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SUBJ: WOULD AWACS DEPLOYMENT TO ENFORCE THE
NO-FLY ZONE OVER BOSNIA BREAK THE
COALITION IN BONN?
TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 BONN 02109
BERLIN PLEASE PASS LEIPZIG
USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MARR, GM
SUBJECT: WOULD AWACS DEPLOYMENT TO ENFORCE THE
NO-FLY ZONE OVER BOSNIA BREAK THE
COALITION IN BONN?
REF: BONN 1771 (NOTAL)
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

2. AS REFTTEL EXPLAINS, THE COALITION POLITICAL
PARTIES ARE NOW ENGAGED IN A GAME OF CHICKEN OVER
EVENTUAL PARTICIPATION IN NATO AWACS FLIGHTS TO
ENFORCE A NO-FLY ZONE OVER BOSNIA. THE ISSUE IS
DISTINCT FROM THE BROADER DEBATE HERE ON A
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT TO AUTHORIZE OUT-OF-AREA
BUNDESWEHR INVOLVEMENT. BUT IT IS AWKWARD, SINCE IT
THREATENS TO FORCE AN EARLY DECISION ON A PARTIAL AND
DIFFICULT ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM.
3. NUMEROUS CONTACTS AND AN INCREASING NUMBER OF
GERMAN PRESS REPORTS HAVE POINTED TO A LOOMING
COALITION CRISIS IF A DECISION MUST BE MADE. ON
JANUARY 25, FDP CHAIRMAN LAMBSDORFF BROUGHT THE
STAKES PLAINLY OUT INTO THE OPEN, WARNING THAT THE
FDP WOULD NOT SUPPORT PARTICIPATION IN COMBAT
MISSIONS ("KAMPFEINSATZ") IN THE ABSENCE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT. HE ALSO SAID THAT
PARTICIPATION IN AWACS FLIGHTS WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE

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FOR HISTORICAL REASONS EVEN IF AN AMENDMENT WERE ON THE BOOKS (ALTHOUGH WE UNDERSTAND THAT THIS IS NOT/NOT THE VIEW OF EITHER FOREIGN MINISTER KINKEL OR MOST OF THE BUNDESTAG CAUCUS). FDP DEFENSE SPOKESMAN HOYER CRITICIZED LAMBSDORFF FOR GOING TOO FAR, AND INDICATED THAT THERE MIGHT BE AVENUES TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE. THE CDU/CSU LINE SUPPORTING AWACS DEPLOYMENT REMAINS SOLID, WITH MOST SENIOR OFFICIALS SAYING PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY THAT THE CHANCELLOR WOULD ORDER DEPLOYMENT.

4. NO ONE WANTS A CRISIS THAT MIGHT BREAK UP THE COALITION (PARTICULARLY ON AN ISSUE THAT IS NOT AT THE TOP OF THE NATIONAL POLITICAL AGENDA). NOR IS ANYONE PREPARED FOR NEW ELECTIONS. KINKEL DOES NOT WANT TO SURRENDER THE BASIC POINT THAT DEPLOYMENT WITHOUT CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORIZATION WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE, BUT HE SAID JANUARY 26 THAT HE SEES ROOM FOR COMPROMISE, EMPHASIZING THAT THE AWACS ISSUE IS STILL A HYPOTHETICAL ONE. IN AN INTERVIEW THE SAME DAY, CHANCELLERY MINISTER BOHL (CDU) SAID THAT THE COALITION PARTIES NEEDED TO SIT DOWN AGAIN AND CAREFULLY EXAMINE THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION. WE SUSPECT THAT THE FDP MIGHT IN FACT FIND A WAY TO COMPROMISE BY DECLARING VICTORY: I.E., BACKING DOWN ON ITS THREAT WHILE KEEPING INTACT ITS CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER'S MEETING NEXT WEEK WITH FM KINKEL OFFERS AN OPPORTUNITY TO HELP MOVE THINGS IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION BY EXPRESSING OUR HOPE THAT GERMANY WILL EVOLVE ITS POLICY TOWARD THE ASSUMPTION OF AN APPROPRIATE SHARE OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. END SUMMARY.

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USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE

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SUBJECT: WOULD AWACS DEPLOYMENT TO ENFORCE THE NO-FLY ZONE OVER BOSNIA BREAK THE COALITION IN BONN?

FDP: LAMBSDORFF

5. AS WE HAVE REPORTED, THE COALITION POLITICAL PARTIES ARE NOW ENGAGING IN A HIGH-INTENSITY POKER GAME OVER EVENTUAL PARTICIPATION IN NATO AWACS FLIGHTS TO ENFORCE THE NO-FLY ZONE OVER BOSNIA. ON JANUARY 25, FDP CHAIRMAN LAMBSDORFF INCREASED THE TEMPERATURE, PUBLICLY WARNING THAT THE FDP WOULD NOT SUPPORT PARTICIPATION IN COMBAT MISSIONS IN THE ABSENCE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT. GERMAN AWACS CREWS TAKING PART IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF A NO-FLY ZONE WOULD BE BY DEFINITION "COMBATANTS." THIS WOULD EXCEED THE GOVERNMENT'S CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY AND BRING ON A CRISIS IN THE COALITION. SPINNING OUT THE SCENARIO, LAMBSDORFF SAID THAT, IN THE EVENT, THE FDP MINISTERS WOULD HAVE TO WITHDRAW FROM THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE FDP BUNDESTAG CAUCUS WOULD VOTE FOR ANY RESULTANT SPD MOTION CALLING ON THE GOVERNMENT TO REVERSE ITSELF. AT THIS POINT, THE COALITION WOULD

BE FINISHED. AS NOTED IN PARA TWO, LAMBSDORFF ALSO SAID THAT THE FDP WOULD FIND UNACCEPTABLE FOR HISTORICAL REASONS ANY GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN AWACS DEPLOYMENT EVEN IF A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT WERE ALREADY IN PLACE.

6. COMMENT: IT IS WIDELY ACCEPTED IN THE POLITICAL ARENA HERE THAT GERMAN TROOPS WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN ANY ACTION ON THE GROUND, GIVEN THE STRENGTH OF WORLD WAR II MEMORIES. HOWEVER, LAMBSDORFF APPEARS TO HAVE TAKEN THIS TO AN EXTREME POSITION, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF WARNINGS BY DEFENSE MINISTER RUEHE AND BUNDESWEHR CHIEF OF STAFF NAUMANN THAT AN FRG AWACS OPT-OUT WOULD BE A SERIOUS BLOW TO GERMANY AND THE ALLIANCE. FDP PARLIAMENTARY WHIP AND DEFENSE SPOKESMAN WERNER HOYER CONFIRMED TO POLMINCOUNS ON JANUARY 27 THAT NEITHER KINKEL NOR MOST OF THE FDP BUNDESTAG CAUCUS SHARES LAMBSDORFF'S VIEW ON THIS POINT; "EVEN GENSCHER" HAS STRESSED THAT A COALITION COLLISION COURSE OVER THIS ISSUE WOULD BE "FOLLY." END COMMENT.

FDP: HOYER, OTHERS MORE OPTIMISTIC ON COMPROMISE

7. HOYER HAD ALSO CRITICIZED LAMBSDORFF'S PRESS INTERVIEW PUBLICLY ON JANUARY 26. HE INDICATED IN A "DEUTSCHLANDFUNK" INTERVIEW THAT THE PARTY LINE WAS NOT AS HARD AS DEPICTED AND THAT LAMBSDORFF HAD GONE TOO FAR. HOYER POINTED OUT THAT THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT AMONG THE NATO ALLIES YET THAT ENFORCING THE NO-FLY ZONE OVER BOSNIA WOULD BE COVERED BY THE NATO TREATY. GERMANY, HE SAID, WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE PROCESS TO REACH ANY SUCH DECISION.

SIGNIFICANTLY, HOYER ALSO SAID THAT THERE WERE "INDICATIONS, PARTICULARLY FROM THE FRENCH AND THE AMERICANS," THAT GERMANY'S ALLIES UNDERSTOOD ITS PREDICAMENT, AND WERE INTERESTED IN FINDING WAYS TO

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 BONN 02109

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EASE IT. (COMMENT: HOYER ADMITTED TO US PRIVATELY THAT NO OFFICIAL U.S. POSITION HAD BEEN TAKEN TO THAT EFFECT. SIMILARLY, A SENIOR CHANCELLERY OFFICIAL TOLD US HE WAS AWARE OF NO HIGH-LEVEL USG POLICY INDICATION ONE WAY OR THE OTHER. END COMMENT.)

8. AN ASSISTANT TO CAUCUS FOREIGN POLICY SPOKESMAN IRMER SAID JANUARY 26 THAT THE FDP REALIZED IT WOULD BE EMBARRASSING FOR GERMANY'S ALLIES TO LET IT OFF THE HOOK -- FOR INSTANCE, BY SUBSTITUTING OTHER NATIONALITIES FOR GERMAN FLIGHT CREWS, WHILE CONTINUING TO USE GERMAN AWACS GROUND SUPPORT TROOPS BY DEFINING THEM AS "NON-COMBATANTS" -- BUT THAT THIS MIGHT BE THE WAY OUT.

KINKEL NOW TRYING TO CALM THE WATERS

9. ON JANUARY 27, KINKEL ALSO SOUGHT TO COOL THINGS OFF, TELLING AN INTERVIEWER THAT HE SAW THE POSSIBILITY OF COMPROMISE. GERMANY SHOULD FIRST AWAIT A UNSC DECISION TO ENFORCE THE NO-FLY ZONE. SUCH A DECISION WOULD HAVE TO BE LOOKED AT CAREFULLY; ONLY THEN WOULD THE COALITION PARTIES BE IN A POSITION TO SAY WHETHER WHAT WAS BEING ASKED OF GERMANY WOULD OR WOULD NOT BE PERMISSIBLE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. IF THE FDP WERE TO CONCLUDE THAT GERMAN FLIGHT CREWS' INVOLVEMENT WERE UNCONSTITUTIONAL, THEN THE CREWS WOULD HAVE TO BE PULLED.

10. ON THE OTHER HAND, KINKEL CONTINUED, DESPITE DIFFERING LEGAL INTERPRETATIONS, THE CDU/CSU AND FDP SHARED THE SAME POLITICAL AIM. KINKEL WAS CERTAIN THAT A COMPROMISE COULD BE FOUND, AND HE HOPED THAT THE ISSUE, EVEN IN THE FACE OF A UNSC DECISION TO GO AHEAD, WOULD NOT LEAD TO A BREAKPOINT FOR THE COALITION. HE ADDED THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR GERMANY IF IT DID NOT REMAIN ON THE SIDELINES, BUT HE THOUGHT GERMAN AWACS CREWS COULD BE REPLACED IF NECESSARY. THIS WAS ALREADY THE CASE WITH THE MONITORING FLIGHTS OVER AUSTRIA AND HUNGARY, HE REMARKED. (COMMENT: HOYER TOLD US HE AND KINKEL DEFINED THEIR LONG TERM GOAL AS A CHANGE IN THE CONSTITUTION TO PERMIT THE FRG GRADUALLY TO TAKE ON GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITIES. IN THE SHORT TERM, THE AIM WAS TO FACILITATE AN EFFECTIVE AWACS DEPLOYMENT IF THE UN AND NATO CHOSE TO GO IN THAT DIRECTION.)
CDU/CSU

11. ALTHOUGH SOME CDU/CSU LEADERS HAVE TRIED TO DEESCALATE THE PUBLIC RHETORIC, WE HAVE NOT SEEN ANY SOFTENING IN THE CDU/CSU LINE THAT GERMANY MUST BE "IN" IF IT COMES TO THE CRUNCH. MANY OF OUR CONTACTS SAY SIMPLY THAT THE FDP WILL HAVE TO GIVE GROUND. A SENIOR CHANCELLERY OFFICIAL PREDICTED TO THE DCM JANUARY 25 THAT KOHL WOULD NOT/PULL THE AWACS

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CREWS. INSTEAD, HE WAS LIKELY TO CARRY THROUGH WITH A DEPLOYMENT DECISION, EVEN IF THE FDP REFUSED TO BUDGE. THE SPD, IF IT CHOSE, COULD FILE A NEW COMPLAINT IN KARLSRUHE, WHICH THE GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, WOULD EXPECT TO WIN.

12. IN AN INTERVIEW IN THE JANUARY 25 "SPIEGEL," CDU/CSU CAUCUS CHIEF SCHAEUBLE SAID THAT IN THE EVENT A DEPLOYMENT DECISION BECAME NECESSARY, KOHL WOULD GO AHEAD, SINCE GERMANY'S NON-PARTICIPATION WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE. SCHAEUBLE SAID HE KNEW FDP LEADERS TO BE RELIABLE PROPONENTS OF NATO, AND NEITHER KOHL NOR THEY WOULD LET THEMSELVES BE DRIVEN BY THE SPD INTO A

CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE VIS-A-VIS THE ALLIES. CDU GENERAL SECRETARY HINTZE, REACTING TO LAMBSDORFF'S REMARKS, SAID GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN AWACS FLIGHTS WOULD BE THE LEAST GERMANY COULD DO TO ASSIST IN BOSNIA. CDU EXECUTIVE MANAGER STAUDACHER TOLD US JANUARY 26 THAT HE ALSO THOUGHT THE CHANCELLOR, IN THE EVENT, WOULD NOT YANK THE CREWS, AND THAT THE FDP WOULD GIVE GROUND TO AVOID A CRISIS THAT NOBODY WANTED.

13. IN A SEPARATE JANUARY 27 INTERVIEW, CHANCELLERY MINISTER BOHL SEEMED ALSO TO WANT TO TONE DOWN THE RHETORIC, PARTIALLY ECHOING KINKEL'S APPROACH BY SUGGESTING THAT THE COALITION PARTIES SHOULD SIT DOWN AGAIN AND CAREFULLY EXAMINE WHAT GERMANY MIGHT BE ASKED TO DO AND EXACTLY HOW THIS WOULD OR WOULD NOT FIT WITH THE CONSTITUTION. BOHL SAID HE DID NOT CONSIDER AWACS DEPLOYMENT TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. HE DEFLECTED A QUESTION ABOUT WHETHER THE CHANCELLOR WOULD USE HIS EXECUTIVE POWERS TO DEPLOY GERMAN CREWS BY TELLING THE REPORTER TO ASK KOHL DIRECTLY.

COMMENT

14. ALTHOUGH IT IS TOO EARLY TO PREDICT WITH CERTAINTY HOW A HEAD-ON COLLISION MIGHT BE AVOIDED (OR FOR THAT MATTER, IF GERMANY WOULD IN FACT DEPLOY), NEITHER THE FDP NOR CDU/CSU WANTS A COALITION RUPTURE. (THERE IS A DANGER THAT THE PARTIES COULD MISCALCULATE, SINCE EACH STILL THINKS THE OTHER WILL STOP SHORT OF TAKING THE ULTIMATE RISK.) HOYER TOLD US JANUARY 27, AND THE FDP REPORTEDLY BELIEVES, THAT KOHL SIGNALLED KINKEL THAT HE DOES NOT WANT A BREAK. NONE OF THE PARTIES HAS ANYWHERE ELSE TO GO, NONE WANTS TO LIMIT ITS OPTIONS NOW BEFORE NEXT YEAR'S ELECTIONS, AND NONE IS IN SHAPE TO FIGHT AN ELECTION NOW. (IF THE GOVERNMENT LOST ITS PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY THROUGH A BREAK WITH THE FDP, AND, AS IS LIKELY, NO NEW MAJORITY COULD BE FORMED, NEW ELECTIONS WOULD RESULT.)

15. OUT-OF-AREA IS AN UNLIKELY ISSUE ON WHICH TO PROVOKE A FULL-SCALE CONFRONTATION WITHIN THE COALITION. DESPITE ITS IMPORTANCE TO US, NATO, AND KOHL, AND THE DISQUIET AMONG POLITICALLY-AWARE

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GERMANS OVER THE AWFUL NIGHTLY TELEVISION PICTURES OF THE SUFFERING IN BOSNIA, OUT-OF-AREA UTILIZATION OF THE BUNDESWEHR IS STILL THE LOCAL EQUIVALENT OF AN INSIDE-THE-BELTWAY CONCERN. THE COMPLEXITY OF THE ISSUE IS DEMONSTRATED BY KINKEL'S EFFORT IN HIS INTERVIEW TO RESTATE THE LEGAL QUESTION SIMPLY: THE CDU/CSU LOOKS TO ARTICLE 24 OF THE CONSTITUTION, WHICH PERMITS GERMANY TO BELONG TO COLLECTIVE

SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, WHILE THE FDP CONSIDERS ARTICLE 87A PARAMOUNT, WHICH STATES THAT THE BUNDESWEHR, UNLESS EXPLICITLY AUTHORIZED OTHERWISE ELSEWHERE IN THE BASIC LAW, IS TO BE USED ONLY FOR DEFENSE. THESE LEGAL-CONSTITUTIONAL NUANCES ARE NOT UNDERSTOOD BY THE PUBLIC, SO THERE ARE FEW VOTES TO BE GAINED BY PROVOKING A GOVERNMENT CRISIS. FURTHERMORE, A NUMBER OF THE POLITICIANS QUOTED ABOVE, ON BOTH SIDES OF THE COALITION, WANT TO REDIRECT THEIR FIRE AT THE SPD, IN ORDER TO REGAIN THE OFFENSIVE HERE IN THE WIDER OUT-OF-AREA DEBATE. 16. DESPITE LAMBSDORFF'S SPLASH, KINKELS AND OTHER FDP STATEMENTS INDICATE THE PARTY HOPES TO FIND A FACE-SAVING COMPROMISE, I.E., A METHOD OF FINESSING THE AWACS DECISION, OR DELINKING IT FROM THE LONGER-TERM ISSUE OF OUT-OF-AREA DEPLOYMENT, WITHOUT GIVING UP THE CLAIM THAT A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT IS NECESSARY. SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER'S MEETING NEXT WEEK WITH KINKEL MAY BE AN OPPORTUNITY TO HELP MOVE GERMAN POLICY TOWARD THE ASSUMPTION OF AN APPROPRIATE SHARE OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (SEPTEL).

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 SUBJ: CGYOOL: BOSNIAN NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT --
 ESTABLISHMENT OF SAFE AREAS

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 ROME 001346
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, UNSC, BK
 SUBJECT: CGYOOL: BOSNIAN NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT --
 ESTABLISHMENT OF SAFE AREAS

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THE ITALIAN WEU PRESIDENCY PROVIDED EMBASSY JANUARY 26 THE FOLLOWING PAPERS PREPARED BY THE U.N. AND UNHCR ON SAFE HAVENS FOR BOSNIA.
3. BEGIN TEXT OF U.N. NON-PAPER ON ESTABLISHMENT OF SAFE AREAS:

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 787 (1992) INVITES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, IN CONSULTATION WITH THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES AND OTHER RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES, TO STUDY THE POSSIBILITY OF AND THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROMOTION OF SAFE AREAS FOR HUMANITARIAN PURPOSES. AT THIS POINT, ESTABLISHING SUCH AREAS DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE EXISTING MANDATE(S) OF UNPROFOR. UNPROFOR'S EXISTING RESOURCES WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT FOR SUCH A TASK SHOULD IT BE MANDATED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. THEREFORE, A SUBSTANTIAL ENLARGEMENT OF UNPROFOR WOULD BE REQUIRED. CONCEPTUAL, THERE ARE TWO BROAD OPTIONS. ONE IS TO ESTABLISH SAFE ZONES IN AREAS WHERE THOSE TO BE PROTECTED ARE STILL LIVING IN THEIR HOMES, AS IS THE CASE IN THE SAFETY ZONE ESTABLISHED BY THE ALLIED POWERS IN NORTHERN IRAQ. THE OTHER IS TO CREATE SAFE HAVENS FOR PEOPLE WHO HAVE ALREADY BEEN DISPLACED FROM THEIR HOMES AND ARE LIABLE TO FURTHER DISPLACEMENT AND PERSECUTION AS THE WAR SPREADS THROUGH BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA. THE FIRST OPTION WOULD APPEAR TO BE VERY COMPLICATED, BOTH MILITARILY AND POLITICALLY. IT WOULD REQUIRE THE UNITED NATIONS TO ESTABLISH A KIND OF

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PROTECTORATE IN THE DESIGNATED AREAS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA. IT WOULD REQUIRE THE UNITED NATIONS TO PROTECT THOSE AREAS FROM HOSTILE INCURSIONS BY ANY PARTY OR TO ENSURE THAT NO HOSTILE ACTION IS TAKEN BY ANY ARMED PARTY WITHIN THE SAFE ZONES. AS THERE ARE ALMOST NO AREAS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA WHICH ARE MONO-ETHNIC, THE LATTER WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR THE UNITED NATIONS TO EXERCISE SOME POLITICAL CONTROL OVER THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN THE SAFE ZONES IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT THEY TOOK NO ACTION WHICH WOULD INCREASE THE RISK OF EXTERNAL ATTACKS AGAINST IT (E.G., USING IT AS A BASE FOR LAUNCHING COUNTER-ATTACKS AGAINST THEIR OPPONENTS). THIS IS, IN EFFECT, WHAT UNPROFOR IS TRYING IN THE UNITED NATIONS PROTECTED AREAS IN CROATIA. EXPERIENCE THERE HAS SHOWN THAT IT IS A VERY DIFFICULT MANDATE, EVEN IF THERE IS A REASONABLY EFFECTIVE CEASE-FIRE IN PLACE AND THE CONSENT OF ALL CONCERNED HAS BEEN GIVEN.

THE SECOND OPTION APPEARS TO BE MORE FEASIBLE, BOTH MILITARILY AND POLITICALLY, ALTHOUGH UNHCR CORRECTLY POINTS OUT THAT IT SHOULD ONLY BE THE OPTION OF THE LAST RESORT. THE CONCERNS AND OBJECTIONS RAISED BY UNHCR ARE VALID.

ESTABLISHING SAFETY ZONES FOR DISPLACED PERSONS OF A PARTICULAR ETHNIC GROUP ALSO MEANS ESTABLISHING AN INTERESTING TARGET FOR THE OTHER GROUPS. FOR POLITICAL AND OTHER REASONS, THEY MIGHT FIND IT IRRESISTIBLE TO HARASS THE SAFETY ZONE WITH RANDOM MORTAR OR ARTILLERY FIRE. THIS WOULD ENTAIL THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A HEAVILY PATROLLED SAFETY PERIMETER OF UP TO 30 KM IN ORDER TO KEEP POTENTIALLY HOSTILE GROUPS OUT OF RANGE. CONSIDERING THE TERRAIN IN MOST OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, THIS WOULD REQUIRE THE DEPLOYMENT OF A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF TROOPS, INCLUDING AN AIR-SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITY. DESPITE SUCH A DEPLOYMENT, THERE CAN BE NO GUARANTEE FOR THE SAFETY OF THE AREA. ANY HOSTILE INCIDENT WOULD FURTHER UNDERMINE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S EFFORTS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA.

THOUGHT HAS TO BE GIVEN TO THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THE TRADITIONAL PEACE-KEEPING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ARE SUFFICIENT TO DISCOURAGE ANY VIOLATIONS OF THE SAFE AREAS. DEP

ENDING ON THE POLITICAL AND ETHNIC ENVIRONMENT OF THE LOCATION OF THE SAFETY ZONE, STRONGER DEFENSIVE MEASURES AND MORE ACTIVE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT MAY BE NECESSARY. HOWEVER, A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN PEACE-KEEPING AND PEACE-ENFORCEMENT IS ESSENTIAL FOR UNPROFOR'S SAFETY AND ABILITY TO IMPLEMENT ITS MANDATE IN OTHER AREAS.

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ESTABLISHMENT OF SAFE AREAS

END TEXT.

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4. BEGIN TEXT OF "SAFE AREAS FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE" (SC RES 787), POSITION OF UNHCR:

1. IN UNHCR'S OPINION THE OVERRIDING PRINCIPLE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA SHOULD BE TO BRING SAFETY TO THE PEOPLE, RATHER THAN TO BRING PEOPLE TO SAFETY. THE FIRST PRIORITY SHOULD REMAIN TO IMPROVE THE LEVEL OF SAFETY AND TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE "IN SITU."

2. TO THE EXTENT HUMAN SUFFERING AND DISPLACEMENT ARE CAUSED PRIMARILY BY ARMED CONFLICT, NOTABLY IN AREAS AND CITIES UNDER SIEGE OR THREAT, THIS MEANS THAT A GENUINE AND DURABLE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IS IMPERATIVE. UNHCR SEES NO VIABLE ALTERNATIVE. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SAFE AREAS RISKS TO DISTRACT FROM THE NECESSITY TO BRING ALL FIGHTING TO A HALT.

3. IN AREAS WHERE DISPLACEMENT IS CAUSED BY ETHNIC PERSECUTION, MEASURES SHOULD BE TAKEN TO IMPROVE THE SAFETY AND MATERIAL CONDITIONS OF THE REMAINING MINORITY GROUPS. BOTH ASSISTANCE AND PROTECTION MECHANISMS SHOULD BE ENHANCED THROUGH A STRATEGY OF THREE COMPLEMENTARY ELEMENTS: DEPLOYMENT OF PEACE KEEPING FORCES, HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. SUCH MEASURES SHOULD INCLUDE MILITARY PROTECTION, AND WOULD INVOLVE A HIGHLY VISIBLE AND MOBILE INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE. THIS APPROACH SHOULD BE FOLLOWED WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION IN ALL AREAS WHERE MINORITY GROUPS ARE SUBJECT TO HARASSMENT, BUT NOTABLY IN NORTHERN AND WESTERN BOSNIA. UNPROFOR'S DEPLOYMENT TO THIS REGION IS CRUCIAL. IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO IMPLEMENT THIS APPROACH BASED ON THE CONSENT OF ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT, WHICH IS PREFERABLE, EITHER AS A "PACKAGE" OR THROUGH SEPARATE AGREEMENTS.

THE ADVANTAGE OF THIS APPROACH WOULD BE ITS IMPLEMENTATION IN THE SHORT TERM. IT WOULD BUILD ON THE CAPACITY OF THE CURRENT UNPROFOR TROOPS AND A FORMAL EXTENSION OF THE MANDATE OF THESE TROOPS WOULD PERHAPS NOT BE NECESSARY.

4. IT IS RECOGNIZED THAT THIS APPROACH MAY AT BEST REDUCE THE LEVEL AND SCOPE OF "ETHNIC CLEANSING." FAILING A CESSATION OF ALL HOSTILITIES, DISPLACEMENT AS A RESULT OF ARMED CONFLICT WILL CONTINUE TO OCCUR. UNHCR'S SECOND PRIORITY THEREFORE REMAINS ADMISSION TO SAFETY, EITHER IN NEIGHBOURING STATES OR, ESPECIALLY FOR THOSE UNABLE TO GAIN ADMISSION ABROAD, IN RELATIVELY SECURE REGIONS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA. THE THREE POINTS STRATEGY REFERRED TO ABOVE SHOULD EQUALLY APPLY TO THESE REGIONS, THEREBY IMPROVING THE SAFETY AND MATERIAL CONDITIONS OF BOTH THE DISPLACED AND LOCAL POPULATION, INCLUDING MINORITY GROUPS. HOWEVER, THE RIGHT TO SEEK ASYLUM ABROAD MUST BE UPHELD. THE BURDEN OF THE NEIGHBOURING STATES CAN AND SHOULD BE ALLEVIATED BY INCREASED INTERNATIONAL BURDEN-SHARING.

5. IN UNHCR'S OPINION THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ONE OR MORE CLEARLY DELINEATED "SAFE AREAS" UNDER INTERNATIONAL MILITARY PROTECTION, SHOULD ONLY BE A LAST OPTION. WHEN CONSIDERING THIS OPTION, THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS WOULD JUSTIFY UTMOST CAUTION:

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(A) REACTION OF THE PARTIES

ALL PARTIES TO THE CONFLICT HAVE VOICED THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF "SAFE AREAS," OR WANT TO USE THE CONCEPT TO FURTHER THEIR OWN MILITARY OBJECTIVES.

(B) MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY PROTECTED AREAS WOULD REQUIRE LOCAL ENFORCEMENT ACTION (WITHOUT PRODUCING A CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES ON ALL FRONTS, OR EVEN RISKING TO LEAD TO INTENSIFIED FIGHTING ON OTHER FRONTS. THIS MAY APPLY IN PARTICULAR TO CITY AREAS UNDER SIEGE OR DIRECT THREAT, IF THE CONSENT OF THE PARTIES IS NOT FORTHCOMING (SEE ABOVE). THE NECESSARY PREPARATION TIME SEVERELY RISKS TO BE USED TO INTENSIFY BOTH THE C

URRENT MILITARY OFFENSIVE AND THE "ETHNIC CLEANSING." ONCE SAFE AREAS WERE ESTABLISHED, THE COMPLETE PRESERVATION OF SECURITY ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 ROME 001346 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MARR, PREF, PREL, UNSC, BK

SUBJECT: CGYOOL: BOSNIAN NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT -- ESTABLISHMENT OF SAFE AREAS

WOULD BE DOUBTFUL. TERRORIST ATTACKS FROM OUTSIDE OR FROM WITHIN THE AREAS ARE NOT TO BE EXCLUDED.

(C) POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SAFE AREAS, ESPECIALLY OF REGIONAL ZONES IN CENTRAL BOSNIA, COULD RESULT IN THE CONSOLIDATION OF FRONT LINES AND THEREBY OF TERRITORIAL CONQUESTS, WITH SERIOUS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES. NON-ACCEPTANCE OF THIS BY INDIVIDUALS OR GROUPS BELONGING TO ONE OR TWO PARTY(IES) IN THE CONFLICT WOULD INCREASE THE RISK OF INSECURITY REFERRED TO ABOVE.

(D) HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE PROTECTION

ADMISSION TO AND RESIDENCE IN SAFE AREAS SHOULD NOT AFFECT FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT NOR IPSO FACTO FRUSTRATE THE RIGHT TO SEEK ASYLUM. DENIAL OF ASYLUM AND FORCIBLE RETURNS OF PERSONS HAVING ALREADY FOUND REFUGE ABROAD WOULD, HOWEVER, BE LIKELY, RESULTING NOT ONLY IN HUMAN DRAMA BUT ALSO IN POLITICAL DISPUTE AND TENSION.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARILY PROTECTED, CLOSED AREAS WITHIN ETHNIC CLEANSING REGIONS, NOTABLY IN NORTHERN AND WESTERN BOSNIA, WOULD INEVITABLY ATTRACT ADDITIONAL "ETHNIC CLEANSING" TOWARDS SUCH AREAS.

(E) IMPACT ON DURABLE SOLUTIONS

IN THE ABSENCE OF A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, PROTRACTED CAMP-LIKE SITUATIONS WOULD RISK BEING PERPETUATED, SURROUNDED BY ENEMY FORCES OR TERRITORY. THE HOMES OF PEOPLE ATTRACTED BY THE EXISTENCE OF SAFE AREAS WOULD RISK DESTRUCTION, SO AS TO FRUSTRATE THE CHANCES FOR RETURN. AFTER A CERTAIN PERIOD OF TIME,

DEMANDS WITHIN THE AREAS CONCERNED FOR TRANSFER
ABROAD, ARE LIKELY TO PRODUCE ENORMOUS PRESSURE.
SERWER

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#1346

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03

<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03

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SSN: 1346

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TOR: 930127165006 M0191510

<^TOR>930127165008 M0191511

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 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O 011509Z FEB 93
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 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0326
 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 9038
 RUFHBE/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 7708
 RUFHZG/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 0641
 SUBJ: GOF VIEWS ON RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND PHASING
 - IN NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT
 TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 02482
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, MARR, NATO HU, SR, BK, HR, UN, FR
 SUBJECT: GOF VIEWS ON RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND PHASING
 - IN NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT
 REF: STATE 29067
 1. - ENTIRE TEXT.
 2. ON FEBRUARY 1, WE MADE POINTS IN REFTEL ON RULES OF ENGAGEMENT AND PHASING IN ENFORCEMENT OF THE BOSNIA NO-FLY ZONE (NFZ) TO QUAI STRATEGIC AFFAIRS DIRECTOR DANA. DANA RESPONDED THAT U.S. AND FRENCH VIEWS ON THESE ISSUES ARE NOW VERY CLOSE. THE GOF AGREES THAT NATO SHOULD HAVE COMPLETED PLANNING FOR ENFORCEMENT BY THE TIME THE UN GIVES THE GREEN LIGHT FOR IT.
 3. DANA SAID THE MOST SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND FRANCE CONCERNS THE MECHANISM FOR DECIDING WHEN TO MOVE FROM ONE ENFORCEMENT PHASE TO ANOTHER. FRANCE CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT THE DECISION SHOULD BE MADE BY "PARTICIPATING NATIONS THROUGH CONSULTATIONS IN THE NAC." WE TRIED ON HIM THE FORMULA IN REFTEL CALLING FOR "FULL NAC APPROVAL TAKING SPECIAL ACCOUNT OF THE VIEWS OF PARTICIPATING STATES." DANA TOOK CAREFUL NOTE OF THE PHRASING BUT SAID HE COULD NOT RESPOND IMMEDIATELY, BECAUSE FRENCH POLICY ON THE ISSUE HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED BY A QUAI-MOD AGREEMENT; THE FRENCH MILITARY INSISTS THAT PARTICIPATING NATIONS SHOULD RETAIN THE FLEXIBILITY TO DECIDE WHEN TO MOVE FROM ONE PHASE TO ANOTHER. DANA REMARKED THAT THE QUAI FULLY UNDERSTANDS U.S. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF DECISIONMAKING BY ALL 16 ALLIES IN THE NAC BUT NOTED THAT THE MOD WOULD HAVE TO BE BROUGHT ON BOARD IF THERE WERE TO BE A CHANGE IN FRENCH POLICY ON THIS POINT. HE UNDERTOOK TO DISCUSS OUR DEMARCHE WITH THE MOD.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By VL NARA, Date 8/23/2019

2015-0926-m (1.03)

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4. AS WE MADE READY TO LEAVE, DANA ASKED HOW THE
BREAKDOWN OF NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA WILL AFFECT U.S.
THINKING ON NFZ ENFORCEMENT. WE RESPONDED THAT IT WILL
PROBABLY MAKE NFZ ENFORCEMENT EVEN MORE IMPORTANT TO
THE U.S. DANA NODDED AGREEMENT BUT ASKED THAT THE U.S.
INFORM THE GOF RAPIDLY IF U.S. THINKING CHANGES ON
TIMING FOR BEGINNING NFZ ENFORCEMENT.

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#2482

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 2482

TOR: 930201101705 M0199438

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 DTG: 011529Z FEB 93
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 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6534
 INFO: RUEHXP/ANATO COLLECTIVE
 RUFHBE/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 1027
 RUFHZG/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 0384
 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 5937
 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0109
 SUBJ: NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT: DUTCH REACTION
 - REGARDING ROE AND PHASING
 TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ THE HAGUE 00704
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: NATO, PREL, MARR, MOPS, SR, BK, HR, NL
 SUBJECT: NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT: DUTCH REACTION
 - REGARDING ROE AND PHASING
 REF: STATE 29067
 1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
 2. EMBOFF MET ON FEBRUARY 1 WITH KEES KLOMPENHOUSER, HEAD OF THE MILITARY COOPERATION SECTION IN THE DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTRY'S ATLANTIC COOPERATION AND SECURITY DIVISION, TO DISCUSS NATO CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR ENFORCEMENT OF THE NO-FLY ZONE RESOLUTION (REFTEL). KLOMPENHOUSER AGREED THAT NATO PLANNING DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH THE GENEVA PROCESS, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE HAPPENINGS OVER THE WEEKEND IN GENEVA. THE GON, HE SAID, AGREED THAT NATO PLANNING NEEDED TO MOVE AHEAD RAPIDLY AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE A MINIMUM OF PHASES AND NEW POLITICAL DECISIONS.
 3. ON THE PHASES, KLOMPENHOUSER ASKED IF THE SECOND PHASE OF AIR-TO-AIR OPERATIONS WOULD INCLUDE LEGITIMATE SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST GROUND-BASED SYSTEMS WHICH THREATEN PLANES FLYING COMBAT AIR PATROLS. HE SAID THE DUTCH WOULD SUPPORT SUCH AN INTERPRETATION. INDEED, HE SAID THEY WOULD PROBABLY EXPECT SUCH FLEXIBILITY TO BE ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. KLOMPENHOUSER ADDED THAT THE ROE WOULD NEED TO BE STUDIED CAREFULLY IN ORDER TO AGREE WITH THE PHASING.
 4. REGARDING POLITICAL CONTROL REMAINING WITH THE NAC AND NOT SOLELY WITH THE PARTICIPATING STATES, KLOMPENHOUSER AGREED THAT THE NAC WAS THE PROPER FORUM FOR DISCUSSIONS BUT ASKED IF THIS MEANT THE

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By W NARA, Date 8/23/2019

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GREEKS, FOR INSTANCE, WOULD HAVE A FINAL VETO OVER ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS IF THEY COULD NOT JOIN A CONSENSUS. HE WONDERED IF THERE WAS ANOTHER WAY TO FINESSE THIS ISSUE. ALONG THE SAME LINES, HE ASKED WHAT THE US VIEWS WERE ON TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN THE ENFORCEMENT OPERATION. THE GREEKS HAVE ALREADY SAID THAT OTHER BALKAN STATES SHOULD NOT BECOME INVOLVED BUT THE TURKS, ALONG WITH THE DUTCH, THE ITALIANS AND THE CANADIANS, WERE ONE OF THE FEW NATO MEMBERS TO RESPOND IN A POSITIVE MANNER TO SACEUR'S REQUEST FOR POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS. HE STATED THAT THIS OBVIOUSLY WAS NOT AN ISSUE WHICH COULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE NAC BUT WHICH NEEDED TO BE RESOLVED QUICKLY. GEWECKE

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#0704

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 0704

TOR: 930201103611 M0199480

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 RHDLSAA/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
 RUSNMHS/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
 SUBJ: NO FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT: ITALIANS PREPARED
 TO FINISH WORK IN NATO; QUESTION WHETHER PARTICIPANTS
 ARE ON BOARD; FRENCH WITHDRAW REQUEST FOR AIR BASE
 ACCESS
 TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 ROME 001663
 E.O. 12356:DECL: OADR
 TAGS: NATO, PREL, MARR, HU, SR, BK, HR, UN, IT
 SUBJECT: NO FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT: ITALIANS PREPARED
 TO FINISH WORK IN NATO; QUESTION WHETHER PARTICIPANTS
 ARE ON BOARD; FRENCH WITHDRAW REQUEST FOR AIR BASE
 ACCESS
 REF(S): A) STATE 29067 B) ROME 1522
 1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.
 2. SUMMARY. DESPITE SOME DOUBTS ABOUT CHANCES FOR
 IMPLEMENTING A "NO FLY ZONE," THE ITALIANS CAN
 SUPPORT GOING AHEAD WITH NATO PLANNING. THE FRENCH
 HAVE WITHDRAWN THEIR REQUEST FOR BASING OF AIRCRAFT
 IN ITALY. AWAITING A NOD FROM THE UNSC TO NATO, THE
 ITALIANS CONTINUE WITH THEIR OWN NATIONAL PLANNING
 FOR THE "NO FLY ZONE." END SUMMARY.
 3. WE CALLED FEBRUARY 1 ON MFA NATO AFFAIRS DIRECTOR
 UGO DI MOHR TO URGE ITALIAN SUPPORT FOR MOVING
 FORWARD ON THE NO FLY ZONE BOTH AT NATO AND AT THE
 UNITED NATIONS. NOTING THAT WE WOULD WISH TO INCLUDE
 ALL OF THE NATO PARTNERS, INCLUDING ITALY, IN THE
 DECISIONMAKING ON MOVING FROM ONE PHASE OF THE ZONE
 OPERATION TO THE NEXT, WE REVIEWED TALKING POINTS
 REFTTEL AND RESPONDED TO A NUMBER OF DOUBTS THAT DI
 MOHR RAISED ABOUT IMPLEMENTING THE ZONE ANY TIME SOON.
 4. DI MOHR SAID DURING ANGLO/ITALIAN "POL/MIL TALKS"
 JANUARY 29, THE BRITISH FORCEFULLY ENUMERATED ALL THE

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By *VL* NARA, Date 8/23/2005

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REASONS THAT A "NO FLY ZONE" WOULD NOT BE PRACTICABLE NOW. IT CAME AS NO SURPRISE, HE SAID, THAT THE BRITISH WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE WELFARE OF THEIR TROOPS ON THE GROUND, AS WERE THE OTHER CONTRIBUTORS. ENFORCEMENT OF THE ZONE WOULD PUT UNPROFOR AT RISK. A "NO FLY ZONE" CONCEIVABLY COULD JEOPARDIZE UNPROFOR'S NON-COMBATANT, HUMANITARIAN ROLE, PARTICULARLY IF COUNTRIES WITH TROOPS ON THE GROUND ALSO SUPPLIED AIRCRAFT TO THE OPERATION.

5. ALTHOUGH DI MOHR AGREED THAT NATO SHOULD CONTINUE ITS PLANNING ON THE "NO FLY ZONE," HE POINTED TO RUSSIAN STATEMENTS OF FEBRUARY 1 OPPOSING SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION ON BOSNIA AS A SIGNAL THAT THERE WOULD BE HARD GOING IN THE UNSC. TOGETHER WITH STRONG BRITISH MISGIVINGS, DI MOHR ASKED WHETHER THE PRESENT WAS THE BEST TIME TO PUSH FORWARD. WOULD THE ZONE PLAY A USEFUL ROLE IN MOVING THE PARTIES TO ACCEPT THE VANCE/OWEN PLAN? WAS THERE SUFFICIENT AGREEMENT AMONG NATO ALLIES ON THE FOLLOW ON PHASES-- AIR-TO-AIR AND AIR-TO-GROUND OPERATIONS?

6. WE STRESSED THAT NATO WOULD NEED TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS OF THE ZONE, INCLUDING "RULES OF ENGAGEMENT." THROUGH THAT PROCESS, SOME OF THE QUESTIONS THAT DI MOHR HAD RAISED COULD BE ANSWERED. DI MOHR SAID THAT HIS COMMENTS WERE OFFERED AS UNOFFICIAL OBSERVATIONS THAT REFLECTED CONCERNS CIRCULATING WITHIN THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT. HE FULLY EXPECTED THAT THE ITALIANS WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT NATO WORK ON THE "NO FLY ZONE" AT NATO. FRENCH WITHDRAW REQUEST TO BRING AIRCRAFT TO ITALY

7. WE ASKED DI MOHR HOW THE FOREIGN MINISTRY WAS APPROACHING THE FAST-CHANGING SITUATION IN EX-YUGOSLAVIA. PESSIMISTIC ABOUT INFLUENCING THE MORE TRUCULENT OF THE INVOLVED PARTIES, DI MOHR SAID THAT ITALY'S PART IN A NO FLY ZONE OR ANY OTHER CONTINGENCY WOULD MOST LIKELY BE LIMITED TO EXTENSION OF BASE ACCESS TO NATO ALLIES. IN THAT CONTEXT, WE ASKED HIM FOR AN UPDATE ON WHETHER THE FRENCH STILL INTENDED TO BRING IN AIRCRAFT TO BACK UP THEIR TASK FORCE IN THE ADRIATIC. DI MOHR RESPONDED (AND A MOD SOURCE CONFIRMED) THAT THE FRENCH HAD WITHDRAWN THEIR REQUEST AFTER THEIR UNPROFOR TROOPS AT RISK IN BOSNIA WERE FREED. HE SAID THAT THE BRITISH, AFTER THEIR RAF SURVEY TEAM (REF B) VISIT TO ITALIAN BASES LAST WEEK, HAD NOT MADE A SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR BASE ACCESS.

8. DI MOHR SAID THAT ITALIAN MILITARY PLANNERS WERE GOING AHEAD ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THERE WOULD BE A NO FLY ZONE. SO FAR, THE ITALIANS WERE AWARE OF POSSIBLE U.S., U.K., FRENCH, DUTCH, AND TURKISH INTEREST IN PARTICIPATING. DI MOHR THOUGHT THAT NATO WOULD HAVE TO FIND A FACE-SAVING FORMULA TO DISCOURAGE DIRECT TURKISH INVOLVEMENT IN THE NATO OPERATION. HE INDICATED HE HAD NOT SEEN THE PLANNING
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 ROME 001663
E.O. 12356:DECL: OADR

TAGS: NATO, PREL, MARR, HU, SR, BK, HR, UN, IT
SUBJECT: NO FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT: ITALIANS PREPARED

TO FINISH WORK IN NATO; QUESTION WHETHER PARTICIPANTS
ARE ON BOARD; FRENCH WITHDRAW REQUEST FOR AIR BASE
ACCESS

DOCUMENTS, BUT IT WAS EXPECTED THE ITALIAN MILITARY
WOULD WORK OUT A LOGICAL DIVISION OF BASE RESOURCES--
POSSIBLY THE U.S. AT AVIANO, THE FRENCH AT RIMINI,
AND THE BRITISH SOMEWHERE DOWN SOUTH, SAY AT GIOIA
DEL COLLE OR BARI.

9. DI MOHR MENTIONED IN PASSING THAT THE ITALIANS
WERE NOT GOING TO GET OUT FRONT WITH THE U.N. ON THE
NO FLY ZONE. AFTER THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S REFUSAL
OF AN ITALIAN CONTRIBUTION TO UNPROFOR WHEN
THE FORCE WAS CONSTITUTED, THE GOI WOULD INSIST ON
CLEAR INSTRUCTIONS ON THE ZONE FROM THE U.N., THROUGH
NATO, TO THE GOVERNMENT. POINTING TO THE PROXIMITY OF
ITALIAN FACILITIES ON THE ADRIATIC COAST TO BOSNIA,
DI MOHR RAISED ITALIAN PRESS SPECULATION THAT ITALY
COULD BE VULNERABLE TO SERB RETRIBUTION FOR ITS
PARTICIPATION IN ACTIONS AIMED AT IMPOSING A SOLUTION
IN BOSNIA. HE DISMISSED SUGGESTIONS OF A "WEU ROLE"
IN THE OPERATION AS SHEER FANTASY. SERWER

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#1663

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

SSN: 1663
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TOR: 930201140442 M0200013
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RUEHXP/ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE
RUFHBE/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 5408
RUFHZG/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 2146
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1831
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 8513
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 3746
SUBJ: UK: NO-FLY-ZONE ENFORCEMENT
TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ LONDON 02075
GENEVA FOR ICFY
USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
BRUSSELS ALSO FOR USEC
PRAGUE FOR AMB. KORNBLUM
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: NATO, PREL, MARR, HU, SR, BK, HR, UN, UK
SUBJECT: UK: NO-FLY-ZONE ENFORCEMENT
REFS: A) STATE 29067, B) LONDON 1879, C) LONDON 936
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
ENFORCEMENT PHASES

2. IN A FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSION ON THE QUESTION OF UK
SUPPORT FOR MOVING AHEAD WITH NATO PLANNING FOR BOSNIA
NO-FLY-ZONE ENFORCEMENT, FCO ACTION OFFICER PETER JONES
TOLD US FEBRUARY 3 THAT THE ENFORCEMENT PHASES OUTLINED
BY THE U.S. (REF A) WERE COMPATIBLE WITH THE PHASES
PROPOSED BY THE UK (REF C).
3. JONES CHARACTERIZED THE U.S.-PROPOSED PHASES AS A
"SIMPLIFICATION" OF THE UK PROPOSAL. HE CONFESSED
RELIEF THAT THE EQUIVALENT OF THE FINAL UK PHASE --
ENFORCEMENT OUTSIDE BOSNIA -- DID NOT APPEAR IN THE U.S.
PROPOSAL. LONDON, HE SAID, PREFERRED NOT TO LIST SUCH A
PHASE. IT HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN THE UK DRAFT ONLY IN
ANTICIPATION THAT OTHERS WOULD WISH IT LISTED.
CHANGING PHASES

4. CONCERNING THE NAC'S ROLE IN DECISIONS TO CHANGE
PHASES, JONES REITERATED (REF B) THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT
TO COME UP WITH LANGUAGE THAT WAS ACCEPTABLE TO
EVERYONE. (THAT LINE HAS BEEN BLESSED AT HIGHER LEVELS
OF THE FCO.) REFERRING TO "FRENCH LANGUAGE" THAT WOULD

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By VZ NARA, Date 8/23/2019

2015-0926-M (1.06)

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PROVIDE A ROLE FOR BOTH THE NAC AND PARTICIPATING STATES, HE SAID SUCH A FORMULATION WOULD PRESENT NO PROBLEMS FOR THE UK.

TURKEY

5. FINALLY, JONES ADMITTED TO HMG UNEASINESS ABOUT THE PROSPECT OF TURKEY GETTING INVOLVED IN NFZ ENFORCEMENT IN BOSNIA. RECALLING THAT ANKARA HAD MENTIONED THE AVAILABILITY OF 12-20 F-16 AIRCRAFT, HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE IMPORTANCE OF TURKISH PARTICIPATION, BUT SUGGESTED THAT A "LESS DIRECT" CONTRIBUTION FROM ANKARA MIGHT BE PREFERABLE. SEITZ

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#2075

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 2075

TOR: 930203132048 M0204836

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 RUEHZG/NATO EC COLLECTIVE
 RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE
 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0216
 SUBJ: RUEHE USES U.S. TRIP TO REVISIT THE DOMESTIC
 - DEBATE OVER AWACS AND THE BOSNIAN NO-FLY-ZONE
 TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 BONN 04562
 STATE FOR EUR/RPM AND EUR/CE
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, NATO, UN, US, GM, OVIP (RUEHE, VOLKER)
 SUBJECT: RUEHE USES U.S. TRIP TO REVISIT THE DOMESTIC
 - DEBATE OVER AWACS AND THE BOSNIAN NO-FLY-ZONE
 REF: A) BONN 4367 (NOTAL)
 - B) BONN 4258 (NOTAL)
 - C) BONN 3818 (NOTAL)
 - D) BONN 2368 (NOTAL)
 - E) BONN 2109 (NOTAL)
 - F) BONN 1771 (NOTAL)
 1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

 SUMMARY

2. DEFENSE MINISTER RUEHE HAS USED HIS FEBRUARY 16-17 TRIP TO WASHINGTON TO REVISIT THE PUBLIC POLITICAL DISCUSSION HERE (REFTELS) ABOUT GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN NATO AWACS SHOULD THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL ORDER THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE BOSNIAN NO-FLY-ZONE (NFZ) AND NATO DECIDE TO ACCEPT THE MISSION. THIS ISSUE HAS BEEN QUIESCENT SINCE CHANCELLOR KOHL'S AND FDP CHAIRMAN LAMBSDORFF'S JANUARY 27 MEETING (REF D), AND SO FAR THERE HAS BEEN NO COMMENT FROM THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND THE POLITICAL PARTIES OR ANY OTHER INDICATION THAT THE DEBATE WILL REVIVE ON THE EVE OF CARNEVAL. HOWEVER, THE CHANCELLERY HAS TOLD US IT IS UNHAPPY THAT RUEHE BROACHED THE ISSUE AGAIN IN PUBLIC SINCE IT DOES NOT SEE HOW A RENEWED DISCUSSION WILL HELP PRODUCE A MORE FAVORABLE ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF THE FDP OR THE SPD. THE CABINET WILL TAKE UP THE ISSUE OF GERMAN PARTICIPATION (AND THE CHANCELLOR WILL DECIDE WHETHER TO RISK A BREAK UP OF THE COALITION) ONLY WHEN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ORDERS ENFORCEMENT AND THE ISSUE COMES BEFORE

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 E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
 White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
 By VL NARA, Date 8/23/2019
 2015-0926-m (1.07)

NATO. OUR COMMENTS ON GERMANY-SPECIFIC RISKS/GAINS ON THE NFZ ISSUE ARE CONTAINED IN PARAS 19-21. END SUMMARY.

RUEHE'S MESSAGES

3. THE GERMAN PRESS GAVE WIDESPREAD COVERAGE ON FEBRUARY 19 TO DEFMIN RUEHE'S STATEMENTS TO THE MEDIA IN WASHINGTON ON GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN NATO AWACS IN THE EVENT THAT NATO SHOULD DECIDE TO RESPOND TO SOME FUTURE UN SECURITY COUNCIL DECISION TO ENFORCE THE BOSNIAN NFZ. THE MAIN POINTS RUEHE MADE WERE AS FOLLOWS:

-- THE MESSAGE HE TOOK TO WASHINGTON WAS THAT THE DECISION COULD PRECIPITATE A BREAK-UP OF THE GOVERNING COALITION.

-- THE MESSAGE HE SENT BACK TO GERMANY WAS THAT A DECISION ON ENFORCEMENT COULD COME SOON, PERHAPS WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS; THAT U.S. PATIENCE WITH GERMANY'S EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE OUT-OF-AREA CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE IS RUNNING OUT; AND THAT THE UNITED STATES EXPECTS GERMANY TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES.

4. ON FEBRUARY 19, MOD ARMED FORCES STAFF MILITARY POLICY CHIEF CAPT. RAINER FEIST GAVE HIS PERSONAL OPINION THAT RUEHE'S STATEMENTS WERE AIMED AT TWO AUDIENCES:

-- HE WANTED WASHINGTON TO KNOW THAT THIS WAS A CRITICAL ISSUE FOR THE GOVERNMENT, AND

-- HE WISHED TO IMPRESS UPON FM KINKEL THAT THIS WAS SOON GOING TO BE A REAL AND NOT MERELY A HYPOTHETICAL PROBLEM.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 BONN 04562

STATE FOR EUR/RPM AND EUR/CE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, NATO, UN, US, GM, OVIP (RUEHE, VOLKER)

SUBJECT: RUEHE USES U.S. TRIP TO REVISIT THE DOMESTIC

- DEBATE OVER AWACS AND THE BOSNIAN NO-FLY-ZONE

5. IN RECENT CONVERSATIONS, SENIOR MOD OFFICIALS (STATE SECRETARY SCHOENBOHM AND PLANNING CHIEF WEISSER) HAVE EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT AWACS WAS AN ISSUE ON WHICH THE CDU/CSU WAS READY TO PUT THE KOHL GOVERNMENT ON THE LINE.

HOWEVER, IF THE QUESTION WERE FRAMED IN TERMS OF FRG PARTICIPATION IN AN ALLIANCE EFFORT TO PURSUE THE ADMINISTRATION'S SIX-POINT PLAN, THAT MIGHT BE A DIFFERENT MATTER.

KOHL CLEARANCE

6. ROEHRS (STRICTLY PROTECT) STATED THAT HE HAD NO IDEA WHETHER RUEHE'S STATEMENTS HAD BEEN SCRIPTED BEFORE FLYING TO WASHINGTON, BUT HE HOPED THAT RUEHE HAD GOTTEN HIS STATEMENTS FULLY CLEARED BY THE CHANCELLERY. RUEHE HAD INCURRED KOHL'S DISPLEASURE EARLIER THIS MONTH BY CRITICIZING THE ADDITIONAL CUTS IN THE DEFENSE BUDGET "DICTATED" BY FINANCE MINISTER WAIGEL (REF C). ROEHRS DEADPANDED THAT RUEHE COULD NOT AFFORD TO CROSS KOHL TWICE IN ONE MONTH.

7. CHANCELLERY CONTACTS -- EAST-WEST OFFICE CHIEF KISCHLAT AND NSC DEFENSE GROUP CHIEF COL. SCHUSTER -- TOLD US FEBRUARY 19 THAT THERE WERE NO DIFFERENCES OF SUBSTANCE BETWEEN THE CHANCELLOR AND RUEHE ON THE AWACS ISSUE. THE CHANCELLERY WAS UNHAPPY, HOWEVER, THAT RUEHE HAD GONE PUBLIC SINCE A RENEWED PUBLIC DISCUSSION AT THIS POINT WAS

UNLIKELY TO MAKE EITHER THE FDP OR THE SPD MORE AMENABLE TO GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN AWACS. THEIR ANALYSIS WAS THAT RUEHE HAD GONE PUBLIC BECAUSE IT HELPED PROFILE HIS VIEWS.

 CHANCELLERY HOPES ISSUE WILL DIE DOWN

8. BOTH SCHUSTER AND KISCHLAT WERE HOPEFUL THAT THE ISSUE WOULD SIMPLY DIE DOWN AS OFFICIAL BONN PREPARES FOR CARNEVAL, BUT THEY WERE ALSO CONCERNED THAT LAMBSDORFF WOULD USE RUEHE'S STATEMENTS AS AN OCCASION TO TRY TO HARDEN THE FDP'S POSITION. (THEY BELIEVE THAT MANY YOUNGER MEMBERS OF THE FDP PARLIAMENTARY GROUP MIGHT SIDE WITH THE CDU IN A SHOWDOWN IF LAMBSDORFF AND GENSCHER ARE NOT ABLE TO "CAPTURE" THE FDP ON THE ISSUE.) BOTH SCHUSTER AND KISCHLAT THOUGHT KINKEL WOULD NOT EXPRESS HIMSELF PUBLICLY AT THIS TIME ON RUEHE'S COMMENTS.

 CHANCELLERY'S RECOMMENDATION TO KOHL
 AND WHAT THE CHANCELLOR WILL DO

9. SCHUSTER (STRICTLY PROTECT) TOLD US THAT HIS RECOMMENDATION TO THE CHANCELLOR EMPHASIZED THAT IN NO CASE MUST GERMANY BACK AWAY FROM ITS ALLIANCE COMMITMENT AND ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE NATO AWACS -- EVEN IF IT MEANS AN END TO THE COALITION AND A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER FROM THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (AT THE BEHEST OF THE SPD AND FDP). KISCHLAT, WHO TOOK A SIMILAR POSITION, SAID THAT THE CHANCELLERY HAD MADE ITS RECOMMENDATION BUT IN THE END THE DECISION WOULD BE MADE BY THE CHANCELLOR, PROBABLY IN A MEETING WITH KINKEL AND RUEHE PRIOR TO A CABINET MEETING,
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 BONN 04562
 STATE FOR EUR/RPM AND EUR/CE
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, NATO, UN, US, GM, OVIP (RUEHE, VOLKER)
 SUBJECT: RUEHE USES U.S. TRIP TO REVISIT THE DOMESTIC
 - DEBATE OVER AWACS AND THE BOSNIAN NO-FLY-ZONE
 AND ONLY WHEN THE ISSUE WAS ACUTE. KISCHLAT SAID THE CHANCELLOR'S PREFERENCE FOR CONTINUED GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN AWACS MISSIONS HAD NOT WEAKENED, BUT HE CAUTIONED (ON A PERSONAL BASIS) THAT ONE COULD NOT PREDICT IN ADVANCE HOW KOHL WOULD HANDLE THE MATTER. MUCH WOULD DEPEND ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE TIME, AND KOHL'S PERSONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS. COMMENT: DESPITE THESE BRAVE WORDS, AND THE EVIDENT ENTHUSIASM OF THE CDU/CSU PARLIAMENTARY GROUP, WE HAVE HAD INDICATIONS FROM SEVERAL OTHER KNOWLEDGABLE CONTACTS THAT KOHL IS IN FACT GOING TO BE VERY CAUTIOUS ON THIS ISSUE AND DOES NOT/WANT TO PRECIPITATE A COALITION CRISIS OVER IT. END COMMENT.

 THE CHANCELLERY'S REASONING

10. SCHUSTER AND KISHLAT OUTLINED TWO BASIC WORST-CASE SCENARIOS IF THE AWACS ISSUE BECOMES ACUTE (I.E. IF A NATO DECISION IS IMMINENT):

-- THE COALITION HOLDS AND THE SPD SUES AGAIN IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AT KARLSRUHE, OR
 -- THE COALITION BREAKS UP (AND BOTH THE SPD AND THE FDP SUE).

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11. SCHUSTER AND KISCHLAT SEE NO INCENTIVE FOR THE SPD TO GO BEYOND ITS CURRENT POSITION OF GERMAN PARTICIPATION ONLY IN WHAT THE SPD CALLS "BLUE HELMETS PLUS" -- I.E., UN PEACEKEEPING AND A LIMITED CATEGORY OF UN-RUN PEACEMAKING ACTIONS. (POLOFFS GOT CONFIRMATION OF THIS ASSESSMENT FROM SPD BUNDESTAG MEMBER GUENTER VERHEUGEN AS RECENTLY AS FEBRUARY 12, AND VERHEUGEN SAID HE HAD JUST HEARD IT FROM PARTY CHAIRMAN ENGHOLM AND PARLIAMENTARY GROUP CHIEF KLOSE.) IN THE CHANCELLERY'S VIEW, THE SPD WILL CONSEQUENTLY HAVE NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE BUT TO SEEK A RESTRAINING ORDER IF THE GOVERNMENT DECIDES TO GO FORWARD WITH GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN AWACS ENFORCEMENT.

12. SCHUSTER AND KISCHLAT BELIEVE THAT THE COURT WILL HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE OTHER THAN TO ISSUE THE RESTRAINING ORDER, EVEN THOUGH THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT THE COURT WOULD EVENTUALLY DECIDE THAT SUCH ACTIONS ARE CONSISTENT WITH CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW PRACTICE. SCHUSTER NOTED THAT NO CHANCELLOR SINCE ADENAUER HAS RISKED A RESTRAINING ORDER FROM THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, BUT THOUGHT THERE WAS NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE NOW SINCE THERE IS NO PROSPECT OF A POLITICAL COMPROMISE. THE PUBLIC WOULD PERCEIVE A RESTRAINING ORDER AS AN INDICATION THAT THE COURT THOUGHT THE GOVERNMENT'S DECISION UNCONSTITUTIONAL, EVEN THOUGH THE COURT WOULD EVENTUALLY RULE IN THE GOVERNMENT'S FAVOR. HOWEVER, SCHUSTER ARGUED, IT WOULD BE BETTER TO GO THROUGH THESE DIFFICULT MONTHS THIS YEAR THAN NEXT YEAR (WHEN THE GOVERNMENT WILL BE IN THE MIDST OF STATE AND FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS).

13. KISCHLAT ADDED THAT EVEN IF THE COALITION BROKE UP, A NEW GOVERNMENT COULD NOT BE FORMED AGAINST KOHL'S WISHES UNLESS IT HAD THE SUPPORT OF THE FORMER COMMUNIST PDS -- WHICH NEITHER FDP NOR SPD WOULD SEEK OR ACCEPT. THUS, SHOULD THE COALITION BREAK UP, KOHL WOULD REMAIN CARETAKER CHANCELLOR OF A MINORITY GOVERNMENT UNTIL THE 1994 ELECTION (OR ALL THE PARTIES AGREED ON A NEW ELECTION DATE), WHEN HE

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, NATO, UN, US, GM, OVIP (RUEHE, VOLKER)

SUBJECT: RUEHE USES U.S. TRIP TO REVISIT THE DOMESTIC

- DEBATE OVER AWACS AND THE BOSNIAN NO-FLY-ZONE WOULD CAMPAIGN ON THE ALLIANCE ISSUE (AS HE TOLD SECDEF AT WEHRKUNDE). COMMENT: A NUMBER OF POLITICAL INSIDERS DISAGREE WITH KISCHLAT ON THIS POINT, ARGUING THAT A MINORITY KOHL GOVERNMENT WOULD BE BLOCKED AT EVERY POLITICAL TURN, AND EARLY ELECTIONS WOULD BE INEVITABLE. WE WILL ADDRESS THE CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THIS IN AN UPCOMING CABLE. END COMMENT.

14. SCHUSTER AND KISCHLAT SPECULATED THAT THE FDP'S DECISION WOULD DEPEND ON THE PRECISE FORM OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL'S MANDATE. IF THE ENFORCEMENT DID NOT INVOLVE BOMBING AIRPLANES ON THE GROUND -- FOR EXAMPLE -- KINKEL AND THE FDP MIGHT FIND SOME WAY TO GO ALONG WITH IT. HOWEVER, THE CHANCELLERY'S RECOMMENDATION TO KOHL WAS THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT TRY TO HIDE BEHIND A LEGALISTIC ARGUMENT THAT THE USE OF NATO AWACS WOULD NOT BE A "DEPLOYMENT." (NOTE: THIS LEGALISTIC ARGUMENT WAS MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT IN ITS RESPONSE TO THE SPD SUIT TO STOP

BUNDESWEHR PARTICIPATION IN NATO/WEU MONITORING IN THE ADRIATIC).

 FDP: NO SIGN OF A CDU/CSU CHANGE

15. OUR INITIAL SOUNDINGS WITH THE FDP AND THE FOREIGN OFFICE PRODUCED NO INDICATION THAT THE FDP WOULD REACT TO RUEHE'S COMMENTS. WE UNDERSTAND THAT KINKEL'S REPLY TO THE SECRETARY'S LETTER ON THE YUGOSLAV CONFLICT, WHICH WAS APPROVED ON FEBRUARY 19, SKIRTS THE ISSUE OF NFZ ENFORCEMENT.

16. FDP BUNDESTAG STAFFER HETZKE INITIALLY EXPRESSED PUZZLEMENT OVER RUEHE'S STATEMENTS AND WONDERED WHETHER THEY HAD EITHER BEEN INCORRECTLY REPORTED OR MISINTERPRETED BY JOURNALISTS. THE FDP'S POSITION ON THIS ISSUE, HE SAID, WAS WELL KNOWN AND WAS NOT GOING TO CHANGE IF NFZ ENFORCEMENT DREW CLOSER TO REALITY. IF THERE WERE TO BE A COALITION CRISIS, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE BECAUSE THE CDU/CSU INSTIGATED IT. WHEN WE ASKED HETZKE WHETHER HE HAD SEEN ANY SIGN THAT THE CDU/CSU WAS NOW READY TO MAKE THIS A MAKE-OR-BREAK ISSUE, HE FLATLY STATED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO SIGN OF SUCH SENTIMENTS IN THE CDU/CSU.

17. KISCHLAT AND SCHUSTER EXPRESSED DOUBT THAT THE FDP STILL COUNTED ON THE RUSSIANS TO BLOCK ENFORCEMENT OF THE BOSNIAN NFZ. MORE CRUCIAL IN THE CHANCELLERY'S VIEW IS THE ATTITUDE OF THE BRITISH AND FRENCH, WHO HAVE TROOPS ON THE GROUND. (SEE KINKEL'S COMMENTS TO HURD IN REF A, AND GENSCHER'S REQUEST FOR A READ-OUT ON AMBASSADOR BARTHOLOMEW'S DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW IN REF B.)

 SPD: A TRIAL BALLOON FROM ENGHOLM?

18. THE SPD HAS ALSO NOT REACTED. A FEBRUARY 1 DPA ARTICLE REPORTS THAT ENGHOLM HAS SAID THE BUNDESWEHR WOULD HAVE TO PARTICIPATE IN UN COMBAT MISSIONS IN THE FUTURE, BUT FIRST THE ISSUE OF PARTICIPATION WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT IN DISCUSSIONS AMONG THE POLITICAL PARTIES. KISCHLAT NOTED THAT ENGHOLM'S REPORTED READINESS TO CONTEMPLATE COMBAT MISSIONS WAS NEW, BUT THE ACCOMPANYING CAVEAT ONLY REPEATED THE SPD'S LONGSTANDING POSITION. WE
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 05 OF 05 BONN 04562
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, NATO, UN, US, GM, OVIP (RUEHE, VOLKER)

SUBJECT: RUEHE USES U.S. TRIP TO REVISIT THE DOMESTIC
 - DEBATE OVER AWACS AND THE BOSNIAN NO-FLY-ZONE
 CONFIRMED WITH THE SPD THE GIST OF ENGHOLM'S COMMENT, BUT (AS ONE MIGHT EXPECT) THERE WAS NO FURTHER ELUCIDATION.

 COMMENT

19. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT KOHL OR THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT WILL MAKE A DECISION ON GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN NATO AWACS ENFORCEMENT OF THE BOSNIAN NFZ UNTIL IT HAS TO, DESPITE RUEHE'S EFFORT TO REMIND EVERYONE THAT THE ISSUE MAY COME UP SOONER RATHER THAN LATER. WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT THERE WILL BE A STRONG EFFORT TO KEEP THE COALITION TOGETHER, EVEN THOUGH THERE IS STILL A FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE OF

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OPINION BETWEEN THE CDU/CSU AND FDP COALITION PARTNERS. THE AWACS ISSUE MAY IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS BE JUDGED NOT SUFFICIENTLY COMPELLING (AS A CONTRIBUTION TO RESOLVING THE CONFLICT) TO JUSTIFY BREAKING UP THE COALITION, DESPITE WHAT OUR CHANCELLERY INTERLOCUTORS HAVE TOLD US. INDEED, WE BELIEVE THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL THINK LONG AND HARD BEFORE PROVOKING A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER FROM THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT. HOWEVER, WE WOULD NOT EXCLUDE A DECISION BY KOHL TO RISK THE BREAK-UP OF THE COALITION AND A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER IF NO TENABLE WAY OUT COULD BE FOUND -- PARTICULARLY BECAUSE IT WOULD BE EASIER TO RIDE OUT THIS CRISIS THIS YEAR THAN NEXT.

20. IN THIS CONTEXT, CLEAR SIGNALS FROM THE U.S. TO ALL THE PLAYERS ABOUT WHERE WE ARE GOING AND WHAT OUR EXPECTATIONS OF GERMANY ARE WILL BE VERY IMPORTANT. RUEHE HAS SENT BACK A MESSAGE THAT U.S. PATIENCE WITH GERMANY'S EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE OUT-OF-AREA CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE IS RUNNING OUT AND THAT THE UNITED STATES EXPECTS GERMANY TO ASSUME GREATER RESPONSIBILITIES. THE OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES WILL PROBABLY SAY THAT THIS IS WHAT RUEHE WANTED TO HEAR, AND THEY WILL BE LOOKING FOR EVIDENCE THAT WASHINGTON IS NOT SO INSISTENT.

21. U.S. POLICY SHOULD MAINTAIN A FOCUS ON THE LONGER-TERM SHIFT THAT HAS BEGUN IN GERMAN OOA POLICY. WE CAN FACILITATE THAT CHANGE BY MAKING CLEAR OUR VIEWS PRIVATELY TO THE SPECTRUM OF GERMAN LEADERSHIP. A HIGH-PROFILE PUBLIC STANCE WOULD BE MUCH RISKIER -- ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE POLITICAL STAKES -- AS WOULD U.S. ACTIONS THAT COULD TURN NFZ ENFORCEMENT INTO THE LITMUS TEST OF GERMANY'S ALLIANCE LOYALTY. IN CONSIDERING OUR NFZ OPTIONS, WE HAVE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE RISKS OF BRINGING DOWN THE KOHL GOVERNMENT. WE SHOULD BE SURE THAT OUR OTHER ALLIES AND UN PARTNERS SUPPORT THE OPTION, AND THAT THE OPTION WILL MAKE A DECISIVE CONTRIBUTION TOWARD ENDING THE CONFLICT, BEFORE ASSUMING THOSE RISKS.

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LINE3: O 230221Z FEB 93
LINE4: FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
DTG: 230221Z FEB 93
ORIG: USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4585
INFO: RUFHZG/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 0461
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUFHBE/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 0493
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUFHSK/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0291
RUFHMB/USMISSION USVIENNA PRIORITY 0413
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0378
RUCBSAA/USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA
SUBJ: CGYOOL: AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT DISCUSSES
-- ENFORCEMENT OF THE NO FLY ZONE WITH THE PERM-4
-- PLUS 1
TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ USUN NEW YORK 000794
WHITE HOUSE PASS TO NSC: JCS FOR DIR, DIR J5,
J5/MEAP (COL BATTAGLINI), STOCKHOLM FOR CSCE DEL
USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
CINCLANT FOR POLAD
E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UNSC, UNGA, BK, HR, SR,
SUBJECT: CGYOOL: AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT DISCUSSES
-- ENFORCEMENT OF THE NO FLY ZONE WITH THE PERM-4
-- PLUS 1
REF: STATE 52139
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. DRAWING ON THE TALKING POINTS CONTAINED REFTTEL,
AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT DISCUSSED THE U.S. INITIATIVE ON
ENFORCEMENT OF THE "NO FLY ZONE" OVER BOSNIA WITH THE
OTHER MEMBERS OF THE PERM-4 PLUS SPAIN. UK PERMREP
HANNAY RESPONDED THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE
ENFORCEMENT RESOLUTION AND THE VANCE/OWEN PROCESS WAS
"VERY CRUCIAL". HE EXPLAINED THAT IF THE ENFORCEMENT
RESOLUTION WAS PART OF AN IMPLEMENTATION PACKAGE FOR THE
VANCE/OWEN PLAN, A THIRTY DAY DELAY WAS NOT NECESSARY.
HMG WAS "VERY IMPRESSED" WITH THE IDEA OF AN ENFORCEMENT
RESOLUTION TO IMPLEMENT A VANCE/OWEN AGREEMENT. LONDON
WAS "BAFFLED" HOWEVER, BY AN INTENTION TO PUSH AHEAD
THIS WEEK WITH A FREE STANDING ENFORCEMENT RESOLUTION.
SUCH AN EFFORT WOULD HAVE A NUMBER OF DRAWBACKS. FOR
ONE, IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE WHERE THE VANCE/OWEN

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By VL NARA, Date 8/23/2019

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EFFORT WOULD BE IN THIRTY DAYS. SECOND, IT WOULD PUT AT RISK OUR INITIATIVE TO AIRDROP SUPPLIES IN BOSNIA.

3. RUSSIAN PERMREP VORONTSOV SAID THAT A FREE STANDING ENFORCEMENT RESOLUTION TO GO INTO EFFECT IN 30 DAYS WOULD AMOUNT TO "A BLIND DATE WITH FATE" AS WE DID NOT KNOW WHERE WE WOULD BE IN 30 DAYS. VORONTSOV SAID THAT MOSCOW WOULD PREFER A STRONG SECURITY COUNCIL STATEMENT TO FORCE THE SIDES TO COME TO NEW YORK AND NEGOTIATE. HANNAY SAID THAT HE AGREED THAT THE KEY WAS GETTING THE SIDES TO NEGOTIATE. HE RECOMMENDED THAT THE PRESIDENT AND THE SYG CALL ON THE PARTIES TO COME TO NEW YORK AND NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY. AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT AGREED THAT THIS IDEA HAD MERIT. AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT ADDED THAT WHAT WAS IMPORTANT WAS TO ENERGIZE THE PROCESS. WE WERE AT A SORT OF PLATEAU NOW AND ACTION WAS NEEDED TO SHOW THAT THE COUNCIL WAS ENGAGED AND DETERMINED TO MOVE THE PEACE PROCESS FORWARD.

4. SPANISH PERMREP YANEZ SAID THAT HE HAD NOT RECEIVED ANY REACTION FROM MADRID BUT THAT HE ASSUMED THAT THE SPANISH POSITION WOULD BE CLOSE TO THAT OF THE UK. YANEZ ADDED THAT AN ENFORCEMENT RESOLUTION SHOULD BE PART OF THE VANCE/OWEN EFFORT.

5. FRENCH PERMREP MERIMEE SAID THAT THERE WAS NO MILITARY JUSTIFICATION FOR AN ENFORCEMENT RESOLUTION AT THIS TIME ALTHOUGH IT SENT A POLITICAL SIGNAL. HE AGREED WITH THE OTHERS THAT AN ENFORCEMENT RESOLUTION AT THIS POINT MIGHT COMPLICATE THE AIRDROPS INITIATIVE. AMBASSADOR ALBRIGHT REPEATED THAT WASHINGTON WAS CONCERNED THAT THE COUNCIL MUST DO MORE TO MOVE THE SITUATION FORWARD. HANNAY AGREED, ADDING THAT THE KEY WAS TO GET PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC AND BOSNIAN SERB LEADER KARADZIC TO NEW YORK TO NEGOTIATE.

6. THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE PERM-5 PLUS SPAIN FINALLY AGREED TO A U.S. SUGGESTION THAT THEY DRAFT TWO TEXTS OF AN ENFORCEMENT RESOLUTION -- ONE FOR A FREE STANDING ENFORCEMENT REGIME AND THE OTHER FOR ENFORCEMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF A VANCE/OWEN AGREEMENT. BOTH TEXTS WOULD THEN BE PUT IN BLUE AND GIVEN TO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL. WE WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT WE WERE DETERMINED TO GO AHEAD WITH ONE OR THE OTHER. THE OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE PARTIES WHILE LEAVING OUR OPTIONS OPEN AS TO WHICH RESOLUTION TO PURSUE.

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 0794

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 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 8158
 RUFHBE/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 3472
 RUFHZG/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB PRIORITY 7215
 SUBJ: NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT AND GERMAN OUT-OF-AREA
 POLITICAL DEBATE

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 066346
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, MARR' GM, BK
 SUBJECT: NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT AND GERMAN OUT-OF-AREA
 POLITICAL DEBATE

REF: BONN 4562

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT. THIS IS AN ACTION CABLE.
2. SEVERAL RECENT GERMAN VISITORS TO WASHINGTON, INCLUDING DEFENSE MINISTER RUEHE, FDP CAUCUS DEFENSE POLICY SPOKESMAN WERNER HOYER, AND CDU/CSU CAUCUS DEFENSE POLICY SPOKESMAN PAUL BREUER, HAVE TOLD US THAT THE QUESTION OF PARTICIPATING IN POSSIBLE NATO AWACS ENFORCEMENT OF THE BOSNIAN NO-FLY ZONE COULD RESULT IN A BREAK-UP OF THE COALITION. AT THE SAME TIME, SOME OF THE PUBLIC DISCUSSION IN BONN HAS FOCUSED ON SUPPOSED U.S. "PRESSURE" ON THE FRG TO CONTINUE PARTICIPATING IN THE AWACS OPERATIONS, AND ON GENERAL U.S. "IMPATIENCE" WITH GERMANY'S EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE OUT-OF-AREA QUESTION (NOTABLY RUEHE'S REMARKS REPORTED REFTEL).
3. SUCH SPECULATION IS UNFOUNDED. HOWEVER, ITS EXISTENCE SUGGESTS THAT ANY DOMESTIC POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY OR EVEN TURBULENCE IN GERMANY RESULTING FROM NFZ ENFORCEMENT COULD BE PORTRAYED IN AT LEAST SOME QUARTERS AS HAVING BEEN CAUSED OR CONTRIBUTED TO BY US "PRESSURE" ON GERMANY TO PARTICIPATE OR UNHAPPINESS THAT IT DID NOT. TO AVOID THIS PERCEPTION, WE WANT TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH THE FRG ON TIMING AND STRATEGY OF NFZ ENFORCEMENT MAKING CLEAR THAT WE DO NOT/NOT INTEND TO INTERFERE IN GERMANY'S DOMESTIC

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 By VZ NARA, Date 8/23/2019
 2015-0926-M (1.09)

OUT-OF-AREA DEBATE. ENFORCING THE NFZ REMAINS CRITICAL TO THE UN'S CREDIBILITY. AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO GIVE NFZ ENFORCEMENT A HIGH PRIORITY.

4. ACTION REQUESTED: EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO APPROACH APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS WITH THE FOLLOWING POINTS, LEAVING THEM ALSO AS A NON-PAPER:

BEGIN POINTS:

-- GERMANY HAS PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN EFFORTS TO CONTAIN AND END THE VIOLENCE IN YUGOSLAVIA, AS WELL AS IN EFFORTS TO MITIGATE THE TERRIBLE HUMAN SUFFERING THERE.

-- WE ARE PLEASED THAT THE HUMANITARIAN AIRDROPS HAVE BEEN CARRIED OUT EFFICIENTLY AND WITHOUT ANY INTERFERENCE. GERMAN ASSISTANCE IN THIS OPERATION HAS BEEN GREATLY APPRECIATED.

-- GIVEN THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL DEBATE OVER GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL MILITARY OPERATIONS, WE BELIEVE IT IS IMPERATIVE TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH YOU ON THE ISSUE OF ENFORCEMENT OF THE NO-FLY ZONE OVER BOSNIA.

-- AS SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER HAS STATED, ENFORCING THE NO-FLY ZONE WILL BE CRUCIAL TO THE CONTINUED CREDIBILITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UN-SPONSORED NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

-- NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT WILL OF COURSE REQUIRE CLOSE COORDINATION WITH THOSE COUNTRIES WITH TROOPS ON THE GROUND IN BOSNIA, AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THEM TO ADDRESS THEIR CONCERNS.

-- WE HAVE CLOSELY FOLLOWED THE CURRENT POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE OVER GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL MILITARY OPERATIONS, AND RECOGNIZE THAT THE QUESTION OF GERMAN INVOLVEMENT IN ACTIONS IN YUGOSLAVIA IS PART OF THAT LARGER DEBATE.

-- IF WE GET TO THE POINT WHERE ENFORCEMENT BECOMES NECESSARY AND APPROPRIATE, WE WOULD, OF COURSE, WARMLY WELCOME CONTINUED GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN THE NATO AWACS OPERATION.

-- HOWEVER WE FULLY UNDERSTAND THAT A DECISION ON WHETHER OR NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN NFZ ENFORCEMENT IS YOURS ALONE TO MAKE. WE DO NOT WANT TO BECOME ENGAGED IN WHAT IS A PURELY GERMAN DOMESTIC DEBATE WITH OBVIOUS RAMIFICATIONS FOR THE GOVERNING COALITION.

-- WE LOOK FORWARD TO CONSULTING CLOSELY WITH YOU AS THE NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT ISSUE IS CONSIDERED AT THE UN, AND WILL SUPPORT YOU AS BEST WE CAN IN WHATEVER DECISION THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT FINALLY TAKES ON THIS ISSUE. CHRISTOPHER
BT

#6346
NNNN

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 6346

TOR: 930304235148 M0261215

DIST:

SIT: BLEICKEN HOLL VAX

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Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 081832Z APR 93
LINE4: FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
DTG: 081832Z APR 93
ORIG: USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5746
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUFHBE/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 0682
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RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUFHZG/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 0648
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RUFHSK/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 0465
RUFHMB/USMISSION USVIENNA IMMEDIATE 0686
SUBJ: CGYOOL: NATO TEAM MEETS WITH REPS FROM MEMBER
COUNTRIES ON NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT
TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ USUN NEW YORK 001745
WHITE HOUSE PASS TO NSC; JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN,
DIR JS, DIR J5, STOCKHOLM FOR CSCE DEL
USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE; CINCLANT FOR POLAD;
US POLAD PASS MINISTER PENNER
E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, UNSC, BK, HR, SR
SUBJECT: CGYOOL: NATO TEAM MEETS WITH REPS FROM MEMBER
COUNTRIES ON NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY: THE NATO TEAM MET WITH REPRESENTATIVES
FROM MEMBER COUNTRIES ON APRIL 7 AT USUN TO BRIEF THEM
ON THE STATUS OF NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT AUTHORIZED BY
S/RES 816. END SUMMARY.
3. A SPOKESMAN FOR THE GROUP, GREG SHULTE, STATED THAT
THE TEAM HAD MET WITH USYG KOFI ANNAN AND THE UN OFFICE
OF PEACEKEEPING AFFAIRS TO DISCUSS POINTS OF COOPERATION
BETWEEN NATO AND THE UN. SHULTE ALSO INFORMED THE GROUP
THAT ON APRIL 2 THE NAC APPROVED PHASE 2 OF THE
OPERATION AND WAS NOW READY TO CONSIDER PHASE 3. HE
ADDED THAT THE NAC WILL MEET NEXT WEEK AND PROBABLY SEND
A LETTER TO THE SYG
OUTLINING THE STARTING DATE OF PHASE 3, THOSE COUNTRIES
WHO WILL CONTRIBUTE FORCES, AND AMENDMENTS TO THE MARCH
24 PAPER WITH REGARDS TO THE EXCLUSION OF PHASE 4 AND
LIASON/RESPONSE MECHANISMS WITH UNPROFOR.
4. WITH REGARDS TO PROCEDURAL IMPLEMENTATION, SHULTE

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 20
By RL NARA, Date 8/23/01
2015-0126-M (1.10)

STATED THAT THE UN STRESSED THAT ENFORCEMENT OF THE NO-FLY ZONE PER S/RES 816 DID NOT REQUIRE FURTHER AUTHORIZATION BY THE SYG AND UNPROFOR BUT "COORDINATION", AS THE MANDATE FALLS UNDER CHAPTER 7. THE MOST LIKELY SEQUENCE FOR THE COORDINATION OF PHASE 3 WOULD BE: FIRST, SYGNATO WORNOR WILL SEND A LETTER TO THE UNSYG WHO WOULD THEN PREPARE A REPORT FTR THE SECURITY COUNCIL, THIS APPROACH WOULD ALLOW FOR INPUTS FROM UNPROFOR OR THE UNSYG. THE RESPONSE TIME FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF A UNSC DECISION IS WITHIN 72 HRS. IN THE MEETING WITH ANNAN THE UN CONFIRMED THAT PHASE 4 OF THE OPERATIONS (AIR/GROUND) WAS NOT COVERED UNDER S/RES 816 AND THAT AN ADDITIONAL RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AIR/GROUND OPERATIONS WOULD BE NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT IT.

5. THE EXCLUSION OF PHASE 4 ESSENTIALLY RULES OUT CLOSE AIR SUPPORT OF UNPROFOR BY NATO. IN ADDITION, A NATO TEAM REP ASSERTED THAT THERE WILL BE "NO RETALIATION AGAINST GROUND TARGETS BY NATO AIRCRAFT." HE ADDED THAT THE AIRCRAFT THAT WILL BE USED ARE NOT EVEN CONFIGURED FOR GROUND ATTACK. IN EFFECT, ALTHOUGH S/RES 816 PROVIDES FOR SELF-DEFENSE FROM GROUND ATTACK, THE PLANES WILL ONLY BE ALLOWED AND ABLE TO DEFEND THEMSELVES FROM AIR ATTACK.

6. NATO HAS PROVIDED A MECHANISM BY WHICH NON-NATO COUNTRIES COULD PARTICIPATE BUT THE NATO REP STATED THAT THE CURRENT NATO FORCES WERE ADEQUATE. THE COUNTRIES WHO HAVE ALREADY COMMITTED FORCES ARE AS FOLLOWS: UK, US, FRANCE, SPAIN, THE NETHERLANDS, AND TURKEY.

7. COMMENT: IT HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY ASSUMED THAT ACCORDING TO S/RES 816 AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN ENFORCEMENT OF THE NO-FLY ZONE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO RETALIATE IN SELF-DEFENSE AT GROUND TARGETS, THE NATO TEAM REP HAS SAID THIS WILL NOT BE THE CASE. END COMMENT. ALBRIGHT

BT

#1745

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 1745

TOR: 930408145618 M0330553

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SIT: HOLL RICE SUM SUM2 VAX WITKOWSKY

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 ORIG: AMEMBASSY BONN
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 RUFHZG/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB IMMEDIATE 0287
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 4047
 RUFHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 9419
 RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0335
 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 2678
 RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0165
 RUFHNA/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE IMMEDIATE
 RUDOGHA/USNMR SHAPE BE IMMEDIATE
 RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
 RHFQAAA/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE IMMEDIATE
 RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE IMMEDIATE
 RHFTACP/435TAW RHEIN MAIN AB GE//CC// IMMEDIATE
 RUFRRSHH/USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT IMMEDIATE
 RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK IMMEDIATE
 SUBJ: TFSR01 - BOSNIAN NO-FLY ZONE (NFZ): GERMAN SUPREME
 COURT GIVES GREEN LIGHT FOR GERMANS CREWS TO FLY, BUT
 CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES ON OUT-OF-AREA STILL NOT SETTLED
 TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 BONN 09416
 GENEVA FOR ICFY
 E.O. 12356: N/A
 TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, UN, NATO, AORC, BK, GM
 SUBJECT: TFSR01 - BOSNIAN NO-FLY ZONE (NFZ): GERMAN SUPREME
 COURT GIVES GREEN LIGHT FOR GERMANS CREWS TO FLY, BUT
 CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES ON OUT-OF-AREA STILL NOT SETTLED
 REFS: (A) BONN 9298, (B) BONN 9283, (C) BONN 9129,
 (D) BONN 8996

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

2. IN AN HISTORIC RULING APRIL 8, THE GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL
 COURT REJECTED SUITS BY COALITION PARTNER FDP, AND THE
 OPPOSITION SPD, TO IMPOSE A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER BARRING
 GERMAN AWACS CREWS FROM PARTICIPATING IN NATO'S ENFORCEMENT OF
 THE NFZ OVER BOSNIA WHILE THE COURT DECIDED ON THE

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By VL NARA, Date 8/23/09

2015-0926 - m (1.11)

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CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE AT STAKE. INSTEAD, THE COURT RULED 5-3 THAT PULLING THE CREWS IN THE INTERIM WOULD DO DAMAGE TO GERMANY'S FOREIGN POLICY AND THE COHESION OF NATO. IN ITS 19 PAGE JUDGMENT, READ IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF GREAT SUSPENSE LATE THURSDAY, THE COURT MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE TESTIMONY OF NATO SECRETARY GENERAL MANFRED WOERNER HAD PLAYED A CRITICAL ROLE IN THEIR REJECTION OF THE SUIT.

3. THE COURT'S DECISION IS A CLEAR VICTORY FOR CHANCELLOR HELMUT KOHL. WHILE IT MAY YET DECIDE THAT THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THE CREWS TO EXIT, THE COURT'S PROVISIONAL RULING APPEARS TO REDUCE THE CHANCES THIS WILL HAPPEN. IN AN ATTEMPT TO PUT THE BEST FACE POSSIBLE ON THE DECISION, FOREIGN MINISTER KINKEL (FDP) AND FDP PARLIAMENTARY PARTY CHAIRMAN SOLMS ARE INSISTING THAT THE RULING IS "A FIRST STEP TOWARD CLARIFICATION" OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE, THE GOAL OF THE FDP THROUGHOUT. PRESS COMMENTARY TO DATE IS PORTRAYING THE SDP AS THE LOSER IN THE KARLSRUHE DECISION. SPD THREATS TO REVERSE THE DECISION IN THE BUNDESTAG APPEAR RATHER EMPTY. AT THE END OF THE DAY, THE COURT RULING MAY PROVE TO BE AN HISTORIC MILESTONE IN UNIFIED GERMANY'S EFFORTS TO MAKE THE TRANSITION TO A "NORMAL," ACTIVE ROLE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. END SUMMARY.

THE COURT'S PROVISIONAL RULING

4. IN A BIG VICTORY FOR CHANCELLOR HELMUT KOHL, THE GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT APRIL 8 RULED THAT GERMAN AIR FORCE CREWS MAY REMAIN -- FOR THE TIME BEING -- ON NATO AWACS AIRCRAFT EVEN THOUGH THEY WILL, BEGINNING APRIL 12, BE PARTICIPATING IN A COMBAT MISSION OUTSIDE THE NATO AREA. WHILE REJECTING SUITS BY

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 BONN 09416

GENEVA FOR ICFY

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, UN, NATO, AORC, BK, GM

SUBJECT: TFSR01 - BOSNIAN NO-FLY ZONE (NFZ): GERMAN SUPREME COURT GIVES GREEN LIGHT FOR GERMANS CREWS TO FLY, BUT CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES ON OUT-OF-AREA STILL NOT SETTLED THE FDP AND SPD TO ISSUE A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER PENDING RESOLUTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE, THE COURT DID AGREE TO CONSIDER WHETHER THE CONSTITUTION PROHIBITED GERMAN PARTICIPATION. THERE IS NO TELLING HOW LONG THE COURT WILL TAKE TO REACH A DECISION ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE; ESTIMATES VARY FROM ONE TO SIX MONTHS, AND EVEN LONGER.

5. THE 8-JUDGE PANEL THRASHED OUT ITS RULING BEHIND CLOSED DOORS AFTER CONCLUSION OF THE ORAL HEARINGS APRIL 7 (REF A). THE SECRECY OF THEIR DELIBERATIONS ADDED TO THE SUSPENSE AND FUELED SPECULATION THROUGHOUT GERMAN POLITICAL AND MILITARY CIRCLES. AT 2100, PRESIDING JUDGE MAHRENHOLZ READ THE 19-PAGE RULING TO INTENSE MEDIA COVERAGE. AFTER SKETCHING THE BACKGROUND TO THE CASE, THE JUDGE RECAPITULATED THE FDP AND SPD ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND THEN THOSE IN OPPOSITION FROM THE CDU/CSU, NATO, AND BUNDESWEHR REPRESENTATIVES.

6. BY A 5-3 VOTE, THE JUDGES DETERMINED THE FDP AND SPD HAD FAILED TO MAKE THEIR CASE FOR PULLING THE GERMAN CREWS PENDING A FINAL DETERMINATION ON THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DEPLOYMENT. WITHOUT EVER MENTIONING HIM BY NAME, THE COURT RULED IN FAVOR OF CHANCELLOR KOHL'S POSITION.

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7. THE COURT EMPHASIZED TWO LIMITING FACTORS TO ITS RULING:
-- AT ISSUE WAS THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, WHICH FAILED;
NOT THE DEEPER QUESTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
DEPLOYMENT, WHICH WILL BE DECIDED LATER BY THE SAME JUDGES.
THE COURT GAVE NO INDICATION WHEN IT WOULD MAKE THE LATTER
DETERMINATION, ALTHOUGH COURT OBSERVERS SUGGESTED IT COULD TAKE
BETWEEN 1 AND 6 MONTHS OR LONGER.

-- BY ALLOWING THE GERMAN CREWS TO REMAIN ON BOARD THE AWACS AT
THIS TIME, THE COURT INSISTED THERE WAS NO "PREJUDICE" FOR ITS
LATER DECISION. IF IT LATER RULED THAT THE DEPLOYMENT WAS
INDEED UNCONSTITUTIONAL, THE GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO PULL THE
GERMAN AIRMEN AT THAT POINT.

8. AT THE HEART OF THE APRIL 8 RULING WAS A CAREFUL WEIGHING
OF TWO SCENARIOS INVOLVING DIFFERENT RISKS TO GERMAN FOREIGN
POLICY:

-- GRANTING THE RESTRAINING ORDER, THEREBY FORCING THE
GOVERNMENT TO PULL THE GERMAN CREWS, ONLY TO HAVE THE LATER
CONSTITUTIONAL DETERMINATION GO IN FAVOR OF THE DEPLOYMENT;
VERSUS,

-- REJECTING THE RESTRAINING ORDER, THEREBY ALLOWING THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 BONN 09416

GENEVA FOR ICFY

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, UN, NATO, AORC, BK, GM

SUBJECT: TFSR01 - BOSNIAN NO-FLY ZONE (NFZ): GERMAN SUPREME
COURT GIVES GREEN LIGHT FOR GERMANS CREWS TO FLY, BUT
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES ON OUT-OF-AREA STILL NOT SETTLED
GERMANS CREWS TO FLY, ONLY TO HAVE THE LATER CONSTITUTIONAL
DETERMINATION GO AGAINST THE DEPLOYMENT.

9. REASONING FROM APRIL 7 PRESENTATIONS BY SENIOR GOVERNMENT,
NATO AND OPPOSITION SPOKESPERSONS, THE COURT DECIDED THAT THE
FIRST SCENARIO WOULD BE MORE DAMAGING TO THE COUNTRY. INDEED,
SUCH A TURN OF EVENTS WOULD CAUSE "IRREPARABLE DAMAGE" TO
GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS AND LEAD TO A CRISIS OF
CONFIDENCE AMONG NATO PARTNERS IN GERMAN INTERNATIONAL
RELIABILITY. HERE, THE COURT FOUND THE TESTIMONY OF NATO
GENERAL SECRETARY WOERNER PERSUASIVE. IT ENDORSED WOERNER'S
IMPLICIT ARGUMENT (REF A) THAT PULLING THE GERMAN CREWS WOULD
CRIPPLE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AWACS MISSION AND NATO
COHESION.

10. FURTHER, THE COURT ACCEPTED THE GIST OF THE TESTIMONY FROM
BUNDESWEHR INSPECTOR NAUMANN AND AWACS COMMANDER GENERAL EHMANN
THAT GERMAN AIRMEN WERE NOT IN GRAVE DANGER FROM THE
DEPLOYMENT. CONSEQUENTLY, THE GERMAN PUBLIC WELFARE WAS NOT AT
RISK.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

11. CHARGE SPOKE WITH THE CHANCELLERY OPERATIONS CENTER LATE
APRIL 8. KOHL'S FOREIGN POLICY ADVISERS WERE ELATED, BUT DID
NOT WANT TO TRUMPET THE DECISION IN A WAY THAT WOULD COMPLICATE
PROSPECTS FOR THE FDP TO SAVE FACE AND REJOIN A COALITION
CONSENSUS ON THIS ISSUE. SPEAKING FOR THE GOVERNMENT ON
NATIONAL TV, DEFENSE MINISTER RUEHE WELCOMED THE DECISION AS A
KEY COURT CONTRIBUTION TO ASSISTING GERMANY MEET ITS
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES. RUEHE EMPHASIZED IN HIS
STATEMENT THE EXPECTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THAT
GERMANY WOULD MEET ITS OBLIGATIONS TO HELP RESOLVE THE CRISIS

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IN BOSNIA.

FDP REACTION

12. SETTING THE SCENE: THE FDP HAD SAID THAT WHILE IT SUPPORTS THE CABINET DECISION TO PARTICIPATE IN NATO ENFORCEMENT OF THE NFZ, THE CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS SUCH ACTIVITY. IT HAD ASKED THE COURT, IN EFFECT, TO CONFIRM OR REJECT THE FDP POSITION. IF CONFIRMED, THE FDP ARGUED, THE CONSTITUTION MUST BE AMENDED TO PERMIT SUCH DEPLOYMENTS. IF THE COURT REJECTED THE FDP POSITION, THE FDP WOULD RESPECT THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 04 OF 05 BONN 09416

GENEVA FOR ICFY

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, UN, NATO, AORC, BK, GM

SUBJECT: TFSR01 - BOSNIAN NO-FLY ZONE (NFZ): GERMAN SUPREME COURT GIVES GREEN LIGHT FOR GERMANS CREWS TO FLY, BUT CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES ON OUT-OF-AREA STILL NOT SETTLED COURT'S DECISION. THE FDP POSITION HAD MET WITH GROWING SKEPTICISM -- SOMETIMES APPROACHING RIDICULE -- BY THE PRESS AND PUBLIC HERE.

13. POST-DECISION SPINS: FDP LEADERS, IN A CAREFULLY ORCHESTRATED RESPONSE TO THE COURT DECISION, HAVE EMBRACED IT, THEREBY ENDING SPECULATION OF A BREAK IN THE COALITION AND ATTEMPTING TO STEM THE GROWING PERCEPTION OF FDP INCOHERENCE. FDP PARLIAMENTARY PARTY CHAIRMAN SOLMS SAID IN A TELEVISION INTERVIEW THAT THE THE DECISION CONSTITUTED A "FIRST STEP TOWARD CLARITY," WHICH WAS THE GOAL OF THE FDP ALL ALONG. FM KINKEL ECHOED AND ELABORATED THIS LINE IN A PRESS CONFERENCE. "POLITICALLY SPEAKING," HE SAID, "THE FDP ALWAYS WANTED" PARTICIPATION OF GERMAN CREWS IN THE ENFORCEMENT ACTION. "AS FOREIGN MINISTER" HE HAD TOLD THE COURT APRIL 7 THAT PULLING THE CREWS "WOULD RESULT IN ALLIANCE AND FOREIGN POLICY DAMAGE" TO GERMANY. FOR THIS REASON, HE SAID, "I AM GRATEFUL FOR THIS DECISION."

14. HOWEVER, KINKEL CONTINUED, IT WAS THE LEGAL ISSUE THAT CAUSED THE FDP TO OPPOSE THE COALITION POLICY, NOT THE POLITICAL. ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT EMPHASIZE THE POINT, THE FDP POSITION REMAINS THAT THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PERMIT THE DEPLOYMENT OF GERMAN CREWS ON AIRCRAFT ENFORCING THE NFZ.

SPD

15. THE SPD'S CHIEF SPOKESMAN FOR ITS SUIT, GUENTHER VERHEUGEN, EXPRESSED THE PARTY'S DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE COURT'S DECISION, BUT QUICKLY MOVED TO TRY TO KEEP ALIVE THE ISSUE OF INTERIM GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN THE NFZ ENFORCEMENT. VERHEUGEN SAID THE SPD MIGHT RAISE (IN A THREATENED SPECIAL SESSION OF THE BUNDESTAG DURING THE CURRENT EASTER RECESS) THE ISSUE OF WHETHER GERMAN CREWS SHOULD REMAIN IN THE AWACS WHILE THE POSSIBILITY REMAINED THAT A FURTHER COURT RULING COULD EFFECT THEIR REMOVAL. HE SAID THAT THE FDP, TO BE CONSISTENT, WOULD HAVE TO VOTE WITH THE SPD. (HOWEVER, IN A JOINT TV INTERVIEW APRIL 8, SOLMS REAFFIRMED THAT THE FDP WOULD RESPECT THE COURT'S INTERIM JUDGMENT, AND ITS DEPUTIES WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE SPD BAIT IN THE BUNDESTAG.)

SYG WOERNER

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 16. PRESS REPORTS HERE INDICATE THAT WOERNER HAS WELCOMED

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 05 OF 05 BONN 09416

GENEVA FOR ICFY

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, UN, NATO, AORC, BK, GM

SUBJECT: TFSR01 - BOSNIAN NO-FLY ZONE (NFZ): GERMAN SUPREME COURT GIVES GREEN LIGHT FOR GERMANS CREWS TO FLY, BUT CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES ON OUT-OF-AREA STILL NOT SETTLED "WITH SATISFACTION AND RELEF" THE COURT DECISION. AGAIN EQUATING GERMAN ACTION WITH ALLIANCE COHESION, A NATO SPOKESMAN IN BRUSSELS TOLD JOURNALISTS THAT THE COURT HAD ACTED IN THE INTERESTS OF THE UN PEACE MISSION, AND THAT THE ALLIANCE COULD NOW FULFILL ITS MANDATE.

 COMMENT

17. IN DENYING A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER THAT WOULD PULL THE CREWS WHILE THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE IS ADDRESSED, THE COURT HAS EXPLICITLY ENDORSED A SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL-STRATEGIC ARGUMENT -- THAT BY PULLING THE CREWS GERMANY WOULD HAVE BEEN ISOLATING ITSELF IRRESPONSIBLY FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY'S EFFORTS IN BOSNIA. HAVING TAKEN SUCH A POSITION, THE COURT HAS CREATED SOME POLITICAL-LEGAL EXPECTATION THAT ITS DECISION ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE WILL ALSO LEGITIMATE GERMAN PARTICIPATION ON AWACS. (WE WILL RESEARCH FURTHER THE COURT'S TRACK RECORD FOR MAKING DECISIONS ON THE MERITS THAT RUN COUNTER TO ITS EARLIER DECISION ON A REQUESTED RESTRAINING ORDER.) HOWEVER, ITS STRONG STATEMENT THAT THE PROVISIONAL RULING DOES NOT PREJUDGE THE SUBSTANTIVE DECISION MUST BE TAKEN AT FACE VALUE; IT REMAINS POSSIBLE THAT GERMAN CREWS COULD BE PULLED.

17. WITH THIS RULING, THE 8 JUDGES ENDED ONE OF THE MOST UNUSUAL POLITICAL EPISODES IN THE COUNTRY'S HISTORY. THE OUTCOME IS HISTORIC: IT ALLOWS BUNDESWEHR SOLDIERS TO PARTICIPATE IN COMBAT MISSIONS OUTSIDE OF NATO FOR THE FIRST TIME. PUBLIC AND MEDIA ATTENTION HAS BEEN RIVETED MORE ON THE ODD CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE -- THAT OF A GOVERNMENT IN EFFECT SUING ITSELF AND A FOREIGN MINISTER ADMITTING THAT HE GOT A "STOMACHACHE" FROM SEEKING TO HALT A POLICY HE SUPPORTED. NATIONAL COMMENTATORS, NOTING THE HUGE RELIEF FELT BY POLITICIANS, HAVE NONETHELESS RIDICULED THEM FOR PUNTING A POLITICAL FOOTBALL TO THE KARLSRUHE COURT. OBLIGINGLY, THE JUDGES WADED INTO THE POLITICAL CONTROVERSY AND, IN THEIR 19-PAGE RULING, SET WHAT MAY PROVE TO BE AN EXTRAORDINARY MILESTONE ON GERMANY'S NATIONAL PATH TO ACCEPTING GREATER INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.

KIMMITT

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#9416

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 05

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SSN: 9416

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PRT: WALKER
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CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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OSRI: RUEHAK
DTG: 161805Z APR 93
ORIG: AMEMBASSY ANKARA
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RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1234
RUFHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 4154
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0500
RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE//POLAD IMMEDIATE
RUFNBOA/USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT//INTAFF IMMEDIATE
RUFQCSA/USNMR SHAPE BE//INTAFF IMMEDIATE
RHFQAAA/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GM//POLAD IMMEDIATE
SUBJ: ERALP DISCUSSES IMBROGLIO OVER TURKISH
- NO-FLY-ZONE PARTICIPATION WITH AMBASSADOR
TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ANKARA 04865
EXDIS
FOR A/S OXMAN FROM THE AMBASSADOR
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, TU, GR, RS, FR, UK
SUBJECT: ERALP DISCUSSES IMBROGLIO OVER TURKISH
- NO-FLY-ZONE PARTICIPATION WITH AMBASSADOR
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. MFA DIRECTOR-GENERAL FOR MUTUAL SECURITY (NATO)
AMBASSADOR YALIM ERALP JUST PROVIDED ME WITH A READING
OF THE STATE-OF-PLAY REGARDING TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN
ENFORCING THE BOSNIA NO-FLY-ZONE. AS I WAS COMING OUT
OF A MEETING WITH FM CETIN AND AMB. MARESCA AT 1930 HRS
LOCAL APRIL 16, ERALP TOLD ME THAT THE FRENCH PERMREP AT
NATO HAS TAKEN A FIRM POSITION IN OPPOSITION TO TURKISH
PARTICIPATION IN THE BOSNIAN NFZ. THE STATED GROUNDS
FOR THE FRENCH REQUEST WERE THAT TURKISH PARTICIPATION
WOULD ENDANGER SOME 300 FRENCH PEACEKEEPERS ON THE
GROUND IN SARAJEVO, WHOM THE GOF IS PLANNING TO EVACUATE
SHORTLY. FURTHER, THE TURKS UNDERSTAND THAT GREECE IS
ASKING RUSSIA TO INTERCEDE AT THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL,
TO HAVE THAT BODY MOVE TO BAR TURKISH PARTICIPATION.
ERALP EMPHASIZED THAT THE GOT HAD HANDLED THIS ENTIRE
MATTER WITH THE UTMOST DISCRETION, RESPECTING THE WISHES
OF NATO SEC GEN WOERNER AND SACEUR GENERAL SHALIKASHVILI
THAT THE GOT PROVIDE BACKUP AIRCRAFT FOR THE NFZ
REGIME. THE PRESENT REQUEST IS FOR TURKEY TO CONTRIBUTE

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By VL NARA, Date 8/23/09

2015-0926-m (1.12)

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18 OF THE 72 ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT NOW SOUGHT BY NATO, BEYOND THOSE ALREADY BEING OPERATED BY THE U.S., FRANCE AND THE NETHERLANDS.

3. I TOLD ERALP THIS CONCERN WOULD LOGICALLY BE A SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION DURING THE PLANNED APRIL 18-19 VISIT TO TURKEY OF GREEK FM PAPAKONSTANIOU. ERALP SAID HE THOUGHT THAT THIS VISIT NOW PROBABLY WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE, SINCE THE GREEK WOULD NOT WISH TO BE SEEN TO BE MEETING WITH TURKEY AT A MOMENT WHEN HIS COUNTRY WAS REACTING SO NEGATIVELY TO THE PROPOSED TURKISH ROLE IN BOSNIA NFZ ENFORCEMENT. NOR, ERALP ADDED, WOULD THE TURKS BE PARTICULARLY PLEASED TO SEE THE GREEK FM, IN VIEW OF THE LATEST GREEK DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES AT BRUSSELS AND NEW YORK.

4. COMMENT: OBVIOUSLY IT WOULD BE AN ENORMOUS POLITICAL SETBACK FOR THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT IF SOMEHOW THIS NOW-PUBLIC INITIATIVE OF THE NATO SEC-GEN WERE TO BE TURNED OFF, AT GREEK OR FRENCH INSISTENCE. AT THE VERY LEAST, IT WOULD FURTHER INFLAME AN ALREADY VOLATILE AND SENSITIZED TURKISH PUBLIC OPINION. PUBLIC FRUSTRATION AT TURKEY'S LACK OF INVOLVEMENT IN THE BOSNIA CRISIS HAS PUT VERY HEAVY PRESSURE ON THIS GOVERNMENT, WHICH WE FEEL HAS RESPONDED--TO DATE--WITH ADMIRABLE RESTRAINT. PM DEMIREL'S GOVERNMENT HARDLY NEEDS ANOTHER FOREIGN POLICY SETBACK, WHEN THE KELBAJAR CRISIS IN THE CAUCASUS IS ADDING SEVERE STRAINS ON HIS FRAGILE COALITION.

BARKLEY

BT

#4865

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 4865

TOR: 930416221721 M0344263

DIST:

PRT: SIT WALKER WIKOWSKY

SIT: BLEICKEN HOLL SUM SUM2 VAX WAYNE

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SIT: WITKOWSKY

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Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LINE1: OAACZYUW RUFHNAA1796 1071443-CCCC--RHEHAAX.

LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH

LINE3: O 171443Z APR 93

LINE4: FM USMISSION USNATO

OSRI: RUFHNA

DTG: 171443Z APR 93

ORIG: USMISSION USNATO

TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3331

INFO: RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
 RUFNBOA/USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT//INTAF//
 RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//POLAD//
 RUCBSAA/USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA//POLAD//
 RUSNTCA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//POLAD//
 RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE//INTAF//
 RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA 0053
 RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//POLAD//
 RUFHZG/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 0515
 ZEN/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE

SUBJ: CGY001: CHARGE'S MEETING WITH SYG WOERNER RE
 FRENCH OPPOSITION TO TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN
 NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 USNATO 001796
 EXDIS - MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 STATE FOR EUR, S/RB, S/NIS, PM AND IO
 STATE ALSO PASS NSC FOR WALKER;
 SECDEF FOR USDP, ADUSP(REE) AND ASD/ISP;
 JCS FOR GEN. MCCAFFREY
 USUN FOR GREY
 PRAGUE PASS TO DCM EVANS FOR CHARGE VERSHBOW
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: NATO, PREL, MARR, BK, SR, HR, UN
 SUBJECT: CGY001: CHARGE'S MEETING WITH SYG WOERNER RE
 FRENCH OPPOSITION TO TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN
 NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT
 REF: A) USNATO 1793; B) USNATO 1636
 1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
 2. SUMMARY: SECRETARY GENERAL WOERNER CALLED IN
 ----- THE CHARGE SATURDAY MORNING, APRIL 17 TO
 EXCHANGE VIEWS ON FRANCE'S REQUEST THE PREVIOUS DAY
 THAT WOERNER DIRECT SACEUR TO RESCIND HIS ORDER FOR
 TURKISH AIRCRAFT TO DEPLOY TO ITALY FOR PARTICIPATION
 IN NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT. WOERNER SAID THE FRENCH
 REQUEST WAS UNACCEPTABLE AND HE WOULD NOT AGREE TO IT
 UNLESS THE ALLIANCE FORCED HIM TO DO SO. HE SAID HE
 WOULD TELL FRENCH AMBASSADOR BLOT IN A MEETING LATER
 THAT MORNING THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO INFORM THE UN THAT

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By 17 NARA, Date 8/23/06

705-0926-m (1.13)

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TURKISH AND UK AIRCRAFT WERE DEPLOYING TO ITALY.
(NOTE: MISSION UNDERSTANDS WOERNER ALSO PLANNED TO MEET WITH THE GREEK AND TURKISH PERMREPS.) WOERNER SAID HE WAS PARTICULARLY UPSET THAT THE FRENCH NATO MISSION HAD CLEARLY BEEN WORKING CLOSELY WITH THE RUSSIAN EMBASSY TO ENLIST SUPPORT FOR FRENCH OPPOSITION TO TURKISH PARTICIPATION.

3. WOERNER SAID THE FRENCH WERE FREE TO WORK FOR UN DISAPPROVAL OF TURKISH PARTICIPATION -- WHICH THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY SOUGHT AND FAILED TO ACHIEVE -- BUT THAT NATO COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO DENY ONE OF ITS MEMBERS THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN ONE OF ITS OPERATIONS. HE ADDED THAT TO DENY PARTICIPATION TO NATO'S ONLY "MOSLEM MEMBER," ON TOP OF THE WEST'S REFUSAL TO GIVE THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS THE MEANS TO DEFEND THEMSELVES, WOULD IN EFFECT ACCORD THE SERBS A VETO OVER NATO POLICY.

4. CHARGE BEECROFT TOLD WOERNER THAT THE U.S. SUPPORTED NATO'S DECISION TO INCLUDE TURKISH AIRCRAFT IN THE OPERATION. WE SAW THAT DECISION AS PROCEEDING FROM A NAC CONSENSUS WHICH HAD BEEN NOTED BY THE UNSC, AND WHICH WOULD REQUIRE ANOTHER NAC CONSENSUS TO REVERSE. HE NOTED THAT WOERNER'S APRIL 8 LETTER TO UNSYG BOUTROS-GHALI HAD DESCRIBED THE INITIAL PHASE OF ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS (DEPLOYING U.S., DUTCH, AND FRENCH AIRCRAFT) IN TERMS OF BEGINNING THE OPERATION ON TIME, NOT THE SELECTION OF PARTICIPANTS, AND THAT THE UNSC HAD NOTED THE FULL LIST OF PARTICIPANTS WITHOUT COMMENT. BEECROFT ALSO SAID THAT WHILE USNATO HAD HEARD RUMORS THAT SOME UN OFFICIALS HAD UNDERSTOOD NATO STAFF MEMBERS TO SAY THAT TURKISH PARTICIPATION WAS NOT IN THE CARDS, WE WERE UNAWARE OF ANY SUCH "GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT." WOERNER SAID HE STRONGLY DOUBTED THAT NATO STAFF WOULD HAVE MADE SUCH A STATEMENT, WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN CONTRARY TO HIS INSTRUCTIONS.

5. IN A SUBSEQUENT MEETING WITH WOERNER (PLEASE HOLD THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION VERY CLOSELY), FRENCH AMBASSADOR BLOT LEFT THE SYG WITH THE DISTINCT IMPRESSION THAT FRANCE HAD RECEIVED PRIVATE ASSURANCES THAT NATO'S LISTING OF TURKISH FORCES HAD REFLECTED A POLITICAL GESTURE, BUT THAT IT HAD NOT/NOT BEEN INTENDED THAT THEY BE INTEGRATED INTO THE OPERATION. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO THIS. BLOT INSISTED THAT OPERATIONALIZING TURKISH PARTICIPATION WOULD REQUIRE A FURTHER "POLITICAL DECISION." AS A POSSIBLE "COMPROMISE" BLOT WAS PREPARED TO SUGGEST TO HIS AUTHORITIES, NATO WOULD CONSULT WITH UN HEADQUARTERS AND UNPROFOR, ELICITING EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN THAT WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF STOPPING THE TURKISH PLANES FROM FLYING. IN THIS MANNER, SAID BLOT, IT WOULD BE THE UN, NOT NATO, WHICH PREVENTED TURKISH PARTICIPATION.

6. WOERNER HAS INDICATED HIS INTENTION TO INFORM THE UN EARLY NEXT WEEK THAT UK AND TURKISH AIRCRAFT ARE NOW
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 USNATO 001796
EXDIS - MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
STATE FOR EUR, S/RB, S/NIS, PM AND IO
STATE ALSO PASS NSC FOR WALKER;
SECDEF FOR USDP, ADUSP(REE) AND ASD/ISP;

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JCS FOR GEN. MCCAFFREY
USUN FOR GREY
PRAGUE PASS TO DCM EVANS FOR CHARGE VERSHBOW
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: NATO, PREL, MARR, BK, SR, HR, UN
SUBJECT: CGYO01: CHARGE'S MEETING WITH SYG WOERNER RE
FRENCH OPPOSITION TO TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN
NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT
BEING DEPLOYED TO ITALY. WOERNER WILL NOT/NOT HOLD UP
THE DEPLOYMENT TO ITALY, WHICH WILL BEGIN APRIL 19 BUT
IS LIKELY TO TAKE SEVERAL DAYS, AND HE WILL HOLD TO HIS
DECISION TO ASK SACEUR TO DELAY TURKISH PARTICIPATION
IN OPERATIONS PENDING THEIR FURTHER CONSULTATION.
END SUMMARY.
WOERNE: THE TURKS MUST STAY IN

7. WOERNER SAID THAT THE U.S. PROBABLY WAS AWARE OF
FRANCE'S APRIL 16 DEMARCHE ON TURKISH PARTICIPATION.
(NOTE: MISSION UNDERSTANDS THAT THE DEMARCHE, CONTAINED
IN A LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR BLOT, TRACKED VERY CLOSELY
WITH FRENCH DCM ANDREANI'S DEMARCHE TO THE CHARGE,
REPORTED REF A). WOERNER DECLARED THAT FRANCE'S
OPERATIVE REQUEST -- THAT HE DIRECT SACEUR TO SUSPEND
HIS ORDER TO DEPLOY TURKISH AIRCRAFT TO ITALY -- WOULD
DISCREDIT SACEUR, OUTRAGE THE TURKS AND SUBJECT THE
ALLIANCE TO A DAMAGING PUBLIC DISPUTE. HE STATED
FORCEFULLY THAT HE WOULD NOT/NOT ISSUE SUCH AN ORDER
UNLESS THE ALLIANCE FORCED HIM TO DO SO.

8. WOERNER NOTED THAT UN UNDER SECRETARY FOR
PEACEKEEPING KOFI ANNAN HAD WRITTEN TO SAY THAT HE
WISHED TO BE KEPT INFORMED ABOUT NATO PARTICIPANTS IN
NFZ ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS. WOERNER SAID HE WAS
PREPARED TO WRITE TO ANNAN TO ADVISE HIM OF THE
DEPLOYMENT OF TURKISH AIRCRAFT TO ITALY (NOT/NOT ABOUT
THEIR SUBSEQUENT INTEGRATION INTO OPERATIONS), BUT
WOULD ABSOLUTELY NOT ASK FOR THE UN'S PERMISSION. AT
THAT POINT, FRANCE WOULD BE FREE TO "PLAY ITS GAME" IN
NEW YORK TO TRY TO OBTAIN UN DISAPPROVAL OF TURKISH
PARTICIPATION. WOERNER SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD TURKISH
AIRCRAFT WOULD ARRIVE IN ITALY BETWEEN APRIL 19 AND 21
AND WOULD THEN REQUIRE SEVERAL DAYS OF TRAINING BEFORE
BEGINNING PARTICIPATION IN OPERATIONS; HE HAD ASKED
SACEUR NOT TO BEGIN DEPLOYMENT UNTIL HE AND WOERNER HAD
CONSULTED FURTHER.

9. WOERNER SAID HE WOULD BE MEETING LATER IN THE
MORNING WITH FRENCH PERMREP BLOT TO MAKE HIS POSITION
CRYSTAL-CLEAR. HE SAID HE WAS VERY UPSET THAT THE
FRENCH MISSION TO NATO HAD BEEN ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN
STIRRING UP THE RUSSIAN EMBASSY IN BRUSSELS TO COME
FORWARD WITH ITS OWN OBJECTIONS TO TURKISH
PARTICIPATION IN NFZ ENFORCEMENT, AND PLANNED TO TELL
BLOT THAT HE REGARDED FRENCH COLLABORATION WITH THE
RUSSIANS ON AN INTRA-ALLIANCE MATTER AS HIGHLY
INAPPROPRIATE (SEE REF A, PARA 9).

U.S.: FULL SUPPORT FOR TURKISH PARTICIPATION

10. CHARGE BEECROFT, IN RESPONSE TO WOERNER'S QUERY
ABOUT THE U.S. POSITION ON THE ISSUE, STATED THAT THE

U.S. STRONGLY SUPPORTED SACEUR'S DECISION TO DEPLOY THE TURKISH AIRCRAFT AND HAD INFORMED TURKEY OF THIS POSITION. HE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- THE U.S. BELIEVES SACEUR'S DECISION REFLECTS A NAC CONSENSUS, AND THAT ANOTHER NAC CONSENSUS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO REVERSE IT.
- SACEUR TOLD THE COUNCIL ON APRIL 7 THAT HE WOULD REQUIRE THREE CAP ORBITS TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE OPERATIONS PLAN, AND THAT HE WOULD NEED ALL THE AIRCRAFT THAT HAD BEEN OFFERED IN ORDER TO MEET THIS REQUIREMENT.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 USNATO 001796
 EXDIS - MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
 STATE FOR EUR, S/RB, S/NIS, PM AND IO
 STATE ALSO PASS NSC FOR WALKER;
 SECDEF FOR USDP, ADUSP(REE) AND ASD/ISP;
 JCS FOR GEN. MCCAFFREY
 USUN FOR GREY

PRAGUE PASS TO DCM EVANS FOR CHARGE VERSHBOW
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: NATO, PREL, MARR, BK, SR, HR, UN

SUBJECT: CGY001: CHARGE'S MEETING WITH SYG WOERNER RE
 FRENCH OPPOSITION TO TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN
 NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT

- HAVING HEARD SACEUR, THE NAC APPROVED THE OPERATIONS PLAN.
- WOERNER'S LETTER TO BOUTROS-GHALI, WHICH THE UNSC SUBSEQUENTLY NOTED, LISTED ALL ALLIES WHO HAD OFFERED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE OPERATION AND DESCRIBED THE INITIAL PHASE OF THE OPERATION, INVOLVING AIRCRAFT FROM THREE COUNTRIES, IN TERMS OF BEGINNING THE OPERATION ON TIME, NOT/NOT IN TERMS OF THE CHOICE OF PARTICIPANTS. (AGREEING, WOERNER INTERJECTED THAT HIS LETTER ALSO HAD DESCRIBED THE "INITIAL" PHASE IN TERMS OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE OPERATION.)
- THE U.S. THEREFORE BELIEVED IT WOULD BE A SERIOUS MISTAKE FOR THE ALLIANCE, HAVING MADE THIS DECISION, NOW TO DENY SACEUR THE RESOURCES HE NEEDS TO CARRY OUT THE OPERATION.

11. BEECROFT NOTED THAT IN A DEMARCHE TO HIM THE PREVIOUS DAY (REF A), FRENCH DEPUTY PERMREP ANDREANI HAD RAISED CONCERNS ABOUT THE SAFETY OF FRENCH FORCES IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND HAD LINKED THAT CONCERN TO TURKISH PARTICIPATION. FRANCE HAD HAD AMPLE OPPORTUNITY, HOWEVER, TO RAISE SUCH CONCERNS IN THE MC, THE NAC AND THE UN, AND HAD NOT TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF ANY OF THESE CONSULTATIVE MECHANISMS. IN ADDITION, FRANCE HAS THE OPPORTUNITY WITHIN THE COMMAND STRUCTURE FOR NFZ ENFORCEMENT TO APPEAL THROUGH COMFIVEATAF OR UNPROFOR IF IT SEES NFZ ENFORCEMENT AS POSING A TEMPORARY THREAT TO ITS FORCES. IT HAS NOT DONE SO. FINALLY, BEECROFT NOTED THAT THE FRENCH MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE HAD SAID ON APRIL 16 THAT PARIS'S CONCERN WAS ONE OF ALLOWING TURKISH AIRCRAFT TO PARTICIPATE AT ALL.

12. WOERNER SAID THAT THE FRENCH HAD AT FIRST TOLD THE PRIVATE OFFICE THAT THEIR LOGISTICS BATTALION NEAR

BELGRADE WAS BEING HELD HOSTAGE, BUT SUBSEQUENTLY HAD INDICATED THAT THE BATTALION IN FACT HAD FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT. IN HIS VIEW, THE KIND OF SECURITY "THREAT" CITED BY THE FRENCH COULD JUST AS EASILY BE RAISED THREE MONTHS FROM NOW -- OR THREE MONTHS AGO -- AS TODAY. WOERNER STATED THAT AGREEING TO FRANCE'S DEMAND WOULD HAND THE SERBS AN OPPORTUNITY TO CREATE ANY LINKAGES THEY WISHED BETWEEN NFZ ENFORCEMENT AND THE SECURITY OF UNPROFOR TROOPS. HE SAID THAT THE SERBS, IN ANY CASE, HAD TRADITIONALLY GOOD RELATIONS WITH FRANCE AND WERE UNLIKELY TO ATTACK FRENCH TROOPS, BUT THAT, IF THIS OCCURRED, HE HOPED THAT FRANCE WOULD HAVE THE WILL TO RETALIATE.

13. BEECROFT SAID ANDREANI HAD REFERRED SEVERAL TIMES TO AN ALLEGED TACIT UNDERSTANDING IN THE ALLIANCE THAT TURKISH PARTICIPATION WOULD BE LISTED BUT NOT IMPLEMENTED. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE NOTED REPORTS THAT SOME UN OFFICIALS HAD UNDERSTOOD THE NATO TEAM THAT VISITED NEW YORK ON APRIL 5 TO SAY THAT SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING EXISTED. WOERNER REPLIED THAT HE WOULD CHECK THIS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL STAFF, BUT THAT HE DOUBTED SUCH A STATEMENT WAS MADE, SINCE IT WOULD HAVE BEEN CONTRARY TO HIS INSTRUCTIONS. HE AGREED WITH BEECROFT THAT NO SUCH UNDERSTANDING EXISTED IN THE NAC ON APRIL 7-8; HE WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED IT, AND THE TURKS IN ANY CASE WOULD HAVE REJECTED IT. WOERNER SAID THAT ON THE CONTRARY, FRENCH AMBASSADOR BLOT HAD TOLD HIM AT THE TIME THAT FRANCE HOPED TO "SOLVE" THIS PROBLEM IN THE UN.

14. WOERNER CONCLUDED THAT NATO COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO DENY ONE OF ITS MEMBERS THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 USNATO 001796 EXDIS - MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE STATE FOR EUR, S/RB, S/NIS, PM AND IO

STATE ALSO PASS NSC FOR WALKER;
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: NATO, PREL, MARR, BK, SR, HR, UN

SUBJECT: CGYO01: CHARGE'S MEETING WITH SYG WOERNER RE
FRENCH OPPOSITION TO TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN
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ONE OF ITS OPERATIONS. HE ADDED THAT TO DENY PARTICIPATION TO NATO'S ONLY "MOSLEM MEMBER," ON TOP OF THE WEST'S REFUSAL TO GIVE THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS THE MEANS TO DEFEND THEMSELVES, WOULD IN EFFECT ACCORD THE SERBS A VETO OVER NATO POLICY. BEECROFT RECALLED ANDREANI'S WARNING THAT PARIS WOULD CONSIDER PULLING ITS FORCES OUT OF BOSNIA IF TURKISH AIRCRAFT WERE DEPLOYED AND WOULD ALSO CONSIDER CAREFULLY THE EFFECTS OF SUCH DEPLOYMENT ON FRENCH DECISIONS ON PARTICIPATION IN FUTURE NATO OPERATIONS. BEECROFT INFORMED WOERNER HE HAD POINTED OUT TO ANDREANI THAT SUCH A POSITION COULD IN TURN RAISE QUESTIONS IN WASHINGTON AS TO WHETHER FRANCE WAS TRULY PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN PEACEKEEPING AS A FULL ALLIANCE PARTNER AT 16.

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15. IN EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR THE U.S. POSITION, WOERNER SAID HE WAS CONCERNED THAT SOME ALLIES' POSITIONS ON THIS ISSUE MIGHT WAVER AND SUGGESTED THAT THE MISSION BRIEF DELEGATIONS ON ITS VIEWS. HE WAS PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT FRANCE MIGHT SUCCEED IN INFLUENCING UK ATTITUDES, AND PLANNED TO CALL UK PERMREP SIR JOHN WESTON TO URGE HIM TO STAND FIRM. (COMMENT: MISSION BELIEVES THAT THERE IS SOME DANGER OF POTENTIAL SLIPPAGE BY OTHER ALLIES, AND UNLESS OTHERWISE INSTRUCTED, WILL BRIEF SEVERAL KEY ALLIES, ESPECIALLY THE BRITISH, DUTCH AND SPANISH. END COMMENT.)

16. FUTHER COMMENT: IT WAS APPARENT FROM AMBASSADOR BLOT'S REMARKS, PARTICULARLY HIS PROPOSED "COMPROMISE" STRATEGY, THAT FRANCE DOES NOT/NOT WANT TO PRECIPITATE A NAC DEBATE ON TURKISH PARTICIPATION. THE SECRETARY GENERAL REMAINS ABSOLUTELY DETERMINED NOT TO ALLOW EVENTS TO UNFOLD IN SUCH A WAY THAT ONE NATO MEMBER IS PERMITTED TO VETO THE PARTICIPATION OF ANOTHER IN AN ALLIANCE OPERATION. WOERNER HAS INDICATED HIS INTENTION TO RAISE THE HANDLING OF THIS ISSUE AT THE APRIL 20 PERMREPS' LUNCH. WHILE HE ACKNOWLEDGES THAT THE SITUATION IS RELATIVELY COMPLICATED AT THIS POINT, HE BELIEVES THAT A SOLUTION IS POSSIBLE, IF ALL NATIONS CONCERNED RESTRAIN THEMSELVES FROM A PUBLIC DEBATE AND IF ALL PARTIE APPROACH THE ISSUE WITH A COOPERATIVE ATTITUDE THAT WOULD LEAVE NO NATO NATION (READ GREECE, FRANCE OR TURKEY) PUBLICLY ISOLATED. IN BROKERING ANY POTENTIAL COMPROMISE, WOERNER BELIEVES THAT HE WILL NEED SOME PERSONAL FLEXIBILITY REGARDING THE TIMING OF DEPLOYMENT AND EVENTUAL INTEGRATION OF TURKISH AIRCRAFT. HOWEVER, WHILE THE SECRETARY GENERAL REMAINS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO TURKISH PARTICIPATION, IT IS APPARENT THAT FRANCE IS DETERMINED TO PREVENT ANY/ANY INTEGRATION OF TURKISH AIRCRAFT INTO THE ENFORCEMENT OPERATION.

BEECROFT

BT

#1796

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 04

<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 04

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SSN: 1796

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PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY KYIM LAKE SIT SODERBERG WALKER

SIT: BLEICKEN FILE HOLL RICE SUM SUM2 VAX

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PREC: PRIORITY
 CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
 LINE1: PAACZYUW RUEHCAA7978 1080253-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: P 180253Z APR 93
 LINE4: FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 OSRI: RUEHC
 DTG: 180253Z APR 93
 ORIG: SECSTATE WASHDC
 TO: RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 0997
 INFO: RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 3704
 RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 4293
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC 5011
 RUFHBE/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 4280
 RUFHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2536
 RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 2581
 RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 4810
 RUFHZG/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 7839
 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0531
 RUEHSF/AMEMBASSY SOFIA 3548
 RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 9363
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC 7430
 RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE PRIORITY
 RUFTRWA/CI.CUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE PRIORITY
 RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GM
 RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK PRIORITY
 RUSNBJA/CDRUSASETAF VICENZA IT//AESE/GBI/CIT// PRIORITY
 RUDOSHA/16AF AVIANO IT//CC// PRIORITY
 RULRAAA/7276ABG IRAKLION AS GR//CC// PRIORITY
 RUFROA/NAVSUPPACT SOUDA BAY GR PRIORITY
 SUBJ: USG WILL NOT INTERVENE TO PREVENT PARTICIPATION
 OF TURKISH AIRCRAFT IN ENFORCEMENT OF BOSNIAN NO-FLY ZONE

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 117978
 MILITARY ADDRESSEES ALSO FOR POLADS
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: MOPS, PREL, GR, TU, BK
 SUBJECT: USG WILL NOT INTERVENE TO PREVENT PARTICIPATION
 OF TURKISH AIRCRAFT IN ENFORCEMENT OF BOSNIAN NO-FLY ZONE

REF: ATHENS 4287 (DTG 151417Z APR 93) (NOTAL)

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE. SEE PARA 6.
3. THE GREEK GOVERNMENT HAS EXPRESSED OPPOSITION TO PARTICIPATION BY TURKISH AIRCRAFT IN ENFORCEMENT OF THE BOSNIAN NO-FLY ZONE, INFORMED US THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO ACCEDE TO ANY TURKISH REQUEST TO FLY IN

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By VL NARA, Date 2/23/09

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GREEK AIRSPACE FOR THIS PURPOSE, AND REQUESTED USG ASSISTANCE IN APPROACHING OTHER NATO ALLIES TO PREVENT THE INVOLVEMENT OF TURKISH AIRCRAFT (REFTEL). GREEK AMBASSADOR ZACHARAKIS CALLED EUR/SE COUNTRY DIRECTOR RANSOM ON APRIL 15 TO SAY THAT PRIME MINISTER MITSOTAKIS HAD INSTRUCTED HIM TO STRESS IN PARTICULAR THAT TURKISH OVERFLIGHTS WOULD BE A GREAT POLITICAL PROBLEM. ZACHARAKIS DID NOT MENTION ANY OBJECTIONS TO TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN THE NO-FLY-ZONE OPERATION.

4. AS OF LATE APRIL 15, WE UNDERSTAND THAT AT NATO, THE GREEKS APPARENTLY WILL NOT CHALLENGE THE MILITARY COMMITTEE'S ACTION TO INCLUDE TURKISH PLANES IN NFZ ENFORCEMENT. NOR HAS THERE BEEN ANY SUGGESTION OF THE GREEKS CALLING A SPECIAL NAC TO OPPOSE TURKISH INVOLVEMENT. IN FACT, NATO HAD REACHED CONSENSUS ON THIS MATTER LAST WEEK, AND SACEUR IS MOVING AHEAD WITH THE AGREED PLAN.

5. A VERY TENTATIVE, APPROXIMATE TIMETABLE COULD SEE TURKISH AIRCRAFT LEAVE TURKEY FOR AVIANO ON APRIL 18, AND BE INTEGRATED INTO OPERATIONS ON APRIL 19. BETWEEN 12 AND 20 TURKISH AIRCRAFT WILL BE INVOLVED.

6. ACTION REQUEST: EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO RESPOND TO THE GOG'S REQUEST USING THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS.

--WE FULLY UNDERSTAND THE GOG'S REASONS FOR EXPRESSING OPPOSITION TO TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN ENFORCEMENT OF THE NO-FLY ZONE. WE ACKNOWLEDGE THE GOG'S RIGHT TO CONTROL FLIGHTS OVER ITS OWN TERRITORY.

--WE ALSO DEEPLY APPRECIATE GREECE'S ROLE IN ENFORCEMENT OF THE NO-FLY ZONE.

--TURKISH PARTICIPATION IS PART OF A PLAN WHICH HAS BEEN ALREADY AGREED UPON BASED ON MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS. TURKEY HAS OFFERED TO CONTRIBUTE FORCES TO THE NATO ENFORCEMENT OPERATION, AND SACEUR HAS DECIDED ON MILITARY OPERATIONAL GROUNDS THAT HE NEEDS THE TURKISH AIRCRAFT TO IMPLEMENT THE NATO PLAN. THIS DECISION HAS BEEN NOTED BY THE MILITARY COMMITTEE.

--TURKISH AIRCRAFT WILL PARTICIPATE IN AN IMPORTANT MULTILATERAL OPERATION WHICH IS BEING CARRIED OUT IN A NATO AND UN CONTEXT.

--THE USG DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO INTERVENE TO PREVENT TURKISH PARTICIPATION.

--WE STRESS THAT THIS OPERATION WILL NOT INVOLVE GROUND OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA.

--THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT IS RESPONDING TO ITS OWN DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRESSURES, AND WANTS TO PLAY A REAL BUT LIMITED ROLE IN BOSNIA. WE DO NOT SEE TURKISH PARTICIPATION AS IN ANY WAY A THREAT TO GREECE. CHRISTOPHER
BT

#7978

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 7978

TOR: 930417225637 M0344912

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SIT: VAX

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PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUFHFRA0522 1131727-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 231726Z APR 93
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
OSRI: RUFHFR
DTG: 231726Z APR 93
ORIG: AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4157
INFO: RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHZG/NATO EC COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUDOGHA/RUDOGHA/USNMR SHAPE BE IMMEDIATE
RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE//POLAD// IMMEDIATE
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//POLAD// IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0624
SUBJ: FRENCH VIEWS ON TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN
- ENFORCEMENT OF BOSNIAN NO-FLY ZONE
TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 10522
EXDIS - MILITARY ADDEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
STATE PASS NSC FOR WALKER AND WAYNE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, NATO, UN, TU, BK, FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH VIEWS ON TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN
- ENFORCEMENT OF BOSNIAN NO-FLY ZONE
REF: (A) PARIS 10204
- (B) ANKARA 5104
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: AT ALL LEVELS, THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT
CONTINUES TO HAVE DEEP MISGIVINGS ABOUT TURKISH
PARTICIPATION IN ENFORCEMENT OF THE BOSNIAN NO-FLY ZONE
AND IS STILL SMARTING AT THE WAY THE DECISION TO CALL
ON THE TURKS WAS TAKEN. THE FRENCH HAVE NOT DECIDED
WHAT TO DO: THEY WOULD PREFER TO AVOID A PUBLIC ROW
OVER THE ISSUE AND DO NOT WISH TO EMBARRASS THE TURKISH
GOVERNMENT. PRESIDENT MITTERRAND IS CONSIDERING HOW TO
RESPOND TO NATO SYG WOERNER'S SUGGESTION THAT THE TURKS
DELAY FLYING UNTIL MAY 2. WOERNER WILL VISIT PARIS ON
APRIL 26 FOR TALKS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER JUPPE AND
DEFENSE MINISTER LEOTARD. WE HAVE LITTLE HOPE OF A
GRACEFUL FRENCH CLIMB DOWN, AND THERE ARE MANY REASONS
WHY IT MAY BE IN OUR INTERESTS TO LET THE TURKS AND
FRENCH SORT IT OUT BETWEEN THEM OR TO TRY TO RESOLVE
THIS IN NATO CHANNELS. BUT IT MAY BE UNREALISTIC TO
THINK THAT THE U.S. CAN STAY OUT OF IT, AND WE MAY BE
FACED WITH A NEED TO CONTINUE TO ENGAGE THE FRENCH AT
HIGH LEVELS TO CLEAR THE AIR. END SUMMARY.
3. OVER THE PAST 24 HOURS WE HAVE DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM
OF TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By 12 NARA, Date 8/23/04

2015-0926-m (1.16)

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BOSNIA NO-FLY ZONE (NFZ) WITH ELYSEE DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR JEAN VIDAL, QUAI DEPUTY POLITICAL DIRECTOR PHILIPPE LECOURTIER, AND BRUNO RACINE, SENIOR ADVISOR FOR POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS IN FONMIN JUPPE'S PRIVATE OFFICE. ALL CONTINUE TO HAVE DEEP MISGIVINGS ABOUT INVOLVING THE TURKS IN NFZ ENFORCEMENT OR IN ANY OTHER OPERATION IN BOSNIA IN WHICH NATO MIGHT BECOME INVOLVED.

4. RACINE MADE CLEAR THAT FRENCH CONCERNS ARE MORE FUNDAMENTAL THAN CONCERN FOR THE SAFETY OF FRENCH TROOPS: FRANCE DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT TURKEY, WHICH RULED BOSNIA FOR 400 YEARS, SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN MILITARY OPERATIONS OF ANY SORT THERE. RACINE INSISTED THAT HISTORY CANNOT BE IGNORED AND THAT ARGUMENTS THAT ALL ALLIES SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE EQUALLY IN THE OPERATION ARE UNREALISTIC AND DOGMATIC. HE ARGUED THAT THE TURKISH RELATIONSHIP TO BOSNIA IS THE SAME AS THAT OF FRANCE TO ALGERIA: IF NATO SHOULD DECIDE IN SOME FUTURE CRISIS TO SEND A PEACEKEEPING FORCE TO ALGERIA, FRANCE SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED BECAUSE OF ITS COLONIAL ROLE. WE COUNTERED THAT THE SERBS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY REACT AS STRONGLY TO THE INVOLVEMENT OF "IMPERIALIST" AMERICANS OR "CATHOLIC" FRENCH IN NFZ ENFORCEMENT, BUT RACINE WOULD NOT AGREE.

5. ALL OF OUR INTERLOCUTORS REITERATED UNHAPPINESS WITH THE WAY THE DECISION TO CALL UPON THE TURKS WAS HANDLED (REF A). BOTH LECOURTIER AND RACINE CLAIMED THE GOF BELIEVED IT HAD A GENTLEMAN'S AGREEMENT ON HOW TO FINESSE TURKISH PARTICIPATION: THE TURKS WOULD BE HELD IN RESERVE BUT NOT CALLED UPON. RACINE EMPHASIZED FRENCH DISMAY AT LEARNING THIS PLAN HAD BEEN CHANGED VIA A CHANCE COMMUNICATION FROM THE DUTCH WHICH REFERRED TO OBTAINING FLIGHT CLEARANCE FOR THE TURKISH AIRCRAFT; HE COMMENTED THAT THE GOF FELT IT HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY DECEIVED. WHEN REMINDED THAT NOTHING HAD BEEN DONE WHICH VIOLATED NAC DECISIONS, HE REPEATED ARGUMENTS HEARD EARLIER (REF A) THAT THE FRENCH HAD STRUCK A BARGAIN WITH THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE. RACINE AND LECOURTIER STRESSED THAT IN FRANCE'S VIEW, SACEUR HAD BEEN ALLOWED TOO MUCH LEEWAY ON SUCH A HIGHLY-CHARGED POLITICAL ISSUE AND THAT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 10522
EXDIS - MILITARY ADDEES TREAT AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
STATE PASS NSC FOR WALKER AND WAYNE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, NATO, UN, TU, BK, FR

SUBJECT: FRENCH VIEWS ON TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN
- ENFORCEMENT OF BOSNIAN NO-FLY ZONE

FRANCE'S INITIAL EXPERIENCE OF WORKING WITH SHAPE ON PEACEKEEPING IS NOT GOING WELL. RACINE ADDED THAT THE AFFAIR HAS GIVEN PAUSE TO THE BALLADUR GOVERNMENT, WHICH HAD COME INTO OFFICE WITH THE GOAL OF IMPROVING FRENCH RELATIONS WITH NATO.

6. HAVING POSED THE PROBLEM, NONE OF OUR INTERLOCUTORS COULD PROPOSE A SOLUTION. ALL EMPHASIZED THEIR CONCERN FOR TURKISH DOMESTIC OPINION AND DECLARED THAT FRANCE DOES NOT WANT TO EMBARRASS TURKEY PUBLICLY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY ADVANCED NO PROPOSALS FOR GETTING PAST THE IMPASSE. THEY WERE AWARE OF THE PROPOSAL FOR

DELAYING TURKISH OPERATIONAL FLIGHTS UNTIL MAY 2, BUT -- CONTRARY TO EMBASSY ANKARA'S UNDERSTANDING (REF B) -- REGARDED IT AS PROPOSAL BY NATO SYG WOERNER AND DID NOT ENDORSE IT. ELYSEE DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR VIDAL TOLD CHARGE THAT THE PROPOSAL WAS NOT WHAT FRANCE WANTED BUT WAS NOW ON PRESIDENT MITTERRAND'S DESK FOR DECISION; HE REFRAINED FROM PREDICTING HOW THE GOF WILL RESPOND. WHEN ASKED WHETHER FRANCE IS CONSIDERING PULLING ITS AIRCRAFT OUT OF THE OPERATION, VIDAL RESPONDED THAT HE HOPED MATTERS WOULD NOT COME TO THAT POINT.

COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATION

7. HAVING CONVINCED THEMSELVES THAT TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA IS BAD POLICY, THE FRENCH DO NOT WANT TO EMBARRASS THE TURKS BY CREATING A PUBLIC ROW OVER WHAT IS ESSENTIALLY A SIDE ISSUE -- NOR DO THEY WANT THIS ISSUE TO BECOME A MATTER OF DOMESTIC PUBLIC DEBATE. WE CANNOT PREDICT WHERE THEY WILL COME OUT, ALTHOUGH VIDAL HELD LITTLE HOPE THAT MITTERRAND -- WHOSE ANALYSES ARE OFTEN ROOTED IN HISTORICAL READINGS -- WILL CHANGE HIS MIND.

8. WITH THE MATTER NOW BEFORE THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT, APPROACHES AT LOWER LEVELS CAN HAVE LITTLE EFFECT. FOR THE MOMENT, IT MAY BE BEST TO LEAVE THE MATTER IN NATO CHANNELS. SYG WOERNER WILL VISIT PARIS ON MONDAY, APRIL 26, FOR MEETINGS WITH FONMIN JUPPE AND DEFENSE MINISTER LEOTARD. IF WOERNER DOES NOT SWAY THE FRENCH, A SENIOR-LEVEL U.S. CONTACT WITH THE FRENCH MIGHT HELP CLEAR THE AIR AND ENCOURAGE THEM TO MOVE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. THAT SAID, WE WOULD NOT BET ON A GRACEFUL FRENCH CLIMB DOWN, AND IT MAY BE IN OUR INTERESTS TO LET THIS ISSUE BE RESOLVED IN NATO CHANNELS OR IN DIRECT FRENCH-TURKISH CONTACTS.

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
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SSN: 0522
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TOR: 930423180855 M0355130
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 OSRI: RUFHNA
 LINE1: OATCZYUW RUFHNA 0337 0212118-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
 LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 LINE3: O 212117Z JAN 93
 LINE4: FM USMISSION USNATO
 DTG: 212117Z JAN 93
 ORIG: USMISSION USNATO
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0775
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 / RUDOGHA/USNMR SHAPE BE IMMEDIATE
 INFO: RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
 RUFHZG/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB PRIORITY 0160
 RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE PRIORITY
 RUCBSAA/USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA PRIORITY
 RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
 RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
 RHFQAAA/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE
 RUFNBOA/USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT
 ZEN/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE//POUCH
 SUBJ: CGY001 STATE OF PLAY AT NATO ON DEVELOPING
 PHASED IMPLEMENTATION AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
 FOR BOSNIAN NFZ ENFORCEMENT

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 05 USNATO 00337
 STATE FOR EUR/RPM
 USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
 GENEVA FOR USREP ICFY (JACKOVIC)
 DEFENSE FOR OASD/ISP (EUR-NATO)
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: NATO, MARR, PREL, UN
 SUBJECT: CGY001 STATE OF PLAY AT NATO ON DEVELOPING
 PHASED IMPLEMENTATION AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
 FOR BOSNIAN NFZ ENFORCEMENT
 REF: A: LONDON 936, DTG 151847Z JAN 93
 B: USNATO 217, DTG 142016Z JAN 93
 C: LONDON 1157, DTG 211353 JAN 93 NOTAL

1. ENTIRE TEXT.
2. THIS IS A JOINT USNATO/USDELMC MESSAGE.

SUMMARY

3. SUMMARY: USNATO AND USDELMC PROVIDE BELOW THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY REGARDING DEVELOPMENT OF PHASED IMPLEMENTATION OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE) FOR ENFORCEMENT OF THE BOSNIAN NFZ. ROE FOR NAC APPROVAL ARE BEING DEVELOPED BY NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES (NMA'S) AS TASKED BY THE NAC ON 14 JANUARY 1993. NMA'S HAD PLANNED TO SUBMIT THEIR RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE MC WITHIN A WEEK, BUT THERE MAY BE DELAYS AS A

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By 12 NARA, Date 8/23/2014

2015-0926-m (1.18)

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RESULT OF AN APPARENT UN DECISION TO POSTPONE COORDINATION ON ROE IN LIGHT OF THE BOSNIAN-SERB PARLIAMENTARY VOTE ON THE VANCE-OWEN PLAN AND THE UK/FRENCH AGREEMENT (REF C) TO DELAY UNSC CONSIDERATION OF A NFZ ENFORCEMENT RESOLUTION.

4. SHAPE STAFF IS ALSO CONSIDERING APPROPRIATE PHASES FOR IMPLEMENTATION, BASED ON AN EARLIER UK PROPOSAL ALONG THE LINES OF REF A. WE BELIEVE THAT THE MOST RECENT UK-FRENCH DRAFT OVERLY COMPARTMENTALIZES AND COMPLICATES LOGICAL ENFORCEMENT STAGES BY PROPOSING TOO MANY PHASES. OUR PROPOSAL FOR APPROPRIATE PHASE POINTS IS AT PARA 9 BELOW. FOLLOWING CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN U.S. AND UK PERMREPS, THE UK REPLACED ITS ORIGINAL COVERING PAPER -- WHICH, AS PRESENTED IN REF A, POSED PROBLEMS REGARDING APPROVAL OF THE ROE AND IMPLEMENTING PHASES THAT WERE FAR MORE OBJECTIONABLE THAN THE PHASING PROPOSALS THEMSELVES -- WITH A SIMPLE LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL TO THE SYG AND THE MILITARY COMMITTEE. HOWEVER, THE FRENCH HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY INTEND TO CIRCULATE THE ORIGINAL TEXT INFORMALLY TO FORM THE BASIS FOR MC AND COUNCIL DISCUSSIONS.

5. WE HAVE INDICATIONS THAT THE UK MIGHT BE WILLING TO EXPLORE A FORMULA FOR NAC APPROVAL MORE IN LINE WITH U.S. DZIE, ANU BELIEVE APPROPRIATE P
ESSURE IN LONDON AND
PARIS MIGHT LEAD TO THIS POSITION BEING RESURFACED. WE REQUEST WASHINGTON CONFIRMATION OF USNATO AND USDELMC VIEWS ON PHASING AND REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION DECISION-MAKING IN THE NAC. IN ADDITION, WE PROPOSE THAT WE SEEK TO COMPLETE NATO PLANNING ON NFZ ENFORCEMENT EVEN IF UNSC DISCUSSIONS ARE TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED. END SUMMARY.
STATE OF PLAY IN NATO

6. THE JANUARY 14 NAC DECISION ON NFZ COMMAND AND CONTROL AGREED THAT ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS WOULD REQUIRE SPECIFIC ROE, WHICH "SHOULD BE DEVELOPED, AGREED AND APPROVED BY NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES, UNPROFOR, AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL (NAC). ACTIVATION OF ROE'S SHOULD BE PHASED AND ADDRESS THE FULL RANGE OF OPTIONS..." (PARA 5D OF "COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR NATO ENFORCEMENT OF THE NO-FLY ZONE IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA," TRANSMITTED REF B). AT THE SAME TIME, THE COUNCIL SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED THE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 05 USNATO 00337
STATE FOR EUR/RPM
USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
GENEVA FOR USREP ICFY (JACKOVIC)
DEFENSE FOR OASD/ISP (EUR-NATO)
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: NATO, MARR, PREL, UN
SUBJECT: CGY001 STATE OF PLAY AT NATO ON DEVELOPING
PHASED IMPLEMENTATION AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
FOR BOSNIAN NFZ ENFORCEMENT

DEVELOPMENT OF DETAILED ROE'S IN COOPERATION WITH UNPROFOR WITH LIAISON BETWEEN NMA'S AND UNPROFOR AS NECESSARY.

7. SHAPE IS NOW ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN THIS PROCESS, BUT THEY HAVE INDICATIONS THAT, DUE TO THE BOSNIAN SERB PARLIAMENTARY VOTE ON THE VANCE-OWEN PLAN, THE UNSYG DOES NOT WANT UNPROFOR TO DISCUSS ROE WITH NATO AT THIS TIME. AS A RESULT, A PLANNED MEETING BETWEEN UNPROFOR AND SHAPE PLANNERS HAS BEEN POSTPONED. THE MC HAD EXPECTED TO HAVE

THE PROPOSED SHAPE/UNPROFOR ROE IN TIME FOR DELIBERATION AT THE JANUARY 28 MEETING. IT DOES NOT NOW LOOK AS IF THIS DEADLINE WILL BE MET. (COMMENT: EVEN GIVEN A DECISION TO SUSPEND UN CONSIDERATION OF A NFZ ENFORCEMENT RESOLUTION, WE WOULD RECOMMEND THAT NATO COMPLETE ITS PLANNING IN ORDER TO BE PREPARED TO RESPOND QUICKLY SHOULD THE SITUATION WARRANT. END COMMENT.)

8. SHAPE IS ALSO WORKING ON RECOMMENDATIONS TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENT THAT "ACTIVATION OF ROE'S SHOULD BE PHASED." THE UK SUBMITTED AN EARLIER PROPOSAL FOR SIX IMPLEMENTATION PHASES (ALONG THE LINES REFLECTED IN REF A) TO SHAPE AS A BASIS ON WHICH TO START PLANNING. THE MC INTENDS TO CONSIDER PROPOSALS FOR ROE AND PHASING AS A PACKAGE, PRIOR TO SEEKING NAC APPROVAL. THE MC COULD SUBMIT ITS PROPOSAL TO UNPROFOR AT THIS STAGE, EITHER THROUGH DELEGATIONS OF NATIONS WITH REPRESENTATIVES IN UNPROFOR, OR OTHER CHANNELS WHICH MIGHT BE MUTUALLY AGREED. IF THE PACKAGE IS SENT TO THE NAC WITHOUT HAVING BEEN COORDINATED WITH UNPROFOR IN ADVANCE, THE NAC WOULD THEN TRANSMIT IT TO UNPROFOR FOR CONCURRENCE. THIS COULD BE A VERY TIME CONSUMING PROCESS, UNLESS THERE WERE VIGOROUS HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL INTERACTION WITH THE UN AUTHORITIES.

PHASE POINTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION

9. WE STRESS THE NEED FOR CAREFUL ATTENTION TO DETAIL BOTH ON THE APPROPRIATE PHASE POINTS AND ON THE ISSUE OF WHO RETAINS THE AUTHORITY TO DIRECT A CHANGE FROM ONE PHASE OF ENFORCEMENT TO ANOTHER. WE BELIEVE THAT THERE SHOULD BE A MAXIMUM OF THREE PHASE POINTS, AND HENCE THREE REQUIREMENTS FOR POLITICAL DECISION, IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A UN RESOLUTION REQUIRING ENFORCEMENT OF THE NFZ IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA.

-- PHASE ONE: THIS SHOULD COVER THE PERIOD FROM ENACTMENT OF THE RESOLUTION THROUGH THE END OF THE "GRACE PERIOD" AS ESTABLISHED BY THE UN, AND SHOULD AUTHORIZE NATO FORCES TO TAKE ALL ACTIONS SHORT OF FLIGHT OPERATIONS OVER THE TERRITORY OF BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA, TO INCLUDE EXERCISING THE COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCESS BY ESTABLISHING OFF-SHORE COMBAT AIR PATROL (CAP) (POINTS 1- 8, PHASES ONE AND TWO, IN REF A). APPROVAL OF ALL ROE NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT THIS PHASE SHOULD BE PART OF THE INITIAL COUNCIL DECISION AGREEING TO THE ROE/PHASE PACKAGE.

-- PHASE TWO: ALL AIR-TO-AIR ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS, UP TO AND INCLUDING ENGAGEMENT WITH ANY AIRBORNE TARGETS DISPLAYING HOSTILE INTENT (POINTS 9-13 IN REF A).

SHOULD THE SITUATION WARRANT, NAC APPROVAL SHOULD

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 03 OF 05 USNATO 00337

STATE FOR EUR/RPM

USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE

GENEVA FOR USREP ICFY (JACKOVIC)

DEFENSE FOR OASD/ISP (EUR-NATO)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: NATO, MARR, PREL, UN

SUBJECT: CGY001 STATE OF PLAY AT NATO ON DEVELOPING
PHASED IMPLEMENTATION AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
FOR BOSNIAN NFZ ENFORCEMENT

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COINCIDE WITH THE EXPIRATION OF THE GRACE PERIOD. ROE DURING THIS PHASE MUST INCLUDE THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST GROUND ATTACKS ALREADY INHERENT IN PEACETIME ROE (A POINT RECOGNIZED IN THE UK PROPOSALS).

- PHASE THREE: AIR-TO-GROUND OPERATIONS INSIDE BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA (REF A POINTS 14-16). SINCE THE REMAINING TWO PHASES IN THE UK PROPOSAL COULD ONLY APPLY AFTER YET ANOTHER UNSC RESOLUTION, THEY NEED NOT BE APPROVED BY THE NAC AT THIS TIME.

WHO DECIDES?

10. ON THE CRITICAL QUESTION OF WHO MAKES THE POLITICAL DECISIONS TO ADVANCE TO SUBSEQUENT PHASES AFTER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PHASE ONE, THE TEXT OF THE COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS PAPER AGREED BY THE NAC ON 14 JANUARY IMPLIES FULL NAC INVOLVEMENT IN GRANTING APPROVAL. (THE ACTUAL LANGUAGE STATES ONLY THAT ROE SHOULD BE "DEVELOPED, AGREED AND APPROVED BY...THE NAC," WITHOUT DIRECTLY ADDRESSING DECISIONS ON MOVING FROM PHASE TO PHASE.) HOWEVER, THE FRANCO-UK FORMULATION CIRCULATED IN LONDON (REF A) STATED THAT "DECISIONS TO MOVE FROM ONE PHASE TO ANOTHER OR TO MOVE TO FURTHER MEASURES WITHIN A PHASE IF PREVIOUS AUTHORITY DID NOT COVER A WHOLE PHASE, SHOULD BE TAKEN BY THE PARTICIPATING NATIONS THROUGH CONSULTATIONS IN THE COUNCIL..." BOTH USNATO AND USDELMC FIND THIS LANGUAGE UNSATISFACTORY ON TWO COUNTS: THE IMPLICATION THAT NEW POLITICAL DECISIONS MIGHT BE REQUIRED TO MOVE FROM POINT TO POINT WITHIN AN ALREADY AGREED PHASE; AND THE CONCEPT THAT DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY WOULD REST ONLY WITH THOSE NATIONS PARTICIPATING IN NFZ ENFORCEMENT CONSULTING "THROUGH" THE COUNCIL, RATHER THAN THE DECISION BEING TAKEN BY THE NAC, PURE AND SIMPLE, AS WITH THE INITIAL DECISION ON ROE'S.

11. SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS TO THE "PARTICIPATING NATIONS" FORMULATION FALL INTO THREE BASIC CATEGORIES:

- IT IS INCONSISTENT WITH WHAT COUNCIL MEMBERS UNDERSTOOD THEY WERE AGREEING TO ON 14 JANUARY, WHEN THEY ADOPTED LANGUAGE THAT ROE SHOULD BE "APPROVED BY THE NMA'S, UNPROFOR AND THE NAC."
- IT RETREATS FROM THE AGREEMENT THAT NATO WOULD IMPLEMENT ENFORCEMENT OF THE NFZ USING ITS NORMAL COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS, AND REPLACES THAT CONCEPT WITH THE CONCEPT OF IMPLEMENTATION BY PARTICIPATING NATIONS IN CONSULTATION WITH OTHER ALLIES.
- IT WOULD RESULT IN STRONG OBJECTIONS FROM OTHER ALLIES, SUCH AS THE SPANISH AND DANES, WHO HAVE FORCES ON THE GROUND BUT ARE NOT EXPECTED TO PARTICIPATE IN NFZ ENFORCEMENT, AND ITALY, WHOSE TERRITORY WOULD BE USED, BUT WHO WOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM DECISION-MAKING IF RESTRICTED TO PARTICIPATING NATIONS.

B-PLAY ON THE FRANCO-BRITISH FRONT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 04 OF 05 USNATO 00337
STATE FOR EUR/RPM
USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
GENEVA FOR USREP ICFY (JACKOVIC)

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DEFENSE FOR OASD/ISP (EUR-NATO)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: NATO, MARR, PREL, UN

SUBJECT: CGYO01 STATE OF PLAY AT NATO ON DEVELOPING
PHASED IMPLEMENTATION AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
FOR BOSNIAN NFZ ENFORCEMENT

12. AS A DIRECT RESULT OF INTERVENTION ON THE LINES
OUTLINED ABOVE BY AMBASSADOR BARTHOLOMEW WITH UK
AMBASSADOR WESTON, THE UK MODIFIED GUIDANCE THAT WOULD
HAVE PLACED THE FRENCH/UK LANGUAGE AT REF A BEFORE THE NAC
FOR DISCUSSION AND APPROVAL THIS WEEK. INSTEAD, THE
BRITISH MERELY PRESENTED THE TABLES OUTLINING THEIR
SIX-PHASE PROPOSALS TO THE SYG AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MC
(CMC), WITH INFORMAL COPIES PROVIDED TO NATIONS.
NEVERTHELESS, IT NOW APPEARS THAT FRANCE WILL RESURFACE
THIS PROPOSAL FOR DECISION-MAKING BY PARTICIPATING NATIONS
DURING MC OR NAC DISCUSSIONS OF ROE, SINCE WE HAVE JUST
BEEN INFORMED THAT THEY ARE GOING TO CIRCULATE THE
ORIGINAL FULL TEXT "ON AN INFORMAL BASIS" TO ALLIES. THE
FRENCH WOULD STILL LIKE TO PRESENT THE CONCEPT AS A JOINT
FRENCH-UK POSITION, BUT THE UK MISSION TO NATO HAS NOT YET
AGREED.

13. THE UK HAS SAID THE FRENCH TOLD THEM THAT THE
ORIGINAL FORMULATION WAS DESIGNED TO WIN MITTERRAND'S
APPROVAL. HOWEVER, AMBASSADOR BLOT, IN A MEETING WITH
AMBASSADOR BARTHOLOMEW ON JANUARY 20, STRESSED INSTEAD HIS
CONCERN THAT PERMITTING THE FULL NAC TO DECIDE WOULD
PERMIT GREECE TO BLOCK ACTION. BLOT ALSO RAISED QUESTIONS
ABOUT THE ABILITY OF THE NAC TO RESPOND QUICKLY ENOUGH TO
DEVELOPMENTS IN BOSNIA- HERCEGOVINA -- A POINT ON WHICH HE
WAS REASSURED BY AMBASSADOR BARTHOLOMEW. THE ADOPTION IN
ADVANCE OF AGREED PHASES AND ROE PACKAGES SHOULD ENHANCE
NATO'S ABILITY TO REACT IN A TIMELY MANNER.

14. IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, ANY DECISION TO MOVE FROM
IMPLEMENTATION OF ONE PHASE TO ANOTHER WILL DEPEND UPON
CONSENSUS IN ADVANCE AMONG THE U.S., UK AND FRANCE. IF
THAT CONSENSUS EXISTS, IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT THE
COUNCIL WILL RESIST IT. EVEN GREECE WOULD PROBABLY FOLLOW
PAST PRACTICE AND, WHILE PROTESTING IF IT DID NOT FULLY
SUPPORT THE PROPOSED IMPLEMENTATION OPTION, WOULD REFRAIN
FROM BLOCKING CONSENSUS WITHIN THE COUNCIL IN THE END.
FRANCE AND THE UK UNDERSTAND THIS FACT OF LIFE AT NATO.
RECOMMENDATIONS

15. AS NOTED ABOVE, THE UK CHOSE NOT TO PUSH THE
DECISION- MAKING PROPOSAL AT EVERE, BUT LONDON STILL
SUPPORTS IT AND WE EXPECT THAT HMG WILL INSTRUCT ITS NATO
MISSION TO DO SO HERE IF THE FRENCH PRESS FOR DISCUSSION
IN THE MC OR COUNCIL. ALTHOUGH AMBASSADOR BARTHOLOMEW HAS
PRESSED THE UK AND FRENCH PERMREPS HARD ON THIS POINT, THE
PROBLEM APPEARS TO BE IN CAPITALS -- ESPECIALLY FOR THE UK
-- AND THE MESSAGE NEEDS TO BE DELIVERED THERE AS WELL.
WE KNOW THAT THE UK EXPRESSED A WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER A
REVISED FORMULATION THAT WOULD CLEARLY STATE THE NEED FOR
FULL NAC APPROVAL, TAKING "SPECIAL ACCOUNT" OF THE VIEWS
OF THE PARTICIPATING STATES -- A FORMULATION WITH WHICH WE
COULD EASILY LIVE. PRESSURE IN PARIS AND LONDON MAY PAVE

THE WAY FOR THEM TO FALL BACK TO THIS.

16. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING ASSESSMENT, USNATO AND
USDELMC REQUEST WASHINGTON CONCURRENCE WITH OUR VIEWS ON
NFZ IMPLEMENTATION PHASES AS OUTLINED IN PARA 9, THE
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 05 OF 05 USNATO 00337
STATE FOR EUR/RPM

USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
GENEVA FOR USREP ICFY (JACKOVIC)
DEFENSE FOR OASD/ISP (EUR-NATO)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: NATO, MARR, PREL, UN

SUBJECT: CGY001 STATE OF PLAY AT NATO ON DEVELOPING
PHASED IMPLEMENTATION AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
FOR BOSNIAN NFZ ENFORCEMENT

REQUIREMENT FOR FULL NAC PARTICIPATION IN DECISIONS
ASSOCIATED WITH THOSE PHASES AS EXPRESSED IN PARAS 10-11,
AND THE VIEW THAT NATO SHOULD CONTINUE TO COMPLETE ITS
PLANNING EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF A FINAL UNSC DECISION ON
NFZ ENFORCEMENT. DEMARCHES IN CAPITALS WOULD APPEAR TO
BE A USEFUL STEP IN THIS DIRECTION. BARTHOLOMEW

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 05

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SSN: 0337

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 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000
 SUBJ: FEBRUARY 17 NAC GUIDANCE - PLANNING FOR
 IMPLEMENTATION OF A PEACE PLAN FOR BOSNIA/NFZ ROE AND
 PHASING

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 047883
 USVIENNA FOR USDEL CSCE
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: NATO, MARR, UN, PREL, SR, BK, HR, UNSC
 SUBJECT: FEBRUARY 17 NAC GUIDANCE - PLANNING FOR
 IMPLEMENTATION OF A PEACE PLAN FOR BOSNIA/NFZ ROE AND
 PHASING

REF: (A) USNATO 709 - DTG 101948Z FEB 93
 (B) STATE 30936 - DTG 020702Z FEB 93
 (C) USNATO 217 - DTG 142016Z JAN 93
 (D) NATO DOCUMENT PO (93)17 FAXED TO EUR/RPM
 (E) NATO DOCUMENT MCM-JED-016-93 (DRAFT) FAXED TO
 EUR/RPM

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VANCE/OWEN PLAN FOR BOSNIA

2. AT THE FEBRUARY 17 NAC, SYG WOERNER WILL ASK PERMREPS TO AGREE TO TASK THE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES TO ENGAGE IN PLANNING FOR A POSSIBLE NATO ROLE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VANCE/OWEN PLAN (OR SOME VARIANT OF THAT PLAN) FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA. MISSION SHOULD SUPPORT NATO PLANNING ALONG THE LINES DISCUSSED IN THE SYG'S FEBRUARY

16 PRIVATE OFFICE MEMORANDUM (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE POINTS MADE BELOW) AS CONTAINED IN REF D. SHOULD THE UN REQUEST ASSISTANCE, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT NATO BE READY TO RESPOND WITHOUT DELAY. THEREFORE, NATO PLANNING SHOULD

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By WJ NARA, Date 8/23/2019

2015-0926-m (1.17)

BEGIN NOW AND DEVELOP AS NEGOTIATIONS PROCEED. ROE PLANNING SHOULD BE TAILORED FOR SCENARIOS 2 AND 3 TO ENSURE AN ENFORCEMENT CAPABILITY EXCEEDING CURRENT UNPROFOR ROE (I.E. APPROPRIATE TO A NON-PERMISSIVE ENVIRONMENT).

3. MISSION SHOULD CLARIFY, OR MODIFY IF NECESSARY, THE LANGUAGE IN PARAGRAPH 4A (1) OF REF D REGARDING POLITICAL GUIDANCE. THIS LANGUAGE SHOULD NOT/NOT BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO THE INTERPRETATION THAT NATO PLANNING SHOULD BE DELAYED UNTIL A PEACE PLAN IS AGREED TO BY ALL THE PARTIES OR A NEW UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION HAS BEEN PASSED.

4. MISSION SHOULD ALSO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- IN DISCUSSING THE PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS COMMON TO ALL SCENARIOS, IT SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED THAT THE PROVISION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE MUST CONTINUE.

-- IN DISCUSSING FORCE REQUIREMENTS, NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES SHOULD CONSIDER EVERY EVENTUALITY.

-- PLANS SHOULD ALLOW FOR PARTICIPATION IN IMPLEMENTATION BY NON-NATO STATES.

-- PLANS FOR EVACUATION OF IMPLEMENTING FORCES MUST BE DEVELOPED ALONG WITH REINFORCEMENT PLANS.

5. IN SUPPORTING THE IMMEDIATE COMMENCEMENT OF PLANNING MISSION SHOULD MAKE EXPLICIT THAT ANY DECISION ON WHEN AND WHETHER TO MAKE USE OF SUCH PLANS REMAINS FOR POLITICAL AUTHORITIES TO MAKE.

6. NATO HAS KEY CAPABILITIES WHICH MAY PROVE ESSENTIAL TO THE ACHIEVEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A NEGOTIATED OUTCOME. GIVEN ITS INTEGRATED MILITARY STRUCTURE AND PROVEN SYSTEM OF POLITICAL CONSULTATION, NATO IS IDEALLY EQUIPPED FOR THE PLANNING COMMAND. AND CONDUCT OF POSSIBLE MULTINATIONAL MILITARY OPERATIONS BY NATO FORCES AND OTHERS.

7. TO ENHANCE COORDINATION AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PLANNING, MISSION SHOULD PROPOSE THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL AUTHORIZE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES TO ESTABLISH

DIRECT CONTACT WITH UNPROFOR AND UN MILITARY AUTHORITIES. AS THE TALKS PROCEED, SYG WOERNER MAY WISH TO CONSIDER REQUESTING REGULAR BRIEFINGS FROM THE UN'S PRINCIPAL NEGOTIATORS AS TO HOW MILITARY OPTIONS MIGHT DEVELOP.

FZ: ROE AND PHASING

8. SYG WOERNER IS ALSO EXPECTED TO ASK PERMREPS TO APPROVE THE MILITARY COMMITTEE PAPER ON "NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT - PHASES OF RESPONSE AND DRAFT RULES OF ENGAGEMENT" - REF E. MISSION SHOULD SUPPORT THE SYG'S PROPOSAL TO AGREE TO THE ROE/PHASING PAPER. IN KEEPING

WITH THE PREVIOUS NATO COMMITMENT TO SHARE ALL SUCH PAPERS DEALING WITH NFZ ENFORCEMENT AS APPROPRIATE. MISSION SHOULD ALSO URGE THAT THE PAPER BE TRANSMITTED TO THE UN. AND TO THE RUSSIANS. AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SHOULD ANY ALLY ATTEMPT TO REOPEN QUESTIONS OF NFZ COMMAND AND CONTROL. MISSION SHOULD INSIST THAT NO MODIFICATIONS BE MADE TO THE EXISTING COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE AGREED TO BY THE JANUARY 14 NAC (REF C). CHRISTOPHER

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#7883

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 7883

TOR: 930217012258 M0229992

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PREC: IMMEDIATE
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SUBJ: TFSR01: FRANCE SUPPORTS NFZ IN PRINCIPLE BUT
- QUESTIONS TIMING; REQUESTS WARNING TO IZETBEGOVIC
TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 04560
GENEVA FOR USDEL ICFY
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, SR, BK, FR
SUBJECT: TFSR01: FRANCE SUPPORTS NFZ IN PRINCIPLE BUT
- QUESTIONS TIMING; REQUESTS WARNING TO IZETBEGOVIC
REF: (A) PARIS 4403 (NOTAL) (B) STATE 52139
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: FOLLOW-UP DEMARCHES WITH QUAI OFFICIALS ON
NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT CONFIRMED FRENCH SUPPORT IN PRINCIPLE
FOR MOVING AHEAD ON THE CURRENT DRAFT RESOLUTION. THE QUAI
QUESTIONS, HOWEVER, 1) THE BENEFIT (WITH REGARD TO
NEGOTIATIONS) OF AN IMMEDIATE VOTE AND 2) THE LIKELIHOOD OF
UNSC CONSENSUS. HOWEVER, "IF THE SUPPORT IS THERE, FRANCE
CAN SUPPORT IT IN THE UNSC." ALSO ON BOSNIA, THE QUAI
REQUESTS THAT THE USG WARN IZETBEGOVIC (DURING HIS UPCOMING
VISIT TO WASHINGTON) AGAINST ACTIONS ENDANGERING UNPROFOR
PERSONNEL. END SUMMARY.
FRANCE QUESTIONS TIMING, BUT WILL GO ALONG WITH UNSC CONSENSUS

3. RESPONDING TO OUR POINTS ON NO-FLY ENFORCEMENT (REF B),
QUAI DAS FOR EASTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPEAN AFFAIRS CHRISTIAN
ROUYER STATED THAT FRANCE STILL SUPPORTS THE CURRENT DRAFT
RESOLUTION AND AGREES FULLY WITH THE STATED U.S. GOAL OF
DEMONSTRATING UNSC RESOLVE TO ENFORCE ITS WILL. FRANCE,
ACCORDING TO ROUYER, NEVERTHELESS WOULD LIKE ADDITIONAL
CONSULTATIONS WITH THE U.S. AND EC PARTNERS ON THE TIMING OF
THE RESOLUTION, ESPECIALLY ITS POTENTIAL EFFECT ON
NEGOTIATIONS. FRANCE IS NOT CONVINCED THAT PASSAGE OF AN
ENFORCEMENT RESOLUTION IS ACHIEVABLE AT THIS TIME --
PARTICULARLY BECAUSE OF RUSSIAN CONCERNS -- BUT WOULD NOT
BLOCK A CONSENSUS DECISION TO PROCEED. IN A SEPARATE
CONVERSATION, QUAI ACTING DIRECTOR FOR I/O AFFAIRS MENAT
NOTED THAT "SOME OF OUR PARTNERS" MAY OPPOSE SUCH A

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By VL NARA, Date 8/28/09

2015-0926-m (1.25)

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RESOLUTION. MENAT SPECULATED THAT THERE MIGHT BE UNANIMOUS UNSC SUPPORT FOR INTRODUCING A DRAFT RESOLUTION "AS SOON AS POSSIBLE," BUT POSTPONING A VOTE ON THE TEXT. MENAT OBSERVED THAT, IN ADDITION TO RUSSIA, OTHER UNSC MEMBERS, INCLUDING THE UK AND SPAIN, REMAIN UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT VOTING ON A RESOLUTION NOW. MENAT ASKED ABOUT U.S. THINKING ON TIMING, GIVEN THAT THERE HAVE BEEN "FEW VIOLATIONS -- ONLY CROATIAN ONES." WE REPLIED THAT A NO FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT RESOLUTION WOULD SEND A STRONG SIGNAL TO THE WARRING FACTIONS AND COULD HELP ENERGIZE THE NEW YORK TALKS. MENAT SAID HE COULD NOT ARGUE WITH THIS AND THAT "IF THE SUPPORT IS THERE WE CAN SUPPORT PASSAGE OF NFZ IMPLEMENTATION IN THE UNSC." FRANCE REQUESTS U.S. TO WARN IZETBEGOVIC

6. NOTING THAT IZETBEGOVIC IS EXPECTED IN WASHINGTON THIS WEEK, ROUYER ASKED THAT THE USG WEIGH IN STRONGLY WITH THE BOSNIAN PRESIDENT AGAINST ACTIONS THAT "ENDANGER UNPROFOR PERSONNEL." ROUYER STATED THAT FRANCE STRONGLY SUSPECTS BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT FORCES OF BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FEBRUARY 11 AND 18 MORTAR "ATTACKS" ON FRENCH UNPROFOR TROOPS. THE QUAI STOPPED SHORT OF PUBLICLY BLAMING ANY ONE PARTY BUT "FIRMLY CONDEMNED" ON FEBRUARY 22 THE LATTER INCIDENT, WHICH ALLEGEDLY INCLUDED MORTAR FIRE "DELIBERATELY AIMED" AT AN AREA OF SARAJEVO'S AIRPORT OCCUPIED BY FRENCH PEACEKEEPERS. QUAI SPOKESMAN BERNARD SAID FRANCE HAD ASKED THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL TO SEE THAT THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ATTACKS BE "IDENTIFIED AND CHASTISED." ROUYER EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THE USG WOULD USE THE OCCASION OF IZETBEGOVIC'S VISIT TO REMIND TZE BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT THAT ATTACKS ON UNPROFOR ARE "UNACCEPTABLE" AND COUNTERPRODUCTIVE, TO SAY THE LEAST.

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 4560

TOR: 930223130212 M0241796

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RUDOSHA/16AF AVIANO IT//CC//
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RULRESS/6931ESS IRAKLION AS GR
RUFRSOU/NAVSUPPACT SOUDA BAY GR
RUEHTH/AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI 0217
SUBJ: GREEK PRIME MINISTER MITSOTAKIS REQUESTS USG
ASSISTANCE IN PREVENTING PARTICIPATION OF
TURKISH AIRCRAFT IN ENFORCEMENT OF BOSNIA NFZ
TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 ATHENS 04287
DEPT FOR EUR A/AS CALDWELL, EUR/SE, AND P STAFF
MILITARY ADDRESSEES ALSO FOR POLADS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, GR, BK, TU
SUBJECT: GREEK PRIME MINISTER MITSOTAKIS REQUESTS USG
ASSISTANCE IN PREVENTING PARTICIPATION OF
TURKISH AIRCRAFT IN ENFORCEMENT OF BOSNIA NFZ
REF: ATHENS 4169
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

2. PRIME MINISTER MITSOTAKIS' DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR,
AMBASSADOR TSILAS, CALLED ADCM THURSDAY, APRIL 15, AT
THE REQUEST OF THE PM, TO EXPRESS GOG OPPOSITION TO THE
PARTICIPATION OF TURKISH AIRCRAFT IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF
THE BOSNIA NO-FLY ZONE. TSILAS SAID THAT SUCH
PARTICIPATION: A) WOULD SUBSTANTIALLY INCREASE THE
CHANCES OF DANGEROUS INCIDENTS; B) WOULD INCREASE THE
RISKS OF PROVOKING AN UNFORTUNATE SERBIAN REACTION;
C) WOULD CAUSE "ENORMOUS PROBLEMS" FOR GREECE; AND
D) WAS NOT, IN THE VIEW OF THE GOG, ESSENTIAL TO AN

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
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EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OPERATION. TSILAS SAID THE PM WAS APPEALING FOR USG ASSISTANCE IN APPROACHING OTHER NATO ALLIES TO PREVENT ANY INVOLVEMENT OF TURKISH AIRCRAFT.

3. REFERRING TO PRESS REPORTS OF 12-20 TURKISH F-16S TO BE SENT TO ITALY FOR THIS PURPOSE AND CONFIRMING A STATEMENT MADE BY THE GOG SPOKESMAN LATE ON APRIL 14, TSILAS STATED THAT THE GOG COULD NOT/NOT ACCEPT OVERFLIGHTS OF TURKISH AIRCRAFT ON THEIR WAY TO STAGING BASES IN ITALY. NEVERTHELESS, THE PM WISHED TO ASSURE US THAT GREECE WOULD HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH SUCH OVERFLIGHTS BY OTHER NATO COUNTRIES (ALTHOUGH HE HOPED IT WOULD BE DONE WITHOUT PUBLICITY).

4. IN A SEPARATE MEETING, ALSO ON APRIL 15, ARMATT WAS TOLD BY A SENIOR MILITARY OFFICIAL OF THE HELLENIC NATIONAL DEFENSE GENERAL STAFF THAT THE GOG WAS IN THE PROCESS OF INFORMING ITS NATO ALLIES THAT "BLOCK CLEARANCES FOR OVERFLIGHTS" WERE BEING OFFICIALLY RESCINDED, BUT THAT THIS POLICY WOULD NOT/NOT APPLY TO USG AIRCRAFT. THIS OFFICIAL ALSO HEATEDLY EQUATED THE PROSPECTIVE TURKISH INVOLVEMENT IN THE NFZ ENFORCEMENT OPERATION WITH TURKISH EFFORTS TO UNDERMINE THE NATO DECISION ON ESTABLISHING THE LARISSA LAND HEADQUARTERS, AND SUGGESTED THAT NATO INCLUSION OF TURKISH AIRCRAFT IN BOSNIA NFZ ENFORCEMENT WOULD REMIND GREEKS OF 1974.

5. EMBASSY FULLY UNDERSTANDS THE OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE OF AN EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF THE NFZ, BUT WE URGE WASHINGTON POLICY MAKERS TO CAREFULLY CONSIDER THE RISKS OF INTRODUCING A NEW DIVISIVE FACTOR IN NATO PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA.

DISCUSSION

6. AT NOON ON THURSDAY, APRIL 15, DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR TO THE PM, LOUKAS TSILAS, PHONED ADCM (IN ABSENCE CHARGE) TO PASS ALONG A MESSAGE AND REQUEST FROM PRIME MINISTER MITSOTAKIS (WHO IS CURRENTLY IN CRETE FOR THE GREEK EASTER). TSILAS EXPLAINED THAT MITSOTAKIS WAS UNDER GREAT DOMESTIC PRESSURE IN VIEW OF THE WIDESPREAD PRESS REPORTS THAT 12 TO 20 TURKISH F-16 FIGHTER AIRCRAFT WOULD BE PARTICIPATING IN THE NATO ENFORCEMENT OF THE BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA (B/H) NO-FLY ZONE (NFZ) AND WOULD IMMINENTLY BE SEEKING TO CROSS GREEK AIR SPACE ON THEIR WAY TO STAGING AREA IN ITALY.

7. TSILAS CALLED ATTENTION TO COMMENTS MADE LATE ON ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 ATHENS 04287 DEPT FOR EUR A/AS CALDWELL, EUR/SE, AND P STAFF MILITARY ADDRESSEES ALSO FOR POLADS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MOPS, PREL, GR, BK, TU

SUBJECT: GREEK PRIME MINISTER MITSOTAKIS REQUESTS USG APRIL 14 BY THE GOG SPOKESMAN TO THE EFFECT THAT THE GOG CONTINUED TO OPPOSE INVOLVEMENT BY ANY BALKAN STATE IN MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, AND THAT IT WOULD NOT PERMIT AIRCRAFT FROM ANY SUCH STATE TO ENTER GREEK AIR SPACE FOR SUCH A PURPOSE.

8. TSILAS SAID THE PRIME MINISTER WISHED URGENTLY TO CONVEY THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO THE USG REGARDING POSSIBLE PARTICIPATION BY TURKISH AIRCRAFT IN THE NATO

NFZ ENFORCEMENT OPERATION:

- A) IT WOULD INCREASE THE CHANCES OF DANGEROUS INCIDENTS
- B) IT WOULD INCREASE THE RISKS OF PROVOKING AN UNFORTUNATE SERBIAN REACTION;
- C) IT WOULD CAUSE "ENORMOUS PROBLEMS" FOR GREECE; AND
- D) IT IS THE GOG'S VIEW THAT EFFECTIVE NATO ENFORCEMENT CAN BE CARRIED OUT WITHOUT TURKISH AIRCRAFT.

FURTHERMORE, TSILAS SAID THE PM HAD ASKED THAT THE USG URGENTLY APPROACH ITS OTHER NATO PARTNERS TO PREVENT TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN THE ENFORCEMENT OPERATION.

9. TSILAS INDICATED THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR GREECE TO ACCEDE TO ANY TURKISH REQUEST TO OVERFLY GREEK AIRSPACE, NOTING AT THE SAME TIME THAT NO SUCH REQUEST HAD YET BEEN MADE. WITH REGARD TO THE USE OF GREEK AIRSPACE BY OTHER NATO MEMBERS, TSILAS SAID THERE WOULD BE "NO PROBLEM" BUT HOPED THAT THIS COULD BE DONE WITHOUT PUBLICITY. HE AGAIN STRESSED THE TREMENDOUS PRESSURE MITSOTAKIS WAS FACING FROM THE OPPOSITION AND THE MEDIA FOR GOG'S CONTINUING COOPERATION WITH THE AWACS OPERATION OVER FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. HE SAID THAT THE PM VERY MUCH WANTS TO CONTINUE TO PARTICIPATE "WITHIN GREECE'S LIMITATIONS" IN NATO EFFORTS WHICH DO NOT CONTRAVENE GOG INSISTENCE ON "NO PARTICIPATION BY BALKAN STATES IN MILITARY OPERATIONS."

10. TSILAS NOTED THAT THE GOG POSITION WITH REGARD TO PARTICIPATION BY BALKAN COUNTRIES IN MILITARY OPERATIONS IS STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY RUSSIA, BULGARIA AND ROMANIA.

11. IN RESPONSE TO ADCM'S QUESTION WHETHER SIMILAR DEMARCHES HAVE BEEN MADE TO OTHER NATO ALLIES, TSILAS SAID THAT THE ISSUE HAD BEEN RAISED IN BOTH THE NAC AND THE NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE, BUT HAD NOT BEEN RAISED IN OTHER BILATERAL DEMARCHES. THE PM HOPED THAT THE USG, GIVEN ITS SPECIAL ROLE IN NATO AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO GREECE, WOULD APPROACH THE OTHER NATO ALLIES.

ADMIRAL FOSTIERIS: 1974 ALL OVER AGAIN

12. IN A SEPARATE DISCUSSION ON THURSDAY MORNING, APRIL 15, THE ARMY ATTACHE RECEIVED A FORCEFUL PRESENTATION ON THIS ISSUE FROM THE "A" DEPUTY OF THE HELLENIC NATIONAL DEFENSE GENERAL STAFF (HNDGS), VICE ADMIRAL FOSTIERIS. ALTHOUGH THE ARMATT HAD GONE TO SEE FOSTIERIS ON ANOTHER MATTER, FOSTIERIS IMMEDIATELY AND HEATEDLY BROACHED THE QUESTION OF TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN THE NATO ENFORCEMENT OPERATION IN B/H. FOSTIERIS INSISTED THAT NATO SYG WORNER'S REQUEST FOR TURKISH PARTICIPATION WAS CONTRARY TO AN EARLIER NATO DECISION (SPELLED OUT IN AN APRIL 2 MEMORANDUM FROM THE NATO MILITARY COMMITTEE TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL) WHICH SPECIFICALLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE UN "WILL BE THE FINAL ARBITER ON THE ACCEPTABILITY OF NATIONAL FORCE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 ATHENS 04287
DEPT FOR EUR A/AS CALDWELL, EUR/SE, AND P STAFF
MILITARY ADDRESSEES ALSO FOR POLADS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MOPS, PREL, GR, BK, TU

SUBJECT: GREEK PRIME MINISTER MITSOTAKIS REQUESTS USG CONTRIBUTIONS." FOSTIERIS EMPHASIZED THAT, COMING ON

THE HEELS OF SUCCESSFUL TURKISH EFFORTS TO DELAY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATO DECISION TO ESTABLISH A LAND HEADQUARTERS AT LARISSA, TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN THIS NATO OPERATION, IN CLEAR DISREGARD FOR GREEK INTERESTS, BROUGHT BACK MEMORIES OF 1974.

13. FOSTIERIS ALERTED ARMATT TO THE FACT THAT THE GOG WAS IN THE PROCESS OF SENDING LETTERS TO ITS NATO PARTNERS RESCINDING "BLANKET CLEARANCES FOR OVERFLIGHTS." HOWEVER, FOSTIERIS PROMPTLY ASSURED ARMATT THAT THIS RESCISSION WOULD NOT BE APPLIED IN PRACTICE VIS-A-VIS THE U.S.. (COMMENT: HE DID NOT REFER TO POLICY VIS-A-VIS THE OTHER NATO PARTNERS BESIDES TURKEY, BUT FROM TSILAS'S ASSURANCES IN PARA 9 ABOVE, WE ASSUME THAT SIMILAR INFORMAL ASSURANCES WILL BE PROVIDED.)

COMMENT

14. WHILE WE ARE OF COURSE UNABLE TO OFFER ANY JUDGMENT ON WHETHER TURKISH AIRCRAFT ARE ESSENTIAL TO AN EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF THE NFZ, WE CAN STATE WITH CONVICTION THAT SUCH PARTICIPATION WILL INTRODUCE A NEW AND DIVISIVE FACTOR IN NATO'S PEACE-KEEPING EFFORTS IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. NO/NO GREEK GOVERNMENT -- NOT EVEN ONE AS SUPPORTIVE OF NATO AS HAS BEEN THE MITSOTAKIS GOVERNMENT -- CAN ACCEPT THE POLITICAL COST OF PERMITTING TURKISH OVERFLIGHTS OF GREEK AIRSPACE FOR AN OPERATION WHICH MOST GREEKS VIEW WITH, AT VERY BEST, LUKEWARM UNDERSTANDING. EVEN IF TURKISH AIRCRAFT PARTICIPATE IN THE OPERATION BY REACHING ITALIAN BASES THROUGH INTERNATIONAL AIRSPACE, SUCH PARTICIPATION WILL HAVE AN IMMEDIATE AND CHILLING IMPACT ON GREEK ATTITUDES TOWARDS NATO.

15. WE FULLY RECOGNIZE THE OVERWHELMING IMPORTANCE OF THE NFZ ENFORCEMENT MISSION, BUT URGE THAT WASHINGTON POLICY MAKERS CAREFULLY CONSIDER WHETHER THE ADDITION OF THE TURKISH AIRCRAFT IS WORTH THE COST OF A NEW RIFT WITHIN THE ALLIANCE OVER POLICY IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA.

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TOR: 930415102606 M0340679
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DIST: PRT: SIT WALKER
SIT: BLEICKEN HOLL SUM SUM2 VAX WAYNE
□

Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUFHNA1793 1061728-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 161728Z APR 93
LINE4: FM USMISSION USNATO
OSRI: RUFHNA
DTG: 161728Z APR 93
ORIG: USMISSION USNATO
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3326
INFO: RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUSNTCA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//POLAD//
RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA 0050
RUFQAAA/USNMR SHAPE BE//INTAF//
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//POLAD//
RUFHZG/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 0511
RUFNBOA/USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT//INTAF//
RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//POLAD//
RUCBSAA/USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA//POLAD//
ZEN/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE
SUBJ: CGYO01: FRENCH DEMARCHE ON TURKISH
PARTICIPATION IN NFZ ENFORCEMENT
TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 001793
STATE FOR EUR, S/RB, S/NIS, PM AND IO
STATE ALSO PASS NSC FOR WALKER;
SECDEF FOR USDP, ADUSP(REE), OSD/ISA AND ASD/ISP;
JCS FOR GEN. MCCAFFREY
PARIS FOR AMB. BARTHOLOMEW
PRAGUE PASS TO DCM EVANS FOR CHARGE VERSHBOW
USUN FOR GREY
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: NATO, PREL, MARR, BK, SR, HR, UN
SUBJECT: CGYO01: FRENCH DEMARCHE ON TURKISH
PARTICIPATION IN NFZ ENFORCEMENT
REF: USNATO 1636
1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
SUMMARY

2. ON APRIL 16, FRENCH DCM ANDREANI CALLED ON CHARGE
TO PRESENT A DEMARCHE CALLING FOR SUSPENSION OF
SACEUR'S DECISION, ANNOUNCED TO THE MILITARY COMMITTEE
ON APRIL 15, TO ORDER DEPLOYMENT OF THE TURKISH (AND
UK) AIRCRAFT THAT HAD BEEN OFFERED FOR NFZ
ENFORCEMENT. KEY POINTS WERE THAT FRANCE BELIEVED AN
"INFORMAL ALLIANCE UNDERSTANDING" EXISTED THAT TURKISH
DEPLOYMENT WOULD BE DELAYED "FOR A PERIOD OF TIME," AND
THAT SUCH DEPLOYMENT WOULD AGGRAVATE THE SITUATION ON
THE GROUND IN BOSNIA AND THREATEN FRENCH FORCES IN

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By 12 NARA, Date 8/23/2019
7015-0928-11 (1.24)

SERBIA. CHARGE BEECROFT UNDERTOOK TO REPORT THE FRENCH DEMARCHE TO WASHINGTON, BUT DISPUTED SEVERAL OF THE POINTS MADE BY ANDREANI. ANDREANI SAID FRANCE WANTED THIS ISSUE TO BE HANDLED DISCREETLY AND DID NOT WANT TO CALL A NAC; HE INDICATED, HOWEVER, THAT FRANCE DID NOT RULE OUT DOING SO IF THIS DEMARCHE DID NOT BEAR FRUIT. ANDREANI'S STATEMENTS STRONGLY SUGGEST THAT FRANCE'S FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM IS NOT ABOUT OBTAINING A DELAY TO ADDRESS A SPECIFIC SECURITY CONCERN, BUT RATHER DERIVES FROM OPPOSITION TO ALLOWING THE TURKS TO FLY AT ALL. MISSION HAS SUBSEQUENTLY LEARNED THAT RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR AFANAS'EVSKIY HAS CALLED ACTING SECRETARY DE FRANCHIS TO LOBBY AGAINST TURKISH PARTICIPATION.

END SUMMARY.

ANDREANI'S DEMARCHE

3. ON APRIL 16, FRENCH DCM ANDREANI CALLED ON THE CHARGE TO PRESENT A DEMARCHE CALLING FOR SUSPENSION OF SACEUR'S DECISION, ANNOUNCED TO THE MILITARY COMMITTEE ON APRIL 15 TO ORDER DEPLOYMENT OF THE TURKISH (AND UK) AIRCRAFT THAT HAD BEEN OFFERED FOR NFZ ENFORCEMENT. ANDREANI CAME ALONE; CHARGE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY ACTING DEFAD BGEN KUENNING, ECON COUNSELOR LANG AND DEFENSE OPERATIONS OFFICER COL DREW. ANDREANI, NOTING THAT THE SAME DEMARCHE WAS BEING DELIVERED TO ALL ALLIES PARTICIPATING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY IN THE OPERATION, MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- SACEUR WAS "ON THE VERGE" OF GIVING AN ORDER TO DEPLOY TURKISH AND UK AIRCRAFT. (COMMENT: WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE ORDER TO DEPLOY WAS ISSUED EARLY MORNING APRIL 16, THAT THE AIRCRAFT ARE LIKELY TO BE ON STATION IN ITALY BY APRIL 21. END COMMENT.)
- FRANCE WAS APPROACHING THE U.S., UK, NETHERLANDS, GERMANY, ITALY, AND TURKEY TO SEEK SUPPORT FOR ITS REQUEST THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL SUSPEND THIS DECISION.
- THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S APRIL 8 LETTER TO THE UN DID NOT STATE THAT NATO ENVISAGED "EFFECTIVE TURKISH PARTICIPATION" IN THE OPERATION.
- THE ENTRY OF TURKISH FORCES WOULD LEAD TO THE DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA.
- THE RESORT TO A TURKISH CONTRIBUTION IS NOT A MERE TECHNICAL MATTER OF MAKING UP A CERTAIN NUMBER OF PLANES, AS SACEUR SEEMS TO CONSIDER IT. ON THE CONTRARY, IT HAS A POLITICAL BEARING ON THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND IN B-H.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 USNATO 001793
 STATE FOR EUR, S/RB, S/NIS, PM AND IO
 STATE ALSO PASS NSC FOR WALKER;
 SECDEF FOR USDP, ADUSP(REE), OSD/ISA AND ASD/ISP;
 JCS FOR GEN. MCCAFFREY
 PARIS FOR AMB. BARTHOLOMEW
 PRAGUE PASS TO DCM EVANS FOR CHARGE VERSHBOW
 USUN FOR GREY
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: NATO, PREL, MARR, BK, SR, HR, UN

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SUBJECT: CGYO01: FRENCH DEMARCHE ON TURKISH
PARTICIPATION IN NFZ ENFORCEMENT

- FRANCE HAD THOUGHT OF TURKEY AS BEING A "THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTOR." FRANCE BELIEVED THERE HAD BEEN AN INFORMAL UNDERSTANDING IN THE ALLIANCE THAT TURKISH PARTICIPATION WOULD NOT BE ACTIVATED "FOR SOME TIME."
- FRANCE ALSO IS CONCERNED THAT TURKISH PARTICIPATION COULD JEOPARDIZE THE POSITION OF A FRENCH LOGISTICS BATTALION IN BELGRADE, WHOSE DEPARTURE IS BEING PREVENTED BY SERBIAN FORCES.
- FRANCE WISHED THIS ISSUE TO BE HANDLED DISCREETLY AND DID NOT/NOT WISH TO CALL FOR A NAC; HOWEVER, IT WOULD ELEVATE THE ISSUE IF A SATISFACTORY RESPONSE TO THIS DEMARCHE WAS NOT FORTHCOMING.
- FAILURE TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE SATISFACTORILY WOULD HAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR FUTURE FRENCH DECISIONS REGARDING PARTICIPATION IN NATO PEACEKEEPING.
(NOTE: ON THIS POINT, CHARGE RESPONDED THAT FRANCE'S APPROACH ON THIS ISSUE COULD RAISE QUESTIONS ON THE PART OF THE U.S. AS TO WHETHER FRANCE WAS TRULY PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE AS A FULL ALLIANCE PARTNER AT 16.)

CHARGE'S RESPONSE

-
4. CHARGE BEECROFT SAID THAT HE WOULD CONVEY FRANCE'S DEMARCHE TO WASHINGTON, BUT WANTED TO COMMENT ON SOME OF THE POINTS ANDREANI HAD RAISED. HE OBSERVED THAT SUSPENDING THE ORDER TO DEPLOY TURKISH TROOPS WOULD APPEAR TO REQUIRE A NAC CONSENSUS, SINCE THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S LETTER TO THE UN, LISTING THE ALLIED NATIONS WHICH HAD OFFERED TO PROVIDE FORCES FOR THIS OPERATION, HAD BEEN APPROVED BY ALL SIXTEEN ALLIES IN THE NAC. IN THIS CONNECTION, BEECROFT POINTED OUT THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S LETTER HAD DESCRIBED THE INITIAL PARTICIPATION OF U.S., DUTCH, AND FRENCH FORCES IN TERMS OF THE NEED TO START THE OPERATION ON TIME, NOT IN TERMS OF SELECTING NATIONAL PARTICIPANTS. UNSYG BOUTROS-GHALI HAD LISTED ALL PARTICIPANTS, INCLUDING TURKEY, IN HIS REPORT TO THE UNSC, WHICH HAD BEEN DULY NOTED. AS FOR ANDREANI'S WARNING THAT FAILURE TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE SATISFACTORILY WOULD HAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR FUTURE FRENCH DECISIONS REGARDING PARTICIPATION IN NATO PEACEKEEPING, CHARGE OBSERVED THAT FRANCE'S APPROACH COULD RAISE QUESTIONS BY THE U.S. AS TO WHETHER FRANCE WAS TRULY PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE AS A FULL ALLIANCE PARTNER AT 16.
 5. ANDREANI REITERATED FRANCE'S VIEW THAT THERE HAD BEEN AN INFORMAL UNDERSTANDING AMONG ALLIES THAT TURKISH (AND UK) AIRCRAFT WOULD BE "KEPT IN RESERVE" FOR A PERIOD OF TIME. BEECROFT RESPONDED THAT THE U.S., FOR ITS PART, WAS UNAWARE OF SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING, AND THAT IT WAS CLEAR THAT TURKEY, FOR ONE, DID NOT SHARE IT.
 6. ANDREANI CLAIMED THAT SERBIAN AUTHORITIES WERE PREVENTING THE DEPARTURE OF ELEMENTS OF A FRENCH LOGISTIC BATTALION FROM BELGRADE, AND THAT PARIS WAS CONCERNED THAT THE PARTICIPATION OF TURKISH AIRCRAFT IN

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NFZ ENFORCEMENT WOULD AGGRAVATE THIS SITUATION. WHEN ASKED WHETHER THE SERBS HAD THREATENED THE BATTALION OR LINKED SUCH THREATS TO TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN NFZ ENFORCEMENT, ANDREANI RESPONDED THAT THERE HAD BEEN "NO SPECIFIC THREAT," BUT THAT THE SERBS WERE "CREATING PROVOCATIONS." ASKED IF FRANCE HAD COMMUNICATED ITS CONCERNS TO UNPROFOR, ANDREANI SAID PARIS HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH "OUR PEOPLE" IN UNPROFOR.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 USNATO 001793
 STATE FOR EUR, S/RB, S/NIS, PM AND IO
 STATE ALSO PASS NSC FOR WALKER;
 SECDEF FOR USDP, ADUSP(REE), OSD/ISA AND ASD/ISP;
 JCS FOR GEN. MCCAFFREY
 PARIS FOR AMB. BARTHOLOMEW
 PRAGUE PASS TO DCM EVANS FOR CHARGE VERSHBOW
 USUN FOR GREY
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: NATO, PREL, MARR, BK, SR, HR, UN
 SUBJECT: CGY001: FRENCH DEMARCHE ON TURKISH
 PARTICIPATION IN NFZ ENFORCEMENT

COMMENT

7. MISSION IS UNAWARE OF ANY TACIT UNDERSTANDING THAT DEPLOYMENT OF TURKISH AIRCRAFT WOULD BE DELAYED FOR A LENGTHY -- PERHAPS INDEFINITE -- PERIOD OF TIME, AS ANDREANI SUGGESTED. FRANCE HAS HAD AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE CONCERNS ABOUT THE SAFETY OF ITS FORCES IN THE NAC, UN AND MC, BUT HAS NOT TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF ANY OF THESE CONSULTATIVE MECHANISMS. IT ALSO HAS THE OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAL THROUGH UNPROFOR IF IT CONSIDERS NFZ ENFORCEMENT TO POSE A TEMPORARY THREAT TO ITS FORCES. SEEN FROM HERE, IT APPEARS THAT FRANCE'S FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM IS NOT ABOUT OBTAINING A DELAY TO ADDRESS A SPECIFIC SECURITY CONCERN, BUT RATHER DERIVES FROM OPPOSITION IN PRINCIPLE TO ALLOWING THE TURKS TO FLY AT ALL, FRENCH AGREEMENT AT THE APRIL 8 NAC NOTWITHSTANDING. THE FRENCH MILREP MADE THIS POINT CLEARLY EARLIER IN THE DAY, REJECTING THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY STAFF'S SUGGESTION THAT THERE COULD BE A DELAY OF UP TO A WEEK FOR TRAINING THE TURKISH CREWS BEFORE USING THEM IN NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT, IN ORDER TO PROVIDE FRANCE TIME TO ADDRESS ITS SECURITY CONCERNS. THE ISSUE, HE STATED, WAS ONE OF ALLOWING THE TURKS TO FLY AT ALL.

8. MISSION ALSO NOTES THAT TURKISH MILITARY PERSONNEL HAVE BEEN PARTICIPATING BOTH IN AWACS MONITORING OF BOSNIAN AIRSPACE AND IN STANAVFORMED ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS IN THE ADRIATIC. IN MISSION'S VIEW, IT WOULD BE A SERIOUS MISTAKE IF NATO, HAVING APPROVED AN OPERATIONS PLAN IN FULL KNOWLEDGE OF SACEUR'S STATED INTENTION (REFTEL) TO DEPLOY ALL/ALL FORCES ON OFFER IN ORDER TO FULFILL IT, NOW DENIED HIM SOME OF THOSE RESOURCES ON THE BASIS OF AN ALLEGED "GENTLEMAN'S AGREEMENT."

ADDENDUM: RUSSIANS ALSO LOBBY AGAINST TURKISH PARTICIPATION

9. AS THE FOREGOING WAS BEING DRAFTED, MISSION LEARNED

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FROM INTERNATIONAL STAFF SOURCE (STRICTLY PROTECT) THAT
RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR AFANAS'EVSKIY CALLED ACTING
SECRETARY GENERAL DE FRANCHIS THIS AFTERNOON TO LOBBY
AGAINST TURKISH PARTICIPATION. AFANAS'EVSKIY, ASKING
THAT HIS REMARKS BE CONVEYED TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL
AND TO THE NAC, STATED THAT:

- RUSSIA HAS BEEN INFORMED BY A "NATO ALLY WHO IS A
MEMBER OF THE UNSC" THAT TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN
NFZ ENFORCEMENT IS NEITHER TECHNICALLY NOR
MILITARILY NECESSARY.
- NATO SHOULD BE SENSITIVE TO THE HISTORY OF TURKISH
INVOLVEMENT IN THE BALKANS.
- FOREIGN MINISTER KOZYREV HAS RAISED THIS ISSUE WITH
SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER IN TOKYO.
- RUSSIA HAS ALSO RAISED IT IN NEW YORK WITH UN UNDER
SECRETARY FOR PEACEKEEPING KOFI ANNAN, AND PLANS TO
RAISE IT IN THE UNSC.

BEECROFT

BT

#1793

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 03

<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03

<^SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03

SSN: 1793

<^SSN>1793

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SIT: FILE SUM SUM2

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Cable

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 LINE3: O 171228Z APR 93
 LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
 OSRI: RUEHAK
 DTG: 171228Z APR 93
 ORIG: AMEMBASSY ANKARA
 TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9716
 INFO: RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 0319
 RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 4433
 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1235
 RUFHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 4156
 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
 RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0502
 RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//POLAD/ IMMEDIATE/
 RUFNBOA/USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT//INTAFF IMMEDIATE
 RUFQCSA/USNMR SHAPE BE//INTAFF// IMMEDIATE
 RHFQAAA/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GM//POLAD// IMMEDIATE
 SUBJ: TURKISH FM CETIN ON TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN
 BOSNIAN NFZ
 TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ANKARA 04872
 EXDIS
 FOR A/S OXMAN FROM THE AMBASSADOR
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADE
 TAGS: MOPS, PREL, TU, GR, RS, FR, UK
 SUBJECT: TURKISH FM CETIN ON TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN
 BOSNIAN NFZ
 REF: ANKARA 4865
 1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ -- ENTIRE TEXT.
 2. TURKISH FM CETIN CALLED IN THE FRENCH AND DANISH
 AMBASSADORS, THE BRITISH CHARGE AND MYSELF AT NOON APRIL
 17 TO DISCUSS THE ARMENIAN-AZERI CONFLICT (SEPTTEL) AND
 BOSNIA. REGARDING BOSNIA, CETIN SAID THE IMPENDING FALL
 OF SREBRENICA HEIGHTENED THE URGENCY OF THE CRISIS AND
 DEMONSTRATED THAT TURKEY HAS BEEN CORRECT ALL ALONG IN
 ITS INSISTENCE ON THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE MEASURES
 AGAINST THE SERBS. CETIN ARGUED THAT SO FAR THE
 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS FOCUSED ALMOST COMPLETELY ON
 HUMANITARIAN AID AND HAS NOT DEALT WITH THE CORE PROBLEM
 OF SERBIAN MILITARY AGGRESSION.
 3. THE BOSNIAN MUSLIMS ARE DEFENSELESS, CETIN
 MAINTAINED, AND THE GOT BELIEVES THE ARMS EMBARGO
 AGAINST BOSNIA MUST BE LIFTED IMMEDIATELY. TURKEY IS
 AWARE OF THE DANGERS AND HAS NEVER PROPOSED LAUNCHING A
 GROUND WAR IN BOSNIA, BUT IT WAS TIME TO SEND A VERY
 TOUGH MILITARY SIGNAL TO BELGRADE. FAILURE TO DO SO
 RISKS SPILLOVER. TURKEY IS NOT EAGER TO ENGAGE IN

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006

By ML NARA, Date 8/23/2019

2015-0976-m (1.25)

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA, AND HAS NEVER ENTERTAINED THE IDEA OF ACTING UNILATERALLY. WHEN ASKED, HOWEVER, IT WILL ACT IN CONCERT WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

4. CETIN THEN HOMED IN ON THE ISSUE OF TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN THE BOSNIAN NFZ (REFTEL). HE NOTED THAT GREECE HAS CLOSED ITS AIRSPACE TO TURKISH PLANES. THE GOT WILL NOT MAKE AN ISSUE OF THIS, BUT TURKEY WILL INSIST ON GOING AHEAD WITH ITS PARTICIPATION. IF IT WERE TO DROP OUT OF THE EFFORT NOW, THERE WOULD BE NO WAY THE GOVERNMENT COULD EXPLAIN THIS ABOUT FACE TO THE TURKISH PUBLIC.

5. CETIN WENT ON TO SAY THAT TURKEY HOPES THE UNSC WILL TAKE TOUGH NEW MEASURES AGAINST SERBIA. ALTERING WHAT WE HEARD FROM ERALP YESTERDAY, CETIN SAID THE GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER WILL NOW PROCEED WITH HIS VISIT HERE ON APRIL 18-19. THIS WAS MUTUALLY AGREED UPON AFTER TELEPHONIC CONTACTS BETWEEN ANKARA AND ATHENS. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR INTERJECTED TO SAY THAT TURKEY SHOULD NOT MISUNDERSTAND FRENCH INTENTIONS REGARDING THE RESERVATIONS PARIS HAS EXPRESSED ABOUT TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN THE NFZ AT THIS TIME. ALL FRANCE WANTS IS TO ENSURE THAT THE NEXT PHASE OF INTERNATIONAL ACTION ON BOSNIA IS MANAGED PROPERLY. NEW MEASURES SHOULD BE WEIGHED CAREFULLY, THE FRENCHMAN SAID. I STATED THAT I UNDERSTOOD THAT SUCH MEASURES HAVE ALREADY BEEN CAREFULLY WEIGHED IN NATO. CETIN CONCLUDED THE DISCUSSION BY SAYING THAT TURKISH CREDIBILITY IS ON THE LINE IN THIS QUESTION. HE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT TURKEY IS TRYING TO AVOID A MEETING OF THE NAC WHICH WOULD REOPEN UNNECESSARILY DECISIONS ALREADY MADE.

BARKLEY

BT

#4872

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 4872

TOR: 930417131952 M0344786

DIST:

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY KYIM LAKE SIT SODERBERG WALKER
SIT: BLEICKEN FILE HOLL RICE SUM SUM2 VAX

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Cable

PREC: IMMEDIATE
CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
LINE1: OAACZYUW RUEHTHA4305 1071347-CCCC--RHEHAAX.
LINE2: ZNY CCCCC ZZH
LINE3: O 171342Z APR 93
LINE4: FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
OSRI: RUEHTH
DTG: 171342Z APR 93
ORIG: AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO: RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0762
INFO: RUDOGHA/USNMR SHAPE BE//SA/SACEUR//IMMEDIATE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUFHBE/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0131
RUFHZG/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB PRIORITY 0034
RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GM
RHFQAAA/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GM
RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GM
RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
RUSNBJA/CDRUSASETAF VICENZA IT//AESE/GBI/CIT//
RUDOSHA/16AF AVIANO IT//CC//
RULRAAA/7276ABG IRAKLION AS GR//CC//
RULRESS/6931ESS IRAKLION AS GR
RUFRSOU/NAVSUPPACT SOUDA BAY GR
RUEHTH/AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI 0226
SUBJ: GOG REACTION TO TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN
NATO ENORCEMENT OF BOSNIA NFZ
TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 ATHENS 04305
DEPT. FOR EUR/SE, EUR/EE, AND EUR/RPM
MILITARY ADDRESSEES ALSO FOR POLADS
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, GR, BK, TU
SUBJECT: GOG REACTION TO TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN
NATO ENORCEMENT OF BOSNIA NFZ
REF: A) ATHENS 4287, DTG 151417Z APR 93
B) ANKARA 4857, DTG 161457Z APR 93
C) USNATO 1793, DTG 161728Z APR 93
D) USDELMC BRUSSELS 161253Z (CITE 137/93)
1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT.

SUMMARY

2. THE GOG, THOUGH OTHERWISE "BECALMED" FOR THE EXTENDED (THROUGH MONDAY NIGHT) ORTHODOX EASTER WEEKEND, HAS SIGNED ITS CONTINUING ADAMANCE ON REFUSING FLIGHTS THROUGH ITS "NATIONAL AIR SPACE" (PROBABLY INCLUDING ATHENS FIR) BY TURKISH PLANES DESTINED FOR STAGING BASES IN ITALY IN CONNECTION WITH NATO ENFORCEMENT OF THE BOSNIA NFZ. FOR NOW, FONMIN PAKONSTANTINOU APPEARS TO BE CONTINUING WITH PLANS (MADE BEFORE THIS CRISIS ERUPTED) TO VISIT TURKEY AND

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2004
By W NARA, Date 8/23/09
2015-2926-01 (1.26)

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TALK WITH CETIN ON APRIL 19. WHILE EMBASSY SEES NO REASON NOT TO LEAVE THIS DISPUTE IN NATO CHANNELS FOR THE PRESENT, WE ARE CERTAIN TO HEAR DIRECTLY FROM THE GOG ABOUT THIS ISSUE IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

AIR OF CRISIS IN GOG OVER TURKISH ROLE IN NFZ

3. DESPITE RELATIVE QUIET IN ATHENS ON THE LONG ORTHODOX EASTER HOLIDAY WEEKEND, THE MEDIA SUGGEST AN AIR OF CRISIS IN THE GOVERNMENT OVER THE QUESTION OF TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN NO-FLY ZONE (NFZ) ENFORCEMENT, ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO TURKISH OVERFLIGHT OF GREEK AIRSPACE TO GET TO STAGING BASES IN ITALY. THE MEDIA HAVE INDICATED THAT DEFMIN VARVITSIOTIS RETURNED FROM HIS EASTER VACATION TO THE GREEK PENTAGON, WHERE HE REPORTEDLY SPENT LAST NIGHT. THE MEDIA HAVE BEEN FULL OF REPORTS OF HIGH-LEVEL CRISIS-MANAGEMENT MEETINGS.

GOVERNMENT STATEMENT

4. EARLY THIS AFTERNOON, APRIL 17, THE GOVERNMENT ISSUED THE FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT (EMBASSY'S TRANSLATION):

BEGIN TEXT:

AT THE ORDER OF PRIME MINISTER MITSOTAKIS, A MEETING WAS HELD THIS MORNING (SATURDAY, APRIL 17) AT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THE MINISTERS OF DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE LEADERS OF THE HELLENIC NATIONAL DEFENSE GENERAL STAFF (HNDGS) AND THE HELLENIC AIR STAFF AS WELL AS HEADS OF THE RELEVANT DIRECTORATES OF THE MFA.

AT THE MEETING, THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CRISIS IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA WERE DISCUSSED, AS WELL AS THE ISSUE OF THE PARTICIPATION OF TURKISH FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE NO-FLY ZONE OVER BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA. MORE SPECIFICALLY, THE TURKISH REQUEST FOR PASSAGE OF ITS AIRCRAFT INTO OUR NATIONAL AIRSPACE WAS EXAMINED.

THIS REQUEST WAS NOT ACCEPTED. THE FACT IS THAT, AS WAS RECONFIRMED AT THE MEETING, GREECE IS AGAINST ANY INVOLVEMENT OR ENTANGLEMENT OF ANY BALKAN COUNTRY IN THESE OPERATIONS, AND, AS HAS ALREADY BEEN ANNOUNCED,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 ATHENS 04305
DEPT. FOR EUR/SE, EUR/EE, AND EUR/RPM
MILITARY ADDRESSEES ALSO FOR POLADS

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: MOPS, PREL, GR, BK, TU

SUBJECT: GOG REACTION TO TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN THE GOVERNMENT INSISTS ON ITS DECISION NOT TO PERMIT THE USE OF ITS NATIONAL AIRSPACE FOR THIS PURPOSE. AT THIS CRITICAL MOMENT, THE GREEK GOVERNMENT EXPRESSES ITS HOPE THAT THE REQUISITE PRUDENCE WILL BE DEMONSTRATED IN A MANNER THAT WILL AVOID FURTHER ESCALATION OF THE CRISIS AND SAFEGUARD PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE REGION, AS WELL AS PROTECT HE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE BALKAN STATES IN A LONG-TERM AND SECURE FASHION.

THE PRIME MINISTER REMAINS IN CONTINUOUS CONTACT WITH

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HIS MINISTERS OF DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND IS BEING BRIEFED ON DEVELOPMENTS.
END TEXT.

FM LEAVES FOR TURKEY; VOWS "NO OVERFLIGHTS OF GREEK AIRSPACE -- PERIOD"

5. FURTHERMORE, ACCORDING TO NEWS ACCOUNTS, PAPAKONSTANTINOU, AT THE AIRPORT FOR HIS DEPARTURE FOR ISTANBUL AND ANKARA, THE FORMER TO ATTEND EASTER SERVICES, THE LATTER FOR A SCHEDULED MEETING WITH FM CETIN ON APRIL 19, MADE A VERY SHORT STATEMENT: "WE WILL NOT ALLOW OVERFLIGHTS OF GREEK AIRSPACE -- PERIOD." (COMMENT: THERE WAS NO SUGGESTION THAT THE GOG HAD CANCELED PLANS FOR THE PAPAKONSTANTINOU - CETIN MEETING. END COMMENT)

6. GREEK RADIO ALSO REPORTED, CITING ANATOLIAN NEWS AGENCY AS SOURCE, THAT TURKISH FLIGHTS WILL GO AROUND CRETE AND WILL ARRIVE THIS WEEKEND IN ITALY.

7. NEITHER GREEK MEDIA REFERENCES TO GREEK AIRSPACE, NOR THE GOG STATEMENT IN PARA 4 (ABOVE), RAISES THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE ATHENS FLIGHT INFORMATION REGION (FIR) AND GREECE'S TERRITORIAL AIRSPACE -- BUT, BASED ON PAST PRACTICE, IT IS NOT UNLIKELY THE GOG IS LUMPING THE TWO TOGETHER.

COMMENT

8. THERE HAS BEEN NO/NO GOG ATTEMPT TO CONTACT EMBASSY SINCE PM DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR TSILAS' CALL ON THURSDAY, APRIL 15 (REF. A). (TSILAS IS OUT OF ATHENS, BUT INDICATED HE COULD BE REACHABLE AT ANY TIME, AND WOULD BE IN CONTINUING CONTACT WITH THE PM IN CRETE.)

9. THE EMBASSY HAS NOT/NOT INITIATED ANY CONTACTS WITH GREEK OFFICIALS TO LEARN MORE ABOUT GREEK POSITIONS, INCLUDING THE PRECISE MEANING OF "NATIONAL AIRSPACE" AS USED IN THE GOVERNMENT STATEMENT (ABOVE). WE PREFER TO LEAVE THIS IN NATO CHANNELS, TO THE EXTENT THAT GOG WILL PERMIT THIS.

10. EMBASSY IS STILL AWAITING RESPONSE TO PM'S REQUEST FOR USG INTERVENTION WITH ITS NATO PARTNERS (REF. A).

11. WITH SO MANY KEY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OUT OF TOWN ON THIS MOST IMPORTANT HOLIDAY ON THE GREEK CALENDAR, IT IS DIFFICULT TO GAUGE WHETHER THERE IS A GENUINE SENSE OF CRISIS IN THE GOG. NEVERTHELESS, WE REMIND WASHINGTON THAT THERE ARE FEW ISSUES THAT RAISE GREEK HACKLES MORE THAN TURKISH USE OF "GREEK AIRSPACE," PARTICULARLY WHEN THE PURPOSE IS A TURKISH MILITARY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 ATHENS 04305
DEPT. FOR EUR/SE, EUR/EE, AND EUR/RPM
MILITARY ADDRESSEES ALSO FOR POLADS

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: MOPS, PREL, GR, BK, TU

SUBJECT: GOG REACTION TO TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN ROLE IN THE BALKANS. WE ARE CERTAIN TO HEAR MORE FROM THE GOG ON THIS ISSUE.

FROMOWITZ

BT

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#4305

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 RUEHTH/AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI 0244
 SUBJ: GREEK PRIME MINISTER MITSOTAKIS' REACTION
 TO USG TALKING POINTS ON TURKISH
 PARTICIPATION IN NFZ ENFORCEMENT
 TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02ATHENS 04361
 DEPT FOR EUR A/AS CALDWELL, EUR/SE, AND P STAFF
 MILITARY ADDRESSEES ALSO FOR POLADS
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: MOPS, PREL, GR, BK, TU
 SUBJECT: GREEK PRIME MINISTER MITSOTAKIS' REACTION
 TO USG TALKING POINTS ON TURKISH
 PARTICIPATION IN NFZ ENFORCEMENT
 REF: A) STATE 117978 (DTG 180153Z APR 93)
 B) ATHENS 4305 (DTG 171342Z APR 93)
 C) ATHENS 4287 (DTG 151417Z APR 93)
 1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

 SUMMARY

 2. ON TUESDAY, APRIL 20, PM DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR TSILAS
 CONVEYED TO EMBASSY MITSOTAKIS' REACTION TO USG TALKING
 POINTS ON TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN BOSNIA NFZ
 ENFORCEMENT. MITSOTAKIS STRESSED THAT:
 -- THE GOG VIEWS TURKISH PARTICIPATION NOT/NOT AS A
 THREAT TO GREECE (AS MENTIONED IN TALKING POINTS), BUT

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 E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
 White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
 By *VR* NARA, Date *8/25/2019*
 2015-0926-M (1.27)

RATHER AS A THREAT TO REGIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY;
 -- THIS IS NOT A GREEK-TURKISH PROBLEM BUT RATHER AN ALLIANCE AND INTERNATIONAL ONE; VARIOUS OTHER COUNTRIES SHARE THE VIEW OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT RE TURKISH PARTICIPATION; AND
 -- THE GOG NOTES THAT TURKEY HAS HANDLED THE MOVEMENT OF ITS AIRCRAFT "IN A WAY WHICH AVOIDED PROBLEMS FOR GREECE."

 RESPONSE FROM TSILAS

3. ON TUESDAY MORNING, APRIL 20, ADCM PROVIDED PM DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR TSILAS WITH THE TALKING POINTS IN REF A RESPONDING TO MITSOTAKIS' APRIL 15 REQUEST FOR USG ASSISTANCE TO PREVENT TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN THE BOSNIA NFZ ENFORCEMENT OPERATION (REF C). TSILAS GAVE AN IMMEDIATE REACTION ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

-- NOTING THE LAST TALKING POINT SUGGESTING THAT TURKISH PARTICIPATION WAS NOT IN ANY WAY A THREAT TO GREECE, TSILAS ARGUED THAT MITSOTAKIS HAD NOT SUGGESTED SUCH PARTICIPATION WAS A THREAT TO GREECE, BUT RATHER TO REGIONAL STABILITY IN THE BALKANS;

--THE GOG BELIEVES THAT TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN OVERFLIGHTS OVER A HIGHLY VOLATILE WAR ZONE WILL INCREASE THE RISKS OF INCIDENTS RATHER THAN CONTRIBUTE TO STABILITY;

-- GREECE IS NOT ALONE IN THIS VIEW: BULGARIA AND ROMANIA, ALSO BALKAN NEIGHBORS TO THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, FULLY SHARE GREECE'S OPPOSITION TO PARTICIPATION BY ANY BALKAN STATE IN SUCH OPERATIONS;

-- EVEN WITHIN NATO, PORTUGAL, BELGIUM, CANADA AND FRANCE HAVE SIMILAR RESERVATIONS REGARDING TURKISH PARTICIPATION; RUSSIA, TOO, SHARES THE GOG VIEW; AND

-- IT HAS BEEN A CONSTANT POLICY OF THE UN TO OPPOSE PARTICIPATION IN MILITARY OPERATIONS IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA OF ANY BALKAN STATE.

 RESPONSE FROM PM

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 ATHENS 04361
 DEPT FOR EUR A/AS CALDWELL, EUR/SE, AND P STAFF
 MILITARY ADDRESSEES ALSO FOR POLADS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: MOPS, PREL, GR, BK, TU
 SUBJECT: (AQS) AND THREATENS
 PEACE AND STABILITY;

-- THE GOG HAS NEVER SUGGESTED THAT TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN NFZ ENFORCEMENT IN BOSNIA IS A THREAT TO GREECE; RATHER, IT IS A THREAT TO THE STABILITY OF A VERY VOLATILE REGION;

-- THE GOG "HAS NO SPECIFIC PROBLEMS" WITH TURKEY WITH REGARD TO TURKEY'S PROVISION OF AIRCRAFT TO NATO; THIS IS AN ALLIANCE AND INTERNATIONAL ISSUE, ON WHICH A NUMBER OF OTHER COUNTRIES SHARE THE GOG VIEW; AND

-- THE GOG NOTES THAT TURKEY HAS HANDLED THE MOVEMENT OF ITS AIRCRAFT "IN A WAY WHICH AVOIDED PROBLEMS FOR GREECE" (I.E., BY NOT SENDING THEM THROUGH THE ATHENS FIR).

MITSOTAKIS-DEMIREL BILATERAL?

5. TSILAS SAID THAT HE WOULD BE LEAVING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER FOR ANKARA LATER THAT DAY (APRIL 20). HE NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THAT TURKISH PM DEMIREL PLANNED TO MEET MITSOTAKIS AT THE AIRPORT AND OBSERVED THAT, DESPITE MEDIA REPORTS THAT A MITSOTAKIS-DEMIREL MEETING WOULD TAKE PLACE APRIL 21, A BRIEF BILATERAL COULD TAKE PLACE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING MITSOTAKIS' ARRIVAL IN ANKARA APRIL 20.

COMMENT

6. WE NOTE THAT TSILAS HAD ON APRIL 15 INDICATED TO US THAT TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN NFZ ENFORCEMENT WOULD "CAUSE ENORMOUS PROBLEMS FOR GREECE." IT APPEARS THAT THE SPECIFIC GOG CONCERN TO WHICH TSILAS WAS REFERRING WAS THE PROSPECT, AT THAT POINT IN TIME, THAT TURKISH AIRCRAFT MIGHT PRESS FOR PERMISSION TO FLY THROUGH THE ATHENS FIR, WHICH THE GOG CONSISTENTLY TERMS "GREEK AIR SPACE." HAVING RESPONSIBLY HANDLED THIS SENSITIVE ISSUE BY FLYING AROUND THE ATHENS FIR, THE GOT HAS AVOIDED ANY "BILATERAL PROBLEM."

7. BY STRESSING THE FACT THAT OTHER ALLIANCE MEMBERS SHARE THE GOG VIEW REGARDING TURKISH PARTICIPATION, MITSOTAKIS CLEARLY HOPES TO AVOID HAVING GREECE SINGLED OUT AS THE ONLY "ODD MAN OUT" AT THIS IMPORTANT JUNCTURE IN ALLIANCE PEACE MAKING EFFORTS.

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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

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 SUBJ: TFSR01: FRENCH CONCERN OVER TURKISH
 - PARTICIPATION IN BOSNIAN NFZ ENFORCEMENT

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PARIS 10028
 EXDIS
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, SR, BK, FR
 SUBJECT: TFSR01: FRENCH CONCERN OVER TURKISH
 - PARTICIPATION IN BOSNIAN NFZ ENFORCEMENT
 REF: (A) USNATO 1793; (B) ANKARA 4865
 1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
 2. GIVEN THE CONTROVERSY OVER TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF BOSNIA'S NO-FLY-ZONE (REFS), ADDRESSEE POSTS SHOULD KNOW THAT THIS ISSUE WAS RAISED BY THE FRENCH DURING AMBASSADOR BARTHOLOMEW'S APRIL 16 PARIS VISIT. (AMB. BARTHOLOMEW'S MEETINGS WILL BE REPORTED SEPTEL.)
 3. ELYSEE SECRETARY GENERAL VEDRINE TOOK AMBASSADOR BARTHOLOMEW ASIDE TO EMPHASIZE FRENCH UNHAPPINESS AT TURKISH PARTICIPATION, WHICH HE STRESSED REPRESENTED THE JOINT VIEW OF PRIME MINISTER BALLADUR AND PRESIDENT MITTERRAND. THE ISSUE WAS AGAIN RAISED AT AN INTERAGENCY LUNCH AND FOLLOW-ON MEETING OF KEY GOF YUGOSLAV POLICY PLAYERS. QUAI SECRETARY GENERAL BOIDEVAIX, WHO CHAIRED THE SESSION, STATED THAT THE DECISION TO INCLUDE TURKISH PLANES WOULD RISK ENLARGING THE WAR. REITERATING THAT BOTH BALLADUR AND MITTERRAND WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THIS RISK, BOIDEVAIX ARGUED FURTHER THAT TURKISH PLANES SIMPLY CANNOT FLY OVER

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SREBRENICA IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. AMBASSADOR BARTHOLOMEW REVIEWED THE KEY STRATEGIC ROLE PLAYED BY TURKEY BUT SAID HE NOTED FRENCH CONCERNS. THIS ISSUE ALSO AROSE DURING AMBASSADOR BARTHOLOMEW'S MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER LEOTARD.

4. IN A SIDE CONVERSATION WITH THE CHARGE, QUAI EUROPEAN AFFAIRS DIRECTOR BLANCHEMAISON IMPLIED THAT FRANCE MIGHT WITHDRAW ITS OWN PLANES FROM NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS IF TURKEY IS PERMITTED TO PARTICIPATE.

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 RUDORIN/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
 RHFQAAA/CINCUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GM
 RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
 RUFDAAA/CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GM
 RUDOSHA/16AF AVIANO IT
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 BOSNIA NFZ DOES NOT THREATEN GREECE
 TEXT:
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 04411
 STATE FOR EUR/SE
 E.O. 12356:DECL: OADR
 TAGS: MOPS, PREL, GR, TU, BK
 SUBJECT: PM MITSOTAKIS: TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN
 BOSNIA NFZ DOES NOT THREATEN GREECE
 REF: ATHENS 04361 (DTG 201502Z APR 93)

SUMMARY AND COMMENT

1. ~~(C)~~ WHILE EN ROUTE TO ANKARA TUESDAY, APRIL 20, THE PRIME MINISTER TOLD THE PRESS THAT THE PARTICIPATION OF TURKISH AIRCRAFT IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE NO-FLY ZONE OVER BOSNIA DID NOT THREATEN GREEK SECURITY. THE SAME DAY, GOVERNMENT PRESS SPOKESMAN MANGINAS TOLD REPORTERS IN ATHENS THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO/NO VIOLATION OF GREEK AIRSPACE BY THE TRANSITING TURKISH AIRCRAFT, THAT ALL OF THE TURKISH FLIGHTS HAD BEEN IN INTERNATIONAL AIRSPACE, THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO "CLOSE ENCOUNTERS" WITH ANY GREEK AIRCRAFT, AND THAT DETAILED FLIGHT PLANS HAD BEEN FILED WITH GREEK AUTHORITIES. ACCORDING TO THE HELLENIC

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MILITARY, HOWEVER, NOT ALL OF THE TURKISH AIRCRAFT HAD FILED FLIGHT PLANS AND THE HELLENIC AIR FORCE HAD, THEREFORE, SENT INTERCEPTORS TO IDENTIFY THEM. NO INTERCEPTORS WERE SENT FOR THOSE AIRCRAFT THAT HAD FILED FLIGHT PLANS, ACCORDING TO THESE SAME REPORTS.

2. (S) THE PRIME MINISTER, IN ANKARA FOR THE OZAL FUNERAL, CLEARLY WANTS TO AVOID HAVING THIS ISSUE BECOME A BILATERAL CAUSE CELEBRE. THE GOVERNMENT CONTINUES TO TRY TO PLAY DOWN THE ISSUE AND HAS REPEATEDLY STRESSED THAT THIS IS NOT A GREEK-TURKISH DISPUTE. THE OPPOSITION -- AND THE PRESS -- ARE NOT BUYING THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION, AND THE OPPOSITION CONTINUES TO CRITICIZE THE PRIME MINISTER FOR NOT BEING TOUGH ENOUGH ON THE TURKS.

PRIME MINISTER SEES NO THREAT TO GREECE

3. (U) THE ATHENS PRESS ON WEDNESDAY, APRIL 21, REPORTED EXTENSIVELY ON PRIME MINISTER MITSOTAKIS' COMMENTS ON TURKEY'S INVOLVEMENT IN NATO OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA. THE PRIME MINISTER MADE THESE COMMENTS ON APRIL 20 TO THE PRESS ACCOMPANYING HIM TO ANKARA FOR OZAL'S FUNERAL AND A MEETING WITH TURKISH PRIME MINISTER DEMIREL. (THERE IS NO GOVERNMENT TRANSCRIPT AVAILABLE.)

4. (U) ACCORDING TO THE PRESS REPORTS, MITSOTAKIS: -- STRESSED THAT TURKEY'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA WAS A MISTAKE FOR THE WEST, THE UN AND TURKEY ITSELF, AND COULD CREATE FUTURE DANGERS FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE REGION.

-- CONSIDERED THAT THERE WAS A PROBLEM FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN THE "UNDESIRABLE" WESTERN MILITARY ACTION IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA.

-- UNDERLINED THAT TURKEY'S INVOLVEMENT DID NOT CONSTITUTE A GREEK-TURKISH DISPUTE, AND THAT GREECE'S SECURITY WAS NOT THREATENED IF TURKISH AIRCRAFT PARTICIPATED IN OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA.

-- STATED THAT THE FLIGHT OF THE TURKISH AIRCRAFT DID NOT VIOLATE GREEK AIRSPACE AND THAT THE TURKISH PILOTS DID NOT PROVOKE GREECE.

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 ATHENS 04411

GOG SPOKESMAN SAYS NO AIR VIOLATION; DEFENSE DISAGREES

5. (U) IN ATHENS, GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN VASSILIS MANGINAS TOLD THE PRESS, ON APRIL 20, THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO/NO VIOLATION OF GREEK AIRSPACE BY TURKISH MILITARY AIRCRAFT FLYING TO BASES IN ITALY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE NO FLY ZONE OVER BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, NOR ANY "CLOSE ENCOUNTER" WITH GREEK AIRCRAFT. MANGINAS STATED THAT ALL THE TURKISH FLIGHTS WERE OUTSIDE OF GREEK NATIONAL AIRSPACE IN INTERNATIONAL AIRSPACE ACCORDING TO THE DETAILED FLIGHT PLANS WHICH HAD BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE GREEK AUTHORITIES.

6. (U) ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, HOWEVER, THE HELLENIC AIR FORCE GENERAL STAFF (HAFGS) ISSUED A STATEMENT THAT ADEQUATE FLIGHT PLANS HAD NOT/NOT BEEN RECEIVED FOR ALL OF THE TURKISH AIRCRAFT AND THAT OF TEN AIRCRAFT ONLY THREE C-130S SUBMITTED DETAILED FLIGHT

PLANS TO THE GREEK AUTHORITIES; THE OTHER 7 AIRCRAFT DID NOT SUBMIT COMPREHENSIVE FLIGHT PLANS AND WERE "IDENTIFIED" BY GREEK AIR FORCE JETS. ACCORDING TO THE HAFGS STATEMENT, THE TURKISH AIRCRAFT HAD FLOWN WITHIN THE ATHENS FIR (FLIGHT INFORMATION REGION) FOLLOWING A COURSE EAST OF RHODES, 25 TO 30 MILES SOUTH OF CRETE, AND LEAVING THE ATHENS FIR SOUTH OF THE PELOPONNESE.

7. ~~(C)~~ POLMILCOUNSELOR SPOKE WITH HELLENIC AIR FORCE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS BGEN ANDREAS POLYRAKIS, ON APRIL 21, TO CLARIFY THE APPARENT DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT'S STATEMENT AND THAT OF THE HAFGS. POLYRAKIS STATED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO/NO VIOLATIONS BY TURKISH AIRCRAFT. HOWEVER, HE SAID, IN THOSE INSTANCES WHERE NO FLIGHT PLAN HAD BEEN RECEIVED -- EITHER BEFORE TAKEOFF OR IN FLIGHT -- THE HELLENIC AIR FORCE HAD SENT UP INTERCEPTORS TO "IDENTIFY" THE AIRCRAFT. THE INTERCEPTORS HAD STAYED AT A DISCREET AND "CAREFUL" DISTANCE AND HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO AVOID ANY MANEUVER OR APPROACH THAT COULD BE PROVOCATIVE OR CAUSE AN INCIDENT.

 GOG DISMISSES PASOK CRITICISM

8. (U) THE APRIL 21 PRESS REPORTS CARRIED OPPOSITION PASOK LEADER ANDREAS PAPANDREOU'S COMMENTS THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD NOT BEEN TOUGH ENOUGH ON TURKEY IN NATO FORA, AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT BORE A GRAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALLOWING TURKEY TO JOIN THE NATO OPERATION. PAPANDREOU REPORTEDLY INSISTED THAT GREECE COULD HAVE VETOED TURKEY'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE NATO OPERATION, AND CHARGED THAT THE PARTICIPATION OF GREEK AIRMEN ON THE NATO AWACS FLIGHTS OVER BOSNIA "LEGITIMIZED" TURKISH DESIGNS IN THE BALKANS. MANGINAS DISMISSED PAPANDREOU'S CHARGES, AND RESPONDING TO REPORTERS' QUESTIONS, DENIED REPORTS THAT THE HELLENIC AIR FORCE HAD BEEN ON RED ALERT AND INSISTED THAT TURKISH PLANES HAD NOT VIOLATED GREEK AIR SPACE OR REGULATIONS.

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 - BOSNIAN NFZ ENFORCEMENT
 TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 10204
 GENEVA FOR ICFY (JACKOVICH)
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: MARR, NATO, TU, BK, FR
 SUBJECT: QUAI VIEWS ON TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN
 - BOSNIAN NFZ ENFORCEMENT
 REF: (A) PARIS 10028
 - (B) USDAO PARIS DTG 201547Z APR 93
 1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
 2. SUMMARY: ON APRIL 20 QUAI STRATEGIC DIRECTOR DANA REPEATED TO US THAT FRANCE FEARS THAT TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN NO-FLY ZONE (NFZ) ENFORCEMENT COULD GIVE THE SERBS A PRETEXT TO HARASS FRANCE'S 300-MAN LOGISTICS BATTALION NEAR BELGRADE AND PERHAPS EVEN HOLD IT HOSTAGE. HE EXPLAINED THAT FRANCE HAD NOT OBJECTED WHEN THE ISSUE OF TURKISH PARTICIPATION WAS DISCUSSED IN THE NAC AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, BECAUSE THE GOF HAD RECEIVED ASSURANCES THAT TURKEY WOULD ACCEPT HAVING ITS AIRPLANES HELD IN RESERVE AND NOT USED IMMEDIATELY IN ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS. SACEUR'S DECISION TO CALL ON THE TURKS CONFRONTS FRANCE WITH A DILEMMA: IT MUST EITHER RAISE A ROW IN THE NAC OR THE SECURITY COUNCIL OR ACQUIESCE IN A DEPLOYMENT WHICH IT FEARS PUTS ITS TROOPS AT RISK. DANA HOPED THAT NATO SYG WOERNER AND THE NATO STAFF COULD HELP FIND A WAY TO PUT TURKISH PARTICIPATION ON HOLD WITHOUT EMBARRASSING FRANCE OR TURKEY. WE WARNED DANA THAT THE U.S. FIRMLY SUPPORTS TURKEY'S RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN ENFORCEMENT OF THE

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)

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By NARA, Date 8/23/2015

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BOSNIA NFZ. END SUMMARY.

3. ON APRIL 20, QUAI STRATEGIC AFFAIRS DIRECTOR DANA INSISTED TO US THAT FRENCH OBJECTIONS TO TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN ENFORCEMENT OF THE BOSNIA NFZ ARE MOTIVATED PURELY BY CONCERNS FOR THE SAFETY OF FRENCH TROOPS AND NOT BY ANTI-TURKISH SENTIMENT. DANA EXPLAINED THAT THE GOF BELIEVES THAT SERB PROPAGANDISTS WILL STOOP TO ANYTHING AND FEARS THAT THEY WILL HAVE A FIELD DAY IN WHIPPING UP POPULAR SENTIMENT AGAINST AN ALLEGED MUSLIM THREAT TO SERBIA. UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS THE SITUATION OF FRANCE'S 300-MAN LOGISTICAL BATTALION NEAR BELGRADE COULD BECOME INTOLERABLE. IT IS ALREADY BEING MADE TO FEEL UNWELCOME, AND IT COULD PROVIDE THE SERBS WITH A READY-MADE GROUP OF HOSTAGES IF THE TURKS ENGAGE SERBIAN AIRCRAFT OR ATTACK GROUND TARGETS IN SERBIA. DANA CONFIDED THAT FRANCE IS IN TOUCH WITH THE UN ABOUT WITHDRAWING THIS BATTALION BUT WILL NOT BE ABLE TO GET IT OUT UNTIL THE UN CAN FIND A REPLACEMENT. (NOTE: FRENCH CONCERN ABOUT THIS LOGISTICS UNIT PREDATES THE DECISION TO INVOLVE THE TURKS IN NFZ ENFORCEMENT. REF B REPORTS THAT THE FRENCH ARE TELLING THE UN THE UNIT MUST BE WITHDRAWN BY APRIL 26, THE DAY THE NEWLY REINFORCED SANCTIONS TAKE EFFECT. END NOTE.)

4. WE RESPONDED THAT THERE WOULD BE LITTLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MUSLIM TURKS OR AMERICANS WHEN IT COMES TO INTERCEPTING SERBIAN AIRCRAFT; THE SERBS COULD WHIP UP POPULAR EMOTION IN RESPONSE TO THE ACTIONS OF ANY PARTICIPANT IN THE ENFORCEMENT REGIME. WE ADDED THAT, IN ANY EVENT, NATO COULD NOT PROCEED TO ATTACKS ON GROUND TARGETS WITHOUT ADDITIONAL DECISIONS BY BOTH THE NAC AND THE UNSC. AS A RESULT, FRANCE IS SURE TO HAVE A SAY BEFORE ANY MEASURES ARE TAKEN WHICH ESCALATE THE SITUATION. DANA ACKNOWLEDGED ALL OF THIS BUT SAID IT DOES NOT REDUCE FRENCH CONCERNS.

5. TURNING TO PROCEDURAL MATTERS, DANA SAID THAT THE GOF IS UNHAPPY ABOUT THE WAY IN WHICH THE DECISION TO DEPLOY THE TURKS WAS REACHED. HE ALLEGED THAT THE FRENCH NATO MISSION EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT POSSIBLE TURKISH PARTICIPATION WHEN THE MATTER WAS FIRST BROACHED AND RECEIVED QUIET ASSURANCES ON APRIL 8 FROM ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 10204 GENEVA FOR ICFY (JACKOVICH)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MARR, NATO, TU, BK, FR

SUBJECT: QUAI VIEWS ON TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN
- BOSNIAN NFZ ENFORCEMENT

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE THAT THE TURKS WOULD BE HELD IN RESERVE FOR POSSIBLE PARTICIPATION IN NFZ ENFORCEMENT AND NOT BE USED RIGHT AWAY. ACCORDING TO DANA, THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR TO NATO INDICATED ON THE SAME DAY THAT THIS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO TURKEY. THE GOF, THEREFORE, WAS SURPRISED TO LEARN A FEW DAYS AFTER COMMENCEMENT OF NFZ ENFORCEMENT THAT SACEUR WOULD TURN TO THE TURKS RIGHT AWAY.

6. DANA SAID THE GOF NOW FACES A DILEMMA. IT DOES NOT WANT TO CREATE A CRISIS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE BY RAISING THE MATTER AT THE NAC OR THE UN. FRANCE WOULD PREFER

TO RESOLVE THE MATTER IN A QUIET MANNER WITH THE HELP OF THE NATO SECRETARIAT, BUT, IF IT CANNOT, FRANCE WILL HAVE TO RAISE THE MATTER IN THE NAC OR THE UN. WE RESPONDED THAT WE COULD NOT SPEAK FOR WHAT THE NATO STAFF MIGHT DO, BUT WE WARNED THAT THE U.S. STRONGLY SUPPORTS TURKEY'S RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN NFZ ENFORCEMENT.

7. COMMENT: WHATEVER THE CAUSE OF THE FRENCH MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE USE OF TURKISH AIRCRAFT IN NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT, THIS EPISODE IS LIKELY TO MAKE THE FRENCH MORE DIFFICULT TO DEAL WITH ON COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS FOR AN EVENTUAL VANCE-OWEN IMPLEMENTATION FORCE. RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, THE FRENCH FEEL THAT IMPORTANT POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS ARE BEING IGNORED AS DECISIONS ARE TAKEN LARGELY ON THE BASIS OF MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS. THIS IS LIKELY TO MAKE THE FRENCH MORE INSISTENT ON THAT THE UN CIVILIAN OVERSEEING THE OPERATION HAVE THE RIGHT TO INSIST THAT MILITARY DECISION-MAKERS TAKE ACCOUNT OF POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. THE FRENCH MAY ALSO HOPE THAT GIVING THE UN A MAJOR SUPERVISORY ROLE WILL ALLOW THEM TO USE THEIR POSITION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO QUESTION DECISIONS WHICH MAY HAVE GOTTEN BY THEM AT NATO.

BOHLEN

BT

#0204

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

SSN: 0204
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TOR: 930421143632 M0350464
<^TOR>930421143527 M0350461

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SIT: HOLL SUM SUM2 VAX WAYNE

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 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
 RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON
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 RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE
 RHDLCNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK
 RUFNBOA/USDOCOSOUTH NAPLES IT
 RUFHBE/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE 1700
 RUFHZG/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB 0240
 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0600
 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 3792
 RUFTEPA/AMCONSUL ADANA 1553
 RUFHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 3257
 RUFTAEA/AMCONSUL IZMIR 4997
 SUBJ: TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN BOSNIAN NFZ
 ENFORCEMENT
 TEXT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 05202
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: MARR, NATO, TU, BK, FR, PREL
 SUBJECT: TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN BOSNIAN NFZ
 ENFORCEMENT
 REF: A) PARIS 10522 (DTG 231726Z APR 93)
 B) USNATO 1873 (DTG 230750Z APR 93)
 C) ANKARA 5104 (DTG 221449Z APR 93)
 1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
 2. SUMMARY. THE GOT IS AWAITING A FRENCH RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSAL THAT TURKISH AIRCRAFT BEGIN ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE BOSNIAN NFZ ON MAY 2. IN ORDER TO ALLAY FRENCH CONCERNS, THE GOT IS CAREFULLY DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN ITS PARTICIPATION IN NFZ ENFORCEMENT AND ANY FUTURE TURKISH ROLE RELATED TO "AIR STRIKES" WHICH MIGHT EVOLVE AS A RESULT OF NEW UN OR NATO DECISIONS; THE LATTER IS AN ENTIRELY NEW AND SEPARATE ISSUE IN TURKISH EYES. THROUGHOUT THE CONVERSATION ERALP STRESSED THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF ANY DECISION TO DENY TURKISH PARTICIPATION NOW THAT AN ALLIANCE OFFER HAS BEEN EXTENDED AND ACCEPTED. END SUMMARY.
 3. POLMILCOUNS DISCUSSED TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE BOSNIAN NO-FLY ZONE APRIL 26

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 E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
 White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
 By N NARA, Date 8/23/06
 2015-0926-M (1.72)

WITH MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS YALIM ERALP, WHO INDICATED THAT ALL 18 TURKISH F-16S WERE NOW AT GHEDI AB IN ITALY AND THEIR OPERATIONAL COMMAND HAD BEEN TURNED OVER TO SACEUR.

4. ERALP ALSO SAID THE GOT WAS STILL AWAITING A DEFINITIVE FRENCH RESPONSE TO THE INFORMAL PROPOSAL THAT TURKISH AIRCRAFT NOT BEGIN ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN ENFORCING THE BOSNIAN NFZ UNTIL MAY 2. ACCORDING TO ERALP, THE GOT WAS VERY SURPRISED AT THE ATTITUDE TAKEN BY THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO NATO ON THIS DURING THE APRIL 22 DISCUSSION (REF B) SINCE THE GOT HAD BELIEVED FRENCH ACQUIESCENCE HAD ALREADY BEEN OBTAINED BOTH IN PARIS DURING DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE EMBASSY AND THE QUAI, AND IN ANKARA DURING BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FRENCH DELEGATION (WHICH INCLUDED THE MILITARY ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT) TO THE FUNERAL OF FORMER PRESIDENT OZAL.

4. ERALP REVIEWED THE HISTORY OF THE REQUEST FOR TURKISH INVOLVEMENT IN ENFORCEMENT OF THE BOSNIAN NFZ, AND EXPRESSED HIS AMAZEMENT THAT ANYONE COULD HAVE MISREAD WHAT SACEUR STATED TO THE NAC ON APRIL 7 WHEN HE CLEARLY INDICATED THAT, WHILE HE WOULD CALL UPON THE FRENCH, DUTCH AND US INITIALLY, HE WOULD NEED TO MAKE USE OF ALL NATO FORCES OFFERED TO SUSTAIN THE OPERATION. ERALP ALSO OBSERVED THAT ONCE NATO ASKED ITS MEMBERS FOR CONTRIBUTIONS, TURKEY FELT OBLIGATED TO RESPOND POSITIVELY, BOTH FOR PUBLIC RELATIONS REASONS AND ALSO BECAUSE OF ITS PAST URGING THAT NATO DO MORE IN BOSNIA.

5. ERALP SAID THAT IN PARIS THE FRENCH HAD HINTED THEY WERE CONCERNED ABOUT TURKISH AIRCRAFT TAKING PART IN "AIR STRIKES" OVER BOSNIA. ACCORDING TO ERALP, THE GOT HAS CAREFULLY EXPLAINED TO THE FRENCH THAT THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN NFZ ENFORCEMENT UNDER UNSCRES 816 EVOLVING INTO PARTICIPATION IN "AIR STRIKES." THE SECOND PHASE, IF PROPOSED BY THE UN OR NATO, WOULD REQUIRE AN ENTIRELY NEW DECISION BY THE GOT AS THE MISSION OF THE TURKISH F-16S WOULD BE DIFFERENT THAN THAT FOR WHICH THEY WERE SENT TO ITALY. ERALP SAID HE COULD NOT FATHOM FRENCH MOTIVATIONS IN THIS INSTANCE; HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND, FOR EXAMPLE, HOW THE FRENCH COULD ARGUE THAT BOSNIAN OR SERB REACTION TO TURKISH AIRCRAFT ENFORCING THE NFZ WOULD BE MORE NEGATIVE THAN IT WOULD BE TO FRENCH AIRCRAFT PERFORMING THE SAME TASK, PARTICULARLY AS FRENCH TROOPS WERE ALSO ON THE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 ANKARA 05202
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MARR, NATO, TU, BK, FR, PREL

SUBJECT: TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN BOSNIAN NFZ
ENFORCEMENT

GROUND. ERALP ADDED THAT TURKEY HAS SO FAR SEEN NO HOSTILE SERBIAN REACTION TO THE NEWS OF TURKISH PARTICIPATION.

6. ERALP SAID THE GOT HAS QUIETLY BEEN MAKING THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO ITS NATO ALLIES:

1) IF TURKISH PARTICIPATION IS NOW DENIED,
THIS IS A BLOW TO THE ALLIANCE, AS WELL AS TO TURKEY.

2) SOME ASSERT THAT TURKEY HAS DESIGNS IN THE BALKANS, AN ALLEGATION WHICH IS COMPLETELY FALSE; IF, HOWEVER, TURKISH PARTICIPATION IS VETOED, THIS WILL ONLY LEND CREDENCE TO THOSE WHO HOLD THIS BELIEF.

3) SOME ARE ASSERTING THERE SHOULD BE NO MOSLEM AIRCRAFT TAKING PART IN THE NFZ ENFORCEMENT; TO ACCEPT THIS VIEW WOULD BE TO ENCOURAGE THE RELIGIOUS DIVIDE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

4) IT IS POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO SUSTAIN THE POSITION THAT TURKEY TAKE PART IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA AND NORTHERN IRAQ, BUT NOT IN BOSNIA, WHERE TURKISH PUBLIC OPINION IS MOST ENGAGED.

5) TURKEY ALREADY HAS A SHIP IN THE ADRIATIC AND IS ALSO TAKING PART IN AWACS OPERATIONS; IN ADDITION, IN THE WEU TURKEY HAS RECENTLY VOLUNTEERED TO PROVIDE A FAST PATROL BOAT AND FOUR CUSTOMS OFFICERS FOR THE DANUBE PATROL AND TO PROVIDE AN ADDITIONAL SHIP IN THE ADRIATIC; NO ONE OBJECTED TO THIS OFFER, ALTHOUGH NO FINAL DECISIONS HAVE AS YET BEEN TAKEN.

7. COMMENT: THE TURKS SEE THEMSELVES AS HAVING RESPONDED TO AN ALLIANCE REQUEST WHICH THEY COULDN'T REFUSE. NOW THAT THEIR OFFER HAS BEEN PICKED UP AND ACCEPTED, A VETO BY AN ALLIANCE MEMBER, OR BY THE UN, WOULD SEND A NEGATIVE MESSAGE THROUGHOUT THE BODY POLITIC HERE, WHOSE CONSEQUENCES WOULD BE HARD TO PREDICT. ERALP ALSO EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR THE STRONG SUPPORT PROVIDED BY THE U.S. IN THIS MATTER.

BARKLEY

BT

#5202

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 02
<^SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02

SSN: 5202
<^SSN>5202

TOR: 930426225024 M0357879
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PREC: IMMEDIATE
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 INFO: *****
 SUBJ: SYG WOERNER ON CONSULTATIONS WITH NATO ON NEXT
 STEPS IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, TURKISH PLANES FOR NFZ

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ USNATO 001945
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 FOR S, P, EUR AND EUR/RPM
 STATE ALSO PASS NSC FOR LAKE AND WALKER
 S/S PLEASE REPEAT TO PARIS, LONDON, ANKARA, ATHENS AND USUN
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: NATO, PREL, MARR, BK, SR
 SUBJECT: SYG WOERNER ON CONSULTATIONS WITH NATO ON NEXT
 STEPS IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, TURKISH PLANES FOR NFZ

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY: SYG WOERNER HAS URGED THAT THE SECRETARY MEET
 ----- WITH HIM DURING ANY EUROPEAN CONSULTATION
 TRIP ON EX-YUGOSLAVIA IN ORDER TO HIGHLIGHT NATO'S ROLE IN
 DEALING WITH THE CRISIS. HE DID NOT RECOMMEND A NATO
 FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING, HOWEVER, UNLESS IT WERE LIKELY
 TO PRODUCE A CLEAR AND STRONG RESULT. WOERNER ALSO URGED
 AN ALL-OUT EFFORT TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF TURKISH PARTICI-
 PATION IN NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT BEFORE MAY 3, WHEN
 TURKISH PATROLS ARE SCHEDULED TO BEGIN. HE INTENDS TO
 EXPLORE A POSSIBLE SIDE UNDERSTANDING WITH THE FRENCH THAT
 WOULD CONFIRM THAT THE TURKS' INVOLVEMENT IN NFZ ENFORCE-
 MENT DOES NOT SET A PRECEDENT FOR THEIR PARTICIPATION IN
 FUTURE AIR-TO-GROUND OPERATIONS, AND THAT SACEUR WILL, IN
 THAT EVENT, NOT REQUEST TURKISH PLANES. THE TURKISH
 AMBASSADOR WILL BE RECOMMENDING THIS BASIC APPROACH TO
 ANKARA WOERNER SOUGHT U.S. SUPPORT IN LOBBYING THE
 FRENCH; WE RECOMMEND SUPPORT, WITH CAVEATS - SEE PARA 11.
 END SUMMARY
 SECRETARY SHOULD INCLUDE A NATO STOP

3. SECRETARY GENERAL WOERNER ASKED TO SEE CHARGE TUESDAY
 MORNING TO EXPRESS HIS STRONG VIEW THAT NATO NOT BE
 OMITTED FROM THE SECRETARY'S ITINERARY IF HE TRAVELS TO
 EUROPE IN THE COMING DAYS TO CONSULT ON NEXT STEPS IN
 MANAGING THE CRISIS IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. WOERNER SAID HE
 HAD NO DOUBTS REGARDING THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S
 COMMITMENT TO THE ALLIANCE. BUT HE WAS CONCERNED THAT, IN

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 E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
 White House Guidelines, September 11,
 By VL NARA, Date 8/23/20
 2015-0926-14 (1.33)

PRACTICE, THE U.S. MIGHT RELY SOLELY ON BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS TO EXPLORE NEW POLICY INITIATIVES, DESPITE THE PRINCIPLE THAT NATO IS THE "ESSENTIAL FORUM" FOR CONSULTING ON ISSUES AFFECTING ALLIES' SECURITY INTERESTS. THIS WOULD BE VERY DAMAGING TO THE ALLIANCE, HE SAID.

4. WOERNER HASTENED TO ADD THAT HE DID NOT INSIST ON NATO BEING THE ONLY OR EVEN THE MAIN FORUM FOR DISCUSSION. BILATERAL TALKS WERE ESSENTIAL AS WELL. BUT GIVEN THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CRISIS AND NATO'S CENTRAL ROLE IN ANY LARGE-SCALE MILITARY OPERATIONS, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO HIGHLIGHT THE ALLIANCE DIMENSION DURING ANY UPCOMING EUROPEAN SWING BY THE SECRETARY.

5. WOERNER SAID THAT A BILATERAL MEETING WITH HIM WOULD, IN FACT, BE SUFFICIENT TOWARD THIS END, AND HE WAS PREPARED TO MEET THE SECRETARY IN ANOTHER ALLIED CAPITAL IF A STOP IN BRUSSELS WERE NOT FEASIBLE. INDEED, WOERNER SAID HE WOULD NOT RECOMMEND A NATO MINISTERIAL UNLESS IT WERE LIKELY TO PRODUCE A CLEAR AND STRONG RESULT (WHICH WOULD REQUIRE CAREFUL PREPARATION). WOERNER WANTED TO AVOID ANY MINISTERIAL GATHERING THAT PRODUCED NOTHING BUT "HOT AIR," AS HAS BEEN THE CASE AT RECENT EC MINISTERIALS. WOERNER SAID THAT THE SECRETARY COULD, AS A THIRD OPTION, STOP OFF IN BRUSSELS TO MEET WITH NATO AMBASSADORS, BUT HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT IT WOULD BE HARD TO PREVENT THIS FROM GROWING INTO A MINISTERIAL MEETING.
DOWN TO THE WIRE ON TURKISH PLANES

6. WOERNER NEXT RAISED THE UNRESOLVED ISSUE OF TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN NFZ ENFORCEMENT. HE WAS CONCERNED THAT TIME WAS RUNNING OUT: BRITISH PLANES HAD NOW JOINED THE OPERATION, AND TURKISH PLANES WERE SCHEDULED TO BEGIN PATROLS OVER BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA ON MAY 3. WOERNER WOULD NEED TO INFORM UN SYG BOUTROS-GHALI OF THE TIMING OF TURKISH PARTICIPATION NO LATER THAN APRIL 30. THEREFORE, A SOLUTION NEEDED TO BE FOUND IN THE NEXT THREE DAYS IF WE WISHED TO HEAD OFF A BATTLE IN THE NAC OR THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL.

7. WOERNER TOLD CHARGE HE HAD SPOKEN WITH GREEK PM MITSOTAKIS AT THE BILDERBERG CONFERENCE AND HAD CONFIRMED THAT THE GREEKS WOULD "AGREE TO DISAGREE," BUT NOT MAKE A PUBLIC ISSUE OF THE MATTER. WOERNER HAD SUBSEQUENTLY MET WITH FRENCH MOD LEOTARD AND FM JUPPE IN PARIS APRIL 26, BUT HAD NOT DETECTED ANY MOVEMENT IN THE FRENCH POSITION. IN AN INFORMAL CONVERSATION WITH CHIEF OF STAFF LANXADE, HOWEVER,

WOERNER HAD PICKED UP SIGNALS SIMILAR TO THOSE REPORTED BY EMBASSIES ANKARA AND PARIS: THAT FRANCE'S GREATEST CONCERN MAY BE THE PRECEDENT THAT COULD BE ESTABLISHED IN FAVOR OF TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN FUTURE AIR-TO-GROUND OPERATIONS.

8. WOERNER SAID HE INTENDED, ON HIS OWN AUTHORITY, TO EXPLORE WITH THE TURKS AND FRENCH A POSSIBLE SIDE UNDERSTANDING THAT SOUGHT TO ADDRESS THE LATTER CONCERN. UNDER THIS APPROACH, TURKISH PLANES WOULD BEGIN NFZ PATROLS, BUT ONLY AFTER WOERNER HAD STATED TO THE NAC THAT THIS SET NO PRECEDENT FOR PARTICIPATION IN ANY FUTURE AIR OPERATIONS. AT THE SAME TIME, A TACIT UNDERSTANDING WOULD BE REACHED AMONG THE ALLIES CONCERNED THAT, IN THE EVENT OF AIR-TO-GROUND OPERATIONS IN THE FUTURE, SACEUR WOULD

NOT REQUEST THE PARTICIPATION OF TURKISH PLANES. HE URGED THAT THE U.S. (AND THE UK) TRY TO SELL SUCH A SOLUTION TO PARIS IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

9. IN A SUBSEQUENT MEETING WITH WOERNER, THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR INDICATED HE WOULD RECOMMEND THIS APPROACH TO ANKARA. THE TURK READ FROM INSTRUCTIONS AUTHORIZING HIM TO ASSURE OTHER ALLIES THAT ANY AIR-TO-GROUND OPERATIONS WOULD BE AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT AFFAIR, REQUIRING A NEW UNSC RESOLUTION. HE TOLD WOERNER THAT TURKEY WAS FAR LESS GUNG-HO ABOUT MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN EX-YUGOSLAVIA THAN THE FRENCH IMAGINED. FOR REASONS OF FACE, HOWEVER, TURKEY WOULD NOT WANT "ON THE RECORD" THE PROPOSED UNDERSTANDING ABOUT TURKEY NOT BEING ASKED BY SACEUR TO PARTICIPATE IN FUTURE AIR-TO-GROUND OPERATIONS.

10. THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT, HAVING BEEN ASKED BY SACEUR TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE NFZ OPERATION, TURKEY WAS NOT GOING TO QUIETLY FLY HOME THE PLANES IT HAD DEPLOYED TO ITALY, OR LEAVE THEM IN PERMANENT RESERVE STATUS UNTIL THEY ROT. IF THE FRENCH REFUSED ANY COMPROMISE, TURKEY WAS PREPARED TO LET THE ISSUE ESCALATE TO THE UNSC, WITH THE FRENCH (AND RUSSIANS) FORCED TO USE THEIR VETO IF NECESSARY.

11. COMMENT: WE BELIEVE WOERNER'S PROPOSED SIDE UNDERSTANDING MAY BE THE ONLY POSSIBLE SOLUTION LEFT THAT HAS ANY CHANCE OF HEADING OFF A MESSY CONFRONTATION. WE WOULD RECOMMEND THAT WASHINGTON CONVEY TO PARIS ITS READINESS TO GO ALONG WITH THIS APPROACH IF/IF THE TURKS CAN LIVE WITH IT, AND ONLY IF IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD THAT THE DEAL IS INFORMAL AND TACIT, AND THAT IT ESTABLISHES NO PRINCIPLE OR PRECEDENT REGARDING AN ALLY'S RIGHT TO VETO THE PARTICIPATION OF ANOTHER ALLY IN NATO OPERATIONS. END COMMENT.

VERSHBOW

BT

#1945

NNNN

SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 1945

TOR: 930427135241 M0358702

DIST:

PRT: BERGER FUERTH ITOH KENNEY LAKE REED SIT SODERBERG WALKER

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 INFO: RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 4227
 UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
 ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
 SUBJ: TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN ENFORCEMENT OF THE NFZ
 OVER BOSNIA

TEXT:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 133774
 EXDIS
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, MOPS, UN, NATO
 SUBJECT: TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN ENFORCEMENT OF THE NFZ
 OVER BOSNIA

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE
 -- SEE PARAS 4 AND 5.

2. THE QUESTION OF TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN NO-FLY ZONE
 ENFORCEMENT OVER BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA WAS RESOLVED APRIL 28
 AT NATO. BASED ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT ANY ADDITIONAL
 OPERATIONS INVOLVING MILITARY MEANS IN THE FORMER
 YUGOSLAVIA, AUTHORIZED BY THE UNSC AND CARRIED OUT BY
 NATO' WOULD REQUIRE NEW DECISIONS BY GOVERNMENTS AND BY
 NATO, TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN NFZ ENFORCEMENT UP THROUGH
 PHASE THREE OF SACEUR'S PLAN WILL GO AHEAD WITHOUT FURTHER
 ATTEMPTS TO DERAIL IT IN NATO FORA.

3. IN A RESTRICTED MEETING, THE SIXTEEN NATO PERMREPS
 CONCURRED WITH A STATEMENT MADE BY SECRETARY GENERAL
 WOERNER NOTING THAT "THE PARTICIPATION OF ANY NATO MEMBER
 IN NO-FLY ZONE ENFORCEMENT OVER BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA DOES
 NOT CREATE A PRECEDENT FOR PARTICIPATION IN POSSIBLE
 FURTHER OPERATIONS INVOLVING MILITARY MEANS OVER OR IN THE

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA." WOERNER SAID HE WOULD CONVEY THIS
 DECISION BY TELEPHONE TO UNSYG BOUTROS-GHALI. TURKISH
 PLANES CAN BEGIN ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN NFZ ENFORCEMENT
 OVER BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA AS OF MAY 3.

4. ACTION REQUESTED, USUN: PLEASE INFORMALLY SOUND OUT

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DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
 White House Guidelines, September 11, 2001
 By VL NARA, Date 8/27/06
 2015-0926-M (1.75)

FRENCH MISSION TO ENSURE THAT THEY KNOW OF THE ARRANGEMENT WORKED OUT AT NATO AND AGREE WITH US THAT THE ISSUE IS NOW CLOSED. ONCE SURE THAT THE FRENCH ARE ON BOARD. MISSION SHOULD THEN QUIETLY INFORM THE RUSSIANS -- EITHER BILATERALLY OR IN THE P-5 CONTEXT, AS APPROPRIATE -- OF THE OUTCOME. SINCE IN THE CASE OF A REQUIRED "NEW DECISION" ON ADDITIONAL MILITARY OPERATIONS OPPOSITION WOULD BE RAISED TO TURKISH PARTICIPATION, OUR UNDERSTANDING IS THAT TURKEY WILL NOT SEEK TO PARTICIPATE IN AIR TO GROUND OPERATIONS OR OPERATIONS ON THE GROUND. SHOULD SUCH OPERATIONS EVENTUATE. MISSION SHOULD STRESS THAT THE COMPROMISE WILL ALLOW EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF THE NFZ AND THAT WE HOPE THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL NOT RAISE OBJECTIONS IN THE COUNCIL.

5. ACTION REQUESTED, MOSCOW: EMBASSY MAY ALSO INFORM APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF MFA OF THE COMPROMISE AND OF OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS ISSUE IS NOW CLOSED. WHARTON

BT
#3774
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SECT: SECTION: 01 OF 01

SSN: 3774

TOR: 930503150430 M0368509

DIST:

SIT: BLEICKEN HOLL VAX WITKOWSKY

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