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Folder Title:

PDD-47 Nuclear Scientific and Technical Cooperation with Russia re: Stockpile Safety and Security, and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) Monitoring and Verification, March 21, 1996

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001a. form	Distribution Receipt. [partial] [CIA Act] (1 page)	03/21/1996	P3/b(3)
001b. profile sheet	re: PDD-47 (1 page)	02/12/1996	P1/b(1) RDS 08/25/2009
001c. profile sheet	[Duplicate of 001a] (2 pages)	02/12/1996	P1/b(1) RDS 08/25/2009
001d. memo	POTUS to VPOTUS et al. re: [PDD-47] (6 pages)	03/21/1996	P1/b(1) RDS 08/25/2009
001e. note	Todd Stern and Phil Caplan to POTUS re: [PDD-47] (1 page)	03/20/1996	P1/b(1) RDS 08/25/2009
001f. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re: [PDD-47] (2 pages)	03/01/1996	P1/b(1) RDS 08/25/2009
001g. memo	Steven Andreasen to Lake re: [PDD-47] (1 page)	02/12/1996	P1/b(1) RDS 08/25/2009
001h. memo	[Duplicate of 001e] (2 pages)	03/01/1996	P1/b(1) RDS 08/25/2009
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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
CTB
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NUCLEAR TESTING

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SUBJECT: PDD-47 NUCLEAR SCIENTIFIC & TECHNICAL COOPERATION W/ RUSSIA RE
STOCKPILE SAFETY & SECURITY & COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY - CTBT -

ACTION: PRES SGD PDD 47 DUE DATE: 15 FEB 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ANDREASEN

LOGREF:

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PERSONS:

SUBJECT: PDD-47 NUCLEAR SCIENTIFIC & TECHNICAL COOPERATION W/ RUSSIA RE
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 21, 1996

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE/NSC-47

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
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SUBJECT: Nuclear Scientific and Technical Cooperation with
Russia Related to Stockpile Safety and Security
and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
Monitoring and Verification (S)

This Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) establishes and directs the implementation of U.S. policy on nuclear scientific and technical cooperation with Russia related to stockpile safety and security and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) monitoring and verification. (S)

I. Background

Recent political dialogue on nuclear scientific and technical cooperation related to stockpile safety and security and CTBT monitoring and verification. On August 11, 1995, I wrote President Yeltsin regarding my decision to seek to negotiate a true, zero-yield CTBT. In that letter, I told President Yeltsin that: "We (the United States) are also interested in expanding scientific and technical cooperation with Russia, including lab-to-lab contacts and collaboration on verification technologies." (S)

On October 15, 1995, the United States provided the Russian Federation with a diplomatic non-paper entitled "U.S.-Russian Scientific and Technical Cooperation." That paper outlined five

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specific areas where unclassified activities could be conducted primarily in the areas of stockpile safety and security, including:

- Fundamental physics processes important to stockpile stewardship.
- The utilization of facilities for physics experiments.
- Technologies and systematic approaches to assure safety and security in the nuclear weapon stockpile and in nuclear forces operations.
- Techniques for monitoring a CTBT.
- Materials science, technologies and development. (U)

The October 15 non-paper also specified that if in the future it is agreed that classified discussions are warranted, an appropriate agreement for cooperation will have to be concluded (consistent with the authorities set forth in the Atomic Energy Act). (U)

II. Purpose and Limits of the Program

U.S.-Russian nuclear scientific and technical cooperation related to stockpile safety and security and CTBT monitoring and verification is in the U.S. national interest in that it can:

- Contribute to greater transparency and to the safe and secure maintenance and drawdown of the Russian nuclear stockpile during a period of political and economic transition in Russia, as well as the U.S. nuclear stockpile.
- Sustain the scientific competence of individuals responsible for ensuring confidence in the Russian and U.S. nuclear stockpiles.
- Facilitate achievement of other U.S. policy objectives, such as Russian agreement to and compliance with a true zero yield CTBT.
- Further our understanding of Russia's nuclear weapons program.

~~(S)~~

While I have determined that a program of nuclear scientific and technical cooperation with Russia related to stockpile safety and

security and CTBT monitoring and verification is in the United States national interest, nevertheless, such a program with Russia can only take place in the overall context of positive United States-Russian relations and should be conducted consistent with other U.S. assistance and cooperative programs to maximize U.S. influence and support U.S. interests. Therefore, the pace and scope of U.S. cooperation will continue to be governed by our ongoing evaluation of the evolution of Russian foreign and defense policy. (C)

U.S. cooperation in this area will be limited to those items that the Secretary of Energy (and, as appropriate, the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State) determine will not jeopardize the security of our own nuclear systems and weapons, enhance military performance of Russian nuclear weapons capabilities or increase the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation. U.S. cooperation will be undertaken in accordance with U.S. domestic laws and international obligations. Specific nuclear scientific and technical cooperation guidance is contained in Section III of this PDD. (C)

III. Areas Approved for Nuclear Scientific and Technical Cooperation

Guidelines for U.S.-Russian Scientific and Technical Cooperation Related to Stockpile Safety and Security and CTBT Monitoring and Verification. The following guidelines will serve as policy guidance for discussions and activities in this area:

1. While we are prepared to engage Russia now in "technical talks" on cooperation and to reach agreement on specific activities in the areas outlined below, actual cooperation would begin only after USG approval. Once agreed, the United States will be prepared to make the "fact of" this program public.
2. Discussion and activities would be conducted only at the unclassified level and shall be consistent with the Atomic Energy Act and subject to U.S. classification procedures. A subsequent decision by me would be required to go beyond this. If in the future it is agreed that classified discussions are warranted and an appropriate agreement for cooperation has been concluded, specific elements of the program will remain classified at the appropriate level.
3. Discussions and cooperative activities would focus on stockpile safety and security and fundamental physics issues with a goal of sustaining the scientific competence of individuals responsible for ensuring confidence in the U.S. and Russian stockpiles. Activities that have direct

applications to nuclear weapons design or military performance enhancements of nuclear weapons shall be prohibited. A subsequent decision by me would be required to go beyond this. (U)

The restrictions in paragraphs 1 and 2 above shall not apply to activities now ongoing or planned under the Agreement for Cooperation now being negotiated with Russia as part of the Safety, Transparency and Irreversibility (STI) initiative. (U)

Subject to the guidelines above and the procedural limitations set forth in Section V, the following areas of cooperation and assistance are approved:

- Computations, experiments and materials. This would include: models of physical processes and mathematical algorithms for new, highly parallel computers, including standard test problems for assessing computer performance; theoretical and experimental studies of the fundamental properties of matter including atomic and molecular physics, nuclear physics, hydrodynamics and properties of substance, physics of plasmas and energy transport and solid state physics; laser technologies related to NIF and other ICF driver applications; pulsed power systems, high magnetic fields and studies of the properties of magnetized plasmas; studies of the fundamental properties of high explosives; methods of hydrodynamics research, including detection, diagnostics and x-ray sources; diagnostics associated with high energy density physics; experiments on U.S. and Russian laser, pulsed power and hydrodynamics facilities; theoretical and experimental studies of material aging; theoretical and experimental studies of material response to various environmental conditions; and environmentally benign processing of nuclear materials.
- Nuclear warhead safety and security. This would include: safety issues associated with the aging of high explosives; combining existing data bases related to safety and security and to develop scenarios and computer models to understand mechanisms to mitigate or respond to related incidents; and exchanges of Russian and U.S. data on past accidents and near-accidents involving weapons.
- CTBT monitoring and verification. This would include: seismic, hydroacoustics, radionuclide and infrasound monitoring systems; possible examination of national monitoring systems; on-site inspection technologies; using ground-based electromagnetic pulse technology for detection of covert underground nuclear explosions that are masked by chemical explosions; techniques for detecting decoupled explosions; modeling of network capabilities for sensor

systems; and systems integration of monitoring technologies.
(U)

IV. Additional Areas

Areas in nuclear and scientific and technical cooperation related to stockpile safety and security and CTBT monitoring and verification not referred to in this PDD, in which cooperation is proposed by either country, shall be referred to me for decision. Pending a decision by me, discussions in these areas shall be limited to those necessary to ensure that the Russian desires are fully understood. (C)

V. Authority and Management

Executive and technical management of the program will be the responsibility of the Secretary of Energy, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense as required. The Secretary of Energy shall establish internal guidelines and review procedures within the Department of Energy to ensure that individual projects and activities within the framework of this PDD are consistent with the guidelines set forth in Section III. A single point of coordination will be designated within the Department of Energy; all Russian proposals for cooperation and U.S. responses will be coordinated through this office. (C)

To ensure that cooperation furnished under this program is properly coordinated with other U.S. diplomatic efforts and is consistent with the overall state of U.S.-Russian relations, the following mechanisms will apply:

- For ongoing areas of cooperation the Secretary of Energy, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense as required, shall ensure that periodic briefings (i.e., at least once every year) are provided to the Deputies Committee. These briefings shall update information concerning the status of the program since the last briefing and include an assessment of the technical value of these exchanges.
- The Secretary of Energy and Secretary of Defense shall similarly ensure that the Deputies Committee is briefed on any significant expansion or contraction of ongoing programs. Should there be a disagreement with any proposed contraction or expansion on national security and/or foreign policy grounds, the issue will be referred to me for decision and the proposed action held in abeyance. (C)

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All information learned as a result of our cooperative efforts shall be provided to relevant agencies. Additional security guidance as necessary will be promulgated by the Secretary of Energy and, where appropriate, the Secretary of Defense. (S)

William J. Clinton

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WASHINGTON
March 20, 1996

3/21/96

MR. PRESIDENT:

Tony Lake recommends that you issue the attached PDD that establishes and directs the implementation of a cooperative program with Russia in the areas of nuclear stockpile safety, security and CTBT monitoring and verification.

The PDD is a follow-up to your August letter to Yeltsin, in which you expressed U.S. interest in expanding this type of cooperation, and to subsequent work in October and December between U.S. and Russian experts.

U.S. cooperation will be limited to issues that will not jeopardize the security of our own nuclear systems, enhance the performance of Russian nuclear weapons capabilities or increase the risk of nuclear proliferation.

In brief, the PDD will, (a) define the purpose and limit of the program (e.g., contribute to safe and secure maintenance and drawdown of Russian stockpile; facilitate Russian agreement to U.S. objectives like zero-yield CTBT; further understanding of Russia's nuclear weapons program); (b) establish guidelines for program classification and specific areas of discussion (only unclassified activities will be discussed with a focus on stockpile safety and fundamental physics issues); (c) establishes procedures for management of the program (by Sec. of Energy in consultation with Sec. of Defense)

If you approve, please sign the PDD where indicated.

Todd Stern *Todd Stern*
Phil Caplan

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

2009-0110-M
8/25/04 MS

~~SECRET~~

PHOTOCOPY
WJC HANDWRITING

CLINTON LIBRARY PHOTOCOPY

THE WHITE HOUSE

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN

WASHINGTON

3/21/96

March 1, 1996

96 MAR 1 P9:02

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE ✓

SUBJECT: Proposed PDD on Nuclear Scientific and Technical Cooperation with Russia Related to Stockpile Safety and Security and CTBT Monitoring and Verification

Purpose

To submit for your approval a proposed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) establishing and directing the implementation of U.S. policy on nuclear scientific and technical cooperation with Russia related to stockpile safety and security and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) monitoring and verification.

Background

On August 11, 1995, you wrote President Yeltsin regarding your decision to seek to negotiate a true, zero-yield CTBT. In that letter, you told Yeltsin that: "We (the United States) are also interested in expanding scientific and technical cooperation with Russia, including lab-to-lab contacts and collaboration on verification technologies."

On October 15, 1995, the United States provided the Russian Federation with a diplomatic non-paper outlining five specific areas where unclassified cooperation could be conducted in the areas of stockpile safety and security and CTBT monitoring and verification. On December 13-14, 1995, U.S. and Russian experts met in London and agreed on topics for potential cooperative activities.

The proposed PDD at Tab A establishes and directs the implementation of a cooperative program with Russia in the area of stockpile safety and security and CTBT monitoring and verification. Specifically, the proposed PDD:

- Defines the purpose and limits of the program;
- Establishes guidelines for program classification;

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AS AMENDED

2009-0110-
8/25/09 MS

~~SECRET~~

Reason: 1.5(a)

Declassify On: 2/11/2006

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

2

SECRET

- Establishes guidelines and specific areas/topics approved for nuclear scientific and technical cooperation related to stockpile safety and security and CTBT monitoring and verification; and
- Establishes procedures for the authority and management of the program.

The proposed PDD has been cleared by all relevant agencies.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the proposed PDD at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A Proposed PDD

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

20151

February 12, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL *RGB*

FROM: STEVEN P. ANDREASEN *SA*

SUBJECT: Proposed PDD on Nuclear Scientific and Technical
Cooperation with Russia Related to Stockpile
Safety and Security and CTBT Monitoring and
Verification

The attached PDD establishes and directs the implementation of U.S. policy on nuclear scientific and technical cooperation with Russia related to stockpile safety and security and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) monitoring and verification. It has been cleared by all relevant agencies.

Concurrence by: Pifer *SP* Fairfax *FF* Kreczko *AK* Leary *WL*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment

Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Proposed PDD

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PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

2004-0110-m
8/25/04 MS

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Reason: 1.5(a)
Declassify On: 2/11/2006

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Document No. _____

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 3-4 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 3-5

SUBJECT: POD on cooperation with Russia on Nuclear Safety

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
VICE PRESIDENT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	McCURRY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
PANETTA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	McGINTY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
McLARTY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	NASH	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
ICKES	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	QUINN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
LIEBERMAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	RASCO	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
RIVLIN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	REED	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BAER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SOSNIK	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CURRY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	STEPHANOPOULOS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
EMANUEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	STIGLITZ	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
GIBBONS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	STRETT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HALE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	TYSON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HERMAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	WALLEY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HIGGINS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	WILLIAMS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HILLEY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<u>Angell</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
KLAIN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
LAKE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
LINDSEY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS: Please forward your comments to the Staff Secretary's Office. Thank you.

RESPONSE:

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, As Amended,
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By HS NARA, Date 12/31/06
200A-0110-m
Staff Secretary
Ext. 6-2702

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 1, 1996

96 MAR 1 9:02

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE ✓

SUBJECT: Proposed PDD on Nuclear Scientific and Technical Cooperation with Russia Related to Stockpile Safety and Security and CTBT Monitoring and Verification

Purpose

To submit for your approval a proposed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) establishing and directing the implementation of U.S. policy on nuclear scientific and technical cooperation with Russia related to stockpile safety and security and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) monitoring and verification.

Background

On August 11, 1995, you wrote President Yeltsin regarding your decision to seek to negotiate a true, zero-yield CTBT. In that letter, you told Yeltsin that: "We (the United States) are also interested in expanding scientific and technical cooperation with Russia, including lab-to-lab contacts and collaboration on verification technologies."

On October 15, 1995, the United States provided the Russian Federation with a diplomatic non-paper outlining five specific areas where unclassified cooperation could be conducted in the areas of stockpile safety and security and CTBT monitoring and verification. On December 13-14, 1995, U.S. and Russian experts met in London and agreed on topics for potential cooperative activities.

The proposed PDD at Tab A establishes and directs the implementation of a cooperative program with Russia in the area of stockpile safety and security and CTBT monitoring and verification. Specifically, the proposed PDD:

- Defines the purpose and limits of the program;
- Establishes guidelines for program classification;

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AS AMENDED

2009-0110-
8/25/09 ms

SECRET

Reason: 1.5(a)
Declassify On: 2/11/2006

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

- Establishes guidelines and specific areas/topics approved for nuclear scientific and technical cooperation related to stockpile safety and security and CTBT monitoring and verification; and
- Establishes procedures for the authority and management of the program.

The proposed PDD has been cleared by all relevant agencies.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the proposed PDD at Tab A.

Attachment

Tab A Proposed PDD

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE/NSC-

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
POLICY
DIRECTOR OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
AGENCY
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Nuclear Scientific and Technical Cooperation with
Russia Related to Stockpile Safety and Security
and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
Monitoring and Verification (C)

This Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) establishes and
directs the implementation of U.S. policy on nuclear scientific
and technical cooperation with Russia related to stockpile safety
and security and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) monitoring
and verification. (C)

I. Background

Recent political dialogue on nuclear scientific and technical
cooperation related to stockpile safety and security and CTBT
monitoring and verification. On August 11, 1995, I wrote
President Yeltsin regarding my decision to seek to negotiate a
true, zero-yield CTBT. In that letter, I told President Yeltsin
that: "We (the United States) are also interested in expanding
scientific and technical cooperation with Russia, including lab-
to-lab contacts and collaboration on verification technologies."
(S)

On October 15, 1995, the United States provided the Russian
Federation with a diplomatic non-paper entitled "U.S.-Russian
Scientific and Technical Cooperation." That paper outlined five

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Reason: 1.5(a)
Declassify on: 2/11/2006

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AS AMENDED

2009-0110-
8/25/09 MS

specific areas where unclassified activities could be conducted primarily in the areas of stockpile safety and security, including:

- Fundamental physics processes important to stockpile stewardship.
- The utilization of facilities for physics experiments.
- Technologies and systematic approaches to assure safety and security in the nuclear weapon stockpile and in nuclear forces operations.
- Techniques for monitoring a CTBT.
- Materials science, technologies and development. (U)

The October 15 non-paper also specified that if in the future it is agreed that classified discussions are warranted, an appropriate agreement for cooperation will have to be concluded (consistent with the authorities set forth in the Atomic Energy Act). (U)

II. Purpose and Limits of the Program

U.S.-Russian nuclear scientific and technical cooperation related to stockpile safety and security and CTBT monitoring and verification is in the U.S. national interest in that it can:

- Contribute to greater transparency and to the safe and secure maintenance and drawdown of the Russian nuclear stockpile during a period of political and economic transition in Russia, as well as the U.S. nuclear stockpile.
- Sustain the scientific competence of individuals responsible for ensuring confidence in the Russian and U.S. nuclear stockpiles.
- Facilitate achievement of other U.S. policy objectives, such as Russian agreement to and compliance with a true zero yield CTBT.
- Further our understanding of Russia's nuclear weapons program.

(S)
While I have determined that a program of nuclear scientific and technical cooperation with Russia related to stockpile safety and

security and CTBT monitoring and verification is in the United States national interest, nevertheless, such a program with Russia can only take place in the overall context of positive United States-Russian relations and should be conducted consistent with other U.S. assistance and cooperative programs to maximize U.S. influence and support U.S. interests. Therefore, the pace and scope of U.S. cooperation will continue to be governed by our ongoing evaluation of the evolution of Russian foreign and defense policy. (C)

U.S. cooperation in this area will be limited to those items that the Secretary of Energy (and, as appropriate, the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State) determine will not jeopardize the security of our own nuclear systems and weapons, enhance military performance of Russian nuclear weapons capabilities or increase the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation. U.S. cooperation will be undertaken in accordance with U.S. domestic laws and international obligations. Specific nuclear scientific and technical cooperation guidance is contained in Section III of this PDD. (C)

III. Areas Approved for Nuclear Scientific and Technical Cooperation

Guidelines for U.S.-Russian Scientific and Technical Cooperation Related to Stockpile Safety and Security and CTBT Monitoring and Verification. The following guidelines will serve as policy guidance for discussions and activities in this area:

1. While we are prepared to engage Russia now in "technical talks" on cooperation and to reach agreement on specific activities in the areas outlined below, actual cooperation would begin only after USG approval. Once agreed, the United States will be prepared to make the "fact of" this program public.
2. Discussion and activities would be conducted only at the unclassified level and shall be consistent with the Atomic Energy Act and subject to U.S. classification procedures. A subsequent decision by me would be required to go beyond this. If in the future it is agreed that classified discussions are warranted and an appropriate agreement for cooperation has been concluded, specific elements of the program will remain classified at the appropriate level.
3. Discussions and cooperative activities would focus on stockpile safety and security and fundamental physics issues with a goal of sustaining the scientific competence of individuals responsible for ensuring confidence in the U.S. and Russian stockpiles. Activities that have direct

applications to nuclear weapons design or military performance enhancements of nuclear weapons shall be prohibited. A subsequent decision by me would be required to go beyond this. (U)

The restrictions in paragraphs 1 and 2 above shall not apply to activities now ongoing or planned under the Agreement for Cooperation now being negotiated with Russia as part of the Safety, Transparency and Irreversibility (STI) initiative. (U)

Subject to the guidelines above and the procedural limitations set forth in Section V, the following areas of cooperation and assistance are approved:

- Computations, experiments and materials. This would include: models of physical processes and mathematical algorithms for new, highly parallel computers, including standard test problems for assessing computer performance; theoretical and experimental studies of the fundamental properties of matter including atomic and molecular physics, nuclear physics, hydrodynamics and properties of substance, physics of plasmas and energy transport and solid state physics; laser technologies related to NIF and other ICF driver applications; pulsed power systems, high magnetic fields and studies of the properties of magnetized plasmas; studies of the fundamental properties of high explosives; methods of hydrodynamics research, including detection, diagnostics and x-ray sources; diagnostics associated with high energy density physics; experiments on U.S. and Russian laser, pulsed power and hydrodynamics facilities; theoretical and experimental studies of material aging; theoretical and experimental studies of material response to various environmental conditions; and environmentally benign processing of nuclear materials.
- Nuclear warhead safety and security. This would include: safety issues associated with the aging of high explosives; combining existing data bases related to safety and security and to develop scenarios and computer models to understand mechanisms to mitigate or respond to related incidents; and exchanges of Russian and U.S. data on past accidents and near-accidents involving weapons.
- CTBT monitoring and verification. This would include: seismic, hydroacoustics, radionuclide and infrasound monitoring systems; possible examination of national monitoring systems; on-site inspection technologies; using ground-based electromagnetic pulse technology for detection of covert underground nuclear explosions that are masked by chemical explosions; techniques for detecting decoupled explosions; modeling of network capabilities for sensor

systems; and systems integration of monitoring technologies.
(U)

IV. Additional Areas

Areas in nuclear and scientific and technical cooperation related to stockpile safety and security and CTBT monitoring and verification not referred to in this PDD, in which cooperation is proposed by either country, shall be referred to me for decision. Pending a decision by me, discussions in these areas shall be limited to those necessary to ensure that the Russian desires are fully understood. (C)

V. Authority and Management

Executive and technical management of the program will be the responsibility of the Secretary of Energy, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense as required. The Secretary of Energy shall establish internal guidelines and review procedures within the Department of Energy to ensure that individual projects and activities within the framework of this PDD are consistent with the guidelines set forth in Section III. A single point of coordination will be designated within the Department of Energy; all Russian proposals for cooperation and U.S. responses will be coordinated through this office. (C)

To ensure that cooperation furnished under this program is properly coordinated with other U.S. diplomatic efforts and is consistent with the overall state of U.S.-Russian relations, the following mechanisms will apply:

- For ongoing areas of cooperation the Secretary of Energy, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense as required, shall ensure that periodic briefings (i.e., at least once every year) are provided to the Deputies Committee. These briefings shall update information concerning the status of the program since the last briefing and include an assessment of the technical value of these exchanges.
- The Secretary of Energy and Secretary of Defense shall similarly ensure that the Deputies Committee is briefed on any significant expansion or contraction of ongoing programs. Should there be a disagreement with any proposed contraction or expansion on national security and/or foreign policy grounds, the issue will be referred to me for decision and the proposed action held in abeyance. (C)

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~~SECRET~~

All information learned as a result of our cooperative efforts shall be provided to relevant agencies. Additional security guidance as necessary will be promulgated by the Secretary of Energy and, where appropriate, the Secretary of Defense. (S)

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UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9620418
RECEIVED: 01 MAY 96 19

TO: BACA, B

FROM: SENS

DOC DATE: 06 MAY 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ACCESS
CTB
NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS

PDD
NUCLEAR TESTING
RUSSIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: APPROVAL OF REQUEST FOR PDD-47

ACTION: DOHSE SGD MEMO

DUE DATE: 04 MAY 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: MERCHANT

LOGREF: 9620151

FILES: IFD 0

NSCP: PDD0047

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY

BT

DATE

5/06/96

BY HAND

W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSBTM

CLOSED BY: NSBTM

DOC 4 OF 4

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 9620418

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

001	MERCHANT	Z	96050119	PREPARE MEMO FOR SENS
002	SENS	Z	96050216	FOR SIGNATURE
002	BERGER	Z	96050217	RECOMMENDATIONS
002		X	96050221	NOTED BY BERGER W/ COMMENT
003		X	96050615	FOR RECORD PURPOSES
004		X	96050617	DOHSE SGD MEMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

<u>DOC</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR ACTION</u>	<u>DISPATCH FOR INFO</u>
004	960506	BACA, B	

UNCLASSIFIED

TO: SENS

SUSPENSE

FROM: BACA, B

DOC DATE: 26 APR 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ACCESS
CTB
NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS

PDD
NUCLEAR TESTING
RUSSIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: COMMERCE DEPT REQUEST FOR CY OF PDD-47

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR SENS

DUE DATE: 04 MAY 96 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: MERCHANT

LOGREF: 9620151

FILES: IF

NSCP: PDD0047

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
MERCHANT

FOR CONCURRENCE
ANDREASEN


FOR INFO
BELL
BLACKER
KRECKZO
LEARY
MILLISON

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSBTM CLOSED BY: DOC 1 OF 1

Free b 5:35 pm
5/2



National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: ✓ LOG # 20418
URGENT NOT PROOFED: ✓ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT
BYPASSED WW DESK: DOCLOG Bm A/O

1 APR 96 2:35

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
<u>Bj</u> Harmon	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Dohse	<u>1/4</u>	<u>D/W</u>	<u> </u>
Sens	<u>2/4</u>	<u>DS</u>	<u> </u>
Soderberg	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Berger	<u>3</u>	<u> </u>	<u>see note</u>
Lake	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Situation Room	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Records Mgt.	<u>6</u>	<u>Bm 5/04/96 D/R</u>	<u> </u>
<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain M = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Return to Bureau for dispatch

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yao

Log # 20418

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

Fm _____ To _____ Date _____

Fm _____ To _____ Date _____

SANDY - we have
not shared these
widely in part. Do
you agree that
we do so this time?

SANDY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9620418
DATE 06 MAY 96

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR PDD-47
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE TIME SIGNATURE

MS. BETTIE BACA
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROOM 5854
14TH & CONSTITUTION AVE, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20230

5-6-96 18:46 Beverly Gallimore

PRINT LAST NAME: GALLIMORE

COPY: ORIGINAL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
DISTRIBUTION RECEIPT

LOG 9620151
DATE 21 MAR 96

SUBJECT: PDD-47
DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

DATE

TIME

SIGNATURE

MS. BETTIE BACA
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROOM 5854
14TH & CONSTITUTION AVE, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20230

PRINT LAST NAME: _____

COPY: #12 _____

DATE, TIME, SIGN THE RECEIPT AND RETURN TO: NSC RECORDS MGNT, ROOM 379 OEOB

PAGE 01 OF 01 PAGES
DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, As Amended,
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By ms NARA, Date 10/31/06


2009-0112-r

May 6, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR MS. BETTIE BACA
Executive Secretary
Department of Commerce

SUBJECT: Request for PDD-47

Pursuant to your request, enclosed for your information and retention is a copy of PDD-47.


Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A PDD-35

~~SECRET~~

No. PDD 47

COPY #12 (COMMERCE)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMATION

Notice

The attached document contains classified National Security Council Information. It is to be read and discussed only by persons authorized by law.

Your signature acknowledges you are such a person and you promise you will show or discuss information contained in the document only with persons who are authorized by law to have access to this document.

Persons handling this document acknowledge he or she knows and understands the security law relating thereto and will cooperate fully with any lawful investigation by the United States Government into any unauthorized disclosure of classified information contained herein.

Access List

DATE	NAME	DATE	NAME
_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____
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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: IDS Date: 10/21/08

2004-0110-1



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Office of the Secretary
Washington, D.C. 20230

20418

May 6, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR

Andrew D. Sens
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
By Fax: (202)456-9480

John
May 6, 96

FROM:

Bettie Baca *Bettie Baca*
Executive Secretary
Department of Commerce

SUBJECT:

PDD 47

Regarding our conversation on Friday, the PDD is for Sue Eckert, Assistant Secretary for Export Administration. She needs a copy of the PDD, as it relates to a licensing issue that she is working on with the Interagency Working Group on Nonproliferation and Export Controls. We will restrict distribution to Assistant Secretary Eckert. You have my assurance that she has the necessary level of clearance.

Please expedite this request. Thank you in advance.



**UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY**

DATE:

5-6-96

TO:

Andrew Sens

ORGANIZATION:

TELEPHONE NUMBER:

FAX NUMBER:

456-9460

FROM:

Bettie Bala

Room 5516, 14th & Constitution Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20230

Telephone Number: 202/482-3934 Fax Number: 202/482-4576

NUMBER OF PAGES TO FOLLOW:

MESSAGE:

May 2, 1996

SIGNED

*5/2 → Andy S -
What is our
policy on this?
Why do they need it?
how do we assure
its confidentiality?*

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW D. SENS

THROUGH: WILLIAM H. LEARY

FROM: BRIAN T. MERCHANT

*ML
BTM*

SUBJECT: Commerce Department Request for Copy of PDD-47

Commerce has requested a copy of PDD-47 (Tab II). NSC staff (Bell) recommend approval. Your memorandum (Tab I) forwards a copy PDD-47 to Commerce for information and retention.

Concurrence by: Robert Bell and Alan Kreczko *AK*
*BTM for
VERBAL*

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I.

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to Commerce
- Tab A PDD-47
- Tab II Incoming Request

*how
sensitive is it?
R*



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Office of the Secretary
Washington, D.C. 20230

20418

~~Staff~~
Brian Merchant

April 26, 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR ANDREW SENS
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

FROM:

BETTIE BACA *Betty Baca*
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SUBJECT:

PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE 47 (PDD-47)

The Department of Commerce would like a copy of PDD-47. This Directive relates directly to work the Department is engaged in with the Departments of Energy, Defense, and State.



**UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY**

DATE: 4-30-96

TO: Brian Mechant

ORGANIZATION: _____

TELEPHONE NUMBER: _____

FAX NUMBER: 456-9341

FROM: Pewsey Gallina

**Room 5516, 14th & Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20230
Telephone Number: 202/482-3934 Fax Number: 202/482-4576**

NUMBER OF PAGES TO FOLLOW: _____

MESSAGE:


NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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