Summary of Conclusions for
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee
DATE: March 3, 1995
LOCATION: White House Situation Room
TIME: 2:30 - 4:00pm

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia and Croatia

PARTICIPANTS:
Chair
Anthony Lake
CIA
Admiral William Studeman

OVP
Leon Fuerth
JCS
General John Shalikashvili

State
Secretary Christopher
White House
Samuel Berger

DOD
John Deutch
NSC
Alexander Vershbow

USUN
Ambassador Rick Inderfurth

Summary of Conclusions

Croatian Decision to Eject UNPROFOR

1. Principals discussed strategy for convincing President Tudjman to reconsider his decision to terminate UNPROFOR's mandate, focusing on the approach that Assistant Secretary Holbrooke should take in his March 6 meeting with Tudjman. They approved the overall approach set forth in the State Department paper and draft talking points: on the one hand, a tough message insisting that Tudjman allow interpositional forces to remain in the separation zone between Croatian and Krajina Serb forces, and raising the prospect of punitive measures if Tudjman remains intransigent; on the other hand, an understanding of his difficult political environment and a willingness to work with him on a new mandate for a force to replace UNPROFOR.
2. In response to Tudjman’s demand for peacekeeping forces or observers along Croatia’s international border, Principals agreed that Holbrooke should unequivocally rule out the possibility that the U.S. would contribute to such a force. If Tudjman is prepared to agree to retaining the interpositional force in the separation zone, Holbrooke may indicate a readiness to take this up with U.S. Allies, but without encouraging him to believe there is a significant likelihood of NATO assuming this mission.

3. Principals agreed that the possibility of a visit by Tudjman to the U.S. in mid-March for the first anniversary of the Bosniac-Croat Federation could provide an inducement for Tudjman to compromise on UNPROFOR. They affirmed the Deputies’ recommendation that Holbrooke should make clear that the minimum requirement for such a visit would be a three-month extension of UNPROFOR’s mandate and Tudjman’s agreement to retain interpositional forces as part of any UNPROFOR successor force.

4. Principals agreed that, following Holbrooke’s meeting with Tudjman, we would seek German agreement on a joint demarche to Tudjman by the President and Chancellor Kohl.

5. Principals requested an analysis of the potential impact on Tudjman’s policies and support for the Federation in the event the U.S. carried out punitive measures in the event he remained intransigent on ejecting UNPROFOR. (Action: CIA)

**Step Two of NATO Prepositioning**

6. To sustain our leadership of the Alliance, principals decided to recommend to the President that he authorize U.S. representatives to support a decision at NATO to implement Step Two prepositioning in Croatia of communications systems and personnel needed to support a possible UNPROFOR withdrawal from Bosnia or Croatia. This decision would be subject to prior Congressional consultations early in the week of March 6. (Based on subsequent discussion among Principals, it was agreed to delay implementation of these steps for one week.) (Action: NSC)

7. Principals agreed that, in the Congressional consultations, we would characterize this as a limited, precautionary move that is being taken without prejudice to a possible future decision to deploy U.S. forces as part of a NATO-led withdrawal of UNPROFOR. We would also state that we intend to consult closely with the Congress on the latter, if and when a decision is taken to withdraw UNPROFOR, and that we will seek prior Congressional approval of the necessary funding. (Action State and DOD, in coordination with NSC)