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SUBJECT: ACDA SECURITY OBJECTIVE & STRATEGY PAPER ON RUSSIA - UKRAINE ISSUES

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	~~GOTTEMOELLER~~	
	LOWENKRON	
	PONEMAN	
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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20451

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

MAR 4 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Subject: ACDA Security Objectives and Strategy Paper on Russia/Ukraine Security Issues ~~(C)~~

I would appreciate your forwarding the attached Memorandum, dated March 3, 1993, to Ms. Rose Gottemoeller, Director for Russian and Ukrainian Affairs, from Stanley A. Riveles, Acting Assistant Director, Strategic Nuclear Affairs Bureau of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). This memorandum responds to a request from the NSC for an ACDA paper on the aforementioned subject. ~~(C)~~

Barbara Starr
Barbara Starr
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated

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ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

March 3, 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR FOR
RUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN AFFAIRS
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: ACDA Security Objectives and Strategy Paper on Russia/Ukraine Security Issues ~~(C)~~

Attached is ACDA's security objectives and strategy paper tasked by the February 26 Steering Group on Russia/Ukraine Security Issues. ~~(C)~~

Stanley A. Riveles /SR

Stanley A. Riveles
Assistant Director, Acting
Strategic Nuclear Affairs Bureau

Attachment: as stated

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By VL NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M

I. U.S. SECURITY OBJECTIVES VIS-A-VIS RUSSIA AND UKRAINE

I. STATEMENT OF SECURITY OBJECTIVES

The overarching U.S. security objectives vis-a-vis Russia and Ukraine are to minimize the threat either could pose to U.S. security and U.S. interests abroad, to integrate each of them politically and economically into the European and world communities, and to promote stable, cooperative relations between them as independent states of the FSU. These ends are best served by encouraging the processes of democratization in these countries and by aiding them in their efforts to liberalize and demilitarize their economies and societies as quickly as possible. Also of paramount importance are efforts to ensure that the nuclear weapons on the territory of Russia and Ukraine are not used to threaten the U.S. or its allies, or become an element in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Thus, the nuclear weapons of the FSU must be reduced to the lowest levels possible, with residual weapons remaining under centralized Russian/CIS control. The nuclear weapons outside Russia, including those in Ukraine, must be returned to Russia for dismantlement as soon as possible. The START framework and our associated efforts in SSD and in diplomatic channels provide the vehicles for pursuing these objectives by creating a web of legal and political commitments.

A. Denuclearization

The near-term security objectives of the U.S. are to achieve the earliest possible withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the other republics to Russia (i.e. faster than seven years if feasible), reduce Russian holdings of nuclear weapons and delivery systems as much and as quickly as possible; and to place Ukraine firmly on the road to denuclearization. This requires Ukraine to ratify START, adhere to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state, and remove nuclear weapons and delivery systems from its territory.

Russia has now ratified START and signed START-II. The U.S. is providing to Russia direct financial and technical assistance for denuclearization steps aimed at getting FSU weapons disabled, stored and dismantled. The U.S. is also prepared to explore ways to help encourage ratification of START-II by the Russian parliament by, for instance, providing experts to meet with Russian opinion leaders, etc.

However, START and START II will not enter into force until Ukraine ratifies START and adheres to the NPT. Ukraine has delayed ratifying START and acceding to the NPT pending agreement with Russia on the disposition of warheads and fulfillment of its demands for security assurances from Russia, the U.S. and the other Western nuclear powers, assistance for

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the dismantling of weapons, and receipt of its share of profits from the sale of HEU to the U.S. The U.S. and its allies have so far tried an approach of offering carrots such as security assurances while applying political pressure on Ukraine to live up to its Lisbon commitments. Overshadowing U.S. policy toward Ukraine is Ukraine's concern regarding its longer-term security and independence from Russia.

The U.S. should continue to be responsive to Ukraine's legitimate concerns and could explore additional ways to assuage Ukrainian concerns, for instance, through proposals for international oversight of the warhead elimination process in Russia. (This may not be necessary since Ukraine may be satisfied with the current arrangement whereby Ukrainian inspectors are permanently stationed in Russian facilities to oversee the destruction of nuclear warheads.) The U.S. has already suggested it can be responsive to Ukrainian concerns about the costs of implementing the START Treaty inspection regime.

Our major effort, however, should be aimed at easing Russian-Ukrainian tension, which is the underlying source of Ukrainian reluctance to ratify START, and getting Ukraine to agree once and for all to return all nuclear weapons to Russia for elimination.

It seems increasingly unlikely that the Rada will complete action on START during its current session. Thus, the U.S. may have to step up to in the near term to a decision on whether to resort to policy "sticks."

B. Demilitarization

It is clearly in the U.S. interest for Russia and Ukraine to continue to demilitarize their societies and economies in the broadest sense. This means reducing their expenditures on the military, reducing the size of their conventional armies, converting military production to useful civilian production, and redirecting human and technical resources away from the defense sector to the civilian economy. Similarly, liberalizing their governments and economies, thus reducing the role of centralized governmental power in the economic and political life of these states, will help direct their societies away from military power.

The U.S. can promote demilitarization in only a very limited way through the use of SSD funds, support of the science and technology centers, implementation of the CFE Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty, and through more direct outreach to defense industries to help them to reconfigure to secure civilian contracts.

However, success with the longer term goals of demilitarization will require fundamental political and

economic reform and new external sources of capital. These problems go well beyond what can be addressed by the relatively limited and narrowly circumscribed provisions of the Nunn-Lugar legislation. Thus, Nunn-Lugar should focus on nuclear dismantlement.

C. Preservation of Control over Nuclear Weapons

Preservation of centralized control by Moscow authorities over nuclear weapons in the FSU is essential to the U.S. objectives of reducing the threat posed by nuclear weapons and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and technological know-how. In this context, we should have no illusions that the nuclear command role of the "CIS" is only a useful device for assuaging non-Russian concerns: Real decisions are in Russian hands. The U.S. aim is to avoid a splintering of the command and control system that would result in de facto control by Ukraine. This is also important from an NPT perspective: To be consistent with the obligations Ukraine will undertake as a non-nuclear weapons state party to the NPT, it is essential that Ukraine not have independent control of nuclear weapons.

Some of the SSD activities are geared toward ensuring continued control over the nuclear weapons of the FSU by getting them out of the other states and into Russian territory as quickly as possible. This effort of course should be integrated with our START/START II emphasis on elimination of the means of delivering those weapons. Thus, our aim remains to deactivate the weapons and ensure that the nuclear materials are stored safely and securely.

It is a vital U.S. interest that Ukraine not gain positive control over the nuclear weapons on its territory. Our best means of preventing this is to continue to ensure that the weapons be removed from Ukraine (or deactivated) as quickly as possible. Toward that end, we should show some sympathy with Ukrainian concerns about the disposition of the warheads that are removed from Ukraine. Since we do not want the warheads to be eliminated in Ukraine, we should explore whether a U.S. proposal for the internationally supervised storage of warheads awaiting dismantlement in Russia would reassure Ukraine both about the disposition of the warheads removed from its territory and about the intention of the U.S. to play the role of honest broker. It is not clear if Ukraine is satisfied with the current arrangement whereby Ukrainian inspectors are permanently stationed at Russian facilities to observe the weapons elimination process. Similarly, we should push for resolution of the profit sharing formula for HEU proceeds, which is currently being discussed by Russia and Ukraine, and should consider playing a more activist mediating role in this matter. We may need to develop additional strategies to push Ukraine to follow through on its Lisbon commitment to remove

the weapons from its territory.

We should strongly oppose other Ukrainian steps to extend control over the weapons in Ukraine (under the pretext of "administrative" control). Moreover, we should urge accelerated steps to disable the systems that will eventually be eliminated.

D. Prevention of Proliferation

A major objective of the U.S. is to ensure that the civilian, as well as military nuclear industry remain under secure and central control, with effective non-proliferation restrictions. Some U.S. financial and technical assistance has been directed toward ensuring that nuclear material is securely stored, converted to a militarily unusable form, or removed from the FSU and toward preventing leakage of weapons, material, technology and experts from the FSU. Similarly, the U.S. has pressed Russia, and to a lesser extent other FSU states, to apply Western standards on other export issues -- such as MTCR standards for the export of missiles and missile technology.

The U.S. should make every effort to encourage responsible export behavior on the part of Russia and Ukraine. This task is difficult because it competes with the Russian and Ukrainian desire for quick hard currency profits from the sale of weapons-related technologies and services. The U.S. and its Western allies must persuade Russia and Ukraine that responsible export policies are in their ultimate interest, and will result in positive near-term benefits such as access to Western technologies and markets.

The Russians have complained of late that the U.S. exhibits a double standard on arms sales. Russia wants U.S. help to expand its market share. The U.S. should consider whether it can help Russia gain access to markets which do not involve export control concerns. This may interfere with our own export efforts and we should consider this trade-off in terms of our overall net advantage. We must also be sensitive to the conflicting demands on Russian policy makers who are sensitive to the export control concerns of the West, but are under enormous domestic pressure to permit foreign sales of Russian high-technology goods and services, most of which are defense-related.

E. Building Cooperation

The most demanding objective of the U.S. is to build cooperative relationships with Russia and Ukraine, and to help integrate each economically and politically into the community of nations. Not only will the U.S. need to work hard to build and sustain good relations with both Russia and Ukraine, but the U.S. may have to modify its current policy of avoiding

mediating between Ukraine and Russia. Playing the go-between may be useful in helping foster reasonably good relations between Ukraine and Russia -- a prerequisite for the achievement of all of the U.S. security objectives related to denuclearization and demilitarization of these two nations.

Were Russian-Ukrainian relations to deteriorate significantly, all bets would be off for removing nuclear weapons from Ukraine, for implementing the START I reductions, for continuation of the process of demilitarization, for the prevention of proliferation, and for the prospects for continued peace in the region. Thus, facilitating reasonably good relations between Russia and Ukraine will of necessity be a major objective for the U.S., requiring patient and time-consuming effort. The U.S. must play the role of honest broker without altering its fundamental position that Ukraine should under no circumstances become a nuclear power. The U.S. will have to demonstrate that remaining a non-nuclear power is in Ukraine's best long-term interest.

Stable U.S.-Russian and U.S.-Ukrainian relations, and even more, stable Russian-Ukrainian cooperation, will be much enhanced by successfully embedding them in the wider political, economic and security institutions of Europe, including the CSCE network, the NACC and, in the future, closer links with the EC and NATO. The Western Europeans have far more immediately powerful economic incentives to offer than do we; European (including NATO) security links are sought by the Ukrainians. The U.S. however will have to take the lead in promoting coordinated and far-sighted action by the West as a whole.

II. STRATEGY FOR ACHIEVING U.S. SECURITY OBJECTIVES

A. ENGAGEMENT

U.S. strategy for achieving its security objectives with Russia and Ukraine has evolved since the breakup of the U.S.S.R. in December 1991. It is now poised to become more activist through more forms of contact and assistance. We can no longer afford to meet only those needs identified by Ukraine or Russia. Nor can we afford to limit our contacts to government-to-government ones. They must be broadened to embrace the parliaments, the military, the scientists and the general public. These contacts must also serve to reinforce the perception, and the reality, of long-term involvement with these countries.

Public diplomacy should support and encourage policies

being pursued with the governments. Thus, it should emphasize specific benefits of denuclearization, proliferation controls, and demilitarization of the economy. It should complement and support assistance and training programs. While consciousness-raising would be its goal, public diplomacy cannot be general in either tone or content. Targeted, more intensive programs (such as inviting public leaders, e.g., newspaper editors or educators, to visit the United States and meet with U.S. government officials) will likely be more valuable than generalized efforts.

Education and training should be used both as a special form of public diplomacy--reaching out to special interest groups (e.g., the military, defense scientists, academics, etc.)--and as a method of pursuing specific projects (e.g. defense conversion projects). U.S. expertise in setting up programs in the economic assistance area (i.e., economic development) gives us some insights, though the challenges faced by the former Soviet Union (FSU) are not exactly the same as those in many developing countries. Experience gained during U.S. domestic defense conversion efforts (e.g., local training programs on environmental cleanup associated with base closings) as well as other U.S. training projects (i.e., commercial sector) may be useful, but we must recognize the almost complete absence of a market economy in the FSU and the highly integrated nature of their defense enterprises.

Military-to-military contacts, including on-going programs such as IMET, will be useful but should focus on developing a concrete, goal-oriented dialogue. In particular, it may be useful to discuss how our military functions within our government, with emphasis on civilian control of the military, as well as opportunities for military-trained people leaving the armed forces. The military's role within our government would also be a useful subject for discussions with parliamentarians and the public. Military-to-military contacts could be used to stimulate both interest in and acceptance of particular assistance projects.

B. DIALOGUE

Focus

Thus far, our security dialogue with Ukraine and Russia has focused almost entirely on arms control issues-- with respect to existing treaties (INF and CFE) as well as those not yet in force (START and START II). Even in the area of financial (i.e., Nunn-Lugar) assistance, the United States has emphasized the importance of strategic nuclear delivery vehicle (SNDV) destruction-related projects--rather than military-to-military contacts, defense industry conversion, or even the need for environmental cleanup of former military facilities. With

respect to security, the dialogue has not moved beyond discussion of a general liaison relationship with Europe and the United States (the NACC, which may not have reached the limits of its effectiveness). We have not seized this potential opportunity to modify Russia's and Ukraine's security relationship with the west.

This focus on arms control is understandable; however, it has had the negative consequences of placing the United States in the position of being demandeur, and, ironically, of giving Ukraine undue leverage vis-a-vis the West by virtue of its "possession" of nuclear weapons. We need to modulate the dialogue so that denuclearization and non-proliferation are no longer its sole content. We must broaden the dialogue with Russia and Ukraine to include the full range of issues in our security relationships.

In view of the importance of securing Ukraine's ratification of START and accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state, the United States has stressed to Kiev the importance of Ukraine's economic and political integration into the Western community of nations and linked such integration, by way of U.S. financial and technical assistance, to Ukraine's ratification and accession. This strategy has correctly underscored the importance we attach to these objectives, but it has not yet produced the desired results. It has also constrained U.S. options for constructive engagement with Ukraine. We must continue to press Ukraine to divest itself of the nuclear weapons on its territory, but it is not in the United State's interest to try to isolate it from the West. Ukraine cannot dismantle nuclear weapons without U.S./Western technical assistance, and without Western assistance its economy will stagnate further and generate greater political instability. Thus, while arms control concerns are critically important, U.S. policy toward Ukraine would benefit from a broader perspective which does not threaten to isolate Ukraine and which does not preclude engagement with Ukraine in other key foreign and economic policy areas.

Hand-in-hand with U.S. efforts, we need to encourage a European role and European linkages to Russia and, in particular, to Ukraine. Such linkages will forge a longer-term and stronger economic and security relationship with the West. Japan should also be encouraged to continue its overtures.

Defense Cooperation and Cooperative Peacekeeping

A dialogue with the Russian and Ukrainian defense ministries and the military could help set the stage for various other programs, e.g. cooperative peacekeeping, defense industry conversion and arms control implementation issues. These contacts would augment discussions on particular financial assistance projects. In this area, as in others, the

offer of immediate opportunities will be important.

Cooperative peacekeeping is an area in which we will have to tread carefully. Russia is becoming vocal in stating that the area which was once the Soviet Union is her sphere of influence. She is reestablishing interest and ties with Serbia, a tradition of protection dating to the Tsars. Finally, forty-five years of mutual military and political distrust will not evaporate overnight. On the other hand, Russia has made positive overtures concerning recent U.S. efforts in Bosnia. Where Russian security interests are not directly involved, such as the Middle East or Africa, or given close consultation where they are involved, such as the Balkan peninsula, cooperation may be possible. The Russian military still possesses considerable manpower, probably more than is needed for her legitimate defense, and peacekeeping under joint arrangements could a viable way of keeping them usefully employed.

Arms Control Implementation

Arms control implementation discussions are primarily conducted in established channels. The Special Verification Commission (INF), Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (START) and Joint Consultative Group (CFE) have been engaged since the breakup of the Soviet Union in ascertaining how the treaties--including the financial burdens associated with them--can be brought into line with the new order. The remaining succession issue is the ABM Treaty, to which Ukraine (among others) has insisted it must be Party. U.S. policy in this regard has been an irritant to our relations with Ukraine and is being reviewed. While issues of succession have often hampered visible progress, existing fora (except SCC) are well on their way to working out new procedures, including possible financial arrangements, to make these treaties both true to their intent and less burdensome. The CFE Joint Consultative Group has had similar discussions for some time, but there are continuing problems related to how Russia and Ukraine (along with other concerned FSU states) will assume all of the FSU START reduction obligations. This effort will involve some Nunn-Lugar assistance (e.g., establishment of communications links in non-Russian parties to START and SNDV dismantlement assistance); also, U.S. flexibility on procedures may be an incentive both for implementing the treaties fully and, perhaps, for more rapid reductions.

Denuclearization and Non-Proliferation

Silo dismantlement assistance discussions have become a significant part of the Safety, Security and Dismantlement (SSD) effort. While occurring in the context of Nunn-Lugar financial assistance, they are closely related to START

implementation and thus are a matter of interest in both fora. This parallel effort should be used to reinforce the theme that the United States is both interested in getting these systems eliminated and is willing to help in an obvious and responsible fashion.

Our strategem on denuclearization and non-proliferation issues needs to make clear to opinion leaders why these ideas are positive and beneficial. Perhaps in the same way that high-level governmental or military contacts can help launch a discussion of specific projects, as well as lead to an understanding of the challenges, so perhaps could high-level discussions with particular interest groups in the parliament and industrial leadership on denuclearization and non-proliferation. The United States needs to reach out to them and explain why--not simply demand that--their promises associated with START and the Lisbon Protocol are both an essential starting point and the basis for a sound and lasting relationship with the United States and other western countries.

Security assurances and dismantlement assistance will, of course, be an essential part of our efforts to show Ukraine that we are serious in our desire to continue a relationship with a non-nuclear Ukraine, but that will not suffice. Our efforts to establish an export control regime, MC&A program and pursue a vigorous and transparent dismantlement assistance program with Russia will be just as important to demonstrate why we can be trusted to be even-handed in our efforts. Impartiality must be apparent in all aspects of our relationship with Russia and Ukraine, and it is extremely important with regard to nuclear weapons-related programs, including the issue of the equitable sharing of proceeds from the sale of HEU to the United States. The United States needs to follow its good words with deeds and, as we have done with issues related to arms control implementation, begin to involve ourselves more in achieving the successful implementation of our policies.

Finally, to the extent our strategy of broadened engagement is successful with Ukraine, we need to look beyond START ratification and consider how best to accelerate withdrawals of warheads so that our denuclearization goals are achieved well before the START seven-year timeline. We must always bear in mind that the longer nuclear weapons remain in Ukraine, the greater the risk that the situation may change and Ukraine may seize unilateral control of these weapons.

C. ASSISTANCE: NUNN-LUGAR

<u>SSD</u>

The U.S. conduct of the Nunn-Lugar SSD assistance effort has been vigorous and fruitful, but has lacked the emphasis,

mentioned above, on immediacy. Some of this is due to how the funds are controlled, but even that could be dealt with better by a little more of the "lend-lease" mind set. To the extent possible, we need to offer equipment, material and ideas that are immediately available, versus limiting ourselves to customized assistance. In some instances, the "best" may indeed be the enemy of the "most useful." We also need to look for projects that, while beneficial in the short term, could also lead to long-term economic development benefits for the region in which they are located.

Russia, and to a lesser extent Ukraine, (which, thus far, has refused to sign any agreements), points to the number of meetings and papers signed without any apparent benefits. This is, of course, partly due to their recalcitrance in coming up with reasonable projects and details in a timely fashion, but it is also due to the lack of focus in U.S. efforts, the U.S. procurement process and the lack of coordination among SSD projects (e.g., silo dismantlement), defense conversion (e.g., opportunities for retraining defense scientists, engineers, managers and military officers in fuel conversion/economic use projects) and environmental cleanup (e.g., opportunities beyond cleaning up the silo area to include POL storage areas on military bases). Thus, we need both to streamline the project procurement process and work to coordinate our efforts, thereby multiplying their usefulness.

The United States, as noted earlier in the paper, needs to apply lessons gained and technologies used in our own experience and try to draw Ukraine and Russia more fully into the creative--project development--phase. The fact that we have fixed budget limits should be made clear to them. Many projects seem worthy until they are balanced against others. This is a lesson both countries will need to learn if they are to develop into vigorous economies.

Defense Conversion and Environmental Cleanup

Assuming increased assistance levels are obtained, the U.S. should provide meaningful defense industry conversion assistance. For Russia and Ukraine we should focus not so much on the large conventional defense production factories, but instead on industrial exports, development firms exploiting FSU technologies and "subcontractors" such as optics and electronics firms. The focus needs to be on leading edge technologies that could develop into focal points for free-market enterprises and joint ventures (where U.S. assistance and experience has a chance for building companies that can respond to market-driven requirements). Initial efforts should address the key deficiency--lack of knowledge and experience with basic market economy philosophy, operations and techniques--by providing entrepreneurial training directly to key defense industry audiences in high technology areas.

As we encourage demilitarization in the FSU, we must also--hand-in-hand --encourage environmental restoration of land ravaged by the consequences of their militarized economy. The United States faces and is meeting significant environmental challenges as we downsize our military/defense establishment, and, through newly developed and developing technologies, we can offer the loan of considerable expertise in such areas as restoring ICBM silos and cleaning up fuel spills.

Reactor Safety

Closely linked to environmental cleanup is the issue of reactor safety. The continued use of RBMK (Chernobyl) style reactors poses a menace to all of eastern and central Europe. Our initial efforts should be to enhance reactor safety and reduce the risk as much as possible, perhaps through cooperative exchanges on risk assessment, training of personnel, programs to help those countries establish an effective safety culture, and joint exploration of "inherently safe" reactor designs for the future.

Reactor Conversion

Russia uses three military plutonium production reactors to generate heat and electrical power in two regions. The two reprocessing plants associated with these reactors are two of the most vulnerable targets in the entire FSU for the diversion of nuclear weapons-usable material. The significant proliferation risks inherent in these reprocessing plants call for prompt action leading to their ultimate shutdown. However, shutting down the reprocessing plants would require converting or shutting down the reactors, and local populations depend upon these reactors as their sole source of heat and electricity. With that in mind, our efforts should be to convert the reactors so that they continue to produce heat and electricity, but the spent fuel can be stored safely without reprocessing so that the reprocessing plants can be shut down and do not pose a proliferation risk.

Chemical Weapons

The disposition of chemical weapons is another area requiring urgent attention. The agreement signed in July 1992 has seen little action towards full implementation. While Russia has tentatively identified three potential CW destruction locations, local permission to begin work remains elusive. Also, the U.S has not received sufficient information from Russia to call for bids from U.S. contractors to develop a concept plan for CW elimination.

Cooperative Ventures with the Allies

The United States should seek truly effective multilateralization of our efforts in engaging Russia and

Ukraine across the spectrum of fronts described above. For example, within the context of SSD, the NATO Ad Hoc Working Group on Nuclear Weapons has proven less useful than it could be, because it is used primarily as a forum for the United States to report its actions, with little feed-back from the Allies. The extent of the financial need is far larger than was anticipated and western efforts need to be coordinated. Thus, burdensharing, plus the attendant need to coordinateassistance, must be discussed. The U.S. either has to make fuller use of the possibilities of this forum or turn to bilateral discussions.

Truly cooperative ventures, versus coordinating projects, would serve an even more important goal: to bring the Alliance into close contact with Ukraine, thereby demonstrating that security assurances are not the only means of achieving a close bond with member nations of the NATO Alliance. Like other longer-term efforts, cooperative ventures with the Allies would help demonstrate the solid commitment the western nations have to Ukraine and to the Russian-Ukrainian relationship.

Case Number: 2016-0048-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 144				
Document ID: 9301808				
Row: 44	Section: 1	Shelf: 5	Position: 1	Stack: V

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. paper~~	~~re: START II Ratification (2 pages)~~	~~03/23/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 01/02/2020
001b. paper	re: Arms Control-ABM Treaty [partial] (2 pages)	03/24/1993	P3/b(3) VZ 01/02/2020
001c. paper	re: Comprehensive Test Ban Issues [partial] (2 pages)	03/24/1993	P3/b(3) VZ 01/02/2020
001d. paper	re: Chemical Weapons [partial] (2 pages)	03/22/1993	~~P1/b(1)~~, P3/b(3) VZ 01/02/2020
~~001e. paper~~	~~re: Biological Weapons (2 pages)~~	~~03/22/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 01/02/2020
001f. talking points	re: START II Ratification [partial] (2 pages)	03/23/1993	P1/b(1), P3/b(3) VZ 01/02/2020
~~001g. talking points~~	~~re: Talking Points: Expanding the Five Power Forum (1 page)~~	~~03/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 01/02/2020
~~001h. talking points~~	~~re: ABM Treaty/Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) (2 pages)~~	~~03/24/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 01/02/2020
~~001i. talking points~~	~~re: Nuclear Nonproliferation (2 pages)~~	~~03/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 01/02/2020
~~001j. talking points~~	~~re: Chemical Weapons (1 page)~~	~~03/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 01/02/2020
~~001k. talking points~~	~~re: Biological Weapons (1 page)~~	~~03/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 01/02/2020
~~002a. paper~~	~~re: Humanitarian Assistance and Food Sales (1 page)~~	~~03/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 01/02/2020

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NSC Records Management
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rs1618

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~002b. paper~~	~~re: Technical Assistance Initiative for the Russian Federation (2 pages)~~	~~03/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 01/02/2020
~~002c. paper~~	~~re: Democracy Corps Initiative (2 pages)~~	~~03/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 01/02/2020
~~002d. paper~~	~~re: Energy and Environment Initiative (1 page)~~	~~03/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 01/02/2020
~~002e. paper~~	~~re: Russian Officers Settlement Initiative (1 page)~~	~~03/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 01/02/2020
~~003a. paper~~	~~re: Vietnam (1 page)~~	~~03/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 01/02/2020
~~003b. paper~~	~~re: Cambodia (1 page)~~	~~03/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 01/02/2020
~~003c. paper~~	~~re: The Non-Russian Ethnic Groups of Russia (1 page)~~	~~03/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 01/02/2020
~~003d. paper~~	~~re: China (1 page)~~	~~03/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 01/02/2020
~~003e. paper~~	~~re: India (1 page)~~	~~03/00/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 01/02/2020

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9301808
RECEIVED: 24 MAR 93 21

TO: ITOH

FROM: STARR, B

DOC DATE: 24 MAR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
START
ABM
ARMS CONTROL
CTB
CBW

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: ACDA BRIEFING MATERIALS FOR PRES SUMMIT MTG W/ PRES YELTSIN OF RUSSIA

ACTION: ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S DUE DATE: 27 MAR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SANNER LOGREF: 9301582 9301905

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M

COMMENTS:

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OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSJEB DOC 1 OF 4

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RECORD ID: 9301808

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	SANNER	Z	93032421	APPROPRIATE ACTION
001		X	95030117	ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/S
002	SANNER	Z	93032915	ADD-ON / APPROPRIATE ACTION
003	SANNER	Z	93033009	ADD-ON / APPROPRIATE ACTION
003		X	93040814	OBE PER SANNER
004	ROSNER	Z	93040107	ADD-ON / APPROPRIATE ACTION
004		X	93040710	NFAR PER ROSNER

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9301808
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TO: ITOH

FROM: STARR, B

DOC DATE: 24 MAR 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
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PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

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ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION DUE DATE: 27 MAR 93 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: SANNER LOGREF: 9301582

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
SANNER	ANDREASEN	BELL
	BURNS	WALKER
	FRY	WITKOWSKY
	GATI	
	GOTTEMOELLER	
	PONEMAN	

OBE N. Burns

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20451

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

MAR 24 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Briefing Materials in Preparation for Summit Meeting with Russian President Yeltsin

As requested in your March 18, 1993 Memorandum, "Summit Meeting with Russian President Yeltsin," attached, in both original paper format and on a single diskette, are the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) prepared Background Papers and Talking Points.

ACDA was tasked specifically to provide appropriately cleared or coordinated Background Papers on START II Ratification and Other Arms Control Issues (ABM, CTB, CW/BW). Accordingly, the following Background Papers, which have been interagency cleared/coordinated as noted at the end of each paper, are attached:

- In the category START II Ratification, the paper entitled **"START II Ratification" (TAB A)**; and

- In the category Other Arms Control Issues, papers entitled:

  - **"Arms Control - ABM Treaty" (TAB B)**;
  - **"Comprehensive Test Ban Issues" (TAB C)**;
  - **"Chemical Weapons" (TAB D)**; and
  - **"Biological Weapons" (TAB E)**.

This Memorandum is Unclassified when separated from Classified attachments.

Classified by: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

Further, ACDA was tasked to provide Talking Points, as appropriate, in the broad categories of Bilateral Economic Issues and Initiatives, Macro Economic Issues, Foreign Policy Issues, and Security Issues. Accordingly, for the category of Security Issues, the following Talking Points, with interagency clearance as noted at the end of each paper, are attached:

- **"START II Ratification" (TAB F);**
- **"Expanding the Five-Power Forum" (TAB G)** [NOTE: Talking Points not interagency cleared. State opposes the ACDA approach taken in the document which calls for sub-ministerial meetings prior to START EIF.];
- **"ABM Treaty/Standing Consultative Commission (SCC)" (TAB H)** [NOTE: These were cleared with State, which joins ACDA in proposing a mid-May SCC session. CIA and Deputy SCC Commissioner also support Talking Points. OSD and JCS oppose the ACDA approach taken in the document.];
- **"Nuclear Non-Proliferation" (TAB I);**
- **"Talking Points Chemical Weapons" (TAB J)** [NOTE: These were derived from the interagency cleared Background Paper.];
- **"Talking Points Biological Weapons" (TAB K)** [NOTE: These were derived from the interagency cleared Background Paper.]; and
- **"Talking Points Comprehensive Test Ban Issues" (TAB L)** [NOTE: Agency views are fully delineated on separate sheet.].

If the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency may be of any further assistance in preparing for the Summit, please let me know.

Barbara Starr
Barbara Starr
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
As stated

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Divider Title: A

START II Ratification

START II will cut the strategic forces of the United States and Russia to 3000-3500 warheads, about one-third of current levels, by January 1, 2003. More importantly, the Treaty will lead to the elimination of all deployed land-based ICBMs with multiple warheads (MIRVed ICBMs). Both the reductions and the MIRVed ICBM ban can be accelerated to December 31, 2000 if the United States and Russia can agree on a program of assistance to Russia in reducing strategic forces.

START II was submitted to the U.S. Senate by President Bush on January 19. Hearings will begin in late April or early May; Senate approval is expected by August. We will work with the Senate to delay the vote until after Russian ratification since overwhelming Senate approval (which we expect) could support Russian hard-line claims that the Treaty favors the United States. Unless conditions deteriorate radically in Russia, no serious Senate opposition to START II is expected.

The Russian Government submitted the START II Treaty to the Supreme Soviet in February. Hearings are now in progress. We anticipate the Supreme Soviet will act during May or June of this year; this timing could easily be influenced by the current confrontation between Yeltsin and the legislature.

There is significant Supreme Soviet opposition to the cost of START II, although START II will cost less than START I. We have promised $400 million in Nunn-Lugar funds (not directly tied to START II), contingent on meeting legal requirements. Russian hard-liners incorrectly claim the Treaty is unequal because it eliminates Russian SS-18 ICBMs while allowing retention of U.S. Trident SLBMs. Finally, some in the Supreme Soviet want to delay final approval until Belarus, Kazakhstan, and (especially) Ukraine have all ratified START I and acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. (Belarus has taken both steps, Kazakhstan has ratified START I, Ukraine has acted on neither treaty.) We oppose such delay. Prompt approval of START II could send a useful signal to the other states, and Russian interests are protected since, by its own terms, START II cannot enter into force until START I does.

The United States has offered to support Russian ratification by encouraging reciprocal visits by the Senate Arms Control Observer Group and Russian Parliamentarians and by providing fact sheets and speakers to Moscow. If asked, we will provide mid-level witnesses to testify before the Supreme Soviet.

Yeltsin is strongly committed to START II and spoke emotionally of its importance during the signing ceremony. We are uncertain of how the current crisis will effect his attitude, the prospects for Supreme Soviet approval, or the desirability of American help. A recent NSC-directed study concluded that if Yeltsin seeks to delay START II ratification for political reasons, we should not object; survival of Yeltsin and his reforms is more important than prompt ratification.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M (1.02)

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001b. paper	re: Arms Control-ABM Treaty [partial] (1 page)	03/24/1993	P3/b(3)

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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CLEARANCE SHEET: START II Ratification Background Paper

Draft: ACDA/Ambassador Linton Brooks -- 3/23/93

Clearances:

State -- Phil Ellis
OSD -- Frank Miller
JCS -- LTC Jae Engelbrecht
DOE -- Pat Scholl
(b)(3)

[001b]

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Divider Title: B

ARMS CONTROL - ABM TREATY

In February and again in March, the Russians formally proposed that the Standing Consultative Commission meet without delay. (The SCC is the body charged with implementating the provisions of the ABM Treaty and is required to meet twice annually. Every five years the Treaty is required to be reviewed. The fourth five-year review should be held prior to October 3, 1993.) The Russians proposed to address ABM Treaty implementation issues including GPS questions, Treaty clarifications, and legal succession. The Russians provided the United States a draft Protocol to resolve ABM Treaty succession and told us they coordinated the Protocol with the non-Russian FSU states. Several of these non-Russian FSU states, including Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, have informed us as well that they consider themselves as ABM Treaty successor Parties. The U.S. told Russia that it has not taken a position on succession but looks forward to resuming our dialogue on the ABM Treaty and associated issues at an early date in the SCC. However, we could not agree to the Russian request to meet in March due to the ongoing review of issues related to the ABM Treaty and ballistic missile defenses.

During the previous Administration, the United States and Russia engaged in high-level discussions to develop a concept for a Global Protection System (GPS) against limited ballistic missile attack. However, the ABM Treaty presented impediments to the GPS Concept as previously proposed by the U.S. In particular, the U.S. proposed, both in GPS discussions and SCC negotiations, five Treaty initiatives: 1) discussion of the distinction between ATBM and ABM systems; 2) eliminating restrictions on sensors; 3) permitting additional deployment of fixed ground-based ABM defenses; 4) eliminating restrictions on the development and testing of ABM systems; and 5) permitting the transfer to GPS participants of ABM systems, ABM components, and technical information. Coming to agreement on issues 1 and 2 above would allow for a fully capable Theater Defense System, which would not be possible under the current ABM Treaty. Discussions relating to the first issue (ABM/ATBM distinction) were more technical and detailed in both GPS and SCC negotiations last year.

Also, there are a number of ABM implementation and compliance matters stemming from the breakup of the former Soviet Union that need to be addressed. The Russians want to continue discussions with the United States on GPS and they recognize the need to update the ABM Treaty in some respects to meet changed political circumstances. However, their firm position, expressed in GPS discussions and the SCC, is to retain the ABM Treaty without amendment. The Clinton Administration has expressed its strong support for continued adherence to the ABM Treaty and has said that any changes to the Treaty that may be required should be negotiated in good faith.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M (1.03)

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. paper	re: Comprehensive Test Ban Issues [partial] (1 page)	03/24/1993	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
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([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 144

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CLEARANCE SHEET: ABM Treaty

Draft: ACDA/Colonel Chic Ciccolella --3/24/93

Clearances:

(b)(3)

STATE -- D. Nickels
JCS -- Col. I. Robinson

[001c]

Not Cleared by OSD -- OSD feels this ABM Background Paper should be completely neutral and should simply make the point that the issues which have been identified are currently under policy review. OSD has prepared an alternative Background Paper for consideration.

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Divider Title: C

Comprehensive Test Ban Issues

Interest in banning nuclear weapon testing has existed almost as long as the weapons themselves. The United States has been engaged in discussions and negotiations on the subject since the late 1950s, bilaterally with the USSR as well as multilaterally. The most recent negotiations on the subject were the trilateral negotiations from 1977 to 1980 in Geneva, among the U.S., UK, and USSR. These countries made progress toward a treaty that included special verification provisions such as in-country seismic stations and on-site inspections to ensure adequate verification among these three nuclear weapon states. When the talks ended, however, important issues were still unsettled.

With the administration change in 1981, the trilateral negotiations were ended and U.S. declaratory policy became one of support for a CTB only as a long-range goal. This differed from Soviet/Russian policy, which continued to favor a CTB as soon as it could be negotiated.

Russia and the United States are currently observing a testing moratorium. For Russia the moratorium began in 1990 (when it was still the USSR), and has been extended in response to the U.S. moratorium. Russia has said it would not be the first to resume testing.

To meet requirements for advance notice of tests under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the United States and Russia have each notified the other of planned tests later this year, while making clear that they will only be conducted if the countries decide to resume testing.

The administration supports the approach on nuclear testing contained in the recently enacted legislation, PL102-377. That approach calls for a plan for achieving a multilateral CTB by September 30, 1996, and allows for tests in the interim, limited as to their number and purpose, following a report to the Congress on the nature of the tests. The Russians may wish to see negotiations begin at once and complete a CTB as soon as possible. Both countries are also observing a moratorium on testing, and both are making technical preparations to resume testing, if the political decision is made to do so.

Review is underway of the issues related to resumed testing, as allowed by the U.S. legislation. This will enable a U.S. decision on whether testing will be resumed between July 1993 and September 1996, and a U.S. decision on how it will seek to conduct negotiations leading to a CTB by September 1996.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M (1.04)

Drafted by: ACDA/NP/NST - Nicholas Carrera NC

Cleared by:
State/PM - P Hanscom/T Pinson (Cleared all except TP 2)
DoE - D Donnelly (Cleared all talking points)
OSD - E Nawrocki (Cleared points 3, 4, and 5 only; did not clear TP 1,2, and the "if asked" talking point) } NC

NOTE on clearances: Background is cleared in substance only; there was no time for final circulation of a much-modified text. Talking points are cleared as noted. JCS opposes providing any background and talking points until the U.S. has completed the PRD-19 exercise. (Source: OJCS/J-5 - Alex Lopes)

NPNSTNC 267
24 March 93

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Divider Title: D

Chemical Weapons (CW)

Chemical Weapons (CW) issues for the Summit should be limited to U.S.- Russian cooperation on Russian CW destruction (read: U.S. assistance to Russian CW destruction program), and the importance of the completion of bilateral agreements and Russian early ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

Russian obstacles to CW destruction are myriad. They have no adequate resource commitment to what will be an expensive and ecologically complex destruction program. They have declared 40,000 tons of chemical agent and have signed the CWC requiring destruction of their entire inventory, but have absolutely no capability right now to begin this destruction. They do not have political permission of any location, including the three republics already asked, to even begin construction of a facility to destroy CW and, therefore, no agreed plan for CW destruction. We estimate the eventual cost of the Russian destruction program will be at least $10 billion -- a heavy finacial burden given their limited funds. So far Russia has committed $4.2 billion rubles (about $8 million) to the program.

Partly because of the economic obligations inherent in the bilateral agreements and the CWC and partly because of internal political disputes, Russian spokesmen at CWC Preparatory Commission are intimating that Russia may not ratify the CWC until (and unless) "all the finacial requirements" are worked out in advance. This is tantamount to attempting to extract more Western financial assistance or tacit Western acceptance of Russia "destroying" its CW inventory in private, without international inspection, prior to their becoming a party to the CWC. Either of these Russian manuvers would not only make U.S. ratification of the CWC problematic, but would deal a severe blow to the CWC's value as an international norm against possession of CW. Continued allegations by Russian scientists of ongoing CW development, Russian prosecution of such scientists, and evidence of continued CW production capability and R & D have similar negative effects. The Russians also must be made to understand that their failure to ratify the CWC could seriously jeopardize continued U.S. financial support for their destruction program.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M (1.05)

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001d. paper	re: Chemical Weapons [partial] (1 page)	03/22/1993	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 144

FOLDER TITLE:
9301808

2016-0048-M
rs1618

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Drafted:MA/STP:SMannix
3/22/93

Cleared:Joint Staff:GDonadio
(b)(3)
OSD/ISP:RLewey
DOE/OAC:DDonnelly
STATE/PM:MWellington
STATE/EUR/ISCA:JHill
STATE/T:STomchick

[001d]

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Divider Title: E

Biological Weapons

We should emphasize the importance for Russia of taking concrete steps to establish U.S. confidence in the validity of President Yeltsin's March 1992 statement that the illicit offensive Biological Weapons (BW) program of the former Soviet Union truly has been terminated.

There has been an ongoing dialogue between the U.S. and UK on one side and the Russian Government on the other in an effort to get the Russians to take visible, concrete steps that would establish confidence that they have actually abandoned their covert offensive BW program. Because of hard evidence we presented to senior Russian policy-makers about the "cover" organization (BioPreparat) the former Soviet Union established to perpetuate an illicit offensive BW program after the former Soviet Union acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1975, President Yeltsin in March 1992 admitted the existence of the illegal program and proclaimed any future such activities illegal. We continue to question whether his decree has been universally enforced, however, both on the basis of recent intelligence and continuing obstructions by Russian bureaucrats of the actions promised by the Russians in a trilateral (US-UK-Russian) statement of September 1992. A reaffirmation at the most senior levels would indicate a continuing commitment to the principle of offensive BW eradication by President Yeltsin.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KL NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-m (1.06)

Drafted:DMahley
3/22/93

Interagency Clearances:

State:MRamee
OSD:VRostow

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Divider Title: F

TALKING POINTS
START II RATIFICATION

-- I strongly endorse the START II Treaty and intend to push for the Senate to begin action on it promptly. I would anticipate U.S. ratification by late summer.

-- I hope that you will be able to proceed quickly with ratification as well. You can best judge what timing to push for; we will understand your decision.

-- We are willing to support Russian ratification by providing fact sheets and speakers to Moscow and by encouraging reciprocal visits by the Senate Arms Control Observer Group and Russian Parliamentarians.

-- What are your plans for this important Treaty and how can we help?

(If he asks about providing witnesses before the Supreme Soviet)

-- We want to be as helpful as possible. What would you like from us?

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M (1.07)

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001f. talking points	re: START II Ratification [partial] (2 pages)	03/23/1993	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 144

FOLDER TITLE:
9301808

2016-0048-M
rs1618

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

CLEARANCE SHEET: START II RATIFICATION TALKING POINTS

Draft: ACDA/Ambassador Linton Brooks -- 3/23/93

Clearances:

State -- Phil Ellis
OSD -- Frank Miller
JCS -- LTC Jae Engelbrecht
DOE -- Pat Scholl
(b)(3)

[001f]

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Divider Title: G

~~SECRET~~

Talking Points: Expanding the Five Power Forum

-- We would like to follow up on our proposal to create a Five-Power Ministerial forum for the exchange of Instruments of Ratification for START with some additional thoughts about how this forum could be used.

-- Primarily, of course, we believe that this group will prove most useful after START Entry Into Force (EIF). Specifically, it would serve as a high-level consultative forum to address issues of concern to the START Parties that grow out of START, or related security matters, and which the START Parties have had difficulty resolving in the JCIC or which fall outside the jurisdiction of the JCIC.

-- In addition, however, the U.S. would like to propose that it take a more active role in assisting in the arms control-related problem solving efforts among the republics of the Former Soviet Union (FSU) before START EIF. We believe that this may be especially important in resolving differences between Russia and Ukraine. In our view, nowhere is such an effort more important than in the final ratification of START by all of the START Parties and accession to the NPT by Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

-- In the nearer term, we should consider specifically whether a Five Power group could be useful in addressing issues that might need to be resolved to assure EIF of the START Treaty. In addition, addressing other issues perhaps not formally related to Treaty ratification might nonetheless contribute to an atmosphere in which treaty ratification is enhanced.

-- Therefore, we propose expanding this Five Power forum to include a sub-ministerial component to address START and other related issues.

--- We would suggest, as a contingency, an agreement to convene "Five-Power" meetings of the JCIC representatives, reporting directly to their respective ministers, in order to resolve any remaining <u>significant</u> points of contention that might stand in the way of ratification or EIF.

--- As a second example, we would propose a "Five-Power" sub-ministerial group to deal with SSD assistance issues that require multilateral versus bilateral discussions. Naturally, Ambassador Goodby, the U.S. head of the SSD delegation, and his opposites would report directly to the Ministers as they progressed in their work.

~~SECRET~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0046-M (1.08)

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Divider Title: H

ABM TREATY/STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION (SCC)
TALKING POINTS

-- The United States believes that we need to resume the dialogue on the ABM Treaty and associated issues. We agree with the Russian proposal to meet in the Standing Consultative Commission for the ABM Treaty.

-- I suggest that we agree to resume the dialogue on these issues in the SCC in mid-May in Geneva. The United States would be pleased to welcome the other Bishkek states to join in these discussions, recognizing that this would be without prejudice to the final decisions and agreements on state succession and other issues relating to the ABM Treaty.

-- The United States has begun a comprehensive examination of U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Policy, focusing on what BMD objectives we will pursue and our strategy for pursuing them.

-- With regard to the SCC meeting agenda, in addition to the issue Russia has raised regarding state succession, the SCC should address other outstanding issues such as the Parties' respective proposals for distinguishing between ABM and non-ABM systems, use of sensors to enhance anti-tactical ballistic missile systems (ATBMs), considerations for planning the next Treaty Review, and other issues as appropriate. The United States is keenly interested in working with you to resolve these issues.

-- In terms of the broader political questions concerning defense cooperation in the context of our GPS discussions, we suggest a meeting at senior-official level to review our high-level discussions of last year and explore the next steps for both our countries. I have asked Secretary Christopher to discuss the arrangements for such a meeting with Foreign Minister Kozyrev.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M (1.09)

CLEARANCE SHEET: ABM Treaty/Standing Consultative Commission Talking Points

Draft: ACDA/Colonel Chic Ciccolella --3/24/93

Clearances: These Talking Points were circulated for information only. However, State, CIA, and the Deputy SCC Commissioner support these Talking Points.

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Divider Title: I

TALKING POINTS
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

-- Our Governments share a strong commitment to achieve the NPT's indefinite extension in 1995. I believe we should take all necessary steps to ensure this outcome.

-- It is vitally important that Ukraine and Kazakhstan adhere to the NPT as soon as possible. While not the only factor, we believe their failure to do so could jeopardize the prospects for indefinite extension.

-- Regarding the NPT, North Korea's announced decision to withdraw presents a grave security threat to the region. We must continue to work together to convince North Korea that this action is unacceptable; this may include action in the UN Security Council.

-- We would welcome your views on how to convince North Korea to retract its withdrawal announcement and fulfill its NPT obligations, including allowing the IAEA to inspect those sites the IAEA has selected.

-- On another regional issue, we both have great concerns about the nuclear situation in South Asia. We hope Russia will continue to play a helpful role as part of the growing international effort to encourage India and Pakistan to consider measures of restraint on their nuclear programs.

-- In that regard, we were surprised to hear recently from Atomic Energy Minister Mikhailov that he was recommending that Russia sell a nuclear power reactor to Pakistan without requiring Pakistan to accept IAEA full-scope safeguards.

-- I strongly urge you not to take this step; to do so would violate the consensus on full-scope IAEA safeguards reached last year by the 27 nation Nuclear Suppliers Group and would require the revocation of your decree of March 1992. Such a decision would seriously damage nuclear nonproliferation principles.

-- We also continue to oppose your nuclear cooperation with Iran, particularly the sale of a large research reactor which would be an ideal producer of plutonium. We believe Iran is seeking nuclear weapons despite its adherence to the NPT.

-- Through these actions Russia stands alone among many democratic nations which have refused to provide assistance to Iran's nuclear program; and we urge you to reconsider this policy.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By YZ NARA, Date 2/16/2019
2016-0048-M (1.10)

TALKING POINTS
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

DRAFTED BY: ACDA/NP/INA STAFF (647-7326)

CLEARANCES:
ACDA/NP/INA - D. Rust
State/NEA - L. Ward
State/OES - J. Dooley
State/SA - A. Carlson
State/PM - J. Marty (INFO)
State/EAP - E. Schmiel [redacted]
State/EUR - (INFO)

DR

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Divider Title: J

Talking Points
Chemical Weapons

--The United States fully appreciates the magnitude of Russian obligations under the bilateral agreements and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Destroying chemical weapons in an ecologically sound manner is a complex and expensive task.

--Russia must not shrink from this obligation. The Chemical Weapons Convention is our best hope to eliminate the threat of such weapons completely from the globe.

--As you know, the United States stands ready to assist Russia's destruction program. At the same time, Russia must accord the program high priority, both in resources and in commitment.

--While we recognize the challenge facing Russia in finding the resources and the political means to fulfill these obligations, Russia must not back away from the obligations of the bilateral agreements and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Russia must also act quickly to address concerns about allegations by Russian scientists about continuing Russian CW development. Failure to do so could jeopardize U.S. assistance for Russia's CW destruction program.

--In particular, failure of Russia to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention and become an early party would make it much more difficult for the United States to ratify the Convention or justify continued U.S. assistance for Russian CW destruction. This, in turn, would seriously undermine the global value of the Convention, a value we both want to promote.

--In order to begin spending U.S. money to help destroy Russian CW, we have to have concrete projects on which to spend the money. Russia must come up with a realistic and agreed approach to CW destruction that identifies such specific projects.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M (1.11)

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Divider Title: K

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Talking Points
Biological Weapons

-- You took a courageous step in March 1992 when you confirmed that the former Soviet regime had conducted an illicit offensive Biological Weapons program. Your decree outlawing any future offensive biological warfare activities by Russia was a forthright and proper action.

-- We continue, however, to see some signs that could indicate not all the elements of the Russian government have taken your decision fully into account.

-- It would be useful if we could quickly reach agreement on implementing our joint statement of last September, and move forward together in demonstrating confidence that offensive BW programs are a thing of the past.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By N NARA, Date 8/16/2011
2016-0048-M (1.12)

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Divider Title: L

TALKING POINTS
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN ISSUES

-- Our countries agree that a comprehensive test ban (CTB) is an important goal, which would support our nonproliferation objectives.

-- To help meet our objective of long-term extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at the 1995 Extension Conference, it will be important to complete or at least make good progress toward a CTB by then.

-- I support the goal of pursuing a multilateral comprehensive test ban (CTB), and I intend to do so.

-- The U.S. Government is currently studying relevant questions such as forum and modalities for negotiations.

-- Our governments will need to be in touch on this issue after I have reviewed this study.

If asked whether the United States will resume testing:

-- No decision has been made on the question of plans to resume testing after June 30, 1993, as allowed under our recent legislation.

(Annotated to indicate clearances)

TALKING POINTS
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN ISSUES

-- Our countries agree that a comprehensive test ban (CTB) is an important goal, which would support our nonproliferation objectives. (Cleared by ACDA, State, and DoE; not cleared by OSD or JCS.)

-- To help meet our objective of long-term extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at the 1995 Extension Conference, it will be important to complete or at least make good progress toward a CTB by then. (Cleared by ACDA and DoE; not cleared by State, OSD, or JCS.)

-- I support the goal of pursuing a multilateral comprehensive test ban (CTB), and I intend to do so. (Cleared by ACDA, State, DoE, and OSD; not cleared by JCS.)

-- The U.S. Government is currently studying relevant questions such as forum and modalities for negotiations. (Cleared by ACDA, State, DoE, and OSD; not cleared by JCS.)

-- Our governments will need to be in touch on this issue after I have reviewed this study. (Cleared by ACDA, State, DoE, and OSD; not cleared by JCS.)

If asked whether the United States will resume testing:

-- No decision has been made on the question of plans to resume testing after June 30, 1993, as allowed under our recent legislation. (Cleared by ACDA, State, and DoE; not cleared by OSD or JCS.)

FYI: OSD proposes to say, if asked: "The U.S. also has a continuing requirement for a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent. Because I support a CTB, I must ensure that the U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile is ready for a CTB regime. Therefore, the U.S. will resume testing and carry out a limited test program, as permitted by U.S. law, in order to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons." (No other agency supports this talking point.)

Drafted by: ACDA/NP/NST - Nicholas Carrera NC

Cleared by:
State/PM - P Hanscom/T Pinson (Cleared all except TP 2)
DoE - D Donnelly (Cleared all talking points)
OSD - E Nawrocki (Cleared points 3, 4, and 5 only; did not clear TP 1,2, and the "if asked" talking point)
NC

NOTE on clearances: Background is cleared in substance only; there was no time for final circulation of a much-modified text. Talking points are cleared as noted. JCS opposes providing any background and talking points until the U.S. has completed the PRD-19 exercise. (Source: OJCS/J-5 - Alex Lopes)

NPNSTNC 267
24 March 93

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9301808
RECEIVED: 24 MAR 93 21

TO: ITOH

FROM: GROSSMAN, M

DOC DATE: 29 MAR 93
SOURCE REF: 9306215

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
START
ABM
ARMS CONTROL
CTB
CBW

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: ADDL BACKGROUND PAPERS & PRESS FACT SHEETS FOR SUMMIT MTG

ACTION: OBE PER SANNER DUE DATE: 27 MAR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SANNER LOGREF: 9301582 9301905

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSJEB DOC 3 OF 4

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RECORD ID: 9301808

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	SANNER	Z	93032421	APPROPRIATE ACTION
002	SANNER	Z	93032915	ADD-ON / APPROPRIATE ACTION
003	SANNER	Z	93033009	ADD-ON / APPROPRIATE ACTION
003		X	93040814	OBE PER SANNER
004	ROSNER	Z	93040107	ADD-ON / APPROPRIATE ACTION
004		X	93040710	NFAR PER ROSNER

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9301808
RECEIVED: 24 MAR 93 21

TO: ITOH

FROM: GROSSMAN, M

DOC DATE: 29 MAR 93
SOURCE REF: 9306215

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
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ABM
ARMS CONTROL
CTB
CBW

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: ADDL BACKGROUND PAPERS & PRESS FACT SHEETS FOR SUMMIT MTG

ACTION: ADD-ON / APPROPRIATE ACTION DUE DATE: 27 MAR 93 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: SANNER LOGREF: 9301582

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
SANNER	BURNS	GROSS
	GATI	ITOH
	GOTTEMOELLER	KENNEY
		SODERBERG

COMMENTS: OBE

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OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: DOC 3 OF 3

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M

9306215 1808

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 29, 1993

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
(with ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ attachments)

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Subject: Additional Background Papers and Press Fact Sheets for Summit Meeting

Attached are the additional background papers and press fact sheets as promised on Friday, March 26th for the President's use in his meetings with Russian President Boris Yeltsin during the April 3-4 Summit Meeting.

Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

Background papers and press fact sheets

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INDEX OF ATTACHED BACKGROUND PAPERS AND PRESS FACT SHEETS

ECONOMIC & ASSISTANCE ISSUES

1. Humanitarian Assistance and Food Sales
2. Technical Assistance
3. Democracy Corps Initiative
4. Energy and Environment Initiative
5. Russian Officers Settlement Initiative

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Humanitarian Assistance and Food Sales

The United States will assist the Russian government in providing for short term political stability by donating food and medicines for use in major industrial cities. Together with similar assistance from our Western allies, these donations will help meet Russian requests for this type of assistance.

The U.S. Department of Agriculture will provide $xxx million in grant food shipments to Russia over the next six months. This will bring to about $400 million in grant food shipments during this fiscal year. This assistance will consist of ...**

USDA, in cooperation with the US Agency for International Development and Department of State, will provide US agricultural products to mothers, infants and children in the Russian Far East. These products will include milk, cereals and nutritional beverages worth $10 million. They will be distributed by a private voluntary organization. Another $1.2 million worth of nutritional supplements will be delivered by the Alaskan Department of Health and Social Services to two Far East cities (Magadan and Anydyr) concentrating on women and children with vitamin and mineral deficiencies.

In cooperation with the Russian Ministry of Health, the US Department of Defense will provide the hospital equipment and supplies from a military hospital in Europe to a hospital in the Moscow area. The equipment and supplies are valued at $10 million. Another $1.2 million worth of medicines and supplies will be delivered by Project HOPE to the Siberian city of Barnaul. In cooperation with the Alaskan Department of Health and Social Services, another $5 million worth of DOD hospital supplies will be donated to hospitals and clinics in the Magadan region of the Far East.

** To be determined by the NSC.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassified on: OADR

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-m (1.13)

HUMANITARIAN FOOD AND MEDICAL ASSISTANCE

-- We share the Russian concern about the needs of the most vulnerable elements of the Russian population. In close cooperation with the Russian government, we can and should assist.

-- We can provide food and medicines to various parts of the Russian Federation.

  - o We will provide nearly $** million worth of food to Russia.
  - o We will also provide $10 million in food assistance to mothers, infants and children in the Russian Far East.
  - o On medicines, we will work with Russian health officials to identify hospitals in the Moscow area that could use $10 million worth of medicines and supplies now available in Europe. We will also provide another $5 million worth of supplies to hospitals and clinics in the Magadan region of the Far East.

-- Through these kinds of cooperative arrangements, we can build humanitarian links between the American and Russian people.

** Levels still being considered by NSC.

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Technical Assistance Initiative for the Russian Federation

One of the most important areas of focus for the USG's program is support for the newly forming private sector. We have proposed expanding and initiating the following activities to address that need:

A Russian-American Enterprise Fund: This fund would be modeled after Enterprise Funds created by the USG in Eastern Europe. It will be managed by a private sector board of directors with the autonomy to make investment decisions relatively unencumbered by traditional AID grant regulations. The success of the funds in Eastern Europe is due, at least in part, to their flexibility and autonomy. We propose to fund this activity at $50 million in FY93 and $300 million over three years.

The Privatization Support Initiative will provide $225 million over three years, $60 million in FY93, to support both privatization transactions and newly private businesses. The transaction support will be directed at national, regional and local levels in an effort to assist government officials to sell off as many state owned enterprises as quickly as possible. The second component of this initiative will provide post privatization support to the newly private businesses. This will include a range of management, finance and accounting technical assistance. In addition, this initiative will assist governments in putting in place the laws and regulations necessary in a functioning market economy.

We will also be expanding our ongoing bank training activities. These activities will train bank employees at every level through programs which operate both in Russia and in the U.S. A portion of this activity will be carried out in conjunction with the Russian American Bankers' Forum. A competition is currently underway to select additional contractees.

In the area of economic restructuring, in addition to bank training, we will be providing assistance to national, regional and local governments in the area of fiscal and financial reform. The activity will include fiscal reform assistance to regions where significant privatization progress is being made. It will provide assistance to local government leaders in designing and implementing fiscal structures, including revenue systems, which are needed to fund a range of social services currently funded by the state owned enterprises.

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In 1992 the U.S. Government announced the creation of the Eurasia Foundation to make small grants in the areas of management training, democratization, and privatization. This activity will receive $8 million in FY93 for activities throughout the NIS. Until this week (3/26) this project had been under a congressional hold by Congressman Obey's staff. The hold has now been lifted and assistance projects can begin.

Helping the Russians to feed themselves is another of our top priorities. To help create a thriving private agribusiness sector, the United States will provide support to U.S. companies seeking to invest in Russia. In FY 1993, the United States will provide approximately $20 million to U.S. companies. We anticipate that a U.S. government contribution of $20 million would leverage $60 million in private investment.

Encouraging partnerships between Americans and Russians is another goal of our program. In the health sector, this goal manifests itself in the form of Medical Partnerships. We will be establishing four additional medical partnerships in Russia over the next several months. These four partnerships will bring the total number of medical partnerships in Russia to nine.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PACKAGE FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

-- The U.S. Government will be initiating and expanding a number of initiatives to provide assistance to the democratic and economic reformers in Russia.

-- One of the most important aspects of this reform package is its support for new private businesses and new foreign investment in Russia. To encourage both, we will be creating a Russian-American Enterprise Fund. We will be providing $50 million in FY93 for this Fund.

  o This fund will be managed by a private sector board of directors. It will make equity investments and provide loans for private Russian businesses and Russian-American joint ventures.

-- We will also be providing assistance in the areas of privatization, bank training and economic restructuring in close coordination with the international financial institutions and other bilateral donors.

-- Our privatization projects will focus both on providing assistance to Moscow in managing the nationwide effort, and to regional and local leaders in creating new private owners in their cities. We will be providing $60 million in FY93 for this activity.

-- Bank training activities will train bankers and introduce financial services such as functioning checking accounts and inter-bank clearing mechanisms, critical for efficient business. This activity will receive $5 million in FY93.

-- Economic restructuring assistance will include projects for central and regional/local officials in fiscal and financial reform including tax policy and administration, banking reform and a range of other activities meant to ease the transition to a free market. This activity will receive $13 million in FY93.

-- We will also be funding the Eurasia Foundation to provide support for projects to promote economic reform and democratization in Russia and the other new states of the former USSR. The Eurasia Foundation will receive $8 million in FY93.

-- As part of a public/private agribusiness partnership, the United States will provide $40 million to U.S. agribusiness companies to support investment in the agriculture sector in Russia. This program, designed to help get food from the farm gates to the market, will leverage approximately $120 million in private U.S. investment.

-- In an effort to increase contacts between American and Russian medical professionals, the United States will establish an additional four Medical Partnerships in Russia over the next several months. These four partnerships will bring the total number of medical partnerships in Russia to nine.

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Democracy Corps Initiative

Russia is embarking on the transformation of its political and legal framework from an authoritarian foundation to one based upon the rule of law, with emphasis on rights and responsibilities of individuals, popular participation in political and economic decision-making, open competition among interest groups, governmental accountability, transparency of political and legal processes and predictability in social and economic relations.

To assist this process, the President will announce the mobilization of the Democracy Corps -- a broad coalition of American people and institutions devoted to nurturing and spreading the momentum for democratization in Russia. As the Coordinator for all U.S. assistance efforts with the NIS, Thomas W. Simons will oversee Democracy Corps activities. Every American is a member of the Democracy Corps. Specific U.S. Government-funded activities in FY 1993 will include:

Democracy Summer: The summer of 1993 will be designated "Democracy Summer," to touch off a $25 million program of intensive people-to-people contacts between Russians and their American hosts. Two types of contacts are envisioned:

Exchanges: Personal exposure of citizens from Russia to life in a democracy can foster grassroots understanding and attitudes supportive of Russia's democratic development. During 1993, 3,000 Russians, including 1,200 high school students, will be brought to the U.S. to participate in a variety of short-term thematic group projects this summer. Themes will include culture, arts, math, science, environment, agriculture, youth leadership training, and political and economic issues. Another 700 students will participate in year-long exchanges beginning with the 93-94 school year.

Training: In addition to exposure to democratic systems, visits by citizens of Russia to the United States can provide insight to U.S. methods of solving technical, managerial, and other problems key to Russia's successful adoption of a free market system. During 1993, about 400 undergraduate and 275 graduate level Russian students will come to the U.S. for training in the areas of economics, business, public policy and government, education, and law. An additional 400 Russians will be brought to the U.S. for study tours and short-term training programs in key technical areas, such as banking, energy, environment, health, and agriculture.

Rule of Law: Mobilization of a broad range of U.S. legal resources to assist the peoples of Russia in reforming their legal structure to reflect democratic and free market principles, and in institutionalizing support procedures and practices in the areas of commercial law, criminal law and procedure, and educational reform. In particular, the U.S. will provide direct support for President Yeltsin's planned Legal Experiment, an innovative plan to begin legal reform including the creation of a jury system in 5 regions.
Funding: $5 million in FY 1993.

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Effective Local Governance: Mobilization of U.S. expertise to assist reform-minded local governments in generating, managing, and expending financial resources in ways which foster the increasingly private provision of social services and broad private sector growth. The first two cities targeted are Moscow and Nizhniy Novgorod. Funding: $7 million in FY 1993.

Strengthening Civil Society: Mobilization of a broad range of private U.S. organizations (political and civic organization development, free trade unions, and advocacy groups) to work closely with counterparts in Russia--reformers, grassroots organizers, regional interests--to expand their participation in Russian political processes and in the dialogue on economic reform. Funding: $2 million in FY 1993.

Strengthening Independent Media: Mobilization of the U.S. media and journalism community to share skills and experience on development of professional journalist techniques and business and managerial skills essential for functioning of a free and open democracy. Funding: $2 million in FY 1993.

Developing Russian Volunteerism: Mobilization of a wide slice of the U.S. private, voluntary organization community to assist counterpart private Russian groups to meet emerging social service needs during this period of economic dislocation. Funding: $4 million in FY 1993.

Developing Educational Partnerships: Mobilization of the U.S. education community to develop linkages and exchanges between American universities and partner universities in Russia focused on areas critical to the creation of free market and democratic institutions. The Administration will establish an American Institute at the Institute of Foreign Languages in Nizhniy Novgorod (IFLNN) for study of American studies and language. Funding: $3 million in FY 1993.

DEMOCRACY CORPS INITIATIVE

-- President Clinton announced the mobilization of the Democracy Corps -- a broad array of American people and institutions devoted to nurturing and spreading the momentum of democratization in Russia. $48 million in assistance will be provided for this initiative. Examples of the programs which will be provided under this initiative include the following:

- o Analogous to the "freedom summers" of the 1960s, the Democracy Summer initiative will encourage intensive people-to-people exchange and training between citizens of Russia and American hosts. $25 million will bring 3,000 people from Russia to the United States this year, 1,200 of which will arrive this summer. 700 undergraduate and graduate level scholars from Russia will undertake academic training this year. Finally, 500 Russian professional will come to the United States for training in public administration, banking, energy, environment, health, and agriculture.

- o $5 million will be provided to promote judicial reform and the development of criminal and commercial law. Support will also be provided to President Yeltsin's "Legal Experiment" -- aimed at enabling the creation of a jury system in five regions.

- o A $7 million local governance initiative was announced by President Clinton to aid reform-minded local governments in developing private mechanisms for social safety delivery and economic growth.

- o The President also launched a $2 million effort to encourage the development of a free, independent media diverse press in Russia.

- o A $3 million education initiative was announced to encourage partnerships between American universities and Russian counterparts.

RUSSIAN OFFICER RESETTLEMENT INITIATIVE

-- This initiative focuses not only on those officers withdrawing from the Baltics and being demobilized, but also on those being demobilized from other areas, such as Belarus.

-- Reintegrating these demobilized officers into the civilian economy is essential to the long-term development of the economy as a whole. The U.S. Russian Officer Resettlement Initiative would not only provide housing but also employment training.

-- Over the next two years, U.S. private and voluntary organizations will work together to build 2,000 houses and provide training for Russian military officers who are being demobilized.

-- This important $30 million initiative is a visible sign of U.S. support for the Russian government and its efforts to withdraw troops from the Baltics and elsewhere as quickly as possible.

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Energy and Environment Initiative

This initiative will assist in the transformation of the Russian energy economy into a market-oriented, end-use efficient, and environmentally protected system. The energy sector's link to the macroeconomic balance and enterprise restructuring makes immediate reform of this sector imperative for viability of the overall reform program. Structural reform should help to remove some of the worst environmental excesses by eliminating obsolescent production techniques and encouraging energy efficiency.

This initiative represents a balanced approach targeted on several critical leverage points:

Gas/Oil/Coal Production and Delivery Systems Improvement: To promote efficient use of gas and oil to increase hard currency exports and, in the long-run, provide alternative fuel sources needed to decommission unsafe nuclear reactors. In addition, programs will promote coal mine safety and cleaner production technologies. Funding will focus initially on engineering and feasibility analyses that could lead to substantial World Bank and EBRD loans to revamp production, transmission, and distribution systems.

Efficiency and Performance Improvement: To improve energy efficiency in electric power, refineries, industries, and residential buildings. Funding also will be used to support the Moscow Energy Efficiency Center which provides information on technology, services and equipment available from U.S. companies as well as a training center on a variety of energy efficiency issues.

Pricing, Policy, and Institutional Reform: To introduce market-driven approaches for energy supply and demand balance in Russia, especially privatizing energy supply entities, supporting reform of the price and tariff structure, and building new institutions to raise efficiency standards and introduce a regulatory framework.

Nuclear Power Plant Safety and Regulation: To undertake short-term operational safety improvements, risk reduction measures, and regulatory assistance.

Environmental Policy and Technology Cooperation: To implement high-impact demonstration projects to reduce air and water pollution, handle hazardous waste, and minimize use of ozone-depleting substances. The first activity will focus on air pollution control in the Volgograd region.

Environmental NGO Consortium: To establish a consortium of public and private sector actors to strengthen collaboration between American and Russian NGOs. The consortium will finance joint U.S./Russian NGO projects that promote environmental awareness.

The total cost of this initiative is $36 million in FY 1993.

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Energy and Environment Initiative

-- President Clinton announced a $xx million ** energy and environment initiative to help stimulate the Russian energy sector.

-- The energy and environment initiative will provide technical assistance and equipment to promote the efficient production, distribution and end-use of the Russian energy sector. It will boost the supply of oil and gas available for export and hard currency earnings and reduce urgent environmental concerns associated with Russian energy production and use.

-- In addition, the initiative will provide U.S. made equipment and services and help leverage future participation by American firms in multilateral assistance efforts and private investment transactions.

- o $xx million ** will be provided to promote energy efficiency in the Russian economy.
- o $xx million ** worth of equipment to enhance the production and distribution of oil and gas will be provided to Russian energy enterprises. Particular emphasis will be given to provide gas pipeline equipment -- improving the efficiency of gas transmission systems and reducing methane emissions from leaky pipelines.
- o $xx million ** to promote safety in nuclear power plants.
- o $xx million ** to address urgent environmental concerns and promote cooperation among U.S. and Russian non-governmental organizations committed to environmental protection.

** to be determined by NSC

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Russian Officers Settlement Initiative

The withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltics and elsewhere is one of the most difficult and potentially destabilizing issues facing Yeltsin and his government. In addition to being of concern to the Russian Government, it is also very important to the Baltic states, U.S. Baltic support groups, the Nordic countries, and the U.S. Congress. Indeed, the Byrd amendment conditions all aid to Russia on progress toward Baltic troop withdrawal.

Assisting Yeltsin to address this issue is one of the United States' highest foreign and security policy priorities. A military resettlement initiative is one of the most important things the United States could do to bolster the Russian government's efforts to withdraw troops quickly and to disarm critics of Yeltsin's policy. While we are particularly concerned about the troops withdrawing from the Baltics, we believe that any U.S. program should have a broader focus in order to decrease the direct linkage between the pace of troop withdrawal and U.S. assistance. We are concerned that a Western resettlement initiative could cause the Russians to slow down troop withdrawal if it did not produce tangible results within a short period of time.

Objective of Initiative

To help address the shortage of housing facing officers returning to Russia, the United States should launch a modest "Russian Officer Resettlement Initiative". The objective of this initiative would be to demonstrate U.S. concern for this specific problem without raising Russian or U.S. industry expectations of a more ambitious program in the future. As such, this initiative is intended specifically to:

1) build 2,000 houses within 12-14 months for retired or demobilized officers returning to Russia from the Baltics and elsewhere. This would be done, to the extent practicable, using local materials and labor and in a manner that is consistent with overall housing sector reform efforts.

2) provide employment training to the participating officers so that they can be reintegrated in to civilian life.

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SITUATION ROOM
1993 MAR 29 PM 10: 57

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9301808
RECEIVED: 24 MAR 93 21

TO: ITOH

FROM: GROSSMAN, M

DOC DATE: 31 MAR 93
SOURCE REF: 9306430

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
START
ABM
ARMS CONTROL
CTB
CBW

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: PRESS STATEMENT & ADDL BRIEFING PAPERS FOR US - RUSSIAN SUMMIT MTG IN VANCOUVER

ACTION: NFAR PER ROSNER DUE DATE: 27 MAR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: SANNER LOGREF: 9301582 9301905

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

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COMMENTS: PER EXEC SEC, ITEM WAS STAFFED TO ROSNER FOR CONCURRENCE

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSWEA CLOSED BY: NSJEB DOC 4 OF 4

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RECORD ID: 9301808

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	SANNER	Z	93032421	APPROPRIATE ACTION
002	SANNER	Z	93032915	ADD-ON / APPROPRIATE ACTION
003	SANNER	Z	93033009	ADD-ON / APPROPRIATE ACTION
004	ROSNER	Z	93040107	ADD-ON / APPROPRIATE ACTION
004		X	93040710	NFAR PER ROSNER

S/S 9306430

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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March 31, 1993

1808

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Press Statements and Additional Briefing Papers for the U.S./Russian Summit Meeting in Vancouver.

Attached are Press Statements and additional briefing papers requested by Rosemary Forsythe directly from EUR/ISCA for the President's use during the April 3-4 Summit Meeting.

Thank you for your assistance.

Marc Grossman
Executive Secretary

OBE —

Attachment:
As stated.

Can be closed - note - I printed out additional items on disk, not included in package

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PRESIDENT CLINTON'S MEETING WITH

RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN

DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL PUBLIC STATEMENT

I have just come from my first Summit meeting with President Yeltsin, and I can tell you that our talks were very successful. On a personal level, it was a pleasure to get to know the man that the world saw on television in 1991 standing atop a tank and fighting for democracy in his country. I can assure you that President Yeltsin has not stopped fighting for democracy and that he has my admiration and full support.

Before I get into the substance of our meeting, I would like to share with you my vision of the new U.S.-Russian partnership we are trying to forge. I want to emphasize the word "partnership." We are cooperating to help achieve common objectives in this very difficult period for Russia, and we have already made good progress. Americans have a major stake in helping Russia's reformers succeed. A democratic Russia with a prospering market economy can stimulate global economic growth, and enable us to orient our own economy away from defense spending toward investment in our people. Russia is already a partner with us in sharply reducing the nuclear threat and in helping us to resolve conflicts around the world.

Russia, like America, is a great country that plays a pivotal role on the world stage; a country that is rich in both human and natural resources. Russia is now engaged in a remarkable transformation from dictatorship to democracy, and from marxism to a market economy. I wholeheartedly agree with President Yeltsin that only the Russian people can chart the course of their country's future. Given the opportunity, I am sure they will vote for freedom: the freedom to choose their own leaders and to choose their own economic system. I share the hope of the vast majority of President Yeltsin's countrymen for a revitalized Russia, one which can work together with America and its allies to make our world a safer place to live.

President Yeltsin and I discussed the full range of issues in our bilateral relationship, including pressing international problems like the conflict in Bosnia and the Middle East peace process. We agreed that respect for the rights of individuals and minorities is key to the resolution of ethnic conflicts. We also discussed measures to implement reductions in our nuclear arsenals and to stem the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Much of our meeting was spent on economic issues. We agreed that we must now move economics to the center of our bilateral relationship in the same way we made arms control the focus in past decades.

President Yeltsin and I agreed to a package of economic cooperation measures that we can work on together to support the reform process in Russia. The package reflects Russian priorities and is designed to be helpful to those engaged in reform. While humanitarian food and medical assistance remains an important part of this package, we are trying to shift its emphasis to helping Russian reformers help themselves. President Yeltsin stressed the priority he is placing on privatization and we agreed to both a Russian Enterprise Fund to help support new private businesses and a set of initiatives to help in the auctioning of state enterprises and assist the newly privatized companies that will result.

Last year I made a campaign promise to create a new Democracy Corps to support democratization in Russia. President Yeltsin has accepted the idea and we are going to work to enlist thousands of Americans and Russians and their families in supporting exchanges and hosting visits by students and professional counterparts. We want to get the American and Russian people more involved in the success of democracy. I am confident that there will be plenty of volunteers from both sides who will lend their efforts to make this initiative work and be the success it ought to be.

President Yeltsin and I discussed the problems encountered by demobilized soldiers and their families who are returning to Russia without homes or jobs. We will be offering to construct housing units and provide retraining for these troops. President Yeltsin and I also reached agreement on the resumption of grain deliveries to Russia. Russia continues to be a valuable market for American grain and other agricultural commodities. We want to preserve that market by putting American food exports to Russia on a firm long-term footing.

I want to underline that President Yeltsin and I both see trade and investment as the new focus of the U.S.-Russian partnership in the 1990's. Russia needs improved access to western markets. The United States supports Russian accession to the GATT and we are prepared to work with Russia to bring its trade regime into compliance with GATT rules. We are ready to work with our Congress to extend preferential tariff treatment to Russian exports to the U.S. under the Generalized System of Preferences.

The package that President Yeltsin and I agreed upon today is a good start, but much more remains to be done. I told President Yeltsin that I intend to make the case to Congress and the American people for a significantly expanded program of

cooperation that will inaugurate a qualitatively new and different U.S.-Russian partnership. I am confident that the American people will respond with enthusiasm because we have a significant stake in the success of democracy and market economic reform in Russia.

While the bilateral steps I have just outlined are important, President Yeltsin and I realize that a multilateral effort with the other G-7 highly industrialized nations can generate substantially more resources for Russia. I am now working hard with the leaders of our G-7 partners to prepare a multilateral package to bolster Russian reform efforts. The next step in this process is the Tokyo meeting of foreign and finance ministers on April 13-14. President Yeltsin and I agreed to stay in touch as this process develops.

In closing, I want to reemphasize that I am personally committed to working with President Yeltsin to the success of the Russian reform process he epitomizes. This is the first of what I hope will be many meetings with our Russian partners to build a lasting relationship, and to forge ever stronger bonds between our two great nations.

DRAFT REMARKS FOLLOWING

PRESIDENT CLINTON'S MEETING

WITH CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER

BRIAN MULRONEY

Thank you, Brian, for hosting this historic meeting. I look forward to my first meeting with President Yeltsin, and I'm glad it could be in such a beautiful setting. I hope to explore a few of the sights while here.

The Prime Minister and I discussed the situation in Russia and what the world can do to help Russia with its transition to a market economy and a democratic, pluralistic society. We strongly support President Yeltsin, and we applaud his efforts to enable the Russian people to determine their future at the ballot box.

Canada has long championed Russian democracy and has already given generously of its resources to assist Russia and other New Independent States. The Prime Minister and I discussed how we can increase bilateral and multilateral assistance.

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VIETNAM

Market-based trade and normal political relations between Russia and Vietnam are compatible with U.S. interests in promoting economic and political reforms in both countries.

The character of economic links between Russia and Vietnam has changed dramatically. The Soviet Union had been Vietnam's major economic partner, and the end of its financial and technical assistance badly shook the Vietnamese economy. Vietnam has realigned its trade toward the market economies of the region and taken steps to facilitate its reintegration into the global trading system. Russia and Vietnam share an interest in resuming trade, but so far the trade volume remains only a fraction of previous levels. There are thirty-three Russo-Vietnamese joint ventures, and numerous Soviet-built factories still operate in Vietnam. Last summer Vietnam agreed to begin repaying its ten billion ruble debt to Russia.

Russia still maintains a small military presence at Cam Ranh Bay to handle signals intelligence, ship refueling and repairs. Two to four intelligence aircraft remain but rarely fly; all combat aircraft were withdrawn in 1989. The Russian Navy bases no ships at Cam Ranh, but its vessels periodically call there en route between the Black Sea and the Far East. The Russians have proposed converting the facility to commercial use, but the viability of this idea appears low.

The Russian government is cooperating in our efforts to ascertain the fates of American servicemen missing from the Vietnam War. Our interviews of ex-Soviet officials have elicited insights into a number of MIA cases. We have no conclusive evidence that any American prisoners were taken to the Soviet Union from Indochina during the Vietnam War; the Russians' search of their archives has so far uncovered no indication of any such transfer. We have raised the idea of Russian pressure on Vietnam to cooperate more with our POW/MIA efforts, but Moscow no longer has the necessary leverage with Hanoi to make such an approach useful.

Approximately 30,000 Vietnamese live in Russia; their treatment and continued employment have been the topic of bilateral negotiations. Some of them may be involved in an anti-Vietnamese government radio station which began broadcasting from Russia into Vietnam last year. The station is reportedly run privately and financed by Vietnamese dissidents in Russia and the U.S.

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CAMBODIA

We want to encourage Russia to continue playing a constructive role in supporting the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Cambodia, especially in preparing for elections in May. Additional Russian pressure on the State of Cambodia (SOC) to curb political intimidation could prove helpful.

The SOC must be made to understand that it cannot count on strong international support if it wins an election widely viewed as unfair. There are doubts about the SOC's willingness to respect the results of the election if it loses. Once the U.N. certifies the fairness of the election, the international community must join in recognition and support of the resulting government as the sole legitimate sovereign authority for all of Cambodia. At that point international assistance to the new Cambodian government will determine its ability to address the enormous security and economic problems it will face.

The major protagonists in the Cambodia conflict have been the State of Cambodia (previously supported by the Soviet Union and Vietnam), the Khmer Rouge (previously supported by China), and the non-communist factions headed by Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann (which we supported). In 1991, the Perm Five and other concerned countries brokered a peace agreement which set up the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) to monitor a ceasefire and prepare for free and fair elections.

Despite some serious problems, the peace process is moving forward in Cambodia. The U.N. has had important successes in many areas, including preparations for the upcoming elections, repatriation of nearly 360,000 Cambodians from Thailand, generally maintaining the ceasefire, and improving human rights conditions. The constituent assembly election is now scheduled for May 23-27. UNTAC has registered 95% of eligible Cambodian voters and 20 political parties, which have set up nearly 700 offices throughout the country.

Russia has continued the cooperative approach begun under Gorbachev. It has participated actively at the Security Council in support of full implementation of the U.N. peace plan. It has used its influence on both Vietnam and the SOC to encourage adherence to the peace process. Russia has also dispatched several hundred military observers to serve under UNTAC. Although Russia has little new to offer in terms of economic assistance, it could help by cancelling existing Cambodian debts to Russia.

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The Non-Russian Ethnic Groups of Russia

U.S. Policy Interest. We support the territorial integrity and unity of Russia and advocate the full extension of the Helsinki human rights agenda to all ethnic and political groups. Consistent with these policies, we maintain a program of contacts with the various regions of Russia, but offer no encouragement to those regions, such as Chechenya, that seek to weaken or sever ties with the central government.

Overview. Roughly 18 percent of the population of the Russian Federation is non-Russian, with the non-Russian population concentrated in 31 ethnic administrative areas. Several regions are seeking economic autonomy, but there has been little ethnic violence in Russia thus far.

Tatarstan, an oil-rich, industrialized region that is trying to cope with general economic disintegration, has sought, through negotiations with Moscow, the maximum degree of economic and political autonomy. At 48.5 percent of the population, Tatars slightly outnumber Russians (43 percent) in Tatarstan. So far the struggle for independence from Russia has been waged rhetorically by a nationalistic intelligentsia.

Bashkortostan, also industrialized, is close to Tatarstan in terms of history, language, culture, and religion. It is attempting to assert economic autonomy. Russians account for almost 40 percent of the population, followed by Tatars (28 percent) and Bashkirs (22 percent). If central power collapses in Russia, a vast Tatar-Bashkir state could emerge in the Volga region given the Tatars' former dominant position there.

North Caucasus is still more diverse than the Volga area. It is largely Muslim, economically distressed, and has been the scene of armed conflicts among rival nationalists. Chechenya, afflicted by internal political instability, has proclaimed independence from Russia. Another headache for the Kremlin is North Ossetia, a Christian island in a Muslim sea, which has been affected by fighting in Georgia and political claims of Ingush irredentists. Moscow fears that Chechenya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan (where there are 14 distinct ethnic groups) will eventually join forces to free much of the North Caucasus from Russia authority. Moscow fears Turkey, Iran, and Azerbaijan are likely to support such a scheme.

Yakutia (Sakha) is a diamond-rich republic in Siberia whose leaders have pushed for sovereignty and control over its natural resources. Nationalism is strong among Yakut intellectuals, and clashes have occurred between Yakut and Russian students. The situation, however, is less volatile than in the North Caucasus; Sakha thus far has been willing to cooperate with Moscow in marketing its diamonds.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M (1.20)

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CHINA

The U.S. is interested in promoting positive relations between Russia and China because this contributes to global stability. However, unrestrained Russian military sales of equipment and technology to China could pose problems for us and others in Asia and the Middle East.

China's leadership appears to have reconciled itself to the demise of Soviet communism and Yeltsin's attainment of power. Russia and China are managing successfully the natural strains in their bilateral relations. Resolution of territorial disputes is virtually complete and negotiations on reducing military forces along the border are proceeding well. Cross-border trade is booming.

Yeltsin's December 17-18, 1992 visit to Beijing highlighted the pragmatic ties between the two countries. The visit produced a joint declaration of principles to guide relations and numerous trade agreements, including one on military technology cooperation.

Russia wants to increase exports to China and views military equipment as its best opportunity. China has a corresponding interest in upgrading its weaponry and defense-industrial base. Last year Russia sold forty-eight SU-27 fighters to China; so far twenty-six have been delivered. It also sold at least sixteen surface-to-air missile launchers with 128 missiles. China has obtained significant military technology from Russia, most notably in rocketry, fighter aircraft, and nuclear testing.

Chinese acquisition of Russian arms and technologies constitutes a problem to the extent that (1) Beijing acquires new capabilities which exceed its defensive requirements, or (2) China reexports items with proliferation implications to trouble spots like the Middle East. China's purchases so far do not threaten the East Asian military balance, but have generated concern among its neighbors.

The Russian government is aware that certain aspects of its military relationship with China trouble the U.S. Last December, Under Secretary of State Wisner called U.S. concerns over Russia's military cooperation with China to the attention of his Russian counterparts (Deputy Foreign Ministers Mamedov and Berdennikov).

Another potential problem is Moscow's ability to control the flow of weapons and related technology to China. This provided further motivation for concluding the government-to-government agreement on military technology cooperation.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 3/16/2019
2016-0048-M (1.21)

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INDIA

Traditional close ties between Moscow and New Delhi have continued on a more businesslike basis. U.S. interests lie in preventing the transfer to India of weapons or technologies prohibited by international agreements, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). We also want Russia's cooperation in containing Indo-Pakistani tensions.

In May 1992 the U.S. placed trade and contract sanctions on Russian and Indian entities (not the governments) involved in the transfer of rocket engines and related technologies contrary to MTCR guidelines. These sanctions remain in effect and we continue to engage the Russian government on this issue. A U.S. delegation led by Assistant Secretary of State Gallucci held talks on this in Moscow March 30-31. The stakes are high: Russian insistence on continuing cooperation on rocket engines and technologies could cause severe restriction or curtailment of U.S.-Russian space and high-technology cooperation as well as terminate Freedom Support Act funds absent a Presidential waiver.

Yeltsin visited India January 27-29 of this year. The visit produced agreements on key bilateral issues, including military transfers and repayment terms for India's debt. He pleased his hosts by siding publicly with India on the Kashmir dispute, pledging that Russia will not sell arms to Pakistan, reaffirming that Russia intends to sell cryogenic rocket engines to India despite U.S. opposition and sanctions, promising Russian support for a permanent Indian seat on the Security Council if the matter comes to a vote, and not raising nuclear non-proliferation.

Other Russian officials moderated some of these positions. Foreign Minister Kozyrev urged that India sign the NPT. A Russian Embassy officer in New Delhi indicated that Russia did not rule out selling Pakistan "defensive" weapons in the future. Deputy Foreign Minister Lavrov told us that Russia recognizes the need for Perm-Five consensus on any changes to the Security Council.

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 8/16/2016
2016-0048-M (1.22)

Vancouver Declaration

(Version given to Russian side March 31)

Having met in Vancouver, Canada on April 3-4, President Bill Clinton of the United States of America and President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation declared that the success of democracy and market economic reform in Russia is a defining imperative of our time. The Presidents expressed their firm belief that a dynamic and effective U.S.-Russian partnership is vital to Russia's historic transformation. At this first summit meeting between the two Presidents, they approved a comprehensive strategy of cooperation to promote democracy, security, and peace. President Yeltsin stressed his firm commitment to fostering democratization, the rule of law, and a market economy in Russia. As the United States moves to reinvigorate its own economy, President Clinton assured President Yeltsin of active American engagement and support for reform in Russia.

The Presidents agreed that Russia's rapid integration into the community of democratic nations and the world economy is essential. They therefore called for accelerated G-7 development of substantial and effective new economic initiatives to support political and economic reform in Russia. In this connection, the Presidents welcomed the extraordinary meeting of the foreign and finance ministers of

the G-7 countries and the Russian Federation scheduled for April 13-14 in Tokyo. Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin strongly supported the earliest possible conclusion of negotiations with international creditors, beginning with the Paris Club, on rescheduling of the international debt of the former USSR. They agreed that the terms of that re-scheduling should encourage market economic reforms in Russia and the other independent states of the former USSR. The United States announced its support for Russia's intention to become a full member of GATT and to begin, in the near future, official talks on the conditions of Russia's accession to GATT.

The two Presidents agreed on a new package of bilateral economic programs and measures to help meet Russia's immediate humanitarian needs and help build the necessary structures for successful transition to a market economy. The two Presidents expressed their determination to promote access to each other's markets, remove impediments to trade and investment, and resume U.S. food exports to Russia on a stable long-term basis.

The Presidents agreed to give fresh impetus to development of the U.S.-Russian relationship in all its dimensions. To coordinate and direct this effort, as well as to improve the mechanism for mutual consultations, they established a broad and

intensive dialogue involving high-level officials of both governments.

The leaders of the United States and Russia attached great importance to the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. They reaffirmed their determination to strengthen and extend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty (NPT) and make it global. Both the United States and Russian sides stressed their expectation that all countries of the former USSR which are not already NPT members will accede to the treaty as non-nuclear states. They urged the DPRK to retract its announcement of withdrawal from the NPT and to comply fully with its IAEA safeguards obligations, which remain in force. The Presidents agreed that efforts of the United States and Russia will be directed toward the ratification of the START II Treaty and the entry into force of START I as soon as possible. The sides have agreed that the United States will assume some of the costs of environmentally safe and secure elimination of nuclear systems in Russia pursuant to arms control agreements, of secure storage of fissile materials derived from the destruction of nuclear weapons, and of a system for controlling and accounting for civilian nuclear material.

[The Presidents expressed their determination to accelerate deactivation of the nuclear weapons scheduled for elimination in

START I. Both sides pledged to use the monies allocated for this purpose as rapidly as possible. The Presidents propose creation of a new forum of the Foreign Ministers of Russia, the United States, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, which would

meet regularly once each of these states has ratified START I and joined the NPT. This forum would provide an ongoing mechanism for exchanges among the participants on the full implementation of the provisions of the START I agreement, as well as questions arising under the security assurances provided by the U.S. and Russia.]*

[The Presidents stressed their determination to enhance defense and security cooperation between the United States and Russia. With this in mind, they announced a memorandum of understanding agreed by their Defense Ministers to develop more fully military and defense cooperation.]*

The Presidents agreed on the need to reach a prompt solution to the question of missile technology exports that would address certain current cases as well as provide guidelines for the future. They also agreed to work together to resolve the issues impeding Russia's access to the global market in high technology and services. The Presidents agreed that negotiations on a multilateral nuclear test ban should commence at an early date, and that their governments would consult with each other.

The Presidents affirmed that U.S.-Russian cooperation is essential to the peaceful resolution of international conflicts

and the promotion of democratic values, the protection of human rights, and the solution of global problems, such as environmental pollution, terrorism, and narcotics trafficking. The United States and the Russian Federation

stressed their determination to improve the effectiveness of peacemaking and peacekeeping capabilities of the United Nations, CSCE, and NATO. They also noted the potential of other institutions and mechanisms, including the Commonwealth of Independent States, in support of security and peace in the world. Recognizing that the problem of mistreatment of minorities and ethnic communities is increasingly a source of international instability, the sides stressed the critical importance of full protection for individual human rights, including those of ethnic Russian and all other minorities on the territory of the former Soviet Union. The two Presidents affirmed their commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflicts in that region on the basis of respect for the independence, territorial integrity, and security of all member states of the UN and the CSCE.

Russia and the United States announced their intention to expand and improve their joint work in the area of environmental protection. They agreed to coordinate on joint ecological measures to be taken and research to be done, and on technical, expert, and financial implementation of agreed programs.

The joint efforts of both countries have succeeded in establishing a new character for Russian-American bilateral

relations. The Presidents reaffirmed the principles and provisions of the Camp David Declaration of February 1, 1992 and the Charter of U.S.-Russian Partnership and Friendship of

June 17, 1992 as fundamental for relations between the two countries. They agreed that the level of mutual openness achieved makes it possible to proceed with accelerated cooperation in science and technology, including programs in the field of outer space. The sides further agreed to expand significantly their contacts, exchanges, and cooperation in the areas of culture, education, the humanities, and the mass media.

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin expressed their deep appreciation to Prime Minister Mulroney and the people of Canada for hosting their meeting in Vancouver. With a view to accelerating the development of U.S.-Russian partnership, the Presidents agreed to meet regularly at the summit level. President Yeltsin invited President Clinton to visit Russia. President Clinton accepted the invitation.

*Denotes language bracketed by the Russian side

Case Number: 2016-0048-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 145				
Document ID: 9302217				
Row: 44	Section: 1	Shelf: 5	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. memo~~	~~Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Report to Congress Pursuant to the~~ START Resolution... (2 pages)	~~05/11/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VL 1/2/2020
001b. memo	To William Itoh from Barabar Starr. [partial] (1 page)	04/05/1993	P3/b(3)
001c. memo	To the President from Thomas Graham, Jr. [partial] (1 page)	04/05/1993	P3/b(3)
001d. report	re: Report to Congress on Treaty Compliance (20 pages)	03/31/1993	P1/b(1)
~~002a. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 001a] (2 pages)~~	~~05/11/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VL 1/2/2020
002b. memo	Duplicate of 001b [partial] (1 page)	04/05/1993	P3/b(3)
002c. memo	Duplicate of 001c [partial] (1 page)	04/05/1993	P3/b(3)
~~002d. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 001a] (2 pages)~~	~~05/11/1993~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VL 1/2/2020
002e. memo	Duplicate of 001b [partial] (1 page)	04/05/1993	P3/b(3)
002f. memo	Duplicate of 001c [partial] (1 page)	04/05/1993	P3/b(3)
002g. report	[Duplicate of 001d] (20 pages)	03/31/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 145

FOLDER TITLE:
9302217

2016-0048-M
rs1619

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9302217
RECEIVED: 06 APR 93 18

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE
WH EXECUTIVE CLERK

DOC DATE: 11 MAY 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: START
CONGRESSIONAL
UKRAINE
ARMS CONTROL
RUSSIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: RPT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO START RESOLUTION OF RATIFICATION ON SOVIET TREATY COMPLIANCE

ACTION: PRES SGD PER WH EXEC CLERK DUE DATE: 09 APR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ANDREASEN LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		ANDREASEN
		BELL
		NSC CHRON

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTAS CLOSED BY: NSMEM DOC 3 OF 3

~~SECRET~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	ANDREASEN	Z	93040618	PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE
002	LAKE	Z	93041517	FWD TO PRES FOR SIG
002	ANDREASEN	Z	93041907	FOR FURTHER ACTION
002	LAKE	Z	93050320	FWD TO PRES FOR SIG
003	PRESIDENT	Z	93051117	FOR SIGNATURE
003		X	93051808	PRES SGD PER WH EXEC CLERK

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
003	930511		VICE PRESIDENT
003	930511		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

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~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 13, 1993

Dear Mr. President:

Enclosed are classified and unclassified copies of the report on Soviet Treaty Compliance required under condition 7 of the Resolution of Ratification for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

The judgments included in this report are drawn from reports prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and submitted to Congress under the provisions of PL 99-145, as amended, and Section 52 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.

Under the terms set forth in the Resolution of Ratification, this report addresses actions of the former Soviet Union which were violations or probable violations of the obligations of the SALT I Interim Agreement, SALT II, ABM, INF and START Treaties and the ultimate resolution of these issues. This report does not address the actions of the newly independent states which have succeeded the Soviet Union. In contrast to the Soviet Union, the newly independent states have demonstrated a substantially improved willingness to adhere to arms control obligations and to work with us to resolve problems.

Sincerely,

Bill Clinton

Enclosures

The Honorable Albert Gore, Jr.
President
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

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OF ~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

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Sincerely,

Bill Clinton

Enclosures

The Honorable Claiborne Pell
Chairman
Foreign Relations Committee
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

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OF ~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 5/13

2217

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 11, 1993 93 MAY 11 P5:34

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK RC

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Report to Congress Pursuant to the START Resolution of Ratification on Soviet Treaty Compliance

Purpose

To recommend your approval of the attached Report to Congress pursuant to the START Resolution of Ratification on Soviet Treaty Compliance.

Background

Condition 7 of the START Resolution of Ratification calls for an updated and expanded Presidential Report to the Senate on Treaty Compliance. This Report addresses actions of the former Soviet Union which were violations or probable violations of the obligations of the SALT I Interim Agreement, SALT II, ABM, INF and START Treaties, and the ultimate resolution of these issues. Further, the Report delineates Soviet actions which were in compliance with those same agreements and provides a comparison of the military significance of those actions.

As clarified in Senator Pell's floor remarks at the time debate began on the Resolution of Ratification, this report was intended by the Senate to deal exclusively with actions taken by the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This report does not address the actions of the newly independent states which have succeeded the Soviet Union. As required by the Condition, the report updates actions taken to resolve these compliance issues. It does not, however, re-examine the original intelligence which provided the basis for these past compliance findings. As noted by Senator Pell, the intent of the Condition was "to close the books on the old Soviet Union."

The Report was prepared by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and has been cleared by the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy, by the Joint Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence's Arms Control Intelligence Staff.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/8/2019
2016-0048-M (1.23)

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Noted: Wa Mrc

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters to the President of the Senate and Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee transmitting the Report to Congress.

Attachments

Tab A	Letter to the President of the Senate
Tab B	Letter to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Tab C	Report to Congress

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. memo	To William Itoh from Barabar Starr. [partial] (1 page)	04/05/1993	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 145

FOLDER TITLE:
9302217

2016-0048-M
rs1619

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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2217

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20451

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

APR 5 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Presidential Report to Congress Prepared Pursuant to the START Resolution of Ratification (U)

The Acting Director is forwarding to the President herewith both the classified and unclassified versions of the "Report to Congress on Treaty Compliance." The President would formally transmit this Report to the Senate. As we understand, the NSC staff is preparing the transmittal letters for the President's signature. (U)

Attached are two sets of original copies of the classified and unclassified versions of this Report for the President's transmittal to the President of the Senate and the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The Report was prepared by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and has been cleared at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level by the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy, by the Joint Staff and the Arms Control Intelligence Staff. (U)

Barbara Starr
Barbara Starr
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
As stated

THIS MEMORANDUM IS
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ATTACHMENT

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. memo	To the President from Thomas Graham, Jr. [partial] (1 page)	04/05/1993	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
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([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 145

FOLDER TITLE:
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2016-0048-M
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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Washington, D.C. 20451

THE DIRECTOR

APR 5 1983

Dear Mr. President:

As Acting Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, I am forwarding herewith the report required by Condition 7 of the Senate Resolution of Ratification entitled "Report to Congress on Treaty Compliance." Condition 7 of the START Resolution of Ratification calls for an updated and expanded Presidential Report to the Senate on Treaty Compliance. This Report addresses actions which are violations or probable violations of the obligations of the SALT I Interim Agreement, SALT II, ABM, INF and START Treaties, and the ultimate resolution of these issues. Further, the Report delineates the actions which are in compliance with those same agreements and provides a comparison of the military significance of those actions.

This Report was prepared by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and has been cleared by the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy, by the Joint Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence's Arms Control Intelligence Staff.

Thomas Graham, Jr.
Acting

Enclosure

The President
The White House

THIS MEMORANDUM IS
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ATTACHMENT

[001c]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

Log Number NSC #2217

Date May 13, 1993

Subject: REPORT ON SOVIET TREATY COMPLIANCE UNDER START REQUIRED UNDER CONDITION 7 UNDER SAME IN CLASSIFIED AND UNCLASSIFIED VERSIONS.

DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: ☐ TOP SECRET ☒ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	#CYS	Date	Time	Received/Signed for By:
The Hon. Albert Gore, Jr. President of the Senate	1	5/13/93	1636	P. L. Madonna
The Hon. Claiborne Pell Chmn. Sen. Forgn. Reltns. Cmte. SD-423	1	5/13/93	4:46 p.m.	B. Allen

// LAST ITEM //////////////////////////////////////

DATE, TIME & SIGN THIS RECEIPT & RETURN TO: BT MERCHANT, SITUATION ROOM, WHITE HOUSE

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001d. report	re: Report to Congress on Treaty Compliance (20 pages)	03/31/1993	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 145

FOLDER TITLE:
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2016-0048-M
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

EMBARGOED PENDING
RELEASE

REPORT TO CONGRESS ON

TREATY COMPLIANCE

March 31, 1993

Prepared by

the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Pursuant to

Condition 7 of the START Resolution of Ratification

March 31, 1993

REPORT TO CONGRESS ON TREATY COMPLIANCE

Condition 7 of the START Resolution of Ratification (see Congressional Record for October 1, 1992) calls for an updated and expanded Presidential Report on Treaty Compliance addressing actions which are violations or probable violations of the obligations of the SALT I Interim Agreement, SALT II, ABM, INF and START Treaties, and the ultimate resolution of these issues, as well as the actions which are in compliance with those same agreements and a comparison of the military significance of those actions.

Section I of this report describes those actions found by the United States Government to have been in violation or probable violation of the obligations of the SALT I Interim Agreement, SALT II, ABM, INF and START Treaties, and the ultimate resolution of these issues. Section II describes those actions the USG has identified as likely having been taken to comply with agreements. Section III describes the military significance of the actions listed in Sections I and II.

This report references previous *Presidential Reports to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements,* an unclassified brochure entitled *Soviet Noncompliance* dated May 1986, prepared by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and previous reports on *Adherence to and Compliance with Agreements* prepared by ACDA which were provided to Congress pursuant to Section 52 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. Copies of these Reports will be made available upon request.

SECTION I

FINDINGS OF VIOLATION OR PROBABLE VIOLATION

Beginning with a Report dated January 23, 1984, the United States Government began annual *Reports to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements.*

SALT I Interim Agreement

The United States Government provided Congress with assessments of Soviet noncompliance with the SALT I Interim Agreement in the President's *Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements*, dated February 1, 1985, and December 23, 1985. In light of President Reagan's decision in May 1986 to end the U.S. policy of observing the provisions of the SALT I Interim Agreement (which had expired), subsequent Noncompliance Reports did not address the question of Soviet noncompliance with the SALT I Interim Agreement.

Violation:

(1) Use of "Remaining Facilities" at Former SS-7 Sites: The SALT I Interim Agreement and its procedures prohibited the Parties from using for storage, support, or launch of ICBMs certain facilities remaining at dismantled or destroyed ICBM sites (such as SS-7 ICBM sites). The Soviets deactivated their SS-7 ICBM sites in the 1970s in compensation for new systems introduced. The launch facilities were destroyed in accordance with the prescribed procedures. However, a number of missile support facilities were left standing. Evidence obtained during 1985 at some of these sites involving deployment of the SS-25 indicated that remaining facilities were used to support deployment and operation of the SS-25. The U.S. Government found that Soviet use of the former SS-7 ICBM facilities in support of the deployment and operation of the SS-25 mobile ICBM was in violation of the SALT I Interim Agreement.

SALT II

The United States Government provided Congress with assessments of Soviet noncompliance with the SALT II Treaty in the President's *Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements*, dated January 23, 1984, February 1, 1985, and December 23, 1985. In light of President Reagan's decision in May 1986 to end the U.S. policy of observing the provisions of the SALT II Treaty (which was never ratified and would have expired on December 31, 1985), subsequent Noncompliance Reports did not address the question of Soviet noncompliance with SALT II.

Violations:

(1) SS-25 ICBM: The provisions of the SALT II Agreement permitted each side to "flight test and deploy" just one new type of "light" ICBM. In addition, it was agreed that no ICBM of an existing type with a post-boost vehicle and a single reentry vehicle (RV) would be flight-tested or deployed whose reentry vehicle was less than 50 percent of the throw-weight of that ICBM. The Soviet Union declared the then SS-X-24 to be its allowed one "new type" ICBM. In addition, it flight tested and deployed the SS-25 ICBM.

The U.S. Government concluded that the SS-25 was a prohibited second "new type" of ICBM and that its testing, in addition to the testing of the SS-24, was a violation of the Soviet Union's political commitment to observe the "new type" provision of the SALT II Treaty. The deployment of the SS-25 in 1985 was found to be a further violation of the SALT II prohibition on a second "new type" of ICBM.

At the time, the Soviet Union argued that the SS-25 was not a new type but rather was an allowed modification of the SS-13 ICBM. The U.S. Government also concluded that if the U.S. accepted that the SS-25 was not a new type of ICBM, it would have been a violation of the Soviet political commitment to observe the SALT II provision which prohibited the testing of such an existing ICBM with a single reentry vehicle whose weight was less than 50 percent of the throw-weight of the ICBM. U.S. analysis showed that the weight of the SS-25 RV was definitely less than 50 percent of the missile's throw-weight.

The question of missile telemetry encryption was considered both as a separate SALT II Treaty violation and as a sub-issue regarding the SS-25 missile violation. The SALT II Treaty permitted each Party to use various methods of transmitting telemetric information during testing, including encryption, but banned deliberate denial of telemetric information, such as through telemetry encryption, whenever such denial impeded verification of compliance with provisions of the SALT II Treaty. The United States Government judged that telemetry encryption during tests of the SS-25 was illustrative of the deliberate impeding of verification of compliance in violation of the USSR's political commitment.

(2) Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle (SNDV) Limits: The United States Government interpreted the Soviet commitment to abide by SALT II pending its ratification as a commitment to maintaining the number of their deployed SNDVs at a level no greater than 2,504 existing at the time SALT II was signed (June 1979). The Soviet Union deployed SNDVs above the 2,504 level in violation of its political commitment under SALT II.

(3) Encryption of Ballistic Missile Telemetry: The SALT II Treaty prohibited deliberate concealment measures that impede verification of compliance with the Treaty provisions by national technical means. The deliberate denial of telemetric information, whenever such denial impedes verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, was specifically prohibited. The Soviet Union heavily encrypted telemetry broadcasts during tests of strategic ballistic missiles, thereby impeding U.S. verification of compliance with the SALT II Treaty. The United States Government concluded that Soviet encryption practices constituted a violation of a legal obligation under SALT II prior to 1981 and a violation of the Soviet political commitment after 1982.

(4) Concealment of the Association Between an ICBM and Its Launcher: Article XV of the SALT II Treaty prohibited deliberate concealment measures which impeded verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty. This obligation was clarified in a Common Understanding that states that Article XV applied to all provisions of the Treaty and "includes the obligation not to use deliberate concealment measures associated with testing, including those measures aimed at concealing the association between ICBMs and launchers during testing." The United States Government found in the December 23, 1985 *President's Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements* Soviet activities related to the SS-25 to be a violation of the Soviet Union's political commitment to abide by the SALT II Treaty provision prohibiting concealment of the association between a missile and its launcher during testing.

Probable Violation:

SS-16: The U.S., in negotiating the SALT II Treaty, obtained Soviet agreement not to produce, test, or deploy ICBMs of the SS-16 type. Further, the Soviets agreed not to produce the SS-16's third stage, reentry vehicle or "other appropriate device" (post-boost vehicle) for targeting the missile's single reentry vehicle. The U.S. addressed the question of whether the SS-16 was deployed at Plesetsk. While the evidence was somewhat ambiguous and the U.S. could not reach a definitive conclusion, the U.S. Government found the activities at Plesetsk to be a probable violation of the USSR's legal obligation and political commitment under SALT II.

The ABM Treaty

Violations:

(1) The Krasnoyarsk Radar: To preclude the development of a territorial defense or providing the base for a territorial ABM defense, the ABM Treaty provides that radars for early warning of ballistic missile attack may be deployed at locations along the periphery of the national territory of

each party and that they be oriented outward. The Treaty permits deployment (without regard to location or orientation) of large phased-array radars for purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means (NTM) of verification of compliance with arms control agreements.

The first *President's Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements*, dated January 23, 1984, stated that the Krasnoyarsk radar "almost certainly" constituted a violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The February 1, 1985 Report reexamined the issue, and stated the U.S. Government judgment that the large phased-array radar under construction at Krasnoyarsk constituted a violation of legal obligations under the ABM Treaty in that in its associated siting, orientation, and capability, it is prohibited by that Treaty.

As reported in the December 2, 1988 Noncompliance Report, during the 1988 ABM Treaty Review Conference, the U.S. told the Soviet Union that the Krasnoyarsk radar was a significant violation of a central element of the ABM Treaty, and that this violation would continue to raise the issue of material breach and proportionate responses until resolved.

The Soviet Union ultimately agreed to dismantle the radar. This is discussed in Section II.

(2) Concurrent Operations: The United States and the Soviet Union agreed in 1978 to prohibit concurrent testing of air defense components and ABM system components at the same test range.

The U.S. expressed its concerns to the Soviet Union about three general types of activities involving Surface to Air Missile (SAM) and ABM components at the same test range: 1) SAM radars operating at the same time as either strategic ballistic missile reentry testing or ABM missile testing; 2) ABM radars operating at the same time as either SAM launches or SAM target flights; and, 3) SAM radars operating at the same time as ABM radars. Subsequent to the signing of the ABM Treaty in 1972, there were many instances of the activities of concern.

Such activities raise the possibility of testing SAM components "in an ABM mode," and, as discussed in the section below on findings of probable violations, the U.S. determined that the activities were in probable violation of the prohibition on "testing in an ABM mode" as that term was defined prior to the 1978 Agreed Statement.

The United States first reported its concerns with respect to Soviet concurrent operations of SAM and ABM components in the February 1, 1985 *President's Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements*. At that time, and in subsequent Noncompliance Reports until the February 1990 Report, the United States found that the evidence

of Soviet actions with respect to concurrent operations was insufficient to assess fully compliance with Soviet obligations.

In 1985, the United States and the Soviet Union further agreed in a 1985 Common Understanding to refrain from launching strategic ballistic missiles to the area of a test range or from launching ABM interceptor missiles at a test range concurrent with the operation of air defense components at that test range.

In the February 23, 1990 Noncompliance Report, the United States reported its judgment that the Soviet Union had continued to conduct type 2 and 3 activities which the U.S. believed were prohibited by the 1978 Agreed Statement. The U.S. also noted, however, that the sides appeared to be moving closer to resolution of this issue.

(3) Gomel: The ABM Treaty provides that ABM radars that have been tested in an ABM mode cannot be "deployed" outside of the one permitted ABM system deployment area or designated ABM test ranges for any purpose.

In March 1987, the U.S. Government observed the appearance of major parts of the original Flat Twin radar, including all of the modular sections of the radar body, and Pawn Shop missile guidance transmitter at an electronics plant in Gomel, about 550 kilometers southwest of Moscow. The timing of the arrival of parts of the Flat Twin and Pawn Shop indicates that they came from the radars that were removed from the Sary Shagan Missile Test Center where, by January 1987, the Soviets were observed disassembling a number of these ABM components.

As stated in the December 1987 *President's Noncompliance Report*, the U.S. Government found that the USSR's activities with respect to moving a Flat Twin ABM radar and a Pawn Shop van, a component of an ABM system, from a test range and initiating deployment at a location outside of an ABM deployment area or ABM test range constituted a violation of the ABM Treaty. While it is not likely that the actions at Gomel were to support an ABM defense at that locality, deployment of such radars at Gomel to carry out any function would be inconsistent with ABM Treaty obligations.

As discussed in Section II, at U.S. insistence the Soviet Union ultimately reversed this violation of the ABM Treaty.

Probable Violation:

Testing in an ABM Mode: U.S. assessments of Soviet compliance with respect to concurrent operations of SAM and ABM components are addressed above. The United States also judged, beginning in the February 1, 1985 Noncompliance Report, that "The number of incidents of concurrent operation of SAM and ABM components indicate the USSR probably has violated the prohibition on testing SAM components in an ABM

mode. In several cases this may be highly probable." This finding remained relatively unchanged until the February 23, 1990 Report, when the assessment was expanded. That Report stated the U.S. finding that:

> The U.S. Government finds that the Soviet Union has conducted tests that have involved air defense radars in ABM-related activities. The large number, and consistency over time, of incidents of concurrent operation of ABM and SAM components, plus previous Soviet failure to accommodate fully U.S. concerns, indicate the USSR probably has violated the prohibition on testing SAM components in an ABM mode as defined in a 1972 U.S. Unilateral Statement on testing in an ABM mode (a statement which the Soviets did not reject) prior to the 1978 Agreed Statement. (The 1978 Agreed Statement refined the definition of testing "in an ABM mode.") In several cases, this may be highly probable. No known violations have occurred which meet the 1978 Agreed Statement's definition of testing "in an ABM mode." Recently, the sides appear to have moved closer to resolution of this issue since the Soviet Union has stated that it is willing to take steps to cease these activities.

The INF Treaty

The U.S. first assessed Soviet noncompliance with the INF Treaty in the December 1, 1988 *President's Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements,* and has continued to report its assessments in annual reports including the 1993 combined *Noncompliance Report and Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Agreements.*

Violations:

(1) Transits of Missiles on Launchers: Paragraph 10 of Article II of the Treaty provides that the term "transit" includes the movement of an intermediate-range missile (such as an SS-20), or a launcher of such a missile, between a deployment area and a missile support facility (such as a missile/launcher repair facility). Paragraph 12 of Article II provides that the term "non-deployed" includes an intermediate-range missile located outside a deployment area. Paragraph 8 of Article VIII of the Treaty provides that non-deployed intermediate-range missiles must not be carried on their launchers, "except as required for maintenance conducted at repair facilities or for elimination by means of launching conducted at elimination facilities." This exception in paragraph 8 of Article VIII means that intermediate-range missiles may be carried on their launchers only if they are actually located at a repair or elimination facility, rather than in transit to or from such facilities.

In the December 1988 and February 1990 Noncompliance Report the United States Government found that although the Soviets notified the U.S. of nearly 200 transits of SS-20s on their launchers, such transits constituted a violation of paragraph 8 of Article VIII of the Treaty. After repeated discussions in the Special Verification Commission (SVC) and in diplomatic channels, the Soviets ceased this practice.

(2) Non-declared Treaty-limited Items (TLIs): Immediately after the INF Treaty's entry into force, the Soviets were not in compliance with Article IX requirements to list all TLIs and their locations in the data update to the MOU. In the summer of 1988, the U.S. presented a demarche to the Soviet Union on the related issue of TLIs at non-declared locations and insisted on full Soviet compliance. While the Soviets never acknowledged their failure to meet the locational restrictions or explained the reasons for this failure, they moved to correct their noncompliance and dismantled or removed TLIs previously observed at non-declared sites.

In the December 1988 Noncompliance Report, the U.S. Government found that Soviet failure to declare all of its TLIs in the initial data update to the MOU was a violation of the provisions of Article IX that require a side to present true and accurate data in the MOU and in all subsequent data updates. Since entry into force, the Soviets, while not acknowledging their violation, moved to correct their noncompliance by dismantling non-declared TLI or removing them from open storage at non-declared locations.

(3) Un-notified Movements of Training Launchers: The December 1988 Noncompliance Report stated the conclusion that the Soviet failure to provide notification of the movement of SS-20 training launchers constituted a violation of the obligations of paragraph 5(f) of Article IX of the Treaty. The Soviets subsequently agreed that such notifications were required and stated that they would observe that requirement.

(4) Treaty-limited Items at a Facility Declared Ready for Elimination; Removal of Shorter-range Missiles from an Elimination Facility: Paragraph 8 of Article X of the Treaty specifies that a party shall eliminate its deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities by removing all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, and associated support equipment and support structures. In addition, for a facility to be considered "eliminated," all INF-related activity, such as production, flight-testing, training, repair, storage or deployment of such missiles and launchers must cease at the facility. Once these conditions have been satisfied, the eliminating party is obligated to notify the other party that the facility is scheduled for elimination, as specified in paragraph 5(a) of Article IX. The deployment area, missile operating base, or declared facility is considered to be eliminated when inspected by the other party pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article XI (termed a "close-out" inspection) or when 60 days elapse since the scheduled date provided

in the notification. In addition, paragraph 2 of Article V prohibits removing shorter-range missiles (SRMs) from elimination facilities from the time they are first located there until they are eliminated.

The December 1988 Noncompliance Report stated the finding that the presence of two SS-12 missiles in the Saryozek Main Operating Base (MOB) during the close-out inspection was in violation of the provisions of paragraph 8 of Article X of the Treaty and the removal of SS-12 missiles from the boundaries of the Saryozek elimination facility constituted a violation of paragraph 2 of Article V of the Treaty.

(5) Treaty-limited Items at Non-declared Locations: Paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty provides that all intermediate-range missiles and their launchers must be located in deployment areas, at missile support facilities, or be in transit. These items must not be located elsewhere.

The December 1988 Noncompliance Report stated the U.S. finding that by locating for brief times SS-20s and launchers outside the boundaries of two launch-to-destruction elimination sites, the Soviets were in violation of paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty. The Soviets were informed that such practices must cease. The Soviets adjusted the boundaries of the two elimination facilities, as permitted by the Treaty, so as to include the holding areas where these SS-20s were temporarily located.

(6) Cargoscan: The INF Treaty gives the United States the right to inspect vehicles exiting through the portal that are declared to contain a missile. Such vehicles shall be subject to, among other things, imaging using non-damaging imaging equipment to be provide by the inspecting party. The U.S. right to use its non-damaging imaging equipment, Cargoscan, is clear. Refusal to permit use of properly functioning non-damaging imaging equipment would be in violation of Article IX of the Inspection Protocol.

On March 1, 1990, the Soviet Union declared the exit of a missile-carrying railcar. After completion of the measurement phase, the Soviet Union refused to permit the U.S. to image the missile/railcar. By mutual agreement, that railcar was moved into the environmentally controlled building at the portal and kept under constant U.S. observation while the problem was elevated to the political level. This missile/railcar remained in the environmentally controlled building until the early morning of March 10. On the evening of the March 9, the Soviet Union announced that it intended to renew shipments without allowing the United States to image the missiles/railcars, and that the missile/railcar stored in the environmentally controlled building would also be moved immediately, exiting the Votkinsk portal. The United States declared this Soviet denial of the United States to exercise its Treaty right to image the missile/railcar an ambiguity. The United States had this canister opened for visual

examination pursuant paragraph 14(c) of Section IX to the Inspection Protocol. Later that same day, two additional missile-carrying railcars exited despite U.S. objections.

The United States Government stated its finding in the February 1991 President's Noncompliance Report that the Soviet Union's failure to permit the United States to exercise its Treaty right to use its non-damaging image producing equipment, Cargoscan, to image the contents of three missile canisters during the period from March 1 to 10, 1990 was in violation of the Soviet Union's obligations under the INF Treaty. The reason stated by the Soviet Union for its failure to allow the United States to image these canisters was that Cargoscan was operating outside of the parameters of the MOA. The United States Government was able to allay these concerns by accepting certain technical and procedural solutions that did not alter Cargoscan's ability to operate within the parameters of the MOA. Since these incidents, the Soviet Union met all U.S. requests to use this equipment.

(7) Undeclared SS-4 Treaty Limited Items: The INF Treaty provides for a comprehensive data exchange -- the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) -- covering all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers, support equipment and support structures associated with those missiles possessed by the Parties as of November 1, 1987. Such data include the numbers and locations of all TLIs. Article IX further requires the Parties to update the categories of data in the MOU within 30 days after entry into force and every six months thereafter. In signing the MOU, each Party acknowledged that it is responsible for the accuracy of its own data.

The February 1991 *President's Noncompliance Report* stated the United States Government finding that the presence, prior to October 24, 1990, of SS-4 Missile Transporter Vehicles (MTVs) and launch stands at locations not declared under the INF Treaty constituted violations of the provisions of the INF Treaty. The United States noted in that Report that while the Soviet elimination of some of this equipment has moved the Soviet Union towards resolution of this violation, more remains to be accomplished and that the United States continued to be concerned about this matter and what it implied about the accuracy of Soviet declarations. The April 1992 Noncompliance Report reaffirmed the finding that the presence of non-operational SS-4 MTVs and launch stands at locations not declared under the INF Treaty constituted violations of the provisions of the INF Treaty.

Probable Violations:

(1) SS-23 Missiles: Article I of the INF Treaty provides that each Party shall eliminate all "its" intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and not have such systems thereafter. Article V repeats the requirement that each Party eliminate all "its" shorter-range missiles of the categories "listed in the Memorandum of Understanding..." Article VI contains a prohibition

against producing or flight-testing any intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles. Read together, these provisions in effect also contain a prohibition on transfer of treaty-limited items after Treaty signature: each Party must destroy all of its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and may not produce any such missiles in the future for any purpose, including transfer.

In early 1990, when the German Democratic Republic (GDR) publicly stated that it was eliminating SS-23 missiles located there, the United States became aware for the first time of the existence of SS-23 missiles in three Eastern European countries. The Soviet Union stated they transferred SS-23s to the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, prior to entry into force of the INF Treaty. None of these three countries is a party to the INF Treaty. SS-23 missiles are shorter-range missiles which are listed in the INF Treaty. Soviet SS-23 missiles were to have been eliminated by November 1, 1989.

The issue of whether the existence of these SS-23 missiles violated the INF Treaty was first examined and reported in the February 1991 President's Noncompliance Report. In September 1991, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency submitted a *Supplemental Report to Congress on SS-23 Missiles in Eastern Europe.* That *Supplemental Report* stated the finding that the Soviet Union:

> had understandings that constituted what amounted to an undisclosed program of cooperation. Thus, the United States has reaffirmed its previous finding that the Soviet Union negotiated in bad faith. The United States further found that the Soviet Union has probably violated the Elimination Protocol of the Treaty by failing to eliminate in accordance with Treaty procedures, re-entry vehicles associated with and released from programs of cooperation.

The START Treaty

In January 1993, the President submitted a combined *Report on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements and Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Agreements.* That Report addressed for the first time implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START Treaty) and compliance with those associated obligations that are in effect prior to its entry-into-force. The START Treaty was signed July 31, 1991.

Although the Treaty has not yet entered into force, the Parties to the Treaty are under a general obligation to refrain from actions that would defeat the Treaty's object and purpose. Furthermore, certain portions of the

Treaty and some related agreements are, by mutual agreement, to be observed pending the Treaty's entry-into-force, such as an Agreement on Early Exhibitions of Strategic Offensive Arms. The sides also exchanged data current as of September 1, 1990 as specified in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).

In addition, the United States and the Soviet Union exchanged policy statements making political commitments not to encrypt telemetry or use jamming during flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs for one year, or until the Treaty enters into force, whichever occurs first, beginning 120 days after Treaty signature. The United States, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Belarus have approved policy statements extending this commitment through November 28, 1993, or until entry-into-force, whichever occurs first.

Violations:

(1) Encryption of SS-19 Flight Test Telemetry: On December 20, 1991, an SS-19 was launched by the Soviet Union to test the feasibility of using ICBMs as space launch vehicles; telemetry from that flight test was encrypted.

The January 1993 Report stated the conclusion that the United States considers that the encryption of telemetry on the December 20, 1991 flight test of an SS-19 ICBM constituted a violation of the Soviet Union's political commitment not to encrypt telemetry or use jamming on flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs after November 29, 1991.

In response to a U.S. demarche, the Russian Federation acknowledged that the Soviet Union, by encrypting the telemetry from the SS-19, had deviated from its political commitment in the unilateral statement, and stated that Russia had taken steps to preclude a repeat occurrence. Russia also provided to the United States, as a gesture of goodwill, acceleration profiles and other technical data from the flight test.

On the basis of the data provided from the subject flight test as well as the assurances concerning future practices, the United States considers the issue of the encrypted telemetry from the flight test of an SS-19 on December 20, 1991 to be closed. This message was conveyed to the Russian Federation (and the other START Parties) in the closing U.S. plenary statement made at the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) on November 19, 1992.

(2) Conduct of Early Technical Characteristics Exhibitions: An Agreement on the Early Exhibition of Strategic Offensive Arms was signed on July 31, 1991, calling for exhibitions of treaty-limited items and their distinguishing features to be conducted within 240 days of Treaty signature. The purpose of these early exhibitions was to ensure the ability to begin accurate and reliable inspections in a timely manner once the Treaty enters into force. In one specific case, the Soviets refused to allow U.S. inspectors to take a critical measurement. Efforts to resolve this matter have been undertaken.

SECTION II

ACTIONS TAKEN TO COMPLY

An amendment to Section 52 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act expanded the requirements of the report *Adherence to and Compliance with Agreements,* to include information on "actions taken by the Soviet Union and other nations with regard to the size, structure, and disposition of military forces in order to comply with such arms control agreements." A section was added in the March 11, 1988 report which briefly addressed this question. It noted that:

> Nations take a variety of actions with regard to their military forces for a variety of reasons, only one of which may be to comply with arms control agreements. For example, older or obsolete systems may be retired from the inventory for reasons of cost effectiveness."

On May 17, 1988, a supplement to the March 1988 Report was provided which addressed Soviet actions in regard to certain aspects of the ABM Treaty, the SALT I Interim Agreement, and the SALT II Treaty. Because the United States ceased observance of the SALT I Interim Agreement and the SALT II Treaty due in part to multiple, uncorrected Soviet violations, discussion of Soviet actions relevant to those Treaties was not repeated in subsequent reports.

The ABM Treaty

Gomel Radar Destruction: The report *Adherence to and Compliance with Agreements*, dated January 18, 1989, stated that:

> After discussions in various U.S./Soviet diplomatic channels, the Soviet Union has made a commitment regarding procedures for dismantling or destroying the illegally deployed radars at Gomel. The process is already underway. If fully carried out, this will be a constructive step, which, when verified, will satisfy U.S. concerns regarding the illegal deployment of these radars. The deployment of these radars in 1987 led to a finding of an ABM Treaty violation which was initially reported in the *President's 1987 Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements.*

As reported in the February 1992 *President's Noncompliance Report*, the Soviet Union ultimately took action to correct the Gomel ABM Treaty violation.

Krasnoyarsk Radar Destruction: As stated in the June 24, 1992, report *Adherence to and Compliance with Agreements*:

> The Soviet Union took several steps toward resolving long-standing U.S. concerns regarding Soviet compliance with the ABM Treaty. In 1989, it made a commitment to dismantle completely, to the ground, the illegal Krasnoyarsk radar and stated in the SCC it planned to do so by the end of 1991. Although dismantlement continued throughout the year, this commitment was not met. The United States is, however, currently involved in dialogue with the Russian Government on its request to use what remains of the radar buildings at the site as a furniture factory. The United States has stated that, in light of the changed political and security environment between the U.S. and Russia, which includes U.S. plans to discuss with Russia and our allies President Yeltsin's proposal for cooperation on a global ballistic missile defense system, the U.S. is prepared to agree in principle to the request to convert the remaining facilities at the Krasnoyarsk radar, including facilities that were to be fully dismantled under the 1989 agreement, into a furniture factory.

The January 1993 combined *President's Noncompliance Report* and *Adherence to and Compliance with Agreements* Report subsequently stated that the United States has agreed in principle to let Russia convert the Krasnoyarsk radar into a furniture factory. The United States is awaiting the promised plans for this conversion.

The INF Treaty

The first USG assessment of Soviet actions taken to comply with the INF Treaty was provided in the report *Adherence to and Compliance with Agreements* dated January 18, 1989.

The June 24, 1992, report on *Adherence to and Compliance with Agreements* stated that:

> The Soviet Union eliminated all its declared INF Treaty limited items (TLI) and facilities under strict verification by the United States. Since the last report, the Soviet Union and new states of the former Soviet Union continued to allow the United States to exercise its inspection rights contained in the INF Treaty. These inspections included the presence of the United States' continuous monitoring inspection site (CMIS) at Votkinsk, Russian Federation; and the conduct of on-site inspections by the United States.

The START Treaty

As stated in the January 1993 Combined Report, although the START Treaty has not yet entered into force, several obligations are, by mutual consent, to be observed prior to entry into force (EIF).

In this regard, the Soviet Union submitted initial MOU data current as of September 1, 1990, conducted a series of early technical characteristics exhibitions of some treaty-limited-items, participated in early sessions of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), and demonstrated equipment to be used for playing back telemetry tapes. The United States and the Soviet Union also made political commitments not to encrypt telemetry or use jamming during flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs beginning 120 days after Treaty signature. With one exception discussed more fully elsewhere in this Report, the Soviet Union and subsequently Russia have refrained from encrypting ICBM and SLBM test flights. After signing the Lisbon Protocol on May 23, 1992, the four successor states to the Soviet Union for START purposes have also taken steps to comply with those START-related obligations in effect prior to EIF, and are participating in sessions of the JCIC.

SECTION III

NET ASSESSMENT

The current military risk associated with individual treaty violations or compliance concerns addressed in this Report ranges from minor to none, and in the aggregate under the current political circumstances and given corrective actions that have been taken, they do not provide any significant military advantage at the strategic or theater level. Particular issues are addressed below. (U)

SALT I Interim Agreement and the SALT II Treaty

The May 17, 1988, report provided by then ACDA Director Burns in response to questions by Senator Pell summarized the specific actions taken by the Soviet Union to dismantle and replace its weapon systems accountable under the SALT I and II agreements during the period of U.S. adherence to those agreements. While such actions were taken, Soviet noncompliance had been judged to outweigh actions taken to dismantle accountable systems. It was because of a continued pattern of noncompliant Soviet behavior that President Reagan decided on May 27, 1986 to end U.S. observance of SALT I and SALT II.

The ABM Treaty

The Krasnoyarsk radar violation was judged to have raised the question of a material breach. This and the Gomel violation in addition to other Soviet ABM and ABM-related activities led to concerns that the Soviet Union may have been preparing the base for a territorial defense. Consistent diplomatic pressure by the United States, bolstered by the support of the U.S. Congress, eventually led the Soviet Union to agree to undertake a reversal of the violations, including destruction of the Krasnoyarsk radar, and cessation of many other activities of concern.

U.S. consideration of the ABM Treaty takes place in the context of a dramatically changed strategic environment, in which ballistic missile defense has taken a new character. Within this context, the United States and Russia have been working together and with their allies to develop a concept for a Global Protection System to defend against limited attack, and the United States has proposed that the ABM Treaty be updated to reflect current geopolitical, strategic, and technical realities.

The INF Treaty

Prior to the signing of the INF Treaty, serious concerns existed within the United States and among our allies concerning the threat posed by Soviet INF systems -- particularly the mobile SS-20 missile. Under the INF Treaty, the Soviet Union eliminated all its declared INF Treaty limited items (TLI) and facilities under strict verification by the United States. The United States is concerned over the continued existence of the SS-23 missiles in Eastern Europe and continues to pursue their destruction in order to fulfill the objective of the INF Treaty to eliminate this class of missiles. On balance, however, the achievements of the INF Treaty have strengthened western security.

The START Treaty

Because the START Treaty has not entered into force, a net assessment would be premature. It can be stated, however, that the START Treaty will, when fully implemented, result in the elimination of a large percentage of the former Soviet strategic forces.

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9302217
RECEIVED: 06 APR 93 18

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE
WH EXECUTIVE CLERK

DOC DATE: 11 MAY 93
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: START
CONGRESSIONAL
UKRAINE
ARMS CONTROL
RUSSIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: RPT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO START RESOLUTION OF RATIFICATION ON SOVIET TREATY COMPLIANCE

ACTION: PRES SGD PER WH EXEC CLERK DUE DATE: 09 APR 93 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ANDREASEN LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		ANDREASEN
		BELL
		NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTAS CLOSED BY: NSMEM DOC 3 OF 3

~~SECRET~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	ANDREASEN	Z	93040618	PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE
002	LAKE	Z	93041517	FWD TO PRES FOR SIG
002	ANDREASEN	Z	93041907	FOR FURTHER ACTION
002	LAKE	Z	93050320	FWD TO PRES FOR SIG
003	PRESIDENT	Z	93051117	FOR SIGNATURE
003		X	93051808	PRES SGD PER WH EXEC CLERK

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
003	930511		VICE PRESIDENT
003	930511		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

Rec'd 5/7 1:15pm
JWR
5/7 1400L

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: WA LOG # 2217 REDO

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG A A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	5		
ExecSec			
Staff Director	6		
D/APNSA	7		
APNSA	8	Nat! Sec Advisor ~~has seen~~	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	9	WA 5/11	D To Press
NSC Secretariat	10		N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS:

3 MAY 93 [illegible]

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 3, 1993

Nancy,

We have modified this correspondence to respond to the concerns that you and Tony raised.

Bob

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4/18

Bob -

Tony thinks the letters should let people know whether we are reviewing these issues (or why we are forwarding previous views) + when we can expect results etc.

MS

Rec'd 4/16 6:15pm
JWR
4/16
1935h

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: MJA LOG # 2217

URGENT NOT PROOFED: TMS SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG MJA A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
DepExecSec	1		
ExecSec			
Staff Director	2		
D/APNSA	3	PASS JWR	
APNSA	4		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk			
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: VP McLarty Other _____

Should be seen by: _____
(Date/Time)

COMMENTS: (1) necessary
(2) results of review

15 APR 93 6:11

DISPATCH INSTRUCTIONS:

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ 2217

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 11, 1993

President sgd per WH Executive Clerk May 13, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Report to Congress Pursuant to the START Resolution of Ratification on Soviet Treaty Compliance

Purpose

To recommend your approval of the attached Report to Congress pursuant to the START Resolution of Ratification on Soviet Treaty Compliance.

Background

Condition 7 of the START Resolution of Ratification calls for an updated and expanded Presidential Report to the Senate on Treaty Compliance. This Report addresses actions of the former Soviet Union which were violations or probable violations of the obligations of the SALT I Interim Agreement, SALT II, ABM, INF and START Treaties, and the ultimate resolution of these issues. Further, the Report delineates Soviet actions which were in compliance with those same agreements and provides a comparison of the military significance of those actions.

As clarified in Senator Pell's floor remarks at the time debate began on the Resolution of Ratification, this report was intended by the Senate to deal exclusively with actions taken by the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This report does not address the actions of the newly independent states which have succeeded the Soviet Union. As required by the Condition, the report updates actions taken to resolve these compliance issues. It does not, however, re-examine the original intelligence which provided the basis for these past compliance findings. As noted by Senator Pell, the intent of the Condition was "to close the books on the old Soviet Union."

The Report was prepared by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and has been cleared by the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy, by the Joint Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence's Arms Control Intelligence Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By RC NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M (1.28)

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~SECRET~~

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters to the President of the Senate and Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee transmitting the Report to Congress.

Attachments

Tab A	Letter to the President of the Senate
Tab B	Letter to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Tab C	Report to Congress

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. President:

Enclosed are classified and unclassified copies of the report on Soviet Treaty Compliance required under condition 7 of the Resolution of Ratification for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

The judgments included in this report are drawn from reports prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and submitted to Congress under the provisions of PL 99-145, as amended, and Section 52 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.

Under the terms set forth in the Resolution of Ratification, this report addresses actions of the former Soviet Union which were violations or probable violations of the obligations of the SALT I Interim Agreement, SALT II, ABM, INF and START Treaties and the ultimate resolution of these issues. This report does not address the actions of the newly independent states which have succeeded the Soviet Union. In contrast to the Soviet Union, the newly independent states have demonstrated a substantially improved willingness to adhere to arms control obligations and to work with us to resolve problems.

Sincerely,

Enclosures

The Honorable Albert Gore, Jr.
President
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

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OF ~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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The judgments included in this report are drawn from reports prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and submitted to Congress under the provisions of PL 99-145, as amended, and Section 52 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.

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Sincerely,

Enclosures

The Honorable Claiborne Pell
Chairman
Foreign Relations Committee
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

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OF ~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002b. memo	Duplicate of 001b [partial] (1 page)	04/05/1993	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 145

FOLDER TITLE:
9302217

2016-0048-M
rs1619

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

2217

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D C 20451

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

APR 5 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Presidential Report to Congress Prepared Pursuant to the START Resolution of Ratification (U)

The Acting Director is forwarding to the President herewith both the classified and unclassified versions of the "Report to Congress on Treaty Compliance." The President would formally transmit this Report to the Senate. As we understand, the NSC staff is preparing the transmittal letters for the President's signature. (U)

Attached are two sets of original copies of the classified and unclassified versions of this Report for the President's transmittal to the President of the Senate and the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The Report was prepared by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and has been cleared at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level by the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy, by the Joint Staff and the Arms Control Intelligence Staff. (U)

Barbara Starr
Barbara Starr
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
As stated

THIS MEMORANDUM IS
UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
SEPARATE FROM
ATTACHMENT

[002b]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002c. memo	Duplicate of 001c [partial] (1 page)	04/05/1993	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 145

FOLDER TITLE:
9302217

2016-0048-M
rs1619

RESTRICTION CODES

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Washington, D C 20451

THE DIRECTOR

APR 5 1983

Dear Mr. President:

As Acting Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, I am forwarding herewith the report required by Condition 7 of the Senate Resolution of Ratification entitled "Report to Congress on Treaty Compliance." Condition 7 of the START Resolution of Ratification calls for an updated and expanded Presidential Report to the Senate on Treaty Compliance. This Report addresses actions which are violations or probable violations of the obligations of the SALT I Interim Agreement, SALT II, ABM, INF and START Treaties, and the ultimate resolution of these issues. Further, the Report delineates the actions which are in compliance with those same agreements and provides a comparison of the military significance of those actions.

This Report was prepared by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and has been cleared by the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy, by the Joint Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence's Arms Control Intelligence Staff.

Thomas Graham, Jr.
Acting

Enclosure

The President
The White House

THIS MEMORANDUM IS
UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
SEPARATE FROM
ATTACHMENT

~~SECRET~~

2217
REDO

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

April 9, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL RGB

FROM: STEVEN ANDREASEN SPA

SUBJECT: Report to Congress Pursuant to the START Resolution of Ratification on Treaty Compliance

Condition 7 of the START Resolution of Ratification calls for an updated and expanded Presidential Report to the Senate on Treaty Compliance. This Report was prepared by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and has been cleared by the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy, by the Joint Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence's Arms Control Intelligence Staff.

The memorandum from you to the President describes the Report, and includes a recommendation that the President sign letters to the President of the Senate and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee transmitting the Report to Congress.

Concurrences by: Rose Gottemoeller and Don Gross

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum for the President
- Tab A Letter to the President of the Senate
- Tab B Letter to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
- Tab C Report on Treaty Compliance

TL-
President's letter says we are forwarding judgments of previous administration, not our own. OK?

NS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/14/2019
2016-0048-M

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 3, 1993

Nancy,

We have modified this correspondence to respond to the concerns that you and Tony raised.

Bob

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4/18

Bob -

Tony thinks the letters should let people know whether we are reviewing these issues (or why we are forwarding previous views) + when we can expect results etc.

MS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

2217
REDO

April 9, 1993

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL RGB

FROM: STEVEN ANDREASEN SPA

SUBJECT: Report to Congress Pursuant to the START Resolution of Ratification on Treaty Compliance

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Tab A Letter to the President of the Senate
Tab B Letter to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Tab C Report on Treaty Compliance

TL - Presidents letter says we are forwarding judgments of previous administration, not our own. OK?

AS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By [illegible] NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-m

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: THE EXECUTIVE CLERK

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Report to Congress Pursuant to the START Resolution of Ratification on Soviet Treaty Compliance

Purpose

To recommend your approval of the attached Report to Congress pursuant to the START Resolution of Ratification on Soviet Treaty Compliance.

Background

Condition 7 of the START Resolution of Ratification calls for an updated and expanded Presidential Report to the Senate on Treaty Compliance. This Report addresses actions of the former Soviet Union which were violations or probable violations of the obligations of the SALT I Interim Agreement, SALT II, ABM, INF and START Treaties, and the ultimate resolution of these issues. Further, the Report delineates Soviet actions which were in compliance with those same agreements and provides a comparison of the military significance of those actions.

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The Report was prepared by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and has been cleared by the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy, by the Joint Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence's Arms Control Intelligence Staff.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VC NARA, Date 2/16/2009
2016-0048-M (1.28)

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letters to the President of the Senate and Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee transmitting the Report to Congress.

Attachments

Tab A	Letter to the President of the Senate
Tab B	Letter to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Tab C	Report to Congress

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. President:

Enclosed are classified and unclassified copies of the report on Soviet Treaty Compliance required under condition 7 of the Resolution of Ratification for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).

The judgments included in this report are drawn from reports prepared by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and submitted to Congress under the provisions of PL 99-145, as amended, and Section 52 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.

Under the terms set forth in the Resolution of Ratification, this report addresses actions of the former Soviet Union which were violations or probable violations of the obligations of the SALT I Interim Agreement, SALT II, ABM, INF and START Treaties, and the ultimate resolution of these issues. This report does not address the actions of the newly independent states which have succeeded the Soviet Union. In contrast to the Soviet Union, the newly independent states have demonstrated a substantially improved willingness to adhere to arms control obligations and to work with us to resolve problems.

Sincerely,

Enclosures

The Honorable Albert Gore, Jr.
President
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

UNCLASSIFED WITH REMOVAL
OF ~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED WITH
~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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Sincerely,

Enclosures

The Honorable Claiborne Pell
Chairman
Foreign Relations Committee
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510

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OF ~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002e. memo	Duplicate of 001b [partial] (1 page)	04/05/1993	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 145

FOLDER TITLE:
9302217

2016-0048-M
rs1619

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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2217

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20451

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

APR 5 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM H. ITOH
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Presidential Report to Congress Prepared Pursuant to the START Resolution of Ratification (U)

The Acting Director is forwarding to the President herewith both the classified and unclassified versions of the "Report to Congress on Treaty Compliance." The President would formally transmit this Report to the Senate. As we understand, the NSC staff is preparing the transmittal letters for the President's signature. (U)

Attached are two sets of original copies of the classified and unclassified versions of this Report for the President's transmittal to the President of the Senate and the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The Report was prepared by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and has been cleared at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level by the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy, by the Joint Staff and the Arms Control Intelligence Staff. (U)

Barbara Starr
Barbara Starr
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
As stated

THIS MEMORANDUM IS
UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
SEPARATE FROM
ATTACHMENT

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
002f. memo	Duplicate of 001c [partial] (1 page)	04/05/1993	P3/b(3)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 145

FOLDER TITLE:
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2016-0048-M
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Washington, D.C. 20451

THE DIRECTOR

APR 5 1993

Dear Mr. President:

As Acting Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, I am forwarding herewith the report required by Condition 7 of the Senate Resolution of Ratification entitled "Report to Congress on Treaty Compliance." Condition 7 of the START Resolution of Ratification calls for an updated and expanded Presidential Report to the Senate on Treaty Compliance. This Report addresses actions which are violations or probable violations of the obligations of the SALT I Interim Agreement, SALT II, ABM, INF and START Treaties, and the ultimate resolution of these issues. Further, the Report delineates the actions which are in compliance with those same agreements and provides a comparison of the military significance of those actions.

This Report was prepared by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and has been cleared by the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy, by the Joint Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence's Arms Control Intelligence Staff.

Thomas Graham, Jr.
Acting

Enclosure

The President
The White House

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b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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EMBARGOED PENDING
RELEASE

REPORT TO CONGRESS ON TREATY COMPLIANCE

March 31, 1993

Prepared by

the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Pursuant to

Condition 7 of the START Resolution of Ratification

March 31, 1993

REPORT TO CONGRESS ON TREATY COMPLIANCE

Condition 7 of the START Resolution of Ratification (see Congressional Record for October 1, 1992) calls for an updated and expanded Presidential Report on Treaty Compliance addressing actions which are violations or probable violations of the obligations of the SALT I Interim Agreement, SALT II, ABM, INF and START Treaties, and the ultimate resolution of these issues, as well as the actions which are in compliance with those same agreements and a comparison of the military significance of those actions.

Section I of this report describes those actions found by the United States Government to have been in violation or probable violation of the obligations of the SALT I Interim Agreement, SALT II, ABM, INF and START Treaties, and the ultimate resolution of these issues. Section II describes those actions the USG has identified as likely having been taken to comply with agreements. Section III describes the military significance of the actions listed in Sections I and II.

This report references previous *Presidential Reports to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements,* an unclassified brochure entitled *Soviet Noncompliance* dated May 1986, prepared by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and previous reports on *Adherence to and Compliance with Agreements* prepared by ACDA which were provided to Congress pursuant to Section 52 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. Copies of these Reports will be made available upon request.

SECTION I

FINDINGS OF VIOLATION OR PROBABLE VIOLATION

Beginning with a Report dated January 23, 1984, the United States Government began annual *Reports to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements.*

SALT I Interim Agreement

The United States Government provided Congress with assessments of Soviet noncompliance with the SALT I Interim Agreement in the President's *Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements*, dated February 1, 1985, and December 23, 1985. In light of President Reagan's decision in May 1986 to end the U.S. policy of observing the provisions of the SALT I Interim Agreement (which had expired), subsequent Noncompliance Reports did not address the question of Soviet noncompliance with the SALT I Interim Agreement.

Violation:

(1) Use of "Remaining Facilities" at Former SS-7 Sites: The SALT I Interim Agreement and its procedures prohibited the Parties from using for storage, support, or launch of ICBMs certain facilities remaining at dismantled or destroyed ICBM sites (such as SS-7 ICBM sites). The Soviets deactivated their SS-7 ICBM sites in the 1970s in compensation for new systems introduced. The launch facilities were destroyed in accordance with the prescribed procedures. However, a number of missile support facilities were left standing. Evidence obtained during 1985 at some of these sites involving deployment of the SS-25 indicated that remaining facilities were used to support deployment and operation of the SS-25. The U.S. Government found that Soviet use of the former SS-7 ICBM facilities in support of the deployment and operation of the SS-25 mobile ICBM was in violation of the SALT I Interim Agreement.

SALT II

The United States Government provided Congress with assessments of Soviet noncompliance with the SALT II Treaty in the President's *Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements*, dated January 23, 1984, February 1, 1985, and December 23, 1985. In light of President Reagan's decision in May 1986 to end the U.S. policy of observing the provisions of the SALT II Treaty (which was never ratified and would have expired on December 31, 1985), subsequent Noncompliance Reports did not address the question of Soviet noncompliance with SALT II.

Violations:

(1) SS-25 ICBM: The provisions of the SALT II Agreement permitted each side to "flight test and deploy" just one new type of "light" ICBM. In addition, it was agreed that no ICBM of an existing type with a post-boost vehicle and a single reentry vehicle (RV) would be flight-tested or deployed whose reentry vehicle was less than 50 percent of the throw-weight of that ICBM. The Soviet Union declared the then SS-X-24 to be its allowed one "new type" ICBM. In addition, it flight tested and deployed the SS-25 ICBM.

The U.S. Government concluded that the SS-25 was a prohibited second "new type" of ICBM and that its testing, in addition to the testing of the SS-24, was a violation of the Soviet Union's political commitment to observe the "new type" provision of the SALT II Treaty. The deployment of the SS-25 in 1985 was found to be a further violation of the SALT II prohibition on a second "new type" of ICBM.

At the time, the Soviet Union argued that the SS-25 was not a new type but rather was an allowed modification of the SS-13 ICBM. The U.S. Government also concluded that if the U.S. accepted that the SS-25 was not a new type of ICBM, it would have been a violation of the Soviet political commitment to observe the SALT II provision which prohibited the testing of such an existing ICBM with a single reentry vehicle whose weight was less than 50 percent of the throw-weight of the ICBM. U.S. analysis showed that the weight of the SS-25 RV was definitely less than 50 percent of the missile's throw-weight.

The question of missile telemetry encryption was considered both as a separate SALT II Treaty violation and as a sub-issue regarding the SS-25 missile violation. The SALT II Treaty permitted each Party to use various methods of transmitting telemetric information during testing, including encryption, but banned deliberate denial of telemetric information, such as through telemetry encryption, whenever such denial impeded verification of compliance with provisions of the SALT II Treaty. The United States Government judged that telemetry encryption during tests of the SS-25 was illustrative of the deliberate impeding of verification of compliance in violation of the USSR's political commitment.

(2) Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle (SNDV) Limits: The United States Government interpreted the Soviet commitment to abide by SALT II pending its ratification as a commitment to maintaining the number of their deployed SNDVs at a level no greater than 2,504 existing at the time SALT II was signed (June 1979). The Soviet Union deployed SNDVs above the 2,504 level in violation of its political commitment under SALT II.

(3) Encryption of Ballistic Missile Telemetry: The SALT II Treaty prohibited deliberate concealment measures that impede verification of compliance with the Treaty provisions by national technical means. The deliberate denial of telemetric information, whenever such denial impedes verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, was specifically prohibited. The Soviet Union heavily encrypted telemetry broadcasts during tests of strategic ballistic missiles, thereby impeding U.S. verification of compliance with the SALT II Treaty. The United States Government concluded that Soviet encryption practices constituted a violation of a legal obligation under SALT II prior to 1981 and a violation of the Soviet political commitment after 1982.

(4) Concealment of the Association Between an ICBM and Its Launcher: Article XV of the SALT II Treaty prohibited deliberate concealment measures which impeded verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty. This obligation was clarified in a Common Understanding that states that Article XV applied to all provisions of the Treaty and "includes the obligation not to use deliberate concealment measures associated with testing, including those measures aimed at concealing the association between ICBMs and launchers during testing." The United States Government found in the December 23, 1985 *President's Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements* Soviet activities related to the SS-25 to be a violation of the Soviet Union's political commitment to abide by the SALT II Treaty provision prohibiting concealment of the association between a missile and its launcher during testing.

Probable Violation:

SS-16: The U.S., in negotiating the SALT II Treaty, obtained Soviet agreement not to produce, test, or deploy ICBMs of the SS-16 type. Further, the Soviets agreed not to produce the SS-16's third stage, reentry vehicle or "other appropriate device" (post-boost vehicle) for targeting the missile's single reentry vehicle. The U.S. addressed the question of whether the SS-16 was deployed at Plesetsk. While the evidence was somewhat ambiguous and the U.S. could not reach a definitive conclusion, the U.S. Government found the activities at Plesetsk to be a probable violation of the USSR's legal obligation and political commitment under SALT II.

The ABM Treaty

Violations:

(1) The Krasnoyarsk Radar: To preclude the development of a territorial defense or providing the base for a territorial ABM defense, the ABM Treaty provides that radars for early warning of ballistic missile attack may be deployed at locations along the periphery of the national territory of

each party and that they be oriented outward. The Treaty permits deployment (without regard to location or orientation) of large phased-array radars for purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means (NTM) of verification of compliance with arms control agreements.

The first *President's Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements*, dated January 23, 1984, stated that the Krasnoyarsk radar "almost certainly" constituted a violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The February 1, 1985 Report reexamined the issue, and stated the U.S. Government judgment that the large phased-array radar under construction at Krasnoyarsk constituted a violation of legal obligations under the ABM Treaty in that in its associated siting, orientation, and capability, it is prohibited by that Treaty.

As reported in the December 2, 1988 Noncompliance Report, during the 1988 ABM Treaty Review Conference, the U.S. told the Soviet Union that the Krasnoyarsk radar was a significant violation of a central element of the ABM Treaty, and that this violation would continue to raise the issue of material breach and proportionate responses until resolved.

The Soviet Union ultimately agreed to dismantle the radar. This is discussed in Section II.

(2) Concurrent Operations: The United States and the Soviet Union agreed in 1978 to prohibit concurrent testing of air defense components and ABM system components at the same test range.

The U.S. expressed its concerns to the Soviet Union about three general types of activities involving Surface to Air Missile (SAM) and ABM components at the same test range: 1) SAM radars operating at the same time as either strategic ballistic missile reentry testing or ABM missile testing; 2) ABM radars operating at the same time as either SAM launches or SAM target flights; and, 3) SAM radars operating at the same time as ABM radars. Subsequent to the signing of the ABM Treaty in 1972, there were many instances of the activities of concern.

Such activities raise the possibility of testing SAM components "in an ABM mode," and, as discussed in the section below on findings of probable violations, the U.S. determined that the activities were in probable violation of the prohibition on "testing in an ABM mode" as that term was defined prior to the 1978 Agreed Statement.

The United States first reported its concerns with respect to Soviet concurrent operations of SAM and ABM components in the February 1, 1985 *President's Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements*. At that time, and in subsequent Noncompliance Reports until the February 1990 Report, the United States found that the evidence

of Soviet actions with respect to concurrent operations was insufficient to assess fully compliance with Soviet obligations.

In 1985, the United States and the Soviet Union further agreed in a 1985 Common Understanding to refrain from launching strategic ballistic missiles to the area of a test range or from launching ABM interceptor missiles at a test range concurrent with the operation of air defense components at that test range.

In the February 23, 1990 Noncompliance Report, the United States reported its judgment that the Soviet Union had continued to conduct type 2 and 3 activities which the U.S. believed were prohibited by the 1978 Agreed Statement. The U.S. also noted, however, that the sides appeared to be moving closer to resolution of this issue.

(3) Gomel: The ABM Treaty provides that ABM radars that have been tested in an ABM mode cannot be "deployed" outside of the one permitted ABM system deployment area or designated ABM test ranges for any purpose.

In March 1987, the U.S. Government observed the appearance of major parts of the original Flat Twin radar, including all of the modular sections of the radar body, and Pawn Shop missile guidance transmitter at an electronics plant in Gomel, about 550 kilometers southwest of Moscow. The timing of the arrival of parts of the Flat Twin and Pawn Shop indicates that they came from the radars that were removed from the Sary Shagan Missile Test Center where, by January 1987, the Soviets were observed disassembling a number of these ABM components.

As stated in the December 1987 *President's Noncompliance Report*, the U.S. Government found that the USSR's activities with respect to moving a Flat Twin ABM radar and a Pawn Shop van, a component of an ABM system, from a test range and initiating deployment at a location outside of an ABM deployment area or ABM test range constituted a violation of the ABM Treaty. While it is not likely that the actions at Gomel were to support an ABM defense at that locality, deployment of such radars at Gomel to carry out any function would be inconsistent with ABM Treaty obligations.

As discussed in Section II, at U.S. insistence the Soviet Union ultimately reversed this violation of the ABM Treaty.

Probable Violation:

Testing in an ABM Mode: U.S. assessments of Soviet compliance with respect to concurrent operations of SAM and ABM components are addressed above. The United States also judged, beginning in the February 1, 1985 Noncompliance Report, that "The number of incidents of concurrent operation of SAM and ABM components indicate the USSR probably has violated the prohibition on testing SAM components in an ABM

mode. In several cases this may be highly probable." This finding remained relatively unchanged until the February 23, 1990 Report, when the assessment was expanded. That Report stated the U.S. finding that:

> The U.S. Government finds that the Soviet Union has conducted tests that have involved air defense radars in ABM-related activities. The large number, and consistency over time, of incidents of concurrent operation of ABM and SAM components, plus previous Soviet failure to accommodate fully U.S. concerns, indicate the USSR probably has violated the prohibition on testing SAM components in an ABM mode as defined in a 1972 U.S. Unilateral Statement on testing in an ABM mode (a statement which the Soviets did not reject) prior to the 1978 Agreed Statement. (The 1978 Agreed Statement refined the definition of testing "in an ABM mode.") In several cases, this may be highly probable. No known violations have occurred which meet the 1978 Agreed Statement's definition of testing "in an ABM mode." Recently, the sides appear to have moved closer to resolution of this issue since the Soviet Union has stated that it is willing to take steps to cease these activities.

The INF Treaty

The U.S. first assessed Soviet noncompliance with the INF Treaty in the December 1, 1988 *President's Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements,* and has continued to report its assessments in annual reports including the 1993 combined *Noncompliance Report and Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Agreements.*

Violations:

(1) Transits of Missiles on Launchers: Paragraph 10 of Article II of the Treaty provides that the term "transit" includes the movement of an intermediate-range missile (such as an SS-20), or a launcher of such a missile, between a deployment area and a missile support facility (such as a missile/launcher repair facility). Paragraph 12 of Article II provides that the term "non-deployed" includes an intermediate-range missile located outside a deployment area. Paragraph 8 of Article VIII of the Treaty provides that non-deployed intermediate-range missiles must not be carried on their launchers, "except as required for maintenance conducted at repair facilities or for elimination by means of launching conducted at elimination facilities." This exception in paragraph 8 of Article VIII means that intermediate-range missiles may be carried on their launchers only if they are actually located at a repair or elimination facility, rather than in transit to or from such facilities.

In the December 1988 and February 1990 Noncompliance Report the United States Government found that although the Soviets notified the U.S. of nearly 200 transits of SS-20s on their launchers, such transits constituted a violation of paragraph 8 of Article VIII of the Treaty. After repeated discussions in the Special Verification Commission (SVC) and in diplomatic channels, the Soviets ceased this practice.

(2) Non-declared Treaty-limited Items (TLIs): Immediately after the INF Treaty's entry into force, the Soviets were not in compliance with Article IX requirements to list all TLIs and their locations in the data update to the MOU. In the summer of 1988, the U.S. presented a demarche to the Soviet Union on the related issue of TLIs at non-declared locations and insisted on full Soviet compliance. While the Soviets never acknowledged their failure to meet the locational restrictions or explained the reasons for this failure, they moved to correct their noncompliance and dismantled or removed TLIs previously observed at non-declared sites.

In the December 1988 Noncompliance Report, the U.S. Government found that Soviet failure to declare all of its TLIs in the initial data update to the MOU was a violation of the provisions of Article IX that require a side to present true and accurate data in the MOU and in all subsequent data updates. Since entry into force, the Soviets, while not acknowledging their violation, moved to correct their noncompliance by dismantling non-declared TLI or removing them from open storage at non-declared locations.

(3) Un-notified Movements of Training Launchers: The December 1988 Noncompliance Report stated the conclusion that the Soviet failure to provide notification of the movement of SS-20 training launchers constituted a violation of the obligations of paragraph 5(f) of Article IX of the Treaty. The Soviets subsequently agreed that such notifications were required and stated that they would observe that requirement.

(4) Treaty-limited Items at a Facility Declared Ready for Elimination; Removal of Shorter-range Missiles from an Elimination Facility: Paragraph 8 of Article X of the Treaty specifies that a party shall eliminate its deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities by removing all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, and associated support equipment and support structures. In addition, for a facility to be considered "eliminated," all INF-related activity, such as production, flight-testing, training, repair, storage or deployment of such missiles and launchers must cease at the facility. Once these conditions have been satisfied, the eliminating party is obligated to notify the other party that the facility is scheduled for elimination, as specified in paragraph 5(a) of Article IX. The deployment area, missile operating base, or declared facility is considered to be eliminated when inspected by the other party pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article XI (termed a "close-out" inspection) or when 60 days elapse since the scheduled date provided

in the notification. In addition, paragraph 2 of Article V prohibits removing shorter-range missiles (SRMs) from elimination facilities from the time they are first located there until they are eliminated.

The December 1988 Noncompliance Report stated the finding that the presence of two SS-12 missiles in the Saryozek Main Operating Base (MOB) during the close-out inspection was in violation of the provisions of paragraph 8 of Article X of the Treaty and the removal of SS-12 missiles from the boundaries of the Saryozek elimination facility constituted a violation of paragraph 2 of Article V of the Treaty.

(5) Treaty-limited Items at Non-declared Locations: Paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty provides that all intermediate-range missiles and their launchers must be located in deployment areas, at missile support facilities, or be in transit. These items must not be located elsewhere.

The December 1988 Noncompliance Report stated the U.S. finding that by locating for brief times SS-20s and launchers outside the boundaries of two launch-to-destruction elimination sites, the Soviets were in violation of paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty. The Soviets were informed that such practices must cease. The Soviets adjusted the boundaries of the two elimination facilities, as permitted by the Treaty, so as to include the holding areas where these SS-20s were temporarily located.

(6) Cargoscan: The INF Treaty gives the United States the right to inspect vehicles exiting through the portal that are declared to contain a missile. Such vehicles shall be subject to, among other things, imaging using non-damaging imaging equipment to be provide by the inspecting party. The U.S. right to use its non-damaging imaging equipment, Cargoscan, is clear. Refusal to permit use of properly functioning non-damaging imaging equipment would be in violation of Article IX of the Inspection Protocol.

On March 1, 1990, the Soviet Union declared the exit of a missile-carrying railcar. After completion of the measurement phase, the Soviet Union refused to permit the U.S. to image the missile/railcar. By mutual agreement, that railcar was moved into the environmentally controlled building at the portal and kept under constant U.S. observation while the problem was elevated to the political level. This missile/railcar remained in the environmentally controlled building until the early morning of March 10. On the evening of the March 9, the Soviet Union announced that it intended to renew shipments without allowing the United States to image the missiles/railcars, and that the missile/railcar stored in the environmentally controlled building would also be moved immediately, exiting the Votkinsk portal. The United States declared this Soviet denial of the United States to exercise its Treaty right to image the missile/railcar an ambiguity. The United States had this canister opened for visual

examination pursuant paragraph 14(c) of Section IX to the Inspection Protocol. Later that same day, two additional missile-carrying railcars exited despite U.S. objections.

The United States Government stated its finding in the February 1991 President's Noncompliance Report that the Soviet Union's failure to permit the United States to exercise its Treaty right to use its non-damaging image producing equipment, Cargoscan, to image the contents of three missile canisters during the period from March 1 to 10, 1990 was in violation of the Soviet Union's obligations under the INF Treaty. The reason stated by the Soviet Union for its failure to allow the United States to image these canisters was that Cargoscan was operating outside of the parameters of the MOA. The United States Government was able to allay these concerns by accepting certain technical and procedural solutions that did not alter Cargoscan's ability to operate within the parameters of the MOA. Since these incidents, the Soviet Union met all U.S. requests to use this equipment.

(7) Undeclared SS-4 Treaty Limited Items: The INF Treaty provides for a comprehensive data exchange -- the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) -- covering all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers, support equipment and support structures associated with those missiles possessed by the Parties as of November 1, 1987. Such data include the numbers and locations of all TLIs. Article IX further requires the Parties to update the categories of data in the MOU within 30 days after entry into force and every six months thereafter. In signing the MOU, each Party acknowledged that it is responsible for the accuracy of its own data.

The February 1991 *President's Noncompliance Report* stated the United States Government finding that the presence, prior to October 24, 1990, of SS-4 Missile Transporter Vehicles (MTVs) and launch stands at locations not declared under the INF Treaty constituted violations of the provisions of the INF Treaty. The United States noted in that Report that while the Soviet elimination of some of this equipment has moved the Soviet Union towards resolution of this violation, more remains to be accomplished and that the United States continued to be concerned about this matter and what it implied about the accuracy of Soviet declarations. The April 1992 Noncompliance Report reaffirmed the finding that the presence of non-operational SS-4 MTVs and launch stands at locations not declared under the INF Treaty constituted violations of the provisions of the INF Treaty.

Probable Violations:

(1) SS-23 Missiles: Article I of the INF Treaty provides that each Party shall eliminate all "its" intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and not have such systems thereafter. Article V repeats the requirement that each Party eliminate all "its" shorter-range missiles of the categories "listed in the Memorandum of Understanding..." Article VI contains a prohibition

against producing or flight-testing any intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles. Read together, these provisions in effect also contain a prohibition on transfer of treaty-limited items after Treaty signature: each Party must destroy all of its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and may not produce any such missiles in the future for any purpose, including transfer.

In early 1990, when the German Democratic Republic (GDR) publicly stated that it was eliminating SS-23 missiles located there, the United States became aware for the first time of the existence of SS-23 missiles in three Eastern European countries. The Soviet Union stated they transferred SS-23s to the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, prior to entry into force of the INF Treaty. None of these three countries is a party to the INF Treaty. SS-23 missiles are shorter-range missiles which are listed in the INF Treaty. Soviet SS-23 missiles were to have been eliminated by November 1, 1989.

The issue of whether the existence of these SS-23 missiles violated the INF Treaty was first examined and reported in the February 1991 President's Noncompliance Report. In September 1991, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency submitted a *Supplemental Report to Congress on SS-23 Missiles in Eastern Europe.* That *Supplemental Report* stated the finding that the Soviet Union:

> had understandings that constituted what amounted to an undisclosed program of cooperation. Thus, the United States has reaffirmed its previous finding that the Soviet Union negotiated in bad faith. The United States further found that the Soviet Union has probably violated the Elimination Protocol of the Treaty by failing to eliminate in accordance with Treaty procedures, re-entry vehicles associated with and released from programs of cooperation.

The START Treaty

In January 1993, the President submitted a combined *Report on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements and Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Agreements.* That Report addressed for the first time implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START Treaty) and compliance with those associated obligations that are in effect prior to its entry-into-force. The START Treaty was signed July 31, 1991.

Although the Treaty has not yet entered into force, the Parties to the Treaty are under a general obligation to refrain from actions that would defeat the Treaty's object and purpose. Furthermore, certain portions of the

Treaty and some related agreements are, by mutual agreement, to be observed pending the Treaty's entry-into-force, such as an Agreement on Early Exhibitions of Strategic Offensive Arms. The sides also exchanged data current as of September 1, 1990 as specified in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU).

In addition, the United States and the Soviet Union exchanged policy statements making political commitments not to encrypt telemetry or use jamming during flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs for one year, or until the Treaty enters into force, whichever occurs first, beginning 120 days after Treaty signature. The United States, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Belarus have approved policy statements extending this commitment through November 28, 1993, or until entry-into-force, whichever occurs first.

Violations:

(1) Encryption of SS-19 Flight Test Telemetry: On December 20, 1991, an SS-19 was launched by the Soviet Union to test the feasibility of using ICBMs as space launch vehicles; telemetry from that flight test was encrypted.

The January 1993 Report stated the conclusion that the United States considers that the encryption of telemetry on the December 20, 1991 flight test of an SS-19 ICBM constituted a violation of the Soviet Union's political commitment not to encrypt telemetry or use jamming on flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs after November 29, 1991.

In response to a U.S. demarche, the Russian Federation acknowledged that the Soviet Union, by encrypting the telemetry from the SS-19, had deviated from its political commitment in the unilateral statement, and stated that Russia had taken steps to preclude a repeat occurrence. Russia also provided to the United States, as a gesture of goodwill, acceleration profiles and other technical data from the flight test.

On the basis of the data provided from the subject flight test as well as the assurances concerning future practices, the United States considers the issue of the encrypted telemetry from the flight test of an SS-19 on December 20, 1991 to be closed. This message was conveyed to the Russian Federation (and the other START Parties) in the closing U.S. plenary statement made at the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC) on November 19, 1992.

(2) Conduct of Early Technical Characteristics Exhibitions: An Agreement on the Early Exhibition of Strategic Offensive Arms was signed on July 31, 1991, calling for exhibitions of treaty-limited items and their distinguishing features to be conducted within 240 days of Treaty signature. The purpose of these early exhibitions was to ensure the ability to begin accurate and reliable inspections in a timely manner once the Treaty enters into force. In one specific case, the Soviets refused to allow U.S. inspectors to take a critical measurement. Efforts to resolve this matter have been undertaken.

SECTION II

ACTIONS TAKEN TO COMPLY

An amendment to Section 52 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act expanded the requirements of the report *Adherence to and Compliance with Agreements,* to include information on "actions taken by the Soviet Union and other nations with regard to the size, structure, and disposition of military forces in order to comply with such arms control agreements." A section was added in the March 11, 1988 report which briefly addressed this question. It noted that:

> Nations take a variety of actions with regard to their military forces for a variety of reasons, only one of which may be to comply with arms control agreements. For example, older or obsolete systems may be retired from the inventory for reasons of cost effectiveness."

On May 17, 1988, a supplement to the March 1988 Report was provided which addressed Soviet actions in regard to certain aspects of the ABM Treaty, the SALT I Interim Agreement, and the SALT II Treaty. Because the United States ceased observance of the SALT I Interim Agreement and the SALT II Treaty due in part to multiple, uncorrected Soviet violations, discussion of Soviet actions relevant to those Treaties was not repeated in subsequent reports.

The ABM Treaty

Gomel Radar Destruction: The report *Adherence to and Compliance with Agreements*, dated January 18, 1989, stated that:

> After discussions in various U.S./Soviet diplomatic channels, the Soviet Union has made a commitment regarding procedures for dismantling or destroying the illegally deployed radars at Gomel. The process is already underway. If fully carried out, this will be a constructive step, which, when verified, will satisfy U.S. concerns regarding the illegal deployment of these radars. The deployment of these radars in 1987 led to a finding of an ABM Treaty violation which was initially reported in the *President's 1987 Report to Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements.*

As reported in the February 1992 *President's Noncompliance Report*, the Soviet Union ultimately took action to correct the Gomel ABM Treaty violation.

Krasnoyarsk Radar Destruction: As stated in the June 24, 1992, report *Adherence to and Compliance with Agreements*:

> The Soviet Union took several steps toward resolving long-standing U.S. concerns regarding Soviet compliance with the ABM Treaty. In 1989, it made a commitment to dismantle completely, to the ground, the illegal Krasnoyarsk radar and stated in the SCC it planned to do so by the end of 1991. Although dismantlement continued throughout the year, this commitment was not met. The United States is, however, currently involved in dialogue with the Russian Government on its request to use what remains of the radar buildings at the site as a furniture factory. The United States has stated that, in light of the changed political and security environment between the U.S. and Russia, which includes U.S. plans to discuss with Russia and our allies President Yeltsin's proposal for cooperation on a global ballistic missile defense system, the U.S. is prepared to agree in principle to the request to convert the remaining facilities at the Krasnoyarsk radar, including facilities that were to be fully dismantled under the 1989 agreement, into a furniture factory.

The January 1993 combined *President's Noncompliance Report* and *Adherence to and Compliance with Agreements* Report subsequently stated that the United States has agreed in principle to let Russia convert the Krasnoyarsk radar into a furniture factory. The United States is awaiting the promised plans for this conversion.

The INF Treaty

The first USG assessment of Soviet actions taken to comply with the INF Treaty was provided in the report *Adherence to and Compliance with Agreements* dated January 18, 1989.

The June 24, 1992, report on *Adherence to and Compliance with Agreements* stated that:

> The Soviet Union eliminated all its declared INF Treaty limited items (TLI) and facilities under strict verification by the United States. Since the last report, the Soviet Union and new states of the former Soviet Union continued to allow the United States to exercise its inspection rights contained in the INF Treaty. These inspections included the presence of the United States' continuous monitoring inspection site (CMIS) at Votkinsk, Russian Federation; and the conduct of on-site inspections by the United States.

The START Treaty

As stated in the January 1993 Combined Report, although the START Treaty has not yet entered into force, several obligations are, by mutual consent, to be observed prior to entry into force (EIF).

In this regard, the Soviet Union submitted initial MOU data current as of September 1, 1990, conducted a series of early technical characteristics exhibitions of some treaty-limited-items, participated in early sessions of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), and demonstrated equipment to be used for playing back telemetry tapes. The United States and the Soviet Union also made political commitments not to encrypt telemetry or use jamming during flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs beginning 120 days after Treaty signature. With one exception discussed more fully elsewhere in this Report, the Soviet Union and subsequently Russia have refrained from encrypting ICBM and SLBM test flights. After signing the Lisbon Protocol on May 23, 1992, the four successor states to the Soviet Union for START purposes have also taken steps to comply with those START-related obligations in effect prior to EIF, and are participating in sessions of the JCIC.

SECTION III

NET ASSESSMENT

The current military risk associated with individual treaty violations or compliance concerns addressed in this Report ranges from minor to none, and in the aggregate under the current political circumstances and given corrective actions that have been taken, they do not provide any significant military advantage at the strategic or theater level. Particular issues are addressed below. (U)

SALT I Interim Agreement and the SALT II Treaty

The May 17, 1988, report provided by then ACDA Director Burns in response to questions by Senator Pell summarized the specific actions taken by the Soviet Union to dismantle and replace its weapon systems accountable under the SALT I and II agreements during the period of U.S. adherence to those agreements. While such actions were taken, Soviet noncompliance had been judged to outweigh actions taken to dismantle accountable systems. It was because of a continued pattern of noncompliant Soviet behavior that President Reagan decided on May 27, 1986 to end U.S. observance of SALT I and SALT II.

The ABM Treaty

The Krasnoyarsk radar violation was judged to have raised the question of a material breach. This and the Gomel violation in addition to other Soviet ABM and ABM-related activities led to concerns that the Soviet Union may have been preparing the base for a territorial defense. Consistent diplomatic pressure by the United States, bolstered by the support of the U.S. Congress, eventually led the Soviet Union to agree to undertake a reversal of the violations, including destruction of the Krasnoyarsk radar, and cessation of many other activities of concern.

U.S. consideration of the ABM Treaty takes place in the context of a dramatically changed strategic environment, in which ballistic missile defense has taken a new character. Within this context, the United States and Russia have been working together and with their allies to develop a concept for a Global Protection System to defend against limited attack, and the United States has proposed that the ABM Treaty be updated to reflect current geopolitical, strategic, and technical realities.

The INF Treaty

Prior to the signing of the INF Treaty, serious concerns existed within the United States and among our allies concerning the threat posed by Soviet INF systems -- particularly the mobile SS-20 missile. Under the INF Treaty, the Soviet Union eliminated all its declared INF Treaty limited items (TLI) and facilities under strict verification by the United States. The United States is concerned over the continued existence of the SS-23 missiles in Eastern Europe and continues to pursue their destruction in order to fulfill the objective of the INF Treaty to eliminate this class of missiles. On balance, however, the achievements of the INF Treaty have strengthened western security.

The START Treaty

Because the START Treaty has not entered into force, a net assessment would be premature. It can be stated, however, that the START Treaty will, when fully implemented, result in the elimination of a large percentage of the former Soviet strategic forces.

Case Number: 2016-0048-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 480				
Document ID: 9407354				
Row: 44	Section: 4	Shelf: 6	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Summit Statement Language on Further Reductions... (3 pages)	09/14/1994	P1/b(1)
~~001b. memo~~	~~Steven Andreasen to Anthony Lake re: Summit Statement on Further~~ Reductions... (1 page)	~~09/13/1994~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 1/2/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 480

FOLDER TITLE:
9407354

2016-0048-M
rs1620

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9407354
RECEIVED: 14 SEP 94 11

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 14 SEP 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NUCLEAR WEAPONS
ICBM
START
RUSSIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMIT STATEMENT LANGUAGE ON FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR FORCES

ACTION: ~~TRANSFERRED FM NSC LOG #9421075~~ DUE DATE: 17 SEP 94 STATUS: C
OBE PER APNSA OFFICE

STAFF OFFICER: ANDREASEN LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		ANDREASEN
		BELL
		NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: NSKDB DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	94091408	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR DECISION
002	PRESIDENT	Z	94091422	FOR DECISION
002		Z	94091514	NOTED BY PRESIDENT W/OUT DECISION
002		X	94091516	OBE PER APNSA OFFICE
002		X	95011318	TRANSFERRED FM NSC LOG #9421075

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	940914		VICE PRESIDENT
002	940914		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9407354
RECEIVED: 14 SEP 94 11

TO: LAKE

FROM: ANDREASEN
BELL

DOC DATE: 13 SEP 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NUCLEAR WEAPONS
ICBM
START
RUSSIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMIT STATEMENT LANGUAGE ON FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR FORCES

ACTION: FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR DECISION DUE DATE: 17 SEP 94 STATUS: X

STAFF OFFICER: ANDREASEN LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
LAKE		

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NARA, Date 7/16/2019
2016-0048-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSJDA CLOSED BY: DOC 1 OF 1

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~~SECRET~~

NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9421075 → PRS # ?
RECEIVED: 12 SEP 94 18

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 14 SEP 94
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEFENSE POLICY

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMIT STATEMENT LANGUAGE RE FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN NULCLEAR FORCES

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT DUE DATE: 15 SEP 94 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ANDREASEN LOGREF: 7354

FILES: IFG NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		ANDREASEN
		BELL
		NSC CHRON

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By RZ NARA, Date 8/16/2016
2016-0048-M

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSMBN DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

THE WHI
WASH

September 15, 1994

MR. PRESIDENT:

Tony wants to review this with you early this morning. I have provided copies to the Vice President and Leon.

9/15 → Steve Anderson

John Podesta

SECRET

NW-
For system.

9/29

Please return to Neal.

- OBE
- No further action required.

Bob

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS
Initials: VR Date: 8/19/2009

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ *LOG #* 21075

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ *SYSTEM* *PRS* *NSC* *INT*

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ *DOCLOG* _____ *A/O* _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed			
Sens			
Itoh			
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	b		OBE
NSC Secretariat			
			Per Notes

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc: _____ _____

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

rec'd 9/14 7:45am

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 21075

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS (NSC) INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG GP A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Reed	1	JWR	
Sens			
Itoh			
Soderberg	2	COPY	
Berger	3	[illegible]	NOTE
Lake	4	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	5	GP 9/14	~~D~~ To Pres
NSC Secretariat			

A = Action I = Information D

cc: _____

Pls give Wiema CY BACK for TL TONIGHT

COMMENTS:

Per TL, THIS SHOULD GO TO POTUS FIRST THING THURS AM 9/15

Exec Sec Office has diskette [illegible]

21075

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

1] JB TO VZ Date:

Shali, in particular, feels quite strongly about this ~~and~~ (use of 3000 figure)

2] TO Date:

and objected after Bill Owens signed off. OSD position not so firm;

3] TO Date:

derivative of Shali

(8)

4] TO Date:

5] TO Date:

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Anthony Lake to POTUS re: Summit Statement Language on Further Reductions... (3 pages)	09/14/1994	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 480

FOLDER TITLE:
9407354

2016-0048-M
rs1620

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

21075

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 13, 1994

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL SPA for in draft

FROM: STEVEN P. ANDREASEN SPA

SUBJECT: Summit Statement Language on Further Reductions in Nuclear Forces

The attached memorandum to the President requests his approval of Summit joint statement language on further reductions in nuclear forces to be previewed with the Russians during consultations in Moscow (led by Lynn Davis and Bob Bell) September 14-15.

At issue is whether to include language in the joint statement that (a) "foreshadows" the possibility, at some future date, of agreeing with the Russians that in implementing START II both sides will pledge to go down to the low-end of the START II final reductions level (3,000 warheads) rather than reducing to the high-end that otherwise is permitted (3,500 warheads), or (b) more generically states that the sides will give "due consideration to exercising equivalent reciprocal unilateral restraint."

ALL AGENCIES BUT OSD HAVE PROVIDED THEIR "OFFICIAL" AGENCY POSITION. I EXPECT OSD TO JOIN JCS AND SUPPORT THE APPROACH IN "(B)" ABOVE; HOWEVER, OSD HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO CLEAR THEIR POSITION WITH JOHN DEUTCH. I SUGGEST THAT EITHER YOU OR SANDY CALL JOHN FIRST THING WEDNESDAY MORNING TO SEE IF YOU CAN GET HIM TO PROVIDE HIS POSITION SO THE MEMORANDUM CAN BE FORWARDED TO THE PRESIDENT FOR DECISION. IF WE ARE GOING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE OPPORTUNITY TO PREVIEW OUR POSITION ON FURTHER REDUCTIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS WHILE LYNN DAVIS AND BOB BELL ARE IN MOSCOW, WE WILL NEED TO GET A CABLE OUT TO THEM COB WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 14.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-(1.35)

Case Number: 2016-0048-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 564				
Document ID: 9500947				
Row: 44	Section: 4	Shelf: 10	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~Steve Pifer et al. to Anthony Lake re: START II and CWC Ratification~~ in Russia (4 pages)	~~02/10/1995~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ NV 1/2/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 564

FOLDER TITLE:
9500947

2016-0048-M
rs1621

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9500947
RECEIVED: 10 FEB 95 15

TO: LAKE

FROM: BEYRLE
BELL
PONEMAN

DOC DATE: 10 FEB 95
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: START CWC
TREATIES

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: START II & CWC RATIFICATION IN RUSSIA

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 14 FEB 95 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BEYRLE LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BELL
		BEYRLE
		NSC CHRON
		PONEMAN

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-m

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS CLOSED BY: NBN DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9500947

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	95022317	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	95022317	NOTED BY LAKE

Rec'd 2/14 2:15

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: jm LOG # 0947

URGENT NOT PROOFED: SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: DOCLOG A/O

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
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Soderberg	~~2~~ Copy		
Berger	2	sub	NOTE
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	~~18K~~ 2/21	~~N/R~~
NSC Secretariat			N

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

cc: Beyrle
Bell
Poneman
2/21

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

1] SB TO TR Date:

Shouldn't we welcome fight w/ Congress over ~~with~~ adequate levels of Nunn Lugar funds for

2] _____ TO _____ Date:

START II and CWC related destruction? Pretty easy for your neighbors to understand this one.

3] _____ TO _____ Date:

@

I agree.

4] _____ TO _____ Date:

5] _____ TO _____ Date:

Rec'd 2/14 2:15

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: jar LOG # 0947

URGENT NOT PROOFED: SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

BYPASSED WW DESK: DOCLOG jar A/O

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
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Soderberg	~~2~~ Copy		
Berger	2	ab	NOTE
Lake	3	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	JBK 2/21	N/R
NSC Secretariat			N

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

cc: Beyrle
Bell
Poneman
2/21

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

1] SB TO TR Date:

Shouldn't we welcome fight w/ Congress over ~~with~~ adequate levels of Nunn Lugar funds for

2] _____ TO _____ Date:

START II and CWC-related destruction? Pretty easy for your neighbors to understand this one.

3] _____ TO _____ Date:

@

I agree.

4] _____ TO _____ Date:

5] _____ TO _____ Date:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

0947

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

JB/RB/DP

February 10, 1995

NOTED

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: JOHN BEYRLE/ROBERT BELL/DANIEL BONEMAN

Nat'l Sec Advisor has seen

FROM: STEVE PIFER/STEVEN ANDREASEN/ELISA HARRIS

SUBJECT: START II and CWC Ratification in Russia

START II and the Chemical Weapons Convention both face uphill ratification fights in Russia, though for very different reasons. Much of the Duma opposition to START II derives from a perception that it is inequitable, while the CWC -- considered a balanced agreement -- is viewed as imposing huge costs (for CW destruction) that an economically strapped Russia cannot now afford.

The Russian government has yet to articulate strategies for winning ratification of either agreement. There are steps we can take to improve START II's image in Moscow and facilitate its ratification by the Duma, but we must tune our approach to support the Russian government's strategy (nothing would make a "no" vote more likely than a perception that the U.S., not Russia, is leading the campaign in Moscow). As for facilitating CWC ratification, further U.S. aid towards defraying the multi-billion dollar cost of CW destruction facilities will be key.

START II

An Uphill Battle in Moscow. START II faces a hard ratification battle in the Duma, where many view the Treaty as inequitable (i.e., by forcing heavier reductions of ICBMs than of SLBMs or heavy bombers). There are secondary concerns about the cost of START II procedures (e.g., silo destruction provisions). Issues outside the Treaty context, including the overall U.S.-Russian relationship, NATO enlargement, ABM Treaty demarcation and CFE flank limits, will likely affect ratification prospects. And there is the domestic political context: the Chechnya crisis, the executive-Duma struggle and the approaching December 1995 legislative elections. According to Embassy Moscow, Yeltsin could conceivably win over enough legislators for ratification but might well have to accede to some of their demands for Treaty changes, perhaps via a protocol.

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-m (1.37)

Russia's Gameplan. In January, both Secretary Christopher and Deputy Secretary Talbott raised START II with their Russian counterparts. It appears the Russian government does not yet have a clear strategy for achieving ratification and is waiting for the dust from Chechnya to settle before approaching the Duma. DFM Mamedov nevertheless told ACDA Director Holum last week that the Russian government was "firmly committed" to the earliest possible Duma ratification of START II and that there was "at least a chance" of ratification prior to the next summit. Strobe sees Mamedov in ten days; we are asking Mamedov to come prepared to talk about Russia's gameplan for START II ratification.

U.S. Steps. We have identified a number of steps to facilitate Duma ratification; some are already being implemented, while others will have to be tuned to match the Russian government's ratification strategy and timeline.

We should bear in mind that our ratification process will be well along, if not complete, by the time the Duma takes up START II. Committee hearings should conclude by early March, with a debate on the floor and full vote in late March or early April. We can not, and should not, try to pace our process to the Duma.

Steps that we are taking or considering to facilitate Duma ratification include:

- *No Crowing.* We are reviewing Administration testimony on START II with an eye to ensuring that we present the Treaty as a win for both countries. We emphatically do not want our testimony replayed by Moscow hard-liners to bolster their claim that START II is one-sided.

  * yes, but not easy.

- *Getting the Word Out.* Many Duma deputies clearly misunderstand the basic provisions of START II. Moreover, they are unaware of major U.S. concessions such as elimination of the START I heavy bomber counting rule (which allowed the U.S. to deploy many more total weapons than Russia) and reduction by almost 50 percent of the number of weapons that will be carried on U.S. SLBMs. Two weeks ago, we sent Embassy Moscow detailed points to use with Duma deputies to make the case that START II is balanced and in the interest of both countries, and we are doing a short "cheat-sheet" for all Embassy officers to draw on in contacts with Duma deputies.

  good

- *Experts Visits.* We are considering having experts, e.g., former negotiator Linton Brooks, travel to Moscow at an appropriate time for low-key discussions with Duma deputies and staffers on the specifics of the START II Treaty. (This must, of course, be coordinated with the Russians.)

- *Congress-Duma Contacts.* The Senate Arms Control Observers' Group will likely visit Moscow this spring and could plug START II (Bob Bell has discussed this with Senator Nunn). We will also look for ways to bring key Duma members to Washington for talks with Congress and the executive branch.

- *Nunn-Lugar.* We will consider how we might package and publicize Nunn-Lugar assistance (past and future) to make the case that the USG is assuming a very large part of Russia's dismantlement burden under START I and II.

- *PRD-34.* We believe the single most important step we could take to improve prospects for START II ratification in the Duma is for the U.S. to commit in some way to reductions "beyond START II." Indeed, many in the Duma (and some in the Russian executive branch) criticize START II's aggregate of 3000-3500 weapons as inconsistent with U.S.-Russian partnership. "Beyond START II" is the central issue still under review in PRD-34. Bob Bell's IWG is on track to bring this review to Deputies by the end of February and to Principals in early March so that the President can make decisions that (potentially) could support both START II ratification in Russia and NPT extension. good

CWC

Another Tough Fight -- But for Different Reasons. Both the Russian government and Duma are committed in principle to CWC ratification and see the CWC as in Russia's national interest. The Duma Defense Committee, for example, in an October 1994 report on the CWC, concluded that elimination of Russia's CW stocks would not detract from the country's defensive capability and should be considered an integral part of the overall disarmament process. The extraneous factors (e.g., NATO enlargement) that will likely complicate Duma ratification of START II will have less of a negative impact on Duma consideration of the multilateral CWC.

CWC ratification, however, remains problematic. As Mamedov told John Holum last week, the challenges to ratification are the cost of CW destruction and local concerns about environmental impact. Embassy Moscow reports that independent Russian defense analysts are pessimistic about the prospects for ratification, seeing the economic costs of the CWC outweighing its political benefits.

Russia's Gameplan. Mamedov termed CWC ratification Moscow's "top" arms control priority with the Duma but offered no gameplan or timeline. Mamedov emphasized that concerns about the cost of destroying Russian CW stocks and the environmental impact of CW destruction in the communities where destruction facilities are

to be built pose major obstacles. He noted that, although the budgetary outlook for CW destruction is bleak for 1995, the GOR is determined to press ahead on the CWC in the Duma because to do otherwise would set a "disastrous precedent." He said whatever the U.S. could do, using Nunn-Lugar or other funds, to help Russia overcome the financial obstacles to implementation of the Convention would be a big help in securing ratification.

How to Help Russian Ratification. Unlike START II, we do not need to help persuade the Duma of the CWC's merits as a balanced accord in the interests of both sides. Steps we can take:

- *U.S. CWC Ratification.* We have asked the SFRC to take up CWC immediately after START II. This would help prod the Russian ratification process, as will indications that CWC is gaining approval in other countries. ✓

- *Technical Assistance.* Thus far, the U.S. has agreed to provide up to $55 million for development of a comprehensive plan to destroy the Russian CW stockpile and for equipment for an analytical laboratory. Late last year, we also began a joint evaluation of the Russian chemical agent neutralization process (the Russians hope to use this to destroy their nerve agents, which are about 80% of their stockpile). The Russian populace distrusts Russian technology; some U.S. imprimatur may help ease local environmental concerns. ✓

The Big Question: Money for Destruction. CW destruction will cost Russia many billions of dollars. While a U.S. contribution would amount to only a modest portion of the total cost, it clearly would help boost CWC ratification prospects.

Russian officials are pressing the U.S. to agree to fund an actual destruction facility based on their neutralization process. Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Harold Smith, who is responsible for coordinating U.S. CW destruction assistance to Russia, strongly supports building such a facility as a means of jump-starting Russian CW destruction. Secretary Perry and Deputy Secretary Deutch reportedly are positively disposed towards this but may be concerned about undertaking a commitment of this magnitude (roughly $500-600 million over a five-year period), given the uncertainties surrounding the future of -- and competing demands within -- the Nunn-Lugar program.

Indeed! Have we discussed w/ OMB?

We believe the time has come for the USG to make a decision on this issue and have asked DOD to prepare a decision paper for IWG consideration by the end of the month. We hope to bring the issue to Deputies by early March, so that we can respond to the Russian request for assistance in building a destruction facility well before the Duma resumes its consideration of the CWC.

good ✓

Case Number: 2016-0048-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 1082				
Document ID: 9600422				
Row: 44	Section: 6	Shelf: 7	Position: 3	Stack: V

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9600422
RECEIVED: 24 JAN 96 16

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 27 JAN 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA START

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: RATIFICATION OF START II IN RUSSIA

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT DUE DATE: 27 JAN 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BELL LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BELL
		NSC CHRON
		PIFER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-m

COMMENTS:

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OPENED BY: NSLA CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	96012615	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
002	PRESIDENT	Z	96012713	FOR INFORMATION
002		X	96012920	NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	960127		VICE PRESIDENT
002	960127		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

National Security Council
The White House

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Sens			
Soderberg			
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	1	ne 1/29	N
Records Mgt.	2		N

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

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COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

National Security Council
The White House

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Records Mgt.			

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cc:

COMMENTS:

Ready for Signature

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 0422

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By [illegible] NARA, Date 8/16/2014
2016-0048-M (1.38)

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Ratification of START II in Russia

Purpose

To update you on our plans to attain ratification of the START II Treaty by Russia.

Background

Today's overwhelming vote by the Senate giving its advice and consent to the ratification of the START II Treaty successfully caps our three-year effort to attain this crucial milestone. Attention now shifts to Moscow, where a concerted and a~~dmittedly~~ decidedly uphill struggle will be required if we are to realize our priority interest in trying to gain Russian ratification in time to allow you to exchange the instruments of ratification of the Treaty with President Yeltsin during the April nuclear summit.

Game Plan for Russian Ratification

The conventional wisdom holds that the Duma will not ratify START II in the first half of 1996. The old Duma had questioned the financial burden of implementing the Treaty, and the Yeltsin government has been unresponsive in providing it with detailed cost estimates. Some Duma members and committee staff have questioned whether START II is "one-sided" in favor of the United States and whether Gorbachev/Shevardnadze made too many concessions. Others have cited the adverse impact on Russia national security interests of possible future U.S. ABM/TMD deployments being advocated in the Congress as a reason not to act (though we have made sure they took note of your veto of the FY 1996 defense authorization bill and the resumption of the ABM/TMD demarcation negotiations in Geneva). The new Duma's makeup and the looming Russian presidential campaign make ratification even more problematic.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5d
Declassify On: 01/26/06

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Duma action is ~~certainly~~ not foreclosed, however. We have everything to gain, and nothing to lose, by trying to use the April 19-20 Moscow nuclear summit as a hook to enlist a Russian push to secure Duma approval, as proposed in your January 18 letter to Yeltsin.

Given the charged political atmosphere in Moscow, the key is Yeltsin's readiness to use his capital to press the Duma to ratify, which will turn largely on whether Yeltsin sees ratification playing to his political advantage. Yeltsin made the right noises ~~in~~ in your January 26 phone conversation. We also plan to raise START II with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin when he is in Washington next week.

If Yeltsin decides to pursue ratification, the views of the Russian military will be paramount with the Duma, particularly the large communist faction. The military spoke in favor of START II last summer (their nightmare scenario is that START II is not ratified, we stay at START I levels, but obsolescence and costs drive them to a significantly smaller START II-like force). Foreign Minister Primakov has far greater credibility with the Duma than his predecessor and has said he favors START II. We are considering having Secretaries Christopher and Perry and General Shali engage their Russian counterparts; such approaches will be much more fruitful if Yeltsin makes clear to his team that he has adopted the April goal.

Once the Senate acts, we will seek maximum exposure in Russia for your statement and press release and set up briefings for Russian journalists with Bob Bell and other U.S. experts. We have asked Embassy Moscow to identify key Duma deputies for meetings in Moscow with U.S. officials knowledgeable about START II and/or possible travel to the United States. We are also examining how to get Congress to engage more generally with the new Duma.

As we support START II ratification in Russia, we must be careful not to get ahead of the Russians. Yeltsin's government must do the heavy-lifting. We can help a bit, but nothing would set the Treaty back further than the perception that the campaign for Duma approval is an American-led effort.

National Security Council
The White House

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Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	1	ne 1/29	N
Records Mgt.	2		N

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

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National Security Council
The White House

Rec'd 1/26
3:20 PM

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URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT

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Dohse	1	D	
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Soderberg	copy		
Berger	2		
Lake	3		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	1/27	D Storm
Records Mgt.			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

ready for signature

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 422
1/29/96

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

96 JAN 27 P12 : 41

January 27, 1996

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5(b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By IC NARA, Date 8/16/2013
2016-0047-M (1.35)

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: Ratification of START II in Russia

Purpose

To update you on our plans to attain ratification of the START II Treaty by Russia.

Background

Today's overwhelming vote by the Senate giving its advice and consent to the ratification of the START II Treaty successfully caps our three-year effort to attain this crucial milestone. Attention now shifts to Moscow, where a concerted and decidedly uphill struggle will be required if we are to realize our priority interest in trying to gain Russian ratification in time to allow you to exchange the instruments of ratification of the Treaty with President Yeltsin during the April nuclear summit.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5d
Declassify On: 01/26/06

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Duma action is not foreclosed, however. We have everything to gain, and nothing to lose, by trying to use the April 19-20 Moscow nuclear summit as a hook to enlist a Russian push to secure Duma approval, as proposed in your January 18 letter to Yeltsin.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

0422

January 26, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: ROBERT BELL/STEVEN PIFER SP

SUBJECT: RGB Ratification of START II in Russia

Attached is a memorandum informing the President of our interagency-agreed game plan for attaining Russian ratification of the START II Treaty, which the Senate is poised to approve today.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/14/2015
2016-0048-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 01/26/06

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Case Number: 2016-0048-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1110				
Document ID: 9604510				
Row: 45	Section: 1	Shelf: 6	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~John Hollum to APNSA re: Achieving Entry-Into-Force of the START~~ II Treaty (2 pages)	~~06/26/1996~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VL 1/2/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 1110

FOLDER TITLE:
9604510

2016-0048-M
rs1623

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~SECRET~~

NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9604510
RECEIVED: 27 JUN 96 16

TO: LAKE

FROM: HOLUM, J

DOC DATE: 27 JUN 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: START
ARMS CONTROL
RUSSIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: ACHIEVING ENTRY INTO FORCE OF START II TREATY

ACTION: OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 01 JUL 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ANDREASEN LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By YL NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEC CLOSED BY: NSVJD DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9604510

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	ANDREASEN	Z	96062716	PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE
001		X	97081815	OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9604510
RECEIVED: 27 JUN 96 16

TO: LAKE

SUSPENSE

FROM: HOLUM, J

DOC DATE: 27 JUN 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: START
ARMS CONTROL
RUSSIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: ACHIEVING ENTRY INTO FORCE OF START II TREATY

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE DUE DATE: 01 JUL 96 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: ANDREASEN LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
ANDREASEN	BLACKER	BASS
	HESLIN	BELL
	PIFER	BERGER
	PONEMAN	DANVERS
	WITKOWSKY	JONES, K
		LAKE
		LORIN
		REZNIK
		SCHWARTZ
		SESTAK

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEC CLOSED BY: DOC 1 OF 1

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Washington, D.C. 20451

4510

JUN 27 1996

THE DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Achieving Entry-Into-Force of the START II Treaty (U)

The United States wants the START II Treaty to enter into force, but without amendments or conditions. In light of recent inquiries from President Yeltsin, the United States needs to make this point to him at an early date. Since President Yeltsin is no longer planning to attend the G-7 meeting in Lyon, I believe that Vice President Gore should speak with President Yeltsin when the Vice President is in Moscow in July to meet with Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. ~~(S)~~

In my view, the Vice President should make it clear that we not only believe that the START II Treaty is in the interest of both countries, but that failing to bring it into force because of extraneous issues or a desire to alter the bargain in some way would be both unacceptable to the United States and could seriously damage U.S.-Russian relations. It would also undermine other states' confidence in the stability of the U.S.-Russian relationship at a very critical time. For these reasons, I believe that the Vice President should also propose to President Yeltsin that we begin a high level dialogue in order to bring this Treaty into force as soon as possible and without substantive amendments or conditions. ~~(S)~~

I believe that I should lead the dialogue on START II with the Russian Government with the involvement of other senior Administration officials. This would be consistent with the President's decision to revitalize the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), in particular through ensuring that it leads arms control negotiations and the development of policy for those negotiations. Leading efforts to achieve the entry into force of the START II Treaty and thereby laying the groundwork for continuation of the arms control element of U.S. national security policy would be a tangible manifestation of ACDA's revitalized role. In addition, it is important that the U.S. Government speak to the arms control constituency in Russia, not to those in the Ministry of Defense who have raised so many objections to the START II Treaty. ~~(S)~~

Classified by: Michael Nacht, Asst. Director, Bureau of Strategic and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. ACDA

Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declass: June 26, 2006

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By TZ NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-m (1.40)

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As my staff has indicated separately to Bob Bell, our goal would be both to ensure that the Russian Government understands that we do not wish to amend START II and, in fact, would find it politically difficult if not impossible to do so, and to make clear that we are open to working with Russia to find a means to bring this Treaty into force. ~~(S)~~

I would be pleased to discuss this matter with you further. (U)

John D. Holum

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Washington, D.C. 20451

JUN 27 1996

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ANDREW D. SENS
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Achieving Entry-Into-Force of the START II Treaty (U)

I would appreciate your forwarding the attached memorandum, dated June 26, 1996, to National Security Advisor Lake from Director Holum. This memorandum contains the Director's views of how to achieve entry-into-force of the START II Treaty. (U)

Barbara Starr

Barbara Starr
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated

UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED
FROM CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS

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FAX to TC
BASS
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cc: Bell

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A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

Fax to Lake
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Staff to Bell for AAN
cc: Soderberg

Done DPG 6/20 1237

Exec Sec Office has diskette ____

TIME OF TRANSMISSION: TIME OF RECEIPT:

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PRECEDENCE: X IMMEDIATE
PRIORITY
ROUTINE

RELEASER: [signature]

DTG:

MESSAGE NO: CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~ PAGES: 3 (Including Cover)

FROM: NSC WEST WING DESK DRG (NAME) (202) 456-9425 (PHONE NUMBER) WH SITUATION ROOM (ROOM NO.)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION: ACDA Memo on Achieving Entry-into-force of the START II Treaty NSC LOG # Non-Log

TO (AGENCY)	DELIVER TO	DEPT/ROOM NO.	PHONE NUMBER
~~Sen~~ Trip	Tony Lake		
Sit	Sandy Berger		
"	Peter Bass		

REMARKS:

Unclassified Upon Removal
of Classified Attachments
VZ 2016-0048-M

Case Number: 2016-0048-M

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Original OA/ID Number: 1127				
Document ID: 9607178				
Row: 45	Section: 1	Shelf: 11	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~Steve Pifer to Anthony Lake re: Potential Decision Items for~~ November/December (2 pages)	~~10/28/1996~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VR 1/2/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 1127

FOLDER TITLE:
9607178

2016-0048-M
rs1624

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
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b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9607178
RECEIVED: 28 OCT 96 15

TO: LAKE

FROM: PIFER

DOC DATE: 28 OCT 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
START
BELARUS
NATO
IMF
ARMENIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: POTENTIAL DECISION ITEMS FOR PRES OR PC / DC IN NOV & DEC

ACTION: NOTED BY LAKE DUE DATE: 31 OCT 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: PIFER LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
BELL
FRIED
NSC CHRON
PIFER
VERSHBOW
WALLER

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-m

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSLA CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 1 OF 1

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RECORD ID: 9607178

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	LAKE	Z	96102820	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	96121810	NOTED BY LAKE

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 7178

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 12 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens	copy		
Soderberg	copy		
Berger	2		
Lake	3		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	12/17	
Records Mgt.	5		

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

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Exec Sec Office has diskette

National Security Council
The White House

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URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG 12 A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens	copy		
Soderberg	copy		
Berger	2		
Lake	3		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	12/17	
Records Mgt.	5		

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

Natl Sec Advisor has seen NOTED

7178

October 28, 1996

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

FROM: STEVE PIFER SP

SUBJECT: Potential Decision Items for November/December

You asked for a list of items that might require POTUS decision or a PC/DC in November or December. RUE's list is as follows:

Russia

- ***NATO-Russia.*** The ball is in Moscow's court on the charter. We should remain ready to work it if the Russians decide to proceed. We will need decisions on what, if anything, the December NATO ministerials should say on nuclear deployments and/or infrastructure on the territory of new NATO members.

- ***START II.*** The Duma noise level over NATO enlargement will likely make START II unratifiable after March 1997, at least until the dust settles. The USG thus must decide whether to make an offer (e.g., a START II level of 3000 and a strong commitment to START III cuts) in return for a Russian government push for ratification in January or February.

- ***Finances/IMF.*** If Russia substantially misses the November IMF revenue target, Moscow could face a serious credibility test as persisting revenue gaps further erode the government's ability to pay wages, pensions and the military. The USG, G-7 and IMF might need to weigh whether extraordinary measures are appropriate or viable.

- ***Yeltsin.*** If Yeltsin dies or becomes incapacitated as a result of his surgery, the USG will have to decide how to respond. Much will depend on how the succession plays out, i.e., according to the constitution or not.

Belarus

- ***SS-25 Withdrawal.*** The USG must pressure Lukashenko to resolve his dispute with the parliament while encouraging

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Reason: 1.5 (d)
Declassify On: 10/28/06

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 8/16/2016
2016-0048-m (1.41)

~~SECRET~~

the transfer to Russia of the last SS-25s and warheads. Although other Belarusian officials have said the SS-25s will be out by the end of 1996, Lukashenko has hinted that they may not. If they are not, we may need guidance from deputies on how to proceed.

Caucasus and Central Asia

- ***Caucasus/Central Asia.*** The restricted deputies group should launch a review of USG policy toward the Caucasus and Central Asian states.

- ***Caspian Energy.*** Oil companies seek decisions in the next two weeks on two issues related to the Caspian and Iran. First, they seek approval for the key consortia in Azerbaijan (AIOC, Karabakh and Shah Deniz -- in which they hold shares) to enter into a rig-sharing agreement despite the 10 percent stake held by a private Iranian company in Shah Deniz. Second, oil companies seek to transship certain equipment through Iran on a case-by-case basis where routes through Georgia and Russia are slow or uneconomic. In both cases, such arrangements are necessary because of the paucity of equipment in the Caspian area.

- ***Nagorno-Karabakh.*** The USG needs to decide in November whether to assume co-chairmanship of the Minsk Group. Such a decision holds out prospects for an institutionalized role for U.S.-Russian cooperation on NK. However, since progress will depend equally on appointment of a strong negotiator and on domestic developments in Armenia and Azerbaijan, such a decision would require an overall NK review.

Other NIS

- ***NATO Relations with NIS.*** As decisions are taken regarding the December NAC and NATO summit, the USG will need to confirm its decision to proceed with a NATO-Ukrainian document and decide how to engage the other NIS (e.g., we should consider how to build NATO links with the emerging Ukraine-Georgia-Azerbaijan-Uzbekistan group, so as to increase their freedom of maneuver vis-à-vis the CIS).

Concurrences by: Bob Bell, Dan Fried, Bob Waller, Sandy Vershbow

SP for

See 2

Case Number: 2015-0772-M; 2016-0048-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 1128				
Document ID: 9607342				
Row: 45	Section: 2	Shelf: 1	Position: 1	Stack: V

Case Number: 2016-0048-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 1130				
Document ID: 9607584				
Row: 45	Section: 2	Shelf: 1	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. memo~~	~~Anthony Lake to POTUS re: NATO, START II and CWC (2 pages)~~	~~11/22/1996~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RR 1/2/2020
~~001b. memo~~	~~From John Holum re: Memorandum to the President (3 pages)~~	~~11/15/1996~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ RR 1/2/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 1130

FOLDER TITLE:
9607584

2016-0048-M
rs1625

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9607584
RECEIVED: 19 NOV 96 10

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: LAKE

DOC DATE: 22 NOV 96
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
ARMS CONTROL
START
CTB
CHEMICAL WARFARE
NON PROLIFERATION

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: RPT FM PC MTG ON KEY NATO POLICY ISSUES / START II & CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION / CWC

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT DUE DATE: 22 NOV 96 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FORT LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: PC0209 CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		ANDREASEN
		BASS
		BELL
		BERGER
		FORT
		FRIED
		HARRIS
		SCHMIDT
		NSC Chron

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0348-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSMEC CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 3 OF 3

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	FORT	Z	96111910	PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE
002	LAKE	Z	96112211	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
003	PRESIDENT	Z	96112221	FOR INFORMATION
003		X	96121810	NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
003	961122		VICE PRESIDENT
003	961122		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9607584
RECEIVED: 19 NOV 96 10

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: HOLUM, J

DOC DATE: 15 NOV 96
SOURCE REF:

Done / 11/22.

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA
ARMS CONTROL
START
CTB
CHEMICAL WARFARE
NON PROLIFERATION

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MEMO TO PRES RE RUSSIA & START II

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR LAKE DUE DATE: 22 NOV 96 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: FORT LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
FORT	ANDREASEN	BELL
	CARAVELLI	DANVERS
	HARRIS	LEE
	HESLIN	LORIN
	PIFER	SCHWARTZ
	SAMORE	SESTAK
	WITKOWSKY	

Summarizing PC
Holum memo / Tab
Discussion contents

Close

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M

National Security Council
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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg	copy		
Berger	copy		
Lake	2	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	PLS MAKE TL CHGS
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	R 11/22	
Records Mgt.	4		N
SANDY BERGER - RY PLS			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

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COMMENTS:

'96 NOV 22 AM 11:55

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National Security Council
The White House

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URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Soderberg	copy		
Berger	copy		
Lake	2	Natl Sec Advisor has seen	PLS MAKE TL CHGS
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	11/22	
Records Mgt.			
SANDY BERGER - RY PLS			

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
11-29-96

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 22, 1996

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ANTHONY LAKE

SUBJECT: NATO, START II and CWC

The Principals Committee (PC) met last week to decide key NATO policy issues in advance of the December North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting and next year's NATO Summit and to discuss options to encourage START II ratification by Russia. (At the PC, John Holum gave me a memorandum to you on the importance of START II ratification by the Duma and U.S. Senate ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) (Tab A).) A summary of the meeting follows.

NATO. Principals agreed that the December NAC set a specific month for a NATO summit, not later than July 1997, that would invite the first group of aspiring members to begin accession talks. We will insist the December NAC confirm that the first group of aspirants invited to join NATO will not be the last.

Principals also agreed to press the December NAC to approve as many Partnership for Peace (PFP) enhancements as possible and endorse the concept of an Atlantic Partnership Council (APC) that would merge current NAC and PFP functions. Principals directed agencies to consider additional measures in the run-up to the summit that would address needs of countries that want to join NATO but may not be in the first group (e.g., the Baltics).

Although Russian resistance to NATO enlargement continues, there are indications Moscow recognizes its inevitability and will eventually agree to negotiate a stronger NATO-Russia relationship -- one that allows Russia a voice, but not a veto, in decisions and actions affecting European security. The most positive sign is a post-surgery letter from Yeltsin in which he reaffirms his personal commitment to working with you to resolve "key problems," specifically mentioning European security. (We will forward it to you soon with a proposed reply.)

In an effort to address Russian concerns about enlargement, Principals agreed to develop more forward-leaning language on NATO nuclear deployments on the territory of new members for

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5(b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By IZ NARA, Date 8/16/2015
2016-0348-M (1.42)

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Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 11/21/2006

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

PHOTOCOPY WJC HANDWRITING

~~SECRET~~

approval at the December NAC. NATO would affirm that it has no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members nor any need to change any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or nuclear policy -- and we do not foresee any future need to do so. Principals also agreed that adapting the CFE Treaty would be a principal means by which we address Russian concerns on NATO "infrastructure" in the context of NATO enlargement.

START II. Prospects for START II ratification by the Duma are not good, due primarily to the perceived costs of implementing the Treaty, aggravated by the "noise" over NATO enlargement. With respect to NATO, the December NAC approval of a statement on nuclear weapons would help, as would CFE adaptation and enhanced cooperation. With respect to "costs," the PC considered options for addressing this issue through a commitment to further reductions in a "START III" Treaty (thus alleviating Russian concerns of having to build more single warhead ICBMs to maintain parity at the START II ceiling of 3,500 warheads). A key issue is whether to agree now with Russia on a numerical "target" for START III. JCS is examining the military implications of reductions down to 2,000 warheads; they may argue that a ceiling this low will not provide an adequate deterrent. John Holum recommends a 2,000 warhead limit, believing this is primarily a political, and not technical, judgment. Principals will meet again in December to review the JCS analysis and options.

CWC. Achieving Senate advice and consent to the CWC is one of our highest priorities with the new Senate in early 1997. We do not have much time: now that 65 states have ratified, the CWC will enter into force with or without us on April 29. Senators Helms and Kyl, supported by conservative Republicans and a cadre of former Reagan administration officials, will strongly oppose our efforts. They seek to defeat not only CWC but also CTBT ratification and our whole second-term arms control agenda. If we fail on CWC, U.S. leadership abroad will be seriously undermined, and CWC-mandated trade restrictions could cost U.S. chemical companies hundreds of millions of dollars and many well-paying jobs. John Holum believes that securing a successful vote by April will require early and sustained involvement of agency Principals in a coordinated legislative effort, similar to that undertaken by the Administration on NAFTA and GATT. We agree. Working with Democratic and Republican supporters in the Senate, as well as former Reagan and Bush administration officials, such as Generals Powell and Scowcroft, we can prevail. The PC will meet in December to approve a comprehensive CWC ratification game plan being developed by the NSC.

Tab A Memorandum from ACDA Director Holum

7584

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Washington, D.C. 20451

NOV 15 1996

THE DIRECTOR

Memorandum to the President

I wrote you in December 1994 about three arms control priorities -- the NPT, the Comprehensive Test Ban, and START. Arms controllers already celebrate yours as an historic presidency for your successes on the first two, and especially for finally realizing Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedys' dream of a total ban on nuclear tests. Your decisions at key points, and your own prodigious efforts, have built a remarkable record of success on the most ambitious arms control and nonproliferation agenda ever.

I write now to underscore the crucial importance of two "short fuse" issues whose outcomes will profoundly affect our prospects for building on that fine record, according to the priorities you laid out in your UN General Assembly speech -- or stalling and even losing ground in your second term.

Strategic Arms Control.

We are in a box on START II, providing for cuts to 3,500 weapons. Without its entry into force, any further progress on strategic arms control will be stymied, our fragile relations with Russia will be further damaged, both sides will be accused of reneging on their disarmament commitments under the NPT, and the U.S. defense budget will have to rise by over $4 billion to maintain START I forces.

But under current circumstances, Russia almost certainly will not ratify START II. In the strategic arms context, two of their objections, in my judgment, warrant our diligent new efforts to overcome:

* NATO Enlargement/Nuclear Doctrine. Any tactical nuclear weapons placed on the territory of new NATO members will, from Russia's perspective, become strategic weapons capable of hitting targets on the Russian homeland, but will be outside the Treaty.

* Build Down To Build Up. Cost-conscious Duma members seem most genuinely put off at having not only to dismantle hundreds of perfectly good multiple warhead missiles, as required by START II, but then also to build entirely new single warhead missiles in order to maintain rough parity with the United States.

We should be able to resolve the first of these, without setting up two classes of NATO members, by creatively codifying the genuine absence of any plans, intentions or need to station nuclear weapons on new members' territory.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By [illegible] NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M (1.44)

CLASSIFIED BY: ACDA Director Holum
REASON: 1.5 (d)
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

The second will require an adjustment in our approach toward START III. We should remain steadfast against renegotiating START II. But we should be prepared now to agree in principle on a follow-on force level of 2,000 deliverable weapons, in a commitment which would be fleshed out and finalized only after START II is in force. This would neutralize the second concern listed above because at 2,000 warheads Russia could have Treaty compliance and parity with no new buildup. By explicitly making START II the doorway to such further cuts, agreement in principle now would give Russia a strong incentive to ratify the Treaty.

Although Secretary Perry has supported substantial further cuts, such a step would have implications for our own nuclear doctrine. Arguably a 2,000 warhead level, last seen in the early 1970s, would begin a shift away from nuclear "warfighting" options and back toward a purely deterrent strategy. It could also require difficult force posture decisions, such as whether to retain land-based ICBMs at all and whether to base nuclear submarines on both coasts.

More self-limiting, bottom-up technical reviews likely will leave us at or near the status quo. But the fundamental choices here are political, not technical, and should be framed at the top. The most basic is that strategic arms control is not over, and that while we must maintain forces sufficient to deter any potential nuclear adversary, we no longer require all the intricate doctrines devised for the greatest arsenals and worst tensions of the Cold War.

Hence, I urge your decision that we should begin now to build the case for the next step -- that experts should define the optimal structure, targeting doctrine and operating practices for a force of 2,000 deployed weapons. Such preparation is our best chance for moving START II forward, keeping U.S.-Russian relations on track, and taking a realistic next step that independently serves our interests.

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Ratification.

Many will define the credibility of U.S. leadership in all areas of nonproliferation by whether we can secure Senate ratification of the CWC in the next few months. After four years of delay, the countdown to entry in force began with Hungary's ratification in October; now the U.S. cannot be an original party unless the Senate acts by April 29.

Failure would exclude us from crucial CWC decisions and inspections, impose trade restrictions on a U.S. chemical industry that exports $60 billion a year, and severely undercut U.S. leadership against all global efforts against proliferation and terrorism.

And there will be a cascading effect. CWC opponents aim to shut down not just this treaty, but the entire bipartisan tradition of arms control. They'll judge that if this Republican treaty is spurned by the Senate, then your own achievements -- the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, South Pacific and African nuclear weapon free zones, CFE adjustments, perhaps ABM demarcation, and others -- can be presumed dead. Domestically, as well as internationally, this comes down to a struggle over a core element of your international agenda.

Ratification can succeed. Absent Senator Dole's intervention it would have succeeded in September. But we have a harder task now. As majority leader, Senator Dole had helped move the CWC forward, but the September experience revealed that Senators Helms and Kyl have Senator Lott's sympathy, along with the active backing of senior hard-liners from the Reagan Administration. The new Senate is not only more Republican but disproportionately more conservative. And if at all possible, we have to find a way for the Senate to act on a tight timetable, before April 29.

This means we have to seize the initiative early to place the issue on the national agenda and define the terms of the debate: not whether the treaty is perfectly verifiable or easily enforceable, but whether we are better off with no treaty -- whether we should pursue or give up on negotiated efforts to control arms, whether we should aggressively fight poison gas or give a free pass to rogue states and terrorists who now legally can have it.

You gave the CWC considerable prominence in the weeks leading up to its withdrawal in September, and then again in your speech to the United Nations. To follow-up, we now need to mount a sustained commitment on the order of the efforts for NAFTA and GATT, with the continuous participation of all the senior members of your national security team.

A comprehensive CWC ratification game plan should be adopted by principles within the next few weeks, and presented for your approval. Such a persistent, coordinated campaign can defy current expectations, save the CWC, and powerfully reinforce our international efforts against proliferation and terrorists.

I would welcome the opportunity to discuss these issues with you.

John Holum

John Holum

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

7584

November 22, 1996

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY LAKE

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL RGB

FROM: STEVEN P. ANDREASEN SPA

SUBJECT: Memorandum to the President on NATO, START II and CWC

The attached memorandum to the President summarizes the conclusions from last week's PC meeting on NATO and START II and covers key points from John Holum's memorandum to the President on START II and CWC.

Concurrence by: Schmidt Fort Fried Harris

SPA for

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Memorandum from John Holum

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006.
By VL NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M

~~SECRET~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 11/22/2006

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Case Number: 2016-0048-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1597				
Document ID: 9700276				
Row: 45	Section: 2	Shelf: 4	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. memo~~	~~Ki Fort to Samuel Berger re: Script for President's Foreign Policy~~ Team Meeting (2 pages)	~~01/15/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VR 1/2/2020
~~001b. talking~~ points	~~re: Berger Script for Foreign Policy Team Meeting on Russia (3 pages)~~	~~01/00/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VR 1/2/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 1597

FOLDER TITLE:
9700276

2016-0048-M
rs1626

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9700276
RECEIVED: 15 JAN 97 10

TO: BERGER

FROM: FORT
PIFER

DOC DATE: 15 JAN 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATO
START
RUSSIA
ECONOMICS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: BERGER SCRIPT FOR 16 JAN FORN POLICY TEAM MTG

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 18 JAN 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FORT LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BELL
		FORT
		FRIED
		KYLE
		NSC CHRON
		PIFER
		SCHMIDT

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDRS CLOSED BY: NSTSM DOC 1 OF 1

~~SECRET~~

RECORD ID: 9700276

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	97011515	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	97012718	NOTED BY BERGER

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0276

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Kerrick	copy ✓		
Soderberg			
Steinberg	2	Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	N/16	N
Records Mgt.	4	1/27	N

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Script for Foreign Policy Team Mtg 1/16

'97 JAN 15 PM 3:19

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 0270

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Sens			
Kerrick	copy ✓		
Soderberg			
Steinberg	2	Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	
Berger			
Lake			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	N 1/16	
Records Mgt.	4	1/27	N

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Script for Foreign Policy Team Mtg 1/16

'97 JAN 15 PM 3:19

Exec Sec Office has diskette Yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

January 15, 1997

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: STEVE PIFER SP

FROM: KI FORT KF

SUBJECT: Script for the President's Foreign Policy Team Meeting, January 16, 9:15-10:15 a.m.

Objective. We want the meeting to secure the President's approval for the packages on NATO-Russia, START and economic relations that Strobe Talbott and Leon Fuerth (leading a small inter-agency team) will take to Moscow next week.

Setting the stage. You will give a brief overview, noting that we are at a critical moment in our relations with Russia. We want to make clear our readiness to work with the Russians on Euro-security issues and move forward on other key aspects of the agenda -- START and economics -- in a way that persuades them to get over NATO enlargement, work with us and set the stage for a successful meeting between the President and Yeltsin in March.

One question may come up at the start: the relevance of all of this while Yeltsin is hospitalized. While concerned about his health, we still have a March target, and the Vice President and Chernomyrdin will meet February 5-8 to prepare the ground for the Presidential session.

Vice President's intervention. You might turn to the Vice President for comments on how he sees the Gore-Chernomyrdin meeting setting up the Presidential encounter.

NATO-Russia and European security. You should ask Strobe for a readout of his talks in London, Paris and Bonn. Most participants will be aware of the French wavering on NATO enlargement that Strobe encountered. Secretary Christopher or Strobe will then outline ideas on NATO-Russia and Euro-security that have been worked by the Deputies and previewed to key Allies. After discussion, you will want to close with Presidential agreement that Strobe and Leon can raise these ideas in Moscow. Caution:

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VC NARA, Date 8/16/2016
2016-0048-M (1.45)

this issue will likely command the most discussion, but you will want to ensure time to address START and economics, so that Strobe and Leon have a full package. Despite the seriousness of French softness, we do not recommend that this meeting address how to bat it back.

START. You should outline our proposed joint statement on START, emphasizing that what we seek is Presidential authority for Strobe and Leon to *test* the Russians' readiness to use a joint statement to press the Duma to ratify START II prior to the March meeting. Bill Perry will not be at the meeting; you might ask Shali to comment. While this is a long-shot, you should guard against any effort to walk back the offer on the grounds that it's too long a shot to try. You should also avoid reopening whether to include the "3,000" figure or set a numerical target for "START III." We want Presidential approval to test the draft joint statement with the Russians next week.

Economics. You might briefly note the importance of economics: a Russian government that ratifies START II and agrees to a NATO-Russia relationship but collapses economically will not be much of a partner. You should ask Dan Tarullo to describe our proposed package, which includes U.S. support for investment; reforms we seek from Yeltsin; and Russian membership in international economic fora. Larry Summers might comment. We expect no controversy, though there may be questions on Jackson-Vanik graduation. Again, we want Presidential approval to put forward these ideas next week in Moscow.

Concurrences by: Daniel Fried, Robert Kyle, Robert Bell, John Schmidt

Attachment
Tab A Talking Points

• Strobe/Leon
• CORE-CHERNO FEB05-08
• CLINTON
YELTSIN - early MAR?

BERGER SCRIPT FOR FOREIGN
POLICY TEAM MEETING ON RUSSIA

OVERVIEW

NATO enlargement / allies / Russia

partnership w/ West outweigh ~~[illegible]~~ ~~apprehensions~~ ~~of~~ sense of grievance

- Critical point ~~in relationship with~~ Russia. If we want to reinvigorate it, get by NATO enlargement with smallest "bump" possible, will have to ask Russians to make tough decisions -- giving them opportunity to move forward with us.

- Assuming Yeltsin recovers, upcoming March Presidential meeting offers critical opportunity. Should make strong effort to persuade Yeltsin to work with us to put relationship on irreversible path of partnership, as envisaged in Vancouver.

- Vice President and Chernomyrdin tasked to prepare ground for March meeting. Strobe and Leon taking team to Moscow next week -- important test of how Russians want to proceed.

- Purpose today is to review ideas that Strobe and Leon will present on NATO-Russia, START, economics. Want them to have good package that makes clear our readiness to work -- and will justify the hard decisions we are asking of Moscow.

- Mr. Vice President, would you like to comment on how you want to use your meeting with Chernomyrdin?

(Vice President comments)

11 START II/III

Eurosecurity Arms Control Economics

4 rings circus next 150+ days - balancing act in 4 rings
I allies
II Russians
III ~~[illegible]~~ not in first wave
IV Congress / public

EUROPEAN SECURITY

- Obviously, NATO enlargement and NATO-Russia top agenda. We want Russia to be comfortable with its place in Europe's security structure, while maintaining the integrity of our policy.

- This means defining strong NATO-Russia relationship, forward-leaning proposal on CFE adaptation and considering some changes to institutions like OSCE, but also keeping NATO enlargement on track in the face of Russian pressure.

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By VL NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M (1.46)

- But first, Strobe, would you report on your discussions with Chirac and Kohl, and in London and Brussels? How do key Allies see our proceeding on NATO-Russia?

  (Strobe reports; discussion)

- Secretary Christopher/Strobe, would you outline ideas for Strobe and Leon to take to Moscow on NATO-Russia relations? (X)

  (Secretary Christopher/Strobe present ideas; discussion)

- Believe we have good package on Euro-security. Mr. President, suggest Strobe and Leon be authorized to discuss these ideas.

ARMS CONTROL

- Bringing START II into force perhaps our highest arms control priority. Will enhance stability, reduce forces, open door to negotiation of historic "START III" accord.

- Unfortunately, poor prospects for Duma ratification, partly due to "noise" over NATO enlargement, but also because of Russia's perceived costs of implementing Treaty (especially having to build hundreds of new single-warhead ICBMs to replace dismantled MIRVed ICBMs).

  maybe window in next few months

- Have considered initiative that could help Yeltsin persuade Duma to ratify soon -- key is proposed "Joint Statement on Further Reductions in Nuclear Forces."

  issue is whether this advances Yeltsin's equation or overloads it? Can't know

- Statement has two parts. First, United States and Russia would under START II deploy no more than 3,000 weapons, instead of 3,500. Second, United States and Russia would immediately begin negotiations on START III, once START II enters into force, with goal of mandating even lower levels.

- Idea is that this could be released when Vice President and Chernomyrdin meet -- with prior Russian commitment to use statement with Duma to push for START II ratification in time for your March meeting.

  approach cooned ~~have~~ be sequenced] Strobe/Leon probe, ~~whether~~ ... not as US position but to determine Russian interest -- whether joint stmnt by GORE-CHERN that we would go to 3000 under START II and begin negotiating START III would entice you to take on Duma. If no, leave for later day. If yes, upon return to address whether ~~State~~ we proceed SENATE - WOULD IT MATTER

- Would tell Russians at outset that, if they are not ready to push to ratify, we are not interested in February statement.

- ~~Shali, would you like to comment?~~

  (Shali comments; discussion)

  Explore not expose

- Mr. President, suggest we authorize Strobe and Leon to raise this joint statement and test Russian readiness to press Duma to ratify START II in coming weeks, making clear our linkage.

ECONOMICS

- Economics a key issue, should be addressed at Presidential level. A Russian government that ratifies START II and agrees to NATO-Russia relationship but collapses economically will not be much of a partner.

- Dan, would you outline economic package that Strobe and Leon could discuss in Moscow?

  (Dan discusses economic package; Larry Summers comments; discussion)

- Mr. President, sensible package, has broad agreement. Propose that Strobe and Leon be authorized to discuss these ideas.

probe as to whether worth pursuing

Case Number: 2016-0048-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 1597				
Document ID: 9700294				
Row: 45	Section: 2	Shelf: 4	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~John Holum to Sandy Berger et al. re: Denying a START II-NATO~~ Linkage (2 pages)	~~01/15/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 1/2/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 1597

FOLDER TITLE:
9700294

2016-0048-M
rs1627

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9700294
RECEIVED: 15 JAN 97 16

TO: BERGER

FROM: HOLUM, J

DOC DATE: 15 JAN 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: START
NATO
RUSSIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DENYING A START II NATO LINKAGE

ACTION: OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 18 JAN 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ANDREASEN LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION FOR CONCURRENCE FOR INFO

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M

COMMENTS:

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OPENED BY: NSLA CLOSED BY: NSVJD DOC 1 OF 1

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RECORD ID: 9700294

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	ANDREASEN	Z	97011516	PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER
001		X	98102016	OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN

~~SECRET~~

NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9700294
RECEIVED: 15 JAN 97 16

TO: BERGER

SUSPENSE

FROM: HOLUM, J

DOC DATE: 15 JAN 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: START
NATO

RUSSIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DENYING A START II NATO LINKAGE

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR BERGER DUE DATE: 18 JAN 97 STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: ANDREASEN LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
ANDREASEN	FORT	BEERS
	PIFER	BELL
	SCHMIDT	DANVERS
	WITKOWSKY	FRIED
		SCHIFTER
		SCHWARTZ
		SESTAK
		VERSHBOW

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M

COMMENTS:

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OPENED BY: NSLA CLOSED BY: DOC 1 OF 1

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0294

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Washington, D.C. 20451

JAN 15 1997

THE DIRECTOR

MEMORANDUM

TO: Sandy Berger, Strobe Talbott, Leon Fuerth

FROM: John Holum

SUBJECT: Denying A START II-NATO Linkage

To follow up on a recent discussion with Sandy, and in anticipation of discussions with Russia preliminary to GCC and the Summit, I want to reemphasize the importance of our not acquiescing in the Russian assertion that START II ratification depends upon a resolution of NATO enlargement and Russia's relations with the Alliance. Clearly they're grabbing everything at hand to pile in NATO's way. We should be just as diligent in saying "no".

START II ratification in Russia can happen in one of two ways -- either (1) delinked from NATO enlargement, or (2) linked and with the NATO-Russia relationship satisfactorily resolved. Perhaps only the second is feasible; however, we shouldn't concede that without making the fullest effort to achieve START ratification sooner, more straightforwardly, and on its own terms. Two chances are better than one.

Moreover, if we let linkage happen we undercut our subsequent arms control negotiating position. If we pay in the START II context for NATO's new members, such as by going to a lower START number to sweeten a package deal, we'll likely lose opportunities for other START III elements important to us, such as accompanying further reductions with limits on warheads.

In my view this means that even as we work at sorting out Russia-NATO issues, we should never fail to dispute Russia's efforts at linkage, or to reiterate the reasons why START II stands on its own, to wit:

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2006-0048-M (1.47)

- The United States is not going to pay for START II twice, by adjusting our position on NATO enlargement for the sake of the Treaty. Thus linkage gains nothing, but only imperils START II and future reductions.

- Start II provides Russia something otherwise unattainable -- true strategic parity at lower levels. Even retaining SS-18s, they'll never match our START I level of 6,000 deployed warheads, which is mandated by the Congress.

- Thus Russia doubles its perceived political and security problems if it holds START II hostage against NATO. Is it prepared for a world with a bigger NATO and a nuclear imbalance favoring the U.S.?

- We are working to solve Russia's only legitimate strategic nuclear concern about NATO enlargement, by confirming the absence of any plan, intention or need to deploy nuclear forces on the territory of new members.

- Concerns about START II implementation costs can only be solved through ratification, because -- as President Clinton and Secretary Perry have made clear -- START II is the door to START III, and to prompt negotiations that could avoid the necessity to build up single warhead ICBMs while dismantling MIRVs. Absent timely ratification CTR funds will also be in jeopardy.

I'm unclear on the extent to which there may be disagreement on these points, because our policy process has grown rather opague. It would be helpful if we returned to "regular order" in developing and implementing our arms control strategy with Russia.

J.D.H.

Sec

Case Number: 2015-0772-M; 2016-0048-M

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Original OA/ID Number: 1599				
Document ID: 9700639				
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Case Number: 2016-0048-M

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Original OA/ID Number: 1600				
Document ID: 9700671				
Row: 45	Section: 2	Shelf: 5	Position: 1	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Samuel Berger to POTUS re: Guidelines on Further Reductions in Nuclear Forces (2 pages)	02/03/1997	P1/b(1)
~~001b. talking points~~	~~re: Guildelines on Further Reductions in Nuclear Forces (1 page)~~	~~02/01/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ R 1/2/2020
001c. memo	[Duplicate of 001a, incomplete copy] (1 page)	02/03/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 1600

FOLDER TITLE:
9700671

2016-0048-M
rs1628

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9700671
RECEIVED: 03 FEB 97 10

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 03 FEB 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NUCLEAR WEAPONS
DEFENSE POLICY
RUSSIA
START

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: GUIDELINES ON FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR FORCES

ACTION: PRESIDENT APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 06 FEB 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ANDREASEN LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		ANDREASEN
		BELL
		NSC CHRON

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By R NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	97020320	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR DECISION
002	PRESIDENT	Z	97020323	FOR DECISION
002		X	97020417	PRESIDENT APPROVED RECOM

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	970203		VICE PRESIDENT
002	970203		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

National Security Council
The White House

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Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	1	2/4	A
Records Mgt.	2		N

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cc: SRB JAH JS DLK RGB JFD 2/4 SA, RGB

COMMENTS:

'97 FEB 4 AM 11:19

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National Security Council
The White House

Rcvd 2/3/97
4:30pm

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Steinberg	2		
Berger			Changes Made
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	TMA 2.3	Stern
Records Mgt.			

Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen

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COMMENTS:

'97FEB 3PM 2:46

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ *DOCLOG* _____ *A/O* _____

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Kerrick			
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	1	re 2/4	A
Records Mgt.	2		N

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc: SRB JAH JS DLK PGB JFD re 2/4 SA, RGB

COMMENTS:

'97 FEB 4 AM 11:19

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
2-4-97

0671

'97 FEB 3 PM 9:41

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION

February 3, 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Guidelines on Further Reductions in Nuclear Forces

Purpose

To submit for your approval draft "Guidelines on Further Reductions in Nuclear Forces" for discussion during this week's Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission (GCC) meeting.

Background

As a follow-up to Strobe Talbott and Leon Fuerth's trip to Moscow, we have developed and cleared with State, Defense, JCS and ACDA the attached draft "Guidelines on Further Reductions in Nuclear Forces." The guidelines include four elements:

- *A commitment to begin negotiations on START III immediately after START II enters into force, with the goal of mandating reductions to 2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear weapons*. The 2,000-2,500 range was proposed by Russia during Strobe's trip to Moscow; last week, Defense and the JCS approved this range as a target for START III.

- *Agreement that START III should include measures concerning nuclear warheads and fissile material to help make deep reductions irreversible*. The Russians told Strobe that START III Guidelines should include a commitment to destroy warheads; you have already directed (in Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-37) that reductions below START II levels will "necessitate limits on, and verification of, inventories of warheads and fissile materials."

- *Agreement that all strategic ballistic missiles to be eliminated under START II will have their warheads removed and placed in a deactivated status by January 1, 2003; agreement to extend the START II reductions schedule by two years, to January 1, 2005, as part of a duly ratified START III Treaty; and agreement that START III will extend the existing START II Treaties indefinitely*. In Moscow, the Russians pressed for extending the START II reductions period by five years. We can agree to a two-year extension (to January 1, 2005) as part

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/16/2015

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Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 2/3/2007

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

PHOTOCOPY W/C HANDWRITING

~~SECRET~~

of a duly ratified START III Treaty. To address any concerns over extending the period MIRVed ICBMs are permitted under START II, we would also propose reiterating in the Guidelines your September 1994 agreement with President Yeltsin to deactivate ballistic missiles to be eliminated under START II no later than January 1, 2003. Finally, we are proposing that Russia agree to extend the START Treaties indefinitely (they currently have a 15-year duration) as part of START III as a further step to underscore our commitment to lower levels.

- *Agreement to consider appropriate measures relating to non-strategic nuclear forces*. The Russians hinted in Moscow they might be amenable to a discussion of nonstrategic nuclear forces (where they currently hold a significant numerical advantage over the United States). We believe it would be useful to highlight this issue as an area for future discussion, without prejudice to whether we would commit to any measures beyond the transparency and chain of custody initiatives you have already approved for discussion with Russia in PDD-37.

GCC and March summit. Vice President Gore wrote Chernomyrdin this week stating we are prepared to work with Russia to develop Guidelines for a START III agreement, noting we are studying the specific ideas put forward by Russia. If you approve the attached draft Guidelines, the Vice President will engage on specifics when he meets later this week with Chernomyrdin. Unfortunately, the context for this discussion has taken a decided turn for the worse: in a meeting today (February 3) with Under Secretary Lynn Davis, Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov linked Russia's ability to conclude Guidelines on START III to resolving both NATO enlargement and ABM/TMD demarcation. In the Chirac-Yeltsin meeting and in other contexts over the past few days, the Russians have staked out tough and unacceptable positions on both. However, if we are able to work around (or through) the NATO/ABM linkages and agree on START III Guidelines with Russia, and in the context of a commitment by President Yeltsin to push for Duma approval of START II this spring, we would be prepared to conclude these Guidelines at your March meeting with President Yeltsin.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached draft Guidelines for discussion during this week's GCC meeting.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Draft Guidelines on Further Reductions in Nuclear Forces

PHOTOCOPY WITH HANDWRITING
~~SECRET~~

Guidelines on Further Reductions in Nuclear Forces

(Draft: 2/1/97/11:00 a.m.)

President Clinton and President Yeltsin have reached the following understandings, to reduce further the nuclear danger.

First, the Presidents have agreed that once START II enters into force, the United States and Russia will immediately begin negotiations on START III, with the goal of mandating reductions to 2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear weapons.

Second, the Presidents have also agreed that START III should include, among other things, measures concerning nuclear warhead inventory transparency, nuclear warhead destruction and data exchange on fissile material stocks, to help make deep reductions irreversible.

Third, the Presidents have agreed that all strategic ballistic missiles which will be eliminated under START II will have their warheads removed and be placed in a deactivated status by January 1, 2003. They have also agreed that the period for final strategic nuclear delivery vehicle elimination's under START II may be extended by two years, to January 1, 2005, as part of a duly ratified START III Treaty mandating further reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. Finally, the Presidents agreed that START III will also contain a provision extending the existing START treaties indefinitely.

Finally, the Presidents have agreed to consider appropriate measures relating to nonstrategic nuclear forces.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VC NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M (1.50)

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

0671

February 3, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL RGB

FROM: STEVEN P. ANDREASEN SPA

SUBJECT: Guidelines on Further Reductions in Nuclear Forces

The attached memorandum to the President requests his approval of the draft "Guidelines on Further Reductions in Nuclear Forces" for discussion during this week's Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission meeting.

Concurrence by: Pifer SP Hamel (OVP) (info).

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Draft Guidelines on Further Reductions in Nuclear Forces

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M

Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 2/2/2007

can agree to a two-year extension (to January 1, 2005) as part of a duly ratified START III Treaty. To address any concerns over extending the period MIRVed ICBMs are permitted under START II, we would also propose reiterating in the Guidelines your September 1994 agreement with President Yeltsin to deactivate ballistic missiles to be eliminated under START II no later than January 1, 2003. Finally, we are proposing that Russia agree to extend the START Treaties indefinitely (they currently have a 15-year duration) as part of START III as a further step to underscore our commitment to lower levels.

- *Agreement to consider appropriate measures relating to non-strategic nuclear forces*. The Russians hinted in Moscow they might be amenable to a discussion of nonstrategic nuclear forces (where they currently hold a significant numerical advantage over the United States). We believe it would be useful to highlight this issue as an area for future discussion, without prejudice to whether we would commit to any measures beyond the transparency and chain of custody initiatives you have already approved for discussion with Russia in PDD-37.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By KZ NARA, Date 3/16/2014
2016-0948-M (1,52)

GCC and March summit. Vice President Gore wrote Chernomyrdin this week stating we are prepared to work with Russia to develop Guidelines for a START III agreement, noting we are studying the specific ideas put forward by Russia. If you approve the attached draft Guidelines, the Vice President will engage on specifics when he meets later this week with Chernomyrdin. Unfortunately, the context for this discussion has taken a decided turn for the worse: in a meeting today (February 3) with Under Secretary Lynn Davis, Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov linked Russia's ability to conclude Guidelines on START III to resolving both NATO enlargement and ABM/TMD demarcation. ~~It~~ However, we are able to work around (or through) the NATO/ABM linkage and agree on START III Guidelines with Russia, and in the context of a commitment by President Yeltsin to push for Duma approval of START II this spring, we would be prepared to conclude these Guidelines at your March meeting with President Yeltsin.

In the charac- Yeltsin meeting and in other contexts over the past few days, the Russians have staked out tough and unacceptable positions on both.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the attached draft Guidelines for discussion during this week's GCC meeting.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment
Tab A Draft Guidelines on Further Reductions in Nuclear Forces

Sec 2

Case Number: 2014-0837-F; 2016-0048-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 1601				
Document ID: 9700864				
Row: 45	Section: 2	Shelf: 5	Position: 2	Stack: V

Case Number: 2016-0048-M

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Original OA/ID Number: 1601				
Document ID: 9700876				
Row: 45	Section: 2	Shelf: 5	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~KI Fort to Samuel Berger re: Your Script for the President's Foreign~~ Policy Team Meeting (4 pages)	~~02/11/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VL 1/2/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 1601

FOLDER TITLE:
9700876

2016-0048-M
rs1629

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9700876
RECEIVED: 10 FEB 97 17

TO: BERGER

FROM: FORT
PIFER

DOC DATE: 11 FEB 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: START
NATO
ECONOMICS
RUSSIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SCRIPT FOR FORN POLICY TEAM MTG ON 12 FEB

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 13 FEB 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FORT LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BELL
		FORT
		FRIED
		NSC CHRON
		PIFER

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VT NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M

COMMENTS:

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OPENED BY: NSMEC CLOSED BY: NSLA DOC 1 OF 1

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RECORD ID: 9700876

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	97021122	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	97021816	NOTED BY BERGER

National Security Council
The White House

Rcvd 2/11/97 7:10pm

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 08376

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG (K) A/O _____

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Harmon			
Dohse	1	D	
Kerrick	copy		
Steinberg	copy		
Berger	2	(D)	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	3	TMS 2/18 Deputy Natl Sec Advisor has seen	N
Records Mgt.	4		N

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'97 FEB 11 PM 5:04

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 11, 1997

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

NOTED

THROUGH: STEVE PIFER SP

FROM: KI FORT KF

SUBJECT: Your Script for the President's Foreign Policy Team Meeting, February 12, 1997, 3:30-4:30 p.m.

Objective. To review the state of play and to frame issues to be resolved prior to the President's March meeting with Yeltsin.

Setting the Stage. You should structure the meeting by taking stock -- after the GCC and your Chirac and Bitterlich meetings and before Secretary Albright's visit to Moscow -- of both U.S.-Russian relations and European security. Having a definite date for Helsinki gives us a benchmark; we should use the next six weeks not only to prepare the summit specifics, but to chart the course we want to follow between now and Madrid. For Helsinki, **there will be three 'baskets' of issues on the agenda: START, economic initiatives and NATO-Russia.**

Framing the Issues. To ensure that the Team focuses on what initiatives the United States will put forward at Helsinki, and to respond to the President's desire to "think outside the box," we suggest you begin with a brief overview of each of the baskets and pose the **key questions** at the outset of the meeting:

START. You might recall that the Vice President presented our proposed START III guidelines to Chernomyrdin, who was merely in a listening mode; Mamedov later told Strobe our proposal looked quite interesting and that the Russians would respond when Albright is in Moscow (February 20). In addition to getting the Russians' reaction, she will also want to probe whether there is any scenario under which the Russians envisage START II ratification by the Duma prior to this summer. The ball is in the Russians' court to respond; Albright will need additional points to explain and defend our proposed guidelines, but we are not now seeking authority for her to put forward new ideas.

Question to Consider: If the Russians are prepared to agree on START III guidelines in time for Helsinki, but do not commit to push for START II ratification prior to Madrid, **are we still willing to go forward with guidelines in March?** (We might give up some leverage, but work on the guidelines would demonstrate

Reason: 1.5 (b)
Declassify On: 02/10/97

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-m (1.54)

our ability to make progress with Russia on important issues despite the enlargement debate.) We should be wary about moving beyond guidelines to negotiations, since that would undercut chances of Duma START II ratification and put at risk the core of the START II Treaty -- the ban on MIRVed ICBMs.

Economic Issues. You should **note that the Vice President and Chernomyrdin agreed on a three-part economics agenda for Helsinki:** Russian commitment to take policy and legal steps to create a better investment climate; U.S. investment financing (about $4 billion worth is available); and U.S. support for accelerated Russian membership in international economic fora. Most immediately, based on the Vice President's positive exchange with Chernomyrdin, we are preparing a **draft joint statement for Helsinki**, for Secretary Albright to table in Moscow. The draft will be vetted with appropriate agencies this week; it should not require Presidential review. The Vice President also promised Chernomyrdin that Larry Summers would subsequently lead an economic team to Moscow to work the Helsinki statement and nail down details on a reform agenda.

Looking to the longer term, there are **two main questions** the Team should consider: **Russia's graduation from Jackson-Vanik** and whether to bring **Russia into a full G-8** by removing financial and macroeconomic issues from the leaders' meetings (i.e., finance ministers would continue to meet at seven). Graduation from Jackson-Vanik is a hugely important step for the Russians and a card to play immediately before or at Helsinki. Chernomyrdin argued strongly for Russian membership in a new G-8 -- to bolster the government's case that Russia is welcome in the world's premier "clubs." We would probably want to hold the G-8 card until closer to Denver. **You could recommend that we plan consultations with the Hill and Jewish community** to prepare so that the President might commit in March to graduation from Jackson-Vanik by year's end; and **ask Tarullo and Treasury to explore whether and how Russia's G-8 request could be met.**

European Security. The Talbott-Fuerth talks in Moscow were substantive; and the Vice-President and Chernomyrdin had a good exchange of views on NATO-Russia, though they did not cover our entire approach. Albright intends to do that systematically.

Our steadiness seems to be paying off: Chernomyrdin took a low-key stance, and Mamedov indicated that the Russians are prepared to continue serious discussions when Albright is in Moscow. However, they still are on a multi-track strategy -- publicly criticizing enlargement and probing for differences among Allies while privately sending signals of willingness to deal, albeit mixed with unacceptable demands. They may seek to pocket our offers while continuing to try to derail enlargement. How long they may stay with this approach is unclear. **You should make the point that we are where we should be at this time: within the President's guidelines and well-positioned should Russia respond positively to our offers now on the table.**

You will want to ask **what next steps to take to get over the substantive hump at Helsinki?** The Russian focus now appears to be on limits on conventional forces and infrastructure on the territory of new members and on having some say over NATO out-of-area operations (apart from those conducted under Article V).

Another **problem** that we need to resolve before Helsinki is **our disagreement with the Germans over not excluding Russia from eligibility for NATO membership in the long term.** State is drafting language to try to finesse this issue.

The Allies. You might also briefly touch on your talks with Chirac, Levitte and Bitterlich, noting the latest French and German views on NATO-Russia, as well as the importance of keeping them solidly on board, so as to give the Russians no encouragement that they can play us off against one another. You should **stress that our position on a Quint summit remains firm -- it depends on whether we can reach a general understanding on the contours of a NATO-Russia deal at Helsinki** -- and this was made clear to Chernomyrdin.

Calendar. You should close your opening comments by noting the Russian-related events, scheduled or projected, in this period, stressing that the right outcome in March will be crucial in determining our subsequent approach.

-- Albright visits to Rome, Bonn, Paris, London, Brussels/NATO, February 16-19

-- Albright-Primakov in Moscow, February 20

-- Solana-Primakov in Brussels, February 23

-- Bilats between Moscow and Helsinki, TBD

-- Summit in Helsinki, March 20-21

-- Possible Quint Summit, April, TBD post-Helsinki

-- NATO-Russia Summit, late May, TBD

-- Denver G-7/Eight Summit, June 20-22
Yeltsin bilateral meeting at Denver

-- NATO Summit in Madrid, July 8-9

Vice President's Comments Post-GCC. Having given the context, you should then turn to the Vice President for his comments on the GCC meetings and for his thoughts on next steps on the three baskets of issues.

Secretary's Albright's Preview of Moscow Visit. You should invite the Secretary to lay out her expectations for her Moscow trip, especially what she wants to cover with Primakov.

Discussion of the Three Baskets:

START: You might ask Bob Bell to review where we are on START, then go through possible next steps.

Economics: You should ask Dan Tarullo to outline our basic approach, as well as to address the questions of Jackson-Vanik and a full G-8.

European Security. You should turn to Strobe to add any detail as to what we have now in play, and to discuss prospects for the Moscow meeting.

Summation. You should sum up the discussion by asking the President to endorse continuation of our approaches on the three baskets.

Concurrences by: Robert Bell, Alexander Vershbow, Daniel Fried } LF for

See ↓

Case Number: 2015-0772-M; 2016-0048-M

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Document ID: 9700910				
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Case Number: 2015-0772-M; 2016-0048-M

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Original OA/ID Number: 3225				
Document ID: 9701567				
Row: 46	Section: 5	Shelf: 9	Position: 3	Stack: V

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Case Number: 2015-0772-M; 2016-0048-M

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Original OA/ID Number: 1608				
Document ID: 9701810				
Row: 45	Section: 2	Shelf: 7	Position: 3	Stack: V

Case Number: 2016-0048-M

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Original OA/ID Number: 1641				
Document ID: 9706272				
Row: 45	Section: 3	Shelf: 7	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Samuel Berger to POTUS re: Yeltsin Pushes START II...[partial] (2 pages)	09/20/1997	P1/b(1)
~~001b. talking~~ points	~~re: Points to be Made for Meeting with Foreign Minister Primakov on~~ START II/III (1 page)	~~09/20/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 1/2/2020
~~001c. memo~~	~~Samuel Berger to POTUS re: Yeltsin Pushes START II...~~ (2 pages)	~~09/17/1997~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 1/2/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 1641

FOLDER TITLE:
9706272

2016-0048-M
rs1630

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9706272
RECEIVED: 17 SEP 97 12

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 20 SEP 97
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: START RUSSIA

PERSONS: YELTSIN, BORIS

SUBJECT: YELTSIN PUSHES START II & START III IN WINGS

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT DUE DATE: 23 SEP 97 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ANDREASEN LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		ANDREASEN
		NSC CHRON

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2006-0048-M

COMMENTS:

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	97091819	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
002	BERGER	Z	97092020	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
003	PRESIDENT	Z	97092020	FOR INFORMATION
003		X	97100207	NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
003	970920		VICE PRESIDENT
003	970920		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

National Security Council
The White House

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Cosgriff			
Rice			
Davies			
Kerrick			
Steinberg	1		
Berger			
Situation Room	~~2~~		
West Wing Desk	2	9/20	D STEF
Records Mgt.	3	TMA 10.1	N
	4		N

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice	1	9/20	
Davies			
Kerrick	Copy		
Steinberg	2		
Berger	3		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk			
Records Mgt.			

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cc:

COMMENTS:

'97 SEP 20 PM 5:13

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National Security Council
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ *DOCLOG* _____ *A/O* _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
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National Security Council
The White House

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG R A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice	1	9/20	
Davies			
Kerrick	Copy		
Steinberg	2		
Berger	3		
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West Wing Desk			
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COMMENTS:

'97 SEP 20 PM 5:13

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Samuel Berger to POTUS re: Yeltsin Pushes START II...[partial] (2 pages)	09/20/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 1641

FOLDER TITLE:
9706272

2016-0048-M
rs1630

RESTRICTION CODES

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THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
9-29-97 6272

'97 SEP 20 PM 7:01

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 20, 1997

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/16/2019
2016-0048-M (1.56)

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Yeltsin Pushes START II; START III in the Wings

Yeltsin has begun his long-awaited push for START II ratification. Russian television showed Yeltsin meeting with Defense Minister Sergeyev Monday to discuss ratification, including a clip of Yeltsin urging the Duma to ratify START II: "We have no need for so many nuclear weapons. We are secure with 1,000 warheads, not to mention the 2,000-2,500 envisaged in the future START III." On Tuesday, Foreign Minister Primakov and Sergeyev meet with Duma leaders to press for ratification.

Reaction in the Duma. Sergeyev told Ambassador Collins some progress was made softening opposition. Communist Leader Zyuganov (who controls the largest bloc in the Duma), however, told supporters "...we were not convinced that START II should be ratified," and suggested his member's vote depends on funding for defense in 1998. Zhirinovsky, who also controls a sizeable Duma bloc, said legislators should hold off ratifying until "a favorable moment...we have created a powerful missile complex, and we must use it to get certain advantages."

A boost in New York. Next Friday's planned signing of the ABM agreements and START II Protocol by Foreign Ministers in New York provides an opportunity to boost START II in the Duma, as these agreements underscore our continuing commitment to the ABM Treaty and specifically address Duma concerns over the cost of START II implementation.

Early deactivation. The remaining hurdle in concluding the START II Protocol extending the Treaty's destruction timetable from 2003 to 2007 is Russia's continued insistence on holding the START II "early deactivation" commitment from the Helsinki summit hostage to conclusion of a START III Treaty. Secretary Albright will make clear to Primakov Monday that we must have early deactivation by 2003 as a "quid pro quo" for extending the destruction period. We already face a daunting challenge in winning a two-thirds vote in the Senate for the ABM agreements

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 9/17/2007

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

on succession and demarcation. If we accepted the Russian linkage, ratification would be further complicated.

A START III twist? On Friday, Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov told Strobe that Primakov will tell you Monday the Russians are pushing START II, and that they plan to ratify START II in time for the next summit. Primakov will also say that Russia cannot afford to remain at the Helsinki agreed START III levels of 2,000-2,500 warheads. To address this issue, he will propose that we begin consultations now on a new START III "framework" accord that would presumably supercede the understanding that we reached at Helsinki by lowering the ceiling envisioned for START III to 1,500-2,000.

We recommend you tell Primakov that we will give the 1,500-2,000 proposal "careful attention" but stress that that does not mean we will necessarily end up saying "yes." Lowering the Helsinki ceiling would require very careful handling with the Joint Chiefs. You will recall that the Joint Chiefs only reluctantly agreed to the 2,000-2,500 range before Helsinki, and they only agreed on the understanding that they would urge us to stay at the high end of that range. (b)(1) [001a] E.O. 13526 3.3(b)(4)(5)

(b)(1)

(b)(1) I do not rule out winning their support for coming down to 2,000.

We also need to avoid encouraging Primakov to think we are receptive to any proposal to "leap frog" START II completely and open formal negotiations now on START III - especially now that Yeltsin appears set to make a real push for START II. Bypassing START II would respond to the argument that, rightly or wrongly, the Treaty is simply to stigmatized in Moscow to ever be approved. However, based on the discussions that preceded Helsinki we anticipate a difficult and perhaps protracted negotiation on START III. The Russians will certainly press us in START III to make concessions on sensitive issues that the Bush administration rejected. Nonetheless, we can agree to have our experts meet to "continue their dialogue on adapting our nuclear forces and practices to a post-Cold War World" (a formula you and Yeltsin agreed to in 1994). We should not, however, agree to say we have agreed to "begin consultations" on START III, which we believe Primakov will propose.

Attachment
Tab A Points to be Made

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR MEETING WITH
FOREIGN MINISTER PRIMAKOV ON START II/III

- We will give careful attention to the proposal you have presented today. I need to emphasize, though, that that does not mean we are agreeing.

- With respect to "next steps," the deal we reached in Helsinki was quite clear:

  - You would use the understandings on European security, START II extension, START III framework and ABM/TMD that we agreed to in principle in Helsinki (and have since agreed to in formal accords) to press the Duma for START II ratification.

  - We also agreed that formal START III negotiations would commence immediately after START II enters into force.

- Need to preserve that basic framework, as our Congress would strongly oppose even the perception that we are leap frogging START II ratification to launch START III.

- As I agreed with President Yeltsin at our meeting in September 1994, our experts can meet to continue their dialogue on adapting our nuclear forces and practices to a post-Cold War World.

- Don't want these discussions to be misconstrued as negotiations on START III.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 8/16/2015
2016-0048-M (1.57)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

REDO
6272

September 20, 1997

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL RGB

FROM: STEVEN P. ANDREASEN SPA

SUBJECT: Update on START II and START III

The attached memorandum to the President updates him on developments this week in Moscow on START II/START III, looking ahead to next week's meeting with Foreign Minister Primakov, as per our discussion this morning.

I talked Frank Miller through the point on "experts" discussions. After underscoring his (and the Joint Staffs) opposition to agreeing to anything at this delicate moment that might in anyway be construed as beginning START III negotiations, he agreed to clear the "experts" formulation in the talking points, consistent with the September 1994 Clinton-Yeltsin Joint Statement.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Points to be Made

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 9/17/2007

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By R NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M (1.58)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Yeltsin Pushes START II; START III in the Wings

The Yeltsin government has begun its long-awaited push for START II ratification. Russian television showed Yeltsin meeting with Defense Minister Sergeyev Monday to discuss ratification, including a clip of Yeltsin urging the Duma to ratify START II: "We have no need for so many nuclear weapons. We are secure with 1,000 warheads, not to mention the 2,000-2,500 envisaged in the future START III." On Tuesday, Foreign Minister Primakov and Sergeyev meet with Duma leaders to press for ratification.

Reaction in the Duma. Sergeyev told Ambassador Collins some progress was made softening opposition. Communist Leader Zyuganov (who controls the largest bloc in the Duma), however, told supporters "…we were not convinced that START II should be ratified," and suggested his member's vote depends on funding for defense in 1998. Zhirinovsky, who also controls a sizeable Duma bloc, said legislators should hold off ratifying until "a favorable moment…we have created a powerful missile complex, and we must use it to get certain advantages."

A boost in New York. Next Friday's planned signing of the ABM agreements and START II Protocol by Foreign Ministers in New York provides an opportunity to boost START II in the Duma, as these agreements underscore our continuing commitment to the ABM Treaty and specifically address Duma concerns over the cost of START II implementation.

A START III twist? On Friday, Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov told Strobe that Primakov will tell you Monday the Russians are pushing START II, and that they plan to ratify START II in time for the next summit. Primakov will also say that Russia cannot afford to remain at the Helsinki agreed START III levels of 2,000-2,500 warheads. To address this issue, he will propose

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

that we begin consultations now on a new START III "framework" accord that would presumably supercede the understanding that we reached at Helsinki by lowering the ceiling envisioned for START III from 2,000-2,500 to 1,500-2,000.

We recommend you tell Primakov that we will give the 1,500-2,000 proposal "careful attention" but stress that that does not mean we will necessarily end up saying "yes." (You will recall that the Joint Chiefs only reluctantly agreed to the 2,000-2,500 range before Helsinki, and they only agreed on the understanding that they would urge us to stay at the high end of that range.)

While committing to consider the Russian proposal, we should remind Primakov that "the deal" you reached with Yeltsin at Helsinki was (a) Yeltsin would use the Helsinki Joint Statements on START, ABM and European security to press for prompt ratification of START II by the Duma and (b) START III negotiations would begin only after START II had entered into force.

We need to avoid any suggestion (either publicly, or privately with Primakov) that there could be an option to "leap frog" START II completely and open formal negotiations now on START III - especially now that Yeltsin appears set to make a real push for START II. Based on the discussions that preceded Helsinki, we anticipate a difficult and perhaps protracted negotiation on START III. While continuing to draw the line against opening formal START III negotiations, we can agree to have our experts meet to "continue their dialogue on adapting our nuclear forces and practices to a post-Cold War World" (a formula you and Yeltsin agreed to in 1994). We should not agree to say we have agreed to "begin consultations" on START III, which we believe Primakov will propose.

Attachment
Tab A Points to be Made

See

Case Number: 2014-0837-F; 2016-0048-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 1657				
Document ID: 9708157				
Row: 45	Section: 4	Shelf: 2	Position: 1	Stack: V

Case Number: 2016-0048-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 2037				
Document ID: 9803632				
Row: 45	Section: 5	Shelf: 2	Position: 2	Stack: V

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9803632
RECEIVED: 19 MAY 98 12

TO: BERGER

FROM: ANDREASEN
BELL

DOC DATE: 19 MAY 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: START RUSSIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: START II DEVELOPMENTS IN MOSCOW

ACTION: NFAR PER EXEC SEC DUE DATE: 25 MAY 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ANDREASEN LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		ANDREASEN
		BELL
		EXECSEC

COMMENTS: _____

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM CLOSED BY: NSSWD DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	98052013	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
001		X	98052018	NFAR PER EXEC SEC

5/20
815am

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 3632

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice			
Davies	1	J 5/19 (edit)	Done
Kerrick			
Steinberg	2		
Berger	3		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		N
Records Mgt.			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: OBE → should be re-assessed after big 4 meeting. &/or incorporated for Yeltsin call

'98 MAY 19 PM 5:56

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

May 19, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL RGB

FROM: STEVEN P. ANDREASEN SPA

SUBJECT: Memorandum for POTUS/START II Developments

Attached is a memorandum to the President regarding recent developments in Moscow and Washington on START II.

Concurrence by: Courtney/Fort KF

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: START II Developments in Moscow

Duma Fights for Position. The Duma leadership agreed May 19 to an opposition request to postpone START II until September. The Kremlin declined comment, but confirmed the "Big Four" meeting on START II between Yeltsin, Kiriyenko, Duma Speaker Seleznev and Federation Council Chairman Stroyev will proceed Thursday. While today's action may be reversible, early ratification will remain an uphill struggle, partly because of rancor over the Kiriyenko confirmation fight.

Latest from Duma Supporters. Duma Deputy Speaker Ryzhkov and Foreign Relations Chairman Lukin complained today in Washington the postponement decision had been taken in their absence but said it was "tactical" (i.e., a warning to Yeltsin he needed to consult more closely with the Duma) and could be reversed if Yeltsin made unspecified domestic policy/political concessions.

Reassurance from MFA. First Deputy Foreign Minister Ivanov told Strobe the Russian side was re-energized to get START II ratified soon in order to hold a summit this summer.

Setback or Endgame? It is too soon to say whether today's events will delay ratification until fall, or simply signal the "hard bargaining" over START II has begun, with ratification still feasible before the Duma's mid-July recess. Yeltsin's team clearly needs to improve its performance - they were surprised today, as they were last week when the Duma rejected a move to agree to "expedited procedures" for START II.

What to do. In addition to underscoring our commitment to begin START III after Russia ratifies START II, we will consider how to help Yeltsin's team get better organized. We also argued to Ryzhkov and Lukin today that delay would be a mistake, as it would: (1) mean the U.S. remaining at START I levels while

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Russian forces decline; (2) increase Congressional pressure to throw over the ABM Treaty (since it is harder to argue the benefits of START II/III require our maintaining the Treaty); and (3) provide India an excuse for not reversing course.

Looking ahead. Embassy Moscow judges that Yeltsin may manage to get START II back on the Duma calendar, since he clearly wants ratification now - and has bargaining chips, *if* he chooses to deal with deputies. At best, however, the Duma's recalcitrance lengthens the odds for early ratification.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: START II Developments in Moscow

May 19

Duma Fights for Position. The Duma leadership agreed ~~today~~ to an opposition request to postpone START II until September. The Kremlin declined comment, but confirmed the "Big Four" meeting on START II between Yeltsin, Kiriyenko, Duma Speaker Seleznev and Federation Council Chairman Stroyev will proceed Thursday. While today's action may be reversible, early ratification will remain an uphill struggle, partly because of rancor over the Kiriyenko confirmation fight.

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cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Case Number: 2016-0048-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 2040				
Document ID: 9803913				
Row: 45	Section: 5	Shelf: 3	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Samuel Berger to POTUS re: Prospects for START II Support from Lebed [partial] (1 page)	06/06/1998	P1/b(1)
001b. report	re: Lebed's Victory (1 page)	05/19/1998	P1/b(1)
001c. memo	Michael Fooks and Ki Fort to Samuel Berger re: Response to President's Note [partial] (1 page)	06/01/1998	P1/b(1)
001d. note	Ki Fort to Ed [partial] (1 page)	05/29/1998	P1/b(1)
001e. memo	[Duplicate of 001a] [partial] (1 page)	05/29/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 2040

FOLDER TITLE:
9803913

2016-0048-M
rs1631

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

~~TOP SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9803913
RECEIVED: 28 MAY 98 16

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 06 JUN 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA START

PERSONS: LEBED, ALEXANDER

SUBJECT: PROSPECTS FOR START II SUPPORT FM LEBED

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT DUE DATE: 03 JUN 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: FOOKS LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		COURTNEY
		FOOKS
		FORT
		NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM CLOSED BY: NSDRS DOC 2 OF 2

~~TOP SECRET~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	98060119	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
002	PRESIDENT	Z	98060617	FOR INFORMATION
002		X	98062013	NOTED BY PRESIDENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	980606		VICE PRESIDENT
002	980606		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

National Security Council
The White House

6/2/98
@4:20 pm

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 3913

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TS A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice	1	6/2	
Davies			
Kerrick	2	6/2	
Steinberg	3/5		
Berger	4	6/6	copy
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	6	6/6	Copy
Records Mgt.	7	TMA 6.15	N
	8		N

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

'98 JUN 1 PM 5:59

COMMENTS:

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

Dan
Please sign out

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Samuel Berger to POTUS re: Prospects for START II Support from Lebed [partial] (1 page)	06/06/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 2040

FOLDER TITLE:
9803913

2016-0048-M
rs1631

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
6-10-98

~~CONFIDENTIAL W/TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

3913

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

'98 JUN 6 PM4:44

June 6, 1998

Copied
Berger
NSC West Wing Desk
COS

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER (K) FOR

SUBJECT: Prospects for START II Support from Lebed

In a note [EO 13526 1.4c] you asked whether we could get Alexander Lebed to support START II ratification. Based on what we now know of his views and his standing among Russian politicians, Lebed's endorsement might not be useful.

Although in the past he has obliquely endorsed the general concept of arms reduction, Lebed is not on record as having a position on START II. He is unlikely to be receptive to an approach, direct or indirect, from the United States on this specific issue. While he has cultivated closer U.S. contacts when they might serve his personal political agenda, he currently has no incentive to endorse START II, in part because of greater anti-American sentiment among political elites in Russia today. Our leverage on him is quite limited.

In any case, it is uncertain that Lebed's support for START II would improve prospects for ratification. His new governorship gives him membership in the Federation Council and a platform to express his views, but currently he has little influence in either chamber of parliament. As a potential presidential candidate, Lebed appeals to some anti-Yeltsin nationalists, but his "loose cannon" reputation also alienates many legislators. In the Federation Council, Chairman Stroyev has already endorsed ratification, making Lebed's support less valuable. In the Duma, the lines on START II ratification are clearly drawn and an endorsement from Lebed is likely to be ineffective among the entrenched factions of deputies.

Attachment

[EO 13526 1.4c]

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/16/2019
2016-0048-M (1.61)

~~CONFIDENTIAL W/TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT~~
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify On: 5/29/08

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. report	re: Lebed's Victory (1 page)	05/19/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 2040

FOLDER TITLE:
9803913

2016-0048-M
rs1631

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. memo	Michael Fooks and Ki Fort to Samuel Berger re: Response to President's Note [partial] (1 page)	06/01/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 2040

FOLDER TITLE:
9803913

2016-0048-M
rs1631

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ W/
TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

3913

June 1, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER (10) For 6/6

THROUGH: WILLIAM H. COURTNEY

FROM: MICHAEL FOOKS MF and KI FORT MF for

SUBJECT: Response to President's Note about Lebed

The memorandum for the President at Tab I responds to his note EO 13526 1.4c about obtaining Lebed's support for START II ratification.

Concurrence by: Bob Bell MF for

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

Attachments
Tab I Memorandum for the President
EO 13526 1.4c

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/16/2019
2016-0048-M (1.63)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ W/~~TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT~~
Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify On: 5/28/08

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001d. note	Ki Fort to Ed [partial] (1 page)	05/29/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 2040

FOLDER TITLE:
9803913

2016-0048-M
rs1631

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

Ed

why do we
refer to
EO 13526 1.4c as
Daily Bulletin
= Line 1?

(P)

[001d]

@ Cross -
Make change pts.

(e)

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001e. memo	[Duplicate of 001a] [partial] (1 page)	05/29/1998	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 2040

FOLDER TITLE:
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rs1631

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Prospects for START II Support from Lebed

In a note [EO 13526 1.4c] you asked whether we could get Alexander Lebed to support START II ratification. Based on what we now know of his views and his standing among Russian politicians, Lebed's endorsement might not be useful.

Although in the past he has obliquely endorsed the general concept of arms reduction, Lebed is not on record as having a position on START II. He is unlikely to be receptive to an approach, direct or indirect, from the United States on this specific issue. While he has cultivated closer U.S. contacts when they might serve his personal political agenda, he currently has no incentive to endorse START II, in part because of greater anti-American sentiment among political elites in Russia today. Our leverage on him is quite limited.

In any case, it is uncertain that Lebed's support for START II would improve prospects for ratification. His new governorship gives him membership in the Federation Council and a platform to express his views, but currently he has little influence in either chamber of parliament. As a potential presidential candidate, Lebed appeals to some anti-Yeltsin nationalists, but his "loose cannon" reputation also alienates many legislators. In the Federation Council, Chairman Stroyev has already endorsed ratification, making Lebed's support less valuable. In the Duma, the lines on START II ratification are clearly drawn and an endorsement from Lebed is likely to be ineffective among the entrenched factions of deputies.

Attachment

[EO 13526 1.4c]

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/16/2019
2016-0048-M (1.65)

Reason: 1.5 (b) (d)
Declassify On: 5/29/08

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

Case Number: 2016-0048-M

MR MARKER

This is not a textual record. This is used as an administrative marker by the Clinton Presidential Library Staff.

Original OA/ID Number: 2059				
Document ID: 9806440				
Row: 45	Section: 5	Shelf: 9	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~Samuel Berger to POTUS re: Russia and START II (2 pages)~~	~~09/28/1998~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ √2 1/2/2020
~~002a. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 001a] (2 pages)~~	~~09/28/1998~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ √2 1/2/2020
~~002b. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 001a, incomplete copy] (1 page)~~	~~09/18/1998~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ √2 1/2/2020
~~002c. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 001a] (2 pages)~~	~~09/18/1998~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ √2 1/2/2020
~~003. memo~~	~~[Duplicate of 001a] (2 pages)~~	~~09/28/1998~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ √2 1/2/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 2059

FOLDER TITLE:
9806440

2016-0048-M
rs1632

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9806440
RECEIVED: 18 SEP 98 19

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 28 SEP 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA START

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: RUSSIA & START II

ACTION: ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/RMO DUE DATE: 24 SEP 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ANDREASEN LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		ANDREASEN
		BELL
		NSC CHRON
		WEISS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTTS CLOSED BY: NSSWD DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	98092113	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
002	PRESIDENT	Z	98092816	FOR INFORMATION
002		X	98100114	NOTED BY PRESIDENT W/ COMMENT
002		X	98100214	ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/RMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	980928		VICE PRESIDENT
002	980928		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

PHOTOCOPY ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ WJC HANDWRITING THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN 9-29-98 6440

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 28, 1998

copied Berger NSC WW Des COS

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Russia and START II

START II: "Last, best chance?" Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov told Strobe in London Prime Minister Primakov would push for a vote on START II ratification in the next two months, win or lose. This comes after Primakov said publicly last week that, if confirmed, he would ask the Duma to ratify START II "without dragging its feet." Communist Party Leader Zyuganov told Ambassador Collins on Friday he "trusts the government more" and might be willing to put the Treaty on the Duma's agenda for October. Much as "only Nixon could have gone to China," we believe Primakov is well-positioned to get START II through (and may see this as a way to improve his image in the West). Primakov and Defense Minister Sergeyev began lobbying the Duma on ratification earlier this year, and his ability to work with key members of the opposition gives us our last, best chance to win the Duma's approval (assuming Russia's economic and political crisis does not get in the way).

START II costs in Russia. In your September 15 meeting with the CINCS, Admiral Mies noted the costs for us to remain at START I levels was beginning to be a real burden, and you expressed concern that START II implementation costs might present difficulties for Russia. While we are unable to provide a precise estimate, our own analysis shows that on balance, START II will be economically *beneficial* for Russia. This is because:

- Their near-term implementation costs are essentially offset by U.S. assistance through the Nunn-Lugar program (we have already provided almost $400 million in assistance to Russia for eliminating strategic arms pursuant to START I, and have budgeted another $600 million over the next seven years to deal with START II);

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M (1.66)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 9/18/2008

Vice President
Chief of Staff

- They will realize long-term operations and maintenance (O&M) savings from reducing to a much smaller force; and

- The long-term force modernization costs are probably lower under START II than without the Treaty.

U.S. costs. Maintaining a START I force structure in the United States as an incentive to START II ratification in Russia will cost the United States $96 million in FY 2000. Statements by Sergeyev and others show that our stated intent to remain at START I levels until Russia ratifies START II has been an effective talking point in their Defense Ministry's argument for ratification. We believe this $96 million bill is worth paying for one more year. Beginning in FY 2001, though, if START II has not been approved by Russia, we will almost certainly want to work with Congress to revise or repeal the legislation requiring us to stay at START I launcher/platform levels and avoid a much higher bill. If START II is ratified, we would expect to save roughly $4 billion through 2003.

Next steps. We are preparing a letter from Vice President Gore to Primakov encouraging him to move quickly on START II, noting both the economic and political benefits of ratification (including reassurance to the international community). We will also underscore these same points with Foreign Minister Ivanov during his visit to the UNGA.

10-2-98

Send to WSC?

Yes ✓

no _____

C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9806440
RECEIVED: 18 SEP 98 19

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 28 SEP 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA START

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: RUSSIA & START II

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 24 SEP 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ANDREASEN LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		ANDREASEN
		BELL
		NSC CHRON
		WEISS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTTS CLOSED BY: NSSWD DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	98092113	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
002	PRESIDENT	Z	98092816	FOR INFORMATION
002		X	98100114	NOTED BY PRESIDENT W/ COMMENT

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	980928		VICE PRESIDENT
002	980928		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6440

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TR A/O _____

TMA

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice	1	9/18	done
Davies			
Kerrick			
Steinberg	2		
Berger	3		done
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4	TTC 9/28	D Chaplan
Records Mgt.			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Russia + Start II

'98 SEP 18 PM 9:49

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6440

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG TR A/O _____

TMA

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
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Records Mgt.			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Russia + Start II

'98 SEP 18 AM 9:49

Exec Sec Office has diskette yes

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
9-29-98

6440

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 28, 1998

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

'98 SEP 28 PM12:39

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Russia and START II

copied
Berger
NSC WW Desk
COS

START II: "Last, best chance?" Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov told Strobe in London Prime Minister Primakov would push for a vote on START II ratification in the next two months, win or lose. This comes after Primakov said publicly last week that, if confirmed, he would ask the Duma to ratify START II "without dragging its feet." Communist Party Leader Zyuganov told Ambassador Collins on Friday he "trusts the government more" and might be willing to put the Treaty on the Duma's agenda for October. Much as "only Nixon could have gone to China," we believe Primakov is well-positioned to get START II through (and may see this as a way to improve his image in the West). Primakov and Defense Minister Sergeyev began lobbying the Duma on ratification earlier this year, and his ability to work with key members of the opposition gives us our last, best chance to win the Duma's approval (assuming Russia's economic and political crisis does not get in the way).

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M (1.67)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 9/18/2008

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

September 18, 1998

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL RGB

FROM: STEVEN P. ANDREASEN SPA

SUBJECT: Russia and START II

Attached is a memorandum to the President on Russia and START II.

Concurrence by: Weiss AW

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 8/16/2015
2016-0048-m

Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 9/18/2008

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6440

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Russia and START II

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M (1.68)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 9/18/2008

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M(1.69)

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Spell out

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9806440
RECEIVED: 18 SEP 98 19

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 28 SEP 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: RUSSIA START

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: RUSSIA & START II

ACTION: ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/RMO DUE DATE: 24 SEP 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ANDREASEN LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		ANDREASEN
		BELL
		NSC CHRON
		WEISS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTTS CLOSED BY: NSSWD DOC 2 OF 2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	98092113	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
002	PRESIDENT	Z	98092816	FOR INFORMATION
002		X	98100114	NOTED BY PRESIDENT W/ COMMENT
002		X	98100214	ORIGINALS RETURNED TO NSC/RMO

DISPATCH DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	DATE	DISPATCH FOR ACTION	DISPATCH FOR INFO
002	980928		VICE PRESIDENT
002	980928		WH CHIEF OF STAFF

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 6440

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM PRS NSC INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
Cosgriff			
Rice			
Davies			
Kerrick			
Steinberg			
Berger			
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk			
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc: ~~SBB~~ RB
LSA

COMMENTS: add to closeout

Exec Sec Office has diskette _____

if this happens,
we must go on to
St. III —

→ Bob/Steve —
o take it "this"
refers to
ratification

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN
9-29-98

6440

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 28, 1998

To: Bell
Andreassen
FYI.

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

'98 SEP 28 PM12:39

FROM: SAMUEL BERGER

SUBJECT: Russia and START II

copied
Berger
NSC WW Desk
COS

START II: "Last, best chance?" Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov told Strobe in London Prime Minister Primakov would push for a vote on START II ratification in the next two months, win or lose. This comes after Primakov said publicly last week that, if confirmed, he would ask the Duma to ratify START II "without dragging its feet." Communist Party Leader Zyuganov told Ambassador Collins on Friday he "trusts the government more" and might be willing to put the Treaty on the Duma's agenda for October. Much as "only Nixon could have gone to China," we believe Primakov is well-positioned to get START II through (and may see this as a way to improve his image in the West). Primakov and Defense Minister Sergeyev began lobbying the Duma on ratification earlier this year, and his ability to work with key members of the opposition gives us our last, best chance to win the Duma's approval (assuming Russia's economic and political crisis does not get in the way).

START II costs in Russia. In your September 15 meeting with the CINCS, Admiral Mies noted the costs for us to remain at START I levels was beginning to be a real burden, and you expressed concern that START II implementation costs might present difficulties for Russia. While we are unable to provide a precise estimate, our own analysis shows that on balance, START II will be economically *beneficial* for Russia. This is because:

- Their near-term implementation costs are essentially offset by U.S. assistance through the Nunn-Lugar program (we have already provided almost $400 million in assistance to Russia for eliminating strategic arms pursuant to START I, and have budgeted another $600 million over the next seven years to deal with START II);

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify on: 9/18/2008

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M (1.70)

cc: Vice President
Chief of Staff

- They will realize long-term operations and maintenance (O&M) savings from reducing to a much smaller force; and

- The long-term force modernization costs are probably lower under START II than without the Treaty.

U.S. costs. Maintaining a START I force structure in the United States as an incentive to START II ratification in Russia will cost the United States $96 million in FY 2000. Statements by Sergeyev and others show that our stated intent to remain at START I levels until Russia ratifies START II has been an effective talking point in their Defense Ministry's argument for ratification. We believe this $96 million bill is worth paying for one more year. Beginning in FY 2001, though, if START II has not been approved by Russia, we will almost certainly want to work with Congress to revise or repeal the legislation requiring us to stay at START I launcher/platform levels and avoid a much higher bill. If START II is ratified, we would expect to save roughly $4 billion through 2003.

Next steps. We are preparing a letter from Vice President Gore to Primakov encouraging him to move quickly on START II, noting both the economic and political benefits of ratification (including reassurance to the international community). We will also underscore these same points with Foreign Minister Ivanov during his visit to the UNGA.

Case Number: 2016-0048-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 2067				
Document ID: 9807440				
Row: 45	Section: 6	Shelf: 1	Position: 2	Stack: V

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9807440
RECEIVED: 02 NOV 98 10

TO: BERGER

FROM: BELL

DOC DATE: 02 NOV 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: START
RUSSIA
ARMS CONTROL
DEFENSE POLICY

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: START II

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 07 NOV 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BELL LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		BELL
		NSC CHRON

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSDMK CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	98110408	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	98122911	NOTED BY BERGER

National Security Council
The White House

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 7440

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG SM A/O _____

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Davies			
Kerrick	Copy Done		
Steinberg	2		
Berger	3	(R)	
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		N
Records Mgt.			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'99 NOV 3 PM 4:34

Exec Sec Office has diskette no

National Security Council
The White House

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Davies			
Kerrick	Copy Done		
Steinberg	2		
Berger	3		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		N
Records Mgt.			

A = Action	I = Information	D = Dispatch	R = Retain	N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS:

'98 NOV 3 PM 4:30

Exec Sec Office has diskette no

7440

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

November 2, 1998

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

FROM: ROBERT G. BELL RGB

SUBJECT: START II: Go/No Go

My IWG continues to lay the foundation for the PC you have requested late this month on the interrelated topics of NMD/ABM/START. The further we get into this, the clearer it is becoming to me that the next several months (November-January) really are the "last, best chance" for Russian ratification of START II. Once Congress gets back into session next year and our relationship with Russia is buffeted not only by the new NATO accessions, but also a new, more forward-leaning U.S. stance on NMD deployment and ABM Treaty amendments, the "window" opened by Primakov's elevation to Prime Minister and his stated resolve to move the Treaty as an early priority may close - perhaps for good.

In this context, the President's meeting with the Prime Minister at APEC on November 16 takes on special importance. I believe the President must press Primakov hard in this meeting and stress that, with all the current tensions in the relationship, we need START II to demonstrate that engagement continues to pay dividends. The reality is that it will be difficult for the Administration to hold a reasonable line on ABM in the next Congress if we are disappointed yet again on START II. I will work with Carlos (and State) to try to capture this sense of urgency in the meeting papers.

I have also attached an excellent editorial from last Thursday's *Moscow Times* that makes the case for Primakov acting now as cogently as I have seen it articulated.

Concurrences by: for RGB Carlos Pascual, for RGB (Gina) Mara Rudman

Attachment
Tab A *Moscow Times* Article

EDITORIAL

Crisis Is No Time for Arms Race

A recent costly setback in Russia's program to develop a new generation of intercontinental ballistic missiles has underlined the stupidity of the State Duma's refusal to ratify the START II arms treaty.

The failure of last week's Topol-M ICBM launch shows just how much money it costs to maintain nuclear parity. Russia is now in a financial crisis and spending money on nuclear weapons is the last thing it needs to do.

Yet, the Duma, the lower house of parliament, is refusing to sign the START II which would allow for bilateral cuts by both Russia and the United States in weapons arsenals.

The point is that Russia cannot afford to keep its nuclear forces at their current levels whereas the United States can.

If the Duma could ever rouse itself to ratify the treaty, then the United States would cut its arsenals and the burden for Russia of maintaining parity would be that much lighter.

The United States will even cough up some money to help Russia make the cuts it is already going to make as a result of attrition.

And it's not like Russia couldn't use the help. Its nuclear modernization program is going poorly. Already Deputy Prime Minister Yury Maslyukov is worrying aloud about paying for just the 35 or 40 new rockets lined up for this year, which are needed to meet even the basic levels set under START II.

And there is more on the table. After START II, the two powers have already sketched out a START III treaty which would make even bigger cuts and more savings for Russia. All of this while maintaining a managed equivalence of force.

The Duma knows all this. The Russian defense establishment which understands just how far it is falling behind in the nuclear race is solidly behind START II. Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev has lobbied the treaty in the Duma.

The Duma's arguments against START II are bizarre: It can't back the treaty because it thinks the United States is cheating on the 1972 ABM treaty; it can't back START II while the United States is putting sanctions on companies that do business with Iran; it can't back START II while NATO is threatening Kosovo.

Nonsense. This is all a smoke screen. The Duma bears an irrational hostility toward the West and will do anything that will make life harder for President Boris Yeltsin.

So it turns out that the politicians who call themselves Russian patriots are furthering their own careers by undermining the national interest and putting Russia behind in the nuclear race.

The Moscow Times

Case Number: 2016-0048-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 2069				
Document ID: 9807777				
Row: 45	Section: 6	Shelf: 2	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001. memo~~	~~Steven Andreasen to Samuel Berger re. START II: What If Russia~~ Does Ratify? (3 pages)	~~11/13/1998~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VL 1/2/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 2069

FOLDER TITLE:
9807777

2016-0048-M
rs1633

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9807777
RECEIVED: 13 NOV 98 10

TO: BERGER

FROM: ANDREASEN
BELL

DOC DATE: 13 NOV 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: START RUSSIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: START II IF RUSSIA RATIFY

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER W/ COMMENT DUE DATE: 19 NOV 98 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ANDREASEN LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		ANDREASEN
		NSC CHRON

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M

COMMENTS:

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OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSGP DOC 1 OF 1

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	98111315	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	98123011	NOTED BY BERGER W/ COMMENT

National Security Council
The White House

11/13 1327

RB
SA

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Davies			
Kerrick	Copy Done		
Steinberg	2		
Berger	3		
Situation Room			
West Wing Desk	4		N
Records Mgt.			

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cc:

'98 NOV 13 PM 12:14

COMMENTS: Info Memo - Start II - Russia -

Exec Sec Office has diskette NO

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ADDITIONAL COMMENTS

Fm _____ To _____ Date _____

Fm _____ To _____ Date _____

SRB - I think Bob has it just right.

SRB -
I think Bob has it just right.

National Security Council
The White House

11/13 1327

~~RB~~ SA

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West Wing Desk	4		N
Records Mgt.			

A = Action I = Information D = Dispatch R = Retain N = No Further Action

cc:

COMMENTS: Info Memo - Start II - Russia -

Exec Sec Office has diskette NO

Log # _____

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Fm _____ To _____ Date _____

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SRB - I think Bob has it just right.

SRB -
I think Bob has it just right

J

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

7777

November 13, 1998

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL RGB

FROM: STEVEN P. ANDREASEN SPA

SUBJECT: START II: What If Russia Does Ratify?

→ Steve — see comments R

This week, the Primakov Government began a serious push for START II ratification, with considerable cooperation from Duma leaders. A draft ratification bill (comparable to our resolutions of ratification) either has been, or soon will be, completed in the Duma. It will then be submitted to Primakov and the cabinet for approval or, possibly, re-negotiation (though one report asserts the Government has already approved the conditions contained in this bill). Assuming the Duma and the Kremlin agree on the final text, a vote on ratification could take place as early as the end of November or early December. (Mamedov told Strobe and Carlos on Thursday that use of force in Iraq would preclude ratification; we should not be surprised if the momentum from the past few days quickly unravels.) With this in mind, we wanted to highlight for you the immediate sequence of events and actions we would foresee assuming Duma approval.

1. Assessing Conditions

The four key Duma committees have reportedly drafted an alternative bill with several conditions:

- One would require an immediate start to START III talks. This poses no problem, as it conforms with our own policy.

- One would underscore Duma concern over NATO "eastward expansion." The key question here is whether the condition would establish "hard linkage" between entering START II into force and U.S. acceptance of limits on NATO forces or infrastructure in new member states or a freeze on future enlargement.

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M (1.71)

- One would apparently require U.S. compliance with the ABM Treaty. Here, the key question is whether the Duma tries to preempt any U.S. NMD deployment or Russian acceptance of any ABM amendments.

- A fourth condition will address U.S. START I compliance. This could cause trouble, since we are still at odds with Russia over a number of START I implementation issues.

- A last condition would require a "feasibility study" relating to the costs of START II implementation. This is strictly an internal Russian matter, but will be given considerable attention in light of the economic crisis.

We must be alert to possible opportunities to try to steer Moscow away from any "showstopper" conditions. We will add a "generic" talking point on this for POTUS-Primakov, and will ask Jim Collins to try to get information on the conditions in the draft Duma law as soon as possible.

2. Statement by the President

Assuming there are no objectionable conditions, we recommend the President make or issue a statement the day the Duma votes its final approval of the ratification bill. This statement would: (1) welcome this historic milestone; (2) state U.S. willingness to immediately begin negotiations on START III; and (3) announce his intent to submit for Senate approval in 1998 the four September 1997 START/ABM agreements. It is important to underscore that even if there are no objectionable conditions in the Duma resolution of ratification, the U.S. Senate will have to ratify the START II Extension Protocol before the Treaty can be entered into force. It is also possible that the Duma will condition Primakov's ability to enter START II and the Extension Protocol into force upon the Senate's approval of the ABM demarcation and succession agreements.

agree

State of Union centerpiece — START / CTBT

3. Formal Negotiations

As directed in PDD-66, immediately after START II is ratified in Russia, the U.S. will propose to begin formal negotiations on START III within a small, senior-level group chaired at either the Deputy Secretary (Talbott) or Under Secretary (Holum) level and reporting directly to the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister. We have named this group the "Strategic Stability Group on Arms Control." If START II is ratified prior to the Bell-Warner visit to Moscow on December 1-4 (for missile early

warning talks), they could try to arrange the modalities for the first negotiating round (perhaps delivering a POTUS or Albright letter with a specific proposal for convening these talks at the earliest possible date). Alternatively, we could prepare a POTUS letter for delivery in Moscow immediately after the Duma has acted on START II, if the Duma acts after the Bell-Warner visit.

If at all possible, we believe it is in our interest to initiate formal START III negotiations with Moscow prior to having to engage them next Spring on NMD and ABM-related issues (depending on the outcome of our NMD-ABM-START review). This dialogue could obviously help "stabilize" what will inherently be a difficult pitch on NMD and ABM.

	CP	AW	SF	JF
Concurrences by:	Pascual/	Weiss	Flanagan	Farrar

Case Number: 2016-0048-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 43325				
Document ID: 9808660				
Row: 50	Section: 2	Shelf: 10	Position: 3	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. memo~~	~~Bob [Bell] to Sandy re: START III (1 page)~~	~~08/05/1998~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VR 1/2/2020
~~001b. paper~~	~~re: Summit Non-Paper for Russia: Reductions in Nuclear Forces~~ Beyond START II (4 pages)	~~08/03/1998~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VR 1/2/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 43325

FOLDER TITLE:
9808660

2016-0048-M
rs1634

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [a)(5) of the PRA]
P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9808660
RECEIVED: 26 JAN 99 11

TO: BERGER

FROM: BELL

DOC DATE: 05 AUG 98
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: START
LIMITED ACCESS
RUSSIA

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: SUMMIT NON-PAPER FOR RUSSIA - REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR FORCES BEYOND START II -- LIMITED ACCESS

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 01 FEB 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: BELL LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-m

COMMENTS:

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OPENED BY: NSVJD CLOSED BY: NSVJD DOC 1 OF 1

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RECORD ID: 9808660

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

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8660

~~SECRET/PROSE~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

August 5, 1998

Sandy -

Leon just called to report that the Vice President concurs with the START III package.

On a related note, Jim asked me to give you my thinking on the question: "why now?" We continue to believe it is important to "strike while the iron is hot" and seek the President's approval of the START III package now, rather than holding it until after the summit (which would mean the hard-won, year-in-the-making interagency agreement would be left hanging out there for about a month).

Beyond that, though, we are confident that if the President approves this package we can produce an abbreviated version of the "Concept Paper" that could be shared in an appropriate form (either as a non-paper or as talking points) with the Russians at the summit without: (a) violating our position not to begin formal START III negotiations until the Duma has ratified START II; and (b) divulging details of our START III position that the Russian's will not welcome (e.g., our decision, at least for now, not to go for lower START III numbers).

To illustrate this, I've attached for your information only a draft "non-paper" on START III developed by Steve and I that the President could give to Yeltsin. I've not shared this with the interagency but would note everything in it is taken from the interagency cleared "Concept Paper."

Bob

Bob

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-m (1.72)

~~SECRET/PROSE~~

SUMMIT NON-PAPER FOR RUSSIA: REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR FORCES BEYOND START II

I. PURPOSE

This paper outlines U.S. views regarding principles and objectives it believes should guide U.S.-Russian bilateral nuclear arms control efforts for further reductions in nuclear forces in or related to START III. These principles and objectives are consistent with the March 21, 1997, Helsinki Joint Statement (HJS) on Parameters on Future Reductions in Nuclear Forces.

II. BACKGROUND

In the HJS, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that START III would include four basic components:

1. Establishment by December 31, 2007, of aggregate levels of 2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear warheads for each of the Parties;

2. Measures relating to the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories and the destruction of strategic nuclear warheads and any other jointly agreed technical and organizational measures to promote the irreversibility of deep reductions including prevention of a rapid increase in the number of warheads;

3. Resolving issues related to the goal of making the current START treaties unlimited in duration; and

4. Deactivation of all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles which will be eliminated under START II by December 31, 2003 by removing their nuclear warheads or taking other jointly agreed steps.

Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin also agreed in the HJS that, in the context of START III negotiations, experts will explore, as separate issues, possible measures relating to nuclear long-range sea-launched cruise missiles and tactical nuclear systems, to include appropriate confidence-building measures, and to consider issues related to transparency in nuclear materials.

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/20/2019
2016-0048-M (1.73)

On September 26, 1997, in New York, Secretary of State Albright and Foreign Minister Primakov signed a protocol extending the date by which START II limitations and reductions must be completed to December, 31, 2007, along with letters on early deactivation requiring experts to meet once START II enters into force to decide on a method for the deactivation of those strategic nuclear delivery vehicles which will be eliminated under START II by December 31, 2003.

III. PRINCIPLES FOR REDUCTIONS

Consistent with the HJS, the U.S. proposes the adoption of the following basic principles to guide further reductions in nuclear forces.

1. *Stability*. Arms control commitments should preserve and, if possible, enhance the stability that will be achieved at the end of the START II draw-down period and seek greater predictability through transparency measures and appropriate constraints.

2. *Equivalence*. Mindful of the sides' differing practices and national security needs, large disparities in force capability and infrastructure that represent an imbalance between U.S. and Russian capabilities must be addressed.

3. *Verification*. We must preserve and, if necessary, enhance key verification measures from START I and II and achieve agreement on measures for monitoring key new obligations with confidence.

4. *Safety, Security and Proliferation*. The United States and Russia should work together to ensure that material, technology and expertise do not fall into third party hands.

IV. OBJECTIVES AND IMPLEMENTATION

Under reductions below START II levels, the United States and Russia will require greater understanding of, and constraints on, each side's capabilities to rapidly reconstitute its nuclear forces (strategic and non-strategic) and thereby achieve a significant military imbalance. With this in mind, the U.S. will seek to make rapid and substantive progress in all elements of the framework in the HJS.

In addition to further stabilizing and verifiable reductions in START III in strategic nuclear delivery systems, the U.S. will

seek measures designed to promote greater transparency of NSNF stockpiles; reduce the probability of diversion, accident or unauthorized use involving non-strategic forces; and address the numerical imbalance between U.S. and Russian non-strategic nuclear forces. With regard to warheads and related fissile material, the U.S. is considering an approach designed primarily to reduce the uncertainty about the size and composition of U.S. and Russian nuclear forces, stockpiles and production infrastructure; facilitate control on the location and handling of excess nuclear weapons and material; and promote the irreversibility of reductions. To assist this effort, the U.S. is committed to the Nuclear Cities Initiative. At the same time, U.S. and Russian ability to maintain a safe and secure nuclear deterrent should not be compromised.

The U.S. is also prepared to proceed immediately following the Duma's approval of the START II Treaty with negotiations on a method for completing the deactivation four years early of those strategic nuclear delivery vehicles which will be eliminated under START II.

V. APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS

The U.S. proposes the following approach be adopted for initiating START III talks and structuring the negotiations:

- Negotiations within Strategic Stability Group (SSG) on Arms Control. Initial discussions on START III would take place within the SSG. The U.S. team will include senior-level representatives from the Department of State, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Department of Energy, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and National Security Council, and will be chaired at either the Deputy Secretary or Under Secretary level. The SSG would report directly to Secretary Albright and Foreign Minister Primakov. We seek Russian representation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Atomic Energy. The SSG will function as a steering group and be charged with reaching agreement on the "scope" of the negotiating effort (i.e., what will be covered), structure (of both the negotiations and agreements), and core substantive issues, as required.

- Ad Hoc Group. As required, the SSG on Arms Control will delegate to an Ad Hoc Group (AHG) issues for study, as well as the negotiation of detailed text. Each side would designate a single individual to head the AHG; these two individuals will

report directly to the SSG on Arms Control. The AHG for each side will consist of an interagency team that will meet as required to explore issues and negotiate text. At this point, the U.S. does not envision a negotiation, chartered in Geneva, similar to the Nuclear and Space Talks.

Case Number: 2016-0048-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 43321				
Document ID: 9906042				
Row: 50	Section: 2	Shelf: 9	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. paper	re: NMD-ABM-START: Negotiating Strategy and Roadamp with Russia (5 pages)	08/11/1999	P1/b(1)
001b. talking points	re: Red Team Questions and Answers (6 pages)	08/11/1999	P1/b(1)
001c. paper	[Duplicate of 001a] (5 pages)	08/10/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 43321

FOLDER TITLE:
9906042

2016-0048-M
rs1635

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9906042
RECEIVED: 10 AUG 99 14

TO: BERGER

CHRON FILE

FROM: ANDREASEN
BELL

DOC DATE: 10 AUG 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ABM
START

NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE
LIMITED ACCESS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: NMD / ABM / START - NEGOTIATING ROAD MAP W/ RUSSIA -- LIMITED ACCESS

ACTION: OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 16 AUG 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ANDREASEN LOGREF: 9906160 9906193

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTTS CLOSED BY: NSVJD DOC 1 OF 1

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RECORD ID: 9906042

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	99081014	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	99120614	OBE / STATUS OF ORIGINAL UNKNOWN

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

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6042 REDO II

August 11, 1999

WWD - New Copy for the File
8/11 1130am

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL SPA for

FROM: STEVEN P. ANDREASEN SPA

SUBJECT: NMD-ABM-START: Negotiating Roadmap with Russia and Red Team Questions and Answers

Attached is a revised draft of both the Negotiating Roadmap with Russia and the Red Team Questions and Answers, incorporating you and Jim Steinberg's comments.

Secretary Albright has now approved the Negotiating Roadmap, without substantive edit.

I've also incorporated comments from Holum and his staff into the Red Team Questions and Answers, none of which run against the grain of the draft you reviewed.

Attachment
Tab I NMD-ABM-START: Negotiating Roadmap with Russia and Red Team Questions and Answers

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-m

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Reason: 1.5(a)(d)
Declassify On: 8/10/2009

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. paper	re: NMD-ABM-START: Negotiating Strategy and Roadamp with Russia (5 pages)	08/11/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
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9906042

2016-0048-M
rs1635

RESTRICTION CODES

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. talking points	re: Red Team Questions and Answers (6 pages)	08/11/1999	P1/b(1)

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NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 43321

FOLDER TITLE:
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

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WWD - New Copy for the File
8/10 1546

August 10, 1999

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL RGB

FROM: STEVEN P. ANDREASEN SPA

SUBJECT: NMD-ABM-START: Negotiating Roadmap with Russia

As per our discussion, attached is the draft "Negotiating Roadmap" we have worked with Holum.

The draft is also being provided to Albright this afternoon - we will feed in both your and the Secretary's comments before providing to Cohen on Wednesday.

Attachments
Tab I NMD-ABM-START: Negotiating Roadmap with Russia

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M

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Reason: 1.5(a)(d)
Declassify On: 8/10/2009

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. paper	[Duplicate of 001a] (5 pages)	08/10/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
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Case Number: 2016-0048-M

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Document ID: 9906160				
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Steven Andreasen to Samuel Berger re: Small Group Meeting on NMD, ABM and START...[partial] (5 pages)	08/13/1999	P1/b(1)
001b. talking points	re: Points to be Made for August 16 Meeting on NMD, ABM and START (5 pages)	08/00/1999	P1/b(1)
001c. paper	re: NMD-ABM-START: Negotiating Strategy and Roadmap with Russia (5 pages)	08/11/1999	P1/b(1)
001d. talking points	re: Red Team Questions and Answers (6 pages)	08/11/1999	P1/b(1)
001e. paper	[Duplicate of 001c] (5 pages)	08/11/1999	P1/b(1)
001f. talking points	[Duplicate of 001d] (6 pages)	08/11/1999	P1/b(1)

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2016-0048-M
rs1636

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RECORD ID: 9906160
RECEIVED: 13 AUG 99 19

TO: BERGER

FROM: ANDREASEN
BELL

DOC DATE: 13 AUG 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE
START
ABM
LIMITED ACCESS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: 16 AUG SMALL GRP MTG RE NMD ABM & START -- LIMITED ACCESS

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 19 AUG 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ANDREASEN LOGREF: 9906042

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-m

COMMENTS:

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	99081316	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	99082516	NOTED BY BERGER

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BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ *DOCLOG* 12 *A/O* _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
GIRE			
JACOBSON			
POWELL			
SARGEANT	1	8/13	
BRADTKE			
RUDMAN			
STEINBERG	2		
BERGER	3	A	
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK			
RECORDS MGMT.	4		N

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

'99 AUG 13 PM 8:25

COMMENTS: NMD Mtg - 16 Aug

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE NO

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

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	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
GIRE			
JACOBSON			
POWELL			
SARGEANT	1	8/13	
BRADTKE			
RUDMAN			
STEINBERG			
BERGER	3	A	
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK			
RECORDS MGMT.	4		N

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

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COMMENTS: NMD Mtg - 16 Aug

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE no

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Steven Andreasen to Samuel Berger re: Small Group Meeting on NMD, ABM and START...[partial] (5 pages)	08/13/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 43327

FOLDER TITLE:
9906160

2016-0048-M
rs1636

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

LIMITED ACCESS
6160

August 13, 1999

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

Natl Sec Advisor has seen

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL

FROM: STEVEN P. ANDREASEN

SUBJECT: Small Group Meeting on NMD, ABM and START, Monday, August 16, 1999, 10:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon, Situation Room

I. PURPOSE

- To determine whether a consensus can be achieved on the approach to NMD, ABM and START III outlined in the *Negotiating Strategy and Roadmap* NSC circulated last week (Tab II).
- Failing that, to identify remaining issues and determine whether agencies could support the "alternative" (as opposed to their "preferred") outcomes.
- Achieve agreement that this issue will be submitted to the President for approval/decision during the week of August 16.

II. BACKGROUND

Since last we met

Following August 7 meeting with Albright, Cohen, and Shelton:

- We provided to DOD the *Negotiating Strategy and Roadmap* requested by Secretary Cohen, as well as *Red Team Questions and Answers*. Shelton and Albright also have this package.
- (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(5)

~~SECRET/PROSE~~
Reason: 1.5(a)(d)
Declassify On: 8/13/2009

~~SECRET~~

Declassified in Part
Per E.O. 13526
VZ 08/16/2019
2016-0048-M (1.81)

- The Arms Control IWG has further refined possible options for cooperation with Russia on ballistic missile defense; expect to present recommendations to principals by the end of August.

Monday's meeting

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(5), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(5), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

Where we need to be on numbers. Our sense is that the Pentagon is still churning on the issue of a lower START III ceiling, and will plead to Cohen for more time, perhaps months, to run the numbers. In our view, we simply do not have that kind of time: we would not advise that we proceed with a recommendation to the

President on NMD and ABM without knowing whether he can expect to have flexibility on this key START III issue down the road.

- *You may want to call Cohen prior to Monday's meeting to find out where he is on this issue and, if necessary, underscore this point.*

(b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(5), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

III. PARTICIPANTS

Secretary Albright
Deputy Secretary Talbott
Under Secretary Holum
Secretary Cohen
Deputy Under Secretary Bodner
General Ralston
Admiral Enright
Jim Steinberg
Robert Bell
Hans Binnendijk
Steve Andreasen
Leon Fuerth

IV. PRESS PLAN

None for the meeting (although given the sensitivity of these issues, you should caution participants to limit their debriefs and not speak with the press regarding the "fact of" the meeting or the issues under review).

V. SEQUENCE

1. (b)(1), EO 13526 3.3(b)(5), EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)

2. You should then seek to focus discussion on the *Negotiating Strategy and Road Map* paper circulated at Cohen's request, if necessary (and we expect it will be), segueing into a discussion of the two key outstanding issues.

3. If a consensus cannot be reached, you should (if appropriate) put forward the proposition of a "preferred/acceptable" outcome as a means of providing the President some flexibility.

Attachments
Tab I Points to be Made
Tab II Negotiating Strategy and Roadmap/Red Team Questions and Answers

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. talking points	re: Points to be Made for August 16 Meeting on NMD, ABM and START (5 pages)	08/00/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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NSC Records Management
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2016-0048-M
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. paper	re: NMD-ABM-START: Negotiating Strategy and Roadmap with Russia (5 pages)	08/11/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 43327

FOLDER TITLE:
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2016-0048-M
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b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001d. talking points	re: Red Team Questions and Answers (6 pages)	08/11/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 43327

FOLDER TITLE:
9906160

2016-0048-M
rs1636

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

LIMITED ACCESS
6042 REDO II

August 11, 1999

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: ROBERT G. BELL

FROM: STEVEN P. ANDREASEN

SUBJECT: NMD-ABM-START: Negotiating Roadmap with Russia and Red Team Questions and Answers

Attached is a revised draft of both the Negotiating Roadmap with Russia and the Red Team Questions and Answers, incorporating you and Jim Steinberg's comments.

Secretary Albright has now approved the Negotiating Roadmap, without substantive edit.

I've also incorporated comments from Holum and his staff into the Red Team Questions and Answers, none of which run against the grain of the draft you reviewed.

Attachment
Tab I NMD-ABM-START: Negotiating Roadmap with Russia and Red Team Questions and Answers

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By M NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M

~~SECRET/PROSE~~
Reason: 1.5(a)(d)
Declassify On: 8/10/2009

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001e. paper	[Duplicate of 001c] (5 pages)	08/11/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
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OA/Box Number: 43327

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rs1636

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001f. talking points	[Duplicate of 001d] (6 pages)	08/11/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
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RESTRICTION CODES

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Case Number: 2016-0048-M

MR MARKER

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Document ID: 9906193				
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. paper	re: [NMD, ABM and START] [incomplete copy] (4 pages)	08/00/1999	P1/b(1)
001b. paper	re: [NMD, ABM and START] [incomplete copy] (4 pages)	08/00/1999	P1/b(1)

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([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 43327

FOLDER TITLE:
9906193

2016-0048-M
rs1637

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9906193
RECEIVED: 17 AUG 99 08

TO: BERGER

FROM: ANDREASEN
BELL
BINNENDIJK

DOC DATE: 17 AUG 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE
START
LIMITED ACCESS
ABM
ARMS CONTROL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: DRAFT POTUS MEMO ON NMD ABM & START -- LIMITED ACCESS

ACTION: ORIGINAL EDITS RETURNED TO NSC/RMO DUE DATE: 23 AUG 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ANDREASEN LOGREF: 9906042 9906160

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		ANDREASEN
		BELL
		BINNENDIJK
		NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSVJD DOC 1 OF 1

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	99081710	FOR DECISION
001		X	99082010	BERGER APPROVED RECOM
001		X	99120614	ORIGINAL EDITS RETURNED TO NSC/RMO

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. paper	re: [NMD, ABM and START] [incomplete copy] (4 pages)	08/00/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 43327

FOLDER TITLE:
9906193

2016-0048-M
rs1637

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. paper	re: [NMD, ABM and START] [incomplete copy] (4 pages)	08/00/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 43327

FOLDER TITLE:
9906193

2016-0048-M
rs1637

RESTRICTION CODES

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Case Number: 2016-0048-M

MR MARKER

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Document ID: 9906211				
Row: 50	Section: 2	Shelf: 11	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	From Samuel Berger re: Meeting with Your Senior National Security Advisors on NMD, ABM and START (3 pages)	08/17/1999	P1/b(1)
001b. memo	[Duplicate of 001a] (3 pages)	08/17/1999	P1/b(1)
~~001c. talking points~~	~~re: Meeting with Your Senior National Security Advisors on NMD,~~ ABM and START (2 pages)	~~08/17/1999~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 1/2/2020

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 43327

FOLDER TITLE:
9906211

2016-0048-M
rs1638

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9906211
RECEIVED: 17 AUG 99 15

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 17 AUG 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE
START
RUSSIA
ABM
ARMS CONTROL
LIMITED ACCESS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: MTG ON ARMS CONTROL 18 AUG - LIMITED ACCESS

ACTION: NOTED BY PRESIDENT DUE DATE: 23 AUG 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ANDREASEN LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		ANDREASEN
		NSC CHRON

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM CLOSED BY: NSJWF DOC 2 OF 2

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RECORD ID: 9906211

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	99081715	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR INFORMATION
002		X	99081915	NOTED BY PRESIDENT

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	From Samuel Berger re: Meeting with Your Senior National Security Advisors on NMD, ABM and START (3 pages)	08/17/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 43327

FOLDER TITLE:
9906211

2016-0048-M
rs1638

RESTRICTION CODES

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

LIMITED ACCESS
6211

August 17, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: HANS A. BINNENDIJK HAB
ROBERT G. BELL RGB

FROM: STEVEN P. ANDREASEN SPA

SUBJECT: Briefing Memo for POTUS: August 18 Meeting on NMD, ABM and START

Attached is a briefing memorandum to the President for Wednesday's meeting on NMD, ABM and START.

We have also tabbed to the President's memo a set of questions for him to consider.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President
Tab A Questions to Consider

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M

~~SECRET/PROSE~~
Reason: 1.5(a)(d)
Declassify On: 8/17/2009

~~SECRET~~

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. memo	[Duplicate of 001a] (3 pages)	08/17/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 43327

FOLDER TITLE:
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2016-0048-M
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RESTRICTION CODES

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MEETING WITH
YOUR SENIOR NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISORS ON NMD, ABM AND START

QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

NMD Program (Cohen/Ralston)

1. When do we expect the first flight test of our NMD system? How many flight tests are expected prior to next years deployment readiness review?

2. How many "successes" will we need before we are confident in moving forward?

3. How likely do you think it will be that we will have enough information to proceed with an affirmative deployment decision next year?

4. If a rogue state threat does emerge from North Korea or Iran before we deploy an NMD, or if "gaps" exist in the coverage of our defenses, to what extent can we continue to rely on deterrence?

ABM Negotiations (Albright/Talbott)

1. How hard do you think it will be to get the Russians to agree to an NMD deployment site in Alaska?

2. To what extent will the Russians see an NMD deployment site in Alaska aimed at them, and not North Korea?

3. What is the Russian incentive to agree to a "first phase" NMD deployment, when they know there is "more to follow?"

4. How do you assess the Yeltsin government's capacity to make the hard decisions that will be required to conclude these talks by next Spring?

START III (All)

1. What is your assessment of the prospects of Russia agreeing to our proposed ABM amendments in the absence of our agreeing to their demands in START III?

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M (7.08)

Reason: 1.5(a)(d)
Declassify on: 8/17/09

2. What do the Russians most want in START III? A lower overall ceiling? Tighter constraints on our ability to "break out" from the Treaty by adding more warheads on our missiles and bombers?

3. How hard do you think it will be to get Russia to agree to our proposals on theater nuclear weapons? Reductions in their nuclear warhead production infrastructure?

4. Understand Russia proposed yesterday to go to 1500 strategic warheads in START III. Recognizing we accepted some degree of risk in agreeing to come down to 2,500 warheads at Helsinki, how is that risk increased at 2,250? 2,000? 1,500?

Case Number: 2016-0048-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 43327				
Document ID: 9906246				
Row: 50	Section: 2	Shelf: 11	Position: 2	Stack: V

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Samuel Berger to POTUS re: Recommendations on NMD, ABM and START III (6 pages)	08/18/1999	P1/b(1)
001b. memo	[Duplicate of 001a] (6 pages)	08/16/1999	P1/b(1)
001c. memo	[Duplicate of 001a, incomplete copy] (1 page)	08/16/1999	P1/b(1)
001d. memo	[Duplicate of 001a, incomplete copy] (1 page)	08/16/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 43327

FOLDER TITLE:
9906246

2016-0048-M
rs1639

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.
PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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~~SECRET~~
NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9906246
RECEIVED: 18 AUG 99 18

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: BERGER

DOC DATE: 18 AUG 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: ARMS CONTROL
ABM
RUSSIA
NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE
START
LIMITED ACCESS

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: RECOMS ON NMD / ABM / & START III - LIMITED ACCESS

ACTION: PRESIDENT APPROVED RECOM DUE DATE: 24 AUG 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ANDREASEN LOGREF:

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION	FOR CONCURRENCE	FOR INFO
		ANDREASEN
		NSC CHRON

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M

COMMENTS:

DISPATCHED BY DATE BY HAND W/ATTCH

OPENED BY: NSTSM CLOSED BY: NSJWF DOC 2 OF 2

~~SECRET~~

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	99081815	FWD TO PRESIDENT FOR DECISION
002	PRESIDENT	Z	99081822	FOR DECISION
002		X	99081915	PRESIDENT APPROVED RECOM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 10246

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: _____ DOCLOG EWK A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
GIRE			
JACOBSON			
POWELL			
SARGEANT	1	has copy	
BRADTKE			
RUDMAN			
STEINBERG			
BERGER	2	~~EWK 8/18~~	
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK	3	EWK 8/18	
RECORDS MGMT.			

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS:

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE yes

Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001a. memo	Samuel Berger to POTUS re: Recommendations on NMD, ABM and START III (6 pages)	08/18/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 43327

FOLDER TITLE:
9906246

2016-0048-M
rs1639

RESTRICTION CODES

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

LIMITED ACCESS
6246

August 18, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: HANS A. BINNENDIJK SPA for
ROBERT G. BELL SPA for

FROM: STEVEN P. ANDREASEN SPA

SUBJECT: Decision Memorandum for POTUS on NMD, ABM and START III

The attached memorandum to the President reflects the outcome of today's briefing to the President and has been cleared by State (Secretary Albright), Defense (Secretary Cohen), JCS (General Ralston), and OVP (Leon Fuerth).

Concurrence by: Krass CK Weiss AW info

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VZ NARA, Date 8/16/2016
2016-0048-M

~~SECRET/PROSE~~
Reason: 1.5(a)(d)
Declassify On: 8/18/2009

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001b. memo	[Duplicate of 001a] (6 pages)	08/16/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 43327

FOLDER TITLE:
9906246

2016-0048-M
rs1639

RESTRICTION CODES

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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

LIMITED ACCESS
6246

August 18, 1999

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: HANS A. BINNENDIJK SAB/m
ROBERT G. BELL SAB/m

FROM: STEVEN P. ANDREASEN SPA

SUBJECT: Decision Memorandum for POTUS on NMD, ABM and START III

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Concurrence by: Krass CK Weiss AWinfo

RECOMMENDATION

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Attachment
Tab I Memorandum to the President

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/16/2016
2016-0048-M

~~SECRET/PROSE~~
Reason: 1.5(a)(d)
Declassify On: 8/18/2009

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001c. memo	[Duplicate of 001a, incomplete copy] (1 page)	08/16/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 43327

FOLDER TITLE:
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2016-0048-M
rs1639

RESTRICTION CODES

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Withdrawal/Redaction Marker
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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001d. memo	[Duplicate of 001a, incomplete copy] (1 page)	08/16/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 43327

FOLDER TITLE:
9906246

2016-0048-M
rs1639

RESTRICTION CODES

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Case Number: 2016-0048-M

MR MARKER

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Original OA/ID Number: 43327				
Document ID: 9906523				
Row: 50	Section: 2	Shelf: 11	Position: 2	Stack: V

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Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
~~001a. memo~~	~~Steven Andreasen to Samuel Berger re: Framework and Core Points~~ for NMD-ABM-START Diplomatic and Congressional Consultations (2 pages)	~~09/02/1999~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 1/2/2020
~~001b. paper~~	~~re: NMD/ABM/START: Framework for Diplomatic and~~ Congressional Consultations (3 pages)	~~09/03/1999~~	~~P1/b(1)~~ VZ 1/2/2020
001c. paper	re: Core Points for September NMD-ABM-START Consultations (23 pages)	09/03/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:
Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Records Management
([Bell and START...])
OA/Box Number: 43327

FOLDER TITLE:
9906523

2016-0048-M
rs1640

RESTRICTION CODES

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NSC/RMO PROFILE

RECORD ID: 9906523
RECEIVED: 03 SEP 99 08

TO: BERGER

FROM: ANDREASEN
BINNENDIJK

DOC DATE: 02 SEP 99
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE
START
LIMITED ACCESS
ABM
ARMS CONTROL

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: FRAMEWORK & CORE POINTS FOR NMD / ABM / START DIPLOMATIC & CONGRESSIONAL CONSULTATIONS -- LIMITED ACCESS

ACTION: NOTED BY BERGER DUE DATE: 09 SEP 99 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: ANDREASEN LOGREF: 9906042 9906160

FILES: PA NSCP: CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
NSC CHRON

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E.O. 13526, Sec. 3.5 (b)
White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VR NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M

COMMENTS:

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OPENED BY: NSGP CLOSED BY: NSVJD DOC 1 OF 1

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RECORD ID: 9906523

ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

DOC	ACTION OFFICER	CAO	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED
001	BERGER	Z	99090309	FOR INFORMATION
001		X	99091617	NOTED BY BERGER

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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BYPASSED WW DESK: ✓ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
GIRE			
JACOBSON			
POWELL			
SARGEANT			
BRADTKE	1	9/3	
RUDMAN	2	9/3	
STEINBERG	3		
BERGER			
SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK			
RECORDS MGMT.			

A = ACTION I = INFORMATION D = DISPATCH R = RETAIN N = NO FURTHER ACTION

CC:

COMMENTS: Framework + Core Pts for NMD-ABM-START.

SEP 3 9:54

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE NO

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

THE WHITE HOUSE

PROOFED BY: _____ LOG # 9906523 LAC

URGENT NOT PROOFED: _____ SYSTEM (PRS) INT ARS

BYPASSED WW DESK: ✓ DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	INITIAL/DATE	DISPOSITION
GIRE			
JACOBSON			
POWELL			
SARGEANT			
BRADTKE	1	9/3	
RUDMAN	2	9/3	
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SITUATION ROOM			
WEST WING DESK			
RECORDS MGMT.			

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CC:

COMMENTS: Framework + Core Pts for NMD-ABM-START

SEP 3 9:54

EXEC SEC OFFICE HAS DISKETTE 10

POINTS TO BE MADE FOR TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP ON NMD AND ABM

- Wanted to call to update you on a number of points related to our national missile defense (NMD) program and arms control. We have been reviewing a number of issues over the past several months relating to NMD, the ABM Treaty and START III.

- We are at a sensitive point in this process. We need to begin discussions with close allies and with the Russians on possible changes in the ABM Treaty that might be necessary. This is beginning this week. I would greatly appreciate your discretion on this issue.

- It is clear there is an emerging ballistic missile threat from rogue states. We are moving forward as quickly as we can with our NMD research and development program, and will make a decision on deployment consistent with considerations of feasibility, cost and arms control.

- The President has said all along that he will make a decision on NMD deployment next summer. It is now clear that NMD deployment would require changes to the ABM Treaty.

- With this in mind, the President has made some decisions that will enable us to begin engaging Russia now on changes to the ABM Treaty that would be necessary if we seek to deploy a limited NMD system.

- We will seek Russian agreement now to those changes to the ABM Treaty required to permit an initial NMD deployment as early as 2005, if the President decides to do so. That site would be in Alaska. This initial deployment would, if made, meet the threshold requirement to defend all 50 states.

- We will leave to President Clinton's successor – and President Yeltsin's – the issue of follow-on negotiations on additional changes to the ABM Treaty required to deploy a long-term capability by 2010.

- Expect this to be a difficult issue with Russia. Believe we have an approach, however, that can succeed in paving the way for a limited NMD deployment, adapting the ABM Treaty to meet the oncoming threat from rogue states and preserving START, which we are very much committed to.

- Are prepared to discuss these issues with you in more detail as they develop.

NMD/ABM Talking Points

- We have said for some time that we would meet the Ballistic Missile Threat from rogue states - consistent with the criteria of cost, feasibility/technology, arms control.

- The President has made no decision on such a deployment nor will he until next summer.

- We are exploring with the Russians possible changes in the ABM treaty that might be necessary to reconcile it with potential new threats.

- There is a unanimous view among the Presidents national security advisors on a general approach to these issues.

- [Do not get into details]

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~~SECRET/PROSE~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

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6523

draft talking points for week

September 2, 1999

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR SAMUEL R. BERGER

THROUGH: HANS A. BINNENDIJK HB

FROM: STEVEN P. ANDREASEN SPA

SUBJECT: Framework and Core Points for NMD-ABM-START Diplomatic and Congressional Consultations

Over the past two weeks, we have put together a package for rolling out the President's recent decisions on NMD, ABM and START, including:

- A three-page "*Framework for Diplomatic and Congressional Consultations*," mapping out a timetable and game plan for consultations with: Russia, the UK/Denmark/France, Congress, NATO, key allies (Canada, Japan, South Korea, Israel and Australia), and Ukraine/Belarus/Kazakhstan.

- A twenty-three page package of "*Core Points*" for each of these consultations.

Both documents have been worked with a small team from State, Defense and JCS in our office. Throughout this process, we have insisted that the recommendations cleared by Principals and approved by the President are strictly reflected in the "core points" that we are using in our briefings.

On Friday, we plan to provide a hard copy of both documents to State, Defense and JCS, underscoring the sensitivity of these documents, so that they can brief "up" prior to our rollout next week.

In addition to Friday's (September 3) calls from you to John Sawyers and Niels Eglund, you will need to make calls late Tuesday (September 7) to Lott, Daschle, Hastert and Gephardt. We will prepare a package.

Finally, we need to consider whether to publicly rollout these decisions next week (Friday - September 10) following

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Reason: 1.5(d)
Declassify On: 9/2/2009

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White House Guidelines, September 11, 2006
By VL NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M (2.21)

~~SECRET~~

diplomatic and Congressional consultations. State and Defense see a benefit to a press briefing with Cohen and other senior administration officials that would frame these decisions the way we want, following Strobe's crucial opening presentation to Mamedov next Wednesday (September 8) in Moscow. We might even be forced to do a public rollout sooner if there is a serious press leak early next week. The one downside in doing this is that we might provoke a "Sergeyev-Ivanov" press conference that would not be helpful.

Attachments
Tab I Framework for Diplomatic and Congressional Consultations
Tab II Core Points

NMD/ABM/START: Framework for Diplomatic and Congressional Consultations

[Draft: 9/3/99/8:00 p.m.]

Russia

- *Notional timing*. September 8-20.
- *Scheduled meetings*
  - *September 8*. Deputy Secretary Talbott and Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov (Moscow).
  - *September 9/10*. Secretary Albright and Foreign Minister Ivanov (APEC).
  - *September 12*. President Clinton with Prime Minister Putin (APEC).
  - *September 13*. Secretary Cohen with Defense Minister Sergeyev (Moscow).
  - *September 17*. Deputy Secretary Talbott and Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov (both with interagency teams) (Washington).
  - *September 20*. Secretary Albright with Foreign Minister Ivanov (New York – not confirmed).
- *Game plan*. Deputy Secretary Talbott would preview with Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov the U.S. approach on NMD/ABM September 8 in Moscow (Mamedov is back in the office on September 6). The meeting would provide an opportunity to present the U.S. approach and get initial, informal feedback. It would also help both us and the Russians to frame more appropriately the meetings over the rest of the month. Secretary Albright would build on this discussion in her meetings with Ivanov at APEC, highlighting key points that we need our interagency working groups to address. President Clinton would stress to Putin at APEC the need to follow through with the Clinton-Yeltsin commitments from Cologne to work cooperatively to address a common threat. A Clinton-Yeltsin letter that recalls Yeltsin's request from Cologne for ministers to report to them directly and highlights our views of issues that need to be addressed based on the early September discussions would immediately follow the meeting. Secretary Cohen would reinforce this message with Sergeyev in Moscow. This would set the stage for Deputy Secretary Talbot and a small U.S. team to meet with Mamedov and a comparable team September 17 for detailed discussions and initial Russian reactions to the U.S. proposals. Plan would also include Albright/Cohen-Ivanov/Sergeyev letters (when appropriate – to be determined).

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By VL NARA, Date 8/16/2019
2016-0048-M (2.22)

UK, Denmark and France

- *Notional timing*. Tuesday (September 7 – London) and Wednesday (September 8 – Copenhagen) just prior to/coincident with presentation to Russia; Thursday (September 9 – Paris) just after presentation to Russia.

- *Game plan*. NSA Berger would call his UK and Danish counterpart (September 3) and preview POTUS decisions on NMD and ABM. A small USG team (led by Under Secretary-designate Holum) would travel to London, Copenhagen and Paris to brief relevant MFA/ MOD officials September 7/8/9. A letter would also be provided from the Secretary of State to her counterparts. Holum would also brief Washington Ambassadors upon his return.

Congress

- *Notional timing*. Just prior to presentation to Russia (i.e., September 7).

- *Target members*. Senate Majority and Minority Leader; House Speaker and Minority Leader; Chair and Ranking Minority of Senate/House Foreign Relations/International Affairs and Armed Services Committees; Senator Lugar; Senator Cochran.

- *Target staff*. [To be determined.]

- *Game plan*. NSA Berger, Secretary Albright and Secretary Cohen would make calls to their Congressional counterparts, laying out the basic outlines of our upcoming presentation to Russia on NMD, ABM and START. Offer to follow-up after discussions with Russia (i.e., the week of September 20th), including (if asked) staff briefings (composition to be determined).

  - Berger calls: Senators Lott and Daschle; Speaker Hastert; Minority Leader Gephardt.

  - Albright calls: Senators Helms, Biden, Lugar and Cochran; Representatives Gilman and Gejdenson.

  - Cohen calls: Senators Warner, Levin, Stevens, and Inouye; Representatives Spence and Skelton.

NATO

- *Notional timing*. Friday (September 10) just after presentation to Russia and Holum meetings in London, Copenhagen and Paris.

- *Game plan*. Holum (with small USG team) would brief all NATO permanent representatives in Brussels. U.S. would also address NMD-ABM-START at the September 22-23 High Level Group meeting.

China

- *Notional timing*. Thursday-Saturday (September 9-11) just after presentation to Russia; October.

- *Scheduled meetings*

  - *September 9*. Secretary Albright with Foreign Minister Tang (APEC).

  - *September 11*. President Clinton with President Jiang (APEC).

- *Game plan*. Secretary Albright and President Clinton would each use their meetings with Chinese officials to discuss the NMD/ABM/START issue, making clear that our NMD program is not aimed at China; that we remain committed to the ABM Treaty; and that we expect to make proposals to Russia to amend the Treaty to permit the deployment of a limited NMD (without getting into the specifics of our NMD program or ABM Treaty proposals). The U.S. would follow-up, as appropriate, with more detailed exchanges with China (including the possibility of discussions with appropriate Chinese officials on the margins of the UNGA in late September and sending a small USG team to Beijing in October).

Key Allies (Canada, Japan, South Korea, Israel and Australia)

- *Notional timing*. Thursday (September 9 – Ottawa) and Friday (September 10 – Tokyo, Seoul Tel Aviv and Canberra) just after presentation to Russia and Holum meetings in London, Copenhagen and Paris; October.

- *Game plan*. U.S. Ambassadors in Ottawa, Tokyo, Seoul, Tel Aviv and Canberra would be provided with a set of basic points to draw from in briefing host countries (points for Ottawa would be delivered Thursday, September 9, the day before all NATO briefing in Brussels; points for Tokyo, Seoul, Tel Aviv and Canberra for delivery Friday, September 10, coincident with all-NATO briefing). If a USG team travels to Beijing in October for NMD and ABM discussions, that team could also visit Seoul and Tokyo. Follow-on discussions could also be scheduled with the Canadians, Israelis and Australians in October.

Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan

- *Notional timing*. September 10 (coincident with briefing to NATO); October.

- *Game plan*. U.S. Ambassadors in Kiev, Minsk and Alma-Aty would be provided with a set of basic points to draw from in briefing host countries; Vershbow would double track with Ambassador Hryschenko (Ukraine) in Brussels. The U.S. Commissioner to the Standing Consultative Commission would brief his U/B/K counterparts at the SCC (October 4 - November 3).

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