

# MIR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 613				
Document ID: 9508187				
Row: 44	Section: 6	Shelf: 4	Position: 2	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001. memo</del>	<del>Gary Samore to Anthony Lake re: Update on North Korea (2 pages)</del>	<del>11/08/1995</del>	<del>P1/b(1)</del> KBH 2/5/2020

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Samore and North Korea...])  
OA/Box Number: 613

### FOLDER TITLE:

9508187

2013-0866-M  
rs943

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: LAKE

FROM: SAMORE

DOC DATE: 08 NOV 95  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA NORTH

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: UPDATE ON NORTH KOREA ITEM FOR CPL LUNCH

ACTION: NFAR PER SAMORE

DUE DATE: 11 NOV 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SAMORE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017  
By DOB NARA, Date 9/18/2019  
2013-0866-M

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLA

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 1 OF 1

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 LAKE  
001

Z 95111415 FOR INFORMATION  
X 95111415 NFAR PER SAMORE

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 8187  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG APB A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	_____	_____	_____
Dohse	<u>1</u>	<u>copy</u>	_____
Sens	_____	_____	_____
Soderberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
Lake	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>PRN 11/14</u>	<u>A</u>
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	<u>N</u>
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:


COMMENTS:

*Item for CPL Lunef*

Exec Sec Office has diskette \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2013-0866-M (1.01)  
KSH 9/9/2019

November 8, 1995



INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: DANIEL PONEMAN *DP*  
FROM: GARY SAMORE *GS*  
SUBJECT: Update on North Korea (Item for CPL Lunch)

After nearly six weeks of negotiations on an LWR supply agreement, the outlines of a deal between KEDO and the DPRK have begun to emerge. ~~as described in the attached memo from Steve Bosworth to the U.S., Japan, and the ROK.~~

~~As explained by Bosworth,~~ The remaining hardcore issues in the negotiations include both practical issues related to implementation of the project (e.g., provisions on delivery schedule, nuclear safety codes and standards, and transportation routes to the project site) and several essentially political issues related to the ROK role in the project. North Korea has opposed KEDO's positions on both sets of issues, but it has been especially adamant in rejecting language that would symbolically indicate official DPRK acceptance of the central ROK role in the project, which the DPRK views as an effort by KEDO to reopen political issues resolved in previous U.S.-DPRK agreements.

To break this impasse, Bosworth is seeking flexibility on the symbolic political issues to trade for North Korean concessions on the remaining practical issues. The U.S. and Japan could accept such a package, but the the ROK insists that the DPRK must accept KEDO positions on both practical and political issues. The ROK argues as before that South Korean public support for the project will be undermined unless the DPRK acknowledges the central ROK role in the project. Up to now, KEDO has maintained an inflexible position on both sets of issues, although Ambassador Bosworth has explored some trade-offs on a personal basis with the North Koreans.

In response to Bosworth's memo, we are trying to persuade Seoul to accept KEDO's strategy for concluding an LWR agreement.

SECRET

Classified by: Gary Samore  
Reason: 1.5(b), (d)  
Declassify On: B

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Hubbard and Samore have already met with the ROK DCM in Washington, and Ambassador Laney will be approaching senior ROK officials in Seoul over the weekend. Given its domestic political weakness and preoccupation with the slush fund scandal, however, the ROK government will stubbornly resist any compromises with the DPRK. Moreover, Seoul appears confident that the DPRK will eventually succumb to KEDO's hardline stance because the DPRK is desperate for a deal and too weak to precipitate a collapse of the Agreed Framework.

In fact, the North Korean efforts at ultimatums and threats in the talks so far have been half-hearted and unconvincing. In the end, however, it seems unlikely that the North Koreans can be forced to accept the political concessions that KEDO is currently demanding at Seoul's behest. Ultimately, a hardline strategy runs the risk of driving the North Koreans to break off the KEDO talks, demanding to resume bilateral negotiations with the U.S. and threatening to break the freeze. It is perhaps only at this point of crisis that the South Koreans can be convinced to show some flexibility. In the meantime, the talks in New York will continue to drag on at a glacial pace.

Recommend that you raise this issue with your counterparts at the CPL lunch. We do not know when the crunch will come, but it may be necessary to include this issue in U.S. discussions with the ROK and Japan on the margins of the APEC meeting in Osaka.

Concurrence by: Stanley Both 

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

# MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1611				
Document ID: 9702243				
Row: 45	Section: 2	Shelf: 8	Position: 3	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001a. memo</del>	<del>Samuel Berger to POTUS re: Article on North Korean Blackmail (1 page)</del>	<del>04/07/1997</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 2/5/2020</del>
<del>001b. memo</del>	<del>Gary Samore and Sandra Kristoff to Berger re: Article on North Korean Blackmail (1 page)</del>	<del>04/02/1997</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 2/5/2020</del>
<del>001c. memo</del>	<del>[Duplicate of 001a] (1 page)</del>	<del>04/1997</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 2/5/2020</del>
<del>001d. memo</del>	<del>[Duplicate of 001a] (2 pages)</del>	<del>04/1997</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 2/5/2020</del>

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Samore and North Korea...])  
 OA/Box Number: 1611

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9402243

2013-0866-M  
rs944

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9702243  
RECEIVED: 02 APR 97 14

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 07 APR 97  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA NORTH  
MEDIA

NUCLEAR MATTERS

PERSONS: GILINSKY, VICTOR

SOKOLSKI, HENRY

SUBJECT: ARTICLE ON NORTH KOREAN BLACKMAIL

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 05 APR 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PRITCHARD

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T   D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
KRISTOFF  
NSC CHRON  
PRITCHARD  
SAMORE

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017  
By ASB NARA, Date 9/12/19  
2013-0866-M

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP      CLOSED BY: NSLA      DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9702243

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER	Z 97040308 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
001 PRITCHARD	Z 97040316 FOR FURTHER ACTION
001 BERGER	Z 97040322 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
002 PRESIDENT	Z 97040709 FOR INFORMATION
002	X 97041110 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
002	970407		VICE PRESIDENT
002	970407		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # \_\_\_\_\_

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG \_\_\_\_\_ A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	_____	_____	_____
Dohse	1	D	_____
Kerrick	_____	_____	_____
Steinberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	_____	_____	_____
Records Mgt.	2	(R) 4/10	R
_____	3	_____	N/R
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A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette \_\_\_\_\_

National Security Council  
The White House

rec'd 4/5  
12:30pm

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 2243 Redo  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG Tmta A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<i>15</i> Harmon	_____	_____	_____
Dohse	<u>1</u>	<u>D</u>	_____
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>Wilkch</u>	_____
Steinberg	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Berger	<u>4</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Situation Room	_____	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>12/17</u>	<u>[Signature]</u> <i>STB</i>
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'97 APR 3 PM 8:25

Exec Sec Office has diskette [Signature]

National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 2243  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG TMA A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	_____	_____	_____
Dohse	<u>1</u>	<u>D</u>	_____
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	<u>2</u>	<u>(K)</u>	_____
Steinberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>TMA 4.3</u>	<u>D</u>
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____
<u>Kastner</u>	<u>4</u>	_____	_____

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:

*A disk doesn't match paper - please send correct version.*

COMMENTS:

'97 APR 2 PM 6:19

Exec Sec Office has diskette

Log # 2243

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

Fm \_\_\_\_\_ To \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Fred <sup>D</sup> amended  
The POTUS asked  
SRB "what the rules  
of "his art"??  
Does the response tell  
POTUS what we  
rule of art?? what  
is driving force of art? etc  
②

Fm \_\_\_\_\_ To \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

3-31-97

Stanley B  
What do you make of this  
BC

Copied  
Berger  
LOS

4/1 Krotzoff / Putkhan  
one page memo  
from me to  
PARKS  
Ⓢ

*Victor Gilinsky and Henry Sokolski*

## Korea: How Long Do We Live With Blackmail?

In this year's State of the Union address, in Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's confirmation testimony and in other statements, the administration has reemphasized the importance of its 1994 nuclear deal with the North Koreans under which they quit their indigenous nuclear program in return for two modern U.S.-type nuclear power reactors. Unfortunately, the deal gradually has changed into something even less desirable than the questionable proposition that was negotiated in 1994. At a minimum, we should get back to the original arrangement.

Two years ago, when the White House was selling the "Agreed Framework" to Congress, its chief virtue was said to be reciprocity. It was a safe arrangement, the administration said, because the U.S. steps—site construction, shipping of key nuclear components, start of operation of the first plant and so on—would be matched by North Korea's steps in dismantling its plutonium production complex. This complex still includes a small operating reactor and its fuel, a reprocessing plant for extracting plutonium from irradiated fuel and two reactors under construction.

The State Department insisted two years ago that we could terminate the deal at any point if the North Koreans did not reciprocate. But the way the deal is now interpreted, the North Koreans don't have to do anything to reduce their weapon potential until nearly the time when we supply the first of the two large modern power reactors and much of the equipment for the second.

To qualify for the deal, the North Koreans certainly do not have to tone down their terrorism against the South. The killings by submarine commandos and the more recent assassination of a North Korean defector have demonstrated that. South Korea, which is supplying the reactors and footing most of the expense, halted work on the project and asked for an apology from the North. The North Koreans had stopped work on "canning" the irradiated fuel from the small power reactor, a kind of flick of the dragon's tail reminding everyone that the weapon potential is

still there. The U.S. administration quickly fell into line, let out that the South's approach was naive and made clear it was impatient to get on with the nuclear project.

The way things stand now, the North Koreans do not have to ship the plutonium-laden fuel out of the country until the first of the two large reactors is built and before it goes into operation—at least six years from now. And the North does not have to dismantle anything until the second of the two reactors is built (but before it goes into operation). That could be 10 years from now, or never. That means that, barring some political change in the North, we will continue to

be blackmailed by the threat of a restart of the weapons program.

One of the selling points of the "Agreed Framework" was that before any "key" nuclear components are shipped, which by law require a U.S.-North Korean agreement for cooperation, the North will let the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspect two disputed waste sites to check on the possibility of North Korean cheating on the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. It was the North's refusal to allow such inspections that started the entire nuclear imbroglio.

North Korea still refuses to allow such inspections, and likely by the time the IAEA gets to carry them out (if it does at all) the information

will be stale and inconclusive. The agreement requires only that North Korea satisfy the IAEA, not that we find out what happened. We can be sure this bold point will not amount to much. The unspoken universal assumption that this is so constitutes a reinterpretation of the agreement in favor of North Korea.

To pay too much blackmail is also dangerous. The only way to make sense of the arrangement as negotiated is to reemphasize the element of reciprocity. We propose that the United States read the agreement to require Pyongyang to dismantle its plutonium production complex in step with the construction of the large modern power plants. The North should:

- Dismantle its reprocessing plant and begin shipping its irradiated fuel out of the country before the United States signs a nuclear cooperation agreement.
- Tear down its small operating reactor and complete shipping of its spent fuel by the time the first new power reactor is finished.
- Dismantle its two partially completed indigenous "power" reactors in step with the construction of the second U.S.-type reactor.

It would be hard for North Korea to argue that it still needs the power from its tiny "research" reactor after the first (200 times larger) new reactor is operating. And why would it then need the reprocessing plant except to threaten a restarting of the nuclear weapon program? This observation contains the answer to the obvious criticism of our proposal; that is, how are we going to get North Korea to agree to dismantle its plutonium production plants in step with the construction of the new reactors? Well, how are we going to get North Korea to do it when the two reactors are built and we have even less leverage?

*Victor Gilinsky is a former U.S. Nuclear Regulatory commissioner. Henry Sokolski is executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and was deputy for nonproliferation policy in the Pentagon during the Bush administration.*



BY THE EDITOR

**The Washington Post**

THURSDAY, MARCH 27, 1997

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

97 APR 7 4 47 AM

April 7, 1997

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER *SB*

SUBJECT: Article on North Korean Blackmail

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2013-0866-M (1.02)  
KBH 9/9/2019

You asked for my reaction to an article on Korea that appeared in *The Washington Post* on March 27, 1997 (Tab A). The article is a weak, factually inaccurate effort to revive criticism of our 1994 Agreed Framework to freeze North Korea's nuclear program. The Agreed Framework remains the best basis for reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula.

Discussion

Gilinsky and Sokolski argue that the Agreed Framework does not require North Korea to dismantle its nuclear program, or report its plutonium inventory to the IAEA, as a "reciprocal step" to U.S. action to complete the light water reactors (LWR) project. Their thesis is the imbalance of reciprocal commitments allows North Korea to "blackmail" us to provide them economic concessions in response to threats to cease spent fuel canning.

While the authors may not like the terms of the Agreed Framework, it is fundamentally sound and is based on reciprocal commitments by each side to specific actions. The Agreed Framework balances these reciprocal steps: once a substantial portion of the LWR is completed, North Korea must comply with IAEA requirements; once the IAEA declares it is satisfied, nuclear components for the LWR can be shipped; once shipment of these components begins, dismantlement begins. The suggestion by Gilinsky and Sokolski that we reinterpret the Agreement to speed up dismantling of the North's facilities and their compliance with IAEA safeguards is unrealistic.

During a March 7 meeting, we told the DPRK that "if, at the proper time, the IAEA is able to complete quickly its work, the reactor project will move quickly to completion. If, however, the IAEA is unable to do its work, the construction will be held up, for as long as it takes."

Attachment  
Tab A *The Washington Post* Article

PHOTOCOPY  
WJC HANDWRITING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)

Declassify On: After Korean Reunification

cc: Vice President  
Chief of Staff

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

2243

Redo

April 2, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: SANDRA J. KRISTOFF *SK*  
GARY SAMORE *GS*

FROM: JACK PRITCHARD *P*

SUBJECT: Article on North Korean Blackmail

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

2013-0866-M (1.03)  
KBH 9/9/2019

The President asked you for your reaction to *The Washington Post* article "Korea: How long do we live with blackmail?" (Tab A). At Tab I is a proposed memorandum from you to the President explaining what the reciprocal steps are and why it is unrealistic to reinterpret the Agreed Framework. The memo also informs the President we put down a marker with the North Koreans at our March 7 bilateral meeting in New York, noting that if the IAEA is unable to do its work, construction on the LWR project will be held up.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Attachments

Tab I Memorandum to the President  
Tab A *The Washington Post* Article

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: Charles L. Pritchard  
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)  
Declassify On: After Korean Unification

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

I made  
these changes  
on disk + then  
realized it  
wasn't the same.

**DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526**

2013-0866-M (1.04)  
KBH 9/9/2019

INFORMATION

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Check w/ Asier*

*Need sentence that gives SRB assessment of article: is it factual? Why did Gilinsky & Sokolski write it?*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Article on North Korean Blackmail

You asked for my reaction to an article on Korea (Tab A) that appeared in *The Washington Post* on March 27, 1997.

*Discussion*

Gilinsky and Sokolski argue the 1994 Agreed Framework does not require North Korea to dismantle its nuclear program <sup>stet</sup> or report its plutonium inventory to the IAEA, as a "reciprocal step" to U.S. action to complete the light water reactors (LWR) project. Their thesis is the imbalance of reciprocal commitments in the Agreed Framework allows North Korea to "blackmail" us through threats to cease spent fuel canning in an effort to extract additional economic concessions from the United States.

*is fundamentally sound and it commits*  
While the authors may not like the terms of the Agreed Framework, it is based on reciprocity, and each side ~~is committed~~ to specific actions. The Agreed Framework is crafted to balance these reciprocal steps: once a substantial portion of the light water reactor (LWR) is completed, North Korea must comply with IAEA requirements; once the IAEA declares that it is satisfied, nuclear components for the LWR can be shipped; once shipment of these nuclear components begin, dismantlement begins. The suggestion by Gilinsky and Sokolski that we reinterpret the Agreement to speed up dismantling of the North's facilities and compliance with IAEA safeguards is unrealistic. It was never possible to require the DPRK to dismantle immediately its nuclear facilities and reveal past plutonium production (thereby giving up all its bargaining chips) before the United States delivered on any of its commitments to provide replacement nuclear power.

During our March 7 bilateral meeting in New York, we told the DPRK that "if, at the proper time, the IAEA is able to complete quickly its work, the reactor project will move quickly to completion. If, however, the IAEA is unable to do its work, the construction will be held up, for as long as it takes."

Attachment  
Tab A *The Washington Post* Article

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reason: 1.5(b)(d)

Declassify On: After Korean Reunification

Vice President  
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Fit on one page*

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Article on North Korean Blackmail

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2013-0866-M(1.05)  
KBH 9/9/2019

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Discussion

Gilinsky and Sokolski argue <sup>that</sup> the Agreed Framework does not require North Korea to dismantle its nuclear program <sup>or</sup> report its plutonium inventory to the IAEA, as a "reciprocal step" to U.S. action to complete the light water reactors (LWR) project. Their thesis is the imbalance of reciprocal commitments allows North Korea to "blackmail" us to provide <sup>them</sup> economic concessions in response to ~~its~~ threats to cease spent fuel canning. <sup>stet</sup>

While the authors may not like the terms of the Agreed Framework, it is fundamentally sound <sup>and</sup> is based on reciprocal commitments by each side to specific <sup>actions</sup>. The Agreed Framework balances these reciprocal steps: once a substantial portion of the LWR is completed, North Korea must comply with IAEA requirements; once the IAEA declares it is satisfied, nuclear components for the LWR can be shipped; once shipment of these components begins, dismantlement begins. The suggestion by Gilinsky and Sokolski that we reinterpret the Agreement to speed up dismantling of the North's facilities and <sup>compliance</sup> with IAEA safeguards is unrealistic. It was never possible to require the DPRK to dismantle immediately its nuclear facilities and reveal past plutonium production before the United States delivered on any of its commitments to provide replacement nuclear power. ✓

During a March 7 meeting, we told the DPRK that "if, at the proper time, the IAEA is able to complete quickly its work, the reactor project will move quickly to completion. If, however, the IAEA is unable to do its work, the construction will be held up, for as long as it takes."

Attachment  
Tab A *The Washington Post* Article

# MIR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 1628				
Document ID: 9704540				
Row: 45	Section: 3	Shelf: 3	Position: 2	Stack: v

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Gary Samore and Bruce Riedel to Samuel Berger re: Your Meeting with UNSCOM Director Richard Butler (3 pages)	07/01/1997	P1/b(1)
	<i>Partial release - KBM 2/5/2020</i>		
001b. report	re: U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	04/16/1997	P1/b(1)

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Samore and North Korea...])  
 OA/Box Number: 1628

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9704540

2013-0866-M

rs945

**RESTRICTION CODES**

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CONFIDENTIAL  
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9704540  
RECEIVED: 01 JUL 97 08

TO: BERGER

FROM: GRUMMON  
RIEDEL  
SAMORE

DOC DATE: 01 JUL 97  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: IRAQ

ANSA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: YOUR MTG W/ RICHARD BUTLER -- DIR OF UNSCOM

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER

DUE DATE: 07 JUL 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: GRUMMON

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
GRUMMON  
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526

White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017

By ACB NARA, Date 9/18/19

2013-0866-M

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSVJD

CLOSED BY: NSGP

DOC 1 OF 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9704540

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 BERGER  
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 97070122 FOR INFORMATION  
X 97070307 NOTED BY BERGER

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National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 4540  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM (R) PRS NSC INT ARS  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG (R) A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Rice	<u>1</u>	<u>(R) 7/1</u>	
Davies			
Kerrick	<u>2 copy</u>		
Steinberg			
Berger	<u>3 2</u>		
Situation Room		<b>Natl Sec Advisor</b>	
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>(R) 7/2</u>	<u>NS</u>
Records Mgt.	<u>4</u>		<u>NS</u>

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'97 JUL 1 PM 1:20

Exec Sec Office has diskette uo

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Gary Samore and Bruce Riedel to Samuel Berger re: Your Meeting with UNSCOM Director Richard Butler [partial] (2 pages)	07/01/1997	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Samore and North Korea...])  
OA/Box Number: 1628

### FOLDER TITLE:

9704540

2013-0866-M  
rs945

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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CONFIDENTIAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D C. 20504

4540

July 1, 1997

Staff Sec Advisor  
has seen



INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL BERGER

THROUGH: BRUCE BRIDEL/GARY SEMORE

FROM: STEPHEN CRUMMON

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with UNSCOM Director Richard Butler;  
July 2, 1997; 3:30 P.M.; in your office

NOTED

Butler assumed his duties as director of UNSCOM on Tuesday, July 1. He is in Washington this week to meet you. (Your meeting is the first one that he will have.) Next week he will return for further political level consultations at State and DOD and for a series of technical/logistical support briefings

EQ 13526 1.4c

We want the transition from Ekeus to Butler to go smoothly. That is why we have encouraged Butler to visit Washington as soon as possible after he assumed his new duties. Overall, we would hope to use these Washington meetings to strike a real rapport with Butler at all levels, be they technical <sup>or</sup> political. We want Butler to internalize the message that over the past six years, we have built a close, cooperative and collaborative relationship with UNSCOM. We want that relationship to continue under Butler's leadership.

As a means to that end goal, you should use your meeting to focus on three key topics:

- **Stressing the Importance of UNSCOM to U.S. Policy:** There are several themes which you can develop:

--UNSCOM's work is crucial to one of the key objectives of UNSC 687, namely the requirement that Iraq demonstrate its intentions to live in peace with its neighbors.

--Know Saddam's track record all too well.

--Clear that there cannot be peace/stability in the region under any scenario in which Iraq would have access to WMD.

CONFIDENTIAL

Reason: 1.5n (d)

Declassify On: 07/01/07

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
PER E.O. 13526

2013-0866-M [1.23]

KBH 9/9/2019

--That's why we remain so highly appreciative of the work of UNSCOM and admire the courage and integrity which <sup>have</sup> ~~has~~ been displayed in the effort to put teeth into the WMD provisions of Resolution 687.

- **Defining U.S. Policy:** The following are key points which you should make to Butler:

--We are fully supportive of UNSCOM. Rolf Ekeus had our full backing; so also do you.

--More specifically, you can expect strong political support in the Council, as demonstrated by our actions earlier this month in the passage of Resolution 1115.

--In this connection, want you to know that we'll be prepared in October to push for new sanctions if you report Iraqi non-compliance and cheating continues.

--Will continue to support strongly UNSCOM's specific activities and programs, including challenge inspections which we believe are important for the work of UNSCOM.

--Again, in this connection, continue to believe that the Iraqis are not partners in this endeavor; their sole responsibility is to comply with the requirements/activities which UNSCOM deems necessary to carry out its work.

--Finally, you can also expect to receive the same degree of technical and intelligence support. Have worked closely with UNSCOM in the past; agencies look forward to doing so in the future.

- **Eliciting from Butler his ideas for UNSCOM over the next six months:** Just as we are supportive of UNSCOM, we want UNSCOM to keep the pressure on Saddam. It will be crucial for Butler's long-term success to establish quickly and pointedly that UNSCOM under his leadership will be administered as effectively and creatively as it was under Ekeus. Among other things that means that Butler will have to demonstrate that challenge inspections will continue and that full compliance with long-term monitoring procedures will proceed uninterrupted and unabated.

There is a certain urgency to all of this because of the four month probation period which Iraq has been put on as a result of the passage of UNSC 1115. In a sense Butler is also on trial. If he is lethargic and passive ~~in~~ during this period, Iraq will receive ~~a~~ favorable marks which it should not get

when this fall's report on Iraqi cooperation and compliance is prepared by UNSCOM. More importantly, that report will set the tone and shape the contours of Butler's relationship with the Council and with the Iraqis.

While we cannot tell Butler precisely how to approach his job or run his organization (and this seems particularly true given his apparent prickly personality), we can ask a series of leading questions which probe his plans and make a point in and of themselves. You may wish to use the following questions to guide this part of the discussion:

--Interested in your plans for the period ahead.

--What are the priority issues which you see on the horizon? How do you plan to tackle them?

--How are thinking about the reporting requirements in Resolution 1115?

--When will you visit Baghdad?

--What issues/problems do you anticipate from the Iraqis? Any thoughts about how to handle them? What is your assessment of how Iraq is assessing you and your chairmanship?

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

Samuel Berger  
Bruce Riedel  
Gary Samore  
Steve Grummon

UNSCOM

Richard Butler  
Charles Duelfer  
otd

EO 13526 1.4c

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. report	re: U.S. Government Report (2 pages)	04/16/1997	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Samore and North Korea...])  
OA/Box Number: 1628

### FOLDER TITLE:

9704540

2013-0866-M  
rs945

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Original OA/ID Number: 43324				
Document ID: 9708780				
Row: 50	Section: 2	Shelf: 10	Position: 2	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. profile sheet	re: North Korea Facility (2 pages)	04/03/1997	P1/b(1)
001b. profile sheet	re: North Korea Facility (1 page)	04/01/1997	P1/b(1)
001c. memo	Samuel Berger to POTUS re: North Korea Facility (2 pages)	04/03/1997	P1/b(1)
001d. memo	Gary Samore to Berger re: North Korea Facility (1 page)	04/01/1997	P1/b(1)
001e. memo	[Duplicate of 001c....incomplete copy] (1 page)	04/1997	P1/b(1)

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**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Samore and North Korea...])  
 OA/Box Number: 43324

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**FOLDER TITLE:**

9708780

2013-0866-M

rs947

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. profile sheet	re: North Korea Facility (2 pages)	04/03/1997	P1/b(1)

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**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Samore and North Korea...])  
OA/Box Number: 43324

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**FOLDER TITLE:**

9708780

2013-0866-M  
rs947

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## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. profile sheet	re: North Korea Facility (1 page)	04/01/1997	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Samore and North Korea...])  
OA/Box Number: 43324

### FOLDER TITLE:

9708780

2013-0866-M  
rs947

### RESTRICTION CODES

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National Security Council  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # Out-of-system  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG \_\_\_\_\_ A/O \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon	_____	_____	_____
Dohse	_____	_____	_____
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	1	② 4/1/97	_____
Steinberg	2		_____
Berger	3		see note
Situation Room	_____	Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	_____
West Wing Desk	_____	_____	_____
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. memo	Samuel Berger to POTUS re: North Korea Facility (2 pages)	04/03/1997	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

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NSC Records Management  
([Samore and North Korea...])  
OA/Box Number: 43324

### FOLDER TITLE:

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2013-0866-M  
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001d. memo	Gary Samore to Berger re: North Korea Facility (1 page)	04/01/1997	P1/b(1)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001e. memo	[Duplicate of 001c...incomplete copy] (1 page)	04/1997	P1/b(1)

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([Samore and North Korea...])  
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- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

# MIR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 43325				
Document ID: 9808695				
Row: 50	Section: 2	Shelf: 10	Position: 3	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Gary Samore to Sandy Berger re: North Korea (2 pages) <i>Partial release - KBM 2/5/2020</i>	12/11/1998	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Samore and North Korea...])  
OA/Box Number: 43325

### FOLDER TITLE:

9808695

2013-0866-M

rs948

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: BERGER

FROM: SAMORE

DOC DATE: 11 DEC 98  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA NORTH

LIMITED ACCESS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NORTH KOREA -- LIMITED ACCESS

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE DATE: 16 DEC 00 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: NONE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017  
By ADS NARA, Date 9/18/19  
2013-0866-11

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSVJD CLOSED BY: NSVJD DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9808695

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001

X 00121112 FOR RECORD PURPOSES

~~SECRET~~

# Withdrawal/Redaction Marker

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Gary Samore to Sandy Berger re: North Korea [partial] (2 pages)	12/11/1998	P1/b(1)

### COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records  
NSC Records Management  
([Samore and North Korea...])  
OA/Box Number: 43325

### FOLDER TITLE:

9808695

2013-0866-M  
rs948

### RESTRICTION CODES

#### Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

#### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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SECRET

OUT-OF-SYSTEM

8695

December 11, 1998

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
PER E.O. 13526

MEMORANDUM FOR: SANDY BERGER

FROM: GARY SAMORE <sup>65</sup>

2013-0866-M [1.22]

KBH 9/9/2019

SUBJECT: NORTH KOREA

At his request, I met with North Korean negotiator Kim Gye Gwan for two hours this week to discuss nuclear and missile issues. Jack Pritchard and Bob Einhorn joined me.

My impressions:

### Nuclear

North Koreans are definitely ready to allow access to the underground site "on an extraordinary basis" in exchange for humanitarian food assistance. We still need to haggle about modalities of access and amount of food aid, but a deal is possible. This reinforces my suspicion that the site is empty. If we go there, we will not find conclusive evidence that the site is nuclear-related. Nonetheless, we can declare victory - we caught the North even before they began to cheat!

I explained to Kim that the USG cannot pay to see the site. Instead, it was in Pyongyang's interest to remove suspicions so that the benefits of the AF would continue to flow to Pyongyang. Otherwise, there would be no LWR project, no HFO, no food aid. Kim responded (in essence) that the DPRK is prepared to structure a "package deal" that avoids any direct linkage between access to the site and food assistance, but that the DPRK must know before hand what they will get in return for allowing access to the site. (As you know, the North proposed a sequenced approach to Kartman - 1) announce agreement on site access; 2) respond to WFP appeal; 3) conduct site visit.)

### Missiles

Kim resisted our suggestion that any package deal must include restraints on missile tests and transfers. They clearly want to put the missile talks on a separate and slower track. He repeated that the North will end missile exports in exchange for compensation and suggested that "another country" (i.e. Israel) could pay the bill.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

SECRET

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

Most worrying, Kim asserted that the North plans to conduct additional "peaceful" satellite launches and didn't seem convinced by our arguments that another launch could destroy political support for the AF, especially in Japan. This may be a negotiating ploy, but I think we need to step up efforts (e.g., through China) to deter the North.

### Next Steps

In addition to reviewing the Perry mission, we (Ken, Jack, and Gary) think the December 17 PC should focus on whether to pursue negotiations for a sequenced package deal at the next round of Kartman-Kim talks in Geneva in January. In addition to access to the site, we want progress on missiles, MIA's, and four-party talks. (On missiles, the North is unlikely to agree in writing to any restraints, but we could assert unilaterally that additional long range tests/transfers would blow up the deal.) In return, we will need to consider some sanctions-relief measures in addition to food aid.

To pass muster on the Hill, we need to be able to defend against accusations that we are paying to see the site. A sequenced package deal will enable us to say that resolution of the underground site is a precondition for our willingness to move ahead on food and sanctions-relief and that our steps are in response to North Korean action on other issues besides the underground site.

Clearances Ken Lieberthal <sup>GS</sup> <sub>FD</sub>

# MIR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 2723				
Document ID: 9902808				
Row: 46	Section: 4	Shelf: 3	Position: 3	Stack: V

# Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

## Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>001a. memo</del>	<del>Samuel Berger to POTUS re: Status of Perry Review on North Korea (3 pages)</del>	<del>05/17/1999</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 2/5/2020</del>
<del>001b. memo</del>	<del>Gary Samore and Ken Lieberthal to Berger re: Status of Perry Review on North Korea (1 page)</del>	<del>05/03/1999</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 2/5/2020</del>
<del>001c. memo</del>	<del>[Duplicate of 001a] (3 pages)</del>	<del>04/1999</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 2/5/2020</del>
<del>001d. memo</del>	<del>[Duplicate of 001b] (1 page)</del>	<del>04/19/1999</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 2/5/2020</del>
<del>001e. memo</del>	<del>[Duplicate of 001a] (3 pages)</del>	<del>04/15/1999</del>	<del>P1/b(1) KBH 2/5/2020</del>

**COLLECTION:**

Clinton Presidential Records  
 NSC Records Management  
 ([Samore and North Korea...])  
 OA/Box Number: 2723

**FOLDER TITLE:**

9902808

2013-0866-M  
 rs946

**RESTRICTION CODES**

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 17 MAY 99  
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: KOREA NORTH

PERSONS: PERRY, WILLIAM

SUBJECT: STATUS OF PERRY REVIEW ON NORTH KOREA

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DUE DATE: 21 APR 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SAMORE

LOGREF:

FILES: PA

NSCP:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
LIEBERTHAL  
NSC CHRON  
SAMORE

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526  
White House Guidelines, May 16, 2017  
By ADSNARA, Date 9/18/18  
2013-0866-M

COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

DISPATCHED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSVJD CLOSED BY: NSDMK DOC 3 OF 3

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001 BERGER  
001 SAMORE  
002 BERGER  
003 PRESIDENT  
003

Z 99041918 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION  
Z 99050314 FOR REDO  
Z 99050318 FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION  
Z 99051714 FOR INFORMATION  
X 99052513 NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC DATE DISPATCH FOR ACTION

DISPATCH FOR INFO

003 990517  
003 990517

VICE PRESIDENT  
WH CHIEF OF STAFF

National Security Council  
The White House

9/25/85  
2000

Exec Sec Office has diskette *yes*

FORM 100-101

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 2002  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG 3 AO 10

COMMENTS: Status of Perry Review on North Korea

SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
1	D 5/3	
2	A	
3	TTC 5/17	Caplan

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

*ADD ON #1*  
 Status of Perry Review on North Korea

Exec Sec Office has diskette *yes*

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

5			Records Mgt.
4	TTC 5/3		West Wing Desk
3			Berger
2			Steinberg
1			Kerrick
			Davies
			Rice
			Cosgriff

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 2002  
 URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS  
 BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG 2 AO

National Security Council  
The White House

*TMA*

National Security Council  
The White House

~~ADD 3/3 925~~  
~~1425~~  
2000

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 2000

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM 3 NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG 3 A/O 01

TMA

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice Jacobson	<u>1</u>	<u>J 5/13</u>	_____
Davies	_____	_____	_____
Kerrick	_____	_____	_____
Steinberg	_____	_____	_____
Berger	<u>2</u>	<u>A</u>	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>3</u>	<u>TIC 5/12</u>	<u>J Kaplan</u>
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

ADD ON # 1

Status of  
Penny Review  
on North Korea

1998 MAY 3 10 04 AM

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

National Security Council 4/20  
The White House

PROOFED BY: \_\_\_\_\_ LOG # 2000

URGENT NOT PROOFED: \_\_\_\_\_ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: \_\_\_\_\_ DOCLOG (2) A/O \_\_\_\_\_

TMA

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff	_____	_____	_____
Rice	_____	_____	_____
Davies	<u>1</u>	<u>G 4/19</u>	_____
Kerrick	<u>Copy</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Steinberg	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Berger	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>4</u>	<u>TIC 5/3</u>	<u>DSANOL</u>
Records Mgt.	_____	_____	_____
<u>Samuel</u>	<u>5</u>	_____	<u>ReDo -</u> <u>SR Request</u> <u>5-8-99</u>

A = Action    I = Information    D = Dispatch    R = Retain    N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Status of Perry Review  
on North Korea


99 APR 19 AM 8:11

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

Log # \_\_\_\_\_

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

From \_\_\_\_\_ To \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_



MONA  
please get this  
revised/updated  
before we leave.

Q

5-18-99

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 17, 1999

MAY 17 1999

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER *B*

SUBJECT: Status of Perry Review on North Korea

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2013-0866-m (1.08)  
KBH 9/9/2019

Bill Perry's review of North Korea policy has progressed since he briefed you in San Francisco. After consulting with key Members of Congress, we proposed to the North Koreans in late April that Perry visit Pyongyang in mid-May to "consult" on his review of U.S. strategy towards North Korea. The North has now agreed to a Perry visit from May 26-28.

Subject to final approval by the Principals Committee, Bill plans to propose the following arrangement in Pyongyang: if North Korea formally agrees to enter into missile and nuclear negotiations, the United States would issue a statement of "no hostile intent" towards North Korea and suspend a broad range of economic sanctions. This would essentially suspend the trade embargo on North Korea, allowing imports of North Korean goods, exports of non-sensitive U.S. goods and services, U.S. investment and financial transactions, and release of frozen assets. (You have executive authority to lift these sanctions, without requiring Congressional action.) At the same time, Bill would make clear that continued suspension of the economic sanctions would depend on North Korean compliance with the Agreed Framework (including access to the underground site) and no additional testing of long range missiles (No Dong and Taepo Dong).

In the missile negotiations, we would seek a verified termination of North Korea's MTCR-class missile programs, beginning with an explicit ban on long range missile testing and exports and eventual prohibition of testing, development, production, possession and export of all MTCR-class missiles. In the nuclear negotiations, we would seek to expand the Kumchang-ni agreement into a broader protocol to the Agreed Framework that would allow U.S. inspection of suspect nuclear sites in violation of North Korean obligations under the NPT and

the North-South Denuclearization Declaration, including nuclear weapons research and development. Both of these negotiations will be very difficult and are likely to take months, if not years, to complete. During this period, if the North breaks the moratorium on missile testing or if the missile/nuclear negotiations stall, we would have the option of re-imposing all or part of the economic sanctions by executive action.

To strengthen our bargaining position with North Korea in the nuclear and missile negotiations, Perry held trilateral consultations with the ROK (National Security Advisor Lim) and Japan (Deputy Foreign Minister Kato) in Honolulu April 24-25. Both the South Koreans and Japanese supported our plan and said they would be willing to provide additional inducements to North Korea if the North accepts the Perry proposal and makes additional missile/nuclear concessions. Japan, for example, which is very concerned about North Korean missile development and testing, said they could consider humanitarian food assistance if the North agrees to explicit limits on its missile program, such as no testing of long range missiles. The Japanese also want to be directly engaged in the U.S.-DPRK missile talks, which Pyongyang is unlikely to accept.

Shortly before Perry is scheduled to leave for North Korea, Madeleine and I recommend that you host a meeting with 30-35 key Members of Congress to provide Bill an opportunity to explain his approach and seek Congressional support for his intended proposal to North Korea. We anticipate that there will be some criticism of the proposal to lift economic sanctions against North Korea in return for agreement to missile and nuclear talks. Indeed, the danger is that the North will pocket these concessions and demand even more for any progress in the subsequent missile and nuclear talks. Bill believes, however, that we need to take dramatic steps up front to change the dynamics of U.S.-North Korean relations and facilitate negotiations to eliminate North Korea's missile and nuclear weapons programs.

Once Perry returns from North Korea, he intends to complete his policy review and submit his report to you. If the North accepts Perry's proposal, we should plan for extended negotiations with the North on missile and nuclear issues. (Up to now, the North has refused to accept any limits on its own missile development and testing, and has said it would agree to restrict missile exports only in return for cash compensation.) I support Madeleine's proposal that Wendy Sherman take over

Perry's responsibilities as policy coordinator for North Korea, but we may need to consider eventually appointing Wendy or another senior official to negotiate with North Korea.

I intend to hold another principals' meeting in mid-May to review the results of Bill's trilateral consultations and finalize planning for the proposed White House meeting with Members and his trip to North Korea.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Revised 2808

May 3, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GARY SAMORE ) 6S  
KEN LIEBERTHAL )

SUBJECT: Status of Perry Review on North Korea

Attached is the information memo you requested on Bill Perry's plan to visit Pyongyang in mid-May. Bill will consult with the ROK and Japan on his proposal in Honolulu over the weekend.

We're basically comfortable with the substance of Bill's approach, except we recommend limiting the sanctions-easing measures that Bill is proposing to take up front in exchange for the North continuing to refrain from missile tests and agreeing to missile and nuclear talks. Some of these measures need to be saved as bargaining chips for the missile/nuclear talks themselves, especially if the ROK and Japan balk at letting us use their inducements in the missile/nuclear talks.

Concurrence by: (Miles Lackey, Jack Pritchard) 6S  
RB

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward to POTUS the attached memo.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2015-0159-M (1.09)  
KBH 9/9/2019

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: GSamore  
Reason: 1.5(b)(c)(d)  
Declassify On: 4/14/09

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526

~~2015-01597~~  
2013-0266-M (1.10)  
KBH 9/9/2019

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Status of Perry Review on North Korea

Bill Perry's review of North Korean policy is substantially the same as he briefed you in San Francisco. After consulting with key Members of Congress, we have decided to propose to the North Koreans that Perry visit Pyongyang in mid-May to "consult" on his review of U.S. strategy towards North Korea. We will discuss dates and details of the proposed Perry visit with the North Koreans on the margins of the next four-party talks in Geneva April 23-24.

Subject to final approval by the PC, Bill plans to propose the following arrangement in Pyongyang: provided that North Korea continues to refrain from additional testing of long range missiles (No Dong and Taepo Dong) and agrees to enter into missile and nuclear negotiations with us, the U.S. would issue a statement of "no hostile intent" towards North Korea and suspend a broad range of economic sanctions under the Trading With the Enemy Act, the Export Administration Act, and the Defense Production Act. Once the North formally agrees to the missile/nuclear talks, we would suspend the sanctions, which would essentially lift the trade embargo on North Korea, allowing imports of North Korean goods, exports of non-sensitive U.S. goods and services, U.S. investment and financial transactions, and release of frozen assets. (You have executive authority to lift these sanctions, without requiring Congressional action.)

In the missile negotiations, we would seek a verified termination of North Korea's MTCR-class missile programs, beginning with an explicit ban on long range missile testing and exports and eventual prohibition of testing, development, production, possession and export of all MTCR-class missiles. In the nuclear negotiations, we would seek to expand the

Doesn't  
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memo  
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POTUS?  
↑  
don't  
understand

Spill out

Spill out

Kumchang-ni agreement to a more general protocol to the Agreed Framework that would allow U.S. inspection of suspect nuclear sites in violation of North Korean obligations under the NPT and the North-South Denuclearization Declaration, including nuclear weapons research and development. Both of these negotiations will be very difficult and are likely to take months, if not years, to complete. During this period, if the North breaks the moratorium on missile testing or if the missile/nuclear negotiations stall, we would have the option of re-imposing all or part of the economic sanctions by executive action.

To strengthen our bargaining position with North Korea in the nuclear and missile negotiations, Perry will hold trilateral consultations with the ROK (National Security Advisor Lim) and Japan (Deputy Foreign Minister Kato) in Honolulu April 24-25. In particular, we will be seeking South Korean and Japanese agreement to provide additional inducements to North Korea if the North accepts the Perry proposal and makes additional missile/nuclear concessions. Japan, for example, which is very concerned about North Korean missile development and testing, may be willing to commit to World Food Program and bilateral food aid if the North explicitly agrees not to test long range missiles. It is not clear that Seoul and Tokyo will allow us to use their carrots in our negotiations with North Korea.

Assuming that the North agrees <sup>plan to</sup> to receive Perry and that we can line up allied support, we recommend that you host a meeting with 30-35 key Members of Congress shortly before Perry is scheduled to leave for Pyongyang. At such a meeting, Bill could explain his approach and seek Congressional support for his intended proposal to North Korea. We anticipate that there will be some criticism of the proposal to lift economic sanctions against North Korea in return for no long range missile testing and agreement to missile/nuclear talks. Bill believes that we need to take dramatic steps up front to change the dynamics of U.S.-North Korean relations and facilitate negotiations to eliminate North Korea's missile and nuclear weapons programs. ✓

Once Perry returns from North Korea, he intends to complete his policy review and submit his report to you. Since it is unlikely that the North will accept Perry's proposal on the spot, we should plan for extended negotiations with the North on the terms for a freeze on long range missile testing and missile/nuclear talks. (Up to now, the North has refused to accept any limits on its own missile development and testing, and has said it would agree to restrict missile exports only in return for cash compensation.) The Department of State is

proposing that Wendy Sherman take over Perry's responsibilities as policy coordinator for North Korea, but we may need to consider appointing Wendy or another senior official to negotiate with North Korea.

I intend to hold another principals<sup>(1)</sup> meeting in early May to review the results of Bill's trilateral consultations and finalize planning for the proposed White House meeting with Members and his trip to North Korea. ✓

April 19, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: GARY SAMORE ) *GS for*  
KEN LIEBERTHAL )

SUBJECT: Status of Perry Review on North Korea

**DECLASSIFIED**  
**PER E.O. 13526**  
2013-0866-M (1.11)  
KBH 9/9/2019

Attached is the information memo you requested on Bill Perry's plan to visit Pyongyang in mid-May. Bill will consult with the ROK and Japan on his proposal in Honolulu over the weekend.

We're basically comfortable with the substance of Bill's approach, except we recommend limiting the sanctions-easing measures that Bill is proposing to take up front in exchange for the North continuing to refrain from missile tests and agreeing to missile and nuclear talks. Some of these measures need to be saved as bargaining chips for the missile/nuclear talks themselves, especially if the ROK and Japan balk at letting us use their inducements in the missile/nuclear talks.

Concurrence by: (Miles Lackey, Jack Pritchard) *GS for*

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward to POTUS the attached memo.

Attachment  
Tab I Memorandum to the President

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED  
PER E.O. 13526  
2013-0866-M (1.12)  
KBH 9/9/2019

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Status of Perry Review on North Korea

Bill Perry's review of North Korea policy <sup>has progressed since</sup> is ~~substantially the same as~~ he briefed you in San Francisco. After consulting with key Members of Congress, we have decided to propose to the North Koreans that Perry visit Pyongyang in mid-May to "consult" on his review of U.S. strategy towards North Korea. We ~~will discuss~~ <sup>discussed</sup> dates and details of the proposed Perry visit with the North Koreans on the margins of the next four-party talks in Geneva April 23-24.

Subject to final approval by the Principals Committee, Bill plans to propose the following arrangement in Pyongyang: provided that North Korea continues to refrain from additional testing of long range missiles (No Dong and Taepo Dong) and agrees to enter into missile and nuclear negotiations with us, the United States would issue a statement of "no hostile intent" towards North Korea and suspend a broad range of economic sanctions under the Trading With the Enemy Act, the Export Administration Act, and the Defense Production Act. Once the North formally agrees to the missile/nuclear talks, we would suspend the sanctions, which would essentially lift the trade embargo on North Korea, allowing imports of North Korean goods, exports of non-sensitive U.S. goods and services, U.S. investment and financial transactions, and release of frozen assets. (You have executive authority to lift these sanctions without requiring Congressional action.)

In the missile negotiations, we would seek a verified termination of North Korea's MTCK-class missile programs, beginning with an explicit ban on long range missile testing and exports and eventual prohibition of testing, development,

SECRET

Reason: 1.5(b) (c) (d)  
Declassify On: 4/15/09

up-date

confusing

There is a better way to say this

[Does this include new long range missile?]

[guid for suspension, is agree to talk? I didn't think it was that low a bar]

Vice President  
Chief of Staff

production, possession and export of all MTCR-class missiles. In the nuclear negotiations, we would seek to expand the

○ ?

Kumchang-ni agreement to a more general protocol to the Agreed Framework that would allow U.S. inspection of suspect nuclear sites in violation of North Korean obligations under the NPT and the North-South Denuclearization Declaration, including nuclear weapons research and development. Both of these negotiations will be very difficult and are likely to take months, if not years, to complete. During this period, if the North breaks the moratorium on missile testing or if the missile/nuclear negotiations stall, we would have the option of re-imposing all or part of the economic sanctions by executive action.

*update*

To strengthen our bargaining position with North Korea in the nuclear and missile negotiations, Perry will hold trilateral consultations with the ROK (National Security Advisor Lim) and Japan (Deputy Foreign Minister Kato) in Honolulu April 24-25. In particular, we will be seeking South Korean and Japanese agreement to provide additional inducements to North Korea if the North accepts the Perry proposal and makes additional missile/nuclear concessions. Japan, for example, which is very concerned about North Korean missile development and testing, may be willing to commit to World Food Program and bilateral food aid if the North explicitly agrees not to test long range missiles. It is not clear that Seoul and Tokyo will allow us to use their carrots in our negotiations with North Korea.

Assuming that the North agrees to receive Perry and that we can line up allied support, we plan to recommend that you host a meeting with 30-35 key Members of Congress shortly before Perry is scheduled to leave for Pyongyang. At such a meeting, Bill could explain his approach and seek Congressional support for his intended proposal to North Korea. We anticipate that there will be some criticism of the proposal to lift economic sanctions against North Korea in return for no long range missile testing and agreement to missile/nuclear talks. Bill believes that we need to take dramatic steps up front to change the dynamics of U.S.-North Korean relations and facilitate negotiations to eliminate North Korea's missile and nuclear weapons programs.

*not  
some way  
it is  
stated  
on p1*

Once Perry returns from North Korea, he intends to complete his policy review and submit his report to you. Since it is unlikely that the North will accept Perry's proposal on the spot, we should plan for extended negotiations with the North on

the terms for a freeze on long range missile testing and missile/nuclear talks. (Up to now, the North has refused to accept any limits on its own missile development and testing, and has said it would agree to restrict missile exports only in return for cash compensation.) The Department of State is proposing that Wendy Sherman take over Perry's responsibilities as policy coordinator for North Korea, but we may need to consider appointing Wendy or another senior official to negotiate with North Korea.

I intend to hold another principals' meeting in early May to review the results of Bill's trilateral consultations and finalize planning for the proposed White House meeting with Members and his trip to North Korea.