This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Folder Title:</th>
<th>Clinton Doctrine - Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Staff Office-Individual:</td>
<td>Speechwriting-Boorstin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Original OA/ID Number:</td>
<td>415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Row:</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE</th>
<th>SUBJECT/TITLE</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>RESTRICTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>001. memo</td>
<td>re: Thoughts for Your Breakfast Tomorrow (3 pages)</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>P5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## COLLECTION:
- Clinton Presidential Records
- National Security Council
- Robert Boorstin (Speechwriting)

## FOLDER TITLE:
- Clinton Doctrine - Articles

## RESTRICTION CODES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P1</td>
<td>National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P2</td>
<td>Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P3</td>
<td>Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P4</td>
<td>Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P5</td>
<td>Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P6</td>
<td>Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.</td>
<td>Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor’s deed of gift.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRM</td>
<td>Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RR</td>
<td>Document will be reviewed upon request.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b(1)</td>
<td>National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b(2)</td>
<td>Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b(3)</td>
<td>Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b(4)</td>
<td>Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b(6)</td>
<td>Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b(7)</td>
<td>Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b(8)</td>
<td>Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b(9)</td>
<td>Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In a world roiling with turmoil, friend and foe alike are asking: Does the President have a foreign policy?

Clinton's Yo-Yo Diplomacy

BY ROWLAND EVANS AND ROBERT NOVAK

Just as individuals look for consistency in the people they deal with, nations prize a consistent foreign policy in their allies and neighbors. Erratic judgment is not only bad but dangerous.

Here is what the world has seen from President Clinton on Bosnia after Bosnian Serbs, backed by Serbia, began waging merciless war on their Muslim countrymen:

In the spring of 1993 President Clinton dispatched Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Europe to urge our reluctant allies to lift the international arms embargo, which had left the Muslims defenseless, and to bomb Serb military positions. But while Christopher was in Europe, the President confided doubts to close advisers as to whether "lift and strike" was such a great idea after all. Following an awards ceremony, the President invited Secretary of Defense Les Aspin and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Colin Powell into his office and told them about his doubts. They were stunned and made immediate transatlantic calls to Christopher, warning that the President seemed to be changing his mind. But it was too late. Christopher had already made his hard pitch to the allies, who ultimately rejected it.
In April 1994, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright defined the stakes as “civilization itself.” The “ethnic cleansing” taking place was likened to Hitler’s genocide, and Bosnian territorial integrity and independence were deemed unshakable U.S. objectives.

Then the Administration revealed that it “would not object” if the Bosnian Serbs formed a political link with Serbia—a surrender of Bosnian independence and territorial integrity.

The disarray in the Balkans capped two years of uncertainty and drift. In a world roiling with turmoil, President Clinton’s foreign policy lurches from crisis to crisis—Somalia, North Korea, Haiti. There is no strategic vision, no advance planning.

To be fair, the numbing complexities of the post-Cold War world would have taxed any President, no matter how interested or experienced. But Clinton is neither interested nor experienced. “He is more disengaged from foreign affairs than any President in my lifetime,” says Zbigniew Brzezinski, national security adviser for President Carter.

Abroad, the criticism has been even more scathing. “On foreign policy, Clinton is simply embarrassing,” says England’s prestigious Economist magazine. “Some of his flailing is understandable. But much of it is the result of lack of attention, time and care; and, not least, lack of spine.” One of Paris’s leading newspapers, Libération, reports, “More and more European and Asian leaders ask the question, ‘Is there a President at the White House?’”

During the third year of his Administration, as dangerous power vacuums have gone unfilled, the President has become a figure of scorn to many foreign leaders, and U.S. credibility has plummeted. Today, U.S. foreign policy is characterized by:

1. Subordination of national security to domestic politics.

Last August, President Clinton abruptly reversed a 28-year commitment by yanking the welcome mat from under thousands of Cubans fleeing Fidel Castro’s communist dictatorship. The decision shocked analysts at the State Department, who had not been consulted. More shocking was the reason: Governor Lawton Chiles of Florida was begging the President to turn away the asylum-seekers, whose presence was jeopardizing Chiles’s chance for re-election. Chiles won, but so did Castro. Almost immediately, Clinton proposed talks with the Cuban dictator on immigration. “Less than two weeks after the Clinton Administration vowed it would never let Fidel Castro dictate a change in U.S. immigration policy,” the New York Times editorialized, “Washington is ready to offer Mr. Castro the policy change he seeks. The shift is embarrassing for an Administration already famous for its serial flip-flops in foreign affairs.”

A particularly dangerous flip-flop
involves national defense. As a Presidential candidate, Clinton said he would reduce the defense budget $60 billion over four years from what President Bush had proposed. When he became President, his first budget reduced defense spending more than $120 billion over five years, the money to be transferred to social-welfare programs.

The extremely deep cuts have caused consternation. "I don't think the President understands just how risky it is," said Adm. Henry H. Mauz, Jr., last May, then commander of the U.S. Navy's Atlantic fleet. Former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft said flatly, "Right now, much less in a year or two from now, we could not repeat what we did in Desert Storm."

As 1994 came to a close, a soon-to-be GOP-controlled Congress prepared for hearings on military readiness. President Clinton suddenly saw a need to spend $25 billion more over six years on the military. Stay tuned.

2. Presidential indifference.
Throughout his Presidency, Clinton has mystified aides by passing up many top-level foreign-policy meetings, often because they interfered with his travels around the country to plug his domestic programs. James Woolsey, the Clinton appointee who headed the CIA until last December, sometimes found himself sitting outside the Oval Office waiting in vain for a Presidential audience.

When crises erupt, Clinton often calls the shots himself, handling each one on a dizzying ad hoc basis. During the crisis in Somalia, Newsday's Patrick Sloyan has reported, Clinton directed policy changes from a pay phone at the Martha's Vineyard golf course.

When North Korea reneged on its nuclear inspection promises last spring, Clinton was golfing in Coronado, Calif. Key advisers were not summoned for a full-scale policy review. Instead, National Security Adviser Tony Lake alone flew to California to brief the President. The initial briefing lasted about the length of time it took Clinton to drive to the golf course.

After Clinton missed critical National Security Council sessions on Bosnia, Haiti, North Korea and NATO, Secretary of State Christopher pleaded, ever so diplomatically, that the President try to attend future meetings. Presidential "ruminations," Christopher explained, are vital to his National Security high command and act as "guidelines to our thinking."

3. Misguided multilateralism.
The President came into the White House with little inclination to project U.S. power, and a naive faith in the U.N. In May 1993, Peter Tarnoff, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, was chosen to spell out Clinton's thinking in a "background" talk to the Overseas Writers Club. "We don't have the inclination to use force," Tarnoff said.
“Our approach is difficult for our friends to understand. It’s not different by accident; it’s different by design.”

Former U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick was appalled by this Presidential abdication of responsibility. “The Clinton Administration offers us a vision of foreign policy from which national self-interest is purged,” she charged. “It proposes to forgo U.S. control over important decisions and rely instead on the judgment of international bodies and officials.”

This misguided multilateralism led to some bizarre moments. When Clinton made a nationwide prime-time TV speech spelling out his plans to invade tiny Haiti, he explained that “the United States has agreed to lead a multinational force to carry out the will of the United Nations.” Secretary of State Christopher has listed among the Administration’s foreign-policy accomplishments taking “the lead in passing responsibility to a United Nations peacekeeping force.” Christopher was talking about Somalia, but the thrust of his words applies to U.S. policy worldwide.

And as Kirkpatrick observed, U.N. operations abroad were “characteristically ineffective.” With his foreign-policy approval ratings plunging, Clinton, in May 1994, issued Presidential Decision Directive 25 repudiating his earlier stance on multilateralism and limiting U.S. participation in or support for U.N. peacekeeping or peacemaking.

Nevertheless, the Administration continues to run much of its foreign policy through the U.N. Though officials deny any connection, it was widely reported that the Administration, seeking U.N. Security Council authorization for the invasion of Haiti, worked out a deal with the Russians, who had threatened to veto any such resolution. Lally Weymouth wrote in the Washington Post that in return for Russia’s raising no objections, Washington gave Moscow the green light to conduct its own “peacekeeping” operations in formerly Soviet Georgia.

4. No global strategy.

What happens to the U.S.-Russian relationship dwarfs all the other foreign challenges that face Clinton. If Russia could be converted into a peace-loving state within its present borders and renounce half a millennium of expansion and empire-building, Clinton would remove a major threat of war. But the “if” is huge, judging from Moscow’s decision to use bombers and tanks to crush separatists in Chechnya. So far neither the President nor his advisers seem up to the task.

The one foreign-policy adviser in whom Clinton clearly had some confidence during his first two years is Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. Talbott, a former Time magazine columnist, laid down the law at the State and Defense departments and the NSC: do or say nothing that might give offense to Russian President Boris Yeltsin or weaken his power.

Thus, with Yeltsin strenuously
objecting to an expanded NATO, Clinton has dragged his feet on taking Poland and other East European nations into that alliance. In addition, Clinton has shown sympathy with Yeltsin's demand for wide Russian latitude throughout the newly independent states of the old Soviet Union.

Yet Russia's December invasion of Chechnya posed a threat to Yeltsin's future and the internal stability of Russia itself. The callous bombardment of Grozny and surrounding villages recalled the frightening image of brass-knuckled power employed so often by the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War. It sent a warning that democracy and a market economy in Russia may be more distant goals than Clinton and Talbott bargained for.

The policy has deeply worried close allies, especially Germany. Last year, when Russia and Ukraine were disputing control of the Crimean fleet, a key foreign-policy aide of German Chancellor Helmut Kohl told Reader's Digest, "There is no master plan, not even a single paper" dealing with a possible Russian intervention in Ukraine. Such an intervention could occur at any time. Joachim Bitterlich, Kohl's national security adviser, told us that if the West ignores the dangerous flashpoints in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, "we will put at risk everything we have reached in the last 40 years.

In that case, a foreign policy without a compass would have devastating consequences for America and the world.

Coming to Terms

As a schoolteacher expecting my first child, I had attended natural-childbirth classes. One of my classmates was in the hospital in labor at the same time I was. She quickly requested drugs to ease her pain, while I self-righteously toughed it out and gave birth aided only by my husband's coaching.

When the nurses rolled me out of the delivery room, I spotted a chalkboard. Beside my classmate's name was an A--; next to mine was a B+. "Alan, look at that!" I complained to my husband. "She took all the drugs they'd give her and made an A--; I did it naturally and only got a B+!"

My patient husband rolled his eyes. "Kathy," he said, "that's your blood type."

—Contributed by Kathy Rhodes Sales

One evening, when I asked our six-year-old which bedtime story she wanted, she replied, "I don't know. Let's open to the main menu and see what stories are in the book." Amused, I explained that "main menu" is a computer term; in books, it's called the "table of contents."

That weekend, I repeated the episode over the phone to her grandmother. Grandma was amused, too. She said, "I guess you must be taking her out to eat too often."

—Contributed by R. E. Avery.
Is Clinton Foreign Policy a Reaction to New World Disorder? (Washn)

By Doyle McManus

WASHINGTON More than two years ago, Bill Clinton sat down with a new foreign policy adviser, Anthony Lake, in the governor's mansion in Little Rock, Ark., to read the draft of a speech. Clinton had been a national political figure for almost a decade, but now he was going for the Democratic presidential nomination, and he needed to define where he stood on foreign affairs.

Clinton went through the text line by line, from Russia and China to nuclear proliferation and human rights. He quizzed Lake on every point. "OK," he said at the end of each paragraph, penciling a check in the margin. "I believe that."

Aspiring members of the future president's foreign policy team were struck by two things. One, which Lake likes to recall, was Clinton's intense engagement with the issues, his insistence that every position had to connect with his core beliefs. "A number of politicians would be thinking of it in terms of what they" the public "would believe," Lake said later. "But he was really eliciting it in to some set of internal values of his own."

The other impression was how little the Democratic candidate had thought about these issues before. Clinton knew plenty about the world, but he had never grappled with foreign policy as he had with domestic issues. "On a lot of these things, this was the first time Clinton had ever had to take a position," one aide said. "He was thinking them through for the first time."

In his presidential campaign, Clinton's brief forays into foreign policy were largely successful. He tied international issues to the core domestic message of his campaign: "In this new era, our first priority in foreign policy and our first domestic priority are one and the same: We must revive our economy," he told the Los Angeles World Affairs Council that August.

Then-President Bush had made his reputation as a foreign policy leader, but Clinton audaciously charged Bush with being too cautious with doing too little to help reform in Russia, stop atrocities in Bosnia. A Clinton administration, the Democrat promised, would "reinforce the powerful global movement toward democracy and market economies" and make U.S. military power "a force for stability and justice" around the world.

Keeping those promises turned out to be harder than it looked. Yet scaling back from his pledges was unpalatable, for, as Lake noted, Clinton really did believe in them. The tension between promise and reality, between good intentions and hard choices, became a chronic dilemma for Clinton, and his indecision damaged his credibility at home and abroad.

On some issues, those on which he focused early and defined a clear position Clinton did well: Russia, Middle East peace talks, free-trade agreements. Although he came to the White House with less foreign policy experience than any other president since World War II, he gained confidence rapidly. But when hard decisions arose in Somalia, Bosnia and Haiti, among others Clinton was too often indecisive and mercurial, according to aides. This made it difficult for friends and allies to find the central threads in the Clinton foreign policy and, more important, to rely on his word. And it invited adversaries, when challenged, to push back.

In fairness, the world is more complicated now than it was for Clinton's predecessors. Without a Soviet threat to define U.S. interests, no one, neither Clinton nor his critics, has succeeded in describing clearly what the United States wants to accomplish in the world or what costs Americans should be willing to bear.

"Suddenly, virtually overnight, we've had to change the way we think about the world and our role in it," Strobe Talbott, Clinton's Rhodes Scholar classmate at Oxford who eventually became his deputy secretary of state, said in a speech last November. Talbott added, "With the end of the Cold War, it is not as easy as it was for the previous 50 years to describe either the dangers or the opportunities we face."

But Clinton didn't want to spend much time on that part of his job. He and his aides knew he had been elected principally to revive the domestic economy. Neither the new president nor the public was excited by a task as ill-defined as building a new security architecture for distant continents. The initial priority, one aide acknowledged, was "damage limitation": keeping foreign policy out of Clinton's way.

But the world didn't want to wait; international issues forced their way onto Clinton's agenda whether he liked it or not. In such a world, Clinton's decision-making style his penchant for thinking out loud, trying out new positions in public and reopening old issues became a foreign policy problem in itself.

Those close to Clinton don't like to talk about the problem, at least not for quotation. But they offer two diagnoses that also describe the country at large. One explanation is that Clinton doesn't believe deeply in anything, at least not in foreign policy, so even when he makes a decision, his heart is never quite in it; he can always be argued back. The other is more subtle and perhaps more compelling. The problem isn't that Clinton doesn't believe in anything, but that he believes in too many things too many worthy goals, too many competing priorities all at once.

Like any government debating high-stakes questions, Clinton's is divided over foreign policy. The conflicts have not been bitter or crippling, but they have been troublesome and revealing, especially on issues where Clinton has had difficulty making up his mind, such as Bosnia. "Nothing ever gets settled," says a senior Clinton adviser.

The most significant division has been a subtle one, embodied in the different temperaments of Lake, who became Clinton's national security adviser, and Warren Christopher, his secretary of state. It is the age-old battle between idealism and pragmatism in American foreign policy. Lake wants the United States to address problems of human suffering and economic development in the poorest parts of the world; Christopher wants to focus more single-mindedly on potential threats to the nation's security such as nuclear proliferation and resurgent Russian nationalism.

(Begin optional trim)

When specific decisions arise, the two men tend to see them through these lenses. In Bosnia, for example, Lake has long been a hawk, insisting that the United States find a way to fulfill its commitment to save the Bosnian Muslims; Christopher has been more cautious, wary of deeper U.S. military involvement and reluctant to provoke breaches with Britain and France, who have sent troops as part of the U.N. force.

Somewhere in the middle is Talbott, the former Time magazine journalist who is personally closer to Clinton than any other major player: more activist than Christopher, less ideal-driven than Lake. Talbott, who made his reputation during the Cold War as a chronicler of U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms talks, defines the administration's most important goal as "the defense of democracy," especially in Russia.

67
The argument between Lake and Christopher over whose vision serves Clinton better, and their gentlemanly struggle for power, played out most clearly in the three hardest problems they have faced: the small-country wars of Somalia, Bosnia and Haiti. These were not, as Christopher frequently admonished reporters, issues that would determine the fate of humanity. But they were the controversial, emotional issues that captured the interest of Congress and the public. And, at bottom, they revolved around a very big issue indeed: the question of when and how the United States would use its military power in the post-Cold War world.

(End optional trim)

For Clinton, the most painful foreign policy case has been Bosnia. During his presidential campaign, Clinton defined the war there as a moral challenge the United States could not duck. "The legitimacy of ethnic cleansing cannot stand," he declared, referring to the Serb rebels' murder and expulsion of Bosnian Muslims and Croats.

But when it came to enforcing that principle, Clinton's intentions collided with a self-imposed limit: he wanted to save Bosnia without putting American troops on the battlefield. That turned out to be impossible, so Clinton and his aides spent two years seeking a Clintonian "third way" out of the dilemma. In the end, all the administration did was disappoint the Bosnians and diminish its own credibility.

Haiti was different. Clinton made up his mind early on some key issues, and although he switched tactics several times, his goals were clear. One was avoiding a flood of boat people; another was restoring Jean-Bertrand Aristide to the Haitian presidency he had won in 1990.

For more than a year, Clinton sought a negotiated compromise between Aristide and Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedms, the leader of the military junta that overthrew him. Both Aristide and the generals were uncooperative. Last spring, Clinton resolved to force the generals out of power, even if that required a U.S. invasion. After 11th-hour negotiations with former President Carter, the Haitian generals surrendered and allowed U.S. troops to occupy the country.

The Haitian decisions were the first visible sign of a new Clinton style in decision-making one that aides described as "coddling" China despite its political repression, and he promised to link China's "trading privileges" to human rights. It was another campaign promise with unforeseen consequences. By November 1993, Clinton decided that he needed to get out from under his own human rights standard.

The contrast with the difficult little wars is telling. In the nightmare case of North Korea's nuclear weapons is more complicated. Clinton was arguably slow in reacting to North Korea's moves to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but so was Bush. The deal his negotiators worked out international funding for North Korea's nuclear energy program and a higher level of diplomatic recognition from the United States faced tough sledding in the Senate. But Clinton did several things right, including some deft personal diplomacy that kept a jumpy South Korea from backing out of the compromise.

International economic strategy is where Clinton has shown the surest hand. He enthusiastically took on the job of selling U.S. products abroad, a task earlier presidents had slighted as a limbo of the free world. He was successful in selling $6 billion in Boeing airframe to Saudi Arabia, sealed in personal talks with King Fahd. His commerce secretary, Ronald H. Brown, shepherded American CEOs through foreign capitals, and Christopher ordered U.S. ambassadors to include promotion of American exports among their top priorities.

One economic issue, however, did touch off a major doctrinal debate, because it pitted two contradictory Clinton priorities against each other: most-favored-nation trade status for China. Clinton had lambasted Bush for "coddling" China despite its political repression, and he promised to link China's "trading privileges" to human rights. It was another campaign promise with unforeseen consequences. By November 1993, Clinton decided that he needed to get out from under his own human rights standard.

"I think anybody should be reluctant to isolate a country as big as China," he said.

In the end, China granted exit visas to the families of some exiled dissidents and promised to stop exporting goods produced by prison labor to the United States. Christopher pronounced that sufficient progress, and Clinton publicly "de-linked" trade from human rights.

(End optional trim)

Anyone who seeks to explain Clinton's failure in some areas of foreign policy must also explain his success in others. Some are strategic: Russia and the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union, nuclear proliferation in North Korea, peace in the Middle East. Others are economic: a worldwide trade pact under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the North American Free Trade Agreement, steps toward similar free-trade areas with Asia and the rest of the Western Hemisphere.

The contrast with the difficult little wars is telling. If Clinton and his aides were merely all thumbs, they might not have managed the ticklish business of persuading Ukraine to give up its nuclear weapons, for example. In fact, Clinton appears to have succeeded on exactly those issues where he has conquered the intransigence that bedevils him on others. He knew what he wanted, worked out a strategy and stuck to it.

On Russia and the Middle East, the administration focused its attention early. Clinton made a fundamental decision to support Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin no matter what and held grimly to it, even when Yeltsin sent tanks to storm his Parliament, fired economic reformers and attacked rebellious Checheyas. In the Middle East, Clinton ordered troops to restore whatever credibility was needed to pump life back into Arab-Israeli peace talks, with good results.

The challenge of North Korea's nuclear weapons is more complicated. Clinton was arguably slow in reacting to North Korea's moves to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but so was Bush. The deal his negotiators worked out international funding for North Korea's nuclear energy program and a higher level of diplomatic recognition from the United States faced tough sledding in the Senate. But Clinton did several things right, including some deft personal diplomacy that kept a jumpy South Korea from backing out of the compromise.

International economic strategy is where Clinton has shown the surest hand. He enthusiastically took on the job of selling U.S. products abroad, a task earlier presidents had slighted as a limbo of the free world. He was successful in selling $6 billion in Boeing airframe to Saudi Arabia, sealed in personal talks with King Fahd. His commerce secretary, Ronald H. Brown, shepherded American CEOs through foreign capitals, and Christopher ordered U.S. ambassadors to include promotion of American exports among their top priorities.

One economic issue, however, did touch off a major doctrinal debate, because it pitted two contradictory Clinton priorities against each other: most-favored-nation trade status for China. Clinton had lambasted Bush for "coddling" China despite its political repression, and he promised to link China's "trading privileges" to human rights. It was another campaign promise with unforeseen consequences. By November 1993, Clinton decided that he needed to get out from under his own human rights standard.

"I think anybody should be reluctant to isolate a country as big as China," he said.

In the end, China granted exit visas to the families of some exiled dissidents and promised to stop exporting goods produced by prison labor to the United States. Christopher pronounced that sufficient progress, and Clinton publicly "de-linked" trade from human rights.

(End optional trim)

After two years, is there a Clinton foreign policy? The scaled-back foreign policy agenda of 1995 back to such traditional basics as stabilizing Russia, preserving the alliance with Western Europe, dealing with China and seeking peace in the Middle East sounds suspiciously like that of George Bush. Indeed, in the nightmare case of Bosnia, Clinton has come virtually full circle to his predecessor's position and is being criticized by Republicans just as he once hounded Bush.

Here Washington jibe puts it, Democrats and Republicans pursue the same foreign policy, the only difference is Democrats feel guilty about it: Is there now a Clinton Doctrine a systematic foreign policy that can guide the United States through the post-Cold War disorder, just as former high-ranking official George F. Kennan's idea of "containment" set a basic course in the Cold War? No, as most senior officials admit. Warren Christopher was right on at least one count: the post-Cold War doesn't lend itself to overarching concepts. How can anyone devise a doctrine for an era so ill-defined there is no name for it? One lesson Clinton and his aides have learned in two bruising years is that doctrines born of enthusiasm may be
regrett at leisure. Some measure of confusion may be unavoidable, a reflection of the inchoate state of the world. Like Britain after World War II, America is struggling to define a new role and finding it an unexpectedly difficult task. You can feel the frustration in the halls of the State Department and the CIA. Coping with ambiguous ethnic struggles just isn’t as exhilarating as leading a global crusade against a Soviet menace.

Any president would have suffered some missteps. Clinton has acknowledged his early errors and says he has learned from them. But this president still sees his destiny in domestic battles and will be satisfied if he can simply avoid any future foreign disasters — no small achievement in this world.

If he succeeds, a half-century from now Clinton’s shaky first efforts may look less like a string of small debacles and more like an inevitable process of trial and error — perhaps the only way a democratic country can find its way across unfamiliar terrain.

End adv sun jan 22

_____

adv sun jan 22

Did Clinton’s Inattention Contribute to Somalia Debacle? (Washn)

By Doyle McManus=
(c) 1995, Los Angeles Times=
WASHINGTON Last spring, President Clinton met at the White House with the parents of some of the 18 U.S. Army Rangers who died during an ambush and ferocious gun battle in Somalia in 1993.

Clinton had put off the meeting for months. Aides said he was shocked by the young men’s deaths, shaken by seeing his own orders lead to tragedy. The bereaved parents did little to salve his anguish. Clinton extended his hand to Herbert Shughart, the father of one of the soldiers and Shughart refused to take it.

“You are not fit to be president of the United States,” Shughart reportedly said. “The blame for my son’s death rests with you.”

The debacle in the Somali capital of Mogadishu on Oct. 4, 1993, was the low point for Clinton’s foreign policy. That same month, a U.S. Navy ship carrying police trainers to Haiti was turned back by thugs on the dock in Port-au-Prince, and American efforts to negotiate an end to the war in Bosnia seemed paralyzed. For the president and his advisers, most of whom came of age as opponents of the Vietnam War, no issues were as agonizing as the use of U.S. troops in pursuit of virtuous ends.

“This is the one ideological issue in the administration: the degree to which you are willing to use American military force in an area of non-vital interest,” a Clinton adviser acknowledges.

In Somalia, the new administration’s errors were born of hubris and inattention. Former President Bush had sent U.S. troops to the east African country to protect food shipments for a nation wracked by famine and civil war. Clinton and his aides, enthusiastic about U.N. peacekeeping, allowed the mission to expand to include “nation-building.”

Somalia, weak and needy, seemed an ideal laboratory for the “assertive multilateralism” that Clinton’s ambassador at the United Nations, Madeleine K. Albright, tried to promote.

But the Somali boss of southern Mogadishu, Gen. Mohammed Farah Aidid, saw the U.N. peacekeepers as a threat to his power and began attacking their patrols. The American commander of the U.N. peacekeeping force, supported by Clinton, responded by trying to capture Aidid.

The urban guerrilla war escalated, casualties mounted and Clinton decided to seek a negotiated disengagement but he also allowed the raids to continue, a compromise in deference to administration aides who still hoped Aidid could be neutralized. “This was a case where collegiality got us into trouble,” says one former senior official.

One reason for the disaster in Somalia, a State Department aide admitted later, was that “nobody was really in charge” in the U.S. government. No single senior official was responsible for what American troops were doing there. Clinton never held a full-scale, cabinet-level meeting to review the premises of the U.S.-led operation until after the Mogadishu raid went awry.

But the public expected the commander-in-chief to be paying attention when his forces were in harm’s way. Some officials complained that Clinton only got involved in crisis management, not in setting clear strategies.

“He was spending the time,” one U.S. official said, “but he wasn’t spending it the right way.”

End adv sun jan 22

_____

Christopher Outlines Foreign Policy Agenda (Washn)

By Norman Kempster=
(c) 1995, Los Angeles Times=
WASHINGTON Outlining the Clinton administration’s foreign policy goals for the next two years, Secretary of State Warren Christopher on Friday pledged a tough, new campaign against terrorists and drug traffickers to disrupt their sources of funds, close down their sanctuaries and make their entry into the United States more difficult.

In cooperation with the Justice and Treasury departments and law enforcement agencies across the country, Christopher said his department will seek new laws, sharpen enforcement of existing statutes and apply diplomatic pressure to stop terrorists and international criminals that “sap the strength of industrialized societies and threaten the survival of emerging democracies.”

Christopher used his speech at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government to sketch foreign policy priorities intended to appeal to the new Republican congressional leadership. But he bluntly challenged GOP critics of the administration’s nuclear deal with North Korea either to come up with “an effective alternative” or stop finding fault.

His address was intended to catalogue the administration’s foreign policy plans in advance of Tuesday’s State of the Union speech by President Clinton, who is expected to concentrate on domestic issues.

Christopher said the administration will pursue a comprehensive strategy to combat terrorism, the drug trade and other aspects of international crime.

In probably the most far-reaching step, Christopher said the administration intends to stop terrorists from raising money in the United States. Although he gave no examples, militant Islamic fundamentalist organizations, the Irish Republican Army and other terrorist groups have long relied on contributions from sympathetic Americans for much of their financial support.

He said the administration will use diplomatic pressure to induce other countries to either extradite or prosecute terrorists and other international criminals, in effect closing down their hiding places. At the same time, he
said, Washington will seek international cooperation in seizing the assets of criminals and money launderers to hit them "in a vulnerable place in their pocketbook."

To keep terrorists and other criminals out of the United States, Christopher said the administration will toughen visa regulations and propose legislation to combat immigration fraud and alien smuggling.

In addition to combating international crime, Christopher said U.S. foreign policy will focus on four other goals, none of them new:

Building on the momentum of recent global trade agreements to reduce still further tariffs and other trade barriers;

Developing a post-Cold War European security structure, especially by opening NATO membership to the continent's emerging democracies;

Contributing to a comprehensive peace in the Middle East;

Renewing the nuclear nonproliferation treaty which expires this year and taking other steps to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

Fired Bishop Draws Support From French Catholics (Paris)

By Scott Kraft=

(c) 1995, Los Angeles Times=

PARIS When the Vatican summoned Bishop Jacques Gaillot to Rome the other day, he was otherwise occupied. In fact, France's outspoken liberal prelate was in Haiti visiting President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, another priest who has had his disputes with the Holy See.

Call it an omen.

Gaillot eventually made it to Vatican City, where he was dismissed as head of the diocese of Evreux, west of Paris, becoming the first French bishop since World War II to be so harshly disciplined.

The firing of Gaillot had much of France up in arms this week. Several thousand of his supporters took to city streets across France on Sunday to protest. And even Catholic priests complained publicly about what they saw as an attempt to silence one of their own.

The volume of the protests reflected deep and growing divisions between the Vatican and large numbers of Catholics in France. Although 80 percent of the French people call themselves Catholics, many fewer go to church regularly or adhere strictly to church doctrine on birth control or abortion.

Priests in the Mission of France said they were "stunned and appalled" by the dismissal of Gaillot, whom they called "a free voice in the church, defending justice and the dignity of man."

The church "likes to cherish its martyrs," observed the Paris daily newspaper Liberation. "But it also has the art of making them."

For his part, the 59-year-old bishop seemed almost relieved as he joined homeless protesters occupying a Paris welfare office this week, helping them press their demand for increases in aid to young people without homes or jobs.

After more than a decade of facing threats of disciplinary action, Gaillot said he felt a new sense of freedom.

"Now that I've become an outsider of sorts," he said, smiling serenely, "maybe my determination will be even more vigorous than before. I've found a certain freedom to speak and act. They can't muzzle someone."

Gaillot gets to keep his title and pension. But, following his final sermon this Sunday, he will, on paper at least, become the bishop for Partenio, a diocese in Mauritania that disappeared long ago. In other words, he'll be a bishop in title but without jurisdiction.

Certainly, in the Vatican view, Gaillot's transgressions were numerous, troubling and cumulative.

He had gained a reputation as an advocate for social outcasts, including homosexuals, immigrants and the homeless. But, in the course of that work, he became a particularly outspoken liberal, blithely taking positions directly opposed to the teachings of the church.

He publicly supported the ordination of married priests, the rights of homosexuals and the use of condoms to protect against AIDS, arguing that "to advise populations at risk to not use condoms is failure to render assistance to a person in danger."

He was, as the French like to say, "mediatique," a tall, photogenic man who loved television's power to get his message across and, in turn, was loved by the camera. "Several minutes on television," he once said, "is worth gold."

In the view of some of his more conservative brethren, though, he didn't spend enough time in his cathedral and wasn't discriminating enough in his choice of news outlets.

He regularly gave interviews to magazines catering to homosexuals, saying it was wrong for Christians to exclude homosexuals. And, earlier this year, the bishop drew a rebuke from the head of French bishops, Joseph Duval, for airing his differences with the Vatican on the frothy talk show, "Frou-Frou."

"What are you looking for?" Duval demanded in a letter. "Your personal success? You can no longer advance on the path you have taken."

But Gaillot frequently defended his use of the media. "A bishop must join the people here, where they are," he said. "And for this, the media are necessary to spread the word."

Gaillot, the son of wine merchants, seemed to court controversy almost from the moment he became a bishop, in 1982. He publicly supported French conscientious objectors, met Yasser Arafat in 1985 and, on any number of issues, seemed to relish taking positions diametrically opposed to Catholic leaders in France.

A day after joining the homeless protest this week, Gaillot was again on the public stage, joining Abbe Pierre, another ecclesiastical celebrity and advocate for society's outcasts. Together, they demanded freedom for a 31-year-old prisoner fighting extradition from France to Italy, where he faces a 22-year sentence for terrorism.

As for Gaillot's future, the bishop speaks of helping AIDS victims, working with prisoners or maybe writing a book.

"The church certainly wants to marginalize me, to lessen the weight of my voice," Gaillot said later. "But I will not keep silent."
Stephen S. Rosenfeld

An Administration Adjusting

Maybe what we need right now in foreign policy is not an overarching vision but adaptability, patience and a little respect for the historical newness and complexity of our situation.

This has to be the autumn of Bill Clinton's foreign policy career, the season when the share of his responsibilities turned from debit to credit on the great political scoreboard whose keeping is Washington's prime daily care.

He has newly in hand an agreement with Communist North Korea that, even in the judgment of those who lauded some of its terms, cracks a nut that had defied previous administrations and materially advances the American purpose of curbing a world-class nuclear threat.

In a second difficult high-profile case spun off by George Bush—a president widely acknowledged as a foreign policy whiz—Clinton adroitness and musculely faced down an ominous probe from Saddam Hussein and did so with no shots being fired and no untoward concessions being made.

In a third such Bush hand-me-down, Clinton delivered on a promise to put Haiti's democratically elected president back in Haiti, and did it with a quiet, uncontested military intervention.

Meanwhile, a comprehensive Middle East peace process that was George Bush's original creation produced on Clinton's watch yet another bloom—a formal peace accord between Israel and Jordan, while work goes on to draw in Syria.

An Irish peace process to which Clinton has lent fresh American impetus also produced a further fruit—Protestant gunmen matched Catholic gunmen in putting down their arms.

He defied for a while, with a refugee agreement, a still looming political crisis arising from the Castro enigme in Cuba. The rescue of Rwanda and the revolt of South Africa are further items in the endless global housekeeping that falls to a great power.

You could say all these projects are still tentative and could collapse, explode or whatever. But when you throw in the results in the administration's foreign political priority of moving Russia to a new plane, and also in its foreign economic priority of market opening, and some other stuff, then you have to give Clinton a good bit more deference in this policy area than he's received so far.

No wonder that he is about to move the location of his midterm election campaigning from at home to abroad. No wonder that trial-rails like the Econo-mint's Daniel Franklin are starting to suggest that a president whose domestic touch has turned leaden may be tempted in his third and fourth years to go for the international gold.

There is a telling thing about the political thermal updraft that Clinton has recently caught. It undercuts the familiar consensus critique of his foreign policy as unsteady in execution and tactics on one level and bereft of "vision" and "strategy" on another.

Part of the explanation for this turn in Clinton's favor is that he and his gang who supposedly couldn't shoot straight have had a good run that could change. Another part is that the critics are on a learning curve of their own and are making more of a distinction between mistakes or misstatements that embarrass and substantive results that matter.

Definitely a third part is that those who launch appeals for strategy and vision tend to offer very little of it themselves. These days a certified vision has a shelf life of about four months.

Let's face it. The loss of the Cold War discipline enforced by the great powers has left a world of unstructured pieces inherently resistant to any imposed order. Maybe what we need right now is not an overarching vision—not a plan—but adaptability, a little respect for the historical newness and complexity of our situation, a little patience while we do sensible things and argue and rally a consensus for the next stage. We will miss some openings but avoid some errors and meanwhile pursue—even as we strive to define—our national interests.

Few doubt that crises for American leadership in the world mean less for most Americans than calls for attention to concerns at home. Nonetheless, others should note that the Great Debate on post-Cold War policy is pretty much over. Internationalism won; isolationism lost. Not the old internationalism but a new sort that keeps America engaged in the world, though with certain limits. This is what you get when you connect up the dots of what Bill Clinton, and George Bush before him, have actually done.

Clinton's background and personality make him vulnerable to the internationalist elite's barbs. But no more than many other areas of policy is foreign policy rocket science: it requires attention but not career immersion. Clinton has begun to show signs that his practice is taking. With more of the luck he's enjoyed in the last few weeks, he could yet learn to like it.
A Sound Beginning
With North Korea

Jessica Mathews

It is difficult to make a little word bear as much weight as it must in this instance, but it— in capital letters and underscored three times— if the U.S.-North Korean nuclear agreement is ultimately carried out, it will be the most important single foreign policy feat of the Clinton administration to date, and an achievement of major strategic significance by any standard.

There are innumerable ways for the agreement to fail. The North Koreans will hesitate, backtrack, draw stones in the way, and may even repudiate the agreement. They may try a double cross or two. South Korea, on whose support the deal absolutely rests, may be unwilling to swallow a deepening U.S.-North Korean relationship, and for domestic political reasons be unable to produce the needed funding. One serious U.S. misstep in the delicate balancing of the turn hawks of the peninsula could torpedo the deal.

The list can be lengthened almost at will. But if the plan holds, the gains are equally sobering. A potential new nuclear power— and a certain spark to a nuclear arms race touching Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and China— will have been removed. A nuclear exporter willing to sell to any country or terrorist group with enough cash will not be selling. A blow to the nonproliferation regime from which it might not have recovered will have been dodged. The possible cause of a second Korean war will have been eliminated.

For these gains the United States conceded remarkably little, and North Korea— negotiate for energy to prop up its collapsing economy—a great deal. Most important, Pyongyang has agreed to give up reprocessing (the process for producing plutonium). This is a right it holds under the Nonproliferation Treaty, though one it gave up and then reacquired in a 1991 agreement with South Korea. Its present supply of spent fuel rods will remain in storage until shipped out of the country. It has undertaken not to refuel or restart its existing research reactor, which would produce more plutonium-laden fuel, and to immediately cease construction of two much larger reactors of the same type. All this is to be under continuous IAEA inspection.

In return, in addition to trade and political openings, the United States promises to supply (though not to pay for) two large new conventional power reactors that produce spent fuel less in plutonium, and to provide heavy oil exactly equal to the amount of energy the three former reactors would have produced until the first of the new reactors goes on line.

Before the new plants’ nuclear equipment, can be delivered— about five years from now—the IAEA must have cleared up the question of whether North Korea has diverted plutonium for weapons use in 1999-99. If, in the IAEA’s opinion, this requires special inspections—a step North Korea rejected in the past—so be it. Before the first plant’s completion, the spent fuel rods must be shipped out of the country. During the second plant’s construction, North Korea must begin dismantling its plutonium-production reactors and reprocessing plant.

In a perfect world, one would have liked the post to be closed right away and the spent fuel rods removed immediately. One would wish that North Korea had not been tempted to spread its nuclear leverage to new reactors or that the agreement had stipulated how the spent fuel will be handled.

But these and other criticisms are quibbles. The administration was right to correct its earlier mistake of insisting that what happened in the past be the first step in resolving this crisis. There is no urgency to clearing up the past, and great urgency to preventing repetition on a much larger scale. The agreement appropriately puts that threat first.

Nor does the deal rely on trust. If the inspectors are ever interfered with, or if U.S. intelligence detects any violation, the oil delivery and construction work on the new plants can be stopped instantly— leaving North Korea starved for energy. In this worst case, we will be back where we were last spring, having lost nothing but diplomatic effort and the cost of some oil in an attempt to avoid nuclear conflict.

There is one cost that neither we nor any other negotiated end to the North Korean crisis could avoid, and it is this: a few signs to other would-be proliferators that if they can get far enough along before being discovered, a covert nuclear program is an eminently bargaining chip. That opportunity was but long before the Clinton administration took office, as the IAEA let itself be denied by Pyongyang for seven years and the United States took no effective action for even longer.

The task for the international community now is to understand that precedent by demonstrating that neither NPT members nor nonmembers will be able to get far enough along to exploit it. This will mean maintaining a strict regime on Iraq and North Korea, and perhaps more aggressive and effective IAEA through adequate funding, intelligence sharing and political support, taking a tougher stance against resistance experiencing nuclear technology and, for most important, establishing that, henceforth, early steps toward a weapons capability—even if legal under the NPT—will be seen and responded to as a direct threat to international security.

The agreement deserves bipartisan celebration. Republicans who have argued that it has been strikingly ill informed about its contents. Its implementation would be smooth; setbacks are the rule, not the exception. If there should be no doubt that if its terms can be sustained, the deal is a solid win for world peace.

The writer is a senior fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations.

For the Record

From remarks by Robert Gallucci, chief U.S. negotiator in the nuclear-deal between the United States and North Korea, on "MacNeil-Lehrer NewsHour" Oct. 18:

Q: Did you get what you wanted from North Korea?

As I think we did. We have had objectives through these three months of negotiations that were pretty clear. Overall, we've characterized them as a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, but the subject to that was to deal with problems which we can roughly characterize as problems that relate to the past activity of the North Koreans, the current nuclear program and the direction that the program was headed in the future. And we think the framework document that we negotiated over these last weeks—finished the negotiations on—addresses all three of these areas of their program.

Q: This whole situation has been characterized, in shorthand, as the North Korea Crisis. Is that crisis now over?

A: I think we are on the verge, and this is, I think, a fair statement, given the breadth of the agreement, making a breakthrough in solving that problem.

Q: Do you believe that, based on what you have agreed to, it will be impossible, assuming that the inspections go on and they in fact do do what they say...?

A: That North Korea will be unable to have nuclear weapons.

I do believe that will be true. They will not have a source of separative plutonium to make nuclear weapons.

And the agreement that we reached is not, as the president said a little earlier this afternoon, based on trust. Maybe it will produce trust, but it is not based on trust. It is based on verified compliance. And we'll be watching all along the way.
To the Editor:

In your call for Kenneth W. Starr to step down as Whitewater independent counsel (editorial, Aug. 18), you state that he "was working on a legal brief for a conservative women's organization opposing President Clinton." The Independent Women's Forum is not conservative, does not oppose President Clinton and has not asked Mr. Starr to prepare a legal brief.

The forum is troubled by the notion that any man should enjoy legal immunity from charges of sexual harassment. We asked Mr. Starr, among others, to explore with us the constitutional question of whether or not a sitting President is immune from civil liability for nonofficial acts before he takes office. While we might decide to take some sort of action, no such decision has been made. It is therefore quite a leap for you to conclude that "Mr. Starr passed from public commentator to litigating opponent." We speak for women working to raise families and build careers. We consider ourselves neither conservative nor liberal, but sensible. Our interest in the Paula Jones case was prompted by a concern that if the immunity defense prevailed, it might serve as a precedent for powerful men to avoid or delay accountability for the sexual harassment of less powerful women.

Anita K. Blair
Pres., Independent Women's Forum
Arlington, Va., Aug. 18, 1994
NOTICE TO CONTRIBUTORS

Articles offered to FOREIGN POLICY should be original and their text should not draw significantly from previously published articles by the writer. They also should not be submitted simultaneously to any other publication.

All manuscripts should be typewritten, double-spaced, with 25 lines per page and margins of at least one inch. Full names of authors, addresses with zip codes, and telephone numbers should be given. All manuscripts must be fully documented to facilitate fact checking. Authors must provide copies of complete English translations for all non-English source materials. A standard length for FOREIGN POLICY articles is 4,000-6,000 words. For spelling, punctuation, and style, refer to the American Heritage Dictionary and the Chicago Manual of Style.

Address all correspondence to the Editor, FOREIGN POLICY, 2400 N Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037-1153. For manuscript return, include a postpaid, self-addressed envelope.

The copy deadline for the Summer 1994 issue is March 1, 1994.

A WORKABLE CLINTON DOCTRINE

by Charles William Maynes

In his confirmation hearings, Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced that with the end of the Cold War, America now had an opportunity to create "a new strategy to direct America's resources at something other than superpower confrontation." He promised that the Clinton administration would "adapt our foreign policy and institutions" to the revolutionary changes that began with the destruction of the Berlin Wall.

In September, nine months into its term, the Clinton administration finally presented its new approach with four speeches: President Bill Clinton's address to the United Nations General Assembly, the secretary of state's address at Columbia University, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake's remarks at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and U.S. ambassador to the U.N. Madeleine Albright's speech at National Defense University.

Revealed in the four speeches was more continuity than change. The new approach turns out to be much like the old one. Under the Clinton doctrine of enlargement, America's alliance commitments remain the same as they were under the Cold War doctrine of containment. American troops stay where they are. As the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee has pointed out, even after proposed drawdowns the U.S. force structure will be at roughly 90 per cent of the figure that retired head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell developed—before the Berlin Wall came down, the Warsaw Pact disbanded, and the Soviet Union fragmented.

Under the new doctrine of enlargement, the United States will try to spread democracy and free markets. But that was the U.S. objective during the Cold War. Meanwhile, the admin-
tration has retreated from its early, bold endorsement of U.N. peacekeeping. Now it states that Americans will only participate under conditions that very few U.N. operations, including those in the Middle East, could ever meet.

The four speeches do represent a serious intellectual effort. They will help provide a badly needed better focus for administration policy. But an issue not directly discussed in any of the speeches is whether America's international aims can be accomplished at a lower price and with less risk than the country is now incurring. Apparently, the Clinton administration's answer is no.

In their overarching message, the September speeches seem almost a collective answer to Peter Tarnoff, the under secretary of state for political affairs who suggested in May 1993 that the United States no longer had the resources to run the world. A political storm followed. Although Christopher repudiated Tarnoff within hours, the administration apparently felt the need to put even more distance between the would-be "Tarnoff doctrine" and its own foreign policy.

But the irony is that Tarnoff's statement was the administration's only serious attempt to grapple with a very difficult three-pronged problem: the growing ability of the news media to set this country's international agenda, the loss of the Cold War geopolitical compass to guide administration responses to media pressure, and a public that refuses to make available the resources necessary to carry out a vigorous foreign policy.

Ever since the breakup of the Soviet Union, it has become clear to anyone who cares to notice that in Washington the real agenda-setters for foreign policy sit not in the White House but in editorial rooms and press cubicles. Clinton may have come to office determined to play down international issues so that he could concentrate on his domestic reform proposals, but news coverage of the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina forced the administration to keep returning to an issue it hoped would go away. It was compelled to engage and reengage with one inadequate policy after another until the only remaining option was committing ground troops. That was a step it refused to take, so it confessed public failure.

The Bush administration also allowed the media to set its priorities once the Berlin Wall came down. The United States had no traditional national interest in the outcome of the unfolding human tragedy in Somalia. But the unrelenting media attention to the famine there finally compelled an administration that had previously tried to limit U.N. involvement in Somalia in order to decrease America's U.N. dues to suddenly reverse course and authorize an American peacekeeping force to end the anarchy and famine there. The cost to the United States could have been a few tens of millions of dollars in U.N. dues for peacekeeping if it had supported early action. By waiting and then acting alone, the Bush administration set the United States on a course that will tax the Treasury in excess of $1 billion and that cost the country a significant number of dead and wounded.

The power of the media to expand the country's foreign agenda against a budgetary background of shrinking resources is a novel problem for U.S. officials. Public opinion plays a critical role in any democracy, but during the Cold War U.S. policymakers possessed a geopolitical yardstick to prioritize international developments and organize domestic support. Events irrelevant to the global struggle between Moscow and Washington were simply downgraded or ignored while rivers of money flowed for programs that seemed related to that struggle. In 1965, the Indonesian government encouraged the slaughter of more than a half million people in an effort to cripple the Communist party there, but the United States did not seem terribly concerned about violations of human rights or oppressive government. Pol Pot carried out his genocide against the Cambodian people, yet America was more troubled by the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the overthrow of the government there than by the earlier moral abomination. Revelations that the Shah of Iran was a dictator or that Korean presidents were corrupt altered American policy only slightly.

No longer. Today, each new revelation brings a call for American intervention or involvement. That is the price both of being the
FOREIGN POLICY

world’s sole remaining superpower and of failing to develop any clear geopolitical standard to guide the country’s international involvement. The United States has the political influence, economic leverage, and military strength to intervene with effect in a number of situations around the globe, and the Soviets no longer stand in the way. Thus, whether or not the United States decides to act seems to depend almost entirely on the unpredictable interaction of media priorities and presidential attention.

Such an approach to foreign policy at some point will pose severe problems for the country. Washington will be pushed either to assume unacceptable burdens or to suffer grave embarrassment. As it says yes on some occasions and no on others, the United States will appear both overextended and lacking will. Indeed, those are the awkward options facing the Clinton administration in dealing with a growing number of crises, from Bosnia to Haiti and Liberia to Iraq.

A New Yardstick

The administration needs a geopolitical yardstick to enable it to regain control of the international agenda. It needs some midpoint between the only two approaches that now vie for dominance as the conceptual foundation of U.S. foreign policy: global preeminence or traditional isolationism.

The former, of course, is too economically expensive whereas the latter is too politically expensive. For that reason, neither approach has gained widespread support. Both the Bush and Clinton administrations have tried to solve the problem by settling on an approach that might be described as maintaining the global pretense politically while adopting a more regional posture economically. Both administrations have seemed determined to maintain all of America’s political commitments worldwide even though most of them were accepted in an entirely different set of circumstances. Bush sought a new world order that the United States would dominate. Clinton seeks an enlarging circle of friends that the United States will lead. But in the economic field both Bush and Clinton have given a greater priority to establishing a free trade agreement with Canada and Mexico (NAFTA) than to completing a new accord under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that would benefit the entire world.

In an era of restricted resources, however, a sensible post-Cold War foreign policy would call for exactly the opposite focus. The United States would work gradually toward a more regional political approach and a more global economic approach. Over time, the United States would abandon its global military pretense because the military challenge is no longer worldwide. The Soviet Union no longer exists. It will be decades before another power poses a similar challenge to the United States. True, many crises around the world may require outside involvement, but an increasing number of them can be handled by the area’s dominant powers or regional organizations if we begin now to strengthen them.

The global pretense now makes Washington responsible for the future of Somali politics, the fate of the Kurds in northern Iraq, the maintenance of the indefensible borders of the newly independent parts of the former Yugoslavia, and the outcome of the election in Cambodia. It threatens to make America responsible for the defense of the new borders of all the former Soviet empire, now a cauldron of ethnic unrest. Indeed, there are calls for the United States to extend NATO’s border guarantees to all of Central and Eastern Europe.

Clearly, the United States cannot suddenly abandon or revise formal commitments it has undertaken in other parts of the world. Nor should it. Change will take years, but either it can come in response to unanticipated events, political setbacks, and an exhausted treasury on the one hand, or it can come in response to a conscious, forward-looking strategy on the other. Washington can wait until its fiscal situation no longer permits further “enlargement” of responsibilities, or it can begin the process of gradually building up the ability of other powers to accept responsibility in their own regions according to some agreed upon norms and accepted international law.

In Europe, such a policy would call on the United States to abandon its recent stance of studied indecision toward the process of Euro-
pean integration. It would return to America's earlier strong commitment to a strengthened European Community. It would encourage a strong, independent European defense arm.

Of course, there will be concern about the role of NATO. The organization remains important because it provides nonnuclear Germany with a nuclear umbrella, less necessary than during the Cold War but still psychologically comforting to Germany and its neighbors. But efforts to saddle NATO with the role of European gendarme, called upon to stamp out ethnic conflict, are almost certain to fail. NATO is a reactive organization. If a hostile power attacks a NATO member, the other members join in the common defense. NATO cannot be a proactive organization because its largest European member, Germany, will not participate in such a reorientation. The political consensus in Germany will not permit the use of German troops in combat operations not directly involved in self-defense.

In Washington the real agenda setters for foreign policy sit not in the White House but in editorial rooms and press cubicles.

The United States, for its part, is not willing to serve as Europe's gendarme. During two world wars and the Cold War it made enormous sacrifices to prevent the rise of a single hegemonic power in Europe, but it is not willing to intervene in crises like Bosnia or Georgia or Northern Ireland to impose a settlement on parties that resist outside intervention. If a gendarme's role is required for European security, a European force will have to play it. America's role should be minor.

Promoting self-reliance in Asia would require the United States to aggressively explore the possibility of a new security order in Asia in which all of the major parties there would be invited to participate. Most of the detailed calls for a multilateral approach to Asian security have emanated from the Asian states themselves. As Stephen Blank, an associate professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, has pointed out, one reason why the United States should look more deeply into more structured forums in Asia is so that "any future negotiation will be of [U.S.] choosing and not imposed on it."

In his confirmation hearings, Winston Lord, the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, indicated for the first time U.S. receptiveness to a dialogue on new security arrangements. But America is still hampered in its approach because it wants to preserve its semi-permanent role as supreme arbiter. That is a role America may not be able to afford over the longer run, particularly if a major arms race is unleashed in an area now awash with money. America cannot escape its immediate responsibilities, but it needs a vision of where it is heading, not simply a mechanical endorsement of more multilateral machinery in the area. States in the region realize the need for change. On May 30, 1993, the New York Times reported that China and Japan had agreed to begin their first postwar bilateral security consultations. Australia has called for new multilateral efforts, as have Canada, Russia, and South Korea.

In other areas, regional self-reliance would lead the United States to develop a long-run policy to strengthen organizations like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Organization of American States (OAS), and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to handle the problems of their regions. That now seems like a distant dream; but, again, unless the United States takes steps now, it will be pressed to undertake more operations like that in Somalia for decades to come. The United States is finally working with some key African states to deal with the Somali crisis. It should also be trying to involve the OAU as an institution. The goal would be to build up the competence of the OAU over time. In Latin America, the United States could try to strengthen the OAS by involving that organization in peacekeeping, perhaps starting with a role in the defense of the Panama Canal. Again, the goal would be to develop a greater competence over the long run. ASEAN might be encouraged to develop a collective ability to protect Southeast Asian sea-lanes.

In the Middle East, the United States now has no alternative but to guarantee the status
quos. Its intervention in the Persian Gulf has left the United States with that responsibility. But here as well, the long-term aim should be to reduce American exposure by working to develop a local balance of power that will protect America's friends and safeguard the flow of oil from the area. The recent agreement between the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel may open more opportunities for that approach than have been available in the past. Over the long run, the United States must strive for some form of reconciliation with both Iran and Iraq. Such a dramatic change in the relationship with either is now impossible without a change in policy direction or leadership by Baghdad and Tehran. But a more normal relationship with both capitals should be the long-range objective of American diplomacy. The dual containment policy against Iran and Iraq announced by the Clinton administration may be a short-run necessity. It will be a long-run mistake if U.S. policy becomes calcified and U.S. diplomats stop looking for ways to encourage change in those two hostile states.

A policy of aiming for greater regional self-reliance does not mean an end to America's global role. The U.S. security task would evolve into one of balancer and conciliator rather than protector or guarantor. Thus in Europe and the Far East, the United States would offer positive nuclear security guarantees to allied states ("we will defend you") and negative nuclear security assurances ("we will not attack you") to states that are signatories of the non-proliferation treaty. In all regions of the world, the United States would, when necessary, continue to bring to bear its naval and air power, which must remain robust. But a policy of regional self-reliance would recognize that certain powerful states in each area will inevitably play a special security role. Others would understand that America would assist that process provided the dominant states in question were democratic and benign.

In the Western Hemisphere, the United States has played the dominant role and will continue to do so. In the former Soviet Union, Russia could play that role. In South Asia, India will. And in Asia, both China and Japan are acquiring the power to take on that role, al-

though there are serious problems because China is not yet even in a transition to democracy. In Southeast Asia, the ASEAN states could play that role, particularly if, in time, Vietnam became a member. In Europe, the European Community should.

Of course, when powerful states have dominated their regions in the past, their purpose has not always been benign. Large powers often intimidated or conquered others. Their success in turn ignited the fears of other states and international tensions began to rise. That disturbing pattern can only be avoided if the great powers agree to exercise their power more responsibly. How can that happen?

Benign Realpolitik

There are two possible cooperative approaches the international community could follow. Both require efforts toward greater democratization and freer markets by the dominant states—top goals of the Clinton administration. The first approach would be to attempt to control world developments by the collective action of the dominant powers acting through the U.N. Security Council. That body over time would forge the tools to impose its decisions on member states. That might be described as muscular multilateralism.

The second approach would work toward a more decentralized international system. That approach also assumes gradual democratization within all the great powers. If that were to happen, then over time the rest of the world might find more acceptable a world order in which the great powers through benign spheres of influence assumed larger responsibilities in some parts of the world but not in others. The U.N.'s role would then be to legitimate and support the regional actions of the great powers or to censure and sanction them. Such a world might be described as one of benign realpolitik.

Muscular multilateralism assumes that the security priority is establishing an international mechanism that, although controlled by the decisions of states, would in fact replace the independent actions of states. The U.N. would act in the place of states. Somalia is an example. The second approach assumes that states will remain the principal actors on the international
scene and that in most circumstances international organizations cannot replace them. The role of the U.N. is then to nudge states into behaving lawfully and constructively in the international arena.

Obviously, there is a place for both approaches. But the issue of which idea should dominate is critical because the choice will set the overall direction of U.S. foreign policy. In trying to decide which approach is the more realistic, one is helped by examining some of the problems the U.N. faces in the post-Cold War world.

The United Nations is now in trouble in Somalia, has proved ineffectual in Bosnia, and has failed in Angola. What is wrong? Some critics answer that the root of the problem is the U.N.'s inability to use military power to enforce its decisions. They propose that the U.N. become more aggressive in the use of force, or they argue that other institutions should be willing to use force—for example NATO, in the case of Bosnia.

But the critics are asking the U.N. or any substitute organization to undertake a Mission Impossible. International organizations have traditionally performed five functions in the field of peace and security: investigation, mediation, observation, defense, and deterrence. They are seldom able to take over whole countries, and when they have done so, difficulties have arisen, as in the Congo in the early 1960s or in Somalia today.

The United Nations and various regional organizations have all—rarely publicly, often quietly—defused international crises over the decades by sending out investigators and mediators who work to persuade the parties to compromise before tension erupts into conflict. The relatively smooth course of decolonization benefited from such efforts. Usually, when mediation efforts succeed, the great powers have backed the international organizations involved.

Those organizations have also helped when a conflict does break out. The Middle East is an example. When Israel and its neighbors reached a point in past wars where they wanted a ceasefire, the U.N. could legitimate the result, observe compliance with its terms, and then permit the United States and others to resume efforts to urge the parties toward some final accommodation.

In cases of clear-cut aggression, international organizations have traditionally played a more marginal role. They have been able to censure but not compel the aggressor to retreat unless some large power was prepared to assume the role of the implementing arm and commit a large number of ground troops to repel the invading forces. The United States was willing to assume that role when South Korea in 1950 and Kuwait in 1990 were invaded, and with U.N. blessing pushed back the aggressor. The United States was not willing to play a similar role when the Soviet Union marched into Hungary, Indonesia seized East Timor, India invaded East Pakistan, or Israel occupied part of southern Lebanon.

A policy of aiming for greater regional self-reliance does not mean an end to America's global role. The U.S. security task would evolve into one of balancer and conciliator rather than protector or guarantor.

Finally, some international organizations—NATO is the most prominent—have performed the task of deterrence. NATO’s capability to defend Western Europe was never tested, but for decades it was assumed that NATO successfully deterred Soviet troops from going into West Germany.

Regrettably, none of the current crises that so trouble world peace fit into the traditional categories of action by international organizations. In Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Liberia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Tajikistan, Somalia, or Sudan, the only way to ensure a quick end to the violence is through the introduction of large outside forces to compel the parties to cease fighting. What is being asked of the U.N., NATO, or other international organizations is thus the establishment of what might be called a peace protectorate. The task is of imperial proportions and possibly of endless duration. In many of those areas, troops would have to remain indefinitely on station to pre-
vent conflict. The U.N. force in Cyprus and the British presence in Northern Ireland are different but instructive examples.

There are several reasons why international organizations find it difficult to carry out the protectorate function many now espouse. First, when significant elements of the population will not cooperate, trying to establish a peace protectorate is immensely difficult. In Northern Ireland, for example, the British presumably enjoy excellent intelligence. The people of Ulster speak English. The British must have agents and sympathizers in both the Catholic and Protestant segments of the population, and they have occupied the area for centuries. Yet the British cannot identify their enemy with sufficient precision to end the civil strife.

Contrast the U.N.'s position in Somalia. There, the terrain is unfamiliar, the language is unintelligible to the peacekeepers, and neither the United States nor the U.N. can have many agents in place. Indeed, the U.S. forces started out using as a translator a son of the man, Mohammed Farah Aidid, they were later trying to capture. Little of the sophisticated eavesdropping equipment that the United States or others might bring to bear is useful in such an environment. The international force is half blind. That is why the U.N. has stumbled into such embarrassments as mistakenly attacking one of its own offices in the search for Aidid.

But the problems of establishing a protectorate do not end there. In the past, imperial powers could impose their sway on vast sections of the globe because few back home paid much attention to the tactics being employed by their imperial agents. Rebels could be suppressed ruthlessly without risk of censure. The press had yet to develop a global reach. The international human rights movement had not been born.

Before Somalia, the U.N. had attempted to establish a peace protectorate only once—in the Congo during the 1960s. How the U.N. accomplished its mission has troubling implications for a similar effort today. At a critical moment, the U.N. commander on the spot cut off telephone contact with New York and proceeded to crush the rebellion in Katanga province. Once successful in reestablishing central control over the entire country, the U.N. concentrated on establishing effective government, not establishing democracy. The real power in the country was General Mobutu Sese Seko, who formally seized power in 1965 and went on to become one of this century's great tyrants. Notwithstanding that outcome, the U.N. operation was judged a success. It would not be considered one today.

Because of the difficulties encountered in Somalia, the Clinton administration has temporarily retreated from its early optimism about muscular multilateralism. In her September speech, Albright stated that in the future, the United States will insist that a genuine ceasefire prevail before the United States commits its ground troops to U.N. peacekeeping operations. That, of course, means that the United States will not participate in another Somalia.

But if the first approach faces difficulties, what can be said for a policy of benign realpolitik? How, under the second approach, would the international organizations handle the problems posed by conflicts like those in Bosnia or Nagorno-Karabakh? The answer is that they could play a constructive role but that they would not necessarily "solve" the problem. It would be understood that ethnic conflicts often cannot be solved, only mitigated through dialogue, mediation, and humanitarian assistance.

There would be no institutional bar to muscular multilateralism, but it would be recognized that only in rare situations—and Somalia may be one—would it be practicable. If force had to be used, a more common path would be for the international community to search for and legitimate some individual state to serve as the enforcer for the international community. In most cases, that would turn out to be a neighbor state with a direct interest in the outcome.

In that regard, Boris Yeltsin has proposed that Russia might serve as the arbiter of disputes in the former Soviet Union, provided that it acted with the formal blessing of the United Nations. His proposal was immediately attacked as a sign that traditional Russian imperialism had returned. But it would be a major advance in international law if any of the great powers accepted such legal restraints.
It is a reality that Russia is destined to remain the strongest state in the former Soviet Union, just as the United States will remain the strongest state in the Western Hemisphere. It is inevitable that such powers will exercise authority in their spheres of influence. What is not inevitable is that any one of them should agree to make its use of power more benign by subjecting it to some international standard of law and morality.

In the past, attempts to build a world order on the basis of spheres of influence have seemed unprincipled and immoral. Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger were roundly denounced for supporting such a world. Some will condemn the concept of recognizing a sphere of influence even for a democratic Russia as recreating the evil empire. But Americans either do or do not believe their own ideology about the relatively benign character of democratic states. If they do believe what they say, then they would be comfortable with a powerful democratic Russia. And, indeed, the world would become more relaxed about an international order based on traditional spheres of influence if several of the great powers were democratic or moving on the path to democracy, provided the dominant powers in each region agreed to exercise their authority according to some international process.

No doubt an approach based on spheres of influence in a more democratic world will alarm those who seek complete equality among states. But the last two decades should have taught us that any semblance of an international rule of law must rest on a system that can harness the power of key states with the capacity to act. The world might have ridiculed and criticized Uganda under Idi Amin, but it took an African country, Tanzania, to overthrow him. The world was annoyed by the criminal actions of Manuel Antonio Noriega, but only the United States could remove him. The world looked on with horror when Pol Pot instituted a policy of auto-genocide in Cambodia, but the only country willing to take military action was Vietnam. In South Asia, the Pakistani army was engaged in a campaign of extermination against the political and intellectual elite of East Bengal. The world deplored the violence but did nothing. Finally, the Indian army moved and Bangladesh was born.

In none of those crises was the world community willing to act, just as it has been unwilling to act in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The world should learn from its history. One tragedy of Bosnia is that no regional power has sufficient interest and capability to impose order there; the relevant regional organization is not ready to act. The logical candidates to impose a peacekeeping protectorate in Bosnia would be the European Community and a democratic Russia acting together through the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; but for many reasons, including U.S. opposition, Europe has not developed a coherent foreign policy and security identity and Russia has been in political disarray and not completed the transition to democracy.

The shortcoming of all the interventions mentioned, of course, is that they were unilateral. The international community sharply condemned most of them in overwhelming U.N. votes. None of the intervening powers saw the need to seek international or regional approval as a prerequisite for action. The challenge to the international community is to come up with procedures for authorizing and disciplining unilateral interventions when national interests are at stake.

The Economic Dimensions

A new approach to security, however, would not alone constitute an adequate post-Cold War foreign policy. The biggest problem facing the world today is not aggression but oppression in the form of intolerable living conditions or inhumane political behavior. The biggest threat to the democratization trend in various parts of the world is the troubled state of the world economy and the totally inadequate response of the major economic powers to that common problem. The next foundation stone for a post-Cold War foreign policy is therefore a commitment to global solidarity, which implies a continuing commitment to enhancing the individual dignity of all the world’s people and to finding innovative ways to restore health to the international economy.

No one can pretend that a policy of global
solidarity will produce early results. The richer states are even more reluctant than ever to open their markets because global economic conditions are so grim. Throughout the developed world, governments now suffer from aid fatigue. Third World countries are seen as corrupt or beyond help. Rising domestic problems in even the richest countries make trade concessions or foreign aid among the most unpopular of all governmental policies. The collapse of the communist order in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has compounded the problem by increasing the number of those in need of concessions.

Nevertheless, political prudence and common decency require that the United States continue the search for policies that can alleviate the conditions in which far too many people now live. But because the Cold War is over, the United States should adopt a totally different approach to development issues. In the past, the focus was on countries useful in the global East-West struggle. Now the focus should be on problems that transcend the nation-state. That is to say, the goal of U.S. development policy should be less to help particular countries and more to cooperate with others on global problems like population growth, environmental degradation, and the spread of communicable diseases.

Such a posture would require the United States to de-emphasize bilateral aid and strengthen multilateral aid because few global problems can be addressed except on an international basis. But much more would have to be done to increase the degree of accountability shown by international organizations to date.

Global solidarity would require an intensified commitment to respect for human rights. That is a long struggle from which no one should expect early results. Yet through a commitment to global solidarity, the advocates of human rights are likely, over time, to continue making gains. It took hundreds of years to establish procedures for the meaningful observation of political and civil rights in Western countries. It has taken the international community only a few decades since the end of World War II and the Holocaust to move from codifying rights to hesitantly implementing them. Mean­while, modern communications are making it harder to carry out mass crimes in secrecy.

The international community must therefore continue to press for transparency and accountability among states. It probably is not possible to bring to justice those who violate international human rights law. But they should be subjected to unrelenting criticism and inquiry from others. They should be deprived of respectability at both the bilateral and multilateral levels. They should remain captives of the political system that spawned them.

The international community, while working toward a more decentralized world politically, should strive toward a more globalized world economically. For a world with globalized trade can only be wealthier than one that is regionalized. Moreover, a world with regionalized trade is one that is likely to freeze out the former communist states and the poorer Third World countries. That cannot be a healthy approach to the world’s economic problems.

Today, however, the economic trends are toward regionalism. Japan’s trade with its Asian neighbors is now higher than its trade with the United States. Western Europe sees a new sphere of trade influence in Eastern Europe. The United States has spurred regionalism with the NAFTA negotiations that would bind Canada, Mexico, and the United States into a single free market. That agreement is in the interests of the three countries and should be concluded. But it cannot stand alone. The GATT agreement would boost world trade by $200 billion by most accepted estimates; NAFTA, by comparison, would add $5 to $20 billion in trade.

Beyond GATT, the Clinton administration needs to develop a detailed global growth package. It should cover debt relief for the poor, more open markets for the former communist countries, a coherent G-7 plan for economic stimulus, and perhaps negotiation for a new trade organization to replace GATT. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank should be reformed to play a counter-cyclical role when the world economy is plagued, as it is now, by slow growth, high unemployment, and inadequate fiscal stimulus because so many of the larger economies are in fiscal difficulty.

An effort to restore global growth cannot
FOREIGN POLICY

succeed without leadership and it can only come from the White House. President Clinton needs to raise his vision beyond the American economy to the world economy. He needs to explain to the American people more emphatically that America’s own economic program cannot succeed unless exceptional steps are taken to make the entire world economy more healthy. He then needs to move beyond exhorting Japan to stimulate its economy or Germany to cut its interest rates. He must articulate a coherent vision of global cooperation and reform that can lift the world out of its current economic rut.

Now that the Cold War is over, Americans need a foreign policy that recognizes the new world before them. The path that America has followed since the fall of the Berlin Wall is understandable, but it is no longer constructive. A policy that tries to hang on to old privileges while pressing for greater economic advantage will inevitably give way to an approach that is increasingly nationalistic and narrow. That will not be the design, but it will be the result.

A policy that offers both more responsibility to others and more cooperation with others in the quest for lower political exposure and greater economic growth is consistent with Clinton’s original campaign vision. It is also a policy that would help guide the American people through the difficult years ahead.
It has been nearly two years since Bill Clinton was elected President of the United States, and the transition between Administrations is now completed. Our transition in many ways mirrors the transition underway in world events which are having a tremendous effect on American foreign policy.

Although there is no longer a hegemonic power on Europe’s borders, we still face what CIA director Jim Woolsey appropriately describes as a "a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes". The stark and vivid lines which divided the world into two competing camps for nearly two generations have been blurred by the new and murky optics of disorder and disarray.

A quick canvass of the day’s headlines more than confirms this point:

- A bloody and senseless war in the former Yugoslavia and mayhem in Cambodia, in Somalia, in Haiti;
- Spreading conflicts in the former Soviet Union, where the once unknown names of Abkhazia, Trans-Dniester, Osetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh have emerged onto the scene with a vengeance;
- Reports of plutonium smuggled into Western Europe are increasing.

Clearly the end of the Cold War has not ended history -- nor has it ended threats to our security.

This is not the first time we have had to confront such new challenges. At the beginning of our republic and at the end of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe when our military policies and forces were dramatically overhauled to underwrite our new foreign policies; in the final years of the 19th century when the U.S. emerged as a world power; and fifty years ago when we had to design security structures to face the heavy burdens of the Cold War, America’s civilian and military leaders have reshaped and retooled the nation’s security resources to meet the requirements of the age.

And just as in 1784, 1815, 1898, and 1946, today, once again we are giving careful thought to how best to apply our nation’s military and diplomatic tools to confront the uncertainties of a very new and complex period in world affairs.
Doing so, I would point out, requires and commands our full and sustained attention, for as we work to navigate a clear course through choppy international seas, there are few obvious beacons or buoys to guide us.

The only fixed point before us seems to be uncertainty, where disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations are becoming increasingly prominent fixtures of the new international landscape.

But even as the consequences of chaos loom large, so too do the traditional threats posed by ambitious and irresponsible nation-states. From the Middle East to Asia, challenges to democracy and law and order remain key concerns.

The question we face as an Administration is how best to organize ourselves to deal with these shifting dynamics of international politics -- be they the humanitarian or environmental consequences of "chaos" or more traditional threats to international order? How do we help predict and control the flow of what Vaclav Havel has called the "lava of post-communist surprises"?

Very early in his tenure Secretary Christopher focused our attention on these critical questions when he said that "America cannot careen from crisis to crisis. We must have a new diplomacy that can anticipate and prevent crises rather than simply managing them."

It is this new diplomacy of preventive statecraft which I would like to discuss today, for in many ways crisis prevention has become a central tenet of the Administration's foreign policy.

Both structurally and substantively, the Administration has made important progress to reorient the resources of government in order to more proactively address coming crises. Reinventing existing bureaucratic assumptions and structures is not a simple task. But major steps have been taken to transform the concept of preventive diplomacy from slogan to actual policy:

A quick tour of the work underway in the Administration provides clear examples:

- At the Agency for International Development, Director Brian Atwood and his team have been mobilizing the intellectual and physical resources of our nation to quickly respond to a massive famine likely to course through the Horn of Africa next year -- before it happens.

- At the White House, the path towards peace has once again passed through the South lawn where King Hussein of Jordan and Prime Minister Rabin of Israel ended a state of war -- before violence once again consumes the Middle East.

- At the Defense Department, Secretary Perry has honed with his staff a counter-proliferation initiative to prevent the Irans, Iraqs, and Libyas of the world from acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction -- before its too late.
At the State Department -- in its new Global Affairs office headed by Tim Wirth -- our diplomats are hard at work preparing for America's visible participation in the upcoming Cairo Conference on population in order to ensure that family-based population planning efforts are embraced by the world community -- before our planet can no longer sustain its current pace of development.

In Mogadishu as in Kigali, in Northern Iraq as in Goma, our military has been keeping watch, keeping the peace and keeping faith with fundamental American interests: saving lives and staving off hunger and disease, thirst and death -- before their toll becomes unimaginable.

And in the late hours of last Friday at Geneva, our negotiators took new and important steps to ensure that North Korea will hew closer to the goals of nonproliferation -- before one of the world's gravest nuclear threats becomes unmanageable.

This new diplomacy of prevention is built upon the clear national interests that have been articulated by the President. At the very beginning of his Administration, the President established three "pillars" which undergird our nation's foreign policy.

Each of these pillars are rooted first and foremost in the soil of our geostrategic interests. But at the same time, each also nurture important and enduring American values.

Let me review each briefly, and explore how they contribute to our preventive statecraft agenda.

The first pillar is ensuring our nation's economic security and prosperity.

As the President has said time and again, we have to be strong at home if we are going to be strong abroad. Foreign policy and domestic policy are two sides of the same coin, for if we can't compete in the global economy, we'll pay for it at home.

That is why the President and his team have worked with great success to open more markets for American products, and to engage America increasingly in the international economic scene by ensuring passage of the Uruguay Round of GATT and the North American Free Trade Agreement.

At the recent G-7 summit in Naples, the President also stressed the need to think-through much more carefully how international economic institutions like the World Bank and the IMF can be revitalized in order to more effectively confront the challenges of the next century. Working with his counterparts, the President won agreement to make this important issue a major agenda item when the G-7 meets again in Halifax, Canada.

As we work to promote American prosperity at home, we also will work to promote democracy abroad. Why do we do so? There is an old maxim that democracies make more peaceful neighbors. And in fact, no democracy has ever declared war on another. But that is only half the story. It is also important to remember that democracies make better trading partners.
The inauguration of Nelson Mandela in South Africa, and the upcoming Summit of the America’s in Miami which for the first time will convene all the democratic nations in our hemisphere in common cause both are testament to the strides that have been made to promote the development of liberal political institutions throughout the world.

Since taking office, the Administration also has taken major steps to protect the democratic gains that have been made in the nations of the former Warsaw Pact, lest its new governments fall and revert to totalitarianism once again. Doing so makes good sense, both strategically and economically. Not only are totalitarian regimes inherently more destabilizing, but defending against them simply costs more money.

On a different level, and much closer to home, where a recognizable democratic process is subverted by its enemies, as in Haiti, it ought to engage U.S. interests. That is why are working aggressively with the full support of the international community and the United Nations’ Security Council to restore democracy and demand the removal Haiti’s repressive de facto regime.

Our success stories in the name of democratic enlargement thus far are impressive. Just last month in Naples, the President gained the commitment of his counterparts to work to provide some $4 billion in assistance to promote democracy and economic reforms in the strategically important Ukraine if it continues to show progress in its commitment to put market reforms into place.

Also noticeably, the Department of Defense has taken the opportunity to put its special skills and resources to work by working with newly democratic states to establish civilian oversight and control of the military; by working with militaries in democratizing states to foster the transition from offensive to defensive military doctrine and organizations; by urging newly democratic nations to show restraint in military hardware modernization and avoidance of regional arms races; and by helping to convert defense related industries to civilian uses.

The primary purpose of our nation’s armed forces of course will be to fight and win our nation’s wars. But in this time of relative peace, our military has been reshaping many of its traditional roles and missions in highly creative and effective ways.

In Europe alone, even though our military’s bilateral programs are still in their infancy, the US has already completed over 170 military exchanges with eleven countries of eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

The fruits of this and other work are now clear for all to see. At the direct urging of the President, just a couple of weeks ago, President Yeltsin announced he would withdraw the last of Russia’s troops from Baltic soil -- in only a few days, the last vestiges of Russia’s half century of military presence in Europe is about to come to an end.

The President’s initiative to forge what he called a Partnership for Peace between NATO and the nations of the Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union is further advancing the cause of democracy and also transatlantic cooperation. In less than a year, some 21 nations of the
East have agreed to join the partnership. This fall, NATO and Eastern Europe troops will join forces in Poland to conduct historic joint peacekeeping exercises. Where these soldiers once faced each other at the Fulda Gap, now they will train to carry out together some of the Europe's thornier humanitarian and civic missions.

The third pillar of the President's foreign policy, and the one that in many respects is most fundamental is the unshakable commitment of this Administration to provide for America's security, both at home and abroad. During the campaign and since, the President has said that under his watch as Commander in Chief, our men and women in uniform will remain the best equipped, best trained, and best prepared fighting force in the world.

As I mentioned, the threats posed by the numerous regional, ethnic, and irredentist conflicts pockmarking the globe are clear and present. Our ability to prevent these conflicts from occurring, or limiting them once they do occur, is vastly enhanced by our ability to maintain a strong and visible overseas presence, to conduct peacekeeping and enforcement operations, and to engage effectively, responsively, and quickly in humanitarian missions.

I will explore each quickly, for the armed forces of the United States increasingly are key elements supporting our preventive statecraft efforts.

The maintenance of a vigorous forward presence across the globe is the best proof of the fact that the President is committed to remaining fully active and engaged on the world scene. Early on in the Administration, the President commissioned a sweeping bottom-up review of our military's requirements and resources in order to equip our military to be able to fight and win two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts. And that is precisely the goal we are committed to achieving. Earlier this month, an independent commission chaired by General Shy Meyer, the former Army chief of staff -- the man who invented the term "hollow army" -- recently issued a report on the state of readiness of our forces, and his conclusion is that we are on target.

But even as we remain poised and ready to prosecute war, we also are taking new and important strides to enforce and keep peace.

The President has made clear that the international community must be prepared to take on a broader role in peacekeeping, and we are pleased to see fresh efforts underway through the UN and NATO to do so. And just yesterday we were reminded of the important new steps we are taking in this direction. In a front-page story in the Washington Post, we read about the Army's peace operations training facility at Fort Polk, where our troops are learning to cope with such Post-Cold War world contingencies such as dealing with refugees, providing security for relief workers, terrorist sniping, and how to keep warring parties -- like those in Somalia and the Balkans -- apart, at bay, and at peace.

As we look forward to even more sustained UN involvement in peacekeeping operations, we must think-through carefully how the UN can better prepare itself to shoulder this burden. Fact finding, crisis monitoring and the development of effective early warning systems increasingly are
important tools of the peacekeeper, and we will continue to develop and provide these resources where and when we can, and we will encourage all member states of the UN to do so as well.

Another problem is the United Nations' inability to provide initial troop lift, and sustained administrative and long-term logistical support to operations already underway. Much thought already have been given to these issues by Secretary General Boutros Ghali. But we need to continue to keep our focus on helping the UN so it can respond quickly to calls for intervention.

Planning for peacekeeping and other security related missions must also take into account the humanitarian dimension.

Where violence exists, there are crippled children, destroyed homes and villages, and as we have seen with such undistilled horror these past weeks in Rwanda, refugees.

And from natural disasters to man-made catastrophes, there are few signs the need for humanitarian missions will diminish any time soon. Once the sole province of non-governmental organizations, interest groups, and churches, this important task is now being supported by the militaries of the world.

We've already had successes in this area -- the massive and decisive response to the crisis in Goma and our continuing efforts to provide comfort to Iraq's Kurds are stunning cases in point -- but we can do more -- not just because it is the right thing to do but because it is in our security and economic interests.

There are those who would criticize our involvement in humanitarian missions as a diversion from our major national security preoccupations.

In my view, this is a short-sighted view. While maintaining as a first priority the readiness and quality of our fighting forces, our challenge in the 1990s is to take advantage of opportunities to use assistance program, broadly defined, to enhance our own security.

This is an important point. Humanitarian assistance is not only moral, it is also a national security tool. It reflects a variety of concerns, to reduce demands on coalition forces, to maintain stability where possible, to prevent the spread of crisis where necessary, and to create new post-Cold War relationships between nations. It also, in a very practical sense, helps guarantee over flight and base rights and open access to areas where we need it most.

Still, in the longer term we will need to improve coordination and efficiency among multinational forces engaged in humanitarian relief work. It is essential that the Secretary-General be able to formulate appropriate policies, take speedy preventive action, and assist UN agencies in accelerating the provision of relief.

The United States is doing its part. Some 40% of the humanitarian assistance to the Rwanda's refugees is being provided by the United States. Americans, after all, are a generous people. But
we hope to do more in years to come, and if necessary, we look forward to working more closely with the U.N. and with our allies in NATO in continued humanitarian assistance efforts.

Why do we care about doing more? Why should we engage our own resources, our materiel, our troops, our national stamina, and our attention to these new and difficult issues?

First, as I have said, because it is in our interests to do so.

Second, because it is the right thing to do.

And third, because the real danger to the world scene is not an overengaged United States, but our withdrawal from the game. And I would submit that the name of the game increasingly, as Secretary Christopher has pointed out, is targeting our resources and our creativity in the service of preventive statecraft.

If our global interests demand a relatively stable international environment, and if the resources available to various international organizations like the UN at present are not up to the task of keeping a lid on crises and dealing with unacceptable international behavior wherever and wherever they erupt, our best strategy is to continue to work collectively to take the necessary steps to head off trouble before it takes place.

Putting all of these pieces into place cannot be done overnight.

Still, many in America remain eager for instant results. In a society increasingly accustomed to the real time of e-drives and CNN, the demand for a bumper sticker foreign policy has become heavy indeed. Many forget that the efforts to change the torque of our nation's international affairs do not often lend themselves to simple or quick formulations. I would remind you that not far from this room it took such eminent thinkers as George Kennan and Paul Nitze more than two years after the end of World War II to define the concept of containment as the galvanizing idea for American foreign policy.

But unlike in the late forties, where the enemy Nitze or Kennan faced was both geographically and ideologically defined, today, we face threats that are much more nuanced. The fixed idea of Communism has, in a sense, been eclipsed by the quick silver of chaos.

In dealing with this new climate, patience must be a virtue. It will be steady steps -- not giant leaps -- that will guide us to a safe and secure future: a future committed to the democratic development of our neighbors; a future in which the international community is ready to make and keep the peace; and a future in which we all are willing to commit resources to relieve human suffering around the world.

These are the foundations of the new world order -- one that our publics will support, our friends and adversaries will respect, and our governments will sustain.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE</th>
<th>SUBJECT/TITLE</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>RESTRICTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>001. memo</td>
<td>re: Thoughts for Your Breakfast Tomorrow (3 pages)</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>P5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**COLLECTION:**
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Robert Boorstin (Speechwriting)
OA/Box Number: 415

**FOLDER TITLE:**
Clinton Doctrine - Articles

**RESTRICTION CODES**

*Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]*
- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

*Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.*

*PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).*

*RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.*

*Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]*
- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(5) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]