

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

POTUS Attendance at P-8 Summit, Nuclear Safety and Security, Moscow, Russia, April 19-21, 1996 (Exec Sec Briefing Book)

Staff Office-Individual:

Executive Secretary

Original OA/ID Number:

2585

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
35	2	9	3	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Anthony Lake to President William J. Clinton re. The P-8 Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security (4 pages)	04/12/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 4/3/2020
002. paper	P-8 Sessions of the Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security (4 pages)	04/00/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 4/3/2020
003. talking points	Talking Points for P-8 Leaders Presentation (3 pages)	04/00/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 4/3/2020
004. talking points	Talking Points for P-8 Sessions of Nuclear Summit (4 pages)	04/00/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 4/3/2020
005. paper	P-8 Plus Ukraine Sessions of the Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security (3 pages)	04/00/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 4/3/2020
006. talking points	Talking Points for P-8 Plus Ukraine Sessions of Nuclear Summit (3 pages)	04/00/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 4/3/2020

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Executive Secretary
OA/Box Number: 2585

FOLDER TITLE:

POTUS Attendance at P-8 Summit, Nuclear Safety and Security, Moscow, Russia,
April 19-21, 1996 (Exec Sec Briefing Book)

2016-0139-M
kh1800

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
- PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: KGH Date: 12/30/2019
2016-0139-M



**THE PRESIDENT'S
ATTENDANCE AT P-8 SUMMIT ON
NUCLEAR SAFETY AND SECURITY
MOSCOW, RUSSIA
APRIL 19-21, 1996**

Office of the Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

— April

19-21

1996

Moscow

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 12, 1996

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KRM/NARA, Date 12/30/2019
2016-0139-M

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE *TL*

SUBJECT: The P-8 Summit On Nuclear Safety and Security

The portion of your Moscow trip devoted to the P-8 Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security can be divided in two segments: P-8 events and events that include participation by President Kuchma. A dinner on Friday evening and a working meeting on Saturday morning will be for P-8 leaders only; President Kuchma will join the group for lunch on Saturday and a one-hour meeting thereafter.

This briefing book contains:

SCOPE MEMORANDA

Memorandum from Anthony Lake

SCENESETTER FOR ALL EVENTS

MEETINGS WITH P-8 LEADERS

- Briefing Memo
- Prepared Presentation to the P-8 Leaders
- Talking Points

MEETINGS WITH P-8 LEADERS AND PRESIDENT KUCHMA

- Briefing Memo
- Talking Points

PRESS DOCUMENTS

- Pool Spray for Summit Opening
- Pool Spray for Summit Closing
- Statement by the Press Secretary

OFFICIAL SUMMIT DOCUMENTS

- Summit Communique
- Separate P-8 Statement on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
- Separate Statement After Meetings With President Kuchma

Program for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in
Nuclear Materials
Official P-8 Summit Background Documents (on nuclear safety,
wastes, and security)
Terms of Reference for Plutonium Meeting

1. Introduction

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 12, 1996

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0139-M (1.01)
KBH 12/30/2019

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: The P-8 Summit On Nuclear Safety and Security

This summit is about managing risk. But an important subtext is about Russia -- the election, the continuation of reform and Russia's role in the post-Cold War order.

The summit takes place against the backdrop of the tenth anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster. The grim legacy of Chernobyl continues; economists estimate that Ukraine is currently spending 5 percent of its GDP on remediation or medical treatment required by the accident. **Your central goal at this summit is to cement a common commitment that the unbreakable rule in all nuclear activities must be safety first.** This rule should apply to ensuring the safety of our citizens from nuclear accidents, protecting the environment and securing nuclear materials against diversion to terrorists or rogue states.

Of the eight participants at the summit, four (the United States, Russia, France and the UK) possess nuclear weapons. One, Italy, does not even have a nuclear energy program -- its fledgling nuclear program yet another casualty of Chernobyl. While the United States and Russia have, by far, the most active bilateral relationship in summit-related areas, all G-7 countries have at least some cooperation under way with Russia on nuclear issues.

Russia's Approach to the Nuclear Summit

Russia does not share our central goal for the summit. Economics and technological pride lead Moscow to accept greater risk than we believe acceptable given the potential international consequences of a nuclear accident or smuggling incident. Moreover, Yeltsin will measure his success at the summit by its impression on Russian voters. His advisors have dubbed this the premier foreign policy event leading up to the Russian election; many therefore view the summit as political theater. For this group in Russia, success is defined simply -- you and the other

G-7 leaders need to be seen to participate in proceedings and to be treating Yeltsin as a respected equal. Substance is secondary.

Other Russian officials believe that Yeltsin only will impress his public if he demonstrates that he can achieve concrete results in dealing with the West. These officials have been eager to cooperate with their American counterparts, but have not always enjoyed the full backing of the Russian leadership. **Indeed, we believe there is a substantial risk that Yeltsin may back away from commitments made in summit preparations, as he did on Chernobyl in your recent phone call.** The danger centers on Russia's Minister of Atomic Energy (Minatom) Viktor Mikhailov, a "wild card" in summit planning, who has attempted to shift discussions from promoting nuclear safety to promoting nuclear power.

Mikhailov will press hard his ambitious plans to expand nuclear power in Russia and to sell nuclear technology to all NPT signatories (i.e., Iran.) He reacts defensively to any perceived criticism of the safety of Soviet-designed reactors, even insisting that the remaining Chernobyl reactors are safer than any reactors operating in the United States. Mikhailov at times has used his considerable power to impede follow-through on international commitments -- even Presidential commitments -- affecting his interests.

If confronted by a "Mikhailov surprise," you should explain to Yeltsin that pushing a pro-nuclear agenda could undermine the image of a successful summit by introducing deep divisions that the sherpas patiently have bridged in their summit preparations and could generate a backlash of criticism of Russian nuclear safety standards.

The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations

A number of prominent environmentalists -- many of whom are leading Russian reformers as well -- are unhappy with Mikhailov's dominant role in planning the summit. Alexei Yablokov, the Chairman of the Russian NSC's Committee on Ecological Security and an influential advisor to Yeltsin during the early years of his Presidency, is one of the co-sponsors of an "alternative" nuclear summit that is being held in Moscow just before the G-7 leaders arrive. This alternate summit is being sponsored by a consortium of 13 Russian and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

The NGOs stress four themes: (1) nuclear safety; (2) nuclear "democracy," i.e., the public's right to receive information and provide input into decision making; (3) sustainable energy

development; and (4) arms control and nonproliferation. The NGOs support the summit initiatives but want the leaders to go further. For example, they want the P-8 to establish a \$10 billion fund to close "the fifty most dangerous reactors in the world," including virtually all Soviet-designed reactors. **Publicly and privately, you should welcome the effort and aspirations of the NGOs, but temper your responses to their specific proposals with the realism they often lack in advancing them.**

While U.S. officials have had extensive contact with the NGOs about their plans for an "alternate summit," it appears that the Russian government has had virtually none. It is likely, however, that the NGO event will receive considerable Russian media and government attention, possibly influencing President Yeltsin's mood at the summit.

Ukraine at the Summit

By agreement among the P-8, (and as you proposed at Halifax), Ukrainian President Kuchma will attend a half-day of summit events, joining the group at lunch on Saturday, April 20. Ukraine's participation has been a difficult issue in pre-summit preparations. It required balancing our interest in Ukraine's engagement on issues like reactor safety and nuclear smuggling against Russia's desire to maintain a clear distinction between its own status and that of Ukraine. The G-7 overcame strong Russian opposition by insisting that the summit (1) acknowledge the Chernobyl accident; and (2) endorse the recent MOU between Ukraine and the G-7 to close Chernobyl by the year 2000.

Bad atmospheric conditions between the two countries may yet spill over into the P-8 meetings with Ukraine. Yeltsin recently canceled -- for the third time -- a long planned trip to Kiev. Recurring Russian-Ukrainian tensions over the implementation of the Trilateral Accord could emerge at the summit if Ukraine reverts to its "on again/off again" threat to hold back removal of the last nuclear weapons from its territory unless Russia fulfills its commitment to compensate Ukraine through nuclear reactor fuel and debt relief.

You need only reaffirm the need for both governments to work together toward the full implementation of the summit agenda, as well as the bilateral and trilateral commitments.

G-7 vs. G-8

Although not on the agenda, Russia's aspiration to join the "G-8" has become a contentious summit issue. Premature Russian entry to the G-8 would undermine the group's role as a forum for

financial and other economic cooperation among the major industrial democracies. It would also present serious risks before the outcome of the Russian elections are known. While other G-7 members generally share our view, the desire -- especially by Kohl and Chirac -- to support Yeltsin in his election bid appears to have overshadowed their concern for maintaining the G-7. **You should resist Russian efforts to drive a wedge between us and our G-7 partners over an immediate move to a formal "G-8."**

Summit Agenda

The agenda for this event is unusually technical for a summit meeting. Three topics are related to nuclear safety, two to nuclear waste and three to nuclear security issues. While not formally an "agenda item," the P-8 will also issue a statement supporting rapid completion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In agreeing to this statement, **Russia at last is publicly endorsing the Australian CTBT language, which bans any nuclear weapons test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.** This formulation is consistent with your commitment to a "zero-yield" treaty. The CTBT statement also affirms a P-8 commitment to complete and sign the CTBT by September, which should give a needed boost to negotiations in Geneva. **The CTBT statement is likely to be viewed as a main achievement of the summit.**

Schedule

The nuclear summit precedes your bilateral with Yeltsin. The first event is a dinner on Friday evening immediately after your arrival from St. Petersburg. This event will combine elements of a traditional G-7 working dinner and a more ceremonial affair. It will be a leaders-only event, followed by a reception and concert to be attended by prominent Russians.

On Saturday, P-8 meetings will last from 9:45 a.m. until noon. These morning sessions will be broken by a "class photo" event. At 12:30 p.m., President Kuchma will join the group for lunch and will participate in an afternoon session scheduled to last from 2:30 until 3:30 p.m. The summit will wind up with a 30 minute press conference at 4:00 p.m., hosted by the summit co-chairs, Presidents Chirac and Yeltsin. We have scheduled a 30 minute press conference for you starting at 6:15 p.m.

SCENESETTER

KREMLIN EVENTS

The main events of the P-8 nuclear summit will take place in the Grand Kremlin palace and the newly refurbished residence of the President of the Russian Federation, also within the Kremlin walls.

The palace was built between 1838-1849 by a team of architects under the supervision of Konstantin Thon on the site of an earlier palace built by the Italian architect Rastrelli in the 18th century. It was the residence of the imperial family during its visits to Moscow. It is now a government building for President Yeltsin and the presidential staff, as well as the site of official receptions.

The first official event of the summit will be hosted by President Yeltsin on Friday, April 19, starting at 7:00 p.m. Guests will be received at the Kremlin in St. Vladimir's Hall. From St. Vladimir's Hall, guests will proceed to the Hall of Facets for the dinner. Following dinner, there will be an official concert in St. George's Hall.

St. Vladimir's Hall: a relatively small oval room, where most of the signings take place. It is also used as a reception room for state dinners held in the Hall of Facets.

Hall of Facets: the traditional reception room of the tsars and is part of a 16th century palace named for its exterior decoration of facets of beveled stone.

St. George's Hall: bears the name of all Russian soldiers who have been awarded the various degrees of the medals of the Order of St. George.

Chiefs of State will be received for the opening, Saturday, April 20, in President Yeltsin's office on the second floor of the residence. They will proceed from President Yeltsin's office to the just-restored St. Catherine's Hall for the opening ceremonies and first meeting (of nine). The session will break for a working lunch in a ceremonial dining room across the corridor from St. Catherine's Hall. The session will then continue in the hall, with the addition of President Kuchma of Ukraine.

St. Catherine's Hall: an ornate, circular ceremonial conference room on the second floor of the residence. The hall is devoted to the Order of St. Catherine, the only Russian order given to women. The order was founded by Peter the Great in honor of Catherine I, who bought Peter's freedom when he was held hostage briefly as a child.

Following the closing ceremonies, Presidents Yeltsin and Chirac will meet with the press in the Presidential Press Center, Building 14, on the opposite side of the Presidential office building complex from the residence.

MTGS WITH
P-8 LEADERS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

P-8 SESSIONS OF THE
SUMMIT ON NUCLEAR SAFETY AND SECURITY

Logistics

The nuclear summit will begin on Friday evening with a dinner for P-8 leaders. The formal P-8 meeting on the summit will take place Saturday morning. (Ukrainian President Kuchma will not join the summit until lunch on Saturday.) As the ranking person on the P-8 protocol list, you will be the last to arrive at all events.

There is no set schedule or agenda for the P-8 dinner or the morning meeting. At dinner, conversation will be completely unscripted. Much of Saturday morning's meeting will be devoted to a series of set presentations by each of the assembled leaders.

Friday Dinner

Much of the conversation at dinner is likely to revolve around Yeltsin's push for entry into a "G-8" by the Lyons summit, discussed in your scope memorandum. The substantive issue most likely to be discussed at dinner is the CTBT. By backing the summit statement on the CTBT, Russia, for the first time, will go on record in support of the "Australian scope text" for a CTBT banning any nuclear weapons test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. This formulation is consistent with your commitment to a "zero-yield" treaty. The statement also affirms a P-8 commitment to complete and sign the CTBT by September, which should give a critical boost to negotiations in Geneva.

The Formal P-8 Meeting

The formal summit sessions will be compressed, and most of the P-8 meeting on Saturday will be devoted to presentations by each of the leaders. While the agenda is technical, a high-level push could serve to break log-jams in important areas. You should seek opportunities to stress the need to convert words into actions. The specific agenda items appear below; more detailed briefing papers are attached.

CTBT: The P-8 leaders should instruct their CTBT delegations in Geneva to build on the P-8 CTBT statement by helping the Conference on Disarmament chairman bring the negotiations to closure. One key hurdle will be to persuade China to drop its insistence that the CTBT allow so-called "peaceful nuclear explosions". While Yeltsin has already indicated his willingness to press Jiang Zemin on this during his upcoming trip to Beijing, by asking Yeltsin to undertake this mission on behalf of the P-8

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(b) (d)
Declassify on: 3/27/06

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0139-M (1.02)
KBN 12/30/2019

you will bolster his position in the group by casting him as the P-8's "standard bearer."

Reactor Safety: Russia supports the Convention on Nuclear Safety and some projects to improve the safety of Soviet-designed reactors located outside Russia, but resists efforts to close any of Russia's oldest and least safe reactors. You should welcome general Russian support for nuclear safety and advocate even more concrete cooperation. This topic must be approached delicately, since Minatom Minister Mikhailov likely has briefed Yeltsin that Western concerns over the safety of Soviet-designed reactors are unfounded and motivated by a desire for commercial advantage in international nuclear markets.

Nuclear Liability: We were able to gain G-7 agreement to communiqué language calling for the establishment of an international regime governing liability in the event of a nuclear accident. Germany and Japan have been the most recalcitrant; Russia, by contrast, has supported us in this area. This regime would cover transboundary effects of a nuclear accident, thereby opening the door to greater involvement by U.S. companies in the business of safety upgrades in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. You should urge your fellow leaders to press their negotiators to overcome complex technical and legal obstacles to finalizing the text of a new convention. In doing so, you should recognize that these obstacles also mask underlying G-7 resistance to concluding a new convention -- their companies already receive some liability protection from existing conventions and a truly global convention could open the door to increased American competition.

Energy Sector Reform: The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission completed a year-long Joint Electric Power Alternatives Study (JEPAS) that lays out a road-map for improving nuclear safety and energy efficiency in Russia. By promoting a market-based approach to energy investments, the JEPAS offers Russia the hope of attracting foreign financing for power projects, including nuclear projects. Russia already supports the JEPAS; while encouraging Yeltsin to implement the study's recommendations, you should also press the other leaders actively to support the JEPAS roadmap by bolstering energy sector investment in Russia.

International Convention on Waste Management: The P-8 all favor the completion of this convention. The United States views this as more urgent than do some of the P-8; you should use any discussion of this topic to urge conclusion of this convention soon -- preferably by the end of 1997.

Ocean Dumping of Radioactive Wastes: Yeltsin has committed to end such dumping immediately and to adhere formally to the international ban on dumping as soon as construction of alternative waste-handling is complete. Japan may reopen this issue, but we can live with the current Russian position.

Program for Combating Nuclear Smuggling: The program is complete and activities underway. The United States and Russia are the plan's primary architects and we jointly advocated it to the P-8. A feud simmers, however, between Russia and Germany over the celebrated 1994 seizures of nuclear material in Germany. Yeltsin's government continues to deny that the seized materials originated in Russia, while German officials at times have seemed more interested in "pointing fingers" for past problems than in cooperating to prevent future occurrences. You should encourage all leaders to cooperate closely to ensure that nuclear smuggling cases do not recur.

Nuclear Material Security: U.S. efforts to work with Russia to improve the security of nuclear materials there have accelerated dramatically in the past year and are now paying dividends. You may want to compliment Yeltsin for his government's determination to improve the security of nuclear materials and encourage him to ensure that our cooperation in this area continues to expand. You should promote the IAEA's "Program 93+2" initiative to enhance the IAEA's ability to detect clandestine nuclear weapons programs through expanded safeguards. Once again, the U.S. and Russia are the most ardent supporters of this program; while the other P-8 countries nominally support this effort, Japan and Germany have been delaying progress in IAEA discussions due to cost concerns.

Fissile Material Disposition: Some countries -- Russia, Germany, France and the UK -- may try to elicit P-8 financial support for specific projects to manage stockpiles of excess fissile materials by burning plutonium in the form of mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) in reactors. Many in the United States and the international NGO community, however, strongly oppose such plutonium use as creating a "plutonium economy" at great environmental and security risk. You should acknowledge the urgency of the issue, but oppose efforts to "pick a winner" now from among various options, such as MOX recycle, disposal in vitrified form or long-term storage. Instead, we should await the results of the scientific experts meeting the sherpas agreed should take place this year.

Wild Cards: Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov - who has played a large role in Russian summit planning and in preparing Yeltsin -- may persuade Yeltsin to propose one or more surprise initiatives at the summit. You already heard one such surprise in Yeltsin's reopening of the Chernobyl issue with you on the phone. Mikhailov is also pushing the formation of an "international commission" to settle U.S.-Russian disputes over nuclear trade. Mikhailov views this commission as a tool for rebutting U.S. objections to his nuclear sales to Iran as well as for curtailing U.S. antidumping actions against Russian uranium imports. Mikhailov has also advocated a P-8 funding facility for the development of "next generation" reactors. This initiative

is designed to obtain international subsidies for Mikhailov's inefficient empire, in lieu of those subsidies that the Russian government is reducing. We cannot predict every surprise that Mikhailov may arrange to have Yeltsin raise, but we can advise you to react to any surprise initiative very cautiously.

Core Objectives

- Strengthen cooperation between Russia and the G-7 countries, demonstrating political and practical benefits of working together on difficult nuclear issues.
- Provide critical P-8 push for CTBT process during the home stretch for concluding the treaty.
- Boost Russia's commitment to nuclear safety, both in its own nuclear program and through cooperation with the U.S. and other donor nations to improve safety of Soviet-designed reactors operating outside Russia.
- Promote European and Japanese action to speed development of a global regime for nuclear liability.
- Promote market-based reform of the Russian energy sector.
- Urge European and Russian action to conclude work on an international convention on radioactive waste management.
- Encourage Russian fulfillment of its pledge to end dumping of radioactive waste at sea.
- Spur the P-8 to undertake concrete steps to implement the comprehensive plan of action to combat illicit nuclear trafficking that will be announced at the summit.
- Encourage the P-8 to expand individual actions and cooperation to improve the security of nuclear materials.
- Initiate an international effort to address disposition of excess plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons, beginning with an experts meeting later this year and demonstrations of disposition technologies.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TALKING POINTS FOR
P-8 LEADERS PRESENTATION

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0139-M (1.03)
KBM 12/30/2019

General Points

- Summit about managing risk: risk of nuclear accident; risk terrorist group could obtain materials to create nuclear warhead; risk unsafe nuclear waste management practices could poison environment.
- Must reflect on tragic accident at Chernobyl ten years and ago and recommit to ensuring another Chernobyl will never occur.
- Reducing risks not easy task. As Bernard Baruch said fifty years ago, in advancing first U.S. proposal to control nuclear arms: "We face a choice between the quick and the dead."
- Have all struggled since to grapple with threat -- accidental or otherwise -- of nuclear weapons use.
- Thanks to efforts of nations gathered today, in recent years witnessed dramatic reduction of threat of nuclear conflict. Our citizens, future generations will rest easier for these efforts.
- No time for complacency. Threat not confined to implements of war -- also extends to nuclear accident. Many nations -- including United States -- nuclear energy plays important role in national energy supply.
- Working together to reduce risks sends message to our citizens and to world: Cold War confrontation replaced with new levels of cooperation -- nations working together to solve problems that concern all.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

- P-8 statement on Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty represents dramatic step toward arms control goal that has eluded grasp for decades. Our statement should instruct representatives to Conference on Disarmament to complete treaty text in June -- so it can be signed in September as called for by UN General Assembly.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(b) (d)
Declassify on: 4/1/06

- Must not let this unique opportunity to achieve crowning nonproliferation achievement slip by. Must work together to build support for CTBT in countries which frankly dragging feet in negotiations.
- Goal of summit communiqué today can be summed up in two words -- safety first. Operation of civilian nuclear power plants, other nuclear activities, must ensure health and safety of our citizens by guaranteeing reactors safe and dangerous materials adequately protected.
- Promoting nuclear safety does not conflict with promoting nuclear power. If we do not promote nuclear safety will lose public support for nuclear power.
- Can cooperate to improve safety of nuclear reactors -- particularly older Soviet-designed reactors.

Illicit Trafficking

- Program against illicit trafficking in nuclear materials addresses risk we all face and represents true milestone in our cooperation. Key to Program's success, however, is **concrete action**.
- Experts have made progress in identifying and tracking seized nuclear materials. But much remains to be done. Each of us must ensure continued progress remains high priority for our governments.
- Must also improve coordination among our technical experts, law enforcement and customs officials and intelligence services.
- Should not seek to assign blame for past problems, but rather act to counter critical proliferation threat. Truly global nature of threat requires us to seek cooperation of other states -- beginning with Ukraine.
- Protecting nuclear material at source stops nuclear smuggling from occurring in first place. Why so pleased with strides United States and Russia made together on nuclear material security. Americans and Russians now working together at over two dozen locations.

Nuclear Safeguards

- Must also supplement bilateral cooperation by strengthening global security regimes. Hope we all will support IAEA's "Programme 93 plus 2" to enhance safeguards against proliferation by rogue states when plan comes before IAEA Board of Governors for approval this June.
- The 93+2 Program provides us with our best tools to prevent nuclear proliferation by "rogue" states.

Fissile Materials

- Of course, easiest way to reduce smuggling is eliminate excess stockpiles. Experts meet later this year to analyze options for managing and disposing of excess stockpiles of fissile material; their top priority remains preventing nuclear proliferation.

Energy Sector Reform

- Need to understand this summit also about reform and change.
- Communiqué cites fundamental role that market-driven energy sector plays in ensuring nuclear safety. Only marketplace can provide sufficient revenues to electric utilities to generate funds required for nuclear safety.
- For private markets to function effectively, must assure free flow of information.

Liability

- Must also reform international mechanisms for addressing liability in event of nuclear accident. Today, ten years after Chernobyl disaster, negotiations on truly global regime for nuclear liability still stalled.
- Negotiations to complete this complex, technical Convention will not be easy. Let's make this a common priority.
- Task before us daunting. Must confront it with patience and determination. Problems we face do not lend themselves to magic solutions. Critical conclusion today is we **must** work together.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TALKING POINTS FOR
P-8 SESSIONS OF NUCLEAR SUMMIT

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0139-M (1.04)
KBH 12/30/2019

G-8 vs P-8

(If Yeltsin raises G-8, as he almost certainly will)

- G-7 is key economic group and its work must continue. Russia making progress but economically not ready for full participation.
- Russia clearly a world political leader and a key P-8 member; we will work to expand participation in P-8 in positive and visible manner.
- Ready to demonstrate at Lyons growing stature and cooperation among P-8 and importance of Russia's increasingly close involvement.
- Understand Chirac will invite you to lunch for discussion with leaders of UN, World Bank, IMF, WTO. Important session; will cover global issues, including economic matters of interest to Russia.

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

(If discussion turns to significance of gaining Chinese adherence to P-8 CTBT statement.)

- Gaining Chinese acceptance of P-8 text means gaining their acceptance of so-called "Australian scope text" which bans all nuclear weapons explosions and all other nuclear explosions.

Safety Of Civilian Nuclear Reactors

(If status of U.S. ratification of CNS is raised)

- United States strongly supports the Nuclear Safety Convention; am urging ratification by Senate at earliest possible date.

(If follow-on to CNS is raised)

- Convention on Nuclear Safety just a start -- should continue to seek opportunities for common action and cooperation on nuclear safety.
- All of us -- Russia and G-7 countries -- should work as partners to address nuclear safety problems, particularly in countries using oldest Soviet-designed reactors.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (d)

Declassify on: 4/8/06

Nuclear Liability

(If status of nuclear liability in Russia is raised.)

- Want to congratulate President Yeltsin on passage of new Russian law on use of atomic energy.
 - Understand separate law specifically on nuclear liability nearing completion.

(If need for new convention is questioned.)

- Issue sounds technical, but is fundamental to improved nuclear safety and improved cooperation on nuclear issues in general.
 - Without liability protection, nuclear firms cannot operate abroad.
 - This means we cannot fully mobilize energy of private sector firms to improve safety around the world.
- We should give clear instructions to our negotiators in Vienna that we want negotiations on global liability regime to be concluded as soon as possible.

Energy-Sector Reform

(If Yeltsin raises energy sector investments.)

- For Russia, key to attracting foreign investment is continued energy sector reform.
- Emerging market economies face difficult challenge in attracting international financing for nuclear projects.
 - Before investing money, multilateral banks want to see concrete proof of commitment to market economy.
 - Banks demand true "least cost" analysis, meaning countries must carefully consider all costs -- including safety, health and environment -- when making decisions.
- This essential part of overall program of economic reform -- viable energy sector is key to a prosperous economy.

International Convention on Nuclear Waste Management

(If opportunity arises to push for more rapid action.)

- Safe management of radioactive waste important to all of us and to global environment.
- Negotiations on International Convention on Safe Management of Radioactive Waste in Vienna should be concluded quickly -- propose joint target date of end of 1997.
- While issues are technical and difficult, need to send our delegations message to be flexible and tell them that we expect success soon. Negotiations have dragged on too long.

Ocean Dumping of Radioactive Waste

(If Japan presses Russia to sign dumping ban immediately.)

- Realize this poses special problems for Russia, both due to legacy of former Soviet Union and demands placed on you by dismantlement of nuclear submarines under START process.
- Respect Yeltsin's commitment to refrain "voluntarily" from dumping until able to formally adhere to ban. Still, encourage Yeltsin to announce soon a specific date for eventual adherence to dumping ban.

Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material

(If Germany -- or others -- push Yeltsin on past cases.)

- Our common goal should be to stop nuclear smuggling. Whatever may have happened in past should not be allowed to impede our cooperation.
- Most important task is to ensure rapid, reliable and confidential sharing of intelligence and law enforcement information on smuggling.
- Additional cooperation on "nuclear forensics" could provide future answer to tracing origin of seized material.

Nuclear Material Control, Accountancy and Physical Protection

(If opportunity arises to advocate better safeguards.)

- As Iraq's clandestine nuclear program demonstrated, need to strengthen IAEA safeguards, as our communiqué says. Urge support for the IAEA's plan [known as Programme 93+2] to enhance safeguards regime.

- Enhanced safeguards will inevitably cost more to implement and maintain than current regime, but risk is too great not to act.

Fissile Material Management/Disposition

(If others advocate "plutonium recycling" or use of mixed oxide fuel (MOX))

- Glad summit providing opportunity for us to pool our expertise to meet challenge. U.S. will be an active participant in experts meeting and technology demonstrations we announcing today.
- Very important not to prejudge conclusions of complex scientific study. Must not express preference now between plutonium use, storage or disposal.

Possible "Wild Card" Issues

(If President Yeltsin Proposes Commission on Nuclear Exports)

- **(If commission is international)** Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), of which Russia a member, already serves this function. Should use existing mechanism.
- **(If commission is bilateral)** Believe joint U.S.-Russian Commission headed by Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin provides excellent venue for discussions of this type.
- **(If President Yeltsin proposes steps to allow greater imports of Russian uranium into United States)** Of course we must fully enforce our trade laws. The suspension agreement between Russia and the U.S. has worked well. Understand Russian and Commerce Department negotiations are working on updating quotas under agreement.

(If President Yeltsin Proposes Joint P-8 Development of Nuclear Reactor Technology)

- Must remember that goal today is promoting nuclear safety, not promoting nuclear power.
- P-8 may not be proper group for developing nuclear reactors. Not all members have nuclear programs. In U.S., this primarily an issue for private companies, not government. Perhaps better to address request to IAEA.

P-8 LEADERS &
PRES. KUCHMA

P-8 PLUS UKRAINE SESSIONS OF THE
SUMMIT ON NUCLEAR SAFETY AND SECURITY

Logistics

By agreement among the P-8, Ukrainian President Kuchma will attend a half-day of summit events, joining the group at lunch on Saturday, April 20, and continuing with a one-hour meeting afterwards. Ukraine was not, however, directly involved in summit preparations or drafting the communiqué. We do not consider Kuchma's participation as a step toward the creation of a "P-9" -- a fear that Russia continues to harbor.

There is no set agenda for either the P-8 lunch with President Kuchma or for the meeting afterward. There will not be time for presentations by each leader. Instead, we anticipate that both Yeltsin and Kuchma will wish to make some sort of opening comments, after which the sessions will likely move to a discussion format.

Ukraine's Participation at the Nuclear Summit

Kuchma's participation at the summit will inevitably draw attention to the summit's nuclear safety agenda in context of the tenth anniversary of the Chernobyl tragedy. For the G-7, this creates an opportunity to reaffirm our serious commitment to implementing the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Ukraine to close Chernobyl. Kuchma, however, would rather ignore the MOU and use the occasion to elicit funding pledges, even though Ukraine has been told this is not a pledging conference. Russia is uncomfortable with any suggestion that former Soviet reactors are unsafe and would prefer to downplay discussion of Chernobyl.

Arguments that the closure of Chernobyl will cause an energy shortage in Ukraine are unfounded. Russia's Minister of Atomic Energy, Viktor Mikhailov, uses these arguments in an attempt to kill the MOU because he fears that Chernobyl's closure will create a precedent which many Russians will want to follow (there are 11 Chernobyl-type reactors still operating in Russia). Ukrainians sometimes echo these spurious arguments in an attempt to elicit additional G-7 assistance commitments.

These dynamics make it particularly important to keep discussions of nuclear safety focused on actions to ensure safety in the future, using the MOU on Chernobyl as an example. Ukraine has worked with us to improve the safety of its civilian nuclear reactor program and strengthen its nuclear regulatory authority. The Chernobyl MOU, furthermore, provides a model for addressing nuclear safety in the context of energy sector reform. As such, it will not harm Ukraine or Kuchma in any way, nor will it cause

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: 3/27/06

an energy shortage. It establishes the need to create a viable and competitive power sector and, in this context, makes a G-7 commitment to help Ukraine finance power investments that meet national power needs.

Ukraine has signed the Convention on Nuclear Safety and intends, shortly before or after the Summit, to adhere to the Vienna Convention on nuclear liability which will be needed to implement certain elements of the Chernobyl MOU. We negotiated a bilateral liability agreement with Ukraine to facilitate our government-to-government safety programs, but this does not provide an adequate legal regime for commercial transactions. Adherence to the Vienna Convention on nuclear liability will improve the situation, although U.S. firms will not be fully protected until conclusion of a new global liability regime to which the United States and Ukraine are parties.

Ukraine is participating in discussions on the Convention on Radioactive Waste Management. Ukraine cannot ship nuclear waste to Russia as it did before independence, so waste is accumulating at its nuclear power plants. Ukraine hopes to build a storage facility in the Chernobyl region. Ukraine does not engage in ocean dumping of radioactive material.

Kuchma is also interested in nuclear security issues. Ukraine has indicated its willingness to become the first country outside the P-8 to support the P-8's program for combating nuclear smuggling. We are working with Ukraine to improve its control, accounting and protection of nuclear material. Ukraine's civilian nuclear research program possesses sufficient highly-enriched uranium to make several bombs.

Implementation of the Trilateral Agreement

If you have a private exchange with Kuchma during the lunch, you will want to stress that all parties should live up to their obligations under the Trilateral Statement. This includes Ukraine's commitment to transfer all nuclear warheads by the end of May. Ukraine's national security advisor affirmed in early April that Ukraine would meet its trilateral obligations. However, Prime Minister Marchuk told Secretary Christopher in March that Kiev may delay delivery of strategic warheads to Russia beyond the end of May to match nuclear fuel deliveries from Russia, scheduled through mid-1997. You should assure Kuchma that we are urging Moscow to compensate Ukraine for the tactical nuclear weapons transferred to Russia and deliver all the nuclear fuel rods it owes Kiev.

Russia's View of Kuchma's Participation

Ukraine's participation has been a difficult issue for pre-summit preparations. Eventually, Russia consented to a united P-8 position to (1) acknowledge the Chernobyl accident; and (2) endorse the recent MOU between Ukraine and the G-7 to secure Chernobyl's closure by the year 2000 (although we note Yeltsin's attempt to back away from endorsing the closure of Chernobyl in your April 9 call with him). Yeltsin recently canceled his long-delayed visit to Kiev, although the risk of friction between Yeltsin and Kuchma may be tempered by their mutual interest to boost Yeltsin's re-election prospects.

Core Objectives

- Commend Ukraine's efforts to improve nuclear safety, including agreeing to close Chernobyl and reassure Kuchma of strong U.S. and G-7 commitment to Chernobyl closure program.
- Emphasize that energy sector reform critical for implementation of MOU and attracting investment.
- (If necessary) Resist efforts to jump prematurely to "pledging session" to support additional work on Chernobyl sarcophagus.
- Welcome Ukraine's intent to adhere to Vienna Convention on nuclear liability and encourage Ukraine to support U.S.-led efforts to establish truly global liability regime.
- Recognize Ukraine's concerns about nuclear waste and commend Kuchma for Ukraine's participation in nuclear waste convention negotiation.
- Welcome Ukraine endorsement as key first step to develop widespread support for program to combat nuclear smuggling and help ensure its success.
- Encourage continued Ukrainian cooperation with our material protection programs.
- (If appropriate) Urge Kuchma to complete transfer of nuclear warheads to Russia in accordance with Trilateral Statement.

TALKING POINTS FOR
P-8 PLUS UKRAINE SESSIONS OF NUCLEAR SUMMIT

General Talking Points

- Pleased President Kuchma can join us today. Ukraine already making important contributions towards our common goals of improving nuclear safety and security.
- Ten-year anniversary of Chornobyl tragedy appropriate reminder of importance of our work together; serves as impetus to ensure success of safety efforts.
- Decision to close Chornobyl by year 2000 an important safety step that we strongly commend and support.

Chornobyl Closure

- G-7/Ukraine MOU on Chornobyl is model for addressing nuclear safety in context of overall energy sector reform. Indeed, Chornobyl issue cannot be separated from need for efficient, competitive energy sector that creates foundation for Ukraine's economic prosperity.
- United States and G-7 strongly committed to this effort; MOU represents unique initiative among G-7, multilateral development banks; need to make this work.
- Considerable financing already available. Will work with Ukraine to disburse as quickly as possible; will work as well with Ukraine to mobilize additional financing as projects prepared.
- This a long-term project; will work in partnership with Ukraine until completed.
- Important Ukraine continue economic and energy reform, critical to mobilize international and Ukrainian financing envisioned in MOU.

(If Yeltsin says endorsement of Chornobyl closure bad for Kuchma, needs to be stripped from communiqué)

- Closing Chornobyl will reduce biggest threat of catastrophe and raise Ukraine's international stature. G-7 committed to help Ukraine finance alternative energy sources as Ukraine reforms energy sector. Should keep Chornobyl in communiqué.

- By addressing closure within context of overall energy sector reform, including investment, no shortage will occur now or in future.
- Construction of single, large replacement power station based on a "megawatt-for-megawatt" trade-off not needed. Instead, functioning energy market and investments in energy sector will ensure adequate power far into future. MOU process designed to promote long-term, efficient market.

Chornobyl Sarcophagus (if raised)

- Understand sarcophagus at damaged reactor unstable.
- Work underway by G-7 and Ukraine experts to determine effective solution; understand plans for short-term stabilization measures ready in June or July; long-term plan ready in November.
- United States prepared to contribute to multilateral solutions on sarcophagus; know that all G-7 committed to keeping work on schedule.
- But sarcophagus only one part of problem; must keep sight of broader energy reform issues.

(If Kuchma proposes an international meeting on the sarcophagus)

- Experts meeting a good idea to focus international attention on issue, but should refer specifics to Nuclear Safety Working Group. Early 1997 good date, would allow time to consider options being analyzed in plans under development for sarcophagus.

Nuclear Liability

- Welcome Ukraine's intent to join Vienna convention on nuclear liability. Important for MOU and will facilitate private investment.
- Urge Ukraine to support our joint effort to establish truly global regime for nuclear liability.

Nuclear Waste Convention

- Given your concerns about nuclear waste, pleased Ukraine is participating in nuclear waste convention negotiations.

Program to Combat Smuggling and Security of Nuclear Materials

- Appreciate good progress we have made on protecting nuclear material in Ukraine, in particular regarding weapon-grade enriched uranium at civilian sites.
- Pleased Ukraine is first country outside P-8 to adopt the program on illicit trafficking.
- Glad Ukraine shares our concerns about preventing nuclear smuggling.

Trilateral Agreement Implementation (if necessary)

- Hope problem of Russian compensation for tactical nuclear warheads can be resolved soon.
- Have urged both Russia and Ukraine to meet commitments according to terms of Trilateral Statement, vital to all of our interest.
- Completion of our trilateral goals can make 1996 a historic year for all.

PRESS MATERIALS

PRESS MATERIALS

POOL SPRAY FOR SUMMIT OPENING

- U.S. and P-8 partners here to continue cooperative effort to strengthen safety and security of nuclear installations and materials. We must make sure such installations and materials not vulnerable to theft, misuse or accident.
- Fitting that we are in Moscow, because Russia has much to contribute. President Yeltsin a leader on nuclear safety and security.
- On some issues, I want to announce new steps, in others, that we are clearly moving toward greater cooperation.

We already have track record we can be proud of:

- Trilateral agreement between Russia, U.S. and Ukraine has paid benefits for both security and safety.
- In past year, greatly increased cooperation with Russia to improve security at nuclear facilities.
- Programs in place to work together on nuclear safety improvements for Russia's reactors.
- We've begun working together to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.
- Goal is to build on common efforts, create new areas of achievement in nuclear safety and security.

POOL SPRAY FOR SUMMIT CLOSING

- Today took on some of most difficult issues our nations face as we look to 21st century.
- Agreement of leaders to work together to achieve truly Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty this year a major accomplishment, almost forty years in making.
- Made leap from Cold War nuclear confrontation to nuclear cooperation on number of fronts:
 - Agreed that safety must come first where nuclear power is concerned.
 - Agreed that, as we approach tenth anniversary of Chornobyl tragedy, must recommit to preventing recurrence of similar tragedies. Leaders reiterated strong commitment to G-7's agreement with Ukraine to close Chernobyl.
 - Have called for end to ocean dumping of radio active materials, stronger international regime of financial liability for nuclear accidents and reforms in energy sector to put nuclear safety on sound footing.
 - Agreed on common action plan to combat illegal trafficking in nuclear materials and to reduce the risk that nuclear materials will be diverted to dangerous hands. Joined in welcoming Ukraine's decision to participate in action plan.
- Also began to address related, and complex, question of how to dispose safely of excess plutonium, to ensure it will never again be used for nuclear weapons.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

STATEMENT BY THE PRESS SECRETARY

The President met with the leaders of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and the United Kingdom met in Moscow on April 19-20, 1996, for a summit on nuclear safety and security. President Kuchma of Ukraine joined the discussion on April 20.

The leaders discussed and approved concrete steps to improve nuclear safety, guard the environment, fight illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and reduce stockpiles of excess fissile materials removed from dismantled nuclear weapons. President Clinton and the other leaders assembled for this summit joined together in issuing a clear, united statement calling on all nations to support the signing of a truly comprehensive nuclear test ban by September of this year.

The United States and our partners in the P-8 have vigorously pursued bilateral and multilateral efforts to deal with the challenges of nuclear safety and security. Russia and the U.S. engage in a broad range of cooperation on nuclear reactor safety, the safe management of radioactive waste and efforts to improve the security of nuclear materials. At the summit, the leaders announced a new, multilateral action plan to combat illegal trafficking in nuclear materials. They also agreed on steps toward international cooperation to dispose of excess plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons.

The Summit illustrates the strong positive role that Russia is prepared to play to advance the common environmental and security agenda it shares with other great powers. In addition to hosting the event, Russia made important contributions to the success of the Summit. This is exemplified by President Yeltsin's commitment on behalf of Russia to play an active role in furthering the programs the leaders agreed upon in this summit, including the program to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and cooperation to improve the safety of Soviet-designed reactors operating in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

The participation of Ukraine added further impetus to the efforts of the P-8 and permitted the group to address additional nuclear safety issues, including those surrounding the Chornobyl reactor.

#

UPDATE ON OFFICIAL SUMMIT DOCUMENTS
WILL BE PROVIDED BY THE FRENCH
EMBASSY ON THURSDAY OR FRIDAY.

31 March 1996

Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit Declaration

1. The end of the cold war and the political and economic reforms in Russia have opened a new era in our relationship and have provided the international community with real possibilities for cooperation in the fields of nuclear safety and security. The Moscow meeting is an important step in the realization of these objectives. We are determined, at this summit and beyond, to work together to ensure the safety of nuclear power and to promote greater security for nuclear materials.

2. We are committed to give an absolute priority to safety in the use of nuclear energy. As we approach the tenth anniversary of the Chernobyl accident, it is our shared objective that such a catastrophe cannot reoccur.

We are ready to cooperate among ourselves so that the use of nuclear energy is conducted all over the world consistently with fundamental principles of nuclear safety. Further, we are committed to measures which will enable nuclear power, already a significant contributor to electricity supply in those countries choosing to exploit it, to continue in the next century to play an important role in meeting future world energy demand consistent with the goal of sustainable development agreed at the Rio Conference in 1992.

We recognize the importance of openness and transparency to obtain public trust which is a key factor for the use of nuclear energy.

3. The security of all nuclear material is an essential part of the responsible and peaceful use of nuclear energy. In particular, the safe management of fissile material, including material resulting from the dismantling of nuclear weapons, is imperative, not least as a safeguard against any risk of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.

4. In the spirit of the decisions adopted during the New-York Conference of May 1995 on review and extension of the NPT, including the Decision on principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, we will increase our cooperation in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament i.a. by promoting universal adherence to the NPT, working vigorously to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system and through effective and responsible export control measures. We are issuing a separate statement on CTBT. We renew our commitment to the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Nuclear Safety

5. Recognizing that the prime responsibility for nuclear safety rests with national governments, it is of the first importance to continue to enhance international collaborative efforts to promote a high level of nuclear safety worldwide.

Safety of Civilian Nuclear Reactors

6. Nuclear safety has to prevail over all other considerations. We reaffirm our commitment to the highest internationally recognized safety level for the siting, design, construction, operation and regulation of nuclear power installations.

7. The promotion of an effective nuclear safety culture in each country with nuclear installations is essential to that end.

8. Sustainable nuclear safety also requires a supportive economic and legal environment whereby both operators and national regulatory bodies can fully assume their independent responsibilities.

9. Nuclear safety can also be enhanced by greater international transparency in nuclear power activities, in particular by means of peer reviews, and this should lead to existing reactors which do not meet current safety requirements being brought to an acceptable level of safety or ceasing operation.

10. The adoption of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, which reaffirms these fundamental safety principles, is a major accomplishment in this field. We urge all countries to sign this Convention and to complete internal procedures to join so that the Convention can be brought into force expeditiously certainly before the end of 1996.

11. National efforts have been made in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States to improve nuclear safety levels, often in cooperation with multilateral and bilateral programmes. In this regard, we acknowledge these important efforts to upgrade reactor safety and improve safety culture, but note that further substantial progress is still required. We reaffirm our commitment to cooperate fully for this purpose.

Nuclear Liability

12. An effective nuclear liability regime must assure adequate compensation to victims of, and for damage caused by, nuclear accidents. In addition, to secure the degree of private sector involvement needed to undertake vital safety improvements, the regime should at the same time protect industrial suppliers from unwarranted legal action.

13. The essential principles in this area are the exclusive and strict liability of the operator of the nuclear installations and ensuring needed financial security for adequate compensation.

14. It is essential that countries with nuclear installations that have not yet done so establish an effective regime for liability for nuclear damage corresponding to these principles.

15. It is important to work together on enhancing the international regime of liability for nuclear damage with a view to ensuring that it will attract wide adherence and accommodate any state which may wish to become a party. We encourage the experts to make further progress to this end. In this connection, the reinforcement of regional cooperation is welcomed.

Energy Sector Strategies in transition countries

16. Efficient market-oriented strategies for energy sector reform are essential to promote nuclear safety. This will generate adequate resources for investment in safety upgrades and maintenance, and encourage energy conservation. All countries in transition should pursue such market-oriented reforms and investment strategies based upon least cost planning, giving due regard to nuclear safety and environmental criteria, and to energy efficiency and conservation.

17. The International Financial Institutions have played a leading role in developing market-oriented energy sector reforms and investment plans. Their continued involvement and support is critical to ensure further progress.

Nuclear waste Management

International Convention

18. National authorities must ensure radioactive waste is managed safely and that provisions are made for its proper handling, storage and ultimate disposal. These are essential elements for any nuclear energy programme.

19. The development of the Convention on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, based on these principles, is of paramount importance. We call on all countries generating nuclear waste with nuclear installations to participate actively in the preparation of this Convention under the auspices of the I.A.E.A. and to encourage its effective finalisation and prompt adoption.

Ocean Dumping

20. We commit ourselves to ban dumping at sea of radioactive waste and encourage all states to adhere at the earliest possible date to the 1993 amendment of the London Convention.

Nuclear Material Security

Programme on Preventing and Combatting illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material.

21. Illicit trafficking of nuclear material is a public safety and non-proliferation concern. We recognized the importance of this issue at our meetings in Naples and Halifax. As risks continue to exist, we have agreed on, and released, a programme on preventing and combatting illicit trafficking in nuclear material to ensure increased cooperation among our governments in all aspects of prevention, detection, exchange of information, investigation and prosecution in cases of illicit nuclear trafficking.

We call on other governments to join us in implementing this programme.

Nuclear Material Control, Accountancy and Physical Protection.

22. We reaffirm the fundamental responsibility of nations to ensure the security of all nuclear materials in their possession and the need to ensure that they are subject to effective systems of nuclear material accounting and control and physical protection. These systems should include regulations, licensing and inspections. We express our support for the I.A.E.A. safeguards regime, which plays a critical role in providing assurance against the diversion of nuclear material going undetected. We underline the need for the urgent strengthening of I.A.E.A. capabilities to detect undeclared nuclear activities. We note that these measures are also conducive to preventing illicit trafficking of nuclear material.

23. We recognize the importance of continually improving systems and technologies for controlling and protecting nuclear materials. We urge nations to cooperate bilaterally, multilaterally and through the I.A.E.A. to ensure that the national systems for controlling nuclear materials remain effective. We are encouraged by the wide array of cooperative projects underway in this field under bilateral and multilateral auspices and pledge to sustain and increase these efforts.

.../...

24. We urge ratification by all states of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and encourage the application of the I.A.E.A. recommendations on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material .

25. We pledge our support for efforts to ensure that all sensitive nuclear material (separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium) designated as not intended for use for meeting defence requirements is safely stored, protected and placed under I.A.E.A. safeguards (in the Nuclear Weapon States, under the relevant voluntary offer I.A.E.A.-safeguards agreements) as soon as it is practicable to do so.

Safe and effective Management of weapons fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes.

26. Major steps have been taken in recent years towards nuclear disarmament. This has created substantial stocks of fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes. It is vital, as mentioned above, that these stockpiles are safely managed and eventually transformed into spent fuel or other forms equally unusable for nuclear weapons and disposed of safely and permanently.

27. The primary responsibility for the safe management of weapons fissile material rests with the nuclear weapons states themselves, but other states and international organizations are welcome to assist where desired.

28. We welcome the steps that the United States and the Russian Federation have taken to blend highly-enriched uranium (HEU) from dismantled nuclear weapons to low-enriched uranium (LEU) for peaceful non-explosive purposes, and the cooperation programs of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States of America and other states with the Russian Federation for the safe storage, the peaceful uses of fissile material released by the dismantlement of nuclear weapons, and their safe and secure transportation for that purpose; we encourage other efforts along these lines .

29. We are determined to identify appropriate strategies for the management of fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes. Options include safe and secure long-term storage, vitrification or other methods of permanent disposal, and conversion into mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) for use in nuclear reactors. We have agreed to share relevant experience and expertise to elaborate and implement these strategies. We welcome plans to conduct small-scale technology demonstrations related to these options, including the possibility of establishing pilot projects and plants. We shall convene an international meeting of experts in order to examine available options and identify possible development of international cooperation in the implementation of these national strategies, bearing in mind technical, economic, non-proliferation, environmental and other relevant considerations. The meeting will take place in France by the end of 1996.

30. We recognize the importance of ensuring transparency in the management of highly enriched uranium and plutonium designated as no longer required for defence purposes.

*
* *

A background document on "Nuclear Safety", "Nuclear Material Control, Accountancy and Physical Protection" and "Safe and effective management of weapons fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes" is being released separately.

FINAL 31 MARCH 1996 (15:00)

STATEMENT ON CTBT

We affirmed our commitment to conclude and sign a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT) by September 1996. We agreed that a CTBT will be a concrete step toward the achievement of one of the highest priority objectives of the international community in the field of disarmament and non proliferation, and the fulfillment of the obligations under article VI of the Treaty on the non proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT). We also agreed that the CTBT must prohibit any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. We affirmed that this would constitute a truly comprehensive nuclear test ban.

In this connection, we recalled the importance of the Decision on Principles and Objectives for nuclear Non Proliferation and Disarmament adopted on 11 May 1995.

9 avril 1996

STATEMENT ON UKRAINE

We met on 20 April 1996 with President KUCHMA of Ukraine and together examined a wide range of issues to improve nuclear safety and security. We agreed to continue our bilateral and multilateral cooperation with Ukraine in this field.

President KUCHMA announced Ukraine's endorsement of the Programme on Preventing and Combatting Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material and expressed his willingness to support the objectives and actions described in the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit declaration. President KUCHMA also endorsed the statement on CTBT.

The importance of President KUCHMA's decision to close Chernobyl by the Year 2000 in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding signed on 20 December 1995 with all its provisions was recognized.

The signatories to the Memorandum reaffirmed their commitment to its full implementation and will cooperate closely with Ukraine and with International Development Banks on measures to support Ukraine's decision. For his part, President KUCHMA confirmed Ukraine's willingness to cooperate actively and efficiently within the framework of the Memorandum.

**PROGRAMME FOR PREVENTING AND COMBATING ILLICIT
TRAFFICKING IN NUCLEAR MATERIAL**

Illicit trafficking in nuclear material* continues to pose a global proliferation risk and a potential danger to public health and safety. Our heads of state and government recognized the importance of this issue at their meetings in Naples and Halifax. The criminal diversion of nuclear material could assist states or terrorist groups to bypass the carefully crafted controls of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and permit them to construct or otherwise acquire a nuclear or radiological weapon. The majority of cases, so far, have involved only small amounts of fissile material or material of little use for weapon's purposes, and many apprehended nuclear traffickers have been swindlers or petty thieves. Nevertheless, cases of illicit nuclear trafficking continue to occur. Accordingly, we have concluded that increased cooperation among our governments to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear material will contribute to increased international security and public safety, and to achievement of global non-proliferation objectives.

International efforts to suppress illicit trafficking in nuclear material should address several fundamental aspects of the problem :

* safe and secure storage of nuclear material and effective material protection, control, and accounting to prevent its diversion ;

* cooperative intelligence, customs, and law enforcement efforts to prevent the transportation and sale of diverted material .

* and joint efforts to identify and suppress illicit supply of, and demand for, nuclear material and to deter potential traffickers.

In addition, nuclear material released by the dismantling of nuclear weapons and no longer required for defence purposes must be safely, affordably, and effectively stored, protected and controlled, until it can be used for non-explosive purposes or safely and permanently disposed of. This material must also be placed under international safeguards as soon as it is practical to do so.

The international community's response to these challenges should draw upon and further reinforce the existing instruments and organizations of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. These include universal adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the

* As defined by Article XX of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Principles and Objectives agreed at the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference, and to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, as well as application of the recommendations on physical protection made by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Cooperation within the framework of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group is important in the fight against illicit trafficking.

The storage and control of nuclear material is, first and foremost, a national responsibility but the international community should support national efforts by providing coordinated assistance, where needed, to ensure that all nuclear material is safely and securely stored and accurately and effectively controlled and accounted for. Cooperative assistance involving the IAEA, the European Union, or other arrangements should be maintained and adequately funded.

In order to strengthen our collective response to illicit trafficking in nuclear material we will :

- * regularly share and promptly disseminate, in accordance with the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, information on nuclear theft and smuggling incidents ;

- * exchange information on significant incidents in this area, especially if sensitive material is involved, and establish appropriate national points of contact for this purpose ;

- * foster enhanced cooperation and coordination among our national intelligence, customs, and law enforcement agencies and cooperation with those other concerned countries in order to ensure prompt investigation and successful prosecution in cases of illicit nuclear trafficking ;

- * vigilantly discharge our national responsibility to ensure the effective storage, protection, control and accounting of nuclear material in our respective territories ;

- * exchange experience and advice among ourselves and make it available to others and support efforts to provide appropriate assistance to ensure safe and effective nuclear material storage, protection, control, and accounting ;

- * maintain effective national systems of export licensing and control, which are important to deter and prevent illicit trafficking, and encourage and assist other states to do the same ;

* support efforts to define training requirements pertaining to detection of concealed nuclear material, radiation protection, safe handling and transportation of nuclear material and radiation protection, for law enforcement agencies (customs, police) in accordance with their respective tasks and closely coordinate relevant training activities in this area.

* support the exchange of scientific information and data to permit the identification of the origin, history, and route of seized illicit nuclear material ;

* support efforts to ensure that all sensitive nuclear material (separated plutonium and highly-enriched uranium) not intended for use in meeting defence requirements is safely and effectively stored and protected and placed under IAEA safeguards (in the Nuclear Weapon States, under the relevant voluntary offer IAEA-safeguards agreements) as soon as it is practical to do so ;

* work to strengthen the effective application of IAEA safeguards and encourage all states to provide adequate funding for them ;

* seek to identify strategies for the safe, effective, and affordable peaceful use of nuclear material no longer required for defence purposes or for its safe permanent disposal ;

* encourage bilateral and other assistance and cooperation arrangements in the above areas and support their appropriate coordination to ensure that they are complementary and mutually reinforcing and to avoid needless duplication of effort ;

* promote universal adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which remains the fundamental basis for all international efforts to prevent the illicit spread of nuclear material, technology and expertise ;

* contribute to the enhanced Treaty review process and implement the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament agreed at the 1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference ; and

* work to promote the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

March 27, 1996

Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit

Nuclear Safety

Peaceful and safe uses of nuclear energy will be important for the international community as it approaches the next century, when energy consumption is likely to grow sharply. Use of nuclear energy and ensuring its safety are two sides of the same coin. Countries using nuclear energy must put "safety first"

This document provides some background information under each of the items "Safety of Civilian Reactors" and "Nuclear Waste Management" for the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit. These two issues encompass :

- . Principles of nuclear safety, including support for early entry into force of the Convention on Nuclear Safety.
- . Progress on establishing effective regimes on liability for nuclear damage in all countries with nuclear facilities.
- . The importance of energy sector strategies in supporting nuclear safety.
- . Encouragement of the negotiations on the Convention on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.
- . Commitments on Ocean-Dumping.

Safety of Civilian Nuclear Reactors

1) Principles of nuclear safety, including support for early entry into force of the Convention on Nuclear Safety

Although essentially a national responsibility, in light of the consequences of a major nuclear disaster, all states have a legitimate concern that nuclear power is managed safely everywhere. Over the years, an expanding international infrastructure and international consensus focused on nuclear safety has developed. It is based on an array of binding legal instruments, internationally recognized safety principles, expert review and advisory services and international assistance. This includes an obligation to bring existing reactors that do not meet today's safety requirements to an acceptable level of safety or cease operation.

A general understanding has developed that nuclear safety is the prime responsibility of nuclear operators within a legally binding national regulatory framework operating independently with adequate technical support. The operator and the regulator can only exercise their responsibilities in an appropriate economic and legal environment where they have access to a stable source of revenue. (See energy sector strategies below.)

The G-7 strategy to help improve nuclear safety of the Soviet designed reactors of Central and Eastern Europe countries and the Newly Independent States was developed at the Munich Summit in 1992 and was complemented by decisions taken at subsequent Summits. There have been a number of initiatives undertaken since then for nuclear safety improvements and for the strengthening of regulatory regimes. These include the establishment of the Nuclear Safety Account managed by the EBRD, the G-24 coordinating mechanism, the European Union PHARE and TACIS programmes, the Euratom loan facility, coordinated support from the international financial institutions for energy sector reform, and bilateral cooperation projects. In addition, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States have taken actions themselves to improve safety and strengthen their regulatory bodies.

The Moscow Nuclear Summit highlights progress to date and reinforces the importance of partnership among the participants of the Summit in addressing safety concerns.

A major accomplishment in the nuclear safety area was the adoption in June 1994 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. As of March 1996, it has been signed by 62 countries and ratified or accepted by sixteen, twelve of which have nuclear installations. Ratification by twenty-two States -- seventeen with nuclear installations -- is necessary for entry into force.

The Nuclear Safety Convention codifies fundamental safety principles concerning the regulation, management and operation of nuclear installations and the obligation to establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory framework. An important feature of the Convention is the obligation to submit reports for review at meetings of the Parties that are to be held on a periodic basis. This approach is based on peer review principles that aim to encourage international collaboration and transparency in the achievement and maintenance of nuclear safety.

2) Progress on establishing effective regimes on liability for nuclear damage in all countries with nuclear facilities

There are two international conventions establishing international norms in the area of liability for third party damages in the event of a nuclear accident. These are: the Paris Convention, parties to which are from Western Europe, and the Vienna Convention, the parties to which include nations from various parts of the world. The conventions establish that nuclear operators (not suppliers) are strictly liable for third party nuclear damages and that others are excluded from liability. They are interlinked through the joint protocol. They also require financial security of a certain amount to cover this liability. Most European nations are members of either one or the other convention. Canada, Japan, Russia, and the United States, among other countries, are not party to either convention. Canada, Japan, and the United States have effective domestic legislation concerning nuclear liability, which channels liability to the operator. Russia proceeds in the same direction and recently adopted relevant framework national legislation.

The strict and exclusive liability channelled to the operator and mandatory operator financial security are important features of international conventions and domestic legislation in this area. While the primary objective of liability regimes is to ensure the protection of potential victims of nuclear damage, without channelling of liability to the operator, suppliers and manufacturers would not contract to the nuclear industry because of the potential risks involved. Western suppliers are reluctant to enter into significant nuclear projects and safety upgrades, absent adequate protection against legal action in the event of an accident.

Recently, many countries in Eastern and Central Europe have adhered to the Vienna Convention and have consequently adopted, or are adopting, appropriate domestic legislation to channel liability to the facility operators. Russia and some other states, including Ukraine have embarked on the development of domestic nuclear liability legislation. Some Western countries and the European Commission have secured bilateral agreements to permit the necessary government-funded safety work to proceed. Further progress on the issue of liability would allow greater cooperation in safety upgrades and overall nuclear commerce between Western contractors and operators in Eastern and Central Europe and in the Newly Independent States.

Discussions have been held for some time on the revision of the Vienna Convention and on the establishment of a global supplementary funding system. Many issues associated with the revision of the Vienna Convention have now been resolved through these discussions, but several important questions of principle are still to be addressed. As for the elaboration of a supplementary funding convention, new progress has recently been achieved. The IAEA Board of Governors has urged the IAEA Standing Committee on Nuclear Liability reviewing the Vienna Convention to intensify its efforts in order that a diplomatic conference may be convened.

The further enhancement of the global civilian liability system, including supplementary funding, is considered by many to be a worthwhile goal. The progress being made in the IAEA Standing Committee in order to develop a global regime to which any country could become a part is welcome. Such a global regime would aid the provision of victim compensation in the event of a nuclear accident causing transboundary damage as well as encourage international trade and cooperation in nuclear safety equipment and services. Such a goal will be facilitated if countries with nuclear installations have adopted appropriate domestic legislation based upon accepted international principles.

3) The importance of energy sector strategies in supporting nuclear safety

Effective strategies for energy sector restructuring are essential to nuclear safety. Energy sector restructuring should contain, as integral elements, provisions for pricing and tariff reform, and for prompt payment for electricity supplies. This will generate adequate cash flow for the utilities to undertake investment in safety upgrades and maintenance, as well as to encourage energy conservation. Full cost tariff policies would also mobilise domestic capital and encourage foreign direct investment. Such restructuring efforts should be seen as a comprehensive process with different initiatives proceeding in parallel, and facilitating early closure of those nuclear power plants that cannot be re-licensed. Decisions on closure should be taken in accordance with the provisions of the Convention on Nuclear Safety.

Bilateral as well as multilateral studies have reaffirmed the strong connection between power sector reform and nuclear safety. Examples include two recently completed studies, the U.S./Russian Joint Electric Power Alternatives Study and the IEA Russian Energy Sector Study, which have examined the Russian power sector and formulated a series of reform and investment recommendations. Their contribution to the development of these concepts is welcome. Among the main conclusions of the U.S./Russian Study mentioned above is the recognition that investments in nuclear power plant safety upgrading are competitive with investments in alternative energy sources and energy efficiency and that it is economic to continue the operation of existing nuclear power plants, provided that they can be re-licensed in accordance with internationally accepted safety standards.

The International Financial Institutions have a continuing role to play in supporting and promoting the implementation of effective strategies for energy sector reform. The EBRD Nuclear Safety Account Grant Agreements call for the completion of least-cost power sector plans and for safety assessments on nuclear reactors as an integral part of a licensing process. This will assist in assuring the safety of these reactors.

Nuclear Waste Management

1) Encouragement of the negotiations on the Convention on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management

Radioactive waste management issues are increasingly important to the public perception of nuclear energy. The preamble to the Convention on Nuclear Safety contains an affirmation of the need to develop a convention on the safety of radioactive waste management. Following general international agreement on safety fundamentals for the safe management of radioactive waste, work began in July, 1995 on the development of the Convention on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. This Convention will be useful to ensure that countries properly manage their waste to avoid unacceptable risks now or in the future to both the public and the environment. Good progress on developing a text has been made.

2) Commitments on Ocean Dumping

The London Convention of 1972, which entered into force in 1975, establishes international norms for the disposal of waste at sea and promotes the effective control of all sources of marine pollution. It included a prohibition on sea disposal of high level radioactive waste. It currently has 74 contracting parties including all Moscow Summit participants.

The parties agreed December 12, 1993 to ban sea disposal of all radioactive wastes or other radioactive matter, including low-level radioactive wastes. (This exempts material containing *de minimis* levels of radioactivity, as defined by the IAEA.) Russia has not yet accepted this Amendment.

In 1993, the Russian Federation discharged low level liquid wastes into the Sea of Japan. A joint Russian, Japanese and Korean study with Agency involvement has so far detected no elevated levels of radionuclides. As technical advisor under the London Convention, the IAEA has undertaken a 4 year *International Arctic Seas Assessment Project* to assess the health and environmental risks and to examine possible remedial actions. There are also joint Russian/Norwegian scientific cruises to the Kara Sea. As the Russian Federation does not currently have sufficient capacity to treat low level liquid waste arising from their Nordic and Pacific nuclear fleets, the United States, Japan, the Nordic countries and the Republic of Korea are assisting through bilateral and multilateral channels in construction of waste treatment facilities.

The Russian Federation has since *de facto* observed the ban and stated its intention to refrain from the dumping of radioactive wastes. This position was confirmed in a statement of the Russian and American Presidents in 1994, which included Russia's intention to continue its policy of voluntary adherence to the ban on radioactive waste disposal under the London Convention and eventually to join the ban.

NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING & CONTROL AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION

At this year's Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit, the importance of IAEA safeguards and of effective nuclear material accounting & control and physical protection in ensuring the security of nuclear material and preventing its diversion was reaffirmed. This constitutes a useful contribution to advancing the nuclear non-proliferation agenda. The work already accomplished in the area of improving nuclear material accounting and control and physical protection was stressed, further effort and cooperation where required were encouraged, and certain principles for nuclear material accounting & control and physical protection and their relation to global nuclear non-proliferation objectives reaffirmed.

The Summit reached a common understanding on the following :

- reaffirmation of support for the I.A.E.A. safeguards regime, which plays a critical role in providing assurance against the diversion of nuclear material going undetected, for an increased capability to detect undeclared nuclear activities, and for appropriately strengthening the regime where required ;

- recognition of the importance of effective nuclear material accounting & control and physical protection, of the fundamental responsibility of nations to ensure the security of all nuclear material in their possession and, to this end, of the necessity for effective national - including, where appropriate for this purpose, EURATOM - systems of nuclear material accounting & control and physical protection, including regulations, licensing, inspections, and state systems of accounting and control ;

- the need for adherence to clearly established standards and recommendations for nuclear material accounting and control and physical protection and for nations to ensure the effectiveness of national and facility-level accounting and control and physical protection procedures in relation to these standards and recommendations.

- urgent ratification by all States of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

To date, only 52 States and the European Community have ratified the Convention. To make the instrument truly effective, universal adherence is necessary;

- encouragement to State Parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to ensure that Convention Points of Contact are able to provide information promptly, and that response plans are prepared for incidents of loss or recovery of nuclear material ;

- reaffirmation of support for a strengthened and cost-effective safeguards system through the I.A.E.A.'s Program 93 plus 2 and recognize the need to implement comprehensive safeguards agreements designed to provide credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear materials from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared activities in accordance with obligations contained in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ;

- encouragement for the application of the I.A.E.A. recommendations on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material .

These recommendations provide useful guidance on measures for the physical protection of nuclear material in use, transit, and storage. The application of these recommendations, adapted as appropriate to national circumstances, would ensure a consistent and high level of security for both nuclear facilities and nuclear materials;

- encouragement to all States to apply the recommendations concerning physical protection in the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines (Infcirc 254/Rev. 2/Part II Annex C) ;

- support for the efforts to ensure that all sensitive nuclear material (separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium) designated as no longer required for defence purposes is safely and effectively stored and protected and placed under I.A.E.A.-safeguards (in the Nuclear Weapon States, under the relevant voluntary offer I.A.E.A.-safeguards agreements) as soon as it is practical to do so ;

- encouragement to additional international cooperation to help ensure effective material accounting & control and physical protection of all nuclear material including :

- international seminars to share appropriate expertise and foster technical contact ;
- bilateral exchanges involving expert collaboration in the development of systems of nuclear material accounting & control and physical protection for nuclear facilities ;
- training, when requested, to assist countries to improve their procedures and expertise ;
- exchanges of information to maximize the effectiveness of technical assistance and other collaborative programs and to avoid needless duplication of effort.

It welcomed the work that has already been accomplished in this field by the I.A.E.A., through bilateral assistance projects, and by the International Science and Technology Centres (ISTC) in Moscow and Kiev./.

**SAFE AND EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT
OF WEAPONS FISSILE MATERIAL DESIGNATED AS NO LONGER REQUIRED
FOR DEFENCE PURPOSES**

As a result of disarmament measures, there are growing stocks of weapons fissile material, separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU), designated as no longer required for defence purposes. It is the national responsibility of each state possessing such material to ensure that it is kept safely guarded so that it may not become the object of criminal diversion which would be a serious threat to the international non-proliferation regime.

This fissile material should be safely, affordably, and effectively stored and handled under physical protection, accounting and control measures that meet the highest international standards and that ensure effective non-proliferation controls, until it can be transformed into spent fuel or other forms equally unusable for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and safely and permanently disposed of.

Significant effort will be required for the storage, handling, and eventual disposal of this fissile material, and each state possessing fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes is responsible for its management, taking into account the need to avoid contributing to the risks of nuclear proliferation; the need to protect the environment, workers and the public; the resource value of the material; and the costs and benefits involved.

In the context of the Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security, Participants wished to comment upon the importance of this issue and to address the risks associated with these growing stocks of excess weapons fissile material. At the same time, they identified possible strategies for the safe and effective management of fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes. They reached a common understanding on the following:

- reaffirmation of their commitment to the *Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)*, to the *Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-*

Proliferation and Disarmament adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, especially the call for an early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and to the relevant nuclear disarmament agreements ;

- recognition that the primary responsibility for the safe management of weapons fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes rests with the nuclear weapons states themselves but that other states and international organizations are welcome to assist where desired ;
- support for efforts to rapidly ensure that separated plutonium and highly-enriched uranium, including that from dismantled weapons, are stored and handled under physical protection, accounting and control measures that meet the highest international standards and that ensure effective non-proliferation controls;
- the placing of fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes by the weapons states under IAEA-safeguards (under the relevant voluntary offer I.A.E.A. - safeguards agreements) as soon as it is practical to do so, consistently with non-proliferation, economic, safety and environmental requirements, and that appropriate resources for safeguarding these stocks should be provided ;
- the importance of the steps that the United States and the Russian Federation have taken to blend highly-enriched uranium (HEU) from dismantled nuclear weapons to low-enriched uranium (LEU) for peaceful non-explosive purposes, of the cooperation programs of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, the United States and other states with the Russian Federation for the safe storage, the peaceful uses of fissile material released by the dismantlement of nuclear weapons and their safe and secure transportation for that purpose, and of other efforts along these lines ;
- declaration that weapons fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes will never again be used for nuclear explosive purposes and that effective management of this material will aim to reduce stocks of separated plutonium and highly-enriched uranium (HEU) through peaceful non-explosive use or safe and final disposal as soon as practicable ; and

- recognition of the importance of increasing transparency in the management of plutonium designated as not required for defence purposes.

On the specific question of possible options for dealing with fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes, including - for plutonium - safe and secure long-term storage, vitrification or other methods of permanent disposal, or conversion into mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) for use in nuclear reactors, they reached a common understanding on :

- the urgent need to identify appropriate strategies and to share relevant experience and expertise to elaborate and implement these strategies ;
- their willingness to undertake small-scale technology demonstrations; and
- the convening of an international meeting of experts to examine available options and possible development of international cooperation in the implementation of these national strategies. Such a meeting should take place by the end of 1996.

Criteria for selecting appropriate national strategies for managing fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes, including safe and secure long-term storage, vitrification or other methods of permanent disposal, or conversion into mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) for use in nuclear reactors, were identified as :

- * reduction of the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices ;
- * effective transformation of the material into spent fuel or other forms equally unusable for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices ;
- * speed with which stockpiles of fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes are reduced ;
- * safety, physical protection, environmental protection ; and
- * other costs and benefits involved./.

5-6

**DRAFT TERMS OF REFERENCE
FOR INTERNATIONAL EXPERTS MEETING**

ON

**SAFE AND EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF WEAPONS FISSILE MATERIAL
DESIGNATED AS NO LONGER REQUIRED FOR DEFENCE PURPOSES.**

An international meeting of experts, in P8-format, with the participation also of Belgium, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and of the IAEA, shall take place in the second half of October 1996 in Paris. This meeting, as decided at the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit, will examine available options and identify possible development of international cooperation in the implementation of national strategies for safe and effective management of weapons fissile material designated, by each Nuclear Weapons States concerned, as no longer required for its defence needs.

The experts meeting will review all relevant political, non-proliferation, economic, environmental, technical and scientific aspects of the issue. All delegations, limited to a number of eight persons for P8 countries and four for others, are therefore anticipated to involve the participation of experts designated, by each Government, including as appropriate from its industry and scientific community.

The results of the meeting shall be reported by the Chair to the P8-NPEG, for consideration at the 1997 Summit. The P8-NPEG will also decide upon any follow-up to the meeting, including the possibility of convening further meetings.

The experts shall concentrate their work on the problems raised by the management of holdings of weapons plutonium designated as no longer required for defence purposes, bearing in mind that the nature and the objectives of this exercise also apply for similar holdings of highly enriched uranium.

The P8 agree to give to the meeting the following mandate:

i) review estimates of holdings of weapons plutonium designated as no longer required for defence purposes;

ii) exchange experience gained through on-going programs, either internally or through cooperation with other countries, and of information about planned activities.

iii) identify, in the light of work already done, the whole range of existing options by which that material might be :

- safely recycled in reactors.
- immobilized and placed in safe and environmentally acceptable permanent repositories ; or
- pending either of the above, prepared for and held in secure internationally verifiable long-term storage :

In doing so, the experts group shall assess the extent to which those options meet the criteria for selecting appropriate national strategies for managing fissile material no longer required for defence purpose, which are :

- reduction of the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices ;
- effective transformation of the material into spent fuel or other forms equally unusable for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices ;
- speed with which stockpiles of fissile material designated as no longer required for defence purposes are reduced ;
- safety, physical protection, accounting and control, transparency, environmental protection, best economic use of energy resources ; and
- other costs and benefits involved.

iv) review possible international cooperation to support national programmes charged with the management and disposition of such material and identification of collaborative projects to develop relevant technologies with industrial participation as appropriate.

These projects could include small-scale technology demonstrations which should complement and support existing work and cooperation programmes.

The international experts meeting shall report to the P8-NPEG preferably before the end of 1996, and, in any case, in time for presentation at the 1997 Summit./.

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: KSH Date: 12/30/2019

2016-0139-M

SECRET

MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Folder Title:

POTUS Trip to St. Petersburg, Moscow, Russia, April 18-21, 1996 (Exec Sec Briefing Book)

Staff Office-Individual:

Executive Secretary

Original OA/ID Number:

2585

Row:	Section:	Shelf:	Position:	Stack:
35	2	9	3	V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Anthony Lake to President William J. Clinton re: Your Meeting with President Yeltsin (4 pages)	04/12/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 4/3/2020
002. memo	Anthony Lake to President William J. Clinton re: Your Visit to St. Petersburg (2 pages)	04/12/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 4/3/2020
003. paper	Meeting/Working Lunch with Russian President Boris Yeltsin, includes talking points (12 pages)	04/00/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 4/3/2020
004. paper	Roundtable with Russian Political Leaders, includes talking points (3 pages)	04/00/1996	P1/b(1) KBH 4/3/2020

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
 National Security Council
 Executive Secretary
 OA/Box Number: 2585

FOLDER TITLE:

POTUS Trip to St. Petersburg, Moscow, Russia, April 18-21, 1996 (Exec Sec Briefing Book)

2016-0139-M
 kh1801

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: K&M Date: 12/30/2019
2016-0139-M



**THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO
ST. PETERSBURG AND
MOSCOW, RUSSIA**

APRIL 18-21, 1996

Office of the Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~

The President's Trip to St. Petersburg and Moscow, Russia, April 18-21, 1996

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 12, 1996

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By K&H NARA, Date 11/30/2019
2016-0139-M

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE *TL*

SUBJECT: Your Trip to Russia: Bilateral Program

The bilateral portion of your April visit to Russia comprises a private visit to St. Petersburg, a meeting/working lunch (on the Hyde Park model) with Russian President Yeltsin, and a round-table discussion at Spaso House with a small group of prominent Russian political figures, including several who are contending with Yeltsin for the presidency in June. This package provides your briefing and press materials. A separate memo provides material for the P-8 dinner/nuclear safety and security summit.

This briefing book contains:

SCOPE MEMORANDA

Scope Memorandum
Memorandum from Secretary Christopher

ST. PETERSBURG, APRIL 19

St. Petersburg Overview
Message Points
Scenesetters

MOSCOW, APRIL 21

MEETING/WORKING LUNCH WITH YELTSIN

Scenesetter
Meeting Paper (background, core objectives, points to make)
Remarks for Photo-op
Remarks for Joint Press Appearance

PRESS MATERIALS

Points to Make in Response to Press Questions

MEETING WITH OTHER POLITICAL LEADERS

Scenesetter

Meeting Paper (background, core objectives, points to make)

Remarks for Photo-op

1
**SCOPE
MEMORANDA**

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 12, 1996

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526
2016-0139-m (1.07)
KBH 12/30/2019

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE 

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with President Yeltsin

The Setting

With less than two months to go before the first-round balloting on June 16, Yeltsin is certain to be preoccupied with his electoral prospects -- and with the political boost that he hopes to get out of your and the other Western leaders' well-timed visits to Moscow. The flurry of rumors in late March about possible postponement of the election have since died down, and since then Yeltsin has said all the right things about proceeding with the balloting as planned. We cannot, however, rule out the possibility that he might resort to postponement by some quasi-legal device should those closest to Yeltsin convince him that he would lose.

To burnish his image as Russia's man of the hour, Yeltsin very much wants both the P-8 nuclear summit and his meeting with you to be successful. Success for Yeltsin, however, will be defined mostly in terms of good political theater -- in demonstrating to the Russian electorate his close relationship with the G-7 and with you, in particular. In part for this reason, we have seen little push on the Russian side to bring issues to closure to provide "deliverables." This reflects Yeltsin's own calculation that the message is the thing -- and that some problems are just too difficult or too controversial to try to wrap up now.

We do anticipate from the nuclear summit and your bilateral; a clear endorsement of a zero-yield comprehensive test ban and perhaps significant movement on CFE flank limits, but nothing to dominate global media. Your session with Yeltsin will be similar to Hyde Park in that regard -- a serious meeting in which you and the Russian president cover a range of issues in a workmanlike manner. We have kept public expectations for the meeting in check to ensure that the absence of flashy deliverables will not be seen as a failure.

The second most important event of the bilateral portion of your Moscow program will be the Spaso House roundtable discussion on April 21 to which we have invited, among others, the leading presidential aspirants, including Communist Party leader Gennadiy Zyuganov, former Army General Aleksander Lebed and reformer Grigoriy Yavlinskiy. The format of this event will closely resemble the breakfast at Spaso last May in Moscow. We suggest you begin the discussion with short introductory comments, then pose several questions for discussion and invite responses.

We expect about a dozen Russians to take part. The roundtable will enable you to bring home to the Russians our support for political pluralism. It will also demonstrate to Russian and American audiences alike that our policy, although keyed to reform and reformers, permits a dialogue with Russian political leaders of various hues.

Your visit to St. Petersburg on April 19 -- before you meet with Yeltsin in Moscow -- will be a low-key affair, in keeping with the Russian government's preference that it be a private program. Five years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the city has regained some its lost allure and has begun to function once again as Russia's "window to the West." Russians throughout the country will deeply appreciate your visit to the Piskaryevskoye Cemetery, which contains the remains of many of the 800,000 Leningraders who perished during the 1941-44 German siege.

The Bilateral Meeting with Yeltsin

The Russians have adapted the Hyde Park formula for your meeting with Yeltsin -- a one-on-one session, followed by a working lunch with expanded participation. The venue will be Yeltsin's dacha at Novo-Ogarevo (where you dined in January 1994), which should lend a note of informality to the proceedings.

We suggest you open by complimenting Yeltsin on the success of the previous day's P-8 sessions on nuclear safety and security, noting both the substantive and political importance of the event. You will want to underscore the importance of what the two of you have managed to achieve since 1993 and the need to insulate the core of the relationship from the political buffeting that is inevitable in an election year.

Yeltsin is likely to seize on this to review the Russian political scene, update you on the status of his own campaign and inquire about your own prospects. You will want to be alert to any sign that Yeltsin might be preparing the ground with you for a possible decision on his part to postpone the June election. If he does, you will need to respond immediately, citing both the danger to his stature as Russia's leading democrat and the

altogether negative impact such an announcement would have on our relations: we would have no choice but to make our strong opposition to any such postponement clear and public.

Following the political discussion might be the most appropriate time to celebrate with Yeltsin the P-8 statement endorsing a zero-yield CTBT, our cooperation in Bosnia and at Sharm al-Shaykh and bilateral progress on economic issues. In this context, and building on Secretary Christopher's meetings with Foreign Minister Primakov in February and March, you will want to underscore to Yeltsin the need to avoid surprises and to keep close tabs on your respective bureaucracies. (The Russians badly mishandled the question of U.S. poultry imports; timely political intervention could have contained the problem.)

You might want to use the "no-surprises" theme to segue into two problem areas: the CFE flank issue and the June NATO ministerial. We are getting close to a deal on CFE that meets both Russian and Turkish concerns, and you will want to secure from Yeltsin an endorsement of the so-called "geography for numbers" formula that we have put on the table. If still unresolved when the CFE Review Conference convenes in May, the issue could play out in ways prejudicial to both our interests and our broader relations.

As for the NATO ministerial, you will be able to assure Yeltsin that it will take no steps on enlargement that would highlight the question prior to the Russian election. We do not recommend an extensive discussion on NATO. Yeltsin remains highly unpredictable on this score, and his domestic political situation precludes him from showing any flexibility on enlargement in any event. You have contingency points in the event he seeks to prolong this discussion.

You will want to address some other issues in the one-on-one. On ABM/TMD, the objective is to convince Yeltsin to de-link the two parts of the prospective agreement and come to closure on Part I (on lower velocity TMD systems), while we continue to discuss Part II (on higher velocity TMD systems). On Chechnya, fighting continues, albeit at a reduced level. While commending him for announcing the army's phased withdrawal and the intensification of the negotiating track, you should impress upon him the urgent need to achieve a durable political settlement. And you may want to put down a marker regarding nuclear cooperation with Iran.

Yeltsin is very likely to press hard on a "G-8," as he did in your April 9 phone conversation. You should resist, though you can note how we are prepared to structure the P-8 session in Lyons to make clear Russia's increasing involvement.

We suggest you focus discussion at the working lunch on economic and regional issues. On the former, you can congratulate Yeltsin on the IMF program and note the importance of continued reform.

Yeltsin is scheduled to visit China April 24-26 and will likely want a read-out of your trips to Japan and Korea; this will provide an opportunity to underscore our shared interest in peace and stability in East Asia. You might also touch on NIS integration, both to draw Yeltsin out on his understanding of the process and to signal our own strong view that integration among former Soviet republics must be voluntary, non-exclusive and outwardly oriented. Relations between Russia and Ukraine are near the top of Yeltsin's foreign policy agenda, and you might ask for a status report. Finally, and time permitting, you should mention our continuing interest in helping to promote peace in Nagorno-Karabakh; ask Yeltsin for his assessment and press him a bit on Russian plans for this troubled region.

Schedule

You arrive in St. Petersburg from Tokyo late Thursday, April 18, for a private visit. Anatoliy Sobchak, St. Petersburg's reformist mayor, will likely greet you at the airport. Your schedule on Friday includes a wreath-laying ceremony at Piskaryevskoye Cemetery and visits to a number of the city's landmarks. We suggest that you offer brief remarks -- what we are calling "message points" -- at several venues: the cemetery, Kazan Cathedral and the Hermitage that will, in a low-key manner, underscore our support for the changes sweeping Russia. You are scheduled to depart St. Petersburg for Moscow at 4:30 p.m.

On arrival in Moscow early Friday evening, you proceed directly to the Kremlin for the P-8 dinner hosted by Yeltsin. Saturday morning will be devoted to nuclear summit events, at the conclusion of which President Kuchma of Ukraine will join the group for lunch and an afternoon session. You will meet with the press at our filing center.

Sunday morning you travel to Yeltsin's dacha for the bilateral meeting, working lunch and press availability. Following the bilateral session, you return to Spaso House for the roundtable discussion with other political leaders, after which you head for the airport and wheels up for home.

CHRISTOPHER SCOPE PAPER

TO BE PROVIDED

ST. PETERSBURG
APRIL 19

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 12, 1996

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 13526

2016-0139-M (1.02)
KBH 12/30/2019

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE *AL*

SUBJECT: Your Visit to St. Petersburg

Overview. You travel to St. Petersburg before Moscow and before seeing Yeltsin, and the Russians ask that your program be a private one. Mayor Sobchak will greet you at the airport and will accompany you to the wreath-laying at the Piskaryevskoye Cemetery, but protocol should be minimized for the balance of the program.

Although the birthplace of the 1917 "Great October Revolution," in the five years since Communism's collapse St. Petersburg has built a reputation as an engine of reform. Indeed, the city bucked the country-wide leftist and nationalist tide in the December 1995 Duma election, awarding six of its eight single-mandate seats to candidates from the pro-reform Yabloko and Democratic Choice of Russia parties while giving the other two to liberal independents. A recent city poll showed Yeltsin with 22 percent, leading Yabloko leader Yavlinskiy with 16 percent and Communist Party chief Zyuganov with 12 percent.

Russia's "window to the West" since its founding almost 300 years ago by Peter the Great, the city has regained much of the allure it lost during the Communist period. Set on the banks of the Neva River, with a series of canals and older buildings in the baroque and neo-classical styles, St. Petersburg is beautiful as Moscow is stolid.

Your Schedule. Time permitting, you will view Catherine's Palace immediately after your arrival in St. Petersburg the evening of Thursday, April 18. Your Friday schedule begins with a wreath-laying at Piskaryevskoye Cemetery, which interns many of the 800,000 Leningraders who perished during the three-year German siege during World War II. This is the only formal event on your program; it will be the one most appreciated by the Russians as a signal of American respect for Russia's wartime sacrifice.

Following the cemetery, candidates for your visits include the Russian Museum, the Church on the Spilled Blood, a market square

(with the chance to meet some regular Russians) and the Kazan Cathedral -- the Museum of Atheism and Religion during the Communist years but now under restoration and slated to become the city's main church. After an informal lunch, you'll have a chance to tour the Hermitage. There may be time to drive by some other famous city landmarks, such as the Peter and Paul Fortress, before heading for the airport and departure for Moscow.

Message Points. Consistent with the desire you expressed at the March 29 briefing on Russia, we have looked for ways to underscore U.S. recognition of the changes sweeping Russia and support for political and economic reform there. Your schedule offers three excellent opportunities and we propose to take advantage of them by "message points" -- brief comments (one or two minutes maximum) that you would offer at the end of each stop:

- (1) *Piskaryevskoye Cemetery:* While remarks are inappropriate during the wreath-laying, on exit you will pass the eternal flame. You will briefly address a press pool there, noting your respect for the sacrifice of the Russian people during the war and your commitment to ensuring that there is never again such a conflagration.
- (2) *Kazan Cathedral:* The restoration from the Museum of Atheism and Religion to a functioning Russian Orthodox church underscores the revival of religion in Russia -- made possible by political change and the freedom of religion. We suggest that, on exit, you make a few informal remarks commenting on the significance of this development to the press pool.
- (3) *The Hermitage.* We will organize a meeting with a group of Russian students in one of the rooms of the museum. That will offer an opportunity for you to give a short message on how we view Russia's future -- and on how they should seize the opportunities that democracy makes possible for them.

ST. PETERSBURG SCENESETTERS

Catherine Palace

A palace was first built at Tsarkoye Selo (Pushkin), just outside of St. Petersburg, in 1719-23 by Peter the Great's wife Catherine, after whom it is named. Today's exuberant baroque palace was built by the architect Bartolommeo Rastrelli for Peter's daughter, Empress Elizabeth, in 1751-56. The richly decorated blue and white facade is 306 meters long. Its interiors are correspondingly magnificent. About 200 kilograms of gold were used to gild the interiors and facade. Elizabeth's successor, Catherine the Great, added a graceful gallery designed by architect Charles Cameron in the classical style.

During World War II, the Nazis virtually gutted the palace and it had to be reconstructed almost completely. Among the rooms which were lost is the famous Amber Room. The amber panels that once decorated the room were presented to Peter the Great in 1717 by Friedrich Wilhelm I of Prussia. Empress Elizabeth had them installed in the Catherine palace in 1755. Reportedly the Nazis dismantled the room and shipped it to Germany, but the panels have never been located. Restoration of the Amber Room is underway, but progress is slow due to high costs.

Piskaryevskoye Memorial Cemetery

The President will lay a wreath at this cemetery, in remembrance of the victims of the 900-day Nazi siege of Leningrad. More than 500,000 soldiers and civilians lie buried in mass graves marked only with the year in which they died -- 1941, 1942, 1943 and 1944 -- and a star if military, a hammer and sickle if civilian.

While the significance of the wartime sacrifice may have faded for younger Russians, St. Petersburg's older generation remains proud that the city never surrendered. Nazi forces entered the Leningrad region in July 1941 and by September had severed the last land link between the city and the rest of the country. Dependent on limited stores and meager supplies smuggled in winter across frozen Lake Ladoga, the city's inhabitants suffered horribly. Daily food rations dropped to a tiny slice of bread. In one month, 10,000 people succumbed to starvation and disease. Soviet forces finally broke the siege in 1944.

The memorial, designed by architect Yevgeny Levinson and sculptors Vera Isayeva and Robert Taurit, opened on May 9, 1960, the fifteenth anniversary of the end of the war in Europe. On the wall surrounding the statue of Mother Russia is engraved a verse by Olga Bergholz, a survivor of the siege, with the line "no one is forgotten, nothing is forgotten."

The Russian Museum

The Russian Museum contains one of the most extensive collections of Russian art in the country. The collection is best known for its medieval icons by Rublev and Theophanes the Greek and works by 19th-century Russian realists such as Repin. The collection also contains avant garde works by early 20th-century artists.

The museum is housed in the Mikhailovskiy Palace, built by architect Carlo Rossi in 1823 for Grand Duke Mikhail, the son of Tsar Paul I. With its majestic colonnaded facade, it is a model of Russian neo-classical design. Many of the palace's rich interiors were destroyed when the building was converted into a museum in the 1890s; however, the grand staircase and a few other rooms have survived.

Church on the Spilled Blood

The Church of the Resurrection was built on the spot where, in 1881, revolutionaries from the "People's Will" group assassinated Alexander II, hence its popular name "Our Savior on the Spilled Blood." Alexander Parland designed the church in a neo-Russian style reminiscent of St. Basil's in Moscow. The church took twenty years to build and was completed only in 1907. It was richly decorated with semi-precious stones and extensive mosaics and sits astride one of St. Petersburg's three canals.

Before the 1917 revolution, the church functioned as a memorial chapel, and only special services were held in it. During the communist era the church was closed as a hated symbol of Tsarism. It suffered severe damage when later used as a warehouse. Its restoration has just been completed, and it is expected to be reopened as a museum in May.

The Art Park

In a small square across the street from the Church on the Spilled Blood is an open air market for art and souvenirs. One can buy Russian lacquer boxes, dolls, jewelry, carved wooden toys, Communist memorabilia, etc. The assortment and prices are among the best in the city; bargaining is recommended. There are some stalls that have particularly good quality lacquer boxes. The "art market" is well-known in St. Petersburg.

Kazan Cathedral

The Cathedral of Our Lady of Kazan was built in 1801-11 by the Russian architect Andrei Voronikhin, a former serf. The design is based on St. Peter's in Rome (Tsar Paul I, who had visited Rome, admired St. Peter's and ordered Voronikhin to build something similar in St. Petersburg). The graceful semi-circular

colonnade facing Nevskiy Prospect is actually on the side of the nave, rather than in front as in St. Peters, because of orthodox rules on the location of the altar. The church is built of local pudost limestone which is soft when first cut, but hardens on exposure to air.

Kazan Cathedral was associated with Russian military leader Mikhail Kutuzov, who left St. Petersburg to lead Russian armies against Napoleon after attending services at the church in 1812. (He was buried there after his death in 1813.) His statue and the statue of Barclay de Tolly, another Russian military leader, stand in front of the church.

Under the Communists, the cathedral was turned into the Museum of Atheism and Religion, and its magnificent iconostasis, made of silver captured from the French during the Napoleonic Wars, was destroyed. The cathedral has been returned to the Russian Orthodox Church and is being restored. The museum, now called the Museum of Religion, will be moved to new premises. The Metropolitan of St. Petersburg has announced that, when restoration is completed, the cathedral will once again become the main church of the city.

Hermitage Museum

The Winter Palace, which now houses the Hermitage Museum, was designed by architect Bartolommeo Rastrelli and constructed from 1754-62 during the reign of Elizabeth I, daughter of Peter the Great. Rastrelli built the new palace on the site of two earlier palaces. The main building is in elaborate baroque style. Catherine the Great added several more buildings in a more restrained, neo-classical style.

One of Catherine's additions, built to house Catherine's growing art collection, was called "the Hermitage." It became the nucleus of the now world-famous Hermitage Museum. Her first large purchase was in 1764, when she bought the collection of a Prussian merchant, Johann Ernest Gotzkowsky. His collection consisted mainly of works by Dutch and Flemish masters. Catherine and her successors added many more masterpieces.

After the Communist revolution in 1917, the museum acquired the confiscated collections of the Russian aristocracy, tripling the size of its holdings. The immense collection includes not only Western European masterpieces by Leonardo da Vinci, Raphael, Giorgione, Rembrandt, Rubens and others, but also fine impressionist and post-impressionist works, classical and Egyptian antiquities and treasures found by Russian archaeologists, such as the Scythian gold.

Peter and Paul Fortress

Here, on May 16, 1703, Peter the Great founded the city of St. Petersburg, his "window to the West." He began with the construction of a fortress, dedicated to Saints Peter and Paul, on Hares' Island on the Neva river. To meet the threat of a Swedish invasion, construction proceeded at a rapid pace. About 20,000 soldiers worked continuously under primitive conditions, and many perished. The earthen ramparts were completed by autumn and replaced with stone in 1706. The fortress was never attacked. Its location, however, proved unsuitable for defense, and it was soon eclipsed by the fortress on Kronstadt island, in the Gulf of Finland.

The fortress instead became a prison for political offenders. One of its first prisoners was Tsarevich Alexei, Peter's son, who was accused of plotting against his father. Historians believe Alexei was strangled to death in the fortress. The fortress continued to be used as a prison by the Tsars until the 1917 revolution and then, for a time, continued to be used by the revolutionaries. Other famous prisoners included the leaders of the Decembrist insurrection of 1825, Russian writer Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Lenin's elder brother, Alexander Ulyanov, and Russian writer Maxim Gorky.

The Cathedral of St. Peter and St. Paul, built in 1712-32 by the Italian architect Trezzini, is one of the city's most famous landmarks. Its spire, topped by a gilded angel and a cross, is the tallest in St. Petersburg. From Peter the Great until the revolution, the cathedral was the last resting place of the Tsars. The remains of the last Tsar, Nicholas II, may also eventually be buried here.

**MESSAGE POINTS
TO BE PROVIDED**

MTG & LUNCH W/
PRESIDENT YELTSIN

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT YELTSIN NOVO-OGAREVO DACHA SCENESETTER

Background

Novo-Ogarevo dacha is a large, government-owned country residence located in Barvikha -- 15 miles west of central Moscow, just outside of the ring road. It has been used in the past for negotiations and receptions; the President dined there with President Yeltsin in January 1994. We believe that President Yeltsin also makes private use of the dacha facilities.

The main dacha building is an elegant two-story country home built in 1896 for the Tsarist Governor-General of Moscow, an uncle of Tsar Nicholas II. The grounds are extensive; a large open area lined with trees in front of the dacha slopes down to the bank of the Moscow River.

The ground floor of the main building has a holding room for security and communications, a music salon, a sitting room, a greenhouse and the dining room. Upstairs are two suites which include a bedroom, sitting room and dressing room, plus a separate sitting room and an additional sitting room complex.

There is a cottage located next to the dacha which staff can use. Further away is another dacha which Khrushchev used during the Cuban Missile Crisis; Gorbachev also used it as the venue for the signing of the ill-fated union treaty in 1991 -- just months before the Soviet Union collapsed.

Schedule

The bilateral meeting and a working lunch with President Yeltsin will be held on Sunday, April 21. The President will travel by motorcade; Yeltsin will greet him on arrival at the complex, and the two Presidents will begin their bilateral meeting. Following its conclusion, there will be a brief photo op before senior staff join the Presidents for a working lunch. After lunch, the President will have brief preparation time, before joining President Yeltsin for the joint press appearance.

MEETING/WORKING LUNCH
WITH RUSSIAN PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN

CORE OBJECTIVES

- Stress need for progress, stability in bilateral relationship in run-up to presidential elections.
- Highlight where U.S.-Russian engagement producing results: CTBT, Bosnia, Middle East peace, economic relations.
- Stress need to close agreement on CFE flanks issue acceptable to all Treaty partners prior to May CFE Review Conference.
- Assure Yeltsin of no surprises -- and underscore need for no explosions -- on NATO enlargement in run-up to June election.
- Press Yeltsin on the importance of coming to closure on those ABM/TMD demarcation points where we are in agreement, while continuing to address outstanding issues.
- Exchange views on economic and regional issues, including Asia and Russian relations with NIS, in particular Ukraine.

BACKGROUND

This will be your last meeting with Yeltsin prior to the first round of the Russian presidential election on June 16. You will see him at the Lyon P-8 meeting, which will take place between June 16 and the run-off round that will be held in July if no candidate gets 50 percent of the vote the first time around.

Yeltsin's electoral prospects have improved from dismal two months ago to fair-to-good; it increasingly is shaping up as a two-man race with Communist leader Zyuganov. We expect Yeltsin to be in an upbeat mood, given the improvement in his political standing and the previous day's nuclear summit, which should serve Yeltsin's goal of validating his claim to have re-established Russia's great power status.

Although we realistically expect only modest results from this meeting (as at Hyde Park), you will want to assure Yeltsin of your desire to maintain momentum in the bilateral relationship. Bear in mind, however, that his approach to particular issues will be guided by their potential impact on his re-election. He will be reluctant to offer concessions that open him to nationalist criticism. The same electoral pressures may also tempt Yeltsin to 1) posture on NATO enlargement and 2) push hard on Russia joining a "G-8" at Lyon.

AGENDA

Your agenda is hefty. We recommend you plow through the bulk of the issues in the one-on-one, where you can press Yeltsin for progress on the U.S.-Russian agenda by appealing to his desire to demonstrate to his electorate his ability to manage the relationship. You can cover economic and regional questions over lunch.

Managing U.S.-Russian Relations in the Political Season. We suggest you begin by noting the success of the previous day's nuclear summit: good in substantive terms, good for Yeltsin's domestic standing. You should stress to Yeltsin our goal of steadying the bilateral relationship against the inevitable strains of electoral politics in both Russia and the U.S.

You will want to plug the importance of the June 16 election. That will provide an opening for the inevitable political discussion. Yeltsin may press for your endorsement; you will want to fend that off gently, noting that you will continue to stress your support for democracy and economic reform and for reformers, which implicitly means him. Although the rumors of an election postponement have died down, should Yeltsin raise a deferral, you will want to leave no ambiguity that such a step would force you to react negatively and publicly.

Perhaps the best pitch is to stress the achievements you and Yeltsin have accomplished together. You can briefly highlight areas where cooperation demonstrates the value of U.S.-Russian engagement and leadership: CTBT, Bosnia, the Middle East and the commercial front. And you should tell Yeltsin that the best defense against critics is continued progress on the agenda.

CTBT. You might highlight the importance of Russia's support for the P-8 CTBT statement calling for completion of a truly comprehensive test ban for signing by September. Yeltsin will visit China shortly after your meeting; you should urge him to take up this issue with his Chinese interlocutors, something he has offered to do in the past. (The Chinese still want to permit "peaceful" nuclear explosions and may want to delay completion of the treaty beyond September until their tests are completed.)

CFE. You and Yeltsin launched the effort to settle the CFE flank issue in Halifax. At Hyde Park the two of you agreed to resolve the problem by adjusting the map that defines the flanks' geographic limits. We have narrowed our differences but have not yet come to closure on the key elements of a deal which would be acceptable to all (including Turkey). You should urge Yeltsin to tell his team to agree on a map (based on the latest U.S.-Turkish offer) and a compromise on the numbers for military equipment (between the Russian proposal and ours), so that experts can wrap up the flank issue by the May CFE Review Conference.

NATO Enlargement. You sent Yeltsin a detailed letter in February outlining exactly what the enlargement process would and would not do this year. The looming election constrains his flexibility, so we recommend you cover the issue quickly and move on. Yeltsin, however, may dwell on enlargement. He may assert that NATO's "intensive dialogues" with prospective members violates your purported assurance that nothing would happen in 1996. In recent weeks, the Russians have implied they could live with Polish/Czech/Hungarian "political membership" in NATO, so long as that did not include NATO troops or nuclear weapons. That is a non-starter: NATO has no "half memberships." But you can note that a number of reputed Russian concerns are overblown.

ABM/TMD. We would like to conclude a demarcation agreement on lower velocity TMD systems, where many elements are already agreed, while continuing to discuss how to handle higher velocity systems. But we have not been able to close on the former. Absent agreement with the Russians, you may face an unpalatable choice later this year or early in 1997 between (a) halting our premier TMD program before it is fully tested, or (b) adopting a more permissive ABM Treaty interpretation to allow it to go forward that will provoke a very negative Russian reaction and also likely require you to overrule the compliance determination previously concurred in by all agency general counsels.

The Russians, moreover, now say that the entire demarcation issue must be resolved if the Duma is to ratify START II. While it is unrealistic to expect ratification prior to the June election, we want to discourage Yeltsin from encouraging such a linkage.

Chechnya. After a period of brutal Russian military activity, Yeltsin's March 31 announcement of a withdrawal of forces and intensified search for a peaceful settlement is welcome. You will want to encourage him on this.

Nuclear Cooperation with Iran. While the Russians have severely limited their nuclear cooperation with Iran, you should remind Yeltsin we oppose any such cooperation. You can tell him that you will invoke a national security interest waiver so that FREEDOM Support Act assistance is not halted as a result of Russia's ongoing cooperation. You might add that Atomic Energy Minister Mikhaylov's constant public references to nuclear projects are very unhelpful.

P-8 or G-8. Probably the most delicate issue you face is Yeltsin's push for entry into a "G-8" by the Lyon summit. Yeltsin alleged to you on April 9 that he had support from Chirac and Kohl (whether or not Chirac and Kohl have told Yeltsin he can be at a G-8 in Lyon, we know they have been sympathetic). Russia, however, is simply unready economically for a G-8, and there is important work (e.g., coordinating macroeconomic policy) done by the G-7 that could not be done with Russia present. Moreover, admitting Russia to a G-8 now runs the risk of having a non-reformist Russian president in the group. You should urge

Yeltsin not to press for a G-8 at Lyon and avoid a political setback when the G-7 says no. At the same time, you can assure him we will set up the P-8 session to underscore Russia's close relationship and critical role.

Economic Points. You and Yeltsin might begin the lunch by recapping the main points from your one-on-one, before covering economic and regional issues. You should congratulate Yeltsin on his progress on economic reform: monthly inflation has dropped to low single digits; overall economic growth is finally expected to be positive; and a new three-year IMF agreement is in place. Our economic relations now need to focus on supporting Russia's implementation of its IMF commitments, with a special focus on creating a favorable environment for private investment.

You should assure Yeltsin that we recognize the severe legislative constraints he's faced on passing new tax and commercial codes, particularly legislation on oil and gas development. We stand ready to intensify work in these areas as soon as Russia's internal politics permit. He may raise rescheduling of Russia's official debt of \$44 billion. Negotiations with the G-7 are underway and could conclude by the end of April; you can tell him that we support a comprehensive rescheduling.

Asia. You might recount the highlights of your visits to Korea and Japan and invite Yeltsin to preview his travel to China.

NIS Integration. Yeltsin has given greater attention to NIS integration, driven in part by the Russian desire to reassert preeminence on the territory of the former Soviet Union and in part by a desire to steal the theme from his Communist rivals. You might invite him to discuss the arrangements agreed with Belarus, Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan. Your own comments could put down markers as to how we believe integration should proceed.

Ukraine. In early April Yeltsin again canceled his oft-postponed visit to Kiev. You might note the importance we attach to good relations between Moscow and Kiev and stress the need for full implementation of the Trilateral Statement. Ukraine has complained that Russia lags in meeting its commitments regarding compensation (in particular, Moscow has not yet written off energy debt as compensation for tactical nuclear weapons removed from Ukraine in 1991-92). We want nothing to prevent the last nuclear weapons from leaving Ukraine by the end of May.

Nagorno-Karabakh. While our efforts to bring the parties to agreement on a statement of principles by mid-April fell short, we are still working to get such a document by June. Moscow remains suspicious of our efforts; you should note our desire for U.S.-Russian cooperation to advance peace in the Caucasus.

TALKING POINTS FOR ONE-ON-ONE MEETING

Managing U.S.-Russian Relations in the Political Season

- Delighted we have this time to talk. Have had good bilateral discussions in past; expect we will today as well.
- Congratulations on hosting successful nuclear summit. Issues technical -- CTBT, reactor safety, combating nuclear smuggling -- but good session, good substantive outcomes.
- Think our children and grand-children will appreciate what we have been doing to make nuclear energy safer and to provide greater security for nuclear materials.
- Also believe summit portrayed you in positive light, tackling contemporary problems in cooperative, far-sighted manner.
- As discussed before, U.S.-Russia a key relationship; world changed for better as result of our work together. Must sustain momentum in relationship.
- Election campaigns ongoing in both countries. Will escalate political rhetoric, could complicate relations. Pressures will grow from critics in both countries who want to divide us or exploit differences between us.
- Need to protect U.S.-Russian relationship we've built since Vancouver against these pressures.
- Of course, closely following your political situation. June 16 will be milestone for democracy in Russia, for your efforts to lead reform.

(Let Yeltsin respond -- opens door for political discussion)

(If Yeltsin presses for your explicit endorsement)

- Not sure that is wise; could prove counterproductive for you. But will continue to make clear my support for political and economic reform, and for reformers.

(If Yeltsin alludes to election postponement)

- Free, fair, competitive elections one of your greatest achievements. Trust Russian people to vote their interests, signal support for new Russia. Urge you in strongest of terms not to postpone.
- Your commitment to democracy key to our ability to work so closely last three years. If election postponed, would have to make public my concern and opposition.

Results of U.S.-Russian Cooperation

- Best way to disarm critics of bilateral relationship is to continue to show relationship yields benefits to both our peoples.
- Pleased with cooperation on key issues: CTBT, Bosnia, Sharm al-Shaykh conference, progress on commercial questions. On each, progress a testament to engagement, joint leadership in difficult international environment.
- **CTBT.** Yesterday's P-8 statement provides very important impulse for truly comprehensive test ban and for completing treaty for signature this fall. Your support was key.
 - During your trip to China, hope you can build on this and press Chinese to join us, in particular by dropping their proposal to allow "peaceful" explosions.
- **Bosnia.** Another excellent example of our joint leadership. Close cooperation in Contact Group bringing peace to region, reunifying Sarajevo, beginning to restore normal life.
- Delighted with cooperation between our troops. Working together as if they had been doing so for years.
- Need to continue to work closely together. The parties to Dayton accord must fulfill commitments they made.
- And international community must quickly provide resources for reconstruction so Bosnian people see peace dividend.
- **MEPP.** Sharm al-Shaykh a key reflection of our leadership as co-sponsors in keeping peace process on track.
- Now essential we translate decisions of summit into concrete and practical recommendations to achieve our objectives. Follow-up meeting in March in Washington was good first step, but must ensure forthcoming ministerial also contributes.
- **Commercial Issues.** Can point to some real achievements: 65 percent growth in trade, expanded commercial space launch agreement, ExIm financing for IL-96 engines and avionics.

Managing Issues/Avoiding Surprises

- Important we avoid surprises, other actions that would complicate U.S.-Russian cooperation.
- Look for ways to make progress on agenda while containing those issues on which we differ.

- **CFE.** Flank issue offers opportunity to show right now that our security partnership produces concrete results in both sides' interests and in interest of Europe as a whole.
- We got things started on finding answer to flank problem in Halifax, gave real boost at Hyde Park. Our experts have worked hard with yours and with Turkey. Now close to solution that all 30 CFE parties can accept.
- My experts proposed map that gives Russia flexibility in southern region. Should be basis for solution.
- Can find middle ground on numerical limits on Russian armored combat vehicles between our proposal and ours.
- Let's tell our experts to agree now on our map and on mid-way point on numbers, then wrap up details so we can bring this issue to closure before May CFE Review Conference.
- **NATO.** Committed to avoiding surprises for you on NATO. We differ on enlargement, but believe we can manage this issue.
- Enlargement process will continue in manner I described to you last May and in my February 8 letter: gradual, steady, transparent. No surprises, especially in coming months.
- Alliance will focus on internal NATO issues, on dialogues with Partners for remainder of 1996.
- At June Foreign Ministers meeting, ministers will address IFOR, Bosnia, internal NATO changes. Communiqué will reconfirm commitment to enlargement, but won't address who will join or when or announce any other new steps. NATO has no "secret lists" as to who will join.
 - As last December, I'll write you before NATO meeting and give you detailed preview -- so you know what to expect.
- Need to avoid sense of confrontation over enlargement. Differ, but must continue to build stable, undivided Europe. That means open, continuous dialogue, practical cooperation and development of strong NATO-Russia relationship.
 - Should build on success in Bosnia. IFOR the kind of cooperation we need. Bosnia, joint military exercises and work between your representatives and ours at NATO show NATO and Russia can work cooperatively, positively.

(If Yeltsin pursues idea of conditional NATO enlargement, with new CEE members receiving security guarantees but no nuclear weapons, stationed forces or infrastructure)

- Don't see much future to this idea. No "degrees" or "classes" of NATO membership. New members, when they join, will be full members.
- But remain strongly committed to managing enlargement in manner that does not threaten Russia.

(If Yeltsin presses concern about nuclear weapons)

- NATO enlargement study made clear NATO now sees no need to change any aspect of nuclear posture or policy as result of enlargement. Very much my own view as well.
- **ABM/TMD Demarcation.** Disappointed by where we are on ABM/TMD. Had understanding last fall that we should record agreement on those points that were resolved while continuing to discuss remaining differences.
- Agreement on lower velocity TMD systems in reach. Would give START II ratification in Russia a boost, help preserve ABM Treaty, show our relationship can solve tough issues.
- Hope you'll tell your experts to delink agreement that is almost in hand on slower TMD systems from the faster systems that we will continue to discuss.
- Demarcation agreement would strengthen my ability to rebut those who wish to undermine ABM Treaty.

(If Yeltsin asks for no testing of higher velocity TMD systems while agreement covering them being negotiated)

- Non-starter. Pending agreement, each side should continue to make own compliance judgments, as have done for over 20 years. But ready to discuss those systems.
- **START II.** Disturbed your government now seems to be linking START II ratification to resolution of ABM/TMD demarcation.
- Recognize early Duma action on START II not likely. But START II in both sides' interests. Your government should not encourage linkage that would hinder Treaty approval.
- **Chechnya.** Know Chechnya a big issue for you domestically; international community watching as well. Clear military solution won't work.
- Thus welcomed your decision to halt military operations, intensify search for peace. Peaceful settlement critical to end dispute and to remove this political problem for you.
- Prepared to be supportive of search for peace with OSCE, any other way I can.

- **Nuclear Cooperation with Iran.** Vice President and Prime Minister should continue dialogue on nuclear cooperation with Iran. We continue to believe Iran seeks nuclear weapons; thus oppose any cooperation.
- Very controversial in U.S. Congress legislated halt to aid to Russia if nuclear cooperation continues. I will invoke waiver provision to allow aid to keep flowing.
- But it sets us back when Minister Mikhaylov makes constant public references to nuclear projects in Iran, especially his false assertions that U.S. no longer objects. They don't help, make Gore-Chernomyrdin dialogue harder.

G-8 vs. P-8

(If Yeltsin raises G-8, as he almost certainly will)

- Consensus that G-7 is economic group and its work must continue. You said in Naples it will be some years before Russian economy ready for full participation.
- Have to be candid: Russia not ready yet. You should not press; you will only be disappointed by G-7 answer. Making this a public issue could only be a setback and we don't want that.
- At same time, understand reasons behind your interest in joining the G-7. Ready to demonstrate at Lyon the growing stature and cooperation among P-8 and importance of Russia's increasingly close involvement.
- Chirac will invite you to lunch for discussion with leaders of UN, World Bank, IMF, WTO. Important session; will cover global issues, including economic matters of interest to Russia.

TALKING POINTS FOR EXPANDED LUNCH

- Might begin lunch by recapping agreements, main points from one-on-one session. (...)

Economic Issues

- Want to touch on economic issues. First, congratulations on IMF agreement. Your bold economic program will provide growth, jobs. Have already seen great strides in reducing inflation and first signs of economic growth.
- Will fully support your implementation of this program.
- Know political environment in Duma has constrained progress on issues key to investors: tax and commercial codes, particularly in oil and gas area.
- \$50-60 billion in oil and gas investment at stake, more in other sectors; key to revitalizing your economy and important for U.S. As soon as you give us signal, stand ready to intensify bilateral support in this area.

(If asked about debt rescheduling)

- Working with G-7 and others on comprehensive debt rescheduling.

Asia

- Had very interesting visits to South Korea and Japan. Might share main impressions. (...)
- Would be interested in your expectations for upcoming visit to China.
- We want a serious, productive engagement with China based on mutual respect.
- China's recent military exercises in Taiwan Strait risky and provocative. Have conveyed our deep concern to China.
 - Have told Beijing that use of force would have grave consequences. Peaceful resolution of Taiwan question is important premise of our "one China" policy.
- Hope Russia, as great power with key interest in peace and stability in East Asia, will urge China to refrain from provocative actions and to resume cross-Strait dialogue.

Russia and New Independent States

- Have followed debate in Russia on relations with NIS. Would be interested in your perspective on this and on recent arrangements with Belarus, Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan.
- Support mutually beneficial relations between Russia and NIS and want to work with you to resolve conflicts/disputes in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, Moldova and Tajikistan.
- Our own policy toward NIS based on their sovereignty; seeks to encourage reform, democratization and nation-building.
- Want to be clear on our view of CIS integration: don't oppose it, but believe integration must respect sovereignty of NIS, be based on equality, voluntary and outward-looking.
 - CIS integration should facilitate, not hinder, broader integration of Russia, NIS into all manner of global institutions.
- Believe this entirely consistent with your strong reaction to Duma's unhelpful March 15 vote on the former Soviet Union; such votes only undermine Russia's efforts to build solid relations with neighbors.

Russia-Ukraine

- Had good talk with Kuchma in late February. He is concerned about how some forces in Russia view Ukraine.
- Hope you can work with him to develop solid, positive Russian-Ukrainian relationship. U.S. fully supports that.
- Would like to raise one issue that directly concerns U.S.: implementation of Trilateral Statement signed in Moscow in January 1994. Major achievement for all three of us.
- All nuclear warheads to be transferred to Russia by end of May. Ukraine concerned Russia has not fulfilled commitments on energy debt write-off, nuclear reactor fuel.
- Your action to complete debt write-off for tactical nuclear weapons, assure Kiev on provision of nuclear reactor fuel important so no problems arise with final warhead transfers.

Nagorno-Karabakh

- Believe may have opportunity to play role of peacemakers once again -- this time in Caucasus.
- Though unable to get parties to conclude statement of principles before our meeting today, their efforts continue. Merit our mutual support.

- Our own bilateral exchanges on this subject have improved in last month; should continue.
- Still think it possible parties could agree to statement by June; that would pave way for more intensive work by OSCE Minsk Group. Let's keep in touch on this -- would be important diplomatic victory for all.

OTHER POINTS (IF RAISED)

Poultry Dispute

- Pleased that in late March we resolved veterinary issues concerning U.S. poultry and decided on framework to avoid future problems. Important we also resolve tariff issue.

PHOTO OP REMARKS
TO BE PROVIDED

**PRESS REMARKS
TO BE PROVIDED**

OPENING PRESS CONFERENCE REMARKS

TO BE PROVIDED

POINTS TO MAKE IN RESPONSE TO PRESS QUESTIONS

Bilateral Meeting Themes

- April 21 tenth meeting. Agenda covers range of bilateral, international issues. Sides take dialogue very seriously, reflecting special responsibilities as nuclear superpowers.
- Looking at ways bilateral dialogue can enhance security of American, Russian peoples and the world -- as in pressing for early conclusion and signature of CTBT.
- Also discussing how U.S.-Russian cooperation can help resolve critical problems like Bosnia, Middle East.
- While won't agree on all issues, U.S.-Russian relationship over last three years shows we can make progress on range of issues while containing differences on other questions.

Importance of Engaging Russia

- U.S. has vital stake in engaging Russia. Matters to us that Russia becoming democracy, developing free market.
- Do have differences. Happens even in best of relationships. However, keep working to resolve them.
- Differences should not obscure what we've achieved:
 - Greater security, as Russia slashes its nuclear arsenal and no longer targets American cities;
 - More jobs as we expand trade; and
 - Cooperation on international problems and freedom from the fears we lived under during Cold War.

State of Bilateral Relations

- Relations remain productive, as have seen over last six months since met at Hyde Park:
 - Making progress on arms control, such as P-8 statement endorsing CTBT.
 - NATO and Russian forces working together in Bosnia to maintain peace.

- Work together to sustain Middle East peace process.
- Believe we're far from having exhausted potential of U.S.-Russian relationship. Think Yeltsin agrees.

State of Russian Democracy

- Russia transitioning to democracy. Not easy, often painful.
- But progress being made. December parliamentary elections went off as scheduled, judged free and fair. Country now in midst of campaign leading to June presidential election.
- U.S. will continue to support democratization in Russia. In our national interest.

Support for Yeltsin Candidacy?

- Election for Russian people to decide, exercising democratic habits that are increasingly taking hold. Inappropriate for U.S. to intrude or endorse particular candidate.
- As elsewhere, U.S. prepared to work with any democratically-elected government on basis of its policies.
- As have made clear in past, consistent in our support for political and economic reform in Russia and reformers.

Chechnya

- Conflict there tragedy for all concerned. Use of force won't resolve dispute. Thus strongly urge/support pursuit of peaceful settlement.

State of Economic Reform in Russia

- Impressed by how much ground Russia has covered: inflation down, ruble stabilized, economic decline arrested.
- Russia deserves credit for sticking with tough stabilization program; believe economy now ready for take-off.
- Western recognition of Russian performance and of Russian commitment to reform reflected in March IMF decision to extend \$10.2 billion loan.

Crime and Corruption in Russia

- Criminals operating across borders pose threat to both Russia and U.S. That's why we and Russia working together.
- Nearly 1700 Russian officials have participated in programs organized by U.S. law enforcement agencies.

- Bilateral cooperation has already put some very serious criminals in jail, and expect to accomplish more in future.

Russia and Bosnia

- U.S. and Russia working together in Contact Group to ensure full implementation of Dayton accords.
- And on ground in Bosnia, U.S. and Russian troops serving side-by-side to implement peace.

Russia and NATO

- Understand many Russians doubt wisdom of NATO enlargement; but Russia should keep open mind, work with NATO to develop cooperative relations, as we now are building in Bosnia.
- Want Russia to play important role in emerging security system, one that promotes secure, undivided Europe. Believe NATO and Russia can and will cooperate toward this end.

NATO Enlargement

- Enlargement process proceeding in steady, measured, transparent manner. Will be no surprises. At same time, working to develop close, robust NATO-Russia relationship.
- Enlargement will extend stability, security; part of integration of Europe. Stable Europe in Russia's interest.

CTBT

- Pleased with P-8 statement endorsing conclusion and signature of CTBT by September.
- Key now is to sustain momentum, continue to push so that we can sign CTBT this fall. Would be significant step for arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament.

CFE

- CFE key to European security. Continue to work to resolve flank zone issue. Heartened by progress made to date; believe resolution within reach.
- Solution will be based on map realignment. Needs to be crafted so that it diminishes security of no state and is acceptable to all CFE parties.

START II Ratification in Russia

- Hope Russian Duma will act soon to approve START II.
- Treaty in interest of both U.S. and Russia; will mean major cuts in nuclear weapons, more stable nuclear balance.

ABM/TMD Demarcation

- We and Russians agree on importance of ABM Treaty and of developing defenses against shorter-range, theater missiles.
- Key question is how to distinguish between ABM missiles, which are limited by ABM Treaty, and theater ballistic missile defenses, which are not. Working hard on this.

Iran Reactor Sale

- Oppose any nuclear cooperation with Iran, given Iran's ambition to acquire nuclear weapons.
- Russians have own reasons to worry about proliferation risks. As they have stated, cooperation will not include uranium enrichment or uranium reprocessing.
- But continue to regard any nuclear cooperation as too much. Vice President and Chernomyrdin continue to work this.

Nuclear Material Security

- One principal focus of P-8 summit is enhancing security of nuclear materials. Believe will energize that effort.
- Robust U.S.-Russian program to enhance material protection, control and accounting. Now cooperating at more than two dozen facilities in Russia, improving protection for hundreds of tons of fissile material.
- HEU contract provides that 500 tons of HEU from dismantled weapons be converted into low-enriched uranium as fuel for electric power generation. Contract being implemented.

Russia-NIS Integration

- U.S. regards NIS as sovereign, independent states, deals with them as such. Support good relations among NIS. As for integration, should be based on equality, voluntary and outward-looking.

**ROUNDTABLE W/
RUSSIAN LEADERS**

ROUNDTABLE WITH RUSSIAN POLITICAL LEADERS SPASO HOUSE SCENESETTER

Background

Spaso House has been the residence of American Ambassadors in Moscow since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1933. Spaso House's name is derived from the park on which it borders, "Spasopeskovskaya Ploshchad" (meaning "Savior of the Sands Square"). The park, in turn, is named after a small 18th century Russian Orthodox Church which also borders on the square. The area immediately surrounding Spaso House was inhabited in the 17th century by the Tsar's dog-keepers and falconers.

Spaso House was built in 1913-1914 in the New Empire style for Nikolay Vtorov, a wealthy Siberian merchant and manufacturer. The building has changed very little in basic appearance, except for the addition of a one-story ballroom wing in the 1930s. Before the Americans occupied Spaso House, the mansion was the property of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The first floor representational area includes a large, high-ceilinged reception hall (the Chandelier Room, where the Ambassador hosted a reception in the President's honor in January 1994) flanked by the Oval Dining Room (where the President had breakfast with Russian political leaders in May 1995), the State Dining Room and the Music Room, an extension of the Chandelier Room separated only by a pillared archway. There is also a library off the Chandelier Room.

Schedule

The President will arrive by motorcade and should have some brief down-time prior to the arrival of the Russian participants. At the beginning of the event, the President will greet the Russians (most likely in the Chandelier Room), before all proceed into the Oval Dining Room, where the roundtable discussion will be held. There will be a brief pool-spray at the start of the roundtable. Simultaneous interpretation will be provided.

ROUNDTABLE WITH RUSSIAN POLITICAL LEADERS

CORE OBJECTIVES

- Underscore importance U.S. attaches to democracy, integrity of electoral process in Russia.
- Note American engagement with Russia based on interests, not personalities, readiness to work with any democratically-elected leader on basis of his policies.
- Solicit views from this diverse group on state of reform in Russia, their perspective on U.S.-Russian relations and other key international problems.

BACKGROUND

The roundtable offers you the opportunity to accomplish three things: (1) to put your message of support for democratic pluralism to a select audience that reflects a wide spectrum of Russian political opinion; (2) to hear diverse views on Russia's current situation; and (3) to make the point -- to Russian and American publics -- that your policy reaches out to a broad range of Russian opinion, i.e., that it is not Yeltsin-centric.

We have included several presidential candidates on the guest list, including Communist Party head Zyuganov, pro-reform Yabloko leader Yavlinskiy and former army General Lebed. (Ultra-nationalist Zhirinovskiy was not invited.) The Russian presidential campaign is increasingly shaping up as a two-man race between Yeltsin and Zyuganov. Yeltsin's popularity has risen considerably recently (he now draws at about 15 percent in most polls, up from single digits earlier this year, in contrast to about 20 percent for Zyuganov). Yavlinskiy and Lebed are competing for third, with Zhirinovskiy in fifth place.

AGENDA

The roundtable with Russian political leaders is your last event in Russia but one of the most important. The very fact of the meeting makes the point that the United States and you are reaching out to a wide political spectrum in Russia.

We suggest you start with short comments. Each of the Russian participants will likely have a statement to make -- and, in the case of the Presidential contenders, will want to be able to tell the Russian press afterwards that he delivered "his" message to the American President. Left to run its natural course, this could lead to a series of monologues.

To avoid this, you may have to be aggressive from the start in breaking in to pose questions and to encourage more of a give-and-take. In order to get a discussion going, we suggest you put one or two questions to the group after your opening comments and solicit responses to them.

We recommend your opening comments highlight our support for democracy and political pluralism in Russia and the importance we attach to the integrity of the June 16 election. You will also want to note our readiness to work with any democratically-elected government on the basis of its policies.

If we succeed in getting a real discussion going, this could be a lively affair. The varied viewpoints around the table mean that comments, questions, prescriptions and forecasts could come from any direction; a fair amount of debate among the Russian participants is possible. Some will critique our support for political and economic reform as either wrong-headed (we aren't doing it right) or ill-intentioned (we aim to drive Russia into the ground). On foreign policy, NATO enlargement is likely to be a big topic, with most speakers challenging you to justify it in light of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union.

You should be aware that the Yeltsin government is less than enthusiastic about your meeting with Yeltsin opponents.

TALKING POINTS FOR ROUNDTABLE WITH RUSSIAN POLITICAL LEADERS

- Just came from good talk with Yeltsin. Glad now to have opportunity to speak with key political figures from across Russian political spectrum.
- Hope you'll leave with better understanding of U.S. policy. And I expect to learn from you.
- Meeting at historic moment in Russian history. Your society in fundamental transition. I follow events here closely. U.S. has strong interest in what happens in Russia.
- But Russia's future yours to decide -- at June 16 election.
- Attach great importance to democracy and integrity of election process. Support for democratic and economic reform has been central tenet of my policy toward Russia.
- That support keyed to reform policies in Russia, not to particular personalities. As elsewhere, prepared to work with any democratically-elected government.
- But hope Russia will stay on reform path and that U.S. and Russia will build on strong relationship we have established over last several years.
- Our cooperation good for Russia and U.S., world peace and stability. Just to cite a few results:
 - Reduced nuclear danger as we cut nuclear arms; no longer target one another; and eliminated nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Kazakstan and Belarus.
 - Promoting peace in Bosnia and Middle East.
- Mutually advantageous expansion of trade, investment.
- Don't want to give long speech, so would like to break quickly to discussion. Begin by posing two questions:
 - Your perception of state of reform in Russia?
 - Your perception of Russia's core national interests?

(Other questions to pose, as appropriate)
- How do you see Russian relations with NIS evolving?
 - Believe START II fundamentally in U.S. and Russia's interest. Understand your concern about ABM Treaty; I support it. How can we move forward on START II?

PHOTO OP REMARKS
TO BE PROVIDED

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

Initials: KBM Date: 12/30/2019

2016-0139-M

~~SECRET~~