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Folder Title:
Bosnia-NATO [2]

Staff Office-Individual:
European Affairs-Kerrick, Donald

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**RESTRICION CODES**

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 19, 1994

BOSNIA PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGY (Ross/Sonenshine)

We recommend that the President take the lead in publicly articulating our policy goals in Bosnia, but that the principals also assist, both on background and on-the-record, in explaining the policy.

TODAY
By the time today’s meeting is over, the President will have spoken (to camera) on the importance of the US continuing to play a role in Bosnia and the importance of reviewing options. The National Security Adviser will background 15-20 White House reporters this afternoon.

TOMORROW
Tomorrow, it would be appropriate to bring the Hill Leadership over to the White House for an early morning briefing by the President. This meeting should be followed by a briefing room event in which the President provides a 3-4 paragraph assessment of today’s meeting, next steps and overall policy goals. The President should take questions but limited in number.

THURSDAY, FRIDAY, WEEKEND
This story is not going to fade away although the initial press hysteria will subside. We recommend that the Secretaries of State and Defense as well as the National Security Adviser and the UN Ambassador be available to speak publicly about events in Bosnia. Media interest is great and the number of outlets is equally great. There should be a concerted effort to provide a united front and a strong across-the-board offensive to publicly articulate our policy.

Sunday talk shows will likely focus on Bosnia. It is important that Administration spokespeople be available to set the tone of those debates.

We strongly believe that it is possible to alter the tone and tenor of the press coverage of Bosnia, and to contribute to public understanding of our interests in the Bosnian conflict.
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BOSNIA

Background

The events that unfolded in Gorazde earlier this week reflected intensive work begun last year by the United States in NATO and in the UN to put the military power of the Alliance at the service of diplomatic efforts to end the conflict in Bosnia.

Last Summer we led the NATO consensus that put air power at the disposal of UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate in Bosnia. We led Alliance members to reaffirm this commitment at the January NATO Summit.

In the UN, we have consistently led in the Security Council to pass resolutions calling for the use of "all measures necessary" to permit UNPROFOR to discharge its mandate. We have worked closely with our allies and others to develop the mechanisms and procedures to permit coordination between NATO and UNPROFOR.

Those twin efforts established a solid relationship between NATO and UNPROFOR that demonstrated its effect with NATO's ultimatum to establish an exclusion zone around Sarajevo, and again this week when NATO airplanes attacked Serb targets in support of UN operations in Gorazde.

In this latest incident, U.S. aircraft flew two missions under NATO command and control. The NATO aircraft successfully engaged targets identified by UNPROFOR, without incident.

This was a limited operation for a limited purpose. It was conducted at the request of the UN and carried out under existing authority and policy.

Q: What are the Administration's goals in Bosnia?

A: We are working to help end the violence in Bosnia and to help achieve a viable negotiated settlement.

Q: How will the air strikes affect prospects for a negotiated settlement?

A: This action, along with the Sarajevo ultimatum, demonstrates NATO's resolve. We are extremely pleased at the close coordination between NATO and UNPROFOR.
The Bosnian Serbs should take note of this coordination and the success it has achieved. They must realize that they should seek a negotiated settlement. The UN/NATO operation gives the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Croats the confidence to make the compromises necessary to end this tragic conflict. My envoy, Chuck Redman, has been in the region talking with the parties, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaliy Churkin, UN officials and others to help move the negotiations forward.

Q: But hasn’t this action had the opposite effect? What if the NATO action does not stop the Serbs? What are the limits of U.S. military involvement in Bosnia?

A: -- We were determined to fulfill our standing commitment through NATO to provide close air support to UNPROFOR troops, if requested. We have done so and will do so again, if asked. We are determined also, as in Sarajevo, to work to help end the aggression and ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief.

Q: Will you expand the Sarajevo model and establish an exclusion zone around Gorazde or the other safe areas?

A: -- Each case is different. We are determined, as we demonstrated in Sarajevo, to build on the progress of Sarajevo, help end the aggression, and ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief. We stand by our commitment through NATO to provide close air support again to UNPROFOR troops, if requested.

Q: Will you seek a resolution authorizing your actions in Bosnia under the War Powers Act?

A: -- As I have said, we welcome the expression of support by Congress.

Q: Did you and Yeltsin disagree about the NATO air strikes on Goradze?

A: -- I had a good and productive conversation with Teltsin. I called him to discuss the strikes and the need for the U.S. and Russia to work together diplomatically to achieve the cessation of hostilities and progress in the negotiations that is clearly required.

-- I’m convinced the U.S. and Russia will continue to work together effectively on Bosnia.
Chuck Redman will stan in close touch with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaliy Churkin.

I believe it is important to have the closest coordination with Russia which has troops on the ground in Bosnia and is a key player in the region.
I am very concerned about the situation in Sarajevo and the situation in very costly.

Thanks to the February 9 NATO decision to make Sarajevo an exclusion zone for heavy artillery weapons, the shelling of the city, which had been massive and caused many casualties, has stopped.

Over the past several months, life has begun to return to a semblance of normalcy.

But during the past two weeks, the Bosnian Serbs have closed down commercial relief routes into the city, effectively closed down the airport by firing on the aircraft, attacked an UNPROFOR convoy trying to enter the city, and have engaged in stepped up sniper activities.

We assume these activities are Bosnian Serb attempts to intimidate the international community in response to the increasing pressure being brought to bear to enforce their acceptance of the territorial settlement proposed by the Contact Group.

Even their allies in Belgrade have now begun to turn against them and have attacked their refusal to accept the reasonable settlement being offered to them.

If these harassing activities in Sarajevo continue to escalate, the international community will have no choice but to take appropriate action.
ARGUMENT THAT EXISTING AUTHORITY PERMITS CLOSE AIR SUPPORT TO BIHAC, INCLUDING USE OF NATO AIR POWER AGAINST UBDINA, IN KRAJINA-HELD CROATIA

Under the authority of UNSC 836 (June 4, 1993), paragraphs 5, 9 and 10, which read in part:

"... that member states, acting ... through regional organizations, ... may take all necessary measures, through the use of air power, ... in and around safe areas, ... to support UNPROFOR...";

and under the authority of UNSC 844, (June 18, 1993), paragraph 4, which:

"... reaffirms [the] decision in paragraph 10 of resolution 836";

the UN may request NATO use of air power to support UNPROFOR in Bihac.

Neither SC resolution restricts air power requests to Bosnia-Herzegovina only. The USC reads the reference to Bosnia-Herzegovina in paragraph 10 of UNSC 836 as referring to the location of safe areas, not the location of strike targets; we believe this is confirmed by paragraph 4 of UNSC 844.

The Croatian government has approved the proposed use of air power.

Based on paragraph 1.1 of the Athens Ministerial Decision Sheet (June 10, 1993), which reads in part:

"Ministers decided ... to offer NATO's protective air power in case of attack against UNPROFOR"

NATO may respond to a UN request for NATO air power, without further action, to support UNPROFOR. Like the UN resolutions, the NATO Decision Sheet makes no reference to territory in Bosnia only.

On November 18, 1994, the UN requested a strike to respond to Krajina Serb attacks on Bihac. It has selected the target of Ubdina Airbase in Krajina Serb-held Croatia. The specific strike may take place under authorities cited above.

UNPROFOR’s inherent right of self-defense, which is supported by NATO in paragraph 1.1 of the Athens Ministerial Decision Sheet (June 10, 1993), is an additional justification for immediate use of air power.

FYI: Proposing a NATO response to UNPROFOR’s request under either SC resolution or based on the inherent right of self-defense may raise questions of necessity and proportionality. Our position is that the requested NATO response is both necessary and proportional.
PRESS QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

BOSNIA - USE OF U.S. TROOPS

Q: Is the U.S. willing to commit troops to implement a peace settlement in Bosnia?

A. - The United States, under certain conditions, is prepared to help implement a viable, equitable peace settlement in Bosnia agreed to by all the parties. Those conditions would include good-faith agreement to a settlement by all the parties, and evidence of good-faith implementation.

A. - We would encourage and welcome Congressional authorization of such action. This remains our policy.

COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCES

Q: What is the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept and how will it be applied?

A. - The CJTF concept would involve drawing forces from different NATO commands, tailored to a specific contingency, while preserving NATO's integrated military structure -- which we need for the defense of Alliance security interests.

- It would allow for more flexible use of NATO resources if the Alliance were to decide to engage in operations outside Allied territory.

- It would also facilitate the formation of combined joint task forces by our European Allies in situations in which the United States did not wish to be involved.

- In addition, it would facilitate the participation of non-NATO forces, as envisaged under our proposed Partnership for Peace.

- The details of the CJTF concept remain to be worked out, but these forces could be used for peacekeeping and other contingency military operations.
PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE: ELIGIBILITY

Q: Would "all" European states be eligible to participate in the PFP? Would allies also become members of PFP?

A. - We have proposed that the Partnership be open to all members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and to other European states agreed to by the Allies.

- The NATO Allies would be members of the Partnership and would participate as appropriate in Partnership activities, but they would not file Partnership work programs, as would the other participants.

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE: RELATION TO NACC

Q: What would be the relationship between NACC and PFP? Would non-NACC participants automatically become members of NACC?

A. - The Partnership will be a NATO activity carried out within the framework of the NACC.

- Non-NACC states could participate in the Partnership -- as some do now in NACC peacekeeping cooperation -- but would not automatically become members of the NACC.

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE: FUNDING

Q: How would PFP be financed? Will PFP training and exercises be in addition to or in place of current NATO activities?

A. - We expect that PFP member states will bear their own costs. The Partnership is an opportunity for them to develop a closer relationship with NATO, and they will need to determine what their level of commitment will be.

- Funding for "shared" costs would come from the NATO civil, military, and other budgets as appropriate. NATO might ask Partners to contribute to meeting these costs.

- Partnership activities would not be designed to replace NATO activities.

- Where practical and appropriate, existing NATO
activities might be opened to Partnership participants. Duplication should be avoided.

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE: CONSULTATIONS

Q: What is intended by the "consultations" provision of the Partnership? Does it imply a security guarantee?

A. - A full and active member of the Partnership would be entitled to consultations with NATO in the event that it perceived an immediate threat to its security.

- No security guarantee is implied or intended.

NATO EXPANSION

Q: What is the U.S. position on NATO expansion? Would membership in NATO be dependent on the degree of cooperation through the Partnership for Peace? Would Russia be first to join NATO if it cooperates more than any other partner?

A. - We want the Summit to formally open the door to an evolutionary process of expansion of NATO. This process must strengthen, not weaken, the ability of the Alliance to act.

- Our approach is inclusive and non-discriminatory. Now is not the time for NATO to set a specific timetable, establish fixed criteria for membership, or identify "preferred candidates." We do not want to draw new lines of division in Europe.

- Participation in the Partnership would be an important basis for evaluating a prospective NATO member's ability to contribute to the Alliance, but would not be a guarantee of membership.

- Nor would the level of participation in the partnership necessarily be used to "rank order" potential new members.

- NATO will take the interests of other states into account, but no state outside the Alliance will have a "veto" over NATO's decisions on expansion.

POLAND

Q: What did you discuss with the two Polish leaders?
A. - It was a pleasure to see my old friend President Walesa (vah-WEN-sa) once again and to meet Prime Minister Pawlak (PAHV-lahk) for the first time. Our talks covered a wide variety of topics ranging from Polish economic reform to regional security issues.

- I was pleased to hear from the Prime Minister that his government will continue the process of economic reform in Poland and wants to work closely with the U.S. As you know, continuation of reform in Poland is a high priority for the U.S. government and we welcome the chance to work with his government to build on the successes of the past.

- As for regional security, we discussed the results of the recent Brussels NATO Summit and exchanged views on the NATO Partnership for Peace initiative. Both President Walesa and the Prime Minister explained in detail Poland’s views on how best to assure security for the region. I am grateful for their input, which was, as always, thought-provoking and cogent.

- We plan a continuing series of consultations with our Polish friends on this issue, as we work together to develop inclusive security structures appropriate to the new Europe.

SLOVAKIA

Q: Are you concerned about the pace of reform in Slovakia?

A. - During our discussions today, President Kovac and Prime Minister Meciar underscored their commitment to democratic principles and free-market economic reforms.

- The United States firmly supports Slovakia’s desire for full integration with Western security and economic organizations.

- We have made clear to the Slovak government, and all the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, that their integration with the West is closely linked to their commitment to respect freedom of the press, the rights of members of minorities, the rule of law, and other fundamental principles of democracy.
HUNGARY

Q: What do you think about the turmoil in Hungary's electronic media?

A. - It is crucial to the democratic process that all legitimate political viewpoints have access to the public through the electronic media. I encourage the government, the opposition and media management to develop a system that allows all segments of society to be heard.

CZECH REPUBLIC

Q: Why does the United States support Westinghouse's participation in the Temelin nuclear reactor project?

A. - We and our G-7 colleagues strongly support safety upgrades of Soviet-designed reactors such as the Temelin reactor. Westinghouse instrumentation and control system and fuel rods we believe can bring the Temelin reactor up to comparable Western safety standards. Moreover, the Czech Government informs us that they intend to shut down highly polluting lignite power plants after the Temelin plant comes on line.

VISEGRAD LEADERS

Q: How are Eastern Europe's economic reforms going?

A. - The countries of Central and Eastern Europe have made great strides in the transition from a centrally planned economy to a free market economy. Social and economic hardships are likely to continue and probably increase somewhat, but most of the countries are expected to turn the corner in 1994. Privatization, financial sector reform and rationalization of the social welfare programs are the key outstanding reforms for 1994.
VISEGRAD

Q: How did the leaders of the Visegrad (Vee-sheh-grahd) countries react to news from the NATO summit?

A. - They were very pleased by the Summit's declaration in principle to open NATO to expansion. They expressed interest in how the Partnership for Peace (PFP) might be used to move toward their ultimate goal of NATO membership. It was important, they stressed, that the PFP provide the prospect of eventual membership.

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE: ELIGIBILITY

Q: Would all European states be eligible to participate in the PFP? Would allies also become members of PFP?

A. - We have proposed that the Partnership be open to all members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and to other European states agreed to by the Allies.

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- NATO will take the interests of other states into account, but no state outside the Alliance will have a "veto" over NATO's decisions on expansion.

EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY (ESDI)

Q: Does the United States support the development of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)?

A. - The United States fully supports the development of a European security identity as part of the process of European integration.

- We believe that a stronger, more cohesive Europe will strengthen our transatlantic relationship and reinforce the integrity and effectiveness of the Alliance.

- It will also facilitate a better balance of responsibilities and leadership within the Alliance.

- As a means of supporting European efforts, the U.S. proposed the development of "separable but not separate" European forces within NATO that would participate in NATO-wide operations but could also undertake independent European-led missions when that was appropriate. Such European missions would be able to draw on NATO collective assets. I am very pleased that the Summit has supported this proposal and has asked the NATO military authorities to provide advice on implementation.

AID TO RUSSIA AND THE NIS

Q: Russian aid: Why isn't the European Union (EU) taking the lead on Russian aid -- it's their backyard?

A. - The European Union is playing a major role in assistance to Russia and the other Newly Independent States.
- The European Commission and EU member states account for over 70 percent of total G-7 commitments to Russia to date.

- The EU also hosted one of the three coordinating conferences on NIS aid held in 1992.

- The U.S. and other Group of Seven (G-7) members agree that no one country or institution could or should take the lead alone on aid to Russia and the other NIS states.

- Also, it is vital that the international financial institutions be centrally involved in providing assistance. For this reason, a consultative group process led by the World Bank is most appropriate.

- Only through joint and concerted effort will we achieve the goal of helping these countries establish democratic institutions and a market economy.

AID TO EASTERN EUROPE

Q: How are the U.S. and the European Union (EU) cooperating on assistance to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Newly Independent States (NIS)?

A. - Cooperation between the U.S. and EU on assistance issues is close and wide-ranging.

- In Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), we work with EU officials through the Group-of-24 process. The G-24 coordinates the assistance activities of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) members and is chaired by the European Commission.

- Our cooperation on CEE aid includes regular exchanges with EU officials in Brussels. We have conducted joint food assessment missions in Albania and the Baltic states. Increasingly, our assistance providers are consulting with each other in the field.

- We also consult regularly with the Commission on NIS aid matters. The EU actively supports the Group of Seven (G-7) process and participates in the World Bank sponsored consultative groups that coordinate assistance for the NIS.
In addition, both the U.S. and EU contribute to the activities of the OECD and the international financial institutions.

Q: What about burdensharing in Eastern Europe? Is the European Union (EU) doing its fair share? Isn't most of its assistance in the form of tied aid?

A. - The European Commission and EU member states account for 62 percent of total bilateral commitments to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) through the end of 1992. (The European Commission is the third largest bilateral donor at $6.3 billion.)

- For comparison, over the same period, the U.S. committed $7.1 billion. This makes the U.S. the second largest bilateral donor after Germany, which committed over $10 billion.

- The U.S. is the top donor of grant assistance with $4.6 billion, or 65 percent of total U.S. assistance.

- A large part of EU assistance is in the form of official debt forgiveness, export credits and investment insurance, some of which is tied. In general, EU assistance to the CEE countries is tied. In addition, grant assistance, which is less than a third of total EU aid, is all tied.

Q: Why is the European Union (EU) denying market access to Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries in key sectors such as steel, agriculture and textiles?

A. - You should really pose that question to the European Union (EU).

(if asked)

- We are pleased with the market opening commitments the EU has made in its association agreements with the Central and Eastern Europeans.

- It is unfortunate, however, that the sectors in which the Eastern Europeans have large capacity and a comparative advantage -- namely agriculture, steel and textiles -- continue to be the most protected sectors in the world, including in the EU.

- The U.S. has consistently urged the EU and other developed countries to open their markets as much as possible to goods from Eastern Europe. We believe that expanding export opportunities is essential for growth in Eastern Europe and will help the reform process move ahead.
Q: What has the U.S. done to increase market access to the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries?

A. - In order to increase access to our market, we have extended Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to virtually all of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

- Most of these countries also enjoy the benefits of our Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program, which permits the duty-free entry of a wide range of products into the United States.

- Also, we have taken steps to reduce barriers to sensitive exports from Central and Eastern European countries.

- We have, for example, negotiated generous textile agreements with Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary and the former Czechoslovakia, and have also taken steps to ensure that agricultural sales under U.S. export enhancement program do not displace the traditional exports from Eastern Europe.

MIDDLE EAST

Q: Did you discuss any topics relating to the Middle East?

A. - Yes, we touched on the region in our discussion. We welcome the European Union’s active participation in the Middle East assistance coordination effort.

- We will continue to work closely with the European Union and others in ensuring that the Israeli-Palestinian agreement leads to tangible improvements in the lives of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.

- I also underscored that the United States is committed to achieving an end to the Arab League boycott in all its aspects. Lifting the boycott would be an important confidence-building measure.

BOSNIA: U.S.-EUROPEAN VIEWS

Q: The Bosnian government reportedly has stated that U.S. troop participation is essential to the successful implementation of any settlement in Bosnia. After events in Somalia and Haiti, are you prepared to send U.S. troops?
As I have said, the U.S., under certain conditions, is prepared to use U.S. forces as part of NATO-led operation to help implement a viable peace settlement in Bosnia.

Those conditions include agreement to the settlement by all parties and evidence of good-faith implementation. Extensive consultations with Congress would also be necessary.

BOSNIA: U.S. PRIORITIES

Q: Now that negotiations on a political settlement in Bosnia are once again stalled, what is your Administration’s priority in this region?

A. Our first order of business has to be ensuring delivery of humanitarian aid supplies to Bosnia during this winter.

- This priority was reflected in the European Union’s recent initiative on Bosnia. It is also our top concern.

- At the November 30 CSCE ministerial in Rome, Secretary Christopher announced additional assistance of $150 million to help the peoples of Bosnia survive the winter. U.S. assistance since the conflict began in 1991 now totals almost $600 million.

BOSNIA: GENEVA TALKS

Q: The EU-sponsored talks in Geneva last month stalled because the Bosnian government demanded additional Croat and Serb-controlled territory. Isn’t the current impasse in negotiations the fault of the Bosnian government?

A. It’s important to remember to distinguish between the principal aggressors and the principal victims in Bosnia. We will not pressure the Bosnian government to accept a particular plan desired by other parties.

- It remains our view that it is for the parties themselves to determine what an acceptable settlement would be. This is the only way to ensure a stable and enduring settlement.
IRAN: U.S. AND EUROPEAN VIEWS

Q: Did you discuss Iran in the course of your talks?

A. Yes, I reviewed our continuing concerns about Iran's unacceptable behavior -- its use of violence to oppose the Middle East peace process, its support of terrorism, its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, and its dismal human rights record.

IRAN: U.S. AND EUROPEAN COORDINATION

Q: What are the United States and European Union doing to address Iran's unacceptable behavior?

A. The U.S.-EU-Canada working group was set up in June to coordinate policy vis-a-vis Iran. We are continuing our discussion at all levels.

U.S.-EUROPEAN UNION RELATIONS: POLICY COORDINATION

Q: Is the U.S. considering better ways of coordinating with the European Union (EU) on security issues such as the Balkans and Eastern Europe?

A. Our coordination with the European Union is very good. We have a well-established network of U.S.-EU consultations and we work closely with EU Member states in NATO, the CSCE, and the United Nations, as well as on a bilateral basis.

- Secretary Christopher spent most of December 1 in consultations with the European Union.

- We agreed today that we would intensify wherever possible our consultations to coordinate common policies on the burning foreign policy issues facing us today.

U.S.-EUROPEAN UNION RELATIONS: EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Q: Does your Administration support European integration or do you view a strong, united Europe as an economic threat?

A. Our support for European integration is firm. Taken as a whole, the European Union is our largest trading and investment partner. The health of our economies is closely interconnected.
Based on our shared values, we work closely with the EU to promote democratization and economic development in Central and Eastern Europe, the newly independent states, and in the developing world.

(if pressed)

While the media tends to focus on the trade disputes between the U.S. and the EU, it’s a good idea to keep in mind that the areas in dispute represent only a very small percentage of our trade with Europe. That doesn’t mean that we won’t vigorously pursue fair treatment for all our exporters, but it does indicate that the overall relationship is in good shape.

U.S.-EUROPEAN UNION RELATIONS: MAASTRICHT

Q: How does the U.S. regard the Maastricht Treaty and European Union?

A. - It is up to the countries of the European Union to decide on a blueprint for further integration. The United States has long supported European political and economic integration. I reiterated that support in no uncertain terms when I met with Prime Minister Nyrup Rasmussen and President Delors last May, and again in my meetings today with Prime Minister Papandreou and President Delors.

U.S.-EUROPEAN UNION: COOPERATION AND RELATIONS

Q: Why has the Administration been ignoring our traditional allies in Western Europe?

A. - It is simply inaccurate to claim that we have ignored Europe. It is true that we have had much-publicized meetings with the countries of Asia and Pacific rim, and a national debate on NAFTA and our trade relations with our neighbors Mexico and Canada; this reflects the growing importance of these markets for the American economy.

However, increased contacts do not mean that we are ignoring Europe. Our full schedule of meetings reflects our continuing close, cooperative relationship. Vigorous debate on some topics -- for instance, the Uruguay Round -- sometimes distracts from the fundamentals of our transatlantic relationship, which remains the linchpin of our foreign agenda.
INTERNATIONAL CRIME

Q: What measures are the United States and the European Union taking together to combat the activities of international criminal organizations?

A. In order to tackle the growing reach of criminal organizations in activities like money laundering, computer fraud, and narcotics and other illegal trafficking -- including alien smuggling --, cooperation between the U.S. and the EU is more important than ever.

- If we are going to combat organized crime successfully, the U.S., and the EU and its member states must work more closely together in sharing ideas and information. The FBI's recent joint efforts with Italy in this area provide an excellent example of what can be accomplished.

- We welcome the establishment of mechanisms under the Maastricht Treaty which facilitate greater cooperation in law enforcement among the member states of the EU, and we look forward to working with them.

U.S.-EU COOPERATION ON POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT

Q: How are the United States and the EU cooperating on the upcoming UN International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo?

A. It is important that the recommendations that come out of the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development are clear, action-oriented, and practical. The United States and the EU and its member states need to work together closely to define common ground on priority issues for the Cairo conference.

- Perhaps the most crucial issue for the future is resources. The United Nations estimates that funding from all sources will need to double to $11 billion annually by the year 2000 to meet current and projected demand for family planning services.

- Additional resources are also needed for programs to improve the quality and range of maternal and child health services and increase female education, as these have a major impact on family size.

- The United States and the EU will lead in the effort to increase bilateral and multilateral resources
devoted to population, but we need support from all countries to meet the substantial contributions that this problem requires.
002a. memo Lieutenant General G.J. Folmer to the Members of the Military Committee and the Chief French Military Mission re: Exclusion Zones in Bosnia-Herzegovina [NATO] (3 pages) 07/15/1994 Pl/b(1)
002b. memo
Lieutenant General G.J. Folmer to the Secretary General, North Atlantic Treaty Organization re: Exclusion Zones in Bosnia-Herzegovina [NATO] (3 pages)

DATE: 07/15/1994
RESTRICTION: P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Donald Kerrick)

FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - NATO [2]

Restriction Codes:

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Extension and Enforcement of Exclusion Zones in Bosnia-Herzegovina (B-H) [NATO] (8 pages)
003. cable
re: Contact Group NATO Reps on NMA [NATO Military Authorities] Planning for Bosnia (4 pages)
07/18/1994 P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Donald Kerrick)
OA/Box Number: 368

FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - NATO [2]

RESISTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
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Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Permanent Mission to the United Nations
New York

June 23, 1994

To Permanent Representatives of France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Spain

Excellencies:

I have the honor to present to You, herewith attached, draft resolutions on the subjects we had discussed in our previous consultations:

- Draft resolution on the demilitarization of Sarajevo, and
- Draft resolution on human rights abuses and ethnic cleansing in Banja Luka, which constitute a serious violation of the cessation of hostilities agreed by the parties on June 8, 1994.

The resolutions presented are for your kind consideration. Your comments, suggestions, and possible sponsorship would be appreciated.

Please, accept Excellencies, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

Muhamed Sacirbey
Ambassador and Permanent Representative
DEMILITARIZATION OF SARAJEVO

DRAFT RESOLUTION

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions,

Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Recalling also the provisions of resolutions 824 (1993), 836 (1993) and 900 (1994), and other relevant measures, in particular the provisions of the NATO ultimatum of 9 February, 1994, and emphasizing the crucial importance that these decisions be fully implemented,

Reaffirming also the efforts to restore normal life to the city of Sarajevo, and desirous of ensuring that the process of reconstruction and restoration of public services that has been under way is fully facilitated,

Determined to achieve complete freedom of movement for the civilian population and humanitarian goods in and out of Sarajevo,

Emphasizing the need for a complete lifting of the blockade of Sarajevo and for the restoration of normalcy to the city, and in this context determined to create an environment of free access to and from the city that would enable the free and unimpeded movement of people, goods, and services in and out of the city,

Bearing in mind the importance of facilitating the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes,

Further aware that returning Sarajevo to normalcy is a political objective crucial to the continuation and successful conclusion of the negotiating process,

Reiterating the importance of maintaining Sarajevo, the capital of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a united city and a multicultural, multi-ethnic and multi-religious center,

Noting in this context the positive contribution that the elimination of internal confrontation lines in Sarajevo could make to this and other objectives,

Acting under chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Decides to have all military forces from the 10 opstins of Sarajevo withdrawn or
disengaged.

2. Calls upon the parties to eliminate, with the assistance of UNPROFOR, any internal
confrontational lines and to dismantle all checkpoints within the city other than those
controlled by UN personnel.

3. Decides that UNPROFOR will be responsible for maintaining the security of the city
with respect to any external threats and hostile acts.

4. Decides to place all the police and internal security of the city under joint authority of
UNPROFOR and Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with
participation of other local authorities where appropriate and where determined by
appropriate agreement.

5. Reaffirms that the status of Sarajevo as the capital of the Republic of Bosnia and
Herzegovina and of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina will remain intact.

6. Affirms that Government offices of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the appropriate security, would remain open
and fully functional within the city of Sarajevo, including all ten opstins other than Pale.

7. Decides to appoint a Senior military official who will be directly responsible for the
security of the 10 opstins of Sarajevo other than the city of Pale, and will coordinate its
work in conjunction with the Senior civilian official and the Government of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.

8. States that this arrangement would be in place for the period of two years from the date
of the adoption of this resolution and could be extended upon agreement reached by the
relevant parties.

9. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
BANJA LUKA

DRAFT RESOLUTION

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions,

Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,


Taking note also of the information provided by the independent UN sources (UNHCR, ICRC, etc.) and the Special Rapporteur in S/1994/165 and the report of the Commission of experts formed pursuant to the Security Council Resolution 780 in its report S/1994/674 reporting continuous human rights violations against the Non-Serb population in the Serb held areas, in particular Banja Luka, Prijedor, and other areas,

Appalled at the persistent and systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing perpetrated by de facto Serbian authorities in Banja Luka and other Serb held areas which has resulted in murder of non-Serb population, rape, expulsions, arbitrary imprisonment, physical intimidation and harassment, dismissal from jobs, fire-bombings and demolition of houses, etc.,

Emphasizing that the continuous and systematic practice of ethnic cleansing by de facto Serbian authorities and forces in Banja Luka and other areas constitutes a clear violation of the 8 June agreement on cessation of hostilities, as well as relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and the Geneva Conventions, and poses a serious threat to the on going peace effort,

Expressing its deep concern over the lack of UNPROFOR presence in the Serb held areas, in particular in Banja Luka,

Determined to put an end to the despicable and systematic practice of ethnic cleansing,

Acting under chapter VII,

1. Reaffirms that all parties to the conflict are bound to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law and in particular the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and that persons who commit or order the commission of grave breaches of the Conventions are individually responsible in respect of such breaches,

2. Strongly condemns the persistent campaign of ethnic cleansing perpetrated by de facto Serbian authorities in Banja Luka and other Serb held areas,
3. Demands that de facto Serb authorities immediately put an end to these despicable acts, some of which constitute a form of genocide.

4. Calls upon the immediate deployment of UNPROFOR troops and UN monitors in this region in order to deter further attacks and human rights abuses against the non-Serb population in Banja Luka and other Serb-held areas.

5. Determined to consider any further measures that it may deem necessary.

6. Request the Secretary General to report to the Council within ten days of the adoption of the present resolution on its implementation.

7. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
**Message No.** 006985  
**Classification** CONFIDENTIAL  
**No. Pages** 5

**From:** Glyn Davies  
**S/S** 647-8448  
**Extension** 7224

**Message Description**  
CABLE TO USNATO RE BOSNIA: PLANNING TO IMPLEMENT CONTACT GROUP PROPOSALS - GUIDANCE FOR JULY 11 NAC

**To (Agency):** NSCS  
**Deliver To:** Nancy Soderberg  
Will Hoff  
Kristie Kenney  
Executive Secretariat  
Clarke Bell  
Rice Witosky

**Extension** 456-6534  
**Room No.** WHSITRM

**For:** Clearance ☑  
**Information** ☐  
**Per Request** ☐  
**Comment** ☐

**Remarks:** Please clear by: MUST Go 7/9  
Guidance for Monday, July 11 meeting in Brussels.  
NSCS POC: DON KERRICK  
Thanks

**UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS**  
**Initials:** KSU  
**Date:** 09-17  
9/9 Officer: Glyn Davies

**CROSSHATCH**  
Return Time-Stamped Coversheet to 9/9
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<tr>
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**COLLECTION:**
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
European Affairs (Donald Kerrick)
OA/Box Number: 368

**FOLDER TITLE:**
Bosnia - NATO [2]

**RESTRICTION CODES**

*Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]*

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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- RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

*Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]*

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<td>005a. memo</td>
<td>Vice Admiral Giuseppe Spinozzi to Director International Military Staff re: Extension and Enforcement of Exclusion Zones (EZ) in Bosnia-Herzegovina [NATO]  (2 pages)</td>
<td>07/26/1994</td>
<td>P1/b(1)</td>
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005b. memo

United Nations Lieutenant-General De Lapresie to NATO CINCSOUTH [Comander-in-Chief Southern Europe] re: Extension and Enforcement of EZ's in Bosnia-Herzegovina (3 pages)

07/26/1994
PI/b(1)

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European Affairs (Donald Kerrick)
OA/Box Number: 368

FOLDER TITLE:
Bosnia - NATO [2]
005c. paper Extension and Enforcement of Exclusion Zones in Bosnia-Herzegovina (B-H) [NATO] (14 pages) 07/26/1994 P1/b(1)

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