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FOR BOB BOORSTIN

Dear Bob:
Enclosed are a number of speeches which I delivered recently.

Sincerely,

Richard Schifter

Enclosures
In 1936 Franklin D. Roosevelt had been re-elected after a first term devoted almost exclusively to the resolution of the domestic problems posed by the Great Depression. This emphasis on domestic concerns was by no means unprecedented. In the 160 years of its existence as a nation the United States had played a major role on the international stage only once, from 1917 to 1920, and had quickly and decisively withdrawn. But as he surveyed the world scene in 1937, Roosevelt saw serious dangers on the horizon, which could ultimately affect the United States. Japan was seeking to expand its grip on China. Italy had completed its conquest of Ethiopia. And Nazi Germany had repudiated the Treaty of Versailles and was engaged in a major rearmament effort. Moreover, all three countries were ruled by oppressive governments, which did not recognize civil liberties.

The President decided to alert the nation to the problems which he saw and to send a signal that the United States was on the side of peace and democracy. He did so, significantly, in a speech delivered at the prototype of a domestic event, at ceremonies dedicating Chicago’s Outer Drive Bridge. As we look back today at our engagement in world affairs for more than half a century, we can appropriately identify Roosevelt’s “Quarantine-the-Aggressors” speech of October 1937 as the first step, following our withdrawal in 1920, to re-enter the world scene. As the speech stated the case for United States engagement in world affairs so well and is so highly relevant to the present, I shall quote it at some length.

Speaking of his recent trip across the country, Roosevelt said:

“[A]s I have seen with my own eyes, the prosperous farms, the thriving factories and the busy railroads, as I have seen the happiness and security and peace which covers our wide land, almost inevitably I have been compelled to contrast our peace with very different scenes being enacted in other parts of the world.”

He then spelled out his concerns:

“It is because the people of the United States under modern conditions must, for the sake of their own future, give thought to the rest of the world, that I, as the responsible head of the Nation, have chosen this great inland city ... to speak to you on a subject of definite national importance.
"The political situation in the world, which of late has been growing progressively worse, is such as to cause grave concern and anxiety to all the people and nations who wish to live in peace and amity with their neighbors... The high aspirations expressed in the Briand-Kellogg Peace Pact and the hopes for peace thus raised have of late given way to a haunting fear of calamity. [A] reign of terror and international lawlessness [characterized by] unjustified interference in the internal affairs of other nations or the invasion of alien territory in violation of treaties... has now reached a stage, where the very foundations of civilization are threatened. The landmarks and traditions which have marked the progress of civilization toward a condition of law, order and justice are being wiped away...

... [L]et no one imagine that America will escape, that America may expect mercy, that this Western Hemisphere will not be attacked and that it will continue tranquilly and peacefully to carry on the ethics and the arts of civilization.”

Almost 58 years have now passed since Franklin Delano Roosevelt delivered that speech. Since then Democrats and Republicans have divided their occupancy of the White House almost evenly: 30 years for the Democrats, 28 years for the Republicans. Throughout that period the United States has followed a foreign policy with a single major theme: to stave off the threat posed to the cause of democracy by aggressive totalitarian regimes. For most of this period the United States was the leader of what came to be known as the “Free World”.

The fact that both Democratic and Republican Administrations found themselves in agreement on the basic thrust of a policy of international engagement has not meant that such engagement has been non-controversial. The tendency to go it alone, to stay out of world affairs, which had been the prevailing tendency prior to and in 1937, has remained a powerful force in our country. Isolationism and the “Fortress America” concept have had strong support in the general public and in the Congress, although such support has waxed and waned as the years have passed. Furthermore, even among advocates of engagement, there have been differences of opinion over the application of the policy to given fact situations. The most profound difference arose over the question whether the policy to withstand the worldwide threat of Soviet totalitarianism required our military involvement in Vietnam.

The totalitarian threat to international peace and tranquillity posed first by the Nazi regime and then by the Soviets is now a matter of the past. With the lodestar by which we have oriented our foreign policy engagement ever since 1937, namely withstanding the threat emanating from a powerful totalitarian system, gone, it has been necessary for us to ask ourselves once again whether there is a need to remain engaged in world affairs and if so what the limits of our engagement should be.

Recognizing the profound change which the end of totalitarianism brought to international affairs, President Bush spoke in 1991 of a “New World Order.” It was indeed clear that the old order was gone. What was not clear was whether a new order, a reasonably predictable way of sorting out international affairs, had taken its place. To sort matters out, to deal systematically and thoughtfully with international affairs in the post-totalitarian era, has been the great foreign policy challenge to both the Bush and the Clinton Administrations. Although there have been differences in detail, the responses of both Administrations have, in fact, been similar.
That that is the case should not be a surprise. As has been said, countries have interests. It is clearly the obligation of an administration to identify these interests and seek to protect them. What makes the task for any U.S. Administration more complex than for the governments of many other countries is that the United States has national interests throughout the world and that the interests of the American people are broader than those of many other nations. In fact, it is the profound interest of so many Americans in helping solve problems wherever they arise, that makes it necessary to distinguish in our foreign policy between “national security interests” and “national humanitarian interests.”

I would define as a “national security interest” an interest which could significantly and directly affect in the reasonably foreseeable future the life or well-being of the people of the United States. The potential impact of developments in the field of national security interests could be adverse, such as a nuclear attack or an act of international terrorism or a cut-off of oil supplies, or positive, such as mutual arms reduction or the enhancement of international trade.

I would further describe as a “national humanitarian interest” the interest of many Americans in the life and well-being of residents of foreign lands. It describes our interest in helping the victims of natural disasters. And it describes our interest in assisting victims of man-made disasters, such as those in Somalia, Bosnia, or Rwanda. A case can be made for the proposition that improvements in the life and well-being of residents of foreign lands would ultimately benefit Americans as well, but where the benefit is remote and indirect, it is quite difficult to make that case convincingly.

There were those who contended that neither Hitler’s Germany nor Imperial Japan constituted a threat to the life and well-being of Americans. There were those who contended that the Soviet Union did not ever constitute such a threat or did not constitute a threat since the Sixties or Seventies. Similarly, there are those who do not see any national security threats today.

The Bush Administration was and the Clinton Administration is, of course, aware that the United States is not now faced by any threat equal to that posed by the potential of a Soviet massive nuclear attack. What both Administrations have recognized, however, is that, first, the mere existence of nuclear arsenals poses risks, which should be significantly reduced. That is why both Administrations have been committed to the START negotiations with Russia. Second, there are direct threats to the life and well-being of Americans which stem from countries which we have come to identify as “rogue states”, namely North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Sudan and Libya. None of the leaders of these countries have a mandate from their people. Each is directed by a leadership group which has imposed itself upon the country by force, rules by repression, constitutes a threat to its neighbors, has sponsored or continues to sponsor international terrorism, and, in most instances, seeks to develop weapons of mass destruction outside any regime of international control.

That the threat assessment of these countries is not the product of paranoia was made evident by the experience of the Bush Administration in its dealings with Iraq. Concerned over the danger posed by Iran to the non-radical states of the Middle East, both militarily and through the export
of its revolution, the United States tilted its policy in favor of Iraq once it appeared possible that Iran might win the war which Saddam Hussein had launched in 1980. This pro-Iraq tilt was continued after the war ended in 1988. Under the Bush Administration it was expanded into a systematic effort to woo Iraq, in the expectation that the country would become a constructive player in Middle East affairs. The repressive character of Saddam Hussein's regime, the massive punitive measures against Iraqi Kurds, including the August 1988 chemical warfare attack on Kurdish civilians, were to be put aside. As for Iraq's involvement in the development of a nuclear and chemical warfare capability and of a long-range delivery technology, it was hoped that a friendly Iraq would change its ways. Ambassador Glaspie, upon whom a great deal of blame was subsequently heaped, was not a Lone Ranger on issues relating to Iraq. She was carrying out U.S. policy.

I am making this point not to place blame on the Bush Administration but to point up the character of the rogue regimes: just as the Munich Agreement of 1938 did not bring "peace in our time," as Neville Chamberlain had hoped, so did the 1989/90 U.S. policy of outreach to Iraq fail to persuade Saddam Hussein to become the "constructive player" anticipated by the U.S. Government's experts on the Middle East.

What became clear on August 2, 1990, was that Saddam Hussein was prepared to reach for the jugular of the Western world: Middle Eastern oil. If he could take over Kuwait, what would stop him from taking over Saudi Arabia and the Gulf sheikdoms and then dictating economic terms to the West? The United States Government, with some encouragement from Prime Minister Thatcher, recognized the serious danger to the economies of the West, including the United States, posed by the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the threat to neighboring states. Making full use of the freedom of action, made possible by the end of the East-West contest, including effective resort to the UN Charter, the United States set about the task of organizing the use of force to undo the occupation of Kuwait.

The decision to use force was controversial. There were those who, fearful of the danger of substantial U.S. casualties, urged a resort to economic sanctions. But the Congress, by bipartisan action, admittedly with more Republican than Democratic support, ultimately did approve Desert Storm and the people of the United States clearly recognized that the operation was undertaken in the national security interest. If any question concerning Desert Storm has been seriously debated in its aftermath, it is whether it was wise to stop after 100 hours, whether the U.S. interest would not have been better served if the operation had continued a short while longer and had thus more sharply reduced Saddam Hussein's residual military capability and had increased the likelihood of his overthrow.

The experiences with Saddam Hussein and Desert Storm have demonstrated that there are national security interests which are threatened in the post-totalitarian world, which require protection through appropriate action, including military force, and which can be so protected. The notion that there are rogue states in the world and that they pose a threat to us, against which we have to adopt safeguards, is now generally accepted, as has been the fact that the five states mentioned above qualify for that appellation.
Finding appropriate ways of dealing with the rogue states does indeed pose the greatest challenge to our foreign policy today. Our concern has focused principally on the rogue states' capability to produce nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, combined with a long-range delivery system. In the case of Iraq we have through UN sanctions effectively neutralized such a capability. But we must make sure that these sanctions remain in place as long there is a danger that Iraq will continue or resume the production of weapons of mass destruction. Given the sentiment of some members of the UN Security Council, this will not be any easy task.

In the case of North Korea the U.S. Government in both the Bush and the Clinton Administrations has tried to come to grips with the problem of how to engage a government which is by far the most isolated and suspicious in the world. No one even suggested that the regime established by Kim II Sung could through accommodation and kindness be persuaded to play a constructive role. It was necessary to make it clear to North Korean policymakers that the United States would not ignore North Korean defiance of international nuclear nonproliferation norms. Through determined efforts and in consultation with our South Korean and Japanese allies, we negotiated an agreement which, if fully implemented, will arrest the development of a North Korean nuclear capability.

With Iraq's nuclear weapons development inhibited and North Korea's a matter on which we seek to implement an accord, Iran remains the rogue state whose nuclear weapons effort would continue to constitute a most serious problem to our national security interest. The threat posed by the Iranian effort in the development of a nuclear weapon and a long-range delivery system is joined by its involvement in international terrorism and, together with Sudan, in efforts to subvert the governments of Islamic countries in the Middle East and North Africa.

That international terrorism can strike directly at the United States was well illustrated by the bomb exploded at the World Trade Center. Tragic as the event was, having cost six lives, many injuries, and substantial property damage, the number of deaths could have been much higher, reaching into the thousands. The recent terror attack in the Tokyo subway and the subsequent discovery of privately-held large stores of chemicals from which nerve gas can be produced have demonstrated even more clearly the dangers to which all of us are exposed. We must indeed gird ourselves against similar attempts at terror attacks in the future.

Today, however, in addition to Israel, the principal victims of the international terror campaign are the Islamic countries whose governments terrorists have sought to subvert. Because of their claim of religiosity and their efforts at penetration of society in the name of Islam, terrorists from the Middle East have often been referred to as Islamic fundamentalists, suggesting that they subscribe to a more deeply rooted religious faith than do their co-religionists. That suggestion is vigorously disputed by many believing, practicing Muslims, who consider the radical anti-Western doctrine preached by the advocates of holy war and terrorism to be a distortion of their faith. We, of course, must continue to make it clear that we respect Islam as a religious faith and do indeed consider it vitally important that moderate Islamic governments not be replaced by radical militants.
There was a time when a great deal of the mischief-making in the world could be traced back to Moscow. Tehran’s focus is narrower, but in its area of special interest, trying to undo the Middle East peace process, its reach can be as deadly. Yet, of all the problems posed by Iran’s rogue regime and its hatred of the “Great Satan,” none is as serious as is the effort to develop a nuclear weapons capability. With that weapon in its possession and the continuing campaign to subvert its neighbors, its ability to destabilize the Middle East and North Africa would be considerable.

Thus, one of the most important challenges on our national security agenda is to find a way to deal with the multiple threats posed by the Iranian regime. It is in this context that our efforts at good cooperation with the world’s other major industrial nations take on special importance, for only through such cooperation can an effective policy of containment be put in place.

Ever since its entry into World War II, and particularly throughout the Cold War, United States engagement in world affairs has been based on close interaction with Western Europe and Canada. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which grew out of that close affinity, has not only been a military alliance created for the common defense but also, as anticipated by Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty, brought the member countries together into increasingly close political collaboration. The six largest NATO members, joined by Japan, have formed the Group of Seven, which seek closely to coordinate their economic policies. Eleven European NATO members, joined by four other European countries, now constitute the European Union. This interlocking network of one Asian, two North American, and eighteen European states constitutes the group of countries with which the United States most closely interacts in its efforts to protect those national security interests which we share with them.

Maintaining this network of relationships, both to assert our common strength and to share the economic burden of the effort to protect the common security interests, has been a critically important aspect of our international engagement. Here too, the United States Government has done well in the post-totalitarian years, both under President Bush and President Clinton. The relationships, forged initially under the military threat posed by the Soviet Union, have not only been preserved but agreements have been reached on ways of considering the further expansion of this network. Much has been made in the media of disagreements over Bosnia. Many of our journalists, or, perhaps, their editors, lacking a knowledge of recent history, are evidently unaware of the fact that in decades past more serious disagreements have arisen within NATO and have been overcome.

The end of Communist totalitarianism, followed by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, has opened many opportunities for the expansion of the zone of peace and democracy into the region which we once identified as the Soviet bloc. Six countries of Central and Eastern Europe have associated themselves with the European Union and most of them have indicated an interest in joining NATO. NATO, in turn, has created the partnership for peace and has initiated a process for consideration of the admission of new members of the Alliance, a highly significant step, with major long-range implications, taken during the Clinton years.

Quite understandably, the relationship between the United States and its NATO allies, on one hand, and Russia, on the other hand, remains in the foreground as we continue the review of our
principal national security interests in today's world. Although the Empire is gone, Russia remains a formidable power, the largest country in the world by area, fifth in size by population, in possession of nuclear weapons, with a significant, well-trained scientific establishment, and a population capable of hard work if properly motivated.

There are those foreign policy observers who, in light of the expansionist policies adopted by the Russian Empire in the 18th and 19th centuries and the heightened expansionism of the Soviet Union in the 20th century, are prepared to make a straight-line projection and predict that Russian will retain its expansionist drive into the 21st century. These observers urge that the United States proceed on the assumption that Russia will prove hostile to the democratic camp.

The U.S. Government has not subscribed to that prejudgment. The policy initiated by President Reagan in 1988, interrupted by President Bush in 1989, but resumed by him in 1990 and continued by President Clinton has been to reach out to leaders of the Soviet Union and later Russia who have sought to steer their country toward democracy and peaceful international relations. This policy is not based on a view that the success of Russia's democrats is a matter of certainty. It recognizes, however, that Russia is now for only the second time in its history under democratic rule (the first being the brief interlude between February and October 1917). The policy is also not tied to support of a particular personality for whom me might harbor a special liking. The responsibility of our government in the field of foreign affairs is to deal with the governments of other countries, not with personages of our choosing. In the case of Russia our principal contacts are the President, who happens to be Boris Yeltsin, and the Prime Minister, who happens to be Victor Chernomyrdin.

We are, quite understandably, greatly concerned over developments in Chechnya. It should be clear, though, that, as troublesome as the events in Chechnya are, they are not typical of developments throughout the vast lands that constitute the Russian Federation. While we must indeed continue to urge an end to the repressive measures to which the Russian military has resorted in Chechnya, we must also maintain the contacts that would help encourage Russia's further evolution toward democracy.

That is not to say that Russia's future will depend on what we may or may not do. That future is ultimately in the hands of the Russian people. It is only at the margins that the Western role can prove useful. Our contacts with Russia's democrats may strengthen their morale. Well-directed economic assistance may help improve economic conditions in Russia and thus make Russians more sympathetic to a political system which in their minds is associated with their country's downward spiral. These are the considerations which must continue to guide our policy toward Russia.

There is one other country which looms large on our foreign policy horizon. One-fifth of the people on this globe live in the People's Republic of China. Its sheer size, but also the capability of its people will cause China to play an increasingly important role worldwide as our global village shrinks. It is, therefore, particularly important that it become, in time, a member of the family of industrial democracies and join us in peaceful political and economic cooperation rather than siding with the world's troublemakers.
These considerations have undergirded U.S. policy toward China since President Nixon's opening with China, but more particularly since the ascension in China of Deng Xiaoping. We welcomed the measures taken by China to establish a market economy and were particularly pleased to see China make significant progress regarding respect for fundamental freedoms. Tiananmen Square came as a shock to all of us and we had to decide how to respond to that event. Both the Bush Administration and, ultimately, the Clinton Administration as well, decided that it was in our best interest to maintain close economic relations with China and, therefore, did not withdraw most-favored-nation status because of China's poor human rights record. There are those who assumed that the U.S. position was taken principally in response to the urgings of companies with business interests in China. While these economic considerations were undoubtedly given some weight, it was the need for us to remain involved with China for the sake of world peace and security that was the paramount reason for the continuation of China's MFN status.

There is another reason for our decision to continue MFN for China. There is a struggle under way in China between the hard-liners who espouse a combination of Leninism and Chinese nationalism and various shades of progressives who want to move their country toward a more open society than now exists. By remaining economically involved in China, we are undoubtedly encouraging the progressives. Through our continued involvement, we can also continue to press the human-rights cause, as we have effectively done. The hard-liners consider that aspect of our involvement a devious plot which they have dubbed "peaceful evolution," a term which to them has pejorative connotations. But the fact is that, whether or not we want it, contacts between the West and China will continue to open up its society, both economically and politically.

Regrettably, foreign policy often becomes entangled in partisan debate in which minor differences, such as those over Haiti, are highlighted while the fundamental principles on which there is broad agreement are minimized, thus weakening the image which we project abroad. It is now as important as it ever was that Senator Vandenberg's call for politics to stop at the water's edge be taken to heart.

And now let me end with a commercial. The effective conduct of our foreign policy is in our national interest. To carry it out we need adequate resources. Careful pruning has over the years reduced the amount of money allocated to our total foreign affairs effort. It is now about $21 billion for the entire International Affairs Function of the United States Government, including the operations of the State Department, foreign assistance, the operations of organizations like the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, our contributions to the United Nations and the international financial institutions, etc. That is about 1.3% of the national budget and about three tenths of one percent of our Gross Domestic Product. Yet, there has been talk of slashing this number substantially. The impact on our budget would be insignificant, but a substantial cut could greatly weaken our essential role in world affairs. Let us hope that wise heads will ultimately prevail.

At the outset, I want to extend my congratulations to the American Jewish Committee for the excellent statement on U.S. Leadership in International Affairs which you adopted yesterday. It could not have been said better. As a member of AJC I am proud that you are indeed continuing the agency’s long-standing tradition of constructive contributions to the national dialogue on matters of public concern.

As a matter of fact, the statement covers the issues that I wanted to cover so well and so succinctly that I wonder whether you really need to hear from me. But as Shula has put me on the program and there is a need to fill out the time, let me deliver my prepared remarks.

It was in the euphoria that enveloped us in the wake of the Gulf War that President Bush spoke glowingly of a “new world order.” Most of us understood that phrase to mean that we were entering an era of worldwide peace and tranquillity. Frank Fukayama had called it “the end of history.” — It hasn’t turned out that way.

That is not to say that the end of the Cold War has not had beneficial results. I still recall that when my oldest daughter enrolled in kindergarten in the Fifties, the PTA provided identification tags for all the children. These were to make it easier for them to be tracked down in case they had to be evacuated straight from school because of the imminence of a nuclear attack.

We no longer worry about a nuclear war with the Soviet Union or its successor states. But that does not mean we are home free. All of us are aware of some of the old problems which are with us still and are no longer overshadowed by the East-West conflict, as they once were. And then there are the new problems. We have to face them all.

Facing these problems does not necessarily mean that we have to act on all of them. As has so often been said, we are not the world’s policeman. There are developments on the international scene which, tragic as they are, do not affect our national interest. The American public is willing to support U.S. initiatives to help in such cases, but only if these initiatives are limited and clearly circumscribed. As Somalia has demonstrated, any activity beyond our borders which places the lives of American soldiers seriously at risk is ultimately likely to invite severe criticism unless it is clear that the national interest is at stake.

As we have discovered, the demise of the Soviet Union has not meant that threats to our national security no longer exist. There are states whose outlook is not pacific, states which
are a threat to their neighbors, states which seek to stir up trouble in other countries through subversion and also through terrorism. When these rogue states also seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction and to develop a capability to deliver these weapons with long-range missiles, we are dealing with a problem which can pose an extraordinarily serious threat to world peace and to our national security.

Furthermore, the terrible incident in Oklahoma City has brought home the fact that there exist in our own country groups and movements pledged to terrorism. Their message of hate and their mode of operation are indeed similar to that of groups and organizations in foreign lands. We are now focused on how to deal with domestic terrorism. But let us not forget that foreign groups are continuing their operations, from which the United States is not immune.

Weapons of mass destruction in the hands of rogue states and international terrorism thus constitute the principal foreign threats to our national security in this period of the “new world order.” There are those who will say that now that Communism has passed from the scene, let us not invent new dangers. My answer is that the Communist danger was real, not invented, and the dangers of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are equally real. We have seen evidence of the first and can only hope that we shall be spared witnessing proof of the second.

Our hope must, of course, be buttressed by a program of action. Exercising our position of world leadership, the United States Government has been working on solutions to the problems posed by North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Libya. It has not been an easy task. While we are prepared to lead and have indeed done so, it is necessary for us to enlist the full cooperation of the major industrial democracies as well as other key countries. We need their cooperation because concerted action by the leading industrial nations, particularly the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, is essential if economic measures of deterrence are to be effectively applied.

The challenge is to persuade some of our closest friends and allies to put their economic interests aside and act in a manner which is truly in the long-range interest of humankind. The challenge is even greater when our efforts at persuasion are directed at a country whose cooperative relationship with us is of fairly recent vintage.

Efforts at containment of the countries which pose a serious risk to world peace is not the only way of confronting the dangers which face us now. Another challenge posed by the “new world order” is to take full advantage of the opportunities which it has offered for the enlargement of the democratic space on this globe. Most of Europe and most of Latin America have now turned to democracy, but democratic institutions are still fragile in a good many countries. They need to be strengthened, in Europe, in Latin America, and wherever democracy has established itself elsewhere. The enlargement of democratic space worldwide helps contain the threats to international peace and security.
The important trends and activities in the field of foreign affairs which I have just described do not translate easily into television footage. What one sees on the evening network news or on CNN are the pictures which describe some current event deemed newsworthy by the producers of a particular program. It may be an event which has long-range significance or, and that is more often the case, it may soon turn out to be of momentary interest only. That is why it is so critically important that we take time out occasionally and ask ourselves: What is going on on the world scene today that will be important a year from now, three years from now? The answer, as I have suggested is proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism.

I spoke earlier of those commentators on world affairs who will tell us that we don’t need to invent new dangers to our national security, that with the Soviet Union gone we are safe. And then there are those of our fellow-citizens who simply do not think of foreign affairs. That is fine if they don’t hold jobs which places the security of our country in their hands. But when some Members of Congress act in a manner which reflects their belief that international affairs have no significant implications for the United States, we are in serious trouble.

What I have in mind is the drive to cut the resources on which our conduct of foreign affairs, our participation on the international scene, depend. To use the bureaucratic lingo of Washington, I am talking about the 150 Account. Included in the 150 Account are the funds for foreign assistance, but also for operating the State Department, the United States Information Agency, for agencies which help us develop foreign trade, such as the Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the Trade and Development Agency, for our contribution to the multilateral development banks, our contribution to the United Nations, our counter-narcotic and anti-terrorism effort, our non-proliferation and disarmament programs, etc. When you add it all up, we are dealing with 1.3% of the total national budget. As your statement of yesterday correctly pointed out, the foreign assistance portion of the 150 Account is less than 1% of the budget.

It is generally assumed that Americans think that we are spending too much money on foreign aid. Surveys of public opinion have revealed that that assumption is correct. But a recent analysis went further and inquired what percentage Americans think is actually spent on foreign assistance. The general belief was that is was about 15% of the budget. When Americans were asked how much they thought ought to be spent, the figure was around 5%. The actual foreign assistance share of the budget, less than 1%, is thus less than one-fifth of the percentage which Americans think should be allocated to foreign assistance.

Let me give you some other figures. In real terms our budget for next year asks for 20% less for foreign assistance than was spent ten years earlier. In terms of percentage of gross national product spent on foreign aid we rank, as your statement has pointed out, last among the twenty-five leading industrialized nations.
Nevertheless the talk on Capitol Hill is that the 150 Account will be substantially cut. Given the reductions in the Account which have been made in recent years, the figures now mentioned in the Congressional budget committees as possible further reductions could have a crippling effect on our ability to conduct foreign affairs.

The American Jewish Committee, reflecting the view of a substantial majority of the American Jewish community, is interested in and concerned with the broad implications of cuts in the foreign affairs account. Nevertheless the question which could understandably be asked is what would these cuts mean for assistance to Israel. The answer is that many of the budget cutters say that assistance to Israel and Egypt should be maintained at present levels. You can readily see what tensions such sharply different treatment will create among the various interests affected by the budget reductions. You will also ask yourself how long this hold-harmless provision for Israel and Egypt is likely to be maintained. That is why AIPAC is a part of the coalition of organizations seeking to maintain the foreign affairs account at its present level.

I began this talk by pointing out that the “new world order” of the post-Communist era presents us with serious dangers but also with significant opportunities. It is the task of those who carry out U.S. foreign policy to minimize the dangers and make full use of the opportunities. If we fail to do that, the dangers will undoubtedly become more serious and the opportunities will be lost. If our foreign policy effort is crippled, if the resources are not available to strengthen democracy worldwide and to ward off threats against the democratic camp, we might save money today but will pay a heavy price later. That is certainly the lesson that should have been learned from the United States withdrawal in 1920 from world affairs.

There are members of Congress of both parties who understand this lesson which history taught us, who are aware of the world beyond our borders and who recognize the role which the United States can play to advance the cause of peace and freedom. But there are also those who lack an understanding of history or of contemporary international affairs. They believe that the problems of the world have evaporated and the role of the Congress at this time is to balance the budget by the year 2002 while at the same time cutting taxes. If serious damage is done to our ability to conduct foreign affairs effectively, that is an outcome on which they simply are not prepared to focus.

To any of us, as individual taxpayers, the sums at issue in the discussion of our foreign affairs budget seem large. In the context of our budget and our gross domestic product, they are very small numbers. We all know that efforts to reduce the deficit significantly will have to focus on entitlements, that reductions in the 150 Account will be almost unnoticeable as far as our budgetary problems are concerned. But the damage which would be done to our position in world affairs would be great and would have a profound and long-lasting impact. In the long run it may require us to spend once again a great deal more on defense.
Our National Security Adviser, Tony Lake, recently delivered a speech which dealt with the same topic which I have addressed here. Let me end my remarks by quoting Tony Lake's words: "American leadership in the world is not a luxury: it is a necessity. The price is worth paying. It is the price of keeping the tide of history running our way."

The year, I believe, was 1922. The Reichskanzler was Josef Wirth of the Zentrumspartei. It was Wirth who uttered the prophetic words: “Der Feind steht rechts.”

All of Europe had to endure the horrors brought about by the extremist nationalism of which Wirth had warned. Thereafter we had to deal with the threat posed by Leninism, an extremism coming from another direction on the political spectrum. And now we are once again back to a setting in which the ideas of the Enlightenment, of human brotherhood and sisterhood, of democracy and respect for human rights, are challenged by nationalist extremism.

In countries in which democracy has become well established, we can be reasonably certain that these challenges will not be successful. It is the countries in which democracy is still fragile, such as those of Central and Eastern Europe, which are at risk.

We are, of course, well aware of the underlying problems in those countries. Their command economies, very much geared to the barter and managed trade arrangements of the Soviet bloc, have been seriously damaged by the collapse of the Soviet-sponsored trading system. The private sector has begun to develop, but in many places it has not as yet been possible to overcome the job deficit created by the cessation of Soviet-sponsored trade. Many factories are short of orders. Workers are either working part-time or not at all. Having grown up in a system in which jobs were found for all workers, even if that added to the inefficient operation of the economy, they find themselves out of work for the first time in their lives.

It is no wonder that these first-time unemployed look around for someone to blame. And it is also no wonder that they blame those who took charge after the changes of 1989. And so, in country after country of the former Warsaw Pact we see a return to office of parties rooted in the Communist era. Fortunately for the democratic cause most of these parties have undergone a genuine conversion and are now committed to reform. But they do not find the task of tackling the unemployment problem any easier than did their predecessors. That is why the danger exists that voters in these countries will turn away from political parties which are committed to economic and political reform and give their support to parties which offer populist/nationalist nostrums. It is worthy of note that parties espousing populism/nationalism won the two most recent national elections in the region: the election in Slovakia in September 1994 and the election in Bulgaria in December 1994.

Anyone familiar with German political history must be well aware of the close interrelationship between economic collapse and the rise of extremism. The NSDAP was
still a negligible political factor in the Reichstag election of 1928, when it obtained 12 seats. It jumped to 107 seats in 1930 and came in first in the Reichstag elections of 1932. It was the depression and mass unemployment that made the difference.

And so, as we look at the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, let us keep in mind that continued economic hardship and mass unemployment can bring extremists to power who will end the reform efforts and stir up nationalist fervor. The experience of the former Yugoslavia has once again vividly demonstrated what suffering can be brought about by political leaders who stir up inter-group hatred.

When questions as to borders in Central and Eastern Europe are now being raised we need to remind the parties that they are signatories to the Helsinki Final Act, under which they agreed to “regard as inviolable all one another’s frontiers.” Regarding countries with national minorities the Helsinki Final Act provides that the participating States “will respect the right of persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, [and] will afford them the full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” The rights thus assured are individual rights. Even the new Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, recently opened for signature, focuses principally on individual rights. To provide you with a flavor of the way in which so-called “group rights” are dealt with, let me read to you Article 14, Section 2:

“In areas inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities traditionally or in substantial numbers, if there is sufficient demand, the Parties shall endeavor to ensure, as far as possible and within the framework of their education systems, that persons belonging to those minorities have adequate opportunities for being taught the minority language or for receiving instruction in this language.”

As you can recognize from this extraordinarily cautious statement, there is no precise international standard which would define group rights. Questions as to minority languages and minority cultures will have to be worked out in domestic political dialogue in each country. It is important that the participants in this dialogue approach the task with a commitment to the search for mutually acceptable solutions.

What if they don’t? What if the voices of extremists drown out any reasonable dialogue? That is, of course, why serious problems can arise. It is to encourage the voices of reason that we need to continue to apply ourselves to the problems of Central and Eastern Europe, to encourage efforts at political and economic reform with the aim of ultimately integrating these states into the zone of peace which lies to their West, a zone of peace which is the realization of the promise of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Threats to international tranquility which stem from the preaching of group hatred are not limited to Central and Eastern Europe. Let me use this opportunity to refer briefly to a problem which has arisen elsewhere in the world and which has caused some differences
between Germany and the United States. It is the problem of commercial dealings with Iran.

I raised this issue with a group of German parliamentarians a few months ago and was taken aback when I got the condescending response from one interlocutor that the United States has not yet gotten over the trauma of the 1979 seizure of our Embassy and that we should try to do so. I am also told that our Iran policy is attributed to that ubiquitous "Jewish lobby." Let me simply say that our policy is based on intelligence information regarding Iran's efforts in developing a nuclear capability and its involvement in international terrorism. We believe that a majority of the people of Iran desire a policy of peace, resulting in improvement in their livelihood. The present regime, as an entity, not just a part of it, prevents Iran from realizing that goal. It is in the common interest of the peaceful members of the international community and, ultimately, of the people of Iran that this regime not be propped up by the democratic family of nations, against which its efforts are directed.
PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW: A STRATEGY FOR WORLD ORDER

Address of Richard Schifter, Special Assistant to the President and Counselor, National Security Council, to the National Security Law Training Institute, sponsored by the University of Virginia, in Washington, D.C., on June 8, 1995.

It was around the middle of March 1945 that the Army unit to which I belonged crossed the Rhine River south of the City of Mainz. I vividly recall our first rest stop east of the river. We were now at a distance from the devastated cities, in an area of beautiful rolling hills. The sun was shining. The snow was melting, allowing the green grass to be seen again. As I took in the magnificent view, I remember reflecting on the fact that the war in Europe was drawing to an end. Hitler’s Empire, the scourge of Europe in the preceding years, was about to collapse. We were all so full of hope for a world of peace and tranquility, for an end to strife and oppression.

I should really have known better. Over two years earlier, a few months before entering the Army, I had attended, at my college, a rally at which we had protested against Stalin’s execution of two prominent Social Democratic leaders from Poland. As I looked out at this peaceful landscape in Southwest Germany I was not aware that the basic problem with which our protest rally had dealt was now one of the issues pre-occupying President Roosevelt during these, the last weeks of his life: the issue of Poland. Within a month following the Yalta meeting it had become clear that Stalin had no intention to abide by the understanding reached there to allow Poland to evolve democratically.

It took a while before we fully realized that the era of peace for which we had hoped during World War II was not to arrive. By 1946 most of us understood that under Stalin’s leadership the Soviet Union would prevent the world from attaining the lofty goals set forth in the United Nations Charter. And until the accession of Gorbachev, Stalin’s successors did not do much better. That experience demonstrated once more that a government which was a threat to its own people would be a threat to its neighbors and, if powerful enough, a threat to world peace.

Through the decades of the Cold War, the democratic world remained on guard. But then, under Gorbachev, the Soviet Union began to reform itself, both internally and in its dealings with the outside that world. These changes encouraged President Bush in the spring of 1991, after our success in the Gulf War, to express hope for “a new world order.” For the second time in my life experience, we Americans were swept up by a feeling that a world truly at peace was at long last at hand.

As we look back at our hopes of just four years ago and compare them to today’s reality, the words which come to mind are what I believe was the instruction which Andrew Jackson sent to his artillery during the Battle of New Orleans: “Elevate them sights a little lower.”
The world is undoubtedly a safer place today than it was in the times when a nuclear exchange was viewed to be a real possibility. It is also a safer place for the cause of democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law than it was only ten years ago. But that cause is by no means safe throughout the world.

Now that we are no longer focused on one single set of opponents of democracy, the Communists, we can see the multitude of anti-democratic movements worldwide, independent of each other, but related to each other by a common ideology: extremist nationalism and deep hatred of people of different ethnicity or even of a different clan, of different race or religion, and if the movement is not in power, such hatred often combined with hatred of one's own government. President Clinton referred to these opponents of democracy the other day as the "forces of disintegration." There is a term which was once in common usage to describe the combination of authoritarianism, populism, extreme nationalism, and aggressive behavior toward neighboring countries. It is fascism.

For those of us who can still remember the customary usage of the term "fascist," Russia's Zhirinovsky or France's LePen or even Iraq's Saddam Hussein can easily be associated with that political outlook. We may have a more difficult time thinking of Iran's clerical regime as fascist, yet does it not have most of the attributes of fascism?

Thus, though democracy is now ascendant, the world continues to be beset by problems which emanate from those movements and countries which reject democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Once again we can note that these movements and countries disturb world peace. Although the bipolar world which we knew during the Cold War is now part of history, a new bipolarity has developed— the countries and the people committed to democracy and peaceful international relations on one hand, and the recrudescence of fascism on the other hand. It is clearly in our best interest to see the first of these two camps enlarged. Even if it is not realistic to think in terms of a truly global solution to the problem posed by the forces of disintegration, we can and should take advantage of every opportunity which arises to enlarge the democratic space, to widen the zones of peace.

One such zone is that which encompasses NATO. We have usually thought of the North Atlantic Treaty as a treaty for the defense of Western Europe against the threat of Soviet aggression. While the treaty did indeed preserve the peace against the threat from the outside, it also contributed greatly to the creation of a zone of peace within. Real meaning was given to Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which reads as follows:

"The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them."
The drafters of the North Atlantic Treaty had thus recognized, at the very outset, the link between peaceful international relations and free institutions. Forty-six years of history have shown the importance of that link.

As the link between freedom and peace is so clearly established, our efforts to help build institutions protective of freedom beyond our borders are not only reflections of our democratic missionary spirit but are also in our national security interest.

For a country in which democracy is solidly anchored will want to be part of the family of democratic nations, a friend of other democracies, including the United States. That is indeed one of the realities of today's world.

I have already referred to the NATO area as a zone of peace, which has effectively realized the objective of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty. It should, therefore, not be surprising that when we speak of enlargement of the democratic space, our thoughts turn, in the first instance, to NATO.

You may have read of the present discussion within NATO of the possibility of taking new members into the alliance, a discussion focused on countries of Central and Eastern Europe. There are those who ask what the external threat might be against which they should be protected. The response offered by the United States is that our principal immediate purpose would be to protect the internal gains registered during the last six years, to help these countries preserve the political and economic reforms which they have undertaken and thus integrate them more firmly into the zone of peace which has indeed been established under the NATO umbrella.

The political, economic, and moral bankruptcy of the Communist system brought democrats to power in the course of the last six years in most of the countries of what once was the Soviet bloc. But the economic hardships which these very countries have undergone since then, as the entire Soviet economic construct imploded, have created deep resentment. Demagogues with the neo-fascist leanings which I have described earlier can take advantage of such resentment. That is why it is so important for all of us in the West to help these countries over the present hump. Assistance rendered to them as they undertake economic and political reforms can be of critical importance.

We should keep history in mind in that regard. In the Nineteen Twenties the countries of the region sported the trappings of democracy. In the Thirties, however, under the impact of the depression, most of them turned into quasi-fascist authoritarian states. Democracy had not sunk its roots in the population deep enough and the institutions which protect democracy and to which supporters of democracy could appeal were simply not in place.

Let us keep in mind that the fateful decision taken by the United States in the 1920 Presidential election was to retreat into isolationism, to give up on President Wilson's idea of making the world safe for democracy. And let us remember the price which the world, the United States included, ultimately paid for that tragic error.
Is it in our power to prevent the history of the post-World War I period from repeating itself? Our experience since World War II suggests that it is. Not only did we put into place a military alliance which succeeded without fighting a war, but we also turned our former enemies into valuable allies.

I started this talk by reminiscing about my thoughts right after my unit crossed the Rhine in March 1945. I stayed in Germany for another three and a half years and saw how our military government thoughtfully and deliberately laid the foundation for the democracy which came into being in West Germany with the creation of the Federal Republic. Let me add that this is not the view merely of a biased American occupier. A few weeks ago I attended a lecture by two German scholars who made the very same point. We indeed helped create Germany’s new democracy out of the shambles left by Hitler. In today’s Germany the safeguards to protect the rights of the individual are well in place.

I cannot bear personal witness for our accomplishments along these same lines in Japan. But there, too, as we all know, our efforts at democracy building bore fruit.

To be sure, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are not defeated enemies under military occupation. But that circumstance makes it easier rather than more difficult for us to assist in efforts to lay a foundation for democracy. We have in fact, through the Support for East European Democracy Program been engaged in doing just that. Assistance has also been rendered by the European Union and the international financial institutions.

But the resources available for these efforts are only a tiny fraction of those devoted immediately after World War II to the restructuring of Germany and Japan. That is why it is important that those resources which are available are used as effectively as possible and why it is also important for Americans who can make a contribution to the democracy-building effort to make themselves available for that purpose.

It is also necessary, and I shall get to that point later, for the financial resources to be available to engage the many talented Americans who are prepared to help in this democracy-building effort. Let me, in this context, focus on one of the U.S. efforts which deserves special attention: the effort to introduce the rule of law and of an independent judiciary into countries in which the executive branch of government has heretofore been all-powerful.

A member of the legal profession and for many years a practicing attorney I was, of course, aware of the important role played by a legal system in undergirding democracy. Yet, only after becoming involved in international human rights work did I fully recognize how important the rule of law is for those who want to maintain freedom in a society which also wants to preserve civil order. An honest, fair, and independent judicial system is the sine qua non of a truly free society.
It follows that an important element in any effort on our part to enlarge the world's zone of peace is to assist in the creation and maintenance of the rule of law under a system which respects fundamental freedoms.

Let me explain what I have in mind: in the Soviet Union, after Stalin's death, the concept of "Socialist legality" was introduced. It meant, inter alia, that repressive measures which under Stalin were put into effect by administrative orders, were now carried out under law. For example, under Article 70 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" was a felony, usually punished with seven years in a labor camp followed by five years of internal exile in a remote corner of Siberia. What acts would constitute "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda?" In the case of Yuri Orlov, head of the Soviet Helsinki Watch Group, it was the dissemination of the truth about Soviet measures of repression.

Thus, when we speak of the rule of law we mean a constitutional and statutory framework which spells out the rights of the individual and a legal system which effectively protects these rights. We are also assuming a social order which seeks to protect the security of individual citizens against criminal behavior by others.

To return to the area of possible NATO enlargement: the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, once under Communist rule, are now democracies. Free and fair elections have taken place. There have been peaceful changes in governments in the wake of these elections. But if these democratic governments do have an Achilles' Heel, it is their judicial system and the failure of a good many persons in public life to have a full understanding of the rules of a democratic legal order.

In one of these countries policemen are now showing up in the homes of persons who last year signed nominating petitions of an opposition party to check the validity of the signatures, even though the election was held last fall and no one has challenged the vote total obtained by that party. In another country I remember reading an indictment against persons arrested for political reasons and telling the President of that country that that document could have been written in Moscow during Stalin's purge trials. I could go on. A great deal of work still has to be done to get average citizens to understand what their rights are and to create the institutions which would protect and vindicate these rights.

I have mentioned our interest in Central and Eastern Europe because of the relevance of that area to the enlargement of NATO. But the democratic evolution of other regions is of similar interest to us. We wish to see democracy strengthened in the successor states of the former Soviet Union, all members of the Partnership for Peace. We wish to see it strengthened throughout the Western Hemisphere, where weak legal systems remain the principal deficiency following the rapid growth of democracy during the last fifteen years. And there are opportunities for technical legal assistance in Africa and Asia as well. Benin and Zambia are recent arrivals in the democratic fold. So are Mongolia and South Korea.
To sum up at this point: although there is thus no single overpowering threat to our national security at this time, long-term dangers persist, but so do opportunities to combat these dangers through the peaceful enlargement of the democratic space worldwide. Such peaceful enlargement can significantly reduce the investment we might have to make in our military strength if that enlargement does not take place. It would, therefore, be a sound investment.

It is for that reason that the action taken by the Congress on the Foreign Affairs Account of the Budget Resolution is most unfortunate. The goal, as we know, is to balance the budget by the year 2002. And there are a great many voters out there who think that spending on foreign assistance is a major factor in creating our deficit. A recent poll revealed that many members of the public believe that foreign assistance spending is about 15% of the Federal budget. But they are wrong! This year the Foreign Affairs Account, including operations of the State Department, came to 1.3% of the budget request. Not only is that allocation scheduled to be cut by at least 13%, but given the various items within the Foreign Affairs Account which are required to be held harmless, the impact on the democracy building efforts is going to be severe.

I want to emphasize to you that these remarks are not designed to be a partisan appeal. Many of the democracy building programs originated during the Reagan and Bush Administrations and have traditionally had the support of Democrats and Republicans alike. They still, I am certain, have such bipartisan support in theory. The problem seems to arise when we get to the practical question of backing that theory with dollars.

But that support is at present insufficient to sustain them against the isolationist onslaught. Quite a number of the newcomers to the Congress appear to be of the view that with the end of the Soviet Union we can retreat to our shores and sharply reduce our involvement in the rest of the world. They feel driven to balance the budget while cutting taxes and to accommodate the assumed desires of a public misinformed about the size of our foreign assistance commitment. So driven, a good many Members of Congress appear to have been swept along by the effort to cut back on the resources available for the constructive conduct of foreign affairs. Will we be able to continue our efforts to promote democracy, human rights, and the rule of law? Perhaps only at a sharply reduced level. Perhaps not at all. It is truly a matter of being penny-wise and pound-foolish.
THE DANGER OF ISOLATIONISM

Remarks by Richard Schifter, Assistant to the President and Counselor, National Security Council, at the Annual Meeting of the Jewish Community Relations Council of Cincinnati, June 14, 1995, in Cincinnati, Ohio

Let me start with a few autobiographical remarks. From 1981 onward I represented the United States at six consecutive annual sessions of the United Nations Human Rights Commission. I then went off to serve as Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights. You would think that as we worked in the same field and in the same government, my successors as representatives on the UN Commission and I would have worked closely together. As often happens in government, bureaucratic rivalry intervened and my two immediate successors and I did not see much of each other.

It must have been in early 1991 that I got word that the job of UN Representative had turned over once again and that a man by the name of Kenneth Blackwell would now represent the United States on the Commission. I wondered whether my problems with the incumbents in that office would continue.

I don't remember whether I called Ken or he called me, but one day this big man showed up in my office and introduced himself as the newest U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Human Rights Commission. We started talking and as far as I was concerned that new kid on the block was a breath of fresh air. Our approach to our jobs was the same: to serve the United States and the cause of human rights and not let petty bureaucratic problems get in the way. By the time we said good-bye to each other at the conclusion of that first meeting, we knew we were going to be a team. And that's what we came to be. What may be unique about us is that we were a bipartisan team which served both the Bush and Clinton Administrations.

It is indeed fitting for the Jewish Community Relations Council to have chosen the Blackwells for an award. As far as Rosa Blackwell is concerned, I must confess that I know of her great accomplishments in the field of education only second-hand, though from a very reliable authority, namely her husband. And I can vouch first-hand for Ken. He was a great colleague, thoughtful, conscientious, highly competent, reliable, and sincerely dedicated to the public good. For me it was truly a pleasure to work with him as I am sure it is for those who work with him now. He has stood up for the principles which are cherished by Jewish Community Relations Councils throughout the country.

The tasks in which Ken and I engaged in a bipartisan manner were an integral part of the effort of the United States to advance the cause of democracy and human rights worldwide. The United States motive for engaging in this effort is to a significant part altruistic. The democratic creed is America's secular religion. We believe in it profoundly and our
missionary spirit causes us to support it wherever we can. As for the protection of human rights: our country's answer to the biblical question "Am I my brother's keeper?" is an emphatic "yes."

I said that our motive to engage in the democracy and human rights cause is to a significant part altruistic. But there is another side to it as well. Ken and I can explain in detail, on the basis of what we have seen and heard in our jobs, that although the world is a less dangerous place than it was, let's say, ten years ago, dangers are still lurking out there, threats to our national security with which we must deal. We are a strong power but we have benefited and can continue to benefit from having friends on the world scene. And democracies respectful of human rights can be depended upon to associate themselves with fellow democracies in their advocacy of international peace and tranquillity. It is in our interest to enlarge the democratic space worldwide.

The proposition that I have just stated, so obvious as recently as one year ago, is now under challenge in Washington. The wave of isolationism that has swept the Congress threatens to drown programs designed to enlarge the world's democratic space and may wreak havoc with the effective management of foreign policy.

I have been around long enough to remember the isolationism of the Nineteen Thirties. The Congressional leaders of the isolationist drive of that era, men such as Senators Borah of Idaho, Wheeler of Montana, Nye of North Dakota were well informed about events beyond our borders. They knew what was happening in Europe and the Far East. It was their opinion that whatever Hitler or the Japanese military might do, we should stay out of the fray.

The isolationist phenomenon of 1995 is quite different. Many of the new arrivals in Washington are not fully aware of the challenges we must continue to meet in the field of foreign affairs. They believe that now that the Soviet Union no longer exists, there are no problems beyond our borders to which we need to pay serious attention. The principal need, they say, is for us to balance the budget by the year 2002, while providing a tax cut. As many citizens assume that foreign aid is a large chunk of our budget, the foreign affairs account is one of the items which is scheduled for a substantial reduction.

We need to compare, in that context, the sharp difference between perception and reality. A recent public opinion poll revealed that it is the prevailing perception that we spend about 15% of the federal budget on foreign aid. In fact, the President's budget request for the fiscal year 1996 allocated about 1.3% of the total to all foreign affairs costs, including operations of the State Department and all our embassies, support of programs to increase our foreign trade, such as those operated by the Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and the Trade Development Agency, contributions to the United Nations and the international financial institutions, as well as bilateral foreign assistance. The latter is less than 1% of the total budget.
The reductions in foreign affair spending which are now under active consideration exceed 13%. That is, standing by itself, a significant amount. When we consider that some items simply cannot be cut much further, such as those earmarked for State Department operations, and other items are covered by a mandate from Congress not to cut, the discretionary programs are the ones which will take the heaviest hits. Among them are the programs designed for the very purposes to which Ken and I devoted a great deal of attention, democracy building and instruction on the rule of law for the protection of human rights. Our effort to strengthen democracy in Central and Eastern Europe is to be cut by 38%. Our contributions to multilateral development banks, which give us an important say in determining the policies of these banks, will be slashed at least 42%. Payments to international organizations, such as the UN, where we have been in arrears for years, will be reduced 27%. And so on.

What is a relatively small amount in the context of the total U.S. budget is a large sum in the field of foreign affairs. As the real budget busters are the entitlement programs, the reduction in the foreign affairs account will make only a minute contribution to the effort to balance our budget. On the other hand, the efforts in which we are engaged to make the world a safer place through peaceful engagement will be weakened because these cuts will have a major adverse effect on our position on the international scene.

The point which I made earlier is that those who believe that we need not be engaged abroad are mistaken. The very reason why we continue to maintain a significant military capability in this post-Cold War period — and on the need to do so we do seem to have a bipartisan consensus — is that we must be prepared to deal with threats to our national security. But we want our military to serve in the role which it played vis-à-vis the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War, to act as a deterrent. At the same time we want to use diplomacy and all the activities associated with diplomatic efforts, as we did during the Cold War, to prevent a hot war.

There is another point to keep in mind. Foreign affairs are a complex business. A great deal of thought must be given to every important step we take. We must reflect in each case what all the possible consequences might be, given the impact which the United States has on world affairs. Experience and knowledge are required to make sure that the right calculations are made. That is the reason why foreign policy should not be micromanaged by the Congress in an off-hand manner, without full consideration of broad policy objectives. These policy objectives must at all times remain in focus and must not be subordinated to efforts to make some political point.

The principal threat which we and the rest of the world now face is the threat posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In the hands of the leaders of rogue states such weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, would constitute an extraordinarily serious danger. They would be, in the first instance, a danger to the neighbors of these rogue states. But let us keep in mind where, geographically, these rogue states are located and let us further remember what it is that, literally, makes the wheels of our economy turn: oil. Then let us reflect on the proximity of the rogue states to the world’s principal oil reserves.
These reflections should make it clear for us how much there is at stake for us on the international scene.

Let us consider the case of Iraq in that light. We know of the set-back suffered by Saddam Hussein when Israel bombed the reactor at Osirak in 1981. But as we discovered during the Gulf War, Saddam was at it again ten years later, trying to develop a nuclear capability. It was the action of our military which forced the Iraqis back out of Kuwait, but thereafter we have been able to press Iraq to end its exploits in the field of weapons of mass destruction through sanctions imposed by the United Nations. It is easy just merely to carp about the work done by the United Nations, and Ken and I certainly could cite chapter and verse to support such criticism. On the other hand, there are actions in which the United Nations can accomplish a great deal that is useful. In its dealings with Iraq, before, during, and since Desert Storm, the UN has done much good. The concrete accomplishment of maintaining economic sanctions which severely retard Iraq's ability to develop weapons of mass destruction demonstrate the value of our efforts to maintain our influence in the UN, an influence which is today far greater than it was during the Cold War. On that important issue, this Administration has been able to use that influence at the UN most effectively.

Another country whose nuclear program is of concern to us is North Korea. Here the challenge is to maintain the current freeze on North Korea's dangerous nuclear facilities, see to their dismantlement, and to bring North Korea into full compliance with international nonproliferation norms.

During the last few days we have made significant progress in our efforts with North Korea. But let us keep in mind that when we press North Korea on the nuclear issue, it is important to enlist China's cooperation. Yet along comes the Congress with the extraordinary suggestion that we accredit an Ambassador to Tibet, which China considers to be part of its territory. Of all the issues on which China might be neuralgic, that one certainly is high on the list. Accrediting an Ambassador to Tibet would not only do the Tibetans absolutely no good. It would also be a serious mistake, given our need for the Chinese to play a constructive role regarding North Korea and the proliferation issue in general.

It was Senator Arthur Vandenberg, Republican of Michigan, who in the period immediately following World War II urged that we see to it that politics stop at the water's edge. And he saw to it that it did. At the very same time that President Truman and the 80th Congress were engaged in bitter battles on domestic issues, some of the most important foreign policy measures of the post-World War II era, such as the Greek-Turkish aid program and the Marshall Plan, were approved through bipartisan action. And in the years immediately following, a bipartisan consensus made it possible for us to take the lead in creating NATO and embark on other programs designed to enhance our security through peaceful, non-military means. The years 1989-1991 proved that we had made an extraordinarily sound investment. The entire Communist system collapsed without an armed conflict between NATO and the Soviet bloc. NATO had served as a
deterrent, but the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe and Radio Free Liberty had carried our message. And our assistance efforts had turned one-time enemies and economically exhausted friends into strong partners.

To use President Bush's famous phrase, we are indeed facing a "new world order." But it is not one that is problem-free. All of us need to be fully aware of the major problems we continue to confront and we need to develop a bipartisan consensus, free of political grandstanding, to deal with them. The resources to support our foreign policy which the President has requested, 1.3% of the budget or less than a third of one per cent of our GDP, are modest. To cut them back is indeed penny-wise and pound-foolish.
In 1936 Franklin D. Roosevelt had been re-elected after a first term devoted almost exclusively to the resolution of the domestic problems posed by the Great Depression. This emphasis on domestic concerns was by no means unprecedented. In the 160 years of its existence as a nation the United States had played a major role on the international stage only once, from 1917 to 1920, and had quickly and decisively withdrawn. But as he surveyed the world scene in 1937, Roosevelt saw serious dangers on the horizon, which could ultimately affect the United States. Japan was seeking to expand its grip on China. Italy had completed its conquest of Ethiopia. And Nazi Germany had repudiated the Treaty of Versailles and was engaged in a major rearmament effort. Moreover, all three countries were ruled by oppressive governments, which did not recognize civil liberties.

The President decided to alert the nation to the problems which he saw and to send a signal that the United States was on the side of peace and democracy. He did so, significantly, in a speech delivered at the prototype of a domestic event, at ceremonies dedicating Chicago’s Outer Drive Bridge. As we look back today at our engagement in world affairs for more than half a century, we can appropriately identify Roosevelt’s “Quarantine-the-Aggressors” speech of October 1937 as the first step, following our withdrawal in 1920, to re-enter the world scene. As the speech stated the case for United States engagement in world affairs so well and is so highly relevant to the present, I shall quote it at some length.

Speaking of his recent trip across the country, Roosevelt said:

"[A]s I have seen with my own eyes, the prosperous farms, the thriving factories and the busy railroads, as I have seen the happiness and security and peace which covers our wide land, almost inevitably I have been compelled to contrast our peace with very different scenes being enacted in other parts of the world."

He then spelled out his concerns:

"It is because the people of the United States under modern conditions must, for the sake of their own future, give thought to the rest of the world, that I, as the responsible head of the Nation, have chosen this great inland city ... to speak to you on a subject of definite national importance."
"The political situation in the world, which of late has been growing progressively worse, is such as to cause grave concern and anxiety to all the people and nations who wish to live in peace and amity with their neighbors. ... The high aspirations expressed in the Briand-Kellogg Peace Pact and the hopes for peace thus raised have of late given way to a haunting fear of calamity. [A] reign of terror and international lawlessness [characterized by] unjustified interference in the internal affairs of other nations or the invasion of alien territory in violation of treaties ... has now reached a stage, where the very foundations of civilization are threatened. The landmarks and traditions which have marked the progress of civilization toward a condition of law, order and justice are being wiped away. ... [L]et no one imagine that America will escape, that America may expect mercy, that this Western Hemisphere will not be attacked and that it will continue tranquilly and peacefully to carry on the ethics and the arts of civilization."

Almost 58 years have now passed since Franklin Delano Roosevelt delivered that speech. Since then Democrats and Republicans have divided their occupancy of the White House almost evenly: 30 years for the Democrats, 28 years for the Republicans. Throughout that period the United States has followed a foreign policy with a single major theme: to stave off the threat posed to the cause of democracy by aggressive totalitarian regimes. For most of this period the United States was the leader of what came to be known as the "Free World."

The fact that both Democratic and Republican Administrations found themselves in agreement on the basic thrust of a policy of international engagement has not meant that such engagement has been non-controversial. The tendency to go it alone, to stay out of world affairs, which had been the prevailing tendency prior to and in 1937, has remained a powerful force in our country. Isolationism and the "Fortress America" concept have had strong support in the general public and in the Congress, although such support has waxed and waned as the years have passed. Furthermore, even among advocates of engagement, there have been differences of opinion over the application of the policy to given fact situations. The most profound difference arose over the question whether the policy to withstand the worldwide threat of Soviet totalitarianism required our military involvement in Vietnam.

The totalitarian threat to international peace and tranquillity posed first by the Nazi regime and then by the Soviets is now a matter of the past. With the lodestar by which we have oriented our foreign policy engagement ever since 1937, namely withstanding the threat emanating from a powerful totalitarian system, gone, it has been necessary for us to ask ourselves once again whether there is a need to remain engaged in world affairs and if so what the limits of our engagement should be.

Recognizing the profound change which the end of totalitarianism brought to international affairs, President Bush spoke in 1991 of a "New World Order." It was indeed clear that the old order was gone. What was not clear was whether a new order, a reasonably predictable way of sorting out international affairs, had taken its place. To sort matters out, to deal systematically and thoughtfully with international affairs in the post-totalitarian era, has been the great foreign policy challenge to both the Bush and the Clinton Administrations. Although there have been differences in detail, the responses of both Administrations have, in fact, been similar.
That is not a surprise. As has been said, countries have interests. It is clearly the obligation of an administration to identify these interests and seek to protect them. What makes the task for any U.S. Administration more complex than for the governments of many other countries is that the United States has national interests throughout the world and that the interests of the American people are broader than those of many other nations. In fact, it is the profound interest of so many Americans in helping solve problems wherever they arise, that makes it necessary to distinguish in our foreign policy between "national security interests" and "national humanitarian interests."

I would define as a "national security interest" an interest which could significantly and directly affect in the reasonably foreseeable future the life or well-being of the people of the United States. The potential impact of developments in the field of national security interests could be adverse, such as a nuclear attack or an act of international terrorism or a cut-off of oil supplies, or positive, such as mutual arms reduction or the enhancement of international trade.

I would further describe as a "national humanitarian interest" the interest of many Americans in the life and well-being of residents of foreign lands. It describes our interest in helping the victims of natural disasters. And it describes our interest in assisting victims of man-made disasters, such as those in Somalia, Bosnia, or Rwanda. A case can be made for the proposition that improvements in the life and well-being of residents of foreign lands would ultimately benefit Americans as well, but where the benefit is remote and indirect, it is quite difficult to make that case convincingly.

There were those who contended that neither Hitler's Germany nor Imperial Japan constituted a threat to the life and well-being of Americans. There were those who contended that the Soviet Union did not ever constitute such a threat or did not constitute a threat since the Sixties or Seventies. Similarly, there are those who do not see any national security threats today.

The Bush Administration was and the Clinton Administration is, of course, aware that the United States is not now faced by any threat equal to that posed by the potential of a Soviet massive nuclear attack. What both Administrations have recognized, however, is that, first, the mere existence of nuclear arsenals poses risks, which should be significantly reduced. That is why both Administrations have been committed to the START negotiations with Russia. Second, there are direct threats to the life and well-being of Americans which stem from countries which we have come to identify as "rogue states", namely North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Sudan and Libya. None of the leaders of these countries have a mandate from their people. Each is directed by a leadership group which has imposed itself upon the country by force, rules by repression, constitutes a threat to its neighbors, has sponsored or continues to sponsor international terrorism, and, in most instances, seeks to develop weapons of mass destruction outside any regime of international control.

That the threat assessment of these countries is not the product of paranoia was made evident by the experience of the Bush Administration in its dealings with Iraq. Concerned over the danger posed by Iran to the non-radical states of the Middle East, both militarily and through the export
of its revolution, the United States tilted its policy in favor of Iraq once it appeared possible that Iran might win the war which Saddam Hussein had launched in 1980. This pro-Iraq tilt was continued after the war ended in 1988. Under the Bush Administration it was expanded into a systematic effort to woo Iraq, in the expectation that the country would become a constructive player in Middle East affairs. The repressive character of Saddam Hussein's regime, the massive punitive measures against Iraqi Kurds, including the August 1988 chemical warfare attack on Kurdish civilians, were to be put aside. As for Iraq’s involvement in the development of a nuclear and chemical warfare capability and of a long-range delivery technology, it was hoped that a friendly Iraq would change its ways. Ambassador Glaspie, upon whom a great deal of blame was subsequently heaped, was not a Lone Ranger on issues relating to Iraq. She was carrying out U.S. policy.

I am making this point not to place blame on the Bush Administration but to point up the character of the rogue regimes: just as the Munich Agreement of 1938 did not bring “peace in our time,” as Neville Chamberlain had hoped, so did the 1989/90 U.S. policy of outreach to Iraq fail to persuade Saddam Hussein to become the “constructive player” anticipated by the U.S. Government’s experts on the Middle East.

What became clear on August 2, 1990, was that Saddam Hussein was prepared to reach for the jugular of the Western world: Middle Eastern oil. If he could take over Kuwait, what would stop him from taking over Saudi Arabia and the Gulf sheikdoms and then dictating economic terms to the West? The United States Government, with some encouragement from Prime Minister Thatcher, recognized the serious danger to the economies of the West, including the United States, posed by the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the threat to neighboring states. Making full use of the freedom of action, made possible by the end of the East-West contest, including effective resort to the UN Charter, the United States set about the task of organizing the use of force to undo the occupation of Kuwait.

The decision to use force was controversial. There were those who, fearful of the danger of substantial U.S. casualties, urged a resort to economic sanctions. But the Congress, by bipartisan action, admittedly with more Republican than Democratic support, ultimately did approve Desert Storm and the people of the United States clearly recognized that the operation was undertaken in the national security interest. If any question concerning Desert Storm has been seriously debated in its aftermath, it is whether it was wise to stop after 100 hours, whether the U.S. interest would not have been better served if the operation had continued a short while longer and had thus more sharply reduced Saddam Hussein’s residual military capability and had increased the likelihood of his overthrow.

The experiences with Saddam Hussein and Desert Storm have demonstrated that there are national security interests which are threatened in the post-totalitarian world, which require protection through appropriate action, including military force, and which can be so protected. The notion that there are rogue states in the world and that they pose a threat to us, against which we have to adopt safeguards, is now generally accepted, as has been the fact that the five states mentioned above qualify for that appellation.
Finding appropriate ways of dealing with the rogue states does indeed pose the greatest challenge to our foreign policy today. Our concern has focused principally on the rogue states' capability to produce nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, combined with a long-range delivery system. In the case of Iraq we have through UN sanctions effectively neutralized such a capability. But we must make sure that these sanctions remain in place as long there is a danger that Iraq will continue or resume the production of weapons of mass destruction. Given the sentiment of some members of the UN Security Council, this will not be any easy task.

In the case of North Korea the U.S. Government in both the Bush and the Clinton Administrations has tried to come to grips with the problem of how to engage a government which is by far the most isolated and suspicious in the world. No one even suggested that the regime established by Kim II Sung could through accommodation and kindness be persuaded to play a constructive role. It was necessary to make it clear to North Korean policymakers that the United States would not ignore North Korean defiance of international nuclear nonproliferation norms. Through determined efforts and in consultation with our South Korean and Japanese allies, we negotiated an agreement which, if fully implemented, will arrest the development of a North Korean nuclear capability.

With Iraq's nuclear weapons development inhibited and North Korea's a matter on which we seek to implement an accord, Iran remains the rogue state whose nuclear weapons effort would continue to constitute a most serious problem to our national security interest. The threat posed by the Iranian effort in the development of a nuclear weapon and a long-range delivery system is joined by its involvement in international terrorism and, together with Sudan, in efforts to subvert the governments of Islamic countries in the Middle East and North Africa.

That international terrorism can strike directly at the United States was well illustrated by the bomb exploded at the World Trade Center. Tragic as the event was, having cost six lives, many injuries, and substantial property damage, the number of deaths could have been much higher, reaching into the thousands. The recent terror attack in the Tokyo subway and the subsequent discovery of privately-held large stores of chemicals from which nerve gas can be produced have demonstrated even more clearly the dangers to which all of us are exposed. We must indeed gird ourselves against similar attempts at terror attacks in the future.

Today, however, in addition to Israel, the principal victims of the international terror campaign are the Islamic countries whose governments terrorists have sought to subvert. Because of their claim of religiosity and their efforts at penetration of society in the name of Islam, terrorists from the Middle East have often been referred to as Islamic fundamentalists, suggesting that they subscribe to a more deeply rooted religious faith than do their co-religionists. That suggestion is vigorously disputed by many believing, practicing Muslims, who consider the radical anti-Western doctrine preached by the advocates of holy war and terrorism to be a distortion of their faith. We, of course, must continue to make it clear that we respect Islam as a religious faith and do indeed consider it vitally important that moderate Islamic governments not be replaced by radical militants.
There was a time when a great deal of the mischief-making in the world could be traced back to Moscow. Tehran’s focus is narrower, but in its area of special interest, trying to undo the Middle East peace process, its reach can be as deadly. Yet, of all the problems posed by Iran’s rogue regime and its hatred of the “Great Satan,” none is as serious as is the effort to develop a nuclear weapons capability. With that weapon in its possession and the continuing campaign to subvert its neighbors, its ability to destabilize the Middle East and North Africa would be considerable.

Thus, one of the most important challenges on our national security agenda is to find a way to deal with the multiple threats posed by the Iranian regime. It is in this context that our efforts at good cooperation with the world’s other major industrial nations take on special importance, for only through such cooperation can an effective policy of containment be put in place.

Ever since its entry into World War II, and particularly throughout the Cold War, United States engagement in world affairs has been based on close interaction with Western Europe and Canada. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which grew out of that close affinity, has not only been a military alliance created for the common defense but has also, as anticipated by Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty, brought the member countries together into increasingly close political collaboration. The six largest NATO members, joined by Japan, have formed the Group of Seven, which seek closely to coordinate their economic policies. Eleven European NATO members, joined by four other European countries, now constitute the European Union. This interlocking network of one Asian, two North American, and eighteen European states constitutes the group of countries with which the United States most closely interacts in its efforts to protect those national security interests which we share with them.

Maintaining this network of relationships, both to assert our common strength and to share the economic burden of the effort to protect the common security interests, has been a critically important aspect of our international engagement. Here too, the United States Government has done well in the post-totalitarian years, both under President Bush and President Clinton. The relationships, forged initially under the military threat posed by the Soviet Union, have not only been preserved but agreements have been reached on ways of considering the further expansion of this network. Much has been made in the media of disagreements over Bosnia. Many of our journalists, or, perhaps, their editors, lacking a knowledge of recent history, are evidently unaware of the fact that in decades past more serious disagreements have arisen within NATO and have been overcome.

The end of Communist totalitarianism, followed by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, has opened many opportunities for the expansion of the zone of peace and democracy into the region which we once identified as the Soviet bloc. Six countries of Central and Eastern Europe have associated themselves with the European Union and most of them have indicated an interest in joining NATO. NATO, in turn, has created the partnership for peace and has initiated a process for consideration of the admission of new members of the Alliance, a highly significant step, with major long-range implications, taken during the Clinton years.

Quite understandably, the relationship between the United States and its NATO allies, on one hand, and Russia, on the other hand, remains in the foreground as we continue the review of our
principal national security interests in today's world. Although the Empire is gone, Russia remains a formidable power, the largest country in the world by area, fifth in size by population, in possession of nuclear weapons, with a significant, well-trained scientific establishment, and a population capable of hard work if properly motivated.

There are those foreign policy observers who, in light of the expansionist policies adopted by the Russian Empire in the 18th and 19th centuries and the heightened expansionism of the Soviet Union in the 20th century, are prepared to make a straight-line projection and predict that Russian will retain its expansionist drive into the 21st century. These observers urge that the United States proceed on the assumption that Russia will prove hostile to the democratic camp.

The U.S. Government has not subscribed to that prejudgment. The policy initiated by President Reagan in 1988, interrupted by President Bush in 1989, but resumed by him in 1990 and continued by President Clinton has been to reach out to leaders of the Soviet Union and later Russia who have sought to steer their country toward democracy and peaceful international relations. This policy is not based on a view that the success of Russia’s democrats is a matter of certainty. It recognizes, however, that Russia is now for only the second time in its history under democratic rule (the first being the brief interlude between February and October 1917). The policy is also not tied to support of a particular personality for whom we might harbor a special liking. The responsibility of our government in the field of foreign affairs is to deal with the governments of other countries, not with personages of our choosing. In the case of Russia our principal contacts are the President, who happens to be Boris Yeltsin, and the Prime Minister, who happens to be Victor Chernomyrdin.

We are, quite understandably, greatly concerned over developments in Chechnya. It should be clear, though, that, as troublesome as the events in Chechnya are, they are not typical of developments throughout the vast lands that constitute the Russian Federation. While we must indeed continue to urge an end to the repressive measures to which the Russian military has resorted in Chechnya, we must also maintain the contacts that would help encourage Russia’s further evolution toward democracy.

That is not to say that Russia’s future will depend on what we may or may not do. That future is ultimately in the hands of the Russian people. It is only at the margins that the Western role can prove useful. Our contacts with Russia’s democrats may strengthen their morale. Well-directed economic assistance may help improve economic conditions in Russia and thus make Russians more sympathetic to a political system which in their minds is associated with their country’s downward spiral. These are the considerations which must continue to guide our policy toward Russia.

There is one other country which looms large on our foreign policy horizon. One-fifth of the people on this globe live in the People’s Republic of China. Its sheer size, but also the capability of its people will cause China to play an increasingly important role worldwide as our global village shrinks. It is, therefore, particularly important that it become, in time, a member of the family of industrial democracies and join us in peaceful political and economic cooperation rather than siding with the world’s troublemakers.
These considerations have undergirded U.S. policy toward China since President Nixon’s opening with China, but more particularly since the ascension in China of Deng Xiaoping. We welcomed the measures taken by China to establish a market economy and were particularly pleased to see China make significant progress regarding respect for fundamental freedoms. Tiananmen Square came as a shock to all of us and we had to decide how to respond to that event. Both the Bush Administration and, ultimately, the Clinton Administration as well, decided that it was in our best interest to maintain close economic relations with China and, therefore, did not withdraw most-favored-nation status because of China’s poor human rights record. There are those who assumed that the U.S. position was taken principally in response to the urgings of companies with business interests in China. While these economic considerations were undoubtedly given some weight, it was the need for us to remain involved with China for the sake of world peace and security that was the paramount reason for the continuation of China’s MFN status.

There is another reason for our decision to continue MFN for China. There is a struggle under way in China between the hard-liners who espouse a combination of Leninism and Chinese nationalism and various shades of progressives who want to move their country toward a more open society than now exists. By remaining economically involved in China, we are undoubtedly encouraging the progressives. Through our continued involvement, we can also continue to press the human-rights cause, as we have effectively done. The hard-liners consider that aspect of our involvement a devious plot which they have dubbed “peaceful evolution,” a term which to them has pejorative connotations. But the fact is that, whether or not we want it, contacts between the West and China will continue to open up its society, both economically and politically.

Regrettably, foreign policy often becomes entangled in partisan debate in which minor differences, such as those over Haiti, are highlighted while the fundamental principles on which there is broad agreement are minimized, thus weakening the image which we project abroad. It is now as important as it ever was that Senator Vandenberg’s call for politics to stop at the water’s edge be taken to heart.

And now let me end with a commercial. The effective conduct of our foreign policy is in our national interest. To carry it out we need adequate resources. Careful pruning has over the years reduced the amount of money allocated to our total foreign affairs effort. It is now about $21 billion for the entire International Affairs Function of the United States Government, including the operations of the State Department, foreign assistance, the operations of organizations like the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, our contributions to the United Nations and the international financial institutions, etc. That is about 1.3% of the national budget and about three tenths of one percent of our Gross Domestic Product. Yet, there has been talk of slashing this number substantially. The impact on our budget would be insignificant, but a substantial cut could greatly weaken our essential role in world affairs. Let us hope that wise heads will ultimately prevail.
U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Totalitarian Years

Franklin D. Roosevelt had just been re-elected after a first term devoted almost exclusively to the domestic issues posed to the country by the Great Depression. This emphasis on domestic consensus was by no means unprecedented. In the 160 years of its existence as a nation the United States had played a major role on the international stage only once, from 1917 to 1920, and had quickly and decisively withdrawn. But as he surveyed the world scene, Roosevelt saw serious danger on the horizon, which could ultimately affect the United States. Japan was seeking to expand its grip on China. Italy had completed its conquest of Ethiopia. And Nazi-Germany had repudiated the Treaty of Versailles and was engaged in a major rearmament effort. The President decided to alert the nation to the problems which he saw and to send a signal that the United States was on the side of peace and democracy. In a speech in he said:

“Almost 58 years have now passed since the quarantine speech. During this period Democrats and Republicans have divided their occupancy of the White House almost evenly: 30 years for the Democrats, 28 years for the Republicans. Throughout that period the United States has followed a foreign policy with a single major theme: to stave off the threat posed to the cause of democracy by aggressive totalitarian regimes. For most of this period the United States was the leader of what came to be known as the Free World”.

The fact that both Democrat and Republican Administrations found themselves in agreement on the basic thrust of a policy of international engagement has not meant that such engagement has been non-controversial. The tendency to go it alone, to stay out of world affairs, which had been the prevailing tendency prior to 1937, has remained a powerful force in our country. Isolationism and the “Fortress America” concept have across the last 58 years had strong support in the general public and in the Congress, although such support has warped and waned as the years have passed. Furthermore, even among advocates of engagement, there have been differences of opinion over the application of the policy to given fact situations. The most profound difference arose over the question whether the policy to withstand the worldwide threat of Soviet totalitarianism required our military involvement in Vietnam.

The totalitarian threat to international peace and tranquillity posed first by the Nazi regime and then by the Soviets is now a matter of the past. The Soviet threat evaporated gradually, beginning with the reorientation of Soviet foreign policy in 1988 under Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, the failure of the August 1991
Putsch, and finally the dissolution of the Soviet Union. With the _______ by which we oriented our foreign policy engagement ever since 1937, merely withstanding the threat emanating from a powerful totalitarian system, gone, it has been necessary for us to ask ourselves once again whether there is a need to remain engaged in world affairs and if that is what the limits of our engagement should be.

Recognizing the profound change which the end of totalitarianism brought to international affairs, President Bush spoke in 1991 of a "New World Order." It was indeed clear that the old order was gone. What was not clear was whether a new order, a reasonably predictable say of sorting out international affairs, had taken its place. To sort matters out, to deal systematically and thoughtfully with international affairs in the post-totalitarian era, has been the great foreign policy challenge to both the Bush and the Clinton Administrations. Although there have been differences in detail, the responses of both Administrations have, in fact, been similar.

That that is the case should not be a surprise. As has been said, countries have interests. It is clearly the obligation of an administration to identify these interests and seek to protect them. What makes the task for any U.S. Administration more complex than for the governments of many other countries is that the United States has national interests throughout the world and that the interests of the American people are broader than those of many other nations. In fact, it is the profound interest of so many Americans in helping solve problems wherever they arise, that makes it necessary to distinguish in our foreign policy between "national security interests" and "national humanitarian interests."

A "national security interest" is an interest which could significantly and directly affect in a reasonably foreseeable fashion the life or well-being of the people of the United States. The potential impact of developments in the field of national security interests could be adverse, such as a nuclear attack or an act of international terrorism or a cut-off of oil supplies, or positive, such as mutual arms reduction or the enhancement of international trade. A "national humanitarian interest" describes the interest of many Americans in the life and well-being of residents of foreign lands. A case can be made for the proposition that improvements in the life and well-being of residents of foreign lands would ultimately benefit Americans as well, but where the benefit is remote and indirect, it is quite difficult to make that case convincingly.

There were those who contended that neither Hitler's Germany nor Imperial Japan constituted a threat to the life and well-being of
Americans. There were those who contended that the Soviet Union did not ever constitute such a threat or did not constitute a threat since the Sixties or Seventies. Similarly, there are those who do not see national security threats today.

The Bush and Clinton Administrations were and are, of course, aware that the United States is not now faced by any threat equal to that posed by the potential of a Soviet massive nuclear attack. What both administrations have recognized, however, is that there are direct threats to the life and well-being of Americans which stem, in the first instance, from countries which we have come to identify as "rogue states", namely North Korean, Iran, Iraq, Sudan and Libya. None of the leaders of these countries have a mandate from the people. Each is directed by a leadership group which has imposed itself upon the country by force, rules by repression, constitutes a threat to its neighbors, has sponsored or continues to sponsor international terrorism, and, in most instances, seeks to develop weapons of mass destruction outside any regime of international control.

That the threat assessment of these countries is not the product of paranoia was made evident by the experience of the Bush Administration in its dealings with Iraq. Concerned over the danger posed by Iraq to the non-radical Islamic states of the Middle East, it became United States policy to tilt in favor of Iraq once it appeared possible that Iran might win the war which Saddam Hussein had launched in 1980. This pro-Iraq tilt was continued after the war ended in 1988. Under the Bush Administration it was expanded into a systematic effort to ____ Iraq, in the expectation that the country would become a constructive player in Middle East affairs. The repressive character of Saddam Hussein's regime, the massive primitive measures against Iraqi Kurds, including the August 1988 chemical warfare attack on Kurdish civilians, were to be put aside. As for Iraq's involvement in the development of a nuclear and chemical warfare capability and of a long-range delivery technology, it was hoped that a friendly Iraq would change its ways. Ambassador Glaspie, upon whom a great deal of blame was subsequently heaped, was not a Lone Ranger on issues relating to Iraq. She was carrying out U.S. policy.

I am making this point not to place blame on the Bush Administration but to point up the character of the rogue regimes: just as the Munich Agreement of 1938 did not bring "peace in our time," as Neville Chamberlain had hoped, so did the 1989/90 U.S. policy of outreach to Iraq fail to persuade Saddam Hussein to become the "constructive player" anticipated by the U.S. Government's experts on the Middle East.
What became clear on August 2, 1990, was that Saddam Hussein was prepared to reach for the jugular of the Western world: Middle Eastern oil. If he could take over Kuwait, what would stop him from taking over Saudi Arabia and the Gulf sheikdoms and then dictating economic terms to the West? The United States Government, with some encouragement from Prime Minister Thatcher, recognized the serious danger to the economies of the West, including the United States, posed by the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the threat to neighboring states. Making full use of the freedom of action, including effective resort to the UN Charter, made possible by the end of the East-West contest, the United States set about the task of organizing the use of force to undo the occupation of Kuwait.

That the lesson of the folly of appeasement had not as yet been learned by all was, regrettably, demonstrated by the opposition in the Congress, stemming mostly from Democrats, to the initiation of Operation Desert Storm. But the Congress, by bipartisan action, ultimately did approve Desert Storm and the people of the United States clearly and overwhelmingly recognized that the operation was indeed undertaken in the national security interest. If any question concerning it has been seriously debated in its aftermath, it is whether it was wise to stop after 600 hours, whether the U.S. interest would not have been better served if the operation had continued a short while longer and had thus more sharply reduced Saddam Hussein’s residual military capability and had increased the likelihood of his overthrow.

The experiences with Saddam Hussein and Desert Storm have demonstrated that there are national security interests which are threatened in the post-totalitarian world, which require protection through appropriate action, including military force, and which can be so protected. The notion that there are rogue states in the world and that they pose a threat to us, against which we have to adopt safeguards, is now generally accepted, as had been the fact that the five states mentioned above qualify for that appellation.

It is how to guard against the threat posed by these states that poses the greatest challenge to our foreign policy today. Our concern has focused principally on the rogue states’ capability to produce a nuclear weapons combined with a long-range delivery system. In the case of Iraq we have through UN sanctions imposed in the wake of Desert Storm effectively neutralized such a capability. In the case of North Korea the U.S. Government in both the Bush and the Clinton Administrations has tried to come to grips with the problem of how to engage a government which is by far the most isolated and suspicious in the world.
No one even suggested that the regime established by Kim Sung could through accommodation and kindness be persuaded to play a constructive role. It was necessary to make it clear to North Korean policymakers that the use of force was an option to which the United States was prepared to resort to halt whatever nuclear development was in progress there and that the result would be the utter devastation of their country. At the same time we had to recognize that a pre-emptive strike on our part would, prior to the destruction of North Korea's military capability, result in a response which would wreak havoc in Seoul, a city of ten million, and would cause other, very substantial losses to South Korean and to our troops stationed there. It was in light of all these factors that an agreement was reached which, if it is allowed to go into effect and is then fully implemented, will arrest the development of a North Korean nuclear capability.

With Iraq's nuclear weapons development inhibited and North Korea's arrested by agreement, Iran remains the rogue state whose nuclear weapons effort would continue to constitute a most serious problem to our national security interest. The threat posed by the Iranian effort in the development of a nuclear weapon and a long-range delivery system is joined by its involvement in international terrorism and, together with Sudan, in efforts to subvert the governments of Islamic countries in the Middle East and North Africa.

That international terrorism can strike directly at the United States was well illustrated by the bomb exploded at the World Trade Center. Tragic as the event was, having cost six lives and substantial property damage, the number of casualties could have been much higher, reaching into the thousands, if the perpetrators of that crime had been less amateurish in their methods. We must be concerned that if the terror network decides to strike again at the United States, it will have learned from past experience.

The principal victims of the international terror campaign have, however, been the Islamic countries where governments of the Islamic radical movement have sought to subvert. Because of its appeal to religiosity and its efforts at penetration of society in the name of religion, the Islamic radicals have often been referred to as Islamic fundamentalists, suggesting that they subscribe a more deeply rooted religious faith than do their co-religionists. That suggestion is vigorously disputed by many believing, practicing Moslems, who consider the radical anti-Western doctrine preached by the advocates of holy war and terrorism to be a distortion of their faith.

Just as there was a time when a great deal of the mischief-making in the world could be traced back to Moscow, now a good deal of
it can be traced to Tehran. But of all the problems posed by Iran's rogue regime and, as far as we are concerned, its hatred of the "Great Satan," none is as serious as is the effort to develop a nuclear weapons capability. With that weapon in its possession and the continuing campaign to subvert its neighbors, its ability to destabilize the Middle East and North Africa would be considerable.

Thus, one of the most important challenges on our national security agenda is to find a way to deal with the multiple threats posed by the Iranian regime. It is in this context that our efforts at good cooperation with the world's other major industrial nations take on special importance, for only through such cooperation can an effective defensive policy be put in place.

Ever since its entry into World War II, and particularly throughout the Cold War, United States engagement in world affairs has been based on close interaction with Western Europe and Canada. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which grew out of that close affinity, has not only been a military alliance created for the common defense but has also, as anticipated by Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty, brought the member countries together in a zone of peace. The six largest NATO members, joined by Japan, have formed the Group of Seven, which seek closely to coordinate their economic policies. Eleven European NATO members, joined by four other European countries, now constitute the European Union. This interlocking network of one Asian, two North American, and eighteen European states constitutes the group of countries with which the United States most closely interacts in its efforts to protect those national security interests which all of them share.

Maintaining this network of relationships, both to assert our common strength and to share the economic burden of the effort to protect the common security interests, has been a critically important aspect of our international engagement. Here too, the United States Government has done well in the post-totalitarian years, both under President Bush and President Clinton. The relationships, forged initially under the military threat posed by the Soviet Union, have not only been preserved but agreements have been reached on ways of considering the further expansion of this network. Much has been made in the media of disagreements over Bosnia. Many of our journalists, or, perhaps, their editors, lacking a knowledge of recent history, are evidently unaware of the fact that more serious disagreements have arisen within NATO and have been overcome.

The end of Communist totalitarianism, followed by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, has opened many opportunities for the
expansion of the zone of peace and democracy into the region which we once identified as the Soviet bloc. Six countries of Central and Eastern Europe have associated themselves with the European Union and most of them have indicated an interest in joining NATO. NATO, in turn, has created the partnership for peace and has initiated a process for consideration of the admission of new members of the Alliance, a highly significant step, with major long-range implications, taken during the Clinton years.

Quite understandably, the relationship between the United States and its NATO allies, on one hand, and Russia, on the other hand, remains in the foreground as we continue the review of our principal national security interests in today's world. Although the Empire is gone, Russia remains a formidable power, the largest country in the world by area; fifth in size by population, in possession of nuclear weapons, with a significant, well-trained scientific establishment, and a population capable of hard work if properly motivated.

There are those foreign policy observers who, in light of the expansionist policies adopted by the Russian Empire in the 18th and 19th centuries and the heightened expansionism of the Soviet Union in the 20th century, are prepared to make a straight-line projection and predict that Russia will retain its expansionist dive into the 21st century. These observers urge that the United States proceed on the assumption that Russia will prove hostile to the democratic camp.

The U.S. Government has not subscribed to that approach. The policy initiated by President Reagan in 1988, interrupted by President Bush in 1989, but resumed by him in 1990 and continued by President Clinton has been to reach out to leaders of the Soviet Union and later Russia who have sought to steer their country toward democracy and peaceful international relations. This policy is not based on a view that the success of Russia's democrats is a matter of certainty. It recognizes, however, that Russia is for only the second time in its history under democratic rule (the first being the brief interlude between February and October 1917).
Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, yesterday Ambassador Richard Schifter, a most distinguished public servant, delivered an important address at a symposium here in Washington sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute. The title of his address was "Is There a Clinton Doctrine?" and its subject was the spate of editorial and other commentary in recent days about the conduct of foreign policy by this administration. Ambassador Schifter—a man who has well served Presidents of both parties—offers an extremely thoughtful analysis of recent developments and the efforts of the Clinton administration to conduct foreign policy in the post-cold war era.

I know that these remarks will be of great interest to my colleagues and I ask unanimous consent that they be printed in the Record at this point.

There being no objection, the remarks were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Is There a Clinton Doctrine?

(Remarks by Richard Schifter, Special Assistant to the President and Counselor, National Security Council, at a Symposium sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute on November 2, 1993, in Washington, DC)

"A vague global policy which sounds like the tocsin of an ideological crusade. . . . Its effects cannot be predicted." These were the words of Walter Lippmann. And Representative Harold Knutson added: "I guess the do-gooders won't feel right until they have us all broke." But the New York Times compared Truman's call, on March 12, 1947, for aid to Greece and Turkey to the Monroe Doctrine. And so the Truman Doctrine was born.

The Greek-Turkish aid program was only the cornerstone of a substantial edifice built in the Truman years, which contained all aspects of a comprehensive U.S. foreign policy, a policy which served
us well for forty years. Its objective was summed up in President Truman’s farewell address:

"Whether the Communist rulers shift their policies of their own free will—or whether the change comes about in some other way—I have not a doubt in the world, that a change will occur. I have a deep and abiding faith in the destiny of free men. With patience and courage, we shall some day move on into a new era."

We are now in that new era. In fact, we have been in it for some years. We did not need a Bush Doctrine, nor do we now need a Clinton Doctrine, namely a catch phrase to describe one particular aspect of foreign policy. What we need is vision in formulating a U.S. foreign policy built on a bipartisan consensus, a policy which can guide us in dealing with the new problems which we face in the post-Communist world.

It may not have been possible to create a comprehensive framework immediately following the Communist collapse. In the euphoric days of late 1989 and early 1990 we did not yet see the difficulties which lay ahead. There was talk of "the end of history" and "a new world order." That new world order is now with us. It is a better world order, one in which our very survival no longer depends on a policy of mutual assured destruction. But it is a world order which poses new dangers as well as new opportunities, and which thus does not allow for a laissez-faire approach. We ignore these dangers only at serious risk to our security and we fail to take advantage of the new opportunities at substantial cost to us. Aware of the calls to a new isolationism which emanate from both extremes of the political spectrum, we need to develop a policy consensus of what Arthur Schlesinger once called the Vital Center.

The essential elements of such a policy consensus, as spelled out in the recent Administration speeches, should include the following elements, designed to protect our most critical security interests:

1. Joining with other nations in efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
2. Seeking international safeguards against international terrorism.
3. Formulating a strategy to deal with movements, whether in secular or religious garb, which consider the West in general and the United States in particular its enemies, which seek to overthrow governments friendly to us, which engage in terrorism and which, if they succeed, could seriously affect our economic security.
4. Support of democratic governments as our natural friends and allies. Recognition of the existence in today's world of countries in which democracy has gained a foothold but is at risk, and of the fact, therefore, that it is in our interest to help strengthen fragile democracies, thereby enlarging the democratic space on the globe.
5. Recognition of the interrelationship between our domestic economic strength and a foreign economic policy based on a commitment to the expansion of international trade on a level playing field.

In addition to the foregoing points, which are of critical security concern, we
have other national interests. We have a stake in international tranquility. There are long-run benefits to be derived from an international system which seeks to prevent or stop breaches of the peace. Beyond that, the American people, more than any other, tend to contribute a hefty dose of altruism to the formulation of foreign policy. The pictures of starving children pull at the heartstrings of Americans more than at those of people of any other nationality.

Reaching a consensus on the foreign policy questions in which our national interest is indirect or basically humanitarian may very well be more complicated than where it is direct and central. And yet, we need to develop guidelines for such a consensus, rather than allowing policy to be driven day by day by television images. Where a threat is indirect, we need to ask ourselves as to the potential of it developing into a direct threat. Where the problem is humanitarian, we need to ask ourselves how serious the problem is, whether our role can help resolve it, whether our financial burden is likely to be, whether the lives of U.S. soldiers would be put at risk, and, if so, at how great a risk. Finally, we need to ask ourselves whether our involvement is likely to have the support of the American people, and whether the United States will be alone or will be joined by others.

This is the setting in which it is appropriate for us to turn to the United Nations. Having preserved for ourselves the right to proceed in self-defense, alone or in coalition, under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, we should look to the United Nations Security Council for action on other threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or acts of aggression. The answer to those who warn against abdication of U.S. policy formulation to the UN is that the Security Council cannot take any action over our veto. What is more, the Security Council is unlikely to take creative action without U.S. leadership or, at least, strong support. The extent to which our resources and our soldiers would be involved in any efforts at peacekeeping or peacemaking should be proportionate to our interest in the matter.

The problems posed by the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Haiti fall into the category just described. In the case of Yugoslavia, the Milosevic government decided, when it could not prevent the dissolution of the Federation, to use its control of the Yugoslav National Army and the support of ethnic Serbian irregulars to create a greater Serbia by force of arms and to use so-called ethnic cleaning to secure its hold on the land it would seize. Hostilities began in Slovenia in June 1991 and quickly shifted to Croatia. By January 1992, the Serbian-populated area of Croatia had been de facto separated from Croatia. Shortly thereafter serious armed clashes began between Serbs and the mostly Muslim Bosnian forces. In the spring and summer of 1992 the world witnessed the atrocities which became known as ethnic cleansing. By November 1992, 70% of Bosnia was in Serb hands and has remained so.

Except for its agreement to UN sanctions imposed on Serbia, the United States had distanced itself from the fighting in the former Yugoslavia in the
more than eighteen months which preceded the inauguration of President Clinton. After taking office, the Clinton Administration tried to modify previous U.S. policy by becoming more active on the side of the victims of aggression. But it decided not to act unilaterally. The effort to engage our allies had only limited success. We continue to do what we can to press for an end to bloodshed and as fair a resolution of the conflict as can be obtained.

Somalia posed a problem of mass starvation brought about by a breakdown of any semblance of law and order. That breakdown had occurred in the wake of the revolt which overthrew President Siad Barre in January 1991. By the summer of 1992 Somalis were dying of hunger by the tens of thousands. Armed thugs prevented relief shipments from reaching their intended beneficiaries. These were the circumstances under which the United States, in December 1992, under the umbrella of a UN Security Council Resolution, and with strong public approval, ordered 28,000 combat-ready troops into Somalia to help end the problem of mass starvation. It should have been clear then and it certainly is clear now that if our intercession is to accomplish more than merely postpone the death of hundreds of thousands of Somalis by a year or so, the international community will have to find a way to protect the production and distribution of food in Somalia.

And then there is Haiti. Located in our hemisphere it is of special interest to us. It has been misgoverned for decades. There is no doubt that President Aristide was chosen in a free and fair election and has the support of a substantial majority of the Haitian people. Acting once again under the UN umbrella, we are seeking to restore a duly elected head of state to his office. Whatever questions may have been raised about some of his past pronouncements, there is a reasonable chance that if he returns to power under the auspices of the international community, that community will be able assure that human rights are respected and that the economy improves. Under those circumstances the current pressure for illegal emigration to the United States would likely be significantly diminished.

These three country situations have been branded as Clinton Administration policy failures. A fair analysis of the facts would characterize them for what they truly are: largely inherited problems which have received a great deal of media attention but are not central to our security concerns, nor are they policy failures. There are some problems which are simply beyond our ability to influence with available resources. We must nevertheless seek to deal with them, not ad hoc, but in the context of their long-term implications for our foreign policy. Above all, though, we must keep in mind that serious foreign policy analysis produces a rank order of priorities which differs vastly from the judgments of newsworthiness made by the editorial staff of CNN. We must not let media judgments prevent us from paying attention to the issues of our time which have historic significance. There is more to a peacetime foreign policy than debates on the deployment of small detachments of U.S. troops.

While the final decision in foreign policy formulation rests with the President, there
is, as I suggested earlier, a sincere interest in the Administration for a constructive bipartisan or nonpartisan dialogue. We all need to commit ourselves to such a dialogue. It is in the interest of our country.