

# MIR MARKER

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<b>Folder Title:</b> The President's Meeting with President Yeltsin of Russia, October 23, 1995 [Briefing Book]				
<b>Staff Office-Individual:</b> Executive Secretary				
<b>Original OA/ID Number:</b> 2586				
<b>Row:</b> 35	<b>Section:</b> 2	<b>Shelf:</b> 10	<b>Position:</b> 1	<b>Stack:</b> V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001. memo</del>	<del>Anthony Lake to President William J. Clinton re. Your Hyde Park Meeting with Boris Yeltsin (2 pages)</del>	<del>10/00/1995</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/3/2020</del>
<del>002. paper</del>	<del>Your Meeting and Working Lunch with President Boris Yeltsin (15 pages)</del>	<del>10/00/1995</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/3/2020</del>
<del>003. paper</del>	<del>Russia and Bosnia (1 page)</del>	<del>10/00/1995</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/3/2020</del>
<del>004. paper</del>	<del>Russia and NATO (1 page)</del>	<del>10/00/1995</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/3/2020</del>
<del>005. paper</del>	<del>Iran Reactor Sale (1 page)</del>	<del>10/00/1995</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/3/2020</del>
<del>006. paper</del>	<del>Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty (1 page)</del>	<del>10/00/1995</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/3/2020</del>
<del>007. paper</del>	<del>Nuclear Material Security and Moscow Nuclear Summit (1 page)</del>	<del>10/00/1995</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/3/2020</del>
<del>008. paper</del>	<del>Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (1 page)</del>	<del>10/00/1995</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/3/2020</del>
<del>009. paper</del>	<del>START II and ABM Treaty (1 page)</del>	<del>10/00/1995</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 4/3/2020</del>
010. report	Biography (2 pages) [partial]	10/17/1995	P1/b(1)  2/16/19
011. report	Biography (2 pages)	10/17/1995	P1/b(1)
012. report	Biography (2 pages) [partial]	10/17/1995	P1/b(1)  2/16/19

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Executive Secretary  
OA/Box Number: 2586

### FOLDER TITLE:

The President's Meeting with President Yeltsin of Russia, October 23, 1995 [Briefing Book]

2016-0137-M  
kh1784

### RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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013. report	Biography (2 pages)	10/17/1995	P1/b(1)
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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS  
Initials: KBM Date: 12/30/2019  
2016-0137-M



**The President's Meeting with  
President Yeltsin of Russia  
October 23, 1995**

**Executive Secretary's Office**

~~SECRET~~

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October

23,

1995

w/

Yeltsin

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON  
October 19, 1995

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)  
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006  
By KBH NARA, Date 12/30/2019  
2016-0137-M

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE 

SUBJECT: Your Hyde Park Meeting with President Yeltsin

Your meeting with President Yeltsin at Hyde Park provides three hours for substantive discussion, first in the one-on-one format, followed by a working lunch with expanded participation. Other than possible comments during a photo op, we do not plan a joint press conference with Yeltsin. This briefing book contains:

SCOPE MEMORANDUM

SCHEDULE

MEETING PAPER

Background, Core Objectives and Points to be Made in One-on-One Meeting and Working Lunch

HYDE PARK SCENESETTER

BACKGROUND PAPERS

- Russia and Bosnia
- Russia and NATO
- Iran Reactor Sale
- Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty
- Nuclear Material Security and Moscow Nuclear Summit
- Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
- START II and ABM Treaty

REMARKS FOR PHOTO OP AT HYDE PARK

PRESS MATERIALS

Points to Make in Response to Press Questions

BIOGRAPHIC MATERIALS

Attachments

As stated



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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ANTHONY LAKE *TL*

SUBJECT

Your Hyde Park Meeting with Boris Yeltsin

**DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526**

2016-0137-M (1.01)  
KBH 12/30/2019

The Setting

Your fifth substantive meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin coincides with the final run-up to Russian parliamentary elections, scheduled for December 17, and precedes by about eight months what promises to be a divisive and hotly contested presidential race. Yeltsin, who appears to have recovered from the mild heart attack he suffered in July, seems a better than even bet to toss his hat into the presidential ring, despite his current low standing in Russian public opinion polls. Given Yeltsin's likely electoral bid, it is perhaps inevitable that his approach to the management of relations with the United States has in recent months taken on an unmistakably political cast.

Although Yeltsin continues to regard the generally positive state of relations with Washington as his single greatest foreign policy achievement, the evident strains in the relationship -- differences over Bosnia, NATO enlargement and the Iran reactor sale, for example -- have forced him onto the political defensive at home. The problem is compounded by many of the Russian President's advisers, who are deeply suspicious of U.S. motives and purposes and anything but shy in communicating their dark vision to the impressionable Yeltsin. The view that the United States is taking advantage of a weakened, dispirited Russia has acquired significant currency in Moscow circles.

As relations between Russia and the United States grow ever more complex, Yeltsin looks increasingly to his friend Bill Clinton, and to the ties that have developed between the two of you, to revive the promise of partnership and to sustain the relationship during this difficult period. As in your May meetings in Moscow, therefore, Yeltsin will look to you at Hyde Park to reaffirm your personal commitment to the development of the strongest possible U.S.-Russian relationship -- even as he challenges and takes pointed exception to particular U.S. actions and policies.

The outcome of this meeting is unpredictable. Significant progress is possible, especially if we can strike agreement on an

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Declassify on: OADR

arrangement for Russian participation in IFOR. But there are no guarantees. Moreover, Yeltsin is certain to bear down hard on the issue of European security and NATO enlargement and may well come to Hyde Park with a proposal designed to bolster Russia's position in Europe and derail Alliance plans to take in new members. Consistent with this being a "working meeting," not a "summit," we have tried to keep expectations in check.

### Substance and Approach

We recommend that you begin the Hyde Park session with a brief review of the bilateral relationship, focusing on both its current status and future prospects. The purpose in so doing is to establish a broad and positive context for the consideration of individual issues, at least some of which are likely to prove contentious. ***Yeltsin should find such a discussion reassuring -- the notion being that together our two countries have traveled a great distance in less than three years and, current tensions notwithstanding, that this remarkable and unprecedented journey, linking the fates of our two people, must continue.*** You might also want to draw Yeltsin out on Russian politics and the possible impact of elections, and electioneering, on U.S.-Russian relations. We anticipate that Yeltsin will be interested in receiving from you a parallel report on the U.S. political scene.

You will want to devote the bulk of your one-on-one meeting to the most complex and sensitive issues on the bilateral agenda, e.g., Bosnia and peace implementation, NATO enlargement and NATO-Russia relations and Iran reactors. Yeltsin, too, will come to Hyde Park with Bosnia and NATO enlargement at the top of his agenda. It is with respect to these two issues that we expect the most prolonged and sharpest exchanges.

The discussion over lunch should focus on (what we hope will be) less divisive questions, such as the CFE "flank limits" issue and security of nuclear materials. The latter should include receipt of an upbeat report from the Vice President and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin on U.S.-Russian cooperation in the area of "material protection, control and accounting."

Secretary Christopher and Foreign Minister Kozyrev will be on hand and could review a number of important issues that, given the time constraints, may not make it onto your and Yeltsin's agendas: Russian support for a "zero-yield" Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, START II ratification and ABM/TMD demarcation and Ex-Im Bank financing for the production of IL-96 aircraft (to be outfitted with Pratt and Whitney engines and avionics).

**SCHEDULE OF  
KEY EVENTS**

SCHEDULE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING  
WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN  
MONDAY, OCTOBER 23

8:30 a.m. The President departs Waldorf Hotel via motorcade  
en route Wall Street landing zone

8:50 a.m. The President departs the Wall Street landing zone  
via Marine One en route Hyde Park

9:40 a.m. The President arrives Hyde Park  
Open Press

9:45 a.m.-  
11:15 a.m. Briefing for meeting with President Yeltsin  
Room TBA, Roosevelt Library

11:20 a.m. The President greets President Yeltsin at front  
steps of Roosevelt Home  
Open Press

11:30 a.m.-  
1:00 p.m. One-on-One meeting with President Yeltsin  
Living Room/Library, The Roosevelt Home  
Pool Spray

1:00 p.m. The President and President Yeltsin walk past  
Roosevelt grave site on way to Roosevelt Library  
Pool Press

1:15 p.m.-  
2:45 p.m. Working lunch with expanded participation  
Dining Room, Roosevelt Library  
Pool Spray

2:50 p.m. The President departs Hyde Park via Marine One en  
route Wall Street landing zone

3:40 p.m. The President arrives Wall Street landing zone

3:50 p.m. The President departs Wall Street landing zone via  
motorcade en route side TBD

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT  
YELTSIN OF RUSSIA

~~SECRET~~

YOUR MEETING AND WORKING LUNCH  
WITH PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2016-0137-M (1.02)  
KBH 12/30/2019

BACKGROUND

Your meeting with Yeltsin at Hyde Park comes at a time of some tension in the bilateral relationship. Russian impotence as NATO conducted air strikes in Bosnia fed Moscow's paranoia about being sidelined on a crucial European security issue and NATO enlargement. Yeltsin's opponents have exploited this to challenge his foreign policy. Sensitive to the December 17 Duma elections -- and to the presidential election that follows in June -- Yeltsin has trimmed his sails to tack to a more nationalist course.

The Russians have made clear their concerns about recent developments and suggested a blow-up over Bosnia could affect overall U.S.-Russian relations. At the same time, however, they have signaled their desire to contain our differences and not let them undermine other parts of the agenda. Yeltsin continues to put great stock in his relationship with you. Thus, while he will come to Hyde Park determined to safeguard Russian positions, and to be seen at home to be doing so, he may also seek solutions.

CORE OBJECTIVES

- o Reaffirm your strong commitment to cooperative U.S.-Russian relations.
- o Reassure Yeltsin that we welcome Russia's participation in Bosnia peace implementation consistent with our need to be part of a NATO-led operation under the NAC's exclusive control and come to terms on how Russian forces will work with NATO in IFOR. Stress the need for continued close cooperation in the Contact Group.
- o Reassure Yeltsin on NATO enlargement (gradual, transparent, no surprises/vetoes); walk him through what we expect for 1996. Be prepared to deflect a challenge to the logic of enlargement. Urge development of NATO-Russia relationship.
- o Reiterate our concern over the Iran reactor sale. Note that the Gore-Chernomyrdin channel should continue working this.
- o Express appreciation for the serious Russian response to NATO's CFE flank realignment proposal. Urge Yeltsin to instruct his experts to work for a solution by November 17.

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Declassify on: OADR

- o Welcome the progress on safeguarding nuclear materials and note the importance of enhancing such cooperation.

(Time permitting)

- o Press Yeltsin to accept zero-yield CTBT and ratify START II.

#### AGENDA

Five major issues top your agenda: 1) Bosnia, including Russian participation in an implementation force; 2) NATO enlargement and NATO-Russian relations; 3) the Iran reactor sale; 4) the Conventional Foreign Europe (CFE) Treaty; and 5) the security of nuclear materials. We recommend you raise the first three issues in your one-on-one. You then may wish to return to Bosnia, as well as addressing the latter two items, over lunch.

Before getting into specifics, **you and Yeltsin should reflect on the overall relationship.** You want Yeltsin to have in mind his stake in a strong relationship (you will be able to cite specific achievements since May). That will provide a larger, positive context for the issues the two of you will tackle. It also can lead to a brief discussion of where you wish to steer relations next year, when elections in both countries may generate partisan political pressures against particular policies. You might note to Yeltsin the importance of insulating the bilateral relationship against such pressures.

Recent diplomatic progress in **Bosnia** has brought us back from the brink of a break with the Russians, but Strobe's meetings in Moscow failed to resolve the nature of their possible participation in IFOR. Yeltsin wants to be visibly involved on the Balkans -- hence, the near-continuous stream of proposals for a conference in Moscow. Yeltsin will not want implementation to go forward without major Russian involvement. That poses a dilemma for him: how to reconcile Russian resistance to placing Russian troops under NATO operational control with our requirement for a unified IFOR command chain under NATO.

The Russians have made clear they have real problems with our preferred option -- Russian troops in IFOR under NATO control. Your points pitch Yeltsin on this, but you very likely will have to fall back to our second choice: Russian forces performing non-combat roles (demining, engineering tasks) in liaison with NATO. You will have to do heavy lifting to get Yeltsin to agree to either, but the prize is substantial: practical NATO-Russian cooperation in support of a Balkans peace.

Yeltsin left no doubt in your September phone conversation that "NATO, NATO, NATO, NATO" will be high on his list. You may well

have to reprise your May assurances about **NATO enlargement**. You should preview the December NATO Ministerial and how the enlargement process will proceed in 1996. Yeltsin might spring a surprise, perhaps an aggressive challenge to the logic of enlargement. Russia, however, has no trump cards in this regard. You should be clear that enlargement will proceed but that we have been responsive to his concerns on "hasty" enlargement. Our internal thinking allows for a decision on "who" and "when" in December 1996 at the earliest; while no decision has been made for this timetable, you should not preclude it. You might tell Yeltsin that our differences over enlargement should not prevent energetic work on the NATO-Russia relationship, where they have not moved forward.

While it is important to signal your concern about the **Iran reactor sale**, you and Yeltsin have turned the issue to the Vice President and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. That channel should continue as our principal vehicle for dissuading the Russians from nuclear cooperation with Iran. Moscow has shown some sensitivity about the proliferation aspects of the sale and is worried about Iran's ability to pay. Yeltsin, however, would face severe domestic criticism if he were seen to cancel the deal in response to U.S. pressure. We have asked the Russians to provide a list of nuclear items they would not provide Iran, while noting that we continue to oppose any nuclear cooperation.

As for **CFE flank issue**, the Russians have indicated they will pick up NATO's map realignment proposal, although they will seek to exclude territory from the flanks that contains far more treaty-limited equipment than NATO's plan. But by adopting our approach and dropping its unacceptable "exclusion zone" proposal, Moscow will have taken an important step: the difference will be less about principle and more about haggling over numbers. You will want to remind Yeltsin of the need to move rapidly toward a solution by November 17, when all CFE limits kick in.

The **security of nuclear materials** should be a good news story. You and Yeltsin should have an interim joint report from the Vice President and Chernomyrdin outlining work already underway and setting out an action plan for expanding cooperation to enhance the security of nuclear materials at Russian sites. We need to show this kind of cooperation to provide a positive context for the nuclear summit that Yeltsin will host next spring in Moscow.

Time permitting, you should press Yeltsin to endorse now the conclusion by next April of a zero-yield Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. You might also press on START II. We expect our Senate to ratify soon; Yeltsin needs to get the Duma to do its part. Yeltsin may try to link START II ratification to an agreement on ABM/TMD demarcation; that will give you a chance to underscore

our commitment to a negotiated solution on the demarcation issue, while rejecting any demarcation-START II linkage.

Circumstances permitting, we hope to be able to issue joint statements on Bosnia, CFE, nuclear material security and CTBT.

POINTS TO BE MADE

Bilateral Overview

- Delighted you came to Hyde Park. Appropriate reminder of our cooperation in past.
- Want to reflect on overall relationship. Worked productively and managed problems because of our ability to speak frankly, take other's concerns into account, recognize our joint responsibility for international peace and security.
- There have been some tensions between our countries since May. Will no doubt discuss these issues today.
- But also important successes: resolved Iran arms transfer issue; Russia came into MTCR and New Forum successor to COCOM; Gore-Chernomyrdin progress; resolved START space launch vehicle question; opened door to liberalize bilateral commercial space launch agreement; cooperation to secure nuclear materials; Contact Group work on Bosnia.
- Also watched with pleasure Russia's important progress on economic, democratic reform. You've made right decisions on tough economic calls and stuck to them.
  - Inflation falling; industrial output growing; national income recovering; currency strong.
  - Success engenders success. Outstanding IMF performance will lead to debt rescheduling. Could mean billions of dollars annually. Will give you flexibility to address pensions, unemployment. Stay course to create jobs, boost revenues, accelerate rebound.
- Will continue to support reform in Russia; remain committed to strong, cooperative U.S.-Russian relationship.
- Russia is important European, global actor. With commitment we have shown in past, can together lay foundations for new global framework that promotes peace and prosperity; peace in Bosnia; integration in Europe; further arms control steps as START II enters into force and CTBT finalized.
- Looking at coming year, note challenges for our relationship.
  - With Duma elections in December, your political season begins. Our presidential primaries begin early next year.

- Domestic politics will put new pressures on us to do things not constructive for developing bilateral relations.
- Isolationists, nationalists seek to restore to U.S.-Russian relations to zero-sum equations you and I did away with.
- Need to insulate core elements of our bilateral relationship from domestic politics in both our countries:
  - our ability to deal in complete candor;
  - our mutual commitment to arms control and nonproliferation, international peace and security;
  - our mutual recognition of importance of relationship and principle of engagement; and
  - your commitment to processes of democracy, market reform and integration, and my commitment to help facilitate.
- As we manage difficult issues, need to keep these shared core interests in mind. And need to temper public rhetoric on, and keep in perspective, differences over specific issues.

#### Bosnia/Peace Plan Implementation

- Worked hard together for progress in Bosnia. Cease-fire taking hold; parties appear ready to negotiate. Our joint efforts in Contact Group crucial in getting to this point.
  - Have best opportunity in four years to stop carnage. Must stay in close touch; keep peace process moving.
- Foresee series of diplomatic steps, including number of conferences on Bosnia. Understand your desire to host major event in Moscow; want to be helpful on this.
- If we agree today on Russia's involvement in peace implementation, will strengthen case for early Moscow event.
- Let me turn to issue of implementing peace. Kozyrev, Grachev have met Christopher, Perry to discuss effective implementation.
- Much of discussion centered on Russia's participation in military implementation force (IFOR), though overall implementation will consist of many diverse, but important, tasks.

- Russian participation in IFOR important, both politically and militarily. Russia key player; unfortunate if Russia not involved in military aspects of implementation. Prepared to be creative in working out form of Russian participation.
- Let me first explain what is critical for me: prepared to commit large number of American troops to IFOR but must be under NATO command and control, and IFOR must get political guidance from North Atlantic Council.
- Unity of command between NAC and NATO commanders in field vital for this difficult, potentially dangerous task.
  - Tensions among parties will remain after peace signed; IFOR must be able to deal firmly with any violation.
  - Traditional UN peacekeeping won't work. Need unified command chain that does not put lives of soldiers needlessly at risk. NATO command essential for Congressional support.
- Appreciate placing Russian troops under direct NATO command very difficult for you.
  - Hope you understand what NATO seeks is operational or tactical control; Russia would retain national command of Russian forces, just as we will have over U.S. forces.
  - Russia would have representation at every level -- in field, in Brussels -- to consult on planning, implementation.
  - Retention of national command would allow Russian troops to opt out of decisions and pull out if necessary. Don't know if this distinction helps from your perspective.
- NATO willing to establish ad hoc bodies at every level, where Russia could consult on planning, implementation of IFOR operation. Can give these bodies names that emphasize unity of effort rather than NATO label.
- Russian three-star at SHAPE and involvement of Amb Churkin in Brussels consultations at present planning stage is welcome, will ensure planning takes account of Russian views.
- Once operation underway, if unforeseen contingencies arise, expect there would be consensus among NATO and non-NATO countries on how to respond, e.g., on using force to deal with violations of agreement in cases where commanders did not already have authority.

- In event Russia did not agree, final decision would be for NAC. But, in that case, Russia -- retaining national command -- would have option of opting out of decision and pulling out, as regrettable as that might be.
- Understood from Perry-Grachev that Russia prefers to participate in IFOR. Our preference, too.
- Also understand ministers agreed on need for unified command. Grachev suggested he could place Russian forces under overall operational control of General Joulwan; Russian units would, of course, remain under Russian national command.
- Given what I've said about retaining national command, is this answer?
- If this problem insurmountable, see alternative that would still allow Russia key implementation role.
- Russian forces could take on critical, non-combat tasks, such as demining, engineering. In this case, NATO control not essential. Would still envisage Russia participating in joint coordinating bodies in Brussels, other liaison links.
- Would like your thoughts. Want to find common ground that enables Russian military participation in IFOR.

### NATO Enlargement

- Talked last year in Washington and again in May about NATO enlargement process. Told you process would be deliberate, gradual, transparent. Kept my word.
- Sensitive to your concerns on enlargement, especially timing of major developments. Want to underscore:
  - Have been and will be no surprises.
  - Enlargement not directed against Russia or any country. Goal is to foster greater stability to Europe; reduce instability in Central Europe.
- Let me preview where we expect enlargement process to go.
- On September 28, NATO released enlargement study and briefed all Partnership-for-Peace members. Russian representative there, received study in English and Russian.

- This month, individual briefings given for PFP members in their capitals or Brussels. Russia has not yet asked for briefing, but NATO prepared to give it in Moscow or Brussels.
- NATO ministers in December will review results of study and briefings, decide on next steps. Next steps will not include decisions on "who" or "when."
- Rather, next steps will consist of more intense multilateral and individual discussions with partners interested in more detailed focus on "how" and "why" of enlargement. All partners, including Russia, eligible to do this.
- This phase will last into late fall 1996. That means no major new decisions when NATO ministers hold semi-annual meeting in spring 1996.
- Follow-on phase would come at later point when, on basis of this intensified dialogue, NATO would consider guide-lines, timing and other aspects of accession negotiations with specific countries seeking membership.
- Hope you see while process moving forward, have not accelerated it and have been sensitive to your concerns, including your domestic political circumstances.

*(If Yeltsin challenges logic of enlargement)*

- Determined to move forward because it's right course. At same time, as have said, sensitive to your concerns.
- Enlargement not directed at any country. Intended to foster stability among new members, just as Alliance has helped Germany and France, Greece and Turkey build more stable relations. NATO enlargement solved problems of unilateralist Germany; similarly, can stabilize Central Europe -- in interests of all Europe.

*(If Yeltsin proposes multilateral summit on European security)*

- Many processes underway. Important they play out. Hard to see what new initiative adds at this point.
- Best way to advance goal of secure, peaceful Europe free of divisions is to work together and for Russia to engage fully in developing NATO-Russia relations.

*(If Yeltsin complains enlargement threatens Russia)*

- Your experts should have better appreciation of NATO's transformation since 1980s. Military doctrine no longer focuses on large, tank-heavy units to stop Red Army but on smaller, mobile units. NATO tactical nuclear weapons down 90%. U.S. forces down from 300,000 to about 100,000. German army capped at fewer than 400,000.
- NATO, even enlarged, poses no threat to Russia. Must avoid language of threats, especially alarming to smaller countries; focus on goal of integration.

### NATO-Russia Relations

- Strongly hope differences over enlargement will not hold you back from developing strong NATO-Russia relationship. Essential as we tackle key European issues like Bosnia.
- Lack of energy on Russia's part in developing relationship raising questions about what Russia wants. Urge you to deepen partnership with NATO, both within and beyond PFP.
- Clearly understand your position on NATO enlargement; would not be compromised by developing NATO-Russia relations.

### Iran Reactor Sale

- Remain very concerned about Iranian intentions to acquire nuclear weapons. Would be huge nonproliferation defeat.
- Welcome your decisions to freeze certain aspects of Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran. Important steps.
- Want to be clear we continue to oppose any nuclear cooperation with Iran. Simply cannot trust Tehran on this.
  - Nuclear-armed Iran would be nightmare: major security threat to both our nations and stability in Middle East. Doubt Iran's ability to pay for even limited nuclear cooperation.
- Gore and Chernomyrdin have good dialogue on this. Should have them continue to work issue in quiet manner.

*(If Yeltsin raises list of what Russia will not provide)*

- Helps bound problem. But we continue to oppose any nuclear cooperation.

*(If Yeltsin asserts light water reactor no proliferation hazard)*

- Reactor enhances nuclear expertise, sets supply chain Tehran would exploit to support weapons program.

*(If Yeltsin asserts Iran no different from North Korea)*

- In North Korea, stopped large, running plutonium program. In Iran, trying to prevent one from taking shape.

**CFE Flank Zone Issue**

- As promised in Halifax, worked hard with NATO for proposal to accommodate Russian concerns regarding CFE flank zone. NATO delivered last month.
- Pleased by Russian response and you coming back to us bilaterally in timely manner. Also pleased you accept map realignment with offsetting measures as basis for solution.
- This is real progress; helps us avoid political problem when full CFE limits take effect November 17.
- Now need to engage other 28 CFE parties in Vienna, for final resolution approval. Critical you make formal response to NATO proposal as soon as possible. November 17 almost upon us.
- On substance, map realignment suggested by Grachev removes more treaty-limited equipment from flanks than NATO proposal. Think carefully: the more you remove, the harder it will be to get all to agree.
- Also, easier to negotiate removal from flank zone of oblasts farther away from international borders (and NATO flank countries) than closer oblasts.
- Reaching agreement requires intensive work in Vienna. Full discussion among all CFE parties will help us find common ground.
- Can continue to work bilaterally; our agreement on basic conceptual elements of solution important step forward.

**Security of Nuclear Materials/Moscow Nuclear Summit**

- Delighted with expanding cooperation to protect nuclear materials. Fact our nuclear experts, who once built bombs to aim at each other, now work together to secure nuclear materials striking manifestation of our changed relations.

- Interim report from Gore and Chernomyrdin good first step. Understand you prefer not to release joint report now. But we should note this is real success story that underscores our seriousness on nonproliferation.
- Need to make sure plans our experts have developed together are promptly, fully implemented.
- If they are, helps set positive context for Moscow nuclear summit next spring.
- Look forward to nuclear summit; believe it can give positive impulse to nuclear security and safety issues.

POINTS TO BE MADE (TIME PERMITTING/DEFENSIVE)

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

- As wrote you in August, believe we should commit to goal of completing zero-yield CTBT by April so treaty signed in fall 1996. Would be major arms control victory.
- Agreement on this provides major boost to CTBT negotiations and puts us on high road at UNGA this fall.

START II

- START II remains good deal for both countries. Confident Senate will ratify START II soon. Urge you to make effort to push START II through Duma as soon as possible, but certainly by Moscow nuclear summit.

*(If Yeltsin links ABM/TMD demarcation to START II)*

- Understand you have concerns over ABM Treaty and ABM/TMD demarcation. Committed to negotiated solution of demarcation issue. Our experts making significant progress; should instruct them to accelerate efforts.
- Linking demarcation to START II ratification only makes things difficult. Don't jeopardize START II, which is in both our interests.

ABM/TMD Demarcation

- Agreed in May both committed to ABM Treaty and effective theater missile defenses.
- Our policy experts have found much common ground on demarcation between ABM and TMD. Recently sent you some new ideas; your experts gave us paper with new elements on October 15, which we will respond to shortly.
- Believe we are getting close. Need our people to find common understanding and then turn over to experts for drafting final document.

**Economics: Next Steps in Reform, Trade, Investment**

- You are poised for growth. Economic turn-around, progress toward market system nothing less than astonishing.
- I remind critics five years ago state controlled all property. Now private sector produces 60 percent of your income.
- Recognize problems. But reform itself will induce investment, promote small business, create jobs, build tax base.
- Management of August banking scare impressive. But better to push banks to reform than face possible collapse later.
- Debt rescheduling key. Extended Fund Facility with IMF will allow multi-year rescheduling. Could reduce near-term payments by billions of dollars. Such flexibility helps find interim solutions on social safety net.

**Commercial Issues**

*(If Yeltsin raises IL-96 financing)*

- Believe we have understanding on IL-96: U.S. will endorse Ex-Im Bank financing, Russia will grant market access to American aircraft, move to GATT practices on aircraft sales and production.
- Establishes foundation for U.S.-Russian trade and investment in aviation sector. Good for Russian defense conversion, American exports.
- Need to finalize details so commitments become hard realities. Let us charge our representatives to work them out quickly so deal moves forward.

*(If Yeltsin raises Russian Banks in U.S.)*

- Assure you Federal Reserve seeks expeditious handling of Promstroy and Inkombank applications.
- Our policy toward all foreign banks provides national treatment and is non-discriminatory. Standards are high; important to safeguard safety of our banking system.
- In recent weeks our central banks exchanged information. Federal Reserve engaged in dialogues with both applicants.

Hope you understand scrutiny is not adversarial but matter of law.

Energy

- Energy development key to region's future prosperity. Development hinges on stable climate, major foreign investment and expanding energy transport systems.
- Russian and American companies working together to develop oil in Russia, Caspian area. Must intensify joint efforts.

Regional Stability

- Need to do more to enhance regional stability, especially in Caucasus. Urge you to continue efforts to achieve negotiated peace in Chechnya.
- Informal cease-fires emerged throughout Caucasus over past year, but peace not secured: territorial integrity of Georgia and Azerbaijan in question; refugee camps breeding grounds for fundamentalism, criminal activities.
- Meeting with leaders from Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. Plan to make same points.

**HYDE PARK  
SCENESETTER**

THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN  
HYDE PARK SCENESETTER

Background

The Roosevelt family estate at Hyde Park provides a uniquely appropriate setting for the President's meeting with Yeltsin.

FDR is highly esteemed in Russia as a symbol of American leadership, generosity and dynamism. His death in April 1945 largely removed him from controversy over the origins and conduct of the Cold War, while his recognition of Russia in 1933, sponsorship of Lend-Lease aid and willingness to treat Moscow as a full partner during World War II are widely appreciated.

Schedule/Significant Sites

Following arrival by helicopter at Hyde Park, you will be briefed for the meeting with Yeltsin in the Roosevelt Library. You will then proceed to the Roosevelt Home, where you will greet Yeltsin at the front steps. You and Yeltsin will meet one-on-one in the Living Room/Library, a rectangular room decorated with family heirlooms and a mix of European and Oriental antiques and American department store furnishings.

After the one-on-one, you and Yeltsin will proceed to the Roosevelt Library, stopping briefly at the Roosevelt grave site in the Rose Garden (FDR expressed his wish to be buried where he was born and made provisions for Mrs. Roosevelt's burial there as well). The working lunch with expanded participation follows in the green and gold White House Dining Room in the Library. This room originally exhibited artifacts from Dutchess County history, a favorite pastime of Roosevelt's, though recently it was converted into a dining room with decor and exhibits highlighting Roosevelt's relations with Churchill. You will bid farewell to Yeltsin and depart after lunch.



HYDE PARK BACKGROUND PAPERS

Russia and Bosnia

Russia and NATO

Iran Reactor Sale

Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty

Nuclear Material Security and Moscow Nuclear Summit

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

START II and ABM Treaty

RUSSIA AND BOSNIA

The question of Bosnian peace implementation, specifically the implementation force, or IFOR, and Russian participation will top the Hyde Park agenda. Moscow places great importance on being -- and being seen as -- a player on Bosnia. The peace settlement issue provides Russia an opportunity to recoup prestige it feels it lost during NATO air strikes. It also has great symbolic importance: Foreign Minister Kozyrev has said privately that Russia considers IFOR a test case of how seriously the West regards Russia in terms of both the Balkans conflict and the broader issue of European security.

The exact requirements for effective implementation of a Bosnian peace will depend on the final terms of settlement. Our preliminary plans call for deployment of a NATO-led IFOR to enforce a cease-fire and ensure the separation of Federation and Bosnian Serb forces. That force would likely stay up to one year and include U.S. participation not to exceed 50 percent of total personnel. Total force size could be 50,000-70,000.

Implementation would include civilian aspects, such as humanitarian operations and reconstruction. There will be a senior implementation coordinator who will have a liaison relationship with IFOR but no "dual key" for military matters. A UNSC resolution would grant authority for civilian implementation and IFOR, but it is our view that the UN would run neither.

Secretary Perry and Minister Grachev discussed Russian participation in IFOR on October 8. Grachev came in a constructive mood, but there are tough questions. They will be taken up between NATO and Russia and on the margins of the October 17 Contact Group. The issues can be grouped into four core areas:

- Overall political guidance for IFOR: we insist political guidance be provided by the NAC but agree Russia should have regular 16-plus-one consultations; the Russians want joint decision-making.
- IFOR chain of command: we want Russian forces under NATO operational control if they perform military missions; the Russians want an ad hoc arrangement, which we could only accept if they are performing non-core (support) functions.
- Size of the Russian contribution: Grachev said Russia will provide a reinforced division; we would prefer a smaller contribution of several battalions.
- Funding: the Russians hope for UN funding for their troops; we expect contributors to pay their own way.

RUSSIA AND NATO

President Yeltsin made clear in the September 27 phone call that NATO will be a prime topic at Hyde Park. He wants a freeze on NATO enlargement but may be content with reassurances that enlargement will not play out in a way that damages him politically. Russian neuralgia about NATO has been exacerbated by the onset of NATO briefings on the "how/why" study and NATO air strikes in Bosnia. Russian rhetoric on enlargement has intensified; a leaked draft Defense Ministry-sponsored study threatens the Baltic states with invasion if they join NATO. While voicing their concerns, the Russians have also indicated they want to contain these problems on the bilateral agenda.

Russia's opposition to enlargement reflects widespread apprehension that NATO expansion will reduce Russian security; it may also reflect a desire to retain the CEEs as an enforced buffer zone. Leaders across the Russian political spectrum view enlargement as a "loser," seeing an anti-Moscow bloc taking advantage of a weak Russia under a leadership that is unable to project serious influence into Western councils.

Yeltsin's need to play to nationalist-leaning domestic sentiment has caused him to send a variety of signals:

- opposition to "hasty" NATO enlargement alternating with occasional vehement opposition to any enlargement;
- efforts to dissuade the West from enlargement by foreshadowing a serious change in Russian foreign policy; and
- a readiness to calibrate Russian interest in developing NATO-Russian relations to the state of play on enlargement.

Prior to NATO air strikes, modest progress had been achieved in developing Russia's relationship with NATO. On May 29, Foreign Minister Kozyrev approved Russia's Partnership for Peace program and "Beyond PFP" document. But the Russians have shown little energy in developing the relationship. Allies generally accept our view that NATO should leave offers of cooperation on the table even in the face of growing Russian recalcitrance.

Yeltsin has demonstrated a willingness on his part to try to navigate these difficulties. Achievement of a practical but politically-sensitive accommodation on Bosnia implementation arrangements would do much to build confidence between NATO and Russia. Equally important will be reassuring Yeltsin on the enlargement timetable: gradual, deliberate, transparent and continued focus on the "how" and "why" well into or through 1996, i.e., until after the Russian presidential election.

IRAN REACTOR SALE

The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) signed in January 1995 a contract with Iran to complete the first unit of the Bushehr power complex with one light water power reactor and other cooperation (e.g., training for 300 Iranian personnel). Under the contract, Russia will install a Russian-designed reactor in facilities partially completed by a German firm but abandoned after the Iranian revolution in 1979.

In August, Russia and Iran concluded a fuel supply contract for the Bushehr 1 power reactor (construction may begin later this year). Russia intends to take back plutonium-bearing spent fuel for reprocessing and return the waste to Iran in vitrified form. MINATOM announced in September an agreement for construction of two additional reactors but said construction of these would begin only after Bushehr 1 becomes operational.

MINATOM also concluded in January a protocol with Iran on assistance in developing Iran's nuclear industry, including the construction of uranium mining, processing and enrichment facilities; supply of a light water research reactor; construction of other research reactors; and advanced training of Iranian nuclear specialists. MINATOM Minister Mikhailov has announced plans to sign a contract with Iran by the end of 1995 for the sale of a light water research reactor.

Notwithstanding the terms of the protocol, President Yeltsin told the President at the May 10 summit that Russia would not engage in any nuclear cooperation with Iran that had potential military applications, including the supply of a gas centrifuge enrichment plant or uranium mine. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin gave the Vice President like assurances in June. Mikhailov told Secretary O'Leary in September that Russia would freeze for 45 months aspects of its nuclear cooperation with Iran except for the construction of Bushehr 1 and a previously-signed uranium ore extraction contract that expires in 1996.

To clarify Russia's intentions and to bound the scope of our differences, the Vice President told Chernomyrdin on October 7 that it would be useful if the Russians provided a written list of what they would not transfer to Iran. He also made clear that the U.S. continued to oppose any nuclear cooperation.

The Russians are sensitive to the proliferation aspects of their cooperation with Iran but maintain that provision of the light water power reactor would not contribute to an Iranian nuclear weapon capability. Moscow is concerned about Iran's ability to pay.

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CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE (CFE) TREATY

The 30-nation CFE Treaty is a cornerstone of Europe's post-Cold War security structure. It sets limits, which take effect on November 17, on key categories of equipment, including tanks, armored combat vehicles and artillery. Since early 1993, Russia has insisted that, while it will meet its overall CFE equipment limits, it needs more equipment in CFE's "flank zone" than the Treaty permits in order to deal with instability in the North Caucasus region (includes Chechnya).

We have made significant progress with Russia on the flank issue since the President raised it with President Yeltsin in Halifax. On September 22, NATO tabled a proposal based closely on ideas broached with Yeltsin in June: a realignment of the CFE map to remove certain oblasts from the flank area, combined with offsets by Russia, including transparency measures and constraints on the number of equipment in certain former flank areas. Equipment in those oblasts removed from the flank zone would no longer count against the flank limits.

NATO's proposal also calls for a Russian commitment to benchmarks for withdrawal of excess equipment from the flank region. The withdrawal schedule, combined with offsetting measures, will be particularly important to our flank Allies, Turkey and Norway, as well as to our ability to obtain Congressional approval for a map realignment.

The Russians have not yet responded formally to the NATO proposal. Informally they have indicated to us that they are prepared to work on the basis of NATO's map realignment approach and thus to fall off their unacceptable "exclusion zone" idea. However, their likely counteroffer, as previewed by Minister Grachev to Secretary Perry, would substitute oblasts with much greater amounts of equipment in them and in more sensitive areas (i.e., along international borders).

The critical next step is for Russia to formally respond to NATO's proposal: we would then be working on the same concept for a solution and negotiating over numbers of equipment and types of offsets. Foreign Ministry officials have previously said we would have to engage Yeltsin to force the Defense Ministry to work out a solution. Grachev's comments, however, indicate the military may now be prepared to negotiate. Getting Moscow to table its counterproposal would also allow us to work with Allies on defining a middle ground. Such a middle ground would mean that Russia would have to moderate its equipment goals, and our flank Allies would have to demonstrate additional flexibility. Though a tough negotiation lies ahead, a solution among the 30 CFE parties may well be found.

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NUCLEAR MATERIAL SECURITY AND MOSCOW NUCLEAR SUMMIT

At the May 10 Moscow summit, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin tasked the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission to prepare a report on U.S.-Russian cooperation to enhance the security of nuclear materials. We are using this report to obtain Russian commitment to a detailed plan for collaboration in 1996 that will remedy some of the most serious security deficiencies at Russian nuclear facilities. We hope to have an interim report for the Presidents prior to the Hyde Park meeting.

U.S. aid to Russia for nuclear material security increased substantially in the past year. We have expanded cooperative programs to more than a dozen facilities. Our lab-to-lab program has made excellent progress. Our assistance has improved security for nuclear weapons transport and storage and is supporting construction of a fissile material storage facility. Nonetheless, many Russians remain suspicious of our motives. Political sensitivities are one reason why official "government-to-government" efforts (with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy) are both more limited and slower than "lab-to-lab" programs which are negotiated directly.

The nuclear summit planned for next spring in Moscow offers an opportunity to create a broader political context for these bilateral assistance efforts as well as our work on nuclear safety in the former Soviet Union. A preliminary agenda has been developed. Among the issues that will be particularly difficult for Russia is a prohibition on the ocean dumping of radioactive waste -- all P-8 countries except Russia have already agreed to this.

In the nuclear security area, we hope the 1996 summit will achieve P-8 commitment to greater cooperation with Russia and others to combat nuclear smuggling, adopting an action plan now in the final stages of negotiation. The summit could also agree to general principles to govern the long-term disposition of plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons, although progress here will be limited by sharp differences in approach.

On nuclear safety, Russia needs both to strengthen its own record and to cooperate with international efforts to address safety concerns at Soviet-designed reactors in Eastern Europe. Possible pre-summit actions by Russia and the G-7 include ratifying the Convention on Nuclear Safety. We are pushing hard for progress toward a global nuclear liability regime.

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COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

President Yeltsin has not yet responded to the President's August 11 letter asking him to support our decision to seek a true zero-yield Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and to press for completing the CTBT by next April so it can be signed in the fall. The Russians were clearly caught off guard by the U.S. announcement (they very likely thought the U.S. would support a threshold treaty) and are unhappy at having been notified formally of the decision the same day it was announced publicly.

On October 15, Under Secretary Davis proposed to the Russians that Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin issue a joint statement at Hyde Park that would endorse concluding a zero-yield CTBT by April. As an incentive, the draft joint statement includes an instruction to experts to "explore the possibility of increased scientific and technical cooperation" relating to stockpile safety and reliability. To underscore our willingness to cooperate with Russia in this area, Davis also gave the Russians a non-paper laying out areas of possible cooperation.

Moscow is still assessing the implications of a zero-yield CTBT; the Russians probably understand that there are limits to how much scientific and technical help the U.S. can provide to maintain their nuclear stockpile. That said, they almost certainly attach great political importance to the U.S. offer, viewing it as a test of our commitment not to seek a unilateral advantage over them under a CTBT.

The issue of whether to support a zero-yield CTBT will almost certainly have to be decided by Yeltsin. We believe the longer he waits, the harder it will become for him to "go to zero," as his experts will further refine their arguments in favor of a threshold. Any significant delay could stall the negotiations and preclude us from completing and signing the CTBT next year.

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KBM 12/30/2019

START II AND ABM TREATY

Under START II, the U.S. and Russia will eliminate multi-warhead ("MIRVed") ICBMs and reduce their total deployed strategic nuclear warheads to no more than 3,500 each. The Treaty should soon pass the Senate. At this point, it is unclear whether the Duma will ratify the Treaty before parliamentary elections in December; most observers do not expect this to happen, which would leave START II to the new Duma in 1996. The Hyde Park meeting offers an opportunity to press President Yeltsin to urge the Duma to ratify START II as soon as it can, certainly in time for the spring nuclear summit in Moscow.

START II faces two major problems in the Duma: the fate of the ABM Treaty and cost. Some have also tried to link the Treaty to such issues as NATO expansion. The concern about the ABM Treaty stems from concern about future U.S. theater missile defense systems; critics assert that, to the extent such systems might have a capability against Russian strategic forces, it is unwise for Russia to reduce to START II levels. As for cost, Russia will have to build, at significant cost, hundreds of new single-warhead ICBMs as it eliminates its MIRVed ICBMs in order to maintain parity with the U.S. at 3,500 warheads.

While many Duma members seem inclined against START II, their understanding of the Treaty is shallow, and there has been no real push yet by the Yeltsin government for ratification. A determined effort would likely answer many Duma concerns and point out that, given Moscow's reduced resources, Russian strategic forces may be headed for START II levels in any event.

Yeltsin may raise the ABM issue in the context of START II. The Russians are alarmed by attempts in Congress to legislate an ABM program that would violate the ABM Treaty. Foreign Minister Kozyrev and others have suggested Russia attach a statement to START II ratification conditioning implementation on our continued observance of the ABM Treaty, as the Soviets did with START I. (This might be an acceptable "solution" for Duma concerns about START II.)

We and the Russians agree on the importance of the ABM Treaty, and on the need to field effective defenses against shorter-range, theater ballistic missiles, as reflected in the Joint Statement of Principles issued at the May Moscow summit. Unfortunately, we have not been able to translate these principles into a common understanding on "demarkation" that would clarify -- in a mutually satisfactory manner -- the distinction between ABM systems limited by the Treaty and theater missile defense systems that are not. Work on this continues, but political-level intervention may be needed at some point.

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REMARKS FOR PHOTO OP AT  
HYDE PARK

**TO BE PROVIDED**

PRESS MATERIALS

## RUSSIA: POINTS TO MAKE IN RESPONSE TO PRESS QUESTIONS

### Importance of Engaging Russia

- U.S. has vital stake in engaging Russia. It matters that Russia becoming democracy, not dictatorship, and developing market economy. No accident; in part due to America's help.
- Do have differences. Happens even in best of relationships. However, keep working to resolve them.
- Our differences should not obscure what we've achieved:
  - greater security, as Russia slashes its nuclear arsenal and no longer targets American cities;
  - more jobs as we expand trade; and
  - cooperation on international problems and freedom from the fears we lived under during Cold War.

### State of Bilateral Relations

- Relations remain productive, as evidenced by progress today:
  - working together to bring peace to Bosnia and on peace implementation arrangements;
  - important progress on CFE flank issue; and
  - intensifying cooperation to secure nuclear materials.
- Don't see eye-to-eye on every issue, but working hard to resolve differences where they exist.

### State of Russian Democracy

- Russia a country in transition to democracy. Transition likely to be long, sometimes painful.
- But progress being made. Media freer today than ever before. Duma and judicial system increasingly acting as independent branches of government. Legislative elections set for December; presidential election to follow in June.
- Democratization not easy process. U.S. will continue to help. In our national interest to do so.

Russia and Bosnia

- Goals remain same: both support peaceful resolution of conflict based on Contact Group proposals.
- Russia's efforts, particularly with Serbs and in Contact Group, have helped move peace process forward.

(If agreement reached on Russian participation in/with IFOR)

- Reached important agreement on how Russian forces will work with NATO in implementing peace in Bosnia. Can be example of how U.S., Russia and NATO can work together to build more peaceful, secure Europe.

(If no agreement on Russian participation in/with IFOR)

- Continuing to discuss how Russia, NATO can work together on peace implementation. We all want to find solution to this.

NATO Enlargement

- We and NATO allies decided in January 1994 to take in new members. Process moving forward. As have said before, will be gradual, deliberate, transparent. No surprises.
- Understand Russia has concerns about logic of enlargement. This is issue on which we simply disagree at present.
- But have ongoing dialogue with Russia on this; working to promote NATO-Russia relationship as enlargement proceeds.

Russia and NATO

- Understand many Russians doubt wisdom of NATO enlargement; but Russia should keep open mind and work with NATO to develop close, cooperative relationship.
- Want Russia to play important role in emerging security system, one that promotes more secure, undivided Europe. Believe NATO and Russia can cooperate toward this end.

Iran Reactor Sale

- Had useful discussion on proposed Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation. Made clear our opposition, given Iran's ambition to acquire nuclear weapons.
- Russians have own reasons to be concerned about proliferation risks. As they have stated, cooperation will not include uranium enrichment facility or uranium reprocessing.

- But we continue to believe any nuclear cooperation with Iran is too much. Will continue to work this between Vice President and Chernomyrdin.

#### CFE Flank Limits

- Made important progress. Agreed to basic concept to solve Russian concerns about CFE flank limits and have instructed our experts to work this with the other 28 CFE parties.
- Solution based on realignment of flank zone, with important offsetting measures to be undertaken by Russia, as proposed last month by the 16 NATO allies.
- Aiming for closure that protects all CFE parties' interests by November 17, when Treaty's limits take effect.

#### Nuclear Material Security

- Agreed to continue, enhance cooperation to secure nuclear materials. Major effort already underway -- U.S. nuclear security experts working with counterparts at more than two dozen sites across former Soviet Union.
- Also actively engaged with Russia, others in law enforcement, customs and other efforts to combat nuclear smuggling.
- Have received important report from Vice President and Chernomyrdin that outlines some very concrete steps we will take together to improve security of nuclear materials.

#### CTBT

- Aim for conclusion next year of zero-yield CTBT. Would be major arms control victory. Urged Yeltsin's support.

#### START II/ABM Treaty

- Urge both Senate and Duma to ratify START II. Treaty will drastically cut nuclear arms, lead to more stable and less expensive strategic balance. And that benefits us both.
- We and Russians agree on importance of ABM Treaty and of developing defenses against shorter-range, theater missiles. Key question is how to distinguish between ABM missiles, which are limited by Treaty, and theater ballistic missile defenses, which are not. We are working this.



# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
010. report	Biography (2 pages) [partial]	10/17/1995	P1/b(1) <del>LOE</del> 12/16/19

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Executive Secretary  
OA/Box Number: 2586

### FOLDER TITLE:

The President's Meeting with President Yeltsin of Russia, October 23, 1995 [Briefing Book]

2016-0137-M  
kh1784

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

**Boris Nikolayevich YEL'TSIN**  
(Phonetic: YELTsin)

**RUSSIA**

*President (since 1991)*

*Addressed as: Mr. President*

3.5c

Boris Yel'tsin has acted increasingly like a candidate for reelection since recuperating from a mild heart attack in July 1995, but he still faces major obstacles in overcoming continued low poll ratings and public concerns about his health. His forceful performance at a rare 90-minute press conference on 8 September capped a two-week period of heightened political activity and public appearances, the likes of which had not been apparent in more than a year. Publicly commenting on Yel'tsin's press conference performance, his chief of staff, Sergey Filatov, said "We saw Yel'tsin as he was in 1991."

3.5c

Heavy publicity of Yel'tsin's activities during his early autumn vacation in Sochi (10 September to 2 October 1995) appeared designed, in part, to maintain his political momentum. Yel'tsin may have intended to use his vacation—which he unexpectedly extended for a week—to rest up in anticipation of a busy political calendar in late 1995. In addition to a trip to New York, he is scheduled to conduct state visits to China and Norway before the Russian legislative elections in December.

3.5c



EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4d, 3.5c

**Election Worries . . .**

3.5c

Since returning from his vacation, Yel'tsin has attempted to demonstrate a renewed political vigor that may be connected to his expressed concern that the December elections could go badly for the democrats:

- At his September press conference, he admitted that efforts to unite Russian democrats had failed, and he noted that he expected the two officially sponsored electoral blocs, under Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin and State Duma Chairman Ivan Rybkin, to garner only 5 to 8 percent of the vote.
- He also said he was worried about the prospect of an extremist coming to power and hinted that he had taken the necessary precautions.

3.5c

Yel'tsin, who has long maintained that he will stay in office until he views the reform process as irreversible, reiterated at his press conference that he would wait until after the legislative elections to

EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4d, 3.5c

EO 13526 1.4c, 3.5c

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announce formally his decision to seek a second term.

EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4d, 3.5c

**... Fuel Populist Rhetoric**

3.5c

As he positions himself for a possible reelection bid, Yel'tsin is focusing on issues important to the Russian electorate:

- He declared at his press conference that he would focus on fighting crime, noting public concern over this issue. He also drew attention to his recent meeting with senior law enforcement officials, at which he had promised new legislation and resources to redress the problem.
- He announced at a meeting of his Security Council in late August that he was prepared to get personally involved in the Chechen peace talks, and he dispatched one of his most trusted aides to the region to take charge of the negotiations.
- His tough rhetoric during August and September on NATO's actions in Bosnia and on its expansion plans appear, in part, to be designed to

address domestic perceptions of Russian diplomatic weakness and to outflank political opponents.

3.5c

Yel'tsin's blasts at the West appear not only to reflect preelection posturing but also what may be his growing disillusionment with the West.

EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4d, 3.5c

**Personal Note**

3.5c

Yel'tsin revealed at his press conference that he had just recently attended the christening of a new grandson, whom he had insisted be named Gleb. Gleb and Boris—the name of his other grandson—are two of the first saints in the Russian Orthodox Church. Yel'tsin, who has no sons of his own, expressed in his 1994 memoirs his elation upon the birth of his grandson Boris, now age 14: “When it comes to Borka, his grandfather is not objective. I had waited for a little boy for such a long time.” Yel'tsin and his wife, Naina, also have two granddaughters, Katya and Masha.

3.5c

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**Pavel Sergeyevich GRACHEV**  
(Phonetic: grahCHOFF)

**RUSSIA**

*Minister of Defense (since 1992)*

*Addressed as: Mr. Minister*

3.5c

Army Gen. Pavel Grachev's position as Defense Minister appears secure for the time being; he is one of the few officials to survive after having been directly involved with the Chechnya debacle. Although he is currently under attack by adversaries throughout the government and subject to rumors that he will be replaced after the December 1995 legislative elections, he apparently continues to enjoy the backing of President Boris Yel'tsin. Grachev has gone on the offensive: since January he has overseen a shakeup of high-level personnel within the Ministry. At least four deputy defense ministers have been relieved of their positions for criticizing Grachev over his failure to assess fully the situation in Chechnya, according to media reporting. Grachev also has been seeking to broaden the Defense Ministry's powers by attempting to consolidate some of the government's paramilitary organizations—such as the Federal Border Service—under his command.

3.5c

**Trouble Still Looms**

3.5c

EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4d

One Russian newspaper noted in early May that the tussle between Grachev and Korzhakov erupted in early 1995 when it became clear to Korzhakov in Chechnya's wake that corruption in the armed forces greatly exceeds combat readiness.

EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4d

EO 13526 1.4c, 3.5c



©

1.4c, 1.4d press reports indicate that Korzhakov was involved in the October 1994 murder of Dmitry Kholodov, a journalist who was investigating the corruption of high-ranking military officers, including Grachev.

3.5c

Grachev is also facing legal problems. Despite having been subpoenaed, he has repeatedly failed to appear in a libel suit he initiated against a Russian reporter. The judge presiding over the case indicated that she will have Grachev arrested if he misses the next court date, scheduled for 25 October 1995.

3.5c

**Grachev and Politics**

3.5c

Grachev and other senior military leaders increasingly blame the Russian Duma for the deterioration of the armed forces, and they have been looking to increase the number of parliamentary members sympathetic to the army's plight. The Minister told reporters in early May 1995 that three political parties—the Communists, the Agrarians, and Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's Liberal Democratic Party—had stepped up their attempts to build bridges to the military in advance of the December legislative elections. Additionally, Grachev announced that 123 active-duty military officers will be running for parliament. Grachev has denied rumors that he will be on the ballot.

3.5c

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17 October 1995

EO 13526 1.4c, 3.5c

**Increasingly Negative on NATO**

3.5c

Grachev has emerged as one of the leading hardliners against NATO expansion. During a 25 September 1995 interview, he stated that the admission of the Baltic states into NATO would represent the "limit of Russia's patience." In an apparent attempt to counter NATO expansion, Grachev surprised his hosts during a trip to China and South Korea in late May by proposing a new six-country security mechanism for northeast Asia, according to [redacted] press reports. [redacted]

1.4c, 1.4d, 3.5c

Grachev has taken advantage of NATO's air strikes on Bosnian Serb positions to ratchet up his anti-NATO rhetoric. He has told Russian news reporters that the air strikes have killed or wounded nearly 3,000 civilians, and he has stated that, if such actions continue, Russia might have to render military aid to the Bosnian Serbs and reevaluate its position on Partnership for Peace. [redacted]

3.5c

EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4d, 3.5c

EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4d, 3.5c

**Career and Personal Data**

3.5c

Grachev was born on 1 January 1948 in the village of Rva in the Tula region, just south of Moscow. His father was a metal worker, and his mother was a milkmaid, according to press reports. He has spent almost all of his career in the airborne corps. He graduated with distinction from the Ryazan Airborne Command School (1969), the Frunze Military Academy (1981), and the General Staff Academy (1990). Grachev had two combat tours in Afghanistan (1981-83 and 1985-88) as an airborne infantry regiment and division commander. In 1990 he served briefly as deputy commander of the airborne forces before assuming command for two years. He was instrumental in derailing the August 1991 coup attempt by refusing to support the putschists. He subsequently served as USSR and then CIS First Deputy Defense Minister before receiving his current appointment. [redacted]

3.5c

Grachev and his wife, Lyubov Alekseyevna, have two sons. The elder, Sergey, is a graduate of his father's alma mater and is serving in the airborne forces. The younger, Valeriy, attends the former KGB Academy, according to press reports. [redacted]

EO 13526 1.4c, 1.4d

Grachev has stated that he rises early each morning to go bike riding. He likes to hunt, attend concerts, and play tennis and volleyball. [redacted]

3.5c

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