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COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Anthony Blinken (Speechwriting)
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Samuel R. Berger-Bosnia Speech, 9/97

RESTRICTION CODES
Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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I want to speak to you today about where we’ve come on the road to a durable peace in Bosnia and where we are headed – the progress we’ve made and the challenges we face.

After a conflict as profound and bitter as the one in Bosnia, it is easy to write that nation off as cursed by history, held in the thrall of age-old hatreds. The columns of refugees, the emaciated prisoners, the bloody market places... those memories remain vivid and they are a powerful invitation to doubt and fear.

Some say that Bosnia can never escape the conflicts of its past. But while we must be informed by the past, we must not be imprisoned by it – we can not allow it to obscure the present or pre-ordain the future. As we assess the prospects for Bosnia, we must adopt a realism that is self-correcting, not a pessimism that is self-defeating.

The United States today has a deep and abiding interest in peace and stability in Bosnia, just as it did two years ago – when America’s leadership, militarily through NATO and diplomatically through the Dayton negotiations, ended the fighting.

When we discuss where we are in Bosnia, we must start with where we began. Less than two years ago, when the talks opened in Dayton, Bosnia was a nation torn and shattered by the worst conflict in Europe since World War II. Opposing armies faced one another in a country scarred by trenches and sown with landmines. Bosnia had been literally decimated: More than one in ten of its people – 560,000 – had been killed or wounded. Half of those who survived – 2.1 million people – had been driven from their homes. Eight out of ten Bosnians relied on the UN for food. Nine in ten were unemployed. Under American leadership, a fragile cease-fire had been put in place, but the flames of extreme nationalism and ethnic hatred still burned white hot.
In conditions so desperate, no nation could revive by itself and move toward a peaceful reconciliation. At the time of Dayton, there was a compelling case for American engagement in Bosnia on humanitarian grounds alone. Without support from the United States and the international community, Bosnia almost certainly would have sunk back into violence and despair.

But our interest was not just humanitarian. Under these conditions, Bosnia also would have remained a source of dangerous instability in Europe. We have learned from hard experience in this bloody century that America’s security and Europe’s stability are intimately linked. With no firewalls against ethnic hatred, the Bosnian war could easily have spread to such flashpoints as Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia...and endangered several of Europe’s new democracies. A broader conflict would have threatened the vital interests of Greece and Turkey – two of our closest allies and core members of NATO.

Indeed, a larger conflict would have cast doubt on the viability of the Alliance itself. Allowing nationalist aggressors to dismember Bosnia in the middle of Europe would have undermined the prospects for building a new Europe that is democratic, undivided and at peace – a Europe that can strengthen America’s own security in the 21st century. If peace had not taken hold, the United States could not have stood aside as the UN’s humanitarian peacekeeping effort collapsed...and Southeastern Europe once again slid toward war.

That’s why we and our partners, under President Clinton’s leadership, committed ourselves not just to contain the conflict but to help the people of Bosnia build a real peace. We and the international community joined together with the parties at Dayton to achieve three goals: To secure the cease-fire and reduce the chance of renewed fighting...to help the parties form a single nation balancing overarching unity with autonomy for the two entities...and to help provide them with an opportunity to build a lasting peace.

Dayton put in motion a military and political effort of extraordinary scope and complexity. The NATO-led IFOR took responsibility for separating the opposing forces, supervising the exchange of territory, enforcing the cease-fire, demobilizing armies, overseeing placement of heavy weapons in storage sites and creating the secure environment essential for beginning political and economic recovery. It carried out its mandate with great skill and determination. The successor force, SFOR maintains that standard today, preserving the stability necessary for the Dayton process to move forward day by day. In these missions, NATO has successfully taken on the greatest challenge it has faced since the end of the Cold War – and working with soldiers from Russia, Ukraine and most of our other European partners – has demonstrated NATO’s indispensable role in assuring Europe’s future security.

Alongside the military effort, the international community also launched a mission of civilian implementation – to help former enemies take the needed steps to make peace self-sustaining. We knew that the Bosnian people needed help to repair and rebuild – not just their houses and factories but their confidence and tolerance. We believed this was possible because this century, for all its bloodshed, has shown that hatred is not transmitted from one generation to another
through iron laws of genetics or culture. Hatreds can be aroused by cynical leaders, but people can lift themselves out of hatred with hope of a better future.

To that end, the goals we and the international community set out to achieve, and to which the parties committed themselves, include the following, all part of Dayton:

- Establishing a stable military balance that can help prevent renewed fighting
- Reforming police forces
- Strengthening democratic institutions and the rule of law
- Enabling refugees to return in safety
- Re-establishing freedom of movement in the country
- Strengthening economic reconstruction
- Helping bring war criminals to justice.

From the beginning, this was an ambitious agenda, and it was clear that it would require an unprecedented civilian effort extending over several years. Last week, that terrible helicopter crash in Bosnia, which claimed the lives of five American civilians and seven others involved in these efforts, reminded us of the dedication of those who have undertaken this work – and of the costs, the risks and the sacrifice they bear.

Less than two years after Dayton – and after so much devastation – the job is far from done. We are not as far along as we would like to be. But given the complexity of the challenge, that is hardly surprising. Bosnia still stands on a tightrope, inching toward a better future but still not past the point of danger. The large majority of refugees remain unable to return home. The Republika Srpska is in the grip of an intense struggle not only for power but for its future and its relationship to the whole. Prominent indicted war criminals – most notably Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic – remain at large. Much of the media is not yet independent, and some of it spews the ultra-nationalist invective that helped light the fuse of war seven years ago. Progress is painfully slow on many fronts, including economic reconstruction.

So is it worth the effort? Is it worth spending scarce resources, putting our troops at risk and losing some of our most dedicated diplomats and civil servants to achieve a unified, peaceful Bosnia... restore basic freedoms... put a broken economy back on its feet? Some argue that the record shows that we set our sights too high at Dayton – that only an ethnic partition will produce the stability we want and extricate us from Bosnia.

I believe the partitionists are wrong because accepting partition means ratifying the worst ethnic cleansing in Europe in more than half a century. We should not give up on justice and reward aggression.

Partition also would be wrong because it would send the message to ethnic fanatics everywhere that the international community will allow the redrawing of borders by force. By creating the kind of ethnically pure states that often harbor a dangerous sense of grievance – entities that would be inherently unstable... ultimately, not viable... and inclined to expansionist aggression, partition would lead not to peace but toward war. In short, to advocate partition is to accept defeat.
Just as importantly, there is mounting evidence that these critics are wrong on the facts... and that the choices made at Dayton are producing real, positive change in Bosnia. Dayton has kept the guns silent and Bosnia intact, and the work of rebuilding – uneven as it is – is moving forward.

USIA polling shows that substantial majorities of Bosnian Muslims, Croats and Serbs believe that conditions are being created for a lasting peace. And for most of the people of Bosnia – especially those in the Federation – life is genuinely, if slowly, improving. This isn’t the story we usually hear and read, but peace is beginning to take root. The gains are not irreversible – and locking them in will require that the international community stay engaged in Bosnia in some fashion for a good while to come. But by almost any measure, life is better for the people of Bosnia today than it was two years ago.

Look through the eyes of a Bosnian child and see why. Imagine for a moment what it is like to be a 15-year old girl in one of Bosnia’s cities or towns. She lived nearly half of her life in the deadly grip of war. Today, instead of huddling in a cold, muddy basement to escape the incessant shelling, she attends school. Hundreds of schools that were damaged or destroyed by war have been rebuilt with the help of international donors, who have spent more than $1 billion of the $3.2 billion that has been pledged for civilian reconstruction, including $524 million from the United States. After class, she spends her time with friends instead of lugging home jugs of water – as she did during the war – because in most places the reconstruction effort has restored water.

Perhaps she lives in one of the 24,000 housing units repaired last year alone with the help of the international community. Undoubtedly, for the first time in seven years, she won’t be afraid of freezing this winter because heating has been restored in most of the country. She eats fruit and vegetables, not boxed military rations dropped from NATO aircraft. She has decent clothes because her family is earning more: Since the fighting ended, average wages in Bosnia have quadrupled, unemployment has fallen from 90% to 50% and, from a still low level, the economy is expected to grow 30% this year.

Above all, she has a new sense of safety: She can walk the streets knowing that the hills no longer conceal snipers... that she won’t be kidnapped or raped because of her ethnic identity... that mortars no longer target the playgrounds.

This teenager is not alone in her newfound sense of security. Because of the work of the IFOR and SFOR, the warring forces have been disengaged; more than 370,000 troops actually have returned to civilian life and further bloodshed has been prevented. Heavy weapons have been put under international supervision, and more than 2000 of them have been destroyed.

At the same time, our Train and Equip program for the Federation’s armed forces is helping create a more stable military balance, making it less likely that anyone will gamble on renewed fighting. And let’s not forget: We made it a condition of Train and Equip that Bosnia sever all military and intelligence ties with Iran – so a nation that exports radicalism and sponsors terrorism has lost the important foothold in Europe that it gained when the war began in 1992.
The international community also is helping the Bosnian people restructure and reform local police forces so they protect citizens instead of intimidate them. This job is far from finished. But the newly integrated forces in Sarajevo for the first time since the war are beginning to stand up to local thugs and bigots and protecting the rights and safety of citizens of all ethnic groups. These strides set the pattern for police reform in other regions.

One of Dayton’s most daunting challenges was establishing freedom of movement. At that time, any citizen traveling between cities in Bosnia would have to brave a dozen or more police checkpoints, risking everything from harassment and extortion to kidnapping and violence. Today, the checkpoints are gone, the roads are clear. Vehicles of all origins move freely on the main arteries. Where just two years ago it would have been inconceivable, now it’s no longer a surprise to see Srpska license plates in Sarajevo or Federation plates on the streets of Banja Luka. And farmers, traders and families cross the Entity Boundary easily and regularly by foot, car or even public bus that run daily.

The people of Bosnia are not only more free to move about the country – generally, they simply are more free. To a greater extent than ever, Bosnians are being governed by people of their own choosing. Last year’s national and regional elections, which were said by the doomsayers to be too dangerous, started Bosnia on the difficult path to democracy. Bosnia took another important step last week, when over 2 million voters, or more than 80% of those eligible – chose mayors, city councils and other municipal leaders from the more than 20,000 candidates who ran for office. And next month we expect an important assembly election to be held in Republika Srpska under international supervision.

Habits of self-government are beginning to be formed in Bosnia, and the state’s national institutions have been created. The Joint Presidency, the Council of Ministers, the Supreme Court and the joint Military Commission have been established. They are not yet self-sustaining, and international pressure often is required to keep all parties cooperating. But this month, the Serb, Croat and Muslim members of the Joint Presidency overcame their differences to establish an integrated telecommunications system to help stitch the country together and speed reconstruction. And the Muslim and Serb co-chairs of the Council of Ministers – Bosnia’s cabinet – who could barely be persuaded in the spring to meet jointly with U.S. officials in Washington – arranged their own trip to Malaysia to lobby together for investment just last month.

But the promise of peace will only be fully realized when the benefits of peace are spread among all of Bosnia’s people. Today, most of the economic growth in Bosnia has occurred in the Federation. By contrast, the recalcitrance of many Serb leaders has caused Srpska to languish. They have failed to fulfill their responsibilities under Dayton, prompting international donors to withhold almost all reconstruction funds for Srpska. It does not have to be that way. But the Serb leaders in Pale have insisted on holding fast to the hatreds of the past instead of turning to the promise of the future. They have chosen a path of self-isolation. Srpska’s persistent poverty will end only when its leaders fulfill their obligations and reconstruction funds can begin to flow.
The struggle now underway in Srpska is both hopeful and uncertain. It pits the diehard secessionists and ethnic cleansers in Pale – those who led the Serb people into war – against a growing movement of Bosnian Serbs who are fed up with a government of profiteers. These Srpska residents are opposing the rampant corruption that is making paupers out of all but a few. They have seen the improvements across the border in the Federation; they want to share in the benefits of peace.

President Plavsic and many of her followers continue to espouse Serb nationalism. But unlike the old regime, they recognize that the only road forward runs through Dayton... that Srpska cannot prosper in isolation... and that there is room within the Dayton framework to fulfill their legitimate aspirations. They want to close a bloody chapter in their history and open a new one of hope and recovery.

We have not “chosen sides” in Srpska. The United States, SFOR and the international community continue to be evenhanded – evenhanded in support of Dayton.

This means supporting those who uphold Dayton... and firmly opposing those who don’t. We reject the false choice of compromising between those who obstruct Dayton and those who want to cooperate. Let me be clear about what this means: It means treating Pale’s paramilitary police, which are used to threaten and punish dissidents, like the non-compliant military units they are... acting swiftly and robustly if the media are used to threaten and incite... responding decisively to attempts to provoke or intimidate SFOR or to compromise the secure environment SFOR is committed to support. As General Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, recently said: “We will not be intimidated. We will not be deterred by mobs.... We will use all the means at our disposal, including lethal means, to protect our forces and continue our mission.”

We are equally determined that those who support Dayton, wherever they live, enjoy the benefits of their choice. That is why, despite the efforts of Pale’s hardliners, we provide aid to communities in the Srpska that accept the return of refugees. We are providing Srpska police that have agreed to reform with technical support and equipment just as we have to police forces in the Federation – and in just the last two months, almost a quarter of the civil police in Srpska have joined this program. We welcome and support the growth of independent media in the Srpska, and we provide them with technical assistance and equipment so that their message can be widely heard.

There is an important struggle going today in Srpska, and it matters how it turns out – because this is turmoil for the right reasons, for change without corruption or ethnic warfare.

We must be realistic: The international community and the Bosnian people face many real challenges that will require patience and sustained effort. For example, we are not satisfied with the rate of refugee returns. So far, only about 150,000 or 15% of those who left Bosnia during the war, have come home. That rate will only increase when stability and safety have been reestablished.
We must help the Bosnians learn about market economics. While the rest of the former communist world in Central Europe was getting a crash course in the subject in the early 90s, Bosnia was simply crashing. Many of the habits of a command economy persist, and with a corruption that too often has undermined the reconstruction effort.

We must also redouble our efforts to defuse the powderkegs of violence in Bosnia that endanger our success. In Brcko, the slender corridor that links the two halves of Srpska and connects the Federation to Europe, tensions remains high and progress is glacial at best. The arbitration that will decide the future of this area is to occur in six months. We are making clear to both parties that failure to fulfill their obligations is unacceptable, and they will pay the price for their behavior in the final decision.

So what verdict can we draw from our experience in Bosnia thus far? After two years, the picture is mixed. We see continued difficulties and recalcitrance. But we also see progress that is making a real difference in the lives of the Bosnian people and in the stability of this critical region. It’s been said that the mark of genius is the ability to hold seeming opposites in one’s mind at the same time. As we look at Bosnia today, some genius is called for. We must keep our eyes on both sides of the picture — and we must not forget the important interests that led us, not merely to look at, but to work for a more stable, more peaceful Bosnia.

In June, 1998, SFOR’s mission will end as President Clinton has said. But the international community’s engagement will continue. Whether an international security presence is part of that engagement, and what role the United States might play remains to be decided. In part, that decision will depend on where things stand as we approach the time of SFOR’s departure.

But one thing is clear: Just as we did when NATO acted to end the slaughter in 1995 and, with our partners, convened the negotiations in Dayton, the United States has an important interest in the establishment of a lasting peace in Bosnia. The best way to advance that interest is through the framework agreed upon in those negotiations. That’s why America has a significant and continuing stake in Dayton’s success.

If Dayton fails, Bosnia will almost certainly slide back into conflict...potentially leading to a wider war in Southeastern Europe. It would undermine NATO’s credibility at a critical moment when the Alliance is preparing for new members and new missions. This would throw into question America’s leadership in Europe — with grave consequences for our people and other freedom-loving people around the world.

Dayton can succeed. And it will — if Bosnia’s leaders take responsibility for their country’s future and lead their people to build the peace they deserve...if the international community does not lose patience or determination...and if we all look at Bosnia clearly — not through a rose-colored glasses but also not through a glass darkly.

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I want to speak to you today about where we’ve come on the road to a durable peace in Bosnia and where we are headed -- the progress we’ve made and the challenges we still face.

After a conflict as profound and bitter as the war in Bosnia, it is easy to write off that nation as cursed by history, held in the thrall of age-old hatreds. The columns of refugees, the emaciated prisoners, the bloody market places... those memories remain vivid and they are a powerful invitation to doubt and fear. But while we must not forget the past, we also must not let it obscure the present – or pre-ordain the future. We must distinguish between a realism that is self-critical and a pessimism that is self-defeating. Because just as we did two years ago – when America’s leadership, militarily through NATO and diplomatically through the Dayton negotiations, ended the fighting – the United States today has a deep and abiding interest in peace and stability in Bosnia.

When we discuss where we are in Bosnia, we must start with where we began. Less than two years ago, when the talks began in Dayton, Bosnia was a nation torn and shattered by the worst conflict in Europe since World War II. Opposing armies faced one another in a country scored by trenches and sown with landmines. Bosnia had been decimated: More than one in ten of its
people – 560,000 – had been killed or wounded. Half of those who survived – 2.1 million people – had been driven from their homes. Eight out of ten Bosnians relied on the UN for food. Nine in ten were unemployed. Under American leadership, a fragile cease-fire had been put in place, but the flames of extreme nationalism and ethnic hatred were still white hot.

In conditions so desperate, no nation could revive itself by itself and move toward a peaceful reconciliation. At the time of Dayton, there clearly was a compelling case for American engagement in Bosnia on humanitarian grounds alone. Without support from the United States and the international community, Bosnia almost certainly would have sunk back into violence and despair.

But our interest was not just humanitarian. Under these conditions, Bosnia also would have remained a source of dangerous instability in Europe – and an ongoing threat to our security interests and to the credibility of American leadership in the post-Cold War world. We have learned from hard experience in this bloody century that America’s security and Europe’s stability are linked. With no firewalls against ethnic hatred, the Bosnian war could easily have spread to such flashpoints as Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia, endangering several of Europe’s new democracies. A broader conflict would have threatened the vital interests of Greece and Turkey – two of our closest allies and core members of NATO.

Indeed, a larger conflict could have cast doubt on the viability of our Alliance. Allowing nationalist aggressors to dismember Bosnia would have fatally undermined the prospects for building a Europe that is democratic, undivided and at peace – a Europe that can strengthen
America's security tremendously in the 21st century. If peace had not taken hold, the United States could not have stood aside as the UN's humanitarian peacekeeping effort collapsed...and Southeastern Europe once again slid toward war.

That's why we and our partners, under President Clinton's leadership, committed ourselves not just to contain the conflict but to help the people of Bosnia build a real peace out of their ruins. To prevent a wider Balkan conflict that would have endangered our interests, we and the international community joined together with the parties at Dayton to achieve three goals: We resolved to secure the ceasefire and reduce the chance of renewed fighting...to help the parties form a single nation that balanced unity with a high degree of autonomy for the two entities, and to help provide them with an opportunity to build a lasting peace.

Dayton put in motion a military and political effort of extraordinary scope and complexity. The NATO-led IFOR took responsibility for separating the opposing forces, supervising the exchange of territory, enforcing the cease-fire, overseeing placement of heavy weapons in storage sites and creating the secure environment essential for beginning political and economy recovery. It carried out its mandate with skill and determination. The successor force, SFOR maintains that standard today, preserving the stability necessary for the Dayton process to move forward day by day.

Alongside the military effort, the international community also launched a mission of civilian implementation – to help former enemies take the necessary steps to make peace self-sustaining.
We knew that, as President Clinton said, the Bosnian people needed help to “repair and rebuild” – not just their houses and factories but their confidence and tolerance.

The goals we and the international community set out to achieve include the following, all part of Dayton:

- Establishing a stable military balance that can help prevent renewed fighting
- Improving public safety and professionalism through reform of police forces
- Strengthening democratic institutions and the rule of law
- Enabling refugees to return in safety
- Re-establishing freedom of movement throughout the country
- Strengthening economic reconstruction
- Helping bring war criminals to justice.

From the beginning, this was an ambitious agenda, and it was clear that it would require an unprecedented civilian effort extending over several years. Last week, we were reminded by that terrible helicopter crash in Bosnia, which claimed the lives of five American civilians and seven others involved in these efforts, of the dedication of those who have undertaken this work – and the costs and sacrifice they bear.

Less than two years after Dayton – and after so much devastation – the job is far from done... and that is hardly surprising. Bosnia still stands on a tightrope, inching toward a better future but still not past the point of danger. The large majority of refugees still are unable to return home. The
Republika Srpska is in the grip of an intense struggle not only for power but for the future of that entity and its relationship to the whole. Prominent indicted war criminals – most notably Radovan Karadzic and General Mladic – remain at large. Much of the media is not yet independent, and some of it spews the ultra-nationalist invective that helped light the fuse of war seven years ago. Progress is painfully slow on many fronts, including economic reconstruction.

So is it worth the effort? Is it worth spending scarce resources, putting our troops at risk and losing some of our most dedicated diplomats and civil servants to achieve a unified, peaceful Bosnia... restore basic freedoms... put a broken economy back on its feet?

Some argue that the record shows that we set our sights too high at Dayton – that only an ethnic partition will produce the stability we want and extricate us from Bosnia.

I believe these critics – the partition defeatists – are wrong – morally and strategically. Morally wrong because accepting partition means ratifying the worst ethnic cleansing in more than half a century. It means that because we have not finished the job in two years, we should give up on justice and reward aggression.

Partition also would be strategically wrong in the broadest sense. It would send the message to ethnic fanatics everywhere that the international community will allow the redrawing of borders by force. It will lead back to hostilities, not peace, endorsing the kind of ethnically pure states that often harbor a sense of grievance and turn to expansionist aggression. The entities that would emerge from a partition plan would be inherently unstable and, ultimately, not viable.
And by permanently denying Bosnian refugees the right to return home, partition would end hope and create an incentive to war.

But just as importantly, there is mounting evidence that these partition defeatists are wrong on the substance...and that the choices made at Dayton are producing real, positive change in Bosnia. Dayton has kept the guns silent and Bosnia intact, as the work of rebuilding – uneven as it is – moves forward.

USIA polling shows that substantial majorities of Bosnian Muslims, Croats and Serbs believe that conditions are being created for a lasting peace. And for most of the people of Bosnia – especially those in the Federation – life is genuinely, if slowly, improving. This isn’t the story we usually hear and read, but peace is beginning to take root. The gains are not irreversible – and locking them in will require that the international community stay engaged in Bosnia in some fashion for a good while to come. But by almost any measure, life is better for the people of Bosnia today than it was two years ago. And cautious hope can replace overwhelming despair.

Look through the eyes of a Bosnian child and you can see why. Imagine for a moment what it is like to be a 15-year old girl in one of Bosnia’s cities or towns. She lived nearly half of her life in the deadly grip of war. Instead of huddling in a cold, muddy basement to escape the incessant shelling, today she regularly attends school. Hundreds of schools that were damaged or destroyed by war have been rebuilt with the help of international donors, who have spent more than $1 billion of the $3.2 billion pledged for civilian reconstruction, including $524 million from the United States. After class, she spends her time with friends instead of endless hours...
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Perhaps she lives in one of the 24,000 housing units repaired just last year alone with the help of the international community. Undoubtedly, for the first time in seven years, she won’t worry about freezing in winter because heating has been restored in most of the country. She eats fruit and vegetables, not boxed military rations dropped from NATO aircraft. She has decent clothes because her family is earning more. Since the fighting ended, average wages in Bosnia have quadrupled, unemployment has fallen from 90% to 50% and, from a still low level, the economy is expected to grow 30% this year.

Above all, she has a new sense of safety: She can walk the streets knowing that the hills no longer conceal snipers...that she won’t be kidnapped or raped because of her ethnic heritage...that mortars no longer target the playgrounds.

This teenager is not alone in her newfound sense of security. Because of the work of the IFOR and SFOR force, the warring forces have been disengaged; more than 370,000 troops actually have returned to civilian life; further bloodshed has been prevented. Heavy weapons have been put under international supervision, and more than 2000 of them have been destroyed. At the same time, our Train and Equip program for the Federation’s armed forces is helping create a stable military balance, making it less likely that anyone will gamble on renewed fighting. And let’s not forget: We made it a condition of Train and Equip that Bosnia sever all military and
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The international community also is helping the Bosnian people restructure and reform local police forces so they protect citizens instead of intimidate them. This job is far from finished. But the newly integrated forces in Sarajevo are for the first time standing up to local thugs and bigots and protecting the rights and safety of citizens of all ethnic groups. These strides set the pattern for police reform in other regions. US-sponsored training in the Federation has been so successful that Serb refugees in Belgrade now call their former colleagues on police forces in Muslim and Croat areas asking if they can have their old jobs back – and in most cases they will be welcomed back.

One year ago, one of the most daunting challenges was establishing freedom of movement. At that time, any citizen traveling between cities in Bosnia would have to brave a dozen or more police checkpoints, risking everything from harassment and extortion to kidnapping and violence. Today, the checkpoints are gone, the roads are clear. Vehicles of all origins move freely on the main arteries. Republika Srpska license plates can be seen regularly in Sarajevo as are Federation plates in Banja Luka and Brcko.

The people of Bosnia are not only more free to move – generally, they simply are more free. To a greater extent than ever, Bosnians are being governed by people of their own choosing. Last year’s national and regional elections, which were said by the doomsayers to be too dangerous, started Bosnia on the difficult path to democracy. And Bosnia took another important step last
week, when 1.75 million voters, or 70% of those eligible – chose mayors, city councils and other municipal leaders from the more than 20,000 candidates who ran for office.

Habits of self-government are beginning to form in Bosnia, and the state’s national institutions have been created. The National Presidency, the Council of Ministers, the Supreme Court and the joint Military Commission are beginning to function – although movement frequently requires international pressure. These aren’t just boxes on a diagram but institutions that are taking their first steps. For example, the Serb, Croat and Muslim members of the Joint Presidency overcame their differences to establish a integrated telecommunications system to help stitch the country together and speed reconstruction. And the Muslim and Serb co-chairs of the Council of Ministers – Bosnia’s cabinet – who could barely be persuaded in the spring to meet jointly with U.S. officials in Washington – arranged their own trip to Malaysia to lobby together for investment just last month.

But the promise of peace will only be fully realized when the benefits of peace are spread among all of Bosnia’s people. Today, most of the economic growth in Bosnia has occurred in the Federation. By contrast, the Republika Srpska has languished. Many of its leaders refuse to fulfill their responsibilities under Dayton, prompting international donors to withhold almost all reconstruction funds for the RS. It doesn’t have to be that way. But the Serb leaders in Pale have insisted on holding fast to the hatreds of the past instead of turning to the promise of the future. They have chosen a path of self-isolation. The Republika Srpska’s persistent poverty will only end when its leaders fulfills their obligations and reconstruction funds can begin.
The struggle now underway in Srpska is both hopeful and uncertain. It pits the old guard in Pale—those who led the Serb people into war—against a growing movement of Bosnian Serbs who are fed up with a government of profiteers. These RS citizens are opposing the rampant corruption that is making paupers out of all but a few in their entity. They have seen the improvements across the border in the Federation; they want to share in the benefits of peace. President Plavsic and many of her followers continue to espouse a powerful Serb nationalism. But unlike the old regime, they recognize that the only road forward runs through Dayton...that Srpska cannot prosper in isolation...and that there is room within the Dayton framework to fulfill their legitimate aspirations. They want to close a bloody chapter in their history and open a new one of hope and recovery.

We have not ‘chosen sides’ in Srpska. The United States, SFOR and the international community continue to be evenhanded—eighthanded in support of Dayton.

Obviously, this means supporting those who support Dayton...not those who don’t. This also means avoiding the false choice of compromising between those who obstruct Dayton and those who want to cooperate. This means treating Pale’s paramilitary police, which are used to threaten and punish dissidents, like the non-compliant military units they are...acting swiftly and robustly if the media are used to threaten and incite...responding decisively to attempts to provoke or intimidate SFOR or to compromise the secure environment SFOR is committed to support. As General Clark, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, recently said: “We will not be intimidated. We will not be deterred by mobs...We will use all the means at our disposal, including lethal means, to protect our forces and continue our mission.”
We are equally determined that those who support Dayton, wherever they live, enjoy the benefits of their choice. That is why, despite the efforts of Pale’s hardliners, we provide aid to communities in the RS that accept the return of refugees. We are providing RS police that have agreed to reform with technical support and equipment just as we have to police forces in the Federation — and in just the last two months, almost a quarter of the civil police in the Republika Srpska have joined this program. We welcome and support the growth of independent media in the RS, and we provide them with technical assistance and equipment so that their message can be widely heard.

There is an important struggle going today in the RS, and we do not know how it will turn out. But this is turmoil for the right reasons — for change without corruption or ethnic warfare.

We must be realistic: The international community and the Bosnian people face many real challenges that will require patience and sustained effort. We are not satisfied with the rate of refugee returns. So far, only about 150,000 or 15% of those who left Bosnia during the war, have come home. That rate will only increase when stability and safety have been reestablished.

We must help the Bosnians learn about market economics. Because while the rest of the former communist world in Central Europe was getting a crash course in the subject in the early 90s, Bosnia was simply crashing. Many of the habits of a command economy persist, and with a corruption that has too often undermined the reconstruction effort.
We must also redouble our efforts to defuse the hotspots in Bosnia that endanger our success. In Brcko, the slender corridor that links the two halves of Srpska and connects the Federation to Europe, tensions remains high and progress is glacial at best. The arbitration that will decide the future of this area is to occur in six months. But at the moment, there is little expectation that the parties will find common ground and accept the decision without controversy.

So what verdict can we draw from our experience in Bosnia thus far? After two years, the picture is mixed. We see continued difficulties and recalcitrance. But we also see progress that is making a real difference in the lives of the Bosnian people and in the stability of this critical region. It's been said that the mark of genius is the ability to hold seeming opposites in one's mind at the same time. As we look at Bosnia today, some genius is called for. We must keep our eyes on both sides of the picture – and we must not forget the important interests that led us, not merely to look, but to work for a more stable, more peaceful Bosnia.

In June, 1998, SFOR's mission will end as President Clinton has said. What international security presence will still be required – and what, if any, role the United States would play in such a mission – remains to be decided. In part, that decision will depend on where things stand as we approach the time of SFOR's departure.

But one thing is clear: Just as we did when NATO acted to end the slaughter in 1995 and, with our partners, convened the negotiations in Dayton, the United States has an important interest in the establishment of a lasting peace in Bosnia. The best way to advance that interest is through
the framework agreed upon in those negotiations. That's why America has a significant and continuing stake in Dayton's success.

If Dayton fails, Bosnia will almost certainly slide back into conflict, leading in all likelihood to a wider war in Southeastern Europe. It will undermine NATO's credibility at a critical moment when the Alliance is preparing for new members and new missions. It will throw into question America's leadership in Europe – with grave consequences for our people and other freedom-loving people around the world.

Dayton can succeed. And it will – if Bosnia's leaders take responsibility for their country's future and lead their people in building the peace they deserve. If the international community does not lose patience or determination. If we all look at Bosnia clearly – not through a glass darkly or through rose-tinted glasses.

There is a long road ahead. The progress we have seen stands as a powerful reminder that while bigotry and hatred may be whipped up to the point of frenzy – they are not genetic. Fear can be overcome. Now – if we don't let our own pessimism be self-fulfilling or our cynicism be paralyzing – America's engagement with others for peace can succeed. The road ahead can lead to a single Bosnian state, living in peace, becoming a part of Europe's future, not a reminder of its bitter past.

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Limits to what the U.S. Can Do in Bosnia

Henry Kissinger

Every American foreign policy setback, from Vietnam to Bosnia, has come about from the failure to define objectives, to choose means to achieve them, and to create a public opinion prepared to pay the necessary price over the requisite period of time.

We are now on the verge of slipping into a similar dilemma in Bosnia: Our goals are unrealizable, the means available do not fit the objectives and the public is unlikely to back the probable elections for a parliament in the hills because three issues await resolution: What are our objectives in Bosnia? How long should our troops remain there? Are the Serbs likely to run for the capture of war criminals?

Bosnia was once a multiethnic state. By the 1927 Treaty of Lausanne, the States of the United States joined the other NATO countries in recognizing the boundaries set by that treaty and the other independent States. With respect to Croatia and Slovenia, inhabited by a dominant ethnic group, this decision made sense. But in Bosnia, populated by Croats, Serbs and Muslims whose reciprocal hatreds had broken up the much larger Yugoslav state, the attempt to bring about a multicultural state provoked a murderous civil war.

The same law that attended the birth of the Bosnian state lies at the heart of the decision to strip it of its natural boundaries. The United States that brought about the current Bosnian ceasefire, its military provisions specify the parties substantially along the lines of the ethnic enclaves that emerged as hostages of a solution imposed from above. They seek to unite these enclaves into a Bosnian state that causes the explosion in the first place.

The American tendency is to treat Bosnian civil and political problems as they are by constitutional provisions that reconcile the part.

In the current context, the Serbs and Croats have considered themselves defenders of their hearts, first against a Muslim tide, then against a Greek tide, each other. The Serbs' identity derives from a series of bloody battles in defense of the Serbian faith and population. Once Islamic was stopped, the Serbs fought to vindicate the right of the Orthodox Serbs toires; from Catholic Austria, spear-

The Croats' perception is precisely the reverse—a uphill battle of Catholicism against Serb Orthodoxy and Islam. And the Muslims, from their own estimates of the two other ethnic groups as a historical instrument of the United States, have realized that they are at one with the Serbs and Croats—without violence.

Once passions were unleashed by the civil war, each group committed unappeasable atrocities in large areas of land in the hands of other groups from the regions that they controlled—

the ethnic cleansing. The process, as but the war continued, the other parties also engaged in murderous acts—below Croats in Sarajevo, the Muslims around Sarajevo. Among the existing leaders, few, if any, innocent are to be found.

The NATO allies would have done well to stop the killing six years ago, in its incipient phase. They could have taken action then that they would not tolerate such outrages within reach of their bases.

The goal of the Dayton agreement seems to be a political concept of human dignity originated and is now institutionalized. Its failure to do so, each of the ethnic regions of Bosnia has become largely homogeneous; the central government in Sarajevo is a facade of a fact of life in Bosnia.

The American provisions of the Dayton agreement seek to reinforce this state of affairs. They provide for free movement among the ethnic enclaves for free repatriation of refugees and for elections leading to national reconciliation. This is to be achieved by the terms of the Dayton agreement which has a fault of a few evil logic, who, once removed either to war crimes trials or to exile, will permit the natural preference of the ethnic groups for some sort of unity to assert itself. This misconcep-

tion, however, that the Dayton agreements were signed. Nor is there free movement of Croats and Muslim groups within the Federation.

Every movement among the various ethnic enclaves takes place, and in some of them, in which mutual or which services exist. Each ethnic group issues its own currency, license plates and passports. Serbs with Cyrillic license plates are at particular risk in other areas, but so are the Muslims and the Croats. Having left their ethnic groups, respectively, refugees tend to return home only with armed escorts and are frequently obliged to flee—

as soon as the operation begins. The Creating perception is precisely the reverse—enemies of Catholism against Serb Orthodoxy and Czech. The analogy is mistaken. Hitler violated a recognized sovereign state, Bosnia's civil war was triggered by the West's misconceptive attempt to experiment with a multibloc state among populations divided by religion and whose very reason for existence has been to prevent domination by the other ethnic groups.

America has no national interest for which risk to live a produces a multibloc state in Bosnia. The Dayton agreement should be left to negotiations among the parties—witnessed by America if it happens but not pursued at the risk of American lives. America does have a political concern to prevent the cease-fire for which the Dayton agreement already decided the deadline for withdrawal which the president promised to Congress. A case can be made to extend it once again with gradually reduced forces for a limited period—

but after next June with personnel who have specifically volunteered for this duty, backed up by air power and naval forces stationed nearby. Moving cease-fire lines in Bosnia cannot be a permanent American undertaking.

As for the war criminals, there is no doubt that they deserve naming and adding before a tribunal constituted for that purpose at The Hague in the current state of affairs, an American military presence is necessary as an effort to break Serb resistance to a multibloc state and overthrow the regime established by the Serb population. But if America confines its role in Bosnia to maintaining the cease-fire lines and left the political evolution to the parties, a situation might present itself in which the arrest of war criminals is possible. America must avoid drifting into a trap with implications it may not be able to master. The administration's resolve for an option bringing about the end of hostilities. Ending combat in Bosnia is an important objective. We can facilitate this but we cannot justify military action.

The writer, a former secretary of state, is president of a major international consulting firm that has clients with business interests in many countries abroad.
What Kabila Is Hiding

In some remote parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo, you can still see the bones. The bones hidden in the central African forest are of Rwandan and Burundian Hutu refugees, killed while fleeing the advancing soldiers of Laurent Kabila's Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL) and the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA). Kabila's troops, with important backing from Rwanda, Uganda, Angola and Burundi, ousted former president Mobutu last May after a seven-month trek across what was then Zaire.

On a recent trip to Congo, I was able to see and photograph part of what Kabila and what Rwandan Vice President Paul Kagame certainly do not want anyone to see: the remains of tens of thousands of civilian refugees massacred during Kabila's military campaign across the former Zaire. Among the decomposed remains were the bodies of a number of women and children. In many areas, the bones already have been hastily exhumed and burned by the RPA and ADFL soldiers who carried out the massacres. Kabila and Kagame are worried, with good reason, that a special U.N. investigative mission, now in Kinshasa, may find these bones and attempt to determine responsibility for the killings.

Over the past several weeks, Kabila has continued a game of cat and mouse with this U.N. team begun in May, sometimes blocking it completely, sometimes stating that the team can move forward—but on his own terms. Meanwhile, massacre sites continue to be cleaned up and potential witnesses intimidated and victimized by RPA and ADFL troops, often through arrest, beating or summary execution. Remarkably, some of the Rwandan officers and soldiers in the Congo in the same areas where they participated in massacres, representing a lethal threat to anyone who would dare collaborate with the U.N. team.

As Kabila stalks, RPA troop continue to operate in the Congo, attacking civilians and human rights activists who carried out the massacre of at least 500,000 Tutsi during the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Many of these armed Hutu elements are still at large in the Congo and neighboring territories, creating a security threat for the region. In the RPA's attempts to eliminate these Hutu soldiers, many Congolese civilians as well as refugees continue to be killed.

During my visit, knowledgeable witnesses told me that they had seen U.S. soldiers in the company of RPA troops on Congolese territory on various dates, including July 23 and 24 of this year. Officials from the State Department have issued blanket denials of any "factual" U.S. military assistance to Rwanda or any presence on Congolese territory, until last month, when the Department of Defense admitted providing combat training to RPA soldiers before the invasion of Zaire. In light of these contradictions and continued allegations of U.S. military on Congolese territory, U.S. Ambassador Bill Richardson has a special responsibility as president of the U.N. Security Council to push Kabila and Kagame for truth-telling regarding the killings. The U.S. government, in turn, should be pressed to fully reveal the past and present role of the U.S. military in Rwanda and Congo.

The U.N. mission has a daunting task, ahead of it and also needs the full support of U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, who already has caved in once to Kabila's conditions regarding the mandate and composition of the U.N. investigation. Mr. Annan must remain steadfast in demanding that an impartial and independent investigation be carried out immediately, from within Congo if Kabila cooperates, or from outside if he doesn't. He should insist that his team have access to all alleged massacre sites, especially where there have been numerous reports of killings, such as the Mbandaka area, from which the team has been barred. If no massacres occurred, what does Kabila have to hide?

Kabila and the international community should insist that Kagame withdraw his troops from Congolese territory and investigate anyone suspected of killing civilians. Armed Hutu soldiers and militia remaining in the Congo must also finally be disarmed and brought to justice.

In the name of stability, many members of the international donor community appear to be ready to get on with business as usual with Kabila's government and sweep the issue of civilian massacres under the rug. Building a new Congo on the bones and ashes of refugees, however, is a formula for renewed violence and instability in the long run, in Congo as well as in the Great Lakes region. As Congolese throughout the country describe a deep frustration of being "occupied" by foreign troops from Rwanda and elsewhere, violent rebellion and human rights violations as already seen in the east are likely to increase.

One deserted refugee camp site that I visited was home to several thousand people before an attack by members of the RPA and the ADFL, which killed hundreds, according to eyewitnesses. Today, the camp is still strewn with the clothing of the dead, equipment and hundreds of bullet shells; the bodies already have been removed.

By blocking the U.N. mission, Kabila "the liberator" is making himself an accomplice to these killings. If Kabila is not willing to have the truth be told, he should step down so that the new democratic Congo he has promised. As head of the new Congolese state, Kabila has a responsibility to the Congolese people to uphold respect for human rights and allow the U.N. mission to move forward.

The writer, a consultant for Human Rights Watch/Africa, recently returned from the Congo.
I want to speak to you today about where we are on the road to a durable peace in Bosnia and where we are headed -- the progress we've made and the challenges we still face. After a conflict as profound and bitter as the war in Bosnia, it is tempting to write off that nation as cursed by history, held in the thrall of age-old hatreds. But we must ask if that would be a realistic conclusion or a cynical one. Armchair analysts can indulge in cynicism. For a great nation with the power to change history, realism is a moral obligation and a practical necessity. We must look at Bosnia clearly and carefully -- not through a glass darkly or through rose-tinted glasses. Because just as we did two years ago -- when America's leadership, militarily through NATO and diplomatically through the Dayton negotiations, ended the fighting -- the United States today has a deep and abiding interest in peace and stability in Bosnia.

When we discuss where we are in Bosnia, we must not forget where we began. Less than two years ago, when the talks began in Dayton, Bosnia was a nation torn and shattered by the worst conflict in Europe since World War II. Opposing armies faced one another in a country riven by trenches and sown with landmines. Bosnia literally had been decimated: One in ten of its people -- Number tk -- had been killed or wounded. Half of those who survived -- 2.1 million people -- had been driven from their homes. Fully 80% of the Bosnian people relied on the UN for food.
Ninety percent were unemployed. A fragile cease-fire had been put in place, but the fires of extreme nationalism and ethnic hatred continued to rage.

In conditions so desperate, no nation could revive itself by itself and achieve a peaceful reconciliation. On humanitarian grounds alone, there clearly was a compelling case for American engagement. Without support from the United States and the international community, Bosnia almost certainly would have sunk into renewed violence and despair.

Under these conditions, Bosnia also would have remained a source of dangerous instability in Europe -- and a permanent threat to our security interests. We could not allow that. We have learned from hard experience that America's security and Europe's stability are linked. In a region where there were no firewalls against ethnic hatred, the Bosnian war could easily have spread to such flashpoints as Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia. A broader conflict would have threatened the vital interests of Greece and Turkey -- two of our closest allies and core members of NATO. It would have threatened several of Europe's new democracies. And it would have fatally undermined our efforts to build a Europe that is democratic, undivided and at peace -- a Europe that can strengthen America's security tremendously in the 21st century. Had peace not taken hold... had Dayton been only a momentary time out in an increasingly deadly and dangerous war... could the United States have stood aside as the UN's humanitarian peacekeeping effort collapsed... and an entire region slid toward war?

We could not afford to let that happen. That's why we and our partners, under President Clinton's leadership, committed ourselves to end the downward spiral by helping the people of
Bosnia build a peace from out of their ruins. To prevent Bosnia from returning to a war that endangered our interests, we and the international community joined together with the parties at Dayton to achieve three goals: We resolved to secure the ceasefire and reduce the chance of renewed fighting... to help the parties form a nation that could accommodate their different aspirations... and to create a roadmap for building a lasting peace.

The agreement that was forged at Dayton upheld several vital principles: It preserved Bosnia as a single state within recognized borders with a constitution and central government. It provided for the right of refugees to return and obliged the parties to comply with the orders of The War Crimes Tribunal. It neither ratified ethnic cleansing nor permitted the partition that the aggressors in the conflict had sought. Yet at the same time, Dayton reflected the reality that no matter how much we might have preferred a truly unitary, ethnically integrated state, no one could not turn back the clock after such bloodshed and impose a utopian settlement. By creating a single state that balanced unity with a high degree of autonomy for the two multi-ethnic entities, the Dayton Accords established the sole basis – the only common denominator – on which a better future could be achieved for Bosnia, one that left the door open for the Bosnians to build greater unity over time.

Dayton put in motion a military and political effort of extraordinary scope and complexity. IFOR, and later SFOR, have set a tremendous example of skill and determination. They have succeeded in keeping the guns silent and eliminating many of the tensions that could have exploded into conflict. Today, SFOR continues to perform its mission with outstanding professionalism, creating the environment in which peace can take root.
We knew, however, that a successful military mission would not be enough... that building peace would require more than setting out on paper an idea of a state that the parties would accept. Alongside the creation of this new state, it was imperative that a reconciliation begin among people who had only just stopped killing one another – because this is a peace process, not just an exercise in writing contracts. That’s why we set out a mission of civilian implementation for the international community – one that will help former enemies take the necessary steps to make peace self-sustaining. We knew that, as President Clinton said, the Bosnian people needed help to “repair and rebuild” – not just their houses and factories but their confidence and tolerance. And it was essential to do this so that peace would not depend on a permanent occupation force. The goals we and the international community set out to achieve include:

- Establish a stable military balance that would prevent renewed fighting
- Improve public safety through reform of police forces
- Strengthen democratic institutions and the rule of law
- Enable refugees to return in safety
- Re-establish freedom of movement throughout the country
- Strengthen economic reconstruction
- Help bring war criminals to justice.

This is an ambitious agenda, and it was clear from the start that it would require an unprecedented civilian effort alongside the military mission. Last week, we were reminded by that terrible helicopter crash, which claimed the lives of five American civilians and seven
others, of the dedication of those who have undertaken this work – and the costs and sacrifice they bear. Despite their efforts, less than two years after Dayton – and after so much devastation – it should not be surprising that few tasks are complete... and that Bosnia still stands on a tightrope, inching toward a better future but still not out of danger of falling into chaos. The large majority of refugees are still unable to return home. The Republika Srpska is in the grip of a struggle between those who support and those who oppose the vision of Dayton. Prominent indicted war criminals – most notably Radovan Karadzic and General Mladic – have not been turned over to the War Crimes Tribunal. The media is not yet independent, and some of it still spews the ultra-nationalist poison that helped light the fuse of war seven years ago. Progress is too slow on many fronts, including economic reconstruction.

Some believe that this record shows that we set our sights too high at Dayton – that only an ethnic partition could produce the stability we want and extricate us from Bosnia. I believe these critics have their principles wrong: Accepting partition means accepting ethnic cleansing, rewarding aggression, giving up on justice and sending the wrong message to ethnic fanatics around the world. They are also wrong to think partition would help build peace: Because by permanently denying Bosnian refugees the right to return home, partition would turn hope to ashes and create a strong motive to resume the war – which we already ended once because it threatened our interests.

But just as importantly, I believe that on closer view, the evidence shows that these critics are wrong on the substance – and that the choices we made at Dayton are producing real, positive change in Bosnia. The single state that the accords created remains intact and has strengthened
in some important respects. With Serb separatism and Muslim opposition to partition still strong, the Dayton-state has proved itself the sole viable basis for keeping the guns silent and Bosnia united. Popular acceptance of the Dayton arrangements is growing among all of Bosnia’s communities. For most of the people of Bosnia – especially those in the Federation – life is genuinely, if slowly, improving. This isn’t the story we usually hear, but peace is beginning to take root. The gains are not irreversible – and locking them in will require that the international community stay engaged in Bosnia for a good while to come. But by almost any measure, life is better for the people of Bosnia than it was two years ago, and cautious hope is replacing overwhelming despair.

Look through the eyes of Bosnia’s future and you can see why. Imagine what it is like to be a 15-year-old girl in one of Bosnia’s cities or towns. She lived nearly half of her life in the grip of war. Today, instead of huddling in a cold, muddy basement to escape the shelling, this girl regularly attends school – more than 400 schools that were damaged or destroyed by war have been rebuilt with the help of international donors, who have pledged $3.2 billion for civilian reconstruction, including $524 million from the United States. [More than $1 billion of has already been spent in Bosnia.] After class, she spends her time with friends and family instead of devoting endless hours to lugging home jugs of water – as she did during the war – because the reconstruction effort has restored water service in most places.

Perhaps she lives in one of the 24,000 housing units repaired last year alone with the help of the international community. And perhaps for the first time in seven years, she won’t worry about freezing in winter because heating has been restored in most of the country. She eats fruit and
vegetables, not boxed military rations, and has decent clothes because her family is earning more: Since the fighting ended, average wages in Bosnia have quadrupled, unemployment has fallen from 90% to 50% and, from a still low level, the economy is expected to grow 30% this year. Above all, she has a new sense of safety: She can walk the town streets knowing that the hills no longer conceal snipers... that she won’t be kidnapped or raped... that mortars no longer target the playgrounds.

This teenager is not the only one with a newfound, though fragile, sense of security. All Bosnians have benefited from the improvements in the military situation achieved by the extraordinary work of the IFOR and SFOR forces. The warring forces have been disengaged with the help of the NATO-led coalition; more than 250,000 troops [ck] have been demobilized; further bloodshed has been prevented. Number tk heavy weapons have been put under international supervision, and more than 2000 of them have been destroyed. At the same time, our Train and Equip program for the Federation’s armed forces [ck] is creating a stable military balance, making it less likely that anyone will gamble on renewed fighting. And let’s not forget: Because we made it a condition of Train and Equip, Bosnia severed all military and intelligence ties with Iran – so a nation that exports radicalism and sponsors terrorism has lost an important foothold in Europe.

Together with our partners in the international community, we are also increasing the security of the Bosnian people by improving public safety -- restructuring and reforming police forces so they protect citizens instead of intimidate them. Newly integrated forces in Sarajevo and Mostar are for the first time standing up to local thugs and bigots and protecting the rights and safety of
citizens of all ethnic groups. These strides are clearing the way for police reform in other regions. US-sponsored training has been so successful that refugees in Belgrade call asking if they can have their old jobs back on police forces in Muslim and Croat areas – and in most cases, they have been welcomed back.

Reforming the police has paid off in the Federation with increased freedom of movement – one of our top priorities. One year ago, any citizen traveling between cities in Bosnia would have to brave a dozen or more police checkpoints, risking anything from harassment and extortion to kidnapping and violence. Today, these checkpoints are gone, the road is clear and traffic around the country is increasing.

The people of Bosnia are not only more free to move – they are simply more free. To a greater extent than ever, Bosnians are being governed by people of their own choosing, not local warlords who rule by whim and coercion. Last year’s national and regional elections started Bosnia on a path to democracy. And Bosnia took another important step forward last week, when 2.5 million voters chose mayors, city councils and other municipal leaders from the more than 20,000 candidates who ran for office.

The habits of self-government are forming in Bosnia, and the state’s national institutions are also taking shape. The National Presidency, the Council of Ministers, the Supreme Court and the joint Military Commission are beginning to function – though movement frequently requires international pressure. These aren’t just boxes on a diagram but institutions that are taking their first steps. For example, the Muslim and Serb co-chairs of the Council of Ministers – who could
barely be persuaded in the spring to accept invitations to meet jointly with US officials in Washington arranged their own trip to Malaysia to lobby together for investment just last month.

The progress we have seen since Dayton – however uneven – has been possible only because many of Bosnia’s citizens have begun working for a new beginning. After so much war, they are determined to reap the blessings of peace. It’s a start – and one that lays the ground for future advances. For example, as police reform continues, and a greater sense of stability and security is established, the trickle of refugees returning to their homes grows. It won’t happen overnight, but it as they begin to come back, Bosnia can take an essential step toward the reconciliation it clearly needs – and can achieve. Because bigotry is not genetic, and fear can and must be overcome. There is a long road ahead, but what we are seeing is that it can lead forward, not just backward toward the abyss – and America’s engagement for peace is worth the effort.

But the promise of peace will only be fulfilled when the benefits of reconstruction are spread among all of Bosnia’s people. Today, most of the economic growth in Bosnia has occurred in the Federation. By contrast, the RS has languished as many of its leaders have refused to fulfill their responsibilities under Dayton, prompting international donors to withhold almost all reconstruction funds for the RS. It doesn’t have to be that way. But the RS has chosen a path of self-isolation, and its persistent poverty will only end when the RS fulfills its obligations and the reconstruction funds are released.

We must be clear about our goals in the RS. The struggle now underway there is both hopeful and uncertain. It pits the old guard in Pale – who both led the Serb people into war effort and
then profiteered during the conflict—against a growing movement of Bosnian Serbs who are fed up with government by kleptocracy. These RS citizens are opposing the rampant corruption that is making paupers out of all but a few in their entity. They have seen the improvements across the border in the Federation and want to share in the benefits of reconstruction. President Plavsic and many of her followers continue to espouse a powerful Serb nationalism. But they recognize that the road forward requires fulfilling their Dayton obligations... that Srpska cannot prosper in isolation... and that there is room within the Dayton framework to fulfill their legitimate aspirations. They want to close a bloody chapter in their history and open a new one of hope and recovery.

We have not ‘chosen sides’ in Srpska. The United States, SFOR and the international community is evenhanded in support of Dayton: We support those who support Dayton, not those who don’t. We are doing that by pursuing a vigorous but evenhanded policy of implementation—helping those who cooperate and making those who oppose implementation pay a price. To those who attempt to provoke SFOR or undermine the security SFOR has created, our response will be swift and decisive. We will not be deterred by mob violence. We will use all the means at our disposal, including lethal ones, to protect our forces and continue our mission. Despite the efforts of Pale’s hardliners, communities on both sides of the entity boundary that accept the return of refugees will receive our assistance. A growing number of Bosnian Serb police forces are signing on for restructuring—and we will see to it that they receive technical support and equipment just as Federation police forces do. We are also supporting the independent and objective media in the RS, providing them with technical assistance and equipment so that their message is heard.
There is turmoil in the RS for the right reasons – for change and a new start, without corruption and without ethnic warfare. But that does not mean it will end soon. In both the Republika Srpska and the Federation, we will achieve the outcome we want and our interests require – a stable Bosnia firmly on the road to reconstruction and reconciliation -- but only if we are prepared to join the Bosnian people on this path for some years to come.

[Two paragraphs tk on further challenges. Key points: 1) Only 10% of refugees have returned. Number of returnees has become key indicator of success – but an inaccurate one, because returnees come at the end of the process of creating stability and safety, not in an even stream. 2) Problem of corruption and teaching free market economics to Bosnia. While the rest of Central and Eastern Europe was getting a fast lesson in the subject, Bosnia was deep in war. Need to make up that gap to get the economy going and loosen the grip of corrupt bosses. 3) Brcko. Challenge of resolving the status of this flashpoint.]

SFOR has just passed the midpoint of its mission. In June, when the military mission concludes, Bosnia will face a critical juncture – and in the weeks and months leading up to that moment, our nation will have to make important decisions about how we can best continue building peace. Let’s have a debate on how to achieve our goals. But let’s make it a constructive dialogue – and not indulge in cynicism or a partitionist defeatism. Clearly, our economic and technical assistance will be required in Bosnia, and we will confront serious issues about how to preserve security in the region. I don’t want to prejudge those decisions – but I hope we will agree that
supporting peace and democracy and strengthening economic reconstruction in Bosnia is our goal, not dismantling everything we have achieved.

This work will take patience and determination, but I am convinced it will be worth it. Not out of charity, but because it will advance our nation’s interests. At a time when we have resolved to remain engaged in Europe... when we are extending our efforts, and expanding our Alliance... peace in Bosnia is vital for our overall effort to build a continent that is undivided, democratic and at peace. Indeed, our continued success in the world – in preserving peace and increasing security for the American people – demands that we stay this course... and ensure that Southern Europe becomes a source of stability, not a powder keg. Twice in this century we have had to intervene in Europe with the full might of our military to resolve wars that spread across the continent and beyond because we waited too long to act. Now we must recognize the dangers we court if we stop acting too soon.

Writing almost a century and a half ago, Tolstoy observed in “War and Peace,” that “The strongest warriors of all are these two: time and patience.” In Bosnia, we must have both of these on our side – but with them, I am certain we can achieve our goals for the region and for our nation.
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   - XFOR.

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5. How
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       - (time to have a break.
         - Open hours)

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   - With Congress in
   - Sennin
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<tr>
<td>001. email</td>
<td>Kristen Cicic to Anthony Blinken and Daniel Benjamin re: Parting Thoughts on Bosnia (1 page)</td>
<td>09/08/1997</td>
<td>P1/b(1)</td>
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</table>

**COLLECTION:**
Clinton Presidential Records  
National Security Council  
Anthony Blinken (Speechwriting)  
OA/Box Number: 3388

**FOLDER TITLE:**
Samuel R. Berger-Bosnia Speech, 9/97

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.  
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).  
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(5) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(5) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

2006-0459-F  
rs355
DAYTON IMPLEMENTATION: 
PROGRESS TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE PEACE

1 August, 1997

MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENTS

♦ The fighting has stopped, warring forces have been separated and heavy weapons are in cantonments.

♦ Real GDP has almost doubled since 1995. Unemployment has dropped from 90% to 50%.

♦ International donors are implementing a three-year, $5.1 billion priority reconstruction program.

♦ Infrastructure is being reconnected and rebuilt.

♦ New national, entity and cantonal governments were elected in the September 1996 elections and are beginning to function.

♦ OSCE logistical preparations for this year's municipal elections are on track, with 2.5 million voters registered and approximately 20,000 candidates registered to run in 136 municipalities.

♦ In the Federation, joint police forces, a joint military, a joint customs service, and integrated financial institutions have been created.

♦ The Train and Equip program has managed procurement of over $300 million worth of military equipment for the Bosnian Federation and coordinated international training.

♦ Roughly 150,000 refugees have returned to Bosnia from residences abroad, and more than 160,000 internally displaced persons have returned to their homes.

♦ The Open Broadcast Network, supported by U.S. assistance, has become a viable cross-IEBL television network.

♦ The Arbitration decision in Brcko was handled peacefully and international supervision structure is in place.
MILITARY STABILITY

- The fighting has been stopped, warring forces have been separated.
- Heavy weapons have been placed in internationally supervised cantonment and over 2000 heavy weapons systems have been destroyed.
- First IFOR, and now SFOR, have maintained the peace with only minimal casualties. Local cooperation with IFOR/SFOR has been excellent.
- Through a combination of arms control and the Train and Equip program, a stable military balance is being achieved.
- Illegal foreign forces have been expelled and Bosnia has terminated military and intelligence cooperation with Iran and other extremist countries.
- The Federation Defense Law was passed in July 1996; agreements on Federation force structure and on the Joint Command have been reached and confidence-building measures, such as hotline installation in respective military headquarters, have been implemented.

ECONOMIC GROWTH

- Real GDP has almost doubled since 1995. GDP growth in 1997 is expected to be 30%. (Most economic growth is taking place in the Federation.)
- Unemployment dropped from 90% to 50%.
- Wages in the Federation have more than quadrupled (from 46 DM/month to 260 DM/month).
- Infrastructure is being reconnected and rebuilt.
- IMF Letter of Intent has been agreed to and London Club debt restructuring was completed.

INTERNATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION EFFORT

- International donors, led by the World Bank, designed a three-year, $5.1 billion priority reconstruction program. Since early 1996, donors have pledged 3.2 billion toward this program.
- In the first two years of the program, the U.S. has committed $448 million, and expects to pledge another $200 million in FY 98.
In 1996, over 320 kms of roads were put back into service, 15,000 housing units were repaired (including over 2,500 by USAID), and heating was restored to 32,000 others. 400 schools were repaired, and 40 cities had their water and sewage systems repaired.

Five power plants were rehabilitated in 1996 and electric power service has been restored in all major cities and many rural areas. Some 776,000 people (roughly 25 percent of Bosnia's total population) have had their electricity restored due to donor-funded power sector projects.

USAID provided $52 million in loans to 95 medium-sized Bosnian enterprises, creating nearly 10,000 jobs. USAID hopes to be lending $10 million a month by the end of this year.

By the end of 1997, USAID's Municipal Infrastructure and Services (MIS) program will have completed major projects in more than 38 municipalities and created more than 10,000 new jobs.

Led by the U.S., nearly all donors have embraced our conditionality policy which restricts assistance to those complying with Dayton. As a result only 3 percent of donor funding went to the Republika Srpska entity in 1996.

NEW GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS

New national, entity and cantonal governments were elected in the September 1996 elections.

The Bosnian Presidency and the Council of Ministers meet in regular sessions.

The Constitutional Court is up and running.

The Parliamentary Assembly has formed and recently passed the Quick Start package of economic laws.

The Standing Committee on Military Matters held its inaugural meeting during Secretary Albright's recent trip to Sarajevo.

The Central Bank has been created.

FEDERATION STRUCTURES AND INTEGRATION

Governmental structures at the Federation and Cantonal levels have been set up.

Joint police forces, a joint military, a joint customs service, and integrated financial institutions have been created.

The Train and Equip program has managed procurement from all sources of over $300 million worth of military equipment for the Bosnian Federation's integrated defense force and has coordinated international training efforts.
PUBLIC SECURITY

- The Federation police forces are being rebuilt from the ground up in accordance with international democratic policing standards under supervision of the UN IPTF.

- Two of the 10 Federation cantons (Sarajevo and Gorazde) have completed the initial phase of restructuring. The remaining cantons are expected to do so by September 1997.

- The Mostar police force has been ethnically integrated and joint patrols (Bosniak and Bosnian Croat officers) introduced in July 1997.

- Strong coordination between the Parties, the IPTF and IFOR on public security planning led to the safe conduct of elections in September 1996.

- Human dignity and basic skills training programs sponsored by the USG have begun in Sarajevo. IPTF assumed the authority to investigate alleged police human rights abuses in December and is working with local police to develop their own internal affairs capabilities.

REFUGEES

- Roughly 150,000 refugees have returned to Bosnia from residence abroad and more than 160,000 internally displaced persons have returned to their homes.

- UNHCR and the USG have jointly identified the first three "Open Cities", communities that accept the return of ethnic minorities. Many other communities have expressed interest in the program.

- As of July 2, 1998, 164 Bosniak families have returned to their homes on the Serb side of the Zone of Separation in the Brcko area. Sixteen Bosniak families have returned to Stolac, one of the four Federation communities designated at Dayton as a "pilot project" for return.

- RS President Plavsic has agreed to allow the implementation of projects in Sipovo that will enable Bosniaks to return.

DEMINING

- The U.S. has contributed to the establishment of a capable, indigenous demining infrastructure; regional demining groups started surveying and removing land mines in November 1996.
DEMOCRATIZATION

♦ Last year's national, entity and cantonal elections were completed without incident and elected officials have been installed into office.

♦ OSCE logistical preparations for this year's municipal elections are on track, with 2.5 million voters registered and approximately 20,000 candidates registered to run in 136 municipalities.

♦ Various donors are providing assistance to nascent political parties.

♦ U.S. financial and personnel support for the Annex Six Human Rights Commission has helped to improve respect for human rights and the rule of law.

MEDIA

♦ The Open Broadcast Network, supported by U.S. assistance, has become a viable cross-IEBL television network.

♦ VOA and RFE operations, as well as donor-sponsored local media projects, are continuing to diversify the kinds of information available within Bosnia.

♦ USAID has given vital assistance to small alternative radio stations in Banja Luka, Doboj, Bijeljina and Prijedor.

♦ The U.S. and other donors have trained dozens of Bosnian journalists in western journalistic practice and media management.

BRCKO

♦ The Arbitration decision was handled peacefully; the international Supervisor has been installed and his office established and staffed.

♦ An IPTF contingent has been augmented to full strength and is on site.

♦ Infrastructure projects are underway and refugee housing is under construction.

♦ Refugee return procedures have been approved, new homes are being constructed with international funding, and many have been identified for return.

♦ Property commission is operating and adjudicating property rights.
FACSIMILE

TO:     DAVID LEAVY

DT:     15 AUGUST 1997

RE:     BOSNIA FACTS

FR:     M.SIEGEL

PGS:    5 TO FOLLOW

PLEASE CALL 202.647.7953
FYI, we had a conference call with Sandy a half hour ago in which he said he wants to give a Bosnia speech in early September. Working with Jock Covey, who has handed me a stack of documents and is writing notes on the issue right now. Central theme is: things are better than many say but not good enough to be satisfactory, and putting aside the military deployment issue, we are in for the long haul.

Call me Monday and we can discuss further.
Media Usage in Bosnia Divides Along Ethnic Lines

While Bosnia has a wide variety of media outlets, the most powerful are controlled by the dominant parties and other regional interests. In light of the upcoming municipal elections, a recent USIA survey in Bosnia raises the issue of media access and shows that many Bosnians believe that political parties do not have equal access.

KEY FINDINGS

- Bosnian Muslims use pro-government or party-controlled media sources most frequently. Bosnian Serbs tend to rely on sources from Pale, Banja Luka, and Serbian sources from Belgrade. Bosnian Croats rely heavily on media originating in Zagreb.

- Bosnians rely mostly on television for news and information, followed by radio and newspapers. OBN/TVIN and international broadcasters attract a small group of regular listeners.

- Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Muslims tend to trust the media source they use most frequently. Sizeable percentages, however, say they do not trust any source.

Access to Media During Campaign Judged Unequal

With elections just around the corner, solid majorities of Bosnian Serbs (69%) and Bosnian Croats (66%) say that political parties do not have equal access to the media (only a quarter of Bosnian Serbs and Croats think that they do). Bosnian Muslims are more likely to say that access is equal (55%) than unequal (34%). In each ethnic group, those who are planning to vote for parties other than the ruling parties are more likely to say that media access is not equal, but among Bosnian Serbs and Croats, access is not seen as equal even by supporters of the dominant Serb Democratic Party (SDS) (59%) and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) (63%).

Bosnian Muslims, Croats and Serbs Turn to Different Media Sources

Asked which stations they turn to most frequently, Bosnians tend to name media sources which are closely aligned with parties and/or strongly influenced by regional authorities more than any other. Many Bosnian Serbs and Croats rely on sources originating from Belgrade and Zagreb, respectively.

More than any other media source, Bosnians rely most on television for information about...
"important [domestic] events and problems" (68% of Bosnian Croats, 62% of Bosnian Serbs, 72% of Bosnian Muslims). When asked about specific stations, Bosnian Serbs tune in most often to Pale’s SRT (Srpska Radio Television), Bosnian Croats report watching Zagreb’s HTV (Hrvaska Television), and among Bosnian Muslims in Central Bosnia, more report watching SDA-controlled TV BiH than any other.

The situation in radio listening is similar, but, likely due to the variety of local stations, there is a wider range of stations cited. Overall, one in six Bosnians (across all three ethnic groups) relies most on radio for information. The most popular stations among Bosnian Serbs are Radio Republika Srpska and Radio Banja Luka, both of which reflect the views of the Bosnian Serb leadership and among Bosnian Croats, Zagreb’s HR Radio and Radio Herceg-Bosna -- closely tied to the Bosnian Croat leadership -- are the most popular. Bosnian Muslims report listening to Radio BiH more frequently than any other.

Newspaper readers (one in ten or fewer across all three groups), also divide along ethnic lines. Better-educated Croats and Muslims and urban and better-educated Serbs are more likely than others to rely most on newspapers. In the Republika Srpska (RS), tabloid-style Vecernje Novine is the top choice of at least four in ten. Among Bosnian Croats, half name the Croatian daily Slobodna Dalmacija. Bosnian Muslims turn most often to pro-government Dnevni Avaz, independent Oslobodjenje and Vecernje Novine.

Independent Media and International Broadcast Audience Limited

Very few Bosnians name independent radio or television stations or international broadcasters as the media source they rely on most for information. When asked directly about VOA, RFE and the BBC, however, roughly one in ten or fewer say they listen regularly (see table), and an additional 3 to 14 percent say they listen less often.

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<th>Regular Weekly Listeners</th>
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More Bosnian Muslims (33%) report that they are able to receive OBN/TVIN than Bosnian Croats (13%) or Bosnian Serbs (7%). Two in ten Bosnian Muslims (21%) and fewer Bosnian Croats (6%) and Bosnian Serbs (7%) report watching at least once a week. Those Bosnian Muslims and Croats who listen to international broadcasters or watch OBN/TVIN at all tend to be better-educated, live in urban areas and have slightly more interest in politics than others. Bosnian Serb listeners and viewers also tend to be better-educated. Many Bosnians who use independent and international media sources use more than one.

Most Trust the Source They Turn to Most Often

Asked which television station, radio station or newspaper they "trust the most to report the news accurately," Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Muslims tend to name the source they use most frequently. International broadcasters are named by only a few (less than 1%) as a most-trusted source. Sizable minorities (between 11 and 26
percent) say they cannot trust any source or they don’t know which source they trust most. This skeptical group
tends to be slightly better-educated in the Bosnian Serb Republic, and slightly more urban and educated in
Hercegovina and Central Bosnia.

Prepared by Anna E. Sweeney and Dina S. Smeltz, R/EU (202-619-5144; reu@usia.gov)
Issued by the Office of Research and Media Reaction, USIA
How This Poll Was Conducted

This survey is based on preliminary data from face-to-face interviews with a probability sample of 994 Bosnian Serbs, 911 Bosnian Muslims and 956 Bosnian Croats aged 18 and older. Interviewing was conducted between July 6 and 29, 1997. USIA commissioned MEDIUM based in Belgrade with an affiliate in Banja Luka and PULS, based in Split with affiliates in Sarajevo and Mostar, to conduct this study. Survey questions were prepared by the USIA Office of Research. The questionnaire was translated by the contractors and reviewed by the Office of Research staff.

In theory, 19 times out of 20, results from samples of this size will differ by no more than about 4 percentage points in either direction from what would be found if it were possible to interview every adult in Bosnia Hercegovina. Sampling error is larger for subgroups within the population. In addition to sampling error, the practical difficulties of conducting a survey of public opinion may introduce other sources of error into the results.

For further information, please contact the analysts.
Bosnian Croats Mix Favorable View of West with Skepticism About International Institutions

A recent USIA survey finds that Bosnian Croats have a generally favorable view of the U.S., its western allies, and their role in the Balkan peace process, but this does not translate into broad support for various international institutions.

**KEY FINDINGS**

- Most Bosnian Croats credit western involvement with making peace possible and have a positive view of the western countries involved in the peace process.

- However, more than half lack confidence in international institutions such as SFOR, NATO and the UN.

- There is little support for giving international institutions the primary responsibility for enforcing international agreements on refugee resettlement, despite strong support for those agreements.

**Western Countries Viewed Favorably**

In marked contrast to Bosnian Serbs, most Bosnian Croats hold a positive view of the role of the United States (75%) and west European countries (65%) in the Balkan peace process. In fact, eight in ten Bosnian Croats believe that peace would not have been possible without the West’s involvement. When it comes to domestic affairs, however, opinion is closely divided on the question of whether the West has had too much influence on the process leading up to September’s municipal elections (49% “too much” vs. 47% “right amount” or “too little.”).

Moreover, very large majorities express a generally favorable view of the United States (81%) and Germany (94%). Only Croatia — at 99 percent — enjoys a more favorable rating among the Bosnian Croats. The public divides almost evenly in its favorability toward Bosnia Hercegovina itself (49%...
favorable, 47% unfavorable), and holds negative views of Serbia (78% unfavorable), Russia (79%), Turkey (83%), and Iran (89%).

**Moderate Opposition to International Institutions**

This generally favorable view of western countries and of the West’s role in Bosnia does not translate into widespread support for international institutions. A wide range of international institutions receive almost identical confidence ratings, with more than half lacking confidence in NATO (56%), the EU (55%), the UN (55%), the High Representative (64%), the UNHCR (53%) and OSCE (56%).

There is also some skepticism about the effectiveness of SFOR. About the same lack confidence in SFOR (56%) as feel that way about other international institutions, even though two thirds support its presence in Bosnia. Bosnian Croats are almost evenly divided on the question of whether SFOR should leave or stay after the June 1998 deadline expires (44% leave, 50% stay).

**Bosnian Croats See Modest Role for International Institutions in Refugee Resettlement, Brcko**

Bosnian Croats further display their skepticism toward the role of international institutions and their concern for sovereignty when asked about refugee resettlement and the status of Brcko. While a majority (79%) support the right of refugees to return to their former homes, most (74%) of those believe that local or Bosnian authorities should be primarily responsible for it. Only two in ten believe that international institutions such as the UNHCR, SFOR or other international peacekeepers should play the lead role in enforcing the right of refugee resettlement. Similarly, only two in ten Bosnian Croats believe that long-term control by international authorities would be the best solution for the disputed Brcko territory.

Prepared by Christopher J. Fleury (619-5143; reu@usia.gov)

Issued by the Office of Research and Media Reaction, USIA
How This Poll Was Conducted

This survey is based on preliminary data from face-to-face interviews with a probability sample of 956 Bosnian Croat residents aged 18 and older. Interviewing was conducted in July 7-28, 1997. USIA commissioned PULS, a polling firm based in Split with an affiliate in Sarajevo, to conduct this study. Survey questions were prepared by the USIA Office of Research. The questionnaire was translated by the contractor and reviewed by the Office of Research staff.

In theory, 19 times out of 20, results from samples of this size will differ by no more than about 4 percentage points in either direction from what would be found if it were possible to interview every adult in Bosnia Hercegovina. Sampling error is larger for subgroups within the population. In addition to sampling error, the practical difficulties of conducting a survey of public opinion, including heightened political tensions during the fieldwork of this study, may introduce other sources of error into the results.

For further information, please contact the analyst.
Bosnian Croats Expect Elections Will Favor Those Already in Power

A just-completed USIA-commissioned survey finds the HDZ remains the leading party among Bosnian Croats.

KEY FINDINGS

• Nearly all Bosnian Croats say it is important to vote in the September 13-14 municipal elections and nearly all plan to do so. But very few think the election will produce significant change.

• The HDZ has the widest public support -- eight in ten. Other parties, including the HSP and the HSS, garner little. One in ten voices no party preference.

• Majorities believe that the status of refugees and war criminals will have little impact on whether the elections are free and fair. However, significant minorities say the elections cannot be free and fair unless refugees can return home and war criminals are arrested.

Most Say Voting Important
Most Bosnian Croats (96%) intend to vote in the September 13-14 municipal elections and as many say they have registered to do so (95%). In addition, almost all (94%) believe it is important that they vote (74% very important).

Outcome of Elections: Little, If Any, Change
Only one in ten thinks that the elections will allow for new people and influences to exercise power in the region; most (86%) think they will favor those already in power. Many would likely welcome this outcome since the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) continues to dominate the political field among Bosnian Croats (82%). Other parties trail with support from fewer than one in twenty: the Croatian Right Party (HSP) (3%), Croatian Peasant Party (HSS) (1%). One in ten (12%) are undecided or “don't know.”

The HDZ attracts support across all age groups, education levels and from both urban and rural dwellers. People who are more favorable toward a multiethnic state are slightly more likely than others to say they are undecided, but a majority of this group also support the HDZ.

Majority Are Satisfied with Candidate List
Six in ten Bosnian Croats (61%) say they are satisfied that they will be able to vote for a candidate who represents their interests. A quarter are dissatisfied, but are as likely as others to say they would vote for the HDZ.

Bosnian Croats Support Nationality-Based Voting
A solid majority of Bosnian Croats (71%) believe that it is more important to vote for a candidate of one’s own nationality than to vote for a candidate whose views can be trusted, regardless of nationality (27%). This view is likely reinforced by the belief of nearly all Bosnian Croats that each of Bosnia’s three ethnic groups -- including their own -- will vote for the nationality-based parties.

This report is based on preliminary results of a USIA-commissioned survey among Bosnian Croats. PULS, based in Split with an affiliate in Mostar, interviewed 956 Bosnian Croat adults, aged 18 and older, July 6-29, 1997.
Few Fear Intimidation, Yet Half Question Safety of Crossing IEBL

There is little concern among Bosnian Croats about voter intimidation. Nine in ten express confidence that they will be able to go to the polling place (89%) and vote for the party of their choice (95%) without fear of intimidation. Half (48%), however, believe it would be unsafe to cross the IEBL to vote, even if “our government, SFOR and the International Police Task Force provide guarantees.” Slightly fewer (41%) are more confident that it would be safe to cross the IEBL with these protections. Confidence that it would be safe to cross the IEBL is related to overall confidence in SFOR and the belief that SFOR contributes to one’s own safety.

Refugees More of An Election Concern than War Criminals

Distinct minorities of Bosnian Croats believe the elections can be free and fair regardless of the status of war criminals or refugees (see Table). The public is somewhat more concerned about the impact of refugees than war criminals, but significant percentages doubt either will affect the electoral process. Those Bosnian Croats living in eastern Hercegovina and central Bosnia are more likely than those in western Hercegovina and in the Mostar area to say that elections cannot be free and fair until refugees have returned home. Those living in rural areas are more likely than urban Bosnian Croats to say elections cannot be free and fair without the arrest of war criminals.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Expected Impact of Arrest of War Criminals and Refugee Resettlement on Elections</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elections cannot be free and fair until most war criminals have been arrested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections can be free and fair even if war criminals have not been arrested</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elections won't be affected much by whether or not war criminals are arrested</td>
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<tr>
<td>Don't Know/No Answer</td>
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Assessment of Western Influence on Elections Mixed

Half among Bosnian Croats (49%) say the West has had too much influence on the electoral process in Bosnia Hercegovina, but only slightly fewer (43%) say the West has had about the right amount of influence. Very few (4%) believe the West has had too little.

Prepared by B. Susan White and Anna E. Sweeney, R/EU (202-619-5133; reu@usia.gov)
Issued by the Office of Research and Media Reaction, USIA
How This Poll Was Conducted

This survey is based on preliminary data from face-to-face interviews with a probability sample of 956 Bosnian Croat residents aged 18 and older. Interviewing was conducted July 6-29 1997. USIA commissioned PULS, based in Split with an affiliate in Mostar, to conduct this study. Survey questions were prepared by the USIA Office of Research. The questionnaire was translated by the contractor and reviewed by the Office of Research staff.

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For further information, please contact the analysts.
Bosnian Muslims Remain Committed to Unified Country, National Institutions

Much is yet to be done to fulfill the requirements of Dayton. Under U.S. pressure, some small steps have been taken recently. Bosnian leaders have reached agreement on a single telephone code and on the naming of key ambassadorships. Preliminary results from a just-completed USIA survey in central Bosnia show that Bosnian Muslims place more urgency than Bosnian Serbs or Croats on the issues of refugee return, apprehension of war criminals and freedom of movement.

KEY FINDINGS

• Bosnian Muslims reject the notion that partition of the country is "inevitable" and support a unified Bosnia Herzegovina.

• Most Bosnian Muslims believe that the arrest of indicted war criminals and the return of refugees to their former homes will advance the overall peace process.

Bosnian Muslims Remain Committed to United Bosnian State
While most Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats think partition is "inevitable," Bosnian Muslims remain committed to an integrated rather than a separated country. Majorities think the three ethnic communities will ultimately be able to live together peacefully (83%) and continue to support a unified Bosnian state (98%). Yet, Bosnian Muslim support for this central provision of Dayton is likely held in part out of a sense of self-preservation. A majority feel that "people can only feel completely safe when they are the majority nationality in their country" (57% agree; 37% disagree). Larger majorities of Bosnian Croats (83%) and Serbs (81%) agree with this idea.

Public Divides Over Who Would Stand to Gain from Potential Partition
If the country were eventually partitioned, Bosnian Muslims split between those who say that all three sides would be affected equally (48%) and those who think one side would be favored over others (44%). Of those who think one side would be favored, most think the Bosnian Serbs would benefit; fewer mention the Bosnian Croats and very few mention Bosnian Muslims. This finding may help explain further why Bosnian Muslims prefer a unified country. Many seem to feel that they stand to lose in a disaggregated Bosnia: nearly all Bosnian Muslims oppose the idea of an independent Bosnian Serb Republic or Herzegovina.

This report is based on preliminary results from a USIA-commissioned survey among Bosnian Muslims. PULS, based in Split with an affiliate in Sarajevo, interviewed 911 Bosnian Muslim adults, aged 18 and older, July 6-29, 1997.
Majority Support Dayton, National Institutions
Although a majority think Dayton was forced on them by the West (83%), Bosnian Muslims still support the Dayton accords (97%). As with the Bosnian Serbs and Croats, the desire to avoid renewed fighting contributes to this support. However, Bosnian Muslims stand apart from the other ethnic communities in their support for a unified country and confidence in national institutions. Seven in ten are confident in the central government and the collective presidency.

Nine in Ten Support Federation -- Oppose Republika Srpska
Bosnian Muslims continue to support the Muslim-Croat Federation (93%). Their Federation partners, the Bosnian Croats, are more opposed (61%) than in favor (38%). Nearly all Bosnian Muslims (86%) continue to oppose the existence of the Bosnian Serb Republic.

Refugees, War Criminals and Freedom of Movement Issues of Concern
While eight in ten think conditions are being created for a lasting peace, Bosnian Muslims are concerned about the return of refugees, “bringing war criminals to justice” and freedom of movement (93% do not feel they “can travel freely anywhere in Bosnia Hercegovina”). By Bosnian Muslim appraisals, the issue of refugee return is the second most pressing issue facing the country, after economic concerns.1 While the apprehension of war criminals is rated as a lesser priority, most Bosnian Muslims believe that the apprehension and trial of indicted war criminals as well as the return of refugees to their former homes are crucial to free and fair elections and will facilitate the overall peace process. By contrast, only a minority of Bosnian Serbs and Croats think the arrest of war criminals and the return of refugees will affect elections or the overall peace process.

Prepared by Dina S. Smeltz and Anna E. Sweeney, R/EU (202-619-4490; reu@usia.gov)
Issued by the Office of Research and Media Reaction, USIA

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1When asked to name the most urgent issue facing the country, the public names economic issues first, (37%), followed by refugee returns (19%), issues of war and peace (10%), reconstruction (7%), bringing war criminals to justice (6%) and freedom of movement (5%), among other topics.
How This Poll Was Conducted

This survey is based on preliminary data from face-to-face interviews with a probability sample of 911 Bosnian Muslim residents aged 18 and older. Interviewing was conducted between July 6 and 29, 1997. USIA commissioned PULS, based in Split with an affiliate in Sarajevo, to conduct this study. Survey questions were prepared by the USIA Office of Research. The questionnaire was translated by the contractor and reviewed by the Office of Research staff.

In theory, 19 times out of 20, results from samples of this size will differ by no more than about 4 percentage points in either direction from what would be found if it were possible to interview every adult in Bosnia Hercegovina. Sampling error is larger for subgroups within the population. In addition to sampling error, the practical difficulties of conducting a survey of public opinion may introduce other sources of error into the results.

For further information, please contact the analysts.
SRB - Boomi Speed

Good things

Removing problems. Do hard hitting.
Staying in Boomi because we are successful and we are lucky. Need more time.

4th couple works on Sept.

Municipal clubs
Sept. 14-15
from this paper, but with more descriptive headings (e.g., "Life is better for most Bosnians.")

Note the most compelling facts from attached and a bit more flavor of what this means in human terms (anecdotes, examples).

Decade-old data and major problem remaining: Why, what needs to be done.

A speech is not worth but you could have more impact.

What do you think?

Could you work with Blinken to produce?

C.C. T. Blinken
MILITARY STABILITY

- The fighting has been stopped, warring forces have been separated.
- Heavy weapons have been placed in internationally supervised cantonment and over 2000 heavy weapons systems have been destroyed.
- First IFOR, and now SFOR, have maintained the peace with only minimal casualties. Local cooperation with IFOR/SFOR has been excellent.
- Through a combination of arms control and the Train and Equip program, a stable military balance is being achieved.
- Illegal foreign forces have been expelled and Bosnia has terminated military and intelligence cooperation with Iran and other extremist countries.
- The Federation Defense Law was passed in July 1996; agreements on Federation force structure and on the Joint Command have been reached and confidence-building measures, such as hotline installation in respective military headquarters, have been implemented.

ECONOMIC GROWTH

- Real GDP has almost doubled since 1995. GDP growth in 1997 is expected to be 30%. (Most economic growth is taking place in the Federation.)
- Unemployment dropped from 90% to 50%.
- Wages in the Federation have more than quadrupled (from 46 DM/month to 260 DM/month).
- Infrastructure is being reconnected and rebuilt.
- IMF Letter of Intent has been agreed to and London Club debt restructuring was completed.

INTERNATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION EFFORT

- International donors, led by the World Bank, designed a three-year, $5.1 billion priority reconstruction program. Since early 1996, donors have pledged 3.2 billion toward this program.
- In the first two years of the program, the U.S. has committed $524 million, and expects to pledge another $200 million in FY 98.
- In 1996, over 320 kms of roads were put back into service, 15,000 housing units were repaired (including over 2,500 by USAID), and heating was restored to 32,000 others. 400 schools were repaired, and 40 cities had their water and sewage systems repaired.
Five power plants were rehabilitated in 1996 and electric power service has been restored in all major cities and many rural areas. Some 776,000 people (roughly 25 percent of Bosnia's total population) have had their electricity restored due to donor-funded power sector projects.

- USAID provided $52 million in loans to 95 medium-sized Bosnian enterprises, creating nearly 10,000 jobs. USAID hopes to be lending $10 million a month by the end of this year.

- By the end of 1997, USAID's Municipal Infrastructure and Services (MIS) program will have completed major projects in more than 38 municipalities and created more than 10,000 new jobs.

- Led by the U.S., nearly all donors have embraced our conditionality policy which restricts assistance to those complying with Dayton. As a result only 3 percent of donor funding went to the Republika Srpska entity in 1996.

NEW GOVERNMENTAL INSTITUTIONS

- New national, entity and cantonal governments were elected in the September 1996 elections.

- The Bosnian Presidency and the Council of Ministers meet in regular sessions.

- The Constitutional Court is up and running.

- The Parliamentary Assembly has formed and recently passed the Quick Start package of economic laws.

- The Standing Committee on Military Matters held its inaugural meeting during Secretary Albright's recent trip to Sarajevo.

- The Central Bank has been created.

FEDERATION STRUCTURES AND INTEGRATION

- Governmental structures at the Federation and Cantonal levels have been set up.

- Joint police forces, a joint military, a joint customs service, and integrated financial institutions have been created.

- The Train and Equip program has managed procurement from all sources of over $300 million worth of military equipment for the Bosnian Federation's integrated defense force and has coordinated international training efforts.
PUBLIC SECURITY

♦ The Federation police forces are being rebuilt from the ground up in accordance with international democratic policing standards under supervision of the UN IPTF.

♦ Two of the 10 Federation cantons (Sarajevo and Gorazde) have completed the initial phase of restructuring. The remaining cantons are expected to do so by September 1997.

♦ The Mostar police force has been ethnically integrated and joint patrols (Bosniak and Bosnian Croat officers) introduced in July 1997.

♦ Strong coordination between the Parties, the IPTF and IFOR on public security planning led to the safe conduct of elections in September 1996.

♦ Human dignity and basic skills training programs sponsored by the USG have begun in Sarajevo. IPTF assumed the authority to investigate alleged police human rights abuses in December and is working with local police to develop their own internal affairs capabilities.

REFUGEES

♦ Roughly 150,000 refugees have returned to Bosnia from residence abroad and more than 160,000 internally displaced persons have returned to their homes.

♦ UNHCR and the USG have jointly identified the first three "Open Cities", communities that accept the return of ethnic minorities. Many other communities have expressed interest in the program.

♦ As of July 2, 1998, 164 Bosniak families have returned to their homes on the Serb side of the Zone of Separation in the Brcko area. The first sixteen Bosniak families have returned to Stolac, the most recalcitrant of the four Federation communities designated at Dayton as a "pilot project" for return.

♦ RS President Plavsic has agreed to allow the implementation of projects in Sipovo that will enable Bosniaks to return.

DEMINSING

♦ The U.S. has contributed to the establishment of a capable, indigenous demining infrastructure; regional demining groups started surveying and removing land mines in November 1996.
DEMOCRATIZATION

- Last year's national, entity and cantonal elections were completed without incident and elected officials have been installed into office.

- OSCE logistical preparations for this year's municipal elections are on track, with 2.5 million voters registered and approximately 20,000 candidates registered to run in 136 municipalities.

- Various donors are providing assistance to nascent political parties.

- U.S. financial and personnel support for the Annex Six Human Rights Commission has helped to improve respect for human rights and the rule of law.

MEDIA

- The Open Broadcast Network, supported by U.S. assistance, has become a viable cross-IEBL television network.

- VOA and RFE operations, as well as donor-sponsored local media projects, are continuing to diversify the kinds of information available within Bosnia.

- USAID has given vital assistance to small alternative radio stations in Banja Luka, Doboj, Bijeljina and Prijedor.

- The U.S. and other donors have trained dozens of Bosnian journalists in western journalistic practice and media management.

BRCKO

- The Arbitration decision was handled peacefully; the international Supervisor has been installed and his office established and staffed.

- An IPTF contingent has been augmented to full strength and is on site.

- Infrastructure projects are underway and refugee housing is under construction.

- Refugee return procedures have been approved, new homes are being constructed with international funding, and many have been identified for return.

- Property commission is operating and adjudicating property rights.
Dan:

Here are some rough notes you might find useful. Setting the speech in the larger peace-process context is important. We are ensnared in the language of "implementation" -- and a time-table mentality -- as if all we need to make Dayton work were a clipboard and the guts to kick ass. Hence, some further notes on that aspect:

- The U.S. is the greatest peace processor in the history of the world. We pretty much invented it in the 70's. With greater or lesser success, we have practiced it all over the globe: One key feature common to most of our peace processes: The Big Agreement -- whatever it is -- usually comes at the end of an convoluted, exhausting process that drags the parties far beyond their going-in positions. It takes time, fatigue, lots of confidence-building experience, and much good luck. Crucial point: if the parties had any inkling at the beginning where the process would actually come out, they would not just refuse to play -- they would sabotage the game to absolutely prevent any such outcome. Ideally, at a certain point, the parties almost demand something in writing, to codify their progress, to start harvesting some of the fruits of peace.

- In terms of U.S. experience, therefore, Dayton was upside-down: The Big Agreement came almost at the beginning, a slam-dunk relying on powerful patrons to sign what the warring factions would not. Arguably, we had no choice; there was no other obvious way to stop the carnage. But it meant that the parties were left holding the blue-print before they were ready to build. They knew exactly where the process was headed, and they were not yet viscerally committed to the peace. They signed the agreement believing they could achieve under cover of this elaborate ceasefire what had eluded them under fire. All their instincts were, of course, to obstruct and sabotage.

- So, the language of "implementation" is wholly inadequate to describe our work. It is the peace process inside the implementation that makes it so hard. We are gaining ground. Doing quite nicely, actually, if we could use a peace process yardstick from the Middle East or Southern Africa.

- More than anything, we are fighting for time. As peace processes go, Bosnia isn't all that difficult. They are all in the same gene pool. They lived together before, not very long ago. They are not proxies for great powers. They are not surrounded by the likes of Syria, Iraq, and Iran, dedicated to perpetuating the conflict. And they are close enough to Europe that the wealthy will contribute handsomely to their re-habilitation. This can work, but only if we are not driven prematurely from the field, by our own impatience.

Hope this and the attached notes are useful. Let's talk when you have had a chance to mull it over.
For Don Kerrick:

As you know, SRB discussed with us the outlines of a speech he'd like to give. The notes below, and the attached thematic outline, will give you a sense of current thinking.

On timing, Tony Blinken says will be recasting his e-mail of yesterday, now that we've had a chance to talk. In short, there won't ever be a really great moment to speak out about Bosnia, and if we tie our public diplomacy too tightly to events there, it will be hard to get started at all.

An overlapping context: Congressional consultations. We are preparing a response to a Levin-to-POTUS letter proposing active consultations on an exit strategy. Levin's tact is not hostile and could be constructive. In any case, if forwarding a draft response to SRB, we are going to suggest for consideration that POTUS convene Leadership some time in September, and conduct a broader retreat-style consultation sometime in October. This, to help ensure there is no vacuum to be filled with resolutions prohibiting post-June98 deployments, as well as to start figuring out what the traffic will bear. Whatever form the consultation takes, however, the decision on the timing of Sandy's speech should take into account, as part of a cadenced outreach program, telling our story, preparing everybody to stick it out in Bosnia.

---Original Message---

From: Covey, James P.
Sent: Monday, August 18, 1997 7:51 PM
To: Benjamin, Daniel
Cc: @PLANNING - Strat Plan & Comm; @BOSNIA - Bosnian Affairs
Subject: SRB speech on Bosnia [UNCLASSIFIED]

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Look Below Top Leadership To Find Hope in Bosnia

By Harriet Hougas

B OSNIA has been getting a lot of bad press lately. But while implementation of the Dayton accord has been slow, and the top leaders show little sign of a commitment to peace, that is not the whole story. Below the top level of leadership is another level of actors whose efforts signify support for the goals of Dayton.

Two events demonstrate this. On July 3 and 4, some 28 Bosnian officials from the three ethnic communities — Bosnians, Croats, and Serbs — met with international experts and officials in Strasbourg for a round-table on justice and reconciliation. They met to explore options for dealing with the aftermath of abuses committed on all sides and to consider how to achieve a sense of justice that would accelerate reconciliation.

It was the first time key officials agreed to meet on these issues. Although the attempt to bring them together fell apart several times, and preparations for the round-table had to be made via phone lines that often didn’t work, across five time zones, and through the use of interpreters, the meeting yielded positive results.

Wide-ranging participation

The Bosnians included a minister of justice, supreme court judges, prosecutors, and leaders of three war crimes commissions. Helping to craft the consensus that emerged were international legal scholars, senior officials of the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague and the Office of the High Representative (responsible for civilian implementation of Dayton) and a member of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Also involved were representatives of the sponsoring organizations — the US Institute of Peace, the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

That we met on the Fourth of July made the discussions more poignant. Bosnians raised issues that enflamed flashes of the struggles and achievements of America’s history, achievements that are only beginning to be recognized in Bosnia — a free news media, a police force that protects civilians rather than political interests, an independent judiciary and the protection of individual rights.

The significance of the day was not lost on the Bosnians either. One said, “There are very few things that Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs could agree on, but we can agree to greet our American colleagues on this their Independence Day and to salute their great country without which there would not be peace in our country.”

The overall tone of the meeting included relatively tolerant and professional exchanges, a recasting of the need to deal with the abuses for the sake of the victims and for reconciliation, and a yearning for a society based on a rule of law. Consensus was reached on a dozen points for action, including concrete steps to improve the Hague Tribunal and to enhance the credibility and fairness of domestic war crimes trials, as well as proposals to exclude from the police and certain government positions those involved in abuses.

This consensus among disparate interests is not an isolated event. The agreement reached by top religious leaders in Bosnia to form an Inter-Religious Council to work “together to replace hostility with cooperation and respect,” and to acknowledge their shared moral commitment is another achievement that gives hope that Bosnia is in a different place than it was a year and a half ago.

Opening for peace

It is a fragile peace, and most of the top political leaders are not there yet. Agreements by a group of individuals below the top leadership on significant issues do, however, present small openings for Bosnians and for the international community to choose a very different way to end this conflict.

Peace building is a messy, complicated, and lengthy process. There is much evidence of donor fatigue and flagging interest in keeping up the pressure on leaders. Members of the international community increasingly ask: Is it worth it? Can a lasting peace be achieved to justify the investment of money, troops, and energy?

The round-table in Strasbourg and the creation of the Inter-Religious Council show the willingness of second-level officials to seek reconciliation. Now it is time to support these efforts and those people who do not have the freedoms we celebrate on the Fourth, but who yearn for them deeply. Their media keep them captive, and their leaders deprive them of the tools to change the course of history.

Whether we like it or not, the international community is needed still to press top leaders to honor commitments made at Dayton, to find ways to support those away from center stage, and to cultivate new leaders in the process.

Harriet Hougas is executive vice president of the United States Institute of Peace.
Bosnian Croats Support SFOR Action
On War Criminals, but Issue is Low Priority

In a recent USIA-commissioned poll, Bosnian Croats voice support for having SFOR take an active role in the search for suspected war criminals, but few cite the arrest of war criminals as a top priority.

Continued Support for an Active Role for SFOR
Consistent with previous USIA polls, two-thirds (68%) favor having SFOR actively search for suspected war criminals. The endorsement of an active role for SFOR has a modest relationship to other opinions of that force. Those who believe SFOR treats all groups in Bosnia equally, and those who generally have confidence in SFOR are somewhat more likely to advocate its active role in war criminal apprehension than are those who perceive a bias or who lack confidence in the force. Nonetheless, less than 1 percent cite SFOR’s possible role in apprehending war crimes suspects as the major factor shaping their view of whether the troops should remain in or leave Bosnia after the June 1998 deadline.

Apprehending War Criminals Not Seen as Priority
There is little sense of urgency among Bosnian Croats for arresting war criminals. Less than 1 percent identify that issue as the most urgent problem facing Bosnia. Economic problems are much more frequently named as Bosnia’s top priority. This lack of urgency may be due in part to concerns about what would follow the arrest of war criminals. Only a third believe that suspected war criminals could get a fair trial at the Hague.

Some See Positive Effect of Arrests on Peace Process, Elections
A slim majority (55%) think that the arrest of war criminals would facilitate the overall peace process, but a third (34%) believe that such arrests would have no effect. Only 6 percent think arrests would hinder the peace process. Similarly, opinions are divided on whether the September municipal elections will be effected by the status of indicted war criminals. Just over one-third (36%) believe that the “elections cannot be free and fair until most war criminals have been arrested.” However, nearly a quarter (23%) take the opposite view, and many (37%) remain doubtful that arrests would have any effect on the elections.

Prepared by Christopher J. Fleury (619-5143; reu@usia.gov). This report is based on preliminary results of a USIA-commissioned survey of Croats in Bosnia-Hercegovina. PULS in Split with an affiliate in Sarajevo interviewed 956 Bosnian Croat adults, aged 18 and older, July 7-28, 1997.
Bosnian Muslims Maintain Favorable View of International Institutions and West

KEY FINDINGS

• Despite their widespread perception that the Dayton accords were forced on them by the West, a large majority of Bosnian Muslims credit western involvement with making peace possible and have a positive view of the U.S. and West European countries involved in the peace process.

• SFOR and NATO enjoy very strong support, with majorities also having confidence in the OSCE, the UNHCR, and the High Representative. The EU and the UN receive a much more mixed reaction.

Bosnian Muslims View Dayton Favorably, Despite Feeling it was Forced by West

As in previous USIA surveys, support for the Dayton peace accords is very high (97%), and Bosnian Muslims overwhelmingly view positively the role of the United States (98%) and its West European allies (71%) in the Balkan peace process. In fact, a large majority (83%) believe that “peace would not have been possible without the help of the West.” Yet, as among the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, a large majority (83%) also believe that the “Dayton accords were forced on us by the West.”

Satisfaction with West’s Role in Elections

There is also broad satisfaction with the role of the West in the process leading up to the September municipal elections, with six in ten saying the degree of western involvement is "about right." Less than a quarter say there has been "too much" involvement, and one in ten even believes that there has been "too little."

SFOR, NATO Most Highly Regarded International Institutions

Bosnian Muslim support for international involvement in the region is also reflected in the very high levels of confidence expressed for SFOR (85%) and NATO (75%). The High Representative, the UNHCR, and the OSCE have the confidence of about six in ten, with opinions being nearly evenly divided on the EU and the UN.

This report is based on preliminary results of a USIA-commissioned survey of Muslims in Bosnia Hercegovina. PULS in Split with an affiliate in Sarajevo interviewed 911 Bosnian Muslim adults, aged 18 and older, July 6-29, 1997.
Despite this generalized support for international institutions such as SFOR and NATO, half would prefer that local authorities or Bosnian central authorities handle the return of refugees in lieu of an international authority.

**Bosnia, West Viewed Very Favorably**
Nearly all (98%) have a favorable opinion of Bosnia Hercegovina itself. By contrast, Serbia and Russia receive unfavorable ratings which are almost as strong (89% and 86%, respectively). Opinions are most divided toward Croatia (50% favorable, 44% unfavorable). The United States (97%) and Germany (92%) also receive high favorability ratings, as do Turkey (95%) and Iran (81%).

**Many Bosnian Muslims See Themselves as European**
One explanation for the strongly positive evaluations of western countries and of their role in the peace process is that many Bosnian Muslims perceive of themselves as European with a future tied to Europe. Seven in ten say they “often” or “sometimes” think of themselves “as not only Bosnian Muslim/Bosniak but also European.” Almost as many (63%) disagree with the statement that “our future lies more with the Islamic world than with the West.”

Prepared by Christopher J. Fleury (619-5143; reu@usia.gov)
Issued by the Office of Research and Media Reaction, USIA
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For further information, please contact the analyst.
Doubts about Enforcement Present Obstacle for Refugee Return

KEY FINDINGS

- Majorities of Bosnian Muslims and Croats support the right of refugees to return to their former homes. But a majority of Bosnian Serbs are opposed.

- Bosnians tend to expect that refugee return will be enforced in the area where their own ethnic group is predominant and will not be enforced in other areas of the country.

Bosnians Divided Over Effect of Refugee Return

Nearly all Bosnian Muslims (95%) believe that the return of refugees to their former homes will advance the overall peace process in their country. While a smaller majority of Bosnian Croats (60%) agree, Bosnian Serbs tend to say either that refugee return will have no effect on the peace process (55%), or that it will hinder peace (22%).

As asked, the impact of refugee status on upcoming municipal elections, the division among the ethnic groups is similar. A majority of Bosnian Muslims (81%) and a plurality of Bosnian Croats (43%) say that elections cannot be free and fair unless refugees have returned to their former homes. Only one in ten Bosnian Serbs think that elections cannot be free and fair without the return of refugees. Three in ten Bosnian Serbs think that they can and half think they will not be affected.

Bosnian Muslims and Croats Support Refugee Return; Bosnian Serbs Oppose

With such divergent views over the role that refugee return plays in the peace process and the upcoming elections, it is not surprising that overall support for their resettlement varies from one ethnic group to the next. Almost all Bosnian Muslims (97%) support this provision of the Dayton Accords (85% strongly). While a majority of Bosnian Croats (79%) support refugee return, their support is less intense (43% strongly support). By contrast, two-thirds of Bosnian Serbs oppose the right of refugees to return to their former homes (38% strongly).

Those who think that the three ethnic groups can live peacefully together (83% of Bosnian Muslims, 19% of Bosnian Croats, 7% of Bosnian Serbs) are more likely than others to support the right of

refugees to return. Among Bosnian Muslims and Croats, current and former refugees are as likely as others to support the right of refugees to return to their former homes.¹

Support for refugee return drops somewhat among Bosnian Muslims (89%) and Croats (59%) and opposition increases among Bosnian Serbs (78%) when respondents are asked specifically about refugees of another nationality returning to their town or village. Yet well-publicized attacks on both returning refugees and their homes in recent months do not appear to have widespread public backing. Among the majority of Bosnian Serbs and the minorities of Bosnian Muslims (9%) and Croats (36%) who are opposed to the return of refugees of other nationalities to their town, significantly more think that “violence against them and their property is not justifiable,” than believe it is justified. Only one in ten or fewer (12% of Bosnian Serbs, 5% of Bosnian Croats, 1% of Bosnian Muslims) thinks that violence aimed at preventing refugees of other nationalities from returning to their homes is justifiable.

**Differing Expectations for Enforcement**

When asked about enforcement of the right of return, a majority of each ethnic group believes that this right will only be implemented in the region where their own nationality predominates. Bosnian Muslims appear convinced that refugee returns will be enforced in Central Bosnia (90%), but are skeptical of enforcement in the Hercegovina region (25% think there will enforcement) or in the Republika Srpska (RS) (8%). Likewise, Bosnian Croats are much more likely to think there will be enforcement in Hercegovina (64%) than in Central Bosnia (21%) or the RS (12%). A majority of Bosnian Serbs (59%) say they have confidence that the return of refugees will be enforced within the RS, but few have confidence that refugee return will be enforced in Central Bosnia (14%), Hercegovina (11%).

**Bosnians Look to Domestic Authority to Guarantee Right of Returns**

Among the majorities of Bosnian Muslims (89%) and Croats (59%) and the minority of Bosnian Serbs (17%) who say they would favor the return of refugees of other nationalities, publics are divided on exactly who should

| [Asked of those who support the return of refugees of other nationalities] | “Who do you think should be primarily responsible for ensuring/enforcing the right of refugees to return to their former homes?” |
|---|---|---|
| **Bosnian Muslims** | **Bosnian Croats** | **Bosnian Serbs** |
| n=808 | n=560 | n=170 |
| **Authorities of area where they are returning** | 24% | 36% | 55% |
| **Central Government of Bosnia Hercegovina** | 22 | 28 | 4 |
| **Local Police** | 4 | 10 | 16 |
| **International Police** | 6 | 8 | 11 |
| **SFOR/International Peacekeepers** | 26 | 10 | 1 |
| **UNHCR** | 15 | 4 | 10 |

¹Among Bosnian Serbs, those who are currently refugees or who were refugees during the war are more opposed to refugee return than others, perhaps indicating that they are thinking primarily of the return of refugees of other nationalities.
be primarily responsible for ensuring the rights of refugees (see table). Bosnian Muslims, Croats and Serbs appear to agree, however, that it should be a domestic authority that takes the lead. Only among Bosnian Muslims is there significant support for SFOR or international peacekeepers to take a leading role in refugee resettlement.
How This Poll Was Conducted

This survey is based on face-to-face interviews with a probability sample of 994 Bosnian Serbs, 911 Bosnian Muslims and 956 Bosnian Croats aged 18 and older. Interviewing was conducted between July 6 and 29, 1997. USIA commissioned MEDIUM based in Belgrade with an affiliate in Banja Luka and PULS, based in Split with affiliates in Sarajevo and Mostar, to conduct this study. Survey questions were prepared by the USIA Office of Research. The questionnaire was translated by the contractors and reviewed by the Office of Research staff.

In theory, 19 times out of 20, results from samples of this size will differ by no more than about 4 percentage points in either direction from what would be found if it were possible to interview every adult in Bosnia Herzegovina. Sampling error is larger for subgroups within the population. In addition to sampling error, the practical difficulties of conducting a survey of public opinion may introduce other sources of error into the results.

For further information, please contact the analyst.
Serbs Critical of West, but Many Favor Closer Ties

In the aftermath of the Dayton peace accords and international sanctions, most Serbs remain critical of the West’s role in the region and suspicious of American influence. At the same time, though, many want closer ties.

West’s Involvement Seen As Negative
Two-thirds have a negative view of the role played in Bosnia by the U.S. and west European countries, and only a quarter have a positive view. This dim view of western involvement may stem in part from Serbs’ distrust of the West’s intentions and fairness. Eight in ten (83%) believe that “America wants to impose its will on the world” and a majority (57%) believe that SFOR is especially targeting Serb war criminals in Bosnia. Only a quarter (24%) believe that SFOR equally targets suspected war criminals regardless of nationality.

There may also be an economic basis for some anti-western sentiment. Of those Serbs who think the economy is bad (76% overall), two in ten blame western countries, the most popular response after Serbian governmental institutions (67%) and ahead of the federal Yugoslav government (5%). One in ten (11%) don’t know. Supporters of the ruling SPS coalition are much more inclined than others to blame the West.

Opinion of US, Germany Down Among Serbs
Just over a quarter now have a favorable opinion of the United States and Germany. Opinions of these two western countries have remained largely negative across USIA polls in Serbia, while Russia’s favorability rating has remained positive (see table below).

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<th>Serb Opinion of Countries</th>
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Many Want Closer Ties to West
Serbs may be quite critical of the West, but that does not appear to mean they desire isolation from it. Three-quarters believe that Serbia should pursue closer relations with the west, but only one in ten (11%) cite this as the top priority.

This analysis is based on a USIA-commissioned survey conducted August 20-30. MEDIUM, in Belgrade, conducted the poll for USIA, and interviewed 1000 adults, age 18 and older in Serbia, excluding Kosovo. Prepared by Christopher J. Fleury, (202-619-5134; reu@usia.gov) and issued by the USIA Office of Research and Media Reaction.
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1997 SEP 12 P 12:49

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REMARKS:

WASHFAX COVER SHEET

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BOSNIA AT ELECTION TIME:
'AS FAR AWAY FROM PEACE AS IT WAS AT DAYTON'

Looking ahead to this weekend's municipal elections in Bosnia, an overwhelming majority of commentators in Europe and Asia weighed in with uniformly dire assessments of the prospects for both the upcoming elections and the entire Dayton peace process. The authors were struck by the ongoing political turmoil in the Republika Srpska involving pro-Karadzic and pro-Plavnic forces, and by the apparent general uncooperativeness among the three Bosnian factions in complying with the Dayton provisions, especially regarding war criminals and refugees. Analysts agreed with London's liberal Guardian that "the purported aim of Dayton--to lay the basis for a unified multi-ethnic democracy in Bosnia--is more remote than ever." In Zagreb, state-controlled Vjesnik concurred, saying that the Dayton plan is a "crumbling wreck of a project." Media voices expressed great concern that war could return to Bosnia. Only one German daily was barely more sanguine about the present state of affairs: "A state of non-war is still better than a bloody war."

Citing a number of factors--including the "disastrous" state of the peace process and the possibility of party and voter boycotts--a majority of analysts were convinced that "conditions" for democratic elections in Bosnia do not exist. They contended that holding elections at this time is "senseless." State-owned papers in Croatia excoriated the OSCE's role in Bosnia as election mediators and defended the Bosnian Croat HDZ party's original decision to withdraw from participating in the elections. (News reports that the HDZ would, after all, participate in the elections came after newspaper deadlines had passed.) Calling the OSCE's election policy "unfair," Vjesnik said that the HDZ made a "difficult," but "necessary" decision, adding: "The election engineering of the OSCE assumed such proportions that Croats even beforehand had no chance [to win]." Some commentators, however, agreed with Beijing's official Legal Daily that the international community has "no alternative but to insist on holding the...elections.... If [they] are postponed again, the...tendency toward a divided Bosnia-Herzegovina will be intensified." A minority of commentators were still hopeful that enough Bosnians would participate in the elections to lend them sufficient legitimacy.

Advice on what strategy the international community should follow in Bosnia also flowed freely. A few analysts called for the Dayton plan to be "redrawn," because, as one British writer put it, "none of the parties believes in a multi-ethnic Bosnia." Most commentators, however, focused on the problems of compliance with the current Dayton provisions. Many continued to warn that stability in the region would not be achieved as long as the principal war criminals remain free. They called on SFOR to act with determination and arrest, in particular, Bosnian Serb strongman Radovan Karadzic. Even more frequent were calls for SFOR to remain in Bosnia beyond its scheduled deadline set for next year. Left-of-center Berliner Zeitung drew this glum conclusion: "Over the past one and a half years little has changed, which requires the mission of the peace force to be extended far beyond next summer."

This report is based on 34 reports from 10 countries, September 6-12.
EDITOR: Diana McCaffrey
CROATIA: "There Is Always A Solution"

State-controlled, mass-circulation tabloid Vecernji List's Jozo Pavkovic stated (9/12): "It was already clear after the afternoon meeting of Dr. Franjo Tudjman and Carlos Westendorp that the Croatian president would try to use his authority to convince the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Croats to continue discussions with the OSCE in the search for a solution to the crisis that had led to the decision of the Presidency of the Bosnian HDZ on the boycott of the municipal elections.... Most of all, (the international community must) thank the Croatian president, who once again has had to solve problems in another country as well as save the OSCE from an unprecedented fiasco. But will the OSCE know how to value this and will it in the future beseech the Republic of Croatia to involve itself in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian question only when it needs it to?"

"Pressure On Croatia Again"

Independent, pro-government Slobodna Dalmacija's Joza Vlahovic asked (9/12): "What does that world (America and England) think of us Croats, wherever we may be? It continuously puts Croatia under pressure, offering now a carrot, then threatening with a stick and with sanctions.... This week in Zagreb and in Sarajevo the traffic of high international officials from the most influential countries of the West, naturally with America in the lead, is thick, and the reasons for their meetings with Croatian and with Croatian Bosnian officials in the capital cities of the two countries alike is the boycott of the election for local government that the leadership of the Bosnian HDZ unexpectedly announced on Tuesday.... Messages arrive from Mrs. Albright and her European colleagues. The pressure is on again. It is as if five years ago they recognized Croatia as an independent country just so that they could incessantly pressure it.... America (and England!) will never, I fear, be pro-Croat."

"If Serbs Boycott Elections, Not Even OSCE Could Recognize The Farce"

In independent, pro-government Slobodna Dalmacija's weekly sister publication, Nedelja Dalmacija, Olga Ramljak wrote (9/12): "Such a farce of free democratic elections will have to vindicate the engagement of the international political actors in B-H and give the illusion of peace. With the pounding of the HDZ, and it has objectively been pounded, and with the creation of the conditions that led to the boycott of the elections from their side, they are demolishing the scheme of the Bosnian elections according to which the three national parties applied the majority of the votes of their national voting body and with this held off the establishment of a triple partition in an undivided Bosnia.... But in the end the outcome depends on the Serbs: If they decide to boycott the elections, not even the OSCE could recognize so great a farce as the free and democratic will of the majority of voters in Bosnia."

"Unacceptable Behavior Of The OSCE"

On influential, state-controlled Vjesnik's (9/11) front page, Maric Barisic wrote about an article that appeared in the Sarajevo paper Dani, based on an OSCE report, impugning the Bosnian HDZ leadership, which, in turn, allegedly played a large role in the HDZ's decision to boycott the elections: "This has raised the question of a dangerous precedent that shows how the OSCE has carried out its work with impermissible means; which completely strip it of its credibility in further playing the role of mediator among the three parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina.... Therefore, the OSCE, if it sticks to civilized behavior, should first of all make apologies to the Croatian side...and then accede in a revision of the obviously unfair elections rules so that all three sides might be able to participate in them on an equal footing."
"What Do You Want, America, In Bosnia?"

Influential, state-controlled Vjesnik's editor-in-chief Nenad Ivankovic commented (9/11): "Washington...faces a crumbling wreck of a project that on its own, with the greatest of exertions, it has made explosive. The fundamental problem is of course the fact that the Washington mediators have decided on a one-sided interpretation of Dayton.... In a word, the Americans decided on the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is in letter and in spirit contrary to the Dayton agreement, so that what is now happening in Bosnia is a kind of realization of Dayton II, only without formal approval.

"The second key problem is, however, much deeper and more complex. Not only because Bosnia-Herzegovina is multi-ethnic and because there does not exist a fundamental political consensus among the current nations over what kind of society they want, but also because of the fact that it is multi-civilizational. It is therefore the crossroads of, indeed even the arena for, three cultural-civilizational circles. Circles that by definition are things unto themselves cannot be reduced to a common cultural-civilizational denominator, for civilizations are more or less closed and autonomous systems of belief and the core of collective identity. In this sense, any kind of mix is impossible.... Dayton has of course been a bad peace agreement, but not so bad that with help it might not be possible to find a way to escape from the--to resort to one current expression--clash of civilizations, as well as their radicalization. The current American policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina shows, however, that at this moment, Washington is farther from the idea of a Kissinger or a Huntington than from the prejudice that earlier led it (naturally, mutatis mutandis) into the Vietnamese catastrophe, the tragedy in Cambodia, and, if you will, also the disgrace in Somalia."

"A Difficult And Logical Decision"

Editor-in-chief (and regular Croatian TV commentator) Nenad Ivankovic said in state-controlled Vjesnik (9/10) and on Croatian TV (9/9): "The HDZ of Bosnia and Herzegovina has made a difficult and dramatic decision. But, of course, a necessary one. The election engineering of the OSCE assumed such proportions that Croats even beforehand had no chance.... The international community, under the director's baton of the Americans and contrary to the Dayton and other related agreements, decided to change the election rules.... Naturally, since the leading global power, together with those who unreservedly (or semi-unreservedly) follow, have invested powerful political and other prestige in these local elections, we have to expect reactions congruent to this. In other words, new pressure, new stigmatization. And not only for the Bosnian-Herzegovinian HDZ and the local Croats, who made this decision completely autonomously, but also for Zagreb. But in spite of this no other path is possible, for it is a question of the fate of Croatdom ('hrvatstva') in Bosnia-Herzegovina and... Croatian interests."

SERBIA-MONTENEGRO: "Airplanes And Voting"

Privately-owned Belgrade tabloid Dnevni Telegraf (9/6) ran this commentary by Aleksandar Fatic, an associate of the Belgrade Institute for International Politics and Economy: "The United States will send six additional F16-s to a military base in Italy to act as support to the NATO forces in monitoring the local election in Bosnia. This means that the United States is afraid of possible desperate actions by a part of the RS [Republika Srpska] leadership, and wants to prevent possible conflicts which might occur in case of Biljana Plavsic's supporters' victory. The sending of planes is more a symbolic act by which the U.S. administration wants to say: If the military interferes in civilian affairs, we will intervene. The Americans want to help Biljana's faction prevail. The reasons for this are the growing pressures on the (U.S.) domestic political scene to end the U.S. troops' mandate. President Clinton is trying to do that in the effort to earn some democratic capital for his party. According to the U.S. administration, the Dayton agreements can be carried out only through Plavsic's victory. Any other option pushes Dayton into a dead end. America is deeply involved in RS politics. On the one hand it is bad, because there is no autonomy or democracy in it.
"But, on the other hand it is good, because the possible intervention of the international community against the Serbian people as a whole is thereby redirected and focused on a part of its leadership. There are still no conditions for the democratic participation of the Serbian people in the whole matter. The Americans know that there is no democracy in the RS, and their interference in internal affairs is acceptable until the time when democratic institutions are formed. It will take at least five years to form these kind of institutions. Then the Americans will support these processes through financial aid or by pre-conditioning RS's participation in the international organizations."

EUROPE

GERMANY: "Bosnia Is In A State Of Dissolution"

According to centrist Stuttgart Zeitung (9/12), "The municipal elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina...were originally considered to be a further step to peace, an important leg on the path to implement the Dayton agreement. But they will now not be a further step to peace. If they take a bad turn, the elections could even increase the chaos.... But these elections will not become the hoped-for contribution to promoting Bosnia's unity.... It is true that another item from the Dayton agenda can be crossed off but nothing will change the fact that the law of the jungle instead of democracy will continue to prevail. On the contrary, the wrestling in the preparatory stage of the elections again makes it clear how hostile the various ethnic groups still are to each other.... Momentarily, we cannot imagine that SFOR will withdraw in June of 1998 as planned. The municipal elections had the goal of making Bosnia more stable, but instead they seem to be evidence of one solid fact: Bosnia is in a state of dissolution."

"Bosnia As Far Away From Peace As It Was At Dayton"

Josef Abaffy judged in an editorial in business Handelsblatt of Duesseldorf (9/12), "Two years after the Dayton peace accords and immediately before the first municipal elections after the end of the war, Bosnia is as far away from peace as it was at Dayton.... This is why we, if we take stock of Western efforts, can only draw one conclusion: A state of non-war is still better than a bloody war...and it is obvious that the mandate of the peace force must be extended.... It was the basic flaw of the Dayton agreement that Bosnia was divided into clearly defined regions for the individual ethnic groups. This division deprived the Bosnians of their daily duty to practice co-existence with the other side. And it is another failure of the Dayton agreement that--with the exception of a few individual cases--SFOR did not force the return of the displaced people to their home communities."

"Bosnia Will Vote--Irrespective Of Who Takes-Part In The Elections"

Frank Herold editorialized in left-of-center Berliner Zeitung (9/11): "Those who consider the municipal elections to be a vote according to democratic rules, must consider them to be senseless or declare them a failure right from the onset. In reality, these elections offer an authentic description of the disastrous state of the peace process in Bosnia. The international community must draw its conclusions from this. The most important one can be named already today: Over the past one and a half years little has changed, which requires the mission of the peace force to be extended far beyond next summer."

"Unreal Elections"

Guenter Nonnenmacher editorialized in right-of-center Frankfurter Allgemeine (9/11): "The Dayton peace accord was no 'peace treaty' for Bosnia but only the framework within which Croats, Serbs, and (Muslim) Bosnians were supposed to organize their new co-existence under international supervision. It was controversial right from the onset whether the local elections could contribute to this effort."
"The number of people voting by mail, which is higher than 400,000, is casting a light on the elections. If we add the hundreds of thousands of people, who were displaced after the 'ethnic cleansing,' the whole thing is becoming even more questionable. Because the elections were laid down in Dayton, the West considers it to be a test run whether the agreement continues to work. This in turn is a precondition for the extension of the military presence, primarily of the United States, which is the real factor of power in Bosnia. The catch-22 situation for the West is obvious. But it cannot be disputed that these elections, despite all OSCE observers, are unreal."

"Plavsic Strikes Back"

Boris Kalnoky concluded in an editorial in right-of-center Die Welt of Berlin (9/10), "Momcilo Krajisnik, leader of the hardliners of the Bosnian Serbs in Pale and Serbian representative in the Bosnian state presidium, had to accept his toughest and politically most humiliating defeat. He played for high stakes and lost. In Banja Luka, he wanted to prove that Serb President Biljana Plavsic does not enjoy much support among the Bosnian Serbs. But this attempt failed. Instead, he had to swallow two bitter pills. The president simply outmaneuvered him. And he had to realize how much his own people want to get rid of him and Serb leader Karadzic."

"Plavsic demonstrated to her opponents that she is able to strike back.... It is painful for the Serbs when someone who acts as a strongman can be outmaneuvered—and by a woman. For the planned municipal elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina this weekend, this means trouble and maybe even their failure.... However, with SFOR's support, they could be carried out. If the people take part in them everywhere, the government in Pale could be told that it is superfluous."

"Arrest Karadzic"

Thomas Wittke stated in an editorial in centrist General-Anzeiger of Bonn (9/10), "SFOR's threatening gestures against the leadership in Pale may be very impressive, but SFOR's commanders are dodging a core demand of the Dayton agreement. The international peacekeeping force has the ability to arrest Karadzic. Fanatic Serbs will react with retaliation, but this risk is militarily calculable and in view of its profit acceptable."

"HDZ Cancelled Its Participation In Elections"

Sandro Schmidt pointed out in an editorial in right-of-center Bonner Rundschau (9/10), "The leading Croatian party HDZ canceled its participation in the municipal elections this weekend. The HDZ is also not interested in the establishment of democratic structures. It must be feared that more blood will be shed in Bosnia."

BRITAIN: "Bildt: The Coming Crisis In Bosnia"

The independent Financial Times had an op-ed byliner (9/12) by Carl Bildt, formerly the EU's high representative in Bosnia: "The peace process in Bosnia has entered a critical stage. It is imperative that the international community fully understands what is at stake in the days and weeks ahead.... There is a need for decisive action. The time for empty rhetoric or empty gestures—like moving fighter bombers between European countries as a reaction to mob violence in Bosnia—has gone. What is needed are soldiers on the ground ready to take risks for peace and democracy. That is why we have soldiers in Bosnia."

"End The Dayton Daydream"

The conservative Daily Telegraph editorialized (9/11): "The politicians and parties of Bosnia have been indulging in a characteristic bout of playpen tantrums in the lead-up to this weekend's local elections...."
"Leaders of the principal parties of two of the communities, the Serbs and the Croats, have recommended supporters to boycott the poll. The leading parties of all three communities have been displaying an ugly authoritarianism, encouraging propaganda and menace rather than political dialogue. No wonder the architect of the Dayton project, Richard Holbrooke, has said it is now undergoing its severest test, and may not survive.... This week British NATO troops prevented the cronies of the wartime leader and indicted criminal Radovan Karadzic from staging a putsch against the legitimately elected Bosnian Serb President, Biljana Plavsic.... The British action contrasts sharply with the less-than-resolute conduct of American troops two weeks ago in the frontier town of Brcko, and when they handed back a transmitter to Karadzic's propaganda television station. The American leadership of the NATO force in Bosnia and the international negotiators, whose task is to implement the Dayton plan, have continued their worrying tendency for tough words and soft action. It is time for the Dayton charade to stop. The principal indicted war criminals, led by Dr. Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic, must be apprehended if the War Crimes Tribunal is to retain any credibility. The Dayton plan also has to be redrawn because none of the parties believes in a multi-ethnic Bosnia. Above all, the generals, diplomats and politicians of the NATO countries must draw up credible exit strategy; otherwise, large contingents of British, American and French troops risk being deployed for decades to come among the feuding Balkan tribes."

"Bosnia: Next Year's Headline Crisis In The Making"

An editorial in the liberal Guardian remarked (9/10): "Bosnia is next year's headline crisis in the making. Yesterday's clashes in Banja Luka may reinforce hopes that the a split on the Bosnian Serb side is now beyond repair. The local elections to be held this weekend may be hailed as another formal step forward in the Dayton peace process. But the purported aim of Dayton--to lay the basis for a unified multi-ethnic democracy in Bosnia--is more remote than ever...."

"Yet why should NATO's continued presence depend on the Americans?... Whatever moral judgement may be passed, there is merit in the argument that Europeans should assume prime responsibility for what is after all a European crisis. It makes a mockery too of NATO expansion if it cannot tackle a crisis already underway.... (British Foreign Secretary) Cook has established a close rapport with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright over Bosnia; he is well placed to broker a continuing European commitment in exchange for assurances that American withdrawal will be carried out gently while U.S. logistical support and financial aid is fully maintained. The alternative prospect of a return to civil war--perhaps with the now better armed government in Sarajevo taking the offensive--would finally demolish any chance of a multi-ethnic Bosnia."

FRANCE: "Pale: Where Paranoia Reigns"

Patrick Saint-Paul wrote in right-of-center Le Figaro (9/11): "The SFOR knows where Karadzic is hiding...but a few details are missing in the scenario for his arrest. Everyone is waiting for the right political moment. Decisions have to be made about which entity will lead the operation, the French, the British or the Americans. But most of all, certain decisions have to be made to protect representatives from international organizations against reprisals by the citizens of Pale."

"Negotiations Under The Threat Of Force"

Dominique Bromberger said on government-funded France Inter radio (9/11): "Elections will take place in Bosnia as scheduled.... Mrs. Plavsic has the north of the republic under her control, something she could not have done without the support of NATO forces.... The same forces which are practicing in case they are called to arrest Karadzic and Mladic.... Recent events have proven that in Bosnia, the only negotiations which have a chance of succeeding are those backed by the threat of military force."
"U.S. Soldiers Should Stay"

Joseph Limagne insisted in regional **Quest France** (9/10): "Everything is pointing to it: War will return as soon as NATO soldiers have left... It will mark the end of the Dayton accords, the U.S. president's main success... In order to avoid a new Bosnian conflict, U.S. soldiers must stay longer than planned. Clinton has begun to prepare public opinion for this."

"International Community Determined Accords Are Respected"

According to Didier Francois in left-of-center **Liberation** (9/10): "The latest events in Pale are proof that times are changing. The message sent to the Serb factions is eminently clear: For once the international community is determined to see that the Dayton agreements are respected. To do so, it has decided to play on divisions that oppose and weaken the two factions in the Srpska Republic."

**RUSSIA: "SFOR Must Stay"**

Centrist **Nezavisimaya Gazeta** (9/10) published this comment by Alexander Kuranov: "Twenty months after the Dayton accords were signed, Bosnia, bled white, is about as far from peace and well-being as it was at the very start of its rise from the ashes. Without international, primarily American, control, which more often than not takes the form of a primitive 'carrot and stick policy,' peace, more declared than real, would not last a few days.... As time goes by, you hear more in Bosnia about the possibility of a war breaking out again, especially after the SFOR pulls out. Holding communal elections, no matter who wins--dashing army generals or corrupt government officials--will be another point scored in implementation of the Dayton accord. But you can only solve the problem of peaceful coexistence of the three nations if you solve it for good, and if the SFOR stays on."

**ITALY: "NATO: A Force Between Two Armies"**

In the view of centrist, top-circulation **Corriere della Sera** reporting from Sarajevo (9/10): "NATO's actions to save Plavsic's adversaries...confirm a dramatic involvement in the Serb factional fighting that is turning out to be a dead-end trap. The scorched-earth aim of isolating Karadzic failed: There are thousands of armed militants who are ready to defend the war criminal.... In practice, NATO today is a force interposed between two armies, two police forces, two policies.... The political clash, which has been going on since July, now risks breaking the delicate institutional balance in Bosnia and putting at risk the administrative elections scheduled for Saturday and Sunday."

"Dayton Structure Is Shaking"

In a dispatch from Banja Luka, leading business **Il Sole 24-Ore** commented (9/10): "Bosnia falls into chaos again. Yesterday morning, thanks to a compromise, a direct clash between police faithful to Republica Srpska President Plavsic and militia hardliners from Pale was avoided.... The situation is further aggravated by the sudden decision of the Croatian party to boycott elections.... Days before the elections, which are considered essential to consolidating the peace process, the entire Dayton structure is shaking, pushed by opposing nationalists."

"Croat Objections May Become 'Great Refusal'"

In a report from Sarajevo, centrist, influential **La Stampa** held (9/9): "Another pillar of the Dayton accords' castle is falling. An indispensable election...loses all meaning even before taking place. It was agreed to in the Dayton accords, it was scheduled for September last year, then it was postponed amid arguments, now, following a long tug of war with European authorities, the Croats also announce on the eve of the elections that they too have objections that may
become 'a great refusal.'

BULGARIA: "Threat Of Force Is Impotence"

Bulgarian Socialist Party Duma (9/11) observed: "In its striving to implement by all possible means the unclear and imperfect Dayton accord, the United States resorts to threat of force even more frequently. However, this concerns only one of the parties in the still smoldering conflict—the Serbs. At the same time the Muslim and Croat reluctance to observe the agreement is overlooked or they just receive a wag of a finger at best.... It is quite indicative that the United States and the NATO-controlled SFOR forces take sides in a merely intra-Serbian political conflict. When the majority of Bosnian Serbs are trying to express their dissatisfaction with Biljana Plavsic's policy, SFOR uses the threat of force. The former American mediator Richard Holbrooke also warned from Washington that the U.S. response to any attempt to inflict casualties on NATO troops would be vigorous and rapid."

THE NETHERLANDS: "Karadzic, Supporters Suffer Major Defeat"

Influential, liberal De Volkskrant commented (9/10): "Karadzic and his supporters suffered a major defeat in their struggle for power in the Republic of Srpska.... Their plan was logical and daring. After they had successfully confounded SFOR in other cities such as Brcko, they now wanted to do the same in Banja Luka. However, this time, both Plavsic's police and SFOR were ready to deal with the situation.... This resulted in a major political and psychological setback for the 'Karadzicists.' Especially the fact that SFOR did not passively watch, is of eminent importance. Had SFOR not taken action, it would have been pushed in a position similar to that of the powerless UNPROFOR at the time. Nevertheless, this incident did not really resolve anything. This time Karadzic lost but he is surely continuing the battle. He is still very powerful in the north and east of the Republic of Srpska and he can also count on the support of Serbia's President Milosevic, who prefers him to Plavsic.... The Dayton process is moving slowly, encountering many obstacles."

EAST ASIA

CHINA: "Turbulence Among Bosnian Serbs Further Intensified"

Xu Kunming wrote in official Communist Party People's Daily Overseas Edition (Renmin Ribao Haiwaiban, 9/11): "The internal struggle among Bosnian Serb leaders has turned white-hot. The NATO-dispatched multilateral peace-keeping forces have completely sided with Plavsic-led moderates in the struggle. Although the Plavsic party is comparatively weak, they have the upper hand because of the support from the West and the NATO peacekeeping troops."

"Local Election Draws Near; An Internal Situation Generates Anxiety"

Guo Zhijia wrote in the official Central Legal And Political Commission Legal Daily (Fazhi Ribao, 9/10): "The international community has no alternative but to insist on holding the local elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina.... The term of the unilateral peace keeping troops is half over. If the local elections are postponed again, the peace process will be impaired and the tendency toward a divided Bosnia-Herzegovina will be intensified."
Blinken, Antony J.

From: Dowling, John N. (Nick)
Sent: Thursday, September 11, 1997 1:02 PM
To: Benjamin, Daniel
Cc: @BOSNIA - Bosnian Affairs; @SPEECH - NSC Speechwriters
Subject: SRB Speech [UNCLASSIFIED]

Dan --

Speech looks good. Perhaps needs to get tougher in parts, on both the Serbs and our critics!

Two general points:

1. On further reflection and given recent op-eds, etc., I would suggest greater emphasis on why we are being more active in implementation of Dayton, why these efforts are at the expense of the Pale hard-liners, etc. For language cues on this issue, take a look at the attached press guidance. You'll want to treat more broadly, of course. The basic line of argument is: our goal is peace, Dayton is only viable road to peace, more active efforts have been needed to overcome Pale hard-liners obstruction of Dayton, RS leadership split is exactly over this issue, tide is shifting in our favor, need to keep up pressure. At the risk of being defensive, we may also want to knock down arguments that Dayton won't work, that we should accept partition, that we are being dragged into some type of quagmire a la Vietnam or Somalia. Arguments against partition: recipe for war, ratifies ethnic cleansing and Serb aggression, Bosniaks would not accept, sends terrible message to other potential ethnic aggressors, etc.

2. Still would strengthen language on why peace and Dayton in Bosnia are important to America. Argument: European security and U.S. security inextricably linked, Conflict in Bosnia threatens security in SE Europe, could spread to elsewhere in Balkans and Europe, Implementation of Dayton is only viable road to peace. On broader importance of European security, need some strong points here on our historical, economic, cultural links to Europe -- same you are likely using for NATO enlargement speeches.

Specific Comments

Page 1, para 1, third sentence: When this military operation concludes. (need to leave door open for possible follow-on)

Page 2, para 1, last sentence: rather than emphasizing that a ceasefire pre-dated Dayton, emphasize that Bosnian armies were at war until August '95 POTUS peace initiative led to cease-fire and Dayton.

Page 2, para 2: Might mention specific flashpoints for broader conflict -- Kosovo, Macedonia

Page 3, para 2, sub-tics: these priorities were established in Spring 1997 review, not at Dayton. Just change last sentence before sub-tics to: "Our priorities in Bosnia include:

Page 4, last para: might put the girl in a "Sarajevo basement" rather than "at home."

Page 6, last para: other Federation success to mention are creation and operation of joint Federation governing bodies, agreement on a common Defense Law and combined Ministry of Defense, joint economic efforts. John Feeley also has some ideas on additional success stories for the Federation and Bosnia-wide.

Page 7, para 1: Would mention agreement on ambassadors rather than Standing Committee on Military Matters.
This covers some fundamental flaws in the Kissinger OpEd that are relevant to your speech. You may be able to use a point or two. Mostly, it is intended to provide a degree of confidence in the face of Kissinger's gloomy -- and highly misleading -- descriptions.

1. "But in Bosnia, populated by Croats, Serbs, and Muslims whose reciprocal hatreds had broken up the much larger Yugoslavia, the attempt to bring about a multiethnic state evoked a murderous civil war. ... For the Bosnians, the overwhelming reality is their historical memory, which has sustained their ineradicable hatreds and unquenchable aspirations for centuries... because their conflict is more akin to the Thirty Years War over religion than it is to political conflict."

This was no popular uprising. The authentic passions were -- had to be -- manipulated by elites trying to survive the fall of communism. They didn't just unleash hatreds; they nurtured, rewarded, and magnified them.

The proof of it is the instantaneous response whenever a Balkan leader chooses to rein in his thugs. These are people who respond to leadership. Their leaders led them to war, to murder, to mayhem. They can lead them back out.

Free of warfare, there is nothing exotic about Balkan passions. Americans know the phenomenon well. It is the same brutal bigotry from which we have done so much to extricate ourselves, just played out in a slavic tongue. The muslim refugee in Jayce confronts Bull Conner. The Serb trying to apply for a passport in Sarajevo faces Faubus on the schoolhouse steps. The hand grenade on the doorstep in Teslic is the cross burning on a Mississippi lawn. It is not unfathomable: It is not genetic. And it can be overcome.

2. "...We engineered the shotgun wedding between Croats and Muslims [but] the dividing line between Croats and Muslims is as rigid as the one between them and the Serbs. No Croat officials enter Muslim territory; no Muslim official serves in the Croat part of the Federation. Few Croats are to be found in Sarajevo..."

This is two years out of date. It describes the situation in the summer and fall of 95, before Dayton. The situation improved slowly, but it did improve. Even late in 96, when Croat hoods were evicting elderly Muslims from their attractive properties, the point was that there were still a lot of Muslims living in West Mostar.

There are still some very tough areas, strongholds of Croat chauvinism -- Stolac, Caplina. In Bugojno and Vares, Muslim discrimination against Croats is outrageous. But number of remaining centers of bigotry is now finite.

There is also an intimate connection between bigotry and organized crime, which desperately fears democracy and honest law enforcement. Every line of separation, however informal, is a source of revenue to the profiteers. They will do almost anything to maintain the divisions, probably including the recent car bomb in Mostar.

A year ago, it was remarked upon when a Mostar or Caplina license plate was parked overnight in Sarajevo. Now Croat and Muslim can drive unmolested from Neum to Mostar to Tuzla, the length of the country. They do it every day, in large numbers. They take some care, to be sure, keeping an eye peeled for cops or other bullies. A lot like I did, thirty years ago wearing long hair and driving a big motorcycle through rural Georgia. But careful is a far cry from ethnic warfare.

3. "No free movement among the various ethnic enclaves takes place, and no mail or telephone services...

A year ago, when you saw a car with no license plate driving openly through Sarajevo, it was almost certainly a Serb. Possibly from Belgrade, if the car was less then five years old. But mostly, from the Republika Srpska. There were still checkpoints then, so the cars without plates were sooner or later pulled over and their drivers shaken down for DM 10 marks. But then they were sent on their way, to repeat this undramatic little ritual over and over until they got back over the IEBL.

Now that there are no check points, it is a lot cheaper to travel across the IEBL, so a lot more people are trying it, even leaving their original license plates on. So it is no longer a big event to see a cyrillic license plate in Sarajevo,
for instance, or Tuzla. Or to see a Mostar plate in Brcko. Or a Sarajevo plate in Banja Luka.

Americans are a bit misled by their own experience in MND-North, where much of the IEBL is strategically crucial. The Serbs feel particularly vulnerable along the whole arc from Zvornik through Brcko and Doboj with great care. Of course, this is where the majority of incidents are now.

In most other areas, things are much more relaxed, and rural traffic washes across the IEBL constantly, anonymously. Farmers, woodcutters, tradesmen, smugglers, and sweethearts move with impunity. In Sarajevo, the other end of the spectrum, the IEBL is marked only by small lines of taxis facing each other. Grandma arrives in a Lukavica taxi, pays the fare, walks 30 meters to a Sarajevo taxi, and drives off to see her daughter in Ilidza. Four hours later, she is back, arms loaded with shopping, cheek warm from grandson's smooch, climbing back into a Lukavica taxi. In the meanwhile, the same undramatic ritual has been played out by dozens of others, going in both directions, driving home for us two points: (1) In a better world, these inter-entity visitors would feel more free to drive right across; (2) They go anyway, however they feel most comfortable.

True there is no inter-entity mail, yet; the Serbs refuse to participate. Inside the Federation, it works about the same as elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Telecommunications were also blocked until recently. This past week, however, the ultra-nationalist Minister of Transport and Telecomm proudly announced the conclusion of a new nationwide arrangement, proudly instructing listeners how to dial from one entity into the other:

"I would like to inform the users of this civilizational achievement, that is, telephone users in the Serb Republic, that if they wish to dial their friends in the Federation they can dial the numbers of the old network group with an additional 0. This means that, if a Serb from Pale wishes to call a Bosniak in the Muslim part of Sarajevo, he may do so by dialing 0710 before dialling the desired phone number. If a Bosniak from Sarajevo wants to call a Serb from Pale he should dial the sub-code of the Serb Republic, that is, number 5."