about that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Do you mean in exactly the same way as in the North Korean --

Q Not exactly, but is the scenario similar? Is there something going on --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: More likely we would be
working with them, let’s say, to help finance specific engineering studies that look to different ways of replacing the present type of nuclear reactor that’s now producing plutonium, for example.

Q And the U.S. would help finance that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have ways in which we can help that. But the larger costs are things that we’re going to discuss with them, but the United States is not signaling to them that we can handle that kind of cost. It will have to be done in some other fashion.

MORE
Q Is there any indication that the Russian government is distracted by the developments in Chechnya?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not as I stand here before you. I mean, literally, I don’t think so. I think the people we’re meeting are specialists in their field with Cabinet-level briefs, and they’re going to be focused on what they’ve been negotiating over these last couple of months with their opposite numbers.

Q Does the U.S. have a reaction to what’s happening in Chechnya?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, the President gave you, I think, our reaction yesterday, and it is that we continue today to follow events there rather closely. There have been a number of developments today. We obviously look upon this as an internal affair of the government of Russia for all Russians. The province in question is part of Russia, and one must keep that in mind. We have talked to the Russians about our hope that bloodshed can be minimized, that the use of force can be minimized, and that they might be successful as they, I think, want to be successful in negotiating an end to this conflict and not ending it with force. The President covered this yesterday, and that is really the extent of our remarks.

Q Who have been the people on either side that -- you said you’ve talked to Russia. Who in the U.S. has talked to who --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Our Embassy in Moscow, of course, is in daily contact with the Russian government on all issues, but this one has been handled by the Embassy in Moscow.

Q Do you know if the peace talks began?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I’m not -- I don’t know for sure. I’ve seen conflicting press reports, as I think you have, this morning. I’ve seen press reports of military action outside of Grozny, and also press reports that the Chechens are interested in a diplomatic dialogue. Those are just press reports; it’s hard to know how to weigh them.

Q This military action -- that’s one of the reasons so many Americans are still skittish about doing business in Russia. When Ron Brown holds his session at the meeting, will this be a major topic, the fact that American businesses are still somewhat uncertain about doing business because -- just because of this and other difficulties in doing business in Russia? Is that a part of --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don’t think -- I’d be surprised to find that what’s going on in that corner of Russia is a major factor in the thinking of American business about Russia in general, or various places in Russia where we know their interests to be concentrated.

If you’re an American oil or gas company your interest
is focused on where you think the oil and gas is and what kind of business you think you can do with the Russians to get at it.

Q Speaking generally because of the uncertainty in Russia, American businesses are skittish about going there and investing. Will that be a topic of discussion when you go?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, broken down into the specifics, as in we need a bilateral investment treaty; where is the Russian legislative process in course of getting that settled. We need more transparent regulations, we need tax laws that are clearer to outside investors; where are those? There have been joint MORE
U.S.-Russia meetings on tax law and energy law which have formed joint recommendations. What is the Russian government's attitude toward these recommendations, and how about implementation? So it gets down very, very -- to the very fine grain of what would interest the businessman about doing business in Russia.

Q Will there be any business representatives making this trip?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: With us? No. We'll be meeting, as always, with U.S. people who are doing business in Russia. But what we're taking with us are Cabinet-level people plus the necessary staff.

Q What will be the reason for those meetings be? What will the purpose of those meetings --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Touching base with the -- that is the reason, to touch base with them --

Q To see what their concerns are?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Each time we've had one of these meetings, whether here or there, there's always been a period of time when people have been brought in and given a shot at directly expressing to the Vice President what kind of success or problems they're encountering. And, of course, Ron Brown has been very active in Russia personally, and so has Secretary O'Leary, and for that matter, also Secretary Perry, whose actual brief in the commission is defense conversion, which is an industrial matter.

Q Is the tightening up of Yeltsin, this, what seems to be almost a new attitude -- is that the result of the rise of nationalism, or is he trying to contend with critics at home, or what's his problem all of a sudden?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm not sure I accept the premise of the question that there is a basic problem here. President Yeltsin is someone who confronts a great many problems at home, as he would be the first to admit -- economic problems, social problems, political problems. He is doing his best, obviously, to try to overcome them. I cannot really speak to that part of the question. You'd have to ask him or a member of his staff. I can speak --

Q I would like to ask him --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can speak to another question, though, and that is, what is the state of our relationship. And I have been a little bit surprised to read in the press lately articles to the effect that somehow the relationship is plummeting downwards. That's not the view of anybody in this --

Q You're surprised by that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm surprised. I'm
surprised, because I think we've got to have a rather mature attitude about this relationship and a mature and pragmatic set of expectations about this relationship.

My colleague has described to you a relationship that has many, many dimensions. And a lot is going right in that relationship. Of course, two countries the size of the United States and Russia, with our respective world roles, also have problems. But we are rather calm. We're going to work through the problems. We are absolutely committed to our policy of engagement with Russia, support for Russian reform. We think it's in our basic national interest.

MORE
So as we go off tomorrow to Moscow, we do with some anticipation, but it’s optimistic anticipation that the Vice President will be announcing a number of agreements that will take the relationship forward and that we will take on the problems in the relationship on Bosnia, on NATO expansion and other issues, and we’ll deal with them. And I would wager that in a couple of months, we’ll have something good to report on the NATO expansion issue.

Q Would you say these reports are overblown?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I certainly think they’re overblown.

Q What do you think is going to be good about it, that Yeltsin will accede to our goals?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I mean, the United States has a basic national interest in the success of reform -- democratic, political and economic reform -- in Russia. If you measure Russia’s progress on both counts against where the situation was a year ago when the Vice President was there, a year ago next month when the President was there, certainly Russia is a more stable country than it was a year ago today. It is a country that has gone far down the road of economic reform -- much farther than a lot of us thought it would go a year ago last January when we were in Moscow with President Clinton.

And so, we think that the status of reform is actually quite good in Russia. The status of our relationship is also quite good. We have some problems, but we will work through them, and we’ll keep a measured view of them.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I have a question for you folks. I steer clear of very detailed discussions of what’s going on because of time limitations, but when we get back, would it be of interest to you to go through a more detailed discussion of what was really on the agenda?

THE PRESS: Yes.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Okay. Then I’ll work with our press people.

END 12:03 P.M. EST

Distribution:
TO: edowd@esusda.gov@INET
TO: ttate@esusda.gov@INET
TO: 1=US@2=TELEMAIL@3=INTERNET@*RFC-822\MWOLFE(A)MH1.JS.MIL@
TO: Dawn A. Alexander
TO: Steven A. Cohen
TO: Jeremy M. Gaines
TO: Arthur L. Jones
TO: Joshua A. King
Russia

U.S.-Russian Relations

During the summit meeting in Moscow, January 12-15, 1994, President Clinton and President Yeltsin reaffirmed the fundamental importance of U.S.-Russian cooperation based on the Charter of American-Russian Partnership and Friendship, the Vancouver Declaration, and existing treaties and agreements. They noted that the relationship between the U.S. and Russia has entered a new stage of mature strategic partnership based on equality, mutual advantage, and recognition of each other's national interests. From this perspective, they reviewed the full range of bilateral and international issues. The two Presidents are convinced that the U.S. and Russia will continue to consolidate their partnership and together promote global stability, peace, and prosperity.

Additionally, the two Presidents, with President Kravchuk of Ukraine, signed a Tripartite Agreement providing for the transfer of all nuclear weapons in Ukraine to Russia for dismantlement and specifying prompt compensation by Russia to Ukraine for the highly enriched uranium in transferred nuclear weapons. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin also agreed to de-target the strategic nuclear missiles under their command by May 30, 1994, and this has been done.

The United States has pledged active American support for the Russian people as they pursue their course toward democratic institutions and a free market economy. U.S. obligations under all assistance programs total $3.6 billion of which more than $2.1 billion has been expended.

The cornerstone of the continuing U.S. partnership with Russia and the other New Independent States (NIS) has been the Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets (FREEDOM) Support Act, enacted in October 1992, which directly addresses their political, economic, and military transformation.

During their summit meeting in Vancouver, Canada, April 3-4, 1993, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed on a new package of bilateral economic programs to address Russia's immediate humanitarian needs and contribute to its successful transition to a market economy and democracy. The economic package announced at the Vancouver summit totaled $1.6 billion for Russia.

In September 1993, Congress passed a $2.45-billion assistance package for the NIS. The funding supports seven categories of assistance: private sector development, a special privatization and restructuring fund, trade and investment, democracy initiatives, humanitarian assistance, energy and environment, and support for troop withdrawal and housing.

In August 1994, Congress approved an additional $850 million for NIS assistance in 1995, of which $379 million will go to programs in Russia. Assistance funding will continue ongoing programs aimed at strengthening democratic institutions and building the market environment needed for private enterprise to grow and flourish. There will be a new emphasis in the 1995 program on direct support for U.S.-Russian trade and investment, which has been growing with the successful implementation of market reforms. Humanitarian aid will be limited to key areas of particular need.

The U.S. has thus far obligated $1.6 billion in humanitarian and food assistance to Russia and $1.7 billion in technical and other assistance (not including nuclear weapons dismantlement—see p. 4, "Military Issues").

Assistance To Support Transition to a Market Economy. The U.S. Government has been at the forefront of delivering privatization assistance to Russia since October 1992. The U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) privatization assistance program has focused on creating privatization policies, programs, and transactions to move government-owned assets—such as trucks, factories, or small enterprises—into the hands of private owners. With USAID's help, Russia successfully completed the mass privatization of 80,000 small businesses and 14,000 medium and large enterprises representing 70% of the nation's industry. USAID also is developing a complementary market infrastructure, to include the creation of laws and regulations, a viable stock exchange, regulatory agencies, and business support organizations—all of which help to safeguard the commercial viability of privatized enterprises.

The thrust of these two initiatives will be to create a business environment which is transparent, fair, and predictable, and encourages foreign and domestic investment.

In addition to privatization assistance, technical assistance and training programs have been provided in small business development and management; export marketing; securities market and exchange operations and regulations; banking; auditing; finance; budget management; tax policy; revenue forecasting; agricultural and agricultural and agribusiness development; food systems restructuring; energy management, pricing, regulation, and efficiency; highway rehabilitation and maintenance; telecommunications development; design of a geological database project; gas distribution; nuclear reactor safety; coal mine safety; petroleum trade; defense conversion; land titling;
land use planning; review of draft housing policy law; housing development, reform, management, and finance; insurance and health care financing; health regulation; hospital administration; and vaccine quality control, manufacturing, and monitoring techniques.

Under USDA's Emerging Democracies Program, technical assistance activities include a commodity exchange and grain marketing program, a market news and information system project, a farm privatization pilot project, and short-term internships under the Cochran Fellowship Program. A U.S.-Russia Joint Commission for Agritbusiness and Rural Development was established in March 1994. The commission will channel funds generated by the sale of donated U.S. commodities to support private and social initiatives in rural communities throughout Russia.

In health care, eight medical partnerships have been established between U.S. institutions and Russian institutions in Moscow, Dubna, Murmansk, St. Petersburg, Vladivostok, and Stavropol.

Peace Corps volunteers are working in Russia with a focus on small enterprise development.

On September 28, 1993, USAID signed a grant agreement to initiate the Russian-American Enterprise Fund. The U.S. plans to capitalize the fund with $340 million in foreign assistance appropriations. The fund, which is managed by a private board of directors, has authority to make loans and equity investments and offer technical assistance to promote new private businesses in Russia, with special emphasis on the promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises. It uses U.S. Government capitalization to attract other resources for private-sector development in Russia.

The U.S. is providing direct support for the expansion of bilateral trade and investment by funding programs in Russia of the U.S. Export-Import Bank (EXIMbank), Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), Trade and Development Agency (TDA), and Commerce Department (see p. 8, "Bilateral Economic Issues").

U.S. funding for the Eurasia Foundation, a private, non-profit, grant-making organization, also supports economic and democratic reform in Russia. Since its inception in the spring of 1994, the Eurasia Foundation has disbursed more than $10 million in the form of small grants (average size is $45,000) to U.S. and indigenous organizations to promote unique and valuable reform-oriented programs in Russia and the other NIS.

Assistance to Support Transition to Democracy. Technical assistance and training programs on the rule of law have included legislative drafting; judicial restructuring, including jury trials; criminal law reform; U.S. legal and judicial systems; federal, state, and local court systems; an adversarial court system; mock jury trials; judicial exchanges; labor relations; conflict resolution; legislative drafting; constitutional reform and the draft Russian constitution; food and drug legislation; and law-making for democracy. A USAID rule of law program for Russia was launched in late 1994 with the opening of a Moscow office to coordinate these programs.

In 1995, new programs will be launched, involving the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other U.S. agencies, to strengthen cooperation in fighting crime and corruption.

Programs in public administration support local self-government, parli­imentary exchange, promotion of civilian involvement in military affairs, municipal management and finance, municipal education, business involvement in city government, and intergovernmental fiscal management. Programs in media have included activities on American media, independent press and broadcast media, publishing, editing, marketing, advertising, legal aspects of advertising, legal aspects of publishing, station management, communications, and copyright legislation. The U.S. Information Agency has signed Worldnet rebroadcast agreements with more than 50 national, local, and independent television stations throughout Russia.
In the area of political process development to support free and fair elections, the U.S. provided technical assistance and training to political parties in preparation for the December 1993 parliamentary elections, as well as assistance on election law analysis and encouragement of voter participation through media activities and public dialogue, and training of Russian monitoring teams. The U.S. also has worked with the Russian Central Election Commission and provided support for electoral administrations.

The U.S. has provided technical assistance to teachers and national and regional administrators in the form of seminars and consultations in the areas of education, civics, American studies, long-distance learning methods, new methodologies in the instruction process, strategies for adding social sciences and humanities to the curriculum of Russian technical colleges, the development of a management training curriculum for the manufacturing and industrial base (including a faculty exchange and an internship program), higher education reform, and community colleges. U.S. educators also are teaching English at universities and higher schools of learning. Books and articles on free-market economics and democracy have been translated, published, and distributed. In 1994 and 1995, more than 20,000 Russians will have participated in U.S.-sponsored educational exchanges and training programs targeting students, teachers, entrepreneurs, and other professionals.

Humanitarian and Food Assistance. Most of the U.S. Government's humanitarian assistance effort in Russia has been completed. This effort included the following important initiatives:

* **Operation Provide Hope**—This initiative, which was officially launched in January 1992, delivered Department of Defense (DoD) excess food, medicines, and medical supplies to Russia and other destinations using DoD transportation (including contracts with private shipping entities).

* **Food Assistance**—Separate from the food deliveries made under Operation Provide Hope, U.S. Department of Agriculture programs have supported a total of $1.2 billion in food assistance to Russia since 1992.

* **Special Initiatives**—Under separate programs, the U.S. Government purchased more than $75 million worth of commodities which were distributed by nine U.S. private voluntary organizations to further their charitable work with vulnerable populations, especially women and children. Over the past year, DoD completed the upgrading of eight hospitals in Moscow with equipment and supplies valued at $37 million and transported 22,696 metric tons of humanitarian items valued at $91 million.

* **Private U.S. Donations**—The U.S. humanitarian assistance effort has also facilitated donations by the private sector. Under the Medical Assistance Initiative, the non-profit organization Project HOPE was authorized to solicit, collect, and distribute medicines and medical supplies within the New Independent States. Since the announcement of this initiative in February 1991, Project HOPE has shipped more than $50 million worth of medical items to more than 60 locations in Russia.

* **Multilateral Cooperation.** Since 1990, the international community has mobilized economic assistance for Russia and the other NIS on a scale unmatched since the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe at the end of World War II. In 1993, the U.S. and Russia's other bilateral creditors rescheduled about $15 billion of Russia's debt service payments. In June 1994, Paris Club creditors agreed to a one-year rescheduling of $7.1 billion of debt service due in 1994. The G-7 also has provided more than $12 billion in bilateral financing. Since 1992, Russia has received $4 billion from the International Monetary Fund under the Systemic Transformation Facility.

The World Bank has approved more than $3 billion in lending to Russia, mainly to support sectoral reform and reconstruction (e.g., $1 billion for oil well rehabilitation). The World Bank's International Finance Corporation, which lends to private sector entities, has committed $115 million to projects in Russia.

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which began operating in 1991 to assist former communist countries, has committed $380 million in loans to Russia.

On June 8, 1994, Russia signed an agreement with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to provide policy guidance and technical assistance on a wide range of structural reform issues, such as competition law and policy.

**Bilateral Economic issues.**

Current U.S.-Russia bilateral trade is about $5.5 billion annually. At Vancouver, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin made bilateral trade and investment growth a major priority. The U.S.-Russia Business Development Committee (BDC) was established at the June 1992 summit and is now co-chaired by U.S. Commerce Secretary Brown and Russian Deputy Prime Minister Shokhin. The BDC is the primary vehicle to help identify and remove impediments to trade and investment.

In October 1993, Russia received GSP status. More than $440 million of Russian goods will benefit. The U.S. also supports Russia's application to become a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and plans to provide a resident GATT adviser to the Russian Government.

Under the leadership of Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, the U.S. and Russia are advancing bilateral cooperation through six working committees known collectively as the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission (GCC). Progress continues at the working level on a range of specific issues in the fields of science and technology, business development, space, energy policy, environmental protection, and defense diversification. The next GCC meeting is scheduled for December 1994 in Moscow.

The U.S. Export-Import Bank is expected to have approved more than $1.5 billion in loans, loan guarantees, and insurance for transactions in Russia by the end of FY 1994. Of this total, more than $1 billion is expected to be approved under its Oil and Gas
Framework Agreement. Under this agreement, secured credit guarantees of about $2 billion will be extended to support capital equipment exports for the rehabilitation of Russia's energy sector.

The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) also is active in Russia in supporting U.S.-Russian joint ventures. To date, OPIC has approved $700 million in investment financing and about $1.2 billion in insurance for 33 projects. The total investment value of these projects is $2.3 billion.

The Trade and Development Agency has approved more than $25 million in funding for feasibility studies on 65 investment projects. The Commerce Department has opened American Business Centers in St. Petersburg and Nizhnevatovsk to help U.S. and Russian companies do business. Four additional centers may open by the end of this year. The Commerce Department also established a Special American Business Internship Program (SABIT) in Russia.

At the June 1992 summit, the U.S. and Russia signed an agreement that grants reciprocal most-favored-nation status and offers strong intellectual property rights protection. At the same time, the two countries signed two other treaties. The Treaty for the Avoidance of Double Taxation, which entered into force in January 1994, provides relief from double taxation, assurance of non-discriminatory tax treatment, cooperative efforts between officials to resolve potential problems, and the exchange of information between tax authorities to improve compliance with tax laws. The Bilateral Investment Treaty, when ratified by the Russian parliament, will guarantee the right to the repatriation of ruble profits in hard currency, non-discriminatory treatment for U.S. investments, effective compensation in case of expropriation, and international arbitration in the event of a dispute between a U.S. investor and the Russian Government.

On September 7, 1994, in Moscow, Secretary of Agriculture Mike Espy announced the authorization of $20 million in export credit guarantees for FY 1994 in connection with sales of U.S. agricultural commodities to private sector buyers in Russia under the Commodity Credit Corporation's Export Credit Guarantee Program (GSM-102).

Military issues. The U.S. and Russia have begun to define a new security partnership emphasizing cooperation in the interest of strategic stability, nuclear safety, the dismantlement of nuclear weapons, the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, and enhanced military-to-military contacts. In Lisbon on May 23, 1992, the United States signed a protocol to the START I Treaty with Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine—those states on whose territory strategic nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union were located—making the four states party to the treaty and committing all signatories to reductions in strategic nuclear weapons within the seven-year period provided by the treaty.

On November 4, 1992, Russia ratified START but stipulated that it would not exchange its instrument of ratification until the other three states accede to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapons states. Only Ukraine has not yet acceded to the NPT. On January 3, 1993, the U.S. and Russia signed the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II), which reduces overall deployments of strategic nuclear weapons on each side by more than two-thirds from current levels and will eliminate the most destabilizing strategic weapons—heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and all other deployed multiple-warhead ICBMs.

Following ratification by Russia and the other NIS, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty entered into force on November 9, 1992. This treaty establishes comprehensive limits on key categories of military equipment—such as tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, combat aircraft, and combat helicopters—and provides for the destruction of weaponry in excess of these limits.

On September 8, 1993, the U.S. and Russia signed a memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation that institutionalized and expanded relations between defense ministries, including through a broad range of military-to-military contacts and joint training for peacekeeping. Based on the January 14, 1994, agreement between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, as of May 30, 1994, the strategic nuclear missiles of each country were no longer targeted.

On April 10, 1992, the Deputy Secretary of State certified that the Russian Federation had met the criteria required under the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act, commonly known as the "Nunn-Lugar Act," for financial assistance to safely dismantle and destroy nuclear and chemical weapons and to convert defense industries to civilian pursuits. In January 1993, the U.S. delivered the first set of emergency equipment for use in the transport, storage, and dismantlement of nuclear weapons. Additional deliveries of equipment and assistance are being made to further a number of Nunn-Lugar projects. Overall, the U.S. has agreed to provide nearly $500 million in Nunn-Lugar assistance to Russia.

On March 8, 1994, the International Science and Technology Center opened in Moscow through the efforts of the founding parties—the U.S., the European Union, Japan, and Russia. With Nunn-Lugar funding, the U.S. provided $25 million for the center, which is designed to prevent the proliferation of technology and expertise related to weapons of mass destruction by providing peaceful employment opportunities to scientists and engineers formerly involved with such weapons and their delivery systems.

In response to appeals from the Russian and Baltic Governments, the U.S. announced in Vancouver the Russian Officer Housing Resettlement Program to ease the burden of withdrawing Russian military forces from the Baltic nations. A pilot project for construction of 450 housing units for demobilizing officers was begun in September 1993. At the G-7 summit, the President announced an additional
5,000 housing units for demobilized and retired Russian officers from the Baltics and elsewhere. Distribution of vouchers and assignment of housing began in August 1994 and will continue in 1995. The Housing Resettlement Program played a key role in helping the Russian and Baltic governments reach agreement on the withdrawal of Russian military forces by August 31, 1994.

**Political Conditions**

In free elections in June 1991, Boris Yeltsin was elected President of the Russian Federation. His mandate was strengthened in a national referendum in April 1993, in which a majority of Russian voters expressed their support for President Yeltsin, for his economic reform program, and for early elections to a new parliament.

By the fall of 1993, politics in Russia had reached a state of stalemate between President Yeltsin and the parliament. The parliament had succeeded in blocking, overturning, or ignoring the President's initiatives on drafting a new constitution, conducting new elections, and making further progress on democratic and economic reform.

In a dramatic speech on September 21, 1993, President Yeltsin dissolved the Russian parliament and scheduled national elections for December 12, 1993. Fifty-four percent (68 million) of registered voters participated in the elections. Two houses of the new Russian parliament were elected on that date—the upper Federation Council (170 members) and the lower State Duma (450 members). Members of both houses serve for two-year terms.

The parliament has been more moderate and effective than had been predicted after the December elections. The opposition, a diverse group, aims for a unified position but remains divided over key political and economic issues and whether to participate in mainstream politics.

In recent months, President Yeltsin has called for national reconciliation and attempted to create a broad consensus on Russian domestic, economic, and foreign policy. He plans to use this consensus to continue to push for reform, but must also take into account Russian voters' call for increased attention to social needs and Russian "prestige."

In early 1994, hoping to solidify this nascent political consensus, President Yeltsin issued a "Memorandum on Civil Peace and Accord," which calls for a two-year period of political peace to allow the government to concentrate on economic revival. On April 28, 1994, more than 100 political parties, regional leaders, trade unions, and social organizations endorsed the document. To date, more than 400 groups and prominent individuals have endorsed it. The "Memorandum" was intended to isolate extremists in Russian politics and establish fundamental ground rules for political competition.

**Foreign Relations**

On December 27, 1991, Russia assumed the seat formerly held by the Soviet Union in the UN Security Council. Russia also is a member of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. It signed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Partnership for Peace initiative on June 22, 1994. On June 24, 1994, Russia and the European Union (EU) signed a partnership and cooperation agreement which provides for, inter alia, political dialogue at all levels, possible talks in 1998 on a free-trade area, EU support for eventual Russian accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and EU assistance on nuclear safety, restructuring state-run enterprises, and economic efficiency.

Russia has played a constructive role in mediating international conflicts through its co-sponsorship of the Middle East peace process and its support of UN and multilateral initiatives in the Persian Gulf, Cambodia, Angola, the former Yugoslavia, and Haiti. Russia has affirmed its respect for international law and CSCE principles. It has accepted UN and/or CSCE involvement in instances of regional conflict on its periphery, including the dispatch of observers to Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Nagorno-Karabakh.

**Economic Overview**

The Russian Federation comprises roughly three-quarters of the territory of the New Independent States, more than one-half of their population, and 60% of their total gross domestic product. Agricultural production, chiefly grain and potatoes, accounts for more than one-half of that for the NIS. Russia is rich in energy sources, such as oil and natural gas (two-thirds of which come from Siberia) as well as coal.

The Russian economy has undergone considerable stress as it moves from a command to a free market system. GDP fell 19% in 1992, and another 12% in 1993. There are some indications that the decline may be coming to an end, however. According to the State Statistics Committee, industrial production rose slightly in July 1994, for the first time since 1993. Furthermore, official statistics mask much economic activity in the private sector. The rate of investment fell by 15% in 1993 and has not begun to recover. Official unemployment was only 1% of the work force in 1993, but this figure omits an estimated 4-5 million who work reduced hours or are on voluntary leave.

Inflation rose to a peak of 30% a month in January 1993. Since February 1993, however, monthly inflation has been below 10% and is declining. The government has pursued various economic policies including raising interest rates, reducing or ending subsidies, and otherwise trying to enforce austerity.

Russia has been running a trade surplus since 1993, due both to increased exports (of commodities such as petroleum and aluminum) and lower imports (including grain.) The government has rescheduled its official debt payment obligations but has not yet done so with its commercial creditors. It has increased official foreign exchange reserves from $4.5 billion in January 1994 to about $7 billion as of September 1994. Capital flight remains a serious problem.

Russia has made significant headway in privatizing many economic sectors. More than 50% of GDP is now produced in the market economy. More
than one-half of the work force is in the private sector, and 70% of state-controlled industry has been privatized since reforms began in 1992. There are 270,000 private farms. About 30% of state-owned housing (about 8 million dwellings) had been turned over to private individuals by the end of 1993. However, state-subsidized rents and utilities discourage individual home ownership.

Consumers make 70% of their purchases in the private sector to take advantage of better selection, quality, and service. Food availability and real per capita income have improved or stabilized, but social welfare problems, such as increased crime and health care shortages, are serious. The gap between rich and poor appears to have widened; about 20% of the population lives below the official poverty level.

Environmental issues
The Russian Government has inherited serious environmental problems. Air pollution and inadequate supplies of uncontaminated water have affected the health of the population and contributed to increased infant mortality rates. Radioactive pollution—generated by military nuclear testing and unsafe nuclear power plants, institutes, and laboratories—is especially dangerous.

At the April 1993 Vancouver summit, the U.S. and Russia announced their intention to expand joint work in the area of environmental protection. They agreed to coordinate joint ecological measures and support for financing these programs.

In cooperation with the international community, Russia works to develop sound environmental policies. It has established a Ministry of Environment and has introduced a pollution fee system by which taxes are levied on air and water emissions and solid waste disposal, with the resulting revenues channeled to environmental protection activities. Russia also aims to develop regional cooperation among the NIS on transborder environmental problems.
Fact Sheet

Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission

At their summit meeting in Vancouver, Canada, April 3-4, 1993, President Clinton and Russian President Yeltsin pledged to jettison the vestiges of the Cold War and forge a new partnership between the United States and Russia. They particularly aimed to develop a program to advance a new joint agenda in energy, space, and science and technology to the benefit of both countries. To initiate this new cooperative venture, the two Presidents agreed at Vancouver that both countries would focus high-level attention on it. This was the genesis of the commission headed by Vice President Albert Gore and Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin.

First Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission Meeting, September 1993

On September 1-2, 1993, in Washington, DC, Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin initiated the new cooperative venture. Its broad agenda included economic and foreign policy issues, as well as the evolution of a commercial partnership for the future. During this round of successful meetings, they accomplished a great deal in the fields of space and energy. Agreements signed represent the leading edge of U.S.-Russian cooperation—aimed at achieving broad market access for Russian high-technology goods and efficient and low-cost cooperation on long-term, complex projects. They also agreed to establish additional subcommittees to focus specifically on environmental, scientific, energy policy, and defense diversification issues.

Space Cooperation. The two sides signed three joint statements: one on space cooperation, outlining a phased approach for cooperation on human space flight and development of a unified space station; a second on cooperative environmental monitoring from space, involving a joint study to determine the feasibility of such programs; and a third on aeronautical sciences. These agreements set a broad strategy for cooperation on global environmental change and in the design of future aircraft. They also signed a commercial launch agreement, giving Russia access to the international launch services market, and a memorandum of understanding on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), committing Russia to the MTCR guidelines on the sale of high-technology goods and services.

Energy and Investment Cooperation. The agreements signed in this area represent the joint intention of the parties to strengthen economic cooperation and to increase trade and investment significantly, especially in energy-related projects. The U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) announced two major projects for Russia to establish the first U.S.-Russian Investment Fund to support privatization and to assist in oil well restoration in western Siberia.

The two sides agreed that each government would name an ombudsman to work together to overcome obstacles to specific trade and investment projects. They also signed a memorandum to facilitate cooperation in fossil fuel energy development and a memorandum of understanding that will lead to an expansion of exports to Russia currently financed by Eximbank. Finally, they agreed to launch a joint study on nuclear reactor safety issues to determine the most potentially productive joint work in the area of nuclear safety.

Second Gore-Chernomyrdin Meeting, December 1993

Following up on the successful September meeting, the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission met again on December 15-16, 1993, in Moscow. At this meeting, many of the programs and joint projects set in motion the previous September began to take on concrete shape. Major accomplishments were achieved in five broad areas.

Space Cooperation. One of the highlights of the meeting was a joint statement issued on space station cooperation. The statement, signed by Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, covers activities involving the U.S. space shuttle and the Russian Mir space station, Russian participation in the International Space Station, and contractual arrangements to facilitate these programs.

The two sides signed a protocol calling for additional manned flights to the Russian Mir space station and extended time for U.S. astronauts there. They also signed a joint statement on aeronautics and space cooperation, noting potential cooperation in the areas of earth sciences and environmental monitoring and space science. The joint statement was accompanied by a memorandum of understanding describing eight areas of cooperation in fundamental aeronautical sciences.

Trade and Business Development. In this area, the Vice President and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin exchanged instruments of ratification for a double taxation treaty, effective January 1, 1994. OPIC agreements totaling $185 million were signed, providing the financial muscle to stimulate significant U.S. private investment in the Russian economy. The two sides released a joint communiqué on conformity of product standards to facilitate trade in both directions. They also signed an interim memorandum for establishing American business centers in Russia and issued a joint statement on the future...
tasks of the Business Development Committee aimed at identifying opportunities, resolving problems, and expanding contracts leading to new trade and investment projects. Finally, they announced a joint energy project to create a model Russian retail gasoline corporation, to determine the commercial and legal conditions needed to establish a privately owned and financed corporation.

Energy, Nuclear Safety, and Environment. The Vice President and the Prime Minister signed a milestone statement of principles for nuclear safety cooperation, with both governments committed to support and expand bilateral and multilateral efforts to promote nuclear safety. The two sides also signed a nuclear liability agreement providing a legal framework for U.S. corporations involved in improving the safety of Russian nuclear reactors. An agreement for the Commodity Import Program provides $125 million in grants for importing U.S. gas technology and equipment to improve Russian energy production and diminish the environmental impact of gas production. They also announced the formation of an oil and gas technology center in the city of Tyumen, a key Russian energy production site, to improve the recovery of oil and gas and reduce production costs. Finally, they signed a joint statement on environmental cooperation involving 15 technical assistance projects to begin immediately and another on alternative energy studies.

Defense Conversion. The Vice President and the Prime Minister signed a memorandum spelling out the principles guiding U.S. and Russian cooperation in the conversion and diversification of defense industries. The two sides followed this with a protocol to the existing Nunn-Lugar defense conversion implementation agreement that provides up to $20 million for direct conversion assistance for the transition to civilian production of modular housing.

Science and Technology. Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin signed a historic agreement providing, for the first time, a framework for cooperation in all fields of science and technology for a 10-year period. A major achievement of the agreement is a new bilateral framework to protect intellectual property resulting from cooperative research and development programs. The two sides also signed a related memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the fields of mining research and minerals information for a five-year period.

Third Gore-Chernomyrdin Meeting, June 1994
The third meeting of the Commission, held June 22-23, 1994, in Washington, DC, registered further progress in all areas of the Commission's work. In particular, this most recent session emphasized the implementation of U.S.-Russian cooperative ventures and programs. In addition, Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin agreed to establish a seventh committee to deal with health issues.

Space Cooperation. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Russian Space Agency signed an interim agreement covering initial Russian participation in the international space station program, as well as a $400-million contract to provide Russian space hardware, services, and data in support of the “Shuttle-Mir” program—a joint flight program leading to the development of the international space station. Key elements of the contract include support of U.S. astronauts on board the Mir space station for approximately two years, the possibility of 10 shuttle docking missions with Mir, provision of hardware, joint technology development, and support for science and technology research to be conducted on board Mir.

Business and Investment Development. A consortium of U.S. and other Western oil companies signed an agreement with the Russians which launched the largest single U.S. investment in Russia—a joint contract to develop the oil fields of Sakhalin Island. The project, worth about $10 billion, is the first development of a Russian energy field involving foreign direct investment. Two OPIC funds expected to leverage more than $4 billion of private sector investment in Russia and the other NIS were signed at this session of the Commission. The initial OPIC fund was signed at the Commission’s inaugural meeting and was expected to leverage $1 billion. The fund has already exceeded its target capitalization and is investing in the NIS economies.

Energy. The Vice President and the Prime Minister signed an agreement obligating the U.S. and the Russian Federation to end the operation of plutonium production reactors by the year 2000. The agreement also prohibits the restarting of any reactors already closed, and bars both countries from using in nuclear weapons any plutonium produced by the production reactors after the agreement enters into force. A committee also is developing a joint study on alternative energy sources and is establishing an Oil and Gas Technology Center in Russia.

Defense Conversion. The U.S. announced the first awards made under a March 1994 Nunn-Lugar defense conversion agreement which provides up to $20 million in assistance to U.S. firms to establish joint ventures with Russian defense firms converting to civilian production. It also announced the incorporation of the Defense Conversion Enterprise Fund with a grant of $7.7 million to assist in the conversion of defense industries in Russia and the other New Independent States.

Science and Technology. The two countries signed a statement of principles on data exchange and five new memoranda of understanding, dealing with transportation, biomedicine, geosciences, offshore energy development, and basic sciences and engineering. These will enable cooperation in areas ranging from cancer research to civil aviation and global climate change.

Environment. A new agreement on the environment provides for broader cooperation on global issues, such as biodiversity, environmental management, and public participation in environmental decision-making. It also calls for joint formulation of policy on environmental problems of bilateral, regional, and global significance, increased data sharing, and more vigorous efforts to protect intellectual property rights. ■

Summary

Every President since Franklin D. Roosevelt has conferred with the Soviet leadership, either the head of the Communist Party or head of the government. The 34 meetings went through several distinct phases. During World War II, Roosevelt and Truman met with Soviet and British leaders to decide on the conduct of military operations and to make arrangements for the peace. Three meetings during the Eisenhower Presidency were expanded to include France, and Eisenhower grappled unsuccessfully in the enlarged forum over the elusive German peace settlement and the growing problem of nuclear weapons. Kennedy and Johnson each met the Soviet leadership during the 1960s in informal circumstances over issues ranging from Europe to crises in the Middle and Far East. Five Nixon-Ford meetings with Chairman Brezhnev and a subsequent Carter-Brezhnev conference in the 1970s dealt primarily with arms control. The agenda of President Reagan's five meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev at Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington, Moscow, and New York included arms reductions, human rights, regional issues, and bilateral affairs. President Bush met eleven times with Presidents Gorbachev and Yeltsin, expanding the agenda to include transnational issues, and continuing to hold meetings with Russian leaders after the breakup of the Soviet Union. The Clinton Administration intends to continue to promote democracy and economic reforms with Russia and the former Soviet Republics. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin held their first summit meeting at Vancouver, Canada, in April 1993, and they met again at Tokyo, Moscow, and Naples.

Tehran (Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin) November 28-December 1, 1943

Discussion centered on planning for the cross channel invasion of enemy-occupied France. The three powers also agreed to try to get Turkey to join the war and to split Finland away from the Axis powers. Also discussed were political questions, including a future world organization, and postwar policy toward Germany. The leaders issued a special declaration recognizing Iran’s contribution to the war effort. Decisions on some issues, such as the Polish question, were postponed. This was the only summit held outside Europe, the Soviet Union, or the United States.

Valta (Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin February 4-11, 1945

The three leaders issued an invitation to the United Nations to meet in the United States and discussed the future of Poland.
and Eastern Europe, the status of postwar Germany, and the conditions for Soviet entry into the Pacific war. In a Declaration on Liberated Europe, the Allies pledged to assist the liberated peoples to establish order and create representative governments through free elections. In a secret agreement, the Soviet Union promised to enter the Pacific war 2 to 3 months after Germany’s surrender in return for certain Far Eastern concessions. Yalta remains the most controversial summit meeting because the Soviets later unilaterally subverted the concept of free elections to establish hegemony over Eastern Europe.

Potsdam (Truman, Churchill and Attlee, and Stalin)
July 17-August 2, 1945

The conference dealt with the military details of the Soviet entry into the Pacific war and political questions, primarily the occupation of Germany and the question of German reparations. The three powers created a Council of Foreign Ministers to work on peace treaties with the European Axis powers and their Eastern European satellites, and reached an agreement on the resettlement of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe to Germany. In a declaration issued on July 26, the United States, Great Britain, and China demanded Japan’s unconditional surrender. During the conference, Truman learned of the successful test of the atomic bomb and informed Stalin in general terms.

Geneva (Eisenhower, Eden, Faure, and Bulganin and Khrushchev)
July 18-23, 1955

At this first postwar conference, also the first to be called a "summit," Eisenhower advanced the "Open Skies" proposal calling for an exchange of military blueprints with the Soviet Union and aerial reconnaissance of each other’s military installations. The participants also discussed disarmament, German reunification through free elections, European security, and the need for greater East-West contacts through travel and exchange of information.

Washington-Camp David (Eisenhower and Khrushchev)
September 15, 26-27, 1959

Following brief meetings with Eisenhower upon his arrival in Washington on September 15, Khrushchev embarked on a 10-day trip to New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, farm communities
in Iowa, and Pittsburgh, arranged to acquaint him with the American way of life. Eisenhower and Khrushchev then engaged in substantive talks for 2 days at Camp David. They agreed to expand exchanges and to remove the Soviet deadline for a Berlin settlement, but no progress was made on disarmament and the reunification of Germany. They also agreed on a four-power summit in Paris the following year. Khrushchev also visited Eisenhower's farm at Gettysburg. Just before he left, Khrushchev addressed the American people on national television. This meeting constituted the first visit to the United States of a Soviet leader since establishment of U.S.-Soviet relations in 1933.

Paris (Eisenhower, Macmillan, De Gaulle, and Khrushchev)
May 16-17, 1960

The four leaders planned to discuss Germany and Berlin, disarmament, nuclear testing, and the general state of East-West relations. On the second day of the conference, before any issues could be considered, Khrushchev demanded that Eisenhower apologize for the U-2 overflight of the Soviet Union on May 1. When Eisenhower refused, Khrushchev seized upon the issue to leave the conference. President de Gaulle's attempt to mediate failed.

Vienna (Kennedy and Khrushchev)
June 3-4, 1961

The status of Berlin was the major subject of discussion, but the conflict in Laos and the question of disarmament were also on the agenda. Khrushchev's truculence on Berlin surprised and sobered Kennedy, but some progress was made when the two leaders agreed that further discussions on Laos should be continued at the Foreign Minister level. Kennedy replaced the highlystructured conferences favored by Eisenhower with more informal and personalized meetings.

Glassboro (Johnson and Kosygin)
June 23 and 25, 1967

The meeting at Glassboro, New Jersey, was arranged and agreed on after considerable haggling over a suitable location. It followed Kosygin's visit to the United Nations, where he came to support the Arab nations' proposals for ending the Middle East conflict that led to the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war. In addition to the Middle East, disarmament and the
Vietnam war were also discussed. During the conference, the Soviet Union served as intermediary in conveying North Vietnamese willingness to negotiate in exchange for a halt to the U.S. bombing. The U.S. counterproposals via Moscow were never answered.

Moscow (Nixon and Brezhnev)
May 22-30, 1972

This meeting had two principal and substantial accomplishments. First, it established a personal relationship between Nixon and Brezhnev, which facilitated the convening of subsequent meetings between the two leaders. Second, Nixon and Brezhnev signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) Interim Agreement, both of which had been in negotiation in Helsinki and Vienna for many months. Also concluded were agreements on public health, environmental cooperation, incidents at sea, exchanges in science, technology, education and culture, and a Declaration of Basic Principles of Mutual Relations.

Washington (Nixon and Brezhnev)
June 18-25, 1973

Brezhnev’s visit to the United States resulted in 47 hours of meetings with Nixon in Washington, Camp David, and San Clemente. The two leaders signed nine accords, which included an Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War and an Agreement on Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Other agreements signed at the summit dealt with scientific cooperation, agriculture, trade, and other bilateral issues. The joint communiqué expressed "deep satisfaction" with the conclusion of the Paris Agreement on Vietnam, which had been signed the preceding January. Nixon stated at Brezhnev’s departure that the meeting "built on the strong foundation that we laid a year ago."

Moscow (Nixon and Brezhnev)
June 28-July 3, 1974

Watergate and the President’s imminent resignation overshadowed the meeting with the General Secretary and limited expectations on both sides. The two leaders discussed arms control and several international and bilateral issues in Moscow and at Brezhnev’s villa in Oreanda on the Black Sea. They signed a protocol limiting each side to one ABM site apiece instead of the two allowed in the 1972 ABM Treaty, and a
Threshold Test Ban Treaty, which limited the size of underground nuclear weapons tests. The Test Ban Treaty was never ratified by the United States because of concerns about its verifiability. The governments signed several other instruments dealing with scientific cooperation, cultural exchanges, and other bilateral matters. Nixon and Brezhnev also agreed to explore the possibility of a 10-year time period for a SALT treaty, which opened the way for the Vladivostok accord a few months later. The communiqué reaffirmed an agreement to hold regular meetings.

Vladivostok (Ford and Brezhnev)
November 23-24, 1974

At the Vladivostok meeting, which followed visits by Ford to Japan and Korea, discussions focused on strategic arms limitations as well as on a number of bilateral and international issues, including the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the Middle East. In the SALT II negotiations, Ford and Brezhnev reached agreement in principle on some of the basic elements that were subsequently incorporated in the 1979 treaty. They issued a joint statement on strategic offensive arms (the Vladivostok agreement) and a joint communiqué calling for continuing efforts at arms limitation and the development of economic cooperation.

Helsinki (Ford and Brezhnev)
July 30 and August 2, 1975

During two sessions at Helsinki, immediately prior to and following the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Ford and Brezhnev attempted unsuccessfully to reach further agreement on strategic arms limitations. Differences between the two governments over cruise missiles and the Soviet Backfire bomber frustrated Ford’s and Kissinger’s desires to strengthen cooperation between the two superpowers and to conclude a SALT II agreement. Ford and Brezhnev held frank discussions on other issues, including the Arab-Israeli conflict and the relationship between Soviet emigration policy and most-favored-nation trading status.

Vienna (Carter and Brezhnev)
June 15-18, 1979

The SALT II Treaty was signed at this summit in Vienna. Carter and Brezhnev also discussed other arms control
questions, including the continuation of the SALT process, and had wide-ranging exchanges on human rights and trade, the Middle East, Afghanistan, Africa, China, and other regional issues. The two leaders also issued a joint statement of principles and basic guidelines for subsequent negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms. The SALT II Treaty was never ratified.

Geneva (Reagan and Gorbachev)  
November 19-21, 1985

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev discussed a four-part agenda: human rights, regional issues, bilateral matters, and arms control. The President pressed for improvement in Soviet human rights practices, removal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and the resolution of regional conflicts in a number of countries including Cambodia, Angola, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua. In the arms control area, both leaders called for early progress on reductions in strategic, offensive nuclear forces. They also had frank exchanges on strategic defense issues. They agreed to study the establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers and to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable treaty banning chemical weapons. They endorsed a policy of regular exchanges between senior U.S. and Soviet officials. The General Secretary accepted the President's invitation to visit the United States in 1986 and the President agreed to visit the U.S.S.R. the following year. At the end of the meeting, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the General Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges, and Cooperation in Scientific, Technical, Educational, Cultural, and Other Fields, and announced that the two countries would resume civil air service.

Reykjavik (Reagan and Gorbachev)  
October 10-12, 1986

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev held a meeting in Reykjavik to discuss all four points of the U.S.-Soviet agenda -- human rights, regional conflicts, bilateral cooperation, and arms control -- with particularly intense discussions on arms reductions. The two leaders agreed in principle to 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive arms to a level of 6,000 warheads on 1,600 delivery systems; they also reached agreement on a counting rule for strategic bombers. In addition, they agreed to seek an initial INF agreement for a global ceiling of 100 warheads on longer-range INF missiles, with none in Europe, and constraints on shorter-range INF missiles. The President and Secretary Gorbachev agreed to expand mutually beneficial bilateral
cooperation. However, on the final day of the meeting, Gorbachev insisted that further progress on INF and START be linked to new and unacceptable restrictions on the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative program. The President rejected such linkage, noting that the proposed Soviet restrictions on SDI were more stringent than those contained in the ABM Treaty and would cripple the SDI research program.

Washington (Reagan and Gorbachev)  
December 7-10, 1987

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev met in Washington to continue discussions on the four-part U.S.-Soviet agenda: arms reductions, human rights, bilateral issues, and regional issues. They had full and frank discussions on human rights issues. The U.S. and Soviet leaders discussed increasing bilateral exchanges, cooperation on environmental matters, and trade expansion. They held wide-ranging talks on regional issues including Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, Central America, southern Africa, the Middle East, and Cambodia.

The two leaders signed the "Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles." They instructed their negotiators at the Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks to intensify efforts to complete a Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms to implement the principle of a 50 percent reduction in these arms, which was agreed to at the Reykjavik meeting. The leaders also instructed their negotiators to work out a new and separate treaty on defense and space issues that would commit the sides to observe the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time.

Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze also signed agreements to increase air service between the United States and the Soviet Union and to extend the U.S.-Soviet world oceans agreement. General Secretary Gorbachev renewed his invitation for the President to visit the Soviet Union in the first half of 1988, and the President accepted.
President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev met in Moscow to continue substantive discussions on the four-point U.S.-Soviet agenda: arms control, human rights and humanitarian affairs, settlement of regional conflicts, and bilateral relations. A wide-ranging discussion of regional questions included the Middle East, the Iran-Iraq war, southern Africa, the Horn of Africa, Central America, Cambodia, the Korean Peninsula, Afghanistan, and other issues. The two leaders exchanged and signed ratification documents on the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which the Supreme Soviet and the U.S. Senate had approved on May 23 and 27, respectively. On Nuclear and Space Talks, understandings were reached in a number of areas, as a joint draft text of a treaty on reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms was being elaborated in the Geneva negotiations. Exchanges on START resulted in the achievement of substantial additional common ground. The two leaders also discussed nuclear nonproliferation, the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers established in Moscow and Washington, the status of ongoing negotiations toward a comprehensive, effectively verifiable, and truly global ban on chemical weapons, the status of conventional forces negotiations, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze also signed or consummated through an exchange of diplomatic notes nine separate agreements, two of them related to arms control: the agreement on Advanced Notification of Strategic Ballistic Missile Launches and the Joint Verification Experiment agreement on nuclear testing. The seven other agreements covered a range of issues such as expansion of U.S.-Soviet cultural and educational exchanges, U.S.-Soviet cooperation on peaceful uses of atomic power and on space exploration, maritime search and rescue, fisheries, transportation technology, and radionavigation.

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev met on Governor’s Island in New York harbor, while the Soviet leader was visiting New York City to address the United Nations
General Assembly. The meeting, which Vice President Bush also attended, was a private, non-negotiating session, followed by a luncheon.

Malta (Bush and Gorbachev)
December 2-3, 1989

President Bush and General Secretary Gorbachev held a shipboard meeting in the harbor at Valletta, Malta, for an informal, personal discussion of major issues. The two leaders held a 5-hour session on December 2, including a 1 1/2 hour private meeting. A scheduled afternoon meeting and dinner was cancelled because of a major winter storm. They met again for 3 hours on the morning of December 3, and then held a joint news conference.

During the meetings, the two leaders discussed the remarkable events leading to peaceful and democratic change in Eastern and Central Europe. President Bush noted his strong support for Perestroika. Discussions also reviewed future steps in the U.S.-Soviet relationship; economic and commercial relations between the two nations; human rights; regional issues, particularly Central America; environmental concerns; and a range of arms control issues; including chemical weapons, conventional forces negotiations, strategic arms talks, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, arms control verification, missile proliferation, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the situation in Lebanon. The two leaders agreed to hold a formal summit meeting in Washington in June 1990.

Washington (Bush and Gorbachev)
May 30-June 3, 1990

Presidents Bush and Gorbachev met in Washington and at Camp David. During the first two days of meetings in Washington, the Presidents held wide-ranging discussions on political and economic matters including arms control, German unification, and U.S.-Soviet trade. On June 1, the leaders signed a key elements agreement for a strategic arms treaty, a chemical weapons reduction accord, and a trade agreement reducing barriers to U.S.-Soviet commerce. Several other bilateral accords increasing cultural and scientific exchanges as well as maritime and air links were concluded. A 5-year U.S.-Soviet grain deal was signed. While in Washington, President Gorbachev hosted events for prominent American figures in the political and business worlds and the arts.
On June 2, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev spent the day in the more informal atmosphere of Camp David, where they discussed regional issues, including Afghanistan, Lithuania, and Central America. They also discussed U.S.-Soviet economic relations. The following day, President Gorbachev left Washington for Minneapolis, where he met with local business leaders, and San Francisco, where he met with former President Reagan, before returning to Moscow.

Helsinki (Bush and Gorbachev)  
September 9, 1990

Presidents Bush and Gorbachev met in Helsinki to discuss the crisis in the Persian Gulf caused by Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait. The summit, announced on September 1, was the product of a decision by the Presidents at Camp David in June to hold more informal and unstructured meetings as global developments warranted.

The Presidents met for 7 hours (3 hours privately in the morning and 4 with an expanded group of advisers in the afternoon). They issued a joint statement expressing their solidarity in opposition to the Iraqi invasion and their intention to cooperate fully in ending the Gulf crisis. They also urged their negotiators to move forward more rapidly in finalizing both strategic and conventional arms control agreements and discussed the progress of Soviet economic reforms.

Paris (Bush and Gorbachev)  
November 19, 1990

Presidents Bush and Gorbachev met during the November 19 summit of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Paris. They held a private discussion on the crisis in the Persian Gulf and Soviet support for a proposed UN resolution authorizing the use of force against Iraq should it prove necessary.

London (Bush and Gorbachev)  
July 17, 1991

Presidents Bush and Gorbachev met privately over lunch on the final day of the economic summit of the Group of Seven industrialized nations. They announced the completion of a
START agreement and scheduled a summit in Moscow for July 30-31. They also discussed the economic situation in the Soviet Union.

Madrid (Bush and Gorbachev)
October 29, 1991

Presidents Gorbachev and Bush next met in Madrid to inaugurate the Middle East peace conference. They declared their intention to continue the CFE and START arms reduction process. The extent of future economic aid to the Soviet Union and its distribution among the increasingly independent Soviet Republics would be subject to further negotiations.

The Madrid meeting was the first since Soviet hard-liners attempted to overthrow President Gorbachev on August 19. On December 8, the leaders of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine declared that the Soviet Union had ceased to exist and proclaimed a "Commonwealth of Independent States." Eleven former Soviet Republics joined the CIS on December 21. The resignation of President Gorbachev on December 25 formally brought the Soviet Union to an end. The United States recognized the independence of all the former Soviet Republics; the Embassy in Moscow became the Embassy to Russia.

New York and Camp David (Bush and Yeltsin)
(January 31-February 1, 1992)

President Yeltsin's first visit to the United States after the breakup of the Soviet Union was to attend the first-ever summit meeting of U.N. Security Council members. Yeltsin then met with President Bush at Camp David. They agreed to continue strategic arms reductions and to cooperate on arms sales, non-proliferation, and ballistic missile defense. President Bush promised to support Russia's admission to the IMF and the World Bank. President Yeltsin announced that an emergency program of humanitarian aid to the former Soviet Republics would begin on February 10. They issued a joint declaration proclaiming "that Russia and the United States do not regard each other as potential adversaries."

Washington (Bush and Yeltsin)
June 16-17, 1992

President Yeltsin made a state visit to Washington for the next summit meeting. He and President Bush agreed to continue the START process and set a goal of reducing their countries' strategic nuclear arsenals to 3,000-3,500 warheads by 2003. Other arms
control agreements dealt with limited ballistic missile defense, nuclear and chemical non-proliferation, conversion of defense industries, and U.S. assistance to Russia in transporting and destroying nuclear and chemical weapons. Both countries declared their support for U.N. peace and humanitarian efforts in Bosnia.

The United States pledged $4.5 billion as a share of a $24 billion international program to support economic reform in Russia, as well as additional credit guarantees and technical assistance. Economic cooperation would be enhanced by a U.S.-Russian Trade Agreement, bilateral investment and taxation treaties, and an OPIC investment incentive agreement. Future cooperation in science and technology ranged from space exploration to studying the ecology of the Bering Sea and Lake Baikal.

Other agreements marked the definitive end of the Cold War. Restrictions on the numbers and movements of diplomatic, consular, and official personnel were lifted. Consulates-General would be opened in Vladivostok and Seattle. Peace Corps volunteers would come to Russia. Russian airspace in eastern Siberia would be opened to international air traffic. A joint commission would try to account for American POW/MIAs who may have been held in the Soviet Union. Bush and Yeltsin reaffirmed their commitment to peaceful cooperation in a Charter for American-Russian Partnership and Friendship.

Munich (Bush and Yeltsin) July 8, 1992

President Bush held a private meeting with President Yeltsin after the Group of Seven Economic Summit in Munich. Yeltsin also told Summit participants that the Russian economy was in a worse state than they could imagine, but assured them that "Russia is resolutely marching on the road to market reforms." The G-7 leaders promised $1 billion in aid to Russia, but linked further aid to economic reform. Yeltsin said he would consider debt-for-equity deals with Western creditors, and announced that the withdrawal of former Soviet forces from the Baltic States would soon begin.

Moscow (Bush and Yeltsin) January 2-3, 1993

After visiting U.S. military personnel in Somalia, President Bush travelled to Moscow to sign the START II Treaty, which codified the nuclear reductions outlined during President Yeltsin's visit to Washington the previous summer. President Bush said that he believed the new Administration would be committed to helping Russia. President Yeltsin expressed interest in holding "a working meeting" with President Clinton in a "neutral place."
Vancouver (Clinton and Yeltsin)
April 3-4, 1993

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin held their first summit meeting in Vancouver, British Columbia. President Clinton announced a $1.6 billion bilateral aid package that included humanitarian aid, private sector development, promotion of democratic institutions, energy development, environmental protection, promotion of trade and investment, and nuclear arms reductions. In the Vancouver Declaration, both Presidents reaffirmed their commitment to cooperate to promote democracy, security, and peace.

Several high-level working groups were to be formed, notably a U.S.-Russian Commission on technical cooperation in energy and space, to be headed by Vice President Al Gore and Prime Minister Viktor S. Chernomyrdin.

Tokyo (Clinton and Yeltsin)
July 9-10, 1993

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin met privately on the night of July 9, after the G-7 Economic Summit Meeting in Tokyo. During a joint press conference the next day, Yeltsin said that 25 issues had been resolved. Clinton praised Russia's "march toward democracy and free markets" and announced that he would seek the repeal of Cold War restrictions on trade with Russia. It was agreed that the next U.S.-Russian summit meeting would be held in Moscow.

Moscow (Clinton and Yeltsin)
January 12-15, 1994

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin took steps toward liquidating military aspects of the Cold War. The United States and Russia agreed to cease aiming their nuclear missiles at each other. The United States would purchase $12 billion worth of uranium taken from Russian nuclear weapons. President Yeltsin announced that Russia would join NATO's Partnership for Peace program. The United States, Russia, and Ukraine agreed to eliminate Ukraine's share of the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal.

President Clinton announced the signing of three investment agreements and the establishment of two funds to promote private-sector development in Russia. Both Presidents reaffirmed their commitment to promoting human rights and democratic reforms. They agreed that the sovereignty and independence of the former Soviet republics should be respected. President Yeltsin agreed to meet with President Clinton at the G-7 Economic Summit in Naples, and to make a state visit to the United States.
Naples (Clinton and Yeltsin)
July 10, 1994

President Clinton described this Economic Summit as the first in which Yeltsin had participated as a full partner. He congratulated Yeltsin on the progress of his economic reform program and invited him to make a state visit to Washington on September 27 and 28. Yeltsin said that Russia would not seek full membership in the G-7 until its economic system had matured. He also announced that he would keep the last 2,000 Russian troops in Estonia until that country recognized the rights of Russian military retirees living there. He hoped to resolve the issue in a meeting with the President of Estonia.

Office of the Historian
September 1994


May 10-11, 1989: During Secretary Baker’s visit to Moscow, U.S. and Soviet officials discussed regional problems (Central America, Afghanistan, and the Middle East), human rights, bilateral matters, and transnational questions. They agreed on dates for resuming bilateral arms talks.

May 12, 1989: President Bush, in a public address, reaffirmed the U.S. desire for Soviet economic reform to succeed and stated that the United States sought the integration of the Soviet Union into the community of nations. He proposed regular surveillance flights over NATO and Warsaw Pact territories (Open Skies) and offered improved trade relations if the Soviet Union relaxed its emigration laws.

May 29, 1989: During a NATO summit meeting in Brussels, President Bush offered initiatives on conventional forces in Europe. He called for completion of an agreement on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) within a year.

June 12, 1989: The United States and the Soviet Union signed an agreement in Moscow designed to prevent dangerous military activities.

September 21-23, 1989: Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met in Wyoming. They released a detailed joint statement covering the full U.S.-Soviet agenda and signed several agreements on arms control verification and notification procedures. They signed several bilateral agreements concerning land and sea passage between the United States and Soviet Union.

December 2-3, 1989: During a shipboard summit meeting near Valletta, Malta, President Bush and Chairman Mikhail Gorbachev set a series of priorities to guide U.S.-Soviet relations and preparations for the next summit. They agreed to seek an accelerated conclusion to nuclear and conventional arms agreements and discussed economic and commercial relations and regional conflicts. President Bush offered ideas for technical cooperation and proposed negotiating a trade agreement that would lift the Jackson-Vanik restriction on most-favored-nation status for the Soviet Union, provided the Soviet government enacted a new law on emigration. They announced that a full summit would take place in the United States in June 1990.
January 31, 1990: In his State of the Union Address, President Bush proposed cutting U.S. and Soviet troops in Central Europe to 195,000 on each side. The United States would be able to maintain an additional 30,000 in peripheral nations. The Soviet Foreign Ministry called the initiative "a step in the right direction."

February 7-10, 1990: Secretary Baker met with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and President Gorbachev in Moscow. They discussed a range of arms control questions, making progress on conventional, nuclear, and chemical agreements. Soviet emigration policy, German unification, and regional issues were discussed. On February 10, Secretary Baker testified before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Supreme Soviet.

February 13, 1990: In Ottawa, the four major World War II Allies (U.S., U.K., France, and U.S.S.R.) plus the two Germanies agreed on a framework for negotiating the unification of Germany ("Two-Plus-Four"). The Soviet Union and other CFE participants accepted President Bush’s January 31 proposal for troop reductions in Europe.

March 20, 1990: Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met during independence ceremonies in Windhoek, Namibia. They discussed Lithuania, German unification, arms control, and Afghanistan.

April 4-6, 1990: Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met with Secretary Baker and President Bush in Washington. A U.S.-Soviet summit to be held in Washington May 30-June 3 was announced. The sides had difficult exchanges on strategic arms control issues, with the Soviets raising issues the U.S. believed were settled. The full U.S.-Soviet agenda and regional issues were discussed.

May 16-19, 1990: Secretary Baker met in Moscow with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and President Gorbachev to finalize preparations for the Washington summit. The Ministers resolved differences on chemical and strategic weapons. Secretary Baker reiterated U.S. policies favoring liberalized Soviet emigration, restraint and dialogue in Lithuania, and a unified Germany within NATO.

May 30-June 3, 1990: Presidents Bush and Gorbachev met in Washington and Camp David. They signed a key elements agreement for a strategic arms treaty, a chemical weapons reduction accord, and a trade agreement reducing barriers to U.S.-Soviet commerce. Several other bilateral accords increasing cultural and scientific exchanges as well as maritime and air links were concluded. A 5-year U.S.-Soviet grain deal was signed. The topics of German unification and Lithuania were discussed in depth. Following the summit, President Gorbachev journeyed to Minneapolis to meet local business leaders. The next day, he met former President Reagan in San Francisco before returning to Moscow.
June 5, 1990: Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met in Copenhagen during the CSCE Foreign Ministers' conference. They discussed German unification, European security, and arms control issues.

June 22, 1990: Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met in East Berlin during a session of the Two-Plus-Four talks on German unification and discussed regional issues, particularly Afghanistan.

August 1-2, 1990: Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met in the Siberian city of Irkutsk where they discussed the full range of U.S.-Soviet bilateral and security issues.

August 3, 1990: Secretary Baker flew to Moscow where he and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze issued a joint statement condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2. They urged a cut-off of all arms shipments to Iraq.

September 9, 1990: Presidents Bush and Gorbachev met in Helsinki for an urgently convened summit to discuss the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. They issued a joint statement expressing their solidarity in opposition to the aggression and their intention to cooperate fully in ending the Gulf crisis. They also urged their negotiators to move forward more rapidly in finalizing both strategic and conventional arms control agreements and discussed the progress of Soviet economic reforms.

September 11, 1990: Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met in Moscow where they discussed CFE and the Persian Gulf. Baker and Secretary of Commerce Robert Mosbacher co-hosted a meeting of U.S. business executives and Soviet officials.

September 12, 1990: Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze joined the Foreign Ministers of France, Britain, and the two Germanies to sign the "Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany." The event concluded the Two-Plus-Four process and provided for formal German reunification on October 3.

September 13, 1990: Secretary Baker met with President Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Moscow. They discussed remaining differences over CFE.

September 26-October 5, 1990: Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met on five separate occasions in New York during the opening of the UN General Assembly and the CSCE ministerial. They resolved major differences on CFE, made good progress toward a START agreement, and discussed the Persian Gulf crisis.

October 18, 1990: The U.S. and Soviet governments issued a joint statement calling for a peaceful settlement to the civil war in El Salvador.
November 8, 1990: Secretary Baker met with President Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Moscow. He sought Soviet support for a UN resolution which would authorize the use of force by the allied coalition against Iraq in the Persian Gulf should it prove necessary. Shevardnadze said the use of force "could not be ruled out."

November 18, 1990: Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met in Paris on the eve of the CSCE summit. They discussed the situation in the Persian Gulf and the necessity of Soviet support for a UN resolution authorizing the use of military force against Iraq.

November 19, 1990: Presidents Bush and Gorbachev met at the Paris CSCE summit. They signed the CFE Treaty and a non-aggression pledge with the other leaders of the North Atlantic and Warsaw Pact alliances. Afterward, they met privately to discuss the Persian Gulf Crisis. They "reaffirmed their unity and commitment" to end Saddam Hussein's occupation of Kuwait.


November 28, 1990: Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met in New York to discuss the details of the resolution to be voted on the following day concerning the possible use of force against Saddam Hussein in the Persian Gulf.

November 29, 1990: The United States and the Soviet Union voted together in favor of a UN resolution authorizing the use of military force against Saddam Hussein if he had not implemented the previous UN resolutions concerning his invasion and occupation of Kuwait by January 15, 1991.

December 9-12, 1990: Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met with Secretary Baker and President Bush in Houston and Washington. They announced that Presidents Bush and Gorbachev would hold a summit in Moscow on February 11-13, 1991 and discussed the issues of economic assistance to the Soviet Union and the START and CFE agreements.

January 26-29, 1991: Secretary Baker and President Bush met with new Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh in Washington. They reaffirmed their commitment to the UN resolutions adopted in connection with Iraq's aggression against Kuwait and discussed arms control, the situation in the Baltic States, and regional issues. They announced that because of the war in the Persian Gulf and technical differences which remained on the START agreement, the Moscow summit previously scheduled for February would be postponed.

February 21, 1991: The Soviet Government announced that President Gorbachev and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz had agreed on a formula for the "full and unconditional withdrawal" of
Iraqi troops from Kuwait. President Bush welcomed the Soviet attempt to end the Gulf war through diplomatic means but pointed out that the Soviet proposal would not oblige Iraq to abide by the terms of all the UN resolutions directed against its invasion of Iraq.

March 14-17, 1991: Secretary Baker, in Moscow, met with Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh and President Gorbachev. They discussed CFE, START, Middle East security issues, and Soviet economic and political developments.

April 24-25, 1991: Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh met in Kislovodsk, in the Soviet Caucasus, where they discussed Middle East security problems, and bilateral and arms control issues.

May 12-13, 1991: Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh met in Cairo to discuss the Middle East peace process. They discussed the Kurdish refugee problem in northern Iraq, bilateral issues, including START and CFE implementation, and regional matters.

June 1, 1991: Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh met in Lisbon after witnessing the signing of the Angola Peace Accords. They resolved outstanding issues which had delayed implementation of the CFE Treaty and progress toward the conclusion of a START agreement and issued a joint statement on conflict resolution in Africa.

June 7, 1991: Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh met in Geneva. They discussed remaining differences over the terms of the proposed START agreement.

June 20, 1991: Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh met in Berlin. They discussed remaining U.S.-Soviet differences on START, El Salvador, Cuba, and the possibility of a Moscow summit.

July 11-14, 1991: Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh met in Washington. They narrowed significantly U.S.-Soviet differences on START. Bessmertnykh presented President Bush with a letter from President Gorbachev outlining his planned presentation to the Western economic summit in London on Soviet economic reform.

July 17, 1991: Presidents Bush and Gorbachev met over lunch on the final day of the economic summit of the Group of Seven industrialized nations. They announced the conclusion of a START agreement and scheduled a summit in Moscow for July 30-31. They also discussed the economic situation in the Soviet Union.
July 30-August 1, 1991: President Bush visited the Soviet Union. He held a 2-day summit with Soviet President Gorbachev during which the leaders signed the START Treaty and agreed to co-sponsor efforts to convene a Middle East peace conference in October 1991. On August 1, President Bush visited Kiev before returning to Washington.

August 19, 1991: Soviet Vice President Gennadi Yanayev and seven senior officials announced that President Mikhail S. Gorbachev was incapacitated. They declared a state of emergency, deployed troops in Moscow, and forbade public gatherings and political activities. Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin denounced these measures as unconstitutional and became a rallying point for opposition.

President George Bush declared that the United States continued to support democratic reform and the constitutionally elected leaders of the Soviet Union. He called on the Soviet Union to abide by international commitments to respect human rights and democratic practices.

August 20, 1991: President Bush said that normal relations with the Soviet Union would not exist "as long as this illegal coup remains in effect." Ambassador Robert S. Strauss would visit Moscow to assess the situation, but not to present his credentials.

August 21, 1991: The attempted coup collapsed as the "Committee for the State of Emergency" faced massive but peaceful resistance in Moscow and failed to win the support of the military and the security forces.

August 24, 1991: Ambassador Strauss read a message from President Bush at the funeral of three civilians who had been killed during the attempted coup. He then presented his credentials to President Gorbachev and met with President Yeltsin.

September 2, 1991: The United States recognized the independence of the Baltic States.

September 4, 1991: Secretary of State Baker said during a news conference that U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union was to encourage self-determination, respect of borders, promotion of democracy, safeguarding human rights, and respect for international law.

September 10-16, 1991: Secretary of State Baker attended the CSCE Meeting on the Human Dimension in Moscow. He announced that the United States and the Soviet Union would end arms shipments to Afghanistan by January 1992, and would negotiate the removal of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. He also visited St. Petersburg, the Baltic States, and Kazakhstan.

September 11, 1991: President Gorbachev announced his intention to withdraw Soviet troops from Cuba.
September 27, 1991: President Bush announced that the United States would eliminate 24,000 nuclear warheads, including tactical missiles and nuclear artillery shells in Europe and nuclear-armed cruise missiles aboard naval vessels. Development of a mobile ICBM would end, and U.S. strategic bombers would no longer be on alert.

October 1, 1991: President Bush announced that Secretary of Agriculture Edward A. Madigan would lead a mission to assess the food situation in the Soviet Union. The United States would extend $585 million in agricultural commodities credits to the Soviet Union.

October 3, 1991: President Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would deactivate 503 ICBMs covered by the START Treaty, remove short-range nuclear weapons from warships and submarines, and take its bombers off alert status.

October 15, 1991: President Bush announced that the United States was willing to discuss with the Soviet Union the deployment of a limited defense against ballistic missiles.

October 18, 1991: Secretary of State Baker met with Soviet Foreign Minister Boris Pankin in Jerusalem, and announced that their governments would sponsor a Middle East Peace Conference in Madrid.

October 24, 1991: President Bush announced that the State Department could employ Soviet nationals in nonsensitive areas of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

October 29, 1991: Presidents Bush and Gorbachev met in Madrid before the opening of the Middle East Peace Conference.

November 20, 1991: President Bush announced the United States would provide an additional $1.5 billion in food assistance to the Soviet Union.

December 2, 1991: After Ukraine voted for independence, President Bush announced that Assistant Secretary of State Thomas M. T. Niles would visit Kiev.

December 8, 1991: The leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus declared that the Soviet Union had ceased to exist and proclaimed a "Commonwealth of Independent States."

December 12, 1991: President Bush appointed Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger to be Coordinator of U.S. assistance to the Soviet Union and the Republics. During a speech at Princeton University, Secretary of State Baker said that future relations with the former Soviet Republics would depend on their commitment to "responsible security policies, democratic political practices, and free market economies."
December 15, 1991: The United States began an emergency airlift of medical supplies to the Soviet Union.


December 18, 1991: The leaders of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan announced their acceptance of U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms reductions.

December 21, 1991: Eleven former Soviet republics formally proclaimed the "Commonwealth of Independent States;" the Baltic States and Georgia did not join.

December 25, 1991: Mikhail S. Gorbachev resigned as President of the Soviet Union. President Bush praised him for his role in ending the Cold War and promoting peace and democracy. The United States recognized the independence of all the former Soviet Republics. The Embassy in Moscow would become the Embassy to Russia. Diplomatic relations would be established with Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine; relations with the other republics would depend on their commitment to "responsible security policies and democratic principles."

January 22, 1992: The United States hosted a Coordinating Conference on Assistance to the New Independent States. President Bush proposed that Congress approve an additional $600 million in technical and humanitarian aid to the CIS.

January 27-29, 1992: Secretary of State Baker attended an organizational meeting for multilateral negotiations on the Middle East in Moscow.

January 31-February 1, 1992: President Yeltsin attended a UN Security Council summit meeting in New York. He then met with President Bush at Camp David. They issued a declaration stating that Russia and the United States no longer considered themselves potential adversaries.

February 10, 1992: Secretary of State Baker visited Frankfurt to inaugurate "Operation Provide Hope," an international emergency aid program to the former Soviet Republics.

February 11-18, 1992: Secretary of State Baker visited Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Russia. He and the Foreign Ministers of Russia and Germany proposed the establishment of an international science and technology center to help re-direct former Soviet scientists and engineers to peaceful purposes.
February 18, 1992: The United States established diplomatic relations with Moldova.

February 19, 1992: The United States established diplomatic relations with Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

March 11, 1992: Secretary of State Baker met with representatives of the European Community, Russia, and Japan in Brussels to promote an International Science and Technology Center in Russia.

March 24, 1992: The United States established diplomatic relations with Georgia.

April 1, 1992: President Bush announced that the United States would support a $24 billion financial assistance program for Russia by international financial institutions, as well as membership for the former Soviet Republics in the IMF. The republics would also receive an additional $1.1 billion in agricultural commodity credit guarantees.

The President also urged Congress to pass a "Freedom Support Act." Key provisions were the authorization of $12 billion more for the IMF, increased authority to work with the G-7 and the IMF to assist the Russian economy, repeal of Cold War trade restrictions, and aid for nuclear disarmament and defense conversion in the former Soviet Republics.

April 3, 1992: The United States and Russia signed a bilateral OPIC agreement.

May 5, 1992: The U.S. Senate ratified the START Treaty by a vote of 93 to 6.

May 23-24, 1992: Secretary of State Baker attended a Conference on Assistance to the New Independent States in Lisbon. He signed a protocol making Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine parties to the START Treaty.


June 9, 1992: Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev visited Washington to discuss strategic arms reductions with Secretary of State Baker. They reached a tentative agreement to reduce U.S. and Soviet strategic forces to 4,700 warheads.

June 16-17, 1992: Presidents Bush and Yeltsin held a summit meeting in Washington. They agreed to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals to 3,000-3,500 warheads by 2003 and signed agreements on arms control, economic assistance, promotion of trade, and scientific and technical cooperation. They agreed to end restrictions on the numbers and travel opportunities of diplomatic and consular personnel, and to establish Consulates-General in Vladivostok and Seattle.

July 8, 1992: President Yeltsin urged the participants in the G-7 Economic Summit in Munich to support economic reform in Russia. They promised $1 billion in aid, but linked additional aid to further economic reforms.

September 16, 1992: Russian and Cuban officials reached an agreement to withdraw a mechanized infantry brigade from Cuba by mid-1993.


November 27, 1992: The United States, Japan, the European Community, and Russia signed an agreement in Moscow establishing an International Science and Technology Center.


December 27-29, 1992: Secretary of State Eagleburger visited Geneva to continue the START II negotiations.


January 19, 1993: President-elect William J. Clinton announced that he would nominate Strobe Talbott as Ambassador at Large and Special Adviser on the New Independent States.

February 25, 1993: Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher met with Foreign Minister Kozyrev in Geneva and briefed him on his visit to the Middle East. They agreed to hold a summit meeting on April 4.

March 22, 1993: Secretary of State Christopher told the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations that the Clinton Administration would soon "set forth a comprehensive strategy" to support democracy and economic reform in Russia. Details would be announced at the forthcoming Vancouver Summit. Christopher also proposed a meeting
later in April of the foreign and finance ministers of the industrial democracies to coordinate aid to Russia.

March 23, 1993: President Clinton expressed his support for President Yeltsin, and described U.S. interests in Russia as prevention of nuclear war, promotion of democracy, and support for the development of a market economy.


April 1, 1993: In an address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Annapolis, President Clinton called for "investments in Russian reform."

April 2, 1993: Russia signed an agreement with its Western creditors to reschedule $15 billion of its foreign debts.

April 3-4, 1993: Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin held a summit meeting in Vancouver, British Columbia. President Clinton announced a $1.6 billion bilateral aid package that included humanitarian aid, private sector development, promotion of democratic institutions, energy development, environmental protection, promotion of trade and investment, and nuclear arms reductions. In the Vancouver Declaration, both Presidents reaffirmed their commitment to cooperate to promote democracy, security, and peace.

April 14-15, 1993: Secretary of State Christopher and Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen attended a meeting of the G-7 and Russian Foreign and Finance Ministers in Tokyo. The G-7 countries proposed a $28.4 billion multilateral aid package for Russia, contingent upon monetary stabilization and further economic reforms. The United States announced an additional $1.8 billion in aid.

April 25, 1993: Russia held a referendum on President Yeltsin and his reform policies. Fifty-eight percent of the voters expressed confidence in Yeltsin, 53% approved of his economic reform policies, 49.5% favored early presidential elections, and 65% favored early legislative elections. President Clinton congratulated him on the outcome the next day.

May 4-5, 1993: Secretary of State Christopher visited Moscow. He and Foreign Minister Kozyrev expressed their countries' support for the Vance-Owen peace plan for the former Yugoslavia.

May 20, 1993: Kozyrev visited Washington to discuss the Bosnian conflict.

President Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan visited Washington and met with President Clinton, Vice President Gore, Secretary Christopher, and other senior officials.
June 5, 1993: A constitutional conference convened in Moscow to consider President Yeltsin's proposal for a new Russian constitution. After an often bitter debate, the conference approved an amended version on July 12, by a vote of 433 to 62, with 63 abstentions.

Secretary of Defense Les Aspin met with Russian Defense Minister Pavel S. Grachev in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. They discussed a plan to place Ukraine's share of the Soviet nuclear arsenal under international control until it could be dismantled in Russia. Grachev criticized the plan, and asked that the CFE Treaty be revised to allow Russia to assign more troops to peacekeeping in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

June 6, 1993: Aspin visited Kiev, where Ukrainian officials spoke favorably of his proposal.

The United States and Russia signed a $700 million agricultural assistance agreement.

June 17, 1993: Presidents Yeltsin and Kravchuk met in Moscow to decide the future of the former Soviet Black Sea Fleet and its base at Sevastopol. Many Russian officers objected to dividing the fleet equally, while a proposed Russian lease of port facilities was unpopular in Ukraine.

June 28, 1993: President Clinton discussed with President Yeltsin the agenda for the G-7 Economic Summit and the progress of the U.S. aid program for Russia.

July 2, 1993: The Ukrainian Supreme Council declared that all nuclear weapons in the country were national property, but added that Ukraine would never authorize their use.

July 7-9, 1993: At the Economic Summit Meeting in Tokyo, the leaders of the G-7 countries expressed their support for the reform process in Russia and Ukraine and urged the former Soviet republics to accept nuclear disarmament agreements. The Summit's Economic Declaration called for a $3 billion Special Privatization and Restructuring Program, with a Support Implementation Group in Moscow. The United States announced a bilateral aid program of $1.8 billion for Russia and the former Soviet republics. President Yeltsin met with President Clinton on July 9 and 10.

July 9, 1993: The Supreme Soviet voted to reaffirm Russian sovereignty over Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet. Both President Yeltsin and the Russian Foreign Ministry criticized the resolution the next day.
July 10, 1993: Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin held a joint news conference after the Tokyo Economic Summit, during which Clinton said that he would seek the repeal of Cold War restrictions on trade with Russia.

The Prime Ministers of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine announced a provisional agreement on economic integration.

July 15, 1993: Russia agreed not to sell rocket engines to India, and announced that it would observe the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime by November 1.


July 23, 1993: As the Clinton Administration presented its $2.5 billion aid program for the former Soviet republics to the Senate, it emphasized loan guarantees through international financial organizations and private sector aid.

July 29, 1993: Secretary of Defense Aspin visited Ukraine, where he was assured that 10 SS-19s aimed at U.S. targets had been dismantled. Konstantin Morozov, his counterpart, said that Ukraine intended to keep the warheads of dismantled ICBMs and return all other parts to Russia. The United States granted $175 million to Ukraine to assist its nuclear disarmament.

August 6, 1993: The U.S. Senate approved the Open Skies Treaty.

August 31, 1993: The last Russian troops withdrew from Lithuania.

August 31-September 2, 1993: Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin visited Washington. He and Vice President Al Gore presided over the first meeting of a Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation. The United States and Russia agreed to cooperate in manned space flight and in building a space station. Russia agreed to accept the Missile Technology Control Regime. On September 2, President Clinton said that when Congress reconvened, he would seek the repeal of about 60 Cold War-vintage laws restricting U.S.-Russian trade.
September 3, 1993: The Presidents of Russia and Ukraine met at Massandra, in the Crimea. Ukraine reportedly agreed to sell its half of the Black Sea Fleet in return for cancellation of its debt to Russia, and to transfer its ICBMs to Russia in return for compensation for the uranium in their warheads. President Kravchuk later denied that any agreement had been reached.

September 7, 1993: Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin discussed foreign policy issues by phone.

President Clinton sent to the Senate investment treaties with Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Moldova.

September 8, 1993: Russian Defense Minister Grachev visited Washington and signed an agreement providing for joint peacekeeping exercises by U.S. and Russian troops.

September 13, 1993: Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev attended the signing ceremony for the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles that granted autonomy to Jericho and the Gaza Strip.

September 20, 1993: The International Monetary Fund delayed a $1.5 billion loan to Russia, citing Russia's failure to curb inflation and conduct economic reforms.

September 21, 1993: President Yeltsin suspended the Russian Parliament and called for elections to the lower house of a new Federal Assembly on December 11-12. He accused the Supreme Soviet of obstructing political and economic reforms and of usurping executive and judicial functions. The next day, he scheduled presidential elections for June 12, 1994. Vice President Alexander Rutskoi called Yeltsin's decree unconstitutional, and Russia's Constitutional Court called for his impeachment.

President Clinton described Yeltsin's call for new elections as "consistent with the democratic and reform course" and assured Yeltsin of his support.

September 24, 1993: An emergency session of the Congress of People's Deputies voted to impeach Yeltsin and to confirm Rutskoi as President. Yeltsin responded by cordoning off the Parliament Building and shutting off its utilities.

September 27, 1993: President Clinton and Secretary of State Christopher met with the Presidents of the Baltic States at the U.N. General Assembly in New York.

September 30, 1993: President Clinton signed into law the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, which included $2.5 billion in aid to Russia and the former Soviet republics.

October 4, 1993: After a day of rioting in which supporters of the Soviet Parliament attempted to seize the state broadcasting complex and the office of the Mayor of Moscow, President Yeltsin summoned Russian army units to crush the rebellion. Vice President Rutskoi and his followers surrendered after tanks shelled the Parliament Building, known as the "White House."

President Clinton expressed support for Yeltsin, but urged him to hold elections. He announced that Secretary of State Christopher would visit Russia later in the month.

October 19, 1993: President Kravchuk said that Ukraine would destroy its 130 SS-19 ICBMs after ratifying the START Treaties. It intended to keep its 46 SS-24s, although they would be taken off alert status. Ukraine sought $2.5 billion from the United States for nuclear disarmament.

October 20, 1993: Russian Defense Minister Grachev expressed concern at the interest that former Warsaw Pact states had shown in joining NATO.

October 21, 1993: During a meeting of NATO Defense Ministers in Travemunde, Germany, Secretary of Defense Aspin proposed gradually linking East European countries with NATO in "Partnership for Peace." NATO would arrange joint training and standardization of equipment, but would not offer membership or security guarantees.

October 21-23, 1993: Secretary of State Christopher visited Moscow. In an address to the Academy of the National Economy, he spoke of a developing "strategic partnership" with Russia. He also offered technical assistance to ensure that legislative elections would be free and fair. The next U.S.-Russian summit meeting was scheduled for mid-January.

October 24, 1993: Christopher visited Kazakhstan and signed a bilateral tax treaty. He announced an economic assistance program of up to $140 million and cooperation programs dealing with the Aral Sea and defense cooperation. President Nazarbayev said that he would seek parliamentary ratification of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty before the end of 1993.

October 25, 1993: During his visit to Kiev, Christopher promised that Ukraine would receive $330 million in economic assistance in 1994. He linked additional aid to economic reforms. He proposed the establishment of a joint commission to promote
trade, easier access to U.S. markets under the Generalized System of Preferences, and support for Ukrainian membership in GATT.

President Kravchuk said that he would seek ratification of START I and accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but Ukrainian officials still linked nuclear disarmament to Western security guarantees.

October 26, 1993: In Minsk, Christopher praised Belarus for its commitment to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and expressed his intention to complete a bilateral investment treaty.

October 27, 1993: Christopher met with Foreign Ministers of the Baltic States in Riga, Latvia. He announced plans for a $50 million Baltic-American Enterprise Fund, continued support for the withdrawal of Russian forces from Latvia and Estonia, and the construction of 5,000 housing units in Russia for military personnel. He also urged Estonia and Latvia to respect the rights of ethnic Russians.

October 28, 1993: Belarus Defense Minister Kozlovsky signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Military-to-Military Relations with Secretary of Defense Aspin during the course of a 4-day visit.


November 2, 1993: Russia's Security Council approved a new military doctrine that stated that "local wars and regional conflicts" were the most likely threat. The new doctrine also called for security cooperation with the former Soviet republics and Eastern European countries.

November 3, 1993: Defense Minister Grachev announced that Russia's new military doctrine ruled out the use of nuclear weapons against signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, unless they were allied with a nuclear power. The Soviet Union's 1982 pledge not to use nuclear weapons first was implicitly abandoned.

The United States ratified the Open Skies Treaty.

November 6, 1993: President Yeltsin told reporters in Moscow that he would consider serving a complete term, until 1996, instead of holding presidential elections in 1994. The next day, President Clinton said that the United States would continue to support Yeltsin as long as he promoted democracy, human rights, and reform.

November 18, 1993: Ukraine ratified the START I Treaty, voting to dispose of 36% of its ICBMs and 42% of its nuclear warheads. It linked complete nuclear disarmament to financial and security guarantees.
November 25, 1993: Yevgeny M. Primakov, director of Russia's foreign intelligence service, said that granting NATO membership to East European countries would promote anti-Western sentiment in Russia and force a reappraisal of Russian military needs.

December 2, 1993: NATO Foreign Ministers met in Brussels and endorsed the U.S. "Partnership for Peace" plan for closer relations with Eastern European countries.

December 5, 1993: The U.S. Defense Department announced that it was considering an agreement with Russia to reduce the risk of accidental missile launches by aiming ICBMs at the oceans rather than at targets on land.

December 9, 1993: President Yeltsin visited Brussels after a meeting of NATO Defense Ministers and reiterated Russia's opposition to NATO membership for East European countries.

President Clinton received the credentials of Moldova's first Ambassador to the United States, Nicolae Tau.

December 12, 1993: Russia held legislative elections. The ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party received 65 of 444 seats in the lower house, the State Duma. The pro-reform Russia's Choice Party also won 65 seats.

December 13, 1993: During a press conference in Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania, President Clinton called the strong showing of Russian ultra-nationalists a "protest vote." However, he believed that election of a new legislature and approval of a new constitution laid the foundation for a democratic society.

Vice President Gore visited Kyrgyzstan, where he signed agreements to protect U.S. investments and to establish a fund to support agricultural development. He then proceeded to Kazakhstan, where he signed an agreement providing $83 million to assist in the dismantlement of nuclear weapons on Kazakhstani soil and in related activities. He also exchanged the instruments of ratification on the bilateral investment treaty and initialed a bilateral science and technology umbrella agreement.

Kazakhstan's Parliament ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty by a vote of 283-1.

December 14, 1993: State Department Spokesman Michael McCurry said that the United States reserved judgement on the results of the Russian elections, but remained committed to supporting economic and political reform. He called certain statements by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, "completely anathema to principles of democracy, ... human rights, the democratic process, economic reforms, and relations between sovereign states."
December 14-15, 1993: Vice President Gore visited Moscow, where he met with President Yeltsin and described Zhirinovsky's views as "reprehensible and anathema to all freedom-loving peoples." Yeltsin reasserted his commitment to democratic reform, peace, stability and respect for international borders.

Yeltsin also condemned Ukraine for delaying its nuclear disarmament.

December 16, 1993: Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin signed 17 agreements concerning economic, technical, and scientific cooperation. As a step toward joint construction of a space station, the United States would pay Russia $100 million a year for the use of the Mir space station. Other agreements included an investment treaty, establishment of a joint petroleum technology center, and modernization of Russian nuclear reactors. The Vice President ended his trip to Russia with a visit to St. Petersburg the next day.

December 18, 1993: During his return from Russia, Vice President Gore discussed security issues with Ukrainian President Kravchuk in Budapest. He then discussed economic aid to Russia with Chancellor Helmut Kohl in Ludwigshafen, Germany.

December 20, 1993: Russia's Central Electoral Commission announced that 54.8% of the electorate had voted in the referendum on a new constitution. With 58.4% voting for the constitution, it would take effect the next day.

In separate speeches, Secretary of State Christopher and Ambassador Talbott said that the United States was redoubling its support of Russian reform in view of the strong showing of opponents of economic reform.

President Kravchuk informed President Clinton that Ukraine had disarmed 17 of its 46 SS-24 ICBMs, expected to disarm 20 by the end of the year, and was prepared to deactivate its entire nuclear arsenal.

December 21, 1993: President Yeltsin announced that he would abolish the Security Ministry (formerly the internally directed arm of the KGB) and replace it with a smaller Federal Counterintelligence Service. He also described the vote for Zhirnovsky as a "protest against poverty."
December 22, 1993: After a telephone conversation with President Yeltsin, President Clinton said that he still planned to support Yeltsin at the next U.S.-Russian summit. He believed that NATO would not decide its relationship with East European countries until after the situation in Russia became clearer.

December 27, 1993: President Clinton announced that he would appoint Strobe Talbott to be Deputy Secretary of State. Talbott would continue to be responsible for relations with the former Soviet republics.

January 10, 1994: President Clinton attended a NATO Summit Meeting in Brussels that formally inaugurated the Partnership for Peace program. Romania became the first country to sign such an agreement on January 26; Lithuania became the first former Soviet republic to do so the next day.

January 12, 1994: President Clinton visited Kiev, where he invited Ukraine to take part in the Partnership for Peace program. He announced the establishment of an enterprise fund for Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova.

January 12-15, 1994: At their summit meeting in Moscow, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin took steps toward liquidating military aspects of the Cold War. The United States and Russia agreed to cease aiming their nuclear missiles at each other by May 31. The United States would purchase $12 billion worth of uranium taken from Russian nuclear weapons. President Yeltsin announced that Russia would join NATO's Partnership for Peace program. The United States, Russia, and Ukraine agreed to eliminate Ukraine's share of the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal.

President Clinton announced the signing of three investment agreements and the establishment of two funds to promote private-sector development in Russia. Both Presidents reaffirmed their commitment to promoting human rights and democratic reforms. They agreed that the sovereignty and independence of the former Soviet republics should be respected. President Yeltsin agreed to meet with President Clinton at the G-7 Economic Summit in Naples, and to make a state visit to the United States.

January 15, 1994: President Clinton visited Minsk while returning from Moscow. He expressed support for the reform process in Belarus, and promised additional economic aid.

January 16, 1994: Secretary of State Christopher warned that an aggressive Russian foreign policy would lead NATO to "consider the erection of a security barrier" in Europe.
January 18, 1994: Foreign Minister Kozyrev warned that the withdrawal of Russian troops from the "near abroad" would cause a security vacuum in the former Soviet republics.

February 13-15, 1994: During an official working visit to Washington, President Nazarbayev presented President Clinton with Kazakhstan's instrument of ratification for the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The two Presidents signed agreements on scientific cooperation, space, defense conversion, and investment, as well as a charter on democratic partnership.

February 23, 1994: At the conclusion of a visit to Central European countries, Foreign Minister Kozyrev denied that the Russian Empire could be revived, but added that Russia could not be ignored in major diplomatic questions.

March 3, 1994: The International Science and Technology Center opened in Moscow.

March 3-5, 1994: Ukrainian President Kravchuk made an official visit to Washington. The United States signed investment and taxation treaties with Ukraine and agreed to provide an additional $700 million in economic assistance, including $350 million for nuclear disarmament and defense conversion.

March 6-8, 1994: Georgian President Shevardnadze made an official visit to Washington. During the visit, the United States and Georgia signed an investment treaty and Georgia acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

March 14, 1994: Secretary of State Christopher met with Foreign Minister Kozyrev in Vladivostok to discuss bilateral and regional issues. They emphasized that there was a "mature relationship" of equals between their countries.

March 17, 1994: After a meeting with Secretary of Defense Perry in Moscow, Defense Minister Grachev announced that Russia intended to join the Partnership for Peace program.

March 22, 1994: President Clinton signed a determination making the Baltic States eligible to receive military equipment and services from the United States.

The IMF agreed to release $1.5 billion in credits on condition that Russia would reduce its inflation rate to 7% per month, restructure its tax collection system, and balance additional spending with additional cuts.

March 31, 1994: The COCOM system that restricted exports of advanced technology with military applications to Communist countries, was abolished.
April 5, 1994: President Yeltsin signed a decree establishing 30 military bases in former Soviet republics, including Latvia.

April 30, 1994: The Presidents of Russia and Latvia signed an agreement in Moscow that called for the withdrawal of all Russian troops from Latvia by August 31.

May 11-13, 1994: A Ukrainian delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister Valery Shmarov visited Washington to discuss non-proliferation issues. Ukraine agreed to abide by the MCTR regime.

May 24, 1994: President Ulmanis of Latvia visited Washington. President Clinton assured him of his support for the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic States.

June 8, 1994: The OECD signed an economic cooperation agreement with Russia.

June 10, 1994: Secretary of State Christopher and Foreign Minister Kozyrev met in Istanbul after NATO and NACC ministerial meetings and discussed U.S.-Russian relations.


June 22, 1994: Foreign Minister Kozyrev attended a NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels, during which Russia joined the Partnership for Peace program.

July 6, 1994: President Clinton met with the Presidents of the Baltic States in Riga, Latvia. In a public address, he expressed confidence that the Baltic States would ultimately become full members of NATO, and promised to encourage President Yeltsin to keep his promise to withdraw all Russian troops by the end of August.

July 10, 1994: President Clinton described the Naples Economic Summit as the first in which Yeltsin had participated as a full partner. He congratulated Yeltsin on the progress of his economic reform program and invited him to make a state visit to Washington on September 27 and 28. Yeltsin said that Russia would not seek full membership in the G-7 until its economic system had matured. He also announced that he would keep the last 2,000 Russian troops in Estonia until that country recognized the rights of Russian military retirees living there. He hoped to resolve the issue in a meeting with the President of Estonia.
July 11-12, 1994: President Clinton visited Berlin and attended the deactivation ceremony for the U.S. Army's Berlin Brigade.

July 26, 1994: After a meeting between Presidents Meri and Yeltsin in Moscow, Russia agreed to withdraw its last 2,000 troops from Estonia as scheduled.

August 9-11, 1994: Armenian President Ter-Petrosyan visited Washington.

August 31, 1994: President Yeltsin visited Berlin for a departure ceremony as the last Russian troops left Germany.

The last Russian soldiers also withdrew from Latvia and Estonia. Six hundred technicians remained to operate a radar station in Skrunda, Latvia, and 210 naval personnel were to decommission two reactors at the Paldiski naval base in Estonia.

September 7, 1994: After 250 soldiers from the U.S. Third Infantry Division completed joint maneuvers at Totskoye, Russia, Defense Minister Grachev announced that 500 Russian soldiers would come to the United States for a joint exercise in 1995.

September 8, 1994: Secretary of State Christopher and Secretary of Defense Perry visited Berlin to attend departure ceremonies as the last U.S., British, and French troops withdrew.

September 9, 1994: During his visit to Berlin, Secretary of Defense Perry and German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe disagreed over whether Russia might join NATO. Ruehe believed that admitting Russia "would blow NATO apart," while Perry declined to rule out eventual Russian membership.

September 12-17, 1994: NATO held its first Partnership for Peace exercise in Poland. Soldiers from Poland, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Romania, Lithuania, and Ukraine took part.

Office of the Historian
September 1994