FOIA MARKER

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Collection/Record Group: Clinton Presidential Records
Subgroup/Office of Origin: Communications
Series/Staff Member: Don Baer
Subseries:

OA/ID Number: 10135
FolderID:

Folder Title: Bosnia Roll-Out

Stack: S
Row: 90
Section: 2
Shelf: 6
Position: 2
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<th>DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE</th>
<th>SUBJECT/TITLE</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>RESTRICTION</th>
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<td>Penn to Baer; RE: Home telephone number (partial) (1 page)</td>
<td>11/26/1995</td>
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**COLLECTION:**
- Clinton Presidential Records
- Communications
- Don Baer
- OA/Box Number: 10135

**FOLDER TITLE:**
- Bosnia Roll-Out

**RESTRICITON CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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MEMORANDUM FOR SANDY BERGER

FROM: DON BAER
   JULIA MOFFETT
   JILL SCHUKER

SUBJECT: BOSNIA OUTREACH

Attached is a list of outreach activity to support the Administration's Bosnia policy. It reflects activity on the part of the White House Offices of Communications, Press, Media Affairs, Public Liaison, Intergovernmental Affairs, the National Security Council, the Department of State, Department of Defense, USUN, and USIA and has been in development over the course of the last month.

The activities are broken down into categories: National Press, Regional Press, Group Outreach, and Opinion Leader Outreach. The Congressional outreach schedule is in a separate document.

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Surrogate Activity: Regional and Specialty Media

- Representatives from the White House, NSC, Department of State, Department of Defense and USUN are conducting conference calls with the top 150 regional paper editorial boards. These papers are chosen from the NSC/State Congressional Target list.

- A mailing was sent to the top 500 regional newspapers and columnists (11/17). Contents included: The President's letter to Members of Congress, the Newsweek op-ed by the President, Remarks by Secretary Christopher in Dayton, and Bosnia fact sheets.

- Another mailing that includes a summary of the agreement, the President's remarks to the nation, and Hill testimony from Administration officials, will be sent on 12/1.

- Interviews by the same representatives are also being conducted on regional talk and news radio. The same targeting method is applied.

- White House, NSC, State, Defense and USUN representatives are conducting conference calls with Baltic, Croatian, Greek, Hungarian, Polish, African-American, Hispanic and Jewish press.

- White House, NSC, State and Defense representatives are holding a regional newspaper roundtable (11/29) and are meeting with the ten White House tongs.

- NSC, State and Defense representatives will conduct satellite tours into major targeted media markets' 6:00 pm newscasts the day after the President's address to the nation. (11/28)
**SURROGATE ACTIVITY**

**Surrogate Activity: Events**

- The Vice President will saturate markets on his upcoming trips to New York, Atlanta and Houston. He will make speeches, visit editorial boards and conduct interviews.

- Surrogate teams comprised of representatives from the White House, NSC, State Department, Defense Department, and the USUN, are being dispatched to speak in targeted markets.

- The Department of Defense, in particular, will begin a heavy speaking and amplification schedule once General Shalikashvili has delivered his testimony on the Hill.

- Secretary Christopher, Richard Holbrooke (11/27) and George Stephanopoulos (12/11) are delivering speeches at the Council on Foreign Relations.

- Secretary Christopher delivered remarks at the opening of the Dayton Talks. (11/1)

- Slazdic speech at Carnegie (11/29)

- Strobe Talbott delivered a speech to the National Press Club. (11/9)

- State Department Assistant Secretary John Kornblum will participate in a Council on Foreign Relations Town Hall Meeting. (12/12)
GROUP OUTREACH

During the next two weeks, the Office of Public Liaison will pursue an aggressive strategy to garner support among key constituencies for U.S. involvement in Bosnia. OPL is implementing a three-tiered plan of telephone contact, dissemination of supporting materials, and White House briefings to targeted constituencies, as described below.

Three-Tiered Outreach

The goals of OPL's outreach are to energize known supporters, to persuade those who have yet to take a position, and to inform and educate those currently opposed to Administration policy.

- **Telephone Contact**: Initial phone contact will determine the current level of support. In addition, OPL is scheduling conference calls by key NSC staff with known and potential supporters. OPL will ensure that appropriate Administration officials will also place calls to selected, individual constituents, as needed. OPL will follow up by telephone with key groups.

- **Distribution of Materials**: On a daily basis, OPL will fax out talking points, speeches, media commentary and other supportive materials to targeted groups. Special packets of support materials will be provided at all White House briefings.

- **Briefings**: OPL will schedule briefings for key groups throughout this period. Every effort is being made to provide senior level briefers appropriate to a particular group. Targeted support materials will be provided. OPL has scheduled for the middle of this week a special meeting for organizations supportive of Administration policy on this issue. It is OPL's goal that these groups will exit the meeting energized to work together and separately to expand the Administration's support network.
GROUP OUTREACH

Targeted Constituencies

- **Ethnic Groups**: Ethnic leadership, including members of the Central and Eastern European Coalition, and Croatian-American and Serb-American organizations, will be briefed at the White House this week by Ambassador Holbrooke. Democratic ethnic supporters will participate in a conference call with a senior NSC staff member.

- **Veterans**: Last week, VFW and American Legion publicly expressed their opposition to the deployment of US troops in Bosnia. OPL has invited sixteen veterans organizations, including these two, to be briefed at the White House this week by Lt. Col. Wes Clark, Dr. John White and Ambassador Gallucci.

- **Jewish-Americans**: Several organizations have already expressed support for deployment of US troops and will be invited to a Supporters meeting this week. OPL is reaching out to other groups by telephone and will invite them to a separate briefing, if necessary.

- **Humanitarian/Relief and Human Rights**: John Shattuck meets with Human Right groups. (11/27). While many of these groups already have a specific interest in peace and stability in the region, OPL will invite representatives to a White House briefing on the importance of supporting the deployment.

- **Religious**: OPL has identified several organizations, including several in the Muslim and Catholic communities, that it will invite to its Supporters briefing. A separate briefing may be arranged for organizations that have not yet committed their support.

- **Business**: OPL, in conjunction with the Department of Commerce, will reach out to its thousands of business contacts via fax, providing support materials and inviting those with a specific interest to join a conference call with a senior Administration official. In addition, OPL will host 200 Washington business representatives this week for a briefing on the budget and Bosnia.

- **Women and Children**: Those groups already engaged in promoting the rights of women and children refugees and in the outcome of the war crimes tribunal will be included in our Supporters briefing.
GROUP OUTREACH, con't:

Targeted Constituencies

- **Hispanics and African-Americans:** A DOD breakdown of the ethnic composition of troops to be deployed will determine the level of emphasis to be placed on these constituencies. Over the course of the past several days, OPL has worked with the leadership of these groups to firm up support within the Hispanic and Black Caucuses.

- **Mayors:** OPL and the Office of Intergovernmental Affairs are reaching out to mayors of cities with Sister City relationships in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as mayors in the top 20 U.S. cities and those with large ethnic communities.

- **Think Tanks:** NDU Think Tank Briefing by Jan Lodal and Sandy Vershbow: Organizations represented were RAND, Atlantic Council, Carnegie, Stimson Center, Brookings, CSIS, CATO, Foreign Policy Institute, Business Executives for National Security, American Enterprise Institute, Heritage Foundation, Lehman Brothers, University of Maryland, and Georgetown University. (11/9)

- **Retired Military:** Secretary Perry hosted a breakfast for Retired Military (11/17) and Deputy Secretary White hosted a dinner for Retired Military (11/20).
INDIVIDUAL INFLUENTIAL OUTREACH

• National Security Advisor Lake, Secretary Christopher, Secretary Perry, Ambassador Albright, Joe Duffy, Penn Kemble, Sandy Berger, Sandy Vershbow, Ambassador Richard Schifter, John Shattuck, Walter Slocombe, John White, Jan Lodal and Ted Warner have taken responsibility for making the following calls. Once contacted, we are determining the best follow-up and use of their support.


• The Vice President will hold a series of one-on-one or small group meetings with influentials. List to include: James Baker, Scowcroft, Eagleburger, Cheney, and Carlucci. He will also call George Schultz. (Proposed)

• Lake Influentials Meeting 11/2: Zbigniew Brzezinski, Max Kampelman, Richard Perle, Hodding Carter, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and Mort Abramowitz.


• Lake Influentials Calls and Meetings (Ongoing): Kissinger, Scowcroft, Perle, Schultz, Kirkpatrick.

• Holbrooke Influentials Meeting 11/28: List in development.

• Holbrooke and Wes Clark will meet with Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz. (Proposed)
INDIVIDUAL INFLUENTIAL OUTREACH, con't:

- Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft, Elmo Zumwalt and Warren Zimmerman are prepared to voice their support on television programs and/or Hill testimony.


- An op-ed by Mort Abramowitz has been accepted by the *New York Times*.

- Several supportive opinion leaders such as Max Kampelman and Hodding Carter are voicing support in their public speaking engagements.

- Individual opinion leaders who are supportive intend to devote time to making additional calls and visits to Capitol Hill.
OUTSIDE GROUP

It is likely that an outside "citizens" committee will form for the purpose of persuading Congress to support U.S. involvement. This committee will be most visible through print ads in national papers and press conferences. Additionally, they will explore distributing video coverage of the war atrocities to interested press outlets.

MATERIALS

• Talking Points are distributed through White House, Agency and DNC networks.

• Bosnia fact sheets are available on the White House and Department of Defense Home Pages/Internet.

• The State Department has prepared and is distributing a 55-page booklet of Bosnia Q & As.
The brave new world of conscience

Thirty-two years ago today, an ambitious Arkansas teacher named Bill Clinton won over the hearts of his hero, John Kennedy. It is easy to imagine the young Clinton dreaming about someday standing in the White House Rose Garden — that hallowed plot of ground in the mythology of Camelot — to announce a triumph for American idealism. In a sense, that was the vision that President Bill Clinton redeemed Tuesday with the dramatic unveiling of the Bosnia peace accord.

Clinton's words will be parsed by everyone from lowly congressional staff assistants to senior foreign policy makers in the Bush administration. The key elements of the House and Senate — setting off for a ferocious Thanksgiving that seemed unattainable just last Sunday — the key word in the president's statement was undoubtedly "consult." Four times, Clinton reiterated variants of a pledge to "profoundly consult with Congress." But I was struck by the president's use of another word that begins with the syllable "con." That word was "conscience," a moral concept that since the days of Henry Kissinger seems to have been stripped from all discussions of American foreign policy. For Clinton, it came tumbling out as an ad-libbed final thought just before he strode proudly out of the Rose Garden.

"We can now begin to review what we have been and heard and read about for the last four years," Clinton said, "and remember what the implications were not only for our consciences, but for the prospect that the conflict could spread." Such stark morality rarely plays a role in elite discussions over foreign policy. But for Clinton, it couldn't have been about the purse but for the prospect that the conflict could spread.

Such stark moralism rarely plays a role in elite discussions over foreign policy. But for Clinton, it couldn't have been about the purse but for the prospect that the conflict could spread.

"The armchair orthodoxy suggests that the average voter is too self-absorbed to support any major military commitment beyond the shores of New York. These cyclics might even argue that foreign affairs for most Americans implies a undue reference to matters of life and death. But, in truth, the section seems evenly divided betweenokus.

The world's better interventionists and traitors. Recent USA TODAY/CNN/Gallup Poll show the public is about evenly divided when asked if U.S. troops should serve as peacekeepers in Bosnia. For Clinton, the race for Republican Congress may put as intractable as the Balkan negotiators in Dayton. Congressman Bill Paxon, who leads the House Republican campaign committee, cynically uses the current mood of edgy miscalment. "On the Republican side," he said, "if the vote were held today, there would be scant support for a commitment of U.S. troops. But in deference to the president's role as commander-in-chief, we'll let him make his case."

The president may pay a political price for a week that turned into a month of non-stop "talking points" on foreign policy and domestic. Clinton pleaded with the Senate to vote to raise the federal budget, a week after the president's speech on "the world's moral conscience" and "prevailing." There is a burnishing sense that the Clinton White House is making us all a bit more comfortable now is the moment for the president to borrow the conscience of the nation to support our high-minded commitment in Bosnia. Just as he did after Operation Provide Comfort and before Operation Provide Relief. The president has a harried George, who announced, "How I asked: will you see the Bosnian peace plan?" That point in the

1986

USA TODAY
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 22, 1995

No State in the Bush administration, pointed out that President George W. Bush won't be the same as a man in the past. But, in truth, the section seems evenly divided between

Throughout the decade, Republicans thought the president spent last week demagoging them on Medicare fees."

Clinton plans an Oval Office address in the coming weeks to explain the bolded foreign-policy commitment of his presidency. The stakes cannot be exaggerated: his re-election dreams, America's future role in the world and, what really matters, peace for Bosnian people. In a far different era, President Kennedy could inspire a renunciation of national resolve. Now — as Bill Clinton confronts his greatest challenge — the torch has truly been passed to a new generation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE</th>
<th>SUBJECT/TITLE</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>RESTRICTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**COLLECTION:**

**OA/Box Number:**

**FOLDER TITLE:**

**RESTRICTION CODES**

- Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
  - P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
  - P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
  - P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
  - P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
  - P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
  - P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
  - b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
  - b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
  - b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
  - b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
  - b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
  - b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
  - b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
  - b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.
Here are the revised questions on Bosnia. They are basically in the field, so call me if there is anything important to change.
1. In general, do you approve of the job that President Clinton is doing in handling Bosnia? Do you strongly approve, somewhat approve, somewhat disapprove or strongly disapprove of it?

   1) strongly approve
   2) somewhat approve
   3) somewhat disapprove
   4) strongly disapprove
   5) don't know

2. Have you heard anything about a peace agreement to end the conflict in Bosnia?

   1) yes
   2) no/don't know

3. On a one to five scale with 1 meaning nothing a 5 a great deal, do you think that the United States had a great deal to do with negotiating a peace agreement to end the conflict?

   1) nothing
   2) 
   3) 
   4) 
   5) great deal
   6) don't know

4. On a one to five scale with 1 meaning nothing a 5 a great deal, do you think that President Clinton had a great deal to do with negotiating a peace agreement to end the conflict?

   1) nothing
   2) 
   3) 
   4) 
   5) great deal
   6) don't know

5. Do you think it was right for President Clinton to try to settle the conflict in Bosnia or should he have stayed out of it?
6. Have you heard anything about the U.S. sending troops to Bosnia?

1) yes
2) no
3) don’t know

7. In general, do you strongly support, moderately support, moderately oppose or strongly oppose sending U.S. troops into Bosnia?

1) strongly support
2) moderately support
3) moderately oppose
4) strongly oppose
5) don’t know

8. In fact, all of the parties to the Bosnian conflict came to a peace agreement after meeting under the direction of the United States in Dayton, Ohio. The peace agreement calls for NATO to send a force of 90,000 troops to Bosnia to carry out the peace accord by separating the warring factions and keeping everyone complying with the terms of the agreement while new governments are set up and elections held. 30,000 of the troops would be from the U.S., and the entire operation would be under the command of an American general. Given this, do you strongly support, moderately support, moderately oppose or strongly oppose sending U.S. troops into Bosnia as part of this process?

1) strongly support
2) moderately support
3) moderately oppose
4) strongly oppose
5) don’t know

9. Do you think that Congress should support or oppose the President in his decision to send U.S. troops as part of the peace process in Bosnia?

1) support president
2) oppose president
3) don’t know

10. Here are some statements people have made about Bosnia. Do you agree or disagree with them.

11. Bosnia is not a European problem, but a human problem, and it is important for the U.S. to become involved with it for the sake of our most basic value – that of saving innocent human lives and promoting peace. Genocide and the killing and
raaping of innocent women and children was involved. Good conscience demands our involvement to stop this.

Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree with this?

1) strongly agree
2) somewhat agree
3) somewhat disagree
4) strongly disagree
5) don't know

USE SAME CODES FOR THESE STATEMENTS

12. Bosnia could quickly turn into another example of the U.S. getting into trouble when it tries to extend its reach too far in the name of doing good and become an open-ended military involvement. This is how we got into Vietnam and Lebanon.

13. America is a unique country that does not just act out of selfish motives but we try to do good things in the world, and bringing peace in Bosnia is something we did not have to do but something that will be of genuine help to the stability of the world and the lives of the people there.

14. This is an operation under the auspices of both the United Nations and NATO. Rather than being comforting, these facts mean that this operation could get out of our control and could become a bureaucratic mess that could put American lives at stake.

15. An American general will head the NATO force, which will be made up of 2/3rds European troops. This means that Europe is doing its fair share, but that Americans will be in charge so that we will be able to make all the decisions necessary to protect our troops.

16. Only America is uniquely trusted by warring factions to bring peace and to disarm others in the best interests of humanity. It is this impartial American involvement that has made peace possible and helped resolve a situation that the Europeans alone were unable to solve.

17. We are putting American lives at stake here for a cause that is not worth it. We should not put Americans at risk for a conflict so far from us and with so little direct benefit to us.

18. There are vital interests at stake in this conflict. This war was in Europe where World War I was started. If it continued unchecked, this conflict could have spread to Albania, Greece, the new Eastern European democracies and embroiled Europe in a deepening conflict. We are right to act to end this conflict before it spreads; this is the whole purpose behind our continuing involvement with NATO.
19. The troops we are sending in here have no clear mission.

20. We have a clear and limited peacekeeping mission here, which defined as protecting refugees from further harm, bringing relief to the civilians, separating the fighting armies, taking away heavy weapons, and overseeing the restoration of functioning governments. This is a clear mission justified by our belief that it is both humane and good for world stability.

21. With an American in charge of the operation we will be able to protect our own troops effectively and will massively retaliate against any faction that attacks American troops.

22. American leadership in the world means that we must follow through our initiation of peace talks with a troop commitment to secure the peace. If we backed out now, we would lose our position as a world leader, and our ability to act elsewhere in the world would be seriously jeopardized. If we go forward and are successful, our world leadership will again be enhanced, just as it has been because of Haiti and the Middle East.

23. Given all these arguments, would you strongly support sending U.S. troops to Bosnia, moderately support it, moderately oppose it or strongly oppose it?

   1) strongly support
   2) moderately support
   3) moderately oppose
   4) strongly oppose
   9) don't know

24. What is the most important reason of the ones we have discussed for sending troops there? (OPEN-ENDED)

25. What is the most important reason to you not to send U.S. troops there? (OPEN-ENDED)

26. Given all the arguments, do you think that Congress should support or oppose the President in his decision to send U.S. troops as part of the peace process in Bosnia?

   1) support
   2) oppose
   3) don't know

27. Some people say that that if Congress opposed sending troops to Bosnia it would be the Republicans playing partisan politics with serious foreign policy matters - Newt Gingrich would be treating world peace just like he negotiates a budget agreement, threatening to hold up our important foreign policy initiatives unless he gets his way. They point out that the Democrats supported Bush in Iraq, and that the Republicans would have supported a Republican President in this effort.
Others say that the Republicans oppose sending troops as part of the peace agreement out of conscience that American lives should not be put at risk there. Which is closer to your view?

1) Repubs playing politics with foreign policy
2) Repubs acting out of conscience
3) don't know

28. The Constitution says that the President needs approval from Congress to make war. The Republicans say that the President is usurping their power to make these decisions by acting without their approval. President Clinton says this is a peacekeeping operation being undertaken to stop the killing of innocent people, save lives and support our allies that such a mission does not require the approval of Congress and is within his powers as Commander in Chief. Who do you agree with more on this – President Clinton or the Republicans in Congress?

1) President Clinton that he needs no approval
2) Republicans that he needs their approval

29. Would you strongly support, moderately support, moderately oppose or strongly oppose President Clinton sending U.S. troops to Bosnia without Congressional approval?

1) strongly support
2) moderately support
3) moderately oppose
4) strongly oppose
5) don't know

30. If troops are committed to the peace process, should we stay there as long as necessary to enforce the peace, which experts say will be about a year, or should we set a definite deadline that we will withdraw in a year?

1) as long a necessary
2) one year maximum
3) don't know

31. Suppose President Clinton said: I want Congress to support me in this and allow me to carry out our foreign policy to try to bring peace to Bosnia. I can't guarantee success. But I think it will work. And we will never have peace unless we try. If it does not work, then blame me, not Congress. But don't hamstring me or America in carrying out this noble effort.” Given this statement do you believe Congress should support or oppose President Clinton's decision to send troops to Bosnia as part of the peace process?

1) support
2) oppose
3) don't know
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  

November 21, 1995  

MEMORANDUM FOR DON BAER  

From: Julia Moffett  

Subject: Bosnia  

I have attached a rough draft of a document I think will be useful as we move forward on Bosnia. Obviously, we are in a holding pattern until there is resolution of the Dayton talks. As you will see in the attached plan, it is hard to put meat on the bones without dates. We should have some guidance today.

In the meantime, I have a brief update:

The attached plan attempts to break up the Bosnia effort into phases--dates still to be determined. In each phase, I have listed activity in three categories: 1) How we are making the case directly to the American public; 2) How we are targeting Congress; and, 3) How outside validators are being mobilized.

I did a lot of ground work yesterday that should help to fill out this plan before we break for Thanksgiving. A summary is listed below:

- POTUS: As you said, a group will get together as soon as there is closure in Dayton to determine the President's role.

- VPOTUS: Office has identified dates in the next three weeks for him to meet with influentials and columnists as well as to travel to major cities for speeches. We are just waiting for marching orders. Also, he has completed a large number of Congressional meetings.

- NSC: The NSC is continuing serious outreach to influentials. While this is not manifesting itself in op-eds, positive results can be seen in recent appearances by Scowcroft and Eagleburger on CNN.

- NSC/Media Affairs: As soon as the Dayton talks conclude, the NSC and Media Affairs will begin the radio and ethnic press programs with NSC officials.

- OPL: Jill and I are meeting with Alexis today to discuss briefings.
STATE: At conclusion of talks, State will resume its ambitious radio and regional editorial board plan as well as meetings with influentials and columnists.

USUN: Albright is attempting to reschedule her speeches in Cleveland, Los Angeles, San Diego, and Phoenix for next week.

DOD: Working with retired military and getting communications plan ready for implementation time.

OPINION LEADERS: The list of people we are currently meeting with and talking to is impressive. Op-eds are hard. The time is paying off in people's support when quoted, on TV, etc. and in their neutralization. Next step needs to be GOP opinion leaders calling the Hill. Still trying with the outside group.

PRESS: Mary Ellen, Jill and I are eager to start bringing in columnists and selected reporters—we just need to time it with something to say a main event. In addition to the regular bunch, we will look to expand to the Tim Russert, Fred Barnes, etc.....

A few miscellaneous issues:

NSC has been keeping a comprehensive list of all activity that can be presented in a variety of forms when requested by press.

If the Saturday morning Situation Room meeting is not happening this week, I recommend that we think about having it before people leave for the holiday. We really need to get a scenario or two on the table once these talks end.

When we understand the implications of the end of the talks, I will need to work with the above parties to ensure that Bosnia is not off the radar screen when the President is in UK/Ireland. This, however, cannot be done in a vacuum—it needs to be part of a plan.

If you have not had a chance to read it, I have attached the articles on Bosnia from this week's TIME magazine. I have underlined points I thought deserved some attention.
BOSNIA COMMUNICATIONS PLAN

OBJECTIVE

To generate support for US involvement in implementing a Bosnia peace agreement, primarily by securing the support of Congress through the passage of a resolution.

This goal will be realized by the combination of the following:

1) Making the case directly to the American people;
2) Targeting specific Members of Congress; and,
3) Mobilizing an extensive group of opinion leaders and groups who will, in turn, influence Congress.

PHASES

I: Immediate Conclusion of Dayton Talks
II: End of Dayton Talks to Paris Signing/Congressional Vote
III: Signing/Vote
IV: Deployment

MESSAGE

This agreement would not have been possible without U.S. leadership. Because of it, we are on the brink of ending a massive human tragedy and ensuring peace in Europe, which is of vital interest to us. We cannot shrink in the face of this need. It is critical to future of humanity, Europe, NATO, and the United States.

MEANS

The attached plan is comprised of the following activities:

- The "stagemanaging" of Presidential events around the talks, signing, vote.
- The President speaking directly to the American people.
- Administration officials being dispatched to relay the message.
- Aggressive Congressional outreach.
- Aggressive outreach to opinion leaders and groups.
- National press plan with columnists and pundits.
- Regional press plan in targeted Congressional districts.
PHASE I: IMMEDIATE CONCLUSION OF DAYTON TALKS-NOVEMBER 21-22

Purpose: To welcome the agreement and highlight US leadership in achieving it. To escalate the presentation of the case for US involvement in implementation.

Making the Case to the American People

- POTUS Welcomes/Initials Agreement. (Tentative for tbd)
- POTUS Address to the Nation. (Tentative for tbd)
- POTUS Interview with Apple
- Christopher and Holbrooke will do morning shows and other following initializing. (Tentative for tbd)
- White House Briefing Room briefing for White House press. (Tentative)
- NSC will begin participating in regional press plan with Media Affairs: Radio, Editorial Boards, Ethnic Press. (Tentative)
- State Resumes Regional Radio Program.
- State places follow-up calls to regional editorial boards which received mailing.

Targeting Members of Congress

- POTUS Calls to Leadership. (Tentative for tbd)
- Defense Undersecretary Walt Slocombe op-ed in The Hill. (Tuesday, 11-21)

Mobilizing Opinion Leaders

- POTUS Calls to Bush, Carter, Ford, Powell, Thatcher. (Tentative for Tuesday, 11-21)
- VPOTUS has time to see reporters/columnists or influential. (Tentative for Wednesday, 11-22)
- Tony Lake will meet with Abramowitz group Executive Committee [Kirpatrick etc]. (Tentative for Wednesday, 11-22)
• Christopher hosts breakfast with influentials. (Tentative for Wednesday, 11-22)


• Second round of calls to opinion leaders already contacted.
PHASE II: END OF TALKS TO PARIS SIGNING/CONGRESSIONAL VOTE-NOVEMBER 27 THROUGH DECEMBER 8

Purpose: All media becomes targeted--need to keep activity up while POTUS is away--targeting Congress

Making the Case to the American People

• POTUS Radio Address. (Tentative for Saturday, 12-2)
• POTUS Radio Address. (Tentative for Saturday, 12-9)
• VPOTUS Speech
• Ambassador Albright reschedules speaking tour in Cleveland, Los Angeles, San Diego, Phoenix. (Tentative)
• Holbrooke Speech at National Press Club.
• State Department "teams" speaking engagements.

Targeting Members of Congress

• Hearings
• State and NSC Regional Media programs become targeted.

Mobilizing Opinion Leaders

• VPOTUS has time to meet with columnists or influencers. (Tentative for Monday, Thursday, or Friday)
• Op-eds
• Committee Activity
• White House briefings for groups/constituencies
• DOD briefing for Senior Retired Military
WHAT PRI

T HE TROOPS OF TASK FORCE LION ARE CONVINCED THAT THEY WILL
first Americans into Bosnia to police the peace. For weeks the
first 1,000 soldiers have prepared at the vast Hohenfels training
compound in northern Bavaria. They have packed up their
mountain training at Hohenfels, including some of the best of
the 2d and 3d Infantry Division, which subsequently conducted operations
during Operation Eagle Strike with 10,000 troops earmarked for Bosnian peacekeeping duties.

If some contingents are sent into action, says task force commander
James M. McDonough, “we’re going in first for the men who know the word.”
For the men who have been trained over the past few months, it will be a
challenge to be policed. They know their duty. They know their role. They
know their mission. They know their purpose. They know their destiny.

As the men of Task Force Lion prepare to deploy, they are united in their
determination to make a difference. They are united in their belief that
their efforts will help bring peace to the region. They are united in their
commitment to protect and serve. And they are united in their love for our
country and our flag.

BY BRUCE W. NELSON

America searches to create a policy for putting its troops to fight, but they have also been making strides in preparing for combat.

The troops are being trained in the art of peacekeeping, as well as the art of war. They are being taught how to handle themselves in the field, how to work with other forces, and how to communicate effectively.

The men of Task Force Lion are well-prepared for the challenges that lie ahead. They are confident in their ability to do their job and serve their country. They are ready to deploy and make a difference in the world.
WE WILL BE THE ADVANCE TRAINING CENTER. IN THREE TRANSPORT PLANE, ROARED OVER THE HILLS, CODE-NAMED 1ST ARMORED, OPERATION MOUNTING DUTY. UNDER COLONEL, OUR TROOPS ARE READY. THEY NEED TO DO WHAT WE TRAIN FOR," SAYS SERGEANT-MAJOR GERALD PARKS, HIS FACE PAINTED GREEN AND BLACK. "IF PEOPLE ARE DYING IN BOSNIA AND WE CAN HELP OUT, LET'S GO."

Whether they go depends on the peace talks in Dayton, but if those negotiations succeed, the U.S. Army could move fast. NATO plans, still secret, call for immediate American help in setting up a communications and logistics headquarters in Bosnia. Close on their heels, the Implementation Force, or I-FOR, of 60,000 troops—20,000 American—would stream into Bosnia. The provisions of the peace agreement now being discussed would give NATO's military peace force a license to throw its weight around throughout Bosnia. They could also involve the I-FOR in a fire fight the first time it crashes a Serb roadblock or seizes artillery pieces from the Bosnian army. Once the peace is shattered and American forces begin taking casualties, voices will be raised in the U.S., loudly demanding answers: What makes Bosnia worth dying for? What vital national interest is involved? In fact, the questioning has already begun, as Congress sends signals to Clinton that it will fight him vigorously on any deployment in which it has no say.
Answering the questions is no easy assignment, as the sometimes floundering efforts of official Washington demonstrate. The activist consensus of the cold war, which made every foot of turf on earth a prize to be won or lost, has evaporated. At the same time the venerable formula that U.S. forces are to be used to protect vital interests and key allies seems less than adequate to guide the country in a violent world of fluctuating priorities. Will America’s $260 billion-a-year military machine be sent into action to fight only aggressors like North Korea, Iran or Iraq, as the Pentagon’s conventional strategy suggests? Those are the least likely contingencies: cross-border invasions and highly visible aggression are increasingly rare. Civil wars, ethnic violence and disintegrating states now produce most of the bloodshed and agony that shock viewers on the evening news programs. Will America duck the new, more common battles? The answers that emerge from the Bosnia debate are likely to set precedents that will channel America’s course for years to come.

Senior officials in Washington have been trying to persuade the country of the need to send troops to Bosnia, but they have not been doing a particularly good job of it. Clinton wrote to Congress last week, “If we do not do our part in a NATO mission, we would weaken the alliance and jeopardize American leadership in Europe.” Secretary of State Warren Christopher warned that the Bosnian conflict might spread, but it remains unclear what danger the Albanian army poses. Meanwhile, William Perry, the Secretary of Defense, testified to Congress last month that the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia “affects the vital national security interests of the U.S. by maintaining the strength and credibility of NATO and, most important, by stopping the war.” That use of the word vital is the heart of the issue and the argument. When officials of the Truman Administration suggested in 1950 that South Korea was not a vital interest, North Korea attacked. It is diplomatic code for an interest a country will go to war over. When President Jimmy Carter declared in 1980 that the Persian Gulf was a “vital interest,” he was correctly understood to mean the U.S. would go to war to maintain its access to gulf oil.

Two weeks after Perry used the word, he seemed to have changed his mind. In a speech in Philadelphia he labeled Bosnia a place “where our vital interests are not threatened, but we do have an important stake in the outcome.” Asked to explain this contradiction last week, Pentagon spokesman Ken Bacon said Bosnia was important, though not vital, but the maintenance of U.S. leadership in NATO was at stake in the peacekeeping mission. “We’re protecting NATO,” Bacon said. “That’s vital.”

“Let’s get this straight: Bosnia is not a vital interest; it’s an “important” interest. NATO is a vital interest. NATO is mixed up in Bosnia, so to defend our vital interest in NATO we have to fight in Bosnia. By this logic, it would make no difference whether Bosnia were an “important” interest or a “somewhat important” or an “utterly trivial” interest; we’d still have to
send troops there because of our desire to preserve NATO. Bacon's explanation skips over the really hard question raised by Perry's comment: Is the defense of merely "important" interests worth the lives of American soldiers?

America's intervention in Somalia, which cost $2 billion and the lives of 30 servicemen and changed nothing, along with the crisis in Haiti and the war in Bosnia, has impelled U.S. leaders to search for new definitions of the nation's interests abroad. Even the prudent George Bush, who ordered U.S. troops to Somalia in the first place, was rethinking the old guidelines just before he left office. He suggested that "military force might be the best way to protect an interest that qualifies as important but less than vital." Force is a key adjunct to diplomacy, he argued, and "real leadership requires a willingness to use military force." Richard Haass, the former White House aide who wrote that speech, explains, "It was an attempt to come up with a slightly more flexible rationale for using force. It was also a defense of what was not being done in Bosnia, because it was hard to match an effective U.S. intervention with the limited nature of U.S. interests."

Colin Powell built on conclusions reached by former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger of the hard-learned, post-Vietnam rules of engagement: commit troops only to clear-cut tasks, with the support of Congress and the public, and then go in with overwhelming force. Now he too is seeking fresher approaches to a changed world that is still riven by conflict. Last week Powell told an audience at Rice University, "New rules are needed; old assumptions need to be rooted out. The kind of warfare we had thought about for 50 years is gone."

In other words, if we simply abide by the Powell doctrine and hew to the Pentagon strategy of preparing for two simultaneous conventional wars, we would keep the U.S. military out of action unless the gravest kind of threat looms up. Perry is struggling to come up with workable new guidelines. He has been thinking about separating the country's interests abroad into three categories: vital, important and humanitarian. This would roughly match the three main types of intervention the U.S. ponders most often: peacemaking, in which warring parties must be forced to stop fighting; peacekeeping, where the parties have accepted a peace agreement; and emergency humanitarian aid, often in warlike conditions. All of them are potentially bloody. "Our level of military involvement must reflect our stakes," says Perry. The Gulf War fell into the first category, and Bosnia the second. "The second category is much more difficult to deal with than the first," he says, "because we must weigh the risks against the interests involved, and because the threats are not always so clear-cut."

Interventions in the gray areas the Pentagon calls "operations other than war" are hardest to explain. General John Shalikashvili, Powell's successor as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, is the man who directed the operation that provided refuge
HUMANITARIAN MISSION: A U.S. Marine says hello to some young Somalis in Baldoa, 1992. The good humor did not last long to the Kurds in Iraq, and he does not shrink from similar missions to bring succor to strife-torn countries. “We have a capacity like almost no one else,” he says. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense Lawrence Korb finds Shalikashvili much more willing to get involved in brush fires than his predecessor. “Powell wanted low-risk operations,” Korb says. “But Shali is not looking for the lowest risk. He thinks the U.S. military can have a useful role in these kinds of missions.” Even Shalikashvili, however, has not been able to set forth a coherent intervention doctrine.

Perhaps no one will find a single strategic concept or a template to fit all situations. “I think it's very unlikely,” says Powell. “I think that as these situations arise they will be dealt with on an ad hoc basis and in the politics of the time.” That means the government will have to argue each case on its own merits, as it must for Bosnian intervention.

No one has suggested that the men and women in uniform are lobbying against any involvement in Bosnia. All the leaders in the chain of command have said the opposite: they are ready to go. What they worry about is the American public's staying power if casualties begin to mount. “Once you have decided to do it,” says David Davies, a British Defense Ministry spokesman, “you must accept the consequences and not debate the decision.” But there is no denying that many senior officers, singed badly by Vietnam and Somalia, are leery about the prospect of going into battle in Bosnia, taking casualties and then being suddenly, ignominiously yanked out. “The American military,” says a former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, “has been let down too often by the American people not to be wary.”

If the American people have let down the military, it has often been because they were squeamish about the losses that the military was taking. And it is possible that the public's criterion for sending Americans to be killed in foreign wars—the Pentagon calls it the mother test—is getting stricter. “In this new post-cold war era,” says Republican Representative Dana Rohrabacher, “we expect the lives of Americans to be taken more into account.” Perhaps because of the surprising success of Operation Desert Storm in the gulf, where only 148 U.S. troops died out of 500,000 allied troops in action, Americans now think low casualties are the norm in any operation.

That level of concern about casualties makes some policymakers nervous. The French, for example, have lost 55 soldiers in Bosnia, and two of their airmen are missing in Serb-controlled Bosnian territory. Such developments would have set off a major outcry in the U.S., but in France they are accepted with relative stoicism. Shalikashvili says there is a danger the U.S. is developing a standard “that cannot be retained in a war.”

“New rules are needed; old assumptions need to be rooted out. The kind of warfare we had thought about for 50 years is gone.”
MANN A settlement in Bosnia does not guarantee peace in Macedonia or Kosovo. Some could argue, ‘It is too late to stop ethnic cleansing and too much ethnic friction.’

GEOFFREY SHERLOCK and Cyril Syms make a deal: the U.S. will be asked to peace in Somalia, and the U.N. will only argue against sending troops.

If I were to ask the question, “Do I think my son should go to Bosnia?” I would have to answer “no.” A great many Americans feel that way now, and are worried that Bosnia will be followed by other interventions.

During the cold war the U.S. was involved, willy-nilly, in every conflict in the world. But at the same time Washington had to be cautious about where it sent troops for fear of stumbling into a direct clash with the Soviet Union, one that could escalate to nuclear war. Now the opportunities for intervention are almost endless and carry little fear of Armageddon.

The new world order actually resembles the order as it stood at the end of World War II, when the U.S. was the sole possessor of atomic weapons and the U.N. Charter was being written. All the peace-loving countries would band together, the theory went, with the five permanent members of the Security Council in the lead. They would punish any nation that dared launch an aggressive war. That scenario was played out in Korea, but never thereafter until the Gulf War, which followed the breakup of the U.S.S.R.

Now that the superpower rivalry has ended and the danger of thermonuclear war has abated, the theory could be put into practice. International legal scholars even began toying with new approaches to intervention, suggesting that the world might have a right to take action against a government that was committing atrocities or genocide against its own people. But experiments in collective security so far have simply proved the old rule: the U.S. will act when it sees clear national interests at stake, but in the pug—but feels no compulsion to send in the Marines without a very good reason. The public demanded a pullout from Somalia because they did not accept abandoning overthrow in Iraq when two U.S. helicopters were mistakenly shot down in April 1994 and 15 Americans were killed. The difference between the two cases is obvious. The public understands that oil is a strategic interest, and Saddam Hussein—a tyrant hoping to build nuclear weapons—represents a threat to U.S. security. On that basis Americans can make a judgment and a choice.

If Americans rejected intervention in Somalia because their vital interests were not at stake, will they accept intervention in Bosnia? One way to persuade them to go along with the deployment, of course, is to argue that America’s vital interests are at stake in Bosnia. The Administration has tried that approach, with limited success. Clinton has another alternative, which is to acknowledge that the fate of Bosnia is not crucial to the national security of the U.S., but add that we still have an interest in peace and stability there, and that our interest merits the loss of some troops.

Powell is probably correct when he says no overall strategy can ever cover all the choices open to the nation; the government of the day will have to convince the public each time that America must act. Precedent will certainly influence the debate, however. Intervention in Bosnia would help establish the principle that we should take action in situations that are less apocalyptic than the global struggle against communism or a direct attack on ourselves or our allies. So far Clinton has failed to explain the value of sending troops to Bosnia on those terms. If he never succeeds, it will be all the more difficult for the next President to involve troops in a similar conflict. To some, such a precedent would be a very good thing. But if most of the conflicts in the future are going to resemble Bosnia’s, the U.S. declares its unconcern, the world may be left a more brutal place.

—Reported by
James O. Jackson/Brussels, Mark Thompson and Douglas Waller/Washington and Bruce van Voorst/Hohenfels

TIME, NOVEMBER 27, 1995
S THE LEADERS OF BOSNIA, CROATIA and Serbia crept toward a peace agreement last week at the U.S.-led talks in Dayton, Ohio, Bill Clinton must have sensed the possibility of a big score. Finally he would have an answer to those who have accused him of fecklessness on foreign policy. No longer could anyone call him "the Governor of the United States," uninterested in and incapable of fulfilling his duties as the leader of the most powerful nation on earth. After all, the Europeans had spent several years trying to solve the Bosnia problem, and they had botched it. Now, after a few months of energetic military and diplomatic leadership on the part of the U.S., peace, or some version of it, was finally at hand. "If you look at the results, from Bosnia to Haiti," Clinton said recently, "from the Middle East to Northern Ireland, it proves once again that American leadership is indispensable and that without it our values, our interests and peace itself would be at risk." A Bosnia settlement would prove that Clinton can lead the world as well as he can lead Arkansas and would reaffirm America's global pre-eminence.

There is only one problem: the American people could hardly care less. More than that—they are actively hostile to the notion of American leadership if it requires risking American lives. In the case of Bosnia, that is exactly what American leadership has led to. Clinton has said he will send 20,000 troops to enforce a peace agreement, and Americans are deeply concerned about this prospect. They are not convinced that their sons and daughters should die for the sake of Sarajevo. Last Friday, in an extraordinary move, the House of Representatives voted to block Clinton from spending any money on the deployment of troops in Bosnia until both houses of Congress specifically authorize it. For peace to take hold in Bosnia, though, an American-led NATO force is probably essential. The coincidence last week of progress in the peace talks and Congress's reluctance to enforce a peace pointed up a grave dilemma: America must lead, but its people may not let it.

The U.S. has always tended to turn in on itself—Washington famously maintained in his farewell address that "it is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliance with any portion of the foreign world." Jefferson, too, warned against "entangling alliances." Even as its power has grown, America's expansiveness toward other countries has waxed and waned, as have the world's expectations of America. But conditions are such that it is again
necessary to ask what U.S. relations with other nations ought to be and what they can be. The President is only intermittently engaged in foreign affairs. Congress is increasingly isolationist and at the same time assertive. The public is bored by international issues. Yet at the same time, America is poised to send troops to help a distant people. Beyond that, U.S. involvement abroad grows inexorably as its foreign trade booms and free-market democracy becomes the world’s dominant ideology. More crucially, the world still looks to its only superpower for leadership. As the Israeli statesman Abba Eban said recently, “Nothing can happen without the Americans. Everything can happen with them.”

Americans did not elect Abba Eban President, however, and if we are to understand the current position of the U.S. in the world, we must first examine Bill Clinton’s stewardship. The main points of the early record—bobbing and weaving on China, Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia—don’t inspire confidence. Clinton’s attention has been episodic and frequently prompted by domestic politics. Neither Secretary of State Warren Christopher nor National Security Advisor Anthony Lake convey to the country that they are firmly in command even as the President is busy elsewhere. All the same, Clinton’s foreign policy deserves more respect than it usually receives. He normalized ties with Vietnam, pushed the NAFTA and GATT trade agreements through Congress, propped up the Middle East peace process, deployed forces to Haiti—with almost no casualties—and worked out a deal to halt North Korea’s nuclear-weapons program. His Partnership for Peace program has bought time for everyone in Europe and NATO to adjust to the idea of NATO’s expansion eastward, without provoking a breach with Moscow. European governments are also happy with Clinton’s support for European integration—even if they are furious that the U.S. noisily vetoed their choice for NATO secretary-general earlier this month.

Ties with Japan have been strained, first after the heavy pressure from Washington to absorb more U.S. goods, more recently after the rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl alleged.

A Bosnian Peace Deal in Dayton Is “Inches Away”

BY KEVIN PEDARNO

A S BOSNIAN PEACE DEAL NEAR DAYTON ENTERED THEIR third week, much of the excitement that had been evident in the diplomatic round in recent days faded. In its place, there was an air of foreboding about the character of a deal countries. Presidents, the grievious arrogance of Serbia’s Slobodan Milosevic; the manipulative militancy of the Bosnian Croats; the machiavellianism of the Bosnian Muslims, and seemingly willful indifference of Bosnia’s Alija Izetbegovic. The resignation of Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbey suggested that tensions had grown within the Bosnian delegation. To escape the pressure, the Croats fled to the wide-screen TV in Paddy’s, a sportsbar at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, where they could watch the Chicago Bulls and root for the star Croatian forward, Toni Kuko. They are all sick of the confinement and the artificiality of it,” said an American official.

The setting was chosen, though, precisely to create such frustration, and out of it has come progress. Indeed, by week’s end, it had moved so far forward that all three Balkan Presidents were almost ready to take the step of actually signing a draft agreement. Almost. “We are inches away,” said a frustrated U.S. official, just before the three Presidents, who had been repeatedly coaxed to the edge of the table, once again backed off. Their skittishness did not stem only from a concern that they may get a better deal; the “Rabin effect,” as Dayton insiders call it, took hold, as the Presidents were worried that if they appeared to give away too much, they might be assassinated at home.

The Americans were frustrated with this final bucking and snorting because they believed the most intractable problems were all resolved. Time has exhausted documents that provide the details of the agreement the parties are near signing, even if they can’t bring themselves to go ahead and do it. Here is a summary of what it would look like:

1. Territory: The thorny issue of all the territories is workable progress has been made. The redbreak came when Tudjman and Milosevic agreed that control over Eastern Slavonia, the Allen of Croatia ruled by rebel Serbs since 1991, would revert to Zagreb control in a year or, under certain conditions, two. That was followed by a compromise on the cornerstone issue—Sarajevo. It will remain, at least in name, an “undivided city” (as the Muslims demand), but it will be partitioned into nine self-governing ethnic zones. Each zone can have its own official language, its own education system and even its own set of holidays. Citizens in each area will elect their own representatives to the City Council, and the council in turn will elect a mayor and three deputy mayors—a Bosnian, a Croat, and a Serb—all of whom will exchange positions every year. Other major territorial obstacles have also been overcome. Milosevic has agreed to give up the safe haven of Gorazde, connected by a corridor to Sarajevo. In return, Bosnia will give up Srebrenica and Zepa, and permit a widening of the Posavina corridor.

JUBILANT WELCOME: Haitians hail the arrival of U.S. troops to Port-au-Prince in September 1994
MIDEAST FOES: Islamic Jihad demonstrators on the march in Gaza in December 1993

ly by three U.S. servicemen. Last week the commander of U.S. Pacific forces had to accept early retirement when he observed that the servicemen could have hired a prostitute for the cost of the rental car in which they purportedly committed the crime. But officials on both sides have been stressing the importance of healthy ties overall to undercut the disruptive power of individual issues, and it seems to be working.

While Clinton’s performance may look better than it did at first, many experts doubt that much has changed. “I don’t see any systemic improvement in the Administration,” says Brent Scowcroft, who served as George Bush’s National Security Adviser. “I think that they’ve been through their shake-down and now have a smoothly running machine just isn’t true. Even when they do things right they don’t manage it well.”

Clinton’s management style leads to confusion and competing agendas. He has always liked delegating responsibility for discrete subjects to particular aides, like Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke for Bosnia and Robert Gallucci for Korea. Bidden and unbidden, Jimmy Carter has also stepped in at crucial moments. Different Cabinet officers sometimes seize parts of a policy, like Commerce Secretary Ron Brown, whose drive for export promotion has clashed with the State Department’s efforts to curb arms proliferation and human-rights abuses. Individual results may be impressive, but foreign policy by franchise loses the force and coherence of a guiding intelligence. “Every once in a while someone wanders into the engine room and pulls the throttle,” says Scowcroft, “but it’s hard to see that anyone is in charge of the train.” The result is that “officials from other countries I talk to say we’re fundamentally unreliable, which is the worst thing you can say about U.S. foreign policy.”

Earlier this year, China was outraged when the U.S. granted a visa to Lee Teng-hui, the President of Taiwan, to attend his reunion at Cornell University. China feared that this might be the first step toward recognizing Taiwan, but equally important, Christopher had given his word which links Serb-controlled Bosnian territories in the northwest and northeast with each other and with Serbia. These concessions have caused strong protests by Croats and Bosnians in Dayton and at home.

**Constitution.** The two halves of the new Bosnian nation—the Croat-Muslim federation and the Bosnian Serb, “entity”—will be brought under the umbrella of a central government. The framework calls for a “collective presidency,” whose chairman will rotate among a Muslim, a Serb and a Croat; a constitutional court; and a multietnic parliament.

**Military.** The peace accord will include complex rules to be enforced by an Implementation Force (IFOR) of 60,000 NATO troops, some of whom will begin arriving in Bosnia within days of signing the agreement. IFOR will be instructed to separate the warring armies in Bosnia along a 4-km-wide cease-fire line. Simultaneously, warring parties will begin to reveal the location of all minesfields and booby traps, vacate territory and withdraw their heavy weapons to cantonment areas. Each side will furnish maps depicting the positions of all fortifications, ammunition dumps, command headquarters, communications networks, antiaircraft artillery, and radars. Once in place, the U.N. peacekeepers, will go where they please and have “the undivided right to observe, monitor and inspect” whatever they like. All sides, moreover, are committed to working out military parity. To accomplish this, the U.S. will equip and train the weaker Bosnian army while the Serbs in turn will be required to ramp back their forces.

**War Criminals.** For their role in atrocities against Muslim civilians that have already provoked indictments from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and his military commander, Ratko Mladic, will be barred from participating in the Bosnian Serb government. Milosevic is still backing at Muslim demands that Karadzic and Mladic be extricated for trial in the Hague, despite a new round of genocide charges against the two last week for the alleged involvement in the July Allied air raids on a Serb army command center. The Serbs have also pledged to cooperate with the Tribunal.

U.S. sources say remaining issues could be resolved quickly once the Presidents steel themselves to initial an agreement. Of course, whether solutions crafted on paper can withstand the test of experience will not be answered in Dayton. But the test, at least, will finally begin.

Dealmakers: Izetbegovic, Tudjman and Milosevic in Dayton

*Photograph: John Moore, Getty Images; Illustration: Gorka/Time*
Brave Beginnings: U.S. Marines marching with confidence the night before they left on the mission to Somalia, which ended in debacle

to the Chinese Foreign Minister just a short time earlier that the visa would not be granted (Clinton changed course because of congressional pressure). Months of difficulties with China followed this incident. Russians also are feeling let down by America. They had an unrealistic notion of riding to prosperity with the West's help, but U.S. assistance—$6.6 billion in grants and $6.9 billion in loans to the former Soviet Union since 1991—has been less than Washington appeared to have promised.

If the Clinton Administration still lacks the ideas and consistency other countries are looking for, the Republican Congress is setting off even louder alarms. Freshmen legislators are so focused on their domestic agenda—the Contract with America has no foreign-policy provisions—that diplomacy has little value for them “except as a great place for drive-by shootings of the Clinton Administration,” says a former Reagan Administration official. The new arrivals want to slash funding for the U.N. and cut the number of U.S. embassies abroad—some have talked about using the foreign-aid budget to build a big fence around the country—but they back higher military spending. “They figure we ought to basically tell other countries what to do because we’re the strongest, then come home,” says a Republican congressional staff member only half in jest. European parliamentarians and ministers who go to Capitol Hill for long-scheduled meetings with groups of congressmen are finding that only one or two—sometimes none—show up. House Speaker Newt Gingrich has set up a foreign-policy breakfast series to educate his charges about the world, but attendance has been sporadic.

Senior Republicans are giving foreign policy their attention, but that is often because some issue offers an opportunity to score political points domestically. Last month, for example, Congress voted without hearings and with little debate to move the U.S. embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. In past years that proposal had always died. However appealing the move may be to some American Jews, everyone knew that voting in favor of it could complicate the peace process. Bob Dole has always opposed the bill—until this year, when he’s running for President.

Under another senior Republican, Jesse Helms, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has virtually ceased to function. The Administration wouldn’t entertain his reorganization plan for the State Department, so Helms retaliated by refusing for months to confirm 18 ambassadors. Meanwhile, START II, the chemical-weapons convention, nine bilateral investment treaties and other pacts are also languishing. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott says Congress is “flirting with ideas that are isolationist in their potential consequence if not in their actual intent. There’s a resurgence of the view that we can now afford to go it alone.” This is hardly a platform from which Clinton, flush from his Bosnia success—if it comes—can launch a new internationalism.

In any case, such an endeavor would not suit the national mood. According to a recent Time/CNN poll, 73% of U.S. adults think the country should further reduce its involvement in world politics to concentrate on problems at home. Americans are more ignorant of foreign events than citizens in other advanced countries; the amount of foreign news in television and newspapers is dropping. Most Americans believe that spending on foreign aid constitutes 15% to 25% of the federal budget—they would consider 5% acceptable—when
aid actually amounts to less than 1% of the budget (compared with 18% for defense). The U.S. already ranks last among donor nations in the percentage of its GNP it devotes to foreign assistance, and Congress plans to cut U.S. aid another 11%.

No matter what the good news from Dayton, there's no reason to expect out of this President, this Congress and this public any great resurgence of international leadership. But there are good reasons to believe the U.S. will not hibernate.

The first is America's already immense and growing commercial involvement in the world beyond its borders. Americans spend more than 10 billion minutes a year on international phone calls. Travel abroad is exploding. About 20% of the U.S. economy now depends on international trade. The Mexican peso's collapse has sullied NAFTA, and makes it harder for Washington to argue the instant benefits of free trade. But the trend toward international economic interdependence is inexorable, and those who participate—some 10 million Americans owe their jobs to exports—are a natural constituency for more robust U.S. leadership.

Americans have also demonstrated time and again that in the right circumstances, and with the right justification, they will respond to a call for foreign involvement. Robert Zoellick, Under Secretary of State in the Bush Administration, calls it "show-me internationalism." Voters, he says, "want each case demonstrated on its own terms why the U.S. should engage. They're not isolationists, but they need to be focused and led."

"That depends on the President above all else. Clinton's foreign-policy speeches are good. But there's no reason to think that's all there is to it."

The difficulty is that, except in extreme circumstances, the most potent mechanism to promote international order—armed force—is irrelevant to addressing the international issues Americans most worry about: instead the U.S. and its allies must look after problem countries' internal health: to dry up the poverty that spawns drug growers, boat people and terrorists; to encourage clean and responsive governments capable of addressing grievances. What kind of U.S. foreign policy can foster such conditions? The tools Washington has inherited from the cold war, designed to defend territory and prop up clients, are certainly unsuited to the task.

Take Mexico. Social upheaval there could flood the U.S. with immigrants. How can Washington attack ethnic hostility and economic inequality, or an unresponsive one-party political system, or pandemic official corruption? Aid programs and diplomatic conferences can't solve problems that big. Free markets and open societies can, but only in the very long run. Meanwhile their birth pangs are often destabilizing—ask the Chechens or Algerians, or for that matter the 45,000 Americans who claim that NAFTA has put them out of a job.

To deal with the problem the U.S. faces today, it must accept a lesson that runs against the isolationist grain: alliances are essential. A task as big as, say, aligning China or Russia toward free markets, responsive government and strategic self-restraint will take consistent diplomacy from countries working together for at least a generation. Building and managing an alliance to last that long will call for leadership more patient and forward thinking than the U.S. has commonly provided. But other countries are eager for it—though they may not always admit as much. "The U.S. is and should remain the chairman of the global community," says Seizaburo Sato, research director at Japan's Institute for International Policy Studies. "It should not be a dictator, more of an enlightened leader. No other country or countries can take that role."

But does the U.S. want that role, and if it does not, what are the consequences? A test case of supreme significance is at hand. If domestic opposition somehow prevents Clinton from sending the troops to Bosnia that he has promised, U.S. leadership in Europe will collapse, along with NATO itself, in all likelihood. That would gut an alliance that has lasted sturdily for almost half a century. Ideally, the U.S. would exert a stable, reliable force throughout the world that is something like gravity. If NATO breaks up over Bosnia, and the U.S. keeps retreating from leadership, international relations could be a little like earth with the gravity turned off. —With reporting by Sandra Burton/Hong Kong, Edward W. Desmon/Tokyo, Barry Hillenbrand/London and Elaine Shannon/Washington
MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

From: Julia Moffett
Subject: Outreach Activities (Updated 11/20)

Attached is an update on the outreach program. Activity continues to be comprised of:

1) Calling and meeting with opinion leaders to get them on board,

2) Soliciting support in the form of op-eds, testimony when appropriate, and calls to Congress,

3) Identifying an outside group to continue supportive activities to influence Congress.

PHONE CALLS

The President
Former President George Bush

NSC (Lake, Berger, Vershbow, Schifter)

Morton Abramowitz (Lake/Schifter; met with 11/2; follow-up 11/6)
Elliot Abrams (Schifter)
Ken Adelman (Schifter; one discussion; will need follow-up )
Fouad Ajami (Schifter)
Richard Allen (Schifter)
Mike Armacost, Brookings (Schifter)
James Baker (Lake; not supportive)
Zbigniew Brzezinski (Schifter/Lake; supportive)
Richard Burt (Schifter; one discussion; will need follow-up)
Frank Carlucci (Lake/Schifter; met with 11/1; will be supportive)
Hodding Carter (Lake/Berger; met with 11/2; will be supportive)
Richard Cheney (Lake)
William Crowe (Lake)
Patt Derian (Berger)
Lawrence Eagleburger (Schifter; will be supportive)
Frank Farenkopf (Berger)
Al From (Schifter)
Leslie Gelb (Lake)
Patrick Glynn, AEI (Schifter; very supportive)
Andrew Goodpaster (Vershbow)
Richard Haass (Lake)
Max Kampelman (Lake/Schifter; met with 11/2; follow-up 11/6; supportive)
Adrian Karatnycky-President, Freedom House (Schifter; supportive)
Jeane Kirkpatrick (Lake/Schifter; met with 11/2; follow-up 11/6)
Henry Kissinger (Lake)
Ron Lehman (Schifter; supportive)
Mike Mandelbaum (Lake)
George McGovern (Schifter)
Paul Nitze (Schifter; supportive)
Richard Perle (Lake/Schifter; needs follow-up; will be supportive)
Marty Peretz (Schifter)
Colin Powell (Lake)
Peter Rodman (Schifter; supportive)
Eugene Rostow (Schifter)
Brent Scowcroft (Schifter/Lake; supportive)
Henry Siegman, American Jewish Congress (Berger)
Stephen Solarz (Berger)
Helmut Sonnenfeldt (Schifter; supportive)
John Sweeney (Berger)
William Howard Taft (Lake/Schifter; met with 11/2; will be supportive)
Elie Weisel (Schifter)
Albert Wohlstetter (Schifter)
Paul Wolfowitz (Schifter; needs follow-up)
Warren Zimmerman (Schifter)
Elmo Zumwalt (Schifter; very supportive)

STATE (Christopher, Holbrooke, Shattuck)

James Baker (Christopher; not supportive)
Holly Burkhalter, Human Rights Watch (Shattuck)
Kerry Kennedy Cuomo (Shattuck)
Lawrence Eagleburger (Christopher; supportive)
Abe Foxman, ADL (Shattuck/Schifter)
Carl Gershman, National Endowment for Democracy (Shattuck/Schifter)
Betty Bao Lord, Freedom House (Shattuck)
Zainab Salbi, Women to Women in Bosnia (Shattuck)
George Shultz (Christopher; not supportive; having Abramowitz call again)
George Soros (Shattuck)
Julia Taft, International Rescue Committee (Shattuck)
Roger Winter, US Committee for Refugees, (Shattuck)
DEFENSE (Perry, Slocombe, White, Lodal, Warner)

George Bundy (Warner)
Richard Cheney (White)
John Galvin (Warner; No op-ed; Will talk to CEOs about support for policy.)
Andrew Goodpaster (Lodal; Considering op-ed; no commitment)
Al Haig (Lodal)
Karen Elliot House (Lodal)
Samuel P. Huntington (Warner)
Richard Perle (Slocombe; Currently opposing Administration, but coming around.
Pete Peterson (White)
Perry Smith-CNN (White)
Bernard Trainor-ABC (Warner)
Paul Wolfowitz (Slocombe)

USIA (Duffy, Kemble)

Geraldine Ferraro (Kemble)
Cornel West (Duffy)
Leslie Gelb (Duffy)
Jack Joyce (Kemble; Very supportive)
Morton Kondrake (Kemble; Lake is following-up)
Bill Moyers (Duffy)
General William Odom (Duffy)
Norman Podhoretz (Kemble; Skeptical about policy, but worries about our leadership credibility and strength of NATO if we don't do this.
Al Shanker (Kemble; Firmly opposed.)

USUN (Albright)

Mike Barnes (Very supportive; Preparing an op-ed)
Geraldine Ferraro (Very supportive)
Edmund Muskie (Very supportive)
John Whitehead (Very supportive; Will call GOP is asked; Schifter following-up)
Andrew Young (Very supportive)

ADDITIONAL CALLS THAT NEED TO BE MADE:

Fred Barnes
Bob Kagan
Authors on Bosnia
Leon Wieseltier
OP-EDS

- John Shattuck, The Washington Times
- Adrian Karatnycky, Submitted to The Washington Times eet Journal
- Elmo Zumwalt, Rejected by The New York Times; looking for other
- Mike Barnes, The Washington Post
  Status: Attempting to place
- Eagleburger/Scowcroft, The New York Times
  Status: Awaiting end of talks (Schifter)
- Brzezinski/Carlucci, The Wall Street Journal
  Status: Awaiting end of talks (Schifter)
- Albright, The Washington Post Outlook
  Appeared on Sunday, November 19
- Slocombe, The Hill
  Appeared on Tuesday, November 21
- Paul Nitze, TBD
  Status: Happy to write one if we want (Schifter)
- Patrick Glynn, AEI, TBD
  Status: Happy to write one if we want (Schifter/Moffett)
MEETINGS/BRIEFINGS

The President

- Congressional Leadership (Dole, Daschle, Gingrich, Gephardt)
  Date: Wednesday, November 1st

- Expanded Congressional Group of 40
  Date: Wednesday, November 8th

- Congressional Meeting
  Date: Thursday, November 9th (Tentative)

The Vice President

- Series of Congressional Meetings
  Date: In progress

Lake

- Met with Kissinger and Kirpatrick

- Met with Brent Scowcroft
  Date: Thursday, November 2nd

- Meet with Action Council for Peace in the Balkans Executive Committee
  Date: Thursday, November 2nd
  (Schifter will follow-up with the group on 11/6 and ask them to make phone calls to others; Lake should meet with them again around end of talks.)

- Heads of Think Tank Briefing
  Date: Friday, November 10th
  Participants: TBD—Approximately 20 (Tentative)

Christopher

- Series of Breakfast Meetings; List TBD
  Date: Week of November 6th

Talbott

- Series of Small Meetings with Influentials; List TBD
  Date: Week of November 6th
Shattuck

- Has had two meetings with human rights community; List being forwarded
  Date: Week of October 23rd

- Is scheduling additional briefings for human rights groups
  Date: Week of November 13th

White House

- Additional briefings for groups need to be identified, both by us and Public
  Liaison: Women, Ethnic, etc. (Meeting with Alexis on 11/6)

DOD

- Perry met with Haig, Scowcroft and Powell

- Perry and White hosted breakfast and dinner for retired military.

- White met with Richard Cheney
  Date: Monday, November 6th

- Think Tank Briefing by Vershbow, Lodal, Steinberg at NDU
  Date: November 9th

- Perry will host a breakfast for Retired Military
  Date: Friday, November 17th

- White will host a dinner for Retired Admirals and Generals
  Date: Monday, November 20th

Other

- Small dinners for influentials hosted by principals have been suggested.

- Co-hosted briefings for small groups of influentials are being hosted by
  CSIS and Senator Nunn.
November 9, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR DON BAER

From: Julia Moffett

Subject: Bosnia Time Line

Here is the initial time line we discussed for you to show Leon. It does not reflect the budget time line. Please remember three things:

• As of yesterday, the odds that the Dayton talks will conclude around the 15th, and that a signing will take place at the end of the month got worse. We need to get an update from Nancy to ensure that we are not worrying about this "internal train wreck" unnecessarily.

• Much of the activity reflected in the attached calendar is still notional. We need to get this into proposal form so that the NSC can request these events if necessary.

• As you know, I personally do not feel the events/POTUS time reflected in this calendar is enough to effectively make our case.
| November 8th | POTUS Congressional Meeting on Bosnia |
| November 9th | POTUS--Other |
| November 10th | POTUS-Down |
| November 11th | POTUS-Radio Address--Budget/Veterans' Day |
| November 12th | POTUS-Down |
| November 13th | POTUS-Bosnia Insert in DLC Speech |
| November 14th | 1) POTUS Meeting with Goldstone or Shattuck  
               2) POTUS Congressional Meeting/Calls |
| November 15th | 1) POTUS Congressional Meeting/Calls  
               2) POTUS--Address to the Nation |
| November 16th | POTUS--Initialing of Agreement in Dayton |

11/17 *The President will be in Japan during this time. It is crucial that a steady thru drumbeat of Administration activity continue during this period.*

11/22 *Congressional debate will be strong at this point. The President will have just made his first public case and then left the country. We need a plan to capitalize on the momentum of the initialing.* (Options: Holbrooke Speech at NPC; Blair House Dinner w/Albright, Holbrooke, and MoCs; Heavy State/NSC Media Program; Increased influentials activity)

| November 18th | POTUS-Radio Address (Bosnia would keep issue visible on trip) |
| November 23rd | POTUS-Thanksgiving (Event/call in conjunction with troops?) |
| November 24th | POTUS-Down |
| November 25th | POTUS-Radio Address |
| November 26th | POTUS-Down |
| November 27th | 1) CONGRESSIONAL VOTE (Tentative)  
               2) POTUS-White House/Prep for Trip (Some type of managed press availability at White House; Phone calls to NATO members to prepare for implementation.) |
| November 28 or 29 | POTUS-Peace Accord Signing--Paris or other |
# November 1995
## Presidential Calendar

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<td>Depart For Israel</td>
<td>White House Reception Ford's Theater</td>
<td>Election Day</td>
<td>DNC Coffee Briefing For Trotter Group</td>
<td>Natl. Conf. of Community Anti-Drug Coalition - Off Complex</td>
<td>Project XL, Rose Garden Videos</td>
<td>Day Off</td>
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<td>RON AP</td>
<td>DLC Conference CG Fundraiser: Boston</td>
<td>Down For Day RON DC</td>
<td>DNC Lunch, Off Complex Queen Beatrix 30 min Congressional Meeting, State Dining Room Hold 30 Minutes (SS)</td>
<td>Environmental Meeting Meeting With Arab-Americans VP Lunch Drop-By Cabinet Meeting DNC Dinner, Off Complex TBA Meeting With DLC Members</td>
<td>Pan Am 103 Memorial Dedication Tape Radio Address Hold Evening</td>
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<td>Day Off (ss)</td>
<td>Veteran's Day Veteran's Breakfast Live Radio Address Arlington National Cemetery Wreath Laying VA Hospital Conference Call WW II Memorial Dedication Evening Off (ss)</td>
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**Notes:**
- Possible Cong. Vote
- Possible Signing of Accord

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Printed on Tuesday, November 07, 1995 5:03 PM
ADDRESS TO THE NATION
ROLL-OUT
(As of 11/25; 6:30 pm)

Sunday

- Brinkley/Lake; Face/Perry; Meet/Holbrooke; CNN/Albright
- Post-show conference call to determine necessary follow-up

Monday

- Pre-speech talking points (Baer)

Morning Shows: CBS/McCurry
- Other/Steer towards Congressional Supporters/Lieberman, Richardson, Dodd, Bob Graham, Bonior, Kerrey, Kerry, Robb, Nunn, Hamilton, Hoyer, Leahy (Danvers/Vicki)

- VPOTUS to meet with: Network White House Correspondents (T)
  Call Network Anchors (T)
  Meet with Military Media Experts (T)
  (Julia/Peggy Wilhide)

- Christopher Columnist Roundtable (Will include people writing for Tuesday)
- Calls to Post-address commentators (Mary Ellen--list; Jill/Julia--assignment)
- Calls to lead editorial writers for Tuesday (Jill is assigning)
- Photo of POTUS meeting with Perry, et al and/or speech prep (McCurry/Baer)
- POTUS statement at Hall event; pictures with Bosnia families (Sens/Moffett/Naplan)
- Holbrooke speaks at Council on Foreign Relations, NYC (State)
- Excerpts from speech to Press Office before 4:00 pm (Baer/Blinken)
- Backgrounder for friendly radio talk show hosts (McHugh)
- Radio program: WH, State, DOD (McHugh)

- Monday Afternoon Shows: Vicki should pick from top team

- Monday Evening Shows: Jim Lehrer News Hour/Christopher
  Larry King Live/Christopher
  Nightline/Albright (T)
  Charlie Rose/TBD
  (Vicki)
Tuesday

- **Morning Shows:** VPOTUS/Christopher/Albright to be offered
  Steer towards Congressional Supporters
  Congressional "convert" to be identified
  (Vicki/Danvers)

- **Afternoon and Evening Programs:** Top Team should be offered (Vicki)

- **POTUS Congressional Meetings:** POTUS statement
  Members at Stakeout

- **POTUS Letter to Congress (T)**

- Holbrooke Meetings with Influentials

- **Public Liaison Briefings:** Ethnic Group Leaders (Holbrooke)
  Veterans/Military (White/Clark)
  (Marteau)

- Congressional Activity/One-minutes, etc (Danvers/Moffett)

- **Radio Program:** WH, State, DOD (McHugh)

- Admiral Crowe for European Reaction and meeting with White House
  reporters later in the week (Naplan/Soderberg)
I. President

II. 

III. 

IV. 

V. 

VI. 

VII. 

VIII. 

IX. 

X.
Bosnia

Q's & A's

11/25/95, 3:20 PM
NATIONAL

INTEREST
National Interest?

Q: What's the national interest served by placing American men and women in the line of fire in Bosnia?

A:

- As a result of American leadership, peace is now possible in Bosnia. Sustaining this peace is essential to prevent new atrocities and human suffering, and to ensure against the outbreak of a wider war in Europe.

- Were the conflict to continue and spread, the security of our closest European Allies will be threatened and the worst atrocities in Europe since World War II will continue unchecked.

- Peace in the heart of Europe is key U.S. strategic interest; we fought two World Wars and a Cold War to preserve it.

- If we break our commitment to help secure the peace, there will be no peace in Bosnia. U.S. leadership is at stake.

Background

Without a commitment to send U.S. troops to Bosnia to enforce a settlement, the current peace would almost certainly collapse, fighting would resume, and we would likely see more massacres, more concentration camps, and more refugees. Europe would once again be at risk of a wider war. U.S. leadership -- both diplomatic and military -- has been essential in bringing the parties as far as they have come towards peace. There is no alternative to continuing U.S. leadership in reaching, and then securing, that peace.

A strong U.S. role has been crucial to the success of the Bosnia peace process. As recently as last July, Bosnian Serb forces overran two UN-declared safe areas, murdering or expelling their inhabitants, and defying the international community. Since then, at the initiative of the United States, the situation has fundamentally changed - and for the better.

Presidents Izetbegovic, Milosevic, and Tudjman have made clear that the peace settlement is contingent upon implementation by NATO, and by U.S. troops in particular. Virtually all our allies have agreed to participate. This will not hold together if it does not include the United States. For almost 50 years, the NATO Alliance has been the anchor of American and European common security. If we do not do our part in a NATO mission, we weaken the Alliance and jeopardize American leadership in Europe.
Why not let the Europeans do this?

Q: Europe has a collective population of more than 370 million, a gross domestic product of $7.5 trillion, and more than two million standing troops. Can you explain why it would be impossible for our European allies to solve this European problem without our overwhelming assistance?

A:

• Only a NATO force, with its strength and unified command and control, can perform this mission. And there is no NATO without the United States.

• That said, two-thirds of the troops will be non-American, mostly Europeans.

• American leadership of the NATO peace force provides us the opportunity to advance our interests in a stable Europe.

• The fact is, without U.S. leadership, there would have been no peace agreement at Dayton. We have seen in the last few months that no European power has the strength or vision to replace us.

Background

U.S. leadership has been crucial to the success of the Bosnia peace process. At the London Conference last July, we convinced our allies to take firm measures, including the use of decisive air power, to protect the remaining safe areas. After the Bosnian Serbs attacked the Sarajevo marketplace, NATO launched a protracted air campaign to underscore that further violations would not be tolerated. In August, the President launched a fresh diplomatic initiative. After weeks of shuttle diplomacy, we have achieved agreement that Bosnia-Herzegovina will be preserved within its present borders, it will maintain a single international personality, and it will have federal structures, including a presidency, parliament, and constitutional court. Led by the United States every step of the way, proximity talks achieved a comprehensive peace settlement on November 21.

Without a commitment to send U.S. troops to Bosnia to enforce a settlement, the current peace agreement would almost certainly collapse, fighting would likely resume, and we would once again be at risk of a wider war that could spread beyond its current confines. U.S. leadership -- both diplomatic and military -- has been essential in bringing the parties as far as they have come towards peace. There is no alternative to continuing U.S. leadership in reaching, and then securing, that peace.
Arms Embargo: Why send troops if we've lifted the embargo?

Q: Why isn't lifting the arms embargo enough? Why do we have to deploy troops?

A:

• After four years of violence and dozens of broken agreements, none of the parties to the current agreement would trust that it would be implemented without a NATO force to guarantee compliance.

• The people of Bosnia need to have confidence in the enduring nature of peace. This is just as true in Bosnia as it was in places like Cambodia and El Salvador, where international forces achieved great success in helping negotiated agreements take hold.

• NATO is the only organization with the strength and credibility to do this job right.

• If all we did was lift the arms embargo, we would invite an arms race and a resumption of war.

• The Bosnians need a political settlement to their conflict, something only a NATO peace implementation force can make possible. A political settlement will allow the Bosnians to defend themselves and make their peace self-sustaining.
Q: Isn't it true that the people of the former Yugoslavia have been hating and killing each other for centuries, and that nothing we do can change it?

- This region does have a complex and violent history. But it's also true that the people of Bosnia have lived together peacefully for most of their history, and have proved that they can do so in the future.

- The vast majority of Bosnians have not been responsible for violence; most of them are simply victims of this terrible war. They have welcomed this agreement and they desperately want peace.

- It's true that some people say this conflict can't be solved. But a few years ago, the same was said about conflicts in the Middle East, South Africa, and Northern Ireland.
DAYTON

AGREEMENT
Q: Why does the Dayton Agreement deserve our support?

- The agreement is our best hope in four years of ending the worst atrocities Europe has seen since WWII and of preventing a wider, more terrible war.

- It settles the territorial issues over which the war was fought. Sarajevo will finally be reunified.

- It allows Bosnia to continue as a single, multi-ethnic state.

- It commits all the parties to the conflict to cooperate with the investigation and prosecution of war crimes. Indicted war criminals will be barred from office.

It provides for free elections, and full respect for human rights. It makes it possible for refugees to return to their homes and gives all Bosnians the right to move freely around the country.

- It makes possible a comprehensive program of economic reconstruction to help Bosnia rebuild.
Partition/Legitimation of ethnic cleansing

Q: Doesn't this agreement legitimize ethnic cleansing by determining boundaries based on the results of that activity?

A:

- After four years of ethnic cleansing, building a true multi-ethnic community in Bosnia will take an immense effort. But, that effort could not even begin if we had not achieved the current peace agreement.

- Bosnia has been preserved as a single state with a functioning structure for central government. The Dayton Agreement provides a framework for reintegrating the country through central government. It provides for the right of free movement of peoples throughout the country, the right of return for refugees, and the right to vote in one's former (or new) home.

- The Agreement commits parties to cooperate fully with War Crimes Tribunal.

- The Agreement commits parties to respect internationally recognized human rights and to allow human rights monitors unrestricted access.

Background

The Dayton accord does nothing to legitimize the practice of ethnic cleansing. On the contrary, the agreement contains specific commitments by all parties to adhere to internationally recognized human rights norms and to guarantee free movement of people. Return of refugees and displaced persons will be a key element in implementation of the peace.
What's the deal with this new central government?

Q: Isn't the central government provided for by the new Bosnian Constitution too weak to survive?

A:

- Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue as a single state, with a recognized international personality (for example, one seat at the UN and other international organizations).
- The parties have worked hard to design a central government that connects the two entities into a workable single state.
- The central government will have key responsibilities, including foreign policy, foreign trade, and monetary policy. Each party has an incentive to make the central government work as it will be the key to acceptance in the international community.
- Entities will begin negotiations in six months on assigning additional powers to the central government.
- This structure is similar to that found in a number of other nations where power is shared along ethnic lines.

Background

The central government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina will have authority over foreign policy, foreign trade, customs policy, immigration, monetary policy, international and inter-Entity law enforcement, communications, inter-Entity transportation, air traffic control, and financing of government operations and obligations. The parties at Dayton agreed that the central government may assume responsibility for other matters that are necessary to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia.

The Constitution provides the Federation and the Republika Srpska with considerable autonomy within this framework, but ensures that Bosnia will continue as a sovereign state within its present internationally recognized borders.
Why two armies?

Q: If it is one state, why will it have two armies?

A:

• Bosnia and Herzegovina is emerging from a catastrophic, four-year war. One of our goals is to ensure stability and lasting peace.

• This is a fact of life in Bosnia. There will, however, have to be a balance of forces within the nation.
Is Brcko arbitration just a punt of a tough issue down the road?

Q: The Dayton agreement appears to paper over differences among the parties over the status of Brcko ("BIRCH-ko") by subjecting the dispute to arbitration. Might not Brcko become a flash point for future conflict?

A:

• The status of the city of Brcko will be settled by binding arbitration within a year.

• The parties have agreed that the arbitrators' decision will be final and implemented without delay.

• The agreement to Bosnian demands to keep open the status of the traditionally Muslim town of Brcko was one of Milosevic's last concessions prior to his agreement to the peace accords.

Background

The parties agreed to the appointment of a third arbitrator by the International Court of Justice if the Federation and Republika Srpska arbitrators cannot reach agreement. A binding decision must be reached within one year; the disputed area will be administered as currently until that decision.
Elections

Q: When will elections be held and what happens if the elections are not free and fair? What if Bosnian Serbs boycott the election?

A:

- Elections for national and local offices will be held within 6-9 months.
- The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) will supervise the conduct of the elections.
- The OSCE will certify whether conditions for free and fair elections exist and that elections can proceed.
- Sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs will not even be suspended until free, democratic elections are held.
IFOR:

MISSION
Mission/Mission Creep?

Q: What is the NATO force's mission?

A:

- The NATO force (IFOR) will implement and enforce the military aspects of the peace agreement, not the civilian. It will enforce the cease-fire and ensure that the parties move their forces to behind agreed lines.

- IFOR's presence will provide a stable and secure environment for throughout the country so that rebuilding and other civilian tasks may occur. However, it will not be directly involved in routine police work or in reconstruction, humanitarian relief, political reform, or human rights efforts.

- IFOR will have the strength and authority to both implement the agreement and ensure its own security. Violations of the military aspects of the peace agreement will be met with swift and decisive force, if necessary.

- The NATO force will be commanded by an American general - with no shared authority with the United Nations or anyone else. The President will review and approve a detailed plan specifying what it should and should not do.

- The U.S. military believes IFOR can accomplish its tasks in about a year. The President will always have the ability to withdraw U.S. forces from Bosnia if and when he sees fit.

- This is not an open-ended mission. It will be of a definite, finite duration.

Background

The main objective of IFOR will be to ensure compliance with the military aspects of the peace plan. IFOR's first task will be to oversee the withdrawal of Federation and Bosnian Serb forces behind the agreed cease-fire line within 30 days. Once this is accomplished, IFOR will monitor a zone of separation along the internal boundaries between Federation and Bosnian Serb territory.

IFOR will not participate in the reconstruction, resettlement, humanitarian relief, political reform, and human rights monitoring efforts that will be undertaken -- these will fall to the OSCE and UN, and other international organizations.
Q: How will we avoid mission creep?
A:

- IFOR will go in with a precise, well-defined mission, approved by the President.
- There is to be a separate, comprehensive civilian infrastructure in place, responsible for all civilian aspects of peace implementation, including police functions.
- There will be a well-defined ext strategy. We believe that the military aspects of the peace agreement can be achieved in about a year.
Measures of success?

Q: How will we measure success? What do we expect Bosnia to look like when IFOR leaves?

A:

• Our goal is to provide the parties with an opportunity to achieve peace in Bosnia. Ultimately, it is up to the parties to implement the agreement -- we are not providing a guarantee.

• Our obligation through the NATO-led force is to create a safe and secure environment that will allow the peace to become self-sustaining. The key elements are ensuring that the parties withdraw behind their agreed lines and creating a stable balance of forces.

Background

We are not sending IFOR to keep the lid on a boiling cauldron or to maintain the status quo. Its will be of limited duration; we estimate it will last approximately one year. IFOR will monitor the cease-fire and separation of forces and ensure compliance with the military aspects of the peace agreement. In short, IFOR is necessary to assure all the parties to the peace agreement that its provisions will be scrupulously upheld by all sides.

We are confident that, when IFOR withdraws, conditions in Bosnia-Herzegovina will be substantially different and more stable than they are today. With the arms embargo lifted and a regional arms control regime in place, the Bosnian Muslims and Croats will achieve military parity with the Bosnian Serbs and be able to defend themselves when IFOR leaves. In addition, we expect the newly elected national government to have taken root and economic reconstruction to be well under way. IFOR will guarantee the military aspects of the peace accord while civilian entities carry out the other provisions of the peace agreement. In this way, all the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina can begin the tasks of reconciliation and building a prosperous and peaceful common future.
Are we "nation-building"?

Q: Haven't we learned that nation-building is a hopeless endeavor? Isn't that what we're trying to do again in Bosnia?

A:

• Our mission in Bosnia is to secure a negotiated peace, not to rebuild a society. The NATO force will not have responsibility for civilian tasks.

• All parties to the agreement have requested international assistance to enforce the accord and contribute to its success.

• Bosnia has been preserved as a single state with a functioning structure for central government.

• But the Bosnians themselves are ultimately responsible for translating the agreement into a civil society and a sustainable peace.

Background

The Dayton agreement and our commitment to help implement its provisions cannot be seen as an exercise in "nation-building." Our commitment is to secure the implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement that we brokered. In the course of that implementation, the international community will provide humanitarian and economic assistance for the physical reconstruction of Bosnia.

Bosnia's social and political reconstruction, however, will depend on the efforts and will of the parties themselves. We recognize that lasting peace cannot be achieved by imposed or artificial solutions. We propose to help secure an environment that will make it easier for the parties to follow through on their commitments and to cooperate to build a civil society.
Use of Force "What Ifs":
IFOR Rules of Engagement

Q: How will IFOR respond if it is threatened or attacked?

A:

- Field commanders will have the authority and the strength to
  defend the troops under their command and to enforce
  compliance with the peace agreement.

- U.S. troops will use whatever means necessary, including
  decisive force, to ensure their own security and freedom of
  movement.

- IFOR soldiers will operate under NATO Rules of Engagement.
  This is not a UN peacekeeping mission and the hands of the
  NATO troops will not be tied.
Use of Force "What Ifs":
Violence against civilians

Q: What will IFOR do if it witnesses violence against civilians?

A:

- IFOR is not a police force and does not have police functions. The agreement provides for a separate internationally-monitored police force.

- If, however, IFOR forces witness a gross violation of human rights they will intervene. If there is a gross violation occurring where IFOR is not present, the IFOR Commander has the authority to take action, as necessary.
Use of Force "What Ifs":
IFOR response to interference with humanitarian relief

Q: What will IFOR do if humanitarian efforts are blocked?

A:

• There will be a variety of procedures in place, involving civil authorities, the local police, and others, to address any such occurrences.

• The principal responsibility of seeing that humanitarian relief goes through does not lie with the military.

• If, however, IFOR forces witness a gross violation of human rights they will intervene. If there is a gross violation occurring where IFOR is not present, the IFOR Commander has the authority to take action, as necessary.

Background

IFOR has the authority to detain or disperse anyone obstructing its efforts. Given the duration of the conflict and the desire of all sides for peace, however, we anticipate few if any problems of this kind.
I FOR:

NATURE OF THE FORCE
Command and Control?

Q: Will U.S. forces be under UN or foreign command? What happens to UNPROFOR?

A:

- IFOR will be a NATO, not a UN, operation.
- All U.S. forces in Bosnia will serve under U.S. commanders.
- UNPROFOR will come to an end when IFOR deploys.
- Overall commander is U.S. Army General George Joulwan, who is both Supreme Allied Commander Europe (NATO's SACEUR) and U.S. European Commander (EUCOM).
- Overall IFOR field commander will be U.S. Navy Admiral Leighton "Snuffy" Smith who is Commander of Allied Forces Southern Europe (known in NATO parlance as CINCSOUTH).
- U.S. ground forces commander in Bosnia, who will be based in Tuzla: U.S. Army Major General Bill Nash of the First Armored Division.
- General Joulwan to respond to the President of the United States and NATO, not to anyone else.
Why U.S. ground troops?

Q: Why doesn't the United States just supply air and logistics support and let the Europeans supply troops? It's their back yard, after all.

A:

• That's not how NATO works. The American general who commands NATO's military forces counts on different countries for various types of troops, and plans accordingly.

• Two-thirds of IFOR will be non-American. But, as the leader of NATO and most powerful nation in the Alliance, our participation on the ground in IFOR is essential.

• If the United States does not supply ground troops, our Allies will not supply troops either and the parties will not implement the peace agreement.

Background

U.S. ground troops in IFOR are militarily necessary. Not to participate fully in a NATO military operation such as IFOR will call into doubt the U.S. leadership role in NATO and may even lead some to question why a U.S. general is NATO's military commander. The United States cannot lay claim to its credentials as a European power or be counted on as a trustworthy ally if it becomes an a la carte member of NATO's military structure.

Without U.S. participation on the ground, there is no IFOR. Without IFOR, the Dayton peace agreement will almost certainly unravel. If fighting resumes, we would once again be at risk of a wider war that could spread beyond its current confines. U.S. leadership -- both diplomatic and military -- has been essential in bringing the parties as far as they have come towards peace. There is no alternative to continuing U.S. leadership in reaching, and then securing, that peace.
Q: What will IFOR cost the average American taxpayer?

A:

- Estimated $1.5 billion in one year; approximately one-half of one percent of the U.S. annual defense budget.
- Renewed war would be far more costly to U.S. interests and damaging to U.S. leadership and credibility.
- Real issue is leadership, not financial costs.

Background

The Defense Department's best current estimate is that it will cost approximately $1.5 billion to deploy a U.S. division for one year. A more precise assessment of costs of U.S. participation in a NATO implementation force will depend upon the exact length of the operation, assumed to be approximately one year, and the number of American troops actually deployed on the ground, which is slated to be approximately 20,000.

The Administration will work closely with the Congress on funding U.S. participation in IFOR. The Department of Defense has taken no final decision on seeking a supplemental appropriation to meet funding requirements associated with a Bosnian peace agreement.
Casualties?

Q: How many Americans are you willing to see die in Bosnia?

A:

- The President is not sending our troops into a war. But this is, of course, not a risk-free mission. We have done everything possible to ensure the safety of our troops.

- The NATO force will be the best-trained, best-armed, and most-formidable force. It will be able to respond to any attack or provocation swiftly and decisively. Anyone who threatens IFOR would pay a heavy price.

- In addition, IFOR will not deploy unless the cease-fire holds and the peace agreement is formally signed by all parties.

- The President is sending American soldiers to Bosnia because our national interests are at stake; stopping the Bosnian conflict now carries far fewer risks for the United States than letting it spread.
Effect on U.S. readiness?

Q: What effect will participation in IFOR have on U.S. military readiness?

A:

- U.S. military commanders are taking all appropriate actions to minimize the effect of this operation on our overall readiness.

- U.S. participation in IFOR will not seriously affect the ability of our forces to fight and win a major regional conflict elsewhere.

- IF a second major regional conflict were to occur while we were still engaged in Bosnia, our commanders would have several options, including calling up Reserve units or redeployment of certain units from IFOR.
The Russians/Are we paying for them?

Q: How can you trust the Russians to go along with what NATO wants? And are we paying for them?

A:

• General Joulwan will have operational control over all Russian in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He will transmit orders through his Russian deputy.

• The Russians have agreed to these military arrangements.

• Secretary Perry has told Defense Minister Grachev that the United States will not pay for Russian forces.

Background

Democratic Russia has nothing to gain from undermining peace in the Balkans. Indeed, Russia has played a constructive role in the Contact Group, the five-nation group that has coordinated international efforts to end the Bosnian war. We expect Russia will play a similarly helpful role in implementing both civilian and military aspects of the peace agreement.
I FOR:

DEPLOYMENT
AND
WITHDRAWAL
Duration? Will IFOR be in Bosnia for years to come?

Q: Former UNPROFOR Commander (Canadian) General MacKenzie has said that the U.S. should be planning on staying in Bosnia for decades to come. Is he wrong?

A:

• Yes. IFOR's role is not an open-ended commitment.

• IFOR's mission is to give the people of Bosnia an opportunity to build a lasting peace in an atmosphere of confidence that the peace agreement will be adhered to by all sides.

• IFOR's presence, coupled with the lift of the arms embargo and the imposition of an arms control regime, will assure the balance of forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina so that the peace will become self-sustaining.

• Ultimately, lasting peace and successful reconstruction depends upon the people of Bosnia.

Background

IFOR's mission is limited, narrow, and focused. It will monitor the cease-fire, ensure the separation of previously warring parties along agreed lines, and create a secure atmosphere for civilian reconstruction efforts. The military believes this mission can be completed in approximately one year. Civilian reconstruction and development tasks will obviously last years. IFOR will not.
Why the rush to deploy IFOR?

Q: Why must IFOR deploy quickly? What's the big rush? Why not wait until winter is over?

A:

• The parties initialed an historic agreement in Dayton. We cannot risk any hesitation in our commitment at this critical point. Prompt deployment will give the parties the confidence they need to implement the agreement.

• The difficult implementation of the civilian aspects requires the rapid withdrawal of the military forces. IFOR is essential for that.

• From a military point of view, our troops are at peak readiness now. Prompt deployment also ensures the best protection of the force.

Background

After three years of war -- the bloodiest in Europe in the last 50 years -- the parties to the Bosnia conflict have finally heeded the urgings of the United States and the international community and made peace. They need IFOR to guarantee that the military aspects of the peace deal will be implemented and to provide the base of military security to allow reconstruction and elections to go ahead. NATO and the Pentagon are up to the task of getting IFOR up and running in Bosnia in mid-winter. Our soldiers have trained hard for this mission and can be counted on to do the job. There is simply no reason to delay deployment once a final peace deal is signed in Paris.
BALANCE
OF
POWER / FORCES
 Equip and Train?

Q: What is our policy regarding equipping and training the Federation military forces?

A:

• To ensure a lasting peace in the Balkans, it is essential to achieve stability and balance among the various forces in the region.

• It is the United States' preference that military stabilization be achieved, to the extent possible, through arms limitations and reductions, rather than by the introduction of large quantities of new arms into the region.
Federation stability

Q: How can we be certain that the Federation won't unravel now that the need for Bosnian-Croat battlefield cooperation has subsided?

A:

• One of the most significant achievements of Dayton was the Federation Accords. The November 10 Dayton accords bring the Federation and its institutions to life, providing for the political, economic and social integration of what will constitute one of Bosnia's two autonomous entities under the peace agreement.

• The accords defined the division of responsibilities between the Federation and the central government and transferred many functions to the Federation from the current government.

Background

The need for improved cooperation between the Bosnian Muslims and Croats is ongoing, and recognized by the parties themselves. The partial return of displaced persons within Federation territory, and Bosnian Foreign Minister Sacirbey's decision to resign to allow for a Croat to take his place, are positive examples of the strengthening of Muslim-Croat relations.
Arms Embargo: Status?

Q: What is the status of the arms embargo?

A:

• The UN Security Council approved on November 22 a graduated end to the arms embargo on all the states making up the former Yugoslavia.

• The full embargo will remain in place for 90 days after final signature of the Dayton peace agreement.

• During the next 90 days most of the embargo will be lifted, but the importation of heavy weapons will still be prohibited.

• The full embargo will be lifted after 180 days.
Arms Embargo: Why send troops if we've lifted the embargo?

Q: Why isn't lifting the arms embargo enough? Why do we have to deploy troops?

A:

• After four years of violence and dozens of broken agreements, none of the parties to the current agreement would trust that it would be implemented without a NATO force to guarantee compliance.

• The people of Bosnia need to have confidence in the enduring nature of peace. This is just as true in Bosnia as it was in places like Cambodia and El Salvador, where international forces achieved great success in helping negotiated agreements take hold.

• NATO is the only organization with the strength and credibility to do this job right.

• If all we did was lift the arms embargo, we would invite an arms race and a resumption of war.

• The Bosnians need a political settlement to their conflict, something only a NATO peace implementation force can make possible. A political settlement will allow the Bosnians to defend themselves and make their peace self-sustaining.
Q: How will disputes between the entities be resolved?
A:

• The Constitutional Court has a broad mandate to decide any dispute that arises between the Federation and the Serb Republic under the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

  -- For example, the court will have the power to decide whether an Entity's decision to establish a special parallel relationship with a neighboring state is consistent with the Constitution, including provisions concerning the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

  -- This also includes the power to judge whether any provision of an Entity's constitution or law is consistent with the Constitution.

• In addition, the Entities have agreed to resolve other disputes between them through binding arbitration, and to design an arbitration system to cover this contingency.

Background
See separate Q/A on Brcko.
CONGRESS
Advance Forces

Q: Why is the President sending advance ("enabling," in military jargon) forces to Bosnia before Congress can act? Won't this present Congress with a fait accompli?

A:

• It is militarily vital to send a small number of logistical troops to ensure that the main NATO force can deploy quickly and safely when it is called upon to do so.

• These "enabling troops" will be non-combat forces involved in command & control, communications, logistics, and other support functions.

• This is essential to preserve NATO's option to deploy if NATO chooses to do so.

• The main body of forces will not deploy until the peace agreement is signed, and the President approves the plan and consults with Congress.

Background

Sending advance forces to Bosnia, in the minimum possible numbers, is necessary to ensure that NATO forces will be able to deploy quickly if we so choose. In his November 13 letter to Speaker Gingrich, the President previewed the necessity of deploying limited numbers of NATO advance troops. The Administration will still ask Congress to express its support prior to the deployment of the main American contingent in IFOR.

The advance parties will consist of between 2,000 and 3,000 troops; they will go in roughly equal numbers to Croatia and Bosnia. Approximately one-third will be American, providing specialized skills that only we can provide. The enabling forces will be under NATO command and control and have the means and legal authority to defend themselves.
Congressional Support/What if Congress opposes?

Q: Will the President send troops even if Congress opposes?

A:

- We do not expect to encounter this situation.
- The President believes that when the members of Congress reviews the agreement and the military plans, they will give their support.

(IF PRESSED:

- That is a hypothetical situation.
- I am not going to get into a constitutional debate here about a purely hypothetical situation.)
Timing of debate

Q: Why has the Administration left so little time for Congress and the public to debate U.S. participation in IFOR?

A:

- The Administration began consulting Congress well before the Dayton talks began and has informed Congress in testimony, letters and briefings repeatedly over the past two years that U.S. troops would help implement a sustainable Bosnia peace agreement.

- IFOR will not deploy until after the formal signing of the peace agreement in Paris in mid-December. Between now and then, Congress will have ample time for a reasoned debate.
Congressional Approval

Q: What is the form of Congressional support that you will seek?

A:

- The President will be meeting with the Congressional leadership this week to discuss the timing, form and content of Congressional support.

(IF ASKED ABOUT PROCEEDING WITHOUT CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT:

- That is a hypothetical situation.
- I am not going to get into a constitutional debate here about a purely hypothetical situation.
- Like Desert Storm, however, the President believes it is important to have a reasoned debate, and congressional and public support.)
UN Approval

Q: Why will you seek UN approval, but not Congressional approval?

A:

• The NATO force will deploy to Bosnia at the request of the parties to the peace agreement.

• Securing UN approval will broaden international support and help ensure that other nations share the risks and costs of the mission.
SERBIA
AND THE
BOSNIAN SERBS
Guarantees of compliance?

Q: How can we be sure the Bosnian Serbs or the other parties to the Dayton peace deal will honor the agreement and respect the status of U.S. forces participating in IFOR?

A:

- Obviously, there is no absolute guarantee.
- The Bosnian Serbs agreed to provide Milosevic with the authority to negotiate on their behalf. They have now initialed, as well.
- There have been positive signs in recent days.
- Sanctions will not be suspended on the Bosnian Serbs until they withdraw. Sanctions will be reimposed on Serbia if the Bosnian Serbs do not carry out their commitments.
- Those who observed up close the use of NATO Tomahawk missiles in September would do well to think twice before violating the agreements.
Future of Karadzic and Mladic

Q: Do Karadzic and Mladic have to step down?

A:

- The United States intends to lead a NATO force to implement the military aspects of the peace agreement.

- Indicted war criminals, such as Karadzic and Mladic, are barred from elected or appointed office under the new constitution (which takes effect upon signature).

- Indeed, IFOR will have the authority to arrest war criminals they encounter (although it will not initiate searches).

- As the settlement is implemented, Karadzic and Mladic will move out of office.
Q: Milosevic has been widely credited with instigating the bloody break-up of Yugoslavia and the war in Bosnia. How can we trust such a man to deliver on his word?

A:

- No peace agreement could have been concluded without Milosevic's support.
- We intend to hold Milosevic and the other parties to their commitments in the Dayton accord. Sanctions could be reimposed if the IFOR commander finds that the Serbs are not meeting their commitments.
- American participation in IFOR and in civilian implementation efforts will help ensure that the parties keep their word.

Background

The heavy costs of Serbia's international isolation and dramatic reverses on the ground have convinced President Milosevic of the necessity of concluding a Bosnia peace agreement. All parties recognize that no peace agreement would have been possible without Milosevic's active participation in the process. The U.S.-led negotiations at Dayton yielded the best possible agreement acceptable to all.

That said, we now look to the Serbian President to uphold the commitments he made on his nation's behalf and on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs. Active American participation in the NATO implementation force (IFOR) and in civilian implementation efforts will help make certain that the parties honor the settlement, whatever their private ambitions.
Kosovo

Q: Didn't the U.S. promise to deal with Kosovo in the context of a Balkan peace settlement? What is the U.S./Contact Group going to do about the ongoing repression of ethnic Albanians by the Belgrade government?

A:

- We are determined to continue making progress toward an overall settlement in the Balkans, and Kosovo remains very high on our agenda
- Belgrade's desire to rejoin the international community provides strong incentives to bring about positive change in Kosovo
- The "outer wall" of sanctions -- blocking Serbia's membership in international institutions, access to international lending, full diplomatic relations, and other aspects of international acceptance -- remains in place
- The return of OSCE monitors to Kosovo will be a condition for Serbia's re-admittance to that organization
- Achieving this agreement in Bosnia now provides a foundation for pursuing other open, contentious points.

Background

Ending the war in Bosnia and achieving a settlement in Eastern Slavonia have been our highest priorities in the Balkans. Those efforts laid the necessary groundwork for addressing other problems in the region. As a result of the Dayton agreement, we are much closer to securing protection of human rights and respect for the aspirations of the ethnic Albanian majority in Kosovo.
Bosnian Serbs and IFOR

Q: What if the Bosnian Serbs do not go along with the Dayton peace agreement?

A:

• The Bosnian Serbs gave Serbian President Milosevic full authority to negotiate on their behalf and they are thus bound by the Dayton agreement.

• Two days after the Dayton talks closed, the Bosnian Serb leaders told Milosevic they would comply with the Dayton accord.

• Once IFOR deploys, it will have broad authority to ensure that all parties live up to their words and comply with the peace agreement.

• In any event, IFOR will not deploy without a serious commitment to peace by all the parties. This will have to be evident as we move towards the final signing of the peace accord in Paris.
WAR CRIMES

AND

HUMAN RIGHTS
War Criminals?

Q: What about war criminals? Is IFOR going to hunt down and arrest war criminals? Why or why not?

A:

- All parties have agreed and are obligated to comply with the War Crimes Tribunal. War criminals are barred by the Dayton agreements from holding appointed or elective office in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

- IFOR is empowered to arrest any indicted war criminals it encounters.

- But no, it will not mount specific missions to hunt them down.

- Justice Richard Goldstone, President of the Tribunal, praised and welcomed the peace agreement, saying its provisions were "entirely in keeping" with the mandate of the War Crimes Tribunal.

Background

The peace agreement obligates the parties to cooperate fully with the international investigation and prosecution of war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law. This obligation binds all parties, including Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serb Republic.

The agreement also stipulates that indicted war criminals who do not comply with the Tribunal's orders cannot run for or hold elected or appointed office in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

If Serbia or any other Serb authorities are found to be "failing significantly" to meet their obligations, sanctions will be reimposed unless the Security Council decides otherwise.

An "outer wall" of sanctions, which affects membership in international organizations and access to international financial institutions gives us another lever to address such issues as cooperation with the War Crimes Tribunal.

Finally, the UN Security Council resolutions sponsored by the United States make cooperation with the Tribunal a binding and enforceable obligation on all nations.
Human Rights

Q: How will the Human Rights situation be monitored?

A:

• The parties have agreed to establish a Human Rights Ombudsman to investigate complaints from citizens, and a Human Rights Chamber to adjudicate violations of human rights.

• The parties have invited the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and UN authorities to monitor closely the human rights situation throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This includes an invitation to establish local offices and observer and rapporteur missions.

• The parties have pledged that these organizations and persons will have unrestricted access to perform their tasks.

Background:

See Annex VI on Human Rights.
RECONSTRUCTION
Reconstruction

Q: What will Bosnian reconstruction cost?

A:

• The total cost is estimated to be $6 billion over the next three years.

• A coordination group has been formed under the leadership of the World Bank. We expect the EU to take the lead among the donor countries and the on-the-ground coordination.

• The Japanese and the Islamic countries have also indicated a willingness to make a significant contribution.

• We hope to contribute approximately $600 million over the next three years.

Background

This $600 million U.S. commitment is an unbudgeted item. A Congressional strategy for gaining Congressional support for the Bosnian program (for IFOR and for reconstruction) is being developed. Leaders of the Foreign Affairs agencies agree that it cannot be funded out of the 150 Function account.

We have not yet decided where to concentrate our assistance efforts. We anticipate that a major portion will have Balance of Payments applications and a portion will go towards technical assistance, particularly for Federation building.
Q: How will the United States' contribution be implemented?

A:

- USAID will be in the forefront of our Bosnian programs. However, other U.S. Government agencies, such as Treasury and TDA, will also be directly involved.

- Policy direction will come from Washington and from the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo.
Coordination of Reconstruction Assistance

Q: How will U.S. assistance in Bosnia be coordinated with our allies?

A:

• We expect agreement on a coordinating mechanism to come out of the December London Implementation Conference.

• Principal responsibility for coordination activities will be vested in a High Representative whom we expect to be a European. The U.S. representative will be a principal deputy.

• The U.S. assistance office in Sarajevo will have complete authority over how U.S. resources are allocated on the ground.
Limits on Reconstruction Assistance

Q: will American assistance be available to just the new Bosnian Federation, or to the Serb Republic as well?

A:

- We will implement current Congressional mandates which restrict the FY96 assistance programs to the Bosnian-Croat controlled regions. We will provide no assistance to Bosnian Serb areas without Congressional authority.