Case Number: 2016-0134-M

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Folder Title:
POTUS Briefing Books-POTUS Trip to Belgium, January 9-11, 1994 [1]
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810

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43	1	7	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~Warren Christopher to President William J. Clinton re: Your January Trip to Europe (4 pages)~~	~~12/22/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
~~002. memo~~	~~Anthony Lake to President William J. Clinton re: Your Trip to Brussels (5 pages)~~	~~12/31/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
~~003. paper~~	~~Meeting with King Albert II (2 pages)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
004. report	U.S. Government Report (1 page)	12/17/1993	P1/b(1)
~~005. paper~~	~~Bilateral Meeting with Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene of Belgium (3 pages)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
006. report	U.S. Government Report (1 page) Partial release - KBH 9/8/2017	12/17/1993	P1/b(1)
~~007. memo~~	~~Anthony Lake to President William J. Clinton re: NATO Summit (9 pages)~~	~~12/31/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
~~008. paper~~	~~Meeting with NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner (2 pages)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
009. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	11/18/1993	P1/b(1)
~~010. paper~~	~~NATO Summit Plenary (3 pages)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
~~011. memo~~	~~Anthony Lake to President William J. Clinton re: The U.S.-European Union Summit (6 pages)~~	~~12/31/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020

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FOLDER TITLE:
POTUS Briefing Books - POTUS Trip to Belgium, January 9-11, 1994 [1]

2016-0134-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~012. paper~~	~~Meeting with European Union Presidency, Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, and European Commission President Jacques Delors (3 pages)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
013. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	11/23/1993	P1/b(1)
014. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	12/17/1993	P1/b(1)

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~~SECRET~~

President Clinton's Trip to Brussels, Belgium

January 9-11, 1994

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KRH Date: 1/15/2020
2016-0134-M

The President

~~SECRET~~

President Clinton's Trip to Brussels, Belgium
January 9-11, 1994

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 31, 1993

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 1/15/2020
2016-0134-M

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Your Trip to Brussels, January 9-11, 1994

Your visit to Brussels includes a major policy address, the NATO and EU Summits, bilateral meetings with King Albert II and Prime Minister Dehaene of Belgium and several events with American business, military and community leaders in Brussels and Europe. We will forward your public statements separately. This briefing book contains:

SCHEDULE OF KEY EVENTS

MEMORANDUM FROM SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER

BRUSSELS SCOPE MEMORANDUM

BILATERAL MEETING WITH BELGIAN KING ALBERT II

BILATERAL MEETING WITH BELGIAN PRIME MINISTER DEHAENE

BACKGROUND FOR YOUR SPEECH AT THE TOWN HALL, GRAND PLACE

AMERICAN BUSINESS COMMUNITY EVENT

MEETING WITH U.S. MILITARY LEADERS IN EUROPE

NATO SUMMIT SCOPE MEMORANDUM

BILATERAL MEETING WITH NATO SECRETARY GENERAL WOERNER

COFFEE WITH NATO LEADERS

NATO PLENARY SESSIONS

LUNCH HOSTED BY KING ALBERT II FOR NATO LEADERS

NATO WORKING DINNER

U.S.-EU SUMMIT SCOPE MEMORANDUM

U.S.-EU PRESIDENCY MEETING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

U.S.-EU WORKING LUNCH

AMERICAN BRUSSELS COMMUNITY EVENT

CONTINGENCY BILATERAL PAPERS

ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION

PRESS MATERIALS

SCHEDULE OF KEY EVENTS

SCHEDULE OF KEY EVENTS IN BRUSSELS

Sunday, January 9

ARRIVAL IN BRUSSELS WITH CEREMONY
12:00 - 12:15 p.m.

MEETING WITH KING ALBERT II
1:00 - 1:25 p.m.

BILATERAL MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER DEHAENE
1:45 - 2:15 p.m.

SPEECH AT HOTEL DE VILLE AT GRAND PLACE (GOTHIC ROOM)
6:00 - 7:00 p.m.

GREET TRI-MISSION STAFF
8:15 - 9:00 p.m.

Monday, January 10

BRIEFING BY U.S. MILITARY COMMAND AT NATO HEADQUARTERS
8:15 - 8:45 a.m.

MEETING WITH SECRETARY GENERAL WOERNER
9:00 - 9:30 a.m.

NATO OPENING SESSION
9:45 a.m. - 12:15 p.m.

NATO WORKING LUNCH HOSTED BY KING ALBERT II
1:00 - 2:30 p.m.

NATO WORKING SESSION
3:30 - 6:00 p.m.

NATO WORKING DINNER AT CHATEAU DU VAL DUCHESSE
8:00 - 10:00 p.m.

Tuesday, January 11

AMERICAN BUSINESS EVENT
8:00 - 8:30 a.m.

NATO WORKING SESSION
9:00 - 10:00 a.m.

PRESS CONFERENCE
10:35 - 11:00 a.m.

EUROPEAN UNION EVENTS
11:30 a.m. - 2:00 p.m.

MEETING WITH E.U. PRESIDENT DELORS AND EUROPEAN COUNCIL
11:35 a.m. - 12:15 p.m.

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT DELORS, PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU AND 8 E.U. COMMISSIONERS
12:15 - 12:30 p.m.

PHOTO OP/PRESS AVAILABILITY WITH LEADERS
12:40 - 1:10 p.m.

WORKING LUNCH WITH MEETING PARTICIPANTS
1:10 - 1:50 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE

10085

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PER E.O. 13526
2016-0134-M (1.01)
KBH 1/15/2020

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

December 22, 1993

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/NODIS
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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Warren Christopher WC.

SUBJECT: Your January Trip to Europe

Overview

Your first Presidential trip to Europe will advance transatlantic security and prosperity by:

--demonstrating continued American engagement and leadership in Europe;

--encouraging continued reform in the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Russia and helping to integrate them into broader Western security and economic structures;

--securing agreement to our NATO Summit proposals and underscoring our seriousness about the eventual expansion of NATO to the east;

--consolidating the gains of the GATT Uruguay Round and addressing the next generation of trade issues; and

--enlisting European cooperation on global issues, particularly non-proliferation.

The timing of this trip is ideal. The Russian election results have added to European concerns about economic recession, the future of the European Union, and continued U.S. involvement in Europe. You should stress steadiness in policy toward Moscow. Russia's transformation will take time. While we need to make it clear that Western support is contingent on a responsible Russian foreign policy, we must not take precipitous measures that make the reformers' task harder.

NATO and U.S.-EU Summits

At the NATO and European Union (EU) Summits, you can lay out our European agenda for 1994 and beyond. You should highlight our determination to complete the unfinished business of integrating the CEE and NIS states into the Western system of democratic values, collective security, and political-economic cooperation. This will complement the trend toward broader arrangements on security and trade reflected in the Partnership for Peace initiative and the Uruguay Round agreement.

You should challenge Europe to work closely with us on global non-proliferation goals, including a new regime to control arms transfers and strategic trade. The NATO Summit will register Allied agreement to put non-proliferation on NATO's agenda. We also need to reinforce our concern about EU willingness to transfer items to Iran.

The Europeans should also be engaged on other transnational problems: the environment; population growth; narcotics; counter-terrorism; and the promotion of democracy and market reform worldwide.

NATO Summit. Following a successful NAC Ministerial, preparations for the Summit are well in hand. The central focus must be on the Partnership for Peace initiative and NATO's evolutionary expansion. The Partnership will engage NATO in close practical cooperation with Eastern partners on military matters and provide a basis for later Allied judgments on whether states seeking to join NATO will be willing and able to make -- and make good on -- the mutual commitments that are central to the Alliance. You will need to put down a marker that we are serious about eventual NATO expansion.

With its focus on cooperation in peacekeeping and crisis management, the Partnership also will expand the array of tools available to the Alliance to deal with post-Cold War security threats. Our Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept responds to this imperative. Summit action on our CJTF proposal will also demonstrate U.S. and NATO support for the European Security and Defense Identity.

EU Summit. The success of NAFTA and the GATT Uruguay Round have given us considerable momentum on trade issues. We should move now to consolidate the gains of the Uruguay Round, address outstanding trade issues, and begin work on the next generation of trade issues: environment, technology, competition, investment, and social policy. You can also use this meeting to foreshadow our agenda for the G-7 Summit and your G-7 Jobs Conference, and to push for improved market access for the CEE and NIS states.

Prague

Democracy and market economies remain fragile in Central and Eastern Europe. Russia's election results -- and Zhirinovsky's incendiary remarks on expanding Russian borders -- will form the backdrop to your meeting with Visegrad leaders in Prague. Our engagement with Russia has led to perceptions of a "second Yalta," in which Russia has a determining voice in the security choices of Central and Eastern Europe.

You should emphasize our firm support for reform. We have developed security and trade initiatives that will offset the costs of reform in the CEE states and will lead to greater integration with the West. You should reiterate U.S. support for the evolutionary expansion of NATO, and emphasize that active participation in the Partnership for Peace will enhance the Partnership's benefits. You should also tell the Visegrad leaders that we are pressing the EU and EFTA for greater market access for CEE states; that we support their participation in the COCOM successor regime; and that we want greater foreign investment in, and trade with, the CEE states.

Moscow and Minsk

The principal theme of your Moscow stop and the follow-on in Minsk is Western support for integration of Russia and the New Independent States into the broader security, economic and political systems of newly unified Europe. Fresh from Brussels and Prague, you will be able to underscore western commitment to support reform in post-Soviet, post-Communist Russia and Belarus and provide an open invitation to your hosts to become full participants in the Partnership for Peace and Europe's emerging security architecture.

In Moscow, the critical element for success will be to put flesh on the bones of "partnership." In the aftermath of the elections, this will entail expanding and deepening, through concrete achievements, the assurances you have received from Yeltsin that economic and political reform will continue and that Russia's foreign policy will not intrude on its neighbors. Our key message will be that integration works. We will underscore our readiness to work with Russia to address key issues of importance to Russia. We hope to have ready a trilateral arrangement with Ukraine that will break the nuclear impasse. If we succeed, we will seek a trilateral announcement of this achievement in Moscow at the end of the summit.

We are also pressing Russia, Estonia and Latvia to use this opportunity to complete their negotiations on a timetable for Russian troop withdrawals. A resolution of either or both of these foreign policy issues would send a positive signal to Russia's neighbors that Moscow is committed to pursue a responsible foreign policy -- and that the US is playing a key role in brokering these breakthroughs.

In exchange for Yeltsin's commitment to real economic reforms, we will build on our already significant post-Vancouver record of support. As Yeltsin tries to strengthen the social security system in light of the elections results, the U.S. will lead the G-7 to be more responsive and to help Russia put a humane face on the difficult process of reform. You will underscore our readiness to work together on policies that are fiscally responsible and socially responsive.

Your stop in Minsk provides the catalyst we need to move ahead in several important areas. We want a firm commitment to parliamentary elections in the first half of 1994 -- the first post-Soviet elections. We should reiterate our respect for Belarus' ratification of START and accession to the NPT and move forward on several bilateral economic and scientific agreements.

SCOPE MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 31, 1993

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0134-M (1.02)
KBH 1/15/2020

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Your Trip to Brussels

I. Setting

All the strategic issues that set the context for your trip -- Russia's future and that of other NIS states, the integration of Central and Eastern European democracies into the West, NATO's relevance to Europe's new security challenges, global denuclearization, U.S. relations with an evolving European Union and the courage of Western societies to change -- will be affected by the vision you articulate in your Brussels speech January 9, the decisions taken at the NATO Summit January 10 and 11 and the tone you set for U.S. relations with the European Union at your Summit with the Union on January 11. The central theme that underlies most of your specific points for each occasion is the challenge of reintegrating Europe's east into the community of market democracies. Cooperating on that historic endeavor will, in turn, forge new bonds between the United States and the established democracies of Western Europe.

You will visit a troubled Europe -- mired in a recession which few believe will be fixed by cyclical recovery, questioning the social precepts that underlay postwar prosperity and social health, traumatized by Bosnia, alarmed about potential instability in the east in general and Russian developments in particular and worried that America's interest is shifting elsewhere. Most West European leaders agree intellectually about the importance of the challenges we face, but at the same time are tempted to try to seal off their relatively prosperous and stable societies from turmoil to their east. That is a dangerous temptation: Western Europe cannot be stable if the continent's east is in chaos. The weak and demoralized state of virtually all West European governments makes them eager for strong American leadership.

The NATO Summit provides the occasion for the trip and setting a post-Cold War course for the Alliance will be its chief concrete accomplishment. But you also should seize the opportunity to articulate a broader concept of "security." Conflict in today's Europe is far more likely to stem from minority tensions within former communist states, exacerbated by the painful economic adjustments each is undergoing, than from planned aggression

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across established international borders. Thus helping former communist states make the difficult transition to market democracy, and making maximum use of all the other means at our disposal to ease the sources of tension and prevent conflict from starting in the first place, are the first line of post-Cold War security policy. Success will both vindicate Western principles and open substantial new economic opportunities.

You are in an excellent position to call for a reinvigorated U.S.-European partnership based on this broader concept of security. The NAFTA victory went far to dispel doubts about America's commitment not just to free trade but also to active international engagement more generally and to risking change for a better future. It also demonstrated your willingness to fight an uphill political battle for an important principle. Successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round closes a long-festering sore in U.S.-European relations and provides a much-needed psychological lift in all Western capitals.

II. Key Objectives

Overall

- **Articulate your new vision of Europe and your commitment to making Cold War divisions historical artifacts by drawing the new democracies of the east into the western community of nations.**
- **Propose joint U.S.-European efforts to promote democratic and economic reform in the east.**
- **Assure the Europeans that the U.S. will be fully engaged in Europe; renew the trans-Atlantic partnership.**
- **Demonstrate to European and American publics the need for and benefits of American leadership in Europe.**

NATO Summit

- **Adapt NATO to post-Cold War realities.**
  - **Open the process of NATO expansion and launch the Partnership for Peace as the vehicle for transforming NATO's engagement in the east.**
  - **Make clear that, in contrast to previous U.S. administrations, you strongly support the development of a European Security and Defense Identity.**
    - **Take steps to strengthen the European pillar within the Alliance by developing forces that are "separable but not separate" from NATO.**
    - **Help European allies assume more of Europe's military tasks by enabling the Western European**

Union (WEU) to use NATO assets when NATO chooses not to engage.

- Through creation of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), create more flexible military structures for potential post-Cold War missions. The creation of CJTFs will:
  - Facilitate NATO's ability to undertake non-traditional missions.
  - Further the objectives of the Partnership for Peace by providing a vehicle for eastern states to train, exercise and operate with NATO forces.
  - Strengthen Western Europe's ability to assume more defense responsibilities by facilitating WEU use of NATO assets.
- Launch an initiative on NATO's role in countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

U.S.-EU Summit

- Reinvigorate U.S.-EU relations by embarking on a post-GATT economic agenda; reaffirm the centrality of the trans-Atlantic partnership.
  - Define a new, post-Uruguay Round economic agenda to stimulate global growth. This agenda encompasses not only trading relations, but also job creation, macroeconomic coordination, competition policy, social policies, and environmental issues.
  - Express unequivocal support for European integration and your conviction that the trans-Atlantic partnership will remain at the core of global stability and welfare.
- Emphasize the need to capitalize on the historic opportunity to integrate the new democracies of Europe's east into Western institutions and markets
  - Encourage the EU to provide more market access to the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).
  - Propose joint undertakings with the EU to consolidate democratic reforms in CEE and help build regional infrastructure.
- Express your desire for closer U.S.-EU political cooperation as the EU becomes a more effective foreign policy actor.

III. Overview of Brussels Events

Upon arrival in Brussels, you will have brief bilateral meetings with King Albert II and Prime Minister Dehaene of Belgium. The

call on the King will be largely ceremonial but he will likely want to engage on one or two substantive issues. Prime Minister Dehaene should be able to provide useful insights into European politics and the state of transatlantic relations; the Belgians will have just completed their six-month term in the EU Presidency.

Your speech on Sunday, January 9 is an opportunity to articulate your vision of U.S.-European relations and set the themes that will be elaborated not only at subsequent Brussels events, but also in Prague, Moscow and Minsk. **Your speech will focus on the importance of capitalizing on the historic opportunity to integrate the new democracies of Europe's east into the West.** In laying out your new vision of a stable, democratic Europe, you should reaffirm your commitment to the Atlantic Alliance in general and a robust American military role in particular and foreshadow your Summit initiatives to adapt NATO to Europe's new security challenges. But, partly because the military aspects of security will receive such prominence at NATO, the speech should also concentrate on America's political and economic engagement in Europe (and especially in the transformation of Europe's east); how to build civil societies and dampen the ethnic tensions that have already begun to fragment Europe; why European integration is good for America as well as for security and stability in Europe (a point on which recent American administrations have been ambivalent); and how cooperating on the new agenda you will outline can solidify American relations with traditional allies as well as with Europe's emerging democracies.

You will deliver the speech in the Town Hall in Brussels' historic and majestic central square (called the Grand Place). In attendance will be Belgian officials, leaders of major European organizations and several hundred young people (age 20-30) from across Europe. After the speech, you will have time to walk around the Grand Place with Prime Minister Dehaene.

Before the opening of the NATO Summit on Monday morning, you will have a thirty-minute bilateral with NATO Secretary General Woerner. Woerner will offer his views on the Summit and identify potential areas of disagreement that will need to be addressed in the following working sessions. Allies have effectively endorsed our proposals already. Any areas of disagreement are likely to be few and confined to rather narrow and detailed aspects of our initiatives. The Russian elections will prompt discussion, although the outcome is not likely to have a major effect on our main Summit proposals.

The Summit consists of three formal working sessions and two meals. Woerner will try to structure the formal sessions around agenda items in order to spark genuine exchanges of views; in the past, however, heads of state and government have insisted on reading their full prepared interventions, leaving little or no time for general discussion. Behind the scenes, country delegations will be working to resolve any problems that arise and finalize the language of the Summit communique. The Belgians want the lunch, hosted by the King, to be a purely social event,

but you and other participants can direct the conversation to substantive issues. The dinner, hosted by Prime Minister Dehaene, but moderated by Woerner, is a working session and will provide the best opportunity for resolving issues that prove difficult to handle in the formal sessions.

At the end of the NATO Summit on Tuesday morning, you will hold your own press conference (it will follow Woerner's). Because the proceedings at NATO are not open to the press, this media event is especially important. We will provide you with a prepared statement. When fielding questions, you should try to convey the importance of the proposals adopted at the Summit and the extent to which they will prepare NATO for new challenges and direct NATO's evolution in a post-Cold War world. You should also make clear the prominent U.S. role in shaping these proposals and reaffirm that the U.S. will stay fully engaged in Europe.

Following the press conference at NATO headquarters, you will visit the headquarters of the Commission of the European Union. Your first meeting will be with Commission President Delors and Greek Prime Minister Papandreou (Greece takes over the EU Presidency on January 1). You will want to discuss the main elements of the U.S.-EU agenda: post-Uruguay Round trade issues, economic growth and job creation, assistance to Europe's east, Bosnia and broad political cooperation on issues such as regional security. An expanded meeting will follow (five participants from the Commission, five from Greece, ten Americans). When this expanded group breaks for lunch, you will have a brief press opportunity; we will provide a prepared statement. The Summit concludes with a working lunch of the same twenty participants. In the expanded sessions, you can cover some of the same topics discussed with Delors and Papandreou. You may want to focus particular attention on job creation (our Jobs Conference is scheduled for March and the EU will participate), macro-economic coordination in the lead-up to the July G-7 meeting in Naples and developments in Russia and Europe's east. You should press the EU leaders to provide the new democracies greater access to their markets.

BILATERAL MEETING WITH BELGIAN KING ALBERT II

MEETING WITH
KING ALBERT II

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0134-M (1.03)
KBH 1/15/2020

CONTEXT OF MEETING

Albert II, 59, became King of the Belgians on August 9, 1993, following the sudden death of his brother, Baudouin. Although Albert was the nominal heir to the throne, there had been intense speculation that he would decline in favor of his eldest son, Philippe, whom King Baudouin had appeared in recent years to be grooming as his successor.

While the Belgian King has only limited constitutional powers, Baudouin used his long reign to become a central moral force for holding Belgium's Dutch- and French-speaking communities together in a single Belgian nation. The late King also played a steadying behind-the-scenes role during the government crises to which Belgium is prone and came to be regarded as a symbol of probity and selfless duty by his subjects.

As heir to the throne, Albert had concentrated most of his efforts on trade promotion. The honorary president of the Belgian Foreign Trade Agency, Albert led Belgian trade delegations on missions around the globe, including many visits to the United States. He also served as Chairman of the Belgian Olympic Committee and national President of the Belgian Red Cross. The Royal Family has shown active concern on social issues including the handicapped, AIDS victims and immigrants.

King Albert, who speaks English well, is thoroughly familiar with the United States. His Belgian Navy training included a brief stint with the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the 1950's. Following his 1959 marriage to Italian aristocrat Donna Paola Ruffo di Calabria (now Queen Paola), the couple visited Washington and toured Mount Vernon with Mamie Eisenhower.

According to Belgian protocol, all meetings with the King are held in strictest confidence, and discussions are never divulged in public. You will likely meet alone.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

Affirm the strong state of U.S.-Belgian relations: There was some unhappiness in Belgium (not necessarily shared by King Albert) over the initial decision to send former Vice President Mondale, rather than a former head of state, to King Baudouin's funeral. Your meeting with King Albert should provide an opportunity to reassure Belgium of our continued respect for its monarchs and for the role they play in uniting the country.

Explore Views on Trade Issues: Acknowledge Belgium's substantial contribution to UN peacekeeping. Belgian and U.S. forces came ashore together in Kismayo, the Somali city from which Belgian troops withdrew in December 1993. A battalion of Belgian peacekeepers is at work in Croatia and Belgian forces are also performing humanitarian missions in Bosnia.

CORE POINTS

- Let me take this moment to express personally my condolences to you and to the Belgian people on the death of your brother. He was clearly a man of great wisdom and probity, widely respected both in Belgium and throughout the world.

- Thank you for arranging to have my Ambassador, Alan Blinken, present his credentials to you soon after his arrival. I have great confidence in his abilities to serve as my representative to Belgium.

- Let me express my sympathy for the effects of devastating floods which forced the evacuation of 14,000 Belgian homes in December 1993 -- the worst floods in Belgium since 1926. I note that the U.S. Embassy has contacted the Belgian government regarding providing assistance. (FYI: The Belgians appreciated the offer but have not yet asked for specific assistance.)

- Given your experience in trade promotion, how do you see the conclusion of the GATT talks affecting world commerce? How can our nations work together to achieve open markets to the benefit of all?

- (IF RAISED) Acknowledge the approach of the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II. The Belgians know you will attend events in Britain, France and Italy and may press you to participate in the September 3-4 commemoration of the liberation of Belgium (or December ceremonies in Bastogne). You should refrain from making any commitments, and underscore our view that World War II commemoration should prominently acknowledge Germany's current status as a valued partner in the EU and the NATO Alliance.

- (IF RAISED) Engage on Belgian ideas for trilateral U.S.-French-Belgian efforts to promote democratization in Zaire. Belgium retains a key interest in its former colonies (Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi). The Belgians asked us to support an OAU peacekeeping force in Burundi. The OAU has accepted our offer to provide $250,000 for peacekeeping equipment.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
004. report	U.S. Government Report (1 page)	12/17/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
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2016-0134-M
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BILATERAL MEETING WITH BELGIAN PM DEHAENE

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0134-M (1.05)
KBH 1/15/2020

BILATERAL MEETING WITH
PRIME MINISTER JEAN-LUC DEHAENE OF BELGIUM

I. Background

Belgium, an ardent proponent of European integration and recent President of the EU (during which it relentlessly pursued a successful outcome to the U.S.-EU GATT negotiations), prides itself on its commitment to a strong trans-Atlantic alliance. Notwithstanding this commitment, however, Belgium also seeks to strengthen the European Security and Defense Identity (EDSI) through active support for the WEU and Franco-German Corps -- which it recently joined. Thus, like so many other Western European countries, Belgium frequently finds itself working aggressively to balance the tradeoffs between trans-Atlantic and continental equities. Belgium also shares the economic difficulties of its European neighbors -- due in large part to high public-sector debt and labor market rigidities. To counter the effects of these problems, the government has pushed through a series of politically difficult measures to reduce social spending and liberalize employment practices.

During the past 30 years, Belgium has instituted a succession of constitutional reforms which have made it a federal (almost confederal) state. Political pressure from the Flemish majority in this linguistically-divided state has led to increasing autonomy for the Dutch-speaking Flemings (57% of the population) and the French-speaking Walloons (43%). Important economic and social powers are now held by the three Belgian regions -- Flanders, Walonia and the Brussels Capital Region. There is increasing talk of separatism, and thus the trend toward increasingly autonomous communities will probably continue. Most observers expect, however, tension between the two communities to remain low.

While the central government retains authority over defense and foreign affairs, the budget, the monetary, social security and the judicial system, the three regions and their associated language-based communities now have wide powers in foreign trade, agriculture, environment, employment and energy policies. The increasing transfer of powers to the regions has made dealing with the Belgian authorities more complicated and time-consuming. Even for Belgians, the system's layers add complexity and expense. Nevertheless, this system has worked to avert the violent disputes which have torn up many other societies divided along linguistic or ethnic lines.

On the international front, the Belgian government has been frustrated by the policy failure of the European Union and others in the former Yugoslavia. This frustration notwithstanding, the Belgians remain committed to UNPROFOR, with over 1,000 troops serving in Croatia and Bosnia. During its tenure as EU President, Belgium pushed initiatives to improve the flow of

humanitarian aid to Bosnia and to reignite negotiations among the parties. While cautious on earlier initiatives to use force or to arm the Bosnians, Belgian Foreign Minister Claes has expressed willingness to see UNPROFOR use force, including airpower, to assure delivery of aid this winter. Like other European contributors to UNPROFOR, the Belgians are increasingly concerned about the cost and duration of the commitment. While pushing hard for a settlement, the Belgians also seek an exit strategy. They support signalling the Serbs that sanctions relief will follow a Bosnian settlement; they believe U.S. participation in implementing a negotiated settlement will be key to achieving one and ensuring its success.

In Africa, Belgium provides substantial humanitarian aid and support for peacekeeping efforts. Despite casualties and media criticism of involvement in Somalia, the Belgian government adhered to its commitment to remain one year and withdrew its troops in December 1993. One reason for that withdrawal was to send peacekeeping troops to Rwanda, where 450 Belgians are now deployed to support UN peacekeeping operations.

In Zaire, Belgium is actively involved in the trilateral efforts with the U.S. and France to pressure Mobutu to accept democratic reform. The GOB cut off all non-humanitarian aid to Zaire in 1990 and has refused to recognize the Birindwa Government.

Belgium has also served as the protecting power for the United States in Libya since 1982.

Dehaene will attend both NATO and EU events.

II. Objectives

-- Underscore the commitment we share with Belgium to a strong trans-Atlantic partnership.

-- Praise Belgian participation in peacekeeping operations, including its sizeable commitment to UNPROFOR in Croatia and Bosnia.

III. Core Points

-- Belgium did a superb job during its European Union presidency. We appreciate the close coordination with the United States during this period.

-- We appreciate Belgian support for our NATO Summit proposals.

-- We are all working to balance domestic and external demands on our budgets in the post Cold War environment.

  -- Notwithstanding inevitable resource constraints, it is important that we all maintain our commitment to funding for NATO at levels to permit it to undertake the new agenda.

-- We admire Belgium's extensive and positive involvement in peacekeeping and multilateral diplomacy. We look forward to our continued close cooperation.

  -- What is the Belgian view of developments in the search for peace in Bosnia?

  -- What next steps can Belgium, France and the United States take to move the process of democratic transition forward in Zaire?

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006. report	U.S. Government Report [partial] (1 page)	12/17/1993	P1/b(1)

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1.4c, 3.5c

Jean-Luc DEHAENE **BELGIUM**
(Phonetic: duhHAHnuh)

Prime Minister (since March 1992)

Addressed as: Mr. Prime Minister

©

Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene, known for his finely tuned feel for the politically possible, is credited with cobbling together Belgium's present four-party, center-left coalition. He is a leading figure in the left wing of the Flemish Christian Democratic Party (CVP) and has been a spokesman for the Catholic labor movement. 1.4c, 1.4d Dehaene is highly respected for his sharp and inventive mind, brilliant debating skills, and unlimited capacity for work. Adept at political balancing acts, he is one of the architects of a controversial far-reaching austerity plan aimed at improving Belgium's competitiveness, promoting employment, and cutting the government deficit. 3.5c

A Master of Compromise

1.4c, 1.4d Dehaene is an accomplished negotiator who is admired by his peers for the way he has skillfully orchestrated political debate to resolve controversial issues and gain the consensus necessary to do business in the international arena. Dubbed "the bulldozer" by the press for his forthright political style, the Prime Minister is a pragmatic, persuasive politician; he has a reputation for tenaciously pursuing compromise while displaying infinite patience and courtesy in dealing with adversaries. We believe these characteristics enabled Dehaene to provide effective leadership during Belgium's six-month tenure (July-December 1993) of the EU's rotating presidency. For example, at the October 1993 special EU summit in Brussels, his no-nonsense approach speeded resolution of an acrimonious debate on the location of important new EU institutions, according to press accounts. 3.5c

Preparing for Prominence

Dehaene worked during 1963-67 as administrative head of the Flemish Association of Catholic Boy Scouts and then embarked on a somewhat unorthodox political career. A CVP party activist, he rose to cabinet rank through a series of staff positions but never held elective office. Dehaene was a longtime aide and associate of former Prime Minister Wilfried Martens, for whom he served as speech writer and *chef de cabinet* from 1979 until 1981. He was then tapped for the position of Minister of Social Welfare and Institutional Reform (1981-87) and in 1982 was appointed to the Senate to fill a vacant seat. From 1988 until 1992 Dehaene held the post of Minister of Communication, Transport, and Institutional Reform. 3.5c

Dehaene, the son of a doctor, was born on 7 August 1940 in Montpellier, France. He holds degrees in law and economics from the Catholic University of Louvain. Dehaene is an avid soccer fan; he also enjoys photography, reading, and walking on the beach. He reportedly has a passion for collecting weather vanes. Dehaene speaks Dutch, fluent French, and English. Married to the former Celia Verbeke, who was an American citizen, he has four children 3.5c

LDA M 93-16146
17 December 1993

1.4c, 3.5c

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

2016-0134-M (1.06)
2/27/2017 KBH

BACKGROUND: SPEECH AT THE TOWN HALL, GRAND PLACE

SPEECH AT TOWN HALL
Brussels

You will deliver a major address in the Brussels Town Hall before a crowd of roughly 200. In the audience will be Belgian officials, representatives from major European organizations and youths aged 20-35 from across Europe. The Town Hall is located in the majestic central square of Brussels, the Grand Place.

The Grand Place, which Victor Hugo called "the most perfect Square in Europe," is a magnificent ensemble of Baroque architecture. The site has been a market since the 12th century, although the guild-houses first constructed there were destroyed by French bombardment in 1695. In the final years of the 17th century, most of the structures now standing were built in the exuberant style of Italian Baroque. Today, as in the past, the Grand Place is a center of activity. Concerts are held in the square during the summer, and the famous "Carpet of Flowers" is laid out during August. In the Christmas season, a living creche appears, and every Saturday a bird and plant market takes place, recalling the site's roots in trade and commerce.

The Town Hall is the only edifice which survived the French attack. This building dates from the first half of the 15th century and is in the style known as Flamboyant Gothic. The tall, slim tower was built to replace the former belfry and is crowned by a statue of St. Michael, patron saint of Brussels. The rooms contain many art works, such as the fine tapestries of the time when Brussels was still capital of the Duchy of Brabant.

The "King's House" is built in a neo-gothic manner. It now contains the Municipal Museum, with a large collection of documents, tapestries and porcelain from the many centuries of Brussels' history.

The "Sacred Isle" is a labyrinth of small streets which surround the Grand Place. Streets here have evocative names such as Pepper Street, Butter Street, Meat and Bread Street and Herb Street, which recall their origin as sites for specialized markets. Today the area is filled with shops offering Belgium's world-famous lace and world-class restaurants.

The "Manneken Pis," perhaps Brussels' most famous "citizen," is found a few blocks from the Grand Place. This bronze statue by Jerome Duquesnoy, was erected in 1619.

Your remarks will be provided separately.

AMERICAN BUSINESS
COMMUNITY EVENT

MEETING WITH THE AMERICAN BUSINESS COMMUNITY IN BRUSSELS

Secretary Christopher will address a breakfast gathering of 300-400 American business leaders assembled by the American Chamber of Commerce in Brussels. Current plans call for Mack McLarty to speak to the group as well. You will join this event, held in the Atrium of the Conrad Hotel, toward its end and deliver a brief address (provided separately) that highlights:

-- The importance of the long-standing U.S. investment stake in Europe to our exporting success there;

-- The significance of the Uruguay Round outcome;

-- The common commitment of the U.S. and EU to addressing jobs, growth and social issues;

-- The agenda for U.S.-EU trade and economic dialogue; and

-- A call to business to invest in the emerging economies to the East.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBM NARA, Date 1/15/2020
2016-0134-M

MEETING WITH U.S. MILITARY LEADERS IN EUROPE

BRIEFING BY U.S. MILITARY LEADERS IN EUROPE

This session will provide you with an overview of U.S. military forces and operations in Europe. You will be briefed by General George Joulwan, who is dual-hatted as CINCEUR (Commander of U.S. forces in Europe) and by Admiral Paul Miller who, as CINCLANT and SACLANT, is similarly dual-hatted as the commander of U.S. and allied naval forces in the Atlantic. In their U.S. roles, Joulwan and Miller report to Secretary Aspin; in their NATO roles, they report to NATO Secretary General Woerner. As Commander of U.S. forces in Europe, General Joulwan's geographic theater extends to North Africa and portions of the Middle East.

Our major subordinate U.S. military commanders in Europe will also be present during the briefing, including:

General Robert C. Oaks	(CINCUSAFE -- Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Force Europe)
General David M. Maddox	(CINCUSAREUR -- Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Europe)
Admiral Jeremy M. (Mike) Boorda	(CINCUSNAVEUR -- Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe)

As General Shalikashvili recently described to you, the focus of U.S. forces in Europe has changed markedly from defending Western Europe and deterring a Soviet threat to providing an effective military response to diverse new security challenges including regional instability and ethnic conflict. In this post-Cold War environment, U.S. forces continue to provide influence and leadership: they offer a forward-based presence for deterrence and crisis response; they visibly demonstrate our commitment to the NATO alliance; and they serve as the basis for our outreach to Central and Eastern Europe.

Changes in the European security environment have allowed us to decrease dramatically the size of our military presence in Europe. U.S. forces in Europe now total about 160,000 -- down from a late-1980s peak of 325,000 -- and will be reduced further by 1996 to a Congressionally-mandated ceiling of 100,000. This rapid drawdown has produced considerable turbulence and dislocation for our forces.

As an example of the pace of our drawdowns, in FY 1992, the peak year for departures from Europe, the Army alone brought back 72,000 soldiers (along with 90,940 family members). At its height, the drawdown saw the Army ship an average of 500 soldiers (plus their family members) per day out of Europe -- the equivalent of a 747 leaving daily. During this period, the Army returned 380 of 858 installations to host countries. The force that the U.S. will retain in Europe will include substantial elements of two Army divisions along with a corps headquarters and other supporting elements, as well as about two and one-third Air Force fighters wings. As forces pull out, whole communities accustomed to an American presence for decades are being returned to Europeans.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 1/15/2020
2016-0134-M

Against this backdrop of downsizing, U.S. forces have been tasked to assume new humanitarian and peacekeeping missions quite distinct from those familiar to Cold Warriors. Ongoing major U.S. operations include Provide Promise (humanitarian relief for Bosnia), Deny Flight (enforcement of the No-Fly Zone over Bosnia), Sharp Guard (sanctions enforcement in the Adriatic) and Provide Comfort (humanitarian relief to Kurds in Northern Iraq).

Military outreach to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union presents further challenges to U.S. forces in the post-Cold War Europe. Contact programs have been underway at many levels in the military, on both a bilateral basis and through multilateral institutions such as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC -- NATO Allies plus former Warsaw Pact countries). Although these military contacts cover a broad range of activities, their underlying purpose has been to help the new democracies develop militaries under civilian control governed by a rule of law. In May 1993, the Marshall Center opened in Garmisch, Germany to provide a place for defense and military officials of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Republics to attend seminars and courses on a regular basis to learn about a variety of defense-related matters. Our bilateral contact programs will continue, ranging from high level dialogue to exchanges in more specific and technical areas (civil engineering teams, for example). Peacekeeping cooperation is one of the newest components of our military outreach, and will provide a key element of "Partnership for Peace" activities.

Questions you may want to raise:

-- How are you changing the way you do business to accommodate the new missions and challenges you face?

-- Tell me about the impact of the drawdown on soldiers and their families. Has the turbulence begun to stabilize as we draw closer to the eventual 100,000 level?

-- How do you assess your commands' current state of readiness? What are your concerns in this area?

-- How are you capturing the experience you are gaining from outreach to the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union? How can we apply that experience as we develop the Partnership for Peace?

-- What are your most troublesome concerns?

NATO SUMMIT SCOPE MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
December 31, 1993

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0134-M (1.07)
KBH 1/15/2020

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: NATO Summit

The challenge for this Summit is to open NATO to the new democracies in Europe's east, giving them concrete evidence of Western engagement in their security and of the rewards that will flow from reform -- but without fueling anti-western fires in Russia that could make CEE states (and the rest of us) less secure in the long run. The wisdom with which we meet that challenge will help shape Russia's choices as well as those of CEE leaders.

NATO's opening to the east also will help determine whether the Alliance remains as relevant to Europe's new security challenges -- and therefore as potent a source of U.S. influence -- as it was to those of the Cold War. All Allied governments continue to value NATO as the only available insurance against revival of a threat to their own territories, a forum for consultation on global issues affecting Western security, a means of preparing together for non-NATO contingencies such as Desert Storm and, with the European Union, a key component of the integrative process that has made war among its own members unthinkable. But for all its important political benefits, NATO is at heart a military alliance. It will not remain central to European security if its military role in Europe is limited to ensuring against what is, at least for now, the least likely contingency.

This Summit therefore will declare that Alliance members "expect and would welcome" NATO's expansion to include new democracies of Europe's east, without setting timetables or precise criteria or otherwise implying which countries can expect to be first in line. It will describe expansion as an evolutionary process and create a "Partnership for Peace" as a key step in that evolution. The Partnership also will have intrinsic merit. It immediately will transform NATO's relations with the militaries of interested East European states from seminars and exchanges to joint planning, training, and exercising and, if necessary, joint operations.

The Summit also will take concrete steps in three other areas: (1) It will adapt NATO's structures to enable the Alliance to perform missions other than defense of its own territory should its members choose. (2) It will help the Europeans assume greater responsibility for defense tasks in Europe by encouraging

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Declassify on: OADR

the development of forces "separable but not separate" from NATO (that is, available for use in NATO or European-only operations) and by creating a mechanism to enable the Western European Union (WEU) to use NATO assets when NATO chooses not to engage. These efforts to strengthen the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) represent an important new direction in U.S. policy. Previous administrations feared that developing a European capability that could operate independently of NATO would undermine the Alliance. In contrast, our policy is based on the notion that strengthening ESDI, by furthering European integration, will solidify the trans-Atlantic partnership while helping to ensure that Western Europe assumes a greater share of the common defense burden. (3) The Summit will launch a new NATO work program on non-proliferation and counter proliferation.

Since all the Summit decisions will result from American proposals, the Summit will demonstrate continued American leadership in ensuring that the Alliance changes with a changing Europe.

II. Key Objectives

-- **Reaffirm that the trans-Atlantic partnership remains at the core of American and European interests and is central to global stability and welfare.**

-- **Adapt NATO to new post-Cold War realities in Europe's east; use NATO's transformation to help draw eastern states into the community of democratic nations.**

-- **Declare NATO open to expansion and launch the Partnership for Peace as the vehicle for transforming NATO's relations with the militaries of Europe's east.**

-- **Get agreement to form Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) to facilitate NATO's ability to undertake new missions.**

-- **Help the Europeans assume more responsibility for managing European security by developing forces "separable but not separate" from NATO and by enabling the Western European Union to use CJTF or other common NATO assets when the U.S. chooses not to engage.**

-- **Launch a new work program on NATO's role in stemming and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.**

III. The Agenda

Immediately after arrival at NATO Headquarters, you will meet with NATO Secretary General Woerner. Woerner will offer his views on our Summit proposals, lay out his agenda for the proceedings and identify outstanding issues to be resolved. You will then move to a conference room for an informal coffee with NATO heads of state and government. Secretary General Woerner will temporarily leave the group to greet French President

Mitterrand. When Woerner returns with Mitterrand, the formal meetings will begin.

The three plenary sessions will be taken up primarily by the prepared interventions of each leader. Time permitting, these interventions will be followed by a discussion moderated by Secretary General Woerner. But most real give-and-take will occur at the lunch and dinner on Monday. At the close of the Summit on Tuesday morning, you will hold a press conference at NATO Headquarters.

Partnership for Peace

The Partnership for Peace (PFP) is the centerpiece of our Summit proposals. Its operational details, important though they are, should not be allowed to obscure its political aims:

Openness. The Partnership is not a second-best substitute for NATO membership, but a major step toward integrating the new democracies into the Alliance. Because it represents an evolutionary, dynamic process rather than a static policy, it keeps the door open to formal expansion of membership down the road and thus retains the flexibility needed to deal with uncertainty in Russia and other regions of the NIS.
The Partnership is open to all members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (the NACC consists of NATO members and all former members of the Warsaw Pact) as well as a number of other European states of NATO's choosing (primarily the former neutrals). While it responds directly to CEE desires for closer relations with NATO and a path toward full membership, we hope that Russia, Ukraine, the Baltics and others also will participate.

Opportunity. Each Partner can largely determine for itself the nature of its engagement with NATO by the extent and enthusiasm of its participation in the Partnership. Thus there will be "differentiation in practice," without formally drawing new dividing lines in Europe. (In private conversations with Polish, Czech and Hungarian officials, we make no secret of our hope that they will be the most active participants and our expectation that most Partnership activities in the east will be on their soil.)

Obligation. NATO is an Alliance of mutual obligation. Participation in Partnership activities will prepare eastern states to meet the obligations of NATO membership, not just receive benefits from it.

Demonstration of commitment. The presence of NATO military units on eastern soil, preparing with eastern militaries for eastern contingencies, will provide dramatic and tangible evidence of NATO's interest in Partners' security. Especially in light of developments in the former Yugoslavia, CEE states are concerned that the West will resist engagement in the region. Partnership activities will counter this fear and, in so doing, bolster the

position of reformers seeking to orient their policies and societies westward.

Political impact. The Partnership's impact on the "democratization" of eastern militaries, and on their relations with each other, can be as important as its role in integrating them with NATO military forces. Formal reviews of eastern Partners' plans for increasing civilian control of the military and transparency of military budget will be supplemented by the socializing effect of working with forces from established Western democracies. Moreover, the NATO aegis will facilitate cooperation between Hungarian and Romanian, or Polish and Ukrainian, militaries as well as between each of them and the west. This can encourage them to think of each other as partners rather than potential adversaries -- much as NATO did for French, German, British and Italian forces after World War II.

NATO allies have responded enthusiastically to the Partnership proposal; many had worried that we would push the membership issue further than they (or their parliaments) now are willing to go. Yeltsin was grateful that we avoided steps that could aid Russia's nationalists. Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia were relieved that NATO was not going to draw a new dividing line that excluded them, as were Ukraine and the Baltics that we would not implicitly consign them to Russia's sphere of influence.

Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic initially were very disappointed that we did not explicitly single them out for eventual full membership in NATO; considerable disappointment lingers. Most recently, however, key figures (e.g., Hungary's President when talking to Vice President Gore in mid-December) have said that while they want a security link with NATO they appreciate their own stake in avoiding actions that would destabilize Russia at this delicate juncture. Many are coming to see the Partnership as the best step for now.

How the Partnership Will Work. Participation in the Partnership will be open to all NACC states (and select others) willing and able to send representatives to appropriate political and military bodies at NATO headquarters and a Liaison Cell at SHAPE, as well as to participate in Partnership activities. NATO authorities currently envisage a number of exercises in 1994, including a command post exercise in Germany in the spring of 1994 and a field exercise in Poland in the autumn. We hope to be able to announce these exercises during your talk with Walesa in Prague.

The Summit will launch the PFP through a Partnership Framework Declaration signed by Secretary General Woerner on behalf of NATO. Prospective Partners will then be invited to sign the Declaration as an indication of their intent to participate. The Declaration spells out in general terms the political and military obligations of signatories (commitment to democracy, peaceful settlement of disputes, civilian control of the military, transparency of military budgets and the development of forces capable of operating with NATO). After signing the

Declaration, Partners will file "Commitment Documents" with NATO indicating what forces and other assets they will contribute to Partnership activities as well as steps they plan to take to enhance civilian control of the military and transparency of military budgets. NATO officials will help prepare these documents if a Partner so requests. Partnership activities will be designed and prepared at the Liaison Cell at SHAPE, under the political guidance and for the approval of NATO headquarters. The North Atlantic Council (NATO Ambassadors) will have political authority over the Partnership, sometimes meeting as the "NAC plus" (i.e., with Partner states). A Steering Committee comprised of NATO and Partner state representatives will provide day-to-day oversight. Office space will be provided to partner states at NATO headquarters and at SHAPE.

Partners participating in PFP activities will receive a commitment to consult with NATO in the event of a direct and immediate threat to their security. This provision parallels Article IV of the North Atlantic Treaty, although NATO allies prefer not to refer to Article IV as such (to avoid the political difficulties associated with even the appearance of committing to a treaty-like obligation). Although it commits NATO only to consult -- not to take action in the common defense (as stipulated in Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty) -- this aspect of the PFP has important symbolic value and indicates to states in the east that their security is of direct and material concern to NATO members.

NATO Expansion

As noted above, the Summit communique will declare that the Alliance expects and would welcome NATO expansion to new democracies in Europe's east. While the Partnership has intrinsic merit, it also is an integral part of an evolutionary process of NATO expansion. Active participants will develop the standard operating procedures, the habits of cooperation, and the routines of consultation that are the core of an effective military alliance. Over time, Partners that continue down the path of democratization and market reform may become full NATO members. But PFP is neither a guarantee of nor a precondition for NATO membership.

Combined Joint Task Forces

NATO's integrated military structure remains critical to the Alliance's ability to undertake coordinated multinational operations. It consists of SHAPE, where overall military planning takes place, and the Major Subordinate Commands (MSC), where additional planning and management of military operations for specific regions take place. This structure was designed to plan and manage large, multi-division operations against Warsaw Pact forces. The headquarters are not constituted for actions outside their territorial responsibilities, or to handle the smaller contingencies likely to arise in Europe's east. As SACEUR, General Shalikashvili designed the Combined Joint Task

Force (CJTF) concept to prepare NATO for possible post-Cold War missions.

A CJTF will be a functioning headquarters element (effectively, a command center capable of planning and carrying out military operations on its own) that would be formed at the MSC level. In peacetime, personnel belonging to a specified subordinate command would be tasked with planning non-traditional missions. During exercises or operations, the CJTF would be pulled from its parent command and deployed with its full complement of command staff and the forces that would be assigned to it for that particular exercise or operation. The CJTF would be able to incorporate the staff and forces of countries not now participating in the integrated military structure -- such as France or Central and Eastern European states.

European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)

The Maastricht Treaty commits the members of the European Union to develop a common foreign and security policy. The Western European Union (WEU) is to implement the defense policies of the EU. In contrast to previous administrations, we want to encourage and help the Europeans assume greater responsibility for military aspects of their own security. At the same time, we want to avoid wasteful duplication of NATO's infrastructure and ensure that the trans-Atlantic partnership remains strong.

To fulfill these objectives and go beyond rhetorical support for a stronger European defense identity, the Summit will encourage the development of European forces that are "separable but not separate" from NATO. It also will declare that if NATO as such decides not to take on a particular mission (which in practice will mean if the U.S. does not participate on the same basis as its European allies), NATO assets could be made available to the Western European Union. Forces, of course, are national, not NATO, assets; NATO assets include the airborne early warning system (AWACS) and other communications and infrastructure systems. CJTFs will be an important new NATO asset that could be made available to the WEU -- in which case it would be commanded by a WEU officer rather than by SACEUR. These arrangements will not give NATO a veto over WEU activities; the WEU is comprised of sovereign states that take their own decisions. But the use of commonly-owned NATO assets would require NATO agreement. And the desire of WEU members to use those assets will give us influence over their decisions. We also might decide to make American national assets, such as lift and intelligence, available to the WEU.

The French are the strongest proponents of building a European defense capability that is independent from NATO. They withdrew from NATO's integrated military structure during the 1960s because they thought it compromised French sovereignty and autonomy. An opportunity now exists to draw France closer to the Alliance, although the issue must be handled carefully. Most progress will be made by focusing on opportunities for concrete military cooperation, not on publicized shifts in France's

institutional affiliation with NATO. The French are attracted to the CJTF concept -- largely because it could be used by the WEU without a command role for SACEUR. (They see putting their forces under SACEUR in peacetime as a symbol of military subordination to the United States.) We believe they want to participate in CJTFs if they can ensure it will not be portrayed as peacetime "resubordination" to NATO's overall integrated military structure.

Countering Proliferation

The Summit will launch a NATO work program on preventing and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Counter-proliferation will enhance our nonproliferation efforts by making the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction less attractive; such weapons would be of little use if we have effective defenses and safeguards. We have agreed with Paris on an institutional framework which will enable France to participate in this aspect of NATO defense planning. NATO will not duplicate the work of other bodies but instead focus on what it uniquely has to offer. Areas for possible cooperation include theater missile defense, passive chemical weapons defenses (protective suits and battlefield detection gear), missile early warning systems and networks for intelligence sharing. This initiative will also reinforce the security component of your nonproliferation and export control policy, providing a useful counter to criticism that recent export control reforms (e.g., computers) reflect a weakened commitment to nonproliferation.

IV. Potential Trouble Spots

PFP Funding: A rough estimate of common NATO costs for PFP activities is $8-12 million over three years. Funding issues have not yet been agreed among the Allies; the UK and Belgium in particular oppose any increases in NATO budgets. If the issue has not been resolved by the time of the Summit, you will need to press hard for commitments from all members. The Partnership will be meaningless unless it is backed up with the necessary resources and activities.

Political Control of the Partnership: Paris wants a new political-military oversight body at NATO headquarters (possibly the NAC and Military Committee meeting in joint session) to ensure civilian control of Partnership activities. [We are trying to get a better understanding of their concerns in order to see whether they can be met without undermining the Military Committee's ability to get independent military advice directly to the NAC.]

NATO, CSCE and the UN: Many European Allies are concerned that the Partnership might encroach on and compete with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). CSCE is a pan-European institution established during the 1970s that now deals primarily with minority issues and other aspects of preventive diplomacy and crisis management. You should respond that the Partnership complements, rather than competes with, CSCE. NATO

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does not share CSCE's mandate to oversee how governments treat their own people and address other potential domestic sources of conflict. CSCE, for its part, has said it would invite organizations such as NATO or the WEU to carry out any peacekeeping operations it might mandate rather than undertake such tasks itself. Partnership activities can prepare NATO and other interested states to respond to a CSCE request if national capitals choose.

European allies want to stipulate that the Partnership can undertake peacekeeping only under a CSCE or UN mandate. Although we assume we would want such a mandate for any peacekeeping operation, no state or group of states should sign away its right under the UN Charter to respond to a call for collective self-defense. Moreover, no UN or CSCE mandate would be appropriate for a Partnership search and rescue mission or possibly some humanitarian missions.

Doing More for Central Europe: While no Allied government wants to move faster on expanding NATO membership than we have proposed, several would like to highlight a special status for CEE states. Dutch leaders speak of explicitly identifying CEE states as prime candidates for NATO membership and compensating Moscow with a NATO-Russian "security partnership," but have not been able to say what that partnership would entail. (CEE states, for their part, would see any special "partnership" between NATO-Russian as evidence of the condominium they fear.) Most European Union members would like to tie NATO membership to membership in the EU -- not least because that would push NATO expansion well into the next century.

Bosnia: The Summit will take place against the backdrop of violence and suffering in Bosnia. Journalists are likely to juxtapose NATO initiatives to become more engaged in Europe's east with "failure" to prevent ethnic cleansing and aggression in Bosnia. There are good reasons why NATO has had difficulty enforcing the no-fly zone and has not retaliated for strangulation of government-controlled towns. The Bosnian government itself is guilty of no-fly violations; most violations are by helicopters and extremely difficult to target; and we seldom know which are performing military missions and which carrying wounded children. And there has been a marked diminution in the specific Serb "strangulation" activities to which NATO's air strike warning applies. But these subtleties are likely to be lost on headline writers.

What Allied governments (as opposed to pundits) most want on Bosnia is not military action against Serbs, but a firm American commitment that if there is an agreement, we will participate in its implementation. You should make clear that we remain ready to help implement a peace settlement. Our willingness to commit ground troops will depend on Congressional support and the fulfillment of conditions we have already identified: negotiations must produce a viable agreement that the parties demonstrate they intend to honor; the UN will have political authority, while NATO has authority over the military operations;

there must be a clear time limit to NATO's responsibility; others must provide more than half of the total force; acceptable funding arrangements must be worked out.

There is no perfect answer. You should stress that this Summit is about the future. The proposals you will be making, at NATO and throughout the trip, will both contribute to the web of Western actions that can help prevent "more Yugoslavias," and make NATO, acting on its own or with Partnership countries, better prepared for future eastern contingencies that might arise. Whether to use NATO forces for "out of area" missions (those other than defense of NATO territory) must remain a case-by-case decision. But the decision of this NATO Summit, in response to your initiative, can increase the range of choices open to us and our European partners.

BILATERAL MEETING WITH NATO SECGEN WOERNER

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MEETING WITH
NATO SECRETARY GENERAL MANFRED WOERNER

CONTEXT OF THE MEETING

You last met with Woerner in October 1993 during his visit to Washington. This meeting will occur just before the opening of the Summit plenary.

Woerner wants the Summit to ensure that NATO remains relevant to the challenges of the new Europe and that the U.S., through NATO, stays fully engaged in Europe. He has been frustrated with NATO's inability to take a firm stand on the former Yugoslavia. He sees continued U.S. leadership as indispensable to the health of the Alliance.

Woerner will press for modest amounts of new funding primarily for the Partnership for Peace. We expect him to express strong views on the sharp cuts by Congress in U.S. funding for the NATO infrastructure program; he is likely to ask for your personal commitment to seek adequate U.S. funding.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

You should ask Woerner whether there are any last-minute issues which still need to be resolved at the Summit plenary or on the margins and how we might best work with him. You can ask how he plans to use the dinner session (the best occasion for free exchanges) and whether there are specific issues that he would like you to raise. You should discuss with Woerner how to ensure Mitterrand's support at the Summit and build on France's cautious willingness to move closer to the Alliance. Finally, you might ask Woerner about his thinking on developments in Russia. Woerner met with President Yeltsin in December 1993 in Brussels and can provide a first-hand assessment of Russian attitudes toward our Summit proposals.

CORE POINTS

- I believe that we are at an historic turning point in Europe's evolution.

- We must use the Summit to capitalize on this historic opportunity to integrate Europe's new democracies into the West. The Partnership for Peace represents NATO's opening to the east through an evolutionary process of expansion. We must ensure its success.

- We are also taking historic steps to revitalize the trans-Atlantic security partnership and adapt it to the post-Cold War era. Creating CJTFs and taking steps to make NATO assets available to the WEU will help NATO prepare for new

missions while simultaneously furthering the process of European integration.

- What outstanding issues need to be resolved in our Summit meetings? Are there any obstacles that could block support for our main proposals?

- What is your assessment of the French position? What is the best way to build on the cooperative relationship that is emerging with Paris?

- I know that you recently met with President Yeltsin. What was his assessment of the Partnership for Peace? Do you think we might be able to use the Partnership to exercise influence over Russian military activity in the near-abroad?

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009. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	11/18/1993	P1/b(1)

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COFFEE WITH NATO LEADERS

COFFEE FOR NATO HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT

CONTEXT OF MEETING

Immediately after your meeting with NATO Secretary General Woerner, you will move to an area located just outside the NATO Summit plenary conference room for an informal coffee with NATO heads of state and government. Secretary General Woerner will depart to meet French President Mitterrand, who arrives at NATO headquarters at 9:30 a.m. The setting for the coffee will be relaxed and informal.

Near the end of the coffee, Secretary General Woerner, accompanied by President Mitterrand, will return. Heads of state and government will be invited to proceed into the conference room.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

You should use this informal setting to greet your colleagues. You will be meeting for the first time: Greek Prime Minister Papandreou, Iceland Prime Minister David Oddsson, Luxembourg Prime Minister Jacques Santer, Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland and Portuguese Prime Minister Anibal Cavaco Silva.

CORE POINTS

GREECE (Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou)

-- I look forward to building on the strong U.S.-Greek relationship during your Presidency of the EU and beyond. Our meeting in Washington will be a good opportunity to identify areas in which our cooperative efforts can accomplish the most.

ICELAND (Prime Minister David Oddsson)

-- The U.S. remains firmly committed to Iceland's defense. We appreciate your willingness to consider modifications to our existing security arrangements as we work together to define the best ways to ensure our collective well-being in the post-Cold War environment.

LUXEMBOURG (Prime Minister Jacques Santer)

-- We are grateful for Luxembourg's strong and unwavering support for the trans-Atlantic partnership and for your help in producing a successful GATT agreement.

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NORWAY (Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland)

-- I am sorry that we have not yet had the chance to meet in Washington. I want to thank you for the continued involvement and support that you and Foreign Minister Holst have provided on the Middle East, particularly your work with Arafat. I trust Johan is well on the way to recovery.

PORTUGAL (Prime Minister Anibal Cavaco Silva)

-- Our negotiations over Lajes air base are important and mutually beneficial. I hope that those talks will conclude successfully and permit us to continue our long tradition of security partnership.

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NATO SUMMIT PLENARY

CONTEXT OF MEETING

The Summit will formally begin at 9:45 a.m. on January 10. You will enter the main conference room at NATO with Secretary General Woerner and the other NATO heads of state and government. Woerner will open the plenary with a short statement of welcome. The international press will attend the opening event. At 10:00 a.m., heads of state and government will be invited to join the Secretary General for a "family photo."

The working session of the plenary will begin at 10:15 a.m. Delegations will be restricted to heads of state and government, foreign ministers, permanent representatives to NATO and a small number of supporting staff. Press will not be present. The Secretary General will lead off a round of interventions with a short statement. You will be one of the first speakers. If time permits after all sixteen Allies have made initial interventions, the Secretary General will lead the discussion through a short agenda of topics focusing on our Summit proposals and possible regional issues, including the former Yugoslavia.

At 12:30 p.m., heads of state and government and Secretary General Woerner will travel downtown to attend a lunch hosted by King Albert II of Belgium (see separate briefing memo). The plenary will resume at NATO headquarters at approximately 3:15 p.m. and will conclude at 5:30 p.m. In the evening, heads of state and government will attend a working dinner hosted by Belgian Prime Minister Dehaene (but moderated by Woerner) at the Chateau Val Duchesse (see separate briefing memo).

The plenary will reconvene at approximately 9:00 a.m. on January 11 to resolve any outstanding issues and to reach agreement on the Summit declaration. At the end of the plenary, Secretary General Woerner will hold a short press conference. Your press conference immediately follows.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

Your goal will be to obtain Allied support for our complete package of Summit initiatives. The Allies have all expressed general support for our proposals. You will need to stress that approval of our Summit initiatives will ensure NATO's relevance to the new security environment, play a key role in promoting stability in the east, and support our efforts to sustain a robust U.S. commitment to Europe. Agreement will also be needed to ensure adequate funding for the Partnership for Peace. Possible trouble spots are identified in the Summit Scope Paper.

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CORE POINTS

Your prepared intervention will be provided separately. The following points are for your use during general discussions in the plenary sessions and for informal exchanges at the meals or during unstructured time.

General

- I believe that we are at an historic turning point in Europe's evolution.

- We must use the Summit to capitalize on this historic opportunity to extend stability eastward and integrate Europe's new democracies into Western institutions and markets.

- American and European interests are inextricably linked. NATO and the trans-Atlantic partnership remain at the core of global stability and welfare.

- The U.S. will remain fully engaged in Europe. We will maintain roughly 100,000 troops in Europe and are committed to sustaining a strong and vibrant NATO.

- We must adapt NATO to the post-Cold War era and take advantage of this historic opportunity to draw the states of Europe's east into the community of democratic nations.

- NATO's transformation also entails enabling the West Europeans to assume more responsibility for managing European security.

Partnership for Peace and NATO Expansion

- The decisions taken by this Summit will open NATO to new democracies in Europe's east without drawing new dividing lines that could make us all less secure in the long run.

- The Partnership for Peace will transform NATO's relations with the nations of Europe's east. Through the PFP, NATO militaries and militaries of the new democracies will plan, train, exercise, and, if necessary, operate together.

- The PFP is an important step in an evolutionary process of NATO expansion. Active participants will develop the standard operating procedures, the habits of cooperation, and the routines of consultation that are the core of an effective military alliance. Over time, Partners that continue down the path of democratization and market reform will be prime candidates for full NATO membership.

- Each eastern state will be able to determine the pace and extent of its participation in the PFP. There will be differentiation in practice, but now is not the time to draw

new dividing lines in Europe. Because the Partnership represents an evolutionary process rather than a static policy, it keeps the door open to formal expansion of membership down the road and thus retains the flexibility needed to deal with ongoing change in the east.

- All NATO members must be prepared to provide adequate funding for the PFP.

Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF)

- The CJTF is an important innovation which will allow NATO to prepare for and execute new post-Cold War missions.

- CJTF's will provide NATO the flexibility needed to plan for and carry out non-traditional missions. They will also facilitate PFP activities by providing a vehicle for NATO militaries to plan, train and operate with the militaries of countries not now participating in the integrated military structure.

European Security and Defense Identity

- In contrast to previous administrations, my administration fully supports the development of a common foreign and security policy within the EU. In this respect, we welcome efforts to strengthen the Western European Union (WEU).

- To fulfill these objectives, the Summit should agree that when NATO decides not to take on a particular mission, it could make common Alliance assets available to the WEU.

- The CJTF will be one important NATO asset that could be made available to the WEU and placed under a WEU command.

Proliferation

- NATO is launching a new and important work program on preventing and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. I am especially pleased that we have been able to find an institutional framework that will enable France to participate in the program.

Bosnia

- The U.S. remains ready to help implement a peace settlement. Our willingness to commit ground troops will depend on Congressional support and the fulfillment of the following conditions: negotiations must produce a viable agreement that the parties intend to honor; the UN will have political authority, while NATO has authority over the military operations; there must be a clear time limit to NATO's responsibility; others must provide more than half of the total force; and acceptable funding arrangements must be worked out.

LUNCH HOSTED BY
KING ALBERT II
FOR NATO LEADERS

NATO LUNCH
WITH KING ALBERT II OF BELGIUM

CONTEXT OF MEETING

After the morning plenary session, NATO heads of state and government and Secretary General Woerner will travel downtown to a lunch hosted by King Albert II of Belgium. The lunch is a purely social occasion. There will be no set agenda for discussion.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

You should express our thanks to the King for Belgium's hospitality and willingness to host the NATO Summit. You might highlight the fact that Belgium, in spite of its small size, has made significant contributions to UN peacekeeping efforts in Somalia and Bosnia and retains a special interest in Africa and its former colonies of Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi. Given the royal family's interest in social issues, you may wish to ask about programs to help the handicapped, AIDS victims and immigrants. There may be opportunities on the margins of the lunch to discuss Summit-related business and press for adoption of our initiatives.

CORE POINTS

- It is a pleasure to be here in Belgium to take part in the NATO Summit. It is particularly appropriate that Belgium, as a founding member of both NATO and the European Union, and the permanent host to NATO, the EU and the WEU is hosting this historic event.

- American and European interests are inextricably linked. NATO and the trans-Atlantic partnership remain at the core of global stability and welfare.

- The U.S. will remain fully engaged in Europe. We will maintain a sizable military presence and are committed to sustaining a strong and vibrant NATO.

- We must adapt NATO to the post-Cold War era and take advantage of this historic opportunity to draw the states of Europe's east into the community of democratic nations.

- NATO's transformation also entails enabling the West Europeans to assume more responsibility for managing European security.

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NATO WORKING DINNER AT CHATEAU VAL DUCHESSE

CONTEXT OF THE MEETING

Belgian Prime Minister Dehaene will host a working dinner for NATO Summit participants on the evening of January 10. Although plans are not yet final, the dinner should begin around 8:00 p.m. The Belgians plan to host three groups concurrently at the Chauteau Val Duchesse. The first group will be NATO heads of state and government. Since this is a working dinner, Secretary General Woerner will preside and keep the discussions on track. You should press the Allies on any aspect of our Summit proposals not yet resolved. The second group will consist of NATO foreign ministers. The third group will be national security advisors/political advisors. Discussion of outstanding issues and final refinement of the Summit declaration language might take place among foreign ministers and security/political advisors.

Although you will have time for conversation, Woerner wants to use the dinner to finalize agreement on our proposals. Woerner can be expected to keep the dinner conversation focused on resolving the issues at hand. Given the format, you may be able to take advantage of unstructured time to lobby individual leaders on contentious points.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

Resolve any outstanding issues and ensure strong allied support for our proposals.

CORE POINTS

See points for plenary session.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 31, 1993

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: The U.S.-European Union Summit

I. The Setting

This will be the first Summit since European Community members ratified the Maastricht Treaty and re-named themselves the European Union. It also comes soon after completion of the Uruguay Round trade negotiations. You should capitalize on this opportunity to lay out your vision of U.S. relations with the new Union and of a post-Uruguay Round agenda for stimulating growth, creating jobs, and integrating the new democracies of the east into the markets of the west.

The Summit takes place at a time of considerable change in the trans-Atlantic partnership. The Cold War's end means that the security link no longer dominates U.S.-West European relations; both sides of the Atlantic already are more assertive in pursuing their economic agendas. Moreover, the EU's efforts to forge common foreign and security policies will have a major impact on intra-European and trans-Atlantic relations. Germany, the UK and others will continue efforts to resolve U.S.-EU differences, but increasingly will give priority to maintaining European unity and supporting French-led efforts to strengthen the Union.

The U.S. in principle welcomes European willingness to assume greater responsibility in foreign and security policy -- including its military aspects. But adjusting to a world in which West European desire for American military protection provides less potent U.S. leverage can prove difficult in practice. And it is far from clear that EU members, for their part, are ready for the responsibilities that a more balanced partnership would entail.

Adjusting to change already has produced strains, most notably over Yugoslavia and the Uruguay Round. EU members have lamented what they perceive as a shift in U.S. priorities away from Europe.

At the same time, there are positive signs in our evolving relationship. U.S.-EU cooperation was at the heart of the GATT agreement. We continue to coordinate efforts to promote regional stability, especially in Europe's east. And, through our

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proposals at the NATO Summit, we have taken concrete steps to strengthen the ability of the Western European Union to act on its own.

The challenge is to build a more mature U.S.-EU relationship -- one in which both sides of the Atlantic adjust to a more equitable sharing of leadership and responsibility. Even though a more cohesive Europe may be a more formidable economic competitor and a less malleable political partner, the success of Western Europe's ongoing effort to achieve political and economic integration is of vital importance to the U.S. The EU represents the best insurance against renationalization in Western Europe and helps ensure that Germany remains embedded in larger European structures. A European Union confident of its increasing ability to advance its members' interests will be a stronger partner for America in promoting global trade and opening Western markets and institutions to Europe's east. A weaker, more hesitant EU is more likely to turn inward to address its own problems.

Because the NATO Summit will have concentrated on military security (including giving a boost to the development of a European defense identity and capability), your Summit with the Union should focus on the economic and political aspects of the trans-Atlantic partnership. Your successful fight for NAFTA, the Seattle APEC meeting and the conclusion of the Uruguay Round have made clear your own commitment to building a more liberal international trading order and resisting the forces of protectionism and regionalism. You should exploit this momentum and emphasize the importance of finalizing and ratifying the GATT agreement while developing a post-Uruguay Round trade agenda. In light of the lingering recession throughout Europe, EU leaders also will be particularly interested in discussing how to stimulate growth and address structural unemployment.

The EU still is battling to revive popular enthusiasm, to cultivate a broader "European" identity among its member states and to extend its successful coordination of trade policy into the realms of monetary and foreign policy. Resistance to further integration is fueled by national loyalties and by concern that the growing power of the European Commission has created a "democratic deficit" within the EU. But it also is integrally related to Europe's economic doldrums. With unemployment at its highest rate since the 1930s and weaker European currencies struggling to maintain their value, governments lack popular confidence and are turning inward to deal with their economic problems, often at a cost to overall competitiveness and growth. (Germany's unwillingness to cut interest rates is a case in point). This contributes to the slowness of EU expansion. Finland, Sweden, Norway and Austria are negotiating terms of accession to the EU. But popular opposition to EU membership in those countries and a complicated negotiating process continue to present obstacles. Even for the most advanced Central European states, membership will not come until the next century.

Against this backdrop, the EU's efforts to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy have had limited success. Member

states have coordinated efforts on Bosnia, contributed to reform in Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, facilitated the Middle East peace process and helped promote a smooth transition in South Africa. They also have sought to strengthen the defense arm of the EU -- the Western European Union (WEU) -- and have approved French Prime Minister Balladur's proposal to convene a conference to negotiate security pacts among countries of Central and Eastern Europe in which ethnic or border disputes might arise. The Union's major foreign policy tools to date are economic -- trade policy and aid. The EU has effectively used these tools to pursue political goals in Eastern Europe, the Middle East and South Africa. However, member states continue to be reluctant to give up more autonomy over their foreign policies. Failure to solve the tragedy in Bosnia weighs heavily. And lingering recession and excess capacity continue to impede further opening of EU markets to the east, a move of critical importance to the success of reform in the new democracies.

These problems notwithstanding, the EU already represents a radical and unprecedented departure from the traditional nation-state system. It probably never will become a federal structure in the American sense, but it already is far more than a common market and a means of coordinating national policies. It has substantially modified prevailing notions of sovereignty; the borders over which European nations fought for centuries are of steadily decreasing relevance in people's daily lives.

II. Key Objectives

-- **Affirm that the fundamental interests of the U.S. and EU are inextricably linked and that the trans-Atlantic Partnership remains at the core of global stability and welfare.**

-- **Express unequivocal support for European integration, including the EU's efforts to develop further a common foreign and security policy; note that this approach represents a significant departure from the policies of previous U.S. administrations.**

-- **Make clear your commitment to building on the Uruguay Round by making progress on issues left unresolved by the Round (financial services, audio-visual, steel, aircraft, maritime services) and by developing a new trade agenda that might include trade and the environment, competition policy, and workers' rights.**

-- **Stress the importance of U.S.-EU political cooperation, particularly in the area of promoting democracy in Europe's east; urge the EU to provide more market access to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and urge U.S.-EU cooperation in supporting projects to build regional infrastructure in CEE.**

III. The Agenda

Your first meeting with the EU will be with European Commission President Jacques Delors and Greek Prime Minister Andreas

Papandreou (Greece assumed the Presidency of the EU on January 1 and will be followed by Germany on July 1). This meeting constitutes the biannual meeting called for in the November 1990 U.S.-EC Declaration. Because of scheduling difficulties and the pace of negotiations in the lead-up to the December GATT agreement, a U.S.-EU Summit did not take place during the Belgian Presidency. (We offered dates but the Belgians were not available.) EU leaders are uneasy about the Greek Presidency; Papandreou has been in office only since October and Greek-EU differences on Macedonia have generated tensions. (The UK, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Denmark and others hastened to establish diplomatic relations with Macedonia before Athens assumed the EU Presidency.) Following your meeting with Delors and Papandreou, they will host a lunch with the twelve EU leaders and Delors. All but Delors and Irish Prime Minister Reynolds will have participated in the NATO Summit.

There will undoubtedly be substantive overlap between the two sessions. We suggest you focus on political cooperation (European integration, Bosnia, the Middle East) with Delors and Papandreou. At the lunch, you might discuss developments in Russia, press the EU leaders to do more to promote reform in Central Europe (including providing more market access), and discuss trade, macroeconomic growth and job creation.

U.S.-EU Economic Relations: The acrimonious debate that characterized efforts to reach agreement on the Uruguay Round has given way to a congratulatory atmosphere in the wake of last month's agreement. Although the draft agreement must still be finalized and ratified, attention will shift to issues not fully resolved (such as financial services, audio-visual, steel, aircraft and maritime) and to development of a post-Uruguay Round economic agenda. This agenda might include macroeconomic coordination, social policies, trade and environment, competition policy and workers' rights.

In light of the focus in the U.S. and in the EU on domestic renewal, the upcoming U.S.-sponsored Jobs Conference and the recent release of the EU Commission's White Paper on job creation and competitiveness, you might want to exchange ideas about long-term strategies for stimulating growth and employment. (Some EU members responded critically to the Commission's paper, claiming its recommended program relied too heavily on public expenditure.) To stimulate growth, the EU White Paper calls for a reduction of public deficits and, once indebtedness is under control, an increase in public spending. It also calls for wage moderation to guard against inflation. To restore competitiveness, the study calls for promotion of small- and medium-sized businesses, massive investment in trans-European infrastructure and increased investment in research and development. On employment, the paper calls for better education and training of the labor force, greater labor mobility and a reduction in the non-wage costs (taxes and contributions to social programs) of employment.

The EU Role in Promoting Reform in Europe's East: Through the development of trade relations and assistance programs, the EU has played a major role in the reform process in the east. The EU has concluded Association Agreements with Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania. These agreements provide for free trade within ten years and envision, but do not guarantee, eventual membership in the EU. Last June's EU Copenhagen Summit produced a detailed annex on EU-CEE cooperation that inter alia provided for a regular EU-CEE dialogue and modest trade liberalization for CEE products. The EU also has Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) with Albania, Slovenia and the Baltics and is negotiating them with Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. PCAs cover economic and political relations but are not intended to lead toward EU membership. Despite these deepening economic ties, the EU has restricted market access in sectors such as aluminum, agricultural products, textiles and steel -- precisely those sectors in which CEE states could be most competitive in EU markets. More access to Western Europe's markets arguably would do more to consolidate democracy and stability in Central and Eastern Europe than Western military guarantees. You should urge the EU to grant the new democracies increased market access. Despite EU accession agreements with most CEE countries, significant barriers to trade remain. Independent studies confirm that the U.S. market is significantly more open to CEE products than is the EU market.

The EU is heavily involved in assistance to the new democracies. The Commission serves as the secretariat for the Group of 24, which coordinates aid from OECD members to CEE. From 1990 through 1992, the Commission and EU members pledged over $30 billion to the region out of total commitments of $65 billion. Through FY 1993, the U.S. has committed over $8 billion. The EU has contributed over $60 billion to Russia (much of which was compensation for German reunification) and is participating in the G-7 privatization fund and the establishment of a G-7 coordinating office in Moscow. The U.S. has contributed roughly $7 billion to Russia.

You should discuss with your EU counterparts how to promote investment and the development of regional communication and transportation networks in CEE. At the Copenhagen Summit, the EU agreed to provide funds for capital expenditure on regional infrastructure projects. You should suggest that the U.S. and EU cooperate in supporting projects that help build regional infrastructure. You should also suggest creation of a data bank covering all private and public projects ongoing in Central and Eastern Europe, in order to facilitate joint projects among our NGOs as well as our governments.

EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP): The Maastricht Treaty established an institutional framework for the EU to seek common foreign policies. The Council and its secretariat are likely to take the lead on foreign policy issues and authority will still rest predominantly with the member states. Nonetheless, Maastricht directed the Commission to create a

directorate-general for CFSP, gave the Commission the formal right to introduce foreign policy issues into Council deliberations and to negotiate on the Union's behalf in an expanding list of non-trade areas and provided for majority voting in the Council in some limited circumstances. Last November, the EU decided to focus enhanced policy coordination on: monitoring elections in Russia and South Africa, facilitating the Middle East peace process, negotiating a peace settlement in Bosnia and developing a French-inspired plan to establish security pacts in Central and Eastern Europe. The EU also is seeking to strengthen its defense arm -- the Western European Union (WEU). In this context, member states have welcomed our intention to propose at the NATO Summit that the WEU should be able to use NATO assets.

The proposed European Stability Pact represents one of the EU's most ambitious foreign policy initiatives to date. In April, the EU will invite Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and the Baltic states to a conference aimed at encouraging CEE states to negotiate bilateral and regional treaties on minority rights and borders. The EU would provide supporting incentives but has not specified what these would be. (The EU has hinted that the incentives might include quickened accession to the Union, or at least that failure to cooperate would delay accession.) A final politically binding Pact would be signed by many European states. The CSCE would then oversee compliance with the Pact. The EU has invited both Russia and the U.S. to participate. You can use this meeting to tell them that we will do so.

Bosnia remains near the top of the EU agenda and the U.S.-EU dialogue. In many respects, the tragedy in Bosnia underscores the extent to which the EU's capacity to develop common foreign and security policies are still quite limited. As efforts to negotiate a peace settlement continue, EU leaders are likely to question whether the U.S. intends to contribute ground forces to help implement a settlement.

The U.S. and some EU members differ over how best to deal with Iran. Our efforts to isolate the Iranian regime are somewhat undercut by the interest of some EU members in rescheduling Iranian debt. In other regions -- CEE, Russia, the Middle East, Africa -- U.S. and EU interests are virtually identical and cooperation is moving forward. You might also explore the possibilities for enhanced cooperation on the environment, human rights, narcotics, refugees, terrorism and population control.

U.S.-E.U. PRESIDENCY
MEETING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0134-M (1.12)
KBH 1/15/2020

MEETING WITH
EUROPEAN UNION PRESIDENCY
GREEK PRIME MINISTER ANDREAS PAPANDREOU
AND
EUROPEAN COMMISSION PRESIDENT JACQUES DELORS

CONTEXT OF MEETING

This meeting constitutes the biannual high level meeting called for in the November 1990 U.S.-EC Declaration. Greece took over the EU presidency January 1 from Belgium and will relinquish it to Germany July 1. Those three currently constitute the EU "troika", an important consideration given expectations for Papandreou's government, which has already generated tensions with the other 11 EU members over Macedonia. This meeting also is our first high-level contact with the Europeans since ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, their own summit with Yeltsin on December 9 and the conclusion of the Uruguay Round.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

With Maastricht safely ratified and enacted, you should use this meeting and the following luncheon to make clear your personal support for the European integration process, dispelling latent fears of American opposition to competition from a Europe which seeks to complement its economic clout with political strength. You should use the juxtaposition of your EU meetings with the previous day's NATO summit to illustrate our view that security has three equally vital, interlinked components: defense, political and economic cooperation. You might want to focus on U.S.-EU political cooperation in this meeting and address economic issues at the lunch.

CORE POINTS

U.S.-European Relations

- The fundamental interests of the U.S. and the EU are inextricably linked; the trans-Atlantic partnership remains at the core of global stability and welfare.

- Maastricht represents a qualitative advance for European unity. The U.S. unequivocally supports the EU in its effort to build a more integrated Europe. We will do our best to help you with this enterprise. I think our proposals at the NATO Summit will further your efforts to strengthen the Western European Union.

- The U.S. intends to stay fully engaged in Europe. Our desire to build new links with the Asia/Pacific region will not come at the expense of our commitment to Europe.

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- During Greece's Presidency of the European Union, I hope we can deepen our partnership on global issues such as environment, narcotics, terrorism, refugees and population.

Economic Relations

- Concluding the Uruguay Round represents a major step toward building an open, global trading order; the GATT agreement promises to give all our economies a much-needed boost. We now need to focus on finalizing and ratifying the draft agreement.

- U.S.-EU cooperation was at the heart of the Uruguay Round agreement. We should build on this cooperation and the momentum created by the Round to make progress on issues not fully resolved -- such as financial services, audio-visual, steel, aircraft and maritime. The U.S. and the EU should also develop a post-Uruguay Round trade agenda that might include trade and environment, competition policy and workers' rights. We should also address macroeconomic coordination.

- I think the EU Commission's White Paper on job creation and competitiveness contains some good ideas. I expect the Jobs Conference this spring to facilitate a fruitful exchange of ideas about how to stimulate growth, restore competitiveness and expand employment.

Foreign Policy

- We must capitalize on this historic opportunity to integrate the new democracies into the West. The U.S. and EU must continue to work together to aid the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the NIS. I appreciate the EU's commitment to further integration with CEE through Association Agreements. But we must do more to ensure that reformers in the region do not lose more ground.

  -- I urge the EU to provide more market access to Central and Eastern Europe, especially in critical sectors such as agriculture, textiles, and steel. We have reduced our own barriers and those that still remain -- quotas on textiles and cheese -- are being phased out. Increased trade will bolster reformers and help stabilize economic conditions.

  -- I suggest we agree to put this on the G-7 agenda for Naples.

  -- I would like to suggest that the U.S. and EU create a joint data bank covering all private and public projects ongoing in CEE. This would provide a basis for better coordination of efforts and perhaps more joint U.S.-EU, public and private projects.

-- I was pleased to note the EU decision, at its Copenhagen Summit, to support regional infrastructure projects in CEE. I have decided that the U.S. should do the same. We should consider cooperating to develop the communications and transportation infrastructure in the region.

-- I want the U.S. to be represented at the April meeting in Paris to launch a European Security Pact initiative. My officials will be happy to work with yours in developing the details.

o We have watched carefully events in Russia and remain convinced of the need to continue working with Yeltsin and bolstering the forces of reform. What is your assessment of developments in Russia following your recent meeting with Yeltsin? What do you make of the elections?

o We must continue to facilitate efforts to bring the violence and suffering in Bosnia to an end. Should the parties agree to a peace settlement, the U.S. stands ready to do its part to implement that agreement.

o We have seen great success in the Middle East this year. We value our cooperation with the EU in this area. We must now work together to provide the economic and financial foundation for further progress. We also need your help in convincing Arab countries to drop their economic boycott of Israel.

o We should explore ways of deepening U.S.-EU cooperation on the environment, human rights, narcotics, refugees, terrorism and population control.

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013. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	11/23/1993	P1/b(1)

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POTUS Briefing Books - POTUS Trip to Belgium, January 9-11, 1994 [1]

2016-0134-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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~~001. paper~~	~~Meeting and Working Lunch with Representatives of the European Commission and Presidency (3 pages)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
~~002. paper~~	~~Contingency Bilateral Paper for Meeting with President Francois Mitterrand of France (2 pages)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
003. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	10/18/1993	P1/b(1)
~~004. paper~~	~~Contingency Bilateral Paper for Meeting with Prime Minister Jean Chretien of Canada (1 page)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
005. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	12/17/1993	P1/b(1)
~~006. paper~~	~~Contingency Bilateral Paper for Meeting with Prime Minister Poul Rasmussen of Denmark (1 page)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
007. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	12/17/1993	P1/b(1)
~~008. paper~~	~~Contingency Bilateral Paper for Meeting with Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany (2 pages)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
009. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	12/17/1993	P1/b(1)
~~010. paper~~	~~Contingency Bilateral Paper for Meeting with Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou of Greece (1 page)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
011. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	11/23/1993	P1/b(1)
~~012. paper~~	~~Contingency Bilateral Paper for Meeting with Prime Minister David Oddsson of Iceland (1 page)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020

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013. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	12/17/1993	P1/b(1)
~~014. paper~~	~~Contingency Bilateral Paper for Meeting with Prime Minister Albert Reynolds of Ireland (1 page)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
015. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages) Partial release - KBH 9/8/2017	12/17/1993	P1/b(1)
~~016. paper~~	~~Contingency Bilateral Paper for Meeting with Prime Minister Carlo Ciampi of Italy (2 pages)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
017. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages) Partial release - KBH 9/8/2017	11/19/1993	P1/b(1)
~~018. paper~~	~~Contingency Bilateral Paper for Meeting with Prime Minister Jacques Santer of Luxembourg (1 page)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
019. report	U.S. Government Report (1 page)	12/17/1993	P1/b(1)
~~020. paper~~	~~Contingency Bilateral Paper for Meeting with Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers of the Netherlands (1 page)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
021. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	12/13/1993	P1/b(1)
~~022. paper~~	~~Contingency Bilateral Paper for Meeting with Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland of Norway (1 page)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
023. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	09/24/1993	P1/b(1)
~~024. paper~~	~~Contingency Bilateral Paper for Meeting with Prime Minister Anibal Cavaco Silva of Portugal (1 page)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020

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025. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	11/09/1993	P1/b(1)
~~026. paper~~	~~Contingency Bilateral Paper for Meeting with Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain (1 page)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
027. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	11/22/1993	P1/b(1)
~~028. paper~~	~~Contingency Bilateral Paper for Meeting with Prime Minister Tansu Ciller of Turkey (2 pages)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
029. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	10/05/1993	P1/b(1)
~~030. paper~~	~~Contingency Bilateral Paper for Meeting with Prime Minister John Major of the United Kingdom (1 page)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
031. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	12/17/1993	P1/b(1)
~~032. paper~~	~~NATO and the Former Yugoslavia (2 pages)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
~~033. paper~~	~~NATO and Proliferation (1 page)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
~~034. paper~~	~~NATO Expansion (1 page)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
~~035. paper~~	~~North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) (1 page)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
~~036. paper~~	~~European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) (1 page)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~037. paper~~	~~Overview of U.S.-EU Trade Issues (1 page)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
~~038. paper~~	~~European Union Common Foreign and Security Ambitions and Prospects (1 page)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
~~039. paper~~	~~European Union Role in Central and Eastern Europe and Russia/NIS (1 page)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
~~040. paper~~	~~The European Union's Stability Pact Initiative (1 page)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020

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U.S.-E.U. WORKING LUNCH

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0134-M(1.15)
KBM 1/15/2020

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MEETING AND WORKING LUNCH WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND PRESIDENCY

CONTEXT OF MEETING

Five members of the Commission (including Delors), five Greeks representatives (including Papandreou), and ten Americans will attend this expanded meeting. The meeting will break for a brief press opportunity after roughly thirty minutes, and reconvene over lunch.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

You should focus discussion on the economic agenda. Issues of primary importance are: building on the conclusion of the Uruguay Round to tackle issues left unresolved and consolidate a global, not regional, trading order; coordinating efforts to stimulate growth and create jobs; cooperating on promoting reform in the east and providing the new democracies more market access.

CORE POINTS

U.S.-European Relations

- The fundamental interests of the U.S. and the EU are inextricably linked; the trans-Atlantic partnership remains at the core of global stability and welfare.

- Maastricht represents a qualitative advance for European unity. The U.S. unequivocally supports the EU in its effort to build a more integrated Europe. We will do our best to help you with this enterprise. I think our proposals at the NATO Summit will further your efforts to strengthen the Western European Union.

- The U.S. intends to stay fully engaged in Europe. Our desire to build new links with the Asia/Pacific region will not come at the expense of our commitment to Europe.

- During Greece's Presidency of the European Union, I hope we can deepen our partnership on global issues such as environment, narcotics, terrorism, refugees and population.

Economic Relations

- Concluding the Uruguay Round represents a major step toward building an open, global trading order; the GATT agreement promises to give all our economies a much-needed boost. We now need to focus on finalizing and ratifying the draft agreement.

- U.S.-EU cooperation was at the heart of the Uruguay Round agreement. We should build on this cooperation and the

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momentum created by the Round to make progress on issues not fully resolved -- such as financial services, audio-visual, steel, aircraft and maritime. The U.S. and the EU should also develop a post-Uruguay Round trade agenda that might include trade and environment, competition policy and workers' rights. We should also address macroeconomic coordination.

- The EU Commission's White Paper on job creation and competitiveness was an interesting contribution. I expect the Jobs Conference this spring to facilitate a fruitful exchange of ideas about how to stimulate growth, restore competitiveness and expand employment.

Foreign Policy

- We must capitalize on this historic opportunity to integrate the new democracies into the West. The U.S. and EU must continue to work together to aid the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the NIS. I appreciate the EU's commitment to further integration with CEE through Association Agreements. But we must do more to ensure that reformers in the region do not lose more ground.

  -- I urge the EU to provide more market access to Central and Eastern Europe, especially in critical sectors such as agriculture, textiles, and steel. We have reduced our own barriers and those that still remain -- quotas on textiles and cheese -- are being phased out. Increased trade will bolster reformers and help stabilize economic conditions.

  -- I suggest we agree to put this on the G-7 agenda for Naples.

  -- I would like to suggest that the U.S. and EU create a joint data bank covering all private and public projects ongoing in CEE. This would provide a basis for better coordination of efforts and perhaps more joint U.S.-EU, public and private projects.

  -- I was pleased to note the EU decision, at its Copenhagen Summit, to support regional infrastructure projects in CEE. I have decided that the U.S. should do the same. We should consider cooperating to develop the communications and transportation infrastructure in the region.

  -- I want the U.S. to be represented at the April meeting in Paris to launch a European Security Pact initiative. My officials will be happy to work with yours in developing the details.

- We have watched carefully events in Russia and remain convinced of the need to continue working with Yeltsin and bolstering the forces of reform. What is your assessment of

developments in Russia following your recent meeting with Yeltsin? What do you make of the elections?

- We must continue to facilitate efforts to bring the violence and suffering in Bosnia to an end. Should the parties agree to a peace settlement, the U.S. stands ready to do its part to implement that agreement.

- We have seen great success in the Middle East this year. We value our cooperation with the EU in this area. We must now work together to provide the economic and financial foundation for further progress. We also need your help in convincing Arab countries to drop their economic boycott of Israel.

- We should explore ways of deepening U.S.-EU cooperation on the environment, human rights, narcotics, refugees, terrorism and population control.U.S.-European Relations

AMERICAN BRUSSELS
COMMUNITY EVENT

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Meeting with the American Community in Brussels

The American community in Brussels is a large one comprised mainly of people working in one of the three missions we maintain in Brussels: our bilateral mission to Belgium, and our missions to the European Union and to NATO.

U.S. Embassy Brussels. Located in the heart of Brussels, the embassy is situated near the Parc de Bruxelles and the Musee de l'Art Ancien. The embassy serves both as a bilateral embassy and as the administrative support unit for the U.S. missions to NATO (located in Evere, a suburb of Brussels) and to the European Union (located one block from the embassy).

U.S. Mission to the European Union (USEC). The United States' official relations with the European Union date back to the EC's earliest days at the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. Formal relations were established on February 18, 1953. The U.S. mission migrated from Paris to Luxembourg and eventually to Brussels as the locus of the EU's predecessor organizations changed. USEC is accredited to the European Commission and to the Council of the European Union. In addition, USEC maintains relations with all EU institutions, including, among others, the European Parliament (Strasbourg), the European Court of Justice (Luxembourg), the European Investment Bank (Luxembourg), the newly-established Committee of the Regions (Brussels), and the European Monetary Institute (Frankfurt -- precursor to a European Central Bank.

U.S. Mission to NATO. NATO Headquarters houses the permanent bodies set up to implement the Washington Treaty. Originally, NATO Headquarters was located in Paris and SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) in Rocquencourt, France. When France withdrew from NATO's integrated military structure in 1966, NATO headquarters and SHAPE were moved to Belgium. Brussels was chosen for its convenient location, ability to absorb Allied personnel without disruption of the local economy, and the willingness of the Belgian government to provide the necessary land and support. SHAPE is located at Mons, about 45 minutes south of Brussels.

NATO is guided by the North Atlantic Council (NAC), comprised of Permanent Representatives from member states that meets at the ministerial level twice yearly, as does the Defense Planning Committee (DPC) which oversees military planning. The French do not participate in the DPC or other defense planning bodies. Day to day operations are carried out by the International Staff, the Political Committee, the Military Committee and the International Military Staff. The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) General George Joulwan, directs the integrated military structure's planning, training and operations at SHAPE.

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBM NARA, Date 1/15/2020
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The NATO International structure includes NATO headquarters in Brussels, NATO agencies which are responsible for specific functional aspects of NATO's work, and NATO's International (integrated) Military Headquarters. Member nations formulate Alliance policy through their representatives in the NATO committees. There are more than 380 separate committees that report through hierarchical structures to the NAC or DPC. These committees also work with Cooperation Partners from Central and Eastern europe and the former Soviet Union under a work plan approved each year by the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. Over three thousand people of all nationalities work at NATO Headquarters including nearly 300 Americans.

CONTINGENCY BILATERAL PAPERS

CONTINGENCY BILATERAL PAPERS

President Francois Mitterrand of France

Prime Minister Jean Chretien of Canada

Prime Minister Poul Rasmussen of Denmark

Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany

Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou of Greece

Prime Minister David Oddsson of Iceland

Prime Minister Albert Reynolds of Ireland

Prime Minister Carlo Ciampi of Italy

Prime Minister Jacques Santer of Luxembourg

Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers of the Netherlands

Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland of Norway

Prime Minister Anibal Cavaco Silva of Portugal

Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez of Spain

Prime Minister Tansu Ciller of Turkey

Prime Minister John Major of the United Kingdom

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CONTINGENCY BILATERAL PAPER FOR MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT FRANCOIS MITTERRAND OF FRANCE

BACKGROUND

President Mitterrand is nearing the end of his second seven-year term. He sees France's leading role in shaping European unity as one of his primary legacies. In his discussions with you about the NATO Summit, he will underscore the importance of strengthening Europe's security and defense identity. You should express your strong support for European union and note the concrete steps we have proposed for the Summit. The CJTF will enable France to participate in military activities without joining NATO's integrated military structure. We have taken steps to strengthen the WEU by enabling it to use NATO assets when NATO chooses not to act. And we found an institutional framework for dealing with the defense aspects of proliferation in which the French are willing to participate. You should make clear that you are very pleased by increasing U.S.-French cooperation on defense matters.

Although the U.S. and France agree on the key substantive proposals for the Summit, a few details have not yet been resolved. The French would like to create a political-military body to oversee the Partnership for Peace, whereas we believe existing bodies can be adapted to provide such oversight. Paris would like to stipulate that the Partnership can operate only under a UN or CSCE mandate. We are opposed to a blanket provision of this nature. The French fear that the Partnership might undermine CSCE, whereas we see the two bodies playing complementary roles.

Prime Minister Balladur, who is expected to accompany Mitterrand to the Summit, has deferred to the President on NATO Summit proposals. Balladur has, however, carved out a niche for himself by introducing in the EU a proposal to establish a European Stability Pact. The Pact will address minority and border disputes in Central and Eastern Europe. The Prime Minister's popularity rose with the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, enhancing his political prospects. The 1995 presidential race, in which Balladur may well be a contender, will increasingly shape French foreign policy.

CORE POINTS

NATO Summit

- I am very pleased by our cooperation on defense issues and want to build on it.

- During the final months of the Uruguay Round, we saw the critical role played by our publics and legislatures. The

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same holds true for NATO: we must demonstrate at this Summit that the Alliance is relevant to post-Cold War challenges.

- I also am pleased that the Summit will give concrete support to a European Security and Defense Identity. This is in both our interests.

Uruguay Round

- We need to put the divisive Uruguay Round debate behind us and work toward finalizing and ratifying the agreement. How does the situation look in France now?

- As the Uruguay Round agreement is implemented, I believe trade issues will take on even more prominence in our bilateral relationship. This will present new opportunities for us both, but we will need to consult early on potential problems.

Nuclear Testing/CTBT

- I am pleased that we are working closely together on preparations for CTB talks in Geneva.

- I urge you to continue your moratorium on testing, which greatly enhances our ability to get a CTBT and achieve an indefinite extension of the NPT.

Bosnia

- Especially against the backdrop of the tragedy in Bosnia, we must ensure that the Partnership for Peace gets off the ground and demonstrates NATO's willingness to help build stability in Europe's east. Democratic reformers need this message to consolidate their governments.

- We believe it is counterproductive to talk about lifting the sanctions on Serbia unless the Serbs demonstrate a willingness to negotiate seriously toward a peace settlement -- a settlement that will entail Serb territorial concessions -- and follow through with implementation.

Russia

- What is your assessment of developments in Russia? What impact, if any, should the elections have on our Summit proposals?

Central and Eastern Europe

- We must do more to consolidate reform in CEE. I urge the EU to provide more market access.

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003. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	10/18/1993	P1/b(1)

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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CONTINGENCY BILATERAL PAPER FOR MEETING WITH
PRIME MINISTER JEAN CHRETIEN OF CANADA

BACKGROUND

Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien has enjoyed a remarkable honeymoon, after taking some heat in the wake of his announcement that Canada would approve NAFTA without obtaining U.S. concessions on energy. In these early months, Chretien has taken a pronounced domestic focus with a particular emphasis on reducing the large budget deficit.

On foreign affairs, Canada will continue to support the Middle East peace process and wants to become more engaged in Asia, including expanding economic truce. We have narrowed differences with Ottawa over command and control of a possible NATO peace implementation force in Bosnia and believe we can reconcile Canada's (and our) desire for UN political authority with our need for NATO command over military issues. On balance, our two foreign policies are more closely aligned than at any time sine World War II.

You will next see Chretien at the Jobs Summit and the Western Hemisphere Leaders Conference. He will also attend the 50th anniversary commemoration of the storming of Normandy Beach.

Chretien will only attend the NATO Summit.

CORE POINTS

- Thank you for your help in completing the Uruguay Round. I understand how difficult the concessions on agricultural quotas were for Quebec. Is the problem manageable?

- I hope our advisors' dialogue in the last two months shows that we take seriously your concerns with subsidies and dumping definitions. I trust we can deal with these issues satisfactorily through our bilateral dialogue and the new subsidies working group.

- We look forward to working with your government to implement NAFTA, including establishing and funding the Labor and Environmental secretariats.

- Canada has played an important role in the Alliance. I count on your support for the Summit initiatives, which were designed to ensure NATO's relevance in post-Cold-War Europe and to maintain the vital support of our publics and parliaments.

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005. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	12/17/1993	P1/b(1)

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CONTINGENCY BILATERAL PAPER FOR MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER POUL RASMUSSEN OF DENMARK

BACKGROUND

Our bilateral relations with Denmark are virtually problem-free. Prime Minister Rasmussen's coalition government is not doing well in the polls, however, reflecting economic uncertainty and high unemployment. Denmark has supported our NATO Summit proposals and (as a member of the European Union) played a constructive -- if marginal -- role in the GATT end-game.

Denmark hosts strategic U.S. facilities at Thule, Greenland. The Danes remain uneasy about potential instability in the former Soviet Union, and share with other Scandinavian countries a special interest in the Baltic states. Rasmussen sent messages of support to you in November with regard to Russian involvement in the international space station and the NAFTA vote. You last met with Rasmussen in Spring 1993 in Washington as part of the U.S.-EC consultations (the Danes were EC President at that time). Edward Elson assumed his duties as our Ambassador to Denmark in December.

Rasmussen will attend both NATO and EU events.

CORE POINTS

- I appreciated your messages of support on the space station and the NAFTA vote.
- Appointment of my good friend Ed Elson as Ambassador to Denmark reflects the high value we place on our continuing close consultations and cooperation.
- I value your support of our NATO Summit proposals, which are designed to ensure NATO's relevance to post-Cold War Europe and to maintain the vital support of our publics and parliaments.

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CONTINGENCY BILATERAL PAPER FOR MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR HELMUT KOHL OF GERMANY

BACKGROUND

Germany is beginning an election year in 1994 that will see unprecedental federal, state, local and European elections, which will end in October 1994 with the election of a new Bundestag. With little overall growth, high unemployment and rising taxes, the German economy is the number one campaign issue. Chancellor Helmut Kohl's Christian Democratic Party has suffered serious setbacks in recent weeks and his personal popularity is lagging behind that of the SPD's youthful chancellor-candidate Rudolf Scharping. While Kohl appears confident that he can win another term as Chancellor and exceed Adenauer's record term in office, there is a good chance that elections instead will result in a new coalition and a new chancellor.

Germany is perhaps our most important European partner on our highest foreign policy priority: Russia. To a large extent, Kohl shares U.S. views on helping promote reform in general, and Yeltsin in particular. He also recognizes and shares the importance we place on a successful NATO Summit. At least through October, Kohl will be our indispensable partner in coordinating U.S.-German policy.

You will visit Germany after the G-7 Summit in Naples this July. The Germans are enthusiastic about your visit. Kohl will come in Washington at the end of January to address the National Governor's Association and the two of you will have lunch.

Kohl will attend both NATO and EU Summit events.

CORE POINTS

- I appreciate Germany's support for the NATO Summit proposals.

- I am determined to work closely with you in promoting reform and stability in Russia and the other new and independent states. Vice President Gore appreciated the opportunity to consult with you on these issues in December.

- I am glad we have been able to intensify our dialogue on how best to achieve our mutual goals regarding Iran.

- I look forward to seeing you in Washington later this month and visiting you in Germany during July. I hope you understand that Berlin is a vital part of the itinerary for me in view of its importance and historic significance to Americans.

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- (IF RAISED) the Hugo Prince case is receiving a good deal of political attention in the U.S. Congress. We hope for a rapid resolution.

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009. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	12/17/1993	P1/b(1)

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CONTINGENCY PAPER FOR BILATERAL MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER ANDREAS PAPANDREOU OF GREECE

BACKGROUND

Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou was elected in October 1993. His party, PASOK, took an anti-U.S and anti-Western stance during its previous government between 1981-1989. In his first month in office, Papandreou has gone out of his way to repair the tense relationship he had with the U.S. during his previous tenure. He appreciated your offer to visit Washington, and we are working on scheduling a mutually convenient date in the first part of 1994.

Greece assumed the EU Presidency January 1, and Papandreou has stated publicly that Greece will use its presidency to address the EU's unemployment problem. Greece is also expected to try to influence events in the Balkans. In former Yugoslavia, Greece will work to have the UN sanctions on Serbia lifted and to counteract widespread international recognition of Macedonia (including nearly all EU and Nordic states) establishment of diplomatic relations with Macedonia. Papandreou continues to work hard. The GOG supports our NATO Summit initiatives.

Papandreou has designated Cyprus as Greece's most important national issue. As EU President, Greece is likely to use its position to sponsor Cyprus's application for EU membership and has pushed to establish an EU commissioner for Cyprus. Both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots have announced that they will not work with any EU representative.

Papandreou will attend the NATO Summit and he will also attend the EU Summit as EU President.

CORE POINTS

- I look forward to building on the strong U.S.-Greek relationship. I look forward to our meeting in Washington to identify areas in which our cooperative efforts can accomplish the most.

- Helping to advance prospects for setting the situation in Cyprus is an important goal of my administration. We are hopeful that with the Turkish Cypriot election behind us, All plans to resume negotiations on the Confidence Building Measures will proceed.

- I encourage you to engage in a dialogue with Skopje to come to a settlement of the issue and not permit an already unstable Balkan situation to worsen. [More to follow on our own decision regarding Macedonian recognition.

- We appreciate your support for our NATO Summit initiatives.

- [U.S. recognition of Macedonia to be provided.]

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011. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	11/23/1993	P1/b(1)

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CONTINGENCY BILATERAL PAPER FOR MEETING WITH
PRIME MINISTER DAVID ODDSSON OF ICELAND

BACKGROUND

Iceland, strategically located though small in size and population, has been an important constant for U.S. and NATO defense planning throughout the Cold War. Our most important bilateral issue is the proposed drawdown of the F-15 fighter squadron from Keflavik Naval Air Station. The GOI opposes the withdrawal on the grounds that it would leave Iceland (which has no military) without a credible defense. Discussions on this issue are ongoing; we hope that it will soon be resolved. Other topics of concern to Iceland include international whaling policy and the impact of GATT on Iceland's economy, which has suffered from several years of slow or negative growth.

Oddsson will attend only the NATO Summit.

CORE POINTS

- The U.S. remains firmly committed to Iceland's defense. We appreciate your willingness to consider modifications to our existing security arrangements as we work together to define the best ways to maintain your defense and that of the North Atlantic in the post-Cold War environment.

- I value your support of the NATO Summit initiatives which were designed to ensure NATO's relevance to post-Cold War Europe and to maintain the vital support of our publics and parliaments.

- I enjoyed meeting Ambassador Benediktsson last month when he presented his credentials.

- How do you see Iceland's economic prospects following the conclusion of the GATT round?

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	12/17/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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FOLDER TITLE:
POTUS Briefing Books-POTUS Trip to Belgium, January 9-11, 1994 [2]

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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CONTINGENCY BILATERAL PAPER FOR MEETING WITH
PRIME MINISTER ALBERT REYNOLDS OF IRELAND

BACKGROUND

Irish Prime Minister Reynolds remains heavily engaged in peace efforts in Northern Ireland. He will want to apprise you of developments in the wake of the Joint Major-Reynolds declaration of December 15. They have been pleased with the flexibility you have recently indicated on the issue of granting a visa for Gerry Adams (our position is that if Adams renounces violence and takes steps to join the political process, we will be prepared to take a new look at the rationale for a waiver the next time he applies for a U.S. visa). You will want to hear his views, but deflect pressure (if any) on this point until we receive a formal request from Adams and until developments following the Joint Declaration are clearer.

Reynolds is also interested in NATO Summit proposals and U.S. policy toward Somalia, where the Irish have made an important humanitarian a contribution. Ireland will hold the EU Presidency during the planned 1996 inter-governmental conference which will examine next steps on the European Security issues. Reynolds is particularly interested in U.S. views on European security and the role of NATO and the WEU.

Reynolds will only attend the U.S.-EU Working Lunch.

CORE POINTS

- I am very pleased to see the commitment and progress you and John Major demonstrated by issuing your joint declaration. The U.S. stands solidly in support of the process you have outlined. Where do you go from here?

- I understand your interest in general European security issues has been growing along with a possibly greater role for Ireland. We look forward to cooperating with you in this area as the European security structure evolves.

- (IF RAISED) I remain committed to the withdrawal plan from Somalia to which the Congress and I agreed. We will continue to work with the UN on ensuring that an adequate support structure is in place upon our departure. We will remain engaged in humanitarian, reconstruction and development efforts and in promoting reconciliation among Somalis while recognizing that the future of the country lies in the hands of the Somalis themselves.

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1.4c, 3.5c

Albert REYNOLDS **IRELAND**

Prime Minister (since 1992)

Addressed as: Taoiseach (tee-shuk) or Prime Minister

©

A self-made millionaire, Albert Reynolds once told the press that politics and business are about the same thing: success. Since entering the political arena, he has risen rapidly through Fianna Fail and government ranks to attain his lifelong desire to be premier. He has earned a reputation as a savvy, nuts-and-bolts operator with an ability to get things done and has gained the respect of civil servants for his energy, dedication, and pragmatism. Political and media pundits have dismissed his style as "cowboyism dressed up as entrepreneurship"; charges that he is a shortcut artist who is too willing to be all things to all people were amplified by his pie-in-the-sky promises of massive spending increases on job creation during the November 1992 general election campaign. Nevertheless, despite Fianna Fail's worst defeat at the polls since 1927, Reynolds defied predictions that he would have the shortest premiership in the Irish Republic's history. A consummate politician, he engineered a political miracle in securing a second term by forming a new coalition government with his rival, Labor Party leader (and now Deputy Prime Minister) Dick Spring. Press reports indicate Reynolds has forged a good working relationship with Spring despite initial mutual distrust. 3.5c

1.4c, 1.4d, 3.5c

Maintaining a Modest Profile

Reynolds, who has had more than his share of bad press, probably remains conscious of the possibility of being upstaged by the more popular Spring 1.4c, 1.4d he has maintained a relatively low media profile since being reelected 1.4c, 1.4d the Prime Minister remained quiet during the currency crisis in January 1993 that led to the government's decision to devalue the punt, leaving Finance Minister Bertie Ahern to defend the government's policy. 3.5c

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1.4c, 3.5c

(continued)

The Northern Ireland Question

Reynolds has delegated overall responsibility for formulating policy on Northern Ireland to Spring (who also serves as Foreign Minister); nevertheless, as a member of the Cabinet committee on Northern Ireland—which includes Spring and Justice Minister Maire Geoghegan-Quinn—the Prime Minister retains a strong voice on the issue. He has assured Fianna Fail members that he will be "fully on top of any arrangements that are made." On 14 December 1993 Reynolds capitalized on his ties to Major- 1.4c, 1.4d -to forge a joint declaration that provides a framework for talks on resolving the ongoing bloody conflict in Northern Ireland. (The formal statement was based in large part on Spring's six-point plan for peace presented to the Irish Parliament in October 1993.) The collaboration of Reynolds and Major—both consensus-oriented pragmatists—suggests that the talks have a better chance than ever of succeeding. Reynolds is almost certainly aware, however, that success could exact a greater political price than failure: seeking approval for an agreement—and by extension, his leadership—from the traditionally nationalist Fianna Fail members could cost him his job 3.5c

From Dancehalls to the Dail

Reynolds was born on 3 November 1935. He was educated at Summerhill College, and, after leaving school, he worked as a clerk for Ireland's public transportation authority before moving into private business. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, Reynolds operated a chain of dancehalls, at the time an elegant and popular form of entertainment; he eventually sold his part of the business to purchase a meat-processing firm. By the early 1970s he had founded and become a director of C and D Pet Foods, which produces gourmet pet foods. After serving several years in local politics, Reynolds was elected to the Dail in 1977. Two years later, he was appointed Minister for Transportation and for Posts and Telegraphs. In 1982 Reynolds served briefly as Minister for Industry and Energy before his party was relegated to opposition by a Fine Gael victory. While in opposition, he was spokesman on industry and employment (1983-85) and on energy (1985-87). He held the Industry and Commerce portfolio during 1987-88 and served as Minister for Finance—traditionally the second-most-important post in the Cabinet after the premiership—from 1988 until he was ousted by then Prime Minister Charles Haughey in November 1991. Three months later, Reynolds was elected leader of Fianna Fail, succeeding Haughey as prime minister 3.5c

Reynolds likes to swim and to sing (he once performed in a band); he particularly enjoys country-western music. According to the press, he is a diabetic and neither smokes nor drinks.

1.4c, 1.4d

Married to the former Kathleen Coen, whom he met at a dance, Reynolds has five daughters and two sons. 3.5c

17 December 1993

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CONTINGENCY BILATERAL PAPER FOR MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER CARLO CIAMPI OF ITALY

BACKGROUND

Parliamentary elections (expected in Spring 1994) will likely end Ciampi's technocratic government and would yield a coalition led by the ex-communist Party of the Democratic Left (PDS). The PDS has signalled it will continue to support the NATO Alliance as well as European security structures, close bilateral cooperation, privatization and economic reforms and use of Italian military facilities by NATO. Italy will merit greater American attention since future governments will be more self-absorbed and more Europe-centered.

You last saw Ciampi when he visited Washington in September, 1993. You have spoken on the phone several times.

Ciampi will attend both NATO and EU events.

CORE POINTS

- The NATO Summit initiatives are critical for the Alliance's future. We seek Italy's continued strong support for a revamped NATO.

- I look forward to visiting Italy this summer. You will have our strong support during your CSCE Chairmanship and G-7 Presidency.

- A streamlined G-7 is appealing. We should continue to work closely with Russia without offering membership. I value your active support for the G-7 Jobs Conference.

- The United States values Italy's constructive international role. It is important that Italy continue to shoulder its responsibilities. Peacekeeping and developmental assistance are two areas of special interest. In war-torn lands such as Somalia, Mozambique and Nagorno-Karabakh, your efforts can make a critical difference.

- FBI Director Freeh's trip to Italy demonstrates our resolve to combat organized crime. The FBI and Treasury Department will bolster cooperation in law enforcement and judicial assistance.

- We need to consolidate the gains of the Uruguay Round -- and to make further progress on audio-visual, steel, energy and market access. Intellectual property rights remain a high priority for the U.S. I commend your efforts against video/software piracy and urge continued aggressive action.

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- I am heartened that Italy has embarked on privatization. U.S. firms want to be part of Italy's economic growth and are bidding on several telecommunications ventures and the Nuovo Pignone company.

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017. report	U.S. Government Report [partial] (2 pages)	11/19/1993	P1/b(1)

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1.4c, 3.5c

Carlo Azeglio CIAMPI
(Phonetic: CHAHMpec)

ITALY

Prime Minister (since April 1993)

Addressed as: Mr. Prime Minister

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PER E. O. 13526

2016-0134-M (1.31)
2/27/2017 KBH

Unexpectedly chosen as a transitional prime minister because of his integrity, apolitical status, and financial acumen, former central banker Carlo Azeglio Ciampi has largely succeeded in leading corruption-weary Italians toward a more accountable political system and a more efficient economy. In addition to pressing Parliament to adopt new electoral laws mandated by a national referendum in April 1993, he has engineered emergency austerity measures, helped broker a crucial labor-management compact, and laid out preliminary privatization plans for several key state enterprises. 3.5c

Ciampi has repeatedly vowed to step down after his budget passes and new voting mechanisms are reasonably in place; he will probably remain in office, at least as a caretaker, until spring 1994. His earnest, forthright style has gained him considerable stature with the public, but the Italians' cumulative frustrations with scandal and recession appear to be catching up with him. Not surprisingly, his popularity has suffered as the details of his economic program have angered those who will be pinched by spending cuts and alienated critics who want sharper limits on government programs and bureaucracy. 3.5c

And Then There Was One?

Ciampi, whose selection as Prime Minister was engineered by President Oscar Luigi Scalfaro, initially drew heavily on the institutional prestige of the presidency and Scalfaro's widely perceived integrity to reinforce his own credibility. Ciampi kept in continual contact with Scalfaro—who had in many respects become the guardian and symbol of Italy's national image—and a typical Italian press account portrayed the relationship as an eminently civilized exchange by two "gentlemen of the old school" charged with rescuing the future of Italy. But Ciampi's ability to rely on the President's moral authority was severely diminished in autumn 1993, when detailed allegations by state witnesses gave substance to persistent rumors about the Scalfaro's complicity in illegal activity while he was Minister of the Interior. 3.5c

A Modest Patriot At Center Stage

1.4c, 1.4d

He almost certainly considered the prime-ministership a serendipitous chance to help establish the stable, morally accountable system he had long advocated. Having scolded fiscally irresponsible politicians for over a decade, Ciampi—who headed the Bank of Italy (BOI) from 1979 until April 1993—is deeply committed to removing the complex 1.4c, 1.4d web of relationships between government and business. He supports a smaller role for state-owned companies, more opportunities for independent entrepreneurs, and a stronger ethic of honesty and civic responsibility throughout the business community. Despite his understandable preoccupation with the

1.4c, 3.5c

(continued)

economy, he has kept the fight against the Mafia high on the government's agenda; he has suggested that the problem of international organized crime receive significant attention at the G-7 summit in Naples in July 1994 3.5c

Able To Play Hardball

Ciampi has a record of steadfast leadership under fire, and 1.4c turned the scandal-plagued BOI into what is widely regarded as one of Italy's most effective institutions. By most accounts, he has successfully adapted the calm, deliberate style that characterized his tenure there to the faster pace of political life. With the system in disarray, Ciampi has seized the opportunity to ignore political convention. Most notably, he has run his administration without the usual heavyhanded guidance of once-omnipotent party chieftains. 3.5c

Image Is Reality

Ciampi has largely overcome his lack of a traditional power base by cutting the figure of a septuagenarian Boy Scout, an image observers say closely reflects the real man 1.4c, 1.4d During World War II he was a member of the Italian resistance, and later he helped found the Partito d'Azione, a stillborn political movement in which he probably invested a large measure of youthful idealism. Throughout his career, Ciampi has conspicuously shunned the trappings that help constitute la dolce vita for other privileged Italians. Press reports note that, during meetings of European Central Bank Governors, he was known for passing up five-star international hotels, paying his own bill, and carrying his own luggage. Ciampi, in fact, refused to accept his Governor's salary and lived on his (lesser) pension as a former BOI director general. He neither drinks nor smokes and obeys stop lights and speed limits 1.4c, 1.4d 1.4c, 1.4d In meetings, he can be expected to project a gentlemanly demeanor and an old-school sense of propriety and correctness, but he is neither stuffy nor humorless.

1.4c, 1.4d, 3.5c

Ciampi and the United States

The powerful ethic of duty and responsibility that drives Ciampi's focus on his domestic challenges is also likely, in our view, to motivate him to carefully tend bilateral relations with the United States. The traditionally strong ties between Rome and Washington loom large in Italy's post–World War II identity and represent the sort of obligation that the Prime Minister characteristically approaches seriously—and personally 1.4c he has "always been friendly and open to discussions with Americans" and speaks English well. 3.5c

Career and Personal Data

Ciampi was born in the port city of Livorno on 9 December 1920. He served in the Army during World War II, earning a military cross. He holds a degree in literature and a law degree from the University of Pisa (1946). In the four decades he was with the Bank, he served as central director, secretary general, vice general manager, and general manager, as well as Governor. He speaks English and German. 3.5c

Ciampi and his wife, Fracesca Pilla, have a son, Claudio, and a daughter, Gabriella; he reportedly dotes on his granddaughter, Maria. 1.4c he relishes family weekends at his vacation house in the seaside village of Santa Severa (not far from Rome), where he takes time to row, bicycle, play cards, and talk to neighbors 3.5c

19 November 1993

CONTINGENCY BILATERAL PAPER FOR MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER JACQUES SANTER OF LUXEMBOURG

BACKGROUND

For a country with a population of only 250,000, Luxembourg plays an active and surprisingly prominent role on the European stage. It is heavily involved on the full range of European integration issues, where it seeks to preserve a role for smaller EU member states, even as the Union grows. The GOL has long been active in the search for a peaceful resolution of the crisis in ex-Yugoslavia and has been quick in providing troops for UNPROFOR contingents there. A charter member of the EU, both the government and population of Luxembourg are strongly pro-American. The country hosts significant U.S. private investment, especially in the banking and services sectors. Luxembourg currently chairs the Western European Union and has made close coordination with the U.S. a major objective of its tenure there.

Santer will attend both NATO and EU events.

CORE POINTS

- The U.S. is grateful for Luxembourg's strong and unwavering support for the trans-Atlantic partnership.
- The Luxembourg Presidency of the WEU has resulted in a European pillar compatible with NATO.
- The U.S. appreciates Luxembourg's ongoing contribution of troops and funding to UNPROFOR.
- We are grateful for Luxembourg's help in producing a successful GATT agreement.
- The first round of negotiations for an updated bilateral tax treaty made sound progress, which we hope will continue.

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CONTINGENCY PAPER FOR MEETING WITH
PRIME MINISTER RUUD LUBBERS OF THE NETHERLANDS

BACKGROUND

The Netherlands is approaching a pivotal period in its domestic and international orientation. Historically activist in international political affairs and vigorously entrepreneurial in foreign trade, the Dutch view with foreboding the West's inability to resolve the conflict in Bosnia and to manage trade disputes better. The GATT agreement should moderate some Dutch concern.

Arguably the most committed Atlanticist of all, the Dutch are consistently supportive of U.S. positions on both trade and security and have been willing to make that support known. In turn, the Dutch seek reassurances concerning the U.S. commitment to Europe and the relative position of Europe in U.S. foreign policy. On the bilateral front, two U.S. companies -- Bell and McDonnell-Douglas -- are bidding for a $830 million contract to supply the Dutch military with up to 40 attack helicopters for its new airmobile brigade. You may wish to use an informal opportunity to encourage the selection of a U.S. company.

You will have met with Lubbers in Washington (a long-standing request of his) a few days before your trip. Lubbers will attend both NATO and EU events.

CORE POINTS

- We appreciate the Netherlands' steadfast support for the trans-Atlantic partnership.

- We have realized significant bilateral achievements this year, including formal agreements in taxation and civil aviation.

- We welcome your continuing commitment to the highest standards of equipment as you modernize your military forces. As you look to modernize your helicopter force, we believe our attack helicopters offer the finest combination of capability, quality and durability available.

- The Senate is expected to conclude soon the confirmation process for Ambassador-Designate Dornbush. I have great confidence in his abilities to serve as my representative to The Netherlands.

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CONTINGENCY BILATERAL PAPER FOR MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER GRO HARLEM BRUNDTLAND OF NORWAY

BACKGROUND

Norway continues to engage many U.S. interests, including the Middle East Peace Process, reform in Russia and environmental issues. Prime Minister Brundtland did well in September's parliamentary elections, but her efforts to promote Norwegian membership in the European Union are not finding much public support. As the only NATO ally bordering Russia, Norway is looking for reassurance that trans-Atlantic security ties are as firm as ever. Brundtland was disappointed that your schedule did not permit a stop in Oslo in January. Norway hosts the Winter Olympics in February. The U.S. will send all official Presidential delegation. Whaling remains a potential sore spot in our relations but we have both agreed to work within the International Whaling Commission to find a science-based management scheme for whale harvesting. Tom Loftus assumed his duties as Ambassador in Oslo in November. Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Holst, which was central to the Israeli-PLO breakthrough, suffered a stroke in mid-December.

Brundtland will attend the NATO Summit only.

CORE POINTS

- Thank you for the continued involvement and support that you and Foreign Minister Holst have provided on the Middle East, particularly your work with Arafat.

- As demonstrated by Deputy Secretary of Defense Perry's visit to Norway in December, we intend to consult closely with you as we together reconfigure security arrangements to reflect post-Cold War realities.

- I value your support of our NATO Summit proposals, which are designed to ensure NATO's relevance to the challenges of post-Cold War Europe and maintain the support of our publics and parliaments.

- I wish you good luck with the Winter Olympics.

- In naming Tom Loftus as my Ambassador to Norway, I have placed at your disposal a close friend and adviser.

- (If Raised) Whaling remains a politically sensitive issue for all of us. We will want to consult with you to avoid having misunderstandings on this issue cloud our bilateral relations.

- (As appropriate) I hope Johan is well on his way to recovery.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
023. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	09/24/1993	P1/b(1)

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FOLDER TITLE:
POTUS Briefing Books-POTUS Trip to Belgium, January 9-11, 1994 [2]

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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CONTINGENCY BILATERAL PAPER FOR MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER ANIBAL CAVACO SILVA OF PORTUGAL

BACKGROUND

Current relations with Portugal are dominated by ongoing negotiations for continued U.S. access to the Lajes (LA jess) air base in the Azores.

Prime Minister Cavaco Silva postponed an early November visit to open an exhibit of Portuguese Baroque Art at the National Gallery, in part because of difficulty in obtaining a meeting with you. He would like to make a visit as early as possible in 1994.

Cavaco Silva will attend both NATO and EU Summit events.

CORE POINTS

- Our negotiations over Lajes are important and mutually beneficial. I hope those talks will soon conclude successfully and permit us to continue our long tradition of security partnership.

- I count on your support for the NATO Summit initiatives.

- Angola: I am delighted by the close U.S.-Portugal-Russia cooperation and by its success in pushing the peace process forward. Together we must encourage UNITA and the Angolan government to reach a viable compromise on the crucial question of power sharing.

- East Timor: We remain concerned about human rights in East Timor and raise our concerns with the government of Indonesia. [Note: our policy is to accept the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia, although no valid act of self-determination took place.]

- Tax Treaty: We should conclude our bilateral tax treaty negotiations. Portugal is the only member of the European Union with which we have no tax treaty.

(IF RAISED)

- I am sorry we were not able to meet in Washington last November. I hope we can arrange a convenient date in the near future.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
025. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	11/09/1993	P1/b(1)

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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CONTINGENCY BILATERAL PAPER FOR MEETING WITH
PRIME MINISTER FELIPE GONZALEZ OF SPAIN

BACKGROUND

Gonzalez is keen to build on the mutual success of his visit to Washington in December. He remains preoccupied with socio-economic issues, including economic growth and job creation. He will also want to continue your dialogue on trans-Atlantic cooperation and may raise areas of concern ranging from the Balkans to the Maghreb to Cuba.

Gonzalez will attend both NATO and EU Summit events.

CORE POINTS

- As was demonstrated in Washington, our countries' relationship has never been better.

- I thank you for support of our NATO Summit proposals. We designed them to ensure NATO's relevance and to maintain public confidence in the Alliance.

- We admire and applaud your continued active involvement in NATO, at the UN, in the EU and in support of Western initiatives in regional trouble spots. Your contribution to UNPROFOR in Bosnia is especially valuable.

- We would very much like consideration to be given to U.S. competitors in the bid to market cellular phones in Spain.

- Let us maintain our close consultations in areas of mutual concern, particularly in Latin America and the Maghreb.

- I'm very pleased that you have gotten to know Richard Gardner. He's doing a great job for us.

(IF RAISED)

- Nicaragua: We applaud your support for military reform and count on your continuing efforts.

- Cuba: We remain convinced that real democratization and true progress in human rights is necessary for improvement in U.S. relations with Cuba.

- [Point to be provided on status of Jack Valenti's film deal]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
027. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	11/22/1993	P1/b(1)

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FOLDER TITLE:
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2016-0134-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

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CONTINGENCY BILATERAL PAPER FOR MEETING
WITH PRIME MINISTER TANSU CILLER OF TURKEY

BACKGROUND

Elected in July 1993, Ciller met with you at the White House on October 18, 1993. She believes you made a commitment at that meeting to give significant new aid to Turkey in compensation for Iraqi embargo losses. Following up your discussion, we have had extensive talks with the Turks on a range of issues involving greater economic cooperation.

Ciller places the economy at the top of her agenda and looks to us for help. Her willingness to relax Iraqi sanctions shows a readiness to reorient Turkish foreign policy for economic ends, even at some risk to relations with the U.S. and others. On the pipeline, the Turks are unhappy with our decision not to agree to an arrangement that did not strictly conform to the requirements of UN Security Council Resolutions. However, the December U.S.-Turkey Joint Economic Commission meeting in Ankara was a success and has laid the framework for an expanded dialogue on EXIM, OPIC, trade and other issues.

Your travel to Europe may come at just the time the UN hopes to reignite the stalled negotiations on Cyprus. The Turks have been extremely supportive of efforts to move forward, and you will want to encourage Ciller to maintain momentum toward winning agreement on the Confidence Building Measures.

Ciller's government supported the extension of Provide Comfort, which the Turkish Parliament approved December 25 with a vote of 196-160. You should acknowledge Ciller's role in this vote.

Ciller will only attend the NATO Summit.

CORE POINTS

- We count on your support for the NATO Summit initiatives.
- We appreciate your governments efforts on extending Provide Comfort.
- Maintaining UN sanctions on Iraq is essential for regional security as long as Iraq fails to comply with all of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. While we are not prepared to compromise the sanctions regime, we will support flushing the pipeline within existing resolutions.
- We will continue looking for ways to help Turkey economically. The work of the Joint Economic Council was a useful first step. We particularly want to help you take advantage of the $5 billion EXIM has identified for use on projects in Turkey.

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- We support your struggle against the PKK, but urge you to respect the human rights of your citizens and to launch political initiatives toward moderate Kurds.

- Resolving the situation in Cyprus is important to us. With the elections in the North behind us, we will need you to push the Turkish Cypriot to an early resumption of the dialogue on the Confidence building measures package.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
029. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	10/05/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
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Records Management
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CONTINGENCY BILATERAL PAPER FOR MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER JOHN MAJOR OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

BACKGROUND

Despite the significant end-of-year breakthroughs on Northern Ireland and GATT, 1993 was a bad year for Britain and for John Major. At year's end, real GDP was on course for an annual growth rate of almost two percent, but unemployment remains stubbornly above ten percent. Major standing in the polls has fallen sharply.

British leaders remain nervous about the U.S. commitment to Europe and to close Anglo-American relations in particular. We have traditionally encouraged the British line of argument that their respective ties to the U.S. and Europe are not a zero-sum game and that a Britain securely at the high table of Europe is very much in U.S. interests. But at a time of growing doubts about American engagement in Europe, the British are also wary about the potential for Franco-German entente to drive European decisions to the detriment of core British interests. The British consequently hedge their bets, for example, by leaning farther than we would like toward accommodating European, particularly French, points of view.

John Major's agenda for early 1994 is an ambitious one, with important implications for the U.S. He has surprised all sides by his personal investment in the high-risk effort to break the long, bloody stalemate of Northern Ireland. He hopes to exploit the GATT agreement to secure a British export boom which in turn will fuel a more robust British recovery. And he will likely work hard to assure that changes in NATO serve to reanchor the U.S. in Europe and revalidate British credentials as a key link in the trans-Atlantic alliance.

You will travel to England in June in connection with World War II commemoration events. Major is aware of your interest to spend some time in Oxford during your June trip to England.

Major will attend both NATO and EU events.

CORE POINTS

- I admire the vision and courage you and Albert Reynolds have shown on Northern Ireland. How can the U.S. be of greatest help?
- I count on your support for the NATO Summit initiatives.
- [I look forward to seeing you in Washington in a few weeks.]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
031. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	12/17/1993	P1/b(1)

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ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION

ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND MATERIAL

NATO and the Former Yugoslavia

NATO and Proliferation

NATO Expansion

North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)

European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)

Overview of U.S.-EU Trade Issues

European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy: Ambitions and Prospects

European Union Role in Central and Eastern Europe and Russia/NIS

The European Union's Stability Pact Initiative

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NATO AND THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Status of NATO Planning: NATO military authorities have updated plans originally drafted to implement the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. Unresolved issues include finalizing agreement with the French on command and control of a NATO implementation force.

Airstrikes: The NAC decided in August that airstrikes would be launched if necessary to relieve the strangulation of Sarajevo and other towns controlled by the Bosnian government. The NAC would approve air strikes in response to strangulation. Airstrikes can also be used to protect UNPROFOR should UNPROFOR request Close Air Support. The UN Secretary General must approve the initial airstrike in either case.

Since NATO's August warning Serb shelling of Muslin-majority towns and interference with the relief effort has markedly decreased but not ended. To date, UNPROFOR has not requested Close Air Support.

No-Fly Enforcement: At U.S. urging, NATO undertook to enforce the UNSC's no-fly resolution over Bosnia. All three parties have violated the no-fly prohibition. The difficulty of distinguishing which aircraft are performing military missions and which carrying wounded civilians, as well as the fact that most are short-flight helicopters, has prevented more forceful NATO action.

Sanctions Enforcement in the Adriatic: Begun in the summer of 1992, this operation combines NATO and WEU efforts. Approximately 20 ships are involved. The U.S. contributes 2-3 cruiser/destroyer type ships and one nuclear-powered attack submarine.

Implementing an Agreement: We have told the Allies that the U.S. remains willing to work with NATO and the UN to help implement a viable settlement acceptable to all three sides. We have said that we welcome and encourage Congressional authorization for such participation. We developed the following conditions in the context of the Vance/Owen/Stoltenberg plans:

- o A viable agreement reached by all the Bosnian parties.
  - -- Terms all parties respect.
  - -- Adequate implementation provisions.
  - -- A joint, formal request by all the parties that NATO, under UN authorization, help implement and enforce the agreement.

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- o Clear signs that the parties intend to honor the agreement.
  - -- Substantial diminution of hostilities.
  - -- Limited, advance NATO deployments will help the agreement get off the ground by signalling our seriousness, while phasing of subsequent deployments will give the opportunity to assess the parties' intentions.
- o The operation must be under the political authority of the United Nations, which will ask NATO to assume responsibility for military aspects of implementation.
- o There must be a clear time limit to NATO's responsibility.
  - -- NATO would accept the tasking from the UNSC for a fixed time -- perhaps up to two years -- with a possibility for review at the end of one year.
  - -- At the end of the two year period, the responsibility will revert to the UN.
  - -- Draw-downs in force levels <u>might</u> be possible over this period.
- o NATO will exercise command and control over all military forces (including those from non-NATO states).
- o NATO commanders will operate in close consultation with UN civilian authorities.
  - -- NATO planning provides for UN civilian representatives to request a temporary delay in a military action if necessary to protect civilian workers.
  - -- However, NATO commanders will take their orders from the NAC via the NATO chain of Command -- not from UN civilian officials.
- o The UN must accept the Concept of Operations and Rules of Engagement (ROE) developed by NATO.
  - -- Agreed ROE that make clear to all an agreement will be enforced.
  - -- Military commanders may use all necessary force for self-defense and for implementation of the peace plan.
- o Others must provide more than half of the total force.
- o Funding arrangements acceptable to the U.S. must be agreed.

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NATO AND PROLIFERATION

The U.S. has proposed (and the Allies generally agree) that NATO strengthen and expand its response to the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Summit declaration will launch this effort by: (1) acknowledging that proliferation is a growing threat to NATO members; (2) calling on the Alliance to combat proliferation within its area of competence, focusing on the task's political and defense dimensions; and (3) outlining the institutional framework for proceeding within NATO.

NATO will not duplicate efforts underway in other forums (e.g., export control initiatives and negotiations of agreements such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and fissile material cutoff), but will focus on a political and defense agenda tailored to its membership and its mission -- protecting the security of Alliance members.

We recently agreed with the French on an overall policy framework that will secure their participation in NATO efforts against proliferation, which is significant in light of the important role that France plays in international nonproliferation efforts more generally. There will be two groups with separate and co-equal status: (1) A Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation, chaired by a member of NATO's International Staff, will develop and implement NATO'S overall approach. It will include representatives of both defense and foreign ministries, including experts from national capitals; and (2) a Defense Group on Proliferation, co-chaired by the U.S. (permanently) and a European ally (on a rotating basis) will work on defense aspects of proliferation. When the two groups meet together they will be called the Joint Committee on Proliferation and be chaired by a member of NATO's International Staff. Both groups will report to the North Atlantic Council.

Allies will consult about emerging threats and possible political responses (e.g., demarches, interdiction of supplies, economic sanctions, political isolation). They also will discuss major nonproliferation issues bearing on NATO, such as negative security assurances, export control assistance for NACC partners and dismantlement.

Given NATO's essential security mission and its comparative advantage (relative to other international fora) in addressing defense aspects of proliferation, military elements will be the primary focus of detailed attention. Defense officials will consider possible adjustments, required by the emerging proliferation threat, to military doctrine, plans and force structure. We anticipate that they will look initially at such areas as theater missile defenses, passive defenses (e.g., protective suits and battlefield detection gear), missile early warning assets and intelligence sharing networks. Discussions could lead to improvements both in national forces and in NATO's integrated military structure.

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NATO EXPANSION

Article X of the NATO Treaty provides that the Allies "may, by unanimous consent, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty." NATO expanded to include Greece and Turkey in 1951, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1954 and Spain in 1981.

Since the collapse of the Soviet bloc, many new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union have stated a desire to join NATO. During the Bush Administration and at the Athens NATO Ministerial meeting in June 1993, U.S. policy was to declare that NATO was not in principle closed to new members, but expansion was not yet on the agenda.

Yeltsin's statements in Warsaw and Prague in August 1993 -- that Russia would not oppose Polish or Czech membership in NATO if it was part of a process of pan-European integration in which Russia also participated -- were interpreted by CEE states as a "green light" for NATO expansion. Although the statements were quickly qualified by Russian officials (including Yeltsin in his September 15 letter to you), the political effect of his remarks was to highlight expansion as a Summit issue.

U.S. policy on expansion was set out in Secretary Christopher's October 19 letter to NATO foreign ministers:

- The Summit should declare that NATO would welcome expansion through an evolutionary process, but it should not identify particular prospective members, spell out precise membership criteria, or establish a specific timetable for expansion.

- Our goal is to give pro-Western forces in Central Europe a Summit result they will see as a significant step forward by NATO and can portray at home as a victory, while at the same time limiting the ability of anti-Western forces in Russia and elsewhere to portray NATO expansion as a threat.

- The Partnership for Peace will qualitatively transform NATO's relationship with eastern states and help partners prepare for NATO membership. However, participation will not guarantee NATO membership.

The Summit will adopt our inclusive approach which anticipates and welcomes NATO expansion, leaves open the possibility of eventual admission of Russia and Ukraine as well as CEE states, and keeps decisions in NATO's hands, with no Russian "veto." But some allies (e.g., the UK, Germany, the Netherlands) want over time to "differentiate" more, favoring CEE states already in line to join the European Union. The CEE states (especially Poland and Hungary) continue to want a clearer sign they can eventually join NATO. Yeltsin welcomed our Summit proposals and wants to ensure that Russia is not left out when NATO expands.

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NORTH ATLANTIC COOPERATION COUNCIL (NACC)

The NACC was established at the Rome NATO Summit in November 1991 on the basis of a U.S.-German initiative. By bringing the countries of NATO and the former Warsaw Pact together and fostering political dialogue and practical cooperation, it plays an important role in drawing the states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union into the Euro-Atlantic community.

The NACC also gives these states a common security anchor in Western structures and provides an instrument for addressing some of their most immediate security concerns.

The NACC helps reinforce NATO's central role in ensuring European stability. It also provides a useful forum for addressing political and military issues in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and has helped to discourage the formation of competing alliances in the region. The NACC is an important tool for encouraging among NATO's former adversaries the same habits of dialogue and cooperation that exist within NATO.

Of particular importance to the U.S. is NACC cooperation in peacekeeping. This is a critical area for European security and a key field for substantive -- particularly military-to-military -- cooperation. Our proposed "Partnership for Peace" will be established within the framework of the NACC, but will also be open to other European states as agreed by the Allies. It will build on work already underway in the NACC and its Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping.

NACC cooperation is not limited to peacekeeping. The NACC also fosters contacts among military and civilian officials and promotes cooperation in such areas as defense planning, budgeting and procurement, defense-related environmental problems, civil-military relations and the role of the military in democratic societies and air traffic management and air defense. These and other programs are set out in the 1994 NACC Work Plan approved by NATO Foreign Ministers on December 3.

In the past, France objected to a more active or operational role for the NACC, largely in order to restrict NATO's political role in post-Cold War Europe. Paris has become much more cooperative in recent months, however. The primary concern NACC now faces is funding. Summit initiatives for enhanced NACC activities, including the Partnership for Peace, will require approximately $8-10 million in new funds over the first two years. Our share would be $2-2.5 million. The UK and Belgium have been most vocal in opposing any increases in NATO budgets.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY (ESDI)

NATO's 1991 Rome Summit Declaration recognized that it was for the European Allies concerned to determine the arrangements needed for a common European foreign and security policy and defense role as part of the process of European integration. Allies also agreed that the development of a European security and defense identity (ESDI) should further strengthen NATO's European pillar and thus reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Alliance. NATO's continuing adaptation and the development of ESDI should be mutually reinforcing processes marked by transparency and complementary.

The Maastricht Treaty tasks the Western European Union (WEU) to implement decisions of the Union that have defense implications. There is potential tension between the WEU's role as the defense component of the European Union and its role as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance. France and, to a lesser extent, Spain and Italy stress the WEU's "European" vocation, as opposed to its role as part of a broader alliance. Our challenge is to accommodate the aspirations of West Europeans to assume greater responsibility for their own security, avoid wasteful duplication and competition with NATO and keep the trans-Atlantic security relationship strong.

As the WEU has become more active, NATO's cooperation with it has increased. Since the summer of 1992, NATO and the WEU have been monitoring and enforcing United Nations sanctions against Serbia/Montenegro in the Adriatic Sea. The United States has strongly supported WEU assistance to Danube riparian states in stopping illegal river traffic to Serbia.

The Bush Administration was ambivalent about ESDI. We fully support European integration -- including a European Security and Defense Identity. At our initiative, the NATO Summit will agree in principle that the WEU can use NATO assets and will adapt NATO's military structure to facilitate the formation of European forces that could undertake both NATO and non-NATO missions. This Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, in which non-NATO operations could be conducted under a WEU or other multilateral command, would serve the purposes of European integration and lead to a more equitable balance of leadership and responsibility between the U.S. and its European Allies.

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OVERVIEW OF U.S.-EU TRADE ISSUES

While the completion of the Uruguay Round resolved many trade issues, a number of outstanding problems remain:

Government Procurement/Telecommunications: We resolved the dispute over the EU's discriminatory government procurement practices in the area of heavy electrical equipment in 1992. However, the EU continues to discriminate in the procurement of telecommunications equipment.

Implementation of Blair House Accord: In addition to the agricultural issues covered in the Uruguay Round, Blair House required the EU to provide greater market access for U.S. oilseeds and corn gluten feed. The EU has yet to implement fully these provisions.

Unresolved Uruguay Round Issues: The Uruguay Round deferred a number of issues, including the completion of a Multilateral Steel Agreement (MSA) and the multilateralization of the U.S.-EU Aircraft Agreement. In addition, we agreed to continue talking about the liberalization of maritime services. We also must decide how to proceed on audio-visual issues.

Energy Charter: After more than 2 years of negotiation, the U.S., EU, Eastern Europe and the NIS have yet to produce an agreement on energy, trade and investment. These negotiations were initiated by the EU; the U.S. later joined in to ensure U.S. companies were not excluded from a trade/investment regime for NIS energy resources. Now, the EU is looking to the U.S. for leadership to complete the negotiations.

EU Enlargement: The accession of additional countries to the EU (e.g., Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden) may have a negative impact on U.S. trade interests. We are monitoring the accession negotiations to identify areas where we may require assurances of continued market access.

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EUROPEAN UNION COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY: AMBITIONS AND PROSPECTS

The Maastricht Treaty established the basis for a formal European Union Common Security and Foreign Policy (CFSP). The predecessor to CFSP was European Political Cooperation, a loose intergovernmental foreign policy coordination process. In its efforts to create political power commensurate with its economic clout, the EU is motivated by the end of the Cold War, perceptions of U.S. disengagement and instability in Eastern Europe. The first areas for cooperation were adopted in November: monitoring Russian elections, the Middle East peace process, South Africa, Bosnia and a French-initiated European security pact.

CFSP is constrained by weak decision-making structures, poor intelligence capabilities and lack of an independent defense force. Although decisionmaking for major issues lies predominantly with member states Maastricht does extend new powers to the Commission. While the EU has developed coordinated positions on such issues as the Middle East peace process and assistance for Eastern Europe, its failure to respond to the Gulf crisis and the quagmire of Bosnia illustrates continued dependence on NATO.

We agree with the EU on most major foreign policy issues -- Russia, Central and Eastern Europe and the Middle East. The EU has taken a leadership role in Central and Eastern Europe (primarily through economic resources and the lure of membership) and wants one in the Maghreb, but accepts taking a back seat to the U.S. in the Middle East and NIS. We differ on Cuba and Iran, on the latter partly due to German commercial interests. Likewise, the EU shares our values and priorities in the transnational issues of environment, human rights, narcotics, refugees, terrorism and population.

The Europeans have been chastened by Bosnia and are reluctant to take on tough new foreign policy challenges. Moreover, poor domestic economies constrain the availability of economic-based foreign policy tools -- trade access, aid and sanctions.

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EUROPEAN UNION ROLE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AND RUSSIA/NIS

Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)

The EU has played a major role in promoting reform in Central and Eastern Europe. It has Association Agreements (also called "Europe Agreements") with Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania. They provide for free trade between the parties within ten years and envision, but do not guarantee, eventual membership in the EU. The EU also has Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs), which do not discuss EU membership, with Albania, Slovenia and the Baltics.

The European Commission and EU members are heavily involved in assistance to CEE. The Commission is secretariat for the Group of 24, which coordinates aid from OECD members to the CEE. From 1990 through 1992, Commission and EU members pledged over $30 billion to CEE (out of total commitments of $65 billion). Germany is the largest bilateral donor at $10 billion, the U.S. second at $8 billion and the European Commission third at $6.3 billion. EU aid includes technical and humanitarian aid and debt relief and is skewed towards those northern tier states (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic) seen as potential EU members.

Russia and other NIS

The European Commission and EU support reform in the NIS and made strong statements supporting Yeltsin during the October events. EU and Russia should soon finish a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) covering economic relations and political/cultural ties; it does not mention EU membership. Yeltsin, Belgian Prime Minister Dehaene (as EU president) and Commission President Delors on December 9 initialed a joint political declaration on the PCA in Brussels. The EU is also negotiating PCAs with Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Progress has been made with Ukraine, but the Commission has raised the lack of reform and the parliament's approach to START/NPT ratification in negotiations with Kiev.

The European Commission has committed over $4.6 billion in economic assistance thus far to the NIS, of which nearly $2 billion is for Russia. EU member states have committed over $60 billion to Russia, most of which is from Germany in the form of housing assistance and other aid related to German unification. After some initial reluctance, the EU is participating in the G-7 privatization fund and the establishment of a G-7 coordinating office in Moscow. Aid and support for reform did not stop the EU from placing a quota on aluminum imports from the NIS (Russia and Tajikistan). The U.S., EU, Russia and other major aluminum producers discussed possible multilateral solutions to the problems (record low prices) facing aluminum producers in two rounds of talks; a third round will be chaired by the EU in Brussels, January 18-19.

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THE EUROPEAN UNION'S STABILITY PACT INITIATIVE

At its December Summit, the European Union (EU) endorsed a French-inspired European Stability Pact initiative aimed at resolving minority and border disputes among Central and East European states. After French PM Balladur announced the initiative last spring, the European Union adopted the project as a key element of its new Common Foreign and Security Policy. The aim of the initiative is to encourage Central/Eastern European states to negotiate regional or bilateral treaties on minority rights, borders and possibly other issues. The EU and other nations would provide supporting incentives (thus far unspecified) and a final, politically-binding Pact signed by many European states would acknowledge the treaties. The CSCE would then oversee both the Pact and treaties.

The French and EU have consulted frequently with us and clearly want U.S. participation. We have praised the Balladur government for raising, as its first foreign policy initiative, the problem of minority disputes and the question of how to use eastern countries' desire for links with western institutions to influence their behavior. But we also have questions and concerns. The concept is generally vague and could actually trigger latent disputes by seeming to encourage states to address sensitive questions about borders and minorities and attempting to rectify in one year age-old disputes over borders and minorities. It also assumes that all CSCE states would undertake some as yet ill defined responsibility for overseeing results agreed by only some of them. The EU's understandable focus on states that have some realistic hope of joining the Union leaves out some of Europe's most tense areas, including the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Several EU states and the Central/Eastern Europeans have reservations about the initiative, but do not want to rebuff the French.

The EU Brussels Ministerial decision on the initiative clarified some points without resolving our underlying concerns. It decided on an April inaugural conference in Paris to include (apart from the EU 12) Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and the Baltic states. Eighteen other CSCE states, including the U.S. and Russia, are also invited to participate. We intend to participate, but have not yet informed the EU of our decision.

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PRESS MATERIALS

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Case Number: 2016-0134-M

MR MARKER

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Folder Title:
POTUS Briefing Books-POTUS Trip to Prague, Czech Republic, January 11-12, 1994 [1]
Staff Office-Individual:
Records Management
Original OA/ID Number:
812

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
43	1	7	3	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~Anthony Lake to President William J. Clinton re: Your Trip to Prague (8 pages)~~	~~12/31/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
~~002. paper~~	~~Meeting with Czech President Havel and Premier Klaus (5 pages)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
003. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	12/17/1993	P1/b(1)
004. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	12/17/1993	P1/b(1)
~~005. paper~~	~~Background: Informal Evening in Prague with President Havel (2 pages)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
006. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	12/17/1993	P1/b(1)
007. paper	Meeting with Hungarian President Goencz and Premier Boross (6 pages) Partial release - KBH 4/30/2020	12/00/1993	P1/b(1)
008. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages) Partial release - KBH 9/8/2017	12/17/1993	P1/b(1)
~~009. paper~~	~~Meeting with Polish President Walesa and Premier Pawlak (6 pages)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
010. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	11/17/1993	P1/b(1)
~~011. paper~~	~~Meeting with Slovak President Kovac and Premier Meciar (5 pages)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
012. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages) Partial release - KBH 9/8/2017	12/17/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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FOLDER TITLE:
POTUS Briefing Books-POTUS Trip to Prague, Czech Republic, January 11-12-1994
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
013. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	12/17/1993	P1/b(1)
~~014. paper~~	~~Your Plenary Lunch with Visegrad Leaders (8 pages)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020

COLLECTION:
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National Security Council
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President Clinton's Trip to Prague, Czech Republic

January 11-12, 1994

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KOH NARA, Date 1/15/2020
2016-0134-M

The President

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President Clinton's Trip to Prague, Czech Republic
January 11-12, 1994

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBM NARA, Date 1/15/2020
2016-0134-M

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Your Trip to Prague, January 11-12, 1994

Your visit to Prague includes bilateral meetings with the Presidents and Premiers of Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, a plenary lunch with all leaders, an opportunity for informal discussions with Czech President Havel and an event showcasing American business. We will forward your public statements and press materials separately. This briefing book contains:

SCHEDULE OF KEY EVENTS

SCOPE MEMORANDUM

BILATERAL MEETING WITH PRESIDENT HAVEL AND PREMIER KLAUS OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC

INFORMAL MEETING WITH PRESIDENT HAVEL

JEWISH CEMETERY EVENT

BILATERAL MEETING WITH PRESIDENT GOENCZ AND PREMIER BOROSS OF HUNGARY

BILATERAL MEETING WITH PRESIDENT WALESA AND PREMIER PAWLAK OF POLAND

BILATERAL MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KOVAC AND PREMIER MECIAR OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

WORKING LUNCH WITH VISEGRAD LEADERS

AMERICAN BUSINESS EVENT

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

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SCHEDULE OF KEY EVENTS

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PRESIDENT CLINTON'S TRIP TO PRAGUE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 1/15/2020
2016-0134-M

SCHEDULE

January 11

1635	Arrival
1640-1650	Greeting
1730-1745	Castle; Arrival Ceremony
1800-1815	Havel One-on-One
1815-1900	Czech Bilateral
1900-1945	Havel Informal Walkabout
RON	

January 12

0800-0845	Jewish Cemetery
0845-0900	Drive To Residence
0900-0945	Hungarian Bilateral
1000-1045	Polish Bilateral
1100-1145	Slovak Bilateral
1215-1415	Plenary Lunch
1415-1430	Press Photo Op
1500-1615	Business Event
1615	Depart for Airport and Moscow

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SCOPE MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 31, 1993

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2016-0134-M (1.55)
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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Your Trip to Prague

I. SETTING

You will visit Prague January 11-12 for a meeting -- organized at U.S. initiative -- of the leaders of the Visegrad group (V-4) comprised of Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. Major events include a Plenary Lunch at which you will make a televised substantive presentation, and four bilaterals with the Presidents and Premiers of each country. You also will have some informal time with Czech President Havel and a meeting with business representatives.

The region faces a moment of strategic choice -- theirs not ours -- but what we say and do can effect the success and Westward orientation of Central and Eastern Europe's new democracies. You will want to: a) convey America's admiration for the tremendous progress these countries have made toward stable democracy and functioning free markets, while recognizing that the outcome is not yet certain and demonstrating intensified U.S. support as their reforms continue; b) stress that you take seriously NATO's historic decision to open itself to future new members and elicit Visegrad support for the Partnership for Peace (PFP), which is an element the NATO expansion process; c) assure the Visegrad countries that the Western option they chose with hope in 1989 remains open and valid, allaying their fears that they will be consigned to a Russian sphere of influence or perpetual outsider status vis a vis the West and; d) encourage Visegrad and other forms of cooperation among Central and East European countries, not as a substitute for but rather to facilitate their integration into the West.

Success of the new and aspiring democracies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is a key test of your objective of enlarging the world's free community of market democracies. This goal may be more attainable in CEE than anywhere else in the world. And it is not yet secured. Even the V-4, among the most advanced of the post-communist world, are still in the nervous, vulnerable half-way point of their transformation. Their successes have been impressive; even inspiring; the remaining problems are

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daunting. Reform fatigue is setting in and vulnerability to extremism is rising. They worry the West will never accept them.

The fact of this first-ever U.S.-CEE regional meeting -- and its timing after the NATO Summit and before Moscow -- gives it considerable political significance. It is neither crisis-driven nor intended to produce agreements but instead is designed to advance our broad vision of new security in Europe. The Visegrad countries welcomed your initiative in calling the meeting and hope -- somewhat apprehensively -- that it indicates continued U.S. interest in their security and reform process. It does, and drawing from the Administration's recently-completed review of our CEE policy, you will be able to offer some specific -- albeit fairly modest -- initiatives in addition to PFP to demonstrate the commitment to reinvigorated engagement that lies behind our rhetoric. The success or failure of the CEE states is their responsibility, but we can do more to help at the margin, and the difference we make can be critical.

CEE and Russia

The V-4 believe themselves kept at arms' length by the West and exposed to what they feel is a neo-imperialist Russia. Zhirinovsky's strong showing ensures that Russia will hang like an ill-favored spirit over the Prague meetings. Your interlocutors may hit hard on Russia, arguing that the situation is deteriorating; that the West is over-optimistic at best; that NATO needs to differentiate actively now, offering the V-4 a fast track toward membership with a timetable and criteria. They are to varying degrees disappointed by PFP, wary that it represents a Western shell game rather than an answer to their security problems. You must overcome these concern.

The V-4 leaders may be eloquent and history lends their arguments some weight, but we are not seeking to use CEE "strategically" against Russia and you should say so. The Russian elections notwithstanding, we should not abandon Russian reform, which is what too rapid or overtly preferential treatment of the V-4 in the process of NATO expansion would mean. Doing so would play into the hands of Russian hardliners and thus likely make CEE states less secure. Yet neither will we treat CEE as a forgotten grey zone. We will conduct a distinct CEE policy, taking its security seriously and supporting its evolutionary integration into the West in all areas -- economic, political and military -- without giving Russia a veto. The PFP is an integral part of this broader policy, not a dodge.

And U.S. Interests.

Thus, one message of the Prague stop -- even if indirectly expressed -- is that our policies toward Russia and the NIS on the one hand and CEE on the other are elements of a consistent strategic vision. The U.S. will conduct active CEE <u>and</u> NIS policies; neither these policies nor the PFP should be seen -- as the Visegrad states, Russians and others may be tempted to see them -- as a zero-sum game. The central challenge of post-

communist reform in both the NIS and CEE is similar, and our policy toward both reflects our deeply-held principles that democratic and thorough market economic reform is the way to meet that challenge. Reform's success in CEE would make it impossible to argue, as many across the NIS and CEE currently do, that the Western path of democracy and market reform is simply beyond the ability of post-communist societies. Success in at least some CEE countries is important in its own right, and may be essential for success anywhere in NIS.

Moreover, reform is likely to fail somewhere in CEE and NIS, but of the two, Visegrad's chances of success are greater. If our policy seemed focussed exclusively on Russia -- as many Visegrad leaders and others fear it is -- then the policy principles we espouse for the whole post-communist world may come to hang by the weaker thread. Our policy will be more durable in the face of the inevitable setbacks if we broaden our scope to include Visegrad and the other CEE's with Russia as part of a sustained effort to promote our vision. This message of sustained engagement in support of our deepest foreign policy interests and values is what your presence in Prague will convey.

II. PURSUING OUR GOALS

Tackling the V-4 Agenda

Your Brussels speech will have outlined themes for the entire trip and the NATO Summit will have launched the Partnership for Peace. We want the V-4 countries to endorse the Partnership and they likely will, though not all may do so during the Prague meetings and the dynamics there will be complex. Your walkabout with Havel the evening before most of the formal meetings may give you a sense of V-4 thinking.

The V-4 leaders will want to hear what we are prepared to offer on their number one agenda item -- NATO expansion -- specifically how the PFP fits in. They know that a firm NATO membership offer or timetable is not in the cards. What they will listen for -- as Polish Foreign Minister Olechowski told me December 16 -- is a statement from you along the lines of "the security of Central Europe is important to the security of the United States"; that PFP is the first stage along a firm path ahead toward NATO membership for reformist democracies and not a detour; that we will not move the goalposts at endgame. They would like NATO to establish more explicit criteria now for NATO membership. Criteria and a firmer link between PFP and NATO expansion, they claim, would reassure their publics that they are accepted by the West and more secure vis-a-vis Russia.

And Turning to Our Own: PFP.

You will need to resist calls for such an explicit tilt in favor of the V-4, but you can address this by confirming that:

-- NATO anticipates expanding to new democracies in the East, especially including the V-4 but without prejudice to any other CEE or NIS democracy;

-- PFP is part of the process of enlarging NATO -- albeit not a guarantee of membership;

-- PFP was not intended as a membership holding room, but was designed to get real cooperation underway as soon as possible, on the ground where it counts;

-- PFP is not a dodge to delay NATO expansion; active participation in it can accelerate countries' ability to meet NATO political and military standards;

-- PFP has a political as well as military dimension, and we regard as important NATO's commitment under PFP to consult in the event of threats to a Partner's security;

-- The U.S. takes the CEE security seriously and will step up bilateral security cooperation.

Finally, you should stress that PFP will be as effective as new partners make it. If the V-4 countries consider themselves the best candidates for NATO membership, they can demonstrate this through active cooperation through the Partnership. Similarly, whether it is seen as an opportunity or rebuff by V-4 electorates will largely depend on how V-4 leaderships portray it.

You should encourage V-4 leaders to be the first to join the Partnership by signing the PFP's Partnership Framework Declaration. Signature will be the first step by nations interested in joining the PFP. The Declaration will include general political as well as military obligations of signatories (e.g., commitment to democracy, peaceful settlement of disputes, civilian control of the military).

But we have deliberately avoided articulating explicit criteria for NATO membership. Doing so would spark competition and apprehension among CEE's about who came closest to meeting them. Factors NATO members will consider include a potential new member's democratic institutions and stability; its human rights record; whether it has minority, border or other complaints against its neighbors and the state of its cooperation with them; and other factors such as the impact of expansion on security and stability in Europe as a whole. This last point does not mean giving Russia or any other state a veto on new members. It does mean that NATO will make its own judgements about the likely consequences of admitting any potential new member. In addition, NATO legislatures must agree to extend security guarantees to a potential member and pay to make these credible. In short, we should at this time preserve a creative ambiguity surrounding the question of NATO membership and criteria.

In the meantime, the PFP <u>is</u> the beginning of political and military integration with NATO, and active participation in it

can prepare Europe's new democracies to meet the obligations of full membership. And PFP also can help us prepare to respond in the event of a catastrophic failure of democracy in Russia.

U.S. Policy Themes

We do not want the meetings to focus solely on NATO. Indeed, you need to show that the military aspects of security are only one dimension of our engagement in CEE. You should use your position as host of the bilaterals and plenary meetings to broaden the discussions. The V-4 argue that they need NATO membership not just because of the Russians but because "belonging" to the West would help their reform process, e.g., by encouraging foreign investment and by showing their publics that reform pays. You should stress that security is broader than military security; indeed, the success of their reforms depends as much or more on economic, political and human rights elements as on Western military guarantees.

You will be able to announce a number of specific initiatives. While none is very dramatic, taken together they amount to significant shifts of emphasis which we believe better fit the region's needs and our experience over the past four years. These include:

-- **More support for democracy and technical assistance to reform social services.** A flourishing private sector is a necessary condition for successful reform, and the private sectors in the V-4 are doing very well, though we can still help. But a strong entrepreneurial sector is not a sufficient condition for successful reform. Grass roots democracy, a modernized public sector, including reformed social safety net programs to ease the shock of economic change, are needed and need some outside support. We estimate our support for democracy programs alone will grow from $30 million to $47 million in FY94.

-- **Matching our NATO summit initiatives with bilateral steps,** e.g., training with CEE units and eliminating cold war-era prohibitions on arms transfers. The CEE's want to believe PFP is serious. We can more easily convince them if our own programs are enhanced to support the PFP's goals.

-- **New stress on support for intra-regional cooperation, not as a substitute for integration into the West, but to facilitate it.** The emphasis of the meeting is regional, and you should note that NATO does not want to import any new intramural quarrels (e.g., Greece-Turkey). The new and raw CEE democracies, jealous of their newly-regained sovereignty, need to learn to think of one another as friends. Yet our programs hitherto have not been tailored to promote regional integration (only about 5 percent of our assistance has gone to regional projects). We will do more in the future.

U.S. Initiatives

Our specific initiatives for this trip can be grouped as follows:

Refocussed and new assistance efforts.

-- You will be able to note a significant, new "Partnership in Democracy" program designed to strengthen civic society at the grass roots by supporting independent, indigenous CEE groups. In referring to this, you should not seem to suggest that we regard the Visegrad countries as undemocratic. The point is that their emerging democratic structures may need resources and expertise that we can provide.

-- You will want to note that thorough economic "shock therapy" reform has worked -- Poland, which pioneered it, went from being regarded as Europe's basket case to one of Europe's fastest-growing economies; the Czech Republic's popular PM Klaus has shown that fast track reform can be sustained politically. But you can stress that we are aware of reform's social side effects and will devote more attention -- bilaterally and through IFI's -- to social safety net reform. Treasury also is working on an innovative program to help firms and communities make privatization a success, including by coping with some of its social impact. We plan as well to increase support for public administration, aiming to help democratic governments respond better to their voters.

-- You also will be able to announce a new policy of support for regional cooperation, including V-4 cooperation. Bilaterally and through our role in the IFI's we will give priority consideration to projects that involve more than one nation and will offer technical assistance to regional groups in preparing projects. You can offer an innovative program to help the V-4 and perhaps other CEE's establish an integrated, regional airspace management network. The Poles and Hungarians will welcome our stress on regionalism; PM Klaus may be far more reserved.

Increased support for trade and investment.

-- The V-4 have complained of EU protectionism and, although much of the vast trade deficit they currently run with the EU is due to the recession in the West, they have some grounds for their claims. Lech Walesa has raised this issue recently, and the Polish post-communists claimed EU protectionism made their September electoral victory possible. You can confirm that the U.S. will put market access on the West's agenda where it can, and will press the EU to match U.S. levels of openness. We hope you will have been able to announce U.S.-EU agreement at your January 11 EU Summit that market access for CEE will be a major theme of the Naples G-7 Summit next July.

-- We want to increase our efforts to bring trade and investment to CEE, and you may be able to announce a [White House-sponsored] Conference on CEE trade and investment. You will be able to

announce increases in OPIC's ability to support U.S. trade and investment.

Bilateral Military programs to reinforce PFP.

-- In presenting PFP, you can note that we will change our bilateral military programs to reinforce our efforts to integrate the CEE's into NATO structures. You will be able to offer modest assistance in organizing and training, and to the degree available stockpiles permit, even some equipping of CEE units to NATO standards. You can encourage creation of CEE peacekeeping units for joint operations with NATO. We recommend you announce our intention to end Cold War-era prohibitions and restrictions on U.S. arms sales and transfers, thereby putting CEE's on the same footing as most other countries in terms of security assistance eligibility. Sales and transfers would still be subject to other existing laws and regulations and would be handled on a case-by-case basis. But the announcement would be a significant signal of a new phase of security relations with these countries.

We estimate the non-military initiatives can be funded from current levels of the SEED Act budget, assuming these remain constant over the next 2-3 years. The military programs may require modest levels of additional funding (as will programs associated with the PFP).

THE PRAGUE SCENARIO

The Plenary Lunch, bilateral meetings, business event and other activities will provide the occasions for working in the above themes and specific initiatives that support them.

Upon arrival in Prague you will proceed to the Castle for a welcoming ceremony and then the Czech bilateral with President Havel and Premier Klaus. This will be a standard bilateral meeting, but it will be followed by a very informal walkabout with Havel across the Charles Bridge and possibly to a pub. This will be a good time to explore the broader themes of your trip in a setting that will bring out Havel's best thinking.

The following morning you will visit Prague's medieval Jewish Cemetery and then proceed to Ambassador Basora's Residence for bilaterals with the Poles, Hungarians and Slovaks. You will meet with both Presidents and Premiers in each bilateral; Foreign Ministers may be present as well. Much of your presentations will overlap, especially points concerning NATO, the PFP and Russia, and the U.S. commitment to remain engaged in the region. You will have a few country-specific issues to raise as well.

The Plenary Lunch

The Plenary Lunch also will be held at Ambassador Basora's Residence, so as host you will be able to set the tone and agenda. We hope for give-and-take, but the Plenary Lunch is the substantive centerpiece of the trip and the venue to address the

security issues on the minds of the Visegrad leaders, and the platform to launch our other, non-PFP initiatives.

Because the bilaterals precede the lunch, you will have good advance indication of your interlocutors' mood and concerns. You will begin with about 10 minutes of televised remarks. After that, you should lead the discussion, working in American initiatives under each agenda point (the NATO summit, PFP and military security, democracy and market economics, regional cooperation).

At minimum, we want to obtain strong V-4 statements in support of PFP -- which should prove attainable in most cases (the Poles are still reserved); however, the V-4 will highlight that their objective remains early and full NATO membership. We have not sought to negotiate a joint statement, which might have the effect of sharpening differences rather than expressing agreed points, but we will have a draft ready.

Press After Lunch

A short photo op following the Plenary Lunch will give the Poles, Hungarians and Slovaks at least some of the exposure they seek (the Czechs, as hosts, are less concerned). You should expect shouted questions.

Attendees:

Czech Republic	President Vaclav Havel	(Ha-vell)
	Premier Vaclav Klaus	(KLAUS)
Poland	President Lech Walesa	(va-WHEN-sa)
	Premier Waldemar Pawlak	(PAHV-lok)
Hungary	President Arpad Goencz	(GOENTS)
	Premier Peter Boross	(BOR-osh)
Slovakia	President Michal Kovac	(KO-vach)
	Premier Vladimir Meciar	(ME-chiar)

MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT HAVEL &
PREMIER KLAUS

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0134-M (1.56)
KBH 1/15/2020

MEETING WITH
CZECH PRESIDENT HAVEL AND PREMIER KLAUS

CONTEXT OF MEETING

The Czech Republic currently is doing the best of the Visegrad states in its drive to consolidate democracy and a free-market economy, owing to high-caliber leadership, a stable governing coalition and government policies geared to macro-economic stability. The Czechs look to join the EU and NATO and value a U.S. commitment to and presence in Europe; lacking a common border with the NIS, they seek but are less nervous about rapid NATO membership than either the Poles or Hungarians.

After initial disappointment that offers of membership were not forthcoming, Prague has welcomed the Partnership for Peace (the Foreign Ministry called it the "minimum acceptable and the maximum obtainable"). Nevertheless Havel, a vocal proponent of a strong U.S. security role in Europe, still urges NATO not to bow to Russian pressure, but rather to expand rapidly into Central Europe. The Czech Republic recently secured election to hold a UN Security Council seat for a two-year period beginning January 1 (and will serve as UNSC President for one month starting January 1). Czech-Slovak relations are fairly good, and no major issues remain unresolved from the still-recent breakup of former Czechoslovakia.

Politics and Leadership

While Havel -- whom you met last April during the Holocaust Museum opening -- deservedly enjoys fame and stature in the West, Klaus wields the power in the country. Klaus presents himself as a hard-eyed economist in a Margaret Thatcher mold. In fact, he is more pragmatic than he lets on; Klaus's greatest strength has been his political ability -- alone among all CEE leaders -- to sell fast-track economic reform to the electorate. Although initial relations were strained, Havel and Klaus make a good team: Havel the intellectual and conscience of his nation; Klaus the competent and decisive head of government.

Czech Republic politics is relatively stable, more so than is the rule among other Visegrad countries. Partly as a result of Klaus's abilities on the stump, the four-party center-right governing coalition is relatively stable and is likely to survive its four-year term. Parties of the far right and left exist but have not captured mass support.

Economics

The Czech Republic is coming out of its post-1989 recession. Unemployment is very low at 3-4 percent; Prague runs a budget surplus and has held annual inflation to about 20 percent. The international financial community has shown confidence in

Prague's policies by upgrading the Czech Republic's investment ratings to "BBB," two steps higher than Hungary's and one step higher than Greece. Prague, though not representative of the entire country, is booming thanks partly to massive tourism.

Obstacles lie ahead, and economists in the region suggest the country will go through a rough patch later in 1994. Unemployment almost certainly will rise, probably doubling next year as large state firms go bankrupt or are restructured. Notwithstanding his free market rhetoric, Klaus has avoided pushing bankruptcy proceedings to date beyond small- and medium-sized firms. Klaus -- whose self assurance occasionally borders on hubris -- speaks of the Czech Republic as having completed its reforms; he is loathe to acknowledge that more needs to be done and you should not emphasize U.S. assistance with the Czechs, but in this bilateral can concentrate on business and investment promotion, and U.S. interest in greater market access for CEE.

Relations within the Visegrad Group

Klaus's rhetoric of crediting Czech exceptionalism for his country's relative success sometimes has led him to denigrate the Czech Republic's CEE neighbors and the whole concept of Visegrad cooperation. The government has argued that it can "go West" faster if it goes alone, and has opposed "institutionalization" of Visegrad cooperation. In preparing this visit, the Czechs irritated their Visegrad partners by stressing its bilateral rather than regional aspects. You should emphasize to the Czechs our support for regional cooperation in general and Visegrad in particular. Havel does not fully share Klaus's skepticism about Visegrad cooperation, but will not break with the government on the issue.

RFE/RL

The Czechs have encouraged RFE/RL to relocate to Prague and have offered the former Federal Parliament building as a site. RFE/RL's oversight body, the Board for International Broadcasting, is studying the financial, legal and technical implications of a possible move. Moving the radios to Prague rather than to Washington could signal continued U.S. engagement in the region and support for democracy. However, significant budgetary and Congressional complications would have to be addressed as part of any USG decision about the Czech offer. We thus recommend a positive but non-committal approach to the issue.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- Elicit strong Czech support for the Partnership for Peace initiative, including a declaration of intent to join. In explaining the PFP, address Czech concerns that the U.S. has consigned CEE to a Russian sphere of influence.

- Set out the broad U.S. agenda of intensified engagement to support CEE democracy and reform.

- Encourage the Czechs to support regional cooperation.

- Note our concerns on bilateral questions, including high-tech trade with pariah regimes and business issues.

- Expressing appreciation for the Czech offer, explain current USG thinking about a possible RFE/RL move to Prague.

CORE POINTS

NATO Summit/PFP

- NATO has just taken the historic decision to begin a process of expanding.

- PFP is a major step forward in that process; I count on the Visegrad countries becoming its most active members.

- PFP will promote the practice of military cooperation on the ground -- getting NATO and Partner militaries planning, training, exercising and operating together.

- PFP has a political dimension as well, including NATO commitment to consult if there is a direct and immediate threat to a Partner's security.

- Over time, Partners that continue down the path of democratization and market reform will be prime candidates for full NATO membership.

- The U.S. will reorient our bilateral military programs to support the Partnership.

  -- For example, within our own budgetary limitations, the U.S. will help organize and train, and perhaps help equip, selected Partner country military units.

Visegrad Concerns re PFP

- Understand your interest in explicit timetables for NATO membership, detailed criteria, and firm commitments.

- We cannot give these now. Not because of a Russian "veto" -- U.S. foreign policy is made in Washington. And not because we consign Central Europe to Moscow's sphere of influence. We do not and will not.

- Moving immediately on NATO membership -- directly or via elaborate criteria -- would mean a new line in Europe; giving up on Russia, Ukraine, other CEE's (Romania, Bulgaria, Baltics).

- That could create tensions in Russia and elsewhere making your countries less secure. Must not create self-fulfilling, pessimistic prophecies.

- Better a process that is open, flexible and creative -- to fit an ambiguous situation to our East. PFP also can lay basis for us to respond to a catastrophic reversal of democracy in Russia or elsewhere.

U.S. Engagement in CEE

- U.S. seeks expansion of the world's free community of market democracies. Your success thus is key for us.

- CEE reforms' success depend on economic results, strength of democratic societies, not just military security.

- U.S. will intensify engagement in CEE; have specific ideas.

- **Public Administration/social safety net reform**: CEE proves serious, comprehensive economic reform works; private entrepreneurship is the engine, but governments have legitimate role in a modern, free market economy.

  -- U.S. can provide more help for public administration and social safety net reform. We are also looking at ways to provide post-privatization assistance to firms and communities.

- **Democracy programs**: Adjustment to new system brings tremendous stress. Now that basic democratic structures are established in CEE, we can work on support of civil society, especially at the grass roots. Czech success building democracy could be shared with other new democracies.

  -- U.S. has prepared a new program -- the "Partnership in Democracy" -- to support independent, non-government organizations in the region.

- **Market access**: Way to economic growth is through trade. Countries introducing bold market reforms have a right to open markets for exports. U.S. will work with EU, G-7 to put market access for CEE high on the world's trade agenda.

- **Trade and Investment**: More can, should be done. I will announce that in 1994, the [White House/U.S.] will sponsor a special conference on trade and investment opportunities in Central and Eastern Europe. U.S. will expand **OPIC** programs.

Regional Cooperation

- U.S. supports regional cooperation in CEE -- e.g., Visegrad group -- to facilitate integration into the West. Cooperation among West European nations after WWII was key step in building Atlantic Community.

- Understand Czech reservations. But regional cooperation can help countries think of one another as allies, not rivals. And it makes good practical sense: roads, rivers, pollution, communications, air traffic systems do not

recognize borders; nations must work together to resolve problems.

- The U.S. will do more to support regional cooperation.

  -- U.S. will offer technical assistance to regional groups to help design projects that involve more than one country; will look favorably on good regional projects.

  -- The U.S., other Western nations and international organizations can do more to help Central European nations improve transport infrastructure in the region.

  -- U.S. can support Visegrad efforts to modernize your airspace system -- important economically and as part of your integration into the Western community. U.S. can offer now to develop with you a complete plan for a cooperative Visegrad system compatible with Western airspace systems, including that of NATO.

Bilateral Issues

- **Trade and Investment**: Very pleased by the rise in U.S. investment in the Czech Republic; proud that American investors have committed over $1.8 billion to projects here, more than investors from any other country.

  -- To continue that momentum, we ask you ensure that U.S. businesses receive a fair opportunity to compete in the Czech market, including aviation, telecommunications.

- **Export Controls**: Pleased COCOM agreed to remove Czech Republic the list of proscribed destinations as of January 1, 1994. Very important to avoid irresponsible sales of arms and dual-use technologies that could be used to make weapons of mass destruction or missiles.

  -- Also very glad to learn your government would not permit the sale of the Tamara radar or equipment for a nuclear reactor to Iran.

- **RFE/RL**: Appreciate Czech offer to make the former federal parliament building available to house Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. RFE/RL contributed to democracy's advent in 1989; much yet to do and I will support them. A more to Prague has real attraction; would send right signal.

  -- Difficult technical, legal and budgetary considerations must be resolved before we can decide on radios' location. I expect recommendations soon and will consider the issue very closely.

- **Defense Cooperation**: Pleased to tell you that I have issued a Presidential Determination to remove Cold War-era ineligibility for USG transfer of defense articles and services to the Czech Republic.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	12/17/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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National Security Council
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POTUS Briefing Books-POTUS Trip to Prague, Czech Republic, January 11-12-1994
[1]

2016-0134-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

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INFORMAL MEETING WITH PRESIDENT HAVEL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0134-M (1.59)
KRH 1/15/2020

BACKGROUND
INFORMAL EVENING IN PRAGUE WITH PRESIDENT HAVEL

CONTEXT OF THE EVENT

Following your bilateral with President Havel and Premier Klaus in the Prague Castle, you and President Havel will meet [at the Prague Castle] and walk across the Charles Bridge and into the heart of the Old Town of Prague. This will be as informal and unstructured as possible; there will be no formal remarks or events. This setting will provide an ideal venue for you to draw out Havel on major thematic issues of your trip: the future of democracy and reform in CEE and Russia.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- To elicit from Havel, in an informal context, a sense of Central Europeans' priorities for your visit and concerns.

CORE POINTS

- U.S. objectives toward Central Europe reflect our prime foreign policy objective of expanding the free community of market democracies. The U.S. has not and will not consign Central Europe to a Russian sphere of influence or "grey zone."

- U.S. foreign policy is made in Washington, not Moscow; Russia does not exercise a veto over the West's Central European policy. Yet we must be careful not to take steps that would draw a new line in Europe; we should not, out of fear of Russian nationalism's potential achievement of power, act in ways that inadvertently made our fears reality.

- CEE's success depends on much more than military security, and U.S. engagement in the region likewise is based on much more than military relations. As discussed in the formal meetings, the U.S. has specific ideas about ways to deepen our support for CEE reforms across the board.

BACKGROUND

The Charles Bridge, one of Prague's most famous landmarks, links the old town with the "small side" of the Vltava River under the Prague Castle. The first stone bridge across the river was built near this site in the 12th century; it was eventually destroyed by flooding. The current bridge was one of the works of Charles IV in the Golden Era of Prague, and was completed in 1357. It is the second oldest bridge in Central Europe (after Regensburg).

The Cobbled Bridge, now only open to foot traffic, is 520 meters long and ten meters wide. It is marked by large neo-gothic

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towers at either end (whose predecessors were redoubts in the defense of the city against Swedish attack in the Thirty-Years War). Along the bridge are thirty statues, mostly baroque, gradually added over the centuries: These statues include Saint Wenceslas, the patron saint of Bohemia.

The bridge is now a focal point for young people, artists and craftsmakers who sell to the many tourists who crowd Prague. On summer evenings, there is a sense of 1960s America, as young guitarists entertain passersby and throngs of visitors enjoy the scene.

From the bridge, one gains a broad view of the Prague Castle and the dome of Saint Nicholas Church to the north and west, and the sight of the spires of the old town's many churches, including the Tyn Church on Old Town Square, to the east.

Wenceslas Square is best known for its statue of St. Wenceslas, the 10th-century Bohemian king who is considered the father of the Bohemian nation. The statue, built at the turn of the 20th century, has been a focal point of Czech national pride.

The square, originally a horse-market, slopes nearly half a mile from the National Museum to the twisted alleys of the old town. Today its hotels and shops offer an eclectic mix of architectural styles, from Empire to Art Nouveau, Art Deco to Constructivist.

Next to the National Museum above the square is the modern Federal Assembly Building, built in the 1970s, which has been discussed as a possible future home for the offices of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Further in the same direction is the Woodrow Wilson Train Station, the main station in Prague, which honors the American President whose influence helped create Czechoslovakia in the wake of World War I.

Just below the statue of St. Wenceslas is a monument to the victims of communism, at the spot where the Czech student Jan Palach burned himself to death in early 1969 to protest the Warsaw Pact's military response to Alexander Dubcek's experiment with "Socialism with a Human Face."

It was Dubcek once again who electrified a crowd estimated at over half a million in November, 1989, when after nearly 20 year of silence he joined Vaclav Havel on the balcony of the Melantrich Building overlooking the square to greet the Czechs and Slovaks who sought to drive out the communist regime and install a democratic government.

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2016-0134-M
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JEWISH CEMETERY EVENT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KQM NARA, Date 1/15/2020
2016-0134-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BACKGROUND
VISIT TO PRAGUE'S OLD JEWISH CEMETERY

CONTEXT OF THE EVENT

You will visit the Cemetery (and the near-by Synagogue and museum) just before your series of bilaterals and the Plenary Lunch.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- To demonstrate respect for the once-vibrant Jewish presence in and contribution to Central European society and history.
- To send an indirect message about tolerance by underscoring the multi-ethnic roots of Czech society, and every other society of Central and Eastern Europe.

CORE POINTS

- These venerable sights are priceless reminders of the great Jewish community of Central Europe that thrived for centuries. Millions of Americans trace their heritage to Prague, Warsaw, Budapest, Bratislava, Krakow, Vilnius, Minsk, Lvov, Kiev and other cities and small towns of Europe's heart.
- This neighborhood -- recalling the ancient roots of Jewish life in this city -- reminds us of the rich, multi-ethnic character of Central European society. Even as we remember the terrible destruction of Jewish life in Central Europe in this century, let us honor the previous centuries of work, life, love and achievement, as well as hardship, that this place represents.

BACKGROUND

The old Jewish cemetery, located in the Old Town, is part of the small complex of sites that make up the heart of the historical Jewish community in Prague. The Old Jewish Ghetto, which occupied much of the surrounding area, was cleared at the turn of the 20th century. Only this small Jewish neighborhood retains some of the medieval flavor of the Old Ghetto.

The Cemetery was used from medieval to early modern times, though the oldest surviving tombstone date from the 15th century. It became so crowded that bodies were buried up to a dozen deep; that is why the tombstones crowd one another at odd angles and give the cemetery its "haunted" look.

The most famous grave dated from the early 17th century: that of Rabbi Loew, a contemporary and acquaintance of Emperor Rudolf II. According to legend, Rabbi Loew created the Golem, a man made of clay, whose remains are still reputed to be locked in the attic of one of the synagogues in the area.

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Next to the cemetery is the Jewish State Museum, which contains a collection of drawings by children from all over Europe who were interned at the concentration camp in Terezin (Theresienstadt), an hour's drive north of Prague.

At the nearby Jewish community center, Prague's small remaining Jewish community (estimated at 2,000, most of whom are elderly) have access to a kosher restaurant and other offices. The current Rabbi of the Prague congregation, Karel Sidon, took the post in 1992; he was a signer of Charter 77 and a dissident colleague of President Vaclav Havel in the 1970s and 1980s.

MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT GOENCZ &
PREMIER BOROSS

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

MEETING WITH HUNGARIAN PRESIDENT GOENCZ AND PREMIER BOROSS

2016-0134-M [1.61]
KBH 1/15/2020

CONTEXT OF MEETING

After having been touted for several years as Eastern Europe's success story, Hungary faces an uncertain near-term future. Premier Antall's death in December (from cancer) puts a hole in the domestic political balance; the recession is continuing and a public backlash is developing. Elections will take place next spring. Budapest, concerned about its southern border with Serbia, increasingly worried about Russia and feeling vulnerable at home, is looking for signals the USG remains committed to supporting Hungary's security and democratic and market reforms.

The Hungarians, with the Poles, have pushed the hardest in Central and Eastern Europe for NATO and EU membership, expressing disappointment that the PFP does not go as far as they would like. They worry it is a weak substitute for their preferred option: a firm process of NATO enlargement that would include the advanced new democracies and, implicitly but clearly, exclude the Russians. The Hungarians also are concerned that what they see as the PFP's focus on military rather than political cooperation will leave them at a disadvantage given their military's weak state.

Politics and Leadership

Until Antall's death, Hungary had enjoyed political stability unusual in the region. Antall had managed a center-right coalition and generally kept his nationalist allies under wraps. His departure may accelerate a growth of rightist and leftist parties. Antall's successor, Premier Peter Boross, is a deeply anti-communist, law-and-order figure without much background in foreign affairs. Boross is a member of Antall's party, the Hungarian Democratic Forum; that party is polling only about 10 percent. The succession process was smooth.

Not surprisingly, the government and other Hungarian reformers are increasingly apprehensive about the next parliament. The Socialist Party (former Communists) is polling well, offering its technocratic expertise and casting itself as a reformist yet concerned party with genuinely democratic instincts. The elections could produce a leftist victory, although the Socialists would still need other, probably pro-reformist partners, to form a government. Although the press is free and unrestricted, recent GOH pressure on the electronic media demonstrates its concern about the elections.

As head of state, President Goencz -- with whom you met last April during the Holocaust Museum opening -- is technically non-partisan with little power. But he is a widely-respected leading figure in the opposition Alliance of Free Democrats, a reformist party that had been a loyal opposition to Antall's government.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
007. paper	Meeting with Hungarian President Goencz and Premier Boross [partial] (1 page)	12/00/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
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POTUS Briefing Books-POTUS Trip to Prague, Czech Republic, January 11-12-1994
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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Goencz did not like but did respect Antall, and the two had been moving toward reconciliation just before Antall's death. Goencz was not happy that Boross has stepped in as Premier, and would have preferred a less conservative figure; Boross may be aware of Goencz's views on this point.

Economics

Hungary's market reforms enjoyed a very strong start in 1989 and its new democratic leaders may have underestimated the difficulties that have now multiplied. (Two years ago, Antall sounded as confident as does Czech PM Klaus today.) Hungary has attracted more than half the region's total foreign investment -- nearly $6 billion; the private sector has grown steadily. Budapest remains an attractive and impressive metropolis.

But the economy cannot shake the post-communist recession. Unemployment has grown (13 percent nationwide, and over 20 percent in some rural localities), living standards are near the poverty line for a third of the population and the economy is still sagging. Hungary carries the highest per capita debt in Europe (a legacy of the old regime). Significantly, the Hungarians opted in 1990 for a more gradualist approach to economic reform than Poland's "shock therapy"; Hungary's initial economic drop was more shallow than Poland's but recovery still has not fully arrived.

Foreign Policy

Hungary is strongly pro-Western (and, with Poland, has pushed for effective Visegrad group cooperation). Beyond Hungary's interest in entering Western institutions, its major foreign policy concerns include the Hungarian diaspora -- particularly the 3 million ethnic Hungarians in Serbia, Slovakia and Romania who were placed outside Hungary's borders by the post-WWI Treaty of Trianon; Russia; and the war in former Yugoslavia.

Hungary seeks a high degree of cultural and political autonomy for Hungarian minorities in neighboring countries, moves its neighbors charge mask irredentist claims. The Hungarian right is loud about the injustice of the current borders, though there is no serious expansionist movement. But Hungary's right does succeed in generating frictions with Slovakia and Romania, and was able to pressure the Antall government. A potentially-disruptive dispute with Slovakia over the Gabcikovo dam project (a Slovak project that diverted Danube waters and, Hungarians claim, caused major environmental damage) has eased.

The war in former Yugoslavia has generated steady concern in Budapest and periodic bouts of alarm about the possibility of a spillover or Serbian pressure against the Hungarians in the Vojvodina province of Serbia. Hungary has a good record on sanctions enforcement but is frustrated by a lack of international compensation for its losses [redacted] EO 13526 3.3(b)(1) EO 13526 3.3(b)(6) [redacted] Hungary has cooperated in allowing NATO AWACS

overflights to monitor former-Yugoslav airspace. At the same time, because of a perception that the West has failed to stop Serbian expansionism, Budapest has begun to seek accommodation with Belgrade, including military contacts.

Like other Central and East European states, Hungary has a mixed record on exports to pariah states such as Iran. We made a series of demarches to the GOH after intelligence channels reported possible sales of electronic warfare equipment to Iran. The Hungarians have confirmed the sales and have asked for our patience and understanding of their economic situation.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- Elicit strong Hungarian support for the Partnership for Peace Initiative, including a declaration of intent to join. In explaining the PFP, address Hungarian concerns that the U.S. has consigned CEE to a Russian sphere of influence.
- Set out the broad U.S. agenda of intensified engagement to support CEE democracy and reform.
- Confirm our support for regional cooperation in general and the Visegrad group in particular.
- Note our concerns on bilateral questions, including sanctions enforcement and the electronic media dispute.

CORE POINTS

Antall's Death

- Please accept my sincere condolences on the death of Premier Antall. He was a respected leader who did much for his country, for Europe and for the world. Pleased that Vice President and Ambassador Albright were able to be in Budapest, though occasion was unfortunate.

NATO Summit/PFP

- NATO has just taken the historic decision to begin a process of expanding.
- PFP is a major step forward in that process; I count on Hungary and other Visegrad countries becoming its most active members.
- PFP will promote practice of military cooperation on the ground -- getting NATO and Partner militaries planning, training exercising and operating together.
- PFP has a political dimension as well including NATO commitment to consult if there is a direct and immediate threat to a Partner's security.

- Over time, Partners that continue down the path of democratization and market reform will be prime candidates for full NATO membership.

- The U.S. will reorient our bilateral military programs to support the Partnership.

  -- For example, within our own budgetary limitations, we will help organize and train, and perhaps help equip, selected Partner country military units.

Visegrad Concerns re PFP

- Understand Hungary's interest in explicit timetables for NATO membership, detailed criteria, and firm commitments.

- We cannot give these now. Not because of a Russian "veto" -- U.S. foreign policy is made in Washington. And not because we consign Central Europe to Moscow's sphere of influence. We will not do this, ever.

- Moving immediately on NATO membership -- directly or via elaborate criteria -- would mean a new line in Europe; giving up on Russia, Ukraine, other CEE's (Romania, Bulgaria, Baltics).

- That could create tensions in Russia and elsewhere making your countries less secure. Must not create self-fulfilling prophecies.

- Prefer process that is open, flexible and creative -- to fit an ambiguous situation to our East. PFP also can lay basis for us to respond to catastrophic reversal of democracy in Russia or elsewhere.

U.S. Engagement in CEE

- U.S. seeks expansion of the world's free community of market democracies. Your success thus is key for us.

- CEE reforms' success depend on economic results, strength of democratic societies, not just military security.

- U.S. will intensify engagement in CEE; have specific ideas.

- **Public Administration/social safety net reform**: CEE proves serious, comprehensive economic reform works; private entrepreneurship is the engine, but governments have legitimate role in a modern, free market economy.

  -- U.S. can provide more help for public administration and social safety net reform. We are also looking at ways to provide post-privatization assistance to firms and communities.

- **Increased support for Democracy programs**: Adjustment to new system brings tremendous stress. Now that basic democratic structures are established in Hungary, we can work on support of civil society, especially at the grass roots. Your success in building democracy could be shared with neighbors.

  -- U.S. has prepared a new program -- the "Partnership in Democracy" to support independent, non-government organizations in the region.

- **Market access**: Way to economic growth is through trade. Countries introducing bold market reforms have a right to open markets for exports. U.S. will work with EU, G-7 to put market access for CEE high on the world's trade agenda.

- **Trade and Investment**: More can, should be done. I will announce that in 1994, the [U.S.][White House] will sponsor a special conference on trade and investment opportunities in Central and Eastern Europe. U.S. will expand **OPIC** programs.

Regional Cooperation

- U.S. supports regional cooperation in CEE -- e.g., Visegrad group -- to facilitate integration into the West. Cooperation among West European nations after WWII was key step in building Atlantic Community.

- Regional cooperation can help countries think of one another as allies rather than rivals. And makes good practical sense: roads, rivers, pollution, communications, air traffic systems do not recognize borders; nations must work together to resolve problems.

- The U.S. will do more to support regional cooperation.

  -- U.S. will offer technical assistance to regional groups to help design projects that involve more than one country; will look favorably on good regional projects.

  -- The U.S., other Western nations and international organizations can do more to help Central European nations improve transport infrastructure in the region.

  -- U.S. can support Visegrad efforts to modernize your airspace system -- important economically and as part of your integration into the Western community. U.S. can offer now to develop with you a complete plan for a cooperative Visegrad system compatible with Western airspace systems, including that of NATO.

Bilateral Issues

- **Sanctions/former Yugoslavia**: The United States and the international community greatly appreciates Hungary's

vigorous sanctions enforcement. We also appreciate the contributions Hungary has made on sanctions issues in the Security Council and the Sanctions Committee. Sanctions are the most effective means we currently have to influence Serbian behavior.

-- (If Raised). We know sanctions have been very costly for Hungary, and for others in the region. We want to find ways to mitigate the costs, perhaps by rerouting trade around Serbia for the duration of the sanctions. I'm interested in international efforts to improve transport infrastructure in Central Europe and the Balkans, which makes sense on economic grounds quite apart from sanctions.

o **Elections/electronic media dispute**: I know elections are coming up, and Premier Antall's death complicates the picture. I am confident Hungarian democracy will function well once again. I was puzzled by recent reports of government political pressure on the electronic media because I know your commitment to democracy. I believe we share the same view of the importance of a free media.

o **Arms Sales**: We all seek to avoid irresponsible sales of arms and dual-use technologies and equipment that could be used to make weapons of mass destruction or missiles.

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1.4c, 3.5c

Arpad GONCZ
(Phonetic: goontz)

HUNGARY

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

2016-0134-M (1.62)
2/27/2017 KBH

President (since 1990)

Addressed as: Mr. President

©

Arpad Goncz, a compassionate and charismatic playwright, has been affectionately referred to as the grandfather of his country, and he consistently places at or near the top of public preference polls. To his countrymen, this former political prisoner (1957-63) embodies the spirit of those Hungarians who suffered for their participation in the uprising against Communist rule in 1956. We believe the uprising and the years he spent as a political prisoner were key factors in solidifying his belief in democracy and Western values. As President, Goncz has employed his tremendous moral authority to weigh in on public policy matters that he deems essential—or injurious—to Hungary's continuing democratization. With the death of Prime Minister Joszef Antall on 12 December 1993, Goncz almost certainly considers his highest priority the overseeing of a fair and democratic national election at the end of the current parliament's term in the spring of 1994. He has told the press that, in a maturing democracy, the second election is usually more important than the first. 3.5c

A founding member of the Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ), Goncz was nominated for the presidency by the late Antall as part of an intricate deal engineered to forge a better working relationship between the ruling Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) and the SZDSZ. In return for SZDSZ concessions, which facilitated the coalition's ability to pass important legislation, Antall gave the SZDSZ a say in some government appointments and a role in restructuring the Hungarian media. He also sponsored Goncz, his longtime friend, for the presidency. Goncz had not been prominent in party affairs before he was nominated for the presidency. He has since relinquished his SZDSZ membership as a gesture to underline his determination to remain above party politics. Nevertheless, Goncz has occasionally made press statements that have been attacked by the governing coalition parties as blatantly partisan.

3.5c

1.4c, 1.4d, 3.5c

1.4c, 3.5c

(continued)

Determining the President's Place

1.4c, 1.4d press reports indicate that Goncz chafes at constitutional ambiguities restricting his position and that he had been frustrated by Antall's concerted effort to limit presidential authority. His training as a lawyer has made him a staunch advocate of constitutional democracy; he has often said that he is a "constitutional" president and feels it his duty to be the conscience of the government. The Budapest press chronicled in detail Goncz's battles with Antall over the President's legal role in overseeing the military; appointing and dismissing government officials; and, in general, maintaining the presidency as part of a democratic system of checks and balances. A September 1991 Constitutional Court ruling dealing with the scope of presidential and prime-ministerial powers was theoretical and vague enough to allow both adversaries to feel vindicated, but it widened the rift between the two men that persisted until Goncz's rapprochement with Antall on his deathbed, in which he presented his old friend with Hungary's highest honor. 3.5c

Foreign Policy Priorities

Goncz has told the press that Hungary's top foreign policy priority is winning full EU membership and gaining access to West European markets, achievements he views as crucial to the rebuilding of his country's economy. He supports his country's eventual admission to NATO and has expressed frustration that a more concrete criteria and timetable for membership has yet to be put forth by the Alliance. He has also emphasized his conviction that the key to lasting peace is resolution of the treatment of ethnic minorities, saying, "If Europe can solve this problem, then it can solve any problem in the future." For his part, Goncz has reached out to Hungarian Jewish and Gypsy minorities in his tenure as President. 1.4c, 1.4d he has expressed hope that the world would someday see a European federated system that would encompass all European nations—something along the lines of a modern, democratic version of the old Hapsburg Empire. 3.5c

Goncz regards the United States as a staunch ally and has traveled to this country many times. 1.4c, 1.4d he has made it clear that he prefers to emphasize the need for private investment in the Hungarian economy rather than solicit official US financial assistance. Goncz has expressed 1.4c, 1.4d the need for continued exposure to Western methods and practices, emphasizing that Hungary's experiment with democracy has been of short duration and that the legacy of Communism most difficult to eradicate is the mentality of living under a totalitarian system and obeying orders. 3.5c

Early Life and Career

Goncz, who was born in Budapest on 10 February 1922, earned a doctorate of laws in 1944. He later fought in Hungary's anti-Nazi resistance and, following the Communist takeover in 1948, became a laborer. During his imprisonment Goncz mastered English by translating Winston Churchill's wartime memoirs for his Communist captors. He was released in 1963 and found work as a translator— 1.4c, 1.4d he has translated "an entire bookcase" of American literature, including former President Bush's autobiography, *Looking Forward*. 3.5c

Goncz and his wife own 1.4c, 1.4d a charming but elegant cottage on the northern shore of Lake Balaton, an idyllic spot where they are most at home. Goncz is characterized 1.4c, 1.4d as speaking fluent, if grammatically imperfect, English. He and his wife, Maria Zsuzsanna, have four children. 3.5c

17 December 1993

MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT WALESA
& PREMIER PAWLAK

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0134-M (1.63)
KBH 1/15/2020

MEETING WITH POLISH PRESIDENT WALESA AND PREMIER PAWLAK

CONTEXT OF MEETING

Poland pioneered "shock therapy" market economic reforms in 1990 and proved these could work, although they carried a price. The Solidarity-based leadership that pushed these reforms outran its political mandate. The economic upturn that the reformers counted on to replenish their political capital arrived -- the four percent growth Poland expects for 1993 is Europe's fastest -- but too late to work its way through to the electorate. Solidarity-based parties, quarreling among themselves, were defeated in the September 1993 elections. A post-communist coalition took office on the basis of campaign promises to ease the pain of economic transformation. Ironically, however, the new government is aware of the achievements of its predecessor and has not significantly altered course.

Poles -- of all political stripes -- feel exposed to instability in Russia and worry the West will abandon them to a Russian sphere of influence. Poland wants to join NATO, the EU and other Western institutions. More than any other Visegrad country, Poles were disappointed with and remains skeptical about the PFP, fearing it is cover for U.S. disengagement from Central Europe in response to Yeltsin's pressure ("Yalta II" was the overheated reaction even of the mainstream, sophisticated Polish press). Polish FM Olechowski, in Washington in mid-December, pressed hard for a firm linkage between PFP and the process of NATO expansion, and for a signal that the U.S. cared about CEE security (your points in fact respond to some of Olechowski's concerns and even use language he suggested).

Politics and Leadership

The leftist two-party coalition (the post-communist Social Democrats and the mainly old-regime Polish Peasant Party) holds a commanding majority in Parliament. The leadership of the new government, however, is more reformist than its electorate or its parliamentary base. The Social Democrats control the economic portfolios and have put in place genuinely reformist figures. Under an informal arrangement, national security ministers -- foreign affairs, defense, interior -- were named by Walesa. Many believe tensions will develop between the new government's relatively reformist leadership and its parliamentary base.

Walesa considers himself the guarantor of Poland's reforms. He has pledged to work with the new government but to use his powers to prevent a reversal of the gains since 1989. You met Walesa at the April opening of the Holocaust Museum. He can be insightful, even inspired, or abrupt and rambling; even his closest aides find him hard to predict. Yet Walesa has been in leadership positions longer than any other statesman in the region and makes his mistakes on the little issues; he tends to get the big calls

right. Pawlak is young, a product of post-1989 Poland and not an old regime apparachik. He keeps his considerable ambition well hidden, is soft-spoken and adept at compromise. How he will work out as Premier is not yet clear. Pawlak's personal relations with Walesa are good; Pawlak was Walesa's political protegee briefly during 1992, though Walesa has kept his distance from the new government.

Economics

Poland's reforms have been the most consistent and radical of any country in the post-communist hemisphere. This was partly of necessity: Poland's economic straits in 1989 were so dreadful that the country was generally written off as a basket case, and the new democratic leadership felt it had nothing to lose by being bold.

The results were both spectacular and insufficient. Poland's private sector has grown rapidly and is the largest of any post-communist country. The new entrepreneurs have helped pull the country out of its recession; most major cities now have substantial middle classes and pockets of genuine affluence. Yet other large sectors of society have not felt the benefits of reform: unemployment is at 15 percent, but is much higher in smaller towns and the countryside. Workers in heavy (and often uncompetitive) state industry and the public sector have seen living standards drop. The many losers resent the many winners, and those in between often feel that the loss of security outweighs the gain of opportunity.

Meanwhile, the new government is mainly sticking to the previous-government's austerity budget targets, trying to meet IMF targets (without which Poland cannot receive $1-2 billion of World Bank loans and about $8 billion in official debt forgiveness from the Paris Club). Economic reform will likely continue, at a slower pace, as the government looks for ways to fulfill its campaign promises without re-igniting inflation or wrecking agreements with the IMF.

Foreign Policy

Walesa's control over national security ministries and influence in the military will ensure continuity of Poland's pro-Western foreign policy direction. The Pawlak government has announced it will not seek to change this in any event. Residual pro-Russian sentiment among the post-communists was dampened by the October events and December elections.

Poland has been a strong advocate of Visegrad cooperation, and has been frustrated by what it sees as Czech (particularly Klaus's) resistance. Poles are deeply suspicious of Russia, and even before the recent elections believed Russian neo-imperialism was on the rise. Partly for this reason, Poland's relations with Ukraine are very good, and the Poles have urged Western support for Kiev generally and understanding on the nuclear question in particular.

U.S.-Polish relations are very strong (e.g., Poland represents U.S. interests in Iraq and has done a very good job) but many Poles expect more from their "Rich Uncle" than we can or should provide. Recent issues have taken on an exaggerated importance in Polish minds, including Polish arms sales to pariah nations, Polish respect for intellectual property rights and other trade issues, and the question of NATO membership. The Poles were badly miffed in the run-up to Prague by what they considered protocol slights, and Walesa may come to this meeting edgy.

While the Poles have pressed hard for early NATO membership or commitments about membership down the road, Walesa has occasionally floated alternatives, such as his pet "NATO bis" proposal which would loosely link NATO to a regional security group comprised of the CEE's, Ukraine, the Baltics and Russia. In some iterations, "NATO bis" has included conditions for prospective members, such as renunciation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- Elicit strong Polish support for the Partnership for Peace, including an expression of intent to join. In explaining the PFP, allay Polish concerns that the U.S. has consigned CEE to a Russian sphere of influence.

- Set out the broad U.S. agenda of intensified engagement to support CEE democracy and reform.

- Note U.S. support for regional cooperation in general and the Visegrad group in particular.

- Confirm the strength of U.S.-Polish relations, based on our support for Poland's reforms, and not subject to the partisan character of whatever democratically-elected government is in power.

CORE POINTS

<u>NATO Summit/PFP</u>

- NATO has just taken the historic decision to begin a process of expanding.

- PFP is a major step forward in that process; I count on Poland and other Visegrad countries becoming its most active members.

- PFP will promote <u>practice</u> of military cooperation on the ground -- getting NATO and Partner militaries planning, training exercising and operating together.

- PFP has a political dimension as well, including NATO commitment to consult if there is a direct and immediate threat to a Partner's security.

- Over time, Partners that continue down the path of democratization and market reform will be prime candidates for full NATO membership.

- The U.S. will reorient our bilateral military programs to support the Partnership.

  -- For example, within our own budgetary limitations, we will help organize and train, and perhaps help equip, selected Partner country military units.

Visegrad Concerns re PFP

- Understand Polish interest in explicit timetables for NATO membership, detailed criteria, and firm commitments.

- We cannot give these now. Not because of a Russian "veto" -- U.S. foreign policy is made in Washington. And not because we consign Central Europe to Moscow's sphere of influence. We will not do this, ever.

- Moving immediately on NATO membership -- directly or via elaborate criteria -- would mean a new line in Europe; giving up on Russia, Ukraine, other CEE's (Romania, Bulgaria, Baltics).

- That could create tensions in Russia and elsewhere making your countries less secure. Must not create self-fulfilling prophecies.

- Prefer process that is open, flexible and creative -- to fit an ambiguous situation to our East. PFP also can lay basis for us to respond to catastrophic reversal of democracy in Russia or elsewhere.

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  -- U.S. can provide more help for public administration and social safety net reform. We are also looking at ways to provide post-privatization assistance to firms and communities.

- **Increased support for Democracy programs**: Adjustment to new system brings tremendous stress. Now that basic democratic structures are well established in Poland, we can work on support of civil society, especially at grass roots.

  -- U.S. has prepared a new program -- the "Partnership in Democracy" -- to support independent, non-government organizations in the region.

- **Market access**: Way to economic growth is through trade. Countries introducing bold market reforms have a right to open markets for exports. U.S. will work with EU, G-7 to put market access for CEE high on the world's trade agenda.

- **Trade and Investment**: More can, should be done. I will announce that in 1994, the [U.S.][White House] will sponsor a special conference on trade and investment opportunities in Central and Eastern Europe. U.S. will expand **OPIC** programs.

Regional Cooperation

- U.S. supports regional cooperation in CEE -- especially Visegrad group -- to facilitate integration into the West. Cooperation among West European nations after WWII was key step in building Atlantic Community.

- Regional cooperation can help countries think of one another as allies rather than rivals. As your foreign minister suggested in Washington, it makes good practical sense: roads, rivers, pollution, communications, air traffic systems do not recognize borders; nations must work together to resolve problems.

- The U.S. will do more to support regional cooperation.

  -- U.S. will offer technical assistance to regional groups to help design projects that involve more than one country; will look favorably on good regional projects.

  -- The U.S., other Western nations and international organizations can do more to help Central European nations improve transport infrastructure in the region.

  -- U.S. can support Visegrad efforts to modernize your airspace system -- important economically and as part

of your integration into the Western community. U.S. can offer now to develop with you a complete plan for a cooperative Visegrad system compatible with Western airspace systems, including that of NATO.

Bilateral Issues

- **Bilateral Relations**: Our relations are strong because they are based on our shared commitment to the basic values of democracy and market economics. We will work with your new government just as we worked with previous democratic governments: on the basis of your programs.

- **Invitation to August 1 Anniversary**: (To Walesa, if raised) Thank you for the invitation; making the 50th Anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising an event for reconciliation is noble. I wish I could be there. I will send a senior-level representative to head the U.S. Delegation in my name.

- **Arms sales**: I understand the economic pressures behind sales of arms to pariah states and appreciate your government's responsible decision not to proceed with the sale of T-72 tanks to Iran. We ask all our friends and allies not to make such sales.

- **Trade**: I have urged the West be more open to exports from Central Europe partly in response to Poland's concerns. I hope we can keep making progress on issues important to the U.S. -- like intellectual property rights and Polish tariff discrimination against U.S. firms in favor of EU products.

- **Polish Assistance in Iraq**: As I wrote you, I deeply appreciate the efforts of Ambassador Jan Piekarski (pye-KAR-ski) as head of the U.S. Interests Section in Baghdad. He was particularly helpful in helping the arrested American Ken Beaty and in getting Mr. Beaty released.

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MEETING WITH
PRESIDENT KOVAC &
PREMIER MECIAR

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0134-M (1.65)
KBH 1/15/2020

MEETING WITH
SLOVAK PRESIDENT KOVAC AND PREMIER MECIAR

CONTEXT OF MEETING

Slovakia is the least advanced of the four Visegrad countries politically and economically, and the most ambivalent about reform. While President Kovac and Foreign Minister Moravcik appear committed to reform and integration into Western institutions, Premier Meciar occasionally has flirted in his rhetoric with a "third way" economic and foreign policy balance between East and West. Meciar has a bad press (e.g., he is routinely labeled a "former Communist boxer") and still argues that biased Western media reporting is responsible for Slovakia's "image problem" and lack of foreign investment.

Nevertheless, the government is moving ahead with a reform program and in recent months has emphasized its strong desire to enter the EU and NATO. Some of Slovakia's wavering on reform -- and Meciar's occasionally pugnacious style -- is due to a sense of post-independent disorientation and insecurity: prior to January 1, 1994, Slovakia's only previous experience with statehood was as a German puppet-regime during WWII. Reassurance from you that a democratic, reformist Slovakia will be treated seriously by the U.S. and will be welcome as a member of the broader democratic community would have a good impact.

Politics and Leadership

Kovac and Moravcik are working with increasing openness to replace Meciar. As head of government, Meciar's position is far stronger and he is a skilled political operator. Kovac is more popular, especially among educated Slovaks who regard Meciar's tough-guy image and authoritarian style with disdain. (You met Kovac during last April's Holocaust Museum opening.) Meciar's party -- a heterodox group created around the single issue of the breakup of the Czechoslovak State -- is in an uneasy coalition with another center-right party. Its opposition on the left and right remains badly divided, and despite months of behind-the-scenes maneuver, Meciar's enemies have not put together a viable alliance against him.

Slovakia is the only Visegrad country where human rights issues are a significant concern. Slovakia was admitted to the Council of Europe last summer, which has democratic and human rights criteria for membership. But Meciar has pressured politicians and journalists critical of him, warning them against slander; he does not entirely accept (or understand) the concept of a "loyal opposition." Relations with Slovakia's large Hungarian (800,000) minority are uneven, with some of Meciar's allies doing little to resolve relatively minor irritations. (To be sure, Hungarian nationalists in Slovakia and Hungary itself fuel Slovak concerns

about separatism.) Kovac and Moravchik are more open to our advice to consult more closely with minority groups.

Economics

Slovakia inherited the least viable portion of former Czechoslovakia's industrial base (one critic cruelly described Slovakia as a huge state farm with a tank factory in the middle). Bratislava's on-and-off approach to economic reform in the year since independence exacerbated the situation. The raw entrepreneurial drive found in other Visegrad countries has not yet taken hold in Slovakia. Privatization of large enterprises is very slow and unemployment is likely to rise to 17 percent in 1994; the GDP is still falling (by 7 percent in 1993).

Nevertheless, thanks in part to reforms introduced by the former Czechoslovak state, many basic elements of a market economy are in place. The government in June adopted an austerity program to qualify for a $90 million IMF Systemic Transformation Facility, and concluded agreements with the World Bank in July and December. Inflation is at 25-30 percent -- not excessive compared to other Visegrad countries. Despite the economic stresses, the social mood is relatively calm.

Foreign Policy

Slovakia's horizons are narrower than those of its Visegrad partners; the leadership's principal concern appears to be overcoming the country's sense of isolation and maintaining parity with its Visegrad partners vis-a-vis the West. Bratislava worried it would be excluded from the Prague Visegrad meeting or given lesser status within the PFP. In fact, the Czechs and other Visegrad countries have urged us not to isolate Slovakia, arguing that Visegrad membership and a viable Western option for the country is one of the principal impulses to reform. Kovac and Moravcik have stressed to our new Ambassador Slovakia's support for PFP, and the hope that it will lead to NATO membership.

Slovakia's relations with the Czech Republic remain good, despite lingering issues left over from the split; relations with Hungary are complicated by the minority issue and Slovakia's Gabcikovo Dam project (which Budapest claims constitutes an ecologically-damaging diversion of Danube waters and violates the border; the issue is being arbitrated under EU auspices).

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- Elicit strong Slovak support for the Partnership for Peace Initiative, including a declaration of intent to join.

- Set out the broad U.S. agenda of intensified engagement to support CEE democracy and reform.

- Confirm U.S. support for regional cooperation in general and the Visegrad group in particular.

- Dispel Slovak concerns that the U.S. has less interest in them than in other Visegrad countries, while stressing that our interest and support is tied to progress in democratic and market economic reforms.

CORE POINTS

NATO Summit/PFP

- NATO has just taken the historic decision to begin a process of expanding.

- PFP is a major step forward in that process; I count on Slovakia and other Visegrad countries becoming its most active members.

- PFP will promote practice of military cooperation on the ground -- getting NATO and Partner militaries planning, training, exercising and operating together.

- PFP has a political dimension as well including NATO commitment to consult if there is a direct and immediate threat to a Partner's security.

- Over time, Partners that continue down the path of democratization and market reform will be prime candidates for full NATO membership.

- The U.S. will reorient our bilateral military programs to support the Partnership.

  -- For example, within our own budgetary limitations, we will help organize and train, and perhaps help equip, selected Partner country military units.

Visegrad Concerns re PFP

- Understand your interest in explicit timetables for NATO membership, detailed criteria, and firm commitments.

- We cannot give these now. Not because of a Russian "veto" -- U.S. foreign policy is made in Washington. And not because we consign Central Europe to Moscow's sphere of influence. We will not do this, ever.

- Moving immediately on NATO membership -- directly or via elaborate criteria -- would mean a new line in Europe; giving up on Russia, Ukraine, other CEE's (Romania, Bulgaria, Baltics).

- That could create tensions in Russia and elsewhere making your countries less secure. Must not create self-fulfilling prophecies.

- Prefer process that is open, flexible and creative -- to fit an ambiguous situation to our East. PFP also can lay basis

for us to respond to catastrophic reversal of democracy in Russia or elsewhere.

U.S. Engagement in CEE

- o U.S. seeks expansion of the world's free community of market democracies. Your success thus is key for us.

- o CEE reforms' success depend on economic results, strength of democratic societies, not just military security.

- o U.S. will intensify engagement in CEE; have specific ideas.

- o **Public Administration/social safety net reform**: CEE proves serious, comprehensive economic reform works; private entrepreneurship is the engine, but governments have legitimate role in a modern, free market economy.

  -- U.S. can provide more help for public administration and social safety net reform. We are also looking at ways to provide post-privatization assistance to firms and communities.

- o **Increased support for Democracy programs**: Adjustment to new system brings tremendous stress. Now that basic democratic structures are established, we can work on support of civil society, especially at the grass roots. Your success in building democracy could be shared with neighbors.

  -- U.S. has prepared a new program -- the "Partnership in Democracy" -- to support independent, non-government organizations in the region.

- o **Market access**: Way to economic growth is through trade. Countries introducing bold market reforms have a right to open markets for exports. U.S. will work with EU, G-7 to put market access for CEE high on the world's trade agenda.

- o **Trade and Investment**: More can, should be done. I will announce that in 1994, the [U.S.][White House] will sponsor a special conference on trade and investment opportunities in Central and Eastern Europe. U.S. will expand expansion of **OPIC** (Overseas Private Investment Corporation) programs.

Regional Cooperation

- o U.S. supports regional cooperation in CEE -- e.g., Visegrad group -- to facilitate integration into the West. Cooperation among West European nations after WWII was key step in building Atlantic Community.

- o Regional cooperation can help countries think of one another as allies rather than rivals. And makes good practical sense: roads, rivers, pollution, communications, air traffic systems do not recognize borders; nations must work together to resolve problems.

- The U.S. will do more to support regional cooperation.

  -- U.S. will offer technical assistance to regional groups to help design projects that involve more than one country; will look favorably on good regional projects.

  -- The U.S., other Western nations and international organizations can do more to help Central European nations improve transport infrastructure in the region.

  -- U.S. can support Visegrad efforts to modernize your airspace system -- important economically and as part of your integration into the Western community. U.S. can offer now to develop with you a complete plan for a cooperative Visegrad system compatible with Western airspace systems, including that of NATO.

Bilateral Issues

- **Bilateral Relations and Slovakia's Reforms**: U.S. considers Slovakia an important partner in the new Europe. We play no favorites: America's relations with all countries in Central Europe depend on each country's commitment to democratic and market economic reforms.

  -- A free press, tolerance of diverse opinions, and respect for minority rights -- including rights of citizens of minority groups -- are the cornerstones of democracy.

  -- We understand that reform is hard -- and the initiatives I have outlined reflect America's commitment to help with fresh ideas. But well-conceived market reform is the only way.

  -- Congratulations on your recent agreements with the IMF and World Bank. Reforms at home can open the way to outside support and investment.

- **Trade, Investment, Export Controls**: I want to work at increasing our trade and investment, and encourage you to take advantage of new opportunities the U.S. will make available. Very pleased COCOM has removed Slovakia from its list of proscribed destinations as of January 1, 1994. Important to avoid irresponsible sales of arms and dual-use technologies and equipment that could be used to make weapons of mass destruction and missiles.

- **Slovak Invitation to National Uprising Anniversary (if raised)**: I would like the United States to be represented; we will be in contact.

- **Defense Cooperation**: Pleased to tell you that I have issued a Presidential Determination to remove Cold War-era ineligibility for USG transfer of defense articles and services to the Czech Republic.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
012. report	U.S. Government Report [partial] (2 pages)	12/17/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 812

FOLDER TITLE:
POTUS Briefing Books-POTUS Trip to Prague, Czech Republic, January 11-12-1994
[1]

2016-0134-M
kh1804

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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1.4c, 3.5c

Michal KOVAC **SLOVAKIA**
(Phonetic: KOHvahch)

President (since February 1993)

Addressed as: Mr. President

©

Slovakia's first president Michal Kovac has proved more assertive than was first expected. A member of Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), Kovac has surprised observers who predicted that he would toe the party line, by distancing himself from the Prime Minister and exercising his presidential authority. Like others in the government, Kovac views Meciar as a detriment to the country's economic and political stability and has admitted to the press that he asked the Prime Minister to resign. 1.4c, 1.4d

Polls indicate that Kovac is considered the most trustworthy politician in Slovakia. 1.4c, 1.4d he sees his role as helping to preserve political stability. 1.4c, 1.4d Slovakia can not turn back from its movement toward democracy and economic reform and that the country is determined to join European structures. 1.4c, 1.4d Although he does not support ethnic Hungarian autonomy in Slovakia's southern territories, he did propose an amendment that would allow southern towns to use both Slovakian and Hungarian names. 3.5c

Career Data

As a loyal apparatchik, Kovac was successful in the old Communist system. He graduated from the Bratislava School of Economics in 1954 and worked there as an assistant for a year. From 1956 until 1971 he was assigned to the regional institute of the Czechoslovak State Bank. He lectured at Cuba's central banking school from 1964 until 1965, and he was deputy director of a Czechoslovak bank in London during 1967-69. Kovac disapproved of the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and rebelled against the subsequent normalization campaign; he was then demoted to a lesser post in the Bratislava city office. 3.5c

In December 1989 Kovac was named Minister of Finance in the first postrevolutionary Slovak government. He was elected deputy to the Federal Assembly in June 1990 as a candidate from the Public Against Violence (VPN) movement. After the VPN split, he joined the HZDS—led by then Slovak Republic Prime Minister Meciar—in April 1991. In May Kovac resigned from the finance ministry to protest Meciar's removal from the republic prime-ministership. Kovac was named HZDS deputy chairman in June. He was reelected in the June 1992 federal elections and became

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parliamentary speaker; he held this function until 31 December 1992, when the federal parliament went out of existence. 3.5c

Personal Notes

Kovac was born on 5 August 1930 in Lubisa, east Slovakia. He does not speak English. His wife, Emilia, is a professor at the Bratislava Economic University. 1.4c, 1.4d

1.4c, 1.4d

The Kovacs are devout Catholics. They have two grown sons: their older son is studying for an MBA at the London Business School. 3.5c

17 December 1993

1.4c, 3.5c

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[1]

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WORKING LUNCH WITH VISEGRAD LEADERS

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0134-M (1.68)
KBH 1/15/2020

YOUR PLENARY LUNCH WITH VISEGRAD LEADERS

CONTEXT OF THE EVENT

This working Plenary Lunch is the substantive centerpiece of the Prague stop. As host, you will be able to set the tone and agenda. We hope to have time for give-and-take, but there are a number of concrete points you should get on the record. Moreover, the Visegrad leaders badly want to hear a strong statement from you that their security and stability are important to us.

You therefore will begin with 10-15 minutes of remarks, which will be televised. After the press departs, you, as host, should continue your presentation. Following broad remarks confirming our engagement in CEE, we propose turning to NATO and the Partnership for Peace. You should explain the PFP's broader context: how it fits our strategy and how it can help CEE's security problems by forging an operating Partnership with NATO now and beginning an evolution toward full membership. You then should outline shifts you are making in American policies to increase our support for democracy and market economic reform (including more active encouragement of American private investment), and conclude by emphasizing the importance of regional cooperation. We have organized your substantive points under these headings and suggest you weave them in during the conversation.

We anticipate releasing to the press an integrated text of your remarks as prepared even if, as is virtually certain, time does not permit you to make all the points at the lunch. For this reason, the text below is presented in full sentences.

At the table will be the Presidents, Premiers and Foreign Ministers of the Visegrad Four (V-4), and from our side Secretary Christopher, Mr. Lake and Ambassadors Albright and Basora. Notetakers and interpreters will be seated in the room.

You will have just concluded bilaterals with the Poles, Hungarians and Slovaks (and will have met with the Czechs the previous evening), and thus will be well aware of your guests' concerns and expectations. Uppermost on their minds will be the NATO Summit and PFP; they will argue that the Russian elections strengthen their case for more explicit differentiation and more rapid movement toward membership.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- Set out the U.S. agenda of intensified engagement in support of CEE democracy and reform.
- Elicit strong V-4 endorsement of your Partnership for Peace initiative.

- Assure the V-4 (and other CEE's) that their strategic choice of Western values and a Western orientation remains valid; the U.S. will neither lose interest in Central and Eastern Europe nor consign them to a Russian sphere of influence.

- Encourage intra-CEE/V-4 regional cooperation.

A note of caution:

The Visegrad Group was created in 1991 as the newly-free countries of Central Europe sought to maintain the cooperative spirit that had animated relations among their democratic dissidents during the 1980's. It has promise but its future is still uncertain. Despite basically common problems and outlooks, the "V-4" often tend to look at one another as rivals and -- the Czechs especially -- are wary that closer association could slow their integration into the West. Moreover, interpersonal dynamics among the eight Presidents and Premiers vary; they have never before been assembled together. All will want the meeting to succeed, but there may be some jockeying between national delegations as well as within them. The Poles especially were irritated that Prague was chosen as the venue and fear the Czechs have sought to slight the regional character of the meeting.

YOUR KEY POINTS

Thematic Remarks (To be revised)

[Televised; to be provided to the media as full text]

- The United States and Europe are at a moment of strategic choice. The old totalitarian system is gone. Europe's new democracies -- whose people led the revolutions of 1989 -- have made tremendous strides in overcoming its legacy. Some of the leaders of 1989 are gathered here now and I am honored to be in their company.

- Let us remember how much your nations have accomplished in so short a time. Your cities and highways are transformed, with commerce, color and increasing wealth visible in place of shortages, greyness and stagnation. The first, hard period of adjustment may well be coming to an end, thanks to the courage and determination of the people of Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic.

- Perhaps most inspiring of all, the new democracies of Central Europe have accomplished this through democratic means -- through parliaments, political parties, vibrant newspapers and television, and vigorous debate.

- Yet difficulties and doubts remain. The benefits of the new reforms have not reached throughout society. The promise of 1989 has not yet been fulfilled; the victory of democracy and reform is not yet won. Some say it cannot be won; that democracy and market reforms are beyond the capacity of the new democracies in Central Europe and the NIS. Those who

have given up the path of reform speak a language we recall from a darker recent past: a language of fear, of anger, of narrow nationalism, of hate, of aggression.

- Those who counsel despair and defeat were wrong in 1989 and they are wrong today. The democratic and free market transformation pioneered by the nations of Central Europe since 1989 has not been easy. But by continuing your reforms you are proving that it is possible.

- You do not stand alone. Indeed, you must not stand alone: the fates of our nations are intertwined. Two World Wars and a Cold War that lasted over forty years demonstrate beyond all doubt that if freedom and democracy are at risk in Central Europe, then they are at risk in all of Europe and beyond.

- My country learned through bitter experience three times in this century that the security of American democracy and the ability to sustain American prosperity depend on the security and the prosperity of other democracies.

- This why the central purpose of my country's foreign policy is to enlarge the world's free community of market democracies. Opportunities to fulfill that vision may be greater in Central Europe -- in the Visegrad countries -- than anywhere else in the world. I envision the full integration of a democratic, free market Central Europe into this community of market democracies.

- The security of Central Europe is important to the security of the United States. All countries, but especially democracies who are behaving as good neighbors with one another, deserve a sense of security. That is why I have come here, straight from the NATO Summit. I want to talk with you about security in all its dimensions -- because, as the Polish saying has it, there should be "nothing about us without us." (FYI - This Polish idiom, well-understood in the region, means essentially "No more Yaltas.")

- With the stakes high, the United States will remain engaged, helping across the board as the Visegrad and other new democratic countries help themselves. Our relations are rich in every field and will deepen. We will do more together in the security area, in support of democratic and market economic reform, and we can work together to support regional cooperation, cooperation which is a major part of your integration into Western institutions.

- I spoke of a strategic choice that lies before us. Shall we fulfill the promise of 1989 and complete the task we have begun? Shall we build a larger, durable community of democracies, prosperous market economies and good neighbors? Shall we turn to one another with hope for the future? I say we shall. And with God's help we will.

[Non-televised; also to be provided to the media as full text]

o I also am here to say not just what the United States believes, but to discuss what the United States and the Visegrad countries can do, working together. I want to focus on specifics, and there is much to cover:

-- First, I want to tell you about the NATO Summit and the new Partnership for Peace that can address security concerns of democracies in Central Europe and the NIS, and to hear your views.

-- Second, I want to share ideas about how the United States can support your democratic and free market transformation.

-- Finally, I want to discuss specific ways how the U.S. can support regional cooperation among the new democracies, including your own Visegrad group. This is not an alternative to integration with the West. Proof that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe can work together to overcome historic rivalries and tensions will make them more attractive partners to the established democracies of the West.

NATO Summit and PFP

o The NATO Summit in Brussels made a historic decision to begin a process of expanding.

o As a major element of that process, NATO has launched a new proposal to expand practical military cooperation to democracies in Central Europe and the NIS -- the Partnership for Peace.

-- We want to get practical cooperation underway as soon as possible between NATO militaries and the militaries of the new democracies who want to join it. Under the Partnership, our militaries can plan, train, exercise and even operate together.

-- The Partnership also has a political dimension. NATO will commit itself to consult with a Partner state if there is a direct, immediate threat to that state's security.

o I cannot promise NATO membership or dates; nor can I promise a precise road map to NATO expansion.

o But I want NATO to expand, through the Partnership. The Partnership will be as effective as you make it; active participation in it will speed our military cooperation and integration. I will be delighted if your countries were the

first to join and become the most enthusiastic and active members of the Partnership.

-- Central Europe is not and will not be a "grey zone" or "buffer area." Military cooperation is complex, but the Partnership's meaning is simple: NATO is ready to get to work to improve your security, and ours.

o To support the Partnership and the new security relationship it establishes, the United States is reorienting some of its bilateral military programs and policies. Our resources are limited but we have some new ideas.

-- **The U.S. will help organize and train, and perhaps even be able to help equip, selected units from Central Europe to NATO standards.** Such units could be designated for possible joint operations with NATO units, if governments agreed on their use in some future contingency.

-- In addition, **I am directing that the United States remove remaining Cold War Era-restrictions that still prohibit transfer or sale of defense articles to some Central and East European countries.** The United States will be able to judge each transfer or sale on a case-by-case basis, as we do with most other countries.

-- Of course, as responsible members of the international community, I know I can count on you to do your share in keeping weapons of mass destruction and other dangerous items out of the hands of rogue nations.

o I look forward to welcoming you as new Partners for Peace.

Support for Democracy and Free Markets

o Military security is only a small part of America's engagement with you. Security goes far beyond its military dimension, and the success of your reforms will depend more on economic and social factors.

o The United States wants to be more active here, and in some different ways than in the past. I have some ideas in mind.

o Your progress since 1989 shows that serious, comprehensive economic reform produces fast results -- look at the Czech Republic. And Poland, which undertook radical reforms regarded at the time as extraordinary daring, is now Europe's fastest-growing economy.

o But the process of reform can bring serious social strains. A flourishing private sector is necessary, but needs to be accompanied by modernization and reform of government administration and social safety net structures.

- **The United States will give greater emphasis in its assistance program to help reform public administration and social safety net systems.** I hope international financial organizations -- such as the World Bank -- can do the same.

  -- It is wrong to think of a trade-off between support for the private or public sectors. Both are necessary. We are exploring a proposal to help newly-privatized firms and their communities; to work with public and private sectors to make economic transformation a success for the whole society.

- **The United States also will intensify its programs in support of what we call civil society, especially at the grass roots.**

  -- Democratic structures rest on a sturdy web of values and civic institutions, woven into every day life. The United States will establish a new "Partnership in Democracy" program to share the spirit, skills and experience of independent, non-government organizations in the United States and Central and Eastern Europe that are engaged in civic projects.

- Some of you here have expressed the hope that the United States will continue to support **Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty**.

  -- These radios played an irreplaceable role in the transition to democracy. And their tasks are not yet complete. I intend to keep supporting the good work RFE and RL do as democracy is built in Central Europe and the NIS.

  -- The Czech Government has made a very generous offer to help if the United States decides to move RFE/RL to Prague. That is a serious offer and we are looking at it very seriously. The issue is complex, with budgetary and legal issues to be resolved. We will be considering these very closely over the coming weeks.

- Successful reform rests on your integration into the world economy. Countries that have overthrown communism and are introducing bold market reforms have the right to expect open markets for their exports.

- **I urge the European Union to join me in putting fair market access for the nations of Central Europe high on the world's trade agenda, and I call on the EU to work with the United States in making sure our markets are open to the fair exports of the new democracies of Central and East European.**

- I also will do more to encourage American investment in Central and Eastern Europe. As your private sectors grow, these opportunities have multiplied.

-- **In the first half of 1994, the [U.S.][White House] will sponsor a special conference on trade and investment opportunities in Central and Eastern Europe, inviting the American and Central European business communities to discuss business opportunities and ways to reduce barriers to trade and investment.**

-- **I am also pleased to announce an expansion of programs by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) in Central Europe. OPIC will accept proposals to establish investment funds in the region, increase from $50 to $200 million its project lending limit, and will seek legislative authority to enable it to provide equity as part of a total project financing package.**

Support for Regional Cooperation

o In a region where national rivalries have produced horrors, a regional group like Visegrad is to be valued. The Atlantic community of the post-WWII world was built on cooperation among West European nations. Cooperation among Central European states will speed your integration into the larger community of market democracies.

o Moreover, a good deal of economic development is regional by nature. Major roads and other forms of transport and communications infrastructure make more sense if they are designed with a regional perspective. Simply removing bottlenecks at border crossings would bring visible economic results, help link nations together and make lives easier for thousands of people.

o I am determined that the United States will do more to support regional cooperation.

-- **We will provide technical assistance to regional groups, or to ad hoc groups of more than one country, in designing projects that would benefit more than one country.** In our bilateral assistance programs and through international financial organizations, **the United States will give preference to sound regional projects.**

-- In particular, **the United States will seek to mobilize international support for sound regional transport and communications infrastructure projects, by offering technical assistance to countries in designing such projects, and by encouraging international financial institutions and the European Union to finance them.**

-- The United States is prepared to **support efforts of the Visegrad countries, and eventually those of other countries in the region, to establish a regional airspace system.** Beyond its economic payoffs, modernizing your airspace systems could be a good example of practical cooperation within the region to

ease your integration into the Western community. **The U.S. could offer now to work with you, individually and collectively, to develop a complete plan for a cooperative system that would bring your countries together and could be compatible with Western airspace systems, including those of NATO.**

-- The U.S. will welcome opportunities to engage in regular dialogue with the Visegrad group and with other emerging regional groups.

Summary

o My country's priorities are clear: Central Europe's security, economic transformation and democracy are indispensable elements of the new Europe and the new world.

-- Central and Eastern Europe is intrinsically important to us. Two of my senior advisers were born in Visegrad states; I am proud that one of them is here with me today. Madeline Albright and John Shalikashvili are visible reminders that America's European roots stretch deep into this region.

-- The success of your democratic, free market transformation also has broader ramifications. America cannot be secure unless Europe is secure. The Western part of Europe cannot be stable and prosperous if Europe's heart and Europe's east are in turmoil. The success of your reform efforts also can have important -- perhaps decisive -- influence on the democratic transition of the New Independent States.

o I have presented a specific action plan of how the United States can help now, across the full agenda of your interests and ours. I am honored to have met with you.

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~~003. paper~~	~~Visegrad Market Access: United States (1 page)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
~~004. paper~~	~~Visegrad Market Access: EU (3 pages)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
~~005. paper~~	~~Visegrad Countries' Arms Sales Policies (2 pages)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
~~006. paper~~	~~U.S. Military Relations with the Visegrad States (2 pages)~~	~~12/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
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VISEGRAD

The Visegrad group takes its name from the Hungarian town which hosted a February 1991 summit meeting between Presidents Havel and Walesa and Prime Minister Antall of Hungary. Though never institutionalized and although beset with reluctance on the part of the Czechs, Visegrad group cooperation nevertheless has yielded results in ministerial consultations, cooperation on border issues, and, most notably, a regional free trade agreement signed in 1992 (to be implemented gradually over an 8-year period).

A good description of Visegrad's origins was made by a Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister and former dissident, who told a USG contact that the Visegrad process represented the logical outgrowth of years of informal contacts among veterans of the democratic opposition who, now in power, wanted their trust and mutual regard expressed as regional cooperation.

When common concerns or interests have been clear, or in cases regarded as emergency, cooperation has grown. Apart from the regional free trade zone, Visegrad members quickly developed a coordinated position condemning the attempted coup by hardliners in Moscow in August 1991, and cooperated in negotiating parallel association treaties with the EU that were signed in December 1991. Visegrad members also cooperate in the security field in areas of common shortcomings, such as military training, air defense technologies and military production. The group maintains high-level bilateral and multi-lateral military contacts and has developed common positions on disarmament negotiations.

However, Visegrad countries are unsure how their cooperation is to develop. In Washington in December 1993, Polish Foreign Minister Olechowski expressed interest in regional economic cooperation, including practical projects among the Visegrad states. However, Czech Premier Klaus believes the Czech Republic stands a better chance of gaining membership in the EU through a "go-it-alone" strategy and has periodically denegrated the Visegrad group as a "club of the poor." The Czechs have also flatly rejected Polish and Hungarian calls to hammer out a common approach to Partnership programs and tried to keep the term "Visegrad" from being used in planning for this regional trip. The Visegrad track record on economic cooperation under pressure is mixed. Although the group for a short time last spring presented a united front in the face of an EU ban on East European meat products, its members quickly broke ranks to negotiate individual solutions. Trade among Visegrad members remains low, having fallen sharply since the end of CEMA in 1991.

The Visegrad countries view Partnership programs as a way station toward NATO membership, not a substitute. They want program proposals to be fleshed out as fully and quickly as possible.

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They are divided, however, on how precisely Partnership programs should be tied to NATO membership to best serve individual national intersts. The Czechs would like both the NATO and Prague summits to spell out specific criteria for membership that they believe would give them a leg up among the Four. The Poles, Hungarians and Slovaks -- in roughly that order of intensity -- favor admission of the Four only as a group.

The U.S. has consistently commended Visegrad as a valuable initiative in regional cooperation that might serve as a potential model for others. We have also made it clear that we see Visegrad not as an end in itself but as a stepping stone to integration into broader European and transatlantic institutions.

U.S. ASSISTANCE TO CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

OVERVIEW

U.S. Interests: The peaceful transition of Central and Eastern Europe to democracy and a market economy will: promote stability in Europe; offer a model for Russia and the NIS and a gateway for their integration into the Western community of market democracies; and open a market of 135 million people to U.S. goods and services.

Total commitment: Through FY 1993, the U.S. has committed over $8 billion ($4.8 billion of which is grant aid) to promote political and economic reform in central and eastern Europe. This includes extensive technical assistance, humanitarian aid, OPIC and Eximbank programs, the U.S. contribution to the EBRD, and $2.4 billion in Polish debt relief.

SEED Program: Of the U.S. commitment, over $1.8 billion in grant assistance has been authorized through the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) program. SEED assistance is linked to progress in these countries on political and economic reform and respect for human rights. SEED assistance has been concentrated in three areas:

1) the development of a market economy and strong private sector through the removal of constraints to entrepreneurship, the advancement of privatization and enterprise restructuring, the provision of capital and technical assistance to new entrepreneurs, and support for the development of the financial sector (**77 percent of overall SEED funding FY 90-93**);

2) the improvement of the basic quality of life in selected areas through quick-response humanitarian assistance and assistance to build cost-efficient health care and housing systems, labor retraining and unemployment services, environmental policy advice, and pension reform (**15.5 percent of overall SEED funding FY 90-93**); and

3) the development and strengthening of institutions necessary for sustainable democracy through supporting the transformation of the public sector to better support democratic development (**7.5 percent of funding FY 90-93**).

Enterprise Funds: The flagships of the SEED program are the Enterprise Funds for Poland, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics, and Bulgaria (**26 percent of overall SEED funds FY 90-93, included in the first category, above**). The Funds are, by design, a bold experiment: private corporations using USG grant funds to make loans to or investments in small and medium sized businesses. Enterprise Fund Boards are comprised of prominent individuals from the private sector who volunteer their time. New funds are being developed for the Baltic states and Romania.

NEW DIRECTIONS AND PRIORITIES

Priorities: **In the context of continuing support for economic restructuring and reform, we will put greater emphasis on technical assistance for democratization, reform of social safety net mechanisms, the environment and promotion of regional cooperation.** We also will begin shifting assistance resources from countries that have made significant progress in economic and political reforms to those further behind.

Democratization: New assistance will include:

-- a multi-year program to train and reinforce democratic behavior in government administration. This will support public administration reforms, including: decentralization; transparency and accountability; and responsiveness to public opinion, interest groups, and elected officials.

-- development and strengthening of indigenous non-governmental organizations (NGO's), as a private means of influencing public policy and monitoring government practices.

Social Safety Net: A legacy of communist regimes has been a bloated and unaffordable entitlements scheme in some areas, e.g. retirement pensions, but no system at all in others, e.g. unemployment. The economic dislocation of the transition to a market economy has been severe for segments of the population.

-- Our technical assistance programs will help governments develop, within their financial restraints, short-term and long term solutions to unemployment, job creation and basic social services.

Environment: The environmental devastation which resulted from past industrial practices is a major U.S. concern in CEE, particularly as regards health hazards.

-- U.S. environmental experts will advise and train national and local governments on policy reform and enforcement measures, as well as individual firms on environmental control and management.

Shifting Resources: We are beginning a gradual shift of assistance resources for CEE countries which have achieved significant progress in their democratic and economic transition -- generally Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary -- to those less advanced. We expect to maintain a significant financial commitment to the region as a whole, however, at least to the end of the century.

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U.S. INITIATIVES FOR PRAGUE

Partnerships in Democracy. Under this new program, we will support civil society in CEE through assistance to indigenous public-policy NGO's in the region. It will feature more field-based decision-making, greater flexibility and faster response time than many of our previous democracy programs in the region. Country programs will be drawn up by newly-established Embassy Democracy Commissions and implemented by a designated NGO (probably U.S. rather than indigenous). Programs will involve training and support of host country NGO's; specific areas of activity will depend on the needs of the country (e.g., law, education, local government, inter-ethnic relations). We will support regional cooperation by 1) giving priority to programs with an ethnic or regional balance in their membership and; 2) giving a U.S. NGO a separate mandate to conduct regional programs, working with counterparts from more than one country. This is a $30 million program for 3-5 years, funded by within existing SEED budgets.

Support for Public Sector/Social Safety Net reform. We will emphasize technical assistance and training to upgrade and modernize public administration and social safety net structures. The Department of Labor is leading an interagency effort to identify the most promising areas of activity. The Department of Treasury is developing an initiative to coordinate World Bank and donor country (G-7) assistance for newly-privatized firms and communities. Funding will come from existing SEED budgets.

Support for Regional Cooperation. We will develop regular dialogue with constructive emerging transnational groups -- such as Visegrad; offer technical assistance to regional groups, giving priority to projects that benefit more than one country; and, support -- through technical assistance and by seeking to influence the IFI's -- regional transportation and communications infrastructure projects.

In addition, we have developed a **regional airspace initiative** to help the Visegrad and eventually other CEE countries establish a region-wide civil/military airspace management system. We can now offer the first phase -- a $.5 million architecture study for the Visegrad countries that would give them a comprehensive airspace system modernization plan. The implementation phase will require outside funding, e.g., the World Bank. While the World Bank may be interested in this project, we should not suggest or promise any Phase II funding at this point.

Market access. Independent studies and USG analyses indicate that the U.S. market is far more open than the EU market for CEE exports. In Brussels and Prague, we will challenge the EU and EFTA to open their markets and urge that market access for CEE be put on the G-7 Summit Agenda.

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Support for trade and investment. We have prepared two initiatives. First, we will announce in Prague a [White House/USG] Conference on Trade and Investment to take place in 1994. Second, we will announce an expansion of OPIC programs in the region. OPIC will:

- Elicit and accept proposals to establish privately-managed investment funds in the region.
- Increase its per-project lending limit from $50 million to $200 million.
- Seek legislative authority to enable OPIC to provide equity as part of a total project financing package.

Bilateral Military Programs. We will orient our bilateral military programs in CEE to support PFP. Specifically, we will:

- Encourage CEE countries to maintain or create unites capable of and earmarked for possible joint peacekeeping operations with NATO.
- Work with allies and CEE partners to identify available excess, second-generation, NATO-compatible equipment for potential transfer or sale or that can be purchased commercially at relatively low cost.
- Seek funding for assistance to CEE countries to modernize the equipment and improve the interoperability of their militaries.

We will also **end Cold War-era prohibitions** and restrictions on U.S. arms sales and arms transfers. Specifically, we will complete Presidential Determinations for all CEE states (except those under arms embargo), which will allow the USG to transfer U.S. defense articles and services to CEE governments. (Sensitive arms transfers would still be constrained by existing laws and policy). We will also remove all CEE states (except those under arms embargoes) from the International Traffic in Arms Regulations list, which will allow commercial purchase of U.S. defense articles.

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VISEGRAD MARKET ACCESS: UNITED STATES

Under the Trade Enhancement Initiative undertaken in 1990 and 1991, the United States significantly liberalized its trade with Central and Eastern Europe. It has extended MFN status to all CEE states except Serbia and Montenegro, whose MFN status was revoked in 1992. It also granted GSP privileges to all states with the exception of Romania (for which GSP status is expected shortly) and, again, Serbia and Montenegro. In addition, the USG negotiated relatively generous textile agreements with Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania, significantly expanding quotas on woolen imports (a domestically-sensitive category). As a result, few quantitative and tariff barriers now affect CEE exports to the United States. Those that do exist -- remaining quotas on textiles and cheese -- are being addressed in the Uruguay Round negotiations and will phased be out over ten years and/or eased.

These U.S. trade initiatives have begun to have an impact on CEE exports. While CEE exports to the United States dropped precipitously in the first years of East European economic transformation, over the past year, these exports have increased at an average annual rate of about 10 percent. Nevertheless, the United States remains a marginal trade partner for these states; even with the past year's increase, the United States still accounts for only two to three percent of their total trade.

Some trade frictions have also emerged.

-- In June, the International Trade Commission found that exporters from Poland and Romania had dumped steel plate in the United States.

-- Inadequate intellectual property rights protection in Poland has also given rise to challenges to Poland's GSP privileges and to a petition under the Special 301 procedures. A similar dispute with Hungary was resolved through a bilateral intellectual property agreement in July, 1993.

-- Finally, the MFN status of Romania, Bulgaria and Albania remains subject to the renewal restrictions of the Jackson-Vanik amendment.

Further problems may develop over the coming year. The U.S. GSP legislation, which provides duty-free access for about 35 percent of CEE exports to the United States, expires in September 1994. In addition, most CEE countries (Poland is one exception) are still classified as non-market economies, which tends to disadvantage them in dumping cases, (though it protects them from countervailing duty suits). Finally, there is some concern among CEE states that the United States may view the restructuring assistance and debt relief extended to formerly state-owned enterprises as public subsidies.

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VISEGRAD MARKET ACCESS: EU

The EU granted the Visegrad countries favorable trade concessions through the March 1992 Association Accords and the EU Summit in June 1993, but it has backtracked on certain trade benefits in the past year because of heavy pressure from industrial and agricultural lobbies. Non-tariff barriers, such as veterinary restrictions, product norms, and packaging rules also hinder the region's exports to the EU. The Visegrad and other Central and East Europeans, meanwhile, constrained by their own production problems and lack of competitive pricing, are often unable to take full advantage of the EU market.

Trade Liberalization: Less Than Meets the Eye

The EU association accords with Visegrad and other Central East European countries (CEE) will remove tariffs and trade barriers on most industrial goods over the next ten years. Nonetheless, access to EU markets for CEE agricultural goods, textiles, clothing, and steel -- 35 to 45 percent of the region's traditional exports to the EU -- remains restricted. Moreover, the EU continues to exercise its right to impose "contingent protection" against sudden surges in low-priced CEE goods.

-- The EU eliminated quotas on northern tier steel exports in March 1992 but reinstated them later in the year when Czechoslovak and Hungarian steel exports rose 56 percent and 31 percent, respectively. After lengthy negotiations, the Commission set new quotas on Czech and Slovak steel in May 1993. The Commission also negotiated new limited access agreements with Hungary an Poland in May 1993.

-- In July, the European Commission set minimum prices on sour cherry imports -- even though sour cherries did not fall on the EU list of restricted goods -- because of a surge of exports from Poland and Hungary. The Poles estimate that they will lose up to $5 million in export revenues as a result of the restriction. In an emotional statement following last September's election, former Polish Prime Minister Suchocka blamed this move for her defeat.

-- Despite the negotiated reduction in EU tariffs on fertilizers, the EU Commission imposed anti-dumping duties on fertilizer from the Czech Republic and Slovakia in early 1993 because of their increased exports of the products.

The European Commission, which is under strong pressure from industrial and agricultural groups, is investigating other charges of dumping by CEE exporters. West European producers claim that their CEE neighbors have an unfair advantage because of low wages, state subsidies, and low environmental standards.

-- The Commission initiated two anti-dumping investigations against Poland: haematite pig iron in December 1992 and

urea ammonium nitrate in May 1993. These investigations are still underway.

-- The European Independent Steelworkers Association in October asked the EU to further reduce imports of all steel products from several countries, including the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland, because these countries erected barriers to free trade in ferrous scrap.

-- The European Chemical Industry Council in June called for EU antidumping action against low-priced CEE chemicals, including caprolactam, polyvinyl chloride, soda ash, fertilizer, and melamine.

-- The French government in July complained to the EU Farm Council about imports of blackcurrants from Eastern Europe at low prices.

Protectionism by Another Name: Indirect Trade Barriers

Indirect barriers to CEE exports to the EU are almost as great a problem as formal restrictions. The Visegrad States were livid over the EU-imposed ban on imports of live animals, meat, milk, and dairy products last April. Although the EU claimed this action was aimed at stopping the spread of hoof and mouth disease, the CEE's saw it as blatant protectionism and took countermeasures against EU exports.

-- The measure was rescinded after the Central Europeans -- with the exception of Poland -- agreed to give 48 hours' warning before exporting animals, accept quarantine periods of 14 days, and abide by additional veterinary requirements.

-- Meanwhile, the ban on Polish livestock, which was finally lifted 15 July, cost the Poles an estimated $28 million monthly.

In addition, quality requirements, product norms, environmental restrictions, and packaging rules are sometimes insurmountable to the CEE. Despite a surplus of some crops, such as cauliflower, for example, the Poles cannot export to the EU because of the quality and packaging problems.

Traditional Markets Lost

The CEE states, meanwhile, have accused the EU of stealing their traditional food markets by dumping grain and meat in Russia and Ukraine.

-- Hungary claims France is delivering wheat to Baltic ports for only $90 per metric ton -- well below cost -- and that Germany is delivering subsidized exports of beef to the former Soviet Union.

A Few Sympathetic Ears

Some West European leaders agree with the CEE charges that the EU has not opened its markets enough for East European goods. British Foreign Secretary Hurd in late November commented that the EU was not living up to its rhetoric about reopening its markets. Sir Leon Brittan, EU trade commissioner, argued in June 1993 that the Community should buy more imports from the east because the hard currency generated will be spent on capital goods from the EU. Germany's Chancellor Kohl in late October urged EU states to grant increased access for Central and East European goods and declared that the West Europeans would benefit from the competition.

East Europeans Share the Blame

While the CEE states have some justification in complaining about market access, they are also held back from exporting to EU markets by their own economic problems.

-- Northern tier countries have not filled all their EU trade quotas due to a decline in production and increased domestic demand. The median fill rate for 53 quotas on Polish industrial goods was only 12 percent as of end-October 1993. The utilization of agricultural quotas was even less: out of 38 quotas, the median fill rate was 8 percent.

-- The prices of many CEE goods are not competitive. The Hungarians complain that prices of their agricultural goods have risen due to increased input costs and decreased subsidies. The Poles say they have lost their EU market for powered milk because Russia offers the some product at a lower price.

Outlook: EU Protectionism Could Ease

Although the EU is unlikely for now to grant any additional formal trade concessions, CEE access to EU markets may improve marginally over the next few years. The major EU trade concessions granted in 1992 will be phased in next year and protectionist pressures in the EU for continuing contingent protection, such as anti-dumping, could ease if economic recovery -- projected at 0.5 to 1.5 percent -- begins in Western Europe. EU agricultural producers, in particular, may face less competition from CEE agricultural exports because of the region's poor 1993 harvest. At the same time, some EU industrial lobbies -- particularly steel and chemicals -- are likely to push for further safeguards against East European exports as their sectors undergo major restructuring and grow slower than the economy as a whole.

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VISEGRAD COUNTRIES' ARMS SALES POLICIES

All of the Visegrad countries have accepted the need to prevent the proliferation of sensitive equipment and technology, and have committed themselves to establishing effective export control systems and observing internationally-recognized sanctions. They generally try to adhere to arms transfer policies that are consistent with international norms, as evidenced by the prominent role of these countries' Ministries of Foreign Affairs in making arms transfer decisions.

Their arms production has declined in all categories of weapons. Economic hardship and a shrinking arms market, however, have contributed to pressure to sell arms to pariah regimes, such as Iran, despite international opposition -- particularly from the United States.

Poland: The United States has objected on several occasions, including in demarches delivered by Vice President Gore, to Poland's decision to sell T-72 tanks to Iran. On December 14, FM Olechowski told the Secretary that Poland had not sold those tanks and was not planning to do so. The Poles should be applauded for this decision, which is an endorsement of healthy bilateral relations with the U.S. made over serious domestic opposition.

On the other hand, since 1991 Polish firms have delivered $5 million worth of machine tools and gas masks to Iran, and $50 million worth of helicopters, trucks and spare parts to Burma. (When approached by the USG on the Burmese helicopter sale, the Poles pointed out -- accurately as it turned out -- that Bell Helicopter's Singapore affiliate was selling Huey helicopters to Burma.)

Hungary: Over the past year, as economic pressures grew, Hungary has become less cooperative about restricting arms and sensitive dual-use sales to Iran, claiming that the economic losses will be severe and that other suppliers will fill orders that Hungarian firms forgo. Strong demarches have been delivered expressing concern over Hungary's contract, which is renewed annually, to sell electronic warfare equipment to Iran. State Department officials recently met in Budapest with GOH export control officials and requested that the contract not be renewed and that no new deliveries occur. The Hungarians stated their desire to make sales consistent with U.S. policies, but requested that the United States be patient -- apparently an indication that deliveries will continue.

Czech Republic: Prague has adopted a more export-oriented arms sales policy earlier this year, but Premier Klaus's decision to revive arms exports probably does not mean the Czechs will pursue sales indiscriminately, or that the government will ignore U.S. concerns. It does indicate, however, that Prague recognizes the need to maintain a viable defense industrial base and will give

increasingly greater weight to Czech economic needs and foreign availability of the equipment than U.S. concerns in arms export decisions.

Although Prague has not yet approved any sales of the Tamara detection system to Iran, officials refuse to rule out a deal and are not discouraging companies from maintaining business contacts.

Slovakia: Against the backdrop of ongoing economic difficulties, the Slovak government has stated that it will aggressively pursue arms exports to all but UN-embargoed countries. About 10 percent of the Slovak work force is employed in the defense sector. The poor condition of Slovak defense firms, however, probably limits the long-term potential for arms sales and technology transfer to pariah states.

CEE nations will retain arms industries to help meet their legitimate defense needs, but we must continue to stress that the commercial needs of these industries do not justify sales to nations that support terrorism, oppress human rights, or harbor aggressive designs against their neighbors, or sales that contribute to instability. At the same time, we should continue to encourage privatization and conversion to civil production as a means of reducing pressure to make irresponsible sales.

In considering U.S. demarches, CEE countries will pay great attention to sales to pariah states by Western nations and Russia, and the U.S. reaction. In fact, many Western firms sell weapons are dual-use equipment to Iran, Iraq, Libya and Burma; these firms are arguably as active as CEE firms.

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U.S. MILITARY RELATIONS WITH THE VISEGRAD STATES

Following the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), and especially since 1991, the U.S. has developed wide-ranging bilateral security relationships with CEE states, especially the Visegrad states. Despite limited security assistance resources, these evolving ties are assuming increasing importance in our overall bilateral relations. The U.S. has no military relations with Visegrad as a collective.

To date, our bilateral military programs have had a broad, introductory character. Areas of cooperation include civilian oversight of the armed forces, medical programs, logistics, military law, chaplaincy, public affairs program, budgeting and other areas. More traditional "hard" forms of military contact have been limited; there have been very few unit exchanges, though we anticipate these will take place through PFP.

Arms transfers from the U.S., which have been minimal to date, may increase somewhat following the NATO Summit and launching of PFP, but will remain constrained by resource limitations in CEE. Through possible future arms transfers we seek to assist the restructuring Visegrad militaries to reorient themselves to defensive postures and promote interoperability with NATO and U.S. forces. Such interoperability, in addition to building confidence, will allow the Visegrad states to participate more effectively in multinational activities, such as the Partnership For Peace (PFP) or U.N. peacekeeping. We have not approved export of any sophisticated, lethal arms to Visegrad.

Key components of our security relationships include:

- <u>Bilateral Working Groups (BWGs) on Defense Matters</u>. The U.S. has established BWGs -- annual, bilateral fora for consultations on regional security, defense relations and security assistance -- with each of the four Visegrad states (two each to date with Poland and Hungary). On the U.S. side, BWGs are chaired by a senior DoD official, with senior participants from State and the NSC staff. The next round of BWGs with the Visegrad-4 will be held in Summer 1994.

- <u>International Military Education and Training (IMET)</u>: The four Visegrad IMET programs, aimed primarily at military officers, emphasize civilian oversight and English-language instruction. Although FY94 IMET funding worldwide was halved by Congress, Visegrad programs fared well -- and may not suffer any cuts from FY93 levels (over $2m).

- <u>Military Contacts</u>: In addition to traditional contacts such as ship visits and air shows, DoD manages a military-to-military contact team program in each Visegrad country. In each capital, Military Liaison Teams (MLT) coordinate visits and exchanges by experts on particular themes (e.g., budget issues). Several Visegrad states also have cadets at U.S. service academies. U.S. defense

attaches are resident in each capital, except Bratislava. We plan to transform this program into a long-term sustained effort, establishing Offices of Defense Cooperation in CEE countries as security assistance programs begin to grow.

- Arms Transfers: Only Poland and Hungary are currently eligible to purchase U.S. defense articles and services from the USG through the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, although Slovakia and the Czech Republic should soon be eligible. Only Hungary has made a significant purchase to date (IFF transponders for aircraft). All four states are eligible to receive excess defense articles (EDA), although actual transfers have been minimal. (EDA transfers to the Czech Republic and Slovakia will be facilitated by issuance of a Presidential determination, expected shortly.) All four are able to purchase U.S. Munitions List items commercially.

  In accordance with the conclusions of a recent policy review, the U.S. will complete Presidential Determinations for all CEE states. Sensitive arms transfers would still be appropriately constrained by existing laws and established policy that, inter alia, prohibit retransfer without U.S. consent, and by case-by-case adjudications of each transfer.

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PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

The Partnership for Peace (PFP) is the centerpiece of our NATO Summit proposals. Its operational details, important though they are, should not be allowed to obscure its political aims:

Openness. The Partnership is not a second-best substitute for NATO membership, but a major step toward integrating the new democracies into the Alliance. It is open to all members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (the NACC consists of NATO members and all former members of the Warsaw Pact) as well as a number of other European states of NATO's choosing (primarily the former neutrals). While the Partnership responds directly to CEE desires for closer relations with NATO and a path toward full membership, we hope that Russia, Ukraine, the Baltics and others also will participate.

Opportunity. Each Partner can largely determine for itself the nature of its engagement with NATO by the extent and enthusiasm of its participation in the Partnership. Thus, there will be "differentiation in practice," without formally drawing new dividing lines in Europe. In private conversations with Polish, Czech and Hungarian officials, we have made no secret of our hope that they will be the most active participants and of our expectation that most Partnership activities in the east will be on their soil. Moreover, because the Partnership represents an evolutionary, dynamic process rather than a static policy, it keeps the door open to formal expansion of membership down the road and thereby retaining the necessary flexibility to deal with uncertainty in Russia and other regions of the NIS.

Obligation. NATO is an Alliance of mutual obligation. Participation in Partnership activities will prepare eastern states to meet the obligations of NATO membership, not just receive benefits from it.

Demonstration of commitment. The presence of NATO military units on eastern soil, preparing with eastern militaries for eastern contingencies, will provide dramatic and tangible evidence of NATO's interest in Partners' security. Especially in light of developments in the former Yugoslavia, CEE states are concerned that the West will resist engagement in the region. Partnership activities will counter this fear and, in so doing, bolster the position of reformers seeking to orient their policies and societies westward.

Political impact. The Partnership's impact on the "democratization" of eastern militaries, and on their relations with each other, can be as important as its role in integrating them with NATO military forces. Formal reviews of eastern Partners' plans for increasing both civilian control of the military and the transparency of military budgets will be supplemented by the socializing effect of working with forces from established Western democracies. Moreover, the NATO aegis will facilitate cooperation between Hungarian and Romanian, or

Polish and Ukrainian, militaries as well as between each of them and the west. This can encourage them to think of each other as partners rather than potential adversaries -- much as NATO did for French, German, British and Italian forces after World War II.

NATO allies have responded enthusiastically to the Partnership proposal; many had worried that we would push the membership issue further than they (or their parliaments) now are willing to go. Yeltsin was grateful that we avoided steps that could aid Russia's nationalists. Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia were relieved that NATO was not going to draw a new dividing line that excluded them, as were Ukraine and the Baltics that we would not implicitly consign them to Russia's sphere of influence.

Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic initially were very disappointed that we did not explicitly single them out for eventual full membership in NATO; considerable disappointment lingers. Most recently, however, key figures (e.g., Hungarian President Goencz when talking to Vice President Gore in mid-December) have said that while they want a security link with NATO they appreciate their own stake in avoiding actions that would destabilize Russia at this delicate juncture. Many are coming to see the Partnership as the best step for now.

How the Partnership Will Work. Participation in the Partnership will be open to all NACC states (and select others) willing and able to send representatives to appropriate political and military bodies at NATO headquarters and a Liaison Cell at SHAPE, as well as to participate in Partnership activities. NATO authorities currently envisage a number of exercises in 1994, including a command post exercise in Germany in the spring of 1994 and a field exercise in Poland in the autumn. These exercises will be announced either at the NATO Summit or during your visit to Prague.

The Summit will launch the PFP through a Partnership Framework Declaration signed by Secretary General Woerner on behalf of NATO. Prospective Partners will then be invited to sign the Declaration as an indication of their intent to participate. The Declaration spells out in general terms the political and military obligations of signatories (commitment to democracy, peaceful settlement of disputes, civilian control of the military, transparency of military budgets and the development of forces capable of operating with NATO). After signing the Declaration, Partners will file "Commitment Documents" with NATO indicating what forces and other assets they will contribute to Partnership activities as well as steps they plan to take to enhance civilian control of the military and transparency of military budgets. NATO officials will help prepare these documents if a Partner so requests. Partnership activities will be designed and prepared at the Liaison Cell at SHAPE, under the political guidance and for the approval of NATO headquarters. The North Atlantic Council (NATO Ambassadors) will have political authority over the Partnership, sometimes meeting as the "NAC plus" (i.e., with Partner states). A Steering Committee

comprised of NATO and Partner state representatives will provide day-to-day oversight. Office space will be provided to partner states at NATO headquarters and at SHAPE.

Partners participating in PFP activities will receive a commitment to consult with NATO in the event of a direct and immediate threat to their security. This provision parallels Article IV of the North Atlantic Treaty, although NATO allies prefer not to refer to Article IV as such (to avoid the political difficulties associated with even the appearance of committing to a treaty-like obligation). Although it commits NATO only to consult -- not to take action in the common defense (as stipulated in Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty) -- this aspect of the PFP has important symbolic value and indicates to states in the east that their security is of direct and material concern to NATO members.

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THE FUTURE OF COCOM AND EXPORT CONTROLS

COCOM restricted trade with the Warsaw Pact countries for over forty years; we and our allies agree that it can now be phased out. The U.S. proposes replacing it with a new arrangement that will enhance transparency and restraint in exports of arms and sensitive industrial items to certain regions of instability and to countries of concern (e.g. Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea). France and Germany have been reluctant to agree to a successor regime with real teeth, and have sought to dilute our proposal. However, we have secured initial agreement from allies to press ahead with discussions on the practical details of the new arrangement, including control lists and information-sharing modalities.

While discussions on the new arrangement have thus far involved only our COCOM partners, we have briefed Russian officials on the discussions, most recently in The Hague on December 7, as well as representatives from the six COCOM cooperating countries (the European neutrals and New Zealand).

We envisage that Russia will be a charter member of the new arrangement. The admission of other countries will be by consensus; the USG would welcome Visegrad participation. When deciding on the eligibility of a state to participate in the new arrangement, we will consider whether that country is a producer/exporter of arms or sensitive industrial equipment, its adherence to nonproliferation policies and control lists, and its adherence to fully effective export controls. The Visegrad countries have made significant progress in implementing effective export control systems, and we expect that they will be well-placed to participate, notwithstanding occasional issues of their arms sales to countries of concern.

As members of the former Warsaw Pact, Hungary, Poland, and the then-Czechoslovakia were all proscribed destinations under COCOM. Since the events of 1989-90, however, COCOM has progressively liberalized controls on exports of sensitive dual-use items to the Visegrad countries, as the countries have put into place the legal bases for export controls and begun implementing those controls.

Hungary was the first country to be removed by COCOM from the list of proscribed destinations, effective in May 1992. The Committee recently decided to remove the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic. Removal of the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic from the proscribed list will become effective as soon as pending national legislation and regulations providing for controls on all items controlled by COCOM enter into force. A new export control law is pending in Poland; its enactment will better enable Poland to meet the conditions for removal and participation in the new regime.

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RFE/RL

The activities of Radio Free Europe (RFE), Radio Liberty (RL) and the associated Research Institute are being consolidated and reduced in size as part of a reorganization and modernization of the U.S. international broadcasting effort. The bill to consolidate U.S. international broadcasting, already passed by the House, goes to the Senate on January 25.

Under current plans, for purposes of modernization and cost-saving, many technical activities of RFE/RL will be taken over by USIA's Voice of America (VOA), and all of RFE/RL's present 1,600 employees will either be laid off or moved from the present facilities in Munich, Germany, to Washington or a location in Europe. The bill does not directly address the move, but does establish a board to study options and make recommendations.

Although the original plan only contemplated moving RFE/RL from Munich to Washington, the government of the Czech Republic has strongly appealed to us to move the two radios and research institute to Prague. As a site, the Czechs are offering a modern building which was constructed as the federal parliament for the former Czech and Slovak Republic. After the formal separation of the two nations, the building has remained empty.

RFE/RL's oversight body, the Board for International Broadcasting (BIB) strongly favors the move to Prague, if cost and other considerations can be addressed satisfactorily. BIB has engaged a group of outside consultants to look at the technical and financial implications of an RFE/RL move to Prague. Their reports, and BIB's conclusion and recommendations, should be ready by mid-January. Preliminary estimates suggest that up-front costs of the move could reach $30 million or more, although considerable savings might be realized in subsequent years. (The move to the U.S. may cost even more.)

In any case, a considerable amount of negotiating with the Czechs will be necessary in order to nail down the rent for the building, and the tax status of the radios and of the personnel before we know if the "Prague option" is best for the radios.

American businessman and philanthropist George Soros recently added an interesting element by offering to house in Budapest the Research Institute's archives, and may also agree to fund some of the Institute's operating costs if it moves to Prague. BIB is looking at the legal aspects of Soros's offer, and believes it worth considering, but discussions with Soros are still at a very preliminary phase.

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MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:
POTUS Briefing Books-POTUS Trip to Russia/Belarus, January 12-15, 1994 [1]
Staff Office-Individual:
Records Management
Original OA/ID Number:
810

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
43	1	7	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~Anthony Lake to President William J. Clinton re: Your Visit to Moscow (5 pages)~~	~~12/31/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
~~002. paper~~	~~One On One Meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin (6 pages)~~	~~00/00/0000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
003. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	12/21/1993	P1/b(1)
~~004. paper~~	~~Expanded Meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin on Economic Issues (8 pages)~~	~~00/00/0000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
005. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	12/28/1993	P1/b(1)
~~006. paper~~	~~Working Dinner with Russian President Yeltsin on Foreign Issues (8 pages)~~	~~00/00/0000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
~~007. paper~~	~~Expanded Meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin on Security Issues (7 pages)~~	~~00/00/0000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Record Copy

President Clinton's Trip to Moscow, Russia and Minsk, Belarus

January 12-15, 1994

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The President

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President Clinton's Trip to Moscow, Russia and Minsk, Belarus January 12-15, 1994

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 31, 1993

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBM NARA, Date 1/15/2020
2016-0134-M

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Your Trip to Russia, January 12-15, 1994

Your summit meeting in Moscow includes four substantive sessions with President Yeltsin: a one-on-one meeting on the first day followed by separate sessions on economic issues and security issues and a private dinner with Yeltsin focused on foreign policy. Your visit will also include: a meeting with Russian Orthodox Patriarch Aleksiy II; a reception for newly elected parliamentarians and other political leaders from across Russia; a visit to a successfully privatized enterprise or joint venture; a speech to the Russian public; and a visit with the U.S. Embassy community. We will forward your public statements and press materials separately. This briefing book contains:

SCHEDULE OF KEY MOSCOW EVENTS

SCOPE MEMORANDUM

ONE-ON-ONE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

WALKING TOUR OF THE KREMLIN

EXPANDED BILATERAL MEETING WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN ON ECONOMIC ISSUES

MEETING WITH PATRIARCH ALEKSIY II

RECEPTION FOR RUSSIAN POLITICAL FIGURES

PRIVATE DINNER MEETING WITH YELTSIN ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES

WREATH LAYING AT THE TOMB OF THE UNKNOWN SOLDIER

EXPANDED BILATERAL MEETING WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN ON SECURITY ISSUES

VISIT TO YELTSIN'S "OVAL OFFICE"

VISIT TO PRIVATIZED FACTORY (TBD)

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

VISIT WITH U.S. EMBASSY STAFF AND MARINE SECURITY GUARDS

BACKGROUND PAPERS

KEY EVENTS IN MOSCOW

SCHEDULE OF KEY EVENTS IN MOSCOW

Wednesday, January 12

ARRIVAL IN MOSCOW WITH CEREMONY
9:55 p.m.

OPTIONAL BRIEFING FOR MEETING WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN
10:45 - 11:15 p.m.

Thursday, January 13

OPTIONAL BRIEFING FOR MEETING WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN
8:00 - 8:30 a.m.

OFFICIAL GREETING CEREMONY AT THE KREMLIN
9:00 - 9:30 a.m.

FIRST BILATERAL WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN
9:30 - 10:30 a.m.

WALKING TOUR OF THE KREMLIN WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN
10:35 - 11:25 a.m.

EXPANDED BILATERAL DISCUSSION ON ECONOMIC ISSUES
12:00 - 1:00 p.m.

MEETING WITH PATRIARCH ALEKSIY II
1:35 - 2:15 p.m.

RECEPTION AT SPASO HOUSE
5:15 - 7:00 p.m.

PRIVATE DINNER WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN
7:30 - 9:30 p.m.

Friday, January 14

WREATH LAYING AT THE TOMB OF THE UNKNOWN SOLDIER
8:30 - 8:50 a.m.

EXPANDED BILATERAL DISCUSSION ON SECURITY ISSUES
9:00 - 10:00 a.m.

PRESS CONFERENCE WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN
10:45 - 11:30 a.m.

TOUR OF PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S KREMLIN OFFICE
11:30 - 12:00

PRIVATIZATION EVENT
12:30 - 1:15 p.m.

SPEECH AT OSTANKINO TELEVISION CENTER
3:30 - 4:30 p.m.

STATE DINNER AT THE KREMLIN
7:00 - 9:30 p.m.

Saturday, January 15

VISIT WITH U.S. EMBASSY PERSONNEL AND MARINE SECURITY GUARDS
8:15 - 8:45 a.m.

DEPARTURE CEREMONY AT THE KREMLIN
9:00 - 9:30 a.m.

DEPARTURE FROM MOSCOW FOR MINSK
10:15 a.m.

SCOPE MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 31, 1993

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INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Your Visit to Moscow

I. **SETTING**

You will visit Moscow for your third meeting, and second "summit," with Boris Yeltsin in nine months. Like all U.S.-Russian and Soviet summits before it, even in the post-Cold War era, the stakes are high. You and Yeltsin will grapple with some tough issues that have brought new challenges to our relationship just in the last few months. Yeltsin is arguably your most important foreign counterpart, and support for reform in Russia remains at the top of your foreign policy priorities -- and an area of great progress -- in your first year in office.

This visit will differ from your previous meetings with Yeltsin in Vancouver and Tokyo in one important respect--it comes at a crossroads in our relationship with Russia **and** at a critical turning point in Russia's own democratic experiment.

In Vancouver, you and Yeltsin succeeded in establishing distinct economic, security and political pillars for a new era of partnership with Russia. You mobilized $4.5 billion in support of Russia/NIS reform and took the lead in garnering international support for those reforms with the G-7, IMF and World Bank. You gave unflinching political support and legitimacy to Yeltsin during the March, April and October constitutional crises as well as in the aftermath of the December elections. You fashioned with Yeltsin a new era of cooperation in foreign policy and in improving our security and military-to-military ties. The results have been generally positive moves toward partnership, as in the recent Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement to build together an international Space Station.

But this new partnership and the positive direction of our relations with Russia are under fresh scrutiny. Critics in the press and elsewhere charge that we bet too heavily on Yeltsin and reform. They point to aggressive Russian

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

behavior toward its neighbors and to the electoral success of Zhirinovskiy and the communists to support their thesis that the Russians will now revert to a more traditional authoritarian and aggressive posture at home and abroad. Specifically, many believe Yeltsin may have to slow the economic reforms in the wake of the elections, and maintain the edge on the nationalists by pursuing a tougher policy in the Baltics, Moldova and with Ukraine -- as well as at the Security Council.

While there are some who believe this to be inevitable, that is not the way we read Yeltsin or his current situation. We think we can continue close cooperation with Russia to advance our many national -- and global -- interests at stake. But this will not be an easy task. It requires persistence, considerable diplomatic skill, and creativity. **Your top priority in Moscow will thus be to reaffirm with Yeltsin the Vancouver framework for a close U.S.-Russia partnership built on a Russian commitment to democratic political and market reform.**

Yeltsin will greet you in Moscow as a man dedicated to reform but burdened by Russia's many problems at the start of its third year of independence. He and the reform movement he leads have just emerged from a bitter and turbulent two-year power struggle with the dying institutions of the old Soviet Union. The past two years have seen several major constitutional crises, the April referendum, and the tragic events of October that nearly cost Yeltsin and reformers their political lives. Against this backdrop, it is a huge achievement that they are still standing at all. It is extraordinary that they were simultaneously able to put in place the essential building blocks of a fledgling democracy and a Russian-style market economy.

The reform "victory" in the first distinct phase of this century's second Russian revolution does not mean that the struggle for power in Russia is over. While the recent elections produced a new post-Soviet constitution and a new parliament, the only thing assured is that Russian politics will remain badly fractured with no clear majority view to guide the future. In the aftermath of the elections, Yeltsin faces stark choices. Russian political and social debate is deeply divided over the pace and direction of economic reform, the role and rights of Russia in the "Near Abroad," and relations with Eastern Europe, the U.S., and the rest of the West. There is substantial ambivalence in Russia about how fast to "integrate" with the West in economics and politics.

Yeltsin enters this new era with several advantages. Despite the difficult past two years, he remains the country's most visible and popular political leader. While the new Parliament will be, in theory, an alternative source of power to him, it will likely be fractured and unfocussed

for some time and not sufficiently strong at the start to challenge the basic direction of his policies. The new constitution also provides Yeltsin with strong powers in foreign policy that give him a measure of freedom in dealing with us and the rest of the world. But there can be no doubt that the elections have raised questions at home about his domestic and foreign policies that he will have to answer soon. These issues, combined with continuing concerns about the state of Yeltsin's health, will make 1994 a pivotal year for his country and for our relations with it.

II. CORE GOALS

- **Reaffirm with Yeltsin the foundations of the U.S.-Russian partnership you designed in Vancouver;**

- **Emphasize privately to him and publicly in Moscow continuing, strong American support for economic reform and the development of a democratic political system;**

- **Reach out to a broader group of Russian leaders to demonstrate our interest in Russia beyond Boris Yeltsin;**

- **Seek Yeltsin's agreement to continue the historic process of integrating Russia economically and politically with the West;**

- **Pursue specific agreements on four core issues in the relationship: 1) new U.S. ideas to support Russia's economic reforms through more intensive World Bank/IMF and G-7 assistance; 2) Russia's agreement to help build a new security environment in Europe through the Partnership for Peace; 3) Russian reaffirmation of its intention to be a good neighbor and specific progress (in Baltic troop withdrawals) to prove it; and 4) conclusion of a historic agreement with Moscow and Kiev to remove all nuclear weapons from Ukraine.**

III. ACHIEVING THESE GOALS

Schedule

You will have a full two-day schedule in Moscow to pursue our objectives for the Summit. The heart of your visit will be four substantive sessions with Yeltsin and other Russian government leaders: a kick-off one-on-one session with Yeltsin in the Kremlin to discuss how to keep our partnership on track; an expanded meeting on economic issues highlighted by discussion of how we can provide the most effective international assistance for Russian reforms and a review of our bilateral efforts; a working dinner at a dacha outside Moscow on foreign policy problems, especially Russian behavior in the "Near Abroad;" and an expanded meeting on security issues where you will, if necessary or

possible, nail down the nuclear deal with Ukraine and discuss nonproliferation issues and arms control.

In addition to these meetings, the possibility exists that you and Yeltsin could meet with Ukrainian President Kravchuk during your visit to conclude a historic agreement to remove all the nuclear weapons from Ukrainian soil.

You will also participate in several events designed to demonstrate our respect for the Russian people and our interest in reaching out to a broader group of reformers and opposition figures. Your brief meeting with the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, Aleksiy II, will send a positive message to the millions of people who are reviving Russia's spiritual life. You will visit a Russian factory to meet workers and give symbolic support to privatization. Your meeting with new Parliamentary leaders and reception with a diverse group of political leaders from throughout Russia will answer those critics who misperceive our policy as a Yeltsin-only embrace. In fact, your schedule has been carefully arranged so that it does not appear to be an exclusive embrace of Yeltsin. One of the most important events will be your speech to the Russian people and a follow-up question and answer session with young Russians at the Ostankino television studio.

SUBSTANCE

As usual, the agenda for the summit is full, involving a number of important security, economic and political issues. Your first substantive objective will be to use the initial one-on-one to focus Yeltsin on the imperative of reaffirming the foundations of the relationship and moving forward together on these core issues. We have designed an approach for you that poses this question directly and asks for his agreement that we will work hard to make progress across the board. This is an important meeting that will set the substantive tone for the entire visit.

<u>Economic issues will dominate the first morning</u>, especially given the criticism in Russia that the reform drive has left average Russians worse off than when the USSR collapsed two years ago. You will want to draw Yeltsin out on his plans for reform in 1994 and determine if he plans any deviation from the course he began in 1992. Your message is twofold: that he should continue a strong reform effort based on a commitment to privatization, macro-economic stabilization and fighting inflation; and that we understand the need for him to provide greater targeted social investments for Russians. If we have made progress with the G-7 in the week preceding your arrival, you will be able to float with him several ideas for more effective western assistance to support this effort. You will need to make clear our inability to design or fully fund

targetted social investments -- that is clearly Russia's job. But we want to help him do so. You will also want to review the effectiveness of U.S. assistance efforts in 1993 and focus Yeltsin on a more ambitious effort to promote greater private trade and investment.

Your working dinner on the first evening will focus on two of the other core four issues: Partnership for Peace, and Russian foreign policy in the "Near Abroad." We are working to insure that Yeltsin says "yes" to the Partnership for Peace proposal that you will bring from the NATO meeting in Brussels. It is important that he understand this is critical to the long-term mission to integrate a modern Russia into the West. It is also critical that he understand that Russia must also be true to important international norms in foreign policy in order to maintain good relations with the U.S. and other countries. You will need to let Yeltsin know squarely that a continuation of aggressive Russian behavior in the Near Abroad risks undercutting the core of his support in the West. You can urge him to take specific steps to make sure this does not happen, such as agreement with Estonia and Latvia on a withdrawal of Russian troops in early 1994.

Finally, the most important of the core four issues will be the centerpiece of your meeting on security issues: our attempt to work with Russia and Ukraine to conclude an agreement that would lead to the withdrawal and dismantlement of all of the strategic nuclear weapons in Ukraine. A successful resolution of this negotiation would be the crowning achievement of the summit, a victory for your nonproliferation policy and would provide a strong public symbol of Russia's willingness to work fairly with its most important neighbor.

OFFICIAL GREETING
AT THE KREMLIN

OFFICIAL GREETING CEREMONY
THE KREMLIN

CONTEXT OF THE EVENT

You will be met by President Yeltsin at St. George's Hall in the Kremlin. You and President Yeltsin will enter from opposite sides of the hall and will meet in the center, where you will each make a short statement to the press in attendance. Your remarks will follow President Yeltsin's. You will then greet the official delegations, standing separately on each side of the hall, before proceeding to your first bilateral meeting with President Yeltsin in an adjacent room. Your remarks will be provided separately.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- **To stress the importance of building upon and expanding the partnership established at the Vancouver summit.**

- **To show your admiration for Russia's democrats and reiterate our strong support for cooperation among the factions of the new parliament.**

CORE POINTS

- Want to focus discussion on ways to strengthen the democratic and economic reform processes in Russia.

- Also will discuss results of NATO summit and new security cooperation under Partnership for Peace.

- Partnership is a two-way-street benefitting both our countries.

BACKGROUND

St. George's Hall, named after the Tsarist military order of St. George, is located in the Grand Kremlin Palace. Along the walls are marble plaques inscribed in gold with the names of Russian soldiers who were awarded the order which was the Tsarist equivalent to our Congressional Medal of Honor.

FIRST BILATERAL
WITH PRES YELTSIN

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0134-M (1.79)
KBH 1/15/2020

ONE-ON-ONE MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

CONTEXT OF THE MEETING

This initial one-on-one session with Yeltsin could turn out to be the most important conversation you have ever had with him. It is no exaggeration that the U.S. and Russia are at a critical turning point in our relationship. Russia, after the October tragedy and the surprising elections, is also at its own crossroads: whether to build a future based on reform, vigorous economic change and foreign policy cooperation; or to look backward to reaction, economic regression and expansion against its neighbors.

At Vancouver, you and Yeltsin established a broad framework for a new U.S.-Russian partnership. In Moscow, you should aim to reaffirm and strengthen that partnership. But you will also confront new strains in our relationship, especially on foreign policy issues. You will have to seek Yeltsin's commitment to work with us to fix them. For example, we need Yeltsin to reaffirm publicly during your visit his renewed commitment to economic reform and to a Russian foreign policy that will be based not on expansion but on good neighborliness. At the same time, you can offer concrete suggestions for how we can help Russia integrate itself more fully with the West.

Integration is not just a slogan. It means pursuing more effective cooperation in a number of areas. You can offer Yeltsin U.S. ideas to advance our relations and Russia's integration with the West in four priority areas: 1) U.S. leadership in the G-7 to help Russia respond to the obvious post-election need to expand targeted social investments for its population; 2) close cooperation in assuring Russia's full involvement in the Partnership for Peace; 3) U.S.-Russian collaboration on foreign policy trouble areas like Nagorno-Karabakh and the Baltics; and 4) concluding the trilateral agreement on Ukraine's nuclear weapons.

These four issues are now at the core of both the problems and the opportunities in our relationship with Russia. They have been the most pressing issues in the run-up to this summit and will dominate each of your working sessions with Yeltsin. With luck, you and Yeltsin will be in a position to announce progress on each by the end of your stay in Moscow.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- **Set the stage for your summit discussions by emphasizing Russia's integration into the community of democratic**

nations as the key to Russia's future and to our relationship.

- **Underscore that Russia's integration depends ultimately on Moscow's commitment to economic and political reform at home and a responsible foreign policy that respects its neighbors.**

- **Assure Yeltsin that if he presses forward with reform (despite the disappointing results of the Parliamentary election), we are prepared to intensify our efforts to generate effective bilateral and multilateral support.**

- **Discuss four specific priority issues to advance in Moscow: U.S. leadership in the G-7 to help Russia in the next phase of its economic reform; eliciting Yeltsin's public support for the Partnership for Peace; improving Russia's relations with neighboring states; and concluding the trilateral nuclear deal with Ukraine.**

- **Agree with Yeltsin to schedule two additional meetings in 1994.**

CORE POINTS

Introductory Points

- Delighted to be back in Moscow, especially at this time of year. Very good to see you and discuss with you in person all that has happened since we saw each other in Tokyo: the October events, the new constitution and the election.

- What happens in Russia terribly important for U.S., for stability in Europe. I follow events in your country with great interest.

- Know you understand better than anyone how critical a period this is for Russia's future. I feel that deeply--thus my hope that we can use next two days for direct and in-depth discussions.

- As I understand schedule, we have four meetings: this one, expanded session on economics later this morning, our dinner tonight where we should discuss foreign policy issues; and tomorrow morning's session on security issues.

- Hope we can use this meeting to take a broad view of progress in U.S.-Russian relations since Vancouver.

Partnership to Integration

- Vancouver established a new bilateral partnership. At Tokyo, we, in effect, "multilateralized" that partnership by securing substantial G-7 support for your reforms.

-- You have stayed with reform when the going got tough. And I am delivering on my commitments in Vancouver to support you. Will discuss in detail during the economics meeting.

-- We've created beginnings of a partnership: in economic support; foreign policy cooperation; and new security dialogue.

-- Gore-Chernomyrdin is best example: real, tangible progress on oil/gas issues, nuclear plant safety and historic space station agreement.

-- Where we've disagreed, on missile proliferation or Bosnia, we've worked through differences to reach solutions that were not concessions by either side, but ultimately joint positions.

o Here in Moscow, need to reaffirm partnership and strengthen it. While foundations for partnership are in place, not yet wholly firm.

-- With your elections, and Zhirinovskiy/communist factor, sense that relationship under challenge in several respects -- some critics wonder if economic reforms will slow; if Russia and U.S. can achieve a true security dialogue; whether Russia will pursue a more aggressive and intrusive foreign policy with neighbors?

-- Understand that Parliament will be a new factor in your policymaking and you may need to build coalitions issue-by-issue.

-- From budget and NAFTA fights, I know this is difficult but doable.

o On our side, your election results may make it tougher to maintain Congressional support for your reforms.

o Some in U.S. and Europe are using Zhirinovskiy and communist gains to press the case for division of Europe and a security structure based on blocs.

o We need to use this summit to meet these issues head on.

-- Strong public reaffirmation from you of commitment to democracy and market economic reform. You have a good policy and a good team.

-- Firm public commitment from me to continue and intensify support for your reforms.

o So, we need to strengthen partnership further and also expand our efforts to achieve Russia's full **integration** into community of democratic nations.

- Would serve both of our interests.

  -- For both of us Russia's integration would mean more stable international environment necessary to make your democratic and market reforms irreversible, new world-wide economic prosperity and political stability possible.

- Want to mention four priority issues to strengthen relations and help achieve your integration. We need to discuss in greater detail over the next two days.

1) **Next Phase in Support for Economic Reform**

- I know the election results require more effort to address social pain and dislocation. I face similar imperatives in dealing with concerns of unemployed workers and inner city problems, like crime.

- But, in both Russia and the U.S., social pain can't be eliminated by perpetuating failed economic policies that created hardship in the first place.

- We both need to help our people understand that bold economic reform and social compassion are not contradictory. They are complementary and must be pursued simultaneously.

- My basic message to you is: keep going on the reforms -- privatization, stabilization must continue. At same time, we will work to attract G-7 support to design programs to help vulnerable segments of your society.

- We can't fully fund targeted social investments but we can attract some IFI support and give you advice. I'll make suggestions in our economics meeting.

2) **Partnership for Peace**

- The Partnership for Peace (PFP) offers Russia relationship with NATO that is inclusive, non-discriminatory, and geared to the future, not the past.

- This approach didn't come without political price. Many Americans and Europeans favored other options.

- I fought for PFP because it was right approach to NATO's future. I'll also work to put meat on bones of PFP and ensure that Russia is welcomed.

- But PFP needs your strong endorsement now. Let's announce together here in Moscow that Russia will be among the first NATO partners under PFP.

3) Russia and Her Neighbors

- At Vancouver and Tokyo, we discussed problems created by the breakup of the Soviet Empire and resulting turmoil along your borders.

- I know you can't ignore instability on your borders, political concerns about Russian minorities in neighboring states, and the economic dislocation that has followed the breakup of the Soviet Union.

- However, some Russian actions in neighboring states have created a strong impression in the West that Russia has at times acted unilaterally and in ways that frankly called into question your commitment to these nations' sovereignty.

  -- Georgia often cited as an example, elements of your military appear to have aided the Abkhaz separatists.

- I want to work with you to resolve these problems. A first step would be to join me at our press conference tomorrow in making strong parallel statements indicating our mutual commitment to preserve the sovereignty of your neighbors.

  -- Our statements should also call for full protection of human rights, as well as firm condemnations of extremist nationalism, ethnic and religious intolerance, and anti-semitism.

- The impact of such statements would be truly dramatic if we could combine it with:

  -- A new announcement of Russia's determination to reach agreement on complete withdrawal of troops from Estonia and Latvia in the first half of 1994

- We must together confront the reality that there are many who -- justified or not -- insist that Russia is pursuing a neo-imperialist course.

- If we do not confront this problem, it will undercut our efforts to achieve Russia's integration into the world community, generate new pressures for immediate NATO expansion, and ultimately threaten our bilateral partnership.

- In short, it will give the initiative to those who wish to divide us and isolate Russia.

4) Ukraine Nuclear Deal

Together we have made great progress in ensuring that no new nuclear weapon states emerge in former Soviet Union. The agreement by Kazakhstan and Belarus to abide by their Lisbon Protocol commitments made 1993 an important year in our efforts to achieve denuclearization of those states.

- Especially with Ukraine, our cooperation has been operational, sustained, and effective. We are close to a breakthrough that would eliminate the specter of a new nuclear power on your border.

- We need to keep pushing hard in our trilateral dialogue with Ukraine for a deal.

- If we can resolve remaining issues, you, President Kravchuk and I can make a public announcement of this truly historic achievement.

- Could be centerpiece achievement of this summit.

Next Meetings with Yeltsin

- I suggest we agree to meet twice more in 1994:

  -- We will be together in Naples in early July for the G-7 Summit when you come for the G-7 Plus One session. I would like to schedule a separate meeting with you there, as we did in Tokyo last summer.

  -- I would also like to invite you to make a State visit to the U.S. in early autumn -- in September or October.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
003. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	12/21/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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FOLDER TITLE:
POTUS Briefing Books-POTUS Trip to Russia/Belarus, January 12-15, 1994 [1]

2016-0134-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

WALKING TOUR OF THE KREMLIN WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN

WALKING TOUR OF THE KREMLIN

CONTEXT OF THE EVENT

Between your first two meetings with President Yeltsin, he will give you a private walking tour of the Kremlin. While the grounds are spacious and President Yeltsin may have a few of his favorite sites off the beaten track in mind, your 50-minute tour will probably include several of the following well-visited sites.

BACKGROUND

The Kremlin Grounds:

Kremlin is a translation of the Russian word "kreml" which means fortress. There are kremlins in a number of old Russian towns but none so well known as the Moscow Kremlin, which is often used as a synonym for the Russian state and government. The Kremlin stands on an irregular triangle of ground covering 69 acres above the river Moskva.

The Grand Kremlin Palace was built in 1838-1849 by a team of architects under the supervision of Konstantin Thon on the site of an earlier palace built by Rastrelli in the 18th century. It was the residence of the imperial family during their visits to Moscow. It is now a government building where the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation meet, and where official receptions are held.

The Green Drawing Room: An oblong room with a fireplace in the Grand Kremlin Palace, this room is the site for your one-on-one with President Yeltsin. It is one of the three formal meeting rooms connected in a row: the Red Drawing Room, the Green Drawing Room and St. Catherine's Hall.

St. Catherine's Hall: A long rectangular room in the Grand Kremlin Palace, the hall is devoted to the Order of St. Catherine, the only Russian order given to women. The order was founded by Peter the Great in honor of Catherine I, who bought Peter's freedom when he was held hostage briefly as a child.

St. Vladimir's Hall: A relatively small oval room in the Kremlin Palace, this is where signing ceremonies normally take place. It is also used as the reception room for state dinners in the Hall of Facets. It is devoted to the order of St. Vladimir, which was awarded in Tsarist times to Russians whose actions benefitted the country.

St. George's Hall: The grandest of the halls of the Kremlin Palace, it is named after the Tsarist military order of St. George. Along the walls are marble plaques inscribed in gold with the names of Russian soldiers who were awarded the order (the Tsarist equivalent of our Congressional Medal of Honor). St. George's Hall is the traditional location for formal greetings and farewells for heads of state.

Red Square (Krasnaya Ploshchad): The main square of the city, Red Square has had different names over the long years of its existence; the first written mention of it calls it Torg, which means marketplace. It was for a long time called Pozhar (fire) because of the devastating fire that swept over it in 1493. It was called Troitskaya, or Trinity, Square after the Trinity Church that once stood there. It has been known as Krasnaya Ploschad since the end of the 17th century. "Krasnaya" has traditionally been translated as "Red", although in old Russian the word most often meant "beautiful, magnificent." But while "Krasnaya" originally denoted the square's grandeur, after the October Revolution the adjective came to signify the color of the revolutionary banner and the country's state flag, and thus acquired its modern basic literal meaning - Red. The square is 760 yards long and 142 yards wide. In addition to its great size and architectural monuments facing it, Red Square is famous for the many historic events it has witnessed. The best view of the square is obtained from the windows of the Historical Museum, which is on the northern side. To the south stands St. Basil's Cathedral with the Minin and Pozharskiy Monument in front, to the west the Kremlin wall and the Lenin Mausoleum, and to the east GUM, pronounced "goom," the State Department Store.

Cathedral of the Intercession (popularly known as St. Basil's): Built to commemorate the victory over the Kazan Khanate in 1552, the cathedral was completed in 1561. Legend has it that Tsar Ivan the Terrible had the two architects, Barma and Postnik, blinded so that they could not build any structure as beautiful as the cathedral upon its completion. It is indeed unique, a whimsically designed structure uniting nine churches into a single whole. It is often quite appropriately referred to as "the stone flower in Red Square."

The Kremlin Wall: Over 500 years old, this is the oldest structure in Red Square. Three tall towers are part of the wall - Spasskaya (Saviour's), Senatskaya (Senate) and Nikolskaya (St. Nicholas').

The Lenin Mausoleum: The austere-looking structure of red and black granite near the Kremlin wall, the mausoleum was built as the Soviet leader's final resting place. Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, there has been much talk of

moving Lenin's body to St. Petersburg to rest beside that of his mother, but thus far no action has been taken. The mausoleum was designed by architect Aleksey Shchusev (1873-1949).

EXPANDED BILAT
DISCUSSION ON
ECONOMIC ISSUES

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
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KBM 1/15/2020

EXPANDED MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN ON ECONOMIC ISSUES

CONTEXT OF MEETING

Economic issues will be a major part of this summit meeting, as they were at your two previous meetings with Yeltsin in Vancouver and Tokyo. Economics is also probably the issue Yeltsin wants to discuss with you most intensively given its current importance following the elections and the value he attaches to your leadership in galvanizing international assistance for Russia during the past year. The economic agenda's prominence is in sharp contrast to our relationship with the USSR during most of this century when it rarely mattered at summit meetings. You and Yeltsin have put economics firmly in the center of our bilateral relationship and it is likely to stay there for many years.

You have three major aims in this expanded meeting which will take place on the first day of the summit: 1) to draw him out on his current, post-election thinking on the pace and direction of economic reform and to suggest how we can lead the G-7 and IFIs to produce more effective help; 2) to review the effectiveness of our own bilateral assistance and discuss plans for future aid levels; and 3) to emphasize your common effort with Yeltsin, begun in Vancouver, to expand substantially trade and investment in 1994 following the recent successful meeting of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission.

The Future of Russia's Economic Reforms and Western Assistance

Your top objective of the three for this meeting is to engage Yeltsin on his latest thinking on the future pace and direction of economic reform and on what we can do more effectively to help him. The Parliamentary election results were a wake-up call generally, but specifically the Russian people view the government's two-year attempt to begin a historic economic transition from command economics to a "Russian" market economy as harsh and directly responsible for the decline in living standards during this period. Russia's economic reforms have not succeeded on at least two fronts. They haven't established a social safety net for the average Russian and have also not reduced subsidies to large state enterprises. The effect is that the State-owned enterprises are being used as an expensive social safety net without real benefits to most Russians.

Yeltsin told the Vice President that he views the election results as a warning to reformers. While he will stand by the essence of the reform program and his team, he wants to be more confident that the government's efforts are effective and responsive to concerns of average Russians. He and other reform leaders will want, at a minimum, to have a better story to tell

by the 1996 presidential elections. He will need to unite his government behind a refocussed reform agenda (Chernomyrdin and Gaydar are already at odds on it) and build support for it in a fractious parliament.

In addition to drawing him out on this issue, you will want to express your view that only bold reform can deliver progress in time for the 1996 elections and suggest what the West can do to help Yeltsin respond to this challenge. By the time of the summit, we hope to have agreement with our G-7 partners on some new ideas to spur the IMF and World Bank to expand their support for Yeltsin's effort to provide more effective targeted social investment for the Russian population. You could offer technical assistance to improve the design of Russia's social assistance programs and financial support for targeted social infrastructure programs. It will be important to let Yeltsin know that while the West can't fully fund a social safety net (that is Russia's responsibility), we can help to design it and contribute international support.

U.S. Bilateral Assistance for Russian Reform

In the short-term, our substantial bilateral assistance will remain important for Yeltsin and other reformers. You mobilized far more financial assistance for Russia and the other new states in 1993 than any other Western leader. The $1.6 billion Vancouver package and the additional $2.5 billion secured from Congress in September are a major part of our overall strategy to provide effective support for reform. Yeltsin has indicated he would like to assess with you in Moscow the status of our current efforts and our future plans. You can report to him briefly on the rapid implementation of the Vancouver package and our plans for the larger program and hand him detailed Russian-language documents on both. You will need to convince him that the $900 million you will request from Congress for FY-95 does not represent a diminution of U.S. support but is a more "normal" level following 1993 (when you effectively went to the well twice for Russia). In any case, actual flows of U.S. assistance to Russia will exceed $1 billion during each of the next two years, due to the pipeline from our very large appropriation in 1993.

Expanding Private Trade and Investment

The greatest future challenge in our economic relationship is to shift the focus away from governmental assistance to an expanded commercial relationship through substantially increased American trade and investment with Russia. The key point here for your discussions with Yeltsin is that broadening commercial relations is the best and fastest way to integrate the Russian economy with the West. Your agreement with Yeltsin at Vancouver to use the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission as a vehicle for expanded cooperation in oil and gas projects, nuclear plant safety and space cooperation was pivotal. The commission has exceeded our expectations. Our cooperation in space, for example, including on the international Space Station, will amount to an additional $100 million per year for Russia over the next four years. The

Vice President's new relationship with Chernomyrdin, who is now the key moderate figure in Russia's economic reform hierarchy, will be critical to our future success in this area as will Ron Brown's new Business Development Committee. You should engage Yeltsin in Moscow to continue this effort and make concrete advances on several multi-billion dollar oil and gas projects as well as other priority commercial projects. You also need to begin a dialogue with Yeltsin on expanding access to each others' markets -- an issue of great concern to him.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- **Underscore the critical need to continue bold economic reforms as the only way to create a base for economic renewal in Russia.**
  - **We stand ready to work with Yeltsin and democratic forces in the new parliament to advance economic reform.**
  - **We look to Yeltsin to signal how we can best support that process.**
- **Acknowledge our understanding that, in light of the elections, the government's economic policy may have to place greater emphasis on social welfare programs.**
  - **You are leading a G-7 effort to support Russian initiatives in this area.**
  - **But Russian social programs must be clearly targeted at the most vulnerable groups and be reconciled with a continued commitment to stabilization, liberalization and privatization in the economy. We cannot fully fund the programs -- that is Russia's responsibility -- but we can help design them and attract international support.**
- **Review our bilateral assistance programs and their current effectiveness in support of Russian reform.**
- **Stress our commitment to build an economic and commercial partnership and to integrate Russia into the world economy through expanded trade and investment.**
  - **We want to make concrete progress in major American oil and gas investment projects.**
  - **The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission should continue to focus on constructing a more stable and predictable environment for foreign investment with a commitment by both the U.S. and Russia to greater access to each others markets through reduced barriers to trade.**

CORE POINTS

o I want to focus our discussion on three broad areas of cooperation: 1) the future of reform and Western assistance; 2) our bilateral economic agenda; and 3) how we can expand private trade and investment.

The Future of Reform and Western Assistance

o Russian reform following the elections: Want to discuss in more detail your thoughts on future of the economic reform program following the elections.

-- Understand from our phone conversation that reform program and team will stay in place.

-- Do you believe it possible to build a pro-reform coalition in new Parliament?

-- I believe very important to press ahead with reform course: expand privatization, continue to pursue fight against inflation, seek financial stabilization, price liberalization.

-- I've just come from Eastern Europe, where it was clear that the shortest transitions and fastest recoveries are in countries that moved boldly.

-- Continued reform will quicken transition period, help generate new businesses, build a foundation for economic growth and help attract international capital.

-- Also understand you need much greater focus on social benefits to cushion average Russians during difficult transition period.

o U.S. prepared to lead Western effort to help in this new stage of reform:

-- I want to help you make this difficult transition -- understand how critical this period is for you.

-- I've discussed with G-7 partners new U.S. ideas to help build international assistance, especially with IMF and World Bank, to support these reforms.

- First, I've asked G-7 leaders to have our senior financial officials meet periodically as a group with you and the IFIs to put some political energy into your collaboration with the IMF and World Bank;

- Second, we're considering pushing for quick IMF and World Bank loans to support a renewed reform push;

- Third, increased multilateral funding for the G-7's Special Privatization and Restructuring Fund;

- Fourth, new loans for other NIS states which now have trouble paying for energy imports from Russia;

- Fifth, a discussion of Russia's debt problems with the G-7. Would appreciate knowing your ideas on this.

-- In addition to these steps, we could be helpful in getting you best advice from our own private sector in design of pension and unemployment systems, developing a food stamp program to offset effect of food price liberalization and job training for those leaving the large state enterprises.

-- Want to work these quietly for now with IFIs to insure best possible chance of success.

-- Secretary Bentsen will keep in close touch with your officials.

-- Great challenge is to combine these two priority efforts in a single package -- continuation of broad reform along with greater social protection.

o We are taking action now to speed support for your reforms:

-- U.S.-Russian Enterprise Fund opening Moscow office next week. Led by your good friend Gerry Corrigan. Will lend to your small businesses. Capitalized at $300 million.

-- New Fund for Large Enterprise Restructuring (FLER) also beginning operations this month. I've asked former Treasury Secretary Blumenthal to head board. This is new $100 million fund to help largest firms through privatization.

-- New Director of G-7 office in Moscow: As we discussed in last two meetings, an American, Mike Gillette, will open office here this week. Will resolve problems in G-7 assistance programs and insure their effectiveness.

U.S. Bilateral Assistance for Russian Reform

o **Was one of my top foreign policy priorities in 1993**.

o We succeeded together in putting in place a substantial U.S. assistance program for Russia. I want to make sure it helps reform and meets your needs.

- Want to summarize briefly what we have accomplished and our plans for 1994.

- Successful implementation of the Vancouver package

  -- After my $1.6 billion commitment at Vancouver, have obligated 100 percent of funds and expended 71 percent. Plan to complete full expenditure of funds early in 1994. (You should hand Yeltsin Russian-language report of the Vancouver program's progress.)

  -- We are distributing this assistance throughout Russia (you can give him a map showing the distribution by region and city).

- Plans for the additional $2.5 billion program

  -- Just beginning implementation of the larger $2.5 billion program for Russian and other NIS states (Russia will receive over $1.6 billion of it).

  -- Major focus on privatization, democratization, exchanges, small business creation, housing for military officers, energy. (You should hand him a second Russian-language document on plans for this program.)

  -- Housing for military officers a special concern. I convinced Congress to finance in order to help with your withdrawal from Baltic countries. Need your military to provide land and utilities to construct the 5000 units within our $160 million budget. Project can't proceed without this agreement. Ambassador Pickering is discussing details with your officials. Appreciate your personal intervention on this.

- Projected future U.S. assistance

  -- I need to submit budget to Congress soon -- will request $900 million for FY-95. This will put Russia and NIS at top of U.S. assistance along with Israel and Egypt.

  -- May seem small after past year but is attempt to reach a "normal" level for Russia.

  -- I went to well twice in 1993 -- an unusual year. This helped galvanize other countries to contribute to you and spurred international assistance.

  -- Because $2.5 billion program just starting, actual flows of assistance will continue to be quite high -- I expect it to be over a billion dollars in both 1995 and 1996.

o Other U.S. steps to help Russia integrate into world economy

-- Cold War Legislation: You requested at Vancouver. Congress passed in November. I signed into law in December. Rescinds over 60 Cold War restrictions. Russia no longer labeled Communist country in our laws.

-- Jackson-Vanik: You asked for full graduation. Don't believe Congress would agree, especially in light of the Zhirinovskiy phenomenon. But I am prepared to declare Russia "in compliance" as interim step to full graduation. This will still be controversial but I am willing to defend it. [Need to make final decision after ongoing talks with Russians.]

-- G-7 Naples Summit: Want to work with you closely to develop constructive agenda for your meeting with the G-7. Want summit to result in concrete ways to help Russian reform. Will ask Secretaries Christopher and Bentsen to coordinate with your officials.

(If Yeltsin requests Russian membership in G-7: I think membership is premature and would lead to many other countries coming forward. You already have the "G-7 plus one" format. Let's focus on making session a success in Naples.)

Expanding U.S.-Russian Private Trade and Investment

o Most important long-term effort in economic area:

-- We need to continue to push our governments to make this a major priority in relationship.

-- Key to unlocking major capital and technology flows; you will need to reform economy long-term and grow.

-- Gore and Chernomyrdin making excellent progress in their two meetings. Want their close cooperation to continue.

-- We are making progress: Russian exports to U.S. tripled in 1993 to nearly $1 billion. I granted Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) to Russia which will make 4,400 of your products duty free in U.S. U.S. Senate has ratified the Tax Treaty. We are now leading investor in Russia. But we can and should do much better.

o Want to agree on agenda for future. We set new foundation in 1993. Let's build on it in 1994.

-- New emphasis should be on improving market access for both countries. Know this is special concern of yours. Let me suggest following steps:

-- 1) Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown to lead Presidential Trade Mission by March. Will bring top U.S. CEOs in industries designed to promote investment fastest in Russia.

-- 2) Focus our efforts on "Pioneer Projects" in oil/gas area discussed by Gore-Chernomyrdin. All now symbols of Russia's readiness to welcome U.S. investment. Important we make early progress:

- U.S./Japanese/Dutch consortium to develop Sakhalin offshore oil deposits (U.S. firms are Marathon and McDermott);

- Texaco's Timon Pechora project.

-- 3) Early Russian action to produce a stable tax and regulatory environment to make these projects happen.

- I am asking Ron Brown to follow up on these actions.

- Two-way street. Need your help.

-- 4) Implement your foreign investment decree and convince your new Parliament to ratify the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT). Will send signal of confidence to our business community.

-- 5) Launch new dialogue on market access: Know this is major concern for you. It is for me too.

- We've focussed too long on narrow dumping cases in uranium (glad we have just settled it), steel, aluminum, etc.

- Want to broaden discussion to look at long-term measures both of us can adopt to increase access to each others' markets.

- Russia can help by concluding some of "Pioneer Projects" and removing regulatory and other barriers.

- Very controversial in U.S. We are considering steps we can take at some point to open our markets to your commodities at the same time as we protect the legitimate interests of our industries.

- Don't want to shut you out of our market. Need to work with EU and Asians as well.

- Therefore, want to keep this very quiet for now. To start, I already have a senior group studying this issue and will get back to you with ideas.

MEETING WITH
PATRIARCH ALEKSIY II

MEETING WITH
PATRIARCH OF THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH ALEKSIY II

CONTEXT OF MEETING

Patriarch Aleksiy II is the spiritual leader of over 60 million Russian Orthodox believers across the former Soviet Union and around the globe. As Russia emerges from 70 years of official atheism, millions of Russians are turning to the Russian Orthodox Church to fill the spiritual vacuum left by Communism.

You are meeting with the Patriarch to demonstrate our respect for the Russian Orthodox Church and our interest in Russia's spiritual rebirth. This meeting will appeal to millions of Russians who are proud of the church. **Your top aim is to communicate our strong support for reform, appeal for his support to ensure continued freedom for foreign religious groups in Russia and to seek his views on the future of Russian reform.**

Historically, Russian Orthodox Patriarchs have enjoyed close relations with Russia's temporal leaders, and Patriarch Aleksiy is no exception. In recent months, however, Aleksiy has worked to cultivate an image of his church as politically neutral. The Patriarch is motivated both by a genuine belief in the church's spiritual mission and a desire to distance himself and the church from allegations of his personal collaboration with the KGB during the Soviet period. Patriarch Aleksiy demonstrated his political neutrality during the September-October crisis in Moscow. Initially, the Patriarch tacitly criticized Yeltsin's decision to dissolve parliament as unconstitutional. But on October 2nd, as the crisis neared the boiling point, he attempted to broker a peaceful settlement to the standoff, reportedly admonishing Yeltsin's opponents for refusing to compromise. The Patriarch subsequently forbade clergy from running in the December 12 parliamentary elections.

Notwithstanding the Patriarch's claims of political neutrality, he and the church will remain at the center of political debate in Russia. Nationalists fear that Russian culture and the church are under siege from the West. They look to the church as a protector of traditional Russian values. This innate Russian phobia has been aggravated by an influx of Western evangelical and other Christian groups. We have received scattered reports in recent months that Russian nationalists (particularly Cossacks) have threatened and even assaulted non-Orthodox believers.

These nationalist sensitivities were also reflected by this summer's controversy over a draft Russian law that would have limited the freedom of foreign religious groups to operate in Russia. The church lobbied actively for its passage. We firmly opposed the bill, arguing that it violated Russia's international commitments to uphold freedoms of religion and expression. President Yeltsin vetoed the bill twice. Efforts to override the second veto died with the Supreme Soviet's dissolution. The

strong showing by Russian nationalists in the December 12 parliamentary elections, however, may foreshadow a resurrection of a similar bill by the new parliament.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- **Underscore U.S. support for President Yeltsin's efforts to foster economic reform while working to relieve the associated hardship for the most vulnerable sectors of the population.**

- **Reiterate U.S. concern for human rights, stressing the positive role the Patriarch can play in promoting religious and ethnic tolerance in Russia.**

- **Note continued U.S. opposition to any laws that would limit religious freedom in Russia.**

- **Seek his views on future of reform in Russia.**

CORE POINTS

- Your Holiness. Honor to meet you. Sorry we missed each other in U.S. in September. Understand your need to return home during crisis. Admire your efforts to mediate.

- Happy to see your health improved. Hope you are feeling well.

- Have come from Kremlin meeting. Told President Yeltsin of our continued strong support for his efforts to foster democracy and a market economy in Russia. Will help mobilize international support for Russian efforts to minimize adverse effects on Russia's most vulnerable citizens.

- Given our deep commitment to human rights and democracy, we stood by you in your struggle under Communism to ensure freedom to worship.

- We hope that believers of all creeds in Russia can enjoy those same freedoms and that Russian people will reject intolerance of all kinds. You have special role as high moral authority in Russia.

- We were concerned about a bill passed by Russia's Supreme Soviet last July restricting religious freedom by denying Russian citizens free access to religious ideas.

  -- I hope that you would not support any future restrictions in violation of Russia's CSCE and other international commitments to uphold freedom of religion and freedom of expression.

- Have really come to listen. Would appreciate your views on Russia's future: course of political and economic reform, but especially Russia's spiritual rebirth that you've spoken of so eloquently.

BACKGROUND

Danilovskiy Monastery, the headquarters of the Patriarchate, is where you will meet with Aleksiy II, Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia. The meeting will take place in a large, rectangular room in which the Patriarch receives lay dignitaries. The monastery was founded in 1282 by Prince Daniil, the First Prince of Moscow. In 1330 the monastic community was transferred to the Kremlin and, after serious neglect, Ivan the Terrible restored the monastery to its former grandeur in 1560.

After the 1917 Russian Revolution, the monastery was closed. Throughout the Soviet period it was used as a detention center for juvenile delinquents. The monastery was returned to the Orthodox Church in 1983 and restored to house the Patriarch's residence and the Patriarchate's Department for External Church Relations. Its most important architectural feature is the Cathedral of the Holy Fathers of the Seven Ecumenical Councils, which was built by Ivan The Terrible in 1565 and enlarged in 1662 by Tsar Aleksey, the father of Peter the Great. The church at the main gate is dedicated to the Monastery's patron saint, St. Daniil the Stylite (the pillar-sitter). The Monastery has a picturesque white crenelated stone wall with ten turrets. It is located on the right bank of the river Moskva.

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RECEPTION AT
SPASO HOUSE

TO BE PROVIDED

SCENESETTER

SPASO HOUSE
MOSCOW

Spaso House has been the residence of American Ambassadors in Moscow since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1933. Spaso House's name is derived from the park on which it borders, "Spasopeskovskaya Ploshchad" (which is Russian for "Saviour of the Sands Square"). The park, in turn, is named after a small 18th century Russian Orthodox Church which also borders on the square. Spaso House is located ten minutes from the Embassy and not far from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Kremlin. The area immediately surrounding Spaso House was inhabited in the 17th century by the Tsar's dog-keepers and falconers.

Spaso House was built in 1914 by Nikolay Aleksandrovich Vtorov, a wealthy merchant and manufacturer, and designed by architects Adamovich and Mayat. The building, in New Empire Style, has changed very little in basic appearance, except for the addition of a one-story ballroom wing in the 1930's. The first floor representational area includes the main reception hall, (the Chandelier room - 82 feet long with a tremendously high, domed ceiling), flanked by the Oval Dining Room, the State Dining Room and the Music Room - an extension of the main reception hall separated only by a pillared archway. Before the Americans occupied Spaso House, a number of notable Soviet revolutionaries used the mansion, including Chicherin, the Soviet Union's first Foreign Minister.

WORKING DINNER WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN

DECLASSIFIED
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WORKING DINNER WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES

CONTEXT OF MEETING

Foreign policy issues continue to figure among the most difficult items on the U.S.-Russian agenda. Much of the problem derives from uncertainty about Russia's intentions toward its closest neighbors, the so-called "Near Abroad" states of the former USSR. In addition, statements by Yeltsin and others opposing NATO membership for Central European states have fortified the perception that Russia is again flexing its muscles to exert undue influence -- if not dominance -- over its former satellites. The electoral successes of the Communists and Zhirinovskiy (whose platforms evoke nostalgia for the "great power" era of Soviet history) have fueled concerns among many observers -- in the press, on the Hill, among prominent Republicans, and in the former satellite countries themselves -- about potential Russian instability, imperialist tendencies, and how these might influence development of a more assertive Russian foreign policy.

Yeltsin is well aware of these fears. In the aftermath of the election, he and Foreign Minister Kozyrev have explicitly reaffirmed Russia's commitment to a "reformist" foreign policy based on the UN Charter, CSCE principles, and respect for the sovereignty and independence of Russia's neighbors. But even Kozyrev has suggested that there will be changes of emphasis in reaction to campaign attacks that he and Yeltsin are U.S. puppets. This provides some context for Yeltsin's Dec. 22 press conference comments on relations with the U.S., in which he called for more equality and fewer "demeaning" concessions.

We need to be sensitive to this dynamic and ensure that we don't convey the impression that we take Russian support on foreign policy issues for granted. At the same time, we need to outline for him how we would like to see Russian foreign policy evolve. You can expect Yeltsin to assure you that the strategic partnership you and he launched at Vancouver will continue in key areas of foreign policy: under the new constitution, the President makes these decisions, not the parliament. We should be prepared to probe Yeltsin's thinking for specific ways in which his assurances can be translated into concrete actions.

<u>Russia's relations with its neighbors.</u> Yeltsin needs to understand that our ability to promote Russia's inclusion in the emerging European security system and to continue a high level of economic support will depend in large part on his success in promoting a policy founded on respect for international (U.N., CSCE) standards in its foreign relations, especially with neighboring states of the ex-USSR. While much of the talk about

Russian "neo-imperialism" may be exaggerated, there have been troubling signs: questionable Russian military activities in Georgia last summer; reluctance to withdraw Russian army units from the separatist region of Moldova; and Russia's go-it-alone approach to resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

These are all complex issues that will require time and creativity to resolve. A much simpler and highly achievable goal would be final agreement with Latvia and Estonia on a date for the withdrawal of Russian troops. Resolution of this issue would help dispel many of the doubts about Russia's "imperial ambitions," and we should press Yeltsin to close the deal at the Summit.

NATO and the Partnership for Peace. Our concern over Yeltsin's policy toward the Near Abroad is matched by Russia's neuralgia over the issue of NATO expansion. Yeltsin will listen carefully to your explanation of the results of the Brussels summit. Since his October letter to you last fall (in which he made clear his opposition to NATO membership for the Visegrad states), Yeltsin has missed few opportunities to remind us that Russia would regard NATO expansion **without** Russia as detrimental to his country's security. Aware that the election results have raised jitters in Europe and generated new calls for expanding NATO membership, he will seek reassurance that the Partnership for Peace is not a cover for a policy of neo-containment by the West. That would play into the hands of Russian nationalists, leaving him vulnerable to the charge that faith in us is misplaced.

You can let Yeltsin know that, while a number of factors influenced our attitude toward NATO expansion, a concern not to undercut pro-Western reformers in Russia was one of them. Winning support for this approach was not cost-free: many Americans and Europeans believe we should be doing more to single out the Central Europeans. There is still much work ahead to get the Partnership up and running. What is perhaps most important in the context of your discussion with Yeltsin is convincing him of the value of the Partnership in advancing Russia's integration into the new European security architecture. It is a door to the future and not only for Russia. It will provide critical security underpinnings for other regional actors, especially Ukraine and Kazakhstan, who might otherwise not be willing to give up nuclear weapons. A strong endorsement of the Partnership by Yeltsin during your visit would be a powerful symbol of his commitment to a secure future for Russia's neighbors.

Other foreign policy issues. Yeltsin will appreciate hearing about your Geneva meeting with President Asad and next steps in the Middle East peace process. The Middle East is a model of cooperation where the Russians' supporting role has been helpful with the Palestinians. The Russians including Foreign Minister Kozyrev, complain that we take Russia's role as co-sponsor for granted; we need to demonstrate that we don't.

You will also want to share with Yeltsin your thinking on the North Korean nuclear issue and raise Russian nuclear cooperation

-- and conventional arms trade -- with Iran. These issues will also be covered in your separate meeting devoted to security issues.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- o Stress our commitment to integration of Russia fully into the world and European security systems.

- o Underscore importance of developing closer cooperation with Russia in foreign policy as an integral part of Russia-U.S. partnership.

- o Have a frank discussion on problems posed by Russian activities in the "Near Abroad."

  - -- Stress importance and urgency of the issue, outline elements of a common approach.

  - -- Emphasize need for some tangible accomplishment -- such as Russian troop withdrawals from Estonia and Latvia -- that would reassure international community.

  - -- Stress our willingness to work cooperatively on peacekeeping, both bilaterally and multilaterally, if Russia is prepared to accept the stringent standards and oversight that come with peacekeeping mandates from international organizations.

- o Brief Yeltsin on results of NATO summit and Partnership for Peace. Stress importance of Russia signing up now for PFP.

- o Emphasize our desire to broaden and deepen our pattern of cooperation in foreign policy.

  - -- Seek Russian support for our game plan on the North Korean nuclear issue. Stress this is a key test of our ability to work together.

  - -- Urge Russians to end all nuclear cooperation with Iran and limit conventional arms sales to small arms.

CORE POINTS

U.S.- Russian Partnership

- o Stay the course: Russia's cooperation with us and integration into the democratic community of nations can transform global politics. Your personal contribution has been enormous.

- o Good work with Japan: You displayed true leadership in your visit to Tokyo in October. Hope your success stimulates progress in resolving territorial dispute and normalizing relations fully. Japan critical for economic support.

- **Middle East peace process:** This is good example of what we can accomplish together. Russia making vital contribution to resolving one of history's most enduring conflicts.

  -- Need to focus now on implementing Palestinian self-rule in Gaza and Jericho. Best for both of us to avoid becoming an intermediary between Israelis and Palestinians unless both sides request this.

  -- With Asad I plan to push for Syrian willingness to define peace and security in order to create momentum in the Syrian-Israeli track and to curb support for terrorist groups and others trying to undermine the peace process.

Russian "Near Abroad"

- **Greatest challenge:** Greatest challenge to our policy of inclusiveness and partnership across Europe is how to manage the issues arising from emergence of new states in the former Soviet Union.

  -- Understand the complexity of this problem as Russia develops relations with its new independent neighbors.

  -- Appreciate your serious concern over treatment of Russian minorities, economic dislocation, and security issues presented by uncontrolled borders.

  -- Want to pick up thread of our dialogue begun at Vancouver and Tokyo and talk frankly about this -- as only friends can.

- **Problem of perceptions:** Growing concern in U.S. body politic and Europe that Russian actions vis-a-vis New Independent States not always in accord with international norms.

  -- Many fear that problem will become worse after strong electoral showing by Zhirinovskiy.

  -- Frankly, people need reassurance. Your statements have helped. But we need to address systematically the issue of the Russian "Near Abroad" before it undermines our ability to work together toward goal of integrating Russia into the world community.

- **Need for common approach:** Our ability to maintain support for this inclusive approach will depend on finding a common language and policies in dealing with the problems of this region.

  -- Seems to me we have a good beginning: the assurances you gave to Vice-President Gore. Those embody the core elements -- respect for the security and independence of each of the new states as well as observance of the

UN Charter and CSCE principles in conducting relations with and among them.

-- Also important to avoid creating the impression that Russia regards NIS as a "special preserve." We understand that Russia has interests in this region, but the west could not support an exclusive Russian presence in the former USSR.

-- Here, Russia should make clear that it wants to cooperate -- not compete -- with the international community in resolving the conflicts in the region -- whether they involve Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Moldova, or Tajikistan.

-- The same philosophy should apply in the economic sphere. It is natural that the new states should seek to diversify their economic ties.

o **Confidence building measures:** Tangible accomplishments along this line would reassure the international community that Russia intends to continue a policy of cooperation and partnership.

-- Accelerating efforts to withdraw the 14th Army from Moldova would further build confidence.

-- Troop withdrawal agreements with Estonia and Latvia would send such a message.

-- Energizing your diplomats to find ways to meld Russian and CSCE diplomacy in Nagorno-Karabakh would serve as a model of cooperation.

o **Our end of bargain:** Consistent with this approach, we are prepared to work with you to find solutions to your problems in the region.

-- We have cooperated closely on the Ukrainian nuclear issue. Understand threat posed to Russia and others in region of nuclear proliferation.

-- In Baltic states, we have worked with all parties to promote a climate of acceptance and tolerance. We have also committed $160 million to provide housing for demobilized military officers, largely from Baltics -- a result of our Vancouver discussions.

o **Prepared to do more:** We are willing to undertake additional efforts bilaterally and in multilateral institutions to respond to issues of Russian concern.

-- We remain sensitive to the welfare of the 25 million Russians residing outside Russia and will continue to work to ensure that they are treated in a fair and non-discriminatory manner.

-- Prepared to accelerate efforts to get the international community engaged in providing an acceptable framework for peacekeeping operations -- if Russia is prepared to accept the stringent standards and intrusive oversight that come with peacekeeping mandates from international organizations.

-- We want to work to promote normalized interstate trade and economic relations among the NIS states. But you should be able to assure us that you do not seek to dominate the area economically or exclude the U.S. and others from normal economic relationships with these states.

-- We are prepared to intensify our bilateral dialogue with you on these issues. This could include an effort to formulate common views on peacekeeping, based on CSCE principles, as well as regular consultations on UN and regional issues. Joint effort to flesh out Partnership for Peace will complement this dialogue.

Russia and Partnership for Peace

o **New security system for Europe:** Our partnership has also led to important new developments in Europe. Just coming from NATO summit in Brussels. Adopted historic initiative inviting NACC members and others to join with NATO in the Partnership for Peace (PFP).

o **Purpose of PFP:** Purpose of PFP is to promote security cooperation and enhanced stability across the whole of Europe, including Russia and the New Independent States. Important focus will be crisis prevention and peacekeeping. Will provide important security underpinnings for countries - Ukraine, Kazakhstan - that otherwise might not be willing to give up nuclear weapons.

o **PFP part of evolutionary process:** PFP is part of an evolutionary process of security cooperation that could in time lead to NATO expansion. NATO is in principle open to expansion, but any decision on that now would be premature. No member of NACC is excluded from possible membership.

o **Train leaving the station:** A number of states have already decided to adhere to the PFP Framework Declaration which has both political and military dimensions.

-- Non-NATO members will identify the steps they intend to take to implement this political cooperation.

-- On the military side, non-NATO members will agree to cooperate with NATO on joint planning, training, and exercises for missions such as peacekeeping, search and rescue or humanitarian operations.

-- In that context, they will be identifying resources and facilities available for use in PFP.

-- Participants will be invited to send representatives to oversight bodies at NATO headquarters, including civilians, to a Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons, Belgium, the site of SHAPE.

-- This latter group will be doing the detailed military planning necessary for a program of activities for the partnership, including specific exercises that we expect to begin this year. Partner states, in coordination with NATO authorities, will decide which activities they will participate in and identify the level of such participation.

o **Sign up now:** Important Russian interests are addressed here.

-- We are envisioning a security architecture for Europe that is open and inclusive and that eschews the creation of new "blocs."

-- This initiative is focussed on peacekeeping, which you have flagged as the key European security issue.

-- We strongly urge you to take the steps underscoring a commitment to political cooperation and join the Partnership. We hope you will send representatives to NATO and to the coordination cell and will participate in the exercises.

Need to Expand Partnership Across the Board

o **New and dangerous challenges:** We look forward to broadening and deepening our cooperation. One area where we need to double our efforts is nuclear non-proliferation. We talked earlier about Ukraine, and will discuss in more detail tomorrow.

o **North Korea:** Clock is ticking on North Korea. Nuclear weapons in North Korean hands would be highly destabilizing and dangerous.

-- We have negotiated in good faith, but stronger measures -- such as sanctions -- may be necessary if North Korea fails to meet international concerns.

-- This is an important test of our cooperation. Hope you will stand with us on this and also work hard to gain China's support, if necessary.

o **Iran:** Also need to be prudent about Iran. Vital not to repeat mistakes we made with Iraq. Important not to let a regime with record like Iran's get the bomb.

-- We welcome your decision not to sell a heavy water research reactor, but hope you will end all nuclear cooperation.

-- Also important to limit Iran's conventional capabilities. I hope you will implement your assurance at Vancouver to avoid sales to Iran that could destabilize the region.

SCENESETTER

NOVO OGARYEVO, A GOVERNMENT DACHA TWENTY-TWO MINUTES FROM MOSCOW

The Novo Ogaryevo complex, in the dacha community of Barviko, consists of a number of dacha sites in a walled estate reserved for the use of the Russian head of state and his guests. In August 1991, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev held talks here. During your visit you will be having a private dinner with President Yeltsin in the main dacha, an elegant two-story country home built in 1896 for the Governor of Moscow. The grounds are extensive, and in front of the dacha there is a large open area lined with trees sloping down to the Moscow River.

WREATH LAYING: TOMB OF THE UNKNOWN SOLDIER

TOMB OF THE UNKNOWN SOLDIER
MOSCOW

CONTEXT OF THE EVENT

You will lay a wreath at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. The tomb, enclosed in red and black granite, was built for the 25th anniversary of the Battle for Moscow (1941-1942). Located on Manezh Square at the northwest corner of the Kremlin Wall, the tomb contains a memorial and eternal flame to the Unknown Solder of the Great Patriotic War (WWII). There is a large stone and granite square in front of the tomb, where the honor guard will march. You will mount a few stairs to lay the wreath, which will be held by military aides. You will not be making any remarks at the tomb. The north corner has a gate where you will exit.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- **The Russian military has a proud past, difficult present and uncertain future. The armed forces were demoralized by the events of October and have been suffering extremely bad living and working conditions. Many voted in protest for Zhirinovsky. <u>Your visit to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier is an important opportunity for you to highlight the contribution of the Red Army to the defeat of fascism in World War II</u>.**

- **<u>You will also acknowledge by your presence the important role that the armed forces play in the life of Russia</u>. The tomb, like similar memorials in every major Russian city, is a venerated spot. Even now, when the armed forces face tough criticism for waste and even corruption, it is a statement of deep-seated respect for the defenders of the country.**

CORE POINTS

No remarks to be made.

BACKGROUND

In a country where public religious displays were long banned, this tomb and others like it served as a magnet for special events in peoples' lives. Newlyweds would visit immediately after their wedding ceremony, to lay the bride's bouquet at the tomb. School children, the straight-A variety, would be selected to be honor guards -- boys and girls alike dressed in school uniform, red Pioneer bandanna, and carrying a rifle. With the new popularity of church weddings and related religious ceremonies, these memorials are less important for the role they play in personal lives, but more important for their original purpose -- as a reminder of national honor and glory.

EXPANDED BILAT DISCUSSION ON SECURITY ISSUES

DECLASSIFIED
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EXPANDED MEETING WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN ON SECURITY ISSUES

CONTEXT OF MEETING

Denuclearization, nonproliferation cooperation and momentum in our joint arms control efforts are the three main themes that will define your meeting with President Yeltsin on security issues. The major push for the denuclearization of Kazakhstan, Belarus and Ukraine that you have undertaken in your first year in office has yielded considerable results. Together with Yeltsin, you can celebrate success in Kazakhstan and Belarus, which have ratified START and agreed to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. If our current negotiations succeed, you and Yeltsin, together with Ukrainian President Kravchuk, would be able to announce resolution of the outstanding issues preventing Ukrainian denuclearization.

Resolving the issues that have prevented Ukraine from giving up the nuclear weapons on its soil would be the major public achievement of the summit. Ukraine's fulfillment of its obligations under the Lisbon Protocol is critical to realizing one of our key security objectives -- preventing nuclear proliferation -- and paving the way to full implementation of the massive nuclear reductions codified in START I and II.

During Vice President Gore's trip to Moscow, we resumed full-scale trilateral negotiations to help Moscow and Kiev break their impasse on two key issues: the Ukrainian desire for prompt compensation for the warheads going back to Russia, and the Russian demand for a two-year deadline for all of the warheads to leave Ukraine. **We have been able to influence progress on these two issues by offering to pay an advance to Russia on the HEU deal: with this advance, Russia will promptly compensate Ukraine for warheads and Ukraine will promptly send them to Russia to be destroyed.**

Meanwhile, with our support, the Ukrainians have been deactivating nuclear systems even prior to entry into force of the START Treaty, which stalled on the Ukrainian Parliament's abortive ratification vote in November. Two regiments of older SS-19 missiles have been deactivated (70 warheads), and Ukraine appears to be deactivating the more modern SS-24s, as President Kravchuk promised in your November 29 telephone conversation. He has stated that <u>all SS-24s</u> will be deactivated by the end of March.

This deactivation process and the trilateral talks have created a strong momentum toward resolving Ukraine's nuclear problem. Fortuitously, your summit meeting with President Yeltsin comes at

a critical moment: Ukraine is gripped by a severe economic and energy crisis this winter and Kravchuk is determined to get this problem behind his government in hopes of greater U.S. support as well as relief from his energy debts with Russia. Yeltsin and his advisors, for their part, recognize that once the new Russian Parliament is active, they will have less freedom of maneuver with Kiev. **All sides may be ready to reach closure.**

Yeltsin has followed up on your suggestion to invite Kravchuk to Moscow to sign a trilateral statement during your summit. The Ukrainian President has been told that the deal must be finished before he will be asked to do so. You may, however, have to do some last-minute work with Yeltsin and Kravchuk.

The second summit security theme is the advance in nonproliferation cooperation since Vancouver. There, you and Yeltsin agreed to pursue Russian adherence to the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). As Russia showed itself to be a responsible nonproliferation partner, the United States expanded the scope of potential space cooperation to include not only the agreement to grant Russia access to the commercial space launch market, but also large-scale efforts like the international Space Station -- a favorite Yeltsin project.

This successful cooperation will expand beyond this summit as you talk to Yeltsin about new partnership initiatives, including cooperation in negotiating an international ban on fissile material production and on a new export control regime to replace COCOM. At Vancouver, Yeltsin sought an end to COCOM, which we and our allies have now agreed to phase out by March 31, 1994. At this meeting, we will ask Yeltsin to confirm his part of the bargain by agreeing to a joint statement that commits Russia to implement effective export controls, join in the COCOM follow-on regime and end arms trade with rogue states such as Iran. This will help to persuade our COCOM partners to replace COCOM with an effective follow-on that will both promote exports and serve nonproliferation goals. Russia has also been generally supportive of regional nonproliferation initiatives (Middle East, South Asia), but we need to secure their continued support for our efforts with North Korea.

Maintaining the momentum of our joint arms control efforts is the third theme, stemming from a combination of bureaucratic frustration on some issues and progress on others. In Vancouver and Tokyo, in the Vice President's meetings with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and other high-level meetings, we have consistently pressed Yeltsin and the Russian leadership to ensure that the shutdown -- to which Yeltsin is personally committed -- of Russia's offensive chemical and biological weapons programs actually occurs. However, we have gotten nowhere with efforts to work with lower levels in the Russian bureaucracy. Yeltsin should know that you will have difficulty making the necessary certifications for Nunn-Lugar assistance unless the biological weapons issue, in particular, is resolved.

In asking for Yeltsin's help to break this bottleneck, we can also point to recent progress on the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. We want to continue our successful bilateral cooperation on the CTB while we coordinate positions among the P-5, in anticipation of the formal opening of CTB negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) later in January. We also want to take note of the encouraging Russian response to our recent proposal to admit the former Soviet republics to the ABM Treaty and to put to rest a persistent problem in ABM Treaty implementation -- demarcation between theater and strategic ballistic missile defenses.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- **Note great progress made on denuclearization, nonproliferation, arms control issues.**
  - -- **Votes by Belarus, Kazakhstan to ratify START, accede to Non-Proliferation Treaty.**
  - -- **Russia's agreement to adhere to guidelines of Missile Technology Control Regime.**
  - -- **Progress toward Comprehensive Test Ban, reaffirmation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.**
- **Reach agreement on trilateral U.S.-Russian-Ukrainian negotiations on Ukrainian denuclearization.**
- **Stress importance of moving ahead with implementation of existing arms control agreements: START I & II, CW, BW, ABM.**
- **Advance future security agenda.**
  - -- **Welcome Russian support for our initiative on fissile materials.**
  - -- **Enlist continued Russian support to address urgent regional proliferation threats (e.g., North Korea, Iran).**
  - -- **Seek agreement on future cooperation in export controls, including the follow-on regime to COCOM.**
  - -- **Express our willingness to work with Russians on CTBT talks and unconditional and indefinite extension of NPT in 1995.**

CORE POINTS

<u>Great Progress Made Since Vancouver</u>:

- In no field have the results of our cooperation and partnership been more dramatic than in the area of arms control and nonproliferation.

-- Successful agreement on Missile Technology Control Regime underpins broad scope of future space cooperation, including Space Station partnership.

-- U.S. supports full Russian membership in MTCR.

-- Have gone long way toward mutual goal of eliminating nuclear weapons from Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine. Votes in Belarus, Kazakhstan to ratify START and accede to NPT extremely positive.

-- Cooperation on safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear arms has advanced to include broad scope of cooperation e.g., in defense conversion.

Ukraine

o **Good Example of Cooperation:** We have worked closely trying to advance our shared goal of getting nuclear weapons out of Ukraine and back to Russia for early dismantlement. This is example of how, if we work together and make some tough decisions, we can make a real contribution to global security.

-- Important to treat Ukraine as sovereign and equal partner, without pressure tactics.

-- Both the U.S. and Russia have a lot to gain from success. So does Ukraine.

-- Now is the time to conclude this trilateral deal, before parliamentary politics complicate it.

o **HEU:** Our offer to purchase the enriched uranium from warheads in Ukraine once they have been dismantled in Russia gives Ukraine a real incentive to reach a deal now. Your willingness to write off energy debt as implicit compensation for HEU in tactical nuclear weapons is important.

o **SS-24 Deactivation:** The Ukrainians have taken some important steps, removing the warheads from 20 SS-24's and promising to deactivate the rest by the end of March.

o **Russian Help Essential:**

-- HEU compensation is necessary.

-- For political reasons the Ukrainians need security assurances. We will issue assurances once Ukraine acts on START and the NPT.

-- U.S. is providing assistance for dismantling.

o **Joint Statement:** We want to release a joint statement that reaffirms our respect for the independence and territorial

integrity of all the new independent states, including Ukraine, as well as reflecting our trilateral agreement on nuclear weapons issues. Releasing this in our meeting with Kravchuk will help Ukraine come to terms with denuclearization.

Momentum of Arms Control

- **Need to finish old business:** maintain momentum of very successful U.S.-Russian arms control process.

- **START I Implementation:** Important to proceed as rapidly as possible with full implementation of agreements already concluded.

  -- Resolution of Ukrainian problem should clear the way for full implementation of START I.

- **START II Ratification:** We look forward to ratification of START II once the Ukrainian problem is behind us.

  -- How do you plan to proceed with the new Russian parliament?

- **Biological Weapons:** Apart from denuclearization issues, we must face some old business related to biological weapons.

  -- In previous meetings, have discussed the Russian biological weapons program. Appreciate your personal commitment to end the offensive biological weapons program inherited from the Soviet Union.

  -- We have reason to believe that illegal work continues in Russia despite your efforts. Have given your side a report summarizing our concerns.

  -- U.S., UK and Russia must agree on program of facility visits and working group meetings to resolve concerns. **Look to you to help personally to make this happen.**

  -- I will have difficulty certifying Russia to receive Nunn-Lugar assistance if cannot resolve.

- **Chemical Weapons:** Need to accelerate progress on CW issues. U.S. and Russia have largest CW stockpiles.

  -- Must lead way on early ratification of Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). U.S. seeking Senate ratification by July; hope Russian Parliament can do same.

  -- Need your personal involvement to conclude Bilateral Destruction Agreement. New Russian proposals not consistent with CWC.

  -- Also need help in getting our bilateral CW destruction assistance going. We've offered $55 million to help

Russia destroy CW stocks, but your technicians keep raising minor technical details that block program.

-- We want to release a joint statement noting progress on bilateral and multilateral chemical arms control issues. Draft has been provided to your team, but need to resolve outstanding issues.

o **Also have to pursue forward-looking security agenda:**

o **Fissile Materials:** Already broad agreement on potential for progress. Should agree on goals of capping, reducing worldwide stocks of fissile materials usable in weapons.

-- Appreciate support for multilateral convention banning production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.

-- Welcome willingness to place materials under international safeguards. Propose bilateral expert talks in parallel.

-- Welcome Gore-Chernomyrdin working groups on shutting down plutonium production reactors and nuclear material control and accounting.

-- We want to release a joint statement that would reflect our gains in this area and outline a program for future work.

o **Regional Threats:** Welcome close coordination on North Korea, Middle East, Iraq, South Asia. Urge Russian restraint in arms sales, especially nuclear cooperation with Iran, China.

-- Yeltsin agreed at Vancouver to curtail sale of heavy water reactor to Iran; we seek tougher conditions for all power reactor sales to Iran.

-- Remain concerned about broad Chinese access to Russian military technology; urge restraint on exports.

o **Export Controls:** Note great progress since Vancouver toward replacing COCOM. Urge Russian commitment to export controls so can be original member of follow-on regime.

-- Joint Russian-American statement confirms Russia's readiness to (1) end arms trade with Iran, Libya, Iraq, North Korea; (2) join in COCOM follow-on regime; (3) cooperate in establishing export control regime.

-- Gains from membership in COCOM follow-on regime far outweigh economic rewards of destabilizing sales to Iran, China, other countries of proliferation concern.

- **NPT:** We will need to work closely to secure the agreement of those countries still straddling the fence to the unconditional and indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995.

- **Comprehensive Test Ban:** Pleased with the cooperation we have developed in realizing our common objective of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. Also welcome your decision to continue the testing moratorium despite the recent Chinese test.

  -- We want to continue our bilateral cooperation on CTB issues, as well a coordinate our positions among the P-5, in anticipation of the formal opening of CTB negotiations later this month.

- **Strategic Disengagement:** Have proceeded with welcome first step, joint detargetting, in context of trilateral agreement with Ukraine. Now have to move to fuller strategic disengagement.

  -- Experts will be meeting as early as late January to discuss joint measures such as lowering alert rates, notifying exercises of strategic forces. Important for building confidence, building strategic stability.

- **ABM Treaty:** Pleased with progress made in technical talks on the recent U.S. proposals to multilateralize the ABM Treaty and create demarcation between "theater" and "strategic" missile defenses. We want to conclude agreement on demarcation this spring, when our technical experts meet again in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC).

PRESS CONFERENCE WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN

TO BE PROVIDED

TOUR OF PRESIDENT YELTSIN'S KREMLIN OFFICE

TO BE PROVIDED

PRIVATIZATION EVENT

TO BE PROVIDED

Case Number: 2016-0134-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:
POTUS Briefing Books-POTUS Trip to Russia/Belarus, January 12-15, 1994 [2]

Staff Office-Individual:
Records Management

Original OA/ID Number:
810

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
43	1	7	1	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. paper~~	~~Nonproliferation Regimes (1 page)~~	~~00/00/0000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
~~002. paper~~	~~Fissile Material Production Ban (1 page)~~	~~00/00/0000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
~~003. paper~~	~~CFE [Conventional Armed Forces in Europe] Flank Equipment Limits (1 page)~~	~~00/00/0000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
~~004. paper~~	~~Russian Policy in the Near Abroad (3 pages)~~	~~00/00/0000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
~~005. paper~~	~~Russia: Post Election Political Survey (1 page)~~	~~00/00/0000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
~~006. paper~~	~~Russian Troop Withdrawals From the Baltics (3 pages)~~	~~00/00/0000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
~~007. paper~~	~~Strategic Deposturing/Detargeting (1 page)~~	~~00/00/0000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
008. paper	The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (1 page) Partial release - KBH 4/30/2020	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)
~~009. paper~~	~~Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (1 page)~~	~~00/00/0000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
~~010. paper~~	~~Russia's Peacekeeping Efforts in the Former Soviet Union (2 pages)~~	~~00/00/0000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
~~011. paper~~	~~Ukraine: START I/Lisbon Protocol (1 page)~~	~~00/00/0000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
~~012. memo~~	~~Anthony Lake to President William J. Clinton re: Your Trip to Minsk (4 pages)~~	~~12/31/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 810

FOLDER TITLE:
POTUS Briefing Books-POTUS Trip to Russia/Belarus, January 12-15, 1994 [2]

2016-0134-M
kh1778

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~013. paper~~	~~Meeting with Belarusian Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich (4 pages)~~	~~00/00/0000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
014. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	12/20/1993	P1/b(1)
~~015. paper~~	~~Meeting with Belarusian Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich (3 pages)~~	~~00/00/0000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
016. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages) Partial release - KBH 9/8/2017	12/20/1993	P1/b(1)
~~017. paper~~	~~Meeting with Belarusian Opposition Leaders (2 pages)~~	~~00/00/0000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
018. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	12/20/1993	P1/b(1)
019. report	U.S. Government Report (1 page)	12/20/1993	P1/b(1)
~~020. paper~~	~~Belaurs: Political Survey - Prospects for Reform (1 page)~~	~~00/00/0000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020
~~021. paper~~	~~Military to Military Cooperation/Defense Conversion in Belarus (1 page)~~	~~00/00/0000~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ KBH 4/30/2020

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SCENESETTER

OSTANKINO
MOSCOW

The Ostankino Estate Museum is just to the west of the Exhibit of Economic Achievements in northern Moscow. The estate belonged to the Cherkassky princes in the 1600's, and it was under them that the Church of the Trinity was built. In 1743 the last Cherkassky daughter married Count Sheremetyev (1715-1788), who then received the estate and devoted his energies to its orchards. In the 1790's Ostankino went to his son, N. P. Sheremetyev, an extremely well-educated man, European traveler, and patron of the arts.

Across the pond from the palace is the Ostankino Television Broadcast tower, a 1740-foot tall stressed concrete structure completed in the later 1960's. Last October, the Ostankino TV tower was the site of a pitched battle between forces loyal to Yeltsin and those loyal to Parliamentary leaders Rutskoy and Khasbulatov. The victory of Yeltsin's supporters in that battle marked the decisive turning point in the fortunes of the parliamentary hardliners.

STATE DINNER AT
THE KREMLIN

STATE DINNER AT THE KREMLIN

CONTEXT OF THE EVENT

President Yeltsin will host a State Dinner in your honor in the beautiful and ornate Hall of Facets in the Kremlin. You will sit at the head table with President Yeltsin and other top political figures. You and 120 distinguished guests will be treated to traditional Russian entertainment which usually includes folksingers, folkdancers and a variety of performers. Also in keeping with Russian tradition, the dress will be business suit, no black tie. You and President Yeltsin will both give toasts; we will provide your toast separately.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- **Emphasize to an audience of newly elected parliamentarians, business and cultural leaders the immeasurable value of the democratic election process and the adoption of a new constitution.**

- **Reiterate our strong support for genuine democratic reforms and continued progress toward a market economy.**

CORE POINTS

- The rich and textured tapestry of public opinion expressed in the recent elections reflects the strengthening of democracy in Russia.

- While profound political and economic reform brings temporary hardship, deep and lasting reform will alleviate difficulties and improve the quality of individual lives across Russia.

- The U.S. stands ready to support reform as we have throughout the dramatic changes of the past few years.

BACKGROUND

The dinner will take place in the Kremlin's Hall of Facets which derives its name from the shape of the stone facings on the side of the hall facing Cathedral Square. It is also famous for the decorative planes descending from the room's ceiling. It was built in 1473-1491 by the Italian architects Marco Ruffo and Pietro Antonio.

VISIT WITH U.S. EMBASSY PERSONNEL & MARINE SECURITY GUARDS

MEETING WITH
EMBASSY STAFF AND MARINE SECURITY GUARDS

CONTEXT OF THE EVENT

Before you depart Russia, you will address the U.S. Embassy staff and the Marine Security Guards stationed in Moscow. Your remarks will take place in the gymnasium where the Embassy staff and their families were forced to take shelter for two days and nights during the climax of the confrontation between President Yeltsin and the former Parliament in early October.

The highpoint of the visit will be the special citation you will award the Marine Security Guards for the exceptional courage they demonstrated in protecting the staff and the compound throughout that tense week. One U.S. Marine Guard, Master Sergeant McClain Bell, was hit in the neck by a stray bullet, and is recovering in the United States. You will make brief remarks which we will provide you separately.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- **Thank Ambassador Pickering and the Embassy staff for their hard work in preparing for your visit and reporting on the political turmoil over the past few months.**

- **Acknowledge the Marine Security Guards' courage in protecting the Embassy compound in October as the defunct Russian parliament and President Yeltsin struggled nearby for control of the "White House."**

- **Emphasize the positive outcome of the December elections, including the adoption of the new Russian constitution, and the value we place in the Embassy's close coverage of events.**

CORE POINTS

- Here to thank all of you and your exceptional Ambassador, Tom Pickering.

- Your tireless and devoted work over the past few months covering the dramatic political events in Moscow and across Russia has been outstanding and a true service to your country.

- The exceptional service of the Marine Security Guards in protecting you and your families on the compound during those tense days in October has earned them a very special citation.

- The election process in December and the adoption of a new constitution demonstrates that Russia is moving in a positive direction toward democratic and economic reform.

- You have a big job to do. This is an exciting time. We're very proud of you and grateful for your service to our country at this critical time.

BACKGROUND

AMERICAN EMBASSY, MOSCOW

The Chancery of the U.S. Embassy is located on Moscow's ring road, a major thoroughfare which encircles the heart of the city. The White House, in which Russia's parliament met until the October confrontation, lies a few hundred meters away.

Nearly five hundred Americans currently work at the Embassy, representing some twelve federal agencies. Counting family members, the total population of the Embassy community is approximately six hundred. In addition, the Embassy has hired almost two hundred Russian nationals for basic support services.

The U.S. Embassy moved to its present site, which is a little over a mile west of the Kremlin, after Stalin decided he did not want us too close. We have recently resumed occupancy of the old Embassy Office Building, converted from a Soviet apartment building in the early 1950s, following repair and renovation work after the most recent fire in 1991. The renovations attempted to maximize security, safety, and efficiency despite the constraints of the building's basic structure.

Construction at the New Embassy complex behind the old Embassy building began in 1979. The housing and recreational facilities are essentially complete. There are 134 American-style housing units, a gymnasium, swimming pool, commissary and other facilities. The complex houses part of the Embassy staff; many employees live in apartments elsewhere in Moscow. Discovery of listening devices suspended work on the New Office Building. We have a basic agreement with the Russian government as well as funding from Congress to allow us to fulfill our office space needs; we are evaluating various options for completing and using the new building.

DEPARTURE CEREMONY
AT THE KREMLIN

OFFICIAL DEPARTURE CEREMONY
THE KREMLIN

CONTEXT OF THE EVENT

You will depart Moscow much as you entered, meeting President Yeltsin at St. George's Hall in the Kremlin. Mrs. Yeltsin will be on hand to greet Mrs. Clinton as well. After entering from opposite sides, you will follow President Yeltsin with brief remarks in the center of the hall. You will have an opportunity to thank members of the official delegations as you depart and proceed to the airport. Your remarks will be provided separately.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- **Underscore the importance of the summit for building a strong U.S.-Russian partnership.**
- **Highlight our commitment to working closely with President Yeltsin and other Russians devoted to democratic principles and human rights, including the new parliamentarians you met at the Spaso reception.**

CORE POINTS

- Much accomplished in few days of talks with President Yeltsin to broaden partnership between Russia and U.S. on security and foreign policy issues.
- Democratic and economic reforms underway in Russia will only strengthen partnership. U.S. and West stand ready to support.

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

~~SECRET~~

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PER E.O. 13526
2016-0134-M (1.85)
KBH 1/15/2020

NONPROLIFERATION REGIMES

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), with over 160 members, is a cornerstone of international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The U.S. is committed to securing an indefinite extension of the NPT at the 1995 review conference. In addition to the NPT, there are various other regimes designed to eliminate or control the spread of materials and technology designed for weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological) and their missile delivery systems.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) makes a vital contribution to international security through its system of safeguards to detect diversion of civil nuclear materials from their intended peaceful purposes. The Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, through their control of lists of items that could be used in the development of nuclear weapons, also serve vital nonproliferation goals. Both the U.S. and Russia are members.

To further assure the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, you proposed at the September UNGA a multilateral convention banning the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for nuclear explosives purposes or outside of international safeguards. You have also offered to place the highly enriched uranium and plutonium in excess of our defense requirements under IAEA safeguards. We have urged the Russians to do the same, as well as work with us and other countries to review options for the disposition of plutonium.

To prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, a 25-nation informal body known as the Australia Group develops lists of chemical weapons precursors, biological pathogens and dual-use chemical and biological equipment for export controls. Member countries must comply with the Biological Weapons Convention, sign and intend to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention and demonstrate a commitment to CBW nonproliferation through comprehensive export controls. Russia has expressed an interest in joining the group and the U.S. will support its bid when Russia has satisfied the group's conditions.

While not yet a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Russia has signed a bilateral agreement with the U.S. Implementation of this agreement, with effective export controls and cessation of missile proliferation activities, will be an important step toward MTCR membership for Russia.

Our primary concern with the Russian nonproliferation posture is its nuclear cooperation with Iran, which will bolster Iran's efforts to develop a nuclear weapons capability. You should remind the Russians that, if they proceed over our objections with reactor sales to Iran, they should do so only with stringent conditions attached to the sales agreement.

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FISSILE MATERIAL PRODUCTION BAN

In the President's September 27, 1993, nonproliferation policy statement, the U.S. proposed, among other initiatives, negotiation of a multilateral convention banning the separation of plutonium and the production of highly enriched uranium for nuclear explosives purposes or outside of safeguards. The U.S. has been consulting with a broad range of countries and has had a positive reaction thus far, including from Russia.

The purpose of this convention would be to strengthen international nuclear nonproliferation norms generally and to give constraints on weapons-usable material the additional weight of a binding international commitment. This convention would have the important effect of imposing a "cap" on the production of fissile material for explosive purposes.

The Russians have indicated their agreement in principle to the fissile material production ban in a letter from President Yeltsin of October 9, 1993, which states: "One of the most effective measures to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation and achieve nuclear disarmament would be to conclude a multilateral agreement banning the production of the weapon-grade fissile materials. Your proposals in this regard are essentially identical to the Russian position."

Some steps already taken by the Russians will be supportive of the fissile material production ban, but there are further steps the U.S. is pressing to achieve. The Russians have ceased production of highly enriched uranium. Additionally, 10 of their 13 plutonium production reactors have been shut down.

We are consulting closely with the Russians in order to develop a common understanding of the basic scope and nature of a fissile material cutoff convention.

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2016-0134-M (1.86)
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2016-0134-M (1.87)
KBH 1/15/2020

CFE FLANK EQUIPMENT LIMITS

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) limits deployments and requires destruction of five categories of equipment: tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles (ACV's), combat aircraft and attack helicopters. Equipment destruction must be completed by November 1995, when limits -- both numerical and geographic -- on deployments also take effect. CFE, originally negotiated between NATO and the former Warsaw Pact, has been adapted to include the eight states of the former Soviet Union located west of the Ural Mountains.

The first year of reductions ending in November 1993 went well; over 17,000 pieces of heavy weaponry were destroyed. Russia essentially met its reduction target.

In a September 17 letter, President Yeltsin asked your support for lifting CFE's limits on Russian equipment in the "flank zone" around the Black Sea. The letter indicated that circumstances in the Caucasus might lead Russia to make decisions "not in line with flank-zone limitations." The Russians want to increase their military presence in the Caucasus and have already begun preparing for a force which would likely exceed CFE equiment limits. Although the flank limits do not take effect until 1995, for planning purposes the Russians would like the issue favorably resolved as soon as possible. Ukraine, whose territory is crossed by the flank zone border, has made similar requests.

Since Russia first raised this issue last February, we and our NATO Allies have said we will not agree to reopen the delicately balanced Treaty. Reconsidering central CFE provisions could unravel it. Your November 24 response to President Yeltsin said that we take Russian concerns seriously and will explore them in the Vienna CFE implementation body, the Joint Consultative Group (JCG). Your letter emphasized the importance of CFE as a cornerstone for the security architecture of the new Europe and indicated that discussions should focus on working within the Treaty to find a solution acceptable to all 30 CFE signatories.

Our Allies have been united in their responses to Russia on this issue, especially the flank states of Turkey and Norway.

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PER E.O. 13526
2016-0134-m (1.88)
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RUSSIAN POLICY IN THE NEAR ABROAD

Russia's relations with the New Independent States on its periphery constitute one of the most difficult issues on the U.S.-Russian agenda. Russian leaders across a broad spectrum increasingly assert that Russian influence and interests are paramount throughout the former Soviet Union, an area Moscow calls its "near abroad." In part, this attitude reflects a legitimate concern for the fate of the 25 million Russians living in these states. It also reflects anxiety that the ethnic strife afflicting some areas could provoke a significant flood of refugees into Russia, invite foreign involvement and spill over into Russia itself.

Often, an additional dynamic is at work. Longstanding economic, social and political ties and the fact that these states suddenly obtained independence through the collapse of the Soviet Union -- rather than through a prolonged struggle forcing Moscow to relinquish control -- have left many Russians unreconciled to the sovereignty and independence of these countries. At the same time, the lack of preparation for statehood, continuing economic dependence on Russia, the presence of Russian troops and military facilities on their soil and endemic ethnic conflict have made these new states vulnerable to Russian pressure.

All of these factors make the former Soviet Union an area of extreme political fluidity and volatility. We recognize that Russia has legitimate interests in the region and that responsible Russian behavior is essential for reform and stability. We can also see that few, if any, members of the international community are prepared to involve their forces directly in peacemaking or peacekeeping activities there. This role has perforce fallen to Russia and other CIS members.

While acknowledging these realities, we also insist on the following principles:

- In playing this influential role Russia must respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of these new states and accept international conditions involving UN or CSCE oversight of peacekeeping.

- Russia should cooperate with efforts of the international community to resolve the underlying political issues that have sparked the conflicts.

- It is also important that Moscow eschew an economic approach that tries to dominate neighboring states and discourage Western economic involvement in the region.

Russia, however, has shown ambivalence about the nature and extent of outside involvement in these countries. Russia seems intent upon preserving its freedom of action in the "near abroad" and has cooperated, only up to a point, with international mediation efforts.

MOLDOVA

The Russians, for instance, have been reluctant to accept more than token international involvement in Moldova. After fighting erupted between the Moldovan government and secessionist forces in its Transdniester region, Moscow acted to broker a truce accord and establish a tripartite monitoring force of Russians, Moldovans and Dniestrians. Underlying political issues remain unresolved, including the political status of Transdniester and the withdrawal of the Russian 14th Army, which is currently stationed in Transdniester and has been supporting the separatists.

Russia acceded to various UN and CSCE expert missions visiting Moldova and to the CSCE monitoring mission currently based there. However, Moscow has worked to confine their mandates to the question of Transdniester's political status. Russia insists that the 14th Army's withdrawal is strictly a Russia-Moldova matter, despite its clear linkage to a political settlement. We have urged Russia to cooperate fully with CSCE efforts to advance open negotiations toward a comprehensive settlement. Russia nevertheless has recently named a special envoy to deal directly with the parties, so far to the exclusion of CSCE.

ABKHAZIA

There has been a Jekyl-and-Hyde quality to Russia's behavior in Georgia. As in Moldova, Russia acted to separate warring factions, but this time urgently requested UN assistance to monitor the cease-fire. Before a UN observer team could arrive in full, however, Abkhaz forces shattered the cease-fire and drove Georgian government forces from Abkhazia. Evidence suggests that local Russian military units, and at least some high-level officials in Moscow, knew in advance of the Abkhaz offensive, did nothing to prevent it and may have supported it. These same officials had earlier provided support and assistance to the Abkhaz.

During subsequent clashes with dissident Georgian forces, Chairman Shevardnadze's appeals to Moscow for help went unanswered until he abruptly reversed his government's policy on relations with Russia. He agreed to join the CIS and permit Russian military bases on Georgian soil. Russian forces now operate with Tbilisi's full consent and serve to protect Shevardnadze's government.

Russia remains supportive of both the UN observer mission in Georgia and the special UN representative heading peace talks. On December 1, these talks yielded an eight-point agreement among the Abkhaz, Russian and Georgian negotiators in which the parties

promised to resolve differences peacefully. The U.S. fully backs these talks and participates in a "Friends of Georgia" group to provide moral support and help advance the negotiations.

NAGORNO-KARABAKH (N-K)

The challenge here has been to gain full Russian cooperation with the "Minsk Group" peace process, the CSCE's negotiating forum for a political settlement to the N-K conflict. Russia has consistently voiced support for "Minsk" but has proved reluctant to subsume its own negotiating efforts fully to the CSCE. Rather, it has pursued unilateral diplomatic efforts that have on occasion complicated, if not hindered, the Minsk Group process and raised suspicions among its members.

Moscow is pushing to introduce a Russian-led "separation force" between ethnic Armenian and Azeri belligerents but has not yet obtained the parties' approval. As an active participant in the Minsk process, the U.S. continues to urge Russia to integrate fully its peace efforts with those of the CSCE. In particular, we have warned Moscow against unilateral deployment of a separation force in Nagorno-Karabakh. We and other Group members, including Russia, have started discussions on how CSCE oversight might be extended to a prospective multinational peacekeeping force.

TAJIKISTAN

Moscow seeks an international imprimatur for, and help in funding, the Russian-led force currently deployed in Tajikistan to bolster the Tajik government in its fight against opposition insurgents. Initially, Russia welcomed UN monitoring of this force, but recently refused to provide UN military observers in Dushanbe access to these military units. On the larger political question of national reconciliation, Russia has posed no objection to UN and CSCE efforts to foster dialogue between the government and opposition political figures. The U.S. supports political reconciliation talks under UN and/or CSCE sponsorship and has started informal discussions with Russia and Tajikistan on possible terms for UN oversight for the peacekeeping force.

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RUSSIA: POST-ELECTION POLITICAL SURVEY

In elections on December 12, Russian voters sent a mixed message to President Yeltsin and his pro-reform government. A majority (58%) of those voting approved the Yeltsin-backed draft Constitution -- a major step forward in the course of Russian democratic reform. The new Constitution puts an end to the Soviet political system and provides a framework for the future development of durable democratic institutions. The Constitution also gives President Yeltsin substantial authority to proceed with his agenda of reform.

As the returns came in, however, it was also clear that many Russian voters were sending a protest vote to leaders of pro-reform parties who had lost touch with the concerns of ordinary Russians. We do not believe that the showing by the Communist Party, the Agrarian Party and the Zhirinovskiy party signifies any real desire to turn back the clock to the communist era. Rather, many Russians were expressing dissatisfaction with hardships brought on by economic reform and their anxiety over rising crime and increased threats to personal safety.

Since the earliest returns, the position of the reformers has improved. Based on near-complete results, First Deputy Prime Minister Gaydar's party, "Russia's Choice," will be the single largest party in the Duma. The Duma will likely have four groupings, with the following approximate percentage of seats:

- Russia's Choice and other pro-reform parties (38%);
- the Communist Party-Agrarian Party bloc (25%);
- self-proclaimed "centrists" and "independents" (20%);
- the "Liberal Democrats," headed by Zhirinovskiy (16%).

The upper house (Federation Council) will include many regional officials, including district governors and republic presidents and prime ministers, whose party affiliations are highly uncertain. It is highly unlikely that any faction of the parliament will be able to form a stable working majority.

Early efforts at organizing the new legislature into working bodies have been fractious. It is much too early to predict the overall orientation of the new Parliament toward key questions such as the future of democratic development, the pace and content of economic reform and the goals of foreign and security policy. Questions will be decided on the basis of shifting coalitions that will take shape as each particular issue is debated. Given his constitutional powers and his strong leadership abilities, President Yeltsin could play a key role in shaping these coalitions. The fractured nature of the parliament makes clear, however, that Yeltsin will face significant parliamentary opposition on controversial reform issues.

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RUSSIAN TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM THE BALTICS

Russia is close to reaching final troop withdrawal accords with Latvia and Estonia, but several disputes stand in the way of final agreement -- particularly with Latvia -- and the regular negotiating sessions are deadlocked. Riga and Tallinn are pressing for summits with Russian President Yeltsin to resolve these disputes, but Yeltsin has said that he would not hold such meetings until negotiators make more progress. Deputy Foreign Minister Churkin and Presidential advisor Ryurikov have met with senior Latvian and Estonian officials in an effort to reach compromises.

August 1994 Target. During the November round of withdrawal talks with Latvia and Estonia, Russia offered to complete the troop withdrawals from each country by August 31, 1994. The offer to Latvia appeared to be contingent on Russian access to the missile tracking radar facility at Skrunda for a period of six years, while the offer to Estonia excluded troops that would remain at the Paldiski naval base to dismantle its nuclear reactor. Riga has not formally responded to Moscow's proposal but wants to limit access to Skrunda to two years. Estonian officials have said they would accept Moscow's proposal if Russia agreed to front-load its withdrawal with the most combat-capable units.

Status of Withdrawals. Russian officials have periodically threatened to halt withdrawals, but the reported number of Russian troops in Latvia and Estonia continues to decline. Estimates put the number remaining in Latvia at 13,000-18,000, and in Estonia at around 2500. More than half the troops left are officers.

Strategic Facilities. In November, Russia dropped its demand to retain access to intelligence and naval facilities in Latvia and proposed to complete its withdrawal from the two facilities by the end of August 1994. Riga has welcomed this proposal, but is resisting Moscow's request for access to Skrunda through the year 2000 out of concern that a continued Russian military presence could threaten Latvian sovereignty.

- Riga initially was prepared to compromise on a four-year Russian access period, but, in the wake of the strong performance by nationalists in Russia's parliamentary elections, is concerned that a four-year stay would extend Moscow's presence beyond Russia's next election, which they fear hardliners might win.

- In late December, Churkin proposed a withdrawal accord obligating Russia to a August 31, 1994 deadline but leaving the status of the Skrunda site for later negotiations. Latvia countered by proposing an accord committing both sides to reach an agreement on Skrunda by a fixed date.

Citizenship Issues. Russian officials have expressed concern for the welfare of the large ethnic Russian communities in Latvia and Estonia following completion of the pullout and have called upon Riga and Tallinn to take steps to integrate ethnic Russians. In recent discussions with Swedish Prime Minister Bildt, Foreign Minister Kozyrev appeared to view the treatment of ethnic Russians in Latvia and Estonia as the key issue in bilateral relations. Nevertheless, Russian officials insist that the withdrawals are not formally linked to the treatment of ethnic Russians.

- The Latvian Parliament has been debating draft citizenship legislation, and Moscow is concerned that Riga will adopt a restrictive law, possibly including a quota on the number of ethnic Russians eligible for citizenship. Moscow has welcomed the CSCE's recent decision to create a mission in Latvia and hopes that the CSCE presence will lead Riga to adopt more inclusive policies. However, the Latvian Parliament appears ready to pass a bill denying non-citizens the right to participate in local elections; this would almost certainly damage relations with Russia.

- Moscow was gratified by Estonia's local elections in October, in which ethnic Russian non-citizens were able to participate, and welcomed President Meri's roundtable discussions with ethnic Russian leaders. Yeltsin has expressed hope that the roundtable will lead to changes in legislation affecting ethnic Russians.

Rights of Retired Military Personnel. Riga and Tallinn believe that Moscow is encouraging military personnel in Latvia and Estonia to retire in place in order to avoid finding housing for them in Russia. Latvian and Estonian officials argue that Russian military personnel who have retired since the time of Baltic independence in August 1991 -- particularly those with past intelligence links -- pose a threat and should be withdrawn. Russian officials are concerned that Riga and Tallinn will move to expel many of these retired personnel once Russia has completed its troop withdrawals.

Housing. Moscow continues to press Baltic leaders and Western interlocutors for assistance in constructing housing for withdrawing Russian troops. In October, for example, Yeltsin raised with Meri the prospect of expediting Russian troop withdrawals from Estonia if Tallinn or Western countries could provide additional housing aid.

Border Claims. Moscow has refused to discuss Estonia's claim to two pieces of adjacent Russian Federation territory that formed part of Estonia prior to 1940. Estonian officials recognize that Tallinn has little chance to recover the territory but are not willing to sign an agreement with Russia dropping Estonia's claim to the area.

Compensation Questions. Latvia and Estonia claim that Russia should provide compensation for environmental damages inflicted by Soviet troops since 1940; Russia has said that it bears no responsibility for former Soviet conduct and has threatened to seek compensation for evacuated Russian military facilities. Moscow is pressing for a mutual renunciation of claims -- the "zero-zero" solution -- as was done in Russia's earlier troop withdrawal agreements with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

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STRATEGIC DEPOSTURING/DETARGETING

On April 23, you issued a statement on advancing U.S. relations with Russia and the other New Independent States which, inter alia, announced that the U.S. was beginning "a comprehensive review of measures that could enhance strategic stability, including the possibility of each side reprogramming its nuclear missiles so they are not routinely aimed at each other." President Yeltsin previously raised the concept of "detargeting" with you during the Vancouver Summit.

During Secretary Aspin's September 8-9 meetings with Defense Minister Grachev, the two sides agreed to explore detargeting and other "strategic disengagement" measures designed to address and, if possible, eliminate the dangerous practices and postures adopted during the Cold War. It was also agreed that a DOD-MOD strategic stability working group (SSWG) would be set up to address these issues.

The DOD-MOD SSWG had its first meeting in Moscow on October 21. In addition to discussion of detargeting, the U.S. proposed that the sides at a subsequent meeting discuss: (1) the military exercises each side conducts involving strategic forces to determine which activities contribute to concerns on the other side and whether notifications or limitations on such exercises could alleviate these concerns, (2) the sides respective plans and systems for increasing force readiness levels (DEFCONs), to identify any instances in the past where misinterpretations of each other's intentions may have occurred, and (3) other measures to promote transparency and confidence-building. The question of when to adopt a detargeting posture was deferred.

The Russians have raised the possibility of going beyond detargeting to actually decommission, for example by removing warheads from certain categories of ICBMs and SLBMs -- the SS-18/SS-24 on the Russian side and Peacekeeper/D-5 on the U.S. side -- that have the capability to attack hardened targets. This would have a disproportional impact on the U.S. since the D-5 is the only one of these systems that would remain after MIRVed ICBMs are eliminated under the START II Treaty. The Russians also have tabled a draft agreement aimed at preventing future submarine-bumping incidents (an issue we prefer to address more informally in navy-to-navy channels).

Before we agree to a detargeting initiative at the Moscow Summit, we need promised information from the Russians on the specific detargeting measures they contemplate. We also need to consult further with the British and the French who have expressed sensitivity about public scrutiny being focused on their targeting policies. We will also consider Ukraine's interest in such an initiative. Ukrainian officials have recently proposed that the U.S. not target missiles against Ukraine as part of an arrangement involving the early deactivation of SS-24s located there.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
008. paper	The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty [partial] (1 page)	00/00/0000	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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FOLDER TITLE:
POTUS Briefing Books-POTUS Trip to Russia/Belarus, January 12-15, 1994 [2]

2016-0134-M
kh1778

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

THE ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE (ABM) TREATY

The ABM Treaty was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union on May 26, 1972, and entered into force on October 3, 1972. A 1974 protocol limited each party to one ABM deployment site having no more than 100 interceptor missiles. The Soviet Union chose to establish an ABM defense of its national capital, Moscow and Russia continues to maintain a deployed ABM system around Moscow. The United States only briefly deployed an ABM system in 1976 to defend its deployed ICBMs near Grand Forks, North Dakota.

The ABM Treaty also provides for a body, the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), to promote the objectives and implementation of the Treaty.

In July 1993, this Administration reversed a 1985 U.S. Government decision and determined that the "narrow" or "traditional" interpretation of the ABM Treaty is the legally correct one and, therefore, that the ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based, and mobile land-based ABM systems and components without regard to the technology utilized.

In this context, as well as the DoD "Bottom-Up" Review, the Administration has redirected its ballistic missile defense (BMD) policy. The highest priority U.S. BMD objective is deployment within this decade of an effective theater missile defense. In light of the decision to refocus the U.S. BMD program, the Administration decided to withdraw all previous U.S. proposals to amend the ABM Treaty to allow a more robust ABM defense against strategic ballistic missiles.

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COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

The Yeltsin government was pleased with the U.S. commitment to negotiate a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as soon as possible and has strongly supported efforts to maintain a global moratorium on nuclear testing among the nuclear weapons states. The Russians have been under a self-declared nuclear testing moratorium since 1991 and have said they will not test as long as the U.S., UK and France does not test. We do not believe Yeltsin will change this policy. Russia agrees with us that China's refusal to adhere to the moratorium should not slow CTBT negotiations. Continued U.S. support for a CTBT and a testing moratorium are important to Yeltsin's efforts to keep Russia on a similar course in light of interest among some members of its nuclear establishment in a resumption of testing.

The U.S. is proceeding with a CTBT on two fronts. First, the negotiations are set to begin in the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD) on January 25. Informal talks on the mandate and organization of the negotiations have already taken place in Geneva. Our Ambassador to the CD has worked closely with his Russian counterpart on these issues. Second, we have been meeting with the other nuclear weapons states (the "Perm-five" members of the UN Security Council) to reach as much agreement as possible on key CTBT issues before the negotiations begin. We met with the Russians bilaterally three times since July and have proposed that the Perm-5 meet in January. We intend to continue P-5 coordination throughout the negotiations in a low-key manner, as suggested by the Russians and our other P-5 partners.

U.S.-Russian CTBT consultations to date have revealed basic agreement on elements of a CTBT, except for a few points. For example, they favor a treaty of unlimited duration, while we favor a review of the treaty's effectiveness after 10 years, with the presumption that the treaty will be extended unless states take specific action to end it.

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RUSSIA'S DESIRE FOR INTERNATIONAL ENDORSEMENT OF ITS PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

Russia is seeking the endorsement of the international community for its peacekeeping operations in the Newly Independent States (NIS). Russia wants international endorsement to counter criticism that its peacekeeping efforts are a pretext for reestablishing a Russian empire in the former Soviet Union. Also, they would like international financial support for their activities.

Initially, Russia sought United Nations endorsement of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as a regional organization able to undertake peacekeeping activities. The CSCE has recognized in general terms that the CIS potentially could be a peacekeeping organization. However, as the CIS is dominated by Russia and not viewed as a true regional organization, we have indicated to the Russians that we would not support such UN or CSCE recognition of CIS in its current form. Instead, we have said that we would consider, on a case-by-case basis, supporting international endorsement of specific Russian peacekeeping (but not peace enforcement) activities in the NIS if the proposals meet our stated conditions:

- The Russian-led regional peacekeeping force must be desired and consented to by the parties to the dispute.
- The force must be neutral and its mission carried out in a manner consistent with the principles of the UN Charter and, if applicable, CSCE.
- There must be some form of objective international oversight of the force and its mandate must be finite and, if necessary, renewable.
- The force's role must be based on maintaining the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Newly Independent States.
- Financing of the force cannot be based on assessments of UN members. While we would consider supporting the creation of a voluntary fund to finance the force, it is not clear how much, if anything, we would be able to contribute.
- As with all peacekeeping operations, a key element would be the development of a process aimed at achieving a political settlement of the dispute. An important initial step in the process must be an established cease-fire.

The Russians are now seeking individual international endorsements for their efforts in Georgia, Tajikistan and Nagorno-Karabakh. At its November 30 Rome Ministerial, the CSCE adopted general language along the lines of our conditions relating to oversight of "third party forces" (meaning the

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Russians) involved in peacekeeping. We have offered to support the issuance of a statement by the UN Security Council president on the situation in Tajikistan if the Russians meet our conditions.

SAFE, SECURE DISMANTLEMENT (SSD) ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIA

To date, the U.S. plans to provide Russia with $440 million in dismantlement and non-proliferation assistance under the Nunn-Lugar legislation for SSD assistance to Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Because Russia is dismantling the largest number of strategic offensive arms and is dismantling all nuclear warheads in the former Soviet Union, it has received the majority of Nunn-Lugar assistance.

The most important area of U.S. assistance to Russia is the dismantlement of strategic offensive arms (ballistic missiles and bombers). We have signed an agreement for $130 million in this area. Another priority for U.S. assistance to Russia is the design and construction of a storage facility for the nuclear materials taken from dismantled nuclear weapons. The Russians have consistently maintained that lack of storage space is the biggest bottleneck in their dismantlement effort. We have signed two agreements for $90 million dollars in this area, but total construction costs could approach $300 million. We are also providing assistance to Russia to help in the safe and secure transport and storage of nuclear weapons and fissile material, to help eliminate chemical weapons and to help guard against proliferation by improving the accounting and control system for nuclear material.

The delivery of U.S. assistance has not been as fast as we would like. However, we expect the pace to pick up substantially over the next several months as some major equipment procurements come out of the pipeline. We have also obtained Congressional approval of changes to the Nunn-Lugar legislation for FY 94 (e.g., a separate line item, grant authority) that will expedite the assistance process in the future.

The major unfinished items on our SSD agenda with Russia include additional assistance for construction of the fissile material storage facility, enhancements to the export control system, chemical weapons destruction and dismantlement assistance to accelerate START II reductions. The USG will consider these and other projects in the coming months.

NUNN-LUGAR IMPLEMENTING AGREEMENTS FOR RUSSIA

($ Millions)

Obligations Project	Funds proposed Oct. 31, 1993	Expended as of Sept. 1, 1993
Armored blankets	$ 5.0	$ 3.321
Railcar security	20.0	10.180
Emergency response	15.0	11.067
Material controls	10.0	0
Storage containers	50.0	2.305
Facility design	15.0	10.8
Facility support	75.0	0
Export controls	2.26	0
Science center	25.0	1.4
Chemical weapons	25.0	2.1
SNDV Dismantlement	130.0	0
Mil-Mil Contacts	9.20	0
Arctic Nuclear Waste	10.0	4.665
Chem Demil Lab	30.0	0
Defense Conversion	20.0	0
Subtotal	**$ 441.46**	**$ 45.838**

NOTE: Expenditures are low by comparison with funds proposed because of several factors, including the slow pace of DOD contracting procedures. The chief reason, however, has been Russian resistance, until recently, to completing high-value agreements such as the one for the SNDV Dismantlement.

START II AND FOLLOW-ON

START II was signed January 3, 1993. There are two central elements to the Treaty. The first is significant additional reductions beyond those called for in START I. When fully implemented, START II will result in a reduction in existing U.S. and Russian arsenals by about two-thirds below current levels, down to 3500 warheads on each side. The second element is the elimination of all ICBMs with multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), traditionally regarded as the most destabilizing strategic offensive arms.

The START I and START II Treaties are separate agreements which will be in force simultaneously. START I is a multilateral treaty between the U.S., Ukraine, Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, while only the U.S. and Russia are parties to START II. (START II assumes that the other parties to START I will be non-nuclear by the end of its seven-year reduction period, in accordance with the commitments undertaken by these countries at Lisbon.) Because START II utilizes the definitions, concepts and verification provisions of the START I Treaty, START II cannot stand alone. By its own terms, START II cannot be implemented until START I enters into force.

There is no serious opposition to START II in the Senate. Hearings were held last summer, but no votes are likely until Russia acts on the Treaty. START II was submitted to the old Supreme Soviet in March where it was immediately caught up in the power struggle between Yeltsin and the parliament. Opponents argued that Yeltsin gave up too much in the Treaty, since MIRVed ICBMs have traditionally formed the backbone of Russian strategic forces, and that the Treaty would be too costly to implement. Russia is also unlikely to ratify START II until Ukraine has ratified START I and acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state. The impact of the recent parliamentary elections in Russia on START II ratification is uncertain at this point, but the strong showing by the communists and nationalists could pose problems.

Our highest arms control priorities at this point are to bring the START I and START II Treaties into force and to implement them, a process that will take us past the turn of the century. All of the parties to START I/Lisbon Protocol have now ratified the START Treaty and acceded to the Non-proliferation Treaty, with the exception of Ukraine.

Beyond START, the Department of Defense has begun a comprehensive nuclear posture review that will address the size, shape and operation of our nuclear forces and their role in the post-Cold War world. This review, which is scheduled for completion by next spring, should set the stage for decisions on required strategic force levels and any possible reductions beyond START I/START II levels.

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UKRAINE: START I/LISBON PROTOCOL

The Ukrainian parliament (Rada) acted on the START I Treaty November 18, attaching a number of conditions, some of which could delay implementation indefinitely. The terms call for Western financial and security guarantees and declare that Ukraine is not bound by Article V of the Lisbon Protocol, which calls for adherence to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state in the shortest possible time. The Rada's action may complicate recertification of Ukraine's eligibility for Nunn-Lugar assistance in January. The legislation requires that, among other things, Ukraine comply with relevant arms control agreements. The Senate's own START ratification was tied to an explicit understanding that the START/Lisbon Protocol package explicitly included the commitments in the associated letters to eliminate all strategic offensive arms.

President Kravchuk has publicly stated that the Rada's action does not go far enough and that Ukraine must live up to its obligations as a non-nuclear weapons state. We have drawn a distinction between the Rada's action and President Kravchuk's stated position, urging the GOU to find a way for Ukraine to fulfill all its Lisbon commitments.

During your November 29 telephone conversation with him, Kravchuk said he would resubmit the START/Lisbon package to the Rada. Kravchuk told diplomats in Kiev he hoped to resubmit the package to the current Rada, provided he can show the West has been forthcoming on financial and security assurances. He added, however, that he is confident the next Rada, to be elected in March, will ratify the package.

While we make progress with the Ukrainians on these nuclear issues, we have begun to engage them more broadly. That includes ongoing support for early deactivation of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, moving ahead to the extent possible in our bilateral economic dialogue, military-to-military contacts and other areas of mutually beneficial cooperation. We are continuing to work with Ukraine, the Russians and others on highly-enriched Uranium (HEU) proceeds-sharing, Nunn-Lugar dismantlement assistance and security assurances, which would, in part, meet a number of Rada concerns.

As Kravchuk indicated to you, Ukraine has become more forthcoming on early deactivation of its 46 SS-24s. Less than a week after Kravchuk told you he was deactivating a regiment (10 missiles, 100 warheads) of SS-24's, Ukrainian officials informed us that 20 SS-24s would be deactivated by the end of December and the remaining 26 by the end of March. We have seen some activity at the SS-24 sites but cannot confirm that this is actually underway (a senior Russian General told us 14 have already been deactivated). Meanwhile, we are continuing sensitive discussions with Ukraine and Russia to come to closure on a timeframe for the transfer of warheads from deactivated missiles to Russia.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 31, 1993

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBM NARA, Date 1/15/2020
2016-0134-M

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Your Trip to Belarus, January 15, 1994

During your visit to Minsk, you will meet with Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich, a reformer whom you met last July, and separately with the more conservative Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich. You will also meet briefly with reform leaders in the opposition. Your visit includes a wreath laying ceremony at the World War II memorial, a visit to the site of the graves of Stalin's victims at Kuropaty and a brief session with U.S. Embassy employees and their families. We will forward your public statements and press materials separately. This briefing book contains:

SCHEDULE OF KEY EVENTS

SCOPE MEMORANDUM

ARRIVAL CEREMONY

VISIT TO THE KUROPATY GRAVES

BILATERAL MEETING WITH CHAIRMAN SHUSHKEVICH

BILATERAL MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER KEBICH

MEETING WITH PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION LEADERS

WREATH LAYING AT WORLD WAR II MEMORIAL

PUBLIC EVENT (TBD)

MEETING WITH U.S. EMBASSY STAFF

BACKGROUND PAPERS

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

KEY EVENTS IN BELARUS

SCHEDULE OF KEY EVENTS IN BELARUS

Saturday, January 15

ARRIVAL CEREMONY IN MINSK
10:20 - 10:45 a.m.

WREATH LAYING AT THE KUROPATY MEMORIAL
11:00 - 11:20 a.m.

MEETING WITH CHAIRMAN STANISLAV SHUSHKEVICH
11:50 - 12:20 p.m.

MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER VYACHESLAV KEBICH
12:30 - 1:15 p.m.

DROP-BY WITH MEMBERS OF THE DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION
1:25 - 1:45 p.m.

WREATH LAYING AT WORLD WAR II MEMORIAL
2:00 - 2:10 p.m.

PUBLIC EVENT (TBD)

MEETING WITH U.S. EMBASSY STAFF
3:30 - 3:45 p.m.

DEPARTURE FOR GENEVA
4:00 p.m.

SCOPE PAPER

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 31, 1993

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2016-0134-M (1.98)
KBH 1/15/2020

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Your Trip to Minsk

I. SETTING

Of all the new states to emerge from the Soviet Union, Belarus has had the hardest time breaking its ties with Russia, establishing its own identity, and bolstering its independence. Reformers have not been able to call upon a strong sense of separateness from Russia or historic oppression from Moscow to create a broad consensus that change and independence are worth the sacrifice they require. Supreme Soviet Chairman Shushkevich, your host in Minsk, is the country's most popular reform figure. But he remains opposed and under attack by government officials and a parliament still dominated by former communists resistant to reform and ambivalent about independence.

Your six-hour visit to Minsk on January 15 serves a twofold purpose. First, you will demonstrate, in a highly visible manner, America's support for the efforts of Belarus's embattled reformers -- led by Shushkevich -- to build a democratic and market-oriented state. Shushkevich has taken a courageous stand in the face of strong opposition, and your visit to Minsk constitutes a powerful symbol that we support those who stand up for the principles we believe in.

Second -- but no less important -- your visit underscores our genuine appreciation for Belarus's firm commitment to denuclearization, as demonstrated by their adherence to the START I and NPT agreements. Your presence in Minsk refutes the view that the United States pays attention to the nuclear successor states of the ex-USSR only as long as those states refuse to give up their nuclear arsenals. It is a clear signal to Ukraine that elimination of nuclear weapons offers tangible benefits, and that we will respond appropriately to states that act responsibly on the nuclear issue. Indeed, we believe that our conscious decision to bypass Kiev during your trip played a significant role in convincing President Kravchuk to move forward on denuclearization.

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II. CORE GOALS OF YOUR VISIT

- **Demonstrate support for Chairman Shushkevich and like-minded reformist politicians in Belarus, thereby bolstering their public and political stature.**

- **Underscore U.S. willingness to expand assistance to Belarus in support of its economic transformation, contingent on decisive governmental action to accelerate reforms.**

- **Elicit from key Belarusian political figures a firm commitment to parliamentary elections in the first half of 1994.**

- **Convey appreciation for Belarus's steadfast pursuit of its goal of a non-nuclear future.**

III. ACHIEVING THESE GOALS

Schedule

Your schedule is structured to maximize the time you spend with Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich. He will meet you upon arrival and accompany you to two ceremonial events that will receive a great deal of press play within Belarus. In addition to a traditional large bilateral meeting, you will have the chance for more candid conversations in your limousine between events. You will also hold a small separate meeting with leaders of the democratic opposition in parliament, whose support for Shushkevich has thus far sustained his hold on the Supreme Soviet chairmanship.

You are also scheduled for a half-hour session with Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich -- a conservative stalwart, and Shushkevich's main opponent on the reform agenda. The meeting is brief for optical reasons, and your message to Kebich is simple: our ability to expand assistance to Belarus is conditioned on Belarus's own commitment to accelerate its transition to a market economy. The last stop on your agenda in Minsk -- a visit to a successful privatized clothing factory -- will make this point in visual terms, as well.

Substance

Beyond the obvious symbolic and rhetorical support that you will convey during your visit, the Belarusians will be looking for more tangible demonstration of U.S. commitment to their future. During FYs 92-93, we provided over $160 million in humanitarian and technical assistance to Belarus, in addition to some $75 million in Nunn-Lugar funds for denuclearization, demilitarization, export control and defense conversion. In connection with your visit, we have assembled a modest package of additional assistance -- approximately $25-30 million -- in the following categories:

Technical assistance ($10 million): funding for small scale privatization, exchanges and training, and projects in health, energy, and environment.

Excess hospital ($7.5 million): equipment, supplies, and furnishings of a 1500-bed facility from excess defense stores in Europe, targeted for several children's health care facilities in Minsk that the First Lady will visit.

P.L. 480 Title I food aid: $10 million in wheat.

Nunn-Lugar Funds ($25 million): [ability to make this commitment contingent on resolution of transfer authority problem; will be determined before visit]

In addition, we will be able to announce the conclusion of a Bilateral Investment Treaty, a science and technology agreement, and the establishment of two joint commissions: on agribusiness and rural development, and defense conversion.

The Belarusians have already told us privately that they consider this package modest. There are two problems that we must deal with here. The first is tied to the basic tenet of U.S. assistance policy: aid **follows** reform. A "higher-end" package of assistance is possible, provided the U.S. sees more aggressive action to implement reforms -- e.g., adoption of a new constitution, national elections (see below), and accelerated privatization of business and industry. The second problem is simply one of unrealistic expectations. The Belarusians proposed a grandiose FY94 Nunn-Lugar program ($270 million!) that exceeds the **total** of all Nunn-Lugar funds available. We are beginning to tell them privately that such spiralling demands are unrealistic as available remaining Nunn-Lugar and economic assistance funds decline and competing demands increase.

We also need to convey a message that we have been stressing with the Russians: it is foreign trade and investment, rather than bilateral assistance, that will determine the long-term vitality of the Belarusian economy. Belarus should therefore work to create a welcoming environment for trade and investment.

Last, but not least, democratic reform; in a word -- elections. The conservative, Soviet-era parliament is "committed" (through a non-binding resolution) to hold new elections in March 1994. Shushkevich, and the minority faction he leads, have waged a campaign to hold the conservatives to this commitment. Prime Minister Kebich told Secretary Christopher in October that he supported these elections, but has done little since to promote the idea. We have no illusions that new elections would magically lead to a majority pro-reform legislature. But as one reformer said, it would definitely put some of the most

obstructionist communist-era figures out on the street. For this reason, as well as for the clean break that such an election would symbolize, we will want to use the occasion of your visit to elicit a clear statement of support for early elections from the conservative Kebich.

ARRIVAL CEREMONY

TO BE PROVIDED

VISIT TO KUROPATY GRAVES

SCENESETTER

MASS GRAVES OF VICTIMS OF STALIN ERA
KUROPATY, MINSK, BELARUS

Kuropaty is a wooded site located just beyond the Minsk city limits. In 1988, during construction of a nearby road, workers uncovered the remains of large numbers of people who had been shot and buried in the woods. Zenon Poznyak, then human rights activist and historian and now leader of the nationalist Belarusian National Front, who is widely considered "the moral force of the Belarusian nation," excavated and investigated the site. Poznyak uncovered the remains of thousands of persons who had been murdered by the Stalinist secret police (NKVD) from 1937-1941, including Poznyak's own grandfather. Early Soviet estimates put the number of dead at 110,000 persons; however, further excavation has raised that figure to almost 300,000. Soviet authorities originally covered up the crime, but since 1988 and "glasnost'," the communist authorities have reluctantly recognized this hideous crime. Some current government officials continue to downplay or ignore the site, especially as many who perpetrated the crime remain alive.

The site has been a gathering place for National Front rallies and solemn inter-denominational vigils for those "who will never forget." Thousands of Poles and Jews join the Belarusian nationalists and Russians who fell victim there to Stalin's henchmen. While there are numerous monuments to victims of World War II in Belarus, Kuropaty is the only monument to victims of Stalinism. According to Poznyak, other killing fields of equal proportions exist in other areas of Belarus.

The site itself consists of a clearing and woody knoll, with a path leading to a stone marker where a future monument is to be erected by the Belarusian government. Wreaths are generally laid at the wooden cross located at the foot of the rise in an open clearing where mourners stand by the thousands remembering the dead. Polish President Lech Walesa has been the only head of state to visit the site.

This event will consist of a wreath-laying but no speeches. The audience of thousands will include representatives of major faiths and nationalities whose members lay buried in the mass graves. Zenon Poznyak will meet you at the site to offer his own description of the horror he uncovered here.

MEETING WITH CHAIRMAN SHUSHKEVICH

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0134-M (1.99)
KBH 1/15/2020

MEETING WITH
BELARUSIAN SUPREME SOVIET CHAIRMAN
STANISLAV SHUSHKEVICH

CONTEXT OF MEETING

Polls consistently show Shushkevich as the most popular politician in Belarus -- he is the physicist who first publicized the human and environmental toll on Belarus of the Chernobyl disaster. However, the reformist Chairman is in the minority in his own legislature and constantly under attack by conservatives, many of whom see little reason to maintain Belarus as a country truly separate from Russia.

Shushkevich's influence remains limited by a Soviet-era political structure dominated by former (and not-so-former) Communists. Although he serves as de facto head of state, he holds no position in the government. The existing Belarusian constitution, another Soviet relic, forces Shushkevich to share executive power with conservative (and politically much stronger) Prime Minister Kebich. As an opposition figure in the parliament, Shushkevich is severely restricted in his ability to promote or pass reform legislation. Unfortunately, conservatives are once again on the offensive in Belarus as they draw strength from the discouraging results of the Russian elections.

Our continued support for Shushkevich is vital. No other figure on the political horizon in Belarus embodies his stature, popular mandate and commitment to a democratic, market-oriented future for his country. The Chairman's visit to Washington in July, when he met with you and presented the Belarusian instruments of accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, was a great personal success for him and enhanced his relative position in the Belarusian political landscape. Your visit to Minsk is viewed as a tremendous honor by most Belarusians, and it is important that your relationship with and respect for Shushkevich -- and the reform course he personifies -- be seen as the central element in our bilateral relationship.

For reasons as much optical as substantive, your discussions with Shushkevich will constitute the longest single segment of your schedule in Minsk. In a nutshell, your objectives for this encounter boil down to two points: **encouraging democratic and economic reform, and congratulating denuclearization success.**

Shushkevich will need little persuading that the road to a better future for Belarus lies in the transition to a democratic, market economic system, and the continuation of the denuclearization program. His chief concern will be in securing increased financial assistance from the U.S. Since 1992, the U.S. has provided over $162 million in financial and technical assistance

to Belarus, in addition to some $75 million in Nunn-Lugar denuclearization funds.

FY 94 assistance levels will fall sharply, however, at the same time that Belarusian requests are spiralling upwards. It is unclear whether the Belarusians grasp the reality that assistance funds are limited, and competing demands are growing. In this environment, it is important that Belarus receive the same message that we have underscored with Russia: Western trade and investment will be the key to the healthy growth of the Belarusian economy and its integration into world markets. Bilateral assistance will never provide the fiscal magic to transform the Belarusian economy, but economic reform and a welcoming climate for trade and investment will.

Here, the United States is willing to help -- with technical assistance, with new cooperative efforts, and with pilot projects that exemplify the transformation that must occur in Belarusian industry and the defense sector. You can already point to a considerable body of U.S.-Belarusian interaction and provide the promise of more. For example, Belarus has led the way in Nunn-Lugar funded programs in defense conversion, nuclear base closure and housing and retraining assistance to officers serving in the Strategic Rocket Forces. Having served as a model not only for Russia, but also for Ukraine, Belarus is now acquiring a permanent institution -- the U.S.-Belarusian Defense Conversion Commission -- like those already developed with Moscow and Kiev. It will serve as a basis for long-term cooperation in conversion of Belarusian defense industries.

In this way, Shushkevich needs to be reassured that our commitment to support remains strong, even if the levels of financial assistance fall. If Belarus will work to establish a good environment for trade and investment and a reforming economy, we will work to bring American companies to Belarus.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- **Build on the personal relationship that you and Shushkevich initiated during his July visit to Washington.**

- **Express continued admiration and support for his efforts to promote economic and democratic reform in the face of stiff opposition.**

- **Reinforce the view that Belarus must expand and accelerate its transition to a market economy in order to raise living standards and create the environment for Western investment.**

- **Stress our commitment to make our assistance funds as effective as possible.**

- **Reaffirm U.S. appreciation for Belarus's denuclearization efforts and world-class commitment to nonproliferation.**

- **Encourage participation in Partnership for Peace as the keystone for Belarusian security in a new Europe.**

CORE POINTS

- **Support for Shushkevich**: Admire and support your efforts to promote greater economic and political reform in conservative parliament. Want my visit to focus attention on need for reform, U.S. support for this process.

- **Denuclearization**: Was focus of our July meeting. Want to reiterate appreciation for your commitment to that principle. As first of Lisbon Protocol signatories to ratify START and accede to NPT, you have made a major contribution to a safer world. Commend you for your vision and determination to make it a reality.

- **Democratic Reform**: New elections crucial step to remove legacy of Soviet past. Hope parliament will soon make firm decision to hold them. We are ready to provide assistance to help ensure a fair, open process, as we did in Russia.

  -- Also encourage progress on new Belarusian constitution.

- **Economic reform**: Know you realize that future prosperity of Belarus lies in expanding/accelerating transition to market economy. Lack of reform slows growth in living standards, creates barriers to expanded assistance and investment.

  -- Need to seize economic destiny: speed liberalization and privatization programs, but also ensure social guarantees to protect most vulnerable citizens.

  -- Welcoming environment for Western trade and investment will be the engine for long-term growth, health of Belarusian economy -- not foreign assistance.

  -- U.S. willing to go far to create permanent institutions to help Belarus in the transition -- Commission on Defense Conversion a good example; another example: Science and Technology Agreement -- an effective way to build bridges to Belarus' high-technology institutes, labs, enterprises.

  -- U.S. will help, but Belarus will have to take the initiative to pursue economic reforms.

  -- Will discuss these views with Prime Minister Kebich, parliamentary leaders, urge them to work with you. Would like your views on how to speed reform in Belarus.

- **Assistance**: Know you have sought increased assistance. Will continue to work with you and multilateral organizations on this. Slow pace of economic reform a problem. Encouraged by government plans to privatize half

of all state firms, but government needs to loosen direct control over economy, show progress on restructuring.

-- Assistance realities mean increased demands for decreasing resources. Want to work with you to make the most out of what is available.

-- First shipment of supplies arrived in Minsk this week for U.S. donation of $7 million, 1500-bed hospital. $10 million in food grants also forthcoming. $40 million in additional Nunn-Lugar funds available for denuclearization.

-- Belarus has led the way in Nunn-Lugar program for defense conversion, base demilitarization, housing for officers -- a model for what is happening in Russia, Ukraine.

-- We've been particularly impressed by Belarus's efforts to use funds to upgrade export controls, customs operations to prevent flow of nuclear and other military contraband. U.S. happy to assist effort.

o **Cooperation:** Recently-concluded Bilateral Investment Treaty important symbol of broadening of bilateral ties. Pleased also by ambitious start of defense cooperation during October visit of Defense Minister Kozlovski (cause-LOFF-ski). Will be working hard to establish military-to-military contacts and active partnership in military training and advisory activities.

o **Partnership for Peace:** Brussels summit established PFP to promote security cooperation and enhanced stability across whole of Europe. Encouraged by your expressions of interest: PFP can be keystone of security for Belarus. Urge you to establish one of first partnerships, send delegation to Brussels soon to explore how it can be tailored to your interests and capabilities.

SCENESETTER

HOUSE OF FOREIGN ECONOMIC TIES (VOSKOVOY 4)
MINSK, BELARUS

The House of Foreign Economic Ties is a stately building located in central Minsk, used exclusively by the Belarusian government for ceremonial functions and high-level government meetings. The House of Foreign Economic Ties is where foreign ambassadors present their credentials to Supreme Soviet Chairman Shushkevich, who functions as chief of state. The building, which is actually run by the Council of Ministers, has been the site of Heads of State meetings of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), for which Minsk is the headquarters.

Events scheduled for the House of Foreign Economic Ties are meetings with Supreme Soviet Chairman Shushkevich, Prime Minister Kebich, and leaders of the democratic political opposition. The events will take place in the main meeting room.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
014. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	12/20/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 810

FOLDER TITLE:
POTUS Briefing Books-POTUS Trip to Russia/Belarus, January 12-15, 1994 [2]

2016-0134-M
kh1778

RESTRICTION CODES

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MEETING WITH
PM KEBICH

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0134-M (2.01)
KBH 1/15/2020

MEETING WITH
BELARUSIAN PRIME MINISTER VYACHESLAV KEBICH

CONTEXT OF MEETING

Prime Minister Kebich is the most powerful political figure in Belarus. In contrast to Chairman Shushkevich's reformist views and Western outlook, Kebich is a staunch conservative whose orientation is to maintain close links to Russia. A supporter of perestroika-style reforms, Kebich remains attached to the old system and to the desire to improve, not replace, it. He points to political and economic instability and dislocation in Russia and other republics as justifying his conservative policies. He also argues that the strong showing of Zhirinovskiy and the communists in the recent Russian elections demonstrates the electorate's ambivalence toward reform. Although Kebich is not generally sympathetic to the reform policies we advocate, his support will be crucial if any reform measures are to succeed in Belarus. Despite his policies, Kebich wants to be seen in the West as a moderate. He will listen attentively to our views, while nevertheless defending his cautious approach.

With economic and political reform at the center of our agenda for Minsk, **your primary objective in the half-hour meeting we have scheduled with Kebich is to engage him on these issues**. While appreciating Kebich's concerns about "harsh" economic reforms, you should draw a distinction between the temporary downturns associated with reform, and the steady, constant decline engendered by lack of change. Political reform is another problem area with Kebich. When he met with Secretary Christopher in October, he offered support for the idea of elections in 1994 to replace the current, Soviet-era parliament. He has done little since to promote this, though, and the parliament recently recessed again without scheduling these elections. You should champion both the elections and economic reform as key to building a post-Soviet foundation for independent Belarus, as well as encouraging expanded Western investment and trade.

Kebich's agenda for this meeting -- and indeed, for the whole of your visit -- will be to position himself as our principal Belarusian interlocutor. He realizes that he lacks reform credentials with Western governments and hopes to improve his image. He may thus seek to divert some of the limelight from Shushkevich, with whom he divides executive power under Belarus's Soviet-era constitution. Kebich has an ambitious wish list of U.S. assistance projects that Foreign Minister Kravchanka presented the Embassy after your visit was announced. We have worked with the Belarusians to conclude, in conjunction with your visit, a science and technology agreement and a Bilateral Investment Treaty, in addition to the $7 million hospital donation, $10 million in food grants, and a modest $25 million in

Nunn-Lugar assistance. Kebich is likely to ask for more, but the slow pace of reform in Belarus constitutes a constraint on what we or multilateral organizations can realistically do.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- **Advocate economic reform as best guarantee of long-term stability and prosperity in Belarus.**

- **Cite desire to expand economic assistance, consonant with Belarusian movement to accelerate privatization and structural reforms.**

- **Seek explicit expression of support for national elections in 1994.**

- **Express appreciation for Belarus's arms control policies and denuclearization.**

- **Underscore our wish to expand defense cooperation, military-to-military contacts, assistance for defense conversion, demilitarization, nonproliferation.**

CORE POINTS

- **Bilateral relations:** Off to a strong start, particularly with ratification of nuclear accords and Shushkevich visit. Encouraged by science and technology agreement, bilateral investment treaty, expanding military cooperation program. Good visit by Defense Minister Kozlovskiy (cause-LOFF-ski) in October.

  -- Look forward to developing high-technology cooperation with Belarus's many important institutes, laboratories.

- **Reform:** Additional assistance and new agreements should build stronger bilateral ties and promote economic development. But slow pace of economic reform limits the effectiveness of such measures.

  -- Recognize Belarus' need to find own pace, but urge acceleration of political, economic reform.

  -- **Basic tenet of our aid policy: assistance follows reform.**

  -- Understand Belarus's historic close trade, social ties to Russia, but also its place as a crossroads between East and West. Should look East and West (e.g., Poland) for reform models.

  -- Yeltsin view: Russian elections underline need to cushion effects of reforms, not discard them.

  -- Long-term prosperity built on investment, not assistance.

- **Elections:** Secretary Christopher reported good prospects for early elections in 1994 after his visit. Believe elections would be a good idea to underscore Belarusian independence, sovereignty. U.S. can provide technical electoral assistance once parliament has committed itself to them. Hope idea of new elections will continue to have your strong support.

- **Denuclearization:** Belarusian ratification and implementation of START and NPT -- first among Lisbon Protocol signatories -- are a credit to nation's farsightedness and statesmanship of leaders. Look forward to working to develop Nunn-Lugar assistance programs in Belarus.

  -- Belarus has served as model for defense conversion, base demilitarization, housing for officers projects in Russia and Ukraine.

  -- Particularly impressed by Belarus's willingness to upgrade export controls, customs operations to prevent flow of nuclear and other military contraband into Europe. U.S. happy to assist in effort.

  -- Deputy Secretary of Defense Perry looking forward to developing stable defense conversion relationship with Belarus -- a commission similar to those in Russia, Ukraine.

- **Partnership for Peace:** Encouraged by your expressions of interest in joining PFP. Welcome your participation. Urge you to establish one of first partnerships, send delegation to Brussels soon to work out details.

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1.4c, 3.5c

Vyacheslav Frantsevich KEBICH
(Phonetic: KEHbeech)

BELARUS

Prime Minister (since 1990)

Addressed as: Mr. Prime Minister

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
PER E. O. 13526

2016-0134-M (2.02
2/27/2017 KBH

A former senior official of the Communist party in Minsk under the Soviet regime, Vyacheslav Kebich remains an unrepentant Communist who holds most of the power in Belarus. Nevertheless, he is sensitive about his Communist image in the West, 1.4c, 1.4d and complains that Western leaders do not accept him as a reformer on a par with leaders of other countries that had been part of the Soviet Union. He has been slow to move toward reform and a market economy and has opposed further privatization of land ownership. Politically astute, Kebich has minimized the potential for widespread opposition by observing some of the rudiments of democracy, allowing demonstrations, a parliament, and limited freedom of the press 3.5c

Kebich has sent mixed messages about the prospects for democratization in Belarus, although his vision clearly entails keeping Belarus within Russia's sphere of influence. 1.4c, 1.4d Indeed, his statements to the press suggest he yearns for the rebirth of a Russian-ruled Slavic empire in which Belarus would be the most favored protectorate and in which he would play a role like that of past Communist Party first secretaries. Kebich has emphasized that Belarus's only hope lies in ever-closer ties to Russia, and he has strongly supported both an economic union with other CIS members and a CIS collective security treaty. (Kebich, nevertheless, dislikes and distrusts Russian President Boris Yelt'sin, whom he blames for provoking bloodshed during the October 1992 showdown with some members of the parliament.) Although Kebich has claimed that Western culture and institutions threaten the Belarusian soul, he has asked 1.4c, 1.4d the principles of democratic institutions. He

1.4c, 1.4d, 3.5c

has said that China and South Korea are his models because they reformed their economies while their governments retained tight political control. 1.4c, 3.5c

1.4c, 3.5c

(continued)

Kebich must contend with a division of executive power between himself and popular Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich. Kebich controls the armed forces, the news media, all of the military, and most of the security forces except the KGB, and he has a strong power base among hardline conservatives. He therefore has the upper hand in a power struggle with Shushkevich, who opposes efforts to strengthen security ties to Moscow. 1.4c, 1.4d he resents what he perceives as Western attention paid to Shushkevich but denied to him. The Prime Minister's main vehicle of control in the Supreme Soviet is the "Belarus" faction, which has been working to sideline Shushkevich and favors impeaching him 3.5c

Kebich is trying to shape the ongoing parliamentary debate on a new constitution, including the division of powers between the legislature and the executive. If the new constitution establishes a strong presidency, Kebich aspires to the post, although he appears less concerned with holding a title than with retaining power 3.5c

Career and Personal Data

Kebich was born on 10 June 1936 in the Minsk region. Trained as a mechanical engineer, he began working at the Kirov Rolling and Cutting Machinery Production Association in Minsk, where he eventually became director. He worked in a variety of Communist Party jobs in Minsk in the early 1980s. At one point he headed the party's heavy industry department. In late 1985 Kebich was appointed deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and chairman of its State Planning Committee (Gosplan). In 1991 he founded the Belarusian State Academy of Management, which he closely oversees. 3.5c

In March 1993 the media reported accusations—as yet unconfirmed—that a commercial enterprise owned by Kebich's wife, Elena, had received funds originally earmarked for badly needed medical supplies. Kebich has denied involvement in any questionable activities. He is a colonel in the reserves 1.4c, 1.4d the Prime Minister claimed that he had been assigned to the GRU while serving in the military. He enjoys fishing. He does not speak English. Kebich regularly visits the village where he was born to see his nonagenarian mother and work on her house and garden. He and his wife have at least one daughter. 3.5c

20 December 1993

MEETING WITH PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION LEADERS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0134-M (2.03)
KBM 1/15/2020

MEETING WITH BELARUSIAN OPPOSITION LEADERS

CONTEXT OF MEETING

The term "opposition" is loosely applied to Belarusian political factions and organizations falling outside the orbit of the conservative forces that control both the parliament and Council of Ministers. The opposition comprises a range of political movements, including radical reformers, centrists, nationalists, independent labor, women's groups, the intelligentsia and others. In this brief drop-by, you will be meeting with [individuals still TBD].

Although they constitute a small minority in parliament, the opposition and independents have thus far been able to defeat no-confidence measures against Chairman Shushkevich. (Ironically, they themselves often criticize the Chairman's political compromises.) Most of their venom, though, is reserved for parliamentary conservatives and the Kebich government, whose resignation they now call for. An opposition-sponsored petition drive in 1992 demanding new legislative elections was summarily quashed by the parliamentary majority. Instead, conservatives pushed through a non-binding resolution to hold elections in March 1994. Leading opposition groups have formed a fragile coalition to keep this commitment alive and in the public eye, but the parliament recently recessed without taking action to schedule these elections.

Your main goal in this meeting is to show that the U.S. is behind the reformers, no matter how outnumbered they may be. Sharing the spotlight with opposition leaders promotes our goal of supporting economic and political reform in Belarus. The opposition feels threatened by the powerful conservative majority in parliament and the government, and fears a de facto government policy of seeking virtual reunification with Russia. They will feel great reassurance from our embrace. They will want to hear how U.S. policy promotes the cause of reform and independence in Belarus; will likely criticize government influence over the press; and will call on U.S. support for introduction of a Belarusian national currency.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- **Assure support for economic reform.**
- **Endorse early elections as a positive democratic step.**
- **Stress importance of protecting and promoting human rights.**
- **Reaffirm U.S. support for Belarus's sovereignty and independence.**

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Declassify on: OADR

CORE POINTS

- o Hang in there: Admire your tenacity in fighting for your political beliefs against stiff opposition. Have great sympathy from my own political experience. Know you won't quit because future is on your side.

- o Reform: Centerpiece of U.S. policy in Belarus and all NIS is support for democratic and economics reform. Most U.S. assistance programs promote private enterprise, farming, commerce, defense conversion, food, health.

  -- Have told government officials repeatedly that full development of relations depends on reform. U.S. can only help reform on margins; success dependent on Belarusians themselves.

  -- Key to future prosperity lies not in financial assistance, but in **investment.**

- o Non-nuclear status: Have appreciated action by Belarusian parliament to be first of Lisbon protocol signatories to both ratify START and accede to NPT. Historic commitment to non-nuclear future, goals of non-proliferation.

- o Elections: We support early elections as promotion of democracy. Disappointed when Supreme Soviet disallowed a petition drive for elections in 1992. Hoped March 1994 elections would have been agreed by now.

  -- Secretary Christopher and I raised with PM Kebich, Chairman Shushkevich.

  -- We are ready to offer technical electoral assistance but only once elections are scheduled.

- o Human rights: Respect for human rights cornerstone of U.S. relations. Endorse call for legal reform, less government interference in mass media.

- o Sovereignty: U.S. firm believer in Belarus' sovereignty, independence. Encouraged Yeltsin to respect rights of neighbors. Urged your government to sign up now to PFP.

  -- Will do best to promote Belarus' independence and prosperity, but ultimate choice belongs to the people.

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
018. report	U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	12/20/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Records Management
OA/Box Number: 810

FOLDER TITLE:
POTUS Briefing Books-POTUS Trip to Russia/Belarus, January 12-15, 1994 [2]

2016-0134-M
kh1778

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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WREATH LAYING AT WORLD WAR II MEMORIAL

WREATH LAYING CEREMONY

WORLD WAR II MEMORIAL
VICTORY SQUARE

CONTEXT OF EVENT

This Soviet-style war memorial is an obligatory stop by all visiting heads of state, since it commemorates the nearly three million Belarusians who perished during World War II. Accompanied by Chairman Shushkevich, you will approach the flame, walk behind it and place a wreath (carried by an honor guard) on the obelisk base. You will touch the ribbon and withdraw. The Minsk Garrison commander is the ceremonial "host" for this event.

BACKGROUND

Among all of the republics of the former Soviet Union, Belarus, sitting astride the traditional invasion route to Russia, suffered the most during the war: one in four Belarusians died. The country only reached pre-war population levels in the 1970's. Nearly every family suffered a loss during the war. Minsk, the capital (and also the site of a large Jewish ghetto established by the Nazis) was almost totally annihilated by war's end.

Victory Square is located in downtown Minsk, on the road in from the airport. The monument consists of a tall obelisk and eternal flame, flanked by a Belarusian honor guard.

TO BE PROVIDED

MEETING WITH U.S. EMBASSY STAFF

MEETING WITH EMBASSY STAFF IN MINSK

CONTEXT OF THE EVENT

You will meet briefly at the airport with the small, hardworking Embassy staff and their families before you depart Belarus. This is an opportunity to thank the Embassy community and to give special recognition to Ambassador David Swartz, who retires from the Foreign Service in January after directing Embassy Minsk's growth over the past year. Your remarks will be provided separately.

YOUR OBJECTIVES

- **Thank Ambassador Swartz before his retirement and the entire Embassy staff for their hard work to make your brief stop a success.**

- **Emphasize Embassy's critical role in promoting key U.S. foreign policy goals: denuclearization, and economic and democratic reform.**

BACKGROUND

The United States recognized Belarusian independence on December 25, 1991. The two countries agreed to establish diplomatic relations in January 1992. The U.S. Embassy in Minsk, Belarus officially opened on January 31, 1992 and has since grown to include 12 direct-hire Americans and approximately 25 locally-hired employees. Ambassador David Heywood Swartz, our first Ambassador to Belarus, arrived at post on March 8, 1992 and was confirmed by Congress in August 1992. The chancery occupies a 46 year-old two-story residence surrounded by a walled-in garden. Other agency presence at the Embassy include USIS (1 officer and 5 FSN's) and Defense Attache Office (2 officers). Most of the Embassy staff live in three or four room apartments located in the center of town.

CORE POINTS

- Here to thank all of you and your Ambassador, David Swartz, for your hard work and dedication. Like you, we in Washington will miss him. Wish him well and appreciate his thirty years of diligent, faithful service to our nation.

- You are working hard to strengthen and encourage Belarus' democratic and economic development, and moves toward complete denuclearization. Aware of hardships you face as small community. Appreciate your dedication.

BACKGROUND PAPERS

BACKGROUND PAPERS FOR BELARUS

Political Survey: Prospects for Reform

Economic Reform in Belarus

U.S. Economic Assistance

Multilateral Assistance to Belarus

U.S.-Belarus Joint Commission

Nonproliferation Issues

Military-to-Military Cooperation and Defense Conversion

Chernobyl and Belarusian Ecology

BELARUS: POLITICAL SURVEY - PROSPECTS FOR REFORM

While Belarus has been spared the ethnic and political turmoil afflicting so much of the former Soviet Union, stability there has meant a glacial pace in economic and democratic reform. The conservative, Soviet-era parliament (elected in 1990) set aside a petition drive calling for early national elections in 1992, passing instead a non-binding resolution promising elections in March 1994. The minority democratic and nationalist parliamentary factions, led by reformist Supreme Soviet Chairman Shushkevich, have recently resurrected this election idea. Parliamentary conservatives, however, are still undecided over whether to support elections in 1994 or simply to serve out their full five-year term.

The Supreme Soviet continues to debate a new draft constitution, which may establish a presidency for the first time in Belarusian history. At present, executive power is split between conservative Prime Minister Kebich and the reformist, but much weaker, Shushkevich. While conservative deputies are inclined to create a powerful presidency, they must contend with the fact that Shushkevich is also the leading presidential candidate (according to pollsters). At a minimum, a new constitution would formally put an end to Belarus' anachronistic Soviet political structure.

Conservative-minded former (and not-so-former) communists dominate the Council of Ministers and the Supreme Soviet. While PM Kebich's public support is waning in the face of worsening economic conditions, conservatives are still likely to retain a sizable majority should a new parliament be elected. Dramatic reform in Belarus' future is therefore very unlikely. While liberal "democrats" and Belarusian nationalists in the parliament constitute a weak and fractious "opposition," their support for Shushkevich has thus far sustained his tenuous hold over the Supreme Soviet chairmanship. Though unable to pass broader reform legislation, the opposition has shifted debate toward greater reform than might otherwise have been considered.

Dependent on Russia and the NIS for energy, markets and essential materials, Belarus is pursuing stronger economic ties with the FSU. The broadest agreements reached with Russia, such as on monetary union, are being sponsored by the most conservative factions. Ironically, implementation of the agreements would require Belarus to make the Russian-style economic reforms most resisted by those same Belarusian conservatives. As it becomes increasingly apparent to Belarusians of all political stripes that living standards will continue to fall with existing policies, trends predict a steady but deliberately slow pace toward reform.

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ECONOMIC REFORM IN BELARUS

Belarus was one of the most economically advanced republics in the former USSR. Since independence, however, it has experienced the full range of pains associated with the breakup of the Former Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the hardships inevitable in the transition to a market economy may be all the more protracted given Belarus' slow progress on basic economic reforms.

Despite the government's intentions to move to a "socially-oriented market economy," the state remains the chief economic actor in Belarus. Some small state-owned enterprises have been privatized but not the inefficient larger industries that still dominate the economy. Modest progress has been made in liberalizing foreign trade, freeing prices and reducing government subsidies, but the government fears a more aggressive program would lead to high unemployment and social unrest. In addition, the Belarusian economy remains closely linked to that of Russia and has suffered the effects of protracted uncertainty in its big neighbor.

In July 1993 Belarus agreed with the IMF on a reform program to be supported with a $98 million loan from the Systemic Transformation Facility (STF). Belarus committed to a number of macroeconomic and structural targets. The first half of this loan has been disbursed. The second tranche will be disbursed if Belarus meets program targets and develops a more ambitious reform program that could be supported by a full IMF stand-by arrangement. Early evidence suggests slippage on inflation and fiscal deficit targets.

The IMF program aims to hold the decline in national output this year to five percent, following drops of 10 percent in 1992 and 15 percent in 1993. Restoring economic growth anytime soon will require a comprehensive stabilization and structural reform program including full price liberalization, revising the tax structure, removing export restrictions, aggressive privatization, better banking regulation, and generous external assistance.

Another key issue facing Belarus is whether to stay in a monetary union with Russia and use the ruble or to opt for monetary independence with its own currency and central bank. In September the two countries signed a treaty on monetary union, but Belarus told Western donors in October that it would pursue independence. Russia's new legislature must now ratify the treaty, and the prospect of policy drift in Moscow may convince Belarus of the merits of full independence. The IMF has made clarification of Belarus's monetary plans -- one way or the other -- a key condition for release of the second tranche of the STF loan and a stand-by program meant to follow it.

U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO BELARUS

Since 1992, the United States has provided approximately $155 million in humanitarian assistance and $7 million in technical assistance to the Republic of Belarus to assist with its transition to democracy and a market-oriented economy. Humanitarian assistance efforts have focused on providing medical supplies to address general shortfalls and to help provide specialized medical assistance to children with health problems stemming from the Chernobyl nuclear accident. Limited technical assistance activities have occurred in energy, agriculture, private sector development, and exchanges and training. Selected activities include:

- Humanitarian: In 1993, the U.S. has provided four deliveries of much needed medical supplies and pharmaceuticals to Belarus -- the most recent was an October Project Hope flight containing medicines and medical supplies to treat cancer and leukemia. USDA also provided over $80 million in food assistance during fiscal year 1993, such as feed wheat, corn, and other commodities.

- Energy: Programs aim to improve energy efficiency in Belarus. Energy efficiency experts have audited district heating plants in Minsk. Conservation equipment is being installed at selected facilities.

- Agriculture: Ten Belarusians have participated in USDA's Cochran Fellowship Program for agribusiness training. The Farmer-to-Farmer program has provided 26 volunteers to work with private farmers and agricultural enterprises. Five of these specialists have worked on an effort to reclaim farmland contaminated by the Chernobyl disaster by growing canola for conversion into diesel fuel.

- Private Sector Development: The International Finance Corporation conducted privatization auctions of small shops in summer 1993. In August, eight Belarusians completed an eight-week course in bankers training at Fairfield University in Connecticut. Eight participants from Belarus have completed the Special American Business Internship Training program.

- Exchanges and Training: 43 Belarusian high school students are participating in the year-long NIS academic exchange program which began in August 1993. Five Belarusians are studying public administration, law, business administration, and education at U.S. universities during the 1993-94 academic year. Seven Belarusians were selected for graduate study in the U.S. as Edmund Muskie Fellows.

The U.S. Government has allocated approximately $20 million for assistance to Belarus during fiscal year 1994. The U.S. has indicated to the Government of Belarus that it would like to expand its technical assistance to help with political and economic reform; however, such an expansion is unlikely until Belarus demonstrates a stronger commitment to reform.

MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE TO BELARUS

International financial institutions have provided assistance to Belarus consistent with its gradual approach to economic reform. Loans totaling some $145 million have been committed since Belarus joined the IMF, World Bank and EBRD in mid-1992. Multilateral agencies are willing to provide greater assistance pending stronger GOB action on privatization and other structural reforms and clarification of monetary policy, i.e., whether to introduce an independent currency or remain tied to the Russian ruble. Such financial support is needed to help Belarus cover large anticipated balance of payments deficits.

International Monetary Fund. The IMF Board in July 1993 approved a loan of $98 million under the Systemic Transformation Facility (STF), a special window for economies in transition. Half of this has been disbursed. The second tranche will be disbursed if Belarus meets program targets and develops a more ambitious reform program that could be supported by a full IMF stand-by arrangement. The STF expires in mid-1994. Before agreeing to a stand-by program, the IMF will require Belarus to choose between an independent currency or monetary union with Russia.

World Bank. The Board in August approved its first loan for an $8 million institution building project that aims to strengthen economic management in enterprise, banking and social sector reforms. Other larger IBRD loans are also under consideration, but progress has been slow because of GOB reluctance to commit to key structural reforms. In October the Bank chaired the first Consultative Group meeting for Belarus, which brought together 16 bilateral donors, the EC and seven international organizations to assess its economic performance and pledge new aid.

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The EBRD has extended one loan of $39 million to upgrade international telecommunications facilities for business use. In addition to such infrastructure investments, the EBRD's strategy for Belarus will stress technical assistance for privatization, support for military conversion, and lending that creates jobs for workers displaced by the Chernobyl disaster.

U.S.-BELARUS JOINT COMMISSION

The U.S.-Belarus Joint Commission for Agribusiness and Rural Development, which will be launched during your visit to Minsk, will mobilize funds generated by the sale of donated U.S. commodities to finance private initiatives in rural communities throughout Belarus. In the absence of a viable rural banking sector, the Joint Commission will act as a primary source of funding for new flour mills, dairies, meat processing plants, and other food-related enterprises, as well as for health clinics, local water supply systems, gas lines and roads. The Joint Commission will serve as an important social support mechanism while at the same time supporting the development of a market economy.

The operation of the Joint Commission will be simple. Applications from rural enterprises and farmers associations will be submitted to the Commission, where a small staff will analyze them and recommend viable projects for funding. The Joint Commission, comprised of an equal number of representatives from the U.S. Government, U.S. non-government, Belarus Government and Belarus non-government sectors, will make the final project selection determinations. The target funding amount will be $20,000 - 100,000, payable in local currency.

Agribusinesses which receive funding from the Joint Commission will repay their loans directly to social service and rural infrastructure providers in their communities to help pay for needed projects. A typical scenario will be the following: a private farmers association submits an application for financing a small-scale flour mill. The Joint Commission staff and U.S. technical assistance providers work with the association to develop a viable business plan, and the Joint Commission votes to fund the mill. Within six months of the mill's start-up, the farmers association begins paying back the principle and interest on the loan. Instead of paying back directly to the Joint Commission, the money is paid to a local civic organization to construct a health clinic and purchase needed medicine.

Alternatively, rural communities can apply directly for funding for social service and rural infrastructure projects. These proposals will be treated as direct grants, with no requirement for paying back the funds.

The first meeting of the Joint Commission should take place within a month of the signing of the agreement. The hiring and training of the secretariat should be completed shortly thereafter, with the first proposal funded within six months.

The model for this Joint Commission is the U.S.-Poland Joint Commission, where dozens of rural agribusinesses have been financed. During its four year history, there has not been a single default on repaying a loan.

BELARUS: NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES

Belarus has been the most forthcoming and cooperative of the newly independent states on nonproliferation issues. As a victim of much of the fallout of the Chernobyl accident, Belarus is perhaps more sensitive to the dangers of nuclear proliferation. It has acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapons state, and ratified key arms control agreements such as START, INF, and CFE.

Belarus has agreed to the removal of nuclear weapons from its territory and is a signatory of the Lisbon protocol (the agreement which designates Russia as the successor state to the Soviet Union's status as a nuclear weapons state member of the NPT, while pledging Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus to become non-nuclear weapons states).

Under the Safe and Secure Dismantlement (SSD) umbrella agreement Belarus has signed with the U.S., we are using Nunn-Lugar funds to provide Belarus with advice, technical assistance, and equipment to develop and implement an export system that will help prevent the transshipment or export of nuclear-related materials, equipment, and technology and other sensitive items.

A natural next step in Belarusian support for nonproliferation efforts would be its adherence to the guidelines contained in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). By exercising control over MTCR Annex items Belarus can reduce the availability of missiles and related technology. Our ongoing export control cooperation under SSD can facilitate MTCR adherence by Belarus.

MILITARY TO MILITARY COOPERATION/DEFENSE CONVERSION IN BELARUS

Signature of our bilateral Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation during Belarus Defense Minister Kozlovskiy's October 1993 visit established the formal basis for military-to-military exchanges. The MOU establishes regular exchanges of visits between the Secretary of Defense and his Belarus counterpart, the respective Chiefs of Staff and a range of other officials, civilian and military. It also envisions joint discussions and seminars on professional issues ranging from historical or legal research to personnel problems or logistics.

The Belarusians are eager to move forward and Kozlovskiy himself presented a list of 41 areas of possible cooperation during his visit. The list, which included only programs of U.S. assistance or instruction, was a useful point of departure for discussion, and we are working to clarify Minsk's priorities and identify additional potential contacts. At the second meeting of the U.S.-Belarus Bilateral Working Group on Defense Cooperation, which will be held in February, we hope to reach agreement with the Belarusians on a formal program of contacts and cooperation. Looking to the longer term, we hope to encourage the Belarusians to move beyond receiving training and advice to being active partners sharing their experience in areas from which U.S. personnel could also benefit.

GOB cooperation, including signature of a Nunn-Lugar implementing agreement, has permitted our $20 million defense conversion program to move faster in Belarus than in any other newly independent states (and far faster than general Belarus economic reform.) Of that amount, $10 million helps withdrawal of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces now stationed in Belarus by providing housing for demobilizing SRF officers. $9.5 million will fund industrial conversion projects that are likely to begin early next year. The remaining $500,000 will fund a retraining program for demobilized SRF officers.

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CHERNOBYL AND BELARUSIAN ECOLOGICAL HEALTH

On April 26, 1986, Unit No. 4 of the Chernobyl power plant in the Republic of Ukraine suffered a catastrophic explosion that released between 25-50 million curies of radioactive materials into the environment. Approximately 70% of this contamination landed on Belarusian soil, affecting 40,000 square kilometers of valuable agricultural and forestry land. Two million Belarusians were exposed to radiation as a result of the accident. The exposed areas were divided into three zones of radiation exposure, primarily cesium-137, with all residents being evacuated from the most intense radiation zone (above 40 curies/square kilometer). Voluntary resettlement has been in effect in less irradiated zones. By 1992, more than 110,000 people had been resettled.

The accident posed an enormous economic burden on Belarus, due to the cost of moving large numbers of its citizens, building new homes for them, and the great increase in health care costs associated with the high levels of radiation. The loss of productive agricultural lands and forests imposed additional burdens on an economy that was further weakened by the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The ecological effects of the accident were most notable in the immediate vicinity of the power plant, where almost all vegetation died. Plant life however, showed a rapid recovery within one year after the accident. The Belarusian government has taken ample precautions to control the radioactivity of milk products and meats. One potential source of contamination arises from the abundance of mushrooms and berries in the forests of the country. These species accumulate cesium and should be avoided, but given food shortages in the country, are often harvested in contaminated areas and sold illegally. There is no evidence of drinking water contamination by radionuclides.

The primary health effect of the accident, probably related to the initial release of radioactive iodine, is a dramatic increase in the number of childhood thyroid cancer cases (from two-three per year in 1985 to over 50 in 1992). The U.S. National Cancer Institute (funded by Department of Energy) is conducting epidemiological studies in collaboration with Belarusian scientists on this problem. The Belarusians have also claimed that there has been a significant increase in cancers and many other diseases since 1986. These claims have been difficult to verify because of lack of rigorous studies. Because of the unique long-term exposure of these populations to radiation and environmental degradation, the U.S. would benefit greatly from pursuing vigorously opportunities to conduct collaborative research on ecological health in Belarus.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 31, 1993

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KBH NARA, Date 1/15/2020
2016-0134-M

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Your Trip to Russia, January 12-15, 1994

Your summit meeting in Moscow includes four substantive sessions with President Yeltsin: a one-on-one meeting on the first day followed by separate sessions on economic issues and security issues and a private dinner with Yeltsin focused on foreign policy. Your visit will also include: a meeting with Russian Orthodox Patriarch Aleksiy II; a reception for newly elected parliamentarians and other political leaders from across Russia; a visit to a successfully privatized enterprise or joint venture; a speech to the Russian public; and a visit with the U.S. Embassy community. We will forward your public statements and press materials separately. This briefing book contains:

SCHEDULE OF KEY MOSCOW EVENTS

SCOPE MEMORANDUM

ONE-ON-ONE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

WALKING TOUR OF THE KREMLIN

EXPANDED BILATERAL MEETING WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN ON ECONOMIC ISSUES

MEETING WITH PATRIARCH ALEKSIY II

RECEPTION FOR RUSSIAN POLITICAL FIGURES

PRIVATE DINNER MEETING WITH YELTSIN ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES

WREATH LAYING AT THE TOMB OF THE UNKNOWN SOLDIER

EXPANDED BILATERAL MEETING WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN ON SECURITY ISSUES

VISIT TO YELTSIN'S "OVAL OFFICE"

VISIT TO PRIVATIZED FACTORY (TBD)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

VISIT WITH U.S. EMBASSY STAFF AND MARINE SECURITY GUARDS

BACKGROUND PAPERS

~~SECRET~~

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Initials: KBM Date: 1/15/2020
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