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Folder Title:
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COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Ted Widmer (Speechwriting)
OA/Box Number: 2190

FOLDER TITLE:
Kosovo [3]

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3):

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]
I’d like to talk with you about the dangerous situation in Kosovo – what’s at stake for America and what we’re doing about it. Over the last seven months, Serbian soldiers have led a campaign of violence against the Albanian people of Kosovo. This violence threatens to spill over into neighboring countries. And it has already created a humanitarian crisis that could become a catastrophe, as tens of thousands of homeless refugees risk freezing or starving to death in winter.

Kosovo is and should remain a province of Serbia. But nine out of ten Kosovars share a heritage that is Albanian rather than Serbian, and Muslim rather than Orthodox. This has been true for centuries, and for much of that time, Kosovars and Serbs have coexisted peacefully, often under the same government.

But when Slobodan Milosevic became the Serbian leader in 1989, he launched a campaign of hatred against Kosovars, stripping away the autonomy Kosovo had long enjoyed. He denied Kosovars any meaningful say in their government, restricted human rights and health care, and distorted history to inflame ethnic tensions.

Then, beginning this past February, Milosevic intensified his campaign of violence. Serbian forces were sent into Kosovo to intimidate ordinary citizens. In the past month, we have found
irrefutable evidence that they committed terrible atrocities. Roughly 200 villages have been destroyed and a thousand people murdered ... including women, children and the elderly. Some 250,000 people have been forced from their villages – and many have no homes to return to. With a cold winter looming ahead and food and medicine scarce, this is a humanitarian disaster waiting to happen.

Milosevic’s campaign deeply offends basic human rights. And it directly threatens America because it destabilizes the delicate balance of the Balkans. If the violence in Kosovo continues, it could undermine the peace we have worked so hard to build in Bosnia. It could exacerbate political tensions and civil disorder in neighboring Albania. It could trigger massive refugee flows to the fragile new democracy of Macedonia. And it could threaten the different regional interests of our NATO allies, Greece and Turkey.

Two weeks ago, the UN demanded an end to Milosevic’s campaign of hatred. It made clear the steps he must take ... implement a cease-fire ... withdraw Serbian special forces from Kosovo ... allow refugees to return to their homes ... grant immediate access for international humanitarian groups ... and begin negotiations with Kosovar leaders on autonomy.

Of course, we would prefer to end this crisis peacefully. But together with our NATO partners, we are prepared to act militarily if Milosevic fails to comply with the will of the international community. The powerful air campaign we have planned is designed to convince Milosevic to move from the battlefield to the bargaining table, or to make it very difficult for him to continue his persecution of the Kosovars.
Two months from today, on December 10, we will celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – a document based on our own Declaration of Independence. The best way we can give meaning to words like “human rights” and “freedom” is to make sure that they are universal … that people from different backgrounds respect both their differences … and the humanity that unites them. It’s time to restore humanity to Kosovo – for the sake of America’s interests … and our ideals.

Thanks for listening.

###

# # #
I'd like to talk with you about the dangerous situation in Kosovo -- what's at stake for America and what we are doing about it. Over the last seven months, Serbian soldiers of the former Yugoslavia have engaged in an escalating campaign of violence against the Kosovo Albanian people. This violence threatens to spill over into neighboring countries, risking a wider war in Europe. And it has already created a humanitarian crisis that could become a catastrophe, as tens of thousands of homeless refugees risk freezing or starving to death in winter.

Kosovo is and should remain a province of the Serbian state. But nine out of ten Kosovars share a language and culture heritage that is Albanian rather than Serbian, and Muslim and Catholics rather than Orthodox. This has been true for centuries, and for most of that time, Kosovar Albanians and Serbs have coexisted peacefully, often under the same government.

But when Slobodan Milosevic became the Serbian leader in 1989, he launched a campaign of ethnic hatred against Albanian Kosovars, stripping away the autonomy Kosovo had long enjoyed. He replaced traditions of tolerance with trumped-up hostilities calculated to shore up his political support. He restricted basic human rights ... he denied Kosovars any meaningful say in their government or law enforcement ... he eliminated schools that taught Kosovars their history and in their language ... and he distorted history to inflame ethnic tensions.
Then, beginning this past February, Milosevic resorted to steadily intensified his campaign of brutal violence. Serbian special forces were sent into Kosovo to intimidate ordinary citizens. In the past month or so, we have found irrefutable evidence that they have committed terrible atrocities against the people of Kosovo. Roughly 200 villages were destroyed and a thousand people murdered ... including women, children and the elderly. Some 250,000 people were forced from their villages -- about 70,000 are literally homeless, with no shelter and little food or medicine. With the freeze of a cold winter looming ahead, this is a humanitarian catastrophe in the making waiting to happen.

This situation deeply offends basic human rights. And it directly threatens America because it destabilizes the delicate balance of the Western Balkans. For most of the 20th century, this has been a place where wars started – a tinder box of competing regional interests. If the violence in Kosovo continues, it could exacerbate political tensions and fuel civil disorder in neighboring Albania. It could trigger massive refugee flows into a democratic but fragile success story, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. and it could threaten the differing regional interests our NATO allies Greece and Turkey.

It does not have to be that way in the next century. It’s time for leaders to recognize what the people have always known ... that citizens of different religions, ethnicities and languages can get along just fine as long as they treat each other with respect. The brave people of Northern Ireland have chosen the path of peace. Now it’s time to end Europe’s last conflict. [too utopian]
The Balkans have seen extraordinary progress over the last ten years. We have built a lasting peace in Bosnia. The people of Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia are creating successful new nations. Hungary about to join NATO. Romania, Bulgaria and Albania are determining their destiny, choosing freedom over despotism. We cannot let this progress unravel. And we will not.

The international community is determined to stop the violence. On September 23rd, the UN passed a resolution that called for an end to Milosevic's campaign of hatred. It outlined four basic steps ... a cease-fire ... the withdrawal of Serbian special forces ... immediate access for international humanitarian groups ... and negotiations with Kosovar leaders on how to restore their traditional autonomy within the Serbian government.

Milosevic must take these steps. We are intensely pursuing a diplomatic solution, working with our partners in NATO and the region, and consulting with the UN. [We are already providing $45 million in humanitarian assistance.] But Milosevic should not misinterpret our desire to build an international coalition as a license to prolong his campaign. We are ready at a moment's notice to back up our diplomacy with a show of strength.

Diplomacy and international demands alone are not enough. We have dealt with Milosevic before. When he invaded Bosnia, we were forced to conduct NATO air strikes before he was willing to talk peace. Now we are again preparing for air strikes ... and he is again backing down before the implacable will of the international community. We hope that he will bring real
proposals to the bargaining table. But we have seen him break his promises in the past. We prefer a diplomatic solution. But we are prepared to act.

There is hope for peace in this troubled region. The Balkans have seen extraordinary progress over the last ten years. We have built a lasting peace in Bosnia. The people of Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia are creating successful new nations. Hungary about to join NATO. Romania, Bulgaria and Albania are determining their destiny, choosing freedom over despotism. We cannot let this progress unravel. And we will not.

Two months from today, on December 10, we will celebrate the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—one of the great documents of the 20th century—a document based on our own Declaration of Independence. The best way we can give meaning to words like "human rights" and "freedom" is to make sure that they are universal—that people from different backgrounds respect both their differences and the humanity that unites them. It’s time to restore humanity to Kosovo.

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Then, beginning this past February, Milosevic intensified his campaign of violence. Serbian forces were sent into Kosovo to intimidate ordinary citizens. In the past month, we have found
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Milosevic’s campaign deeply offends basic human rights. And it directly threatens America because it destabilizes the delicate balance of the Balkans. For most of the 20th century, this is where wars started. We have a strong interest in preventing escalation. If the violence in Kosovo continues, it will cause disorder in neighboring countries like Albania and Macedonia, and threaten our NATO allies, Greece and Turkey.

There is no reason the Balkans cannot become a place of peace in the century ahead. Earlier this year, the brave people of Northern Ireland chose to bury their hatred. It is past time to end Europe’s last conflict. The Balkans have seen extraordinary progress over the last ten years. We have built the foundation for peace in Bosnia. People and nations are determining their destiny across the region. We cannot sit back and watch this progress unravel.

The international community is determined to stop the violence. On September 23rd, the UN passed a resolution that called for an end to Milosevic’s campaign of hatred. It outlined four basic steps ... a cease-fire ... the withdrawal of Serbian special forces ... immediate access for international humanitarian groups ... and negotiations with Kosovar leaders on how to restore their traditional autonomy within the Serbian government.
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We have dealt with Milosevic before. When he invaded Bosnia, we were forced to conduct NATO air strikes before he was willing to talk peace. Now we are again planning air strikes ... and he is again backing down. We hope he brings real proposals to the bargaining table. But we have seen him break his promises in the past. We prefer a diplomatic solution. But we are prepared to act.

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But diplomacy and international demands are not enough. We have dealt with Milosevic before. When he invaded Bosnia, we were forced to conduct NATO air strikes before he was willing to talk peace. Now we are again planning air strikes ... and he is again backing down. We hope he brings real proposals to the bargaining table. But we have seen him break his promises in the past. We prefer a diplomatic solution. But we are prepared to act.
It is past time to end Europe’s last conflict. There is hope for peace in this troubled region. The Balkans have seen extraordinary progress over the last ten years. We have built the foundation for peace in Bosnia. People and nations are determining their destiny across the region. We cannot sit back and watch this progress unravel. And we will not.

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Then, beginning this past February, Milosevic resorted to brutal violence. Serbian special forces were sent into Kosovo to intimidate ordinary citizens. Roughly 200 villages were destroyed and a thousand people murdered, killed, and mutilated ... including women, children and the elderly. Some 250,000 people were forced from their villages -- about 70,000 are literally homeless, with no shelter and little food or medicine. There are now a quarter of a million refugees, many with no home to return to. With a cold winter looming ahead, this is a humanitarian catastrophe waiting to happen.

This situation deeply offends basic human rights. It is intolerable. It obviously violates human rights. And it directly threatens America because it destabilizes the delicate balance of the Balkans. For most of the 20th century, this has been a place where wars started -- a tinder box of competing regional interests. If the violence in Kosovo continues, it could exacerbate political tensions and fuel civil disorder in neighboring Albania. It could trigger massive refugee flows into a democratic but fragile success story, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. And it could threaten the differing regional interests of our NATO allies Greece and Turkey.

It does not have to be that way in the next century. It's time for leaders to recognize what the people have always known ... that citizens of different religions, ethnicities and languages can get along just fine as long as they treat each other with respect. The brave people of Northern Ireland have chosen the path of peace. Now it's time to end Europe's last conflict.
Men make war; women, increasingly, suffer the consequences.

During World War I only 5 percent of the casualties were civilians. During World War II the figure was 50 percent. In the first half of the 1990s, 80 percent of the casualties of the world's conflicts have been civilians, most of them women and children, according to the human rights group Amnesty International. Women have been raped in Mexico, East Timor and Bosnia; mutilated in Tibet and Rwanda; arbitrarily imprisoned in Bulgaria and Somalia. Women fleeing conflicts make up 80 percent of the world's refugees.

"The great failure of the world's community of governments is not just that they have been unable to guarantee women their social, economic and cultural rights," Amnesty International said in a report this month. "They have been unable to prevent, and in some cases have sanctioned, the violation of women's civil and political rights - the rights not to be tortured, killed, made to 'disappear,' arbitrarily detained and imprisoned."

The report, which documents the horrors experienced by women in 75 countries, was published to coincide with International Women's Month. Its release was also timed to draw attention to women's rights in the months leading up to the United Nations' fourth conference on women, to be held in Beijing in September.

The report calls on the international community to adopt a 15-step plan to end these abuses and to safeguard women's rights through treaties. It declares that these rights are universal and indivisible, not subject to the cultural interpretations of individual countries.

Although most of the abuses documented in the report are war-related, Amnesty International reminds us of the universality of violence against women. Violence and discrimination transcend class, race, nationality and ethnic origin. Those who are battered in their homes or shot at abortion clinics in the United States are inextricably linked to those who suffer under political repression. The world's nations can no longer pay mere lip service to gender equality. They must ensure that it is a reality in every city and hamlet.

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH
The White House

Tom-

This is the kind of analytical thoughtfulness to which I aspire in the "dysfunction dilemma" speech. As I suggest you start by collecting all of the pieces that have been written that have accused us of unilateralism (from the Euro/Left) or fecklessness (from the Right). Let's just focus on the critique.

Sandy
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Tuesday, August 17, 1999

Sandy:

Thanks so much for being willing to look at this again. As I mentioned, I've been spending much of the last two weeks reading our critics and marshalling ammo for a fall/winter counteroffensive, both on Kosovo in specific and our worldview/grand-strategy in general.

There's a theme emerging in the attacks on us: the 20th century is a Clash of the Titans, not so much between liberal democracy and predatory tyranny, as between Woodrow Wilson and Teddy Roosevelt. WW is the militant naïf, the goo-goo crusader; TR is the "realist," the hard-headed defender of American interests. (It's no accident that WW was a Democrat and TR a Republican.) Real mean don't eat kische, nor do they commit American power and prestige to 4th rate corners of the former Ottoman empire. This is coming up quite a bit (see Krauthammer's recent stuff) in the context of neo-cons and others who supported the war in Vietnam getting a kind of ideological revenge against those of us who opposed it, starting with You Know Who down the corridor from you. ("Now that there are no longer any legitimate ideological or geopolitical stakes, the Vietnam doves can afford to be Kosovo hawks."

Anyway, I'll be taking one more crack at this on Friday, and I'd be mighty grateful for your mark-up.

Thanks again.

ST
THE BALKAN QUESTION
AND THE EUROPEAN ANSWER

BY STROBE TALBOTT
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
August 24, 1999
The Aspen Institute,
Aspen, Colorado

{August 17, 1999 ST version}

Thank you Elmer [Johnson] for that introduction, and for all
that the Aspen Institute has done over the years to encourage and
focus discussion on the world’s toughest problems. In that spirit, I’d
like to talk to you about the Balkans, about why that corner of
Europe has been so troubled and what’s at stake there for Americans
as well as Europeans.

Let me start with a question. It goes to the heart of what’s
happening in the Balkans today, but it also resonates through history
and around the world. It’s a question that has never been answered
with total clarity and permanence, either in theory or in practice:

What exactly is a nation? What is a state? When does a
nation become a state, and what allows it to survive as such? What
are the economies of scale, the natural boundaries that make a piece
of real estate viable as a sovereign country? What, indeed, is
sovereignty, and what are its limits?

These are questions not just of geography but of
anthropology: they concern human behavior. How similar must the
inhabitants of a certain territory be to feel enough of a sense of
common identity and common destiny?
There is, of course, an American answer to this cluster of questions, and it goes like this: a state should let its people choose their leaders through elections; it should subject the powers of the government to checks and balances; it should give primacy to the rule of law; it should derive strength and cohesion from the diversity of its population (or, as we say in Latin, "e pluribus unum"); and it should protect the rights of minorities, especially those of the ultimate minority — the individual citizen. In short, it should be a liberal democracy. *(in the Burkean vs. Calhounian sense)*

Of course, we American have had plenty of arguments among ourselves, some extremely violent, about what that phrase — liberal democracy — actually means. Yet the pursuit of that ideal has undergirded not just our domestic politics but our foreign policy as well.

We have promoted and defended democracy in other lands not just out of missionary zeal but out of self-interest — for reasons not just of idealism but of pragmatism: we Americans have believed, and acted on the belief, that the way foreign leaders behave within their own borders has a direct bearing on the way they will behave toward other countries, including our own. Governments that operate by the consent of the governed tend to operate by consensus in their conduct of international relations. States that protect the rights minorities on their own territory are more likely to respect the independence of other nations.

The converse is also true. A regime that relies on force or institutionalizes intolerance in dealing with its own people is predisposed to aggression against its neighbors as well. At some
point, the resulting threat to peace requires the intervention of the United States, either to defeat or deter the offending power.

That pattern has required us to send troops across the Atlantic five times in eight decades: twice in world wars, once in the cold war, and twice more since the end of the cold war, first in Bosnia, then in Kosovo.

In one sense, Europe is the appropriate testing ground for the proposition that the defense of American strategic interests requires the promotion of American political values. Europe, after all, is the birthplace of the Enlightenment and thus the ancestral homeland of much of our own political culture. But Europe has also been the scene of a protracted and harrowing struggle between the forces of liberalism and those of tyranny — primarily in three forms: imperialism, fascism and communism.

The action-reaction cycle among those three isms has been a cumulative disaster, making the 20th-century a near-run thing for liberal democracy in Europe: as one system failed and gave way to another, the result was often not an improvement or a correction but a new, worse species of failure — one that, before it collapsed in exhaustion or defeat, wreaked havoc and demanded major exertions of American power.

The Balkans have suffered especially from this phenomenon. The people of that region began this century in the shadow of doddering imperial regimes. The more empire faltered, the more it repressed its subjects, making them all the more determined to assert their national identity as a prelude to nationhood itself.
The Serbs are the prime example. They broke free of Ottoman rule in 1878 and established their own state. In 1912 and again in 1913, Serbia went to war against the Ottoman empire in its decrepitude. Then, a year later, a Serb nationalist, Gavrilo Princip, struck a blow against the other imperial power in the region, the Habsburgs.

What started as the Third Balkan War quickly escalated into the First World War, which was also the first of the five times that the U.S. dispatched troops "over there," to the battlefields of Europe. Two catch phrases emerged from that intervention: first, the vow to "make the world safe for democracy," and the second, the conviction that a stable, democratic peace should be based on "self-determination" for the various nationalities that a righteous war liberates from old, failed, dictatorial systems.

Those mottos — which are associated with the worldview of Woodrow Wilson — have reverberated over the years, generating quite a bit of controversy, both in the U.S. and around the world. They have figured prominently in the debate over America's intervention in the Fourth Balkan War — the one that began with the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991 and that ended on HOW MANY TKTKTK days ago, on June TK, when NATO formally ended its bombing campaign after Slobodan Milošević's capitulation in Kosovo.

"Making the world safe for democracy" is simplistic, of course, as all slogans are; but it actually stands up pretty well over the years, as long as we understood what it does — and doesn't — mean. It doesn't mean that the Uncle Sam dons a suit of armor, grabs a lance and sallies forth to slay every antidemocratic dragon in
sight; it doesn't mean resorting force to impose liberal democracy on everyone everywhere. But it does mean that we have been willing and able to oppose, deter and, if necessary, defeat antidemocratic regimes when they have threatened other states that were trying to establish themselves on the principles of liberal democracy—and democratic peace.

That has been a consistent theme in America’s commitment to the security of Europe from World War One right through our current engagement in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Now let me turn to that other highly charged watchword of Wilsonianism: "self-determination." How to translate that phrase into practice—and into peace—was one of the challenges at Versailles 80 years ago, just as it was at Rambouillet HOW MANY MONTHS AGO, and just as it is in Priština today.

At Versailles, self-determination meant the dismantlement of empire and the formation of a whole cluster of new nation-states. The nation-state is both a venerable and a problematic answer to the question I posed at the outset: what is a nation? what is a state? A people who are sufficiently similar to comprise a nationality band together to form a state. In theory at least, a nation-state is as exclusive and harmonious as an empire is inclusive, heterogeneous and roiling with frustrated national aspirations. Thus in the mid-17th century the Treaty of Westphalia broke up the Holy Roman Empire and established the territorial sovereignty of a country called France for the French and a country called Sweden for Swedes.

However, a pure nation-state doesn’t exist in nature, since the ethnographic map never coincides with the political one. That is
especially true in the Balkans. Partly for that reason, the map-makers at Versailles, at the prodding of Cartographer-in-Chief Wilson, created a 3-in-1 home for the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

The very eclecticism of Yugoslavia might, over time, have made it an improvement on the older, Westphalian generation of mono-ethnic nation-states. However, that was not to be because of what was going on in Europe as a whole in the '30s and '40s. The continent was like a sprawling, musty laboratory in the basement of a gothic castle where mad scientists were experimenting with two competing yet similar monstrosities: fascism and communism.

Fascism is a malignant hybrid of imperialism and nationalism. It's the idea of the nation-state run amok. The Nazis pursued the goal not just of Germany for Germans, but other countries for Germans too, with Germans as the master race and all others as subjects, slaves or targets of extermination.

Communism, like fascism, was dictatorial in its internal order and predatory in its external behavior. It was because of this combination of characteristics that the U.S. saw fit to intervene in World War Two against Hitler and in the cold war against Stalin.

Those back-to-back conflicts cost Yugoslavia terribly and set the stage for what it has endured — and inflicted on Europe — in the '90s.

First Yugoslavia experienced a double dose of fascism, both imported by a Nazi occupation and a homegrown variety imposed on Croatia by the Ustasha. Then Yugoslavia fell under communism. While it soon broke free of Moscow's control, it did not break free of what turned out to be the fatal flaw of the Soviet system. Like the
USSR, Yugoslavia was divided into republics more or less on ethnographic lines. And like the USSR, Yugoslavia had no ideology for binding its constituent nationalities together beyond the authoritarian and artificial one imposed — and strictly enforced — by an autocracy. When my wife Brooke and I lived there in Belgrade in the early '70s, we often heard it said that Yugoslavia consisted of six republics, five nationalities, four languages, three religions, two alphabets and one Tito. When it lost that last, unifying attribute in 1980, things fell apart; the center would not hold.

Starting ten years ago, we saw communist hacks morph into power-hungry, hate-mongering jingoists. They made the transition, virtually overnight and almost seamlessly, from paying lip service to the solidarity of the working class to spewing ethnic hatred. As in the '30s, nationalism went on the offensive. Serbia mobilized Serbs beyond its own borders on behalf of the dream of Greater Serbia, which was a nightmare for everyone else in the region. And, within its own borders, the Serbian regime repressed, evicted and often slaughtered those inhabitants who were not Serbs, especially the Kosovo Albanians. Irredentism abroad and ethnic cleansing at home were part and parcel of the same policy: the drive to define Serbian statehood in terms of Serb ethnicity.

Thus an evil — and that's the only word for it — that we thought had been expunged by the middle of the century made a stunning comeback at the end.

However, this time, thanks to the revolution in global communications, it was much harder to avert our gaze, as Chamberlain and others did in 1938, from “faraway countries” of
which "we know nothing." This time, we had learned the lesson that such trouble, if left unattended, has a way of getting out of hand; it tends first to fester, then to escalate in ferocity and scope until only our intervention, at considerable risk and cost, will bring it to a halt.

Also, unlike in the '30s, this time the international community had both the political will and the mechanisms to meet the challenge, even if not in as timely or decisive a fashion as any of us would have wished.

The mechanisms at hand were NATO, the OSCE and the EU — structures that had their origins after World War Two but that have reached out to the East since the end of the cold war. These organizations, along with the United Nations, have different but overlapping memberships, different but mutually reinforcing missions. They have been able, when the chips were down, to make common cause in enforcing, in Europe at least, a vital principle: national leaderships must not be allowed to define national interests or national identity in a way that leads to crimes against humanity and threats to peace; if they do so, they will incur sanctions, including the ultimate one of military force.

While it took longer than it should have to get there, the bottom line in the Balkans is positive: the international community stepped in, ended a war and imposed a peace. As we're reminded almost every day, that last enterprise — imposing a peace — is frustrating, protracted and dangerous.

LAST-MINUTE, ONE-SENTENCE INSERT ON DEALING WITH COMMUNAL VIOLENCE AND REVENGE.

Ethnic violence we see today in Kosovo, particularly against Serbs, is not same as "ethnic cleansing" of Spring. But it is wrong.
But the fact remains: Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo today are — each in its own way — wards of the international community; they are both under the day-in, day-out protection by a consortium of global and regional organizations.

There are, of course, basic differences between the two cases.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina, our goal is to enhance a sense on the part of all communities that they belong to a single state, thus to overcome the objections of powerful internal forces that would rather see their communities go their own way or join neighboring states (i.e., to Croatia and Serbia).

In Kosovo, by contrast, we have quite literally, fired the powers that be in Belgrade as the administering authority over a large piece of what remains, under international law, Yugoslav territory. While our intervention has saved the ethnic Albanian community from expulsion and exile, it may also have saved Yugoslavia from violent dismemberment.

However, whether a state called Yugoslavia remains intact on the map is, in the final analysis, up to the people who live there — all of the people who live there. Unless those of Serbia free themselves from the tyranny and barbarism personified by Milošević, they will lose any hope of re-establishing ties with Kosovo.

What we and our Allies and partners can do is give the time for the people of Serbia to recognize and adapt themselves to a basic principle: in successful, modern European states — whether unitary like Great Britain, federal like Germany, or confederal like Switzerland — have defined statehood in a way that encourages...
majorities and minorities to live and prosper together. That's because in those countries, the norms of society, politics and economics all conspire to make cooperation across ethnic lines itself a norm. They effect is to soften ethnic competition, channeling it, making it less relevant to everyday life.

Obviously, recreating that effect in Bosnia-Herzegovina is going to be a long, uphill task, especially after the sudden, downhill slide into chaos and slaughter that had occurred there over the last few years. But it's not impossible. It means establishing common institutions that embrace both the Serb entity, Republica Srpska, and the Muslim-Croat one, the Federation; it means strengthening civil society; and it means thwarting those politicians who would like to partition Bosnia-Herzegovina and thus trigger further breakdown and bloodshed.

Meanwhile, our task in Kosovo is to help its residents develop, over time, rule of law, decent public services, economic opportunity. This must happen not only under the protection of KFOR, but under the umbrella of autonomy within Yugoslavia. Full independence for Kosovo would be both an illusion and a provocation. A free-standing Kosovo would be barely able to sustain itself economically. Its secession would give heart to separatists and irredentists of every stripe elsewhere in the region. Most of all, it would encourage advocates of Greater Albania — a single state stretching across the Balkan peninsula from Albania proper to northwestern Macedonia, with its own sizable ethnic Albanian population. Greater Albania would be no less anathema to regional peace and stability than Greater Serbia.
Macedonia deserves special care and attention. It’s a brave, young independent state that has made real and promising effort at establishing multi-ethnic democracy and thus escaping the dangers of the nation-state. But Macedonia would probably disappear from the map, and violently so, if Kosovo were to become a catalyst for Albanian nationalism throughout the region.

For all these reasons, we must keep alive the possibility — not the certainty or the guarantee, but the possibility — that someday, Kosovo will re-establish ties with Belgrade. That does not mean reconstituting the Yugoslav state in the form that existed before Milošević unleashed his armed forces, special police and paramilitary gangs against the Kosovo Albanians. Rather it means fostering the conditions in which Serbia and Kosovo can eventually reconcile with each other — not in the context of the old Yugoslavia but in the context of a new Europe.

That brings me to the good news about European politics in the last half-century: the emergence of a concert of liberal democracies. After World War Two, the major countries of Western Europe set about a great experiment that has led to the formation of the European Union. The treaties of Westphalia and Versailles are giving way to those of Maastricht and Amsterdam. The old system of nation-states — each sovereign in its exercise of supreme, absolute and permanent authority — is giving way to a new one in which nations feel secure enough in their identities and in their neighborhoods to make a virtue out of their dependence on one another.

In the new Europe, this means pooling sovereignty in certain areas of governance and, in other areas, granting greater autonomy
to regions. It means simultaneously relinquishing some powers upward and devolving others downward.

On those matters where borders have become an obstacle to efficiency and prosperity, such as commercial activity and monetary policy, much of Europe is investing authority in supranational bodies. The euro is only the most dramatic example.

On other matters, where communal identities and sensitivities are at stake, such as language and education, central governments are devolving power to local authorities. For example, there is still a country in Europe today called Spain, but within its borders is an entity that calls itself the state of Catalonia, where Catalan is the official language and Spanish is taught as an elective.

The German lander — from Bavaria to Schleswig-Holstein — have taken control of affairs that once resided in the national capital. In Britain, the Blair government has sanctioned the establishment of parliaments in Scotland and Wales, thereby, however paradoxical it may seem, actually making the United Kingdom more united, because the institutions of governance are more accommodating of the national communities [OR NATIONALITIES?] that make up the state.

In this fashion, Europe is managing and sublimating the forces that could otherwise trigger civil strife, conflict across borders, or both — that is, precisely the forces that have so devastated the Balkans.

As the most multi-ethnic of the Balkan states, Yugoslavia would have especially benefited from those trends that have characterized West European politics these past 50 years: the
opening of borders, the opening of societies, the protection of minorities, the empowerment of regions and the pursuit of transnational cooperation. But since Yugoslavia was largely cut off from the European mainstream, its multi-ethnic character became a curse: deprived of inducements for integration, it fell victim to disintegration.

Now we have an opportunity to bring the fragments of the old Yugoslavia, along with other countries that are emerging from the wreckage of communism, into the orbit of those innovations in national identity and international relations that the Western Europe is putting in place. Or, to put the point in Wilsonian terms, we have an opportunity to make the entire continent safe for democracy, and thereby create an environment in which self-determination does not require the proliferation of ethnically based micro-states.

Taking advantage of that opportunity is first and foremost a challenge for the Europeans in general and for the European Union in particular. But it is also a challenge for us. Five times in this century the United States has had to rescue Europe from the consequences of political experiments gone catastrophically awry. Each time our intervention has been crucial in making possible yet another chance at peace. Now, finally, there is an experiment underway in the laboratory of continental politics that is going right, an experiment that carries with it the promise that the 21st century might truly be an improvement on the 20th, an experiment that coincides with our own values and therefore with our own vital strategic interests. That's why we must do everything we can to help the Europeans to succeed, for our good as well as their own.