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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>V</td>
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Dear Ted,

1. Attached is the piece I have just done on how the US sees the European security and defense identity within NATO. Let me stress that this is NOT written in diplomatic style, but on the contrary was presented in France to provoke the French. But I thought it might contain some useful detail or information for you, and then last few pages, which say to Europeans "OK, so how would you have done it differently?" might also stimulate some ideas.

2. The SAIS REVIEW piece from Summer-Fall 1997 is mostly about Europe, but you might find the last few pages on US interests of use.

3. I will send you my short Turkey piece separately; I do think this is a critical theme.

On the more positive side, you might also want to mention some recent economic achievements--financial services agreement; information technology agreement; and mutual recognition agreements on product testing.
Best of luck, and happy to help further or look at the draft if you like.

Phil Gordon
US Senior Fellow
Editor, Survival
The United States and ESDI in the New NATO

Americans have always been ambivalent towards ESDI, and they remain so even after the Alliance's most recent reforms. In theory, officials and analysts in the U.S. have tended to express wholehearted support for the creation and strengthening of a European pillar, and since 1995 they have professed great satisfaction at the prospect of this identity being built within, as opposed to independent from, NATO. In practice, however, most Americans have never been so enthusiastic. Most U.S. analysts are sceptical about Europe's prospects for genuinely building up a serious military capability, and US officials are rarely willing to make the types of compromises that might be necessary to make the Alliance more balanced. The U.S. Congress is not only ambivalent, but often contradictory: many legislators demand that Europeans do more and take more responsibility (for example in Bosnia), but many (sometimes the same ones) also strongly resist any European attempts to implement policies other than those desired by the United States.

As a result of these American attitudes, there is significant misunderstanding about ESDI on the two sides of the Atlantic. Whereas Europeans—and especially the French—have tended to interpret the ESDI as a genuine opportunity to enhance Europe's capacity to influence NATO and, if necessary, to act without it, Americans tend to take it less seriously. Europe's attempts to strengthen its military capability and organization are all well and good, and Americans do not object to the creation of a theoretical capacity within the Alliance for autonomous European operations. But many Americans are also often doubtful that an effective military capability will actually be created given falling European defense budgets, and they are skeptical that Europe's theoretical capacity for action within NATO will ever be used. Indeed, Americans seem to interpret the purpose of ESDI literally—it is about the creation of an "identity" (not a "capability"), meant more to give the Europeans a feeling of unity and responsibility than the actual ability to act.

Europeans often resent what they see as a condescending American attitude—even American arrogance—and demand that the United States take more seriously, and give more substance to, Europe's role within NATO. They justifiably dislike being asked to pay more and do more without gaining commensurate influence on NATO's
decisionmaking. But if the ESDI is to be given substance in the coming years and if Europe’s role in the Alliance is to grow, the burden for accomplishing this will fall to the Europeans, not the United States. Rightly or wrongly, the overwhelming NATO priority for Washington now and for the next several years is enlargement, and ESDI, among American priorities, takes a clear back seat. Americans would welcome—as they always have—more European defense spending and a greater European contribution to common goals, but they are unlikely to be forthcoming about sharing responsibility in an Alliance where the United States appears to have more power and leverage than ever.

Although Europeans often (rightly) complain about the lack of US support for (and sometimes even the resistance to) ESDI, the main responsibility for its current weakness lies with Europe itself. If Europeans could muster the unity and military power that a true ESDI would imply, the responsibility and influence within the Alliance would follow whether the Americans liked it or not. As it happens, however, few Europeans seem to believe that a true ESDI is worth the effort, the EU has proven unable to agree on the institutional adjustments that common positions would require, and most Europeans seem willing to live with the status quo of an Alliance dominated by the United States. Although there would be some advantages to a more effective ESDI within the Alliance, the most likely prospects are that Europe’s hopes for greater roles and responsibilities within NATO remain unfulfilled.

**American Unilateralism after the Cold War**

To understand how and why the American attitude towards ESDI has developed, it is necessary first to note that—perversely, perhaps—the American role in NATO has grown since the end of the Cold War, not diminished. Whereas many had expected the disappearance of a Soviet threat to result in the decline of American influence and to permit a rise in Europe’s role, the opposite has in fact taken place. Far from declining as a European power or as the leader of NATO, the United States somehow seems as dominant—or indeed as domineering—within the Alliance as ever.

Recent American unilateralism in the Alliance—or at least assertive leadership—has manifested itself in a number of ways. On NATO enlargement, for example, the U.S. was not only instrumental in adopting the policy in the first place, but it got its way,
sometimes in the face of strong allied opposition, on the timing, nature, number of new members invited to join, and relationship with Russia. In Bosnia, once NATO got deeply involved, the U.S. not only provided the lead negotiator, Richard Holbrooke, but it took command of the NATO operation, provided the largest contingent of forces, dictated the terms of the peace treaty with little toleration for European positions, created a “train and equip” program for the Bosniak-Croat forces against unanimous European opposition, and—symbolically if not substantively significant—held the peace negotiations in the American heartland of Dayton, Ohio. On NATO command structure reform, the U.S. agreed to certain measures of “Europeanization,” but it refused to concede control of the Alliance’s southern command, even though France, with German and other support, made this a precondition of its re-integration, and Washington insisted on keeping what were arguably three of the Alliance’s four most important command positions (SACEUR, SACLANT, and CINCSOUTH) for itself. And even in the appointment of NATO’s most recent secretary general, once a congenial example of Alliance compromise and joint-decisionmaking, the United States in 1995 was willing and able to impose a choice (Javier Solana) different from that already made by most of its main European allies (Ruud Lubbers). How did this happen, and why should the United States—whose role and presence in European security only came about because of the Soviet threat—be more dominant than ever within the Alliance when that original threat no longer exists?

Perhaps the main reason for the United States’ rising rather than falling role is that whereas Europe’s absolute need for an American role in European security is obviously less than it was during the Cold War, its relative need is greater. Indeed, defending Western Europe against a Soviet threat was so clearly and directly a threat to America’s own national interests that it went almost without saying that the U.S. had to be involved in European defense. The United States needed Europe almost as much as Europe needed the United States, and Washington was obliged to recognize European perspectives and often to defer to them in the interests of creating and maintaining an Alliance. Today, while Europe’s need for U.S. protection is obviously less than it was during the Cold War, it has not diminished as much as America’s perceived need for Europe as an ally.
The result of this changing relationship is that the United States feels that it is in a position of strength vis-à-vis its allies. European security is still of course an important American interest, but given the lack of a threat, changing American trade and demographic patterns, and the decline in the perceived importance of foreign policy in the United States, European security is less important than it used to be, and American engagement more optional. The American perception, reinforced by strong elements in Congress and public opinion that no longer think European security should be an American responsibility, is that Europeans are the demandeurs in this alliance, and that if they want an American role they will have to accept American terms. Accurate or not, this American perception leads to a tendency toward unilateralism within NATO, and to an implied American threat—never credible during the Cold War—that if Europeans do not play by U.S. rules the U.S. will not play at all. Arguably, as it has led the transformation of NATO in the post-Cold War era, the United States has been less willing to accommodate European perspectives into its leadership style, not more.

This American feeling of relative strength within the Alliance has only been reinforced by Europe’s perceived inability to create any credible alternative to a U.S.-led NATO to deal with the security crises of the post-Cold War world. Hopes expressed in 1989-90 that the European Community could eventually replace NATO as the main provider of security in Europe have proven misplaced, and the EU’s goal of creating a common foreign and security policy, as declared at the Maastricht summit of December 1991, has proven elusive. Most observers on both sides of the Atlantic agree that the marginal institutional adjustments made to CFSP at the EU’s June 1997 Amsterdam summit will not have a significant effect on the EU’s foreign and security policy credibility.

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1 I have discussed these structural changes in the transatlantic relationship in Philip H. Gordon, “Recasting the Atlantic Alliance,” *Survival* 38, no. 1 (Spring 1996), pp. 32-57.

2 The tendency toward unilateralism and growing primacy of domestic politics, of course, applies not only to U.S. policy within NATO, but to post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy in general. The most recent example was Congress’ November 1997 refusal, because of a domestic political dispute (over abortion and family planning), to carry out an agreement to repay U.S. debts to the United Nations and to issue further credit to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), even while the President was seeking to muster a consensus at the UN Security Council over policy toward Iraq and a Southeast Asian currency crisis threatened the world economy. See Eric Pianin and Thomas W. Lippman, “Republicans Withhold Funds for UN and IMF,” *International Herald Tribune*, November 14, 1997; and the discussion in David S. Broder, “Clinton’s Sway Abroad Is Undermined at Home,” *International Herald Tribune*, November 19, 1997.
Finally, the most important factor leading the United States to feel indispensable within NATO was the Western experience in former Yugoslavia. In the Balkans, Europeans sought unsuccessfully for more than four years to cope with a conflict on their own soil before yielding to an American-led diplomatic and military intervention that, temporarily at least, brought the conflict to an end. Far from having proved to be “the hour of Europe, not the hour of the United States,” as an EU official hopefully proclaimed at the outset of the war, the conflict in the Balkans proved to be the opposite, at least in the eyes of most American observers. Whether the view that only the U.S. could bring the Bosnian war to an end was “fair” or not (and it certainly needs to be qualified, given America’s own failure to stop the war from 1991-95 and Bosnia’s still uncertain future) is not really the point. What matters where ESDI is concerned is that the sight of Europeans giving way to an American negotiator and U.S.-dominated military force under NATO auspices certainly created the widely shared impression that the U.S. was the indispensable power within NATO and that Europe could not act without it. As then Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke put it not long after the Dayton Agreement, “Unless the United States is prepared to put its political and military muscle behind the quest for solutions to European instability, nothing really gets done.” The “lesson” of Bosnia for most Americans is that Europe is militarily dependent on American unity and power.

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4 Holbrooke cited in William Drozdiak, “Europe’s Dallying Amid Crises Scares Its Critics,” International Herald Tribune, February 8, 1996. Holbrooke’s view seems to be shared by U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen’s, who has argued that Bosnia “was principally a European problem to be solved. The Europeans did not move.” It pointed out that the Europeans do not act in the absence of American leadership.” Cited in Barbara Starr, “Cohen Establishing His Doctrine as Clinton and Congress Look On,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 5, 1997, p. 19. Also see the even more pointed—and again representative—view of journalist Stephen Rosenfeld, who writes that Bosnia’s “disintegration was Europe’s to address, but the (partial) solution finally reached came out of American power and diplomacy. Why European would want to maintain anything but a discreet silence on the matter is a mystery.” See Stephen S. Rosenfeld, “U.S. Arrogance? What About European Freeloading?” International Herald Tribune, November 8-9, 1997.

5 Though it irritates them when Americans make the point, most Europeans in fact tend to agree. See, for example, Carl Bildt’s assessment that “The distinctly unimpressive performance of the European Union’s CFSP has reinforced the idea throughout the European region that America is, and will remain, the only force that counts. American strength lies less in an ability to devise strategies and set out policies than in a superior ability to orchestrate action and support for whatever policy happens to be theirs at any given moment. This give the impression—perhaps rightly so—that only the United States can act and firmly deliver effective results.” See Bildt, “The Global Lessons of Bosnia,” in What Global Role for the EU? (Brussels: The Philip Morris Institute for Public Policy Research, September 1997), p. 23. For a similar view from the region, see Greek analyst Thanos Veremis’ assessment that “the foreign-policy protagonists of the European Union failed to muster a common policy throughout the protracted crisis in Bosnia. The United States, on the other hand, projected its comprehensive solution with single-minded determination. There is little doubt in the Balkans today as to which Western power will act as a catalyst of future
The United States’ attitude in NATO is thus one of very high self confidence. Americans generally do support greater European unity and welcome Europe’s efforts to contribute more to NATO, but they see little reason to accommodate European perspectives that they do not share, and little cause for ceding institutional power in an Alliance that they currently dominate. If Europeans want to create an effective ESDI within NATO, they will have to begin by making progress toward their own unity, developing the military power they bring to the bargaining table, and ultimately making credible a European alternative to NATO if the Americans prove unwilling to compromise within it. As the next section shows, however, none of these tasks will be easy.

The Structural Obstacles to ESDI
The creation of an ESDI within NATO was first formally adopted by the Alliance at its landmark Brussels summit of January 1994, when NATO agreed on the set of reforms—the Partnership for Peace (PiP), Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), and the non-proliferation/counter-proliferation program—that would mark its agenda for the rest of the decade. The goal of an ESDI, of course, long predated the 1990s, and in some ways goes all the way back to the aborted European Defense Community (EDC) of 1950-54 and the French Fouchet Plans of 1960-62. Indeed, the difference in nature between these two possible types of European organizations—the EDC would have been militarily integrated and within NATO and the Fouchet Plans intergovernmental and separate from NATO—was one of the reasons an ESDI never came about, since Europeans were never able to agree on one or the other model. During the Cold War, not enough Europeans could be convinced by “Gaullist” arguments that Europeans needed the potential capacity to act without the United States, Gaulists could not be convinced that the ESDI should be embedded in NATO, and Americans, in any case, were unwilling to accept separate—or even separable—European forces that they feared might divide the Alliance. As a result, agreement on

developments.” See Veremis, “Southeastern Europe After Dayton,” in Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and Dimitris Keridis, Security in Southeastern Europe and the U.S.-Greek Relationship (McLean, VA: Brassey’s, 1997), p. 21. Leading members of Germany’s ruling Christian Democratic (CDU) Party have also concluded that “Bosnia has made clear that effective conflict resolution in Europe is possible at the present time only with the active involvement of the United States,” to take just one more of many examples. The CDU report is cited in Craig R. Whitney, “NATO Puzzle: Can It Still Be Effective?”, International Herald Tribune, July 7, 1997.
a NATO ESDI could only be reached in the 1990s, when France had come to accept that it could not be built separate from NATO, and the United States no longer felt threatened by potentially separable European capabilities.

This convergence in perspectives made possible the adoption of an ESDI that would be built on two pillars: on one hand the strengthening of the Western European Union (WEU), Europe’s only exclusive defense and security organization, and on the other hand a re-organization of NATO that would permit the creation, when agreed, of all-European forces and missions. Some progress has been made on both counts.

The WEU has been significantly strengthened since 1992, when WEU leaders took steps at their Petersberg summit to make the organization into the defense component of the European Union, as had been agreed at Maastricht at the end of the previous year. Since then, the organization has become more capable in a number of ways, most notably with the setting up of a Defense Planning Cell of some forty officers, the creation of a 24-hour capable Situation Center for monitoring crises, and the development of a satellite interpretation center in Torrejon, Spain, where it is already training staff and receiving data from the Helios I satellite. The WEU can now also call on several new multinational European forces such as the Eurocorps, the European Force (EUROFOR), and the European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR). Clearly, the WEU is more significant, and operationally capable, than it has ever been in its nearly 50 years of existence.

NATO has also taken steps to enhance Europe’s role within the Alliance and develop its potential capacity for operations without the participation of the United States. This

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6 The Petersberg Declaration listed possible operations (now commonly referred to as “Petersberg tasks”) that would include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, and combat tasks in crisis management. See the Petersberg Declaration of the WEU Council of Ministers, Bonn, June 19, 1992; and the discussion in Assembly of Western European Union, Sir Russell Johnson, rapporteur, Western European Union: Information Report (Brussels: March 14, 1995), pp. 33-36.

7 In addition to these measures, the WEU has it has moved its headquarters from London to Brussels (to facilitate contact with NATO); developed a catalogue of military units answerable to the WEU; arranged for the regular meeting of armed forces chiefs of staff and other military officers; developed a political-military decision-making process; initiated a comprehensive military exercise policy; set up its own Institute for Security Studies in Paris. On the WEU’s operational development, see Brigadier Graham Messervy-Whiting, “WEU Operational Development,” Joint Forces Quarterly, no. 15, (Spring 1997), pp. 70-74; and Philip H. Gordon, “Does the WEU Have a Role?” Washington Quarterly 21, no. 1 (Winter 1996-97), pp. 125-40.
“Europeanization” of the Alliance includes a major restructuring of NATO command structures that will see Europeans take on a greater percentage of command posts within the Alliance; the enhancement of the position of Deputy SACEUR, who will now be tasked with preparing for, and eventually commanding, European-only missions; far-reaching cooperation agreements between the WEU and NATO; and most importantly, the creation of CJTF headquarters, which will make possible European operations using NATO assets and command structures but without the necessary participation of U.S. forces. When the CJTF concept was formally agreed at NATO’s June 1996 summit in Berlin, Europeans and Americans alike proclaimed it a major step towards the creation of an ESDI, one that, in the words of the then French Foreign Minister Hervé de Charette, would allow Europe “to be able to express its personality for the first time in Alliance history.”

This combination of developments—the strengthening of the WEU and the Europeanization of NATO—constitute the basis for the ESDI. In theory, they allow Europe to express a more distinct voice within NATO, and provide the basis for Europeans to better defend their interests militarily, even without the United States. In practice, however, the significance of these steps has been limited, and barring significant changes in Europe’s cohesion, means, or will to act, they are likely to remain so. In fact, for the reasons suggested above, in some ways NATO has not been “Europeanized,” but “Americanized,” and the Alliance is more than ever dominated by the United States. The weakness of the current ESDI, and Europe’s relative dependence on the United States, is the product of several structural factors that will be very difficult for proponents of ESDI to overcome.

At the most basic level, the ESDI is incomplete because European countries, most of which have for the past forty years been exclusively focussed on territorial defense, do not currently have the capacity for autonomous military action that would give them more of a voice within an Alliance whose main missions now are outside its borders. Although WEU members as a group have large armed forces (nearly 1.8 million

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9 See de Charette cited in Rick Atkinson, “NATO Gives Members Response Flexibility,” Washington Post, June 4, 1997. For a range of similar American and European comments, also see “NATO Acquires
troops, not including reserves), they generally lack the capacity for anything but relatively small and nearby operations, and only two WEU members (the UK and France) can effectively mount and sustain significant deployments abroad. For crises that require projecting large numbers of combat forces beyond European borders and sustaining them there, Europe remains dependent on the United States for military intelligence, air and sea-lift, and even numbers of troops, at least until more European forces are professionalized.

Despite all the talk of the WEU and NATO’s "Europeanization," moreover, Europeans are unlikely to be willing to acquire such capabilities in the foreseeable future. For understandable reasons, given Europe’s economic challenges, the budgetary requirements of monetary union, and the low priority given by many Europeans to military affairs, EU governments have been cutting defense budgets substantially and are likely to cut them further in the coming years. Thus whereas the United States spends $266 billion—3.6% of its GDP—on defense annually, the members of the WEU spend only $173 billion—2.3% of their GDP. And not only is WEU-member aggregate spending just 65% of U.S. spending, but Europe’s fragmented defense industries and large conscript armies mean that it is not spending even that amount as efficiently as it might, leaving less funding available for future-oriented functions like research and development. U.S. government-funded defense R&D spending in 1996 was about three times that of all NATO’s European members combined.

It is true, of course, that some European countries are reorganizing their armed forces to be better able to project forces and participate in peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions abroad. France has announced the professionalization of its armed forces and plans to build up an intervention force of up to 60,000 troops, and the Federal Republic of Germany is for the first time creating crisis reaction forces that

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10 For a good discussion of European NATO members’ logistical limitations, see Michael O’Hanlon, "Transforming NATO: The Role of European Forces," Survival 39, no. 3 (Autumn 1997), pp. 5-15.


12 The U.S. figure for 1996 was $35 billion; for NATO Europe it was $12 billion. The gap is expected to grow slightly for 1997, with U.S. spending rising by almost $1 billion and NATO Europe falling by the same amount. See IISS, The Military Balance 1997-98, p. 34.
could be used on combat missions abroad. These are both useful developments and will strengthen Europe’s capacity for action. But while the defense reforms in both countries are important and relevant contributions to a potential ESDI, both countries are also planning major cuts in defense spending, and serious questions remain about their commitments to critical projects like the Future Large Aircraft (for military transport) and Helios II and Horus optical and radar satellites (for military intelligence). Given that it would most likely cost at least $30 billion for Europe to create the military capability to conduct medium-scale “out-of-area” missions without the United States (including intelligence satellites, floating communications headquarters, mobile logistics, and transport craft), European states are unlikely to make the investments necessary to do so.

A second reason why the potential for the ESDI is limited is the enduring European inability to agree on just what form it should take. Europe is no longer as divided on this issue as it was during the 1960s or even the 1980s, when intra-European clashes between “Gaulists” and “Atlanticists” plagued efforts to create an ESDI. The French agreement of 1994-95 to build the ESDI within NATO rather than outside it, and the more pro-European orientation of the British Labour government elected in May 1997 have narrowed the differences among European on this issue.

While the differences have narrowed, however, they have by no means disappeared. At Maastricht, despite the sense of urgency created by the outbreak of war in Yugoslavia three months before, EU leaders were unable to agree on the extent to which defense and security policy should be an EU task (or whether they should

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remain exclusively in NATO’s hands). In a split reminiscent of the divisions between French Gaullists and British and Dutch Atlanticists in the early 1960s, EU leaders agreed on a compromise that stated that the WEU would be both “the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance” and “the defense arm of the EU.” The most telling evidence of this intra-European failure to agree on how to build their ESDI was found in the Maastricht Treaty’s article 14, which stated awkwardly that Europe’s CFSP would include “the eventual defining of a common defense policy which might in time lead to a common defense.”

At the EU’s June 1997 Amsterdam summit, a main goal of which was to improve the functioning of Europe’s “common foreign and security policy,” a number of EU member-states—France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Greece—put forth a proposal calling for a specific timetable for the gradual merger of the EU and the WEU. As at Maastricht six years before, however, this proposal was blocked by Britain (with the support of the Nordic countries). London remains determined to keep defense affairs out of the EU and to preserve the leading defense role for NATO. All that could be agreed upon at Amsterdam was an unspecified commitment to “enhance cooperation” between the two organizations, that EU members that are not members of the WEU could participate in some WEU activities, and that an EU-WEU merger could take place “should the European Council so decide.”

The Amsterdam summit also set up a foreign policy planning and analysis unit at the EU Council of Ministers; appointed a “High Representative” for foreign policy (who will initially be the Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers); and agreed on the principle of “constructive abstention,” which will allow member-states to abstain from certain foreign policy actions without having to block them altogether.

This set of steps will marginally enhance European unity on security and defense issues, but they will not overcome the major differences among Europeans that remain. Some EU states remain far more prepared to contemplate military force than others; some strongly believe defense and security policy should be a function of the EU while others equally strongly oppose this; some believe Europe needs the capacity for

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17 See the proposal outlined by French Foreign Minister Hervé de Charette and his Italian counterpart Lamberto Dini in “Innover pour progresser,” Le Monde, March 25, 1997.
military action outside of NATO and without American agreement while others believe Europe can and should act only when in conjunction with the United States. So long as these differences remain, and unless and until Europe is able to create an institutionalized, binding foreign and security policy with common European goals, the European role within the Alliance will not fulfill its potential. The fact remains that while on some issues (such as the question of secondary boycotts on Iran or some trade matters) there are such things as “European” and “American” views, on many security questions this distinction does not hold up, and some European positions are closer to those of the United States than to those of other Europeans. If Europeans had been able to arrive at truly “European” positions in the debates with the United States over NATO enlargement, the Balkan wars, and internal reform, the outcomes of these debates would not have been as close to the initial U.S. bargaining position as almost all of them have been. A prerequisite for a European security “identity” is that Europeans identify more strongly with each other and each other’s goals.

A third reason for skepticism about the fulfilment of ESDI, and for believing that the United States will remain the Alliance’s dominant actor, is that even the highly touted new arrangements for ESDI within NATO are more limited than they at first appear. To be sure, with CJTF, NATO has the capacity and authority to organize all-European missions using NATO assets and structures. In theory, if a military mission arises that the United States supports but does not want to participate in, it can agree to a WEU-led CJTF, which the Deputy SACEUR or some other European CJTF commander would lead. In practice, however, such arrangements seem highly unlikely ever to be used, and the significance of CJTF needs to be qualified in several ways.

It is important to remember, for instance, that the “NATO assets” referred to in all references to WEU-led CJTFs, are very limited in scope: NATO has an air defense system; some command, control and communications assets (which are mostly fixed and therefore of little use for outside interventions); oil pipelines (equally irrelevant for force-projection); a system of bunkers and shelters; and 18 airborne warning and control systems (AWACS). What NATO does not have, however, are independent forces, the means of force projection (such as airlift, sealift, and airborne refuelling

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capabilities), and satellite intelligence systems—only the United States has these in significant amounts. Thus while the agreement that the WEU can borrow NATO assets is a useful step, one should not forget that for most operations beyond Europe’s borders, Europeans would have to rely not on NATO’s assets, but American national ones.

Moreover, and more important, the prerequisites for a European-only mission taking place within NATO are that, first, the United States (and all other NATO members) agree to authorize it, and second, the Europeans (WEU or some other subset) agree to undertake it. There is cause for skepticism on both counts. To be sure, one can imagine certain situations in which the United States would agree to lend its support to European missions—where missions are small with little risk of escalation and where Washington supports Europe’s goals. But for plenty of other missions U.S. support would likely be in doubt. If a mission is large and has U.S. support, it is hard to imagine Washington agreeing to let it be led by the WEU; far more likely is an insistence by the Americans that it be a NATO mission, governed by the North Atlantic Council, and led by the United States. If, on the other hand, an operation is potentially large or could escalate, and the United States does not support it, the United States, particularly under Congressional pressure, might be reluctant to allow Europeans to use NATO assets, let alone U.S. national ones.19

Even if one can imagine U.S. willingness to authorize and support a WEU-led CJTF, the more significant constraints might actually be on the “demand side,” that is, from the Europeans themselves. As suggested earlier, after relying on the U.S. and NATO security guarantees for more than forty years, have developed a “culture of

19 At the time of the CJTF deal in June 1996, U.S. officials were quick to point out—mostly privately but to an extent publicly as well—that while they were pleased with the agreement they doubted whether European-led CJTF would ever really be used. As one senior Administration official put it at the time, “It’s very difficult for us to look around the landscape and see any situations where the United States would not want to be involved... In the real world, when real threats develop, the United States will be there.” Cited in Rick Atkinson, “NATO Gives Members Response Flexibility.” The senior Defense Department official responsible for briefing the press at the time of the agreement also stressed repeatedly that “the ultimate commander (SACEUR) is American and it’s staying that way,” and he had trouble explaining the possible advantages for the United States of a European-led CJTF: “In appropriate circumstances, Europe could lead and if there was a situation which for whatever reason, as I said, it’s hard to anticipate with any precision what it might be, Europe could go forward and the US could provide support. That would have to be done with the consent of the [North Atlantic Council].” See “Readout of NATO Conference in Berlin,” News Briefing, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs, June 11, 1996.
dependence” that will not disappear soon. As the crises in Rwanda in spring 1994 and in Albania in early 1997 showed, for example, even relatively small military missions are unlikely to receive the widespread European backing that would allow Europeans to turn to the WEU (or a Europe-only CJTF); differences in interests among European countries still seem too great.

An even more illustrative case is that of former Yugoslavia. Ever since NATO first deployed ground forces there in the late fall of 1995, the European attitude toward the operation has been “in together, out together,” and Europeans have been adamant that they have no intention of staying in Bosnia if U.S. forces leave.20 There are, of course, good reasons for such an attitude: Europeans remember the bad experience of 1991-95 when European troops were present and American ones were not; the U.S. is unlikely to defer politically to Europe even if it pulls out its troops; and only American forces have the credibility on the ground to deter renewed conflict among the warring parties.21 Still, it is legitimate to ask this: If Europeans are unwilling to undertake a Europe-only (or WEU-led) mission in Bosnia, where European interests are directly engaged, the U.S. commitment is uncertain, and the stakes are very high, will there ever be a significant case where Europe will agree to take the lead? EU, WEU and NATO officials can talk endlessly about ESDI, adjust their institutional arrangements, and hammer out agreements on concepts like CJTF, but (as NATO’s own recent evolution shows) facts on the ground are far more powerful drivers on institutional development than any initiatives, concepts, or declarations. If Europeans were to agree on what needed to be done in Bosnia, seize the initiative, propose a Europe-only mission, and carry it out in a determined, unified, and coherent manner, an ESDI would exist in fact, whether the Americans liked it or not. The fact that they have been unwilling, or unable to do so in this important test case has to lead to the conclusion that a true ESDI is still far away. If a major war in Europe, combined with perceived

20 See, for one of many examples, French President Jacques Chirac’s insistence that “If the United States leaves, we all leave,” cited in Drozdiak, “NATO Puzzle.” Also see the discussion in Ivo H. Daalder, “Bosnia After SFOR: Options for Continued US Engagement,” Survival 39, no. 4 (Winter 1997-98) pp. 5-18. When in May 1996 EU Commissioner Hans van den Brock suggested that perhaps European troops could remain in Bosnia even if the U.S. were to leave, he was quickly contradicted by French Foreign Minister Hervé de Charette, and no senior European official has publicly contemplated a European-only role since. See Agence France-Presse, “EU Commissioner Slammed for Bosnia Comments,” May 7, 1996.

American unreliability, was not enough to motivate Europeans to adopt a common defense and security policy, it is difficult to see what will.

The (Aborted) French-American Rapprochement

One of the greatest disappointments for proponents of an ESDI within NATO was the collapse of a French-American rapprochement that began in the early 1990s. The French rapprochement with NATO was so promising because agreement between these two long-time antagonists within NATO for a time seemed likely, after more than 30 years of debate, to permit the creation of an ESDI within NATO that would have satisfied both countries—the U.S. because NATO would be recognized as the primary European security organization, and France because Europe’s (and France’s) contribution to European security would be enhanced and acknowledged. If there was a disagreement in the interpretation of ESDI on the two sides of the Atlantic, however, this gap was greatest between France and the United States. When the true nature of the two positions became clear, it also became clear that agreement on the substance of the ESDI was not going to be reached.

When France first started coming closer to NATO under Defense Minister Pierre Joxe during 1992-93, and especially after the December 1995 announcement by Foreign Minister de Charette that France would re-join NATO’s Military Committee after a boycott of nearly 30 years, American officials and analysts tried to interpret the French motivation. Had France now “seen the light” and accepted that US-led NATO was the most important security organization in Europe, or was France just pursuing old goals by new means, using a “Trojan Horse” strategy to change NATO from within rather than provide an alternative to it from without? Though elements of both explanations probably played a role, there can be little doubt that the French desire to come closer to NATO was genuine. France’s new interest in NATO was motivated by a wide range of factors including:

*German unification (which disrupted the balance among Europe’s leading powers and suggested France might no longer be the continent’s military leader);
*the lessons of the Gulf War (which showed the value of NATO interoperability even for out-of-area operations and confirmed the effectiveness of American military power);
*the lessons of Bosnia (which again demonstrated NATO’s effectiveness as a means both for organizing military deployments and credibly threatening force);*

*and finally the realization that, even if an ESDI outside of NATO might still be desirable from a French point of view, the rest of the Europeans were as unlikely as ever to support it, and France clearly did not have the resources to do so alone.22*

All of this led France to seek accommodation with NATO and the United States, and the French government apparently believed it could re-integrate with NATO without sacrificing the level of European autonomy and visibility Paris believed necessary and appropriate.

Why, then, did the rapprochement fail? If France was genuinely interested in coming closer to NATO, and the Americans were interested in having them do so, why did the new relationship not work out? The best explanation seems to be a mutual misunderstanding between Paris and Washington of each other’s positions on ESDI. When the Americans agreed in principle to the “Europeanization” of NATO that France claimed was the price of its reintegration, they saw clear limits to what this meant in practice. For Washington, it meant at most giving Europeans larger numbers of commands in the new military structure; accepting CJTF and the (theoretical) possibility of all-European missions with NATO assets; and, reluctantly, agreeing to the enhancement of the role of the Deputy SACEUR. What it did not mean was that Washington would no longer insist on getting its way on the most important questions of Alliance decision-making, or that it would give up key positions of influence within the Alliance. Indeed, as noted earlier, the politics of the post-Cold War Alliance suggested that, rather than being less demanding about getting its way within NATO because the stakes were lower, Washington was going to be more demanding than ever—for the same reason.

Paris, on the other hand, expected more. Having announced that France would re-join the integrated Alliance bodies only if the United States genuinely agreed to give the Europeans a greater role, President Jacques Chirac felt obliged to “deliver” that greater role, lest he be accused of getting nothing in return for France’s reintegration. This,

indeed, was already happening by mid-1996, with the Socialists, then out of power, condemning Chirac’s new “Atlanticism,” and former Mitterrand adviser Hubert Védrine (now Foreign Minister) claiming that the government had unnecessarily “played all its cards at once.”

To achieve what he felt would be a sufficient level of Europeanization, Chirac focused on two issues: the enlargement of NATO to include two southern European countries, Romania and Slovenia, in addition to the three (Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary) favored by the Americans; and greater representation for Europeans in NATO’s new command structure, including in particular the command of NATO’s southern flank (AFSOUTH). When the Americans refused to concede on either point, France felt unable to continue its rapprochement with NATO and the United States, and in October 1997 Paris announced that it would not be re-joining NATO’s integrated command structure after all.

The AFSOUTH dispute demonstrated the gap in thinking about ESDI that exists between France and the United States. The American assumption was that France, having finally acknowledged the importance of NATO and the need for U.S. leadership, now understood that this was a U.S.-led alliance and would complete its reintegration so long as symbolic tribute were paid to Europe’s role; France was asking for more “visibility” for Europeans, and the Americans felt that the measures taken at the June 1996 Berlin summit easily met this demand. What the Americans apparently did not understand was that in addition to a higher profile within the Alliance, France also wanted more actual power, which the Americans found much more difficult to accept. When in summer 1996 France began to propose that Europe take over command positions with real authority—first SACEUR, and when that was rejected out of hand CINC SOUTH—the Americans categorically refused. They claimed that U.S. leadership of NATO’s southern region was a vital national interest, and that American public and Congressional support for European security could only be guaranteed if the Americans were in command. The search for a compromise over AFSOUTH, which lasted well into 1997, showed a genuine desire by both sides to

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seek a solution, but ultimately the two conceptions of the Alliance, and Europe's proper role in it, proved too far apart.  

Washington’s unwillingness to pay a material price to resolve the AFSOUTH dispute and complete France’s reintegration revealed more than a particular American view about a particular military command; it demonstrated the lack of trust that prevails between Washington and Paris even after the period of rapprochement of the mid-1990s. Though most Americans recognized that France’s desire to come closer to NATO was genuine, many still suspected the French of trying to use NATO for their own purposes, along the Trojan Horse model suggested earlier. These suspicions only grew when French conditions for reintegration seemed to escalate each time previous conditions seemed to be fulfilled, and France’s insistence on Europe taking over AFSOUTH gave many Americans—even those previously prepared to believe France’s new Atlanticism was genuine—doubts about whether it was genuine. After more than 30 years of disagreement about Europe’s proper role in the Alliance, many in Washington needed to experience more than a few years of relative cooperation before they were willing to believe that the French now shared their vision of the Alliance. If France could not accept that the United States, given its military power in the Mediterranean, leadership in Bosnia, and role in managing the Greece-Turkey crisis, was the most appropriate country to hold the Alliance’s southern command, maybe France did not share Washington’s conception of U.S. leadership of the Alliance after all. If that was the case, Americans reasoned, better to have no agreement at all.

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25 In mid-May 1997 French and U.S. negotiators were close to a compromise that would have split the commands in two (one European and one American), but U.S. insistence that the European be “slightly” subordinate to the American, and French insistence that the U.S. agree on moving to a single European command in six years prevented agreement from being reached. See Daniel Vernet, “La France reste un pied dedans et un pied dehors en attendant un meilleur partage des responsabilites,” Le Monde, July 10, 1997.
26 In some ways this was similar to de Gaulle’s attitude about the United Kingdom joining the Common Market during the 1960s, when the General insisted that Britain demonstrate its true commitment to the French vision of Europe before France would let it join; since Britain could not do so, France vetoed its entry. A memorable cartoon from the time shows de Gaulle sitting at a bar with UK Prime Minister Harold Wilson depicted as a stripper who has taken off all his clothes but his underwear. Wilson says “All of it?” and de Gaulle responds “Yes, all of it.” This is not altogether different from the U.S. attitude toward France within NATO.
The failure to agree on AFSOUTH—together with French resentment over other cases of what Paris sees as U.S. unilateralism—means that France’s new relationship with the United States and NATO will now remain incomplete, which is unfortunate. Though the importance of France’s formal integration into NATO commands should not be exaggerated, as France can still operate effectively with the rest of the Alliance, it is nonetheless a setback both to France and the Alliance. France would have benefited from a more familiar and more trusting relationship with NATO’s military structures, and NATO’s unity and credibility would have benefited from the full participation of France, one of its members most willing and able to act militarily. Some French officials and analysts claim to expect that the new NATO command structure that will be agreed without them will only be a temporary one, but that seems unlikely. Given how long it took to reach the latest reform agreements and how difficult they were to reach, whatever gets decided at NATO’s December 1997 and June 1998 ministerials will likely be in place for some time, as the Alliance places attention on other matters, like enlargement, Bosnia, and the renovation of its Strategic Concept. In the new command structure, even NATO’s newly admitted members will be more integrated than France. Unless other European members of NATO come to share France’s vision of ESDI within NATO, France is unlikely to achieve its goals.

The Bosnia Test Case
As noted earlier, the greatest test case for the ESDI has been, and continues to be, Bosnia. To be sure, Bosnia is a particularly hard test, and Europeans are right to point out that a failure of ESDI in Bosnia is not necessarily a failure of the concept altogether; perhaps there will be other crises in or around Europe in which Europe will be better able to demonstrate its unity or power. Still, the Bosnia test is relevant. It is, after all, the greatest security policy challenge to Europe at present and for the foreseeable future; it is one of the main reasons Europeans have said they need an ESDI; and it is an area in which the United States is calling on Europe to play its newly enhanced role within the Alliance. If Europeans continue to insist—even if for good reason—that Bosnia is not an appropriate place to try out NATO’s new

27 Some embittered U.S. officials thus now suggest that Poland will be a “more important ally” than France. The point is overstated but it does give a sense of the level of disappointment at the failure to reach an agreement.
mechanisms for all-European peacekeeping forces, the limits to ESDI will have become clear.\textsuperscript{28}

It is now widely accepted that some form of outside military force must remain in Bosnia even after the scheduled June 1998 departure of NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR). Though the NATO presence has kept the peace among Bosnia’s combatants and the military aspects of the Dayton agreement have been implemented, Bosnia is still a deeply divided country, few refugees have returned to their homes, and no one can be certain that, if NATO forces were to leave, war would not resume. Indeed, with “Republika Srpska” divided, and Bosniak forces having rearmed and retrained and anxious to retake lost land, without a NATO presence war would be very likely to resume.

The question for the summer of 1998, then, is no longer whether there should continue to be an outside military presence in Bosnia, but what kind it should be, and whose troops it should consist of. Most Americans now firmly believe that it is time for Europe to take over. The U.S. played the leading role initially when the Intervention Force (IFOR) deployed in 1995 and required a large combat presence, and Americans agreed to stay on for another 18 months after their first withdrawal deadline was reached in December 1996. But with the fighting now having been halted for two years, future military requirements reduced, and ESDI technically in place, the U.S. view is that it is time for Europe to take the lead in Bosnia. If there is really an ESDI worthy of the name, and Europeans genuinely want more responsibility, should this not apply to a war in Europe, especially given that the United States has global responsibilities—in Asia and in the Middle East—where the Europeans play only a minor military role?\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{28} As Ivo Daalder has put it, “if a Bosnia that has been at peace for four years as a result of a U.S.-led military presence proves too much for Europe to take on, ESDI will be exposed as a myth rather than a nascent reality.” See Ivo H. Daalder, “Bosnia After SFOR: Options for Continued U.S. Engagement,” \textit{Survival} 39, no. 4 (Winter 1997-98), p. 16.

\textsuperscript{29} The strongest voices for a European takeover in the U.S. come from Congress, but the feeling is widespread. On the strong Congressional opposition to the continued presence of U.S. ground forces in Bosnia, see “Will Congress Force America out of Bosnia?” \textit{The Economist}, October 25, 1997, p. 25. Also see John Hillen, “After SFOR: Planning for a European-Led Force,” \textit{Joint Forces Quarterly} (Spring 1997), pp. 75-79. Hillen is himself for a European takeover, but also quotes Defense Secretary Cohen’s statement at his confirmation hearings that the United States should send a “strong message to our European friends [that] we are not going to be there…that it’s time for them to assume responsibility [in Bosnia]…and that we are not going to make an unlimited commitment to that region.” Cohen could of
The case for an all-European post-SFOR force is reasonable. A mutually agreed handover from the U.S. to a European force—perhaps delayed for one more year in order for peace further to take root and for Europeans to prepare their force—would help satisfy Congress about transatlantic burden-sharing and would give the WEU a chance to prove its credibility as a force for peace in Europe.\footnote{For a proposal for a U.S. "handover" to an all-European force after an agreed period of time, see Daalder, "Bosnia After SFOR," pp. 16-17.} The prerequisite for an all-European SFOR follow-on force, however, is that Europeans be ready, willing and able to take on the task, and that the United States be genuinely willing to let Europe take the lead. Since these prerequisites have not been met, the best option—for now at least—is for the United States to stay involved on the ground.

A continued U.S. ground presence in Bosnia is necessary for several reasons. First, as noted earlier, even if it withdrew all its forces from Bosnia, the United States would have a hard time staying out of its politics and the decisions about Bosnia's future. The perception that the U.S. is the main outside player in the Balkans is one widely held not only in the U.S. and in Europe, but just as importantly in the region itself. Unless or until Europe demonstrates a truly common and credible foreign and security policy, the local parties will look to the United States to arbitrate disputes, and the United States is unlikely—whatever its previous understandings with Europe—to remain silent on the sidelines. If the United States is going to be the key political player, then, it is appropriate, and perhaps even necessary, that it be present on the ground as well. Europeans are right to be concerned about repeating the experience of 1991-1995, when a European (but not U.S.) ground presence was one of the main reasons for the different tactics supported by the two sides.

Second, if the U.S. stays out, there is now way to be certain that Europeans would have the necessary will, unity, and power to contain or deter renewed fighting. Credibility, of course, is something to be earned, and the only way to earn it is to have the opportunity to do so. Perhaps if given the chance, Europe would rise to the occasion, and a CFSP would emerge from the obligation to have one in Bosnia. After five years of vicious war in Bosnia, however, this is a chance that may be too risky to
take. If the lack of a U.S. presence failed to deter renewed war, and Europeans were divided on how to respond to a new conflict, the United States might again be obliged—or choose without being asked—to take a leading role.

Third, if Europeans do not agree to go along with U.S. ideas for all-European forces, the consequences of Washington pulling out anyway would be disastrous for NATO and transatlantic relations. It would be perverse, to say the least, for the United States to declare itself the leader of the Alliance and to press for its expansion, while at the same time announcing, in effect, that major wars in Southeastern Europe are “Europe’s problem” and not the responsibility of the United States. A failure to remain engaged in Bosnia would undermine the United States’ claim to be a “European power” and raise questions about what NATO was for. Indeed, as noted earlier, it was American leadership and intervention in Bosnia that created the impression that the United States was NATO’s indispensable power and gave Washington the right to insist on imposing its views on its Allies where there were differences among them.

To be sure, Americans who insist on pulling ground troops out of Bosnia claim that the United States would remain militarily engaged in the region in a support role. The U.S. could provide intelligence, lift, and logistics, and if conflict did break out again U.S. combat forces deployed “over the horizon” could return. Even here, though, there are problems. If the United States is sincere when it says it would re-commit ground forces if necessary, why not leave them in theater, where they would have a greater deterrent effect? As Pauline Neville-Jones has pointed out, “it is far from clear that a European force, even with the U.S. off-stage in Hungary, would command the necessary respect from the former combatants. They would be tempted to test its resolve, posing some very awkward choices for NATO.” If the U.S. is not sincere that it would be willing to go back in, then the problem is even worse, and NATO would be back to the situation of 1991-95, when the U.S. was involved, but not on the ground.

Under these circumstances, the best option might be to give up searching for a means to get U.S. forces out of Bosnia, and accept that staying is the cost of both peace and leadership within the Alliance. A U.S. presence of several thousand troops as part of
an SFOR follow-on force would be a concrete demonstration of the U.S. commitment to European security, would probably have more deterrent value than all-European forces, and would strengthen the U.S. claim to leadership of the Alliance. If Congress would agree, appointing a European to command the new force—so long as Europeans provided the bulk of the ground forces—would be a useful demonstration of Alliance solidarity and mutual trust. If Congress refused to put U.S. troops under a European NATO commander, U.S. participation in a U.S.-led force would still be better than no U.S. participation at all. Finally, if, despite all the reasons given here that the United States should stay, Washington withdraws in the face of European pleas that it stay, the Europeans should come up with their own follow-on force rather than stick to their pledge to leave if the Americans do. Despite its drawbacks, an all-European engagement in Bosnia would be far better than no outside engagement at all.

**Conclusion: America’s European Dilemmas**

In theory, most Americans realize they have an interest in fostering European unity and responsibility. Few Americans admit to the unilateral attitudes described here, and most, both within government and without, would proclaim themselves to be enlightened leaders who see the value of an enhanced European role. Americans understand that there are advantages to a Europe that is more united and better able to look after its own security.

Sharing power in practice, however, is harder than in theory. For all the reasons given above, the United States feels it is in a position of strength within NATO, and countries—or individuals—that have power rarely give it up without getting something in return. Sharing power when one holds most of the cards may be an admirable trait, but it is not one found often in the history of international relations. Indeed, EU states critical of Washington’s hard bargaining within NATO might study the national bargaining practices within the EU itself, where they would find states equally insistent

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32 For a recent U.S. call for a more genuine U.S. partnership with Europe, written by a number of former senior policymakers from both the Democrats and Republicans, see David C. Gompert and F. Stephen Larrabee, eds., *America and Europe: A Partnership for a New Era* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
on getting their way whenever they can. It just so happens that the United States has greater relative power within NATO than any single state within the EU.

As many Europeans (and this paper) have pointed out, it is true that the United States has dominated NATO’s reform process, and that Washington has insisted on getting its way on almost all important aspects of that process. It seems fair to ask those critical of this development, however, on which specific NATO issues should the United States have made concessions in the name of influence-sharing? Should the Clinton administration have agreed to extend membership to Romania and Slovenia, even if it felt they did not meet all the criteria, that this might pose problems with Congress, that too many members in one round might be hard to assimilate, and that having a more likely second round was good for the process as a whole? Should Washington have agreed to let a European take over AFSOUTH, even though most Americans felt it was essential that the country with the most military power in the region keep its most important operational command, that a sceptical Congress might be reluctant to put U.S. forces under a European commander, and a number of European countries—in particular in the Southern region itself—agreed that the command should remain American? In Bosnia, should the United States have shied away from pushing through an agreement that many would agree would not have been reached without American bullying? To ask these questions is by no means to say that the American position on NATO issues will always be “right”—surely it will not be. The point, though, is that unless they are faced with a compelling case that some particular NATO reform is in their interest, or that there is a great cost to not insisting on getting their way, Americans are unlikely to make compromises for compromise’s sake. If Europeans were truly united on any of these issues, or if they could put forth a credible case that they needed the United States less than the United States needed them, they would more often get their way. Since this does not seem to be the case, American domination of Alliance decision-making, for better or worse, is likely to endure.

To take just one of countless examples, consider France’s recent nomination of central banker Jean-Claude Trichet to head the new European Central Bank, even though most EU members had already agreed on the Dutchman Wim Duisenberg. This does not seem very different from Washington’s putting forth Javier Solana as NATO secretary general after most Europeans had agreed on Ruud Lubbers, a move that was widely condemned by France as an example of U.S. unilateralism. See Wolfgang Münchau, “Cracks in the consensus,” Financial Times, November 24, 1997. More generally, on how national interests are traded off among big powers within the EU, see Andrew Moravcsik, “Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community,” International Organization 45, no. 1 (1991), pp. 651-88.
Some Europeans complain that it is not so much the substance of American positions that bothers them, but the style: the U.S. should lead, but should be more considerate in how it puts forth its view. Europeans were offended, for example, by the way in which the U.S. ended discussion of both the Romania/Slovenia and the AFSOUTH questions—simply by asserting, in the latter case to journalists on an airplane—that the case was closed.34 Here, too, though, it is hard to see how the United States could have taken these hard decisions in any other way. On both issues, it was the Europeans who made public their views before the issue could be negotiated within the Alliance, and the United States that had, later, to announce the limits of what it felt it could accept. There is a fine line between leadership and unilateralism, and sometimes it is impossible to have one without the other. When the United States puts forth a strong view on NATO questions and arbitrates among European differences, it is accused of unilateralism; when it fails to have a strong view—as in the Balkans before 1995—it is accused of failing to lead.

However much Europeans might expect Americans to take the lead in creating an ESDI, and however much they might blame the United States for failing to bring one about, ultimately the responsibility falls to Europe itself. The United States wants a Europe that can contribute more to common goals, but it can hardly be expected to give away lightly the power that it currently has. The U.S. view of ESDI will thus always be one in which a more united Europe contributes more to an Alliance that is still clearly led by its main power, the United States. Faced with this reality, Europe has a choice. It can either—on the model of what the EU has done in the economic sphere—build up its military capability, create a binding, institutionalized foreign policy, and take charge of the Bosnia operation in a unified, assertive manner; or it can accept the leadership of a United States that may not be as generous in sharing power as most Europeans might like. The structural constraints described in this paper—and

Turkey Overreacts, but the EU Is Not Blameless

By Philip H. Gordon

London — At last weekend’s European Union summit meeting on enlargement, EU leaders sought to tread a fine path in managing their relations with Turkey.

Their challenge was to make it clear that Turkey could not reasonably expect to enter the EU anytime soon, while at the same time giving Turkey the feeling that it was still part of the European family and that its candidacy for membership was still alive.

This hoped-for middle ground was not found. Turkey’s prime minister, Mesut Yılmaz, rejected the EU’s “conditionality” — an invitation to participate in an all-European conference for EU candidates next spring — and stormed out of the meeting in a huff, refusing even to attend a final dinner with the leaders of aspiring member states.

No one expected Turkey to be happy, but its reaction to the perceived rebuff from Europe has been harsher than anyone imagined. Ankara has included not only denunciations of the EU’s treatment but several threats: to withdraw its application for EU membership, to rescind the 1996 EU-Turkey action plan and freeze northern Cyprus if Cyprus joins the EU before Turkey and even veto NATO enlargement.

Some of this — such as the threat to withdraw its application for EU membership — is a reaction to the EU — might not be so bad and might even help clarify the relationship. Other steps, however — such as the threats to end the customs union or veto NATO enlargement — would be nothing short of disastrous.

EU diplomats are right to argue that Turkey is overreacting and that domestic politics are largely responsible. Turkish leaders must have known that the EU could not offer them any near-term prospects for membership until after all the others had finished their talks.

While the EU is surely right to make it clear to Turkey that it remains far from meeting the criteria for membership — its human rights record, standards of democracy, income levels and even geography all pose big problems — it is hard to understand why Turkey did not at least have been put on the same footing as the other applicants whose negotiations were put off.

That would have allowed Mr. Yılmaz to claim some degree of success and would have spared him the need to make threats he may feel obliged to carry out.

An obvious model for approaching candidates in this way comes from NATO’s Partnership for Peace: Let the candidates themselves determine how close a relationship they are ready for, and treat them as if they are being treated as equally as possible.

The EU’s other self-made (and much more serious) problem in its relations with Turkey is its commitment, made in 1995, to begin accession negotiations with Cyprus six months after the end of its latest intergovernmental conference — that is, in early 1998.

The EU’s expressed hope was that the “carrot” of EU membership might be enough of an incentive to get the Turkish Cypriots to agree to a deal with their Greek Cypriot neighbors, and that a reunited Cyprus could join the EU with Turkey’s blessing.

The chances of this were always more than remote, however, as EU leaders should have known. Turkish Cypriots’ concerns about security and self-determination, along with Turkey’s opposition to a reunified Cyprus, have always made it unreasonable to think that an economic incentive would be enough to push Turkish Cypriots into reaching a deal they have steadfastly refused for more than 20 years, even at the cost of isolation and hardship.

The EU leaders who knew this at the time argue that offering to begin accession talks with Cyprus was necessary to prevent a Greek veto of EU enlargement to Central Europe and of the customs union with Turkey.

These were indeed worthy goals, but Turkey’s realistic threat to annex the north if the EU goes ahead is evidence that Brussels is paying the price now for its expediency then.

The great irony is that an EU strategy designed to bring about the reunification of Cyprus and a better relationship with Turkey is now likely to end up bringing about Cyprus’ formal partition and a rupture between Turkey and the EU.

The threats from Ankara over Turkey’s “rejected” candidacy will probably die down once Mr. Yılmaz has had the chance to make a public show of his anger — Turkey’s relationship with the West is too important to be sacrificed out of pique. But the Cyprus problem will not go away, and it will have to be managed very carefully next year.

If the EU backs away from its commitment to offer Cyprus membership, Greece will no doubt revive its threats to veto EU enlargement to Central Europe, a strategic priority for Germany and others. If the EU does take Cyprus in, however, Turkey will proceed with the

The biggest problem for the EU vis-à-vis Ankara is its commitment to begin negotiations with Cyprus.

Effective annexation of the north. This would mean that the EU will either have to accept Cyprus’ formal partition and no membership or accept a situation in which Turkey, with 30,000 troops in northern Cyprus, militarily occupies part of EU territory.

The former course would create a crisis with Greece, which would fight against partition, and the latter would create a crisis with Turkey.

The U.S. role as an honest broker in sorting out this mess is limited, but the contributions that Americans can make. The United States needs to help lower Turkey’s expectations about EU membership, which can do no longer give Turkey the impression that Washington will somehow use its leverage to get Turkey in.

But it also needs to remind the EU — so often taken in its own parochial politics — of the importance of Turkey for Western security and economic interests, and of the consequences that a perceived rejection of Turkey by the West would have.

The writer, a senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, contributed this comment to the International Herald Tribune.
If you look at recent newspaper headlines, you might assume the European-American relationship is a relic of the Cold War, producing more friction than friendship. “Europeans Charge Arrogance on Issues from NATO to Jobs,” “Fight Looms Over Foreign Policy,” “US and France: A Study in Rancor.”

It is true that we live in a time of geopolitical reorientation. Through NAFTA, the United States has consolidated trade and deepened our relationship with Canada and Mexico. Through APEC and ARF we have strengthened our engagement in the Asia-Pacific community. Europe is also pursuing new global markets, investing heavily in Central Asia, competing with us in South America and the Pacific Rim. Once in a while, it’s healthy to step back and ask: Is the Euro-Atlantic Community a has-been? Are Europeans right when they look across the Atlantic and see a hegemon wearing Mickey Mouse ears? In the wake of the Cold War, is our common agenda powerful enough to unite the United States and Europe?

The answer to that last question, of course, is an emphatic yes. From the beginning of his administration, President Clinton has demonstrated the importance he attaches to transatlantic relations, and has probably devoted more personal attention and diplomatic capital to the
relationship than any President since Kennedy. He initiated the New Transatlantic Agenda, a framework to move forward together on a broad range of diplomatic, economic and trade issues and resolve our differences. The NTA is becoming a reality, spawning the path-breaking Mutual Recognition Agreement affecting 40 billion dollars in trade.

He has encouraged Europe’s aspirations for deeper integration, supported military command reforms that increased the proportion of European flag officers in NATO, and proposed mechanisms from Combined Joint Task Forces to European use of NATO assets that will help foster a European security and defense identity.

The time is right to be forward-looking, to take a serious look at where we are in adapting our old relationship to new demands. The Berlin Wall came down in 1989, but at the beginning of 1998, we are still witnessing historic change. It’s less dramatic, but still comparable to the late 1940s when so much of our foreign policy architecture was built. Now, as then, Europe and the U.S. are centrally involved in reshaping global economic, political and security institutions. Together, we are providing the ideas, the resources and the energy to implement a broad agenda of change. Without our common efforts, there is little prospect that any of us—or the world—can master the challenge of the next century. But as the headlines I cited made clear, this is not a time for complacency.

We have a pressing agenda: to bring Europe’s new democracies into the security and defense architecture that has guaranteed our transatlantic security and prosperity. To deter the actions of states who threaten the security of the international community. To be a force for peace from
Northern Ireland to Bosnia to the Middle East. To assure productive jobs for our workers at home, and help those left behind reap the benefits of the global economy. To help Asia find the path back to financial stability. To stand together against the new transnational threats that affect all of us, from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to terrorism to cyber-crime to global warming.

I don’t think anyone would dispute that these are shared goals. The problem lies more often in our inability to find complementary approaches to these shared goals. At times, we seem to work at cross-purposes, even when our interests are the same. We all know the issues that have divided us recently: the role of economic sanctions to change the behavior of states who threaten our interests, the environment, trade issues from biotechnology to audio-visuals.

It helps to take a wider perspective, seeing the problems as small stumbling blocks alongside the large building blocks already in place.

The proof of our ability to find a common path to meet the changing international environment is our effort to adapt our security relationship to the 21st century. The bedrock of this security is NATO. Just as the alliance served a pivotal role in the Cold War, so it now underpins Europe’s best hopes for a continent that is democratic, undivided and at peace. Together we are successfully navigating NATO’s enlargement, strengthen our partnerships with Russia and Ukraine, and intensifying our cooperation with all states of Europe through the Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Council. This will lay the basis for a generation of peace to come.
True, a perception that U.S. leadership is heavy-handed rankles some. But it is easy to forget the cries of alarm at the perception that the U.S. might abandon our leadership and retreat into isolation. The fact is, our actions are in support of the larger cause of an integrated Europe. In the coming weeks, the President will ask the Senate to ratify treaty changes that will make Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic NATO members. And the Partnership for Peace continues to bring together countries as far apart as Canada and Uzbekistan to plan for our common security with new tasks of peacekeeping, emergency evacuation and humanitarian relief.

Elsewhere in Europe, American leadership is making a difference. The President has named superbly qualified Americans to address some of Europe's oldest problems. Dick Holbrooke is working with the EU to find a solution to the still-unresolved Cyprus problem. In Northern Ireland, George Mitchell is leading the all-party talks that give us the best chance for lasting peace since the start of The Troubles. And the United States, Europe, Russia and others are hard at work on the ground in Bosnia, where the road to a lasting peace is long, but clearly demarcated. Our common determination offers the best—perhaps the only—prospect to bring peace in these areas of conflict. These are all real accomplishments.

We may not always get the balance exactly right, but President Clinton welcomes growing European responsibility. President Clinton's commitment to remain engaged testifies to the importance we attach to stability in Europe. We are prepared to see our allies—indeed, we encourage our allies to take a greater role in efforts from civilian implementation and indigenous police support in Bosnia, to co-leadership in Trans-Caucasus diplomatic efforts like the Minsk
group, to reducing Aegean tensions, name just a few. We also support institutions like the OSCE, and Europe’s vital contributions to UN peacekeeping around the world.

We recognize that leadership has its responsibilities, and for all our efforts, we do not always live up to them. Nowhere is that more true than the refusal of Congress to pay our UN arrears. We recognize this a serious situation undermining confidence in American leadership, and we are working hard to repair the problem. The administration is committed to a strong UN, as are the American people. But we also need your help to ensure that Secretary-General Annan continues to make necessary reforms, and that UN budget is shared fairly and responsibly.

Alongside the security community linking the United States to Europe, there is an obvious economic community, which is the engine of the world. You know the numbers as well as I do, but they’re so big they’re worth repeating. Over 300 billion dollars of good and services flow back and forth with few barriers. There’s another $650 billion in combined investment. This results in at least fourteen million jobs on both sides of the Atlantic. And our economic policies have forcefully converged. We’re locked in a dead heat for who has lower budget deficits and inflation. We have a deep stake in each other’s prosperity.

But we cannot afford to rest with the status quo, and there is a growing recognition on both sides of the Atlantic that opportunities exist for moving forward even more boldly. The administration has taken one step after another to promote these opportunities, from the Uruguay Round in 1993 to the New Transatlantic Agenda in December 1995, to the Information Technology Agreement and the recent Financial Services Agreement. These initiatives are yielding concrete results. To
cite just the NTA, the Mutual Recognition Agreements concluded under the aegis of the NTA last year eliminated redundant standards on almost $50 billion of two-way trade—saving 100 million dollars for manufacturers of everything from computers to jet-skis. We have a brisk and promising Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue involving industry leaders. And we have mechanisms to solve emerging trade disputes before they become serious.

Our economic partnership also has ramifications that go beyond the Euro-American community. Cooperation between the G-7 countries is helping to mitigate the effects of the recent Asian financial crisis. As major creditors to the IMF and the World Bank, we have a strong interest in working closely to ensure that new micro- and macro-economic policies are effective in Asia.

The U.S. welcomes the European Union’s initiatives to stabilize its economic future through deeper integration, as well as its political cooperation. When Europe prospers, so does the United States. It will strongly serve the entire Euro-Atlantic Community to make sure a single currency starts off right.

A strong European Union, working in tandem with an adapting NATO alliance, can be a powerful vehicle for bringing Europe’s new democracies into a stable family of nations. No one can force seamless integration by edict. But time and time again, we have watched nations bring about necessary, often painful reforms because of the incentive of participating in our economic and security systems. This is the best way to secure progress. We welcome the EU’s efforts to move this process forward.
True, there are areas where we have questions about the EU’s economic and trade policies. One important area is agriculture. The CAP continues to consume a huge amount of EU resources, close to 60 per cent of the budget. This strikes us as a relic of the long-past era in European integration. The advent of new members provides an incentive for reform. We share Europe’s commitment to food safety, but have trouble understanding objections to biotechnology innovations in the absence of any evidence of a public health threat. These same innovations promise more environmentally sound agriculture and greater output to feed the world.

Outside the large traditional framework of our security and economic relationships, there are a host of emerging transnational threats posed by global warming, terrorism, cyber-crime, drug trafficking and rogue states. Through the NTA and our law enforcement cooperation, we are starting to find a common approach, but these are daunting problems that will demand intensified efforts in the future.

While treating these new problems, we have often differed on tactics, dangerously muddying the waters. Let me begin with the environment. Some seem to believe the United States is moving too slowly, but I think you will agree the President has made climate change a very high priority, and acted on that conviction. Our proposal to cut our own emissions by more than 30% led to a historic accord in Kyoto. Now the common challenge before Europe and the United States is to secure meaningful commitments from developing nations to do their part to achieve Kyoto’s goals. Climate change is a global problem that requires a global response.
We also need to find better ways to harness our efforts to counter the new kinds of crimes looming ahead in the next century. We have made progress through the summit of the eight... taking new steps to increase airline security... to protect our infrastructures... to fight cyber-crime... and most important, to promote nuclear safety. We are encouraged that Prime Minister Blair has identified cooperative law enforcement as a major topic for the Birmingham summit.

But also under the third pillar, we were disappointed by tepid European support for the U.S.-sponsored International Law Academy (ILEA) in Budapest. Full integration in the Euro-Atlantic community means that all of our police forces must have the confidence to work together against the transnational threats. It is vital that the emerging democracies enjoy the rule of law during their transitional period. And we will have terrible difficulty if the U.S. and E.U. are not able to work together to address the problem of encryption in a way that allows our cutting edge industries to thrive, and citizens to have security in their communications while protecting our common public security interests.

But the gravest and most immediate challenge before us is to find more common ground dealing with rogue states. We have started to fall into a troubling pattern of behavior. It's the old routine of "good cop, bad cop." This pattern, whereby Europe provides the carrot and the U.S. is left holding the stick, is unhealthy for both sides, and only benefits our common adversaries.

While we all believe that dialogue and engagement are the preferred course, dialogue cannot be an excuse for inaction when countries like Iraq fail to live up to Security Council resolutions, and others import weapons of mass destruction and export terror. This divergence compromises the effectiveness of our efforts. Secretary Albright put it well recently when she observed that
Europeans are irritated by our willingness to reach for the trigger, while we are irritated by their willingness to reach for the contracts.

We need to devise clear rules for dealing with states that support terrorism and pursue weapons of mass destruction. Our position is clear: we must be uncompromising against regimes that flout the rules of international behavior. We know this is an area where the EU questions us. But in cases where normal diplomacy and dialogue have not fundamentally changed the behavior of regimes like Iran, Iraq and Libya, we would like to think that a common effort on economic pressure is available to avoid the necessity to resort to force. We continue to believe that Europe has skewed the balance between “criticism” and “dialogue.”

We recognize the limits of unilateral policy, but Europe has to see the risks attached to the failure to be firm in facing these threats. I don’t need to restate our opposition to investment in Iran, which directly finances activities that promote instability in a volatile region. In geographic terms, this poses a more direct threat to Europe than it does to the United States, though ultimately it threatens all of us. Khatami’s speech offers promise, but we are well advised to calibrate changes in our own policies based on Iran’s actions rather than its words.

At the same time we oppose terrorism, we need to encourage and respond to moderation where we see it. The expansion of the EU is an internal European concern, but we hope the EU will provide Turkey with a workable pre-accession strategy. We agree this will require Ankara to improve its human rights record, but that goal is compatible with ensuring that Turkey remains
anchored to Europe. An integrated Turkey is a step toward stability in a dangerous
neighborhood.

The coming year offers an opportunity to bridge gulfs between the EU and the United States.
The UK has a double responsibility and opportunity this year, presiding over both the EU-15 and
the G-8, and we look forward to a productive six months ahead. We could not agree more with
the sentiment expressed by Prime Minister Blair: “strong in Europe, strong with the U.S. There
is no choice between the two. Stronger with one means stronger with the other.” When he visits
here in two weeks, we look forward to exploring specific steps that will reinforce US-EU
relations.

There will always be new challenges before the Euro-Atlantic Community, and nerves will fray
now and again. But our mutual respect and mutual interests will ensure that we weather the
inevitable storms. The partnership we built fifty years ago is durable and offers enormous
promise in addressing the global issues we face as we enter the 21st century.

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If you look at recent newspaper headlines, you might assume the European-American relationship is a relic of the Cold War, producing more friction than friendship. "Europeans Charge Arrogance on Issues from NATO to Jobs," "Fight Looms Over Foreign Policy," "US and France: A Study in Rancor."

It is true that we live in a time of geopolitical reorientation. Through NAFTA, the United States has consolidated trade and deepened our relationship with Canada and Mexico. Through the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum and the ASEAN Regional Forum, we have strengthened our engagement in the Asia-Pacific community. Europe is also pursuing new global markets, investing heavily in Central Asia, competing with us in South America and building new political ties with the Pacific Rim. One is tempted to ask: Is the Euro-Atlantic Community a has-been? Are Europeans right when they look across the Atlantic and see a hegemon wearing Mickey Mouse ears? In the wake of the Cold War, is our common agenda powerful enough to unite the United States and Europe?

The answer to that last question, of course, is an emphatic yes. From the beginning of his administration, President Clinton has demonstrated the importance he attaches to transatlantic
relations, and has probably devoted more personal attention and diplomatic capital to the relationship than any President since Kennedy. He initiated the New Transatlantic Agenda, a framework to move us forward together on a broad range of diplomatic, economic and trade issues and resolve our differences. The NTA is becoming a reality, spawning the path-breaking Mutual Recognition Agreement affecting 40 billion dollars in trade.

He has encouraged Europe’s aspirations for deeper integration, supported military command reforms that increased the proportion of European flag officers in NATO, and proposed mechanisms from Combined Joint Task Forces to European use of NATO assets that will help foster a European security and defense identity.

The time is now right to be forward-looking, to take a serious look at where we are in adapting our old relationship to new demands. The Berlin Wall came down in 1989, but at the beginning of 1998, we are still witnessing historic change. It’s less dramatic, but still comparable to the late 1940s when so much of our foreign policy architecture was built. Now, as then, Europe and the U.S. are centrally involved in reshaping global economic, political and security institutions. Together, we are providing the ideas, the resources and the energy to implement a broad agenda of change. Without our common efforts, there is little prospect that any of us—or the world—can master the challenge of the next century. But as the headlines I cited made clear, this is not a time for complacency.

We have a pressing agenda: to bring Europe’s new democracies into the security and defense architecture that has guaranteed our transatlantic security and prosperity. To deter the actions of
states who threaten the security of the international community. To be a force for peace from Northern Ireland to Bosnia to the Middle East. To assure productive jobs for our workers at home, and help those left behind reap the benefits of the global economy. To help Asia find the path back to financial stability. To stand together against the new transnational threats that affect all of us, from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to terrorism to cyber-crime to global warming.

I don’t think anyone would dispute that these are shared goals. The problem lies more often in our inability to find complementary approaches to these shared goals. At times, we seem to work at cross-purposes, even when our interests are the same: We all know the issues that have divided us recently: the role of economic sanctions to change the behavior of states who threaten our interests, the environment, trade issues from biotechnology to audio-visuals to name a few.

It helps to take a wider perspective, seeing the problems as small stumbling blocks alongside the large building blocks we are putting in place.

The proof of our ability to find a common path to meet the changing international environment is our remarkable effort to adapt our security relationship to the 21st century. The bedrock of this security is NATO. Just as the alliance served a pivotal role in the Cold War, so it now underpins Europe’s best hopes for a continent that is democratic, undivided and at peace. Together we are successfully navigating NATO’s enlargement, strengthening our partnerships with Russia and Ukraine, and intensifying our cooperation with all states of Europe through the Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Council. This will lay the basis for a generation of peace to come.
True, a perception that U.S. leadership is heavy-handed rankles some. But it is easy to forget the cries of alarm at the thought that with the end of the Cold War the U.S. might abandon our leadership and retreat into isolation. The fact is, our leadership is essential in support of the larger cause of an integrated Europe. In the coming weeks, the President will ask the Senate to ratify treaty changes that will make Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic NATO members. And the Partnership for Peace continues to bring together countries as far apart as Canada and Uzbekistan to plan for our common security with new tasks of peacekeeping, emergency evacuation and humanitarian relief.

Elsewhere in Europe, American leadership and engagement is helping to make a difference. The President has named superbly qualified Americans to work with our European partners to address some of Europe’s oldest problems. Dick Holbrooke is working with the EU to find a solution to the still-unresolved Cyprus problem. In Northern Ireland, George Mitchell is chairing the all-party talks that give us the best chance for lasting peace since the start of The Troubles. And the United States, Europe, Russia and others are hard at work on the ground in Bosnia, where the road to a lasting peace is long, but clearly demarcated. There is no clearer example of America’s commitment to Europe’s stability than our continued engagement in Bosnia. Our common determination offers the best—perhaps the only—prospect to bring peace in these areas of conflict. These are all real accomplishments.

We may not always get the balance exactly right, but President Clinton welcomes enhancing the European role from civilian implementation and indigenous police support in Bosnia, to co-
leadership in Trans-Caucasus diplomatic efforts like the Minsk group, to reducing Aegean tensions, name just a few.

We recognize that leadership has its responsibilities, and for all our efforts, we do not always live up to them. Nowhere is that more true than the refusal of Congress to pay our arrears. We recognize this a serious situation undermining confidence in American leadership, and we are working hard to repair the problem. The administration is committed to a strong UN, as are the American people. But we also need your help to ensure that Secretary-General Annan continues to make necessary reforms, and that UN budget is shared fairly and responsibly.

Alongside the security community linking the United States to Europe, there is an obvious economic community, which is the engine of the world. You know the numbers as well as I do, but they’re so big they’re worth repeating. Over 300 billion dollars of good and services flow back and forth with few barriers. There’s another $650 billion in combined investment. This results in at least fourteen million jobs on both sides of the Atlantic. And our economic policies have forcefully converged. We have a deep stake in each other’s prosperity.

But we cannot afford to rest with the status quo, and there is a growing recognition on both sides of the Atlantic that opportunities exist for moving forward even more boldly. The administration has taken one step after another to promote these opportunities, from the Uruguay Round in 1993 to the New Transatlantic Agenda in December 1995, to the Information Technology Agreement and the recent Financial Services Agreement. These initiatives are yielding concrete results. To cite just the NTA, the Mutual Recognition Agreements concluded under the aegis of the NTA
last year eliminated redundant standards on almost $50 billion of two-way trade—saving 100 million dollars for manufacturers of everything from computers to jet-skis. We have a brisk and promising Trans-Atlantic Business Dialogue involving industry leaders. And we have mechanisms to solve emerging trade disputes before they become serious.

Our economic partnership also has ramifications that go beyond the Euro-American community. Cooperation between the G-7 countries is helping to mitigate the effects of the recent Asian financial crisis. As major creditors to the IMF and the World Bank, we have a strong interest in working closely to ensure that new micro- and macro-economic policies are effective in Asia and that our institutions are up to the task of sustaining global prosperity in an era where billions of dollars of capital can move at the stroke of a computer key.

The U.S. welcomes the European Union's initiatives to stabilize its economic future as well as its political cooperation through deeper integration. When Europe prospers, so does the United States. It will strongly serve the entire Euro-Atlantic Community to make sure a single currency starts off right.

A strong and growing European Union, working in tandem with an adapting NATO alliance, can be a powerful vehicle for bringing Europe's new democracies into a stable family of nations. No one can force seamless integration by edict. But time and time again, we have watched nations bring about necessary, often painful reforms because of the incentive of participating in our economic and security systems. This is the best way to secure progress. We welcome the EU's efforts to move this process forward.
True, there are areas where we have questions about the EU's economic and trade policies. One important area is agriculture. The CAP continues to consume a huge amount of EU resources, close to 60 per cent of the budget. This strikes us as a costly relic of the long-past era in European integration. The advent of new members in the EU provides a powerful incentive and opportunity for reform. We share Europe's commitment to food safety, but have trouble understanding objections to biotechnology innovations in the absence of any evidence of a public health threat. These same innovations promise more environmentally sound agriculture and greater output to feed the world.

Outside the traditional framework of our security and economic relationships, there are a host of emerging transnational threats posed by global warming, terrorism, cyber-crime, drug trafficking and states that thumb their nose at international norms. Through the NTA and our law enforcement cooperation, we are starting to find a common approach, but these are daunting problems that will demand intensified efforts in the future.

While treating these new problems, we have often differed on tactics, dangerously muddying the waters. Let me begin with the environment. Some seem to believe the United States is moving too slowly, but I think you will agree the President has made climate change a very high priority, and acted on that conviction. Our proposal to cut our own emissions by more than 30% led to a historic accord in Kyoto. Now the common challenge before Europe and the United States is to elaborate the rules for market-based mechanisms that allow us to continue our growth in the most cost-effective way, and secure meaningful commitments from developing nations to do
their part to achieve Kyoto’s goals. Climate change is a global problem that requires a global response.

We also need to find better ways to harness our efforts to counter the new kinds of crimes looming ahead in the next century. We have made progress through the summit of the eight… taking new steps to increase airline security… to protect our infrastructures… to fight cyber-crime… and most important, to promote nuclear safety. We are encouraged that Prime Minister Blair has identified cooperative law enforcement as a major topic for the Birmingham summit. We have been disappointed that Europe has not strengthened its cooperation with us on the vital third pillar, and the limited European support for the U.S.-sponsored International Law Academy (ILEA) in Budapest. Full integration in the Euro-Atlantic community means that all of our police forces must have the confidence to work together against the transnational threats. It is vital that the emerging democracies enjoy the rule of law during their transitional period. And we will all pay the price if the U.S. and E.U. are not able to work together to address the problem of encryption in a way that allows our cutting edge industries to thrive, and citizens to have security in their communications while protecting our common public security interests.

But the gravest and most immediate challenge before us is to find more common ground between U.S. and Europe dealing with states that threaten our common interest. We have started to fall into a troubling pattern of “good cop, bad cop.” This pattern, whereby Europe provides the carrot and the U.S. is left holding the stick, is unhealthy for both sides, and only benefits our common adversaries. While we all believe that dialogue and engagement are the preferred course, dialogue cannot be an excuse for inaction when countries like Iraq fail to live up to
Security Council resolutions, and other nations import weapons of mass destruction and export terror. This divergence compromises the effectiveness of our efforts. Secretary Albright put it well recently when she observed that Europeans are irritated by our willingness to reach for the trigger, while we are irritated by their willingness to reach for the contracts.

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We recognize the limits of unilateral policy, but Europe has to see the risks attached to the failure to be firm in facing these threats. I don’t need to restate our concern about investment in Iran, which directly finances activities that promote instability in a volatile region. In geographic terms, this poses a more direct threat to Europe than it does to the United States, though ultimately it threatens all of us. Khatami’s speech offers promise, but we are well advised to calibrate changes in our own policies based on Iran’s actions rather than its words. We welcome the decision of EU senior officials to engage in a collective dialogue with the U.S. on the risks and opportunities presented by Iran, and hope that this can lead to a more coordinated response in the future.
At the same time we oppose terrorism, we need to encourage and respond to moderation where we see it. The expansion of the EU is an internal European concern, but we hope the EU will provide Turkey with a workable pre-accession strategy. We agree this will require Ankara to improve its human rights record, but that goal is compatible with ensuring that Turkey remains anchored to Europe. An integrated Turkey is a step toward stability in a dangerous neighborhood.

The coming year offers an opportunity to bridge gulfs between the EU and the United States. The UK has a double responsibility and opportunity this year, presiding over both the EU-15 and the Birmingham Summit, and we look forward to a productive six months ahead. We could not agree more with the sentiment expressed by Prime Minister Blair: "strong in Europe, strong with the U.S. There is no choice between the two. Stronger with one means stronger with the other." When he visits here in two weeks, we look forward to exploring specific steps that will reinforce US-EU relations.

There will always be new challenges before the Euro-Atlantic Community, and nerves will fray now and again. But our mutual respect and mutual interests will ensure that we weather the inevitable storms. The partnership we built fifty years ago is durable and offers enormous promise in addressing the global issues we face as we enter the 21st century.

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